PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAEL HARBOE ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27 and 49
(79th Congress)
CONCURRENT RESOLUTIONS AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THEr.ETO
PART 5
DECEMBER 31, 1&45, AND JANUARY 2, 8, 4, AND 5, 194Q
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
«^c...joiOT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HAKBOE ATTACK
CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSIONS
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27 and 49
(79th Congress)
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 5
DECEMBER 31, 1945, AND JANUARY 2, 3, 4, AND 5, 1946
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79710 WASHINGTON : 1946
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Miclii- tive from California
gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin
North Carolina
COUNSEL
(Through January 14, 1946)
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel
Jule M. HAnnaford, Assistant Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
(After January 14, 1946)
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel
Samuel H. Kaufman. Associate General Counsel
John E. Mastkn, Assistant Counsel
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel
Logan J. Lane, Assistant Counsel
HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
Pages
Transcript
Hearings
No.
pages
1
1- 399
1- 1058
Nov.
. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2
401- 982
1059- 2586
Nov,
. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3
983-1583
2587- 4194
Dec.
5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4
1585-2063
4195- 5460
Dec.
14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5
2065-2492
5461- 6646
Dec.
31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6
2493-2920
6647- 7888
Jan.
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7
2921-3378
7889- 9107
Jan.
22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946.,
8
3379-3927
9108-10517
Jan.
30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9
3929-4599
10518-12277
Feb.
7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10
4601-5151
12278-13708
Feb.
15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11
5153-5560
13709-14765
Apr.
9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.
EXHIBITS OP JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
No. Exhibits Nos.
12 1 through 6.
13 7 and 8.
14 9 through 43.
15 44 through 87.
16 88 through 110.
17 111 through 128.
18 129 through 156.
19 157 through 172.
20 173 through 179.
21 ISO through 183, and Exhibits-IUustrations.
22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26 Hart Inquirj' Proceedings.
27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings,
34 Clarlie Investigation Proceedings.
35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.
in
IV
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VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
I I Im 1 I 1 I 1 I I ! ! ! I I I N-"o"'^''[n \ I§00*CO'(N
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Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
428-432
414-417
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
212-213
166-161
182
"'166-161"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
;2 1 1 1 1 j 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 j j 1 1 1 i i i !
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
;Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
1070-1076
461-469
""763-772"
816-851
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
lO— ii'^iiOC-lilii'-J^t^iii lOOil
lOlt^ It^ 1 1 ■>*"* 1 1 1 Ir-Hi-I III lt^ 1 1
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iiroio iCA 1 i(Nco 1 1 1 10^ III ii> 1 1
lOOi iia5illi(N<35ill 1 II
KNtOi iilNiiiKN-Hiii 1 II
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
417-436
Joint
Committee
E.'chibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941.
to Jan. 23, 1942)
Pages
1571-1574"
1664-1676
"'469-473'
Hamilton, Maxwell M., State Dept
Hannum, Warren T., Brig. Gen
Harrington, Cyril J
Hart, Thomas Charles, Senator
Rayes, Philip, Maj. Gen
Heard, William A., Capt., USN
Henderson, H. H., Lt., USA
Herron, Charles D., Maj. Gen
HiU, William H., Senator
Holmes, J. Wilfred., Capt., USN
Holtwick, J. S., Jr., Comdr
Hoppough, Clay, Lt. Col
Hornbeck, Stanley K
Home, Walter Wilton
Howard, Jack W., Col
Hubbell, Monroe H., Lt. Comdr
Huckins, Thomas A., Capt., USN
Hull, Cordell
Humphrey, Richard W. RM 3/c
Hunt, John A., Col
IngersoU, Royal E., Adm
Ingiis, R. B., Rear Adm
INDEX OF WITNESSES
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X
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
OI1II110500 IIIII ^-rO 1 1
CO 1 1 1 1 1 lOcO till iS^O 1 1
ici C2C0II i2;sc^ii
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ftiio 00 1 1 1 1 1 1 oS^ ' '
lO -* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i^^"^ ' '
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(He-vvitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
541-553
182-292
"'140^142"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
103
107-112
186
219-222
102
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
1 1— 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II
^ Mill 1 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
lllllloOiiiiiCOiiiloliO II
iliiiii— iiiiiiTt<iiiiTttiOO II
gilliiiiCJiiliiCOiiiit^iOO II
§• 1 1 I 1 1 1 14 ! 1 1 1 lob 1 ! I I4i !c<i ! !
ft,lllllliOiilii(Niilif0i>0 11
lllllliOl COiiiit^iOO 11
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
2665-2695"
3028-3067
1161-1185'
2787-2802"
1014-1034
1678-1694
3226-3250
2362-2374"
2-54"
T. S. 2-52,
192-226
3126-3152
1816-1913
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 to it» 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II
1 1 1 1 1 1 |(N ICO 1 1 1 1 1 1 II
«iliilii(NiCO 1 II
& : ! ! ; 1 1 14 Ic^ ! ! 1 ! 1 1 ! 1 ! ! : ! I
A 1 T-i ICO 1 1 1 1 11
1 1 1 1 1 1 i(N iCO 1 1 1 1 1 II
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
toJan. 23, 1942)
iicOi^KNiOiiiOiiii^iiiiO iC^-jOl
1 1 lo 1 1>- 1 CO as 1 1 100 1 1 1 lO 1 1 lO 1 10 00 lO
•jii^i^HilOiiifNiiiiiCiiiOO iCOTfCO
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iii-ii^i OiiilMiiii iiit^ 1
3
Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN
Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen
Landreth, J. L., Ens
Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/0
Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col
Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC
Lawton, William S., Col
Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN
Leahy, William D., Adm
Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm
Lewis, Fulton, Jr
Litell, S. H
Locey, Frank H
Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA
Lorencc, Walter E., Col
Lumsden, George, Mai
Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN
Lynch, Paul J
Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr
MacArthur, Douglas, Gen
Marshall, George C, Gen
Marston, Morrill W., Col
Martin, F, L., Maj. Gen
INDEX OF WITNESSES
XI
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XII
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
Pages
5210
4933-5009
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
"387-388"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
14S
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
45-46
"179-181"
232
76^77"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Invcstisation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
i \\\ ill ill ; ; i i i i i i
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
1 iiO III III -„-^cfrC(N 1 iCD 1 1 00 00
1 i05 III III Z^ ?J j2 00 CO lO 1 i'!}< 1 lOO
E 1 IT III III Tc^^S::^ 1 IT 1 1? ^
1 i if: i i i i i i "i=!iicia. i ii i Hj.
11^ III III C^iO§2l2ll'** II^^O
*ll III III I— (i-HrHII llrH
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
1107-1160,"
1240-1252
3636^3640
2375-2398,
3990-3996
3153-3165
2923-2933
3885-3915
1968^1988"
1035-1070
778-789
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
147-169
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Comjnission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
II II 1 1 1 1 ^ 1 1 1 1
1 1 ^~t^ rt< 1 1 CD 1 ,^,_-00 1 1 1 CO rt< 1 1 1 1
1 iJ^OOOl 1 1 lO 1^12'^ ' ' '0000 1 1 1 1
1 1 l^7i2 1 1 2 177^ ! I 1^°? 1 1 1 1
(^ 1 \ii^ 1 ! ci Ig^ 1 I Icili 1 1 1 1
i
Pettigrew, Moses W., Col
Phelan, John, Ens
Phillips, Walter C, Col
Pickett, Harry K., Col
Pierson, Millard, Col
Pine, Willard B
Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov
Powell, Boiling R., Jr., Maj
PoweU, C. A., Col .
Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr
Prather, Louise _
Pratt, John S., Col
Pye, WUliam S., Vice Adm
Rafter, Case B
Raley, Edward W., Col
Ram.sey, Logan C, Capt., USN
Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm
INDEX OF WITNESSES
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XrV CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
IS Illl IgS 1 IS 1 :s!;SSS? 1 lo» 1 1 :
, iS i i i i iSS I lg 1 ip^Sg ; ;j| ; ; ;
? i§ i i i i igs i ii i iiiSP i iii i i i
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Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11. 1945)
II iio>ii»o IIIIII III leoi
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Joint
Committee
Exhibit No..
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
---
195-197
203-204
185'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarko
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
II 1 1 i(N 1 1 1 1 iM 1 1 III III
t\\ \ \ \ 11 ill 1 J 1 1 1 III
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
lo 1IIII<N ^III l_J-_J-0 III III
it^ illlil>OOiiii^^^ III III
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S, \i I 1 1 ! 1?5 ri I 1 ! 1^^^ III III
\'^ I 1 1 I 1"= ^ 1 1 1 1 w"^ 111 111
1 lllll ,— 1 1 1 1 1 III III
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
3644-3650
276-541,
4411-4445
3265-3286'
1539^1575'
4037-4094
C
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
32-65'
323-334
Joint"
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
lOJt^iC IM 1 lOOO III III
iCO-^iClilil i-^iiClO III III
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fti 1 CO t^ 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 00 1 1 CD lO 111 III
Ir-HTfllllll ICOIIOOO III III
ICD lllll ll>llrH0O
1
Short, Arthur T
Short, Walter C, Maj. Gen
Shortt, Creed, Pvt
Sisson, George A
Smedberg, William R., II, Capt. USN.-
Smith, Ralph C, Maj. Gen
Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen
Smith, William W., Rear Adm
Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN
Smoot, Perry M., Col
Sonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr
Spalding, Isnac, Brig. Gen
Staff, W. F, CH/CM
Stark, Harold R., Adm
Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR
Stilphen, Benjamin L
Stimson, Henry L
Stone, John F
Street, George
Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen
INDEX OF WITNESSES
XV
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XVI CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HAR-BOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945.
to May 31,
1946
1 : ! 1 1 ;:: 1 : ; i : ; : 1 ! : i :g:s i
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Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
iiiiiioliiiiiCDCOiMiOiii 1
1,1111^1, ,,,,00iOOiiOiii 1
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i^iiiiiiooi i>-<j<a)i'iiii 1
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Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
1 1 1 1 1 1 la> i 1 1 1 Ico 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 lOO 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 i i i i i i i^ i i i ^ ijb i I i i i i i
tti 00 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1,1,1 1
Joint
Committeo
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
~ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 j ; I 1 ;
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
! 1 ! ! 1 ! 1 1 1 1 !o 1 i 1 1 ! 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l05
« 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1-H 1 1 1 1 1 , , 1 1
^ : : ; : icJb ; i :
1,1 00 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 lO II 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
2722-2744
3120-3124
1989^2007"
2456-2478
1345^1381'
910-931
3663-3665
3677-3683'
3750-3773
3357-3586"
2580a-2596
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15. 1944)
Pages
""279-288"
37^382
Joint
Committee
E.\hibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
toJan.23, 1942)
Pages
1311-1329
496-499
1830-1842
1334^1340'
""247-259"
152.5^1.5.38"
1683-1705
1
1
Wells, B. II., Maj. Gen
West, Melbourne H., Lt. Col
Whaling, William J., Lt. Col
White, William R., Brig. Gen
Wichiser, Rea B
WDke, We-slie T
Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm
Wllloughby, C. A., Maj. Gen
Wilson, Durward S., Maj. Gen
Wilson, Erie M., Col
Wimer, Benjamin R., Col
Withers, Thomas, Rear Adm
Wong, Ahoon H
Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR
Woodward, Farnsley C, Lt. (jg), USN.
Woollev, Ralph E
Wright, Wesley A., Comdr
Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col
York, Yee Kam
Zacharias, Ellis M., Capt., USN
Zucca, Emil Lawrence
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2065
[5my PEAKL H4EB0R ATTACK
MONDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1945
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington^ D. C.
The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m.,
in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, and Ferguson and
Kepresentatives Cooper (vice chairman), Murphy, and Gearhart.
Also present: William D, Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A.
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the
joint committee.
[S46£] ' The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Counsel informed the Chair that they first wish to put in some
documents as part of the record before going ahead with the testimony.
Mr. Gesell. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
We have laid some of the documents before the members of the
committee this morning. Some of the others we will refer to can be
spread upon the transcript or made exhibits.
I would like to call attention to the very large bulky volume which
is at the bottom of the pile of material before the members of the
committee. That contains the testimony of General Short given in
prior proceedings. We thought we would make that available in that
form to each member of the commitete for study and we are pre-
paring a similar volume containing all the prior testimony of Admiral
Kimmel which will be distributed as soon as it is received from the
Navy.
The Chairman. What number will that be ?
Mr. Gesell. That is not going to be given a number, I simply wanted
to call attention to it. It occurred to us that each member of the
committee would be particularly anxious to read that testimony before
General Short appears as a witness.
At page 4477 of the transcript, when we were last presenting mate-
rial covering responses to various committee member requests, I made
reference to a draft of November 16 [5463] of the August 17
statement which the United States Government delivered to the Jap-
anese. We have now obtained a photostat copy of that and I would
like to offer it to be included with the other material as Exhibit 22-A.2
The Chairman. 22-A ?
Mr. Gesell. 22-A.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 22-A.")
Senator Ferguson. Have you marked these in any way?
^ Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of
testimony.
=* See Hearings, Part 4, p. 1694.
79716 — 46— pt. 5 2
2066 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gesell. No, they are not marked and that is not among the
material before you. It is just another draft of that message, Sen-
ator, which we have presented several drafts on.
At page 1824 of the transcript there was a request by Senator
Ferguson for the number of messages sent by Ambassador Grew to
the State Department between November 26 and December 7, 1941.
The State Department advises us that there were 58 telegrams, num-
bers 1853 to 1910, inclusive, and 15 dispatches, numbers 5993 to 6006,
inclusive, and 6008, sent during that period. We have examined this
material and it appears to be, for the most part, administrative docu-
mentation, the dispatches and telegrams, and if the actual documents
are desired by Senator Ferguson we can arrange to have them photo-
stated by the Department of State. Some of them, of course, are
already in the record.
\_6Jf6Jf\ At page 1728 there was a request by Senator Ferguson
for any information received by Ambassador Grew from the State
Department as to the probability of the United States coming into
armed conflict with the Japanese Government if Japan was at war
with the British in the Pacific. The State Department informs us
that they cannot find any record of any such information being
sent by the Department of State to Ambassador Grew.
At page 1831 to 1835 of the transcript there was a request by
Senator Ferguson for any instructions sent by the Department of
State to Ambassador Grew concerning the destruction of codes. The
State Department has informed us that on December 7 there were
in existence standing instructions to all American diplomatic and
consular offices authorizing the destruction of codes and confidential
files in case of necessity.
On December 5, 1941, the State Department sent Ambassador Grew
the telegram, which includes instructions concerning burning of codes,
which appears in the transcript at page 1967. It will be recalled that
Mr. Grew stated in the transcript, at page 1966, that he did not think
he had ever received that telegraph.
On December 18, 1941, after the Swiss Government had undertaken
to represent the United States interests in Japan, the State Depart-
ment sent a telegram to the American Legation \6Jt65'\ at
Bern, Switzerland, to be transmitted to the American diplomatic
and consular offices in Japan and the Far East.
Paragraph 7 of this message refers specifically to the question of
the destruction of records, and reads as follows :
OflScers shall destroy* all seals, codes, ciphers, true readings, protectograph
(lies, confidential files, et cetera. Fee stamps should be destroyed by burning
in the presence of at least two competent witnesses, who shall prepare affidavits
concerning the destruction.
I will ask to have the entire dispatch, which constitutes an addi-
tional dispatch on this matter of code burning, designated as the next
exhibit, Exhibit 90.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 90.")
Mr, Gesell. At page 1853 of the transcript there is a request by
Senator Ferguson for any records of conversations between Secretary
Hull and Ambassador Grew while the latter was in this country. The
State Department informs us that they cannot locate in their files
any record of any such conversations.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2067
At page 1951 of the transcript, there is a request by Congressman
Keefe for memoranda dated December 1, 1941, prepared by Stanley
K. Hornbeck. These have been obtained from the War Department
files and delivered to Mr. Keefe.
[5466] At page 1996 of. the transcript there is a request by
Senator Ferguson for the time when Ambassador Grew destroyed his
codes. In that connection we have several exhibits which we will
ask to have all marked under the next exhibit number, number 91.
First there are two dispatches dated December 15, 1941 from
Ambassador Grew to the Department of State concerning the burn-
ing and destruction of codes, ciphers, and cipher devices. I will
simply state that we have not photostated the entire dispatches
since they contain considerable reference to code designations. We
simply left that part of the dispatch blank.
Senator Lucas. What was the date of that ?
Mr. Gesell. That is a dispatch of. December 15, 1941.
Another dispatch dated February 16, 1942, regarding destruction
of confidential material in the reporting section of the Embassy
iri Tokyo. Another dispatch dated March 25, 1942 regarding de-
struction of confidential material in Embassy files. These dispatches
show no destruction of confidential codes prior to December 8 Japa-
nese time or December 7 our time.
Those simply will be offered as an exhibit.
The Chairman. All in one ?
Mr. Gesell. I should think so, yes.
The Chairman. They will be so marked. They are all attached?
[S4j67] Mr. Gesell. Yes.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 91.")
Mr. Gesell. At transcript page 2002 Senator Ferguson asked
whether Ambassador Grew had any knowledge of the withdrawal
of United States shipping from Japanese areas. No record can be
found in the Department of State files of the sending of any infor-
mation regarding the re-routing of the shipping to Ambassador
Grew.
At transcript page 2014 a request by Congressman Keefe for af-
fidavits in connection with the burning of codes in the Embassy at
Tokyo. In this connection we would like to point out that the
material already previously introduced in Exhibit 90 shows that an
affidavit was required only in connection with the burning of fee
stamps; also as shown by the telegram dated December 5 to Am-
bassador Grew.
The photostats of Ambassador Grew's dispatches concerning code
burning include certificates of the witnesses so that the material I
offered a moment ago answers that request as well.
[6468'] Mr. Gesell. At page 2045 of the transcript a request by
Congressman Gearhart for any instructions sent to American con-
suls in Japan during the last 3d of November and the first 7 days
of December directing the destruction of codes and code machines.
The State Department has found nothing in its files on this other
than the telegram of December 5 and December 15 previously re-
ferred to and, of course, the standing instructions which were in
effect for burning in the event of necessity.
At transcript page 2046 a request by Senator Ferguson for Army
messages to the military attache at Tokyo concerning the burning
2068 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of codes. I simply want to note that that material was placed in
the transcript at page 2223.
At transcript page 1881 a request by Senator Ferguson for Am-
bassador Grew's reports to the State Department on his return to the
United States in 1942. I believe other members of the committee
expressed some interest in those reports as well.
We have examined approximately 30 written dispatches delivered
by Ambassador Grew to the State Department upon his return in
1942 and except for two having to do with the destruction of con-
fidential files and ciphers, which we have just introduced, the reports
do not to us appear to be per- [5469] tinent. They relate al-
most entirely to administrative matters. We can arrange to have
those documents photostated and made available if any of the mem-
bers of the committee wish.
At transcript page 1630 a request by Senator Ferguson for material
relating to the proposal of Prime Minister Hiranuma in the spring of
1939. That is also discussed at pages 1947 and 1948. That, I believe,
is the so-called peace proposal made by Baron Hiranuma prior to
the outbreak of the war in Europe.^
We have obtained from the State Department a series of seventeen
documents relating to that subject, which I will transmit today to
Senator Ferguson's office for his inspection. I won't take the time
of the committee to read the list of the documents. There are some
seventeen in number.
Senator Lucas. Wliat is the date of that ?
Mr. Gesell. Those documents preceded the breaking out of war
in Europe.
Senator Ferguson. In 1939 ?
Mr. Gesell. In 1939, yes. They went up, I think, until August
1939.
In the transcript at page 1288, a request by Senator Lucas for the
official report of Prime Minister Churchill's speech of January 27,
1942, before the House of Commons.
We offer that report, a photostat of that, as the next exhibit, num-
ber 92, furnished by the Library of Congress, [5469-A'\ pho-
tostating pages 591 to 618 of volume 377 of the Official Reports of
the Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons.
'^The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 92.")
[S47O'] Senator Ferguson. What was the date of that speech?
Was that January 27 ?
Mr. Gesell. That is the January 27, 1942, speech.
Senator Ferguson. Thank you.
Mr. Gesell. I believe a text of that speech is already in the tran-
script and this is simply the official record of the speech.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I think the record ought to be
clear on this last statement. I do not think the whole speech was in
before, just certain transcripts out of it at the time.
Mr. Gesell. Perhaps I was mistaken on that.
The Chairman. Well, if that is true probably the whole speech
ought to be made a part of the record and not simply as an exhibit.
Mr. Gesell. Very well, then, we will have that spread upon the
transcript after making a double check. It is a substantial typing
job. I am probably in error.
Senator Ferguson. All right.
* See Exhibit No. 177, subsequently Introduced.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2069
Mr. Gesell. At page 4930 there was read into the record a series
of intercept messages during the period of January 1 to July 1, 1941
indicating varying degrees of knowledge by the Japanese or suspicions
by the Japanese that [S4.71] their codes were being read.
The Army has completed the search and there are four additional
messages which have turned up, which were submitted to us by the
Army under date of December 19 and I will ask to have these mes-
sages spread upon the transcript to complete that part of the inquiry.
The Chairman. That will be done.
Mr. Gesell. I can advise the committee at this time that the Navy
has completed its search, but that its search has not disclosed any
messages which the Army search has not disclosed, so we now believe
we have the complete documentation on that subject.
(The documents referred to follow:)
[5^721 WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C. Room 4D761, The Pentagon, 19 December 1945.
Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell :
Completion of the search of Signal Intelligence Sei-vice flies has disclosed four
additional messages, here inclosed, during the period 1 January-1 July 1941, which
may be pertinent to the question of the extent of Japanese suspicions that their
code messages were being read.
/s/ Haemon Buncombe,
BB
Lt. Col. GSC.
From: Tokyo (Matuoka)
To: Panama (Koshi)
23 January, 1941
(J17-K6)
#004
(Chief of Office Routing)
The statement issued by the president of the Japanese Association and others
during (April ?) of last year, regarding the manipulation of the books in your
office, was apparently based on communications between your office and mine.
This raises a very serious question of security. How did [5^73] the con-
tents of these official communications leak out to the above persons? Please in-
vestigate this matter immediately and submit a report.
We questioned Matumoto concerning this matter recently, and he explained
that it was of your doing. Please explain.
JD-1: 568 14073 23 January, 1941 Navy trans. 1-29-41 (S)
From: Tokyo (Matuoka).
To: Chicago (Rioyoji).
7 February, 1941.
(J17K6).
#002.
(Secret)
If it is Impossible to remove the code safe and transfer the telegraphic duties
to the official residence, there is no way out (in view of the fact that certain
circumstances require giving the codes added protection) except for your office
to discontinue secret communication. You will have to rely on the nearest office
to handle your secret communications.
For this reason, will you transfer the following codes to the Embassy in Wash-
ington for safekeeping, at the earliest opportunity :
"G"
"i" (H-D*
"ho" (KO)
"hen"
"oite" (PA-K2)*
2070 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[5^7^] "Tu" (J 17)*
"So" (New Orleans Only) P-1)*
Please have the Embassy send us a receipt.
Relay copies of this message, as a "Minister's Instruction" to Los Angeles and
Portland ; also to Washington for information.
•Insert by translator.
jD-1: 956 14610 7 February, 1941 Navy Trans. 2-14-41 (S).
From : Berlin.
To: Tokyo.
April 14, 1941.
Purple.
#407.
Intelligence wires emanating from our offices in the Near East and Egypt to
our offices in Germany and Italy should be appropriately paraphrased before
transmitting their contents to the German and Italian authorities. This pro-
cedure is advisable in order that there be no danger of giving the German and
Italian authorities clues in decoding our codes. Therefore, in intelligences of
this type emanating from the area, the "I" * code and the "SO" '' code should be
discontinued, using only the more efficient "O" "^ code. In communicating other
secret matters I would like to have you use the "TSU" ** code and other appro-
priate codes. Please follow this procedure.
[5^75] Relayed to Italy and Turkey.
» An auxiliary code.
"P-l.
«PA (K-2).
<> J series codes.
(J-18 (K7) now under study.)
Army 16312 Trans. 4-16-41 (W)
From: San Francisco (Muto).
To: Tokyo.
May 28, 1941.
J-18.
#86. (Part 1 of 2)
(Strictly Secret)
While the Nichi Shin Maru, of the Pacific Whaling Steamship Company, was
coming into Port Costa (approximately 20 miles from San Francisco) in order
to take on petroleum, under suspicion of carrying contraband drugs the interior
of the ship was searched by customs officials about noon on the ''. In order
to burn them, should the need arise. Naval "SA" code," secret Naval documents
in the custody of the captain, secret wireless telegraphy documents in the cus-
tody of the Chief Radio Operator, meteorological codes belonging to the Central
Meteorological Bureau, planning board codes, and other secret document,
[5476] under pretext of passing inspection were taken away. As soon as
I had been informed of this by telephone, I immediately filed a protest with
the local customs officials and demanded the return of these documents. They
replied that they had decided to return these documents at a later date to the
fishing vessel after an investigation had been made into the facts of the case.
» -y^iafele tie identify this code a* pf-eeefttr (NL) fully available. Now cancelled.
''29th.
Army 18037 Trans. 6-11-41 (2)
[6477] Mr. GESEiiL. At pages 4102 and 3 of the transcript Sena-
tor Ferguson asked whether the British notified the United States
prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor that they were fully alerted at
Singapore.
The Army has submitted in response to that request two documents :
First, a copy of a December 1, 1941, UP dispatch from Singapore as
appearing in the New York Times and, second, a photostat of a 2
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2071
December report, received in the War Department, G-2, April 12,
1942, from the United States military observer in Smgapore, concern-
ing the status of the alerts. The net effect of that is that there was
newspaper publicity about Singapore being alerted but that the official
report, while sent on the 2d of December, did not reach here until April
12 1942,
i will ask to have both the official report and the UP dispatch placed
in the transcript.
The Chairman. It is so ordered.
(The documents referred to follow:)
Copy No. 6-1
For Record Section Only
[5^781 Secret
Military Intelligence Division
war department general staff
Military Attache Report : Malaya
(Stamp:) REC'D-G-2 APR 13 1942
Subject : ALERTING OF MALAYAN COMMAND I. G. No. 6900
Source : BRITISH— OFFICIAL
Reliability : EXCELLENT.
Summarization of Report :
1. System of Alerting.
2. Present State of Alert.
1. System of Alerting.
a. States of Alert in the Malayan Command are prescribed as three "degrees of
readiness", each degree being indicated by a code word.
(1) The 3rd, or lowest degree of readiness is designated by the code word
"AWAKE". When this code word is transmitted by Command Headquarters to
the H. Q. Ill Indian Corps, Singapore Fortress; Australian Imperial Forces,
Malaya, and to Sarawak and Borneo it has the following meaning : "The inter-
national situation is getting worse and you should malie certain, as far as possible
without causing public uneasiness, that all your precautionary measures are
ready to be brought into operations at very short notice. Civil authorities have
been informed accordingly."
[5^79] (a) Commanders will take the following action upon receipt of
the code message "AWAKE" : "Ensure that all schemes are in readiness for in-
stant action and will take such precautionary measures as may be possible cov-
ertly or under the guise of an exercise. Officers and other ranks on leave
within Malaya will be recalled, but no movement of units to war stations without
previous reference to Command Headquarters".
(2) The second degree of readiness is indicated by the code word "SEA VIEW".
Upon receipt of this code message the following will ensue :
(a) Beach defenses will be manned on a skeleton basis and a constant night
watcli maintained.
(b) A. A. defenses fully deployed.
(c) Fixed defenses fully deployed.
(d) Commanding General III Indian Corps will secure the northern frontier.
(e) All other regular forces will be at not more than 12 hours notice to take
up initial positions.
(f ) Mobilization of impressed civilian motor transport to be put into effect as
far as required for [5480] mobilization of Volunteers when and if ordered.
(g) Booms across rivers will be put into place.
(h) Off shore and river patrol vessels to be fully manned and on patrol,
(i) Operations room and Headquarters all organizations will be manned
continuously on a skeleton basis.
(3) The first degree of readiness is called for by the code message "RAFFLES".
Upon its receipt, tlie following steps will be taken :
(a) All forces will be deployed and ready for action.
(b) All airdrome defense schemes will be brought into operation.
(c) Operations rooms and Headquarters all units fully manned.
(d) War Code for communications go into effect 12 hours after origin of
message "RAFFLES".
2072 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
&. Other precautionary measures.
(1) Mobilization of Volunteer forces is called for by the code word "OILCAN"
followed by the date of mobilization in words. Upon receipt, Volunteer force
commanders prepare to mobilize on the date indicated. They report comple-
tion of mobilization to Headquarters Malayan Command.
(2) Guarding of vulnerable points. This is [5481] called for by the
code message ARMOUR. Full precautions against sabotage is called for by
this message. All military vulnerable points will be constantly guarded. Troops
will leave barracks only on duty and will be under arms at all times.
(3) The code message "BROWNOUT" calls for the following:
(a) Permanently dismantle all advertisement lighting.
(b) Extinguish street and all other outside lighting.
(c) Shade interior lighting and lights on vehicles.
(d) Institute complete blackout on sounding of air raid signals.
(4) Internment of enemy aliens will probaly take place in 3 stages, i. e. :
(a) First phase, indicated by code message "COLLAR". This calls for arrest
and detention of dangerous Japanese known to police.
(b) Second phase, indicated by code word "TROUSERS". All male Japanese
will be interned.
(c) Third phase, "COLOUR". All Japanese will be interned.
(5) Complete closing of Thailand frontier is [5482] indicated by code
word "BUNKER". Minor degrees of frontier restriction are indicated by other
code words.
2. Present State of Alert in Malaya.
a. Malaya was placed in the second degree of readiness by the code message
"SEAVIEW" on Monday, December 1, 1941.
b. Guarding of vulnerable points, prevention of sabotage, and restriction of
troops to barracks, etc. was called for by the message "ARMOUR" on the pre-
ceding day, November 30, 1941.
/S/ B. A. TORMEY.
Distribution :
6 copies to AC of S, G-2, Major, General Staff. WD.
3 copies to AC of S, G-2, HPD.
1 copy to file.
(Stamp:) 1st Ind(?) U. S. Military Observer, Singapore, 12/4, 1941 (?) To:
AC of S, G-2, WD.,
Approved :
/S/ Francis G. Brink.
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff.
[5483] [Extract from The New York Times, 1 December 1941, page 9,
column 2.]
Singapore Placed Under Emekgency — Volunteers Called Out — New Forces
Landed in BxmMA to Meet Japanese Threat
AUSTRALIANS TO CONFER — ^BRITISH NAVAL AID TO U. 8. IN FAR EAST STRESSED BY
FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY
Singapore. Monday, Dec. 1 (UP). — The Governor today signed a proclamation
declaring that a state of emergency existed in the Straits Settlements, British
Crown Colony. He called out the volunteer army, air and naval forces.
The proclamation was issued by Governor Sir Shenton Thomas after he had
conferred with Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, chief of the
British forces in the Far East.
[S484-] Mr. Gesell. Senator Lucas requested certain informa-
tion concerning the Philippines, to wit, the following :
The total number of airplanes in the Philippines on 7 December
1941, that request being made at pages 3993 and 4404 of the tran-
script ; the number of bombers at Clark Field when the Japanese at-
tacked, that request being made at page 3994 of the transcript, and
any report on the number of bombers lost at Clark Field in that attack,
that request being made at page 4405 of the transcript.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2073
The War Dei^artment has submitted the best information which is
available bearing on these requests at the present time in the War
Department, in the form of a memorandum three pages in length
containing the information in detail and I think the best procedure for
handling it, again, would be to have it spread upon the transcript.
The Chairman. It is so ordered.
(The document referred to follows :)
[5485] 27 Decembeb 1945.
Memorandum for L & L Division
Att : Lt. Col. Duncombe
Subject : Information re Philippine Plane Situation
1. Reference is made to memorandum from Lt. Col. Duncombe to Lt. Col.
Eoot, dated IS December 1945, concerning request of Senator Lucas on pages
3993 and 4404 of the transcript for the number of planes in the Philippines on 7
December 1941, and on pages 8994 and 4404 for the number of bombers on Clark
Field and the number of bombers lost there.
2. Information bearing on the above requests, supplied by the Army Air Forces,
is inclosed herewith. No more definite information is at present available in
the War Department.
3. Inclosure No. 1, a report by the Office of Statistical Control, AAF, regarding
the status of aircraft in the Philippines 1-31 December 1941, indicates that 317
planes were on hand as of 1 December. Inclosure No. 2, an extract from the
"History of the Fifth Air Force and Its Predecessors, December 1941 Installment"
indicates that, of the total of 35 B-17's on hand, 20 to 23 were at Clark Field on
8 December prior to the attack. The 8 December cable from the Philippines on
plane losses, noted in inclosure No. 1, states that 17 heavy bombers remained
after the attack, but does not disclose how many of the bombers lost were lost
at Clark Field.
/S/ E. E. PvOOT,
Lt. Col. G8C
Ctirrent Oroup, OPD
[5486] 2 Incls—
Copy Status of Aircraft in Philippines 1-31 Dec 41.
Copy Table III, pages 8 & 9, "History of Fifth Air Force and Its Prede-
cessors, Part I, December 1941 Installment" (on file at AAF Historical
Offlt^e).
Restricted
Status of aircraft in Philippines, 1-Sl December 1941
Model
On hand
as of 1
Dec 1941
Losses*
during
month
On hand
as of 31
Dec 1941
Model
On hand
as of 1
Dec 1941
Losses*
during
month
On hand
as of 31
Dec 1941
B-17
35
12
18
8
15
51
13
141
1
21
11
16
8
15
51
13
141
1
14
1
2
0-46
7
3
10
1
1
1
7
3
10
1
B-10
0-49
B-18-
0-52
A-27._-
OA-9
P-26
C-39
1
P-35
C-49
1
P 39
Total
P-10
0-19
317
299
18
•Due to the lack of adequate aircraft reporting facilities [5487] during the early part of the war, the
cause of these losses and the dates on which they occurred are both incomplete and inaccurate. However,
after extensive research and based on the few cable reports which were transmitted, the following observa-
tions are made:
1. Cable from Philippines dated 8 December 1941 states: "After attack now have 15 P-35's, 17 heavy
bombers and 50-55 P-40's; no losses other types". This would indicate that 18 B-17's, 36 P-35's, and 86-91
P-40's were lost before or on 8 December 1941.
2. Cable from Philippines dated 12 December 1941 states: "Must conserve to maximum the 27 P-40's for
reconnaissance to make a show of strength." This would further indicate that approximately 23-28 P-^'s
were lost between the 9th and 12th of December 1941.
3. We have no way of determining how or when the balance of the losses were incurred.
Office of Statistical Control
18 December 1945 AFSSC-2B
2074 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[5J/88] A True Copy as found in History of the Fifth Air Force (and its
Predecessors) . Part I, December, 1941, Installment.
(S) Richard L. Watson, Jr.
Maj. A. C.
FEAF Dispositions on Dec. 7, 1941
Table III. — Status and location of aircraft (44)
CO.
Unit
Location
Type
Number
operat.
Major 0. L. Qrover
24 Pur. Qrp
Lt. W. B. Putman
Hq. &Hq. Sq
3rd Pur. Sq
Clark
Lt. H. Q. Thorne
Iba
P-40E
18
1st Lt. Boyd Wagner...
17th Pur
Nichols
P-40E
18
1st Lt. J. H. Moore
20th Pur
Clark
P-40B
P-35
18
18
1st Lt. Sam Marett
21st Pur
Del Carmen.
Nichols
1st Lt. W. E. Dyess
34th Pur
P-40E
18
Total pursuit 1
90
Opt. J. Y. Parker
2nd Obs.--
Clark
0-46, 52, 79
10-12
Lt. Col. Eugene L. Eubank
19th Bomb Q Group..
Captain MacDonald
Hq. & Hq. Sq
Clark
Major C. E. Combs
93rd Sq
Del Monte
Del Monte
Clark
B 17D
} -
} «
12
Major E. 0. O'DonneU
14th Sq
B 17D
Major Wm. Fisher
28th Sq
B-17D
B-17D
Major H. Qibbs.
30th Sq
Clark
Note: Two planes out of com-
mission at Clark, also three
planes of 93rd and 14th Squad-
ron at Clark.
6th Pursuit (Phil. Air Force):
6th Sq
Batangas
P-26
Captain Jesus A. Villamour.
(Clark
[b-is
Miscellaneous
Wichois
10
[Neilson
1
B-10
Cabantuan
Clark.. .
3
A-27
2
Del Monte
B-18
2
ffli'^^L Total first line Operational Aircraft Dec. 7th (19 Bomb. 24th Pursuit 2nd Obsv.) 135 or 137
All other operational tactical planes 29
Grand total operational _ 164 or 166
44. This table has been compiled from the History 24th Pur. Grp. * * ♦ and
Journal 19 Bomb -Gp. * * * Gen. Marshall in his biennial report gives the
number of P^O's as 107. The discrepancy is due to the fact that table III
above, is of planes operational on Dec. 8th, and excludes planes not erected or
out (of commission.
Copy
[64W] Mr. Gesell. At page 3273 of the transcript, Senator
Ferguson requested that the records be checked for any memorandum
by General Marshall concerning our preparedness, similar to the
memoranda for the President of 5 November and 27 November 1941
signed by General Marshall and Admiral Stark. A search of the
War Department files for the year 1941 has disclosed no such mem-
orandum.
At pages 4178-79 of the transcript. Senator Ferguson asked what
codes the so-called ^inds messages had been sent in. Both messages —
SIS Nos. 25432 and 25392— were sent not in the "Purple" code, but in
the code known as "J-19".
At pages 3758 and 3760 of the transcript, Congressman Keefe asked
when the first Army troops were sent to Iceland, and when the Army
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2075
relieved the Marines there. Records of the Adjutant General in con-
nection with the memorandum we have received from the War De-
partment indicate the following : • a j
The first Army unit on Iceland was the 33d Pursuit bquadron,
which arrived 6 August 1941.
The first Army ground troops arrived 16 September 1941.
The Marines in Iceland were not relieved at the time the Army
ground troops arrived; by a Presidential directive of 22 September
1941 they were placed under General Bonesteel, the Army commander.
At page 4235 of the transcript Congressman Murphy asked
[S4S1] for the initials of Colonel Bundy, head of the Plans Section
of the War Plans Division in 1941. The Army Register for 1940
gives Colonel Bundy 's name as Charles W. Bundy.
On December 22, 1945, the War Department advised as follows
with respect to a request appearing at page 4104 of the transcript made
by Senator Ferguson, who asked when the Batavia message from
Thorpe for Miles (CR0222) was received in G-2--that is the so-called
Batavia "winds" message. The Army has submitted to us a photostat
of page 2 of the December 5, 1941, register of incoming cables of the
G-2 record section, indicating that the message in question was re-
ceived in that section at 8 : 16 a. m., 5 December 1941.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 93. )
Mr. Gesell. On December 10, 1945, the War Department made its
reply to a request by Senator Ferguson and Senator Brewster con-
cerning the original Opana plot. These requests were made at pages
372 and 373 of the transcript and at other points.
In response to these requests they have made available to us the
following information which we have available for Senator Brewster's
and Senator Ferguson's inspection : , tt j
Letter dated 24 November 1945 from the Adjutant General, Head-
quarters United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific, inclosing the
original radar plot of the Opana station, and various related original
records
Letter dated 21 November 1945 from the Adjutant General, Head-
quarters United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific, in- [5492]
closing 4 original plots of radar stations in operation on Oahu, 7
December 1941, as plotted at the information center and covering
the period from 10:43 a. m. to 12 p. m., local Hawaiian time, 7
December 1941.
Letter dated 18 November 1945 from Assistant Adjutant General,
Headquarters United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific, with 6
inclosures. . . , ,
At page 4051 of the transcript, Senator Ferguson inquired about
orders relating to the relief of General Short in addition to the cable
of 16 December 1941 read into the record at pages 4050 and 4051 of
the transcript.
Two photostats of two cables on this subject, dated December 17,
1941, and January 6, 1942, have been made available to us by the
Army and I will ask to have them spread upon the transcript.
The Chairman. It wiU be so ordered.
(The documents referred to follow:)
2076 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[5493] [Telegram]
From : War Department
Bureau : Secretary, GS
OCS: WBS
December 17, 1941.
Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short,
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, Hawaii.
For general Short only stop Chief of Staff believes it important that you
remain in Hawaii during the presence there of the President's Commission stop
Orders for you will issue later stop Regards end
Bbyden.
I hereby certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the
public service.
[S] W. B. Smith,
W. B. Smith,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.
[Telegram]
From : War Department
Bureau : A. G. O.
AG 210.31 (1-5-42) OD-F.
JED-hrm-hg-1509-1.
JANUABY 6, 1942.
Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.
[5494] Secretary of War relieves Major Generals Walter C. Short O dash
1621 US Army and Frederick L. Martin O dash 2507 US Army present assign-
ment and duty in Hawaiian dept effective upon departure of Roberts Commis-
sion then assigns them to western defense command presidio of San Francisco,
Calif to proceed that station and report to CG for duty stop travel directed
necessary military service stop FD 1401 P 1 dash 06 comma 15 dash 06 A
0410 dash 2
Adams.
Official :
/S/ J. E. Daly,
Adjutant General.
[54^51 Mr. Gesell. I would like to read at this time a memo-
randum submitted to us by the War Department under date of De-
cember 21, 1945, in response to a request made by counsel's office for
certain information which will be apparent. The memorandum reads
as follows:
In response to your request, the records of the Signal Intelligence Service have
been searched to ascertain if Japanese messages were intercepted which contained
the word "haruna" (specified in the messages at page 215 of Exhibit 1 as the
word to be used to signal compliance with Tokyo's orders for destruction of
codes). The records disclose that messages containing the single word "haruna"
were transmitted from the following places on the dates listed (the date on which
the intercept reached S. I. S. is also given in those instances where it is shown by
the records.
This memorandum, the full text of which will be put into the record,
discloses that the word "haruna", which was the code word, was sent
by Japanese offices on December 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 located at the following
points :
Panama, New York, New Orleans, Havana, Hollywood, Vancouver,
Portland, Menado, Surabaya, Seattle, Ottawa, San Francisco,
Chicago, Washington, Dublin, Songkhla.
I will ask to have the whole memorandum put in. I thought that
that would be of benefit to the committee to show that [54^6]
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2077
that word "haruna" was in fact implemented and followed up and
transmitted from these various points.
The Chairman. Do you want that put in as part of the transcript?
Mr. Gesell. Yes, I think we should put that whole thing in the
record and have the whole memorandum spread of record.
The Chairman. It will be so ordered.
Senator Ltjcas. As a matter of information, Mr. Chairman, may I
ask counsel if that is a record showing that the messages went to
these various places just indicated?
Mr. Gesell. It was the reverse. Senator. The Japanese sent out
a circular message which asked for the destruction of codes and said,
"When you have destroyed the codes, send the word back to show
that you have done it," and on these various dates these various
points reported to Tokyo that they had destroyed their codes.
Senator Lucas. Thank you.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether all of
these had been intercepted and deciphered prior to the time of the
attack ? Is there any showing of that ?
Mr. Gesell. Yes, there is a showing to the extent available, Senator
Ferguson. Apparently the records in not every instance are com-
plete as to whether or not they were intercepted and received, but
there appear to be in that group [54^7] nine which were inter-
cepted and received prior to that time and then a group of five on
December 8, 10, 12, and 17 which were not received until later.
Senator Ferguson. Thank you.
Mr. Gesell. That will all appear in the full body of the memo-
randum in the transcript.
Senator Ferguson. Thank you.
{The document referred to follows :)
Wab Department,
Washington, D. C, Room 4D761, The Pentagon, 21 December 1945.
Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell :
In response to your request, the records of the Signal Intelligence Service
have been searched to ascertain if Japanese messages were intercepted which
contained the word "haruna" (specified in the messages at page 215 of Exhibit
1 as the word to be used to signal compliance with Tokyo's orders for destruc-
tion of codes). The records disclose that messages containing the single word
"haruna" were transmitted from the following places, on the dates listed (the
date on which the intercept reached S. I. S. is also given in those instances
where it is shown by the records) :
[5498]
Message sent by
Japanese ofiEice at—
Date transmitted
by Japanese
Date
Intercept
received
by SIS
Message sent by
Japanese office at—
Date transmitted
by Japanese
Date
intercept
received
by SIS
2Dec
4 Dec.
3 Dec.
3 Dec.
3 Dec.
5 Dec.
5 Dec.
4 Dec.
?.
Surabaya
3Dec
(?).
2 Dec- -.- -
Seattle
4 Dec
5 Dec.
2 Dec
Ottawa
4 Dec
6 Dec.
2 Dec
San Francisco
Chicago--
4Dec
8 Dec.
2 Dec
6Dec.-_ ---
8 Dec.
Vancouver . - . .
2 Dec
Washington
Dublin
6 Dec. 8:21 p. m.--
?
10 Dec.
Portland
3 Dec
12 Dec.
3 Dec
Songkhla
7Dec
17 Dec.
/S/ Harmon Buncombe,
BB
Harmon Duncombe,
Lt. Col, GSC.
2078 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[54^9] Mr. Gesell. Another request made by counsel related to
obtaining the intercept, if any, from Washington to Tokyo transmit-
ting Secretary Hull's message of November 26, 1941. That intercept
has been obtained and we would like to have it marked as Exhibit 94.
The Chairman. It will be so marked.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 94."
Mr. Gesell. I would now like to read into the record a memorandum
from the War Department dated December 31, 1945, reading as
follows :
At page 4114 of the transcript, Senator Ferguson asked for (a) the informa-
tion which G-2 had between 26 November and 12 noon 7 December 1941 indi-
cating that Japanese ships were moving southward, and (b) the War Department
copy of the 6 December 1941 cable from Ambassador Winant to the State De-
partment concerning Japanese ship movements.
All the documents found in the G-2 files relating to the first request are con-
tained in Inclosures No. 1-ld. In addition, MID was on the distribution for
the ONI Intelligence Reports for 26 November (#65), 27 November (#66), 29
November (#68), 29 November (#70), 1 December (#71), and 3 December
1941 (#72-41) — all contained in Exhibit 85. Also, attached as Inclosure
[5500] No. 2, is a 26 November 1941 Memorandum for the President from
the Secretary of W^ar concerning a possible Japanese convoy movement toward
Indo-China.
A thorough search of the War Department files has disclosed no evidence that
a copy of the Winant cable was received in the War Department. However,
Inclosure No. 3 shows that the 6 December despatch from CINCAF to CNO
(Exhibit 66), containing similar information, was received by the Executive
Officer, War Plans Division of the War Department at 1710, 6 December 1941,
and the G-2 comment in item Id. of Inclosure No. 1 shows that the contents of
that despatch were known to G-2.
That is a very comprehensive memorandum covering that request
and I think the best way of handling it would be not to read the
various enclosures but to have them appear in the transcript immedi-
ately following this memorandum.
(The document referred to follows :)
[5501] SECRET
Controlled Information
Re ; Operations of Friendly Powers
PABAPHRASE of a SEXatET CONFIDENTIAL RE^STEICTED MESSAGE RECEIVED AT WAK
Dept., at 11 : 05 a. m. Dex^mbeb 1, 1941
From London : Filed 4 : 22 p. m. December 4, 1941
Received in I. H. 8 : 15 a. m. December 5, 1941 No. 1275
1. Libya: Authentic information here indicates the British have at this
time approximately 180 tanks ready for battle in Libj'la after reinforcements
were rushed to the Desert. British estimates have placed Axis tank strength
at the outbreak of hostilities at 500 light tanks, 400 of which were tanks of nine
tons or over. Estimates on their strength, admitted to be pretty much guesswork,
were at the beginning of the present let-up in fighting around 120 tanks in combat
trim.
2. Far East: Japanese movement for the present appears to be all out-boimd,
supposedly moving southward. The Commander-in-Chief at Hong Kong is the
only late news from the Far East also reports there are no signs evident of
Japanese concentration on Hong Kong.
3. Russia: British Ambassador Sir Stafford Cripps is protesting to the Soviet
Government on the very incomplete information given the British Military
Mission in Russia. The Mission Chief, still in Kuiblshev, is being given nothing
more [5502] than official Red Army communiques.
ROTCE.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2079
Paraphrase of a Sex'Ret Message Received at War Dept. at 8 : 45 a. m.
December 2, 1941
From London : Filed 1 : 40 p. m.
Received in I. B. : 11 : 30 a. m. December 2, 1941 No. 1249
The following is the December 1st estimate by the War OflSce of Japanese
dispositions :
Centrlal China Army 8 Divs.^, 3, 13, 6, 15, 22, 34, 40.
Ind. Brigs.— 11, 12. 13, 14, 17, 18, 20.
South China Army — Canton 3 Divs. — 104, 48, 18.
Swatow 1 Ind. Brig. — 19th.
Formosa Army 3 Div. — 28, 116, one unidentified.
Hainan Army 1 Div. unidentified.
Indo-China Army (north) 1. Div. — Guards.
(south) 3 Divs.— 5, 38, 88 (from Formosa).
Navy —
Hainan 4 large cruisers.
Saigon 1 sm'all submarine.
[5503] The 2nd and 3rd China fleets moving South made up of 4 heavy and
12 light cruisers, 4 aircraft carriers, 52 destroyers, and 18 submarines.
Air Force Distribution:
Formosa 71 pursuit
24 light bombers
42 heavy bombers
9 reconnaissance
10 seaplanes
Total 156
South China and Hainan 103 pursuit
lOO light bombers
129 heavy bombers
14 seaplanes
Total 346
French Indo-China 64 pursuit
58 light bombers
55 heavy bombers
9 reconnaissance
Total 186
[55041 Air Ministry's note as to Indo-China airforce states that 157 of
these planes are in the south and the plane strength may be reinforced in the
near future. The light bombardment planes seem to be equipped with extra gas
tanks for distant reconnaissance.
ROYCE.
Paraphrase of a Secret Message Received at War Dept. at 12 : 53 p. m.
December 2, 1941
From Manila, P. I. Filed 11 : 29 a. m. December 1. 1941
Received in I. B. 4 : 05 p. m. December 2, 1941 No. 1038
A reliable American source reports that since November 10th, 6 Japanese
Divisions (100,000 men) have landed at Haiphong. Also:
150 medium bombers
350 fighters
450 light tanks
50 medium tanks
200 75 mm. guns.
Source states figures taken from ship manifests.
Source states 6 Japanese Divisions on Formosa, and 3 light cruisers and 20
Japanese destroyers at Saigon.
Englehart.
2080 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[5505] G-2 Comment :
Doubtful that Japanese transports have manifests which could be checked as
indicated. The troops reported disembarked at Haiphong (in this 20-day period)
are almost three times the unloading capacity of the port (ONI estimate), al-
though on November 25th the Consul at Hanoi stated that within the last few
days troop landings had mounted to 4,000 a day. On November 29th, however, the
Consul at Hanoi reported "past few days no great increase in number of Japanese
troops." Consular reports from Saigon, on the other hand, since November 21st,
have indicated heavy arrivals to include the end of the month. G-2 accepts this
radiographic report with reserve, and believes that the bulk of this force about
80,000 may have been landed in Southern rather than Northern Indo-China.
(With 25,000 in Northern Indo-China the total is about 105,000.) Estimated also
that not more than 3 divisions are on Taiwan, 3 on Hainan, and 2 «n transports
located December 1, in Camranh Bay (N. E. of Saigon).
[5506] confidential
Wae Department
wae depabtment general staff
Military Intelligence, Division G-2
Washington, Decemher 4, 19/fl.
Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 :
Subject : Japanese Troop Movements.
1. The following information has just been received from the State Depart-
ment:
a. Taingtao, Shantung Province, North Cliina, December 1. In the past ten
days an average of 3 loaded troop transports has left this port daily. The men
are believed to be from the Yangtze Valley, as they wore summer uniforms,
whereas all troops in this area are in winter uniforms. (Note: This is estimated
to imply a movement of 15,000-30,000 men, that is, one or two divisions. It prob-
ably supplements to some extent the previous sea-borne movements reported.)
&. Canton, December 2. Large land troop movements continue through Can-
ton. Estimated 8,500 men passed eastward through the city up to noon today.
It is now believed that these movements are local and indicate oijerations to the
north and east of Canton, rather than preparations for overseas move- [5507]
ment.
2. It is recommended that the foregoing be not brought specifically to the atten-
tion of the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War. They are details of the general
picture that is already known.
In the absence of Colonel Kramer.
(S) TJB
T. J. B.
SECBETT
Paraphrase of a Secret Message REcEi\rED at War Dept. at 4 : 29 P. M.
December 6, 1941
From Singapore: Filed 5: 13 p. m. December 5, 1941
Received in I. B. : 1 : 35 a. m. December 7, 1941 No. 96
Brink advises that at one o'clock in the afternoon, following a course due
west, were seen a battleship, five cruisers, seven destroyers and twenty-five
merchant ships ; these were seen at 106° 8' E., 8° N. ; this was the first report.
The second report was that ten merchant ships, two cruisers and ten destroyers
were seen following the same course at 106° 20' E., 7° 35' N.
Both of the above reports came from patrols of the Royal Air Force.
Bbink
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2081
G-2 Comment: It is G-2's opinion that these are the same convoys reported in
ONI's December 6 from "C in O China" [5508] through "C in CAF."
SECfiET
November 26. 1941.
Memorandum for the President :
Subject : Japanese Convoy Movement towards Indo-China.
About a month and a half ago we learned through Magic that the Japanese
Government informed the Vichy Government that they proposed to move approxi-
mately 50,000 troops into Indo-China in addition to the 40,000 already there by
previous agreement.
Today information has accumulated to the effect that a convoy of from 10
to 30 ships, some of 10,000 tons displacement, has been assembled near the mouth
of the Yangtse River below Shanghai. This could mean a force as great as
50,000, but more probably a smaller number. Included in this ship concentration
was at least one landing-boat carrier. The deck-load of one vessel contained
heavy bridge equipment. Later reports indicate that this movement is already
under way and ships have been seen south of Formosa.
The officers concerned, in the Military Intelligence Division, feel that unless
we receive other information, this is more or less a normal movement, that is,
a logical follow-up of their previous notiiication to the Vichy Government.
[5509] I will keep you informed of any other information in this particular
field.
[s] sgd
OCS/18136-125 10 Secretary of War.
ART 411 (P COMINST, 1939)
Paraphrased versions of translations of secret messages may be prepared on the
authority of the flag or commanding officer in cases where necessary. . . . They
shall have the same classification as the original messages, and shall be safe-
guarded accordinglj'^ as prescribed by navy regulations. Their possession shall
be vouched for by signed receipts retained by the communication officer, to
whom they should be surrendered for destruction when no longer required.
Note: This is the only copy of this secret message being distributed in the Navy
Department. When no longer required, it should be returned to the Navy Depart-
ment Communication Officer, Room 2625, for destruction and return of receipt.
Dec, 6, 1941.
Received from the Navy Department Communication Officer one paraphrased
copy of CINCAF dispatch (secret) with [5510] reference numbers
061255 CR 0151.
/s/ C. R. Gabung,
Maj. GSC.
Orig
Action
Cog Army
Record Copy:
Delivered at 1710, by
/S/ H. S. HALL.
NAVCOM-15
79716 — 46— pt. 5-
2082 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[SSll] Mr. Gesell. Now there is before each member of the
committee a mimeographed statement of four pages in length entitled
"Information from Documentary Evidence on Messages at pages 14:-
29 of Exhibit 2." These are the messages in the so-called set of military
intercepts.
The Vice Chairman. Is that this paper?
Mr. Gesell. Yes ; that is it. Exhibit 2 of the military intercepts at
pages 14-29 are the various intercepts which were translated on the
days of the 5th and 6th of December, and some of them translated
subsequently.
The committee has expressed interest in what documentary infor-
mation there is as to those various messages, as to when they were inter-
cepted, when they were enciphered, when they were decoded, and when
they were translated. The documentary material is summarized in
this memorandum, which I think should also be spread upon the tran-
script at this point.
This is prepared along the lines of the memorandum which has
already been submitted to the committee concerning the 14-part, 1
o'clock messages, and will facilitate subsequent testimony before the
committee concerning these messages.
The Chairman. That will be spread upon the record.
(The document referred to follows:)
15512] INFOEMATION FbOM DOCUMENTABY EVIDENCE ON MESSAGES AT PP. 14-29
OF Exhibit 2
Note. — Information based on documents in Navy files indicated by "(N)";
information based on documents in Army files indicated by "(A)".
SIS 25817, dated 18 November, translated 6 December, sent in code system
J-19 (Exhibit 2, p. 14).
Intercepted at Army Station 2, San Francisco, 18 November (A). Air-
mailed to Army SIS; received by Army SIS on or before 21 November (A),
Enciphered in a key not recovered until about 3 December (A).
Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A).
SIS 25773, dated 18 November, translated 5 December, sent in code system
J-19 (Exhibit 2, p. 15).
Intercepted by Navy Station S, Bainbridge Island, IS November (N & A).
Airmailed to Navy ; received by Navy, 21 November (N) .
Sent by Navy to Army SIS.
Enciphered in a key not recovered until about 3 December (A).
Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A).
SIS 25694, dated 20 November, translated 4 December, sent in code system J-19
(Exhibit 2, p. 15).
Intercepted by Navy Station S, Bainbridge Island, [5513] 20 No-
vember (N).
Airmailed to Navy ; received bv Navy 24 November (N),
Sent by Navy to Army SIS.
Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A).
SIS 25823, dated 29 November, translated 5 December, sent in code system
J-19 (Exhibit 2, p. 15).
Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, 29 November (N).
Airmailed to Army SIS; received by Army SIS, 1 December (A).
Sent by Array SIS to Navy, 1 December (A).
Decoded by Navy, 3 December (N).
Translated by Navy (N).
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2083
SIS 26351 (Part 1) and SIS 26352 (Part 2), dated 24 November, translated
16 December, sent in code system J-19 (Exhibit 2, pp. 16-17).
Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, 25 November (A),
Airmailed to Army SIS ; received by Army SIS, 26 November (A).
Enciphered in a key not recovered until about 16 December (A).
Decoded by Army SIS, 16 December (A).
Translated by Army SIS (A).
SIS 25880, dated 28 November, translated 8 December, sent in code system
J-19 (Exhibit 2, p. 18).
[5514] Intercepted by Navy Station S, Bainbridge Island, 28 Novem-
ber (A).
Airmailed to Navy; received by Navy, 2 December (N).
Sent by Navy to Army SIS.
Enciphered in a key not recovered until about 7 December (A).
Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A).
SIS 25928, dated 28 November, translated 8 December, sent in code system
J-19 (Exhibit 2, p. 19).
Intercepted by Army Station 7, Fort Hunt, Va., 28 November (A).
Received by courier by Army SIS, 29 November (A).
Enciphered in a key not recovered until about 7 December (A).
Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A).
SIS 26053, dated 1 December, translated 10 December, sent in code system
J-19 (Exhibit 2, p. 20).
Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, 2 December (N) .
Airmailed to Army SIS, received by Army SIS, 4 December (A) .
Sent by Army SIS to Navy, 4 December (A).
Enciphered in a key not recovered until about 8 December (N).
Decoded by Navy, 9 December (N).
Translated by Navy (N).
SIS 27065, dated 2 December, translated 30 December, sent in code system J-19
(Exhibit 2, p. 21).
Decoded and translated by Army SIS. The translated [5515] mes-
sage contains the notation : "This message was received here on December 23."
This decode and translation was based on a copy of the Japanese coded
text received by Army SIS on 23 December, by airmail from Station 5,
Hawaii (A) . It had been mailed from Station 5 on or after 11 December (A) .
The files also contain a copy of the coded text, which is marked "dupe"
("duplicate") and therefore appears to have been received by Army SIS
later than the airmailed copy noted above ; the "dupe" copy is on a Mackay
Radio (Honolulu office) form, and appears to have been the basis of the
airmailed version forwarded by Station 5.*
SIS 26065, dated 3 December, translated 10 December, sent in code system
PA-K2 (Exhibit 2, p. 21).
Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, 4 December (N) .
Airmailed to Army SIS (A).
Sent by Army SIS to Navy, 5 December (A).
Decoded by Navy, 8 December (N).
Translated by Navy (N).
[5516] SIS 26145, dated 3 December, translated 11 December, sent in code
system PA-K2 (Exhibit 2, pp. 22-24).
Intercepted by Army Station 7, Fort Hunt, Va., 3 December (N).
Received by Army SIS by courier.
Sent by Army SIS to Navy, 4 December (A).
Decoded and translated by Navy (N).
•A transmission of the message was Intercepted by Navy Station S. Bainbridge Island,
at 1131 GMT on 2 December (N). This version, received by the Navy on 6 December by
airmail, was badly garbled and was not further processed (N).
2084 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
818 26066, dated 3 December translated 10 December, sent in code system PA-K2
(Exhibit 2, p 24).
Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, 4 December (N).
Airmailed to Army SIS.
Sent by Army SIS to Navy, 5 December (A).
Decoded by Navy, 8 December (N),
Translated by Navy (N).
SIS 26161, dated, 4 December, translated 12 December, sent in code system
PA-K2 (Exhibit 2, p. 25).
Intercepted at Army Station 2, San Francisco, 5 December (A) .
Airmailed to Army SIS ; received by Army SIS 8 December (A).
Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A).
SIS 26029, dated 5 December, translated 10 December, sent in code system
PA-K2 (Exhibit 2, p. 26).
Intercepted by Army station 2, San Francisco, 6 December (N).
Airmailed to Army SIS ; received by Army SIS, 8 December (A).
Sent by Army SIS to Navy.
Decoded by Navy, 9 December (N).
Translated by Navy (N).
[5517] SIS 26158, dated 6 December, translated 12 December, sent in code
system PA-K2 (Exhibit 2, p. 26).
Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A).
This decode and translation was on the basis of a Japanese coded text
received by Army SIS by radio from Army Station 5, Hawaii, apparently
on 11 December. The files do not show whether the Japanese text was
obtained by intercepting the transmission or from the commercial cable
company (the date on which it was obtained is now shown).*
SIS 25877, dated 6 December, translated 8 December, sent in code system
PA-K2 (Exhibit 2, pp. 27-28).
Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, at 0022 GMT, 7 December
(7: 22 p. m., Washington time, 6 December) (A).
Sent by teletype to Army SIS (A). Teletype sheet does not show time
sent by teletype. Another copy, sent by courier by Army Station 7, Fort
Hunt, Va., was received by Army SIS not later than 7 December (time now
shown), and is marked "dupe" (A), indicating that the teletype copy had
arrived previously.
Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A).
[5518] SIS 25S7.'i, dated 6 December, translated 8 December, sent in code
system PA-K2 (Exhibit 2, p. 29).
Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, at 0542 GMT, 7 December
(12 : 42 a. m., 7 December, Washington time) (A).
Sent by teletype to Army SIS (A). Teletype sheet does not show time
sent by teletype. Another copy, sent by Station 2 by airmail, was received
by Army SIS at 2 : 33 p. m., 8 December, and is marked "dupe" (A), indi-
cating that the teletype copy had arrived previously.
Mr. Gesell. 'Now I come to the somewhat confused question of Dr.
Stanley K. Hornbeck. We have had a number of requests concern-
ing his memoranda, and I will try, if I can, to make clear to the
committee the present situation as to those memoranda.
There was first a request by Congressman Keefe, to which I have
already referred, asking for memoranda dated December 1. Those
were made available to him, and I believe were read into the record
by him at that time.
Mr. Murphy. Just one. The other one was not.
Mr. Gesell. I believe there Mas one that was read, you are right,
Congressman Murphy, and the other was not.
♦The Army files also contain a copy intercepted by Navy Station S, Bainbridge Island,
which was received by the Navy by airmail on 8 December (N), and sent by the Navy to
Army SIS.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2085
There was a request by Senator Ferguson for Dr. Hornbeck's memo-
randum read at the Joint Board meeting of November 3, which
should be included among the documents relating to the [S519]
November 5 joint memorandum, and we have obtained Dr. Horn-
beck's memorandum of October 31, 1941, which I would like to intro-
duce at this time and have spread upon the transcript in response to
that request.
The Chairman. So ordered.
Senator Ferguson. That is the one dated October 31 ?
Mr. Gesell. October 31, 1941. That is before the members of the
committee.
The Vice Chairman. Is that the one I hold here, Mr. Gesell ?
Mr. Gesell. I think so, Congressman.
The Vice Chairman. Dated October 31, 1941?
Mr. Gesell. That is the one.
The Vice Chairman. Which is headed "Memorandum by Doctor
Hornbeck"?
Mr. Gesell. That is right.
The Vice Chairman. And it does not show to whom it was dis-
tributed?
Mr. Gesell. No. It was read at the Joint Board meeting.
The Vice Chairman. I see.
Mr. Gesell. The people attending that meeting appear in the other
documentation. I think it is tied in. I think it was not addressed
because he simply had it before him to read, apparently.
(The document referred to follows:)
[5520] Memorandum by Doctor Hornbeck Octobee 31, 1941
I believe that there is warrant for an opinion that for several days the Japa-
nese have been see-sawing in an effort to come to a decision. While watching
the situation in Europe and on the Atlantic, they have been putting addi-
tional troops at the rate of about "1,000 per day" and some equipment into
Indo-China and have been carefully watching to see whether we say or do
anything indicative of any determined objection on our part. They have
been given no indication of any intention on our part to place any effective
obstacle in the way of their continued penetration of Indo-China. It is
my feeling that, in the absence of such indication, they have about made up
their minds to go ahead more strongly. It is my further feeling that if such
an indication were given by us now, the interjection of that indication might
substantially influence the situation and cause the Japanese further to post-
pone coming to a decision.
Another line of action, not exclusive of the line above suggested, open to
us is to rush aid, especially planes and pilots, with or without parallel action
by the British, to the Chinese. This would, of course, involve a difficult
decision and it is perhaps politically impracticable, but it is not physically
impossible.
Another course open to us is — to do nothing.
I am convinced that it would be highly inadvisable politically to make to
Chiang Kai-Shek any evasive, noncommittal [5521] or merely hortatory
reply.
If we are not prepared and willing to follow one or the other or both of
the first two courses outlined above, it would, in my opinion, be best that
we at this moment preserve silence.
If we do not follow one or the other or both of those courses, we should expect
to see the situation in the Far East deteriorate rapidly. If we will follow one
or the other or both of those courses there is a chance that Japan will continue
to hesitate and that Chinese resistance will continue, temporarily at least, at its
present level of defensive effectiveness.
That there is risk in making firm representations to the Japanese no one can
deny or should try to deny, but that there is greater risk in not making such
2086 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
representations I for one am and long have been convinced. By taking the risk
which such action would entail, we at least have the chance of further restraining
Japan. By not taking that risk we would permit it to become almost a certainty
that Japan will strike hard at the Chinese and Chinese power to resist (to say
nothing of morale) will be substantially diminished.
If, having taken the risk, we should find armed hostilities between Japan and
ourselves thrust upon us, there would then exist a situation than which a good
many other conceivable situations might be worse.
[5522] With Japan as comparatively weak as she is today and with this
country as comparatively strong as it is today, we need not fear unduly the military
outcome — or even the immediate consequences — of such a conflict. This country
is physically capable now of waging a properly conducted war with Japan and
at the same time carrying on in the Atlantic all operations which it would be
advantageous for us to make our business up to such time as production of
materials on our part may make it practicable for the British, with or without
us as associates in war, to take the offensive in the struggle with Germany.
Mr. Gesell. Now there was also a request made by Senator Fergu-
son for certain specific memoranda of Dr. Hornbeck bearing various
dates. One of those was for any memorandum dated November 27,
1941.
That memorandum of Dr. Hornbeck has been located by the Depart-
ment of State. It is dated November 27, 1941, entitled "Problem of
Far Eastern Relations." When it was found in the files there were
attached to it two subsequent memoranda, apparently provoked by
some reference to this memorandum that appeared in Mr. Drew Pear-
son's colunin. Accordingly, we have had reproduced all of the memo-
randa, not only Dr. Hornbeck's memorandum of November 27, but
his subsequent comments on it. That is the document the top page of
which is dated November 2, ISSSSI 1944, memorandum of "Dr.
Hornbeck to the Special Assistant to the Secretary.
Senator Feegtjson. Do we have that ?
Mr. Gesell. That is before the members of the committee. I ask
that all of these memoranda be spread upon the record.
The Chairman. It will be so ordered.
(The documents referred to follow:)
[In handwriting :] Not to be removed from file except with permission of Chief.
(Signature illegible.)
Depabtmknt of State
special assistant to the seceetaey
November 2, 1944.
The memorandum at the bottom of this file, a memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck,
dated November 27, 1941, entitled "problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate
of situation and certain probabilities," indexed as 711.94/2512 PS/GD., Confiden-
tial File, is a memorandum regarding the contents of which there have been
leaks and misrepresentation..
For purposes of the record there is now being superimposed a memorandum
by Mr, Hornbeck, of date February 28, 1944, in which certain pertinent facts
are stated and an analysis is made of the contents and true purport of the
memorandum of November 27, 1941.
(s) SKH
SA/H;SkH:MZS
[55241 February 28, 1944.
On Sunday evening, February 20, Mr. Drew Pearson made in his radio broad-
cast certain statements regarding Mr. Stanley Hornbeck. Among these, as
reported to Mr. Hornbeck on February 21 by the State Department's recorder,
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2087
was a statement that : "On November 22, 1941 Hornbeck drafted a memorandum
stating Japan would not attack this country. Just fifteen days later she did
attack Pearl Harbor."
On February 27, Mr. Pearson made in his column of that day certain state-
ments regarding Mr. Hornbeck. There, inter alia, he stated that : "* • * on
November 22, 1941, just 15 days before Pearl Harbor, he wrote an important
memorandum to the Secretary of State advising that Japan never would attack
the United States."
Such charges warrant attention. What are the facts?
Mr. Hornbeck did not write on November 22, 1941 any memorandum of esti-
mate or prediction. He did on November 27 write a memorandum giving an
estimate of "probabilities." Knowledge of the existence of such a memorandum
was at some time before the end of August 1942 imparted by someone who had
knowledge thereof to some member or members of the press. There appeared
in a Washington newspaper in August 1942 under the dateline "By United
Press" an article purporting to compare the record of prophecy of Mr. Grew
with that of Mr. Hornbeck — unfavorable to the latter. In the course of th(at
article there was given an account of "Hornbeck's 5-1 odds," as follows :
"In contrast to that record (citations of occasions on which Mr. Grew had
'advised the United States to guard against a possible surprise attack') was
the vievppoint of the State Department adviser on political relations, Stanley
Kuhl Hornbeck. Hornbeck was of the opinion, even after the truculent state-
ments of Japan's two ambassadors, Kichisaburo Nomura and Sabusu Kurusu,
that Japan was bluflQng.
"Hornbeck's idea was that Japan would not dare attack the United States, that
it was bogged down in China and that the most that need be feared was an
intensified campaign against the Burma Road.
"In mid-November, Hornbeck told consultants that if the situation was viewed
as a gambling proposition the odds should be 5 to 1 that the United States and
Japan would still be at peace a month later. He said it was even money that
the United States and Japan would not be at war some months later."
The contents of that story indicate that there was a "leak," with apparently
prejudicial purpose, somewhere and at some time antedating the moment of the
publication of the UP article under reference. It may be presumed that Mr.
Pearson [5S26] has had knowledge of that article or has been told by
someone somewhere a story identical with or similar to the story on which the
statements in that article were based.
Now what are the facts regarding a memorandum which Mr. Hornbeck is
alleged to have written to the Secretary of State on November 22?
To begin with, Mr. Hornbeck did not write on November 22 any memorandum
of the type indicated. With regard to a memorandum which Mr. Hornbeck did
write (on November 27), see infra.
Mr. Hornbeck had over the years frequently advanced the view that the
United States and Japan were moving toward an armed collision and that, unless
Japan changed her course or was deflected or brought to a standstill by an
encounter with some other country, such q. collision was bound some day to
occur. During the "exploratory conversation" of the year 1941, Mr. Hornbeck
took the position that the only "peaceful settlement" which Japan was seeking
was a settlement on her own terms wherein she might have the assent of the
United States to her program of conquest in the Far East. By August of 1941
the situation had become definitely threatening. Toward the end of that
month, the British Government and the American Government served on Japan
a strong warning against further extending of her courses of aggression. From
then on it was generally recognized that Japan might embark on acts of
[5527] force against Great Britain or the United States or both. Officers
of the Department of State were in constant touch with officers of Military In-
telligence and Naval Intelligence, exchanging factual data and discussing the
possibilities of the situation.
On September 3, in the light of all information at that time available to him,
Mr. Hornbeck expressed an opinion that Japan would not attack the United
States within the next three months.
On November 3, Mr. Hornbeck advised that the last remaining United States
landed armed forces in China be promptly withdrawn.
On November 20, Messrs. Nomura and Kurusu presented to the Secretary of
State the last of various proposals advanced by the Japanese Government or
agents thereof during 1941 or an agreement between Japan and the United
States. Six days later, on November 26, the Secretary of State gave to Messrs.
2088 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Nomura and Kurusu papers which became the last of the statements of counter-
proposal made by the American Government during the course of the "exploratory
conversations" which had been going on for several montlis.
On the next day, November 27, Mr. Hornbeck wrote an informal memorandum
entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of Situation and Cer-
tain Probabilities." That memorandum began with a statement, "The Japa-
nese Government has [5528] made certain plans, some of which are abso-
lute and some of which are conditional, for new military operations." He then
stated that Mr. Kurusu's mission had had two principal objectives, and that
Mr. Kurusu had achieved neither of those objectives. He then moved into the
field of "forming conclusions as to what is probable". He stated that in his
opinion, "The Japanese intend at this moment to persevere in and to intensify
their operations toward 'bringing China to her knees' " ; he expressed the opin-
ion that, "The Japanese Government does not desire or intend or expect to
have forthwith armed conflict with the United States" ; and he said that, "were
it a matter of placing bets", he would give odds of 5 to 1 that the United States
and Japan would not be at "war" on or before December 15, lie would wager
3 to 1 that the United States and Japan would not be at "war" on or before the
15th of January, and he would wager even money that the United States and
Japan would not be at "war" on or before March 1. "Stated briefly", he said,
"the undersigned does not believe that this country is now on the immediate
verge of 'war' in the Pacific." Continuing, he said : "The reasonable probability
is that Japan's new military operations of the near future will be directed
either toward gaining position in Thailand or operations against Yunnan and
the Burma Road or both." And, in conclusion, he said: "There is no warrant
for any feeling on our part that the situation in the Pacific has been made
worse, as regards [55291 the interests of the United States, by refusal
on the part of the American Government to make a deal with Japan in terms of
'concessions' by us in return for 'pledges' (qualified and hedged around pledges)
by Japan to keep the peace while continuing to make war and to prepare for
more war. Japan has been at war in eastern Asia and the western Pacific for
several years past. Japan has threatened to make war on each and every one
of her near neighbors and even on the United States. No price that we might
have paid to Japan would buy or produce peace in the Pacific or security for
the United States (and/or Great Britain and/or China and/or Russia) in the
Pacific. The question of more war or less war in the Pacific rests at this moment
in the control of minds and hearts in Tokyo, not in the control of minds and
hearts in Washington."
Examination of the whole content of the memorandum of November 27, 1941
shows that its author was offering not a long-range forecast but an estimate of
situation in terms of short-range prohahiUties ; that he nowhere suggested that
Japan would not (or that she "would never") attack the United States.; that,
although he was of the opinion that the Japanese Government was not intending
"to have armed conflict forthxoith with the United States", he clearly perceived —
and so indicated, as he had done many times before — that the situation was rapidly
moving toward such conflict. In suggesting odds of 5-to-l against "war" within the
next three [5530] weeks, at 3-to-l against "war" within the next seven
weeks, and at 1-to-l against "war" within the next fourteen weeks ; in affirming
that within that period "there may be some armed encounters similar to those to
which we have been and are a party in the Atlantic" ; and in refraining from even
a tentative prognostication beyond that period, he implied that he considered
that the sands were fast running out. In stating, in conclusion : "The question of
more war or less war in the Pacific rests at this moment in the control of minds
and hearts in Tokyo, not in the control of minds and hearts in Washington",
he both admitted and affirmed that in the situation thpn prevailing in American-
Japanese relations almost anything might before long happen.
All this is a far cry from the purport of the charge that "On November 22 {sic),
1941, just fifteen days before Pearl Harbor he (Hornbeck) wrote an important
memorandum to the Secretary of State advising that Japan would never attack the
United States."
Especially to be noted regarding this whole matter is the fact that Mr. Horn-
beck's memorandum under reference was written not on November 22 (which was
during the period while the question of reply to be made to the Japanese proposals
of November 20 was under consideration) but on November 27 (which was after
the American* Government had reached its [55^1] decision and the Secre-
tary of State had — on November 26 — made this Government's reply).
(Note. — The memorandum of November 27, 1041 is in the confidential files of
the Department of State under index number 711.94/2512.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2089
NOMCMBEK 27, 1941.
Problem of Fab Eastern Relations — Estimate of Situation and Certain
Pkobabilities
' The Japanese Government has made certain plans, some of which are absolute
and some of which are conditional, for new military operations.
Mr. Kurusu's mission has had two principal objectives: (1) to obtain, if possi-
ble, from the United States, terms of agreement favorable to Japan; (2) to ascer-
tain, if possible, what action, positive or negative, the United States might,
may or will take in the event of certain moves by Japan.
The American Government has now given clear indication that it has no inten-
tion of making "concessions" to Japan which would be inconsistent with the
declared principles and the general objectives of American foreign policy and
that it does not intend to condone or give countenance to policies and practice,
past and present and future, or ag- [5532] gression on Japan's part.
(Handwritten note) : Tallied to PA/H on Dec. 4, 1941 and returned to file on
November 8, 1944. (Signature illegible).
Mr. Kurusu has not achieved the first objective of his mission.
The Japanese Government has given, during the course of the "exploratory
conversations", clear evidence that it is not that Government's intention at the
present time to disassociate Japan from the Tripartite Alliance ; or to give up its
objective of conquering China, conquering other regions in tlie Far East, and
establishing a "new order" and a "co-prosperity sphere" in eastern Asia and the
western and southern Pacific. It has persevered in distribution and disposal
of its armed forces on a pattern clearly designed for offensive rather than
merely defensive operations. It has shown that it clearly intends to persevere
in pursuit of its general and its particular objectives by the methods of threat of
force or use of force — which means continuance of contribution to instability
rather than stability of situation in the Pacific and eastern Asia.
The United States has not shown what action it will take on the positive side
in the event of Japan's taking one or another of several possible steps. Mr.
Kurusu may have gained certain impressions, but he cannot be sure. Mr. Kurusu
has not achieved the second major objective of his mission.
The business of prophesying involves a procedure of [5533] examining
facts and, as among various developments conceived to be possible, forming
conclusions as to what is probable.
A prophecy is an expression by an individual or a group of individuals of an
opinion as to what is going to happen.
In the opinion of the undersigned, the Japanese intend at this moment to
persevere in and to intensify their operations toward "bringing China to her
knees". They have hoped that out of the conversations with the American
Government they would extract something which would facilitate their effort
toward that objective. Even now, they have not entirely abandoned hope of
getting from us either positive or negative action helpful to them in pursuit of
that objective.
In the opinion of the undersigned, the Japanese Government does not desire
or intend or expect to have forthivith armed conflict with the United States.
The Japanese Government, while launching new offensive operations at some
point or points in the Far East, will endeavor to avoid attacking or being attacked
by the United States. It therefore will not order or encourage action by its
agents (foremost among which are its armed forces) which, if taken, would lead
toward use by the United States of armed force by way of retaliation or resist-
ance. So far as relations directly between the United States and Japan are
concerned [553^] there is less reason today than there was a week ago
for the United States to be apprehensive lest Japan make "war" on this country.
Were it a matter of placing bets, the undersigned would give odds of five to one
that the United States and Japan will not be at "war" on or before December 15
(the date by which General Gerow has afiirmed that he would be "in the clear"
so far as consummation of certain disi>osals of our forces is concerned) : would
wager three to one that the United States and Japan will not be at "war" on or
before the 15th of January (i. e., 7 weeks from now) ; would wager even money
that the United States and Japan will not be at "war" on or before March 1 (a
date more than 90 days from now, and after the period during which it has been
estimated by our strategists that it would be to our advantage for us to have
"time" for further preparation and disposals). These ventures into the field of
speculative prediction are posited on an assumption that our definition of "war"
2090 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
must be the same in reference to activities and events in the Pacific that it is in
regard to activities and events in the Atlantic ; the indicated wagers are offered
on an assumption that, although there may be some armed encounters similar to
those to which we have been and are a party in the Atlantic, there will not be
a recognized "state of war" such as to disrupt substantially or put an end to the
present program of our Army and Navy for disposal [5535] within the
periods mentioned of equipment and men for "defensive" and general purposes —
Stated briefly, the undersigned does not believe that this country is now on the
immediate verge of "war" in the Pacific.
Japan has her disposals so made that she might now move against Russia
or move against the Dutch East Indies or move against Thailand or launch
some new operations in and against China. But, a move against Russia would
be a major operation involving very substantial hazards for Japan ; and it
would be a move from which, once begun, it would be hard for Japan to with-
draw. A move by Japan against the Dutch East Indies would involve for Japan a
risk of armed embroilment with Great Britain and possibly the United States ;
it would involve a risk of developing into a major operation.
A move by Japan now against Thailand would be a move which need not re-
quire great effort or involve great risk; if made, it would have a twofold
objective, on the one hand and exploration of British and American reaction, and
on the other hand a possible gaining of advantageous position in connection with
and for operations against the Burma Road and therefore toward bringing closer
to an end the "China incident". A move on Japan's part via Indochina into
Yunnan and toward putting the Burma Road out of commission (especially
by continuous air attack) would involve little risk of embroilment with Great
Britain or the United States, [5536] would not necessarily involve a major
effort, and could be halted or be withdrawn from at any time should develop-
ments in the general situation render such action advisable in the opinion
of Japan's military leaders.
The reasonable probability is that Japan's new military operations of the near
future will be directed either toward gaining position in Thailand or operations
against Yunnan and the Burma Road or both.
If, when and as Japan makes either or both of those moves, Japan will ipso
facto be further disclosing what are her political and military policies and will
be further extending herself as regards military disposals and effort and as
regards burden and draft upon her national capacity (economic, social, political
and military) ; she will be weakening her position in the event of there coming,
later, armed confiict between herself and the United States: she will be expos-
ing herself to naval and air attack on flank and from rear, if and when, by
the United States; and she will be adding to the number of her enemies and
the weight of a public opinion adverse to her in the United States and the
British Empire.
There is no warrant for any feeling on our part that the situation in the
Pacific has been made worse, as regards the interests of the Ignited States by
refusal on the part of the American Government to make a deal with Japan
in terms [5-5571 of "concessions" by us in return for "pledges" (qualified
and hedged around pledges) by Japan to keep the i)eace while continuing to
make war and to prepare for more war. Japan has been at war in eastern
Asia and the western Pacific for several years past. Japan has threatened to
make war on each and every one of her near neighbors and even on the United
States. No price that we might have paid to Japan would buy or produce
peace in the Pacific or security for the United States (and/or Great Britain
and/or China and/or Russia) in the Pacific.
The question or more war or less war in the Pacific rests at this moment in
the control of minds and hearts in Tokyo, not in the control of minds and hearts
in Washington.
/s/ SKH"
PA/H : SKH : FLB
Mr. Gesell. Now there was also a request made and an interest
expressed in memoranda of Dr. Hornbeck relating? to the question of
the basin^j of the fleet. We have now in hand three memoranda
which seem to have some relation to that subject.
The first is a memorandum dated July 12, 1940, which contains a
handwritten note on the front page with the initials of Captain
Schuirmann and Admiral Stark saying:
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2091
Hornbeck is anxious to liave you read tliis. The high ranking oflBcer
153SS] mentioned is Admiral Richardson.
I think the paper is slightly academic.
That memorandum apparently refers to a conversation between Ad-
miral Kichardson and Dr. Hornbeck of July 11, 1940. I would like
to have it marked as an exhibit.
The Chairman. So ordered.
Senator Ferguson. May we get that exhibit number?
Mr. Gesell. Number 95.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 95.")
Mr. Gesell. The next is a very slibstantial document of 50-some
pages in length, which is before the members of the committee, bear-
ing the date July 16, 1940, the second sheet of which gives the title
of the memorandum as follows : "Keflections on Certain Features of
the Far Eastern Situation and Certain Problems of U. S. Far Eastern
Policy. July 4, 1940."
I would like to call the committee's attention to the fact that from
page 7 to page 15 is a detailed discussion of the question of the basing
of the fleet at Pearl Harbor. We have reproduced the entire memo-
randum feeling we should not take any portion of it out of context.
This memorandum is not signed by Dr. Hornbeck but we believe it is
Dr. Hornbeck's memorandum, since in the Navy Department files it
appears with his other memoranda and, as best can be told from sur-
rounding circumstances, it is in his style.
IS5S9] The Chairman. What do you want to do with it ?
Mr. Gesell. That will be Exhibit 96, Senator, if you please.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 96.")
Mr. Gesell. Now I have here a series of memoranda of which the
top one is dated September 21, 1940, prepared by Dr. Hornbeck and
made available by the Department of State, also relating to the ques-
tion of the fleet dispositions, which we will have marked Exhibit 97.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The docmnents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 97.")
Mr. Gesell. Now, in addition, there are a number of Hornbeck
memoranda which relate to other topics bearing various dates, Decem-
ber 1940, November 20, 1941, May 20, 1941, November 30, 1941, and
others as well, obtained from the Navy files or Arni}^ files and State
Department files.
These memoranda we have bunched together and are sending to
Congressman Keefe in response to his request for all memoranda of
Dr. Hornbeck. I believe that the ones we have here cover the matters
in which the committee has expressed particular interest.
The Chairman. Do we have that memorandum before us in this
file?
[SS^O] Mr. Gesell. You have all the ones we introduced.
The Chairman. I mean the one you sent to Congressman Keefe.
Mr. Gesell. No.
The Chairman. Why not let us all have that?
Mr. Gesell. We thought perhaps he would send those around. We
will try to reproduce them, if you wish.
The Chairman. I thought maybe you had them here.
Mr. Gesell. No, we haven't any copies. We have not been able to
find anything in them that is pertinent, but perhaps they may be of
background value.
2092 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Chairman. We will see how that will work out after you pass
them out.
Mr. Gesell. Now our attention was called to a matter which we
felt we should immediately bring to the committee's attention.
The committee will recall that the G-2 estimates were introduced
when General Miles was on the stand in the pink volume designated
Exhibit 33. Among those was an estimate dated October 2, 1941.
Examination of the memorandum in its photostatic form — that was
the memorandum to the Chief of Staff, October 2, 1941, subject:
Japanese-American Relations, signed by Hayes A. Kroner, Colonel,
General Staff — discloses there is written on a copy, which is appar-
ently the copy distributed to Secretary Stimson, a note in his hand-
writing, [SS4.1] and in order to make the record complete I
would like to read that note into the record now, and offer the photo-
stat of that particular memorandum as a related exhibit to exhibit
33, that is. Exhibit 33-A.
The note reads:
Quite independently I have reached similar conclusions and hold them
strongly. I believe, however, that during the next three months while we are
re-arming the Philippines great care must be exercised to avoid an explosion
by the Japanese army. Put concretely this means that while I approve of
stringing out negotiations during that period, they should not be allowed to
ripen into a personal conference between the President and P. M.—
I think that means Prime Minister and not a New York newspaper.
I greatly fear that such a conference if actually held would produce concessions
which would be highly dangerous to our vitally important relations with China.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 33-A.")
Senator Lucas. Who was responsible for that memorandum?
Mr. Gesell. Col. Hayes A. Kroner, who was General Miles' chief
assistant, and Secretary Stimson wrote what I have just read.
The Chair]vean. That handwriting is the handwriting of Secretary
Stimson and not Colonel Kroner?
[554^] Mr. Gesell. That is right. It is on his copy which was
distributed to him. He was one of the distributees.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I try to get this straight a
moment? This is the memorandum that came out of the Secretary
of War's files?
Mr. Gesell. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. And you found that note written only on his
paper ?
Mr. Gesell. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. That is not in any of the other papers in other
files?
Mr. Gesell. That is right. Senator. So that the record is clear
on it we offer the actual document with his handwriting in the record.
The Chairman. Do you want that printed or made an exhibit?
Mr. Gesell. Made an exhibit. I read the portion that we want in
the record. Copies of that are before each member of the committee.
You will find one among your set.
Senator Ferguson. Does counsel undertake to say it is in the hand-
writing of the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson ?
Mr. Gessell. Yes. As Exhibit 48-A, simply to complete the docu-
mentation, I would like to introduce the memorandum from the Chief
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2093
of Staff to General Gerow concerning the subject matter of exhibit 48
which General Marshall made [5543] available after his tes-
timony. It is of no particular importance, but simply fills out the
documentation.
The Chairman. So ordei-ed.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 48-A.")
[5544] Mr. Gesell. Also, we would like to oflfer as the next
exhibit, Exhibit 98, a memorandum from the Secretary of War, Mr.
Stimson, to the President, dated November 26, 1941, concerning the
Japanese convoy movements toward Indochina.
The Chairman. Do we have that?
Mr. Gesell. Yes. That is before the members of the committee.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 98.")
Mr. Gesell. Now, there has been distributed to the committee, but
we noted that we have failed to introduce it as an exhibit, a mimeo-
graphed statement of two pages entitled "Telephone calls from out-
side through White House switchboard on 11/25-26, 11/27, and
11/28/41 as compiled from operators' notes available." I think it
might be well to have that memorandum spread upon the transcript
so it becomes a matter of record.
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
(The document referred to follows:)
[6545] TELEPHONE CALLS MADE FROM OUTSIDE THROUGH WHITE HOUSE SWITCH-
BOARD ON 11/25, 11/26, 11/27, AND 11/28/41 as compiled from operator's
notes available
Nov. 25.
730A VP Wallace eld Secv Wickard— OK.
854A AG eld VP Wallace— LWC— OK 940A.
930A Judge Patterson eld Robert Lovett — OK.
1050 A Judge Patterson eld McCloy— O of C— OK.
1045 A Secy Ickes eld AG— LWC— OK 1130A
11AM Mr. Stettinius eld Jesse Jones^OK.
1205P Jesse Jones eld PMG— OK.
121 5P Mr. Blandford eld Secv Wickard— OK.
1227P PMG eld Secv Hull— LWC— OK 330P
1245P Secy Wickard eld Mr. Blandford— OK.
1254P Mr. Blandford eld Wickard— OK.
lOOP Secy Jones eld Mr. Knudsen — at Lunch — NM.
154P Ad'm. Stark eld Gen. Marshall— LWC.
259P Mr. Stettinius eld Gen. Marshall— LWC.
345P Gen. Marshall eld Ed. Stettinius— OK.
405P PMG eld Secv Hull— OK.
415P Secy Knox eld PMG— OK.
420P General Marshall— eld Ad'm. Stark— OK.
425P Secy Stimson eld Secy State Hull— OK.
500P Ad'm. Stark eld Gen. Marshall— OK.
510P General Marshall eld Ed. Stettinius— OK.
[5546] 510P James Forrestai eld Secy Stimson — Talked Judge Patterson — OK
515P James Forrestai eld Knudsen — OK.
520P Wavne Cov eld Judge PattersonPP — OK.
530P PMG eld Secy Hull— LWC— 530P OK.
Nov. 26.
707A Secy Stimson eld Gen. Marshall — OK.
91 5A Secy Stimson eld Secy Hull— OK.
950A Secy Stimson eld Secy Hull— OK.
1022A Mr. Forrestai eld Donald Nelson— OK.
1025 A Mr. Forrestai eld Leon Henderson — OK.
1030A Mr. Forrestai eld Judge Patterson— OK.
1030A Ad'm. Stark eld. General Marshall, Miss Thomas talked — OK.
115P Secv Hull eld Ad'm. Stark— OK.
2094 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
125P Ad'm. Stark eld General Marshall— NM.
159P Secy Perkins eld Wells— LWC.
235P Ad'm Stark eld Seey Hull— OK 345P
253P Gov'r. McNutt eld Secy Stimson— OK.
508P Secy Welles eld Secy Perkins— OK.
530P James Forrestal eld Judge Patterson — OK.
615P Ad'm Stark eld Secy Knox— OK.
Nov. 27.
852A Mr. Forrestal eld Sumner Welles— LWC— RTD Call 954A.
853A Mr. Forrestal eld Secy Morgenthau— LWC— OK 11AM.
[5547] 9 17 A Seev Stimson eld Secy Hull— OK.
1025A James Forrestal eld Secy Welles — OK.
1044A Secv Knox eld Ad'm. Stark— OK.
1045A Secy Stimson eld Secy Hull— LWC— 11 AM OK.
1048A Ad'm. Stark eld Seey Hull— LWC— OK 11 A.
1135A Seey Morgenthau eld Ben. Cohen — OK.
1230P James Forrestal eld Jesse Jones — OK.
1240P Judge Patterson eld Wayne Coy— LWC.
302P Wayne Coy eld Mr. Stettinius— OK.
337P Judge Patterson eld Mr. Forrestal— LWC.
350P Seey Stimson eld Secy Hull— OK.
41 OP Jesse Jones eld James Forrestal — LWC.
500P Seey Hull eld Ad'm. Stark— LWC— O of C, Capt. Sherman talked— OK.
530P James Forrestal eld Judge Patterson — OK.
545 P James Forrestal eld Jesse Jones — OK.
842P J. Rowe eld Miss McDonough— LWC— Mr. Rowe WCAM.
900P Jesse Jones eld Secv Hull — OK.
901 P Jesse Jones eld AG — OK. ,
Nov. 28.
839A Ad'm, Stark eld Gen. Marshall— OK.
900A Judge Patterson eld Robert Lovett — OK.
1032A Ag eld VP.— OK.
1058A Jesse Jones eld Knudsen — OK.
1129A Jesse Jones eld James Forrestal — OK.
[5548] 1150A Judge Patterson eld Wayne Coy— LWC.
1230P James Forrestal eld Don Nelson —
1245P Secy Welles eld Ad'm. Stark— in Conf— NM.
207P VP eld Secv Morgenthau— OK.
217P VP eld Nelson Rockefeller— LWC.
249P Ad'm. Stark eld Secv Hull— Talked to Mr. Stone— OK.
411 P Wayne Coy eld Dir. Smith— OK.
525P Seey Stimson eld Secy Hull— Talked with Hornbeck— OK.
525P Seey Stimson eld Secy Knox — OK.
[SS4^] Mr. Gesell. In order to complete the documentation as
we go along on the events of the Gth and 7th vre "would like also to
introduce and have designated as the next exhibit, Exhibit 99, a
memorandum prepared by Mr. Ballantine and Mr. Hamilton, Depart-
ment of State, dated September 26, 1944, stating their then recollection
of what took place in Secretary Hull's office on December 7 concerning
the Japanese intercepted messages. That has already been dis-
tributed to the committee at an earlier date.
The Chairman. It will be so ordered.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 99.")
Mr. Gesell, It may be helpful to have it set forth in the transcript,
for the convenience of the committee. It is a short memorandum.
The Chairman. It mav be copied in the transcript.
(Exhibit No. 99 follows:)
[5550] Depaetment of State,
Office of Fab Eastern Afpaibs,
September 26, 19U-
Top Secret
There is attached a page from the Congressional Record of September 21, 1944,
In which there is a statement by Congre&sman Church in respect to the delivery of
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2095
a message to the State Department on December 7, 1941, by Lieutenant Com-
mander Kramer of the Navy Department.
Our recollection of the matter is as follows : At about 10 a. m. on December 7
Mr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Ballantine came to the outer office of the
Secretary of State to discuss the general situation of relations with Japan. They
were shown by Mr. John Stone, a Foreign Service officer then serving as an as-
sistant in the office of the Secretary, a document the contents of which were
pertinent to the subject of what they were going to discuss with the Secretary and
which had then been delivered to the outer office by Lieutenant Commander
Kramer, then on duty in the Navy Department. Lieutenant Commander Kramer
was present in the room. The document contained no reference to any Japanese
military movement. Mr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Ballantine are posi-
tive that no statement was made in their presence by Lieutenant Commander
Kramer, as alleged, to the [5551] effect that "this looks like a sunrise
attack upon Pearl Harbor and a midnight attack upon the Philippines."
The conversation in the Secretary's outer office was intermittent and scattered
amwng those present in the room. In other words, each person was not a party
to all of the conversation. Mr. Hornbeck has a distinct impression that there
was brought up Japanese naval disposition with specific mention of most recent
advices of Japanese naval movements in the Gulf of Siam.
Mr. Hamilton recollects also that Lieutenant Commander Kramer remarked on
that occasion, in reference to the matter of an appointment for the Japanese
Ambassador to see the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. on December 7, that the
naming of the hour might mean that it was the hour for some Japanese movement.
No mention was made of Pearl Harbor or of Hawaii or of the Philippines.
With regard to the statement that Lieutenant Commander Kramer then went
to the White House and delivered the message, they have no knowledge whether
this was a fact.
/s/ JWB.
FE: Ballantine: HST
/s/ M. M. H.
{&S52'] Mr. Gesell. Nov\;', there is also a committee request for
copies of the interrogation made by intelligence officers of the Japanese
prisoner of war No. 1, a Japanese officer in charge of the midget sub-
marine taken prisoner at Bellows Field December 8, 1941, We have
made copies of that available to each member of the committee. This
document was previously used as exhibit 68 in the Hewitt investigation.
I would like to have it designated as the next exhibit, Exhibit 100.
Copies of it are available to the members of the committee.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 100.")
Mr. Gesell. Also to make the record complete we have the question
of the logs of the U. S. S. Enterprise and U. S. S. Lexington. Those
logs were made available to Congressman Keefe and used by him in
questioning Admiral Turner, I believe. We subsequently obtained
them back and had them photostated. I think we would like at this
time to introduce as Exhibit 101 a duplicate copy of the log of the
U. S. S. Enterprise covering the period November 24, 1941, to Decem-
ber 16, 1941, and as Exhibit 102 a duplicate copy of the log of the
U. S. S. Lexington covering the period of December 5, 1941, through
December 8, 1941, and Exhibit 103 a duplicate copy of the action
reports of the air group of the U. S. S. Enterprise., Serial No. 579 of
December 15, 1941, and as Exhibit 104 a duplicate copy of the war diary
l5r5SS] of the JJ. S. S. Lexington for December 7, 1941.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 101, 102,
103, and 104, respectively.)
Mr. Gesell. The Navy Department has advised that according to
the Office of Naval Kecords and Library there are no action reports
2096 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of the U. S. S. Enterprise and the U. S. S. Lexington previous
to February 1942.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question on that last ?
The ChxMrman. Senator Lucas.
Senator Lucas. Is there anything in those exhibits which bears
directly on things that the committee ought to know ?
Mr. Gesell. Those exhibits cover the activities of the Enterprise^
for example, in the period immediately preceding Pearl Harbor. They
establish the time when the planes were launched from the Enterprise^
which subsequently became engaged in combat with the Japs over
Pearl Harbor. They will undoubtedly be useful to the committee
when Admiral Halsey, who was in command of the Enterprise and
who is on the list of witnesses, is a witness. I think they are useful
background information.
Now, we have obtained clearance from the British for the so-called
British estimates, and I would like to introduce that as the next exhibit,
Exhibit 105, dated October 21, 1941, and {555^1 November 21,
1941, respectively. They are before the members of the committee.
I introduce them as one exhibit.
Senator Ferguson. That will be what number ?
Mr. Gesell. No. 105, Senator Ferguson.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 105.")
Mr. Gesell. I think that completes the partial report on the
committee's requests for various material. In connection with some of
the requests, we are going to be in a position to distribute in the next
day or so material in response to those requests.
The Chairman. The committee thanks the counsel for their dili-
gence in making the interim report on the various requests made.
Are you ready now to proceed ?
Mr. Mitchell. We are ready to call Admiral Stark.
The Chairman. Admiral Stark.
[5555'] TESTIMONY OF A-DM. HAROLD R. STARK, UNITED STATES
NAVY^
(Admiral Stark was first duly sworn by the Chairman.)
The Chairman. Counsel will proceed.
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Stark, what is your present rank and
station ?
Admiral Stark. Admiral, United States Navy. I am on terminal
leave.
Mr. Mitchell. You served as Chief of Naval Operations from
August 1, 1939, until March 25, 1942?
Admiral Stark. I did.
Mr. Mitchell. I understand that you have a statement you would
like to present to the committee at this time. Is that right?
Admiral Stark. That is correct, yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Before you refer to the statement, I would like to
offer in evidence as Exhibit 106 a file, which the committee has, giving
Admiral Stark's letters to Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Kimmel's
replies.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 106.")
Mr. Mitchell. Now, Admiral, if you will present your statement.
1 See suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by Adm. Stark in Hearings, Part 6,
p. 2671 et seq.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2097
The Vice Chairman. Pardon nie a moment, please, General Mitch-
ell. It is noted here on the receipt to be si<Tned for [6SS6] this
document, "Please hand the bearer for delivery volume entitled 'H.
K. Stark letters to Admiral H. E. KimmeP which is superseded by the
volume referred to above." It is understood that this covers all
correspondence between Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel ?
Mr. Mitchell. All papers that they were asked to surrender. That
came about this way : The letter was written by Admiral Stark at one
time and was replied to by Admiral Kimmel at another time, so we
just put them together in one volume in chronological order.
The Vice Chairman. I am sure the committee appreciates that
ver}' valuable assistance given by the counsel.
Mr. Mitchell, This does not contain all the correspondence be-
tween them, because they had some letters that were personal, that
had no relation to the case. These are the letters that both Admiral
Stark and Admiral Kimmel agree, as I understand it, are the ones
to be brought to the attention of the committee.
The Vice Chairman. My purpose of inquiring was to know whether
I could disregard the previous copies that were furnished and con-
sider that this contains everything that is pertinent to this inquiry, as
to the letters passing between Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel.
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, sir.
[J557] Senator Ferguson. May I make an inquiry in order to
straighten out a matter that is in my mind? Are there any new
letters in this volume that are not in the two previous volumes ?
Mr. Gesell. I think there are one or two new letters in there.
In the main, they cover the material in the other two documents.
Senator Ferguson. Sometime will counsel point out what the new
ones are?
Mr. Gesell. Yes ; we will do that after the recess.
Senator Lucas. As I understand now, counsel for Admiral Stark
and counsel for Admiral Kimmel agree that these are the letters
that are pertinent and material to the inquiry ?
Mr. Mitchell. I think that is the understanding.
Admiral, will you proceed with your statement, please ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I should like to ask the indulgence of
the committee. This statement is rather long and there are a good
many parts in it that have already appeared in the testimony, some
of which I will not read, with the committee's permission.
Also it was made, with the exception of possibly four words which
have been deleted, before any of the hearings before this committee.
In other words, this statement has been influenced not [6558]
at all by what came out before this committee. It is the picture as
I wanted to present it at this time, not knowing whether I would be
the first witness or the last.
The Chairman. You will indicate. Admiral, such parts, when you
read them in your statement, that you will leave out ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. But the whole document will go in as your state-
ment.
[S559] Admiral Stark (reading) :
1. I served as Chief of Naval Operations from 1 August 1939 until
25 IV^arch 1942. During that time the position of Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) and that of Commander in Chief, United States
79716 — 46 — pt. 5 -4
2098 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Fleet (CINCUS), were not combined, but were separate. The Com-
manders in Chief, United States Fleet, during the period from 1
August 1939 to 7 December 1941, were Admiral Claude C. Bloch
(29 January 1938 to 6 January 1940), Admiral James O. Kichardson
(6 January 1940 to 1 February 1941), and Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel (1 February 1941 to 17 December 1941).
2. Navy Kegulations, made pursuant to an act of Congress, charge
the Chief of Naval Operations, under the direction of the Secretary
of the Navy, with the general direction of the fleet and with the
preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war.
3. When I became Chief of Naval Operations, the situation in
Europe was tense, and war broke out early in September, The Presi-
dent immediately (5 September 1939) proclaimed the neutrality of
the United States and declared the existence of a national emergency
(8 September 1939). He also authorized an increase in the enlisted
strength of the Navy and Marine Corps to 145,000 and 25,000,
respectively.
[5660] DUTY TO PRESENT NAVy's NEEDS TO CONGRESS
4. In November 1939, I appeared before the subcommittee of the
House Approjjriations Committee for the funds necessary to bring
enlisted strength of the Navy and Marine Corps up to the numbers
authorized by the President. The Department was also asking for
funds to recommission 80 ships, including 68 destroyers and support-
ing units, to safeguard our neutrality. I pointed out that in spite
of the Navy's feeling that our ships should always be 100 percent
manned, we had been getting along for years with allowances which
were only 85 percent of complement. The additional men for which
funds were requested immediately were only enough to enable us to
man the recommissioned ships ana increase the allowances on all ships
to an average of just over 89 percent. I told the Committee that it
was essential that the fleet be at least 100 percent manned. I felt it
highly desirable that we be 15 percent overmanned in order to provide
a seagoing reservoir to assist in the manning of ships going into com-
mission—4)oth old and new. At that time, however, the Bureau of
the Budget permitted us to request only sufficient increases in man-
power to put new ships in commission and to maintain our allowances
at about 90 percent of complement. In this connection, I told the
Committee that the Department expected to ask for funds for enough
men in the next regular appropriation bill to bring the fleet up to
100 percent of complement.
{5561] 5. In January 1940 I appeared before the House Naval
Affairs Committee, in support of an increase of 25 percent in the size
of the Navy. I would like to read an extract from the statement I
made at that time :
The international situation has altered substantially. World conditions today
presage a greater menace to our peace than was the case a year ago. The events
which have taken place since then are so fresh in the mind of everyone that
I do not need to detail them. I believe everyone will agree that the international
situation has deteriorated and that there is no immediate prospect that it will
improve. The situation is rife with possibilities of a general European war and,
in conjunction with Far Eastern conditions, presents a threat of world
conflagration.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2099
In the world of today it seems only a fair and moderate statement to say
that the best interests of our Nation will be served by keeping our own force
suflaciently strong to be an effective deterrent against foreign aggression.
Although the building programs of other naval powers are not definitely known,
and in some cases not even approximately known, it is a reasonable supposition
that those nations now at war are building to the maximum augmented war-
time capacity of their shipbuilding industries. All other conside,rations aside, if
the United States does not take [5562] immediate action toward increas-
ing the strength of its fleet, the end of the present war will find us in a relatively
weak naval position.
Therefore, it is my considered opinion, as I believe it will be that of the great
majority of our people, when the significance of the situation is understood,
that a substantial expansion, approximately 25 percent, of our Navy should be
planned and undertaken at once.
6. The bill, as passed by the House, provided only an 11 percent
increase, and although I pressed the Senate Committee in April 1940
to restore the provision for a 25 percent increase, the bill as finally
approved carried only 11 percent. While the result was not what we
wanted, it did not substantially hamper our development, for it
allowed us all we could start work on at that time with the facilities
then available to us.
7. In May 1940, we asked Congress to authorize us to acquire as
many planes as might be necessary to maintain the stock of useful
naval planes at not less than 10,000. As a part of our request for a
25 percent increase in the Navy as a whole, we asked that the au-
thorized number of naval aircraft be increased from 3,000 to 6,000.
After that program was submitted, the international situation became
much worse, and it was apparent that we would need even more naval
aircraft. In presenting the program for 10,000 planes to the House
and Senate [5563] Naval Affairs Committee, I said:
We have in the world today classic examples of the lack of preparedness and
readiness which are being borne home to every thinking man and woman.
The importance of time, which I stressed when last before this committee
and which every student of war appreciates, has also been brought home to us,
as it has to those in their life and death struggle, and where in some cases there
has already been written "too late".
We have been prone to criticize others, feeling that somehow or other we
have been sitting over here in comparative security. That feeling, too, has been
given some rude jolts in recent weeks and I believe that wishful thinking is
finally being replaced by consideration of cold facts and the necessity that we
ourselves take immediate steps toward greater preparedness in order that we
too may not some day write "too late". The word "speed" has taken on new
significance.
***** 4:
We can put our trust only in ourselves and it is self-evident we must be strong,
both within and without, to have any real sense of security.
Nations desiring peace must be stronger than those desiring war.
[5564] *******
* * * rpjie need for immediate and expedited rearmament has become more
apparent. The handicap to a Navy engaged in continuous war operations at
sea, of an inadequate naval air arm, has received, and continues to receive,
tragic demonstration. The indispensability of naval aircraft constructed for,
trained for, and organized for prompt and continuous action at sea with ships,
and against ships and aircraft has challenged the attention of all.
******
The number of aircraft provided in this bill is adjusted to the initial war
needs as they can be estimated at this time. Such a number is not obtainable
in the immediate future unless available construction capacity is quickly and
drastically expanded. Aviation expansion can only be accomplished by large
appropriations, appropriations for procurement of aircraft, appropriations for
2100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
aircraft facilities, and appropriations for increases in aircraft personnel and
for their training.
* * * If we really wish to face at this time the needs of the future, as
now indicated — authorization and appropriation must contemplate a greatly
expanded aircraft procurement program, the establishment of facilities, and
a [5565] personnel program that will provide before the event of war, not
less than the naval aviation strength set forth in this bill. To meet these
needs, we are placing the immediate stress on training.
Naval operations in the Atlantic in protection of the Western Hemisphere
should be supported by such naval aircraft as can be ship-based by carriens,
cruisers, and battleships, and by naval shore-based or tender-based aircraft
strategically distributed, wherever it may be necessary to oppol^e enemy naval
operations, or to oppose the approach overseas of enemy forces of any character.
In the Pacific, in addition to ship- and tender-based aircraft, it is necessary
to provide naval aircraft distributed throughout the United States possessions,
as well as along our west coast, and also to be ready to provide for a suitable
distribution of naval aircraft off the Pacific approaches to the Panama Canal.
8. This bill, as finally enacted, authorized us to acquire 10,000 naval
aircraft. However, as the committee well knows, the passage of this
bill did not give us overnight 10,000 planes. We next had to come
back to Congress for funds with which to procure them.
9. Early in June, the House subcommittee held hearings on the bill
to give us the money necessary to begin the acquisition of these planes.
We also asked for money to implement [6566^ the 11 percent
increase authorized in the size of the Navy. At this time, we had 1,813
useful airplanes on hand and 933 on order toward our immediate goal
of 10,000.
10. On June 16, 1940, France fell. The seriousness of the situa-
tion, which had not been fully appreciated in many quarters before, now
became apparent. On June 18, I appeared before the House Naval
Affairs Committee and recommended a further increase in our Navy
by some 200 combatant ships with an over-all tonnage increase of
about 1,250,000 tons. This represented an increase in combatant ton-
nage of something over 70 percent. We also requested an additional
20 auxiliaries of 100,000 tons.
11. Congress granted the 70 percent increase and the funds to im-
plement it, and thus the foundation was laid for the so-called two
ocean Navy.
12. Hand in hand with the expansion of the fleet went the con-
tinued building up of facilities on shore to support the fleet and its
air arm. Once funds were obtained the work was pushed, for ex-
ample the big drydock at Pearl Harbor Avas finished some months
ahead of time, fortunately in time to accommodate ships almost
immediately after Pearl Harbor.
13. During my tour as Chief of Naval Operations I was under
continual pressure from the successive commanders in chief of the
fleet — Admirals Bloch, Richardson, and Kimmel — to bring personnel
allowances up to 100 percent and to provide extra men \6fj67]
for training to man new construction. The inevitable result of not
having these extra men was to reduce the efficiency of existing ships
in order to obtain the experienced men necessary to form basic crews
for new construction. I explained some of the difficulties in getting
more men for the expanding Navy and to increase allowances to 100
percent in a letter to Admiral Kimmel on February 10, 1941 :
I am struggling, and I use the word advisedly, every time I get in the White
House, which is rather frequent, for additional men. It should not be necessary
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2101
and while I have made the case just as obvious as I possibly could, the President
just has his own ideas about men. I usually finally get my way but the cost
of effort is very great and of course worth it. 1 feel that I could go on the Hill
this minute and get all the men I want if I could just get the green light from
the White House. As a matter of fact what we now have was obtained by my
finally asking the President's permission to go on the Hill and state our needs
as I saw them at that time and his reply was "go ahead, I won't veto anything
they agree to." However, the struggle is starting all over again and just
remember we are going the limit, but I cannot guarantee the outcome.
14. In July 1941, 1 wrote Admiral Kimmel as follows:
We are pushing recruiting just as hard as we can [5568] and for
budgetary purposes you will be glad to know the President has okayed a figure
of 533,000 enlisted men and 105,000 Marines. Please give us a "not too badly
done" on that. But what a struggle it has been. If we could only have gone
full speed two years ago but that is water over the dam and I am only hoping
and praying we can take care of what we have in sight to man.
15. As late as November 15, 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote me as
follows:
Greater permanence of personnel is required to obtain that ship, unit and
fleet, efficiency so essential for readiness to fight. Reduction of changes to a
minimum especially in key positions, must be accomplished. Detachment of
officers and men has already dangerously reduced efficiency of this fleet and
they continue. * * *
This fleet requires approximately 9,000 men to fill complements ; it can utilize
an additional 10,000.
16. As badly as I wanted to reply that we could and would give him
what he wanted and what we knew he needed, I had to tell him on
November 25, 1941, that :
Regarding personnel, we have at last succeeded in getting the President to
authorize our use of draftees. I have been after this for months. Now that
I have got permission it will take some time to get it through the Congress as
we have to [5569'] have special legislation to use our funds for this
purpose. * * *
Believe it or not, the Reuhen James set recruiting back about 15 percent. We
are increasing our advertising campaigns extensively ; not only that, but Navi-
gation is hiring civilian managers to assist in recruiting. Draftees, however,
constitute something sure and I only wish I could have gotten them months ago.
The President in giving final approval said he just hated to do it ; but sentiment
is fast getting out of my system, if there is any left in it on this war.
17. Another large program which was developed under my direction
and which Congress approved in February 1942, was the 1,799 ships
and other items for the British under Lend-Lease at a cost of approxi-
mately $4,000,000,000. The ships included a large number of landing
craft and escort vessels. I assured Congress at the time — and it was
thoroughly understood by the British when this bill was passed — that
we reserved the right to retain anything in this program which we
felt we needed, and that final allocation would be made only when
units were completed.
18. Everything I said and did to increase the size, strength and
efficiency of the Navy as a fighting force was motivated by what I
considered the absolute necessity of preparing as quickly as possible
for war.
[6570] DUTY TO MAKE ADEQUATE AND REALISTIC WAR PLANS
19. Shortly after I became Chief of Naval Operations the War
Plans Division began devoting their energies to bringing our war
2102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
plans up to date. Late in 1940 we completed work on the plan known
as Rainbow No. 3, and copies were sent to the Commander in Chief,
U. S. Fleet, and to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet.
In transmitting the plan to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic, on 12
December 1940 I wrote :
1. The Commandei" -in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet is informed that a plan designed
for governing naval operations in case of war with Japan, Germany, and Italy,
and entitled "RAINBOW 3" has been prepared. Two copies of this plan are for-
warded to you by special officer messenger. While it is not to be considered as
the policy of the United States Government to become involved in war under this
plan, such a war appears at this time to be a possible eventuality. You are re-
quested, therefore, to give a high priority to the preparation of your operating
plans, and also to the preparation of your vessels, aircraft, and personnel.
2. The officer messenger carrying this plan. Commander J. L. McCrea, U. S. N.,
is authorized to remain in the Manila area for about nine days. He [5571]
is prepared to present you the general views of the Chief of Naval Operations as
to various political and strategical matters which have influenced the preparation
of "RAINBOW 3." You are requested to make a study of the plan and to for-
ward to the Departiuent via Commander McCrea recommendations and sugges-
tions for changes which may appear desirable to you at this time. It may be
stated, however, that it does not seem practicable, under the existing situation, to
effect material changes in the Assumptions of the plan.
3. One of the assumptions of the plan is that war would be fought with the
United States, the British, and the Dutch Colonial Authorities as Allies. Staff
conversations with the British, of a limited nature, have been undertaken in Lon-
don and Washington, but so far as concerns an allied operating plan and com-
mand arrangements in the Far East, the only useful staff conversations would
appear those which the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet might be able to hold
with the British and Dutch Supreme War Commanders in that region. It is be-
lieved that you may be able to hold such conversations with the British. There
is a considerable doubt as to the extent [5572] of the conversations which
may become possible with the Dutch, owing to their fear of repercussions in
Japan.
Commander McCrea had left a copy of the plan at Pearl Harbor on
his way to Manila, and returned via Pearl Harbor to get the reaction
of Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and his staff.
20. I avoided, wherever I could, giving specific and categoric in-
structions to the commanders in chief. War plans developed under
my direction as Chief of Naval Operations were broad outlines of
tasks and objectives, leaving the detailed operating plans to the com-
manders in chief, who were on the spot and familiar wth the peculiar
problems affecting their own forces. Kainbow No. 3 was such a plan.
21. In our planning, we assumed that if the United States was drawn
into war, it would be alined with Great Britain and against the Axis
Powers. We also knew that while our most immediate concern was
with the war then in progress in the Atlantic and in Europe, we might
also be faced — perhaps concurrently — with a war in the Pacific. With
these thoughts in mind, we held extensive staff conversations with the
British and Canadians early in 1941 and the report of these conversa-
tions was embodied in a document known as ABC-1, dated March 27,
1941.
[6573] 22. Based on the understandings arrived at in ABC-1,
the Army and the Navy developed a Joint Basic War Plan, known as
Rainbow No. 5, which was approved by the Secretaries of War and
the Navy.
[SS74-] You will note that I have crossed out the words "and by
the President." That is the only change made in this statement
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2103
23. In May 1941, the Navy's Basic War Plan, implementing Rain-
bow No. 5, was promulgated. The highest priority was assigned to
the detailed planning which had to be done by the fleets to fill in the
broader outlines of the Navy's Basic War Plan, referred to sometimes
by the short title— WPL^6.
24. In connection with WPL-46, two things must be kept in mind.
First, that the Atlantic and European area was considered to be the
initial decisive theater. The Joint Army and Navy Plan, Rainbow
No. 5, in the chapter entitled "Concept of the War," provided:
Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic
and European area is considered to be the decisive theater. The principal United
States military effort will be exerted in that theater, and operations of United
States forces in other theaters will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate
that effort.
Second, the plan was a realistic one ; that is, it was predicated on the
availability of forces actually in hand. There were not initially avail-
able to tlie Associated Powers all the facilities necessary to wage all-out
war in both [<5575] oceans. We were not able to give the
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, all the ships and men he wanted ;
but neither were we able to put in the Atlantic or in the Asiatic Fleet
the strength we knew they wanted.
25. Tlie Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (Admiral Kimmel) , was
fully advised of the situation confronting me as Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, for we had discussed it at length during his trip to Washington
in the summer of 1941. On 7 November 1941, I called his attention
again to the fact that we just didn't have the ships needed to go around
when I wrote :
I note the great desirability of many things for the Pacific Fleet — particularly
destroyers and cruisers. We just haven't ani/ destroyers or cruisers to give you
at the moment, nor is the prospect bright for getting any for you in the near
future. I fully appreciate your need for them. We could profitably employ
twice the number we now have if they were available. I will not burden you
with a recital of King's troubles
Admiral King at that time was Commander in Chief of the Atlantic
Fleet-
but he is up against it for DDs for escort — and defense against raiders.
26. Admiral Kinunel pointed out that he could not fight an all-out
war in the Pacific with the forces allocated to him. [5576] On
15 November 1941, he wrote :
In repeated correspondence I have set forth to you the needs of the Pacific
Fleet. These needs are real and immediate. I have seen the material and
personnel diverted to the Atlantic. No doubt they are needed there. But I must
insist that more consideration be given to the needs of the Pacific Fleet.
In case of war in the Pacific we shall have a problem difficult of solution under
any circumstances ; one requiring a major effort to bring the war to a successful
conclusion. During preparation for such an effort we must be in a position to
make Japanese operations costly and of limited effectiveness. The strength of
this fleet limits our freedom of action and lack of modern equipment in ships we
now have limits their effectiveness.
We must be in a position to minimize our own losses, and to inflict maximum
damage to Japanese fleet, merchant shipping, and bases. We should have suf-
ficient strength in this fleet for such effective operations as to permit cruising
at will in the Japanese Mandated Island area, and even on occasions to Japa-
nese home waters. We should have [5577] the strength to make any
enemy operations against Wake a highly hazardous undertaking. To do these
things substantial increase of the strength of this Fleet is mandatory.
2104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Greater permanence of personnel is required to obtain that ship, unit and fleet
efficiency so essential for readiness to fight. Reduction of changes to a minimum
especially in key positions, must be accomplished. Detachment of officers and
men has already dangerously reduced efficiency of this fleet and they continue.
Well qualified officers are in many instances, detached to fill billets much less
Important, in my opinion than those filled in this fleet. Battleship Captains
must be chosen for proficiency regardless of seniority.
This fleet requires approximately 9,000 men to fill complements ; it can utilize
an additional 10,000.
If this fleet is to reach and maintain a satisfactory degree of readiness for
offensive action, the foregoing requirements must be met; and it must not be
considered a training fleet for support of the Atlantic Fleet and the shore es-
tablishment.
27. We are painfully aware of the situation. On 25 November, I
replied :
[5578] This is in answer to yours of 15 November. If I didn't appreciate
your needs as well as Tommy Hart's and King's, I would not be working almost
literally eighteen hours a day for all three of you.
We have sweat blood in the endeavor to divide adequately our forces for
a two ocean war; but you cannot take inadequate forces and divide them into
two or three parts and get adequate forces anywhere. It was for this reason
that almost as soon as I got here I started working on increasing the Navy.
It was on the basis of inadequate forces that ABC-1 and Rainbow 5 were pred-
icated and which were accepted by all concerned as about the best compro-
mise we could get out of the situation actually confronting us.
I agree with you for example that to cruise in Japanese home waters you
should have substantial increase in the strength of your fleet but neither ABC-1
nor Rainbow 5 contemplate this as a general policy. After the British have
strengthened Singapore, and under certain auspicious conditions, opportunity
for raids in Japanese waters may present themselves, but this will be the ex-
ception rather than the rule.
It might interest you to know that King strongly recommended his taking
the destroyers which we now [5575] have in our West Coast ports, and
the Secretary was sold on it; however it has been successfully I'esisted to date.
King said that if they were out with you on the firing line he would not make
such recommendation, but where they were he thought they were legitimate
prey. He, too, you know is up against it for sufficient forces to perform his
tasks. Just stop for a minute and realize that into his heavy routine escort
work he has added at the moment large U. S. troop transports for Iceland on
the one hand, British on another in Northern waters, and stiU another of
20,000 which have been brought over and are now on their way down to Cape
Town and possibly to Durban because of submarines operating off Cape Town.
Obviously these troop movements are highly secret. We are at our wit's end in
the Atlantic with the butter spread extremely thin and the job continuously in-
creasing in toughness.
*******
Regarding permanence of personnel I have been over with Nimitz in detail
some of the recent changes — Nimitz at that time was Chief of Bureau of Per-
sonnel— and he will write you the details. There is a problem here as well
as elsewhere ; and while we expect you and want you to hammer away on your
own difficulties, just occasionally remember that we fully realize our only
[5580] existence here is for the Fleet and that we are doing the best we
can with increasingly vexing problems.
Your letters at least give us ammunition, if not much comfort.
I asked Nimitz last week to give me the figures showing the i)ercentage of men
now on board on the basis of the old complements. Enclosed is a table he has
just handed me. It may be poor consolation but at least it is something to know
that the Fleet has more men now than at any time since the last war. I do not
have the data for tlie last war. This does not mean that we are at all satisfied
with it, but it is something I have been following. I assure you every effort is
being made to improve it. It is steadily improving, but all too slowly to satisfy
any of us.
One thing I forgot to mention was your "the Pacific Fleet must not be consid-
ered a training fleet for support of the Atlantic Fleet and the Shore Establish-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2105
ment". I'll hand tliat one to King. Once in a while something happens which
gives real interest. I thing I'll have a gallery ready to see King when he reads
that, particularly after a recent statement of his that he noted he was getting
fewer men and had less percentage of complement than did the Pacific Fleet,
etc. etc.
IS5S1] 28. There were shortages and deficiencies in material and
manpower, both for the Navy and the Army forces in Hawaii, beyond
our ability to remedy, limited as we were by considerations of indus-
trial capacity and time. However, the ships and planes available were
allocated to the fleets and forces according to the tasks assigned to them
in the War Plan. I considered, as did my principal advisers, that
the forces allocated to the Pacific Fleet were adequate for the execution
of the tasks assigned.
DUTY TO ORDER MOVEMENTS OF THE FLEET IN A MANNER NOT INCONSISTENT
WITH THE WAR PLAN
29. It seems appropriate at this point to say something about the
movements of the United States Fleet during my tour of duty as Chief
of Naval Operations. In October, 1939, the so-called Hawaiian De-
tachment was sent from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor. This detach-
ment consisted of 8 heavy cruisers, 1 aircraft carried and 18 destroyers
plus certain auxiliaries. I felt that basing such a detachment at
Pearl Harbor would demonstrate the weaknesses of that most impor-
tant base and that the remedies for those weaknesses would thereby
be facilitated. I wrote Admiral Bloch, then Commander in Chief,
U. S. Fleet, to that effect on 8 September, 1939. My letter reads in part
as follows:
Again I urge you to keep your eyes toward the [5582] West for I feel
most anything may happen any time.
Not only from a strategic, psychological standpoint do I believ the sending of a
good detachment to Pearl Harbor to be worthwhile, but I also am hopeful it will
show up the weakness in the habitability of that yard to support even a moderate
sized force. I am out to plug every hole I can as soon as I can.
30. Moreover, basing a detachment on Pearl Harbor offered a valu-
able opportunity for training and for familiarizing officers and men
with our various island possessions in the mid-Pacific area. I ex-
plained to Adimral Richardson on 15 March 1940 that :
My original ideas in regard to the Hawaiian Detachment were that possibly, in
fact probably, the Commander of this Detachment would be able to carry out
the regular schedule of gunnery firings and for training would be able to visit
the various island possessions in the mid-Pacific area to familiarize himself with
these possessions and their potential uses in time of war.
I still think that the decision to send the Detachment to Hawaii under present
world conditions is sound. No one can measure how much effect its [5583]
presence there may have on the Orange (Japanese) foreign policy. The State
Department is strong for the present setup and considers it beneficial; they
were in on all discussions, press releases, etc.
31. The Pacific Fleet held its spring maneuvers in the Hawaiian
area in 1940, and after the maneuvers were completed, the fleet was
ordered to remain in that area temporarily. At first it was thought
that the delay in returning to the West Coast would be not more than
two weeks, but the stay was extended from time to time. On 22 May
1940, Admiral Richardson wrote me, asking why the fleet was being
2106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
kept in the Hawaiian area and how long it would probably remain
there. I answered him on 27 May as follows :
You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence
may have on the Japs going into the East Indies. In previous letters I have
hooked this up with the Italians going into the war. The connection is that with
Italy in, it is thought the Japs might feel just that much freer to take inde-
pendent action. We believe both the Germans and the Italians have told the
Japs that so far as they are concerned she, Japan, has a free hand in the
Dutch East Indies.
*******
[5584] Along the same line as the first question presented you would
naturally ask — suppose the Japs do go into the East Indies? What are we going
to do about it? My answer to that is, I don't know and I think there is nobody
on God's green earth who can tell you. I do know my own arguments with re-
gard to this, both in the White House and in the State Department, are in line
with the thoughts contained in your recent letter.
I would point out one thing and that is that even if the decision here were
for the U. S. to take no decisive action if the Japs should decide to go into the
Dutch East Indies, we must not breathe it to a soul, as by so doing we would
completely nullify the reason for your presence in the Hawaiian area. Just
remember that the Japs don't know what we are going to do and so long as
they don't know they may hesitate, or be deterred. These thoughts I have
kept very secret here.
The above I think wil answer the question "why you are there." It does not
answer the question as to how long you will probably stay. Rest assured that the
minute I get this information I will communicate it to you. Nobody can answer
It just now. [5585\ Like you, I have asked the question, and also — like
you — I have been unable to get the answer.
[6686] I pointed out to Admiral Richardson that I hoped the
time spent in the Hawaiian area would have some indirect or incidental
results, such as :
(a) Solving the logistic problems involved including not only supplies from the
U. S. but their handling and storage at Pearl Harbor.
(b) Training, such as you might do under war conditions.
(c) Familiarity of Task Forces with the Midway, Aleutian, Palmyra, Johnston,
Samoa general area, in so far as may be practicable.
(d) Closer liaison with the Army and the common defense of the Hawaiian
area than has ever previously existed between Army and Navy.
(e) Solving of communication problems involved by joint action between Army
and Navy and particularly stressing the air communications.
(f) Security of the Fleet at anchor.
(g) Accentuating the realization that the Hawaiian group consists of con-
siderably more than just Oahu.
Admiral Richardson pointed out the deficiencies of Pearl Harbor as
a Naval Base. These deficiencies were appreciated, both by the Navy
Department and by the President, [6687] but it was decided as
a matter of policy to keep the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area.
During 1940 and 1941, many of the shortcomings of Pearl Harbor as a
base, disclosed by the long stay of the Pacific Fleet, were remedied.
The Annual Report of the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific
Fleet for the year ending 30 June 1941, states :
(h) Bases
* * * * * * •
(3) . Haicaiian Area.
Pearl Harbor. Many of the deficiencies of this base, disclosed by the prolonged
stay of the U. S. Pacific Fleet in this area, listed in last year's report, cither
have been or are now in process of correction. The commissioning of the Naval
Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, and the stationing of 3 patrol plane squadrons there has
relieved the congestion, for planes of this type, at Ford Island. However, facili-
ties for carrier groups are still inadequate and considerable congestion still exists.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2107
It Is probable that this condition, while being ameliorated by progress of current
projects at Ford Island, will not be completely satisfactory until completion of
the work at Barber's Point — sometime in the future.
Work on additional shops, the new drydocks, the net depot and target repair
base at Bishop's Point is continuing and being accelerated as fast as delivery
of material and availability of workmen permit. It is expected that, with the
completion of the additional workmen from the mainland, the industrial capacity
of the yard will be materially increased.
Remaining deficiencies, on which satisfactory progress is not being made, are :
(a) Insufficiency in numbers and types of small craft to adequately service a
large fleet, particularly in the supply of oil, gasoline, provisions, water, general
stores and ammunition. Provision for augmented means for delivery of fresh
water, made necessary by reduced capacity of ship's distilling plants due to con-
taminated waters of Pearl Harbor, is a present pressing need.
(b) Inadequate local defense forces to provide for the safety of the Fleet
in harbor and for the Important functions of shipping control and other re-
quirements of the Fourteenth Naval District. Specifically, the situaion in regard
of such forces is as follows :
(1) Insufficient patrol craft, particularly anti-submarine types.
(2) District patrol and observation aircraft, [5589'] though allocated
in the aircraft expansion program, not yet available.
(3) Insufficient army anti-aircraft guns actually available.
(c) Provision of additional torpedo overhaul and storage facilities.
34. We recognized the deficiencies in small craft and local defense
forces referred to by the Commander in Chief, but again it was a mat-
ter of not having enough vessels. I summed up this situatiton in a
letter to Admiral Kimmel dated 10 February 1941 :
I wish we could send Admiral Bloch more local defense forces for the 14th
Naval District but we simply haven't got them. If more are needed I see no
other immediate solution than for you to supply them. I am moving Heaven and
earth to speed up a considerable program we have for small craft and patrol
vessels for the Districts but like everything else, it takes time and "dollars cannot
buy yesterday."
Again, on 28 August 1941, 1 wrote Admiral Kimmel :
I note what you say about not resting until you get the patrol vessels you
have requested in official correspondence. I might add "neither will I." You
know I am keenly alive to your needs. At present we [5590] are con-
stantly fighting material shortage and priorities. You are thoroughly familiar
with the building program and the dates of completion so no need to comment on
it. We are ahead of schedule at present but the steel situation grows more
critical daily and at last I believe the blocks are going to be put on unnecessary
civilian needs."
35. That fleet gunnery improved during the stay at Pearl Harbor is
demonstrated by Admiral Kimmel's letter of 12 August 1941 :
I feel that gunnery in the Fleet is better than we have any right to expect
considering the enormous changes in personnel and the lack of permanency of
the officers. We have of course stressed battle procedures above everything
else and you well know how much more experience and training it takes to be
' prepared for battle than for a target practice. * * *
Recent directives from the Office of Fleet Training have put our target prac-
tices on a much more realistic and practical basis. We feel that in the event of
hostilities we will be forced to make very few changes, if any, in these directives.
We are scheduling our services and area assignments in accordance with these
directives now and I hear from all sides that it is [5591] considered much
more satisfactory than anything we have ever had before.
36. About mid-1941, to meet the immediate needs in the Atlantic,
we moved certain forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic. This shift
was contemplated by the Navy Basic War Plan, WPL-46.
2108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
37. In this connection, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, ex-
pressed concern in a letter to me dated 12 September 1941 regarding
possible further transfers from the Pacific to the Atlantic. He wrote :
The emphasis, in the Pi-esident's speech, on the Atlantic also brings up the
question of a possible further weakening of this Fleet. A strong Pacific Fleet
is unquestionably a deterrent to Japan — a wealier one may be an invitation. I
cannot escape the conclusion that the maintenance of the "status quo" out here
is almost entirely a matter of the strength of this Fleet. It must not be reduced,
and, in event of actual hostilities, must be increased if we are to undertake a
bold offensive.
On 23 September 1941, 1 wrote Admiral Kimmel :
We have no intention of further reducing the Pacific Fleet except that pre-
scribed in Rainbow 5, that is the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month
[5592] after Japan and the United States are at war. The existing force
in the Pacific is all that can be spared for the tasks assigned your fleet, and new
construction will not make itself felt until next year.
38. We had pursued the policy of making no transfers of units from
one fleet to another except as such transfers were provided for in
WPL-46. The last transfers prior to 7 December 1941 of surface
combatant units from the Pacific to the Atlantic were accomplished
in June 1941. A comparison of the forces allotted the Pacific Fleet
in the Navy Basic War Plan (May 1941) with the Administrative
Organization of the Pacific Fleet published 1 October 1941 (13CN-41)
shows that the forces — both surface units and aircraft — under the
command of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, immediately
prior to 7 December 1941 were — with no substantial differences — in
accordance with the Navy Basic War Plan.
39. In accordance with WPL-46, there were assigned to the Pacific
Fleet 107 patrol planes suitable for long-range reconnaissance. Of
this number, 24 planes of PATWING 4 were in the United States or
Alaska just prior to 7 December. Of the remaining 83 patrol planes,
approximately 60 were available in the Hawaiian area during the
period immediately preceding the Japanese attack.
[SS93] DUTY TO KEEP FLEET COMMANDERS INFORMED
OF POmTICAL ANt) MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
40. During my tour of duty as Chief of Naval Operations, my office
maintained a close liaison with the State Department and the Army.
The Central Division — a part of the Office of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions— was charged with the duty of keeping in touch with activities
of the State Department which affected the Navy. The head of the
Central Division met frequently with representatives of the Far East-
ern Division of the State Department, and he kept me informed regard-
ing important diplomatic and political developments in the Far East.
I was a member of a liaison committee which was established by the
State, War, and Navy Departments for the consideration of matters
of mutual concern, the committee consisting of the Under Secretary
of State, the Chief of Staff (Army) and the Chief of Naval Operations
(Navy). This committee usually met weekly, and in addition, I had
many conferences with the Secretary of State. I consulted with
General Marshall concerning military matters, and we worked very
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2109
closely together, either by telephone or by personal visits. My duties
also required frequent consultation with the President.
41. In addition to the information gained from the above sources,
I had available the information obtained by the [5594-^ Office
of Naval Intelligence, A meeting was held in the Office of the Sec-
retary of the Navy each morning which was attended by the heads of
the various divisions of Operations and certain other key officers in
the Navy Department. At these meetings the Director of Naval Intel-
ligence gave a resume of the information received since the last meet-
ing on the military situation throughout the world, and other infor-
mation such as that on international politics which he believed to be
of value. He also brought to me at other times such information as
he considered important. From time to time the Director of War
Plans prepared estimates of the military situation in the Pacific for
my information, and the information of the key officers of my staff.
42. It was my duty, of course, to keep the fleet commanders in
Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic waters informed of significant develop-
ments in political and military matters of concern to them. It was
always my purpose to give these commanders the best information
and estimates of the situation available to me, not only through offi-
cial letters and dispatches, but also by means of frequent and regular
personal letters. I might point out, in passing, that there was nothing
unusual in this so-called "personal" correspondence between the Chief
of Naval Operations and the Commanders in Chief — it was a long-
established custom when I took office.
[5695] 43. Admiral Kichardson became Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, and Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, on 6 Jan-
uary 1940. On 18 January, I wrote him in part as follows :
* * * I have a letter from Tommy Hart (Admiral Hart, Commander-in-
Chief, Asiatic Fleet), Just received, in which he thinks the situation in the Far
East is very serious and that this year may prove to be a crucial and critical
one. As I have written Bloch (Admiral Bloch, retiring CommandeiMn-Chief,
U. S. Fleet), and as you undoubtedly know, I have continually asked him to bear
in mind what is going on to the Westward which in this particular period in this
old world's history may be far more important to us than the troubles in Europe,
especially if something should break and break quickly and without warning. It
is something, in my humble opinion, for which you should be mentally prepared.
Anything in this wide world I can do to help, of course I will ; that is my only
reason for existing here. * * *
44. Throughout 1940, 1 continued to write these personal letters to
Admiral Richardson two or three times a month and during some
periods as often as once a week. On several questions raised by Ad-
miral Richardson, my answers were in- [5596] definite and as
unsatisfactory to him as they were to me. I was entirely sympathetic
with his desire for information and for the answers to such questions
as, "How long is the fleet to stay in the Hawaiian Area"?, or 'Suppose
the Japs to go into the East Indies, what are we going to do about it?"
I, too, wanted the answers to those questions and to similar questions.
I had asked them myself in the White House and in the State Depart-
ment, but like Admiral Richardson, I was unable to get the answers.
Moreover, my honest opinion was that no one knew the answers to
such questions.
45. During this same period, Admiral Hart also had questions he
wanted me to answer. I was up against the same situation — they were
2110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
not matters on which I had the final say, and I was unable to get
answers for him. On 22 October 1940, 1 wrote Admiral Hart :
I wish there was something I could give you from the State Department but
there isn't. I think I may say safely, however, that there will be no backdown
anywhere by the United States in the Far East, unless there is a right-about-face
in present day policy.
46. On 12 November 1940, I wrote Admiral Hart, giving him the
current picture as I saw it, sending a copy of this letter to Admiral
Richardson. It is an example of the estimates of the situation which
I passed to the fleet commanders from time [6597] to time and
reads in part as follows :
"The Navy can, of course, make no political commitments. Therefore, we
can make no specific military plans for an allied war. However, as I told you in
my despatch, you can perform a useful service by laying, with the British and
possibly the Dutch, a framework for a future plan of cooperation, should we be
forced into the war. I rather doubt, however, that the Dutch will talk freely
with you. If they do my idea would be that you would explore the fields of :
Command arrangements.
General objectives ;
General plan of cooperative action, including the approximate naval and mili-
tary deployment.
"I do not believe Japan will attack us if she can avoid doing so.
I invite attention to the fact that this letter was written in November 1940.
"In fact, I believe she will go far to avoid hostilities with the United States. It
is even doubtful if she wishes, at this time to fight the British or the Dutch. It
seems more likely that she would prefer, while maintaining a position of readi-
ness, to consolidate Indo-China with her positions further north, and to begin a
more or less [5598] gradual economic penetration of the Netherlands
East Indies and Siam. Should we refrain from imposing additional economic
sanctions, present conditions, including the recent 1,800,000 ton oil contract,
might be stabilized over a considerable period of the future. Our State Depart-
ment, as you may know, had a hand in the execution of that contract.
"But we never can tell. Should a war develop between Japan and an alliance
of British, Dutch, and Americans, I believe that Japan will plan to :
"(a) Occupy Guam, and reinforce the Mandates with troops, submarines, and
some air ;
"(b) Establish naval control of Philippine Waters by destroying our naval and
air forces, basing her main fleet in the Pescadores and a strong, fast detachment
in Halmahera ;
"(c) Capture Luzon with troops now b-ised in Formosa and Hainan;
"(d) Capture Borneo, to be followed by a campaign against the Dutch directed
from East to West.
"I believe that the allied objective should be to reduce Japan's offensive power
through economic starvation ; the success of the blockade would surely depend
upon allied ability to hold the major portion of the Malay Barrier. Tour own
action would, of course, be based upon your view as to the [5599] most
effective method of contributing to the attainment of the ultimate objective.
"One thing (and this is for your ears alone) you can depend upon is that we
would support you, probably by sending a naval reenforcement to you at Soerabaja
or Singapore, and by other means. I would be glad to get your views as to the
size and composition of such a reenforcement; but in making your recommenda-
tion I trust you will keep in mind that our Navy must hold in the Mid-Pacific, that
we may also be in the war against the other two Axis Powers, and that the col-
lapse of Britain would force us to a major re-orientation toward the Atlantic.
"You may well appreciate that I do not welcome such a war (British Collapse)."
47. In the last letter I wrote to Admiral Richardson as Commander
in Chief, U. S. Fleet— on 23 December 1940—1 said:
There is little that I can add which is not repetition, but I shall repeat just
the same that every 24 hours past is just one day nearer to actual hostilities and
that your flag officers and captains should be completely in the frame of mind that
we will be in the fighting business most any time, and purely as a guess on my
own part, I would say at any time after the [5600] next 90 days. Our
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2111
heads and our hearts and every ounce of energy that we have should be devoted
exclusively to the business of war and keeping fit — and I don't mean maybe.
48. Admiral Kimmel succeeded Admiral Richardson as Commander
in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, on 1
February 1941. On 13 January, just after his selection for Com-
mander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, I wrote Admiral Kimmel in part as
follows :
* * * I am hoping J. O. (Admiral Richardson) will turn over the personal
letters I have written him. They give all the slants here that I know and they
show the urgency as I see it. In my humble opinion, we may wake up any day
with some mines deposited on our front door step or with some of our ships
bombed, or whatnot, and find ourselves in another undeclared war, the ramifica-
tions of which call for our strongest and sanest imagination and plans.
I have told the Gang here for months past that in my opinion we were heading
straight for this war, that we could not assume anything else and personally
I do not see how we can avoid, either having it thrust upon us or of our delib-
erately going in, many months longer. And of course it may be a matter of
weeks or of days. I would like to feel that I could be perfectly complacent if
some day someone opens [5601] the door of my office and reports that
the war is on. I have been moving Heaven and Earth trying to meet such a
situation and am terribly impatient at the slowness with which things move here,
even though I know much has been accomplished, there still remains much to
be done.
My estimate of the situation which I presented to the Secretary and Rainbow
3, both of which you should have, will give you fairly clearly my own thoughts.
Of course I do not want to become involved in the Pacific, if it is possible to
avoid it. I have fought this out time and time again in the highest tribunals
but I also fully realize that we may become involved in the Pacific and in the
Atlantic at the same time; and to put it mildly, it will be one H of a job,
and that is one reason why I am thankful that I have your calm judgment,
your imagination, your courage, your guts and your good head, at the seagoing
end.
49. It was my constant endeavor to keep Admiral Kjmmel in-
formed of significant events of a political or military nature which
affected the interests of the United States.
On 10 February 1941 1 wrote :
I continue to press Marshall to reinforce Oahu and elsewhere. You now know
that he is sending out 81 fighters to Oahu, which will give that place 50 fairly
good ones and 50 of the latest type. I jumped to give him the [5602] trans-
portation for them in carriers when he requested it. I hope too, you will get the
Marines to Midway, .Johnston and Palmyra, as soon as you can. They may have
to rough it for a time until barracks are built, and the water supply, if inadequate,
will have to be provided somehow just like it would be if they had captured an
enemy atoll.
Speaking of Marshall, he is a tower of strength to us all, and I couldn't conceive
of a happier relationship than exists between him and me. He will go to almost
any length possible to help us out and sometimes contrary to his own advisors.
51. On 25 February 1941, 1 wrote:
I hesitated to take the chance of upsetting you with my despatch and letter
concerning a visit of a detachment of surface forces to the Far East. I agree with
you that it is unwise. But even since my last letter to you, the subject has twice
come up in the White House. Each of the many times it has arisen, my view has
prevailed, but the time -might come when it will not. I gave you the information
merely as a sort of advance notice.
The difliculty is that the entire country is in a dozen minds about the war — to
stay out altogether, to go in against Germany in the Atlantic, to concentrate
against Japan in the Pacific and the Far East — I simply can not predict the
outcome. Gallup polls, editorials, talk on [560S] the Hill (and I might
add, all of which is irresponsible) constitute a rising tide for action in the Far
East if the Japanese go into Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies. This can
not be ignored and we must have in the back of our heads the possibility of having
2112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to swing to that tide. If it should prevail against Navy Department recom-
mendations, you would have to implement Rainbow III, and forget my later
despatch concerning "Plan Dog." This would mean that any reinfox'cement to
the Atlantic might become impossible, and, in any case, would be reduced by
just so nmch as we would send to the Asiatic. And that might be a very serious
matter for Britain.
52. Enclosed with this last letter was a memorandum for the Presi-
dent in which I had recommended against sending a detachment of
the Pacific Fleet to the Philippines. In this memorandum, I said :
If we are forced into the war our main effort as approved to date will be
directed in the Atlantic against Germany. We should, if possible, not be drawn
into a major war in the Far East. I believe the Pacific Fleet should at least at
first remain strong until we see what Japan is going to do. If she remains quiet,
or even if she moves strongly toward Malaysia, we could then vigorously attack
the Mandates and Japanese communications in order to weaken Japan's attack
on the British and Dutch. We would also then [5604] be able to spare
forces for the Atlantic.
********
I have just read a paraphrase of a telegram of 7 February from the American
Embassy at Tokyo, which the State Department has furnished us. In it appears
the following:
"Risk of war would be certain to follow increased concentration of American
vessels in the Far East. As it is not possible to evaluate with certainty the
imponderable factor which such risks constitute, the risk should not be taken
unless our country is ready to force hostilities."
You undoubtedly have seen the entire despatch and obviously I am picking out
the portion which supports my view.
53. Admiral Kimmel, in a letter dated February 19^11. had asked
that the responsibility for sending him secret intelligence information
be fixed in order that he would miss nothing of interest to the Fleet.
In my reply of 22 March, I wrote :
With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and
responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to CincUS, Kirk informs
me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately
informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal ele-
ments within the United States. He further says that information concerning
the location of all Japanese merchant vessels is forwarded by airmail weekly
[5605] to you and that, if you wish, this information can he issued more fre-
quently, or sent by dispatch. As you know, ONI 49 contains a section devoted
to Japanese trade routes, the commodities which move over these trade routes,
and the volume of shipping which moves over each route.
[6606'\ 54. On 26 April — a month before the promulgation of
Rainbow No. 5 — I wrote :
This is just to get you mentally prepared that shortly a considerable detach-
ment from your fleet will be brought to the Atlantic.
You will recall from my last letter what that detachment was and what the
President cut it to. but only for the time being, awaiting some further clue to the
Japanese situation.
Not only do I anticipate the reinforcing of the Atlantic by the 3 BBs, ICV,
4CLs and 2 squadrons of destroyers, but also by further reinforcements.
King has been given a job to do with a force utterly inadequate to do it on
any efficient scale.
I am enclosing a copy of his last order which implements the changed Hemis-
pheric Defense Plan No. 1 and is now known as Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 2
or WPL^9.
Even the Press and those who wanted to go all out in the Pacific are now
rounding to and clamoring for an all out in the Atlantic. You know my thoughts
with regard to this which were set down in my Memo about what is now known
as Plan Dog and which will shortly be covered by Rainbow 5.
[5607] Action on the above, that is transfer to the Atlantic, may come at
any time, and in my humble opinion is only a matter of time.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2113
No other news for the moment and this letter is the result of a long conference
yesterday in the White House.
I am sending a copy as usual to Tommy Hart.
55. On 14 May 1941, 1 sent a letter to the commandants of 12 of the
naval districts, including Panama and Hawaii, with copies to Ad-
mirals King, Kimmel and Hart, in which I said :
What will happen to the Pacific is anyone's guess ; but here, too, there is only
one safe course ; that is to be prepared, so far as humanly possible. Though the
danger of mines, raiding and diversions, and even of sporadic or stunt air
attack, may be more remote in the Eastern Pacific, we cannot discount it, and
hence should likewise be bending every ounce of effort of which we are capable
not to be caught napping in that area. Japan may come in the second Germany
does — possibly preplanned joint action. Russia is still a ?
56. My letter to Admiral Kimmel of 24 May 1941 points up some
of the problems we were facing with respect to both the Atlantic and
the Pacific. I wrote:
You have probably been surprised over the movements of transports, Marines,
hospital ships, etc., to [560S'i the east coast, which you have, or will have
shortly received. Please keep the following with regard to it highly secret,
known only to your trusted few whom I assume you keep informed regarding
such matters. In this I include Bloch.
Day before yesterday afternoon the President gave me an over all limit of 30
days to prepare and have ready an expedition of 25,000 men to sail for, and to
take the Azores. Whether or not there would be opposition I do not know but
we have to be fully prepared for strenuous opposition. You can visualize the
job particularly when I tell you that the Azores recently have been greatly re-
inforced. The Army of course will be in on this but the Navy and the Marines
will bear the brunt.
I know your reaction will be "Why didn't we get the transports and assemble
such a force months and months ago." My only answer to that is that such
thoughts are water over the dam. and I am confronted with the problem as is
and not one as I would like to have had it, and for which I would like to have
been ready long ago. I simply could not get authority to acquire and prepare
the necessary train.
King of course is active and operating in connection with Atlantic problems —
our own and the British. He has nothing like what he would like to have or
what we [5609] would like to give him if we had it to give. I do not
contemplate for the moment ordering anything additional to the Atlantic except
auxiliaries in connection with the Azores task and except possibly later four
CA's as per Rainbow 5. However, I am not the final "Boss of this show."
The Force which we are preparing to go to North Ireland and Scotland on
the outbreak of war is coming along in good shape so far as the Navy is con-
cerned but the Army has neither the equipment, the ammunition nor the aircraft
to defend these bases; fall again being the earliest date when they can do
this for us. Meanwhile we will try and find some way of solving it with Marines
and British help if we are in the war before that time. God knows what will
happen if we are not in by that time though personally I give the British a longer
time than do most people here in their ability to hold out. I most emphatically
do not believe they can hold out indefinitely without effective aid from us. We
are being pressed for ammunition and material from the South American Re-
publics— not a h^ppy situation — and not to mention British requests for more
DD's etc.
57. Admiral Kimmel had raised the matter of the un- [5610]
certainty of his information before his trip to Washington in mid-1941.
Among other things he mentioned his uncertainty as to the future
strength of his fleet. In a letter dated 26 May 1941, he said:
The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is
far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing
situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy,
reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to
evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of
79716— 46— pt. 5 5
2114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically
affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information
is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contra-
venes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so
necessary to the conduct of military operations.
It is realized that, on occasions, the rapid developments in the inter-
national picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even
the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may
militate against the furnishings of timely information, but certainly
the present situation is susceptible to marked improve- [6611]
ment. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and ob-
jectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Com-
mander in Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even reorient his
possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is
particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the
necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be
carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this
training, by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending
eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time,
the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation,
particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island de-
velopment, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander
in Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather
than by categorical instructions.
It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Com-
mander in Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all im-
portant developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means
available.
58. Admiral Kimmel brought this letter with him when he came to
Washington. I considered the matters raised so important that I had
the letter circulated among the principal [5612] officers of the
Department and later assembled them for a full discussion of these
problems with Admiral Kimmel. While there was no formal reply to
this letter, I feel sure that when Admiral Kimmel left Washington,
he was fully informed of the situation as we knew it.
59. On 24 July 1941, I wrote Admiral Hart, sending a copy of the
letter to Admiral Kimmel. I told them that :
Yesterday, before Nomura went to the State Department, I had a two hour
talk with him ; A'ery interesting, as my previous talks with him have been, and
of course he is worried. I believe him to be genuinely sincere in his desire that
Japan and the United States do not come to an open rupture. Of course, I have
that same desire, but there are many flies in the ointment, and in my talks with
him I have not minced matters one particle, or minimized the dilBculties, or in
any way condoned Japan's present course of action, or hesitated to discuss per-
fectly frankly the shallowness of some of the reasons she is putting out in defense
of her actions. We have had very plain talk. I like him and, as you know, he
has many friends in our Navy. Nomura dwelt at length on his country's need
for the rice and the minerals [5613} of Indo-Chlna. My guess is that
with the establishment of bases in Indo-China, they will stop for the time being,
consolidate their positions, and await world reaction to their latest move. No
doubt they will use their Indo-China bases from which to take early action against
the Burma Road. Of course, there is the xwssibility that they will strike at
Borneo. I doubt that this will be done in the near future, unless we embargo oil
shipments to them. Tliis; question of onUiargo has been up many times and I have
consistently opposed it just as strongly as I could. My further thought is that
they will do nothing in I'egard to the Maritime provinces until the outcome of
the German-Russian war on the continent is more certain. If the Russians are
well beaten down, I think it highly probable that they will move into Siberia.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 21l5
Meanwhile, they are merrily going their way and just where it all will end I dN
not know.
I had a talk with the President after the Cabinet meeting last Friday and
again yesterday after my chat with Nomura, and have succeeded in securing
an appointment with the President for him today. I hope no open rupture will
come, particularly at this time, but it would be wishful thinking to eliminate
such a [5614] possibility or to think that conditions are getting better
rather than worse. However, we can still struggle for something better, and
I want you to kuow that I am.
[5616] 60. On 26 July 1941, following the Japanese move into
Indochina, the President issued an executive order freezing Japanese
assets in the United States in the same manner in which assets of vari-
ous European countries were frozen on 14 June 1941. I sent a priority
dispatch to commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, commander in chief
Asiatic Fleet, and commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet, on July 25
reading as follows :
This Is a joint despatch from the CNO and the Chief of Staff U. S. Army.
Appropriate adees deliver copies to Commanding Generals Hawaii, Philippines
and Caribbean defense command and to General Chaney in London.
You are advised that at 1400 GCT July 26th United States will Impose economic
sanctions against Japan. It is expected these sanctions will embargo all trade
between Japan and the United States subject to modification through a licensing
system lor certain material. It is anticipated that export licenses will be
granted for certain grades of petroleum products, cotton, and possibly some
other materials and that import licenses may be granted for raw silk. Japanese
assets and funds in the United States will be frozen except that they may be moved
if licenses are granted for such movement. It is not, repeat not, expected
[5616] that Japanese merchant vessels in United States ports will be seized
at this time. United States Flag merchant vessels will not at present be ordered
to depart from or not to enter ports controlled by Japan. CNO and COS do not
anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military
means but you are furnished this information in order tliat you may take appro-
priate precautionary measures against possible eventualities. Action being ini-
tiated by the United States Army to call the Philippine Army into active service
at an early date.
This despatch is to be kept secret except from immediate Navy and Army
subordinates. SPENAVO inform CNS but warn him against disclosure.
61. The foreign policy of the United States has never been very
clearly defined — certainly not fixed — and it must have been necessary
for the President and the State Department to feel their way along
carefully in many situations. It was impossible, however, for the
Navy to plan on the basis of a well-known and clearly defined foreign
policy, desirable as that might have been. In discussing our planning
problems in a letter to Admiral Hart dated 9 February 1940, 1 wrote :
In view of the actual situation existing today in the Far East and elsewhere,
we might well say that [5617] we need "Tension Plans" as well as "War
Plans." But to prepare well considered "Tension Plans" we need a planning
machinery that includes the State Department and possibly the Treasury De-
partment as well as the War and Navy Departments. Of course, we have plan-
ning machinery for the Army and Navy which now provides for a better coordi-
nation of planning effort than has existed in the past. We do not, however,
have regularly set up planning machinery that brings in the State Department.
It is true that we have frequent consultation with the State Department, but
things are not planned in advance, and often we do not receive advance informa-
tion of State Department action which might well have affected our own
activities.
It is also true, of course, that the State Department must in a country such as
ours feel its way allong to a large extent. This is unavoidable. In view of this
the State Department is probably unable always to set up, in advance, concrete
programs of their intentions.
*******
2116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Undoubtedly the disposition of your forces could be better guided if you could
be kept advised in advance of actions contemplated by the State [5618]
Department. Whenever it is possible to do so, we vs^ill keep you so advised, and
whenever State Department policies for either temporary or longer contem-
plated periods can be set forth, I will keep you informed of them.
62. We had gone on record at the State Department with our views
regarding an embargo on oil. I made it plain to the State Depart-
ment— as I had in my letter to Admirals Kimmel and Hart — that I
believed if Japan's oil supply were cut off, she would go to war to get
it. I did not think that necessarily meant war with us, but with some
power from which she could take oil.
63. In its official publication "Peace and War," the State Depart-
ment confirms the fact that the State, War, and Navy Departments
all understood this position. It states at page 88 :
Throughout this period (1938-1940) the United States Government had under
active consideration various ways and means which might be used to induce
Japan to renounce its policies and programs of conquest and domination tli rough
the use of force or threat of force. Among other methods, this Government
frequently had under consideration the question of applying economic pressure —
advocated in many quarters [5619] as a means of checking Japanese
aggression. It was tlie opinion of the responsible officials of the Government,
including the highest military and naval authorities, that adoption and applica-
tion of a policy of imposing embargoes upon strategic exports to Japan would be
attended with serious risk of retaliatory action of a character likely to lead to
this country's becoming involved in war. Practically all realistic authorities
have been agreed that imposition of substantial economic sanctions or embargoes
against any strong country, unless that imposition be backed by show of superior
force, involves serious risk of war.
The President and the heads of the Army and the Navy and the Department of
State were in constant consultation throughout this period in regard to all
aspects of the military and diplomatic situation confronting the United States.
*******
They were in agreement that prevailing public opinion in this country and,
with the imminence of and finally the outbreak of war in Europe, the compara-
tive military unpreparedness of this country were such as to render it inadvisable
to risk, by resort to drastic economic measures against Japan, involvement in
war.
[S6201 The Chairman. The hour of 12 : 30 having arrived, we
will recess until 2 o'clock. Admiral.
Admiral Stark. All right, sir.
(Whereupon, at 12 : 30 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m., of the
same day.)
[6621'\ AFIERNOON SESSION 2 p. M.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Admiral Stark, you may proceed with your statement.
TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)
Admiral Stark. The top of page 41, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Yes.
Admiral Stark. 6-1. On 28 August 1941, 1 wrote Admiral Kimmel :
With regard to the general situation in the Pacific about all I can say is the
Japs seem to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods. I can
only intimate to you that some very strong messages have been sent to them but
just what they are going to do I don't know.
I told one of their Statesmen this morning that I felt another move, such
as one into Thailand, would go a long way towards destroying before the
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2117
American public what good-will still remained. As you know, I have had some
extremely frank talks with them.
I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but I could wish
the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender.
65. On 22 September 1941, I wrote Admiral Hart, sending
[56^2] Admiral Kimmel a coj)y of my letter. It shows not only
the picture existing at that time in the Pacific, but also reminds us
of our pressing and immediate problems in the Atlantic. I quote:
So far as the Atlantic is concerned, we are all but, if not actually, in it. The
President's speech of September 11, 1941 put the matter squarely before the
country and outlined what he expected of the Navy. We were ready for this;
in fact, our orders had been issued.
In addition to the incidents cited by the President, other and probably equally
compelling reasons lay behind his decision. For some time, the British have
found the problem of getting supplies across the Atlantic a difficult one. They
have never had enough ships suitable for escort duty. Their forces are thinly
spread and, as a result of casualties, the spreading has had to be thinner and
thinner as the campaign has progressed. If Britain is to continue, she has to
have assistance. She will now get it openly. King's forces, too, are thinly
spread, working as he is from 20 South to the Iceland area.
In a nutshell, we are now escorting convoys [562S] regularly from the
United States to points in the Iceland area, where these convoys are picked
up by the British and escorted to the British Isles. In addition to our own
escort vessels, the Canadians are participating. Both forces (Canadian and
our own) are operating under King's direction.
This will be a boon for the British. It will permit them to strengthen their
forces elsewhere, both with heavy and light ships, particularly in critical areas
through which convoys for the Near East via the Cape of Good Hope, must pass.
It will further help the British to meet the ever-present threat of a raid on
troop or merchant ship convoys by heavy units, in that it will narrow the area
in which the British heavy units will be required to be responsible. Moreover,
ships for other possible activities, such as duty in the Mediterranean, etc., will
thus be released.
The area which we regard as ''our ocean" is roughly outlined as follows: all
west of a line 10° West Longitude to Latitude 65° North, thence by rhumb line
to a position 53° North, 26° West, thence south on 26°. Unless the Axis powers
withdraw their menof-war from this area, contacts are almost certain [5624]
to occur. The rest requires little imagination.
That line, sir, rims up 26, which runs through the Azores and then
it slopes up to the eastward of Iceland and then on north.
* * * * i)s ^ m
Iceland has, of course, in recent months, taken on much significance for us.
Since the President's speech, it has taken on added significance. Since July, we
have had 4500 Marines there, and on Monday last we landed some 6000 Army.
While this Army convoy was enroute, the Germans had by far the strongest con-
centration of U-Boats that they have ever had in the North Atlantic. It was so
strong and so active that it raised the very devil with a British-escorted convoy,
the Germans claiming 28 ships sunk. About half that number is more nearly
correct and admitted by the British. Our own Army troop convoys was in the
immediate vicinity of the attack and had to be re-routed by despatch several times
in an effort to avoid the area of action. At that, seven SS contacts were had.
We should have gotten at least one SS, which was attacked under favorable
circumstances.
As to conditions in your part of the world, Mr. Hull has not yet given up hope
of a satisfactory [2625] settlement of our differences with Japan.
Chances of such a settlemen are, in my judgment, very slight. Admiral Nomura is
working hard on his home government and while he appears to be making some
progress, I am still from Missouri. It looks like a dead-lock ; but I suppose as
long as there is negotiation there is hope.
The press is making much at the moment of the way the Far Eastern situation
has apparently quieted down. One can not help being impressed with the opti-
mistic note of the editorial writers and columnists in this regard. For my own
part, I feel that false hopes are beng raised. While on the surface the Japanese ap-
2118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
pear to be making some effort at reaching a satisfactory solution, I can not disre-
gard the possibility that they are merely stalling for time and waiting until the
situation in Europe becofes more stablized. If Russa falls, Japan is not going to
be easily pried away from her Axis associations. She will no doubt grab any op-
portunity that presents itself to improve her position in Sbera. If Russa can hold
out (which at the moment, hardly appears possible), I feel that there might be
more hope of some sort of an agreement with Japan.
The same sort of false hopes are being raised [5626] in our press with
reference to the German-Russian situation. There is no question but that the
Greece and Crete incidents delayed Germany's move on their Eastern front. I
think it quite probable that they intended to move against Russia earlier in the
year. If the delay incident to the two campaigns noted above have introduced
sufficient delay in their time table, which, coupled with Russian resistance, will
permit the Russians to carry on some sort of a front this winter, then possibly
those two debacles were not entirely without compensation. The Hun is after
the Russ Army. It has proved far more of a stumbling block than Hitler had
imagined. However, the Germans are making steady progress. The Russian
losses in men and material are great, and production of essential war materials
is being much lessened. When the Harriman mission returns from Moscow (Ad-
miral Standley is our senior Navy member), we will probably get some real news.
Harry Hopkins saw only Stalin. The Russian Military Mission that is now in the
United States has presented very large requests for war materials, and it makes
our own planning an ever changing affair.
[5627] You now have our reply to your official recommendation concerning
the withdrawal of the Marines from China. We recognize the soundness of all
your arguments, pro and con, and we put more weight on those questioning with-
drawal. We feel that a complete withdrawal of our forces from China would
create a reaction in that country and in Japan and in our own, that would be bad.
So, for the moment at least, we will hang on. I know you will open it up again
by letter or despatch if you consider it should be again reviewed; and it very well
may be — there is little that is static in this old world at present.
I would be less than frank if I did not tell you that I am not fully supported in
the above view. Tommy Holcomb wants to withdraw, lock, stock and barrel.
Tommy Holcomb was major general of the Marine Corps, major
general commandant.
I can easily see his point of view. He wants to avoid, if at all possible, "blood
letting." In this, he is supported by Colonel Peck. That officer feels that all or
none of the marines should come out. Peck is against leaving a "token force."
He feels that to do so, we are inviting trouble and that the "token force" can be
of little support to the local police. In that, I agree. But, something bigger is
at stake. So far as China is concerned, we have [5628] "our foot in the
door — the door that once was "open," and if I had the say so, it would remain
there until I was ready to withdraw it — or until the door opened to such a point
that I could gracefully withdraw if and when I saw fit. I agree that proper tim-
ing may be extremely difficult. You may be right that they should come now.
I hope I am right in holding on. Ultimately, I hope we may both see alike. I
don't enjoy not being 100 per cent with you.
You know how I have long felt about reinforcing the Philippines. The en-
closed memorandum shows what is in the wind. Personally, I am delighted,
and I am sure you will be, too. I think it should have a pronounced effect in
prevention — or, if not, then in execution.
66. In sending a copy of the foregoing letter to Admiral Kimmel,
I sought to also put at rest some fears he had expressed about the pos-
sibility of taking additional units from the Pacific to bolster our thinly
spread forces in the Atlantic. I told him, in a letter dated 23 Sep-
tember 1941 :
We have no intention of further reducing the Pacific Fleet except that pre-
scribed in Rainbow 5. that is the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month
after Japan and the United States are at war. The existing force in the Pacific
is all that can be spared for the tasks assigned your fleet, and new construction
will not make itself felt [5629] until nest year.
In this same letter I also added :
I have held this letter up pending a talk with Mr. Hull who has asked me to
bold it very secret. I may sum it up by saying that conversations icith the Japs
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2119
have practically reached an impasse. As I see it we can get nowhere towards
a settlement and peace in the Far East until and unless there is some agreement
between Japan and China — and just now that seems remote. Whether or not
their inability to come to any sort of understanding just now — is — or — is not —
a good thing — I hesitate to say.
Admiral Nomura — that is Ambassador Nomura — came in to see me this morn-
ing. We talked for about an hour. He usually comes in when he begins to feel
near the end of his rope ; there is not much to spare at the end now. I have
helped before but whether I can this time or not I do not know. Conversations
without results cannot last forever. If they fall through, and it looks like they
might, the situation could only grow more tense. I have again talked to Mr. Hull
and I think he will make one more try. He keeps me pretty fully informed and
if there is anything of moment I will, of course, hasten to let you know.
67. I would like to point out that while I have stressed, in the ex-
tracts I have read, the information I gave the [S630'] com-
manders in chief on political and military developments affecting the
international situation, I also maintained a very great interest in
seeing that the commanders in chief were adequately informed on
technical matters affecting their forces. For example, on 26 July
1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote me a six-page letter, most of which had
to do with material preparations for a Pacific war. It raised ques-
tions concerning such matters as additional transports, ordnance
equipment for the Marines, anununition handling and stowage facili-
ties, the further development of the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard to make
major overhauls of large ships possible, additional personnel, the
equipping of light craft with depth charges and listening gear, small
craft for patrol purposes, the supply of communication, radio, radar,
and sound equipment, and the many requirements for aviation.
68. I distributed extracts from this letter to the appropriate bureau
chiefs and asked for their comments. As a result, a 22-page letter
went out to Admiral Kimmel on 22 August 1941, giving him all the
information on these matters available at that time. This is only one
example of letters giving the commander in chief information concern-
ing progress on material problems.
69. The fall of the Japanese Cabinet on 16 October 1941 marked the
beginning of a critical stage in Far Eastern af- [S6S1] fairs.
On that day I sent a secret priority dispatch to commander in chief,
Atlantic Fleet, commander in chief. Pacific Fleet, and commander in
chief, Asiatic Fleet, which reads as follows :
The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation. If a
new Cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-
American. If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate
under a new mandate which will not include rapproachment with the U. S.
In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility.
Since the U. S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present
desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two
powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including
such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor consti-
tute provocative actions against Japan.
Second and third adees inform appropriate Army and Navy District Au-
thorities. Acknowledge.
70. It is noteworthy that also on 16 October, I diverted all our
merchant shipping in the Far East to the south in order to get it out of
the danger zone in case Japan attacked [S632] us. I kept it
diverted until war broke. As a result, we lost only one merchant
ship — and that was one on which we deliberately took a chance.
71. On the following day (17 October 1941), I wrote to Admiral
Kimmel (with a copy to Admiral Hart), commenting on the dispatch
2120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
concerning the Cabinet change and enclosing an estimate regarding the
change prepared by the head of the Central Division. In this letter
I said:
Things have been popping here for the last twenty-four hours but from our
despatches you know about all that we do.
Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message
I sent you merely stated the "possibility" ; in fact I tempered the message handed
to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long
pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least until
something indicates the trend.
If I recall correctly I wrote you or Tommie Hart a forecast of the fall of the
Japanese Cabinet a couple of weeks ago after my long conference with Nomura
and gave the dope as I saw it.
You will also recall in an earlier letter when War Plans was forecasting
a Japanese attack on Siberia in [5633] August, I said my own judgment
was that they would make no move in that direction until the Russian situation
showed a definite trend. I think this whole thing works up together.
With regard to mercsant shipping it seemed an appropriate time to get the
reins in our hands and get our routing of them going. In other words, take the
rap now from the Hill and the Press and all the knockers, so that if and when
it becomes an actual necessity to do it, it will be working smoothly.
We shall continue to strive to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. How
long it can be kept going I don't know, but the President and Mr. Hull are
working on it.
The stumbling block, of course, is the Chinese incident and personally without
going into all its ramifications and face-saving and Japanese Army attitude,
civil attitude and Navy attitude, I hardly see any way around it. I think
we could settle with Nomura in five minutes but the Japanese Army is the
stumbling block. Incidentally, the Chinese also think that they will lick Japan
before they get through and are all for keeping going rather than giving way
anywhere. A nice setup for not sounding the gong.
Offhand without going into the "ins" and "outs" I see no reason for your
stopping your normal visits to the Coast. The ships concerned constitute self-
contained task [56341 forces. We have left it up to you and I am just
giving you my reaction.
The memorandum referred to reads as follows — that is a memoran-
dum prepared by the central division, which I sent out so that I might
get that division's point of view.
I believe we are inclined to overestimate the importance of changes in the
Japanese Cabinet as indicative of great changes in Japanese political thought
or action.
The plain fact is that Japanese politics has been ultimately controlled for
years by the military. Whether or not a policy of peace or a policy of further
military adventuring is pursued is determined by the military based on their
estimate as to whether the time is opportune and what they are able to do, not
•by what cabinet is in power or on diplomatic maneuvering, diplomatic notes
or diplomatic treaties.
Prince Konoye has been Premier and Konoye Cabinets in oflSce for the most
of the last five years. Time and again he and his Foreign Ministers have ex-
pressed disapproval of the acts committed by the Japanese Military, but remedial
action has not been taken.
Konoye was Premier when the attack on China began, he declared Japan's
policy was to beat China to her knees.
[5635] The most that can be claimed for the last Konoye Cabinet is that it
may have restrained the extremists among the military not that it has opposed
.Lapan's program of expansion by force. When opportunities arise, during the
coming months, which seem favorable to the military for further advance, they
will be seized.
At the present time the influence of the extremists goes up and down depending
on the course of the war in Russia.
[5636] The same bill of goods, regarding the necessity of making some con-
cession to the "moderates" in order to enable them to cope with the "extermists"
has been offered to the United States since the days when Stimson was Secretary
of State and Debuchi Ambassador.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2121
Present reports are that the new cabinet to be formed will be no better and no
worse than the one which has just fallen. Japan may attack Russia, or may
move southward, but in the final analysis this will be determined by the military
on the basis of opportunity, and what they can get away with, not by what cabinet
is in power.
72. I invite attention to the fact that both the despatch and the letter
speak of war against the United States only as a possibility. Based
on the information available to me at the time (17 October 1941), I
felt that such language was all the then existing situation warranted,
and in my letter I told Admiral Kimmel that I had tempered the orig-
inal draft of the message, because I did not think the Japs were going
to sail into us. I recognized the possibility, however, and for that
reason thought we should be "on guard,"
73. On 22 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote me, telling me of
the action he had taken and the dispositions he had made following
receipt of my despatch regarding the change [5637] in the
Japanese cabinet.
74. On November — just a month before the attack — I O. K.'d the
dispositions he had made, and added :
* * * The big question is— "What next?!
Tnings seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when
it will break, no one can tell. The principal reaction I have to it all is what I
have written you before ; it continually gets "worser and worser" ! A month may
see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies can not go forever —
particularly if one party can not live with the set up. It doesn't look good.
75. My letter was sadly prophetic. One month did see "most any-
thing"— the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor — exactly one month
from the date of this letter.
76. Also on 7 November, I wrote Admiral Hart as follows :
Events are moving rapidly toward a real showdown, both in the Atlantic and
in the Pacific. The Navy is already in the war of the Atlantic, but the country
(iosen't seem to realize it. Apathy, to the point of open opposition, is evident in a
considerable section of the press. Meanwhile, the [5638] Senate is drag-
ging out the debate with reference to the arming of the merchantmen. Whether
tlie country knows it or not, ive are at war.
« * * ,K * * *
You no doubt have noted in the press the conversations going on between the
State Department and the Japanese Foreign Oflace. Mr. Kurusu's trip to the
United States has its dramatic appeal, but I am dubious of it having any real
influence.
And on 8 November, I again wrote Admiral Hart a letter which con-
tained a paragraph quite similar to that quoted from my letter to
Admiral Kimmel of 7 November. It read :
The Japanese situation looks almost like an impasse to me, and I wouldn't
be surprised at anything happening in the next month or two. I imagine your
picture of that is just about as close as mine. The two points of view appear
to be simply irreconcilable. But of this, more should be in the open before long.
77. On 14 November, I wrote Admiral Kimmel :
The next few days hold much for us. Kurusu's arrival in Washington has
been delayed. I am not hopeful that anything in the way of better understanding
between the Uniter States and Japan [5639] come of his visit. I note
this morning in the Press despatches a listing of a number of points by the
Japan Times and Advertiser upon which concession by the United States was
necessary for the "solution of the Pacific Crisis." Complete capitulation by the
2122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
United States on every point of difference between the Japanese and this country
was indicated as a satisfactory solution. It will be impossible to reconcile such
divergent points of view.
And I enclosed an estimate of the Far Eastern situation which Gen-
eral Marshall and I had prepared for the President. I think the whole
of that memorandum will bear reading :
The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have reexamined the
military situation in the Far East, particularly in the light of messages recently
received from the American Ambassador to Chungking, the Magruder Mission,
and the United States Naval Attach^. These despatches have indicated it to
be Chiang-Kai-Shek's belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming is imminent,
and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of
United States and British air units, is the sole hope for defeat of this threat.
The [5640] Secretary of State has requested advice as to the attitude
which this Government should take toward a Japanese offensive against Kun-
ming and the Burma Road.
There is little doubt that a successful Japanese offensive against the Burma
Road would be a very severe blow to the Chinese Central Government. The
result might even be the collapse of further effective military resistance by that
Government, and thus the liquidation by Japan of the "China incident." If use
of the Burma Road is lost, United States and British Commonwealth aid to
China will be seriously curtailed for some months. If resistance by the Chinese
Central Government ceases, the need for Japanese troops in China will be
reduced. These troops can then be employed elsewhere, after the lapse of time
sufficient to permit their withdrawal.
Concentration of Japanese troops for the contemplated offensive, based in north-
ern Indo-China, cannot be completed in less than about two months, although
initial offensive operations might be undertaken before that time. The advance
toward Kunming over nearly three hundred miles of rough country, with
[5641] poor communications, will be extremely difficult. The maintenance
of supply lines will not be easy. The Chinese, or favorable defense terrain,
would have a good chance of defeating this offensive by the use of ground troops
alone, provided these troops are adequate in quality and numbers.
The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have
taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in
undertaking offensive military operations with U. S. forces against Japan, to pre-
vent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations,
however well-3isguised, would lead to war.
At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the
Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the
Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened
by withdrawing practically all naval vessels from the Atlantic except those
assigned to local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet
would require tremendous merchant tonnage, which coiild only be withdrawn
from services now considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the
Atlantic of [56.'i2'\ naval and merchant strength might well cause the
United Kingdom to lose the Battle of the Atlantic in the near future.
The only current plans for war against .Japan in the Far East are to conduct
defensive war, in cooperation with the British nnd Dutch, for the defense of the
Philippines and the British nnd Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now
being reinforced. The present combined naval, air. and ground forces will make
attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of Decem-
ber, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines will have
become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The
U. S. Array air forces in the Philippines will have reached its projected strength
by February or March. 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased
to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring .Japan in oper-
ations in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time, additional
British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived. The gen-
eral defensive strength of the entire southern area ngainst possible Japanese
[56431 operations will then have reached impressive proportions.
Until such time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can he extended to Chiang-
Kai-Shek by measures which probably will not result in war with Japan. These
measures are: continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying in-
creasing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and
acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2123
The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the
following conclusions :
(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United
States-British Staff Conversations remain sound. The primary objective of
the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Ger-
many remain undefeated, decision will still have not been readied. In any
case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan,
since such a war would greatly wealien the combined effort in the Atlantic
against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.
[56^4] (b) War between the United States and Japan should be
avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time
as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the
United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan
should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies :
(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the terri-
tory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Common-
wealth, or the Netherlands East Indies ;
(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of
100° East or South of 10° North ; or into Portuguese Timor, New Cale-
donia, or the Loyalty Islands.
(e) If war with Japan can not be avoided, it should follow the strategic
lines of existing war plans; i. e., military operations should be primarily
defensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening [5645]
Japan's economic position.
(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming,
into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would
not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.
(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended
to the Chinese Central Government.
(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete co-
ordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be
undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and
the Netherlands East Indies.
The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommended that the
United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.
"Specifically, they recommend :
That the dispatch of United States armed forces for interventon against Japan
in China be disapproved.
That material aid to China be accelerated [5646] consonant with the
needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.
That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to
the maximum practicable extent.
That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.
78. On 24 November, I sent the following despatch for action to
Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Commander in Chief, Pacific
Fleet, Commandants 11th, 12th, 13th and 15th naval Districts, and
for information to Special Naval Observer, London, and Commander
in Chief, Atlantic Fleet.
I do not know whether the Committee is familiar with those
Districts.
Starting south, the 11th at San Diego, the 12th at San Francisco,
the 13th at Puget Sound, and we jump to Hawaii for the 14th, and
back down to the Panama Canal for the 15th.
The Far Eastern, Manila, is the 16th.
This is the despatch which was sent for action :
Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This
situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their
naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive move-
ment in any direction including attack on Philippines [56-^7] or Guam is a
possibility.
Chief of Staff has seen this despatch, concurs and requests action adees to
inform senior Army Officers their areas.
2124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation
or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately.
79. On November 25, 1 wrote Admiral Kimmel a letter which ends
with these two paragraphs (the only part bearing on the dispatch of
November 24) :
I held this (the letter) up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull
today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long
talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the
gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the
President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From
many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing
that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I
do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling
among some people. [56^8] You know I have generally held that it was
not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still
rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the
most likely.
I wan't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will
be dam»ned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may
do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we
may do nothing — I think it is more likely to be 'anything'.
80. This letter gave the background for the dispatch and indicated
opinions which went to make up the dispatch. It must be understood
that official dispatches, though sent in the name of and on the responsi-
bility of the Chief of Naval Operations, often reflected not only his
personal opinion but also a consensus of the opinions of his principal
advisers ; and at times in cases as represented here, those of the State
and War Departments and of the White House. The letter points out
that neither the President nor the Secretary of State would be surprised
over a Japanese surprise attack. Some felt that such an attack would
come in the Philippines because of the consequent embarrassment to us.
While appreciating this, I did not give it the weight some [5649']
of my advisers did, but stressed more strongly the attack in southeast
Asia. They keynote that the letter and the dispatch were intended to
convey was the possibility of "a surprise aggressive movement in any
direction," and the necessity of being prepared for anything.
81. On November 27 Mr. Hull informed us that negotiations with the
Japanese had ceased and that it was now up to the Army and Nav3\ I
later learned that a note had been handed to the Japanese on November
26 — the so-called ten-point note. I feel confident in stating that I
did not see or know of this note at the time it was given to the Japanese
Ambassador.
82. General Marshall and I completed and sent to the President a
memorandum dated November 27, stressing that —
The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to gain time.
and thati —
Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided as long as con-
sistent with national policy.
83. On November 27, I sent to commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet
and to commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, for action, and to commander
in chief, Atlantic Fleet, and special naval observer, London, for infor-
mation, the following priority dispatch :
[56501 This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with
Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an
aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2125
The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval
task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines,
Tai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo.
Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the
tasks assigned in WPL-46. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar
warning is being sent by War Department. SPANAVO inform British. Conti-
nental districts Guam, Samoa directed to take appropriate measures against
sabotage.
84. This message begins with the words "This dispatch is to be
considered a war warning." These words were carefully weighed and
chosen after considerable thought and discussion with my principal
advisors and with the Secretary of the Navy. The words "war warn-
ing" had never before been used in any of my dispatches to the
commander in chief, Pacific Fleet. They were put at the beginning
of the message to accentuate the extreme gravity of the situation.
We considered the picture as we saw [5651'] it and we felt
that there was grave danger of Japan striking anywhere. We wanted
our people in the Pacific to know it, and we used language which we
thought would convey what we felt.
85. The message further stated that certain signs indicated an
"amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or the
Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo." This indication from evidence
we had, did not, in our opinion, rule out or preclude an attack else-
where. Our dispatch of the 24th (only 3 days before) should be read
in connection with the dispatch of the 27th. I warned against "a
surprise aggressive movement in any direction."
86. We went to what we thought was an all-out on this dispatch of
the 27th. We considered it an unequivocal war warning. Previously,
we had talked about possibilities, but by this dispatch we intended
to convey the thought that war was imminent. In fact, we gave most
careful consideration before making this a war warning, for we had
no definite information or evidence indicating an attack on the United
States. We could not tell whether Japan in her next move would
or would not attack United States territory. The only movement of
which we had definite knowledge, indicated an amphibious expedition,
with the Philippines, Thai, the Kra Peninsula, or Borneo as its po-
tential objectives. We decided, [56521 however, that the situ-
ation was so grave that we should warn our forces to be prepared for
the worst.
87. I had long shared the concern of the commanders in chief for
the security of the fleet in Pearl Harbor and of the vital elements
of the Naval Establishment in the Hawaiian area. After the success-
ful attack by the British Fleet Air Arm on the Italian Fleet at
Taranto, my concern increased, and on November 22, 1940, 1 wrote to
the then commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral Richardson, as
follows :
Since the Taranto incident my concern for the safety of the Fleet in Pearl
Harbor, already great, has become even greater. This concern has to do both
with possible activities on the part of Japanese residents of Hawaii and with
the possibilities of attack coming from overseas. By far the most profitable
object of sudden attack in Hawaiian waters would be the Fleet units based
in that area. Without question the safety of these units is paramount and
imposes on the Commander-in-Chief and the forces afloat a responsibility in
which he must receive the complete support of Commandant Fourteen, and of
the Army. I realize most fully that you are giving this problem compre- [5653]
hensive thought. My object in writing you is to find out what steps the Navy
2126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Department and the War Department should be taking to provide additional
equipment and additional protective measures.
*******
I would like to have you take up the whole question upon your return to
Hawaii with Comfourteen and with the Army, and let me know of any deficiencies
which will require remedial action here in Washington.
88. I asked that the matter be considered with the Army because
"Joint Action of the Army and the Navy," approved by the Secre-
taries of War and the Navy, and in effect during 1941, provided for
coordination by the Army and Navy in meeting attacks against our
coastal frontiers, of which the Hawaiian coastal frontier was one.
Joint action states that in carrying out its functions, the Army will
provide and operate or maintain among other things :
(1) Guns on land, both fixed and mobile, with necessary searchlights and fire-
control installations.
(2) Aircraft operating in support of harbor defenses; in general coastal
frontier defense ; in support of or in lieu of naval forces.
[5654] (3) A communication and intelligence system to indue an aircraft
warning service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the
prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy.
The Navy, in carrying out its functions, will provide and operate,
among other things :
(a) A system of offshore scouting and patrol to give timely warning of an
attack, and, in addition, forces to operate against enemy forces in the vicinity
of the coast.
(b) A communication and intelligence system among the elements of the sea
defense, with provisions for the prompt exchange of information or instructions
with the Army.
Joint action also states the functions of Army and Navy air com-
ponents, and in order to minimize duplication, it provides :
(a) The functions assigned to the Army Air component require the Army
to provide and maintain all types of aircraft primarily designed for use in sup-
port of military operations, or in the direct defense of the land and coastal
frontiers of continental United States and its [5655] overseas posses-
sions, or in repelling air raids directed at shore objectives or at shipping with-
in our harbors, or in supporting naval forces to assure freedom of action of the
fleet
(b) The functions assigned to the Navy air component require the Navy
to provide and maintain all types of aircraft primarily designed and ordinarily
used in operations from aircraft carriers or other vessels, or based on aircraft
tenders, or for operations from shore bases for observation, scouting and patrol-
ling over the sea, and for the protection of shipping in the coastal zones. These
aircraft may be required to operate effectively over the sea to the maximum
distance within the capacity of aircraft development.
In accordance with joint action, the commandant of the Fourteenth
Naval District and the commanding general, Hawaiian Department
had entered into a "joint coastal frontier defense plan" for the Ha-
waiian coastal frontier dated April 25, 1941. Among other things,
this agreement assigned responsibility for the aircraft warning serv-
ice and antiaircraft and fighter defenses to the Army, while respon-
sibility for distant re- [5656] connaissance was assigned to
the Navy.
89. On receipt of the reply from Admiral Richardson — in reply to
the letter in which I had asked his comment on how the War and Na^^
Departments could help them out out there — and largely predicated on
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2127
it, I caused the Secretary of the Navy, on January 24, 1941, to send
the following letter to the Secretary of War :
The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl
Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department
and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in
part, promoted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan,
and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks
on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily
possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or
the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.
In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the fleet or
naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase
the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character
mentioned [5657] above.
The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are con-
sidered to be:
(1) Air bombing attack.
(2) Air torpedo plane attack.
(3) Sabotage.
(4) Submarine attack.
(5) Mining.
(6) Bombardment by gun fire.
Defense against all but the first two — that is, air attack, both bombing and tor-
pedo— of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactorily. The
following paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion of the problem
encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which I consider to be of
primary importance.
Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively,
simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated.
The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons,
and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of
carriers and their supporting vessels.
The coimter measures to be considered are :
[5658] (a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting
vessels before air attack can be launched ;
(b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their
objectives ;
(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire;
(d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke;
(e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.
The operations set forth in (a) —
that is, the location and the engagement of the enemy carriers and
their destruction —
are largely functions of the Fleet but, quite possibly, might not be carried out
in case of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war.
Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required
for the operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit
aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that while the organization and equipping
of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control equipment
is in progress, the present [5659] system relies wholly on visual observa-
tion and sound locators which are only effective up to four miles.
Available Army anti-aircraft batteries appear inadequate if judged by the
standards of the war in Europe. There are now in Oahu 26 3" fixed anti-air-
craft guns (of which something over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor),
56 mobile 3" guns, and 109 .50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft bat-
teries are manned in part by personnel which is also required to man parts of the
sea coast artillery. Should an attack on Oahu combine air attack with a gun
bombardment, one or the other countering fires would suffer from lack of men.
If the prevailing high ceiling is taken into account the caliber of the anti-
aircraft guns might be inadequate against high altitude bombing attack.
By late summer the defenses will be considerably strengthened by additions
in guns, planes, and radio locators. It is understood, sixteen additional 3"
mobile twenty-four 90 mm., and one hundred twenty 37 mm. guns will be on
2128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK:
hand ; the pursuit aircraft strength is to be expanded to a total of 149 ; the new
radio locators will have an effective range of [5660] 100 miles. Although
the caliber of the guns will still be small for effective action against high altitude
bombers, this augmentation will markedly improve the security of the Fleet.
It does not, of course, affect the critical period immediately before us.
The supplementary measures noted in (d) and (e) might be of the greatest
value in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Balloon barrages have demonstrated
some usefulness in Europe. Smoke from fixed installations on the ground might
prove most advantageous.
To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals:
(1) That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit
aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net
in Hawaii.
(2) That the Army give consideration to the question of balloon barrages,
the employment of smoke, and other special devices for improving the defenses
of Pearl Harbor.
[566 1] (3) That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination
of naval and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun
fire, against surprise aircraft raids.
(4) That the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of
joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids
against Pearl Harbor.
(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu
for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long
as the present uncertainty continues to exist.
Your concurrence in these proposals and the rapid implementing of the meas-
ures to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the seciirity
of the Fleet, will be met with the closest cooperation on the part of the Navy
Department.
90. Copy of this letter was sent to the then Commander in Chief,
United States Fleet, Admiral Kimmel. On February 18, 1941, Ad-
miral Kimmel wrote :
I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is
a possibility. We [5662] are taking immediate practical steps to minimize
the damage inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force will pay. We need
anti-submarine forces, — destroyers and patrol craft. The two squadrons of
patrol craft will help when they arrive.
91. In the meantime on 7 February 1941 the Secretary of War had
replied to the letter of 24 January as follows :
In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise
attacks upon the Fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express com-
plete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our
making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian
Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues
to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of
the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.
The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit planes.
There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes; nineteen of these are P-36's
and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-
one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to [566S]
Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This
will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and
seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-B
pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assem-
bled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.
"There are at present in the Hawaiian Island.^; eighty-two 3-inch AA guns,
twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA
machine guns. The total projects calls for ninety-eight 3-inch AA guns, one
hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA
machine guns.
With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has
been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for
installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. In-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2129
quiry develops the information tliat delivery of the necessary equipment can-
not be made at an earlier date.
The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give
immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages
[560J,] and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities.
Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation and cannot
be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on
hand and eight-four being manufactured — forty for delivery by June 30, 1941,
and the remainder by September. The Budget nov? has under consideration
funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke
for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion
is that atmosfioheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment
of smoke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, the Com-
manding General will look into this matter again.
With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a
copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian De-
partment, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities
in making those measures effective.
Copies of this reply were sent to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet,
and commandant. Fourteenth Naval District.
92. Subsequent to the receipt of the letter of 7 February [5665]
from the Secretary of War, the matter of antiaircraft defense and of
planes for the defense of Hawaii was the subject of frequent con-
versations with General Marshall and I offered to transport planes via
carrier whenever they could be made ready. On at least two occasions
during 1941, I sent a carrier from the west coast to Pearl Harbor to
ferry Army fighter planes.
93. You will note that the Secretary of War in his letter of 7 Feb-
ruary stated that the equipment for the aircraft warning service had
been ordered and would be delivered in Hawaii in June 1941, and that
all arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the
equipment is delivered. I was informed that this equipment was
delivered in Hawaii about the middle of 1941.
94. On 31 March 1941, Rear Admiral Bellinger, who was Com-
mander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor and Commander of
Pacific Fleet Task Force Nine, made, with the Commanding General,
Hawaiian Air Force, a joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy
air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or fleet
units in the Hawaiian area and entered into an agreement covering
joint air operation. A copy of this agreement and estimate was for-
warded to the Chief of Naval Operations by the Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District on 1 May 1941. The estimate, under the
[5666] heading "Possible Enemy Action," reads in part as follows :
(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:
1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl
Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.
(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU
would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would
most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach
inside of three hundred miles.
On 20 June 1941, I sent a copy of this agreement entitled "Joint
Security Measures, Protection of Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base" to the
Commandants of all the naval districts and to the Commanders in
Chief of the Atlantic, Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, calling their attention
to the importance of the problems presented therein.
79716—46 — pt. 5 6
2130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
95. Admiral Kimmel left with me, during his trip to Washington
in mid-1941, a memorandum dated 4 June, which reads as follows :
The agreement entered into betwixt tlie Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth [5667] Naval District, in
regard to joint action of the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii provides :
(a) That in activities in the defense of Oahu and the other islands against
enemy bombing attacks the command shall be vested in the Army Air Corps
assisted by Navy fighters which may be available.
(b) That in a mission which involves bombing of enemy ships the command
shall be vested in the Navy Air Commander in charge of the Base. Briefly,
when an alarm is sounded the Navy patrol planes take off to locate the enemy
ships and when located the Navy directs the efforts of the Army and Navy
bombers in the offensive action which they take against the enemy ships.
The liaison betwixt the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satisfactory
and weekly drills in air raid alarms with the two services acting in unison are
held. These drills have developed many weaknesses but the conditions are
steadily improving and it is felt they are in much better shape now than they
were a few months ago. The conditions will continue to be unsatisfactory until
certain equipment has been supplied [5668] and the personnel drilled in
its use.
There are about 140 light Army planes (fighters and light bombers) and 21
heavy bombing Army planes now in the Islands. These in addition to some
obsolescent bombers and fighters. It is believed that the number of Army bombers
in the Islands should be at least four times the number that they have there
now and it is felt these planes should be sent out as soon as it is practicable
to do so.
"There are not now a sufficient number of Army pilots to man all the
Army planes in the Islands."
96. In mentioning the Army's responsibilities with respect to the
defense of Pearl Harbor, I don't mean to minimize the problems which
were facing the Army at that time. They, too were faced with a short-
age of equipment and men.
97. My war warning despatch of 27 November must be considered
in the light of what had gone before. Commander in Chief, Pacific
Fleet, and Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, were action addressees
of the war warning despatch, and they were directed to "execute an
appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the
tasks assigned in WPL-46" (Navy Basic War Plan) .
98. I might mention that on 26 November, we sent to Commander
in Chief, Pacific Fleet, two despatches asking his [5669] reac-
tion to the possibility of reinforcing Wake and Midway by Army units.
These were routine matters having to do with the general strengthen-
ing of our Pacific bases — a matter we had long been pushing.
99. The same day that I sent the war warning, the Army also sent
a despatch to its field commanders. In order that Navy coastal fron-
tier commanders and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet might be
informed of what had been sent their Army opposites, I sent the
following priority despatch on 28 November to Commander, Pacific
Northern Naval Coastal Frontier and Commander, Pacific Southern
Naval Coastal Frontier for action and to Commander in Chief, Pacific
Fleet and Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Frontier for informa-
tion:
* * * Army has sent following to Commander Western Defense Command :
"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes
with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come
back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile
action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat not, be avoided the
United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This [5670]
Proceedings of joint committee 2131
policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action
that might jeopardize your defense.
"Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such recon-
naissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should
be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent.
Report measures taken.
[5671] "A separate message is being sent to G-2 Ninth Corps Area re sub-
versive activities in United States. Should hostilities occur you will carry out
the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dis-
semination of this highly secret information to minimum essential oflBcers."
WPL52 is not applicable to Pacific area and will not be placed in effect in that
area except as now in force in Southeast Pacific sub-area and Panama Naval
Coastal Frontier. Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an
overt act. Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL46 so far as they apply
to Japan in case hostilities occur.
100. On 30 November, I sent a despatch to Commander in Chief,
Asiatic Fleet, making Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet an informa-
tion addressee, which reads as follows :
Indications that Japan about to attack points on Kra Isthmus by overseas
expedition.
In order to ascertain destination this expedition and for security our position
in the Philippines desire you cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on three
days commencing upon receipt this despatch. Instruct planes to be observe only.
They must not approach so as to appear to be attacking but must defend them-
selves if attacked.
Understand British Air Forces will search arc [5672] 180 miles from
Tedta Bharu and will move troops to line across Kra Isthmus near Singora.
If expedition is approaching Thailand inform MacArthur. British Mission here
informed.
101. On 3 December, we sent to Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval
District and Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District the following
priority despatch :
Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instruc-
tions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong,
Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their
codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret
documents.
102. Also on 3 December, I sent a priority despatch to Commander
in Chief, Asiatic Fleet and Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District for
action, and to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District for information, which reads as follows:
Circular Twenty Four Forty Four from Tokyo one December ordered London,
Hongkong, Singapore and Manila to destroy purple machine. Batavia machine
already sent to Tokyo. December second Washington also directed destroy purple,
all but one copy of other systems, and all secret documents. [5673] British
Admiralty London today report Embassy London has complied.
103. I considered that the urgent destruction by the Japanese of
their codes and ciphers and secret documents was one of the most
telling items of information we had received, and our despatch inform-
ing Commanders in Chief, Asiatic Fleet and Pacific Fleet and Com-
mandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts of this fact
was one of the most important despatches we ever sent. We felt that
war was just a matter of time.
104. On 4 December, because of Guam's highly vulnerable position,
we sent her the following message :
Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified mat-
ter except that essential for current purposes and special intelligence, retaining
2132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential commanications with
CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 14, COM 16 and OPNAV. Be prepared to destroy
instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain. Report crypto
channels retained.
Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Com-
mandant, Fourteenth Naval District and Commandant, Sixteenth Naval Dis-
trict were all information addresses on this despatch.
105. We were also concerned lest Commander in Chief, Pacific
Fleet, might feel that he needed specific authorization [56741
from US before he could authorize destruction of secret papers and
codes in the outlying Pacific Islands. Accordingly, we sent him a
despatch on 6 December which reads as follows :
In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying
Pacific Islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confi-
dential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency. Means
of commimication to support our current operations and special intelligence
should of course be maintained until the last moment.
106. In the few days immediately preceding 7 December, Admiral
Ingersoll (then Assistant Chief of Naval Operations), Admiral Tur-
ner (then head, War Plans Division), and I went over the informa-
tion we had sent to the fleet commanders. ' We were all of the opinion
that everything we could do had been done to get them ready for war,
and that we had sent them sufficient information and directives.
107. During the night and early morning of 6-7 December, the
Japanese transmitted to their Ambassador in Washington an answer
to the ten-point note which had been handed to the Japanese on 26
November by Mr. Hull. The answer was in fourteen parts, the four-
teenth part being received some time early Sunday morning, December
7. I was not acquainted with this despatch until I arrived at my office
Sunday forenoon. I would like [5675] to invite attention to
the meat of the fourteenth part of this message and compare it with
the meat of my war warning message. The Japanese message con-
cludes :
* * * Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Jap-
anese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific
through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.
The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Gov-
ernment that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but
consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.
Our war warning message stated f
* * * Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions
in the Pacific have ceased * * *.
Thus, what we learned on the morning of 7 December only con-
firmed what we had sent out on 27 November.
108. During the morning of Sunday, 7 December 1941, we had in-
formation to the effect that the Japanese Ambassador was to pre-
sent his Government's reply to the 10-point note to the Secretary
of State at 1 p. m. that same day. I was discussing this note and
the time of its presentation with the head of the Central Division
(Captain Schuirmann) when General Marshall called me on the 'phone
to ask if I knew of it. I told him [567(^] I did, and he asked
me what I thought about sending the information concerning the time
of presentation on to the various commanders in the Pacific. My
first answer to him was that we had sent them so much already that
I hesitated to send more. I hung up the 'phone, and not more than
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2133
a minute or two later I called him back, stating that there might be
some peculiar significance in the Japanese Ambassador calling on
Mr. Hull at 1 p, m. and that I would go along with him in sending
the information to the Pacific. I asked him if his communications
were such that he could get it out quickly because our communications
were quite rapid when the occasion demanded it. He replied that he
felt he could get it through very quickly. I then asked him to include
in the despatch instructions to his people to inform their naval op-
posites.
I am informed that this despatch''' was sent "First Priority" to
the Army Forces in the Far East (Philippines), Caribbean [5677]
Defense Command (Canal Zone), Hawaiian Department, and the
Fourth Army (San Francisco). I am told that the message was sent
at 1217 EST (0G47 Honolulu time) to the Hawaiian Department, but
was not delivered in Hawaii until after the attack.
109. My presentation of the manner in which I discharged my
responsibility to keep the fleet commanders fully informed of all sig-
nificant military and political developments would not be complete
without a reference to certain very secret information which we were
receiving during this period. This information was gathered by the
intelligence centers at the headquarters of Commandant, Sixteenth
Naval District (Cavite), Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District
(Pearl Harbor), and the Office of Naval Intelligence (Washington).
There was a considerable volume of this material received in Washing-
ton during 1941, but it increased substantially during the last half
of the year. The volume was so great and the personnel qualified to
handle it so limited that we shared the work with the Army — they
processed the material one day, we did it the next.
110. To be useful, the diplomatic information obtained from this
source required careful evaluation, a task which could be better per-
formed here in Washington where the officers charged with this task
had access to other sources of information, such as the State and War
Departments.
111. After this information was evaluated and distilled — [5678]
so to speak — we sent our conclusions and recommendations to the fleet
commanders for their information and guidance.
112. I considered that the letters and despatches I sent to Com-
mander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
were sufficient to keep them informed on the important military and
political developments in the Pacific as we knew them, and that they
had received adequate information and directives to be on guard.
113. I have gone into considerable detail — though by no means men-
tioning all my letters and despatches — to indicate to the committee
how I discharged my duties as Chief of Naval Operations with ref-
erence to the expansion of the entire naval establishment, its strength
and efficiency ; with reference to plans for the use of the fleet in war ;
with reference to assignment of forces available in accordance with
war plans ; and with reference to keeping the fleet commanders in-
formed of important political and military developments affecting
them.
♦The text is quoted for the convenience of the committee :
"Japanese are presenting at one p. m. eastern standard time today what amounts to an-
ultimatum ; also thev are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately.
".lust what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accord-
ingly. Inform naval authovHiea of this communication."
2134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
114. I have endeavored to stick to the record of events as they hap-
pened, rather than to give present impressions of what has happened,
or of conjectures as to what might have happened if some things had
been done differently.
115. My correspondence with the Commanders in Chief in the Pa-
cific during the years 1940 and 1941 indicated that for almost two
years before the attack on Pearl Harbor the lack [6679'] of
physical resources was fully known to all the Navy officers in critical
positions, and that the danger of war with Japan and a possible sur-
prise attack on Pearl Harbor and methods of meeting it had been
fully considered.
116. By way of summary, I would like to point out that during the
vjritical period October, November, and December 1941, I sent the
following specific warnings to the Commanders in the Pacific :
(a) Secret dispatch, dated 16 October 1941, containing the state-
ment:
The resignation of the Japanese cabinet has created a grave situation. If a
new cabinet is fox'med it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-
America. * * * Since the U. S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan
for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may
attack these two powers. * * *
(b) My letter to Admiral Kimmel, copy to Admiral Hart, dated 17
October 1941, containing the following words:
Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message
I sent you merely stated the "possibility" ; in fact I tempered the message handed
to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after
long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least
until something indicates the trend.
[5680] (c) My letter to Admiral Kimmel, dated 7 November
1941, containing the paragraph :
Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when
it will break, no one can tell. The principal reaction I have to it all is what I have
written you before ; it continually gets "worser and worser" ! A month may
see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable polices cannot go on forever —
particularly if one party cannot live with the set up. It doesn't look good.
(d) My letter to Admiral Kimmel, dated 14 November 1941, in
which I stated :
* * ♦ I note this morning in the press despatches a listing of a number of
points by the Japan Times and Advertiser upon which concession by the United
States was necessary for the "solution of the Pacific Crisis". Complete capitula-
tion by the United States on every point of difference between the Japanese and
this country was indicated as a satisfactory solution. It will be impossible to
reconcile such divergent points of view.
With this letter, I enclosed a memorandum for the President, pre-
pared jointly by General Marshall and me, in which the following con-
clusion is stated :
War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building
up defensive forces in the Far East, [5681] until such time as Japan
attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of
very great importance.
and in which we recommended :
That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2135
[5682] (e) Secret dispatch, dated 24 November 1941, stating
that
Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This
situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their
naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive
movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a
possibility.
(f) My letter to Admiral Kimmel, dated 25 November 1941, includ-
ing the statement that neither the President nor Mr. Hull
would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack.
(g) Secret dispatch, dated 27 November 1941, including the para-
graph :
This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan
looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggres-
sive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. * * * Execute an
appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned
in WPL-46 (the war plan).
(h) Secret dispatch, dated 3 December 1941, stating:
Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent in-
structions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts
[56SS] at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to
destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important
confidential and secret documents.
(i) Secret dispatch, dated 3 December 1941, stating :
Circular Twenty Four Forty Four from Tokyo one December ordered London,
Hongkong, Singapore and Manila to destroy purple machine. Batavia machine
already sent to Tokyo. December second Washington also directed destroy
purple, all but one copy of other systems, and all secret documents. British
Admiralty London today report Embassy London has complied.
(j) Secret dispatch, dated 4 December 1941, stating:
Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified
matter except that essential for current purposes and special intelligence re-
taining minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications
with CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 14, COM 16 and OPNAV. Be prepared to
destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain. Report
crypto channels retained.
(k) Secret dispatch, dated 6 December 1941, stating:
l568Jf] In view of the international situation and the exposed i)Osition
of our outlying Pacific islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret
and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency.
Means of communication to suport our current operations and special intelligence
should of course be maintained until the last moment.
That concludes the statement.
[S68S] Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Stark, in 1940, when the dis-
cussion arose between Admiral Richardson, then Commander of the
Pacific Fleet, and officials in Washington, about basing the fleet at
Pearl Harbor, according to the record we have to take, no question was
raised by anybody prior to November 1940 about the safety of the
fleet while in Pearl Harbor ; is that in accord with your recollection ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall anything up until the letter
which
Mr. Mitchell. Which you wrote ?
Admiral Stark. Which I wrote at that time. There may have been.
2136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. MiTCiiELL. Admiral Richardson gave the Secretary of the
Navy a memorandum dated September 12 in which he listed all the
objections he had to keeping the fleet based at Pearl Harbor, and in
that list there was no suggestion about the dangers to the fleet while
in Pearl Harbor. Can you remember any instance where the safety
of the fleet was discussed before that ? I mean, safety while in Pearl
Harbor.
Admiral Stark. I do not, specifically. I have a rather hazy re-
membrance that before I wrote Admiral Richardson asking him to
get data with Com. 14, with the Army, I had written Admiral Bloch,
in fact, I think a letter to Admiral Richardson stated that I had
gotten some information but it wasn't specific [66861 or com-
plete enough for our purposes, and we wanted the entire situation
gone over.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, the first document in evidence we have in this
case that anybody was worrying about the safety of tl^e fleet while in
Pearl Harbor is your letter of November 22, 1910. written to Admiral
Richardson in which you referred to a dispatch that you had sent in
October to Admiral Bloch asking him for a report on the question of
safety.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. What inspired you to write that letter, how did it
happen that it occurred?
Admiral Stark. The incident at Taranto and the British success
there in torpedoing ships at anchor in harbor.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, that was an attack that the British made on
the Italian fleet in the harbor with torpedo planes, was it?
Admiral Stark. Yes. sir.
Mr. Mitchell. And bombers. Which was quite successful?
Admiral Stark. That is correct. Of course, we had long and often
thought of an attack on Pearl Hnrlwr as a possibility and something
which might some day be pnlled. Our fleet exercises always con-
tained an exercise of an attack in which the two sides, the attacking
force wanted to get in, if it could, and the defending force, of course,
would first want to get the [56S71 attacking forces carriers.
I mean, it has been much discussed. So, I am answering your ques-
tion by saying that was the first time T am thinking of what docu-
mentary evidence I can recall at the moment. Whether or not T had
mentioned it ])reviou?ly in some of my letters to Admiral Richardson,
T would have to look it up.
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Richardson didn't raise any question about
the safety of the fleet as a reason for going back to the coast?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. IMiTCHELL. You agreed with him. didn't yon, about the better
training facilities?
Admiral Stark. I did agree with him, yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. You didn't raise any question at that time about the
safety of the fleet?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. It was after the decision had been made to keep the
fleet out there and a little time had passed that then you began to
think about the problem; is that it?
Admiral Stark. That is correct. When the fleet went out there for
that fleet problem I had no thought, and so far as I know, no one else
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE ' 2137
had any thought whatsoever of the fleet remaining there. It all de-
velopecl when we talked about bringing the fleet back. We had not, not
having envisaged the [S6'88] fleet going out there, we had not
sent many things which they would need to carry on their routine
target practice, which was one of the things Admiral Kicharclson was
worried about. The fleet had left with the idea of coming back. The
people on the coast all expected the fleet to come back. The question
of morale came up. Of reenlistments. In other words, personnel
and morale and material conditions affecting training of the fleet, and
also getting it ready for war quickly, that was what he was concerned
about. Now, the drill out there, and so forth— rancl we did get them
ready, but if he came back to the coast he could strip a ship more
effectively and quicker than he could out there. It could be done out
there. But those were his primary reasons.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, as the result of your letter to Admiral Rich-
ardson of November 22, 1940, you remember he undertook an inquiry.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. He went right out into the Army defenses and
inspected those, did he not?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. We asked — the letter to him stated not
only the fleet but the commandant of the naval district, and also the
Army — so that all hands out there would be in on that estimate.
[S689] Mr. Mitchell. Well, do you recall that it was as a result
of an inquiry, started and conducted in that way, that Admiral Bloch
made his report of December 30, which is in evidence here?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. The report came in and our reply was
largely predicated on it.
Mr. Mitchell. I notice here
Admiral Stark. That is, our action, I should say.
Mr. Mitchell. There has been handed me a copy of the letter from
the Chief of Naval Operations to the Director of Naval Districts Divi-
sion, dated December 31, 1940, a memorandum signed by R. E. Inger-
soll, Acting Chief of Naval Operations. I have never seen it before.
Have you any knowledge of that ?
Admiral Stark. I would like to see it.
(Short pause.)
Mr. Mitchell. This is one of the papers that j^ou have in the brown
envelope.
The Chairman. You mean the one we got today ?
Mr. Mitchell. In the same envelope.
[6600] Admiral Stark. I think I saw that. It had slipped my
mind for the moment.
Mr. Mitchell. That letter was written before Bloch's report came
in, wasn't it?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. His report was dated the 30th of December, indorsed
by Richardson at Hawaii on the 7th of January.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I would like to put that in evidence and I will read
it into the record.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Mitchell. It is (reading) :
2138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From : The Chief of Naval Operations.
To : Director, Naval Districts Division.
Subject : Defense of Pearl Harbor by Army.
1. The Chief of Naval Operations has for some time felt considerable concern
over whether the Army's anti-aircraft defense of the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor,
including vessels of the United States Fleet berthed there, is adequate in view of
the probability of an early surprise attack by carrier aircraft if Japan decides to
make war on the United States.
2. It is, therefore, requested that information be obtained concerning the details
of the Army's Hawaiian defense plan in this regard. We should be informed as
to their present and also the projected anti-aii"craft defense, including such
features as the following :
(a) Number, caliber, and proposed location of anti-aircraft guns, including
machine guns.
(b) Use that is to be made of smoke screens from either fixed or mobile sources.
(c) Number and location of pursuit planes to be used for this purpose, with
probable percentage of availability.
(d) The character and extent of the wraning net to be used, from shore or
floating stations, and the present i)ercentage of availability of such stations.
(e) Whether or not the present defense elements have received adequate
training.
R. E. Ingeirsoll,
Acting.
Now, here is another letter dated January 9, 1941, that has not yet
been offered in evidence, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the
Chief of Staff. That is again signed by Admiral Ingersoll. Did you
know of that at the time it was sent to the Chief of Staff?
Admiral Stark. January 9th ?
Mr. Mitchell. January 9th
[5692] Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; I think I saw that. I think
I have seen that despatch.
Mr. Mitchell. I will read that into the record. [Reading :]
January 9, 1941.
From : The Chief of Naval Operations :
To : The Chietf of Staff, U. S. Army.
Subject : Installation of Aircraft Detection Equipment.
1. The Navy Department con.><iders that improvement of the antiaircraft
defenses, and particularly of the aircraft detection components of thosei de-
fenses, in the Hawaiian Islands is urgently necessary for the protection of the
fleet units there present. It is believed that in the spring and summer of 1941
enemy air operations are much more likely to take place in the Hawaiian area
and in Alaska than in Puerto Rico. Panama and the Continental United States.
2. For the foregoing reason the intended priority of permanent installation
of the lixed anti-aircinft detection equiimiciit being procnieil by the Navy is a^'
follows: Midway, Johnston, Guam, Palmyra. Samoa, Wake, Gnantanamo. It is
r^uested that consideration be given to revising schedules of delivery so as to
provide Army installations in the Hawaiian Islands and at Kodiak, Dutch
Harbor and Sitka before completing installations at Panama and before pro-
ceeding with [569S] installations in Puerto Rico and the continental
United States.
.S. Confirmation is also requested of the understanding reached on 8 Janu-
ary 1941 in a conference between the Director of Naval Communications, the
Chief Signal Office, and representatives of the War Plans Divisicmis of both
services, that the Navy Department will be given priority in deliveries of seven
sets of mobile equipment and at least eight of the eighteen sets of antiaircraft
equipment for the use of Marine Defense Battalions.
4. It was learned in the conference on S January that delays are anticipated
in obtaining steel for use in completing this equipment. It is recommended
that the highest priority be given to production of this eqi;ipment and supplying
the material needed. The Navy Department will be glad to cooperate in obtain-
ing the necessary priorities.
R. E. Ingersoll.
Acting.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2139
Now, following that this Bloch report came in. You remember
that?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr, Mitchell. In which he condemned the situation at Hawaii
as inadequate for defense against an air attack ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir.
\6€9Jf] Mr. Mitchell. And then you said in your statement
today that you caused that letter to be written by Secretary Knox to
Secretary of War Stimson ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. What part did you take in that ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Turner said that he did, too.
Admiral Stark. That letter was formed in the War Plans Division,
gone over very carefully in the front office and then submitted to the
Secretary for signature.
Mr. Mitchell. You were in full accord with the conclusions in that
letter?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; in complete accord with it.
Mr. Mitchell. From that time on, following that letter to the
Secretary of War, steps were taken by both the Army and the Navy
to prime the defense, both naval and military, in Hawaii against a
possible air attack, were they not?
Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, we have had here in much of the correspond-
ence between General Marshall and General Short, as to the latter's
desire for more planes and guns and other equipment. What did
the Navy do? What did you do toward supplying Admiral Kimmel
with any additional equipment that he needed or that was available
for defense against an air [6695'] attack in the way of anti-
aircraft equipment on the ground or fighter planes or reconnaissance
planes, PBY's?
Admiral Stark. We increased — I have forgotten just how much,
of course it is a matter of record — the number of squadrons he had
out there capable of long distance reconnaissance. With regard to
surface vessels, we were able to do very, very little for him and we
Mr. Mitchell. Well, were surface vessels of real significance in the
detection of an incoming enemy carrier force ?
Admiral Stark. They would have been helpful, yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. They would have had a great deal of ground to
cover, would they not ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, they would have had a great deal of ground
to cover but still you will note in his letters his constant request for
them and my statement to him that we could not supply them.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I inferred from his letters that he was refer-
ring a good deal to patrols against submarines.
Admiral Stark. Yes, but they might have helped him in an emer-
gency to use his eyes. For example, we told him that we did not have
them and that he would have to detail such craft from his own fleet,
which meant a detail of destroyers. I told him — I think it appears
in one of these personal [S69S] letters — that statement and
we also sent him an official letter to that extent.
2140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Mitchell. Am I wrong in thinking that that patrol by sur-
face craft was merely for the purpose of determining submarines
approaching and vessels ?
Admiral Stark. Well, it was all to be used in that, in the distance.
It would have helped him for use in shore patrol, but he might have
extended them.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, you were familiar with the plans that were
made from time to time thereafter affecting Hawaii, directed toward
the coordination and the union of action between the Army and Navy
forces in defense against an air attack ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember the Martin-Bellinger report?
Admiral Stark. Very clearly, yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. In which they practically described the Jap attack
as it afterwards occurred?
Admiral Stark. Well, we thought that report was so good when it
came in that we distributed it as noted in the statement.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, in August 1941 there was a report
or study by General Martin, the Army air commander, [6697]
that went directly to the Chief of the Army Air Forces. Did you
see that, that study of reconnaissance by Martin?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall having seen it at the time. I may
have. I have seen it since.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, that report showed very clearly that in order
to insure against the complete thwarting of an air attack by the Japs
it would be necessary to detect their carriers at sea the afternoon be-
fore and bomb them ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. That was the conclusion that Martin and Bellinger
reached together, was it not?
Admiral Stark. Well, the conclusion was to spot them, if you could,
before they could launch their planes.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, that is what I am leading up to.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. IMiTCiiELL. Now, in order to be sure that your fleet was not
going to be bombed from the air they agreed that you would have to
catch the carriers before their planes were launched, did they not?
Admiral Stark. Tliat is correct, yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. And they figured out that the natural way for the
Japs to come in there would be at daylight, that is', with the planes.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
[56981 Mr. Mitchell. And it would be necessary to run a recon-
naissance out for seven or eight or nine hundred or a thousand miles
and detect them the afternoon or the ninht before in order to damage
them before their planes were launched, is that right ?
Admiral Stark. It is always the objective to get the carriers before
they can launch their planes.
Mr. Mitchell. And it was also equally true, as they said, that
actually if you could not do that, if you had to rely on catching the
planes in the morning after they had left tlie carriers and had been
launched at a distance up to two or three or four liundred miles, they
could not be confident that the attack would not get home to some
extent.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2141
Admiral Stark. It is pretty difficult to stop all of an air attack once
it gets started. You might break up its effectiveness somewhat but
some planes, we have always felt, are very likely to get in.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, as a result of all those studies and all
those plans, which indicated very clearly that unless you had a certain
number of reconnaissance planes and a certain number of bombers you
could not count on discovering the Japs before they had launched their
planes, you were taking some hazards by having your fleet in Pearl
Harbor, isn't that correct?
[S699] Admiral Stark. There is always a hazard to have a fleet
on the firing line, sir, or in an exposed position and there has been ever
since the war started.
Mr. Mitchj:ll. The number of planes that the Army had and the
number of planes that the Navy had were admittedly known at both
ends, both at Hawaii and in Washington by the Army and Navy to be
inadequate to run a full reconnaissance over a 360-clegree circle at a
distance of seven or eight hundred miles, is that true?
Admiral Stark. That is correct, yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. And isn't it a fact that your PBY's, plus the bombers
that were there for the Army, were so limited in number that the best
you could put out, or that the commander out there could put out would
be to run a sectional reconnaissance, taking one sector one afternoon
or morning and another one another day ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. He did not have enough for a 360-degree
search.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, even assuming that he left out the west and
southwest, where your task forces were operating and Guam and Mid-
way intervening and all that, and he even tried to cover the area to
the north, which was apparently the dangerous area, there being little
traffic up there, the commanders out there could not have run a recon-
naissance that would [5700] cover more than a third of the
area in one day, could they?
Admiral Stark. Well, 1 do not understand just what you mean by
"a third of the way" or "a third of the area."
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I am speaking of a sector. There is 180 de-
grees on the north side on a horizontal line.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I am speaking of a reconnaissance to the north.
Admiral Stark. Yes. He did not have enough for that whole
northern semicircle.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, could they have covered more than a third of
that northern semicircle daily?
Admiral Stark. The air people have testified on that, as to what
they could cover, or if they have not testified they can testify, con-
sidering the upkeep of their planes and their pilots, and so forth,
and I hesitate to get into detail on that.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, Martin said he needed 189 big four-motored
planes to run a 360-degree reconnaissance daily out to a distance of 700
or 800 miles. That would mean half that number at least to run the
180-degree sector, would it not, and you did not have that many?
Admiral Stark. Kimmel had available, without regard to Army
planes, approximately 60 operating planes at that time. [6701]
He had 82, I believe, out there, of which 60 were operating. There
are always a certain number laid up for repairs.
2142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Mitchell. Well, he had a little less than a third of the planes
that Martin reported he needed for the 360 degrees.
Admiral Stark. As I say, that has been studied both by the Army
and the Navy. There has been testimony submitted, not before this
court, but I believe before the Navy last summer, or perhaps before
the Army, as to what could have been done and witnesses can be
called for that. I would hesitate to pronounce an opinion.
Mr. Mitchell. I was hoping possibly that you had given that sub-
ject some thought in 1941 when the question of the safety of the fleet
was at stake and that maybe you had formed some ideas yourself about
the extent of the hazards and the difficulty of their discovering the
Jap carrier fleet in that way. Did you not give it some attention men ?
Admiral Stark. Yes. What we did was to give them in distribut-
ing all we had to different areas, all that we felt that they needed —
all that we felt that we could give them.
Mr. Mitchell. That is right.
Admiral Stark. They needed more,
Mr. Mitchell. You gave them everything you had.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
[5702] Mr. Mitchell. But it was not quite enough.
Admiral Stark. No, it was not.
Mr. Mitchell. That is just what I am getting to. I think I am not
making any statement exactly as to what the record will show, but
the impression one gains from it to date is that admittedly they were
away short of the reconnaissance planes, fighting planes and anti-
aircraft of Hawaii and that the chances of detecting a carrier force
in time to destroy the carriers before the planes were launched was a
rather slim chance, as Mr. Churchill said about the Chinese.
Admiral Stark. When you haven't got enough planes to search
the entire area which you would like to search, whether it is planes or
what not, you narrow down to where you think is the most likely area
of travel and your next study is how can you cover that or how much
of it you can cover. That had been studied out, I believe, and wit-
nesses who have made that study can be available.
Mr. Mitchell. I was trying to get your views on it.
Admiral Stark. I know it only by hearsay. I never made a per-
sonal study of the number of degrees they could cover, and so forth.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, were you troubled about the possibility of an
air attack at Hawaii after the 1st of November 1941 as a possibility?
Did it seem to you to be a real [5703] hazard ?
Admiral Stark. We always recognized the possibility.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, when you had a fleet out there and you
did not have an adequate antiaircraft defense why were you not wor-
ried about the safety of the fleet in Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Stark. 1 stated in my letter that I was worried about it.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, that is in November 1940.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I am bringing you down now to the period between
November 27th and December 7, 1941. Had you lost your fear of an
air attack?
Admiral Stark. No, I won't say that I was fearing an air attack.
We recognized the possibility of it.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, had you changed your views?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2143
Admiral Stark. And we recognized that we should be ready so far
as what we had available to use.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, suppose you did not have enough and you
thouglit there was a substantial hazard, didn't tlie question arise in
your mind and those of your staff here as to what you ought to do,
whether you ought to move the fleet east a ways or make arrangements
to keep a smaller number of the vessels in the harbor at a time and
things of that kind ?
[6704] Admiral Stark. There are certain hazards which you
have to anticipate. As to just what should be kept in port and what
should be kept at sea of what was out there, that was clearly up to the
man on the spot.
Mr. Mitchell. Your idea was that having done everything you could
for him and given him all the equipment that you could scrape up and
he was still inadequately prepared to defend against an air attack, that
the responsibility of just what he did to meet that situation was up to
him, is that the idea ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. That was all we could do, except we were
pressing continually to get more material.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, 1 know, but I am talking now about on Novem-
ber 27th, when the clock had struck and the codes were being burned
and war was a matter of days and you could not get any material in
that length of time. You were up against a second problem, weren't
you, of how to handle the fleet at Pearl Harbor ?
Admiral Stark. Well, it was then up to the Commander in Chief
on the spot. I would not have presumed, sitting at a desk in Washing-
ton, to tell him what to do with his fleet. There were many factors in-
volved, of which he was the only person who had the knowledge, and
once I had started, if I had started, to give him directives, I would have
been [570-5] handling the fleet. That was not my job.
Mr. Mitchell. I was wondering why when you sent the warning
message at that time, what does this "defensive deployment" mean
that was in your message of November 27th ? Wliat does that mean as
applied to the conditions that existed there ?
Admiral Stark. My thought in that message about the defensive
deployment was clear all-out security measures. Certainly, having
been directed to take a defensive deployment, the Army having been
directed to make reconnaissance, but regardless of the Army, our
message to Admiral Kimmel, that the natural thing — and perhaps
he did do it — was to take up with the Army right away in the gravity
of the situation, the plans that they had made, and then make dis-
positions as best he could against surprise for the safety not only of
the ships which he decided to keep in port but also for the safety of
the ships which he had at sea. He had certain material which he
could use for that and we naturally expected he would use it.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, the word "deployment," at least in the Army
sense, is to scatter, isn't it ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct, yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Is that what you meant when you applied it to the
Navy command?
[S706] Admiral Stark. He should deploy what planes he had ;
submarines are splendid craft to see without being seen. They might
have been employed. He could have used a light force if he had seen
2144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
fit and had them available. He had certain forces at sea. We were
not handling them. That was his force. Just what deployment he
was using them for, that also was up to him. He could search — I am
not stating that he should and it is difficult to testify on this, par-
ticularly in the light of hindsight.
Mr. Mitchell. I know.
Admiral Stark. It is awfully difficult to keep away from it.
Mr. Mitchell. I am just trying to get a translation of the words
"defensive deployment."
Admiral Stark. Well, a defensive deployment would be to spread
and to use his forces to the maximum extent to avoid surprise and,
if he could, to hit the other fellow and in conjunction with the Army,
to implement the arrangements which had previously been made for
just this sort of thing.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you think the possibilities of a successful sur-
prise attack by the Japs in the way that it was done was increased
by moving the shipping out of the northern ship lanes in October?
Did that give the Japs a little better chance to get through without
being observed ?
[S707] Admiral Stark. It never occurred to me, I never thought
of it in that light until I heard it brought up recently, because there
were not many ships up there, not an awful lot anj^way. It was easy
to cross the lanes. A fleet that does not want to be seen and that has
adequate air scouting does not have to be seen as a rule. They can
steam darkened at night. Also, they can searcli out the night area
that they propose to go through and I would not have said that it had
any bearing.
Mr. Mitchell. You were aware, of course, that the Jap espionage
system in Hawaii was working without any real hindrance ?
Admiral Stark. The Jap what, sir?
Mr. Mitchell. The Jap espionage system, their spies in Hawaii.
Admiral Stark. We had always felt — and again there are other
witnesses available to 3^011 there who can tell you just what the Japs
were doing. We had felt that not only in Hawaii but at practically all
our given posts tlie Japs knew everything we were doing.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, you told us here, and you, yourself, knew then
in 1941, that the Japs not only had every opportunity to watch
the movements in Hawaii and to know whether the forces there were
alert or not alert, but tliey also had other means of communicating it
to their superiors in Tokyo. They liad access to the radio and to the
cable companies ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; that is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. Don't you think that really the key to this attack
at Pearl Harbor was not only the fact that our forces were not alerted
but that the Japs knew it ?
Admiral Stark. You mean they knew our forces were not alerted?
Mr. ]\Iitchell. Yes.
Admiral Stark. That would be conjecture. I do not know, sir.
They may have, but I do not know. We have nothing, I believe, of
record to show it. I think it is very likely.
Mr. Mitchell. We have plenty in this record to show they were
getting dispatches from Hawaii every day telling exactly what was
going on and they were inquiring about the conditions there. Some
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2145
of these dispatches that we did get and decoded in time talk about air-
craft reconnaissance and all that sort of thing.
Admiral Stark. That is true, yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. It is a fact, isn't it, that they must have known every-
thing he was doing and had every means of reporting that fact to their
government.
Admiral Stark. That is true, yes, sir. Just what they reported in
the last hours I do not know, but what you say is [5709] quite
true.
Mr. Mitchell. I do not mean over the last hours but I mean over
the last weeks.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. As a matter of fact, that was a considerable hazard
normally in the Japs making an attack of that kind, a hazard to them,
was it not ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct, yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. And in order to decide whether they would take it
or not they would have to know something about the extent of pre-
paredness at the other end, wouldn't they?
Admiral Stark. Yes. sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you know here in Washington between Novem-
ber 27 and December 7, 1941, that our D. F. system, direction finder
system, had lost track of all but two divisions of Jap carriers and that
they did not pick them up again before the 7th ?
Admiral Stark. I was familiar at that time in general with the
general picture. It is a long time ago and what I heard recently that
is so definite on that. Just how much I am colored by hindsight on
that I do not know. I do distinctly recall their changes of call signs
and that sort of material and also we asked — it shows in the record, I
believe — the Army to make reconnaissance over the Mandates
[5710] and we were not too sure at that time, in fact I say we were
not too sure ; the last information we had as to the carriers had come in
some time previously as I recall.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, your report sheets that we have here about
the location of carriers seem to differ a little bit from the ones that
they were using out in Hawaii. Didn't you get your inf ormtaion from
Hawaii or did you pick it up directly here in the Navy Department?
Admiral Stark. The information that came in with regard to mate-
rial of that sort came from the field. That is, it came from Hawaii and
it came from the Philippines. We were dependent upon them for
that information.
Mr. Mitchell. You had about the same data to work on that they
did?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, there are two in one of the old records that
has not been presented yet here, there is evidence by one of the officers
in charge of that work in Hawaii, of the direction finding reports and
ship locations, that they lost track of the Jap carriers around the 26th
or 27th of November and that he reported it to his chief.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did anything like that occur around that time?
Did anybody call it to your attention anything to [5711] that
effect?
79716 — 46— pt. 5 7
2146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. I have no recollection of it now.
The Chairman. Are you ready to suspend?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
The Chairman. The committee will stand in recess until 10 o clock
on Wednesday morning. The chair desires to hold a brief executive
session with the committee and everybody else will please retire from
the room. .
(Whereupon, at 4 : 10 p. m., December 31, 1945, an adjournment was
taken until 10 a. m., Wednesday, January 2, 1946.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2147
[57m PEAEL HARBOE ATTACK
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 2, 1946
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
OF the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington^ D. C.
The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, and Fergu-
son, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman). Murphy, and
Gearhart.
Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A.
Gesell and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the Joint Committee.
[6713^ The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Counsel may proceed with Admiral Stark.
TESTIMONY OF ADM. HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Stark, there is a letter from you to Admiral
Richardson dated December 23, 1940, in which you offered the predic-
tion that war with Japan would come at any time after the next 90
days and tlien I notice on October 17, 1941, there is a letter from you
to Admiral Kimmel in which you state : "Personally I do not believe
the Japanese are going to sail into us."
What caused your change in view about the possibility or proba-
bility of war with Japan during that period ?
Admiral Stark. Well, it was the information that developed as
time went on.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, just what information was it that indicated
any less tension with Japan up to October 1941 that led you to reach
that conclusion ?
Admiral Stark. Well, it is the information which is on file and
which I have read, you may recall, I think, in my statement, I remem-
ber distinctly of having written it, that at one point in 1941 Japan
seemed to have developed one of those waiting attitudes, that there
was sort of a lull, and tiiat may have accounted for that.
Mr. Mitchell. Was your view the same as that expressed [5714]
here by Admiral Wilkinson, that you thought the Japs would nudge
along slowly and grab what it could without a fight ? Did you have
the same view as Wilkinson about that?
Admiral Stark. Well, I had in mind and I think — well, I will say
that I had in mind the possibility of Japan playing the same game that
Hitler did, that is, one at a time. That was just one factor.
2148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, when it came to November 24, 1941, and
your warning of November 27 you changed back to the view then that
war with Japan was only a matter of days.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. It is the message of November 27, 1941.
Admiral Staek. The message of the 27th or the 24th ?
Mr. Mitchell. Both of them I should have said.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I am referring now to the two messages of November
24 and 27 which you sent to Admiral Kimmel, the warning messages
in which you then appeared to have the view that war was only a matter
of days.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. What was that based on ?
Admiral Stark. Well, we had at that time the intercepts giving dead
lines, which I think you will recall, the first being the 25th, the next
the 29th. That furnished some [o71S] background. We had
the note of the Japanese of November 20, I believe it was, which was
irreconcilable with our viewpoint.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you have before you the intercepts which Japan
had sent to their Ambassadors here, which said that unless they get
an affirmative agreement from us to abandon China and start fur-
nishing them oil that they would go ahead, or something would auto-
matically happen?
Admiral Stark. Well, I had that also. I have forgotten just when
the intercept came in. I may also state, since you included the mes-
sage of the 27th, we had Mr. Hull's reaction to the Chiang Kai-Shek
notes regarding the modus vivendl.
Mr. Mitchell. You mean you learned from him that he had aban-
doned the idea of the modus vivendi because of the objections of Chiang
Kai-Shek that it would collapse China's army ?
Admiral Stark. I may state with regard to the message from Chiang
Kai-Shek that Mr. Hull called me up, I am not sure just when, it may
have been the 25th or it may have been the 26th, I kept no record and
I have tried to straighten that out, but he called me up stating how
very much he was put out by the action of Chiang Kai-Shek in sending
that despatch and rather broadcasting it and it worried him very
greatly and I gathered that that, along with other reactions that he
had, might lead him to abandon the modus vivendl^ and then we had
1^5716^ also his statement about that time that it was now up to
the Army and Nav}^ It was the first time that Mr. Hull had stated
definitely to me, indicated to me, that he considered there was no chance
of a settlement through diplomatic intercourse with the Japs.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, in your warning messages of November
24 and 27, 1941, you had taken into account and evaluated all these
Japanese diplomatic intercepts and the exchanges which showed the
dead line and the refusal of Japan to go along unless we affirmatively
agreed to their ideas, you took all that into account and evaluation?
Adniiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, assuming for the present at least that you gave
your commander at Pearl Harbor a sufficient warning of the imminence
of immediate war generally with Japan in a few days, I am interested
in knowing what your attitude was about the possibility of that war
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2149
involving an attack on Pearl Harbor. They are quite two different
things, are they not?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, the commanders at Hawaii were evidently of
the opinion that there wasn't any chance of an air attack and what
I am interested in bringing out is what the views and the attitude of
the high command in the Navy Depart- [5717] ment were on
that very point. Now, what was your personal view about the possi-
bility of an air attack on Hawaii as of November 27 to December 7,
1941'?
Admiral Stark. I was not expecting an air attack on Hawaii at
that time. I was surprised at that attack. I knew it to be a possi-
bility, which I think is plain from the letters that I have written and
our efforts to help them out there to be in position to guard against
such an attack, but as to actually expecting an attack at that time,
I did not. The evidence which we had and the only tangible evidence
was that the action, the initial attacks by the Japs, would come in the
Far Eastern area.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, did your view accord with that of your
chief assistants in the Navy Department?
Admiral Stark. I believe Admiral Ingersoll is to be one of the wit-
nesses here and in his testimony of last summer it is my recollection
that he stated that he also was surprised at that attack.
Mr. Mitchell. I am referring not so much to his testimony given
since as to their expressions at the time you had consultations with
them.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir, it is my recollection that he was surprised
at that time.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, before the attack did Admiral Inger-
16718] soil or any other of your assistants in their consultations
with you make any expressions to you as to their views about an air
attack before December 7? Was it the subject of discussion?
Admiral Stark. It was a subject of discussion so far as possibility
is concerned. As I recollect, we went into all phases of it but we
did not have anything definitely pointing toward an air attack. How-
ever, it was our intention to put the forces in the Pacific, to put Hawaii
on guard against an air attack. It is my recollection that the words
"in any direction" appearing in the message of November 24 was at
my suggestion. In other words, we had some definite indications of
an attack in certain directions, and which proved to be correct as re-
gards the main campaign, but that did not preclude attack elsewhere,
and by the words "in any direction" we intended to convey that it
might come anywhere, but personally I did not expect an attack on
such a broad scale by Japan in the initial stages, that is, not only all
oyer the Far East but as far east as Hawaii. I knew it to be a possi-
bility; and as regards submarines, I would not have been a bit sur-
prised if some submarines had appeared, for example, off San
Francisco or anywhere else in the Pacific, but we looked for the main
effort in the Far East but it was our intention to convey to Hawaii
the possibility of an attack there; that is, it was [5719] our
intention, at least, to put them on guard against such an attack and
we thought we had done so.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, if you had that in your mind when you
wrote these messages of November 24 and November 27, why did you
2150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
say merely, "Including the Philippines and Guam" as a possibility,
or mention even Borneo as a possibility? Why didn't you say some-
thing to the effect that an attack on Hawaii is a possibility ?
Admiral Stark, Well, the Philippines and Borneo and that area
in general and Guam was in our thoughts not only as a possibility
but as a likely point of attack. I think perhaps my best answer to
your question would be that we did not put Hawaii down as likely
of attack as we did these other places.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I know but, still, if you thought that there
was any possibility, if your intention was to put the commanders at
Hawaii on alert against a local attack, why not say so in the mes-
sages? Doesn't the message really reflect your view, your personal
opinion that Hawaii was really not in substantial hazard of any
attack ?
Admiral Stark. No, I would not go that — I would not say that,
sir, because if we had thought that there was no possibility or no
danger of that we would not have given them the directive which
we did, which directive was intended to have them take up a position
or take action against surprise ; [6730'] that is the directive to
make a defensive deployment.
May I just refer to this message of the 27th for a minute and look
at it?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Admiral Stark. It will be noted that when w^e stated "Japan is
expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days" we
stated, which was from the information we had, that "the number
and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task
forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philip-
pines or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo," and then we gave
the directive. We gave the information which we had. We had
nothing which we thought at that time — I may say certain messages
have been developed since regarding which I assume you will ask me.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Admiral Stark. But at that time we had nothing, or at least I do
not recall having anything which indicated an attack on Hawaii,
while we did have rather definite information regarding an amphibi-
ous expedition and an attack in southeast Asia.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, who prepared this warning message of
November 27th and the one of the 24th ?
Admiral Stark. Those war warnings were initially prepared in
War Plans, Admiral Turner.
[57^i] Mr. Mitchell^ Who suggested that you mention Borneo
as a possibility?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall who mentioned it. The NEI was
always a possibility.
Mr. Mitchell. Wlien you were drawing those messages, did the
people that helped you ])repare them and yourself have any discussion
as to whether Hawaii might be an object of attack?
Admiral Stark. Well, it is my recollection that we discussed all
phases of the matter. I do not specifically recall just what the con-
versations were. I may state, though, that regardless of anything
which I say now or hereafter in the development of this as you may
ask me that I was surprised at the attack on Pearl Harbor.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2151
Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, the messages really reflect the view that
you had that Pearl Harbor was not in substantial hazard, do they not,
at the time they were drawn, that were in your mind ?
Admiral Stark. Well, they were in my mind also and, as I stated,
we had intended to convey that an attack there was a possibility and
to that extent that we should be on guard. I also want to make that
real plain.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, you intended to do so, but what is there in
your messages that said so ?
[67^2] Admiral Stark. There is nothing in the message, that
is, there is no definite statement in the messages which we sent to Ad-
miral Kimmel or, as I recollect, in any of the messages of that time,
which mentioned Pearl Harbor as a possibility in so many words,
but we did mention that we expected war, we mentioned that it might
come in any direction and we directed a development, which we thought
would put them on guard against such a possibility.
Mr. Mitchell. Was that warning message of November 27 sent
to the President before it was issued?
Admiral Stark. I did not put that in my statement because I could
not swear, for example, that it was, but it is my rather clear recol-
lection. If he were here I would have verified it with him, if I could
have, and put it in. The message was of such importance that I went
personally to see the Secretary of the Navy about it because it was an
all-out.
We had nothing definite at that time to say that Japan was going
to attack the United States. It was an inference on our part and
I remember at tlae time that I thought I might be taking my hand off
my number a little bit in going so far, but we had to make a decision.
Time was creeping up on us, this thing had been going on for a long
time. We had the State Department reaction, as I have mentioned
before, that it was now up to us. I either told the President before-
hand [S723'] or immediately after. I do know that within 24
hours, if not before, that it had his full approval and that he gave
us an O. K.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, my attention was attracted by the fact that
this message you sent said nothing about not committing the first
overt act and that appears to have been the point that the President
was very much interested in, so it raises a question as to whether he
saw it before it was sent. Your idea is that he saw it either before
or afterwards, you are not sure which, is that right?
Admiral Stark. I think it w^as before but I would not like definitely
to say so.
Mr. Mitchell. Had you a copy of the Army message before you
at the time you sent your own ? '
Admiral Stark. We had discussed it; yes, sir. Gerow came over to
my office, as I recollect, on the afternoon of the 27th with that mes-
sage and I sent for Turner, probably also Ingersoll because Ingersoll
generally was called in on everything of that sort, just as was Turner.
As a matter of fact they usually came through Admiral Ingersoll first
and
Mr. Stark. Well, Gerow had been advised on the 26th that the
President wanted this overt act business in the warning message and
if he saw you don't you think he brought that to your attention?
2152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[57^4] Admiral Stark. I am certain that he did — you mean that
who brought it to my attention ?
Mr. Mitchell. Gerow.
Admiral Stark. The President or Gerow ?
Mr. MiTCHFXL. Gefow. You say you saw him and conferred with
him about the warning messages and your messages before they were
sent and Gerow certainly was impressed by the need for following
the President's direction about that.
Admiral Stark. Well, the Army despatch differs in some particulars
from our despatch. It was their despatch and I personally was not
worried about an overt act in Hawaii, in the Hawaiian area so far
as the Navy was concerned. You will recall, for example — I think
it is in an exhibit here, I am not sure, but I recall Admiral Kimmel
having told me about his orders to bomb a submarine which should
come within certain areas in the Hawaiian area and I took no exception
to that whatever.
[6725^ Mr. Mitchell. Well, your only statement in the message
of November 27 which you think put the people in Hawaii on guard
against an attack at Pearl Harbor was this direction to conduct an
appropriate defensive deployment under WPL-46?
Admiral Stark. Preparatory.
Mr. Mitchell. Preparatory ?
Admiral Stx\rk. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Now the main part of WPL-46 involved an offensive
attack against the Jap Mandate, did it not ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Preparatory defensive deployment according to
WPL-46 miglit well be construed to be some preliminary movement
preparatory to carrying out that offense against the Japanese Man-
dated Islands, might it not ?
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. And was it not susceptible to that interpretation by
the man who received the message?
Admiral Stark. It was, but along with it a defensive deployment
which we regarded as taking a position as best he could with what
he had for the defense of his fleet, whatever he had either at sea or
in port, to the best of his ability and to guard against being caught
unawares.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, your idea is when you told him to [5726]
take defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out that WPL-46,
which involved mainly offensive action against the Jap Mandate,
you mean that in doing that he might incidentally be guarding him-
self against an air attack, is that the idea?
Admiral Stark. I would say it was more than incidental. I would
say the defensive deployment was to guard against being caught by
surprise, and the preparatory to carrying out WPL-46 we thought
showed, in our minds, that war might eventuate at any time and that
WPL-46 would then come into full sway. If he were to take these
measures it would be the first measures to be followed in case of war
by the implementation of the war plan.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, did this defensive deployment which
you mentioned in the message of November 27 involve the movement
of battleships in Pearl Harbor ?
Admiral Stark. I left that entirely to Admiral Kimmel.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2153
Mr. Mitchell. I am asking you whether your idea in carrying out
this defensive deployment with a view for the preparation of WPL-46
called for the movement of any battleships out of the harbor of Pearl
Harbor?
Admiral Stark. I did not consider that particular point at that
time, so far as I recall. It is very difficult to give any categorical
answer as to what I believe is the purport of your question — if I do not
will you correct me — [S727] as to whether he should have left
the Fleet in Pearl Harbor or taken it out.
Mr. Mitchell. That is not what I am asking you. I am asking
you whether or not the directive for further deployment of the Fleet
with the view to carrying out WPL— to, a defensive deployment, would
reasonably call for the movement of battleships to sea— not an air
attack movement but a deployment.
Admiral Stark. I do not recall that I thought at that time of that
particular detail. It was a matter entirely within his province.
There were many factors which would affect the movement of ships,
with regard to what he had available in the air there at that time, and
a number of other things. That was his job and I did not go into it.
Mr. Mitchell. You had a map in your room somewhere in the Navy
Department that showed the precise location of ships in the Pacific
Fleet day by day, did you not?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did not you have a ship movement division there
that kept track of where the Fleet was?
Admiral Stark. Not in detail, sir. The ships were in the Hawaiian
area, but their departures from Pearl Harbor, for example, to their
target practice ground or other local maneuvers, and that sort of thing,
to my best knowledge and [6728] belief we did not know. I
know I did not know it. He was not required to report that. If he
wanted to move the Fleet to the West coast, for example, he would
not have done it without asking our permission, but if he wanted to
go 100 miles in this or that direction, or if he wanted to go out for some
special maneuver or for target practice, or what not, he would not
have reported that to us.
Mr. Mitchell. You did not then have a system of keeping track of
the daily location of ships or of the fact that ships were or were not in
Pearl Harbor ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you know that the battleships were in Pearl
Harbor prior to the 7th, that they were collected there ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall at that time. I might say with
regard to the previous answer that there were certain things laid down
in the schedule calling for repairs of ships at a certain time which had
to be dovetailed with the shore establishment, and those what might be
called fixed positions we knew, but as for the general movement in and
out of Pearl Harbor under his local arrangements, we did not know
that.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I believe on November 26, at the very same
time that this message was sent or thereabout, orders were given to
Admiral Kimmel to send two of his carriers to the west, the Lexington
and Enterprise, that is, [5729'] he was ordered to do it if he
considered it feasible.
2154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
You knew that his 2 carriers had left to the west with their air
screen? That was the movement that called for the shipment of 25
Army pursuit planes to Wake and 25 to Midway from Pearl Harbor,
and was stripping Pearl Harbor to that extent of defenses against an
air attack.
Now do you think that was a movement that you ordered, or at least
suggested he take, was consistent with the idea that Pearl Harbor was
in immediate or possible danger of an air attack ?
Admiral Staek. With regard to the movement of those carriers,
the order for carrying that out at that particular time was Admiral
Kimmel's order, not the Department's. We had taken up the move-
ment to which you refer, as I recall, a month or a little over a month
before hand. Admiral Kimmel had made a plan as to how that move-
ment was to be made also as I recall about 3 weeks prior to its being
made in which he directed how it should be made. He stated, as I re-
call, in that order that he would implement it later on, which he did.
But the order to go at that time was his own, and as I recall, we were
told, in answer to the dispatch asking him as to the advisability, and
other things, about the Enterprise, I believe it was, which left around
the 28th.
Mr. Mitchell. The Lexington left December 5.
[5730] Admiral Stark. Yes. I do not recall, and I recollect
of no evidence of his reporting to us about the movement of the Lex-
ington which left the 5th.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, you knew that they were both designed to move
to the west, that plans had been made to carry the planes out there.
Admiral Stark. Yes ; but the date was set by him.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I know
Admiral Stark. We had covered that over a month beforehand.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you know that they had not departed prior to
November 27 ? Did not you know that the movement was taking place
right about the time that you were sending these warning messages
out there?
Admiral Stark. Not until his message came in in reply to the one in
which we asked his advice on the relief — on the movement of certain
Army troops, nor do I recall that we ever were informed about the
movement of the Lexington.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, you knew that 25 Army pursuit planes to Wake
and 25 to Midway were to be taken from Hawaii, did you not?
Admiral Stark. I think you are referring to the message of the
26th.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
[6731] Admiral Stark. In which we put up a proposal
Mr. Mitchell. It is on page 42 of your correspondence, I think. I
guess I have the wrong place here. What dispatch have you before
you. Admiral ?
Admiral Stark. I have the dispatch 270038 and it bears the date
of 26 November, which was the one I was looking for and to which
I thought you referred.
Mr. Mitchell. Would you. read that into the record, please?
Admiral Stark (reading:)
In order to keep the planes of tl>e Se<'ond Marine Aircraft Wing available for
expeditionary use OPNAV has requested and Army has agreed to station lio Army
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2155
iniisuit planes at Midway and the similar number at Wake provided you consider
this feasible and desirable.
This being to CincPac.
Mr, MrrcHELL. Your dispatch to Kimmel ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and si'ound crews from
Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier. Planes will be flown off at desti-
nation and ground personnel landed in boats. Essential spare parts tools and
amuuinition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips on regular Navy supply
vessels. Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents. Navy must
be resjwnsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army
supplies. Stationing these planes [5732] must not be allowed to interfere
with planned movements of Army bombers to the Phillippines. Additional park-
ing areas should be laid promptly if necessary. Navy bombs now at outlying
positions to be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those positions for sup-
porting Navy operations. Confer with Commanding General and advise as soon
as practicable.
I note in the dispatch that we state "provided you consider this
feasible and desirable," and he is also requested to "confer with the
Commanding General" out there about it, and to advise us as soon
as practicable.
Now Admiral Kimmel's answer to that, if you would like to
have it
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. Let me inquire, does that dispatch appear in
the exhibit?
Senator Ferguson. Exhibit 37 is the one it should be in.
Mr. Mitchell. It is not in Exhibit 37, the basic Navy dispatch.
The Chairman. Does this dispatch appear in any of the exhibits?
Mr. Mitchell. It does not. It is something we have put our hands
on more lately. I am bringing it out this morning. It is the dis-
patch dated November 26 from the Chief of Naval [5733] Op-
erations to Kimmel and provides for the removal of 25 pursuit planes
from Hawaii to Wake and to Midway as on the 26th of November,
the day before the warning message was sent.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to get the time
of sending it, if they have it.
Mr. Mitchell. The hour you mean ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; when it arrived out there.
Admiral Stark. Our message number is 270038, which means
38 minutes after midnight on the 27th, Greenwich time.
Mr. Mitchell. What time is that in Washington ?
Admiral Stark. Well, Washington is fivei hours earlier, so the
message actually went out on the 26th Washington time.
The Chairman. About 7 or 8 o'clock ?
Admiral Stark. Well, 5 from 12 would be 7. I should say about
half-past 7.
Senator Ferguson. Morning or evening?
Admiral Stark. In the evening.
Mr. Mitchell. The evening of the 26th ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
2156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Mitchell. Don't you think that the fact of your agreeing to
take 25 pursuit planes out of Hawaii and sending them to Wake and
Midway on the 26th indicated pretty plainly to the Commander at
Hawaii that you did not think they were needed there for defense
cigainst an air attack?
[5734-] Admiral Stark. We left that to him to balance against
the needs.
Mr. Mitchell. I know you left it to him, but I am trying to find
out what your frame of mind was and what inferences he could fairly
draw as to your attitude about it.
Admiral Staek. I do not know what he drew from our attitude
except as w^as answered by his dispatch.
Mr. Mitchell. He thought it was all right because he was not
worrying about an air attack, and you thought it was all right be-
cause you were not worrying about an air attack, isn't that the plain
fact about it?
Admiral Stark. Yes. It was toward strengthening that general
area, and it strengthened it obviously against an air attack should it
occur further westward in those outlying islands.
Mr. Mitchell. It obviously strengthened Wake and Guam and'it
weakened the most important base you had — Hawaii.
Admiral Stark. This was Wake and Midway.
Mr. Mitchell. I mean Wake and Midway, yes.
Admiral Stark. And we considered Midway in particular a very
vital point because of its closeness to Hawaii. Wake stuck out in
a sort of an area which we realized would be difficult to defend from
the fleet standpoint, but we were sending planes to the Philippines
via those two islands at [5735] that time. That movement
was also important, and this was in connection with it.
Mr. Mitchell. What did Admiral Kimmel reply? Would you
read that, so we will have it in the record ?
Admiral Stark. His message is dated 28 November 1941. The
time group on it is 280627. That is 6:27 in the morning, which
would be 1 o'clock our time, and 5i/2 hours earlier his time.
Mr. Gesell. That is the sending time ?
Admiral Stark. It would be back on the 25th.
Mr. Mitchell. That is the sending time, is it?
Admiral Stark. I mean the 27th. That is the sending time, yes.
He refers to our two dispatches 270038 and 2700-40; the last one I
believe I have not read yet.
Mr. INIrrciiELL. Suppose you read 270040 before you read his
reply ?
Admiral Stark. 270040 dispatch reads as follows —
The CHAiiRMAN. What is the date ?
Admiral Stark. That is the 27th also, just after midnight, our
dispatch, which would have been about 7 o'clock in the evening nf
the 26th.
Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for reinforcing de-
fense battalions now on station if you consider this desirable. Army also pro-
poses to prepare [5736] in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases
which you may occupy but is unable at this time to provide any anti-aircraft units.
Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable number
of troops desired and recommend armament.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2157
Mr. Mitchell. Does that relate to the garrisons of some of these
Islands to the west?
Admiral Stakk. That is right ; j^e's, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Now read his reply.
Admiral Stark. In his reply he refers to the two mesasges from the
Chief of Naval Operations which I have read, and he states :
Wright now at Wake to discharge ground crews and material to operate one
squadron Marine planes. Afterwards proceeds Midway to land similar items.
Already arranged to send each those places leaving Pearl about 1 December
essential ground material for temporary operation 12 B-17 Army bombers, but
at present only 6 such planes of the 12. on Oahu in operating condition.
Acute shortage Army bombs precludes any shipment to outlying bases but Navy
bombs now available there usable by Anny with minor alteration.
Doubtful capability Army pursuit planes to operate over 20 miles offshore
radically limits their usefulness for [5737] insular defense. Their use
possible but inability to land on carrier freezes them to island where landed.
Flexibility disposition thereby curtailed.
Additional AA guns required this area for Army and Marine defense battalions.
Plans for Army troop reinforcement outlying bases being made however con-
sider such use inadvisable as long as Marines available. All outlying forces must
be exclusively under Naval command.
Twelve Marine fighters leave 28 November in carrier for Wake. Expect send
other Marine planes to Midway later. On December 1 sending twelve patrol
planes Midway to Wake and replacing those at Midway from Pearl. Will in-
vestigate more thoroughly feasibility and advisability of relieving Marine planes
with Army pursuit.
Now I would like to state that, so far as I know or recall, the part of
that dispatch which I read, which speaks about the 12 Marine fighters
leaving on 28 November in a carrier for Wake was the only informa-
tion sent to us giving the definite time of the movement of the Lexing-
ton group or the Enterprise group.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes ; he did refer in that message to a later shipment
to be made without giving a date.
Admiral Stark. Well, the earlier shipment he informed us about
probably were not carriers.
[5738] Mr. Mitchell. What is that?
Admiral Stark. The Wright was out there with supplies, if you
are referring to the first part of the dispatch.
Mr. Mitchell. In the last part of it he saj^s "we are going later
to send some bombers out there."
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. How were they to be sent ?
Admiral Stark. He says "on December 1 sending 12 patrol planes
Midway to Wake and replacing those at Midway from Pearl." They
would fly.
Mr. Mitchell. They M^ould fly?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
[5739'] Mr. Mitchell. Did Admiral Kimmel
Admiral Stark. Would you like my reply to that, sir?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, if you have it available.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire: Is his reply
in exhibit 37?
Mr. Mitchell. No. These are new messages. We have not had
them available for the committee before, or ourselves for that matter.
Admiral Stark. We have a file that we have had made up covering
that which I am sure, if the committee so requires, the Navy Depart-
2158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ment will be glad to furnish. It covers the dispatches I have just
read and other matters bearing on the matter.
The Chairman. I suggest that'copies be prepared for distribution
to the committee. You may read them into the record now and they
will become part of the hearings, but for convenience it might be
well for the committee to have copies.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I think they should be made avail-
able in connection with the dispatches from October 17 on, when
this thing started. There are dispatches from October 17 giving the
reasons for these things. They are already in the record of the
Navy Board at page 321 on — the Navy narrative.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, during the noon hour we will
review the file and get them together.
[6740] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I might say that the
narrative is not an official document.
Mr. Murphy. I am just saying that they are available. They have
been available.
The Chairman. The narrative is not an official document but it is
available here.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, Admiral, you have another document that you
want to read ?
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I ask, just to have the record
clear on that matter — may I ask counsel if he would get the time from
the witness now, so that it will be at this place in the record, as to when
the Navy prepared the document that he is now reading from ?
The Chairman. Will counsel inquire as to that ?
Mr. Mitchell. I don't know what he is reading^f rom.
Senator Ferguson, He indicated that the Navy had made up a file
on this matter and other matters. I would like to get the time when
the Navy made it up.
Mr. Mitchell. Who made that file up for you ?
Admiral Stark. I directed it be prepared, because the question of
movement of these carriers came up in the hearings last summer, and
I thought it possible it might come up again, and I wanted put to-
gether the dispatches in convenient form, which I have here.
['57^1] Mr. Mitchell. And who did the work?
Admiral Stark. I wanted it in convenient form for reference. The
work was done by counsel.
Mr. Mitchell. Your counsel ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. It is mv own. I mean, the Navy Depart-
ment did not do this for me. I asked for these from the Navy De-
partment.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Senator Lucas. May I ask one question. Mr. Cliairman ?
Does the document that the admiral now holds in his hands cover all
of the messages that were sent by the admiral and received by Admiral
Kimmel on this question ?
Admiral Stark. I think it does ; yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. How many documents are there? You have read
three of them.
Admiral Stark. Well, there is another dispatch, and then there is
the order to which I referred where Admiral Kimmel laid the plans
for this movement.
Mr. Mitchell. Suppose you read the other dispatches ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2159
The Chairman. The Chair wouhl like to ask if this is something that
you have had dug out from the Navy Department or whether the
Navy has dug it out for you that they didn't dig out for us.
Mr. MncHELii. He exphiined that it was dug out by his counsel.
[5742] The Chairman. Why didn't the Navy dig it out for us?
Admiral Stark. The Navy had not dug anything out for me, sir.
I have done my own digging.
Mr. Mitchell. I didn't ask him for it.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, does that indicate that if we
don't inquire about it that we are not getting it from the Navy ?
The Chairman. I don't know that it necessarily indicates that.
Probably Admiral Stark knew about it, and nobody else did, and
nobody, certainly outside of the Navy, would have known about it.
I can't explain why it wasn't included in these other documents,
although it is included in the narrative story furnished by the Navy.
I think it advisable that all these be read into the hearings and made
a part of the record.
Mr. Mitchell. These dispatches — there is nothing secret about it —
I understand that they were dug up in previous hearings. The sig-
nificance of them didn't strike us very hard at one time, and now it
has, so we are going into it.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I think the record should show that
the message of the 26th is on page 325 of volume 2 of the narrative ;
it is Exhibit 70 in the Hewitt Report, Document No. 24, Exhibit 70,
in the Hewitt Report ; it is Exhibit 38 at page 50 in the Naval Court of
Inquiry. So there is nothing [S74S] secretive about it. This
matter has been in the hands of the committee for at least the last
month.
[5744] The Chairman. Let us make it a part of the record here.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, in order that there is no question,
I make the suggestion that the liaison man from the Navy who is
handling these documents make a further search on behalf of the
committee to ascertain whether or not there are any more documents
bearing upon this question.
Mr. Mitchell. You mean on this question of shipping planes?
Senator Lucas. Upon this one question.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
The Chairman. I think you were about to make an observation,
Mr. Mitchell, when I interrupted you.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I have forgotten what it was.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, Admiral, suppose you read the rest of this file
into the record now so that we will have it there and we can get
mimeographs of it afterward.
Admiral Stark. If I may interject : I don't want any inference made
from my remark about the Navy not digging out material for me that
it has held back anything or not given me everything I have asked
for, but I have done my own digging.
Shall I take this up in sequence ?
Mr. Mitchell. Take it up in sequence and omit the three you have
already read.
[5745] Admiral Stark. The. first dispatch here is 17 October
1941 and reads :
Because of the great iiuportance
2160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR Al^TACK
The Vice Chairman. From whom to whom?
Admiral Stark. From the Chief of Naval Operations to Com-
mander in Chief Pacific.
Because of the great importance of continuing to reinforce the Philippines
with long-range Arnay bombers you are requested to take all practical precau-
tions for the safety of the air fields at Wake and Midway.
The next paper I have bearing on this is from the Commander in
Chief United States Fleet to the Commander Aircraft, Battle Force,
and Commander Patrol Wing Two.
Subject : Naval Air Station Wake and Naval Air Station Midway — Basing
of Aircraft at.
1. In order to be able to meet emergency requirements for basing of aircraft
at Wake and Midway, while minimizing logistic demands of these places for
the present, the Commander in Chief desires that the following action be taken
immediately :
(a) Make preparations at Wake for basing :
(1) 12 patrol planes.
(2) 12 Marine scout bombers or 12 Marine fighters.
(b) Make preparations at Midway for basing :
[57.^6] (1) 12 additional patrol planes (total 24).
(2) 18 Marine scout bombers or 19 Marine fighters.
2. These preparations shall include the following provisions and assumptions :
(a) When the aircraft movements are ordered, it shall be necessary only to
fly the patrol planes and land planes (from a carrier in the latter case) to the
designated places and it shall be practicable to operate on arrival without attend-
ant transportation of material or personnel by ship.
(b) It shall be practicable to continue operations on this basis for a period
of six weeks, at the end of which time relief may be expected, either by air
exchange of planes and flight crews or by provision of additional support trans-
ported by ship, or by combination of the two.
(c) Preparations shall, accordingly, include transportation to Wake and
Midway of :
(1) Necessary tools, spares and equipment for minor repairs, adjustments and
checks.
(2) Necessary minimum number of ground personnel to meet the requirements
of subparagraph 2 (b) above, assuming the full availability of Naval Air Sta-
tion personnel and Marine defense personnel already present for non-technical
manpower assistance.
(3) Necessary additional bombs, with necessary [5747] additional
bomb handling equipment. (Note: With delivery of the 48 1,000-pound bombs
appi'oved for the patrol planes at Wake the bomb situation for patrol planes
will be satisfactory at both Wake and Midway. The following additional
bombs are needed for the Marine planes: Wake, 12 1,000-pound, 24 500-pound;
Midway, 18 l.OCO-pound, 36 500-pound, l.W 100-pound bombs each, of those
already available at Wake and Midway, should be designated for the Marine
planes. Aircraft machine gun ammunition already at Wake and Midway is
sufficient).
(d) Patrol plane personnel at Wake shall base and subsist in excess accom-
modations available in Contractor's Camp No. 2 near the air station site. Patrol
plane personnel at Midway shall base and subsist at the Naval Air Station with
additional accommodations, if and as necessary, to be provided by the use of
Contractor's space.
(e) Marine squadi'on personnel at Wake shall base and subsist adjacent to
the land plane runways. Marine squadron personnel at Midway shall base and
subsist on Eastern Island. At both places it is necessary to set up a suitable
tent camp. The assistance of Marine defense personnel shall be used to accom-
plish this.
(f) Commander Patrol Wing Two shall provide, by patrol plane tender, the
necessary personnel and material transportation [57^8] for both patrol
plane and Marine aircraft preparations.
3. By copy of this letter the Commandant 14tli Naval District is directed
to take immediate steps to :
(a) Make available the 48 1,000-pound bombs still due for patrol planes at
Wake and the additional bombs for the Marine planes.
2 (b) (3) above.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2161
(b) Provide for necessary stowage of bombs and ammunition for Marine land
planes adjacent to land plane runways at Wake and Midway.
(c) Make available the Contractor's accommodations needed for patrol
squadron personnel at Wake and Midway.
(d) Cover the bulk subsistence and potable water requirements of the per-
sonnel of the foregoing preparatory parties arid anticipate the additional re-
quirements resulting from actual aircraft basing.
(e) Expedite expansion of tank storage of aviation gasoline at Wake and
anticipate the aviation gasoline and lubricating oil requirements at both Wake
and Midway resulting from actual aircraft basing.
(f) Provide lumber needed for the tent camps of Marine aircraft personnel
at Wake and Midway.
(g) Make available the needed assistance from Naval Air Station and Marine
defense personnel for camp construction [57^9] and, on arrival of air-
craft, for aircraft operations.
Copies of this preparatory letter of Admiral Kimmel's were sent to :
COMBATFOR
COMSCOFOR
COMBASEFOR
COMAIRSCOFOR
COM-14
NAD, OAHU
C. O., MARINE AIR GROUP 21
Copy was not sent to Chief of Naval Operations. It was a local
operation order of Admiral Kimmel to his own people on how to carry
out that which he directed.
The next message is 270038, the message which I have already read.
The next message is 270040, wherein I stated Army has offered to
make available some units and which I have also read.
The next message was the message from CINCPAC to OPNAV,
28 06 27, which was in reply to the two previous ones.
The next message, which I have not read, is 282054 from the Chief
of Naval Operations to Commander in Chief Pacific.
The Vice Chairman. The date ?
Admiral Stark. The 28th, sir. 2054, which would be 10 [5750]
hours and a half earlier, which would be about 10 o'clock in the morn-
ing on the 28th. From Admiral Kimmel to the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions.
Arrangements described in your 280624 appear to be best that can be done under
the circumstances but suggest advisability of transporting VMP221 from San
Diego to Hawaii via Saratoga period War Department will instruct commanding
general Hawaiian department to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army
pursuit planes and army troops in support of landings period War Department
will endeavor to expedite plans for increase of anti-aircraft defenses but it is
doubtful if much improvement is possible soon period Marine Corps will shortly
receive sixteen thirty-seven mm. anti-aircraft guns and receive ammunition in
February period Do you desire these guns for Midway and Wake period Re-
quest air mail report on present effective defenses of all outlying bases and
increases planned in immediate future period
That is from the Chief of Naval Operations to CINCPAC.
The next dispatch is a dispatch from Admiral Kimmel to his own
people, namely, to the Commander of Task Force Two and to the
Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and for information to
Combat Wing Two, COMBATFOR, and COMBASEFOR.
It is dated the 28th of November, 0447, which would bring it, in our
time, back to the 27th, about 6 o'clock :
[57.51] Twelve planes marine fightrnn two eleven are to base Wake accord-
ance myser 101825 of 10 November period Enterprise provide transportation
79716— 46— pt. 5 8
2162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
period After departure Pearl on 28 November form task force eight consisting of
Enterprise Chester Northampton Salt Lake City and Desron six and past com-
mand task force two to Rear Admiral Draemel with orders task force two carry
out normal operations in Hawaiian area period Proceed to arrive 200 miles 070
degrees from Wake period At 0700 on 3 December period Fly off marine planes
that vicinity and upon receiving info that planes have arrived Wake return Pearl
period Enroute to and from Wake pass through Point Afirm 400 miles south of
Midway period Patrol planes from Midway and Wake will cover your route and
provide security while at Wake period Communications radio condition nine-
teen guard MPM primary fox continuously period Comfourteen inform Wake
that planes expected arrive there 0830 on 8 December and direct Wake report
comfourteen by coded dispatch when planes available there period Comfourteen
furhish this final arrival information to comtaskfor eight period Wake sub-
marine patrol Tambor Triton will be advised period. Narwhal and Dolphin are
enroute Pearl at 1200 GCT on 27 November they were about 300 miles east of
Wake period
The next message is 040237, which is 4 December, 2 o'clock,
[67S2'\ 0237, Greenwich. We would be 5 hours earlier, which
would be half-past nine, and the time in Hawaii would have been
about 4 o'clock in the afternoon on the 3rd.
Myser 01825 of 10 November Marine Scoron two three one will base eighteen
planes Midway period Lexington provide transportation period on five December
after sortie Pearl form task force twelve under comcruscofor consisting of Leam-
ington Chicago Astoria Portland desron five less desdiv ten period task force
twelve proceed by direct route to arrive four hundred miles 130 degrees from
Midway at 2230 October on seven December period from that vicinity fly off
Marine planes to Midway period return operating area and resume normal
operations after planes have arrived Midway period comtaskfor nine direct
patrol planes from Midway cover Lexington flying off position provide security
while that area and guard Marine plane flight period communications radio
condition nineteen guard continuously MPM primary fox period comfourteen
inform Midway planes expected arrive about 0200 GCT on eight December and
require Midway report arrival to comfourteen by coded dispatch period com-
fourteen pass this report to comtaskfor twelve period Midway submarine patrol
will be advised period
That last message, I believe I didn't give you the heading. It is from
CINCPAC, to COMTASKFOR 3, COMFOURTEEN, [5753^
and COMPATWING 2, by mailgram, and info to COMBATFOR,
COMBASEFOR, COMAIRBATFOR, Lexington, also by mailgram.
[5754] ^Jti*- Mitchell. That completes the file, does it?
Admiral Stark. That completes it so far as the correspondence on
that particular subject.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, in order to complete the record on this item I
call the committee's attention to a letter in Exhibit 106, which is
already in evidence, which is the file marked, "Correspondence between
Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel", and that letter is a letter dated
December 2, 1941 from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark and it
refers to these despatches.
I won't read it all, it is in evidence, unless you want it read into the
record.
Mr. Murphy. 1 was wondering, Mr. Mitchell. There is only one
letter here and there were two written on that day by Kimmel on the
same subject.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, this document is not paged. It is December
2, 1941.
The Chairman. Well, it might go into the record at this point, unless
the committee wants it read, as if read.
Mr. Mitchell. Suppose I have the reporter transcribe it in the rec-
ord without my reading it.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2163
To get the thing cleared up here, the thing that the Congressman is
asking about, I only see one letter.
Mr. Murphy. There is only one in the exhibit, but there [S7S6]
were two letters written. The second letter is referred to on page 528
of the narrative.
Mr. Mitchell. Is it a letter relating to this subject?
Mr. Murphy. Yes, and covered in the previous inquiry.
Mr. Mitchell. Both the same date?
Mr. MuRPHT. Both the same date.
Mr. Mitchell. Both the same subject?
Mr. Murphy. Apparently. One is at page 528 of the narrative
and the other is on page 524.
The Chairman. Suppose both letters are printed here then.
Mr. Mitchell. We will have both letters put in the transcript here,
the one I have in Exhibit 106 and the other one of the same date which
the Congressman has referred to.
Mr. Gesell. I think the other one is an official letter and would
not be in this folder.
Mr. Mitchell. This is one of these personal letters and not an
official communication.
Mr. Murphy. I don't know, but it is in regard to the same subject.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, then we will put them both in. I only want
to mention one thing in this letter that is now being written into the
record of December 2 that is rather suggestive.
[5766'] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, might I
Mr. Mitchell. Could I finish this, please?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. On this question of moving marines and antiair-
craft equipment out to Wake and Midway, Admiral Kimmel says this :
On inquiry and conference with the Army I find that the army in Hawaii
has no guns, either surface or anti-aircraft, available for outlying bases. They
can supply some .30 caliber machine guns and rifles. I have frequently called
to your attention the inadequacy of the Army anti-aircraft defense in the
Pearl Harbor area with particular reference to the shortage of anti-aircraft
guns. So far, very little has been done to improve this situation. With nothing
but .30 caliber machine guns and rifles the replacement of Marines by Army
at outlying bases now will result in an increased number of Marines in Oahu
with no Suitable equipment as Army would require all of the Marine equipment
now in the islands.
(The letters of December 2, 1941, referred to follow :)
[5757] commandee-in-chief
united states pacific ft.eet
u.s.s. pennstlvania
flagship
Pearl Harbor, T. H.,
December 2, 194 1.
Ser. #8
Secret
Dear Betty : —
We had your despatches in regard to reinforcing the outlying islands with
Army pursuit planes and Army personnel. With regard to the use of Army
pursuits on the island bases, some time ago we investigated the feasibility of
putting some kind of fighters on the outlying islands and decided at the time
2164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that our best chance of quickly reinforcing the islands and to make the minimum
demands upon the supplies in the island that we should send a minimum number
of ground crews to Wake and Midway in order when the time came, to be in a
position to fly off the Marine planes from a carrier or to send them direct from
Pearl to Midway in the case of the SBD's. At the time your despatch in regard
to Army pursuits was received we had the WRIGHT at Wake discharging the
Marine ground crews and she arrives at Midway tomori-ow, December 3, to
discharge Marine ground crews there.
Halsey, in the ENTERPRISE, with three heavy cruisers and a squadron of
destroyers, will fly off 12 Marine fighting planes for Wake tomorrow morning
after which he returns to Pearl. We have been covering his advance by 2 VP
squadrons operating [5758] from Johnston, Midway and Wake. Upon
Ihe completion of the movement we now plan to return one VP squadron to Pearl
and leave the other one at Midway awaiting further developments. I will hold
the Marine SBD's at Pearl awaiting further developments as they can fly under
their own power from Pearl to Midway.
During all the period that I have been in command the question of the develop-
ment of supply and defense of these outlying bases has been a very difficult one.
We cannot expect to supply Wake quickly and expeditiously until we have a
space to put a ship alongside for loading and unloading. The Commandant of
the District has been and is exerting every effort to obtain this objective. As
you know, ships have been delayed in unloading at W^ake lor as long as 28 days,
due to bad weather, and it is not unusual for a ship to take as much as 7 or 8
days. This, in the face of any opposition, presents an impossible situation. Pres-
ent facilities at Wake must be improved, particularly as to storage of fuel oil,
aviation gas, food and ammunition. This work should not stop and the 1,000
defense workers at Wake are essential to keep this work moving as rapidly as
material can be supplied. A recent estimate by Bloch sets the time for the
completion of the ship channel to about the first of May. I hope, and so does he,
that this date can be anticipated. At the present time we cannot support more
personnel on Wake than we now have there. As you will remember, we put six
5" guns and twelve 3" anti-aircraft guns, together with a number of machine
guns on [5759] the island, well, knowing that we did not have sufficient
marine personnel to man them. However, I think good progress has been made
in organizing the defense workers to assist in the manning of the battery at Wake.
In case the present situation should cease, we can readily withdraw the Marine
fighters from Wake in order to decrease the demands upon the facilities there
and also in order to keep up the training of the pilots of these planes.
The situation at Midway is somewhat better than at Wake. You will note
from our report of the defenses submitted today that we have shipped three of
the four 7" guns to Midwa.v. Also we have shipped, or are shortly shipping,
four of the 3"-50 anti-aircraft guns to Midway. These, in addition to the bat-
teries already installed there, which comprise six 5"-ol"s and twelve 3" anti-
aircraft. You will also note from our official letter submitted today that the
defenses of Johnston and Palmyra, while not what we would like to have, are
nevertheless not entirely Inadequate.
Your despatches in regard to the use of Army personnel and the organization
of Army defense forces to be used in outlying islands is being given earnest
consideration. I know yon appreciate the difficulties of mixing Army, Marine
Corps and Navy personnel in a small island base. I believe you will subscribe to
the principle that all these outlying bases must be under Navy command and the
forces there must be subject to the orders of the Commander in Chief without
any qualification whatsoever. I anticipate some difficulties along this line when
Army personnel [5760] is injected into the picture unless a very clear
directive is issued jointly by the War and Navy Department. On inquiry and
conference with the Army I find that the Army in Hawaii has no bases. They can
suppl.v some .30 caliber machine guns and rifles. I have frequently called to your
attention the inadequacy of the Army antiaircraft defense in the Pearl Harbor
area with particular reference to the shortage of antiaircraft guns. So far, very
little has been done to improve this situation. With nothing but .30 caliber
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2165
machine guns and rifles the replacement of Marines by Army at outlying bases
now will result in an increased number of Marines in Oahu with no suitable
equipment as Army would require all of the Marine equipment now in the islands.
The Marines in the outlying islands are trained, acclimated and efficient beyond
standards immediately obtainable by the Army even if they took over the present
Marine equipment. We cannot appreciably increase the number of military
personnel in the outlying islands unless we remove the defense workers. We can-
not afford to remove the defense workers if we expect ever to reach a satisfactory
condition in the islands. Essential items include, as I have previously stated,
provision to berth a ship at Wake, completion of air fields at Palmyra and John-
ston and completion of fuel, ga.soline. food and ammunition housing at all bases.
I am proposing in ofllcial correspondence that: (a) the Army organize 3 defense
battalions of approximately SOO men each ; that steps be taken in Washington to
supply [5761] them with guns, both surface and antiaircraft; supply them
with .37 mm. or .50 caliber machine guns ; to make up a well-balanced defense
battalion ; that prior to the time the equipment of these organizations is supplied
that they drill with the 5-inch guns of the Fourth Defense Battalion now at Pearl
as long as the equipment is available here. If it is decided to supply these bat-
talions with some other caliber of guns, that sufficient number of guns of the type
to be used be shipped to Oahu to be utilized for training purposes; (b) that these
Army defense battalions be held in readiness to (1) furnish replacement to pre-
sently occupied islands (2) to relieve battalions in presently occupied islands
(3) to garrison islands to be occupied.
The Marine garrisons now at Midway, Johnston and Palmyra should be
retained there for the present. They will not be withdrawn until arms and
equipment for the Army defense battalions have been received and the Army
trained. At this time a decision can be made according to the situation then
existing.
That the Army organize three IS-plane pursuit squadrons and keep them
in an expeditionary status ; maintain the ground crews organized and ready
to man them ; maintain the planes ready to be transported by carrier when
ordered.
The Army has oi'ders to defend Canton and Christmas. We are turning
over to them two five-inch 51 guns for use at Canton. These they will man
with Army personnel and supplement with some obsolete anti-aircraft guns
and machine guns. The expedi- [5762] tion is now due to leave here
on December ninth.
The Army is also sending some obsolete guns and a garrison to Christmas.
I will let you know more definitely what they send when I find out exactly.
I feel that we cannot determine the defenses of Canton and Christmas until
we find out how much personnel can be maintained there. Meanwhile the
Army is sending some forces there.
In view of the foregoing I am unable to understand the reason for the
despatches from the War and Navy Department directing us to utilize the
Army in the defense of the outlying bases, as we can hope for no relief from
this quarter until they have been supplied with suitable equipment.
I feel the wiser course is to continue to organize Marine defense battalions
and supply them with the necessary equipment. I believe we can train Marine
defense battalions just as rapidly as the Army can do so and probably as
rapidly as the equipment can be supplied. If there is any prospect of the
immediate supply of considerable quantities of suitable equipment I can see
some reason for injecting the Army into the picture.
I think it would be well for you to read the despatch sent by the War
Department to the Commanding General on this subject. It differs considerably
from the one you sent to us in that the War Department says they will take
2166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
over the defense of some outlying bases from the Navy in accordance with an
[576S] agreement to be reached by the Commanding General and myself.
Your despatch left me with the conviction that the Army was to reinforce
the Naval and Marine forces on the outlying bases in case of necessity. I feel
that this should be clarified.
We have one transport in commission which, due to a delay in the sailing
of the Wharton we are now obliged to use for one trip to transport essential
Naval personnel from the West Coast to the Fleet. The other transports, to a
total of six, are in various stages of completion. The Marines at San Diego
are in urgent need of transport training and will not be ready to come to
Hawaii until some time in February. I can see very little chance for any
overseas expendition even on a small scale until that date. Eventually this
war will require a much greater number of transports and supply ships in
the Pacific. We are working on an estimate of the requirements. This esti-
mate, in addition to some thirty or forty transports and an equal number of
supply ships must also include a thirty to fifty percent increase in the fighting
strength of the Fleet before we can occupy the Marshall's and Caroline's in an
advance across the Pacific.
With these considerations in mind I am at loss to understand the considera-
tions which injected the Army into the picture.
With kindest regards and best wishes, always.
Most sincerely yours,
[576^1 H. E. KiMMEL.
P. S. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Detachment made the
statement in conference that his pursuit planes could not operate farther than
15 miles from land. If this be the case, I can see very little use for Army
pursuit planes in an outlying island. This, added to the inability of this type
plane to land on a carrier, makes them practically useless for an overseas
expedition of any kind. Except for the four-engined Army bombers, we must
depend upon Navy and Marine Corps planes to support any overseas expedition
apd to man outlying bases. This is and has been one of my reasons for urging
the supply of all types of carrier planes.
P. S. You will note that I have issued orders to the Pacific Fleet to depth bomb
all submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area.
H. E. K.
Admiral H. R. Staek, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
P. S. In connection with the development of outlying bases by the Army, I
must invite your attention to the fact that when the War Department issued
orders to the Commanding General out here to develop these bases they author-
ized him to charter [5765] ships and to take all other necessary steps to
insure the early completion of the project. He has already taken over three
large inter-island vessels and has caused some army transports and other ship-
ping to be diverted to the supply of Christmas and Canton. He has also
chartered a number of smaller vessels such as tugs and sampans.
I feel he has done an excellent job. I feel that the Navy personnel in this
area with equal authority would have their efforts much facilitated. I do
not know the considerations which prompted the Navy to turn over the develop-
ment of the island bases to the Army; I do know that it has complicated our
problems considerably.
The Commanding General is keeping me informed of what he is doing but
frequently the information is so late that I have been unable to plan adequate
protection. I am sure it is no fault of his because he informs me as soon as he
himself is informed. I have nothing but the highest praise for the way General
Short has taken hold of this problem which was dropped in his lap.
H. E. KiMMEL.
P. S. From correspondence which General Short has furnished me I note that
the Army is engaged in developing air fields in Fiji and New Caledonia. This
will involve questions of supply and protection both of shipping and the fields
themselves. The Australians I understand are loath to assume the protection
[5766] of the field in New Caledonia. The Navy is bound to be ivolved
in these affairs. I fear we may become so much concerned with defensive roles
that we may become unable to take the offensive. Too much diversion of effort
for defense will leave us an inadequate force with which to take the offensive.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2167
With regard to the escort of convoys by using a single cruiser to escort not
to exceed 8 ships, we endeavor to limit the number of cruisers so occupied at
one time to four. We now find that routing via Torres Strait to Manila, we are
going to have seven cruisers continuously occupied with convoy duty. This
without any consideration for such protection as may eventually be required
from San Francisco to Oahu. I realize of course that the demands for trans-
Pacific escorts may decrease if it becomes impossible to route ships to Manila
but it will still be necessary to supply the Asiatic Fleet and our allies inj' the
Far East.
(S) H. E. KiMMEL.
[J767]
EG61/(16)
Serial 0114W
Secret Pearl Haebob, T. H.,
2 Dec. 1941.
From : Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Defense of Outlying Bases.
References :
(a) OpNav despatch 270038 of November 1941.
(b) OpNav despatch 270040 of November 1941.
(c) Cincpac despatch 28067 of November 1941.
(d) OpNav despatch 282054 of November 1941.
(e) War Dept. despatch 48 of Nov. 29, 1941.
(f ) Cincpac secret serial 0113W of December 3, 1941.
(g) Cincpac secret serial 090W of October 21, 1941.
1. Reference (a) advised that Army pursuit planes, could be made available
for Wake and Midway in order to retain 2d Marine Aircraft Wing available for
expeditionary use. Reference (b) advised that Army could make infantry avail-
able to reinforce defense battalions now on station, and that Army proposed to
prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which the commander in
chief, Pacific Fleet, might occupy but that they could provide no antiaircraft
units.
2. Reference (c) outlined certain measures that the commander in chief,
Pacific Fleet, had already taken to [5768] strengthen the air defenses of
Midway and Wake and others, including Army air cooperation, that were in
progress. Reference (d) approved of the arrangements made and stated that
the War Department would instruct the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and Army
troops in support of Marines. It also asked for report on present defenses of
outlying bases and increases planned in immediate future. The report is fur-
nished in reference (f).
3. Reference (e) from the War Dfparlment to the Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department, which referred to commander in chief. Pacific Fleet's
280627, is somewhat at variance with Chief of Naval Operation despatches in
that it states the War Department has offered to take over defense of Pacific
advanced bases from the Navy except for furnishing AA equipment. It also
stated that the War Department has assumed responsibility for defense of Christ-
mas and Canton Islands.
4. Reference (g) contained a study by the commander in chief. Pacific Fleet,
of the defenses of outlying bases and recommendations as to personnel and
equipment therefor.
5. It is not completely clear whether or not the Navy Department has in mind
that the Army will ultimately relieve the Marine Defense Battalions. If so, it is
assumed that such action would be taken in order to have those battal- [5769]
lions and their equipment available to garrison positions taken by assault
in the Marshalls and the Carolines. Should such assumption be correct, it is
pertinent to note that transports, trained assault troops, etc., are not now avail-
able to make the seizures. Moreover, the local Army authorities are not only
short of antiaircraft equipment, but of most other armament necessary for
defense of an advanced island base. If the Marine Defense Battalions 'were
withdrawn at this time it would be necessary to leave behind most of their
equipment, and they would have none for use elsewhere.
2168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
6. To clarify the current situation to some extent, certain information and
considerations that may not otherwise be readily available in the Department
are mentioned below :
(a) Army is not only lacking AA guns for outlying bases, but has a serious
shortage on Oahu. It has insufficient suitable guns for replacing Marine 7" and
5" guns without weakening the defenses of Hawaii. By taking 155-mm. guns
from Hawaii and Marine 5" guns might be replaced but the 155-mm. guns would
either cover a limited arc or else their mobility would be lost.
(b) Army can spare no .50 caliber machine guns but can supply rifles and
.30 caliber machine guns.
(c) Army has a limited number of 37 mm. guns, badly needed for defenses
in Hawaii, but some few might be made available by weakening the defenses
here; particularly as a [5770] considerable increase in the number of
such guns is expected in the near future. At present there is a marked shortage
of ammunition for 37 mm.
(d) (1) Army pursuit planes are available in sufficient numbers to send at
least one squadron each to Midway and "Wake.
(2) Tlie fighting capabilities of those planes is superior to that of Marine
lighters or light bombers.
(3) They have no offensive capabilities against hostile surface craft or sub-
marines.
(4) They lack navigational equipment, their personnel are inexperienced in fly-
ing over water and are much averse to operations more than fifteen miles from
land.
(5) Pursuit planes once having landed at Midway or Wake, cannot fly off
to carriers. It would be virtually impossible to take them out of Wake; and a
very slow and difficult undertaking to remove them from Midway.
(e) Army has personnel available in sufficient numbers to reenforce or relieve
the Marine Defense Battalions. The Marines have been organized, equipped,
and trained for work of this particular character. They are already established,
habited to the mode of life, and experienced in fitting their activities to accord
with the various other naval activities in these outlying places. It is no reflec-
tion upon the Army to say that their units would require considerable time
[5771] to acquire the proficiency in this specialized work that the Marines
already have.
(f) In emergency Army personnel might replace casualties or reenforce
Marines, but it would, for very obvious reasons, be highly preferable to have
other Marines available for that purpose.
(g) No spare armament for defense battalions is available. In fact, some
deficiencies in equipment for existing battalions exist ; and the recommenda-
tions of reference (g) as to armament for the outlying bases have not been
completely filled. Armament and equipment for any new defense battalions
have not been assembled.
(h) The bases are being developed to facilitate fleet operations. Irrespective
of the source of defense forces, various other naval activities will continue at
these outlying bases. Placing the defenses in Army hands would bring some
difficult problems of command relationships. Such problems woiild not, of course,
be insurmountable, but they would be avoided if the Marines are not replaced.
(i) TSvelve Marine fighting pianos are now on Wake; a quadron of Marine
light bombers is in readiness to fly to Midway. Tliese planes are accustomed to
long operations over water, and from carriers. Tlie bombers have offensive power
against surface ships or submarines.
(j) Arrangements exist or will shortly exist on [5772] both Midway
and Wake for temporary offensive operations of Army B-17 bombers, using
Navy bombs. Only six such bombers on Oahu are now in operating condition.
(k) Personnel and equipment, up to the liujits given in reference (g), are
being transferred to the outlying bases as rapidly as available and the conditions
at those bases made feasible.
(1) Prior to receipt of reference dispatches, arrangements for Army cooper-
ation in certain respects had been made; and clo.se cooperation and liaison
will continue.
(m) Essential work is being pushed at outlying bases, and it is not intended
to withdraw civilian workei's if hostilities develop. Plans have been made
to incorporate such workers into the defense organization insofar as practicable.
7. From the foregoing, it is concluded that at this time:
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2169
(a) Marine armament can be withdrawn from outlying islands to a very
limited extent.
[5773] (b) If the Marines are replaced, the personnel relieved, lacking
equipment, will be valueless as a defense battalion.
(c) Replacing the Marines will very materially weaken the defenses because
of less proficient personnel.
(d) Considering all aspects of the matter, marine planes are more valuable
in the Advance Bases than Army pursuit planes.
8. The presence of Army forces on outlying bases will inevitably bring up
the question of command. Midway, Wake, Johnston and Palmyra are Naval
Air Stations, designed and built primarily to support Fleet operations. Any
other activities there, including defense, must be subordinate to this purpose.
Defense itself exists solely for the purpose of insuring the availability of
the bases. The establishments are small and close coordination of all activities
is mandatory, extending to joint use of material and equipment and even to
joint participation by all hands in unusual tasks. This can be accomplished
only by unity of command, which must be vested in the one oflScer qualified
to insure that the base fulfill^ its purpose, whether under attack or not and
no matter what organization operates the defenses. The interests of the Navy
are paramount and unity of command must be vested in the Commanding
Officer of the Station. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as already
[5774] brought out in his despatches, cannot too strongly emphasize this
point.
9. The Commander-in-Chief i*ecognizes that unforeseen events may rapidly
develop that would necessitate replacement of Marines by Army personnel, pro-
vided suitable equipment is available. He has had conferences with the Com-
manding General, Hawaiian Department, on the matter and arrangements are
in progress looking toward
(a) Organization of three Army defense battalions of approximately 800
men each (organization along the lines of Marine Defense Battalions) ;
(b) Training of such units with equipment. Army or Marine, available on
Oahu;
(c) Army steps to obtain requisite armament comparable to that called for
in reference (g) for use in the Advance Bases;
(d) Army organization of three 18-plane pursuit squadrons to be kept in ex-
peditionary status with crews, ground crews and equipment ready for transporta-
tion, on short notice, to Advanced Bases — planes to be transported by aircraft
carrier and flown off near destination ;
(e) Bringing aforementioned units to a satisfactory state of readiness and
keeping them available for (1) i-elieving, supporting, or furnishing replacements
for Marine Defense Battalions, or (2) for garrisoning other islands or [5775]
developments not now manned by Marines.
10. In connection with this whole question, the major point for the moment
appears to be that the Advanced Bases we now have are, to a greater or lesser
extent, going concerns. Their development and provisions for defense have been
evolved after much work and study. The internationl situation is such that
active defense against hostile forces may be required on extremely short notice.
Any radical change in the defense arrangements should be made only if there is
compelling necessity therefor ; and a definite indication of clear cut gain for over
all operations.
11. The Commander-in-Chief is not aware of the particular circumstances
which have opened up the questions under discussion. If additional Advanced
Bases in our own or friendly territory are contemplated, it is highly important
that further information on the subject be furnished the Commander-in-Chief.
12. If, during the progress of tlie war, enemy positions are taken and require
garrisons tliey should, of course, be defended by Marine Defense Battalions. It
2170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
would be preferable to have Marine battalions with full equipment available for
such duty without disrupting the defenses of existing bases. At present, our
Advanced Bases should be defended by the most competent personnel available,
viz, the Marine Defense Battalions. If our progress in the war has brought more
[5776'] advanced positions under our control, then the most seasoned and ex-
perienced personnel should be in the more exposed positions ; and the present Ad-
vanced Bases which, by virtue of our forward movement, would be less liable to
enemy attack, could be manned by less skilled personnel. Even so, it would be
better to have new Marines rather than the Army take over their defense, but
the Army should be ready and qualified to do so. In any event, the battalions
projected into the new bases must have their full equipment without withdraw-
ing that in the present bases.
13. The foregoing discussion has had particular application to Midway, Wake,
Johnston, and Palmyra. The situation as to Samoa is not greatly different.
(Construction of Army airfields at Canton and Christmas Islands has brought
those places into the picture. The Commander-in-Chief has felt that some de-
fense at Canton should be provided at once against an enemy raider. As the
Army has no suitable guns available for the purpose, he has arranged to send two
five inch guns with fire control equipment from the Fourth Defense Battalion to
meet temporarily the existing situation, pending clarification of the Department's
policy regarding Canton. These guns will be manned by Army personnel.
14. Meantime, the Commander-in-Chief is making a study as to minimum re-
quirements for the defenses of Canton. This will be forwarded separately
within the next few days. [5777] The defenses contemplated will call for
not more than two or three batteries of three inch AA guns, not more than two
batteries of five inch guns and a limited number of smaller weapons. It is
expected that not more than 300 men will be required for manning the defensive
armament. It is probable that the requirements for Christmas would be less
rather than more than that for Canton.
15. In view of the Commanding General's information that the War Depart-
ment has assumed responsibility for defense of Christmas and Canton Islands,
no steps have been taken toward defending Christmas, and agreement has been
made locally with Army authorities that Marine equipment now going to Canton
would be replaced as soon as possible.
16. It seems appropriate here to express the growing concern of the Com-
mander-in-Chief over the increase in number of Army and Navy stations that
may require support from the Fleet. Such support may involve logistics,
keeping open lines of communications, or active defense. Establishments at
Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Samoa are already well advanced. Our
Army is now engaged in building air fields at Christmas, Canton, Fiji, and
New Caledonia, and consideration is being given to other installations in the
New Hebrides and Solomon Islands. In addition, discussion has been made
from time to time over establishment of American bases in the Gilberts,
Bismarck Archipelago, and [5778] other places.
17. Whether or not the Navy is initially concerned in the building or logistics
or defense installations of these far flung establishments, it inevitably will become
involved with them if war develops. Such involvement may seriously interfere
with offensive operations of the Fleet. It can not be too strongly emphasized
that new development of this nature must be curtailed, and only those permitted
that will definitely contribute toward success in the Western Pacific. A Fleet
in being behind a series of defensive positions in the Central and South
Pacific can not contribute very much toward victory over a power some
thousands of miles to the westward.
18. To summarize : the Commander-in-Chief considers that the current setup
in the existing bases is in accordance with long and well considei*ed plans
that should not now be changed. He intends to :
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2171
(a) Continue the Marine Defense Battalions at Wake, Midway, Johnston, and
Palmyra ; ,
(b) Continue use of Marine planes at such of those places as circumstances
require ;
(c) Transfer a battery of five inch guns to the Army for use by Army
personnel at Canton until the Army can obtain suitable replacement;
(d) Continue cooperation and liaison with local [5779] Army authori-
ties to develop and maintain in readiness Army units and equipment that may,
on short notice, reenforce or relieve Marines at aforementioned bases in whole
or in part.
19. It is recommended that:
(a) Deficiencies in armament at existing Advance Bases, and in ex-
isting Marine Defense Battalions, be remedied as rapidly as possible (see
reference (g) ) ;
(b) Fourth Defense Battalion and proposed new Defense Battalion be main-
tained as mobile battalions in Pearl Ilarbov in accordance with existing plans;
and that the organization and acquirement of equipment for this new additional
battalion be expedited ;
(c) At least two additional defense battalions be organized and equipped at
San Diego, with plans to use these battalions and those mentioned in (b) above
for garrisoning positions captured in the Marshalls;
(d) An understanding with Army be reached now that in case Army takes
over defense of Advance Bases, command of such bases will remain in the Navy
(see paragraph 8) ;
(e) Commitments to further island developments in the Central and South
Pacific be held to a minimum as to number and logistic requirements ;
(f) No plans lie made for relieving Marine Defense Battalions; [5780-
.57^/] or air units until Army has organized, equipped and trained for co-
ordinated action suitable units for taking over.
20. Transmission via U. S. Registered air mail is hereby authorized.
H. E. KlMMEL.
Copy to : C. G., Haw. Dept. Com-14.
[6782] Mr. Mitchell. Now, Senator, what did you have to say ?
Senator Fekguson. I just wanted to get the record clear on this
Exhibit 106. Did I understand counsel to say that that only has the
personal letters and not all official letters?
Mr. Mitchell. That is it. That is a correspondence file and the
official letters would have a way of starting out, "From the Chief of
Naval Operations."
' Senator Feeguson. Now, do we have any exhibit that has the official
letters in them so that we would know where to find this other letter
that Congressman Murphy talks about, being an official letter?
Mr. Mitchell. I do not think we have ever compiled a separate
document with the official letters, have we? They have been put in
from time to time in evidence but there has never been any compilation
made of them as we have in the correspondence file.
The Chairman. May I ask counsel whether this thick document
here, which is a compilation of Admiral Stark's letters to Admiral
Kimmel and his letters back, are to be regarded as official or personal ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, they are official but they are written in the
personal style as distinguished from a formal communication. This
is in the personal style. Those formal com- [57831 munica-
tions were phrased differently. They did not call each other "Dear
Betty" and so on in them. They start out with, "From : Chief of Naval
Operations to CINCPAC. Subject : So and so and paragraph so an so."
They are more formal in style, but Admiral Stark obviously had a
practice of communicating in this form with his commanders.
The Chairman. All right.
2172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Mitchell. Sometimes he would send a formal dispatch and
then he would write a letter about it afterward.
The Chairman. They are mixed in here, I see. Here are some from
the commander in chief to the Naval Operations and others addressed
"Dear Betty" and "Dear Mustapha." I suppose that was a nickname
given to Admiral Kimmel because it sounded like Mustapha Kemal
of Turkey.
Mr. Mitchell. That may be so.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; that was the reason for my addressing
him in that way. That was an affectionate term I had of addressing
him by Mustapha Kimmel.
The Chairman. How did you get the nickname Betty?
Admiral Stark. A lot of people have asked me that question, sir.
The Chairman. You might as well clear it up now.
Admiral Stark. When I went to the Naval Academy the history
Avhich we studied there ha'd the statement of old General [6784]
John Stark, who was one of my forebears, that "We win today or
Betty Stark will be a widow tonight." The histories that I had always
studied at home were, "We win today or Molly Stark will be a widow
tonight."
I was called both Molly and Betty off and on for a number of months
and finally dropped into the name of Betty and I have been known as
Betty Stark ever since. Every time an upper classman came in my
room when I was a plebe I had to get up and say, "We win today or
Betty Stark will be a widow." I did the same thing when I went
from the youngster floor; that is, the third-class floor, up to the fourth-
class floor, I would stop and say, "We win today or Bett}' Stark will
be a widow."
That name has stuck. It probably will be given to all Starks sub-
sequent to my time. For example, Governor Stark of Missouri was
known as Molly Stark, which is how names carry on as a rule in the
Naval Academy.
The Chairman. You came very near being a widow at Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, just so that we may keep this
record straight : Now, in Exhibit 106, they are the personal letters and
not the official letters, but I find, for instance, on July 10, 1941 a
memorandum for [6785] Admiral Hart, Admiral Kimmel,
Admiral King, commander of all Naval Districts, signed "H. R. Stark."
Now, would that be classified as a personal one or an official one, so
that we get the record straight?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, the record will show for itself. There are
some communications interspersed in this Exhibit 106 that are in the
formal form.
The Chairman. Well, let us proceed.
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Stark, did Admiral Kimmel ever inform
you that he had made a decision not to conduct any air reconnaissance
after November 27 around Hawaii?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I call your attention to some intercepts in exhibit 2.
As I understand it, the intercepted and decoded Jap diplomatic mes-
sages and military messages that were decoded by the Army and Navy
were delivered to you regularly, copies of them.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2173
Admiral Stakk. If you are referring to certain particular dis-
patches, I ^YO^kl like to see them. Generally
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I am talking about the practice. The record,
I think, shows that the Army and Navy at Washington here had those
means of decoding and translating the secret Jap messages and we
have one volume here. Exhibit 1, that was what we call diplomatic
intercepts, that were mes- [S786] sages between the Tokyo
government and its diplomatic representatives abroad back and forth,
and then we have in as Exhibit 2 another type of those messages that
the Japs sent out to representatives abroad, that are of a military
nature and not a diplomatic nature. You are familiar with that,
are you not ?
Admiral Stakk. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, there was a system for having these mes-
sages decoded and translated by sometimes the War Department, some-
times the Navy Department.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. And a regular dissemination or distribution or de-
livery to certain officials. You were one of the officials to whom it
was the practice to deliver copies of those intercepts, were you not?
Admiral Stark. I was ; yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. And you got them regularly ?
Admiral Stark. I got them regularly. I would state with regard
to that that when the book came to me, which usually came through
my 'aide, there were clipped certain dispatches which they considered
important that I should read. Those not clipped were considered not
necessary for me to read. I always read those clipped. Those not
clipped I might sometimes go through the file just to check up to see
whether I [5687] was getting all that in my opinion was also
important. I believe my aide generally went through all of them.
The same book that I read Admiral IngersoU read.
Mr. Mitchell. Did it come to you in one of the pouches ?
Admiral Stark. Locked ; yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Locked pouch ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. And it was a book in which the messages were bound
or tied together?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. And when you say "clipped" you mean with little
paper clips, that little paper clips were stuck on those that you were
expected to read ?
Admiral Stark. Tliat is correct: yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I will call your attention now to exhibit 2
commencing at page 12. That is an intercepted Jap message from
Tokyo to Honolulu dated September 24, 1941, translated
Admiral Stark. Did you say page 2, sir?
Mr. ISIiTCHELL. Page 12, translated October 9, 1941. It is the mes-
sage with which we are familiar, that divides the waters of Pearl
Harbor into five areas and requests information as to the location
of ships in those areas and you will note on pages 13, 14, and 15 there
is a series of messages [5783] relating to that subject, all of
them translated and available here in English form before December 7.
Did those messages come to your attention at or about the time they
were received ?
2174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. I have no recollection of having seen those par-
ticular messages. I believe that I did not see them. However, I may
have seen them. They naay have been brought to me and they may
have slipped my mind, but I think I did not see them.
Mr. Mitchell. Why do you believe you did not see them ?
Admiral Stark. Because I have no recollection of them, and if I
may go on I would like to comment on these messages.
Mr. Mitchell. All right.
Admiral Stark. These messages are of a class of message which
gives positions of ships in harbor, gives locations. The message,
however, is distinctly different from the usual type of ship report,
which simply would say, "So many ships," or give their names, in
Pearl Harbor. This dispatch is different in that it calls for the loca-
tion of a ship in the harbor in her particular berth.
I recall no such request from Tokyo to the field; that is, to the
Japanese people, to report like that except for Pearl Harbor. There
might have been. We did not see it. I believe there are one or two
places where ships were reported, [S7S9] like in Puget Sound,
in a certain berth or a dock, alongside of a dock, but this dispatch
while of a class is of a character which is different.
In the light of hindsight it stands out very clearly, with what we
can read into it now, as indicating the possibility or at least the
groundwork for a Japanese air raid on Pearl Harbor. That sig-
nificance which we now have in the light of hindsight was not pointed
out to me by anyone, nor do I have the slightest recollection of any-
body ever having given that significance at the time.
Mr. Mitchell. Whose hands would this message pass through
in the Navy besides your own — in the Department I mean ?
Admiral Stark. That message would come in and be decoded and
translated and go to the office of naval intelligence, it being informa-
tion. If naval intelligence had thought it important enough — and
there were good men looking over those dispatches in intelligence —
if they had thought it important or of unusual significance, they
had full authority to send it out.
Mr. Mitchell. Send it out to whom?
Admiral Stark. Send it out to the field. This particular dis-
patch would have been of particular interest, if they had so considered
it, to Admiral Kimmel. They could have simply sent it out as it
was. If they had thought it vital, they [5790'] could have
also brought it to what we call the front office; that is, to IngersoU
or myself, or come through Turner, but I have no recollection of this
dispatch having been discussed, certainly not with regard to what in
the light of hindsight we would now read into it.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, it is clear in the light of handsight what it
means, we will agree to that, but how about foresight? Don't you
think this message, because of the very things you point out, would
have been or ought to have been a very significant thing to a careful
intelligence man before the attack at Pearl Harbor ?
Admiral Stark. It is very difficult to separate hindsight from
foresight. I can only say that it went through our people, it went
through the Army, who were likewise vitally interested in the defense
of Pearl Harbor, and I do not recollect anyone having pointed it out.
There was literally a mass of material coming in. We knew the Japa-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2175
nese appetite was almost insatiable for detail in all respects. The
dispatch might have been put down as just another example of their
great attention to detail.
If I had seen it myself I do not laiow what I would have done.
I might have said, "Well, my goodness, look at this detail," or I
might have read into it because it is different, I might have said,
''Well, this is unusual. I wonder why they [6791] want it?"
I might have gone on, and diagnosed it or I might not. I simply do
not know. We read it now in the light of what has happened.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, it was of interest to the Army, but don't you
think because it asked for ships and ship locations that it was a little
more pertinent to the Navy Intelligence to analyze it and evaluate it
than it was the Army people ?
Admiral Stark. Well, both were analyzing, but it is of a naval
color.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Admiral Stark. It is also of an air raid color.
Mr. Mitchell. What could it mean ? Looking at it now and read-
ing the words of it what could it mean other than the formation of
a target plan? What do you conceive would be the purpose of the
Japs in having the precise location by areas of the ship's location in
each section in Pearl Harbor unless it was that ?
Admiral Stark. Well, as I look at it now in the light of what I
know
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I did not ask you to do that. I am asking
you what it could have meant? Read it and tell us what it could
have meant if it did not mean that?
Admiral Stark. Well, it could have meant that they were just
down to getting the detail. Whether a submarine might [6792']
have come in, whether the small submarines might have come in,
whether the so-called suicide, one-man submarine attack might have
been in their minds, that might have been possible. I am thinking
now in the light of hindsight. I did not see the messages.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, that was of vital interest if it were all of
those things to Admiral Kimmel, wasn't it ?
Admiral Stark. Yes; if it could have meant that, if it had been
clear at the time.
Mr. Mitchell. If it meant sabotage or small submarines or air
attack or anything, and it must have meant one of them at the time, it
was very important for him to know that, wasn't it ?
Admiral Stark. It meant they wanted to know what was in par-
ticular spots and its significance now is quite clear.
Mr. Mitchell. What was your impression prior to December 7,
1941, as to whether Admiral Kimmel or the Navy out at Pearl Harbor
had the equipment or the forces trained to decode and translate these
diplomatic and military messages to which I have referred, these
Jap messages ?
Admiral Stark. I inquired on two or three occasions as to whether
or not Kimmel could read certain dispatches when they came up and
which we were interpreting and sending our own messages and I was
told that he could. However, I want [5793] to make it plain
that that did not influence me in the slightest regarding what I sent.
2176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I felt it my responsibility to keep the commanders in the field and to
see to it that they were kept informed of the main trends and of
information which might be of high interest to them. Regardless of
what dispatches I might have seen, they may have formed background
for me bnt I saw that affirmative action was taken from the Chief of
Naval Operations to the commanders in the field on matters which I
thought they should have.
[67d4] Mr. Mitchell. Well, if it was your responsibility, and
you say it was, to keep him informed, was it not of vital importance
that you know what means of information he had by himself ? What
sort of a system is it when the commander in chief of the Navy De-
partment having the duty of keeping his field commanders well
posted does not know whether the field commander has certain means
of informing himself?
Admiral Stark. Well, I took the means to inform him.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, you ignored the fact then that you felt he
had it all anyway and gave him what you thought was worth while ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; I worked on the principle that it was
my responsibility and by official letter dispatch and personal letter
endeavored to give him my thoughts.
Mr. Mitchell. Don't you think if he already had copies of these
intercepts that his forces had decoded out there that it was taking
some chances for you to expose your code-breaking system by sending
him copies over the wires of those same messages ?
Admiral Stark. I had confidence in the security of our highest
codes.
Mr. Mitchell. More than you had in the Japs ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. So far as we know, they had not been
broken.
[■5796] Mr. Mitchell. Well, as a matter of fact, notwithstanding
somebody told you Admiral Kimmel had a decoding and decrypting
outfit out there, you did send him from time to time not only the sub-
stance but practically verbatim copies of some of these Jap intercepts,
did you not ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. Who was it that told you that they had a system
out in Honolulu or Pearl Harbor of decoding and decrypting Jap
messages?
Admiral Stark. Admiral Turner.
Mr. Mitchell. Wliat did he say he had done to try to find out about
it?
Admiral Stark. He did not say. As I said, I remarked to him — I
remembered on one or two occasions not of having talked with Admiral
Turner but I recall last summer that I was under the impression
Kimmel could translate these messages. I do not mean that he could
have translated all of them. The volume was very great at times. It
is my understanding that people, who I believe you have down on the
call, can give you far more than I can.
There was a mass
Mr. Mitchell. Who was it in the Navy Department
Admiral Stark. May I finish?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
[5796] Admiral Stark. There was a mass of material that came
in and a portion of it was decoded into the book, part of that which we
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2177
thought was worth while was, and furthermore it was clipped, that
which was really important.
Mr. Mitchell. Who was it in the Navy Department here that did
know whether Admiral Kimmel had the decrypting and decoding of
the code available to him?
Admiral Stark. People who were doing the same work for us in
the Department.
Mr, Mitchell. To find the tiutli out it was only necessary to go to
them and ask them, was it not?
Admiral Stark. Well, when Admiral Turner told me he could do
it I did not consider it necessary to go any further.
Mr. Mitchell. How is that?
Admiral Stark. I say when Admiral Turner told me that he could
do it, I mean Admiral Kimmel could do it, I did not consider it neces-
sary to go any further.
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Kimmel came here on a visit at one time,
and he wrote a letter in which he said how important it was that he
should know all about the diplomatic negotiations, and that sort of
thing.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did not you know at that time, and in the discussion
did not it come to light that he did not have any [5797] diffi-
culty in decoding these diplomatic top messages?
Admiral Stark. No ; he did not mention that. I do remember dis-
tinctly his wanting everything which was pertinent. We had con-
ferences on everything he wanted, and I told him all I knew, the main
trends at that time, and I continued to tell him.
I might make this observation at this time and that is that the
intercepts formed only a part, though a very vital part, of informa-
tion which we here in Washington had.
Mr. Mitchell. I understand that, Admiral. I am driving at the
question of how it came about that Admiral Kimmel came here, and the
letter that he presented personally, asking that he be informed of all
of these political developments and diplomatic developments, and you
thought he had a code decrypting outfit there that would break these
messages, why the subject was not mentioned? Why he should be
asking for these things if he had a system of his own of getting
them?
Admiral Stark. Well, there was more than just the material that
came from Japan, much more, and that is their interpretation, such
as you could get from the State Department, Mr. Hull, from the White
House, from the Army and other sources, the Treasury, that we had
and which we welded together as our responsibility and sent them out.
Our picture was [5798] complete, and I felt it was our job to
send him that. Of course I would have far rather sent him too much
than too little. I felt I was keeping him informed.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, you haven t any recollection, in your confer-
ence when he was here about that subject, of ever having mentioned
the subject of having a crypt analytical unit out in Honolulu?
Admiral Stark. No, sir ; I do not recall it.
Mr. Mitchell. You say that between November 27 and December 7
you had some conferences with people in your department over the
situation as to whether any other messages were needed by way of
warning.
79716— 46— pt. 5 9
2178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. In. any of those discussions did any of your people
or yourself mention or bring the question up as to whether Pearl
Harbor was at any risk from an air raid ?
Admiral Stark. Well, as I have stated before, we went into the
picture continuously.
Mr. Mitchell. I asked you before with reference to the prepara-
tion of the November 27 message. Now I am talking about the con-
ference you say you had after that, between the 27th and the 7th of
December, in. which you reviewed the warnings you sent. That is
M'hat I am asking about now.
Admiral Stark. No ; I do not recall that we particularly [5799']
mentioned an air raid after we had sent out our messages. We did go
into what we received subsequent to that time. We felt that we had
received nothing which would change or strengthen the messages
which we sent out on the 24th and 27th, except the fact that the Japs
were destroying their means of communication with their representa-
tivetives in the American, British, and Dutch Governments.
Mr. Mitchell. Can you tell us when the last time was that any
communication was exchanged between you and Admiral Kimmel that
mentioned the question of an air raid ? We have this record that you
initiated yourself of November 22, 1940, bringing out the necessity for
investigating that problem and that was followed by the Clarke Re-
port, the Knox-Stimson letter, and great activity for months on the
Army and Navy part in reviewing- the situation, estimating the dan-
ger, how it would happen and how to defend against it.
The last official document I have seen of that kind was the Martin
Report of August 21. Now I am wondering if there is anything you
know of a communication between you and Admiral Kimmel that
took place after September, October, November, or December, up to
the 7th, that mentioned the air attack possibility. We have read a
letter this morning of December
Admiral Stark. I was going to say talking about anti- [6800']
aircraft.
Mr. Mitchell. December 2, or 1, it was, a letter from Admiral
Kimmel, in which he mentions the fact that he thought the anti-
aircraft defenses of Hawaii were inadequate and he complained about
it, and they had not been remedied.
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. I wondered whether you could lead us to any other
communication in which you raised the point, or he raised it. There
may be some. It is a hard question to answer, but I am looking for
a pointer in some document that maybe we have not noticed.
Admiral Stark. I do not recall at present.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you look it up?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. And come back later, if j'^ou will, please, and see if
we can dig up anything more on that subject.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I want to say I do not recall anything
except our general discussion and pressure to increase the antiaircraft
defenses. I will look into what I have got and see if I can find
anything.
Mr. Mitchell. How late did that take place in the year, about ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2179
Admiral Stark. It was mentioned in what we read this morning.
[SSOl] Mr. Mitchell. That is right.
Admiral Stark. That you mentioned a minute ago. I think I
know what you want, sir, and I will endeavor to find it.
[S802] Mr. Mitchell. I want to find out when the idea vanished
completely from the people's mind here and in Pearl Harbor, if I
can, the idea of an air attack.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Have you finished your observation on what you
were trying to find out ?
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, in connection with
The Chairman. Just a moment. Have you finished your observa-
tion on what you were trying to find out about when the idea vanished ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes; I have finished. I wanted to find out when
the idea of an air attack vanished from people's minds, that was
lively for a while.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, in that connection I would like to
suggest that there is a reference in the letter of November 25 to it.
Mr. Mitchell. November 25 ?
Mr. Murphy. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. In the Stark-Kimmel communications ?
Mr. Murphy. In the Stark-Kimmel communications, in the post-
script.
Admiral Stark. Yes ; I remember that letter, and I would like to
state that the idea of an air raid had not vanished from our minds.
[5803]' Mr. Mitchell. I am looking for documentary proof
of that fact.
Admiral Stark. After the White House meeting on the 25th, in
a postscript to a letter to Admiral Kimmel — I better get the document.
My remembrance is I told him that neither the President nor Mr.
Hull would be surprised. I will read that. It is the letter of the
25th of November.
Mr. Mitchell. That is in Exhibit 106.
Admiral Stark. Shall I read that ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes ; we would like to have it.
The Chairman. Go ahead and read it.
Admiral Stark (reading) :
I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today.
I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk
with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity
of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President.
Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles
an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could
happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not
give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling
among some i)eople. You know I have generally held that it was not time
for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still [58041
rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the
most likely.
Mr. Mitchell, Where do you find anything in that that talks about
a surprise attack on Hawaii ?
Admiral Stark. That does not talk about an air raid on Hawaii.
Mr. Mitchell. That what?
Admiral Stark. It does not mention an air raid on Hawaii.
Mr. Mitchell. That is what I am asking about.
2180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. I will endeavor to see if I can find anything subse-
quent to the date you gave.
Mr. Murphy. I would like to suggest there is one more paragraph
that was not read. The paragraph says that was the only thing to be
prepared for.
Admiral Stark. The final paragraph in that postscript was in my
statement, in which I stated :
I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will be
damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do
most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for ; or we may
do nothing — I think it is more likely to be "anything".
Mr. Mitchell. What are you reading from there ?
Admiral Stabk. I am reading from the postscript of that [S805'\
letter of the 25th of November, which was also in my statement and
in which I stated that the letter and the dispatch were intended to
convey to be ready for anything.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, if you will just read that again, you will
see when you are talking about "anything" you are talking about what
tve are going to do and not what the Japs are going to do, if you read
that carefully. It is what we are going to do. We may do anything
or nothing.
Admiral Stark. No; but I state, "The only thing J do know is that
we ma}^ do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be pre-
pared for" — in other words, the dispatch and this postscript I had
hoped would convey the thought that anything might happen and we
should be prepared for anything, and I think that is what if states.
Mr. Mitchell. It states we will be prepared for anything we may
want to do. That is the plain English of it, isn't it ?
Admiral Stark. I would take it, when I say "we" — "We have got
to be prepared for anything," that means the men in the field.
Mr. Mitchell. You are referring to the last sentence in the post-
script ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, let me read it. It may be wasting time to dis-
cuss English.
I won't go into the pros or cons [3806] of what the United States may
do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is
that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared
for —
that is to say, prepared for anything we may decide to do. That is not
in preparation against anything the Japs may want to do, is it ?
Admiral Stark. My thought here, when I said —
we may do most anything —
I was telling the men in the field we might do anything, and as I
stated —
that's the only thing I know to be prepared for.
In other words, they should be prepared for anything.
Mr. Mitchell. I think it was Lord Bacon who said that the man
who wrote the document was the poorest man to interpret it, because
he was always thinking of what he meant to say instead of what he
did say.
Admiral Stark. I will have to stand by what other people think
of that.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2181
Mr. Mitchell. Now, let me turn your attention to the mysterious
document known as the winds message for a moment. You are
familiar now with the Jap decoded secret messages appearing on the
bottom of page 154 of Exhibit 1, arc you? You just look at them
at the bottom of page 154. That is the message from Tokyo to
Washington, a diplomatic intercept, dated November 19, 1941, and
translated November 28, 1941. It [6807] states:
"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and
the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be
added in the middle of the daily Japanese Language shortwave news broadcast",
and in which certain Japanese words were "east wind rain", "north wind
cloudy", "west wind clear", if used in the broadcast meant diplomatic relations
were in danger or broken, and to burn the codes.
Did you see that message prior to December 7, that is, the message
setting up that code system ?
Admiral Stark. My recollection is not clear on the winds message.
I undoubtedly saw it.
Mr. MrrcHELL. Now, when you saw the winds message, the question
is whether this is the one message that everybody knows was received,
and there is another real question as to whether any such code message
was ever later sent out. I would like to be clear as to what you are
referring to.
Admiral Stark. I probably saw this message setting up the code
at the time it was received.
Mr. MrrcHELL. When you say "probably," you heard it talked
about recently ?
Admiral Stark. I heard it pretty well covered.
Mr. Mitchell. You cannot remember what you knew prior to
[5808] December 7?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. We talked about it a lot since.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you know prior to December 7 that any naval
monitoring stations had been alerted to try to intercept such message?
Admiral Stark. No, I did not know — I did not get your question.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you know prior to December 7, 1941, that any
Navy monitoring station had been alerted to try and listen in on
Japanese weather broadcasts?
Admiral Stark. I undoubtedly knew that.
Mr. Mitchell. You undoubtedly knew it?
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. If you knew that then you must have seen this
message.
Admiral Stark. I said I assumed that I did.
Mr. Mitchell. Wlien you say you undoubtedly knew it, you assume
you knew it, but do you know now that you knew it then?
Admiral Stark. I know now.
Mr. Mitchell. But you cannot really support your memory before
and after the 7th of December to say what you did know about this
code system prior to that date ?
Admiral Stark. I am anticipating your next question which I sup-
pose will be as to whether I knew of its implementation.
[5809] Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I haven't gotten to that yet.
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. I will in a minute.
2182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. When this message came in it was undoubtedly
brought to my attention. I state I must have seen it. I do not recol-
lect particularly the details of it.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you have any present recollection that you did
see this code system message prior to December 7 ?
Admiral Stark. Well, that is not clear, sir. I have seen it so
much since then
Mr. Mitchell. It is hard to tell.
Admiral Stark. I assume I undoubtedly saw it at the time, but it
is one of those things. My mind has not been burdened with it for
over the 4 years in question.
Mr. Mitchell. Would you have the same answer with respect to
the message at the top of page 155, which was on the same date and
used an abbreviated system, with the Japanese words "east, north or
west" instead of "east wind rain, north wind cloudy jand west wind
clear," which was to be used in general intelligence broadcasts. Do
you remember ever seeing that prior to December 7 ?
Admiral Stark. I assume I saw it. I do not remember the details
of the "Higashi" and "Kita," and the rest that went with it.
[5810] Mr. Mitchell. Prior to December 7, 1941, was there ever
brought to your attention any copy or any information about the im-
plementing message sent out by the Japs in a weather broadcast which
used the significant words that were set up in this code ?
Admiral Stark. No, there was not, sir. I am sure of that.
Mr. SIitchell. How about a message sent out under the second
code system set up at the top of page 155 of Exhibit 1, which was an
abbreviated system to be used in general intelligence broadcasts?
Prior to December 7, was any implementing message under that
brought to your attention ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you ever hear, prior to December 7, of any
implementing message under this winds code system, or a message
thought to be that, having been received and decoded in the Navy
Department ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. The Federal Communications station was alerted I
think by the Army to try to listen in on these Japanese weather broad-
casts to see what they could get, and their report shows the two mes-
sages between November 28 and December 7 that did not quite fit the
exact wording of the [5S11] code system but came pretty close
to it in regard to a possible war with Russia. Did you see those?
Were they brought to your attention ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recollect. I have heard it discussed since
in all its detail. I do not recollect the Russian situation at that time.
Mr. Mitchell. I will next call your attention to what we have been
calling here the 14-part and 1 p. m. message. It appears of record
here that on December 6 there was intercepted and decoded here in
Washington a pilot message sent from the Jap Government to their
ambassadors here stating there would come shortly a longer message
containing their answer to the American Government's position, and
then it appears on the evening and before midnight December 6-7, the
first 13 parts of that message were translated, decoded, and made
available to certain officials here, and on the next morning, the 14tb
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2183
part and 1 p. m. part, which directed the presentation of the message
to our Secretary of State at 1 p. m. on the 7th, were translated and
disseminated. When did any part of that message first come to your
attention ?
Admiral Stakk. It first came to my attention Sunday forenoon
when I came to the office in the Navy Department. I had no informa-
tion of it prior to that time.
[S812] Mr. Mitchell. Nobody endeavored to reach you, that
you know of, Saturday evening, about the early 13 parts?
Admiral Stark. Nobody reached me.
Mr. Mitchell. Where were you, if you know ?
Admiral Stark. I don't know, sir. I thought I was home but if
they had tried to reach me I should have been there. Also if I were
not there word would have been left where I was. Also the duty offi-
cer was generally informed of my whereabouts. Unfortunately, Mrs.
Stark has destroyed her date calendar of that time. I have tried to
run down two or three blinds. There was a party given in the
Navy yard that night for Governor Edison, ex-Secretary of the Navy.
I knew that I had been there on a party with him. I wrote the Com-
mandant at that time. He said that he had completely forgotten
they had given the party and his wife said she was sure I wasn't
there, in any case. So that blind went by the board.
Mr. Mitchell. The record shows that Secretary Knox had it that
night ; your Chief of Naval Intelligence had it that night.
Admiral Stark. That is right.
Mr. Mitchell. And Knox called up and made an appointment with
Stimson and Hull the next morning. You didn't hear anything
about that?
[5S13] Admiral Stark. No, sir, not a word.
Mr. Mitchell. In the afternoon of the Saturday before, during
office hours, this pilot message came in, which was the preliminary
message from the Japs to their ambassadors stating that they were
going to send this message along.
Did you see that ?
Admiral Stark. I have no recollection of having seen or heard of
the pilot message. The first information that I had on the subject was
Sunday forenoon.
Mr. Mitchell. I noticed in your statement about this incident you
make no mention of the hour you got in the office or the hour you first
saw this 13- or 14-part message Sunday morning. Have you no recol-
lection about the hour ?
Admiral Stark. I can only guess on that and I did guess last sum-
mer. I usually got down to the office Sunday mornings around 10 :30
and I just assumed that I had gotten there somewhere around 10 :30
or 11 o'clock. I was lazy on Sunday mornings unless there was some
special reason for getting up early. I usually took a walk around the
grounds and greenhouse at the Chief of Naval Operations' quarters
and didn't hurry about getting down and my usual time, as I recall,
was about 10 :30 or 11. What time it was on this particular Sunday
morning I couldn't go beyond that.
Mr. Mitchell. I believe there are some officials in [58J4,]
your Department, who have not yet been called as witnesses, Avhose
job it was to deliver and consider messages of that type, who think
2184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
you got there at 9 o'clock and saw a part of this message as early as
that and the balance of it, the fourteenth part, at least by 1 : 30.
Would that be contrary to the fact if they should so testify?
Admiral Stark. They have told me the same thing and they are also
estimating. You will have those people before you. And as regard-
ing the 1 o'clock message I think you will have, probably, from one of
the witnesses who kept some track of his time, the fact that he got to
my office, and he can testify, about 10 :40, with the 1 o'clock message,
but I have no recollection.
Mr. Mitchell. The records show, the White House phone records
show that General Marshall called you at 11 :30 about it, he had writ-
ten out a message to Pearl Harbor, to the Army commander there
about this 1 p. m. business.
Do you recall that ?
Admiral Stark. That is the one thing on that morning which stands
out very clearly in my memory, w^as General Marshall's call to me
about that message. At that time I was talking over that message with
Admiral Schuirmann, as to what it might mean. He pointed out, he
said, we don't [5815] know what the significance of it is, but
it might mean something, and he- said he thought it would be a good
thing to inform the people in the Pacific.
My first reaction was that we had sent so much out that — and as
there was no deduction from the message, as to what it meant, at least
w^e had made none at that time, that it would be just as well not to
send it. A few days previous, when we had a discussion whether to
send out anything more, the question came up, be careful not to send
too much, it might create the story of "wolf."
That was my first conversation with General INIarshall.
I put the phone up and, as I recall it, I put it up and stopped, and in
a matter of seconds, or certainly only a few minutes, and thought,
well, it can't do any harm, there may be something unusual about it,
General Marshall states he doesn't know what the significance is, but
there might be something, and I turned back and picked up the phone,
he had not yet sent the message, and I said, perhaps you are right,
I think you had better go ahead and I would like to have you make
sure that it goes to the naval opposites where this message was going,
which was throughout the commands in the broad Pacific.
I also asked General Marshall, knowing that the time was rather
short, whether or not he would get it out quickly. [ 5816] I told
him our own system under pressure was very fast. And he said, no,
that he was sure he could get it out quickly also. And with that I did
nothing more.
Mr. MrrcHELL. What was your system?
Admiral Stark. Radio.
Mr. Mitchell. You had a powerful sending apparatus, did you?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; very.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, ff we are right in our assumptions as to the
fact that you had this 1 p. m. message in your hands an hour before
Marshall did, that is at least 10 : 30 — you are not willing to concede
that, are you ?
Admiral Stark. My remembrance, as I said, was 10 : 40. When
you say "at least 10 : 30," I think you will find testimony to that effect
by a witness, and if he states that, and I think he probably has good
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2185
siipportinc: data, I accept it, that it was delivered to my office and
then after that was given, by whomever he gave it, to me.
Mr. Mitchell. Is it fair to say that if Marshall hadn't spotted that
message and started to send word out to Pearl Harbor that you prob-
ably wouldn't have sent anything?
Admiral Stark. I don't know that I would. I think that might be
a fair deduction.
Mr. Mitchell. Noav didn't you have somebody more than [5817]
Schuirmann in there discussing this 1 p. m. business?
Admiral Stark. Well, sir
Mr. Mitchell. Didn't Commander Kramer
Mr. Gesell. I believe one witness says there were 15 officers in there.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral Schuirmann.
Admiral Stark. Admiral Schuirmann. I said when Marshall called
I was talking it over with Schuirmann.
Mr, Mitchell. After you got the 1 p. m. message wasn't there some
discussion in your office then about it?
Admiral Stark. There may have been. I don't recall it.
Mr. Mitchell. Commander Kramer
Admiral Stark. I can give you what I know by hearsay.
Mr. Mitchell. I don't want that. I just want whether any of these
officers spoke to you about it.
Admiral Stark. I don't recollect it that morning. I recollect it
since.
Mr. Mitchell. There were some younger officers that spotted the 1
p. m. business and made some suggestion about it being daylight at
Honolulu ?
Admiral Stark. I am certain nobody mentioned Honolulu with ref-
erence to a daylight attack. I am positive of that.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, this was what we lawyers call a last clear
chance. These people were not ready at Pearl Harbor; [6818]
the Jap Fleet was piling in ; here was a chance to get a message to them
that might have saved them; it reached your hands, we will say, at
10 : 40 ; the chance wasn't taken.
Does that sum up the situation as you see it?
Admiral Stark. Well, I gather from your
Mr. Mitchell. You might have intervened and done something.
Admiral Stark. I gather from your question you are now pointing
that dispatch directly at Pearl Harbor. It didn't mention Pearl
Harbor. It gave no inference with regard to Pearl Harbor any more
than it did the Philippines or the Netherlands East Indies.
Mr. Mitchell. Are you right about that? 1 p. m. here was dawn
at Pearl Harbor and 1 p. m. here was in the middle of the night in
the Philippines.
Admiral Stark. I would say that dawn at Pearl Harbor was about
an hour— -that can be checked by the Naval Observatory — before the
time specified in the message; and as regards midnight in the Philip-
pines, as to whether that would mean anything, that could have been
an attack at night. Taranto was an attack just a few minutes after
midnight.
Mr. jVIitchell. Why not send a message to all three of those places
saying something is liable to happen at 1 p. m. Washington time?
Admiral Stark. In the light of hindsight, if we had read [SSW]
into that message that it meant an attack at that hour, and had sent it
2186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
out, of course, it would have been helpful. I wish such an inference
could have been drawn.
Mr. Mitchell. The fixing of an exact hour to deliver the diplomatic
message and rout out the Secretary of State on a Sunday at 1 p. m.,
wasn't it obvious that there was some special significance, having in
mind the history of the Japs striking first and declaring war after-
wards?
Admiral Stark. If so, Mr. Mitchell, I would like to say that so far
as I know the Secretary of War didn't read that inference into it, the
Secretary of State didn't read that inference into it, the Secretary of
the Navy didn't read that inference into it. General Marshall and his
staff didn't read that inference into it, and nobody mentioned it to me.
Mr. Mitchell. Are you quite right about General Marshall ? The
first thing he did was to spot that message and he wouldn't even allow
his answer to be typed, he put it into longhand and told them to encode
it without typing it.
Admiral Stark. May I read his dispatch?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, we are all familiar with it.
Admiral Stark. I would like to read this :
Just what significance the hour set may have been we do not know.
[S820] Mr. Mitchell. Of course, you didn't know.
Admiral Stark, (reading) :
But be on the alert accordingly.
Mr. Mitchell. That means, to you, being alerted at 1 p. m. Wash-
ington time, doesn't it ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; but I would like to invite attention also
to the fact that we had thought that they were on the alert. I am
not attempting to argue the fact, sir, that I don't think it would have
been a good thing to have gotten this message out, drawn the inference
and sent it. I wish we could have. We didn't.
Mr. Mitchell. You didn't know they weren't on the alert ?
Admiral, Stark. No, sir. On the contrary, we felt they were.
Mr. Mitchell. You don't know what time Stimson and Hull got
this 1 p. m. message, do you, or saw it?
Admiral Stark. I think, if I may say so, Kramer can tell you
that. And if Kramer says that message was delivered to my office at
10 : 40, 1 accept it.
Mr. Mitchell. It has been suggested to me that Kramer may have
told you about the text of that message before delivery of the docu-
ment. Do you recall that ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I think I will not ask the admiral any [SS^l]
more questions. Do you want to go on with the committee examina-
tion or take it up at 2 o'clock ?
The Chairman. Inasmuch as we want to have an executive session
we might suspend now until 2 o'clock,
(Whereupon, at 12 :25 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock
p. m. of the same day.)
[58'22'] afternoon session — 2 p. m.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. The chair
understands counsel wishes to ask some further questions.
Mr. Gesell. a few additional questions, Mr. Chairman.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2187
TESTIMONY OF ADM. HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)
Mr. Geselli. First, Admiral Stark, with respect to the events of the
6th and 7th. With respect to your whereabouts on December 6th, did
you have a duty officer at your home on the evening of the 6th ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. Gesell. If someone had wanted to reach you in a hurry could
they have gotten you ?
Admiral Stark. I left word at home when I went out as to where I
could be reached ; also before leaving the Department the duty officer
in Operations was informed if I would be out.
Mr. Gesell. Was it generally known that the duty officer knew
your whereabouts in the Navy Department ?
Admiral Stark. I think so. Also it was a general Navy custom or
at least it was a departmental custom, they would probably have called
one of my aides.
Mr. Gesell. Was there anyone at your home on the 6th who could
have taken the calls if you were absent ?
Admiral Stark. Yes. There was always a servant avail- [68£3]
able at the telephone.
Mr. Gesell. Well, did your servant, or did the duty officer at the
Navy Department, or did any of your aides ever telephone that any-
one had sought to reach you at any time on the 6th ?
Admiral Stark. No.
Mr. Gesell. Now, with respect to the 7th, I think we want to have
a little clearer idea of when you got to your office. Admiral Wilkin-
son testified that you reached your office at least by 9 :15 that morning
because his recollection is that at 9 : 15 he discussed the first thirteen
parts of the message with you or handed them to you. Do you recall
that you were at your offiee that early ?
Admiral Stark. I do not. I may have been but I do not recall just
what time I got down that Sunday morning. I made a guess when I
was asked at the hearing before the Naval Court of Inquiry last sum-
mer about half past 10.
Mr. Gesell. Your best recollection is that you got there at half
past 10 ?
Admiral Stark. Well, that was about the usual time and I had no
reason to think otherwise. I may have gotten in earlier.
Mr. Gesell. Whenever it was you got there was your first order
of business the 14-part message ?
[S824-] Admiral Stark. I do not recall that.
Mr. Gesell. Well, do you recall when you saw the fourteen part
message first ?
Admiral Stark. I saw it after I got in the office. Just what time
I do not recall.
Mr. Gesell. You do not recall how soon after you got to your office
that you saw it ?
Admiral Stark. No.
Mr. Gesell. Now, do you recall anyone telling you that the 1 o'clock
message was in before you were shown the text of the 1 o'clock message ?
Admiral Stark. No ; I do not.
Mr. Gesell. You do not recall that Captain Kramer or anyone else
passed oral word into your office that the 1 o'clock message was in ?
2188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. I not only do not recall it, I think I had no such
word.
Mr. Gesell. Now, during the 6th and the 7th prior to the attack,
did you have any conversations with anyone at the White House,
President Roosevelt or anyone else?
Admiral Stark. I may have ; I do not recall.
Mr. Gesell. Do you recall any conversation that you had with any-
one at the White House concerning the ll-part message and the 1
o'clock message ?
[S8£5] Admiral Stark. No ; I do not.
Mr. Gesell. Did you have any conversations prior to the attack
concerning those messages with Secretary Knox?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall that I did. I may have. I simply
don't remember.
Mr. Gesell. Well, now, there are two or three other points, picking
up some loose ends at this time, which are somewhat unrelated and I
will just go right down them with you.
General Marshall indicated that he was not certain what the length
of time was which the Navy had in mind as being the minimum neces-
sary for it to get ready for combat in the Pacific. Did you have some
date in mind and, if so, did you state your estimate of that at any
time?
Admiral Stark. I am not sure of your question unless you mean
the delay that we wanted in connection with the Philippines ?
Mr. Gesell. I believe that is it ; yes.
Admiral Stark. If that it what you refer to and I believe he testi-
fied I wanted somewhat longer.
Mr. Gesell. That is right.
Admiral Stark. And if I go a little further, I believe he testified
that he thought by 10th December or something of that sort he would
be ready and that I wanted that into Feb- [-5826] ruary.
Mr. Gesell. I was not clear about that. He was not clear how long
you wanted and that is what I am trying to get now.
Admiral Stark. That is to what you refer ?
Mr. Gesell. Yes.
Admiral Stark. I was asking for 3 months. I based that request
on the Army air schedule which, as I recall, they anticipated complet-
ing their quota of planes out there in February or March and, of
course, the Army can give you that testimony.
Mr, Gesell. And when you say you were asking for three months
who were you asking for three months ? To whom were you talking ?
Admiral Stark. Largely Mr. Hull, in endeavoring to keep the nego-
tiations going if possible until the Army schedule was completed.
Mr. Gesell. Did Mr. Hull keep you advised of the progress of the
negotiations with the Japanese?
Admiral Stark. Mr. Hull kept me I think rather closely advised
as to the progress of negotiations. It was his habit frequently, some-
times day 'after day, to call me up in the late afternoon and let me
know if there was any progress.
Mr. Gesell. Well, now, you said, I think, in your pre- [SSS?]
pared statement something to the effect that you do not recall seeing
the 10-point note of November 26th at or about the time that it was
delivered.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2189
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Mr. Gesell. The evidence here shows that that note was intercepted
in the regular course and was among the Japanese intercepts; in other
words, the text of the note being transmitted by the Japanese repre-
sentatives here to Tokyo.
Admiral Stark. That is true. I think that was on the 28th.
Mr. Gesell. Do you think you saw it then on the 28th?
Admiral Stark. I could not be sure. I would like to say with
regard to that 10-point note, while not recollecting having seen it at
that time, that I had discussed in the State Department a memoran-
dum by Mr. Morgenthau and expressed my opinion on it and confirmed
it in writing. The note of the 26th, the iO-point note, as I recall con-
tained nothing, or at least very little or only minor differences from
the note of the Secretary of the Treasury and also did not contain
anything which I had objected to in the other note, so in general^ I
knew of the substance of that note but as to having seen it in its
actual form when it went out or whether I saw it on the 28th I could
not say.
Mr. Gesell. With respect to the basing of the fleet in [S8£8'\
Pearl Harbor we have had a great deal of discussion concerning
whether or not the fleet should have been based out there in 1940. Did
you state any opinion or take any position as the days grew more
critical in 1941 as to whether or not the fleet should be based at Pearl
Harbor?
Admiral Stark. In my opinion when the situation was tense and
critical the fleet should have been in Pearl Harbor ; that is, should
have been based in that area.
Mr. Gesell. Commencing in your opinion at about what date,
Admiral Stark?
Admiral Stark. Well, I never tried to narrow that down. It would
be purely a guess. If I may go back a little bit, I do not want that
confused with the fact that when the fleet first stayed out there I
pointed out, and pointed out very clearly, in conversations with the
President the advantages from the standpoints which Admiral
Richardson mentioned of the fleet's return.
Mr. Gesell. We are talking now about a wholly different thing.
Admiral Stark. Yes ; I know we are.
Mr. Gesell. You testified that you were in agreement with Admiral
Richardson on his position that he took in 1940.
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Mr. Gesell. Now what I am asking you is what view you [6829']
took, if any, with respect to the basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor as
the days became critical in 1941 ?
Admiral Stark. Well, the fleet was then based at Pearl Harbor.
I would say that by the time Admiral Kimmel had command of the
fleet we had practically wiped out of our minds, or at least we no
longer considered and talked about bringing the fleet back.
Mr. Gesell. And you have stated that it was your opinion that at
least by the last quarter of 1941 the place for the fleet was in the
Hawaiian waters?
Admiral Stark. In my opinion that was a covering position in
the Pacific.
2190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gesell. Now, what information did you have in the latter part
of 1941 as to the preparedness of the fleet for combat? Was it ready
for war or was it not ready for war ?
Admiral Stark. In my opinion it was. Of course, no commander
in chief is ever satisfied, even those we had in Europe, they were not
satisfied. I know of no one who was ever satisfied but generally speak-
ing I have quoted from Admiral Kimmel's annual report. I did
not mention that he also — I think it was in the same letter — he said
that his shooting was good judged by any standards, which showed
that the fleet was performing satisfactorily in target practice, and he
also said the morale was good.
[6380'] Mr. Gesell. So that it was your opinion that the fleet
was ready for war at that time and was that opinion shared by other
officers advising you ?
Admiral Stark. I think so. Now, when you say "ready for war"
it is subject to two interpretations there. It was ready for war in
accordance with the war plans. It was not ready for an advance into
the western Pacific, which would have required a large train and
which we did not have.
Mr. Gesell. It still had no train and was not ready for offensive
action?
Admiral Stark. It was ready for offensive action in the way of
raids as envisaged by the war plans and it had a train of certain
dimensions but it did not have the great fleet of supply vessels required
to take it and maintain it in the western Pacific.
Mr. Gesell. Now, what about this dispatch that the President
sent concerning the placing of three reconnaissance or patrol vessels
in the China Sea, in the South China Sea waters? We have in evi-
dence the dispatch, which I believe you were the issuing officer of,
which was sent at the direction of the President asking that three
patrol vessels be put out there. Do you remember that?
Admiral Stark. Very well.
Mr. Gesell. Before we discuss the circumstances I want [5831']
to get one thing clear in my mind. Was that ever done ? Were those
vessels put out there or weren't they?
Admiral Stark. They were not. The ship Isabel I think got out
there just about the time the attack broke, was out a few hours and
came back. That, to my recollection. Admiral Hart told me. The
other vessels were not sent out.
Mr. Gesell. Now, did the President give the direction for the send-
ing of that dispatch to you personally ?
Admiral Stark. He did.
Mr. Gesell. Will you state to the committee what discussion you
had with him at that time, please, sir?
Admiral Stark. Well, if I may read the dispatch, I think the
dispatch speak for itself as to why it was.
Mr. Gesell. We have the dispatch in mind I think, Admiral. I
don't mind your reading it as part of your answer, but what I am
anxious to have in addition to that is any conversatiofi you may have
had with President Roosevelt concerning the surrounding circum-
stances.
Admiral Stark. Well, of course, at that time I was discussing with
the President, as we were discussing in the Department, what might
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2191
happen ; that is, as to where this expedition going south was likely to
hit. His thought was the Kra Peninsula. I was in complete agree-
ment with that. The Philippines was a possibility and the other
places which have [5832] been mentioned, the East Indies, and
just where it would go we did not Imow and these three small vessels
were to assist in that determination.
Mr. Gesell. I think we have fairly well in mind the points where
the vessels were.
Admiral Stark. Well, if you have fairly well in mind the points
where the vessels were you will see where the President put them
they were well placed to get information either positive or negative
and it was for that reason and for the reasons as stated in the dispatch,
to get information, that he directed that be done ; and I would like to
state and just take out of the dispatch what the reasons were.
He says "to form a defensive information patrol ; to accomplish a
purpose which is to observe and report by radio Japanese movements
in the West China Sea and Gulf of Siam," and then he himself desig-
nated where those vessels were to be placed and they were well placed
for the purposes for which he wanted them.
Mr. Gesell. Well, did he indicate to you in any way why he wanted
the information, other than the general desire to have information con-
cerning Japanese movements?
Admiral Stark. No, that is all. We are all after information.
We were scouting by air, and I simply think that he thought that
was additional precautions. He was intensely [5833] inter-
ested in ever}^ move at that time, as we all were.
Mr. Gesell. Now, you attended these various war council meetings
which were held immediately preceding these warning messages, did
you not, with General Marshall and the Secretaries of War and Navy
and President Roosevelt ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gesell. Do you recall President Koosevelt stating at one of
those meetings that he thought it was possible that there would be a
surprise attack before the following Monday ?
Admiral Stark. I think he stated "as early as the following Mon-
day." Yes, I recall that.
Mr. Gesell. You heard General Marshall's testimony concerning
those meetings, did you not?
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I have that answer again? I had
difficulty in hearing the Admiral.
Admiral Stark. I said yes, sir, I recall it. I think that he stated
"possibly as early as next Monday." I have forgotten just exactly
what his exact words were, but that is my impression.
Mr. Keefe. When did that occur?
Admiral Stark. That was the Monday after the 25th, I believe it
was at that time.
Mr. Gesell. I believe we computed that on a calendar which was
furnished us, w^hich is in evidence and I think it [5834] showed
December 1 as the Monday.
You heard General Marshall testify concerning those meetings, did
you?
Admiral Stark. Yes.
2192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gesell. Did you hear or read Secretary Hull's testimony con-
cerning those meetings ?
Admiral Stark. I am not sure that I did.
Mr. Gesell. Well, have you anything to add to what General
Marshall said concerning what took place at those meetings? Have
you a more detailed recollection of the discussions ?
Admiral Stark. No, nothing more than I mentioned in the post-
script of my letter to Admiral Kimmel which was mentioned this
morning. We went over the situation and we looked at the charts and
were wondering when they were going to strike and where.
Mr. Gesell. Was there any discussion of Hawaii in those meetings
as a possible point where they would strike ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall that there was.
Mr. Gesell. You participated in the drafting and preparation of
the joint memorandum signed by yourself and General Marshall to the
President of Xovember 27, did you not ?
Admiral Stark. Well, General Marshall and I were responsible for
it.
[S8SS] Mr. Gesell. Eight.
Admiral Stark. That was formed up by the two war plans di-
visions.
Mr. Gesell. Can you tell us under what circumstances that was
written? It is still a little vague on the record why that particular
memorandum was written.
Admiral Stark. Primarily we wanted to gain time. I was ex-
tremely anxious to gain time and Marshall was, too. We stood to-
gether on that. We had going out in December — and again the Army
could give you perhaps more accurate information — but as I recall
twenty-odd thousand troops and that meant a lot in the Philippines.
The air program as I recall involved about 600 planes, Army. It
meant a good deal to us to get them out there. Also the Philippine
Scouts were being trained.
I might mention a point which I think has not been brought out
before, that I directed Admiral Hart to lay his mines in tlie Philip-
pines for protecting Manila Bay. it was either June or Jidy. At
that time I considered the situation such that we had better get that
job done and not be suddenly confronted with it. But the primary
reason for that was to gain time and that is what the memorandum
sought to stress.
Mr. Gesell. In other words, what you were doing was stressing
how much you could tolerate in the way of activity [6836] by-
Japan before you felt some action liad to be taken by this country?
Admiral Star"k. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gesell. Can you tell us when that memorandum was delivered
to the President? I notice it is typed on the stationery of the Navy
Department. It is dated November 27. General Marshall did not get
back until late that night and did not get to his oflice until the morn-
ing of the 28th. Now, he has identified his signature on the message
as being his own signature, so with that before us the question of
when the memorandum was delivered to the White House is now be-
fore us and I wondered if you could help us on that.
Admiral Stark. I am sorry I cannot. We have gone over the
dates, I have personally, and tried to recall that 4-year-ago picture,
particularly of the 25th, 26th, and 27th, with regard to the Chiang
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2193
Kai-shek note, with regard to the joint board meeting of the 26th,
with regard to just when Mr. Hull first informed us. I believe he has
testified that he came to that conclusion on the 25th or the 28th. He
mentioned the Army and Navy taking over.
In my statement I said that he informed me on the 27th and, as I
stated, that statement was completely written before hearings here
started and I may be wrong on that. I may have gotten it from him
on tlie 2Cth. I was in very close touch with [5837] him and
whether or not, when he called me greatly perturbed about the Chiang
Kai-shek note, he told me at that time he was going to throw it over,
or whether he did later on the 27th, whether he called me on the 25th
or the 2Gth I do not k]iow. Now, Marshall left the joint board meet-
ing on the 26th and whether he signed it on the 28th or not, I do not
know.
Now, to come back to the White House part of that question, we
have done our best to try and find that out, but we have been unable
to. We do know that it was in the White House, we have ascertained
that, but just when the President got it I do not know.
[S8S8] Mr. Gesell. Well, now, one other question closely re-
lated to that perhaps has to do with this question of overt act.
You testified this morning that the Navy message of November 27
did not contain any direction that Japan should commit the first overt
act. However, we have in evidence here a dispatch sent by you under
date of November 28 transmitting an Army message, but in addi-
tion to reciting the text of the Army message it has some additional
Navy direction in it, and included in that direction is a direction con-
cerning the overt act in these terms "Undertake no offensive action
until Japan has committed an overt act." That indicates that some-
time between your message of the 27tli and your message of the 28th
this idea of an overt act came forward.
Your dispatch was not sent to Admiral Kimmel except for his
information ?
Admiral Stark. That is right.
Mr. Gesell. It was sent to the west coast department, but I won-
dered if that in any way refreshed your mind as to the conferences
and discussions on this question of the overt act.
Admiral Stark. At this time I could not say positively as to just
why we put that in. I do know, for example, that we used to
worry somewhat about the location of the Japs [S8S9] around
our naval ammunition depot, for example, up in Puget Sound. The
same was true in Los Angeles harbor. It may possibly have been
if they had gotten this message they may have corraled some of the
people who were close by, some that they had suspected. It was only
the continental districts, as I recall it, that were covered in that
dispatch.
Mr. Gesell. That is correct.
Admiral Stark. Who were ordered not to make an overt act. The
Army had issued a similar warning to those people, and it may have
been to go along with that.
I could not answer the question definitely, but I know it is there.
Now as far as going along with the Army, that might not necessarily
hold, because we did not go along with them in the Hawaiian Islands,
and again it might hold because their problem in the Hawaiian Islands
79716 — 46 — pt. 5 10
2194 COiNGKESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
was quite different from ours. With the large Japanese population
we were thinking more in terms of the high seas. i ,^i ^•
Mr. Gesell- You attended the meeting at Argentina, the Atlantic
conference meeting, did you not?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. . .
Mr. Gesell. Did you at that time, or at any other time prior to
December 7, receive any information or advice to the effect that the
United States Government had undertaken [6840] to declare
war against Japan in the event Great Britain was attacked m the
Pacific?
Admiral Stark. Never.
Mr. Gesell. I think that completes the questions I have.
Mr. Mitchell. Just one that I would like to ask you, Admiral.
This morning you spoke about the fact that the Navy Department
was not volunteering any help to you in preparation for your testi-
mony. I understand you did not mean that the Navy was delinquent
in any way.
Admiral Stark. I qualified that later. I thought it was possible
that an inference might have been drawn that the Navy Department
might have been withholding something from me.
Mr. Mitchell. What you meant was that they were not volunteer-
ing aid to you but they were giving you everything that you asked for.
Admiral Stark. That is correct; they were giving me everything
that I asked for, and helping me out wherever they could, or they
detailed to help me, and Lieutenant Commander Richmond was de-
tailed to help me, and Lieutenant Johnson, and in general the depart-
ment has been cooperative in giving me help where I have asked for it.
But in attempting to prepare myself for this investigation, I have done
it [6S4I] largely on my own memory as to what I wanted to
bring out.
Mr. Mitchell. Have you had any difficulty or lack of cooperation
in the office of the counsel of the committee in giving you everything
that you wanted?
Admiral Stark. No, sir, everything has been fine, and I might say
it has been all right with the Navy Department.
The Chairman. Admiral, the Pacific Fleet was sent out to the
Hawaiian area early in 1940, was it?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Ostensibly on maneuvers, is that true?
Admiral Stark. That is true; yes, sir.
The Chairman. Well, of course the Government had spent a large
sum of money in blasting through the land to get into what is now
Pearl Harbor, with a view of making it a suitable base for the fleet
over the years.
Admiral Stark. That is correct, yes, sir.
The Chairman. Now apparently the fleet was kept out there longer
than Admiral Richardson either knew or thought that it would be
kept, ancl he kept prodding you to find out why it was kept out there,
and in the letter he wrote you prior to his visit to Washington in
October 1940, and in many of these letters, he wanted to know why
he was out there, why the fleet was out there, and in a good many of
your letters, at least one or two of them, you wrote back that you did
not [S84£] know why it was out there, that you wished you
did know why it was out there.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2195
How long did that lack of information on your part as to what the
Navy was doing out there remain ?
Admiral Stahk. I think I might say, Mr. Chairman, if I may sug-
gest to yon, where yon stated I said I did not know why they were
out there, I did not know how long they were going to remain there.
The reason for their being there, which I wrote Admiral Richardson,
was that their presence there might act as a deterrent against Japanese
aggression in the Pacific.
When they went out there I tliought they were coming back, and
Admiral Richardson did, and I might say so far as I know the Presi-
dent had no other thought when those maneuvers began.
But when it came time for them to come back, in view of the condi-
tions in the Pacific it was decided to keep them there for a while.
We did not know how long.
The Chairman. I might have misquoted you, because I am referring
to your letters from memory. I do not have them before me. I over-
looked bringing them down this morning. I remember in one or two
of your letters you stated you did not know how long they were to
be kept there, and 1 got the impression you stated also in your early
correspondence with Admiral Richardson that you did not know why
they were being [SS4^] kept there.
If I am mistaken about that I want to be corrected.
Admiral Stark. Here is a letter in which I reply to Admiral Rich-
ardson, and I quote:
"Why are you in the Hawaiian area?" Answer: This was my an-
swer, "You are there because the deterrent effect which it is thought
your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies."
[5844-] The Chairman. What was the date of that letter?
Admiral Stark. 27 May.
The Chairman. Obviously, Admiral Richardson was not convinced
of the wisdom of your course, because when he came back here in
October he and the President evidently engaged in a very earnest ar-
gument as to the wisdom of the policy of keeping the Navy out there
as a deterrent. Were you present at any of the conferences between
the President and Admiral Richardson ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir; I was not. Admiral Richardson went over
himself.
The Chairman. Did Admiral Richardson talk with you about his
conference with the President?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; he gave me, as I recall, a short memoran-
dum on the subject of the discussion, so that I would have it.
The Chairman. That was in October. By that time, had you
reached an agreement with the attitude of the President, the Secretary
of State and others, to keep the fleet in the Hawaiian area or Pearl
Harbor was a wise course, as a possible deterrent against Japan ?
Admiral Stark. It was one of those things which at that time, as
I recall, was carrying along because, if I also recall correctly — and
I will check this, and if it is not [S<S4r5] correct I will ask for
a change in the record — as I recall at one time we had about come to
the conclusion we might bring the fleet back in the fall or for Christ-
mas in that year, I am not certain, and that later we decided not to
do it but to keep it there, and after that time, about the last of 1940,
it just became a fixed policy to retain the fleet there.
2196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Chairman. Inasmuch as the fleet was out there, no matter what
the purpose for which it was originally sent, to have withdrawn it
back to the Pacific Coast had possibilities of misinterpretation on the
part of Japan and on the part of our own people, did it not?
Admiral Stark. It might have. Also sending it back again might
have been more difficult. I testified this morning I thought that was
the place for the fleet when things were tense might also have its
disadvantages.
The Chairman. That was my next question. If it had never been
sent to Pearl Harbor in the spring of 1940, had not remained out there,
if it had remained on the Pacific Coast where. Admiral Richardson
testified there were better facilities for reaction and training, and one
thing and another, it did not have anj^thing to do with the safety of
the fleet, but if it had been kept on the Pacific coast until thingrs
became tense and then sent to the Pearl Harbor region or the Ha-
waiian area, what would have been the effect of such a movement as
that at the time [S846] when things did become critical ?
Admiral Stark. Of course, no one knows, but it might have been
difficult diplomatically to do it. It might have been interpreted by
the Japs as a move for our getting ready for war out there in the
Pacific, and it might possibly have precipitated something.
The Chairman. Of course, everybody understood, I suppose, in-
cluding the Japanese, that the Hawaiian Islands were American ter-
ritory and Pearl Harbor was an American base and we had a right
to send our fleet out there whenever we saw fit.
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
The Chairman. Without giving an explanation.
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
The Chairman. In view of the critical situation as it developed
and tenseness of relations between the two countries, to have kept the
fleet back at the Pacific Coast and then have sent it out there in the
midst of one of these tense situations you think might have given
rise to the feeling that it was a threat against Japan and therefore,
in a sense, might have been a sort of moral overt act ?
Admiral Stark. It might have been; j-es, sir. I might say, Mr.
Chairman, that when we first decided not to bring the fleet back —
and I was talking to the President about the advantages, from a
materiel and personnel standpoint of bringing it back, [S847]
balanced against the political reasons, I can remember just as though
it happened seconds ago; the silence — I was with the President
alone — and the tense thought that he gave to it then for a few minuteg,
and he finally looked up and he said — and you may have heard him
say the same'thing — "Well, I hardly know, but," he said, "when I am
in doubt and I am not sure just what is best, I am inclined to sit tight,"
and he said, "I think we better do that for the present." That
continued.
The Chairman. That was with reference to keeping the fleet out
there?
Admiral Stark. That was with reference to keeping it out or bring-
ing it back, yes, sir.
The Chairman. Do you recall, as a naval officer, that a similar situ-
ation existed in the Far East back in 1932 following the Shanghai
incident, I believe, when the American fleet was kept out there in
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMIT'TEE 2197
those Pacific waters, followinj^ the Japanese attack upon China, or
followino; lier invasion of Manchuria, and following the Shanghai
affair, that the fleet was out there and was kept there, according to
Secretary Stimson, who was at that time Secretary of State, for a
similar purpose, that it would have its moral effect upon Japan. Do
you recall anj^thing about that?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall the fleet, as we usually [584^]
refer to the fleet, being out there at that time. We had an Asiatic
squadron.
The Chairman. It may not have been a full fleet, but it was a
detachment of the Navy.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; and it may have been kept in Chinese
waters at that time rather than possibly used for a cruise south in
the wintertime, or something of that sort.
The Chairman. Now, you referred this morning to a couple of
letters or dispatches that you sent to Admiral Kimmel between the
24th and 27th of November, with reference to the sending of certain
airplanes from Hawaii to Midway and Wake.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I did not get very clearly in my mind whether
they were sent.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; they were sent.
The Chairman. Were they the planes that were on the Lexing-
ton that was supposed to be headed west while the Enterprise was
headed east from the Philippines?
Admiral Stark. No. There were two detachments of Marine fight-
ers, I believe, that were sent. One carrier took some to Wake and one
to Midway. The dates of the sailing of those carriers were fixed by
Admiral Kimmel. We gave no specific dates for it. We knew of one
of the sailings, which was in answer to another dispatch of ours, and
as to the other we were [<5<§^] not informed.
I would like to state in that connection, if I may, I do not know
whether or not there has been the impression created in the com-
mittee that by doing that the defenses in that area were decreased.
Pearl Harbor was mentioned. If you look at the map you will find,
of course, that Midway is — I have forgotten — 1,000 or 1,200 miles
farther westward, and Wake is still farther. That was a general
area of defense. Anything we could find in those areas, from scout-
ing or otherwise, lent itself just that much to the defense of Oahu.
So it was strengthening the general island position tiiere. That was
particularly true with regard to the patrol squadrons, of which I
think one squadron was sent to Wake, and two to Midway. It enlarged
the scouting area. It might have decreased it temporarily in a con-
centrated way around Oahu, but as against that there was the getting
of information, or the possibility of getting it, farther west, and also
of defending those carriers.
Incidentally, originally General Marshall asked us to watch for and
to give them any warning we could, because we were ferrying planes
to the Philippines via those two outposts.
The Chairman. With regard to the purpose for sending them to
Wake and Midway, in view of what happened it may have been bet-
ter if they had all been there?
2198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[58S0] Admiral Stark. We would have lost fewer of them ; yes,
sir.
The Chairman. The fewer ships and planes were at Pearl Harbor,
tlie fewer we would have lost?
Admiral Stark. That would have been incidental to what happened.
The Chairman. It would have been incidental to what happened,
but still it would have probably happened.
Now, in regard to the overt act, of course it was in view of the fact
that both you and General Marshall, as heads of the Army and Navy,
were seeking to gain time and to postpone any conflict as long as possi-
ble, it was perfectly consistent with that attitude not to commit an
overt act on the part of the United States and not precipitate a war
which you were seeking to avoid or postpone as long as possible, would
it not?
Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir.
The Chairman. Regardless of the omission of this phrase in your
telegram in regard to an overt act, were the commanders in the field,
m the Pacific area, Panama, and on the Pacific coast and the Philip-
pines and Pearl Harbor, sufficiently aware of that general attitude of
our Government so that they knew it ?
Admiral Stark. I think so.
The Chairman. Without having it especially called to their atten-
tion in a message on any particular date ?
Admiral Stark. I think so. They all knew we wanted to [S851']
avoid war in the Pacific if possible. Each one of them was a very re-
sponsible man, and I think none would have created an overt act if
they could have avoided it. On the other hand, each one unquestion-
ably would have defended himself.
The Chairman. Oh, yes.
Admiral Stark. The message which Kimmel sent, which is in one
of his letters backing up a dispatch about bombing submarines within
a certain area, I think was thoroughly justified, and I would not have
called it an overt act I think if a submarine was found there without
any business.
The Chairman. You were assuming that everybody in authority,
while holding off actual hostilities, if they had to come, was to pre-
pare, as well as it was possible under all the circumstances, for any
eventuality whenever it did come ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Now, in your message to Admiral Kimmel on the
24th, which has been read into the record several times, you say, "The
chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful.
This situation, coupled with statements of Japanese Government and
movements their naval and military forces inclicate, in our opinion, that
a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on
the Philippines or Guam is a possibility."
Did you know at that time, at the time you sent that [5862]
first paragraph of your message, what the movement of the Japanese
naval and military forces was ?
Admiral Stark. The movement of which we had knowledge was
the movement south, the amphibious movement.
The Chairman. You knew at the time you sent this message of the
24th of November that they were moving south ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2199
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. With a considerable naval and military force?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And then you say, "An aggressive movement is
indicated in any direction." That would include the whole 360° of
the circle, would it?
Admiral Stark. It included the broad Pacific.
The Chairman. Well, it included any direction from Tokyo?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Which would raean anywhere they could come ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. That might be an offensive movement against us?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. My thought was it covered widely a
movement against us anywhere.
The Chairsian. Yes. Now, you go on to state, "The Chief of Staff
has sent this dispatch and requests action addressees", and so forth.
This dispatch of yours of November 24 does not [S8S3~\ seem
to correspond with any similar correspondence dispatched on that
date. Was it to be distributed to the Army officers ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I showed that dispatch to Marshall and
he agreed with it. I generally took things of that sort up with him,
and he with me, and we put that memorandum in about showing it to
Army opposites.
The Chairman. On the next day you wrote Admiral Kimmel a
letter. It went by the ordinary course of sending letters. Do you
know when that letter was received ?
Admiral Stark. I think we have that. As I recall, it was about
5 December, but I think the letter shows it.
The Chairman. At any rate it was not received until after you sent
the message of the 27th of November ?
Admiral Stark. It was received on the 3d of December.
The Chairman. On the 3d ?
Admiral Stark. Yes. That was about 6 days after he had received
the war warning of the 27th, or about 9 days after he received the war
warning of the 24th.
The Chairman. Then, on the 27th you sent your other message,
in w^hich you start out by saying: "This dispatch is to be considered a
war warning." Did you understand and did you intend that that lan-
guage should make this message of the 27th more acute and empha-
size more the danger than the one of the 24th in which you said that
the Japanese might start an [5854-] aggressive movement in
any direction?
Admiral Stark, I consider the message of the 27th much stronger.
I never had heard of the words "war warning" in any message before
anywhere, at any time.
[S8SS] The Chairman. This may be speculative, but if you
had not seen fit to send the message of the 27th and had relied on
the message of the 24th, would you have regarded the terms of that
message of the 24th sufficient to require that the Naval Forces in Pearl
Harbor and in the Hawaiian area be constantly on the alert for any
movement in any direction?
Admiral Stark. Well, it showed the possibility and to that ex-
tent— and again I may say it is difficult to get away from hindsight
2200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Chairman. I know.
Admiral Stark. But my feeling is that if I had received a mes-
sage that the Japs might make a surprise aggressive movement in any
direction, I would say, well, we better look out and be ready for it.
The Chairman. That is the purpose you had in sending this message
of tJie 24th?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; but we made a much more positive mes-
sage on the 27th, because on the 24th we stated that favorable outcome
of negotiations with Japan very doubtful; there was left a loophole
there that there still might be a change, through negotiations, to obtain
a settlement in the Pacific. We closed that loophole in the message
of the 27th.
But even so I think the message of the 24th showed the imminence
of trouble anywhere.
[S8S6] The Chairman. In your message of the 24th you say
that the Japs are liable "to make an aggressive movement in any
direction", and after saying in the 27th message that "this message is
to be considered a war warning," you say "negotiations with Japan
looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased.
An aggressive movement by Japan is expected within the next few
days."
In that language you did not say "in ni}" direction."
Admiral Stark. No, sir ; I did not.
The Chairman. Did you intend for that to implement your message
of the 24th or did you intend to withdraw the suggestion that they
might make an aggressive movement in any direction ?
- Admiral Stark. No, we did not intend to withdraw it, and I think
the two messages tie up together. Probably it might have been better
if we had put it in. Iput it in personally in the message of the 24th
and I do not recall discussing it with the message of the 27th.
The Chairman. Is it regarded in Naval circles as logically follow-
ing a warning given to a commanding officer anywhere tJiat a nation
is liable to make an aggressive movement against us, is the mere send-
ing of such a message to an officer of that kind within any possible
area of attack regarded in Naval circles as a warning that they should
be [S8S7] on the alert?
Admiral Stark. I thought so at the time.
The Chairman. Wouldn't that be the rule in any Navy?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir, I think so.
The Chairman. And any commanding officer in a responsible posi-
tion, like Admiral Hart, Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Block, or any
other commanding officer, would know what that meant if he received
such a message ?
Admiral Stark. I think so, yes, sir. It is something that doesn't
happen very often.
The Chairman. Now, when you used the words in your message of
the 24th, in the middle paragraph "the number and equipment of
Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an
amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, the Kra
Peninsula, or possibly Borneo," did you mean or intend that to be
interpreted as in any way modifying your message of the 24th that
an aggressive movement might be in any direction ?
Admiral Stark. No, we did not.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2201
The Chairman. If I understand you, your purpose in sending this
message was to emphasize the greater possibihty, in your mind, of an
attack on the Philippines or Thai or the Kra Peninsula, or possibly
Borneo, than elsewhere, particularly even the Hawaiian Islands ?
ISS58] Admiral Stark. Our purpose was the imminence of war,
that so far as looking toward stabilization of peace in the Pacific
negotiations were through, and then we gave the information we had,
and the only direct information we had, of what the Japanese were
doing, that is, that the information we had indicated that southern
movement.
I think it should be read in connection with the message of the 24th.
The Chairman. You laiew that that movement was in progress?
Admiral Stark. We had definite information of that and we gave
that information.
The Chairman. You didn't know what else was to be done or was
in process of being done by the Japs ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
The Chairman. You didn't know anything about the 6 carriers
that had sneaked out from the Island north of Japan and were going
through this unfrequented lane?
Admiral Stark. We had no information pn that, sir.
The Chairman. So that obviously this moving of this big con-
tingent of ships and men down through the China Sea toward the
south was for the purpose of deceiving you and everybody else with
respect to their immediate action against Pearl Harbor, by the send-
ing of this force of 6 airplane carriers and the three hundred-some-odd
planes ; is that your interpretation ?
[SS59] Admiral Stark. I don't think it was deceit. That was
a carefully planned campaign, that expedition south.
The Chairman. Well, they didn't go to pains to conceal that?
Admiral Stark. They couldn't very well.
The Chairman. No, but they didn't go to any pains to conceal it,
but rather ostentatiously let it be known that they were heading that
way, while at the same time sending this other force to the north to
make the attack on Pearl Harbor if the situation justified it when they
got there ; is that not correct ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir, that may have been in their thoughts.
The Chairman. The truth is that they just outsmarted everybody
didn't they ?
Admiral Stark. Well, they certainly concealed their intentions so
far as we were concerned of any definite indication of any attack on
Pearl Harbor.
The Chairman. That is not an unusual situation when an assassin
intends to attack someone, he knows what he is going to do, but the
other fellow does not.
Admiral Stark. We play that in our war games.
The Chairman. That is the part of the war games, not to let the
other fellow know what you are going to do ?
[SS60] Admiral Stark. That is true.
The Chairman. And a nation planning a sudden surprise attack
has the advantage over the nation that may be thinking one may
occur but doesn't know where or when it will occur, any more than
a man going along a highway knows that a man is concealed in the
2202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
corner of a fence and is going to shoot him. He may have his pockets
full of guns but unless he knows the man is there he won't have them
ready. Is that a fair simile ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Did you have your suspicions aroused by the fact
that this task force, or this force of airplane cai-riers, was missing, that
for several days there was no report about them, or did that come to
your attention ?
Admiral Stark. I don't recall any suspicion directly bearing on
that. We, in locating the Japanese Fleet, you might put certain sliips
on what you might call a pinpoint. You would know where they are.
In other cases you would get them in an area by your cuts from them
and radio intelligence. If they went to a navy yard, just as when our
ships go to a navy yard, their radios are bottled up, the shore station
may do it for you, and there are people down the line who will testify
more directly on just how they evaluated that information, but the
ship going into a home port, for [SS61] example, you might
not hear from her for a while, and they might assume that she was still,
there until they did hear from her again.
And, of course, at this particular time they had changed call signs.
I remember that feature of it very well. And it takes time to pick
up and identify again.
But as to whether or not we discussed at that particular time these
6 carriers I have no remembrance of it. I do have a distinct remem-
brance of our request of the Army to take a look at the Marshalls and
the Carolines and their fitting up two planes to do that for us about
that time, and which I recall not in connection, perhaps, with these
6 carriers, but with two other carriers that we had rumors were in
there. We wanted to get anything we could of anything in the eastern
Marshalls or further to the westward. And that reconnaissance,
due to bad weather, and other things, was held up, we didn't get it.
It wouldn't have been helpful, except as negative information.
The Chairman. Did the Japs have better facilities for locating
our ships than we had for locating theirs ?
Admiral Stark. Well, we had, I would say, very little, if any, but
there again the people in Naval Intelligence might give you something
on that, of locating ships in Japanese ports. That is, telling us what
was in Tokyo Bay, or elsewhere, [5S62] out there. But in
Hawaii, in the Canal, in the Los Angeles area, in San Francisco area,
in the Puget Sound area, the Japanese we felt were reporting regu-
larly with regard to our movements.
In one or two places I think we got hold of their people who were
doing that reporting. I am not too clear on that.
The Chairman. Probably they had a more universal spy system
than we did ?
Admiral Stark. They had an enormous spy system.
The Chairman. In view of your message to Admiral Kimmel of the
24th and the 27th, and Genera! Marshall's dispatch to General Short of
the same date, that is, the 27th, which he instructed him to convey
to Admiral Kimmel, what was the duty of the naval commander there
during the days following the receipt of that message on the 27th?
Admiral Stark. Well, my thought was, we assumed that there
would be a conference between the senior Army and Navy commanders
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2203
there, that a conference would occur, and that they would implement
( heir plans against surprise, and in the protection of the Island of Oahu,
])articularly of the Fleet, Pearl Harbor, for what ships were kept thei-e,
and the alerting of ships at sea, with the fact that Japan was expected
to attack and the oflicers in charge of tlie ships at [586-3] sea,
of course, would be very much on the alert against surprise anywhere.
The Chairman. Did that alertness include day and night?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. In view of these instructions contained in the Army
and Navy dispatches to Pearl Harbor, was it or was it not in com-
pliance with or in violation of them not to have any reconnaissance,
say on the 6th day of December, the day before the attack. The evi-
dence shows there was no reconnaissance of any kind on that day. I
am speaking now of the 6th.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. We had assumed when we sent out dis-
patch that reconnaissance would be started and kept up.
The Chairman. That is from the 27th or the 24th ?
Admiral Stark. Well, I would say from the 27th in any case.
The Chairman. 27th.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Do you know whether it was kept up from the 27th
until the attack?
Admiral Stark. I don't know just what they did at that time. Mar-
shall's dispatch particularly directed reconnaissance. Ours directed
the deployment. And just what action was taken there I don't know.
[SS64] The Chairman. Deployment means the arrangements of
whatever forces there are, the grouping or separation or movement in
such a way as to facilitate the greatest possible defense in the event of
an attack?
Admiral Stark. That is correct, yes, sir.
The Chairman. Well, you didn't answer my question as to whether
if there was no reconnaissance of any kind on the 6th that that would
be considered as being in violation of the orders or in compliance.
Admiral Stark. I would say it would be not carrying them out.
The Chairman. That is a very diplomatic way to answer my ques-
tion. It was not in compliance with the instructions.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
.The Chairman. It was not?
Admiral Stark. It was not.
The Chairman. In other words, they did not obey the instructions
that were received?
Admiral Stark. That is my understanding, yes, sir.
The Chairman. That is, if they had no reconnaissance at all on that
day, that was in disobedience?
Admiral Stark. That is correct, yes, sir.
The Chairman. Now, do you agree with — first, did you hear Ad-
miral Turner's testimony in which he said that if [5865] they
had been properly alerted, with the material and with the men they
had, and the forces they had, if they had been alerted on the day of
the attack, that the damage done to us might have been considerably
lessened and the damage done to the Japanese might have been con-
siderably increased and thereby lessening the success of the raid —
what is your view on that?
2204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. I agree with that. That is, of course, on the
assumption they might have scouted for that Japanese attack and
might have missed it. But there was a chance of their getting it.
And if they had located it, if the radar station which did pick it up,
if that had been reported, there was a chance of the Army fighters
being in the air, and other measures which could have been taken with
antiaircraft batteries which, I think, unquestionably would have
considerably lessened the damage which the Japs inflicted.
The Chairman. It is conceivable the planes might have gone up
and missed the Japanese planes, but if they didn't go up they were sure
to miss them.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. It made it easy for the Japanese planes?
Admiral Stark. That is correct. If they had used everything
they had they still might have missed that flight ; depending on where
they made their estimate as to where the [6866] Japanese
might come in.
The Chairman. You mean if they had gone out it would have been
possible to have gone out on a reconnaissance and not discovered the
approaching Japanese airplanes?
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
The Chairman. Now, whose duty was it, whose obligation or re-
sponsibility was it to decide whether this Fleet should have been in
Pearl Harbor at that particular time, or at any other particular
time?
Admiral Stark. That was the Commander in Chief Pacific.
The Chairman. That was Admiral Richardson's responsibility
when he was Commander of that Fleet and it became Admiral Kim-
mel's after he took charge?
Admiral Stark. That is right.
The Chairman. And the frequency of the visits of the fleet to
Pearl Harbor and the length of its stay was altogether then within
the control of the Commanding Officer out there?
Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir.
The Chairman. And were there any general instructions from
Washington about that, or was that left entirely to the Commanding
Officer?
Admiral Stark. That was left to the Senior Officer there. There
may have been a general understanding of the fact on the so-called
employment schedule that ships periodically have [5867] cer-
tain periods assigned for repairs, but generally speaking, which I be-
lieve you refer to, the fleet going in or out, except for vessels that
might be sent to the navy yard, or might be repairing there on a
periodic overhaul, that was up to the Commander in Chief there.
The Chairman. I believe that is all.
Congressman Cooper.
The Vice Chairman. Admiral Stark, how long have you been in
the Navy, please, sir?
Admiral Stark. I have been in the Navy a little over 46 years.
The Vice Chairman. When did you enter the Academy?
Admiral Stark. I entered the Academy in October 1899.
The Vice Chairman. From what State?
Admiral Stark. From Pennsylvania.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2205
The Vice Chairman. And during what period of time did you
serve as the Chief of Naval Operations?
Admiral Stark. From August 1939 to March 1942.
The Vice Chairman. Did your period of service as Chief of Naval
Operations compare with the usual length of time that an officer served
in that capacity?
Admiral Stark. The appointment as a rule is for 4 years. It some-
times happened that an officer's term was up before his 4 years — I
mean, he retired before his 4 [686S] years was up. I did not
serve out the full term of 4 years.
The Vice Chairman. Have you at any time during your long period
of service in the Navy been stationed at Hawaii ?
Admiral Stark. Not stationed there; no, sir. I have been there
with the fleet but I have never been stationed there.
The Vice Chairman. You never were in command there?
Admiral Stark. Never in command there ; no, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Did you consider war with Japan inevitable ?
Admiral Stark. Ultimately I considered it inevitable. Do you want
me to enlarge on that ?
The Vice Chairman. I would like you to be as specific as you can,
sir, whether you ever considered war with Japan as inevitable.
Admiral Stark. I did, and, to come down to a specific term, I con-
sidered it inevitable the latter part of November. Mr. Hull had been
working continuously, he had not given up hope, and as long as there
was negotiations there was some hope. I couldn't say that it was in-
evitable until we had come practically to the final clinch. I considered
it possible. I went on the basis, in everything I did, on the assumption
that it was going to happen. It was the only safe, sane, sensible course
to take and my record here, what I had to say before Congress and
in everything I did, bears that out. [S869] But we might have
reached an agreement in late 1941. I couldn't say we wouldn't until
we knew that that agreement was practically unattainable. The
chances grew more and more slender.
The Vice Chairman. I can understand that, but I am trying to
ascertain as to whether you in your own mind ever reached the point
that you considered war with Japan as inevitable.
Admiral Stark. Well, I did at that time.
The Vice Chairman. When was that ?
Admiral Stark. That was in late November.
The Vice Chairman. 1941 ?
Admiral Stark. 1941 ; but I stated in some of my letters that I
considered that we were heading straight for this war long earlier.
The Vice Chairman. When did you reach the conclusion that we
were heading straight for war with Japan? About what time? I
don't mean the hour or minute or day. About what time ?
Admiral Stark. I am thinking over the whole picture. When
Japan jointed the Axis, which I believe was in September of 1940,
there certainly was a distinct danger sign flying there. I thought —
I didn't^ see how we could avoid sooner or later, the way things were
shaping up, getting in this [S870] world conflict that put Japan
on the other side of the fence from us. I have forgotten just the dates
of my letters, but I continually stressed the fact I didn't see how we
could avoid it, either by being forced into it or getting into it. I stated
2206 CONGRESSIONAL IN\'ESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in a letter of November 7 — I made Avrong estimates at other times —
I happened to hit it then — that I didn't see how it could last, didn't see
liow -we could avoid it more than another month.
I pointed out that there were two irreconcilable forces and one side
couldn't live with the set-up. I also always thought that the China
incident, so-called, was a stumbling block we could not get around
until either Japan backed or we backed, and, as I wrote Admiral
Kimmel. or Admiral Hart. I have forgotten which, I didn't think there
would be any change here. I felt we were heading for it at least a
year before we got into it.
As to the inevitability of it. by just saying, here. Mr. Hull, you might
as well stop, don't try any more, of course we were playing for time,
it was in the fall of 1941. it just looked like we couldn't keep out or
from being attacked much longer.
[587 1'\ The Vice Chaie^ian. Well. I can well understand, of
course. You have made it quite clear that you wanted and the Presi-
dent wanted and General Marshall wanted and all responsible officials
of the Government wanted to stay out of war if possible.
Admiral Stark. We were extremely anxious to avoid a two-front
war.
The Vice Chalraiax. And I can well understand that, we all shared
that view, but what I was tiying to get at. you. the head of the United
.States Navy, holding that responsible position, whether you reached
the conclusion in your own mind that war with Japan was inevitable {
Admiral Staek. Well. I believed we were going to get in it many,
many months before we did.
The Vice Chaie3ian. But you say that in November 1941 that you
reached the conclusion that war with Japan was inevitable.
Admiral St.^k. That is the time when we thought so and it is when
we said it definitely.
The Vice Chairman. Well, Admiral Turner was j'our Chief of War
Plans, wasn't he ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Vicx Chair3ian. He has testified here that he reached the con-
clusion aVxjut June or July 1941 that war with Japan \'jH72]
was inevitable and that he discussed it with you and I got the impres-
sion from what he said that you were in agreement with him. ^
Admiral .Stark. Well, of course, as to just what "inevitable" means.
I have tried to give different points of view I have had on that. About
that time the freezing of assets took place, that was in July as a matter
of fact, and, as I say. when Japan joined the Axis I had written I
thought we were heading for this war and I thought that that would
pull us all in together. I would not have differed with anyone who
had told me at that time that they thought we were surely going to get
into it. I would not have wanted to differ with them so far as getting
ready for it was concerned.
The Vice Chairman. Do you recall that Admiral Turner did dis-
r-u.ss that with you about that time ?
Admiral Stark. Well, we discussed it more or less continuously.
The Vice Chairman. Did you ever think an attack would be made
on Pearl Harbor ?
Admiral Stark. Again I knew an attack on Pearl Harbor was a
possibility. We had .stressed it in all our rorresponderire. wf had
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2207
endeavored to build up ii^rainst it, we had talked to them out there
about it. we had approved their plaus which also envisacred such a
thing happenino; and we thouglit it nnght [oS73] very well
happen some day. but as to that particular time. — and I previously
testified that I did not want anything that I miglit say to be construed
as otherwise than the fact that at that time I was not expecting an at-
tack on Peai;l Harbor.
The Vice Chairman. Even though you saw the li-part message
and the so-called pilot message and the 1 o'clock message you still did
not think an attack would be made on Pearl Harbor at the time it was
made ?
Admiral Stark. I was thinking of the situation so far as actual
action was concerned ftirther to the westward. On the other hand,
I recognized the possibility clearly that they might hit there or else-
where and on that possibility I had sent a message which I had thought
would convey to them that possibility and that they would be on guard
against it and I wrote to that etfect also, about being on guard.
The Vice Chairman. And that was A"our messaire of November 24,
1941?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Now. what was the purpose of that message?
Admiral Stark. The message of the 27th and the 24th ?
The A'iCE Chairman. Well, first take the messaire of November 24,
1941.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
[S874] The Vice Chairman. "\Miat was the purpose of that
message ?
Admiral Stark. The purpose of the message of the 24th i
The Vice Chairman. Of the 24th.
Admiral Stark. "Was to show the situation regarding the negotia-
tions, about which we had corresponded so much. "We were not getting
anywhere. It looked like a break-down. The break-down had not
yet actually occurred. Also w-e had the definite information of the
movement south, which looked like eTapan was going to strike some-
where to the southward. "VMiether it might hit the Philippines or the
Kra Peninsula or Borneo. I think the despatch covered it. I will
check it.
The Vice Chairman. Those points are mentioned in the November
27 message but they are not mentioned in the November 24 message.
Admiral Stark. AVell, the message of November 24 states:
Naval and military foi'ces indicate in our opinion that a siirin"i>=e aggressive
movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a
possibility.
And that message was meant to show the critical situation then
existing.
The Vice Chairman. "Well, did you intend the message of Novem-
ber 24. 1941, to Admiral Kimmel as a war wariiing message?
Admiral Stariv. "Well, I think if I had gotten it I would have con-
sidered that it was a war warning.
[oS?o] The Vice Chairman. And that was your intention in
sending it then ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Vice CiiAiitxiAN. All riffht.
2208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. In the critical situation that something might
break.
The Vice Chairman. Now, then, your message of November 27,
also sent out to Admiral Kimmel as well as Admiral Hart, was cer-
tainly intended as a war warning message because it so states in the
opening expression of the message, doesn't it?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. It is stronger.
The Vice Chairman. Now, in these two messages. Admiral, the one
of November 24, in which it is stated :
Indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction,
including an attack on ttie Philippines or Guam is possible —
and in the message of November 27, 1941, among other things it states :
The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval
task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines,
Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo.
Now, in neither of those messages is any direct reference made to
Hawaii, is there?
Admiral Stark. No, sir; there is not.
[6876] The Vice Chairman. And all of the points mentioned in
both of these messages are not within the area coming within the
responsibility of Admiral Kimmel, are they?
Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. We in those despatches gave
the information we had. In my opinion an attack elsewhere was not
precluded by the fact that we had no tangible evidence of an attack
elsewhere. It was for that reason that, take the message of the 24th,
it was not only sent to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Force
and the Pacific ; it also went to the Canal and to the commandant of
the Eleventh, Twelfth and Thirteenth Districts, which are on the
west coast.
The Vice Chairman. Now, then, the message of November 27, 1941,
also includes this language :
Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the
tasks assigned in WPL 46.
That would be a direct order to the commander of the Pacific Fleet,
wouldn't it ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And I believe, as jou stated to the chairman
in response to his question, at least that part of the order was not
complied with by the commander, was it?
Admiral Stark. So far as the use; I said, so far as I knew with
regard to the use of patrol planes he had not complied with it.
[5877] The Vice CHAiR]\rAN. Well, do you know of anything he
did to comply with that part of the order?
Admiral Stark. I do not know what orders he had given to his two
task forces which were sent out. I do not know what order he had
given to his submarines. He may have given orders there. I do not
know just what additional orders he may have given to his ships in
Pearl Harbor with regard to tintiaircraft batteries, and so forth.
The Vice Chairman. Well, the fact that practically all of his fleet
was caught in the harbor 6 days after this message was sent to him
would not indicate that he moved many of tliem out, would it?
Admiral Stark. Well, he had a considerable portion out in the two
task forces.
1
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2209
The Vice Chairman. How many battleships did he have out?
Admiral Stark. I think he had no battleships out.
The Vice Chairman. How many cruisers did he have out?
Admiral Stark. The ships attached to the Pacific Fleet that were
at sea or located at bases other than Pearl Harbor on the date of the
attack — this is information from the Office of Naval Intelligence —
there was 1 battleship not there, which was on the west coast, the
Colorado^ under repair. His 3 carriers were not in Pearl Harbor. He
had 10 of his heavy cruisers that were out, 10 out of 12 if I re-
[5878'] call correctly. Three of his light cruisers were out and of
his destroyers 24 were out.
The Vice Chairman. Do you know how many of those, if any, were
moved out after he received your message of the 27th?
Admiral Stark. I think most of them.
The Vice Chairman. Left the harbor after he received your mes-
sage ?
Admiral Stark. I think so. He can testify to that but I think that
they were in the two task forces, one of which left on the 28th as I recall
and the other early in December.
The Vice Chairman. Well, most all these vessels that you have men-
tioned as not being in the harbor at the time of the attack were in the
task forces, were they?
Admiral Stark. In the task forces ; yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Except for one battleship which was under
repair on the Pacific coast?
Admiral Stark. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. Most of the others you have mentioned as not
being in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack were in the two task
forces ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I think it is not generally understood
that our fast ships, what might be called our fast striking forces were
not much hurt at Pearl Harbor. I doubt if people realize how many
ships were in Pearl Harbor that [5879'] were not hurt. I told
the President the morning after the attack, or the afternoon or night,
I think it was the morning after, while there wasn't much comfort in
the fact, but that I wanted him to understand that our fast striking
forces were practically intact.
Now, I will just give you a list of ships which were not in Pearl
Harbor at the time. It might be of interest to you to know what was
there and was unhurt.
The Vice Chairman. It would be.
Mr. Mitchell. Just a moment, please.
The Vice Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Congressman, if I am not mistaken the commit-
tee has a mimeographed copy of the exhibit that he apparently is now
using, that was distributed, which shows all these figures about that.
The Vice Chairman. I think that is true, yes. It has already been
put in evidence, has it ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, but I was going to suggest that it be put in right
now and read into the record at this time.
The Vice Chairman. All right, go ahead.
Mr. Mitchell. We will just hand it to the reporter. I did not mean
to interrupt your examination.
79716— 46— pt. 5 11
2210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Vice Chairman. I am glad you did.
(The document referred to follows:)
[5880] Statistical Section,
Division of Navat. Intelligence,
Nov 6 1945.
Confidential
Names of Major Vessels in Pacific Ocean on December 7, 1941
I. SHIPS SUNK OB put OUT OF COMMISSION AT PEARL HABBOK
Date stricken or returned to duty
BB Arizona Stricken 12/1/42.
BB Oklahoma Striclten 11/22/44.
BB Pennsylvania Available for sea 1/28/43.
BB Nevada Ready for sea 12/12/42.
BB Tennessee Repaired and converted 5/10/43.
BB California Repaired and converted 1/1.5/44.
BB Maryland Repairs completed 2/21/42.
BB West Viryinia Repaired and converted 7/1/44.
CL Helena Ready for sea 7/14/42.
CL Honolulu Ready for sea 3/16/42.
CL Raleigh Ready for sea 6/— /42.
DD Cassin Repairs completed 2/19/44.
DD Downs Repairs completed 12/1/43.
DD Shaw Repairs completed 7/13/42.
CM Oglala Ready for sea 12/7/42.
AG Utah Stricken 11/13/44.
[5081] AV Curtis Ready for sea 12/15/41.
AR Vestal Ready for sea 12/17/44.
Total 18
IL SHIPS AT PE;AKL HARBOR BUT UNHURT IN THE ATTACK
CA Neiv Orleans
CA San Francisco
CL Phoenix
CL St. Louis
CL Detroit
DD Phelps
DD Dewey
DD Hull
DD McDonough
DD Warden
DD Farragut
DD Dale
DD Aylwin
DD Monagham
DD Conyngham
DD Reid
DD Case
DD Cumings
DD Tucker
DD Self ridge
DD Blue
DD Helm
DD Henley
DD Bagley
DD Mugford
DD Ralph Talbot
DD Jarvis
DD Patterson
DD Allen
DD Chew
DD Schley
DD Ward
lU. SHIPS ATTACHE© TO PACIFIC FLEEfr BUT AT SEA OR LOCATED AT BASES OTHER THAN
PEABfL HARBOR
[5882] BB Colorado
CV Enterprise
CV Lexington
(^V Saratoga
CA Northampton
CA Chester
CA Salt Lake City
CA Chicago
CA Portland
CA Astoria
CA Minneapolis
CA Indianapolis
CA Louisville
CA Pensacola
CL Concord
CL Richmond
CL Trenton
DD Batch
DD Maury
DD Craven
DD Gridley
DD McCall
DD Diinlap
DD Benham
DD Fanning
DD EIHe*
DD Porter
DD Drayton
DD Flusscr
DD Lamson
DD Mahan
DD C/f/rA-
D'DCushing
DD Perkins
DD Preston
DD Smith
DD Rathburnc
DD Dent
DD TflZbo^
DD Wafers
DD Litchfield
[588S]
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2211
Ntmibers of vessels in Pacific Fleet on December 7, lOJfl
Sunk or put out of com-
mission at Pearl Harbor
Unhurt in
the attack
on Pearl
Harbor
At sea or
located at
bases other
than Pearl
Harbor
Sunk or put out of com-
mission at Pearl Harbor
Unhurt in
the attack
on Pearl
Harbor
At sea or
located at
bases other
than Pearl
Harbor
BB. 8
1
3
10
3
24
17
AVD
AVP._ _._
AV.._ _ 1
ASR
AS _
AG _ .._. 1
AR 1
AO
Misc -
Total 18
3
2
1
1
1
2
1
2
8
2
CV
3
CA
2
3
27
5
1
CL. 3
DD 3
SS...
CM. 1
1
1
DM .__
8
4
6
2
9
DMS
9
3
10
AM..._
AD _ _
78
97
>884]
Admiral Stark, It shows that 10 of his 12 cruisers were
out. The other 2 of the fast heavy cruisers were in, not damaged.
There were 3 light cruisers not damaged. And of the destroyers in
port there were about 27 that were not damaged. So practically
out of his destroyers of, as I recall, somewhere around 55 or 60, there
was only 1 damaged. I do not see anything about submarines here,
so I assume no submarine was damaged. The battleships were the
worst sufferers in proportion to their strength by far.
The Vice Chairman. Does that complete the reading of that docu-
ment?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman, Then I beelieve you have already stated.
Admiral, that you considered the messages of November 24 and
especially the message of November 27 as adequate and sufficient war
warning message to the Commander of the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii?
Admiral Stark. We thought so. We sent them for that purpose.
The Vice Chairman. And in response to the question by the Chair-
man, if the naval forces there had been on the alert as you had ex-
pected to place them by your message and likewise the Army com-
mand there had been properly on the alert, you think the damages
inflicted upon our forces would have been [S885] much less?
Admiral Stark. I think so ; yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. All right. I thank you.
The Chairman. Senator George.
Senator George. Admiral, in talking about war being inevitable
with Japan I gather that you mean to say that we were moving towards
war and you felt that a conflict would actually come at some time?
Admiral Stark. I felt so.
Senator George. But you did not necessarily think that a conflict
was imminent until late in 1941, that is, in October or November of
1941?
Admiral Stark. That is true; yes, sir.
Senator George. You did not see, I believe you testified tliis morn-
ing, the intercepted Japanese message of September 24, the one re-
ferring to Pearl Harbor and the location of ships, the tie-up at docks,
and so forth, in Pearl Harbor of the Fleet. I believe it is contained
in Exhibit 2 at page 12.
Admiral Stark. I have no recollection of ever having seen that
dispatch until I saw it recently.
2212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator George. Well, Admiral, that dispatch is more than a mere
ordinary message or dispatch dealing with the movement of ships,
isn't it?
Admiral Stark. It is ; yes, sir.
[5S86] Senator George. Decidedly so.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator George. Now, did you ever hear that message of Septem-
ber discussed by anyone in your department or division ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir ; I did not.
Senator George. So far as you know Admiral IngersoU did not
know anything of it or did not see it ?
Admiral Stark. Admiral IngersoU has told me that he did not
see it.
Senator George. Well, I mean of your knowledge prior to Decem-
ber 7?
Admiral Stark. No ; I have no recollection of ever having seen that
message or of any conversation or reference with regard to it before
December 7 and I also stated that it might be that my memory is
faulty there, but I have no recollection of it whatsoever.
Senator George. Did you testify this morning that you did not see
the 1 o'clock message, I believe it is designated as the 1 o'clock mes-
sage of December 7, the one directing the delivery of the fourteen part
message to the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock, until about 10 : 40 or
something like that ?
Admiral Stark. Until somewhere around, I would say not before,
10 : 40 and I am basing that on what I have since heard. [58871
My own recollection is not clear. I believe Captain Kramer will be
able to give a rather definite time on that, which I will accept if he
does.
Senator George. You did say that you did recollect the discussion
of the 1 o'clock message or intercept when you were called by General
Marshall, Chief of Staff.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. It is the only clear
Senator George. It is the only really outstanding recollection that
you have of it?
Admiral Stark. Yes, it is, because thinking the whole thing over
afterwards that message is the only thing of that morning that stands
out like a beacon light.
Senator George. Well, now, so far as you know no information
reached Admiral Kimmel about that 1 o'clock message until after the
attack ?
Admiral Stark. I think that is correct. I know it is, yes, sir.
Senator George. You did not make an effort to send, except direct
a request that Admiral Kimmel be notified in the Marshall message?
Admiral Stark. That is true ; yes, sir.
Senator George. But you did not know that the Marshall message,
the Chief of Staff's message, had not gone through ?
Admiral Stark. No; I did not.
[S888] Senator George. You did not, however, take any steps
to send directly to Admiral Kimmel a notice of that 1 o'clock message ?
Admiral Stark. No ; I did not parallel it.
Senator George. You did not parallel it.
Admiral Stark. And that is the thought I have often had since, that
if I had paralleled it it might have gone through. I let it go the way
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2213
it was. That is, Marshall stated that he would get it through. I
offered to get it through but I did not. I had no reason to believe
hat he would not get it through just as quickly.
Senator George. Admiral, tliere was a time, as you have testified
about and others, other officers in the Army and Navy, when the
possibility and strong, maybe, probability of an air attack on Pearl
Harbor was discussed in Army and Navy circles, that is in 1940 and
up during some early months even of 1941 and in your correspondence
with the commander of the Pacific Fleet you did discuss the possibility
of an air attack?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator George. And then there did seem to come a time when
there was a lapse of interest in that point down here in Washington ;
isn't that true?
Admiral Stark. I w^ouldn't say there was a lapse of interest. We
initially pointed out wdiat we thought was necessary [68S9]
and we took steps to correct the deficiencies as far as we could and
my conversations with Marshall on that continued, not only with
regard to radar and things for which the Army was responsible, but
also craft and antiaircraft weapons. We continued to talk about that
and the war plans covered what we had to give them and which were
made available substantially as the war plans stated.
We had received and O.' K.'cl what we thought was a very splendid
arrangement out there for meeting the situation and from then on,
except to follow up on materiel, there was no particular mention, as
I recall, about the continued danger. We had set it forth. We did
not talk particularly about other types of attack which might occur,
but I think you are right in stating that. I do not recall of it having
been specifically mentioned. I will look through the record and see
if I can find anything.
[5890'\ Senator George. I did not mean that you had lost all
interest in the possibility of an air attack, but I have been unable to
escape the conclusion that little emphasis was placed upon the possi-
bility of an air attack at Pearl Harbor late in the year 1941. That is
what I meant to say. Of course, you did not have adequate preparation
at any of the outlying posts, especially you did not consider that you
had all of the preparation that you needed at Pearl Harbor to repel an
air attack or a combined attack.
Admiral Stark. That is true. I think I might say. Senator George,
what Ave said earlier in the year still stood.
Senator George. I understand that. I understand you now to say
that we are to take it that that still stood, that nothing happened to
change that or no changes had been made and you were relying upon
the plans as they had been developed.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator George. And the conversations as they had gone on during
the previous months.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator George. And you were making an effort to strengthen your
defenses at Pearl Harbor.
Adrniral Stark. Yes, sir ; and we also had word about tlieir carrying
on their weekly drills, and so forth.
Senator George. I believe you have agreed, Admiral, [S891]
and I recall also General Marshall's agreement, that while we did not
2214 CONGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
luive as strong defenses at Pearl Harbor as we desired, as we expected
to build up. that if the two services, that is, the Army and Xavv, had
been fully alerted ilurinir the week precedin<r December 7 the attack
niitrht have been diverted or miirht have been so broken up as to have
saved the losses to the Navy in men as well as materiel, or substantial
injury at that time.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator George. Now, I just want to ask you a few questions about
what seems to me to be the two important messac;es that you have sent
out, that is the message of November :24 — that did go to Achniral
Kimmel ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator George. And then the message of November '27 also went to
Admiral Kimmel ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator (teorge. Then, there was a message of November '28 in which
you quoted the full message of the Chief of Staff to the conunanders of
the Armed Forces. Did that go to Admiral Kimmel?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator George. That reached him ?
Admiral Stark. That went to him, as I recall, for informa-
[oS9.^] tion. The other two were for action.
Senator George. That went to "INFO." That means "Informa-
tion"?
Admiral Stark. "Information", yes, sir.
Senator George. That did not go to him as a connnand message, or
an action message?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Senator George. There was subjoined to the quoted Army message
a further statement which he was, of course, assumed or presumed to
recognize and follow, was he not ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator George. And that cautioned against offensive action until
Japan had committed an overt act ?
Admiral Stark. That part of it for action was to the two naval
coastal frontier on the West coast. It was sent to Admiral Kimmel
for information.
Seiuitor George. I see. The whole of it was in the nature of in-
formation, as far as Admiral Kinnnel was concerned?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I might mention. Senator George, in
that connection that the two action addressees in the dispatch auto-
matically came under Admiral Kimmel in case of war, as shown in
AVPL— to, so we wanted Admiral Kimmel to know what we had told
the naval coastal frontiers.
Senator (George. I see. They automatically came under [SSOo]
his control in the case of war?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator George. Do you know what time Admiral Kimmel received
that message ?
Admiral Stark. Of the 28th?
Senator (teorge. Yes, sir.
Admiral Stark. I do not know. sir. We obtained from naval
comnimiications the fact that that message was sent out at half past
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2215
2 on the morning of the 29th. That would mean Hawaiian time half
past 2. He probably got that in the late afternoon or early evening
on the 28th.
Senator Gkokge. Could you give us the time of receipt by Admiral
Kimniel of tlie November 27 message, or at least the date of the
receipt ?
Admiral Stark. Well, we obtained the infoi-mation from com-
munications that that message went out, Greenwich Time 2801 — or,
rather, OlOG in tlie morning of the 28th. You take 10 hours and a
half off from that and he probably got that the afternoon of the 27tli.
Senator Geok(;p:. Admiral, have you before you the several messages
regarding codes and the destruction of codes?
Admiral Stakk. I think they are in this file. I remember them.
Senator George. Beginning, I believe, December 2 or [S894 \
3. the one I am referring to, and going through, maybe, to the 5th
of December. I merely wish to ask you about those messages, whether
they were addressed to or received by Admiral Kimmel.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; they were sent to Admiral Kimmel and
Admiral Hart, the commandants of their two naval districts.
Senator George. That statement is generally true of all of those
code destruction messages?
Admiral Stark. The next one was sent to CINC Asiatic and COM
If) for action, and to CINCPAC, Admiral Kimmel, and COM 14 for
information. That is the one that speaks about Singapore, Manila.
(lestro34ng j^urple machines, Batavia, and so forth.
Senator George. But the receipt by Admiral Kimmel either for ac-
tion or for information
Admiral Stark. It was for information, sir.
Senator George. Is indicated with respect to all of those messages
referring to the destruction of codes ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator George. Admiral as to the message of November 27, which
is the strongest war warning message that was sent to Admiral Kim-
mel, a portion of that message is also by way of information, is it not ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. It was sent to him for action [5895]
but the message does contain certain information.
Senator George. The message does contain certain informational
matter ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator George. It contains, for instance, this statement, the factual
statement that the negotiations with Japan had broken down, had
ceased, and that Japan is expected "within the next few days, to com-
mence an aggressive move," or to make an aggressive move, and then
reference is made to the size of the Japanese forces that were being
mobilized or put in action, and then this statement is made, "an am-
phibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, Kra Penin-
sula or possibly Borneo" is specifically pointed out. That is by way
of information, is it?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator George. By way of information of what was in the minds
here, in "Washington, that you thought?
Admiral Stark. They gave them what we had.
Senator George. Wliat you had?
2216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator George. In other words, that statement is based on the
evaUiation you made of all of the information that you received or
that you had?
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
[S896] Senator George. Then you come to the action
Admiral Stark. I might state with regard to that, about all the
information we had with regard to the rest of the Japanese Fleet,
any information that we had concerning that was also known to the
commanders in the chief in the Pacific, because they were the ones
that sent us information on that.
In other words, the stations could cut in and locate and evaluate the
information as to the whereabouts of the Japanese Fleet, that informa-
tion which blowed into the department came from Admiral Kimmel
and Admiral Hart. So any other information that was available, that
would have been available to us, they already had.
Senator George. Admiral, the enumeration of the possible points
of attack with no reference whatever to Pearl Harbor was calculated,
was it not, to weaken the warning message, so far as Admiral Kimmel
was concerned?
Admiral Stark. I can only say with regard to that, that that did
not occur to me, and, so far as I know, did not occur to anyone else.
We gave the war warning. It was sent to the two commanders in
chief for action with a directive, and what information we had and
what indications we had we sent along as information. Now, the
reaction that it had in the minds of the commanders in chief is some-
thing to which they can testify. I can only state that we thought we
had given them [S897] an unequivocal war warning to be on
the alert against any possibility. Wliether what we sent was suffi-
cient or insufficient is something I would say for the committee to
decide. We thought it was, and we intended to convey that.
Senator George. Your message of November 2-i had definitely stated
that action in any direction might be anticipated.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator George. Might be expected.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator George. But in this message there is, of course, no mention
of Pearl Harbor, and there isn't any message, in late November at
least or early in December, that did specifically refer to Pearl Harbor,
and the enumeration of possible points of attack which omitted Pearl
Harbor might, will you not say, tend to weaken the force of the warning
to a commander of a fleet who was at Pearl Harbor ?
Admiral Stark. I can only say we did not think so at the time. In
the light of hindsight it may have.
Senator George. Now, the very concluding sentence in this war mes-
sage is :
"Continental District Guam-Samoa directed to take appropriate measures
against sabotage."
Isn't that also calculated to indicate a complete, all-out defense or
reconnaissance was meant to be undertaken by Admiral Kimmel, or
might have led him to believe that he was not to take an all-out
[5898] reconnaissance?
Admiral Stark. I do not think so.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2217
Senator George. You did not think so ?
Admiral Stark. No, I did not. If I had thought so I would have
worded the message or caused it to be worded differently. About the
only thing that Guam could do was to take action against sabotage.
We knew that Guam could not hold out. And about the only thing
the continental district could. do was to take action against sabotage.
Senator George. I am not asserting, admiral, that these points that
I am pointing out in this message were calculated in fact to weaken the
effect of this warning message, so far as the commander of the Pacific
Fleet at Pearl Harbor was concerned, but I am asking you as an
experienced officer in the Navy if the enumeration of certain points
of possible attack with no reference to Pearl Harbor and with the
reference that is contained here to Guam, Samoa, continental districts,
and so forth, might not have the effect of leaving the Commander
of the Pacific Fleet in some doubt as to what action he should take
to defend his position ?
Admiral Stark. I can only say we did not think so. I can also
agree with you now that it might have, particularly in the light of
hindsight. However, we did not think so. In mentioning those
places we simply indicated the information we [S899] had.
It was not necessary for us to tell Admiral Kimmel to be prepared
against sabotage or destruction of codes, for example, which we also
mentioned for Guam, because he would automatically take care of
that, although we did, so far as the outlying islands were concerned,
authorize it. We, in sending that message to him for action — not for
information but for action — had thought it would activate his com-
mand, and we gave him the only information we had. If we had
had any indication of an air attack from the movement of ships we
would have given it. We had nothing. But the absence of that
information, in my opinion, did not preclude the possibility of an
attack.
Senator George. Admiral, I believe that you said earlier in your
testimony that you regarded the fleet reasonably secure at Pearl Har-
bor. Did you state that?
Admiral Stark. Reasonably secure? »
Senator George. Yes.
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Senator George. Based at Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Stark. I do not recall having stated that they were rea-
sonably secure. I stated that I would not have hesitated to put the
fleet there. The fleet, even though it was a dangerous position or
not a dangerous position, it was the furthest point westward that
we could approach at that time.
[SOOOI I pointed that out shortly after Pearl Harbor in a meet-
ing of Senators in which I was called about the position of the fleet
and the danger to the west coast, and the question about bringing the
fleet back to the west coast, and they were very much perturbed that
the attack might come on the west coast. I remember the meeting
very well. General Marshall was called before it. I pointed out the
place of the fleet was as far west as we could put it, and we would
continue to push it back until it accomplished its purpose of defeat-
ing Japan. But I would not state that the fleet was secure there, in
view of the possibility of an attack. The fleet was never secure in the
2218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
possibility of war, unless it was back in the navy yards somewhere on
the home coast.
Senator George. It was reasonably secure against submarine
attack?
Admiral Stark. Against submarine attack in port quite secure;
yes, sir.
Senator George. That comes down to this last and final question.
Admiral. What proportion of the fleet in the Pacific, that is, our en-
tire naval forces in the Pacific, were concentrated at Pearl Harbor
the first week in December, or late November and early December?
What proportion of the entire naval forces in the Pacific area was
concentrated there or based there ?
[6W1] Admiral Stark. Was based in Pearl Harbor?
Senator George. Yes, at Pearl Harbor. I am not asking what spe-
cific ships were there at that time, but what proportion of our entire
naval strength was there.
Admiral Stark. Of our entire naval strength ?
Senator George. Yes, in the Pacific.
Admiral Stark. In the Pacific?
Senator George. Yes.
Admiral Stark. I could work that out as a percentage. I might
state Admiral Hart at that time had two cruisers, and 13 destroyers —
if that is not correct, I would have to refresh my memory on it — 28
submarines, 28 or 29 patrol planes.
The Chairman. While you are looking that up I might say to one
or two of the members of the committee who were absent Monday, the
committee formally agreed to sit to 4: 30 in the afternoon until Con-
gress reassembles.
Admiral Stark. Senator George, I want to make sure I have got the
question right.
Senator George. Yes.
Admiral Stark. You do not mean the percentage of the whole
Navy?
Senator George, No,
Admiral Stark. But the percentage of the ships that were in the
Pacific?
[5902] Senator George. In the Pacific area.
Admiral Stark. The percentage that were in the Hawaiian area?
Senator George. Yes, sir. Now, admiral. I do not care to have you
go to the trouble of making an accurate statement, or a mathematically
accurate statement, but just about the proportion of the strengh.
Admiral Stark, Of course, he had the very great proportion.
Senator George. Well, admiral, you may put it in the record if you
wish to. I will be very glad to have you do so.
Admiral Stark. All right, sir. I can give it to you from memory —
I thought I had it here — which would be fairly accurate, but I think
it would be better to give you a detailed statement. For example,
there w^ere 13 heavy cruisers in the Pacific of which the Pacific Fleet
had 12 and Hart had 1. There were 45 new submarines in the Pacific
of which — well, I may be 2 or 3 out. It is just as well, I think, to give
you this accurately. There were no battleships in the western Pacific.
Senator George. No battleships?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2219
Admiral Stark. No battleships out there. There were 18 destroy-
ers. In the southeast Pacific, there were 2 destroyers. I will give
you the table in the morning.
Senator George. If you do tliat will be sufficient for my purposes.
\SWS] Mr. Mitchell. How do you make the comparison ?
By so many destroyers in the Atlantic and so many destroyers in the
Pacific, so many battleships figuring the weight in metal, or how would
you give the relative strength of the fleet?
[6904] Admiral Stark. I have a table which has just that on
it. I thought I had it with me. I think it shows it fairly accurately.
Mr. Mitchell. You can present it then in the morning and we
will put in the record.^
Senator George. Yes.
Admiral Stark. When you come to strength it is a very difficult
(hiing. Until we reinforced the Atlantic, for example, by three
l)attleships, we had on paper three battleships in the Atlantic. They
were battleships. Any aged cruiser in clear weather could take its
lange on them, outside of those three battleships' guns, and pound
( hem to pieces, because they were old.
When you get in to the strength and penetrative effect of 12, 14,
16-inch guns, and so forth, it would be a pretty tough problem, and if
any such evaluation as that were wanted I suggest the Navy De-
partment, but I will give you the number of ships.
Mr. Geariiart. Along this line I wonder if the Admiral will give
the figures so as to show the number and type of ships in the Asiatic
PTeet and the number and type in the Pacific Fleet, and in giving the
strength of the Pacific Fleet if you would indicate how much was
in Pearl Harbor and how much was out of Pearl Harbor on De-
vember 7 it would be [S905] very interesting to me.
For instance, there were two task forces at sea, as you remember,
under Admiral Halsey, and another admiral whose name I don't re-
member— Admiral Newton. Then there was one battleship, I think,
on the Pacific coast in drydock or for overhauling.
Admiral Stark. That is correct ; the Colorado.
Mr. Gearhart. So if we could have the figures reflecting not only
the number of ships in the Pacific but where they were it would be
very illuminating.^
Admiral Stark. It is very easy to obtain. As a matter of fact,
I think it is in the exhibits now. But I have one of my own and I
will fix it up from the data furnished me by the Department and a
table Avhich I think will make it very plain.
Mr. Gearhart. In making this present request I don't want to
interfere with the requests made by the Senator from Georgia.
Senator George. No, no, no.
The Chairman. I think they are practically identical anyway.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator George. I merely wish to get a rough view of the relative
strength.
[6906'] That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Congressman Clark.
Mr. Clark. I believe some of the witnesses here. Admiral, probably
including General Marshall, have testified that a surprise attack by
air w^as considered the chief danger to Pearl Harbor.
1 See Mr. Hannaford's statement on p. 2492, infra.
2220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Do you agree with that ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clark. In this message of the 27th, in which you referred to
the possibilit}^, or maybe likelihood, of an attack on the Philippines
or the Kra Peninsula, and Borneo, and so forth, when you were under-
taking to tell what the Japanese were likely to do, based on your
information
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; we stated "our information indicated".
Mr. Clark. Yes.
Now, if it had then occurred to you that a surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor was at all likely, you would have included that, perhaps?
Admiral Stark. If we had expected it at that time I certainly would
have included it. If I had been expecting it.
Mr. Clark. You did not expect it ?
Admiral Stark. I was surprised. I was not expecting it. I was
thinking of what was going on further west.
[5907] Mr. Clark. Still the circumstances that existed then
really created almost an ideal situation for such an attack, did they
not ?
Admiral Stark. As it existed, yes, sir; and we thought
Mr. Clark. I am referring to the diversionary movement southward
by the Japanese, the fact that traffic had been diverted to the north
and south across the Pacific, and so forth. Wouldn't that indicate
to a strategist an opportune momement for a surprise air attack?
Admiral Stark. Of course, in a surprise attack the other fellow
had the initiative, and he took it and it proved that his estimate was
correct, that it was a good time.
Mr. Clark. Now, may I ask you this, please, sir : At the time you
were preparing this message as to what the Japs were doing, did
you even then consider the likelihood of a surprise air attack, or had
you dropped that consideration ?
Admiral Stark. No, we hadn't dropped it. And with regard to
the message of the 24th, my memory on that is very clear, although
I didn't mention air attack, to include the words "in any direction,"
and if an attack had come on Hawaii, that would have been the most
dangerous form.
It might have come that way. It might also have, of course, come
from submarines. And, as I have already said, it might have come
on the Pacific coast. I was thinking of [S90S] the broad Pa-
cific, not only Hawaii but our other points of possible attack, at
that time.
Mr. Clark. Well, I am completely ignorant of all matters military
and some of my questions may sound rather silly to you, but I was
trying to get at the time when you were framing this message to
the man in charge of the fleet out there, as to what the Japs were
doing and what the Japs were likely to do, at which time they were
making this movement to the southward, and did lead you actually to
believe that is where they were going to strike.
Why did you not then consider the likelihood at that time of a
surprise air attack?
Admiral Stark. Well, I think we did consider it to the extent that
we gave a directive to take a deployment preparatory to putting a war
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2221
plan into effect, a defense deployment. That was what we intended
it. It was a direct order to that effect.
Mr. Clark. Yes. I see that, admiral. I appreciate that.
Admiral Stark. Perhaps my background on that could be explained,
for not having diagnosed the thing as it did happen, and which I
didn't, by stating that I wasn't expecting, in view of the magnitude of
the attack which might come, and we expected it to come and it did
come, much farther west, that they would strike all over the Pacific,
practically. [S909] That is, as far as Hawaii, at that time. I
just didn't expect it. I was surprised. I don't know that I can add
much to it. I knew it was a possibility. I thought we had gone at
the thing from every angle before.
If we had not thought of it being a possibility we could have just
sent that message to Hart for action, but we included Kimmel in it,
and thought — we had intended to alert them against an attack, which
we said might come anywhere, in the 24th and the w^ar warning of
the 27th.
Now
Mr. Clark. If you will pardon me just a moment, admiral. I
thoroughly understand that. I heard you say it. My point was this,
when in the later message you undertook to point out, as Chief of
Naval Operations, where you thought they were likely to strike, and
what you thought they were likely to do, you entirely omitted any like-
lihood or possibility of an air attack. Is that because you didn't think
of it at that time or because you didn't think it likely or possible?
Admiral Stark. I don't recall a discussion of an air attack on Ha-
waii at that time. Now, I was thinking only in general terms other
than information we had.
Mr. Clark. You mentioned specific points where the attack might
go.
\6910] Admiral Stark. We had information indicating that.
Mr. Clark. Yes, sir. You knew, of course, that there was a move-
ment that way and that there was a set-up there that would be almost
ideal for a surprise air attack, did you not ?
Admiral Stark. In Hawaii ?
Mr. Clark. Yes.
Admiral Stark. That there the situation was ideal?
Mr. Clark. Yes.
Admiral Stark. I wouldn't call it ideal. I think there was a great
deal of risk involved.
Mr. Clark. Yes.
Admiral Stark. Assuming that the radar stations had been in full
effect, that Marshall's order to make reconnaissance had been in ef-
fect, that everything had been manned, and so forth, I think they
might have given a right good account of themselves.
Mr. Clark. I agree entirely with that, but I had in mind the move-
ment of Japanese forces south, and, of course, you didn't know it, but
it seemed to have been a fact that there was a report or reports being
made from Hawaii that there was not any reconnaissance down there,
the Japs seemed to have known that, although the Navy here didn't
seem to know it; but taking those circumstances into account, I was
[5911] trying to find whether, as you framed that message, it
2222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
passed into your mind at all that there mip;ht be a surprise attack on
Pearl Harbor. I believe I have asked you that question.
Admiral Stark. I can only say that we always thoug;ht it possible
but I was not looking for it at that time and 1 was surprised that it
occurred.
Mr. Clark. You were as much surprised as Admiral Kimmel was,
of the air attack?
Admiral Stark. I was surprised at the air attack. I also was sur-
prised that there were no steps, or that certain steps had not been
taken to intercept it and be on the lookout for it.
Mr. Clark. That brings me to another question that I would like
to ask you, if it is a proper question :
As an experienced naval officer, having long and fine experience, if
you had been in command at Pearl Harbor, with the equipment that
was there, and liad received the message that Admiral Kimmel did
receive, of the 27th of November, exactly what would you have done?
Admiral Stark. Separating the answer from hindsight, it is so
easy for me to say what I would have done which would have caught
this attack.
Mr. Clark. 1 don't think it is a question of hindsight. I am asking
you this simple, plain question, leaving hindsight [5912] out
of it.
Admiral Stark. Well, my thought is that I certainly would have
started the radar going 24 hours a day.
Mr. Clark. Yes.
Admiral Stark. That I would have made an estimate, and, I believe
estimates had been made, as to where an attack, if it came by air, might
come, from what direction. I would have known, of course, he did
know, how many planes he had that were usable for reconnaissance
at that time, long distance reconnaissance. I would have assumed that
that would have been put into effect.
I don't know just how many submarines he had available at that
time, but I certainly think I would have used them to supplement my
other means for getting early information of a possible attack.
As to the light forces, I don't know just what I would have done
with them. The carriers. I don't know what orders he had given
them. They were on an expedition to the westward. He may have
given them orders, either by radio or before they went out. about
sweeping and assisting in reconnaissance. If the carriers had been
available to him he might have sent them out in a certain direction,
supplementing his other efforts. In other words, used what he had
as best he could to avoid being caught aback.
[691o] Mr. Clark. One other question. It may be that I am
anticipating and if so counsel will advise me and I will wait.
With regai'd to this message that divided uj) the harboi- into sections,
which you say you are not sure you saw, have you looked at that since?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clark. Was it clipped ?
Admiral Stark. AVas it what?
Mr. Clark. Was it clipped?
Admiral Stark. I don't know. ^lost of those dispatches werp
burned, except the file copy. Wlien you say have I looked at it since,
I don't recall having seen the dispatch at all before. I have seen it. It
has been photostated and copied from the file copy in the Navy Depart-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2223
ment. It was one of those things that in going through the mass of
material, it was one of those dispatches that was picked out.
Mr. Clark, I didn't know whether the fact that it was or was not
clipped might enable you to say whether you had seen it or not.*"
Admiral Stark. Well, there is nothing left clipped in the Navy
Department now. I think all those dispatches have been burned
except the file copy.
Mr. Clark. Who exactly would be the one to determine — [5914]
well, I will say, to clip the messages, as you referred to in youi"
testimony ?
Admiral Stark. They were clipped in Intelligence. And I think
you have Captain McCollum down. There were two or three of them
working there. McCollum, Kramei-. Which one did the initial clip-
ping I am not sure. And that booklet also would go on up to the liead
of Intelligence.
Mr. Clark. Now, just one other thing. It appears in the record
here that there are some intercepts that were intercepted but not
decoded and made available.
In other words, some, what we call magic, appear.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clark. Intercepted but intercepted prior to December 7 and
not decoded until after that date. I was wondering whether after this
situation reached tJie crucial stage, say the 24th, 25th, 27th of Novem-
ber, any effort was made to give priority to the decoding of these mes-
sages from Japan over the great mass of stuff that you have testified
was intercepted.
Admiral Stark. I think that the people who actually handled that
would be better qualified to answer that question than I could. My
understanding is that they at times would look at a message and see
right away that it wasn't particularly imjDortant and throw it aside
and look for something more [5916] important and use the
best judgment they had with the people they had available to get the
maximum amount of important stuff into our hands. But they can
tell you the procedure better than I. I am not familiar with just how
they did it.
Mr. Clark. You did not yourself initiate any movement or give any
direction to give priority so far as possible to decoding the Jap inter-
cepts after, say, the 27th of November ?
Admiral Stark. No, I did not. There were people working on that
who I think fully realized the situation.
Mr. Clark. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Lucas.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, it is 4 : 25. I don't believe I can
finish in 5 minutes with the admiral.
I would like to recess at this time until tomorrow morning.
The Chairman. Not taking that as a precedent for any future re-
cesses earlier than 4:30, the committee will recess until 10 o'clock
to morrow morning.
(Pursuant to Senator Ferguson's request at p. 2068, supra, Exhibit
No. 92 follows:)
[5916] Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now
adjourn." — (Mr. James Stuart.)
Mr. Stephen (Camlachie). May I ask whether, if a Vote of Confidence is t<»
be put on the Paper, it will be in the hands of Members today?
2224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Primej Ministeir (Mr. Churchill). That will be for the next Sitting Day.
From time to time in the life of any Government there come occasions which
must be clarified. No one who has read the newspapers of the last few weeks
about our affairs at home and abroad can doubt that such an occasion is at
hand.
Since my return to this country, I have come to the conclusion that I must
ask to be sustained by a Vote of Confidence from the House of Commons. This
is a thoroughly normal, constitutional, democratic procedure. A Debate on the
war lias been asked for. I have arranged it in the fullest and freest manner for
three whole days. Any Member will be free to say anything he thinks fit about
or against the Administration or against the composition of personalities of the
Government, to his heart's content, subject only to the reservation which the
House is always so careful to observe about military secrets. Could you have
anything freer than that? Could you have any higher expression of democracy
than that? Very few other countries have institutions strong enough to sustain
[5917] such a thing while they are fighting for their lives.
I owe it to the House to explain to them what has led me to ask for their
exceptional support at this time. It has been suggested that we should have
a three days' Debate of this kind in which the Government would no doubt be
lustily belaboured by some of those who have lighter burdens to carry, and that
at the end we should separate without a Division. In this case sections of the
Press which are hostile — and there are some whose hostilitiy is pronounced —
could declare that the Government's credit was broken, and, it might even be
hinted, after all that has passed and all the discussion there has been, that it
had been private intimated to me that I should be very reckless if I asked for a
vote of Confidence from Parliament.
And the matter does not stop there. It must be remembered that these
reports can then be flashed all over the world, and that they are repeated in
enemy broadcasts night after night in order to show that the Prime Minister
has no right to speak for the nation and that the Government in Britain is
about to collapse. Anyone who listens to the fulminations which come from
across the water know that that is no exaggeration. Of course, these state-
ments from foreign sources would not be true, but neither would it be helpful
to anyone that there should be any doubt about our position.
There is another aspect. We in this Island for a long [5918] time
were alone, holding aloft the torch. We are no longer alone now. We are
now at the centre and among those at the summit of 26 United Nations, com-
prising more than three-quarters of the population of the globe. Whoever
speaks for Britain at this moment must be known to speak, not only in the
name of the people — and of that I feel pretty sure I may — but in the name
of Parliament and, above all, of the House of Commons. It is genuine public
interest that requires that these facts should be made manifest afresh in a
formal way.
We have had a great deal of bad news lately from the Far East, and 1
think it highly probable, for reasons which I shall presently explain, that
we shall have a great deal more. Wrapped up in this bad news will be many
tales of blunders and shortcomings, both in foresight and action. No one will
pretend for a moment that disasters like these occur without there having
been faults and shortcomings. I see all this rolling tt)war(ls us like the waves
in a storm, and that is another reason why I require a formal, solemn Vote
of Confidence from the House of Conmions, which hitherto in this struggle
has never flinched. The House would fail in its duty if it did not insist upon
two things, first, freedom of debate, and, secondly, a clear, honest, blunt Vote
thereafter. Then we shall all know where we are, and all those witli whom we
have to deal, at home and abroad, friend or foe, will know where we are and
where they ai'e. It is because we are to [5919] have a free Debate, in
which perhaps 20 to 30 Members can take part, that I demand an expression
of opinion from the 300 or 400 Members who will have sat silent.
It is because things have gone badly and worse is to come that I demand
a Vote of Confidence. This will be placed on the Paper to-day, to be moved
at a later stage. I do not see why this should hamper anyone. If a Member
has helpful criticisms to make, or even severe corrections to administer, that
may be perfectly consistent with thinking that in respect of the Administration,
such as it is, he might go farther and fare worse. But if an hon. Gentleman
dislikes the Government very much and feels it in the public interest that it
should be broken up, he ought to have the manhood to testify his convictions
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2225
in the Lobby. There is no need to be mealy-mouthed in debate. There is no
objection to anything being said, plain, or even plainer, and the Government
will do their utmost to conform to any standard whlcli may be set in the course
of the Debate. But no one need to be mealy-mouthed in debate, and no one
should be chicken-hearted in voting. I have voted against Governments I have
been elected to support, and, looking back, I have sometimes felt very glad that
I did so. Everyone in these rough times must do what he thinks is his duty.
Mr. Shinwell (Seaham). A free vote?
The Pkimk Minister. A vote under all the conditions [5920] which
hitherto have made the conduct of Parliamentary government possible. Surely
the hon. Gentleman is not the man to be frightened of a Whip? The House of
Commons, which is at present the most powerful representative Assembly in the
world, must also — I am sure, will also — bear in mind the effect produced abroad
by all its proceedings. We have also to remember how oddly foreigners view
our country and its way of doing things. When Rudolf Hess flew over here
some months ago he firmly believed that he had only to gain access to certain
circles in this country for what he described as "the Churchill clique"
Mr. Thorne (Plaistow). Where is he now?
The Prime Minister. Where he ought to be — to be thrown out of power and
for a Government to be set up with which Hitler could negotiate a magnanimous
peace. The only importance attaching to the opinions of Hess is the fact that he
was fresh from the atmosphere of Hitler's intimate table. But, Sir, I can assure
you that since I have been back in this country I have had anxious inquiries
from a dozen countries, and reports of enemy propaganda in a score of countries,
all turning upon the point whether His Majesty's present Government is to
be dismissed from power or not. This may seem silly to us, but in those months
abroad it is hurtful and mischevious to the common effort. I am not asking
for any special, personal favours in these circumstances, but I am [5921']
sure the House would wish to make its position clear ; therefore I stand by the
ancient, constitutional, Parliamentary doctrine of free debate and faithful
voting.
Now I turn to the account of the war, which constitutes the claim I make
for the support and confidence of the House. Three or four months ago we had
to cope with the following situation. The German invaders were advancing,
blasting their way through Russia. The Russians were resisting with the utmost
heroism. But no one could tell what would happen, whether Leningrad, Moscow
or Rostov would fall, or where the German winter line would be established. No
one can tell now where it will be established, but now the boot is on the other
leg. We all agree that we must aid the valiant Russian Armies to the utmost
limit of our power. His Majesty's Government thought, and Parliament upon
reflection agree with them, that the best aid we could give to Russia was in sup-
plies of many kinds of raw materials and of munitions, particularly tanks and
aircraft. Our Forces at home and abroad had for long been waiting thirstily
for these weapons. At last they were coming to hand in large numbers. At
home we have always the danger of invasion to consider and to prepare against.
I will speak about the situation in the Middle East presently. Nevertheless we
sent Premier Stalin — for that I gather is how he wishes to be addressed ; at
least, that is the form in which he telegraphs to me— exactly what he [5922]
asked for. The whole quantity was promised and sent. There has been, I
am sorry to say, a small lag due to bad weather, but it will be made up by the
early days of February. This was a decision of major strategy and policy, and
anyone can see that it was right to put it first when they watch the wonderful
achievements, unhoped for, undreamed of by us because we little knew the
Russian strength, but all the more glorious as they seem — the wonderful achieve-
ments of the Russian Armies. Our munitions were of course only a contribu-
tion to the Russian victory, but they were an encouragement in Russia's darkest
hour. Moreover, if we had not shown a loyal effort to help our Ally, albeit at
a heavy sacrifice to ourselves, I do not think our relations with Premier Stalin
and his great country would be as good as they are now. There would have been
a lack of comradeship, and the lack of comradeship might have spread reproaches
on all sides. Far from regarding what we did for Russia, I only wish it had
been in our power — but it was not — to have done more.
Three or four months ago, at a time when the German advance was rolling
onwards, we were particularly concerned with the possibility of the Germans forc-
ing the Don River, the capture of Rostov and the invasion of the Caucasus, and the
79716—46 — pt. 5 12
2226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
reaching of the Baku oil wells before the winter by the Panzer spearheads of the
German Army. Everyone who has been giving careful study and independent
thought to this war, knows [5923] how deep an anxiety that was in all our
breasts three or four months ago. Such an advance would not only have given the
Germans the oil which they are beginning seriously to need, but it would have
involved the destruction of the Russian Fleet and the loss of the command of the
Black Sea. It would have affected the safety of Turkey, and it would, in due
course, have exposed to the gravest dangers Persia, Iraq, Cyria and Palestine,
and beyond those countries, all of which are now under our control, it would
have threatened the Suez Canal, Egypt and the Nile Valley. At the same time
as this menace defined itself with hideous and increasing reality as it seemed,
General von Rommel, with his army of 10 German and Italian divisions en-
trenched in his fortified positions at and behind the Halfaya Pass, was prepar-
ing to make a decisive attack on Tobruk as a preliminary to a renewed advance
upon Egypt from the West. The Nile Valley was therefore menaced simul-
taneously by a direct attack from the West and by a more remote but in some
ways more deadly attack from the North. In such circumstances it is the
classical rule of war, reinforced by endless examples — and some exceptions —
that you prepare to fight a delating action against one of the two attacks and
concentrate, if possible, overwhelming strength against the other and nearer
attack. We therefore approved General Auchinleck's plans for building up a
delaying force in the vast region from Cyprus to the Caspian Sea, along what
I may call the Levant- [5924] Caspian front, and preparing installations,
airfields and communications upon which larger forces could be based, as time
and transport allowed. On the other flank, the Western flank, we prepared to
set upon Rommel and try to make a good job of him. For the sake of this
battle in the Libyan Desert we concentrated everything we could lay our hands
on, and we submitted to a very long delay, very painful to bear over here, so
that all preparations could be perfected. We hoped to recapture Gyrenaiea and
the important airfields round Benghazi. But General Auchinleck's main ob-
jective was more simple. He set himself to destroy Rommel's army. Such was
the mood in which we stood three or four months ago. Such was the broad
strategical decision we took.
Now, when we see how events, which so often mock and falsify human effort
and design, have shaped themselves, I am sure this was a right decision.
General Auchinleck had demanded five months' preparation for his campaign,
but on 18th November he fell upon the enemy. For more than two months in the
desert the most fierce, continuous battle has raged between scattered bands of
men, armed with the latest weapons, seeking each other dawn after dawn, fighting
to the death throughout the day and then often long into the night. Here was a
battle which turned out very differently from what was foreseen. All was dis-
persed and confused. Much depended on the individual soldier and the [5925]
junior officer. Much, but not all ; because this battle would have been lost on
24th November if General Auchinleck had not intervened himself, changed tlie
command and ordered the ruthless pressure of the attack to he maintained
without regard to risks or consequences. But for this robust decision we should
now be back on the old line from which we had started, or perhaps further back.
Tobruk would possibly have fallen, and Rommel might he marching towards the
Nile. Since then the battle has declared itself. Cyrenaica has been regained.
It has still to be held. We have not succeeded in destroying Rommel's army, but
nearly two-thirds of it are wounded, prisoners or dead.
Perhaps I may give the figures to the House. In this strange, sombre battle of
the desert, where our men have met the enemy for the first time — I do not say
in every respect, because there are some things which are not all that we had
hoped for — but, upon the whole, have met him with equal weapons, we have lost
in killed, wounded and captured about 18,000 ofticers and men, of whom the
greater part are British. We have in our possession 36,500 prisoners, including
many wounded, of whom 10,500 are Germans. We have killed and wounded at
least 11,500 Germans and 13,000 Italians — in all a total, accounted for exactly, of
61,000. There is also a mass of enemy wounded, some of whom have been evacu-
ated to the rear or to the Westwai'd — I cannot tell how many. Of [5926]
the forces of which General Rommel disposed on ISth November, little more than
one-third now remain, while 852 German and Italian aircraft have been destroyed
and 336 German and Italian tanks. During this battle we have never had in
action more than 45,000 men, against enemy forces — if they could be brought to
bear — much more than double as strong. Therefore, it seems to me that this
heroic, epic struggle in the desert, though tliere have been many local reverses and
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2227
many obbs and flows, has tested our manhood in a searching fashion and has
l>roved not only that our men can die for King and country — everyone knew
(hat — but that they can kill.
I cannot tell what the position at the present moment is on the Western front
in Cyrenaica. We have a very daring and skillful opponent against us and, may
1 say across the havoc of war, a great General. He has certainly received rein-
forcements. Another battle is even now in progress, and I make it a rule never
lo try and prophesy beforehand how battles will turn out. I always rejoice that
I have made that rule. (An Hon. Member: "What about the SkaggerakV") That
was hardly a battle. Naturally, one does not say in a case like that that we have
not a chance, because that is apt to be encouraging to the enemy and depre.ssing
to our own friends. In the general upshot, the fact remains that, whereas a .year
ago the Germans were telling all the neutrals that they would be in Suez by May,
when some people talked of the iwssibility of a German [5927] descent
ui)on Assiut, and many people were afraid that Tobruk would be stormed and
others feared for the Nile Valley, Cairo, Alexandria and the Canal, we have con-
ducted an effective offensive against the enemy and hurled him backward, inflict-
ing upon him incomparably more — well, 1 should not say incomparably, because
I have .iust given the comparison, but far heavier losses and damage — than we
have suffered ourselves. Not only has he lost three times our losses on the
battlefield, approximately, but the blue waters of the Mediterranean have, thanks
to the enterprise of the Royal Navy, our submarines and Air Force, drowned a
large number of the reinforcements which have been continually sent. This
process has had further important successes during the last few days. Whether
you call it a victory or not, it must be dubbed up to the present, although II
will not make any promises, a highly profitable transaction, and certainly is an
episode of war most glorious to the British, South African, New Zealand, Indian,
Free French and Polish soldiers, sailors and airmen who have played their part
in it. The prolonged, stubborn, steadfast and successful defence of Tobruk
by Australian and British troops was an essential preliminary, over seven bard
months, to any success which may have been achieved.
Let us see what has happened on the other flank, the Northern flank, of the
Nile Valley. What has happened to Palestine, Syria, Iraq and Persia? There we
must thank Russia. [5928] There the valour of the Russian Armies has
warded off dangers which we saw and which we undoubtedly ran. The Caucasus
and the precious oilfields of Baku, the great Anglo-Persian oilfields, are denied' to
the enemy. Winter has come. Evidently we have the time to strengthen still fur-
ther our Forces and organisations in those regions. Therefore, sir, I present to
you, in laying the whole field open and bare and surveying it in all its parts, for
all are related, a situation in the Nile Valley, both West and East, incomparably
easier than anything we have ever seen, since we were deserted by the French Bor-
deaux-Vichy Government and were set upon by Italy. The House will not fail
to discern the agate points upon which this vast improvement has turned. It is
only by the smallest margin that we have succeeded so far in beating Rommel in
Cyrenaica and destroying two-thirds of his forces. Every tank, every aircraft
squadron was needed. It is only by the victories on the Russian flank on the
Black Sea coast that we have been spared the overrunning of all those vast lands
from the Levant to the Caspian, which in turn give access to India, Persia, the
Persian Gulf, the Nile Valley and the Suez Canal.
I have told the House the Story of these few months, and Hon. Members
will see from it bow narrowly our resources have been strained and by what a
small margin and by what st:rokes of fortune — for which we claim no credit —
we have \5929] survived — so far. Where should we have been, I wonder,
if we had yielded to the clamor which was so loud three or four months ago that
we should invade France or the Low Countries? We can still see on the walls
the inscription. "Second Front Now." Who did not feel the appeal of that?
But imagine what our position would have been if we had yielded to this
vehement temptation. Every ton of our shipping, every flotilla, every aeroplane,
the whole strength of our Army would be committed and would be fighting for
life on the French shores or on the shores of the Low Countries. All these'
troubles of the Far East and the Middle East might have sunk to insignificance
compared with the question of another and far worse Dunkirk.
Here, let me say, I should like to pay my tribute to one who has gone from
us since I left this country, Mr. Lees-Smith, who. I remember, spoke with so
much profound wisdom on this point at a moment when many opinions were
in flux about it. His faithful, selfless and wise conduct of the important work
2228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Which he discharged in this House was undoubtedly of great assistance to us
nil, not only to the Government but to us all, in the various stages of the war.
His memory as a distinguished Parliamentarian will long find an honored
place In the recollection of tliose who had the fortune to he his colleagues.
■ Sometimes things can be done by saying, "Yes," and sometimes things can be
done by saying "No." Yet I suppose there [5930] are some of those who
were vocal and voluble, and even claimant, for a second front to be opened in
France, w;ho are now going to come up bland and smiling and ask why it
is that we have not ample forces in Mala.ya, Burma, Borneo and the Celebes.
There are times when so many things happen, and happen so quickly, and time
seems to pass in such a way that you can neither say it is long or short, that
it is easy to forget what you have said three months before. You may fail to
connect it with what you are advocating at the particular moment. Throughout
a long and variegated Parliamentary life this consideration has led me to try
and keep a watchful eye on that danger myself. You never can tell. There
are also people who talk and bear themselves as if they had prepared for this
war with great armaments and long, careful preparation. But that is not true.
In two and a half years of fighting we have only just managed to keep our
heads above water. When I was called upon to be Prime Minister, now nearly
two years ago, there were not many applicants for the job. Since then, perhaps,
the market has improved. In spite of the shameful negligence, gross muddles,
blatant incompetence, complacency, and lack of organising power which are
daily attributed to us — and from which chidings we endeavor to profit— we
are beginning to se our way through. It looks as if we were in for a very bad
time, but provided we all stai-t together, and provided we throw in the last
spasm of our strength, it [5931] also looks, more than it ever did before, as
if we were going to win.
While facing Germany and Italy here and in the Nile Valley we have never
had any power to provide effectively for the defence of the Far East. My
whole argument so far has led up to that point. It may be that this or that
might have been done which was not done, but we have never been able to
provide effectively for the defence of the Far East against an attack by Japan.
It has been the policy of the Cabinet at almost all costs to avoid embroilment
with Japan until we were sure that the United States would also be engaged.
We even had to stoop, as the House will remember, when we were at our very
Weakest point, to closf the Burma Road for some months. I remember that
some of our present critics were very angry about it, but we had to do it.
There never has been a moment, there never could have been a moment, when
Great Britain or the British Empire, single-handed, could fight Germany and
Italy, could wage the Battle of Britain, the Battle of the Atlantic and the Battle
of the Middle East — and at the same time stand thoroughly prepared in Burma,
the Malay Peninsula, and generally in the Far East against the impact of a'
vast military Empire like Japan, with more than 70 mobile divisions, the third
navy in the world, a great air force and the thrust of SO or 00 millions of hardy,
warlike Asiatics. If we had started to scatter our forces over these immense
areas in the [5932] Far East, we should have been ruined. If we had
moved large armies of troops urgently needed on the war fronts to regions
which were not at war and might never be at war we should have been alto-
gether wrong. We should have cast away the chance, which has now become
something more than a chance, of all of us emerging safely from the terrible
plight in which we have been plunged.
We therefore have lain — I am putting it ns bluntly as I can — for nearly two
years under the threat of an attack by Japan with which we had no means of
coping. But as time has passed the mighty United States, under the leader-
ship of President Roosevelt, from reasons of its own interest and safety but
also out of chivalrous regard for the cause of freedom and democracy, has
drawn ever nearer to the confines of the struggle. And now that the blow
has fallen it does not fall on us alone. On the contrary, it falls upon united
forces and unified nations, which are unquestionably capable of enduring the
struggle, of retrieving the losses and of preventing another such stroke ever
being deliverpd again.
There is an arsrument with which I will deal as I pass along to sursue my
theme. It is said by some. "If only you had organised the munitions production
of this country properly and had had a Minister of Production (and that is not
a question which should be dogmatised upon either way) it would have made
evervthing all right. There would have been [5983] enough for all needs.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2229
We should have had enough supplies for Russia, enough well-equipped squadrons
and divisions to defend the British Islands, to sustain the Middle East and to
arm the Far East effectively." But that is really not true. As a matter of
fact, our munitions output is gigantic, has for some time been very large indeed,
and it is bounding up in a most remarkable manner. In the last year, 1941, al-
though we were at war in so many theatres and on so many fronts, we have
produced more than double the munitions equipment of the United States, which
was arming heavily, though of course a lap behind on the road. This condition
will naturally be rapidly removed as the full power of American industry come
into full swing. But, Sir, in the last six months, thanks to the energies of Lord
Beaverbrook and the solid spadework done by his predecessors and the passage
of time — he particularly asks me to say that — (An Hon. Member : "Who didV") —
Lord Beaverbrook ; I should have said it anyway — our munitions output has
risen in the following respects : We are producing more than twice as many
far more complicated guns every month than we did in the peak of 1917-18 war
period, and the curve is rising. The guns are infinitely more complicated. Tank
production has doubled in the last six months. Small arms production is more
than twice what it was six months ago. Filled rounds of ammunition have
doubled in the last six months. 1 could go on with the catalogue, but these are
not doublings [5.93^] from early very small totals, they are doublings from
the totals we boasted about, as far as we dared six months ago. There has been
an immense leap forward. In aircraft production there is a steady increase not
only in the numbers but also in the size and quality of the aircraft, though I
must say there has not been all the increase which I had hoped for.
But all this has nothing to do with the preparations it was open to us to make
in Malaya and Burma and generally in the Far East. The limiting factor has
been transport, even assuming we had wished to take this measure and had had
this great surplus. From the time that this present Government was formed,
from the moment it was formed I may say, every scrap of shipping we could
draw away from our vital supply routes, every U-boat escort we could divert from
the Battle of the Atlantic, has been busy to the utmost capacity to carry troops,
tanks and munitions from this Island to the East. There has been a ceaseless
flow, and as for aircraft they have not only been moved by sea but by every route,
some very dangerous and costly routes to the Eastern battlefields. The decision
was taken, as I have explained, to make our contribution to Russia, to try to beat
Rommel and to form a stronger front from the Levant to to Caspian. It fol-
lowed from that decision tliat it was in our power only to make a moderate and
partial provision in the Far East against the hypothetical danger of a [5935]
Japanese onslaught. Sixty thousand men, indeed, were concentrated at Singa-
pore, but priority in modern aircraft, in tanks, and in anti-aircraft and anti-tank
artillery was accorded to the Nile Valley.
For this decision in its broad stagetic aspects, and also in its diplomatic
policy in regard to Russia, I take the fullest i>ersonal responsibility. If we
have handled our resources wrongly, no one is so much to blame as me. If
we have not got large modern air forces and tanks in Burma and Malaya
tonight no one is more accountable than I am. Why then should I be called
upon to pick out scapegoats, to throw the blame on generals or airmen or
sailors? Why, then, should I be called upon to drive away loyal and trusted
colleagues and friends to appease the clamour of certain sections of the British
and Australian Press, or in order to take the edge off our reverses in Malaya
and the Far East, and the punishment which we have yet to take there? I would
be ashamed to do such a thing at such a time, and if I were capable of doing
it, believe me, I should be incapable of rendering this country or this House
any further service.
I say that without in the slightest degree seeking to relieve myself from
my duties and responsibility to endeavour to make continual improvements in
Ministerial positions. It is the duty of every Prime Minister to the House,
but we have to be quite sure that they are improvements in every case, and
[5936] not only in every case but in the setting. I could ,not possibly
descend to, as the German radio repeatedly credits me with, an attempt to
get out of difficulties in which I really bear the main load by offering up scape-
goats to public displeasure. Many people, many very well-meaning people, begin
their criticisms and articles by saying, "Of course, we are all in favour of the
Prime Minister because he has the people behind him. But what about the
muddles made by this or that Department; what about that general or this
Minister?" But I am the man that Parliament and the nation have got to
2230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
blame for the general way in which they are served, and I cannot serve them
effectively unless, in spite of all that has gone wrong, and that is going to go
wrong, I have their trust and faithful aid.
I must linger for a moment on our political affairs, because we are conducting
the war on the basis of a full democracy and a free Press, and that is an
attempt which has not been made before in such circumstances. A variety of
attacks are made upon the composition of the Government. It is said that it
is formed upon a party and political basis. But so is the House t>f Commons.
It is silly to extol the Parliamentary system and then, in the next breath, to
say, "Away with party and away with politics." From one quarter I am told
that the leaders of the Labour party ought to be dismissed from the Cabinet.
This would be a return to party Government pure and simple. From [5937]
opposite quarters it is said that no one who approved of Munich should be
allowed to hold office. To do that would be to cast a reflection upon the great
majority of the nation at that time, and also to deny the strongest party in
the House any proportionate share in the National Government, which again,
in turn, might cause inconvenience. Even my right hon. Friend the leader of
the Liberal party— (An HON. MEMBER: "Who is he?")— the Secretary of
State for Air, whose help today I value so much and with whom, as a lifelong
friend, it is a pleasure to work, even he has not escaped unscathed. If I were
to show the slightest weakness in dealing with these opposite forms of criticism,
not only should I deprive myself of loyal and experienced colleagues, but I
should destroy the National Govermnent and rupture the war-time unity of
Parliament itself.
Other attacks are directed against individual Ministers. I have been urged to
make an example of the Chancellor of the Duchy of liaucaster, who is now return-
ing from his mission in the Far East. Thus, he would be made to bear the blame
for our misfortunes. The position of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster
at the head of the Council which he had been instructed to form at Singapore
was rendered obsolete by the decision which I reached with the President of the
United States to set up a Supreme Commander for the main fighting zone in the
Far East. The whole conception of a Supreme [5938] Commander is that,
under the direction of the Governments he serves, he is absolute master of all
authorities in the region assigned to him. This would be destroyed if political
functionaries representing the various nations — for it is not only this country
which would be represented ; others would have to be represented as well as ours —
were clustered around him. The function of the Chancellor of the Duchy was
therefore exhausted by the appointment of General Wavell to the Supreme Com-
mand. I may say that regret was expressed at his departure by the New Zealand
and Australian Governments, and still more by the Council he formed at Singa-
pore, which, in a localised and subordinate form, it has been found necessary to
carry on. When I am invited, under threats of unpopularity to myself or the
Government, to victimise the Chancellor of the Duchy, and throw him to the
wolves, I say to those who make this amiable suggestion, I can only say to them,
"I much regret that I am unable to gratify your wishes," — or words to that effect.
The outstanding question upon which the House should form its judgment for
the purposes of the impending Division is whether His Majesty's Government were
right in giving a marked priority in the distribution of the forces and equipment
we could send overseas, to Russia, to Libya, and, to a lesser extent, to the Levant-
Caspian danger front, and whether we were right in accepting, for the time being,
a far lower [5939] standard of forces and equipment for the Far East
than for these other theatres. The first obvious fact is that the Far Eastern
theatre was at peace and that the other theatres were in violent or imminent war.
It would evidently have been a very improvident use of our limited resources — as
I pointed out earlier — if we had kept large masses of troops and equipment spread
about the immense areas of the Pacific or in India, Burma and the Malay Penin-
sula, standing idle, month by month and perhaps year by year, without any war
occurring. Thus, we should have failed in our engagements to Russia, which has
meanwhile stjuck such staggering blows at the German Army, and we should have
lost the battle in Cyrenaica, which we have not yet won. and we might now be
fighting defensively well inside the Egyptian frontier. There is the question on
which the House should make up its mind. We had not the resources to meet
all the perils and pressures that came upon us.
But this question, serious and large as it is by itself cannot be wholly decided
without some attempt to answer the further question — what was the likelihood
of the Far Eastern theatre being thrown into war by a Japanese attack ? I have
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2231
explained how very delicately we walked, and how painful it was at all times,
how very careful I was every time that we should not be exposed single-handed
to this onslaught which we were utterly incapable of meeting. But it seemed
irrational [59-^0] to suppose that in the last six months — which is what I
am principally dealing with — the Japanese, having thrown away their oppor-
tunity of attacking us in the autumn of 1940, when we were so much weaker,
so much less well-armed, and all alone, should at this period have plunged into
a desperate struggle against the combined Forces of the British Empire and
the United States. Nevertheless, nations, like individuals, commit irrational
acts, and there were forces'^t work in Japan, violent, murderoiis, fanatical and
explosive forces, which no one could measure.
[5941] On the other hand, the probability, since the Atlantic Conference, at
which I discussed these matters with Mr. Roosevelt, that the United States, even
if not herself attacked, would come into a war in the Far East, and thus make
linal victory sure, seemed to allay some of these anxieties. That ex:pectation
had not been falsified by the events. It fortified our British decision to use our
limited resources on the actual fighting fronts. As time went on, one had
greater assurance that if Japan ran amok in the Pacific, we should not fight
alone. It must also be remembered that over the whole of the Pacific scene
brooded the great power of the United States Fleet, concentrated at Hawaii.
Tt seemed very unlikely that Japan would attempt the distant invasion of the
Malay Peninsula, the assault upon Singapore, and the attack upon the Dutch
East Indies, while leaving behind them in their rear this great American Fleet.
However to strengthen the position as the situation seemed to intensify we sent
the Prince of Wales and the Repulse to form the spear-point of the considerable
battle forces which we felt ourselves at length able to form in the Indian Ocean.
We reinforced Singapore to a considerable extent and Hong Kong to the extent
which we were advised would be sufficient to hold the island for a long time.
Besides this in minor ways we took what precautions were open to us. On 7th
December the Japanese, by a sudden attack, delivered while their envoys were still
negotiating at Washington, crippled for the [55^2] time being the Ameri-
can Pacific Fleet, and a few days later inflicted very heavy naval losses on us
by sinking the Prince of Wales and the Repulse.
For the time being, therefore, naval superiority in the Pacific and in the
Malaysian Archipelago has passed from the hands of the two leading naval
Powers into the hands of Japan. How long it will remain in Japanese hands is
a matter on which I do not intend to speculate. But at any rate it will be long
enough for Japan to inflict very heavy and painful losses on all of the United
Nations who have establishments and possessions in the Far East. The Japanese
no doubt will try to peg out claim and lodgments over all this enormous area,
and to organise, in the interval before they lose command of the seas, a local
command of the air which will render their expulsion destruction a matter of
considerable time and exertion.
Here I must point out a very simple strategic truth. If there are 1,000 islands
and 100 valuable military key points and you put 1,000 men on every one of
them or whatever it may be, the Power that has the command of the sea and
carries with it the local command of the air, can go around to every one of these
places in turn, destroy or capture their garrisons, ravage and pillage them,
ensconce themselves wherever they think fit, and then pass on with their circus
to the next place. It would be vain to suppose that such an attack could be met
by local defence. You might disperse 1,000,000 men over these [5943] im-
mense areas and yet only provide more prey to the dominant Power. On the
other hand, these conditions will be reversed when the balance of sea power
and air power changes, as it will surely change.
Such is the phase of the Pacific war into which we have now entered. I cannot
tell how long it will last. All I can tell the House is that it will be attended
by very heavy punishment which we shall have to endure, and that presently,
if we persevere, as I said just now about the Russian front, the boot will be on
the other leg. That is why we should not allow ourselves to get rattled because
this or that place has been captured, because, once the ultimate power of the United
Nations has been brought to bear, the opposite process will be brought into play,
and will move forward remorselessly to the final conclusion, provided that we
persevere, provided that we fight with the utmost vigour and tenacity, and pro-
vided, above all, that we remain united.
Here I should like to express, in the name of the House, my admiration of the
splendid courage and quality with which the small American Army, under General
4
2232 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
MacArthur, has resisted brilliantly for so long, at desperate odds, the hordes of
Japanese who have been hurled against it by superior air power and superior
sea power. Amid our own troubles, we sent out to General MacArthur and his
soldiers, and also to the Filipinos, who are defending their native soil with vigour
and [59f{Jt\ courage, our salute across those wide spaces which we and
the United States will presently rule again together. Nor must I fail to pay
a tribute, in the name of the House, to the Dutch, who, in the air and with their
submarines, their surface craft, and their solid fighting troops, are playing one
of the main parts in the struggle now going on in the Malaysian Archipelago.
We have to turn our eyes for a moment to the hard-fought battle which is
raging upon the approaches to Singapore and in the Malay Peninsula. I am
not going to make any forecast about that now, except that it will be fought to
the last inch by the British, Australian and Indian troops, which are in the line
together, and which have been very considerably reinforced. The Hon. Member
for the Eye Division of Suffolk (Mr. Granville) had a very sound military idea
the other day, when he pointed out the importance of sending reinforcements
of aircraft to assist our ground forces at Singapore and in Burma. I entirely
agree with him. In fact, we anticipated his suggestion. Before I left for the
United States, on 12th December, the moment, that is to say, when the situation
in Singapore and Pearl Harbor had disclosed itself, it was possible to make a
swift redistribution of our Forces. The moment was favourable. General
Auchinleck was making headway in Cyrenaica ; the Russian front not only stood
unbroken but had begun the advance in a mignificent counter-attack, and we were
able to order a large number of measures, which there is no need to elaborate,
but which will [5.9^5] be capable of being judged by their i-esults as the
next few weeks and the next few months unfold in the Far East.
When I reached the United States, accompanied by our principal officers and
large technical staffs, further important steps were taken by the President, with
my cordial assent, and with the best technical advise we could obtain, to move
from many directions everything that ships could carry and all air power that
could be flown transported and serviced to suitable points. The House would be
very ill-advised to suppose that the seven weeks which have passed since 7th
December have been weeks of apathy and indecision for the English-speaking
world. Odd as it may seem qiiite a lot has been going on. But we must not
nourish or indulge light and extravagant hopes or suppose that the advantages
which t"he enemy have gained can soon or easily be taken from him. However,
to sum up the bad and the good together, in spite of the many tragedies past
and future, and with all pity for those who have suffei'ed and will suffer, I must
profess my profound thankfulness for what has happened throughout the whole
world in the last two months.
I now turn for a short space — I hope I am not unduly wearying the House,
but I feel that the war has become so wide that there are many aspects that
must be regarded — to the question of the organization, the international, inter-
Allied or inter-United Nations organization, which must be developed to meet
the fact that we are a vast confederacy. To hear some [5496] people talk,
however, one would think that the way to win the war is to make sure that every
Power contributing armed forces and every branch of these armed forces is
represented on all the councils and organizations which have to be set up, and
that everybody is fully consulted before anything is done. That is in fact the
most sure way to lose a war. You have to be aware of the well-known danger
of having "more harness than horse," to quote a homely expression. Action to be
successful must rest in the fewest number of hands possible. Nevertheless, now
that we are working in the closest partnership with the United States and have
also to consider our Alliance with Russia and with China, as well as the bonds
which units us with the rest of the 26 United Nations and with our Dominions,
it is evidence that our system must become far more complex than heretofore.
I had many discussions with the President upon the Anglo-American war
direction, especially as it affects this war against Japan, to which Russia is
not yet a party. The physical and geogi-aphical difficulties of finding a common
working centre for the leaders of nations and the great staffs of nations which
cover the whole globe are insuperable. Whatever plan is made will be open
to criticism and many valid objections. There is no solution that can be found
where the war can be discussed from day to day fully by all the leading military
and political authorities concerned. I have, however, arranged [59-}7]
with President Roosevelt that there should be a body in Washington called the
Combined Chiefs of the Staff Committee, consisting of the three United States
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2233
Chiefs of the Staff, men of the highest distinction, and three high oflScers
representing and acting under tlie general instructions of the Britisli Chiefs of
tlie Staff Committee in London. This body will advise the President, and in
the event of divergence of view between the British and Amerjican Chiefs of
the Staff or their representatives, the difference must be adjusted by personal
agreement between him and me as representing our respective countries. We
must also concert together the closest association witli Premier Stalin and
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek as well as with the rest of the Allied and
Associated Powers. We shall, of course, also remain in the closest touch with
one anotlier on all important questions of policy.
In order to wage the war effectively against Japan, it was agreed that I should
propose to those concerned the setting-up of a Pacific Council in London, on the
Ministerial plane, comprising Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the
Dutch Government. Assisted by the British Chiefs of the Staff and the
great stall's organisations beneath them, I was to try to form and focus a united
view. This would enable the British Commonwealth to act as a wliole and
form part of plans — plans which are at present far advanced- — for collaboration
at the appropriate levels in tlie spheres of defence, foreign affairs [55^8]
and supply. Thus the united view of the British Commonwealth and the Dutch
would be transmitted, at first, on the Chiefs of the Staff level, to the combined
Chiefs of the Staff Committee sitting in Washington. In the event of differences
between the members of the Pacific Council in London, dissentient opinions
would also be transmitted. In the event of differences between the London and
Washington bodies, it would be necessary for the President and me to reach
an agreement. I must point out that it is necessary for everybody to reach
an agreement, for nobody can compel anybody else.
The Dutch Government, which is seated in London, might be willing to agree
to this arrangement, but the Australian Government desired and the New
Zealand Government preferred that this Council of the Pacific should be in
Washington, where it would work alongside the Combined Chiefs of the Staff
Committee. I have therefore transmitted the views of these two Dominions
to the President, but I have not yet received, nor do I expect for a few days to
receive, his reply. I am not, therefore, in a position to-day to announce, as I
had booed, the definite and final arrangements for the Pacific Council.
I should like to say, however, that underlying these structural arrangements
are some very practical and simple facts upon which there is full agreement.
The Supreme Commander has assumed control of the fighting areas in the South-
west Pacific called the "A. B. D. A." area— A. B. D. A.— called after the [59Ji9]
countries which are involved, not the countries which are in the area but the
countries which are involved in that area, namely, America, Bi'itain, Dutch and
Australasia. We do not propose to burden the Supreme Commander with fre-
quent instructions. He has his general orders, and he has addressed himself
with extraordinary buoyancy to his most difficult task, and President Roosevelt
and I, representing, for my part, the British Government, are determined that
he shall have a chance and a free hand to carry it out. The action in the Straits
of Macassar undertaken by forces assigned to this area apparently has had very
considerable success, of the full extent of which I am not yet advised. The
manner in which General Wavell took up his task, the speed with which he
has flown from place to place, the telegrams which he has sent describing the
methods by which he was grappling with the situation and the forming of the
central organism which was needed to deal with it — all this has made a most
favourable impression upon the high officers, military and political, whom I met
in the United States. This is all going on. Our duty, upon which we have been
constantly engaged for some time, is to pass reinforcements of every kind, espe-
cially air, into the new war zone, from every quarter and by every means, with
the utmost speed.
In order to extend the system of unified command which has been set up in
the "A. B. D. A." area — that is to say, the South-West Pacific — where the actual
fighting is going on, [5950] in order to extend that system) to all areas
in which the forces of more than one of the United Nations — because that is
the term we have adopted — will be operating, the Eastwai'd approaches to Aus-
tralia and New Zealand have been styled the Anzac area, and are under United
States command, the communications between the Anzac area and America are
a United States responsibility, while the communications across the Indian Ocean
and from India remain a British responsibility. All this is now working, while
the larger constitutional, or semi-constitutional, discussions and structural ar-
2234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
rangements are being elaborated by telegrams passing to and fro between so
many Governments. All this is now working fully and actively from hour to
hour, and it must not, therefore, be supposed that any necessary military action
has been held up pending the larger structural arrangements which I have
mentioned.
Now I come to the question of our own Empire or Conmionwealth of Nations.
Tlie fact that Australia and New Zealand are in the immediate danger zone
reinforces the demand' that they should be represented in the War Cabinet of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. We liave always been ready to form an
Imperial War Cabinet containing the Prime Ministers of the four Dominions.
Whenever any of them have come here they have taken their seats at our
table as a matter of course. Unhappily, it has not been possible to get them all
here together at once. General Smuts may not be able to come over from South
Africa, [5951] and Mr. MacKenzie King could unfortunately stay only
for a short time. But Mr. Fraser was with us, and it was a great pleasure to
have him, and we had a three months' visit from Mr. Menzies, which was also a
great success, and we were all very sorry when his most valuable knowledge
of our affairs and the war position, and his exceptional abilities, were lost. For
the last three months we have had Sir Earle Page representing the Common-
wealth Government at Cabinets when war matters and Australian matters were
under discussion and also, in similar circumstances upon the Defence Committee.
As a matter of fact this has always been interpreted in the most broad ami
elastic fashion. The Australian Government have now asked specifically, "that
an accredited representative of the Commonwealth Government should have
the right to be heard in the War Cabinet in the formulation and the direction
of policy." We have of course agreed to this. New Zealand feels bound to ask
for similar representation, and the same facilities will of course be available to
Canada and South Africa. The presence at the Cabinet table of Dominion
representatives who have no power to take decisions and can only report to
their Governments evidently raises some serious problems but none, I trust.
which cannot be got over with good will. It must not, however, be supposed
that in any circumstances the presence of Dominion representatives for certain
purposes could in any way affect the collective responsibility of liis Majesty's
Servants in Great [5952] Britain to Crown and Parliament.
I am sure we all sympathise with our kith and kin in Australia now that
the shield of British and American sea power has, for the time being, been
withdrawn from them so unexpectedly and so tragically and now that hostile
bombers may soon be within range of Australian shores. We shall not put any
obstacle to the return of the splendid Australian troops who volunteered for
Imperial service to defend their own homeland or whatever part of the Pacific
theatre may be thought most expedient. We are taking many measures in con-
junction with the United States to increase the security of Australia and New
Zealand and to send them reinforcements, arms and equipment by the shortest
and best routes. I always hesitate to express opinions about the future, because
things turn out so very oddly, but I will go so far as to say that it may be that
the Japanese, whose game is what I may call "to make hell while the sun shines,"
are more likely to occupy themselves in securing their rich prizes in the Philip-
pines, the Dutch East Indies and the Malayan Archipelago and in seizing island
bases for defensive purposes for the attack which is obviously coming towards
them at no great distance of time— a tremendous onslaught which will charac-
terise the future in 1942 and 1943. (An HON. MEMBER: "1944 and 1045?")
No, I do not think we can stretch our views beyond those dates, but, again, we
must see how we go. I think they are much more likely to be arranging them-
selves in those dis- [595S] tricts which they have taken or are likely to
take than to undertake a serious mass invasion of Australia. That would seem
to be a very ambitious overseas operation for Japan to undertake in the pre-
carious and limited interval before the British and American navies regain —
as they must certainly regain, through the new building that is advancing, and
for other reasons — the unquestionable command of the Pacific Ocean. However,
everything in human power that we can do to help Australia, or persuade America
to do, we will do; and meanwhile I trust that reproaches and recriminations
of all kinds will be avoided, and that if any are made, we in Britain will not
take part in them.
Let me, in conclusion, return to the terrific changes which have occurred in
our affairs during the last few months and particularly in the last few weeks.
We have to consider the prospects of the war in 1942 and also in 1943, and, as
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2235
I said just now, it is not useful to look further ahead than that. The moment
that the United States was set upon and attacked by Japan, Germany, and Italy —
that is to say, within a few days of December 7, 1941 — I was sure it was my
duty to cross the Atlantic and establish the closest possible relationship with the
President and Government of the United States, and also to develop the closest
contacts, personal and professional, between the British Chiefs of Staff and
their trans-Atlantic deputies, and with the American Chiefs of Staff who were
there to meet them.
[59o-'f] Havini? crossed the Atlantic, it was plainly my duty to visit the
great Dominion of Canada. The House will have read with admiration and
deep interest the speech made by the Prime Minister of Canada yesterday on
Canada's great and growing contribution to the common cause in men, in money,
and in materials. A notable part of that contribution is the financial offer which
the Canadian Government have made to this country. The sum involved is
one billion Canadian dollars, about £225,000,000. I know the House will wish
nie to convey to the Government of Canada our lively appreciation of their timely
and most generous offer. It is unequalled in its scale in the whole history of
the British Empire, and it is a convincing proof of the determination of Canada
to make her maximum contribution towards the successful prosecution of the
war.
During those three weeks which I spent in Mr. Roosevelt's home and family,
I established with him relations not only of comradeship, but, I think I may
say, of friendship. We can say anything to each other, however painful. When
we parted he wrung my hand, saying, "We will fight this through to the bitter
end, whatever the cost may be." Behind him rises the gigantic and hitherto
unmobilised gigantic power of the people of the United States, carrying with
them in their life and death struggle the entire, or almost the entire. Western
hemisphere.
At Washington, we and our combined staffs surveyed the entire [5955]
scene of the war, and we reached a number of important practical decisions.
Some of them affect future operations and cannot, of course, be mentioned, but
others have been made public by declaration or by events. The vanguard of
an American Army has already arrived in the United Kingdom. Very consider-
able forces are following as opportunity may serve. These forces will take
their station in the British Isles and face with us whatever is coming our way.
They impart a freedom of movement to all forces in the British Isles greater
than we could otherwise have possessed. Numerous United States fighter and
bomber squadrons will also take part in the defence of Britain and in the ever-
increasing bombing offensive against Germany. The United States Navy is
linked in the most intimate union with the Admiralty, both in the Atlantic and
the Pacific. We shall plan our Naval moves together as if we were literally
one i)eople.
In the next place, we formed this league of 26 United Nations in which the
principal partners at the present time are Great Britain and the British Empire,
the United States, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics of Russia, and the
Republic of China, together with the stout-hearted Dutch, and the representatives
of the rest of the 26 powers. This Union is based on the principles of the At-
lantic Charter. It aims at the destruction of Hitlerism in all its forms and
manifestations in every corner of the globe. We will march forward together
until every ves- [59561 tige of this villainy has been extirpated from
the life of the world.
Thirdly, as I have explained at some length, we addressed ourselves to the war
against Japan and to the measures to be taken to defend Australia. New Zealand,
the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, Burma, and India against Japanese attack
or invasion.
Fourthly, we have established a vast common pool of weapons and munitions,
of raw materials and of shipping, the outline of which has been set forth in a
series of memoranda which I have initialled with the President. I had a talk
with him last night on the telephone, as a result of which an announcement
has been made in the early hours of this morning in the United States, and I have
a White Paper for fthel House which will be available, I think, in a very
short time. Many people have been staggered by the figures of prospective Ameri-
can output of war weapons which the President announced to Congress, and the
Germans have affected to regard them with incredulity. I can only say that
Lord Beaverbrook and I were made acquainted lieforehand with all the bases
upon which these colossal programmes were founded, and that I myself heard
2236 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
President Roosevelt confide their specific tasks to the chiefs of American industry
and I heard these men accept their prodigious tasks and declare that they would
and could fulfill them. Most important of all is the multiplication of our joint
tonnage [5957] at sea. The American programmes were already vast.
They have been increased in the proportion of 300 to nearly IGO. If they are
completed, as completed I believe they will be, we shall be able to move across
the ocean spaces in 1943 two, three or even four times as large armies as the
considerable forces we are able to handle at sea at the present time.
I expect — and I have made no secret of it — that we shall both of us receive
severe ill-usage at the hands of the Japanese in 1942, but I believe we shall
presently regain the naval command of the Pacific and begin to establish an
effective superiority in the air, and then later on, with the great basic areas in
Australasia, in India, and in the Dutch East Indies, we shall be able to set
about our task in good style in 1943. It is no doubt true that the defeat of Japan
will not necessarily entail the defeat of Hitler, whereas the defeat of Hitler would
enable the whole forces of the united nations to be concentrated upon the de-
feat of Japan. But there is no question of regarding the war in the Pacific as a
secondary operation. The only limitation applied to its vigorous prosecution
will be the shipping available at any given time.
It is most important that we should not overlook the enormous contribution
of China to this struggle for world freedom and democracy. If there is any
lesson I have brought back from the United States that I could express in one
word, it would be "China." That is in all their minds. When we feel the
[5958'\ sharp military qualities of the Japanese soldiery in contact with our
own troops, although of course very few have as yet been engaged, we must
remember that China, ill-armed or half-ai*med, has, for four and a half years,
single handed, under its glorious leader Chiang Kai-Shek, withstood the main fury
of Japan. We shall pursue the struggle hand in hand with China, and do every-
thing in our power to give them arms and supplies, which is all they need to
vanquish the invaders of their native soil and play a magnificent part in the
general forward movement of the United Nations.
Although I feel the broadening swell of victory and liberation bearing us and
all the tortured peoples onwards safely to the final goal, I must confess to feeling
the weight of the war upon me even more than in the tremendous summer days
of 1940. There are so many fronts which are open, so many vulnerable points
to defend, so many inevitable misfortunes, so many shrill voices raised to take
advantage, now that we can breathe more freely, of all the turns and twists of
war. Therefore. I feel entitled to come to the House of Commons, whose servant I
am, and ask them not to press me to act against my conscience and better judg-
ment and make scapegoats in order to improve my own position, not to press
me to do the things which may be clamovu'ed for at the moment but which will
not help in our war effort, but, on the contrary, to give me their encouragement
and to give me their aid. I have never ventured to predict the future. I stand
by my original programme, blood, [5959'\ toil, tears and sweat, which is
all I have ever offered, to which I added, five months later, "many shortcomings,
mistakes and disappointments." But it is because I see the light gleaming be-
hind the clouds ajid broadening on our path, that I make so bold now as to
demand a declaration of confidence of the House of Commons as an additional
weapon in the armoury of the united nations.
(Whereupon, at 4:25 p. m., an adjournment was taken until 10
a. m., Thursday, January 3, 1946.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2237
[6960] PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
THURSDAY, JANUARY 3, 1946
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington^ D. C.
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, and Fer-
guson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart, and Keefe.
Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A.
Gesell and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.
[596 l] The Vice CiixVirman. The committee will please be in
order.
Does counsel have anything at this time ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I have here a letter from
Admiral Turner dated December 26, 1945, addressed to the counsel.
He asked to have some corrections and changes made in his testi-
mony, in line with our practice.
(The letter referred to follows :)
Department of the Navy
GENER.VL Board
Washington MMK
26 December 1945.
The Honorable William D. Mitchell,
Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C-
Dear General Mitchell :
Subject: Amplication and Correction of Testimony of Admiral Richmond
Kelly Turner, U. S. Navy, on December 21, 1945.
Reference: (a) Volume 30 of Report of Proceedings of the Joint Committee.
Enclosures: (A) Copies of Documents relating to reenforcement of Midvs^ay
and Wake Islands.
(1) CNO Secret Despatch 171450 of October 17, 1941.
(2) CincPac Confidential Ltr. L24/VZ/(95) Serial 01825 of November
10, 1941.
(3) CNO Secret Despatch 270038 of November 26, 1941.
(4) CNO Secret Despatch 270040 of November 26, 1941.
(5) CincPac Secret Despatch 280627 of November 28, 1941.
[59621 (6) CNO Secret Despatch 282054 of November 28, 1941.
(7) CincPac Secret Despatch 280447 of November, 1941.
(8) CincPac Secret Despatch 040237 of December, 1941.
(B) Copies of photogi-aphs of OpNav Fleet Location Boards of 1 to 7
December 1941, with explanation diagram.
1. There are two series of questions in reference (a) to which I believe I
unintentionally did not give clear and explicit answers; I, therefore, believe
that my answers should be clarified. These are :
(a) The questions from page 5444 to page 5450, relating to the employment
of two carriers for the reenforcement of Midway and Wake Islands. Enclosure
(A) constitutes a series of papers relating to these operations.
2238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(b) Included in the foregoing are certain questions, from page 5444 to page
5446, concerning information shown on the Cliief of Naval Operations' daily
chart of ship locations. Enclosure (B) consists of photostats of tlie photo-
graphs of the daily set-up of the chart from December 1 to December 7, 1941.
2. You will note, from Enclosures (A) (1) and (A) (G), that the task for
the reenforcement of Midway and Wake, with forces attached to the Pacitic
Fleet had in October been placed entirely in the hands of the Commander in
Chief of the Pacific [5963] Fleet, for execution at his discretion. Tlie
Commander in Chief's plan and directive. Enclosure (A) (2), was not sent to
Ihe Chief of Naval Operations. Therefore, the exact status of the reenforce-
ment plan was not known in the Department until the receipt of Enclosure (A)
(5), replied to by Enclosure (A) (6). The chief point in the clarification of
my testimony is that the orders for the movement of reenforcements to Midway
and Wake were issued by the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and not
by the Chief of Naval Operations.
3. From Enclosure (B) it will be noted that exact locations of the ships of
the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian Area are not shown on the daily location
charts, but only the main concentration itself. My recollection is that, though
the Ship Movements Division had an accurate list of the ships of the concentra-
tion, it was, not informed as to details of the deployment. I trust this informa-
tion will serve to clarify my testimony.
4. In addition, it is requested that the following corrections be made to other
parts of my testimony shown in reference (a) :
(a) Page 5321, line 21, insert the word "not" after the word "would".
(b) Page 5342, line 6, change the words "such material" to the words "decryp-
tion means and personnel".
(c) Page 5344, lines 11 and 12, delete the words "and three members from the
Army".
(d) Page 5350, line 25, change the word "agree" to the [.1.96//] word
"disagree".
(e) Page 5367, line 8, delete the word "boat".
(f) Page 5373, lines 5 and 6, delete the words "my report", and insert in their
place the words "me mistaken".
(g) Page 5380, line 18, replace the word "proper" with the word "preliminary",
(h) Page 5381, lines 7 and 8, change the last sentence in the paragraph to
read, "the only war warning sent was that on the twenty-seventh".
Line 10, change the comma after the word "overhaul" to a iieriod.
Change the sentence after this period to read as follows: ^'Reconnaissance
planes can be operated over a long period of time under more severe conditions
than he had there in Pearl Harbor or Kaneolie", replace the word "sheltered"
with the phrase "or in partly sheltered watei's".
(i) Page 5383, lines 6, 7, and 8, delete all after the word "Kimmel", and replace
the deleted words with the following: "because when Admiral Richardson was
there, the Naval Air Stations at Johnston Island and at Midway had not been
activated". Line 9, replace the word "radii" wnth the words "air stations".
(j) Page 5386, line 2, replace the words "the Axis" with the word "Japan".
[5965] (k) Page 5400, line 14, insert the words "Admiral Turner" at the
beginning of the line to show that this was an answer by the witness.
(1) Page 5412, line 10, after the word "situation", insert the words "so far
as possible".
(m) Page 5415, line 5, after the word "not", insert the word "written".
(n) Page 5416, line 7, change the word "have" to "had".
Co) Page 5423. line 6, change the word "it" to read "we".
(p) Page 5442, line 4, change the word "other" to read "his".
(q) Page 5444, line l.j, change the word "have" to the word "had".
(r) Page 5447, line 19, change the answer to read. "Correct. Planes were to
go to Midway and Wake".
(s) Page 5448. line 22, after the word "on" insert the words "the enemy force
attacking".
(t) Page 5449, in line 12, change the word "cruiser" to the word "cruisers";
line 17, change to read "the carriers could then be free to act on the offensive".
(u) Page 5452. in line 11, change to read "down in the Gilbert Islands, which
was certainly to be expected" : line 21, change the word "the" to "by", the word
"patrol" to "patrols", and delete the word "areas".
Respectfully,
/S/ R. K. Turner,
R. K. Turner,
Admiral, U. 8. Navy.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2239
[S966] Mr. Mitchell. Now all the enclosures lie refers to there
were read into the evidence yesterday, so I need not describe those.
Now paragraph 3 was written in relation to the questions I asked
Admiral Stark as to whether he did not here in Washington know day
by day what ships were actually in Pearl Harbor, and the enclosure
(B) that he refers to are the ship location maps, or copies of them,
taken from tlie Navy Department which were in use here today, and
we will have them available if anybody wants to look at them, or the
witness wants to refer to them.
Now I have two other documents that counsel for Admiral Stark
would like to put in the record now, with the idea that the subject
of it may be subject to further examination.
I will read the letter of May 1 for the information of the com-
mittee. You have copies of it before you. I will ask that it be just
spread upon the record instead of being labeled with an exhibit number.
The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered.
Mr. Mitchell. "Office of the Commandant Fourteenth Naval Dis-
trict and Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U. S. A.
S-A16-3/A7-3 (.3 ) /ND14
(0410)
Secret 1 May 1941
From : Commandant Fourteenth Naval District
To : Chief of Naval Operations
[5967] Subject : Air Defense of Pearl Harbor
Reference: (a) Correspondence between the Secretaries of War and Navy on
this subject dated 24 January 1941 and 7 February 1941.
Inclosures :
(A) Copies of two joint letters HHD-14ND dated 14 February 1941.
(B) Annex No. VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (JCD-42).
That is part of Exhibit 44 in the record.
(C) Joint Estimate by Commander Hawaiian Air Force and Commander
Naval Base Defense Air Force.
1. In connection with reference (a) there are enclosed herewith for your infor-
mation copies of the principal directives issued in cooperation vi'ith the local Army
authorities in accordance witli whicli operation plans have been prepared, put
into effect, and are in process of test and improvement, to provide for the joint
defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and ships of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian
waters against surprise raids or air attacks.
2. Inclosure ( A) , two joint letters HHD-14ND dated 14 February 1941, initiated
study by joint committees of Army and Navy officers of the joint problems of the
defense which were mentioned in reference (a), and also included study of addi-
tional problems which were raised by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
3. Inclosure (B). Annex No. VII of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, is
a neM^ joint agi-eement with the local [5968} Army authorities which per-
tains to joint security measures. Section II in particular relates to joint air
operations.
I will interpolate by saying that that is also in Exhibit No. 44.
4. Inclosure (C), Joint Estimate by Commander Hawaiian Air Force and
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, serves as the basis of joint air oper-
ation orders which have been issued, placed in effect, and are in process of test,
with a view to improvement in their effectiveness.
5. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to
phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other tham
secret.
6. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the
addressee in time by the next available ofiicpr courier. The originator therefore
authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the conti-
nental limits of the United States.
/s/ C. C. Bloch.
2240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The other document which I will read into the record is dated June
20, 1941.
OP-30B2-BP
(SC)A7-2(2)/FFl
Serial 059230
Navy Department
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washingtofi, Jun 20 1941
Secret
From : The Chief of Naval Operations
[5969] To: The Commandants, All Naval Districts
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet
Subject : Joint Security Measures for the Protection of the Fleet and Pearl Har-
bor Base.
Enclosure: (A) Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements of the Joint
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and
Fourteenth Naval District.
1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information. Attention is invited to the
importance of the problems presented in the subject matter.
2. Transmission by registered mail within the continental limits of the United
States is authorized.
/s/ H. R. Stark
Headquarters Headquarters,
14th Naval District Hawaiian Department
Pearl Harbor, T. H. Fort Shafteb, T. H.
JOINT
COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT 1939
28 March 1941
Annex No. VII Section VI * Joint Agreements
Joint Secltsity Measures, Protection of Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base
[5970] I. general
1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the tleet
and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air
attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization
for war, the following agreements, supplementary to the provisions of the
HCF-39, (14ND-JCD-13), are adopted. These agreements are to take effect at
once and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their
renouncement in whole or in part. Frequent revision of these agreements to
incorporate lessons determined from joint exercises will probably be both desir-
able and necessary.
II. joint aib operations
2. When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval
Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that
the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such
action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to
make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the
air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint opera-
tions may be conducted in accordance with the following plans.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2241
a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the
tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine
the Army bombardment [5911] strength to participate in each mission.
With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bom-
bardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable.
This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required,
until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control,
h. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will
be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense
Officer will determine the Navy lighter strength to participate in these missions.
With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter
aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force
will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for main-
tenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situa-
tion, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, 14th
Naval District), and reverts to Navy control.
c. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search opera-
tions, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the
tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.
d. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for
the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will
pass to the [5972] tactical control of the Navy until completion of the
mission.
in. JOINT COMMUNICATIONS
3. To facilitate the prompt interchange of "information relating to friendly
and hostile aircraft, and to provide for the transmission of orders when units
of one service are placed under the tactical control of the other service, Army
and Navy communications personnel will provide for the installation and opera-
tion, within the limitations of equipment on hand or which may be procured,
of the following means of joint communication.
a. Joint Air-Antiaircraft page printer teletype circuit with the following
stations :
ARMY NAVY
Hawaiian Air Force Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor
18th Bombardment Wing Naval Air Station, Kaneohe
14th Pursuit Wing Ewa Landing Field
Hq. Prov. AA Brigade Waialupe Radio Station
6. Joint radio circuit on 219 kilocycles with the following stations :
ARMY NAVY
♦Headquarters Hawaiian Department Waialupe Radio Station
Headquarters, HSCA Brigade Senior Officer Present Afloat
Hq. Prov. AA Brigade Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor
Hq. Hawaiian Air Force Naval Air Station, Kaneohe
Marine Air Group, Ewa
♦Net Control Station.
[5973] 18th Bombardment Wing S« '
14th Pursuit Wing
0. Direct local battery telephone lines as follows :
ARMY NAVY
Hq. Haw. Dept. (G-3 Office) 14th Naval District
CP, H. S. C. A. B, 14th Naval District
CP, Pearl Harbor Gpmt (Ft. Kam) 14th Naval District
d. Radio frequencies to be employed during joint air operations both during
combat and joint exercises, for communication between airplanes in flight will
be as agreed upon by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, and the
Commander, Base Defense Air Force.
4. To facilitate the prompt interchange of information relating to the move-
ments of friendly and hostile naval ships and of commercial shipping. Army
and Navy communications personnel will provide for the installation and opera-
tion, within the limitations of equipment on hand, or which may be procured,
of the following means of joint communication :
a. Joint page printer teletype circuit connecting the Harbor Control Post
with the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade loop.
79716 — 46— pt. 5 13
2242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
b. Joint radio circuit on 2550 kilocycles with the following stations :
ARMY NAVY
CP, PH Gpmt. Ft. Kamehameah Waialupe
[597^] CP, Hon. Gpmt, Ft. Ruger, Destroyer Patrol
Additional Stations that may be deter- Mine Sweepers
mined to be necessary
c. Telephone circuits as provided in par. 3 c. above.
5. Pending the establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, the Army will
operate an Antiaircraft Intelligence Service which, using wire and radio broad-
casts, will disseminate information pertaining to the movements of friendly
and hostile aircraft. It should be understood that the limitations of the AAAIS
are such that the interval between receipt of a warning and the air attack will
in most cases be very short. Radio broadcasts from the AAAIS will be trans-
mitted on 900 kilocycles. All information of the presence or movements of
hostile aircraft off-shore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels
will be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Provisional Anti-
aircraft Brigade.
6. Upon establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, provision will be made
for transmission of information on the location of distant hostile and friendly
aircraft. Special wire or radio circuits will be made available for the use of
Navy liaison officers, so that they may make their own evaluation of available
information and transmit them to their respective organizations. Information
relating to the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu
which is secured through Navy cjiannels will be transmitted without delay to the
Aircraft Warning Service [5975] Information Center.
7. The several joint communications systems listed in paragraphs 3 and 4
above, the Antiaircraft Intelligence Service, and the Aircraft Warning Service
(after establishment) will be manned and operated during combat, alert periods,
joint exercises which involve these communications systems, and at such other
periods as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Depart-
ment and the Naval Base Defense Officer. The temporary loan of surplus com-
munication equipment by one service to the other service to fill shortages in joint
communication nets is encouraged where practicable. Prompt steps will be taken
by the service receiving the borrowed equipment to obtain replacements for the
borrowed articles through their own supply channels.
rV. JOINT ANTIAIRCRAFT MEASURES
S. AiTivnJ and Drparturr Proccdnre, Aircraft.
During joint exercises, alert periods, and combat and at such other times as
the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense
Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) may agree upon, all Army
and Navy aircraft approaching Oahu or leaving airfields or air bases thereon will
conform to the Arrival and Departure Procedure prescribed in Inclosure A. This
procedure will not be modified except when a departure therefrom is essential
due to combat (real or sinuilated during exei-cises) or due to an [5976]
emergency.
9. Balleon barrages.
Reports from abroad indicate the successful development and use of balloon
barrages by European belligerents both British and German. Although de-
tailed information is not available, the possibilities of balloon barrages in the
Oahu area are recognized. Further investigation and study is necessary both
locally and by the War and Navy Departments in order to determine the
practicability of this phase of local defen.se.
10. Marine Corps Antiaircraft ArtiJIrry.
When made available by the Naval Base Defense Officer, (Commandant. 14th
Naval District), Marine Corps units manning anti-aircraft artillery present on
Oahu will be placed under the tactical control of the Conunanding General,
Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.
11. Aircraft Warning Service.
The Army will expedite the installation and placing in operation of an Air-
craft Warning Service. During the period prior to the completion of the AWS
installations, the Navy, through use of RADAR and other appropriate means,
will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2243
V. MUNITIONS, JOINT USE OF
12. Army and Navy Officers charged with the storage and issue of ammunition
and bombs will exchange informa- [5.977] tion concerning the types, quan-
tities, and locations of these munitions which are suitable for use by the other
service. Studies will be instituted and plans prepared for the prompt transfer
of ammunition from one service to the other. No such transfer of munitions
will be made without specitic authority granted by the commander concerned
for each transfer.
VI. SMOKE SCREENS
13. Smoke screens will not be employed for screening the Pearl Harbor —
Hickam Field area from air attacks.
VII. HARBOR CONTROL POST
14. A joint harbor control post, as described in Inclosure B, will be established
without delay. This system will be actively manned during joint exercises, alert
periods, and combat and for such other periods as may be agreed upon by the
Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer
(Commandant, 14th Naval District).
Approved: 2 April 1941.
(Signed) C. C. Bloch
C. C. Bloch,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval DiMriet.
(Signed) Walter C. Short
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant (icneral, U. S. Army,
Commanding,
Ifaiaaiian Departnient.
Inclosure A
Annex No. VII HCF-S9; IJf ND—JCD—IS.
[5978] Aircraft Departure, Approach, and Recof/nition Procedure
Oahu Area
To Be PuWshed Later
Inclosure B
Annex No. VII. HCF-39; Ui ND--JCD—13
Harhor Control Post, Honolulu and Pearl Harbors, Oahu, T. H.
To be published later. Pending publication of this inclosure, the Harbor
Control Post will be established, as far as practicable in accordance with the
recommendations contained in the report (dated 17 March 1941) of the Joint
committee (Chairman, Commander H. B. Knowles, USN) convened to study
and report upon the establishment of a Harbor Control Post and Measures for
Communication, Coordination, and Liaison between the Inshore Patrol and the
Harbor Defenses.)
Mr. Mitchell, I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.
2244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)
The Vice Chairman. Admiral Stark, do you have anything you want
to present to the committee before the committee resumes questioning
you?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I have one or two things [5979]
which the committee asked for yesterday.
The Vice Chairman. You may proceed.
Admiral Stark, I would also like to comment on the so-called
Narrative Statement of the Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investi-
gations, which the committee had before it and mentioned yesterday.
I am sure the committee appreciates full well that this only repre-
sents the idea of some representative or representatives of the Navy
Department as to what the evidence in the previous proceedings
will show.
I have not had an opportunity to study this statement — it is some
700 page — but I do want to point out to the committee what, to
my mind, is a very imporant error. There may be others.
On page 699 of volume 2 and also on page 699 of the loose pages
distributed yesterday, you will find the paragraph beginning:
Althoiigh there may be some basis foi* the comment that prior to 27 November
1941 there was a certain sameness of tone in the communication sent by
Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, it should be noted that the message of
November 27 vpas stronger than any message which Admiral Stark sent previ-
ously to Admiral Kimmel.
In this paragraph, the stateemnt goes on to quote what purports
to be my war warning message, and at the top of [5980] page
700 it omits a part of the concluding sentence. The last two sentences
of the quoted material read :
A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Appropriate measures
against sabotage.
This should read :
A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Spenavo inform
British X Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures
against sabotage.
As the message stands in this so-called narrative statement, it is
so inaccurate as to be misleading. I am very anxious to have this
error corrected if the document is to be referred to by the committee.
Now, the committee asked me yesterday to search my correspond-
ence to see if I found anything additional in the way of air comment
to Admiral Kimmel, and I would like to read this as my answer.
I have searched my personal correspondence with Admiral Kimmel
and also the official documents I have secured from the Navy Depart-
ment for any mention, subsequent to August 1941, of anythmg which
would indicate my continuing concern over the possibility of an air
attack on Pearl Harbor.
I find no such letters in this later period. I would like to point
out, however, that on May 1, 1941, the commandant of the Fourteenth
Naval District — Admiral Bloch at Pearl Harbor — sent me an official
letter on the subject of air defense of [59S1] Pearl Harbor.
That letter referred to the correspondence between the Secretaries of
War and Navy on the subject of the air defense of Pearl Harbor
dated January 24, 1941, and February 7, 1941, to both of which letters
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2245
I have referred in my statement and with wh^ch I am sure the com-
mittee is familiar. Enclosed with the commandant's letter were
three documents. The first does not appear pertinent here. The
second was annex VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan
entitled, "Joint Security Measures, Protection of Fleet and Pearl
Harbor Base." Among its provisions were those for joint air opera-
tions and joint antiaircraft measures, including an aircraft warning
service. The third enclosure was a joint estimate by the commander,
Hawaiian Air Force, and commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force,
commonly Imown before this committee as the Martin-Bellinger
agreement.
This estimate included a summary of the situation which reads as
follows :
(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, un-
certain, and varying.
(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration
of war.
(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on
Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western
Pacific for a long period.
[59S2] (d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the
operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface
or submarine force which initiates hostile action.
(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast
raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our
intelligence service.
The estimate also included, under posible enemy action, the following
two paragraphs :
(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by :
1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl
Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.
(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU
would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would
most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably
approach inside of three hundred miles.
A copy of the letter of May 1, 1941, had been sent to the commander
in chief, Pacific Fleet, by the commandant. Fourteenth Naval District.
[5983] After reviewing these documents I was impressed with
the soundness of the arrangements arrived at between commanding
general of the Hawaiian Department and the commandant of the
Fourteenth Naval District with respect to joint security measures
at Pearl Harbor. In fact, on June 20, 1941, I caused copies of the
joint agreement to be sent to the commandants of all naval districts
and to the commanders in chief of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic
Fleets, and in my forwarding letter I stated :
Attention is invited to the importance of the problems presented in the subject
matter.
I had shown considerable concern, as far back as the fall of 1940,
for the security of the fleet and the base at Pearl Harbor against air
attack, and I had caused the people in Hawaii to make an exhaustive
investigation, which Admirals Bloch and Eichardson followed by a
report to me at the beginning of 1941. I then caused the Secretary
of the Navy to write to the Secretary of War, pointing out the danger
2246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, to which the Secretary of War
]-eplied, recognizing flie danger and setting forth the steps which
the Army had taken and proposed to take to meet this danger. I
further mentioned from time to time during the first half of 1941
the matter of an air attack, and when Admiral Kimmel was here
in May and early June I discussed fully with him the joint measures
which were being taken, and he left with me a memorandum dated
June 4, 1941, on this [5984] subject.
As I said, I was so impressed with the agreement made at Pearl
Harbor that I sent it out to all concerned, stressing the importance
of the subject matter.
In view of the fact that the matter of the air defense of Pearl Harbor
had been surveyed and machinery put in action to implement the de-
fense, and in view of the fact that the authorities at Pearl Harbor had
arrived at a satisfactory joint arrangement for the air defense of Pearl
Harbor, with which I was thoroughly familiar, I felt it no longer nec-
essary to emphasize this matter in my letters.
I assumed that having made this agreement and having agreed with
me that the danger of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was present, the
commander in chief, Pacific fleet, would continue his efforts to prepare
himself to meet the possible air attack.
I feel sure my assumption was well founded, for he wrote on October
14, 1941, in the revision of his confidential fleet letter on the subject of
security of fleet at base and in operating areas, as follows :
The security of the Fleet, operating and based in the Hawaiian area, is predi-
cated, at present, on two assumptions :
(a) Is left out as being nonrelevant.
(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by: (1) a surprise attack on
ships in [5.985] Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships
in operating area, (3) a combination of these two.
This letter also provided, under the head "Defense against air at-
tack," the following:
(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor,
plus all fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu. will augment the local air defense.
(6) The Commandant 14th Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer
(NBDO). As such he shall:
(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against
air attack.
(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns implaced.
(c) Exercise supervisory control over Naval shore-based aircraft, arraiigiiig
through Commander Patrol Wing 2 for coordination of the joint air effort by
the Army and Navy.
A copy of this confidential fleet letter was distributed to the Chief
of Naval Operations.
I had no reason to believe, from any communications which came
to me from the Pacific Fleet, that the concern shown by the responsible
officers there over a possible air attack on [SOSd] Pearl Harbor
had diminished in any respect during 1941. I am certain that my
concern had not.
Now, the other paper, sir, I have is the table
Mr. Mitchell. Just a minute. Do you want to add to that state-
ment a reference to the letter of December 2. 1941, from Admiral Kim-
mel to you in which, among other things, he made this statement :
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2247
With respect to sending aircraft equipment farther to the west to the outlying
islands I have fi'equently called to your attention the inadequacy of the Army
anti-aircraft defense of Pearl Harbor, with particular reference to the shortage
of anti-aircraft guns. So far very little has been done to improve this situation.
Have you found any other references than those you mentioned ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. It is perfectly satisfactory to me to in-
clude what you have just read.
Mr. Mitchell. I remembered this one.
Admiral Stark. We searched primarily my letters to him.
Mr. Mitchell. Not his to you?
Admiral Stark. Not his to me, over that period.
Mr. Mitchell. I see.
Admiral Stark. We have this official document of his of October.
Mr. Mitchell. All right.
[5987] Admiral Stark. If you would like, I will go through his
letters to me and bring the subject up tomorrow.
Mr. Mitchell. I wanted to be sure we had everything.
Admiral Stark. I will search and if I find anything I will bring
it up.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, you had another statement ?
Admiral Stark. The other statement is the table which I was asked
to prepare yesterday on the distribution'of our fleet.
I think I have covered everything. It won't take but a minute to
read it.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, before going into that I would like to
say that we already have in the record the distribution of the fleet.
You got that in the first exhibit in the Navy folder.
The Vice Chairman. I think it would be well to have this clear,
concise statement at this point in the record, because questions have
been asked General Stark directly on this point.
Admiral Stark. Aye, aye, sir.
In each case, I will first read the total number of ships in the Navy :
Battleships, 15 : Total in the Atlantic, 6. That does not include the
North Carolina and 'Washington^ both of which were on trials. Total
in the Asiatic, none. Total in the Pacific, nine. Total in Pearl Har-
bor— that is, on December 7 — eight. Total sunk or put out of com-
mission at Pearl Harbor, eight.
\5988\ Then, under the next heading is, "Total Pacific Fleet,
vessels undamaged : Battleships in Pearl Harbor, none." In the task
forces, 8 and 12, which, you will recall, included the Enterprise and
the Lexington which we discussed yesterday.
None of those was hurt.
Fleet vessels elsewhere in the Pacific not hurt, was one, and which
was the Colorado^ under overhaul.
In the next heading, I put carriers. We had a total of seven. Four
were in the Atlantic. That excludes the Hornet^ which was on trial,
and it includes the first of the so-called escort carriers, the converted
Long Island. In the Asiatic Fleet, no carriers. In the Pacific Fleet,
three. Total in Pearl Harbor, none. Total put out of commission or
sunk at Pearl Harbor, none. And then the next, the latter column,
shows that two of these carriers, the Lexington and the Enterprise,
were absent in connection with distribution of planes at Wake and
Midway, and the one other I just put down "Elsewhere."
2248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I would like to point out that the data I am giving here is from
Exhibit 86. I haven't gone behind that in any way.
Heavy cruisers : The Navy had a grand total of 18 — 5 in the Atlan-
tic ; 1 in the Asiatic ; 12 in the Pacific ; 2 were in Pearl Harbor. None
were put out of action. None were damaged in Pearl Harbor. Six
of them were accompanying the two task forces previously referred to.
And elsewhere in the Pacific [5989] outside of Pearl Harbor
were four, undamaged.
Of light cruisers, we had 19. Eight were in the Atlantic. That
excludes the light cruisers Jimeau, Atlantic, San Diego, and San Juan
which had not yet joined the fleet but were in the process of completion
and shakedown. One in the Asiatic, and that excludes the Boise,
which was escorting in Asiatic waters but attached to the Pacific Fleet.
Ten in the Pacific Fleet. That included the Boise. In Pearl Harbor
at the time of the attack, six. Total sunk or put out of action, three.
In Pearl Harbor, undamaged — which were undamaged — three. And
vessels elsewhere in the Pacific, four. The location of those four is
shown in detail in the Navy folder, item 5. My recollection is that
two were in the Southeast Pacific and two were on escort work, but the
exhibit will show that if the committee wants to follow it up.
Destroyers, 159: 92 in the Atlantic; 13 in the Asiatic; 54 in the
Pacific, which includes four destroyers assigned to the fourteenth
Naval District, and does not include the destroyers which were assigned
to the west coast naval districts. There were 30 in Pearl Harbor, of
which three were sunk or put out of conunission, leaving undamaged
in Pearl Harbor, 27. And there were 14 destroyers which were accom-
panying the two task forces previously mentioned, and there were ten
on other missions in the Pacific.
[5990] Of submarines, we had 111. There were 158 in the Atlan-
tic, 29 in the Asiatic Fleet ; 24 in the Pacific Fleet ; and of which the
status of two of them was not clear. I took that from the former
exhibit and didn't follow it up as to why it is not clear. Total in Pearl
Harbor on December 7, five ; none of which were damaged. And else-
where in the Pacific were 19 submarines. So that left 98 vessels of the
Pacific Fleet undamages. And of the 51 which were in Pearl Harbor,
14 were sunk and variously damaged from light to heavy damage.
Now, if that table is what the committe wanted, I will let it stand
as is. If there is anything further that is wanted I will be glad to get
it.
Mr. Mitchell. I suggest that the table be placed in the transcript in
the tabulated form right at this point.
The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered.
(The table referred to follows :)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2249
[5991}
Dispositions of Atlantic, Asiatic, and Pacific Fleets on
Dec. 7, 1941
Grand
total
Total if
Atlantic
Fleet
Total in
Asiatic
Fleet
Total in
Pacific
Fleet
Total in
Pearl
Harbor
Total
sunk
or put
out of
commis-
sion at
Pearl
Harbor
Total Pacific Fleet vessels
undamaged
Types
In
Pearl
Harbor
In task
Forces
No. 8 1
and
No. 122
Fleet
vessels
else-
where
in Paci-
fic 3
Battleships
Carriers .
15
7
18
19
159
111
^6
19 4
5
'8
92
58
0
0
1
81
13
29
9
3
12
»10
10 11 54
12 24
8
0
2
6
30
5
8
0
0
3
3
0
0
0
2
3
27
5
0
2
6
0
14
0
1
I
Heavy cruisers
Light cruisers
Destroyers
Submarines __
4
4
10
"19
Total --
329
173
44
112
51
14
37
22
39
98
■ Task Force No. 8 included Enterprise.
2 Task Force No. 12 included Lexington.
3 Locations of these ships shown in detail in Navy folder, item 5.
• Excludes North Carolina and Washington, both on trials.
' Excludes Hornet on trials.
• Includes Long Island, escort carrier.
' Excludes Juneau, Atlanta, San Diego and Son Juan carried on Atlantic Fleet lists but not completed
or commissioned.
' Excludes Boise escorting in Asiatic waters but attached Pacific Fleet. (See (9).)
• lucludes Boise which at that time was escorting in Asiatic waters.
'" Includes 4 destroyers assigned Fourteenth Naval District (Pearl Harbor).
1' Does not include destroyers assigned other west coast naval districts.
12 Status of 2 submarines not clear.
Source: Exhibit 86 and transcript, pp. 5880-5883.
[6992] Mr. Mitchell. I call attention to the fact that you have
two prior sources of information. One is the one that Congressman
Murphy has calleci attention to, put in by Admiral Inglis, giving
the statistics at Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December 1941, and later
we have Exhibit 86, which tabulated the fleets in both oceans.
The Vice Chairman. Yes.
Admiral Stark. I might mention that the committee will note that
this includes only major categories of vessels. I haven't got down net
tenders and that type of ship. It is just combatant ships of major
categories.
The Vice Chairman. Does that complete the material you desired
to submit to the committee at this time?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Does counsel have anything further?
Mr. Mitchell. No.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe.
2250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. KJEEFE. Before proceeding with the examination of Admiral
Stark, I feel it necessary to call to the attention of the committee the
fact that quite some time ago I made a request of counsel that he secure
from the State Department and make available to the committee a
memoranda prepared by Mr. Lawrence Salisbury to the Secretary of
State, Mr. Hull, [5993] which was delivered, according to the
information which I had, some 3 months prior to the resignation of
Mr. Salisbury from the Far Eastern Section of the State Department.
I had already placed in evidence some material of Dr. Hornbeck
and my advices were that this communication from Mr. Salisbury to
the Secretary of State contains material very material to this inquiry.
Counsel has submitted to me this morning his correspondence with
the State Department in respect to my request and includes a copy
of a letter dated December 19, 1945, from Dean Acheson, Acting
Secretary of State, in which he concludes that the Department is
unable to comply with my request and gives as the reason that Senate
Concurrent Resolution 27 establishing the Joint Committee on the
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack provides that the commit-
tee shall "make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating
to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the attack
made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of
Hawaii on December 7, 1941." Mr. Acheson continues in his letter :
The President's Order of October 23, 1945 addressed to this and other depart-
ments instructs the Secretary of State to make available to the Joint Committee,
for such use as the committee may determine any information in his [599^]
possession "material to the investigation." In pursuance of this order, this
Department has made available to the Committee Counsel all information in its
possession which is material to the investigation.
The memorandum requested by Congressman Keefe relates exclusively to ex-
changes of American and Japanese nationals after the war began. In these
circumstances the Department does not understand how this memorandum
could possibly be considered material to the Committee's investigation within
the meaning of the President's Order of October 23, 1945. The Department is
therefore unable to comply with the request of Congressman Keefe.
Now, Mr. Chairman, if I interpret this letter correctly it is to the
effect that the State Department is determining in advance whether
or not material requested by a member of this committee is in its
judgment material to this inquiry, having before it the full text of
the statement which I requested. I have not seen that text, and yet I
am foreclosed from a determination of materiality as a member of this
committee by the determination of the Acting Secretary of State,
Mr. Acheson, who concludes that in his opinion it is not material and
therefore is not to be made available to tlie committee.
It seems to me that this presents to the committee a very definite
question as to the responsibility of this investigat- [S995\ ing
committee. I may say that I have very definite and certain informa-
tion that this communication which I have asked for is material and
while it may contain some matters which are not material, it does con-
tain matters which are definitely material and are necessary in order
that I may pursue the introduction at a subsequent date of certain
memoranda prepared for the War and Navy departments by Dr.
Hornbeck.
Now, I want to ask this question : When a request is made by a mem-
ber of this committee to the State Department or any other depart-
ment of Government, am I, as a member of this committee, to be
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2251
bound by the determination of an executive department of Govern-
ment that in their opinion the material which I requested is not mate-
rial to this inquiry and therefore I am not permitted to see it?
The Chairman. Is that a question propounded to the Chair?
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
The Chairman. Well, it has not been the Chair's understanding
that an individual member of the committee could determine the mate-
riality of any evidence requested of a department, but that the com-
mittee as a whole had jurisdiction and authority to determine that
matter, and if the committee as a whole determined that any record
was material its determination governed instead of that of the execu-
tive officer who might assume to pass upon the question.
[S996] Mr. Keefe. May I ask then, Mr. Chairman, that the
State Department be directed to bring this communication to the
committee in order that the committee, itself, in executive session, may
determine whether or not it is material.
How can the committee, or any member of the committee, determine
that question in the absence of seeing the communication itself ? That
is the point I am getting at.
The Chairman. That is a matter we might well discuss in executive
session without taking the time of the hearing, but inasmuch as it
has been brought up, before any action is taken, the Chair would
like to ask counsel if he has additional information about that, in
regard to Mr. Acheson's letter ?
Mr. Mitchell. I have never seen the document, so I do not know
whether it is material or not. Heretofore when any question has been
raised, I haven't found that the State Department has objected to
somebody looking at certain material. They haven't yet closed the
♦door on me. I don't see any reason why I shouldn't agree with Mr.
Keefe that the committee ought to have an opportunity to examine
it for the whole committee to decide whether it is material.
The Chairman. From the beginning it was the committee's under-
standing— it was certainly mine — that the committee would deter-
mine the materiality of evidence and not the Secretary of State or any
officer of any department, and if it [S997] is agreeable to the
committee, the committee will request counsel to get that document and
submit it to the committee for its determination as to whether it is
material.
[5998] Mr. Keefe. My point, Mr. Chairman, is that if it ap-
pears upon an inspection of the document in connection with other
matters which they have submitted that it is immaterial and not
material to this controversy, certainly I would not want, nor would
I expect, to pursue the matter.
The Chairman. The Chair thinks the point made by the Congress-
man is well taken and the committee will take such action.
Mr. Keefe. Very well.
The Chairman. Senator Lucas will now examine.
Senator Lucas. Admiral Stark, throughout the course of these
hearings it becomes more clear as we move along that Japan knew
everything that we were doing in this country previous to Pearl
Harbor and apparently we knew little or nothing about what Japan
was doing.
2252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Let me ask you just briefly about our naval and military intelli-
gence service in Japan at that time. How many people did we have
employed in Japan in December 1941 who were actively engaged in
obtaining military and naval intelligence for this country?
Admiral Stark. I do not know, Senator Lucas, of any, and infor-
mation of that kind could come far better from Intelligence, I am
not familiar with the details. My recollection is we had none. I
may be wrong. I hesitate to testify [6999] as to the details
of who we had and where.
Senator Luoas. Well, upon yesterday you testified before the com-
mittee that in your opinion Japan had a complete spy system in this
country through which they were obtaining and forwarding intelli-
gence to their home country about every movement that took place
in our naval and military circles here in America.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. My thought in asking you this question was
whether or not in view of the fact that you have been a naval officer
all of these years that you could suggest to this committee as to what
Congress might do in the future to remedy what seemed to be a very,
very serious situation in Hawaii and other command posts when the
Japs struck us in December 1941.
Admiral Stark. Well, only a considered answer, I think, should be
given to that question and I would not like to make an otfhand
answer to it.
Senator Lucas. All right. I appreciate it may be somewhat a sur-
prise question to you, but it does seem to me to have very considerable
importance in connection with this hearing as I move along and
listen to the testimony, that Japan knew every move that we were
making in connection with the movement of ships in and out of Pearl,
Harbor and had all [(jOOO] this information and apparently
we were getting nothing from Japan. While I appreciate that under
our form of government it is almost impossible to keep anything a
secret, yet, on the other hand, looking to the defense of this country
in the future, it does occur to me that perhaps Congress might be
able to do some things to remedy certain conditions that existed at
that time and I thought perhaps you might have given it some
thought.
Admiral Stark. Well, I quite agree with you that it would be well
to look into the subject and the question of legislation to correct it.
I am hazy on just what we had proposed but I do recall that there was
some legislation proposed, I think, which did not get through, about
our ability to arrest people on suspicion and that sort of thing, but
it has been studied and in the light of present experience, in my
opinion, and I take it in yours, I am agreeing with you, should again
be reviewed with a view to our not getting into such a position again
if it is possible to avoid it.
Senator Lucas. Well, now, how many naval attaches did you have
in Tokyo at the time, do you remember that?
Admiral Stark. No, sir; I do not. Of course, there was one naval
attache and some assistants and usually we had language students
over there, but I haven't got the details.
Senator Lucas. Well, from whom did you get this informa-
[6001] tion upon which you based your reports for certain evalua-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2253
tion and certain information that you had to send your commands
in the field?
Admiral Stark. We got it from what we got from the State Depart-
ment, the War Department, sometimes the Treasury Department,
intercepts from our people in the field, which was rather world-wide.
For example, in Hawaii we had the district intelligence officer and
the fleet intelligence officer and a radio communication man studying
those subjects. We had them spread in different places in China
and, in fact, a rather broad coverage. We also, of course, in con-
nection with the movements of the fleet had the stations which were
constantly, through radio, studying through direction finder and
through the system of calls to assist us in location, but we used to
say, and I may possibly have expressed to you in some of the hear-
ings, that as regards Japan, even in peacetime, we felt our informa-
tion more or less stopped at the 3-mile limit.
For example, they built stockades around their navy yards, they
pulled down the curtains, I have been told, in trains if they passed a
section where people might look out to see what was being done.
You will recall when I w\as asked how many battleships Japan had
we could only estimate. We could get their hearings, [6002]
For example, we could get from the amounts of money they had appro-
priated and working on every scrap of information that we could get,
backed by previous experience, we would make an estimate, but over
here, as you will recall, a Japanese frequently sat in committee hearings
and knew everything about what we w^ere proposing.
I remember when I was asking for the large increases shortly after
I became Chief of Naval Operations, seeing a Japanese naval attache
among those listening to the hearings and in which we put all our
cards on the table.
Senator Lucas. Well, the reason that I asked these preliminary
questions is followed by this one: According to the report received
from the supreme commander of the Allied forces in the Pacific, and
which has been made a part of the record, that part of the Japanese
Fleet which attacked Pearl Harbor was sent by the Imperial Head-
quarters of the Naval Staff on December 7, 1941, to a place which I
cannot pronounce, which is spelled H-i-t-o-k-a-p-p-u.
Now, I was wondering whether or not you as Chief of Naval
Operations were familiar with that Japanese harbor previous to Pearl
Harbor ?
Admiral Stark. We knew of the harbor; yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Were any of our Intelligence men or any of the
Navy men working in there at any time, or did they ever [6008]
get in there to make an inspection and see what that bay was like?
Admiral Stark. Not that I know of. It might be that you will get
something on that if you repeat the question to our far-eastern man
who is due here.
Senator Lucas. Well, at least as far as you are concerned j^'ou do
not recall that in the information you received any direct report about
this particular bay in the months of, say, September, October, Novem-
ber, and December of 1941 ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct. I think it might be helpful with
regard to what has been termed the "lost carriers" and which were
not lost so far as we knew at that time, but whose appearance later
2254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
showed that our estimates as to where they were were incorrect, you
will recall tliere has been introduced into the testimony that on De-
cember 24 Admiral Wilkinson sent a dispatch to the two commanders
in chief in the Pacific regarding their size-up of where the Japanese
fleet was.
You will notice that sometimes there were conflicts, but that we felt
the estimates made by Admiral Hart, who had a very large force
working on it and was very much closer to Japan, were probably the
best we had.
Now. I would also like to point out that, of course, Admiral Kimmel
was informed of that, it went to Kimmel and to [6004] Hart
and there was a complete interchange.
Senator Lucas. You meant November 24. You said December 24.
Admiral Stark. Well, if you say so that is all right. On November
24. I will read that dispatch if you would like to have it read. It is
short.
The Chairman. You said "December," Admiral.
Admiral Stark. Oh. I am sorry.
The Chairmax. We are asking to have it corrected.
Admiral Stark. There was a conflict. We thought that Hart's
estimates appeared to us to be the better, but Kimmel had estimates,
Kimmel had his estimates. Hart had Kimmel's estimates, we had both
their estimates and all three of us were working on that. Now, on
the 26th
Senator Lucas. Just before you get to the 26th. With respect to
those estimates, they were not the same. Hart had one set of figures
showing where the carriers were and Kinnnel had another set of figures
which were different.
Admiral Stark. I am coming to that.
Senator Lucas. All right, sir.
Admiral Stark. On the 26th we received two dispatches, one from
Kimmel, who thought that possibly there might be some carriers in
the eastern Marshalls, and one from Hart putting them in home waters.
[6005] You will recall that we endeavored to get a coverage on
the eastern ISLarshalls but due to weather were not able to do so. Hart
put them in home waters.
On the 28th and again on the 1st we had from the Asiatic no change,
which still put, in his opinion, the carriers in the home waters from
what he had been able to gatlier or not gather. On the 1st of December
Intelligence made an estimate, our own Office of Naval Intelligence,
to me and from the information as they sized it up from Hart and from
Kimmel they put them in home waters. So we thought we knew where
the carriers were. You never can be certain in the absence of any-
thing definite in the way of call signs and cutting them in.
Senator Lucas. In other words, you accepted the information that
Admiral Hart gave you with respect to this task force or this supposed
lost fleet and concluded that the fleet was not lost but it was in home
waters some place?
Admiral Stark. That was the best we had to go on. Yes, sir; we
accepted them.
Senator Lucas. Well, do you know whether Admiral Kimmel ac-
cepted that same viewpoint and in view of that he gave you a report
that the fleet was lost?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2255
Admiral Stark. The only difference that I recall in Admiral Kim-
mel's information was that there might be two carriers in the eastern
Marshalls and, of course, as time went on [6006\ and there
was no further change, or in the absence of information, why, one
might wonder, but the best at the time we had from those who were
making the estimates was that the carriers were in home waters.
Senator Lucas. Well, that is what you are telling the committee at
(his time, that upon the information that you evaluated at the time
and sent to the commanders in the field it was your opinion that there
was no lost fleet but that the ships of the Japanese Navy were all ac-
counted for through the Hart report?
Admiral Stark, We did not send it out. That estimate was just
given to me by Intelligence. Hart and Kimmel both had their own
estimates and whether Admiral Kimmel after receiving Admiral Hart's
hitest information agreed with him or not, whether his Intelligence
officer did, I do not know.
Senator Lucas. Well, you will agree that that was an extremely
important message that came from Admiral Hart at that particular
time with respect to the location of the Japanese fleet, was it not?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; but I will say, and the people in the field,
I believe, would bear it out, that it was the best information we had.
You never could count on it a hundred percent of accuracy. Every
naval officer knows that ships can maintain radio silence.
[6007] Senator Lucas. I appreciate that. Well, now, after this
task force went into this bay the name of which I cannot pronounce,
they were ordered, according to the report that is in the record here,
to stay there until November the 22, 1941, and take on supplies and
then upon that date they were to sail for the Hawaiian waters.
Now, as I understand it, there was no one in the Hawaiian area con-
nected with the fleet, there was no one in the Asiatic area that was
connected with the fleet that ever heard a single thing about this task
force being at this bay or having the slightest knowledge of when it
went there or when it sailed.
Admiral Stark. I think that is correct. I would suggest. Senator
Lucas, that you repeat that question to McCollum and Kramer as to
whether or not Admiral Hart in making that evaluation, — that would
be home waters, and whether he had them there or not I am not
certain.
Senator Lucas. Well, I thought. Admiral Stark, in view of the crisis
that we were fast approaching with Japan that you as Chief of Naval
Operations would have probably known about any movements of ships
in the Japanese waters at that time ; that was the reason I was asking
you the question.
Admiral Stark. Well, the data they gave me was home waters. I
have the dispatches here, if you would like to hear [60081 just
what they sent in.
Senator Lucas. All right, please read those dispatches.
Admiral Stark. This dispatch is of November 26, from the com-
mandant, Fourteenth District, Fourteenth Naval District, which is
Hawaii, to OPNAV and for information of the commander in chief
2256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of the Pacific and the commander in chief of the Asiatic and the com-
mandant of the Sixteenth Naval District. It reads :
For past mouth commander Second Fleet has been organizing a task force
which comprises following units :
Second Fleet, Third Fleet including first and second base forces and First
Defense Division, combined airforce, Desron Three, Airon Seven, Subron Five
and possible units of BatDiv Three from First Fleet.
In messages concerning these units South China Fleet and French Indochina
force have appeared as vpell as the naval station at Sama Bako and Takao.
Third base force at Palao and Rno Palao have also been engaged in extensive
communications with Second Fleet Commander.
Combined air force has assembled in Takao v^ith* indications that some compo-
nents have moved on to Hainan.
Third Fleet units believed to be moving in direction of Takao and Bako.
[6009] Second base force appears transporting equipment of air forces to
Taivpan.
Takao radio today accepted traffic for unidentified Second Fleet unit and
Submarine Division or Squadron.
CruDiv Seven and Desron Three appear as an advance unit and may be en-
route South China.
There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air groups in
the Marshalls which comprise Airrou Twenty Four at least one Carrier Division
unit plus probably one third of the submarine fleet.
Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in South
Eastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palao and Marshalls.
From Com. 16, that is Asiatic, to the CINCPAC and to OPNAV
and to COM 14 and to CINCAF, which was Admiral Hart.
Morning comment —
Mr. Mitchell. The date of that ?
Admiral Stakk. This is the 26th.
Mr. Mitchell. Of November?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Morning comment Comfourteen two' one ten of twenty-sixth —
The message I just read bears "2613"— it refers to the [6010]
one I just read, which was Admiral Bloch's dispatch.
"Morning comment Comfourteen," to the despatch I have just read
from Hawaii. [Reading :]
Morning comment Comfourteen two one ten of twenty sixth X Trafiic analysis
past few days indicate Cine second directing units of first second third fleets and
subforce in a loose knit task force organization that apparently will be divided
into two sections X For purposes of clarity units expected to operate in south
China area will be referred to as first section and units expected to operate in
mandates will be referred to as second section X Estimated units in first section
are Crudiv seven X Airron six defense division one X Desron three and subron
six XX Second section —
which is the one he put in the Marshalls —
Crudiv five X Cardiv three Ryujo and one Maru X Desrons two and four X
Subron five X Desdiv twentythree X First base force of third fleet X Third
base force at Palao X Fifth base force at Saipan and lesser units unidentified
XX Crudiv six and Batdiv three may be included in first and second sections
respectively but status cannot be clarified yet XX Balance third fleet units in
doubt but may be assumed that these vessels including Desron five will take
station in Formosa Straits or further south X There are slight indications
[6011] today that Desron three Crudiv seven and Subron six are in Takao area
X Combined airforce units from Empire are at Paklioi Hoihow Saigon Takao
and other bases on Taiwan and China coast X Cannot confirm supposition that
carriers and submarines in force are in mandates X Our best indications are
that all known first and second fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure area X Our
lists indicate Cine combined in Nagato X Cine first in Hyuga and Cine second in
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2257
Atago in Kure area X Cine third in Ashigara in Sasebo area X Cine fifth In
Chichijima area X Comdr subforce in Kashima in Yokosulia area but this
considered unreliable XX South China fleet appears to have been strengthened
by units from central or north China probablj' torpedo l)oats XX Southern
expeditionary fleet apparently being reinforced by one base force unit XX Direc-
tives to the above task forces if such are directed to individual units and not to
complete groups X Special calls usually precede formation of task force used in
area operations X Cine second X Third and Cine southern expeditionary fleet
appear to have major roles X Traffic from Navminister and Cngs to Cincs of
fleet appear normal X Evaluation is considered reliable. ^
That shows differences in opinion as to at least the carriers in the
Marshalls.
[601'2] Senator Lucas. In view of subsequent events, Admiral
Kimmel's report was more accurate than Admiral Hart's?
Admiral Stark. I beg pardon, Senator Lucas ?
Senator Lucas. In view of subsequent events. Admiral Kimmel's
report was more reliable than Admiral Hart's with respect to where
the Japanese carriers were ?
Admiral Stark. I do not know that either one of them was reliable.
I do not know yet whether there were any carriers in the eastern Mar-
shalls, and I have been unable to ascertain.
Senator Lucas. Well, it is a certainty, however, there was a task
force that was lost, and Kimmel in his message was talking about the
loss of part of a fleet that he could not find ; isn't that true ?
Admiral Stark. Yes ; and Admiral Hart thought they were in home
waters.
Senator Lucas. Yes. And the very carriers that Admiral Hart
talked about being in home waters turned out to be in the task force
that struck Pearl Harbor ; that is correct, isn't it ?
Admiral Stark. Yes. I think the iniormation is they were not in
the eastern Marshalls.
Senator Lucas. I do not know where they were. At least they were
lost and were finally discovered where they were on December 6, 1941 ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
[6013'] Senator Lucas. Assuming you had taken the other posi-
tion. Admiral Stark, that there was a lost fleet out in the Pacific, would
that give you any greater concern with respect to the Hawaiian area ?
Admiral Stark. Well, it might have. I do not know. That would
be hindsight.
Senator Lucas. What was the Navy's principal business in the
Pacific Ocean ? What was our chief problem out there in the Pacific ?
Admiral Stark. To protect the United States interests.
Senator Lucas. Yes ; to protect the United States with what ? With
what would we protect them ?
Admiral Stark. With the fleet.
Senator Lucas. After all, the fleet was the chief interest of the
United States, was it not ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. That should have been the chief interest of every
naval officer in the Navy, both here in Washington and in the Pacific?
Admiral Stark. Well, it was.
Senator Lucas. Now, no one knew where the Japs were going to
attack, but whether it was the Philippines or Wake or any other Amer-
ican possessions, the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor was the watch-
79716 — 46— pt. 5 14
2258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
dog for American safety and security, [6014-] not only for our
possessions but for the continental United States as well; is that not
correct ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Senator Lucas. In other words, it seems to me, in view of the fact
that the fleet was in the Hawaiian area, the sole purpose being the
defense of our country and our possessions, that there should not have
been anything left undone on the part of any naval officer either in
Washington or in the Pacific area to protect that fleet, because without
it we were in pretty bad shape, were we not ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Now, any of these places that you mentioned, any of
the places tliat were mentioned there in those messages, like the Kra
Peninsula, Borneo, Philippines, and other sjDots, if they had been
struck by the Japs there would not have been any danger to our fleet,
would there ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. You are speaking of the southern
Senator Lucas. I am speaking now of the message that you sent to
the commander of the Pacific Fleet and the commander of the Asiatic
Fleet wherein you mentioned certain points that you thought, from the
information you had, Japan might strike.
Admiral Stark. Well, if Japan struck the Philippines, that part of
our fleet out there was certainly in danger.
[6015] Senator Lucas. That part of our fleet was in danger, but
the principal part was based at Hawaii, and insofar as the principal
part of the fleet was concerned it was not in danger with respect to any
of those places that were mentioned in the message; isn't that correct?
Admiral Stark. That is correct, so far as the places mentioned in
the message. I would like to point out. Senator Lucas, with regard to
the places mentioned in the message, that they referred to an attack by
an amphibious force.
Senator Lucas. Well, what would an amphibious force be. Admiral
Stark?
Admiral Stark. Well, an amphibious force — for example, there
were somewhere in the neighborhood of 30 transports in that force.
Senator Lucas. Yes.
Admiral Stark. It was a force of ships with men for landing and
with equipment for landing, and with boats for landing them, such,
for example, as our own amphibious forces when they strike.
Senator Lucas. Yes.
Admiral Stark. We mention in that dispatch, or I think it may
have been read into the dispatch and perhaps understood, that the
dispatch referred only to that. I would like to go through that dis-
patch once again, if I may.
[6016] We state that—
negotiations * * * looking towards a stabilization of conditions in the Pacific
liave ceaSed and an aggressive move by .Tapan is expected vrithin the next few
days.
That is an aggressive move.
Now, we state that —
the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task
forces indicates an amphibious expedition —
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2259
and the amphibious expedition, not any strike that might come but
this amphibious expedition, to be either against the Philippines or
Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Then we go on with—
execute au appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the
tasks assigned in WPL-46. Inform district and army autliorities.
Now, Ave knew there was an amphibious force and we knew its pos-
sible objectives. We had stated in a previous dispatch that an attack
might be coming in any direction. This dispatch speaks of a surprise
aggressive movement.
Senator Lucas. Yes, sir.
Admiral Stark. The fact that it is sent to any man for action means
that we are thinking of him with reference to the material contained
in this dispatch. If it were simply inf ormatory and of interest to him
we would have on there, as has been pointed out, "for information."
I think the distinction between "for information" and "for action"
should be cleared up.
[6017] Senator Lucas. That is right.
Admiral Stark. We would not have sent this to Admiral Kimmel
for action unless we had been thinking of him and the possibility of
an attack in his direction, and for that reason he was put down "for
action." I do not know whether I made that point clear before, as
to the difference between "for action" and "for information."
Senator Lucas. I appreciate the distinction and it was very fairly
put to us by General Marshall on that score. However, it does seem to
me that whenever, even in a command action of that type, where you
mentioned these various places as the theater and Hawaii was not
mentioned, it just occurred to me it was calculated to take just a little
away, perhaps, from Hawaii. Maybe I am wrong.
Admiral Stark. Again, I invite your attention to the point that we
were putting down the points of a possible attack of an amphibious
expedition. We had no thought of an amphibious expedition striking
at Hawaii. We were not thinking of an assault on Hawaii and a
landing on Hawaii as a result of an amphibious expedition.
Senator Lucas. Assuming that they did strike as was suggested,
which they did later on
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; the forecast was correct.
Senator Lucas. The point I am trying to make is tliat none
[6018] of that information that was sent was as vital as the pro-
tection of the fleet in Pearl Harbor. That was the main thing, was
it not?
Admiral Stark. And for that purpose we gave a directive to take
a defensive deployment; yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Admiral Stark, do you believe, as Chief of Naval
Operations, that in November and December 194:1, you exercised that
high degree of care and caution which the nearing Japanese crisis
compelled you to do in sending to Admiral Kimmel all the informa-
tion, and the timely information, upon which he could base a wise
decision ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; I had thought so.
Senator Lucas. And you still believe it?
Admiral Stark. I still think so ; yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. You know he had many difficult decisions to make
out there?
2260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR A'rPACK
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. And, of course, you had many difficult decisions to
make here.
Admiral Stark. I not only had many to make here with regard to
the Pacific, but we were operating and were practically at war on the
high seas in the Atlantic with the Department alerted for material
coming in, dodging submarines, and troop convoys, and so forth, day
and night. We had attacked [6019] for example, between
September and the 1st of December, as I recall, three destroyers that
were attacked, one sunk. We also had the Salinas attacked but it
managed to get in; it was torpedoed. We had attacks going back as
far as June. That was in addition to all the rest of the build-up, and
so forth. We were extremely occupied with many heavy problems.
Senator Lucas. I appreciate that. I want to ask you one other
question along that same line. Do you feel that on the morning of
December 6, 1941, when you received the last part of the 14-part
message
Mr. Mitchell. December 7.
Senator Lucas. I mean December 7, 1941, when you received the
last part of the 14-part message, that you acted with that high degree
of care that you should have under those circumstances in sending or
failing to send, rather, a message to Admiral Kimmel at that time?
Admiral Stark. I thought so, because if j'ou take out one or two
words in the Japanese 14-part message, just took the meat of it, it is
almost a paraphrase of what we had sent. I read that in my state-
ment, and if you would like I will read it again.
Senator Lucas. You took the position at that time, as I recall, when
you first talked to General Marshall, that you had already sent suffi-
cient information to Admiral Kimmel, [6020] and if you sent
him more it might confuse him.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I thought there was a possibility of send-
ing too much. That was with reference to the 1 o'clock message which,
as I have stated, was the thing which stood out so clearly, because
naturally, in the face of hindsight and in thinking that situation over,
and in searching my conscience for what I might have done that I did
not, I stated both to the Naval Committee and to the Roberts Com-
mission, in looking over the whole field, I had, in the light of hindsight,
regretted that I had not paralleled the Army message rather than just
let the Army message go for me as well as for the Army. But I did
not diagnose it to mean an attack at that time, and, as I stated a day
or two ago, no one else pointed that out to me. Marshall said he did
not understand the significance; nevertheless, it did alert him to the
point that he thought something ought to go out. He read into it a
possibility which I had not up until the time he called me.
Senator Lucas. Admiral Stark, you had much communication with
Admiral Kimmel, both from the standpoint of letter writing and the
standpoint of messages. Let me ask you if you ever talked to him over
the telephone?
Admiral Stark. I never had talked to Admiral Kimmel over the
telephone.
[6021] Senator Lucas. And it did not occur to you on the Sun-
day morning there that this message was important enough that you
should call him on the telephone and give him the contents of the last
part of the message?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2261
Admiral Stark. It did not. I brought that out before the Roberts
Commission as one of the things, and that is one thing I have thought
so much about since, and that was the use of the teleplione. I frankly
did not think of it. I never heard it mentioned by anyone else until
I volunteered the fact that I did not think of it.
Senator Lucas. It is true that had you immediately picked up the
telephone at that time, or even sent a message at 10 : 30 or 10 : 40, that
morning, to Admiral Kimmel, giving him the complete digest of the
fourteenth part of the 1 4-part message, it would have placed Kimmel
on a complete war alert, would it not?
Admiral Stark. I do not know.
Senator Lucas. Why do you say that ?
Admiral Stark. Because I do not. I did not know what his re-
action would have been to the fourteenth part of that message, which
was merely confirmatory of what we had sent. After the 1 o'clock
message, if I had told him that the message had come in from the Japs
as confirming what we had already told him, with the simple statement
that they were directed to deliver that to the State Department, to Mr.
[6022] Hull, at 1 o'clock, I do not know what his reaction would
have been. That is all it stated. As to whether he might have read a
significance in it which nobody here read into it, I do not know. He
might have.
benator Lucas. In other words, you go back to the message of
November 27 and state to the committee now, if Admiral Kimmel was
not on the alert on December 6 as the result of the message you sent
him of November 27, then whatever you might have given him subse-
quently on December 7 would not have made much difference?
Admiral Stark. For example, I sent him that information. If I
had made the evaluation which we now make in the light of hindsight,
and told him that, that would be one thing, but if I simply sent him the
information, whether or not he would have read into it what we did
not read into it here, I do not know.
Senator Lucas. Now, you sent him some four or five messages, as I
recall, between November 24 and December 6. Do you feel that you
sent him all of the vital and material information that was necessary,
upon which he could properly alert the naval command of the Pacific
at that time ?
Admiral Stark. I do; yes, sir. I feel that the message about the
burning of the codes was just about as strong in its implications as
anything could be. Now, as you Imow — [6023'] and I haven't
mentioned it before — I have been criticized by the Department, for
example, for not having sent out Mr. Hull's 10-point note.
Senator Lucas. I was going to ask you that in the next question.
Admiral Stark. I was hoping it would come up. I did not want
to volunteer it.
Senator Lucas. I have it here. I want to ask you whether you are
familiar with the 10-point note that was prepared by Mr. Hull and
given to the Japs.
Admiral Stark. With the ground work ; yes. Just when I saw it,
I do not know, but if you read my message of the 27th carefully, as to
what it says, with the knowledge that I did not know of the 10-point
note at that time, and if I knew of it subsequently and had sent it to
Admiral Kimmel, I do not know what he would have thought, but it
could be said, "Here is a note from Stark that negotiations have
2262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ceased ; here is one from Mr. Hull which offers to carry on negotia-
tions, or may be considered an ultimatum," there has been much argu-
ment about that, but, in any case, it could not have strengthened the
unequivocal statement which I made. It might have confused him or
it might have weakened the statement. If he was confused he could,
of course, have sent me the dispatch, "You state the negotiations are
over; here is an offer to [602^^ continue." Unless I told him
Mr. Hull's own opinion was that the whole thing was over, it could
have confused him. That opinion was expressed in my dispatch of the
27th. My own feeling, even in the light of hindsight and careful study
of the message, is that to have sent it would have either weakened my
dispatch of the 27th or would have been confusing to the man at the
other end of the line.
Senator Lucas. In your opinion the 10-point message of Mr. Hull,
had it been sent to Admiral Kimmel verbatim, would have confused
the issue rather than have clarified the issue ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; or weakened it.
Senator Lucas. Now, your message of November 24 merely states —
Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful.
Then, on November 27, as I get the distinction in the two messages,
you said :
Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the
Pacifiic have ceased.
Now, that is the message that went on to Kimmel, is it?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; and to Hart.
Senator Lucas. And Admiral Hart. That was a command message ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. And it was a message that anyone who could read
the English language ought to be able to understand, [6025]
was it not ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. When diplomatic negotiations between two coun-
tries have ceased — and that is all that Admiral Kimmel knew at that
time — it means that imminent and serious danger between these two
countries is near at hand ; isn't that true ?
Admiral Stark. It is, coupled with the statement that this was a
war warning.
Senator Lucas. That is right. Now, there has also been some com-
plaint about your failure, as I understand it, not to send to Admiral
Kimmel the message that you received on November 27, 1941, in which
Japan informed Hitler that war with the Anglo-Saxon powers would
break out sooner than anyone dreamed. Do you think that would help
Admiral Kimmel any, to have sent that out to him ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. I think that dispatch was pretty well
distilled and covered by our own which said that Japan is expected
to make an aggressive move within the next few days. I think it was
also distilled, so to speak, in the Army dispatch which said war might
happen any minute.
Senator Lucas. In other words, if I understand you correctly, it is
your contention that the messages of the 24th and the 27th, especially
the last one, which commands, that every commander at every post
should have thoroughly [60£6] understood the important sig-
nificance of it and acted accordingly ?
PKOCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2263
Admiral Stark. We felt so; yes, sir; and we studied that situation,
as to sending anything more out, and decided that the message stood
and we qualified it in no way whatever. We supported it in the "codes
burning" message.
Senator Lucas. Yes. And with respect, Admiral Stark, to the
"codes burning" message, do you know of any time in history where
nations have burned codes that war was not imminent and did not
take place?
Admiral Stark. I do not know of any. There might be some, but
I do not know of any.
Senator Lucas. There may be, but it is the exception rather than
the rule, is it not, that that takes place ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. We thought it pointed right toward war.
We thought it was just perfectly confirmatory of what we had sent.
Senator Lucas. And there was no question but what Admiral Kim-
mel knew about the burning of the Japanese codes in Hawaii at that
time ?
Admiral Stark. No. We got our information of the burning of
codes in Hawaii from Hawaii.
Senator Lucas. That is what I say. There is no question but what
he knew about it ?
[6027] Admiral Stark. There was no question in our minds;
no, sir.
Senator Lucas. It was through his command that you received the
information that they were burning codes, am I correct about that?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. The dispatch came from Com. 14, which
was Admiral Bloch, to us, and we assumed that Admiral Kimmel was
familiar with it.
Senator Lucas. Was that on December 5 ?
Admiral Stark. December 6. -
Senator Lucas. December 6 ?
Admiral Stark. Yes. The dispatch reads, "local consul has de-
stroyed all but one system, although presumably not included your
18005 of the 3rd."
Senator Lucas. Then you b^ent a message to Admiral Kimmel fol-
lowing that, to destroy certain papers, did you not ?
Admiral Stark. We sent a message out on the 6th, authorizing him
to authorize at his discretion his outlying islands to destroy their codes,
retaining such as were necessary for talking with him up until the
last minute, is the way the dispatch finished up.
Senator Lucas. Now let me ask you this question. Admiral Stark.
When these messages went to Admiral Kimmel between November
24 and December 6, and especially the mesages of [602S] the
24th and 26th, and "code burning" messages
Admiral Stark. You mean the 27th, don't you. Senator?
Senator Lucas. The 27th; yes, sir. To whom in the fleet would
that information be distributed ? What officers in the fleet should have
received that information besides Admiral Kimmel? I am especially
referring to your war messages.
[6029] Admiral Stark. Well, the distribution in the fleet
would be by Admiral Kimmel. We addressed it to the Commander
in Chief of the Fleet. The distribution within his command would
be at his direction.
2264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Lucas. In other words, that would be under his jurisdic-
tion, as to whom he delivered the contents of that message?
Admiral Stark. Entirely ; yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. And you wouldn't have anything to do with that on
this end of the line?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Senator Lucas. Do you know now who Kimmel talked with about
the message that was sent on November 27 ?
Admiral Stark. I couldn't be sure ; no, sir.
Senator Lucas. If you had been in command of the fleet at that
time and had received a war warning message, what officers in the
Fleet would you have talked to ?
Admiral Stark. My feeling is that I would have brought in my
key officers.
Senator Lucas. Wlio would they have been?
Admiral Stark. COMFOURTEEN would be one of them, my bat-
tleship commanders, submarine commanders. In general the people
in command of task forces and my air force commander. And we
would have gone over the situation. And, of course, [60301 out
there we would have assumed also that he would have taken it up, and
he probably did, he can tell you, with General Short.
Senator Lucas. Now, if there was any question about the proper in-
terpretation of any of these messages, if Admiral Kimmel was con-
fused in any way as to what they meant, there was nothing in Navy
regulations which would not have permitted him to have gotten you
on the telephone or obtained from you by message just exactly what
you did mean, was there?
Admiral Stark. Nothing whatever in Navy regulations, and my
knowledge of Kimmel, and his of me, from that I would have expected
that if he didn't understand what I sent him he would have asked
me.
Senator Lucas. There is nothing that prevented Kimmel from con-
ferring with you at any time upon any situation ?
Admiral Stark. Nothing whatsoever.
Senator Lucas. And did you receive anj' replies from Admiral
Kimmel to any of these messages between the 24th and the 6th of
December which would give you any indication whatsoever that Ad-
miral Kimmel didn't thoroughly understand what these messages
meant ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir, I did not.
Senator Lucas. Admiral Stark, I want to talk just a moment with
you about the anti-torpedo baffles that were [6031] discussed
between yourself and Admiral Kimmel, as I recall, along in the spring
of 1941.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. I have before me an exhibit that is not in evidence
here, a statement made by Admiral Kimmel, in which he refers to an
official letter which you wrote and which is a part of Exhibit 49 in
the Naval Court of Inquiry, in which is stated the following :
Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T baffles within Pearl
Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. It is considered that the
relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl
Harbor. In addition, the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room
limit the practicability of the present type of baffles.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2265
Certain limitations and considerations are advised to be borne in mind in
planning the installation of auti-torpedo baffles within harbors, among which
the following may be considered :
(a) A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to suc-
cessfully drop torpedoes from planes. 150 feet of water is desired. The maxi-
mum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250 feet. Launch-
ing speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. Desirable height of [6032]
dropping is 60 feet or less. About 200 yards of torpedo run is necessary before
the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.
Now, at one time you considered seriously placing these anti-tor-
pedo nets in Pearl Harbor to protect the battleships ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator LtrcAS. And you, as I understand it, made an exhaustive
search with the British as well as our own naval experts and engineers,
scientific men, with respect to what could or could not be done in
shallow water?
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Senator Lucas. And this letter that you wrote is the consequence
of that, am I right?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Well, the Navy Board of Inquiry called this bomb
a secret weapon in the nature of a robot bomb which was unknown to
the best professional opinion in America at this time. Do you agree
with that statement?
Admiral Stark. A robot bomb ?
Senator Lucas. This torpedo bomb was in the nature of a secret
weapon, they said, along the lines of a robot bomb, which was unknown
to the best professional opinion in America and Britain at that time.
I ask if you agree with that? Do you agree that it was \_6033']
unknown to the best American and British opinion at that time, that
a bomb of that kind could not operate in water as shallow as it was
in Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Stark. No, I did not agree with that. There is a later
letter of ours that states that no capital ship was safe in any water
which she could float in, where there was sufficient run for the torpedo
to arm itself.
However, the letter was further qualified by stating depths which
were desirable. I have got the letter here.
Senator Lucas. I wish you would produce that letter and read it
into the record, as I have been under the impression that there was
an. opinion among British and American experts that you couldn't
use a bomb of that kind in that shallow water.
Admiral Stark. That was true at the time it was written. There
is a later letter of 13 June from the Chief of Naval Operations.
Senator Lucas. 1941 ?
Admiral Stark. 1941. To the Commandant, 1st, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th,
7th, 8th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th Naval Districts.
The subject is:
Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.
Then there is a reference to the letter of 17 February, {603^']
which I believe may be the one you just mentioned :
1. In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the em-
ployment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles
especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the Fleet in their
respective harbors and especially at the major Fleet bases.
2266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In paragraph 3 were itemized certain limitations to consider in
the use of A/T bailies among which the following was stated:
A minlnuim depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to suc-
cessfully drop torpedoes from planes. About 200 yards of torpedo run is
necessai-y before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.
That was in the letter you just referred to. 2:
Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes
may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as 300 feet, and in some
cases make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent
runs. Hence, it may be stated that it cannot be assumed that any capital
ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack
if surrounded by water at a sulRcient distance to permit an attack to be
developed and a sufhcieut run to arm the torpedo.
I would like to read the rest of that. If the letter [6035']
stopped right there, there wouldn't have been any doubt, but it
does show that possibility.
Paragraph 3 :
While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be anchored
can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack,
it may be assumed that depths of water will be one of the factors considered
by any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10
fathoms or more) is much more likely.
4. As a matter of information the torpedoes laimched by the British at
Taranto were, in general, in 13 to 15 fathoms of water, although several tor-
pedoes may have been launched in 11 or 12 fathoms.
In other words, we pointed out the danger that any ship was
subject to if she were afloat, had enough water to float in and enough
room to fire the torpedo, if they could get the appro:^.ch, and enough
length of run for arming, and we then go on to say, and I would like
to repeat that "it cannot be assumed that an}'^ capital ship or other
valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if
surrounded by water," from this type of attack, and then we go on
to say that we feel the attacks are more likely where the depth of
water is greater.
Senator Luc^s. That letter was written in June, 1941?
[6036] Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; and a copy of that letter was
sent to the commander in chief. Pacific; commander in chief, At-
lantic; commander in chief, Asiatic; and commander in chief of
some of the naval net depots, Bureau of Ordnance, and OP-12.
Senator Lucas. In view of that discovery in June of 1941 that
these torpedo bombs could operate in shallow water, was there any-
thing done by the Navy Department toward the construction of
torpedo nets to go into Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Stark. "We had directed the Bureau of Ordnance, I have
forgotten the date, but it is here, to go ahead and design and develop
antitorpedo nets for harbor work. The letter of February 11, which
I would like to read, shows the action we took as far back as that,
because of this possible contingency.
Senator Lucas. Is it a long letter?
Admiral Stark. No, sir; one page.
Senator Lucas. All right.
Admiral Stark (reading) :
1. Reference (a) requested information concerning all promising experimental
and development work on nets and booms done by the U. S. Navy since March
1940.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2267
2. As far as this Office is aware, no such work has been done other than the
making of minor modifications to the Admiralty designs. It is considered that
experimental and development work should be undertaken. If necessary,
[6037] additional personnel for this purpose should be secured.
3. There appears an urgent need for an anti-torpedo net which can be laid
and removed in certain harbors in a short time for temporary use, and which
will give good if not perfect protection from torpedoes fired from planes. The
present Admiralty type net is designed to withstand torpedoes and with cutters,
and its appurtenances are very heavy. A lighter net which will stop a
torpedo not armed with cutters would furnish some protection, especially against
torpedoes which would explode on contact with a metal net.
4. Effort should he made to reduce the weights of the present Admiralty nets
and booms and their appurtenances witliout reducing their efficiency in order
that they may be more readily handled. As a beginning, it is also suggested
that plans be made to test sections of the old A/S net and of the new, as well
as indicator nets, by attacking submarines. While such tests may duplicate
British experiments, valuable lessons may be learned. It is requested that this
office be kept informed of development work and all tests and experiments con-
ducted with nets and booms.
That was our initial letter on directing the Bureau of Ordnance
to go ahead with that work.
Senator Lucas. The date is February 1941?
Admiral Stark. February 11, 1941; yes, sir.-
[6038] Senator Lucas. When did you first get any nets?
Admiral Stark. We didn't get any nets until 1942.
Senator Lucas. Do you know why?
Admiral Stark. I have forgotten the date but we did not have
them up to the time of Pearl Harbor.
Senator Lucas. Do you know why the delay?
Admiral Stark. The Bureau of Ordnance just didn't produce on it.
Senator Lucas. Was any follow-up made on that letter of February
11 with respect to the Bureau of Ordnance insisting that the nets be
produced ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; there were several.
Senator Lucas. A lot of ships could have been saved at Pearl Har-
bor if the nets had been out ; isn't that right ?
Admiral Stark. If an effective baffle had been there it undoubtedly
would have minimized the effect. Of course, the bombs also did
considerable damage.
Senator Lucas. I understand the torpedo planes did the real dam-
age to the battleships, according to previous testimony; more than
altitude bombs.
Admiral Stark. I think that is correct.
Senator Lucas. Do you know how long it took us to perfect this
type of bomb that we could use in shallow water ?
Admiral Stark. No; I do not have that information. The
[6039] Bureau of Ordnance could furnish it.
Senator Lucas. And you don't have the information as to how
long it took the Japanese to perfect that type of bomb?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. I remember the original specification.
I was Chief of Bureau of Ordnance. Our first specification was 100
knots and 100 feet. We were continually trying to raise the speed
and increase the altitude from which they could be fired.
Senator Lucas, LTndoubtedly Japan had Pearl Harbor in mind
when she first started experimenting with this type of bomb ; do you
agree?
2268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. Unquestionably she had us in mind, just as we had
any possible enemy in mind. We were all after a high-dive and
shallow -water run.
Senator Lucas. Very few harbors are as shallow as Pearl Harbor,
however ?
Admiral Stark. Well, it was a shallow-water harbor. So is Colon.
So is Guantanamo. So are many others. Too shallow in many cases
for comfort.
Senator Lucas. I want to change the course of the questioning
just a little and ask you this. Admiral.
Did you have any definite or direct advance information that
Japan was going to strike us?
[6O4O] Admiral Stark. No ; I did not.
Senator Lucas. You have told the committee the various sources
from which you obtained information in the Far East and upon
which you made your evaluations and estimates and which were sent
to the respective naval commands.
Have you given to the committee every source of information that
you had, including magic and information from Intelligence offi-
cers, and what not, upon which you based these estimates and upon
which your Intelligence officers made the proper evaluations?
Admiral Stark. I think so, yes, sir. I can't think of anything
more at the moment which I msiy have omitted.
Senator Lucas. And the Army exchanged its information with
you as to what they received in the Hawaiian area, through the East-
ern Asiatic section of the world?
Admiral Stark. Complete and daily exchange and very close liai-
son and continuous between General Marshall and myself.
Senator Lucas. You also had the advantage of seeing all the diplo-
matic messages that came in through the codes, at least?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; such as were considered as important
were given to me ; and I had confidence in the people, as to their selec-
tions.
Senator Lucas. You were in frequent communication with
[60U] the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, and the President of the
United States, Mr. Roosevelt, at that time?
Admiral Stark. Very frequent, yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Now, as a result of your close association and your
intimate loiowledge with all the cabinet officers, with all the people
in the Executive Branch of the Government at that time, do you know
of a single man in the Army or Navy, State Department or other
branches of the Executive Government, who had any direct, clear-
cut information that Japan was going to attack this nation ?
Admiral Stark. I do not.
Senator Lucas. Do you Ivnow of any individual in the Executive
Branch of the Government, including the Navy, Army and State
Department, that had any information as to the precise point and
hour that Japan was going to attack this country?
Admiral Stark. I do not.
^ Senator Lucas. So far as you know all these rumors and specula-
tions, newspaper articles that have been written in the past, that men
high in the Navy, Military, and official life of Washington knew the
precise time and place the Japanese would attack was utterly without
frvnndation in fact?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2269
Admiral Stark. That is my opinion.
^senator Lucas. Admiral Stark, as Chief of Naval Operations
[6O42] you appeared, in April 1940, before the Naval Aifairs
Committee of the United States Senate as a witness in behalf of
HK-8026. Do you recall that?
Admiral Stakk. I recall the number. I don't recall the subject
matter of the bill.
Senator Lucas. You recall the time you appeared before the Naval
Affairs Committee, of which I was a member, at that time ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. As a roember of that committee I remembered a
statement you made, a statement which I have never forgotten, and
I had occasion over the week-end to review these hearings in order
that I might find your direct quotation. You made the following
statement after a colloquy with the Senator from Maryland, Mr.
Tydings, the late Senator from New Jersey, Mr. Barbour, and the
Senator from Illinois, here it is — it is on page 92. You stated, in
answer to a question of Senator Tydings :
If we can get peace on earth and good will to men we are all for it. The
Naval officers are not in favor of war. If there is any ofiicer in existence who
wants a war I would like to find him. Our recommendations are solely with
the view of the peaceful interests of this country in mind. If anything happens
we have got to bear the brunt of 16043} it. Our job is taking care of
you people.
Do you remember making that statement?
xA^dmiral Stark. I recall it now, yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What is the date of that ?
Senator Lucas. That is under date of April 1940, when Admiral
Stark appeared before the Conmiittee on Naval Aifairs. Admiral
Stark, that was your position in April 1940 ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Was that your position in November and December
of 1941?
Admiral Stark. That has always been my position.
Senator Lucas. Do you know of a single high ranking officer in
the Army or Navy in November or December of 1941 who wanted
to plunge this country into war with any nation ?
Admiral Stark. With any nation ?
Senator Lucas. Yes, Japan or any other nation.
Admiral Stark. I certainly didn't want to with Japan. I would
like to say with regard to Hitler that I spent many hours speculating
myself as to what was the best course for this nation to pursue. Every
thinking man of responsibility did. I had seen Hitler's game of one
at a time. I felt that without our help England might fail. That
along with that picture came the possibility of a break-up of the
British Empire and its control by Germany and a Europe controlled
[6044] by Germany.
That was also paralleled by the possibility of a war in Asia.
And the combination might have worked a squeeze play on us which
would have been a terrible thing for this country. We might have
armed to the teeth and steered a course that would have kept us out,
but it may just have postponed the day. That was something over
which I thought a sreat deal.
2270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
However, I did have this background, that Congress, through lend-
lease, and the knowledge of what we were doing, had, in my opinion,
taken the position and the country was committed to seeing that Hitler
should not win, and on that basis I felt we might wait too late, and I
therefore, recommended that if we were going to get in, and if we were
going to have a war psychology which would produce what it was
necessary to produce, and if we did not wait until it was too late,
that, in my opinion, the time had come for us to get in it, based on
what I considered the country's policy.
[6045] Senator Lucas. Well, that was your feeling towards
Hitler at that particular time?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. And that, of course, was not followed out by the
President of the United States. War was not declared upon Germany
until Germany declared war upon us.
Admiral Stark. That is true.
Senator Lucas. Let me ask you this question : In your connections
with the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of War, the Secretary
of State, and the President of the United States did you reach the
conclusion that any one of these men, or any group of men, wanted
to take this country into war with Japan for the sole purpose of just
going to war.
Admiral Stark. No, I did not. To the best of my knowledge and
belief all were in sympathy from the military standpoint to avoid
that war if we could do it without walking back on our principles.
Senator Lucas. In other words, the high ranking Navy, War, State,
and other officials of the executive branch of the Government were
seeking through an honorable way to obtain peace with Japan but at the
same time preparing ourselves for war in the event Japan and other
dictator nations attacked this Nation or any of our possessions?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
[6046] Senator Lucas. Do you agree with me that if we had
followed any other course it would have been necessary for us to yield
to this new order of might, which would have meant that we would
have had to give up the freedom of the seas, we would have been sub-
mitting to mass subjection and the world trade would have been run
by the edicts or decrees of the dictators of this world ?
Admiral Stark. I think that might very well have happened and
I think Mr. Hull's testimony and his writings and what he was after
shows that it was not just theory with him but working on what
Japan had done and was doing where she controlled, that any ex-
tension by her would have been very restrictive to our own intersts.
Senator Lucas. You are familiar with the testimony of Mr. Hull,
are you not ?
Admiral Stark. With most of it I think, yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Do jj'ou agree in principle with what he said before
this committee?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Do 3^ou agree with me that had we yielded to Japan
at that time we would have been yielding to might and we would have
deserted every belief and every liberty and every tradition and every
concept on which this Nation is founded?
[6O47] Admiral Stark. I think so, yes, sir. My feeling with
regard to a Pacific war and in which my letters state this fact, I think,
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2271
many times was that we would not forsake China and back out from
the stand we had taken and that Japan, on the otlier hand, also would
not back out and that regardless of all else there was a stumbling block
which could not be overcome.
Senator Lucas. That is what you continually say in your letters to
the Commander of the Pacific Fleet.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. You go over that several times, as I recall it.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. You talk about irreconcilable conflicts here that
exist between Japan and this country.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. That some day they would probably meet and have
to be decided through war. I think that was your position.
Admiral Stark. That is true, yes, sir. Other things Japan might
have promised she would do, but personally I had no faith in her
promises and there is good factual data to base that on.
Senator Lucas. One other question : From your intimate [6O4B']
knowledge of the naval, military and diplomatic conditions as they
existed in the United States in tlie summer and fall of 1941 was there
any one man or group of men who maneuvered the Japanese crisis so
as to deliberately invite the Pari Harbor attack?
Admiral Stark. Not to my knowledge, or I had never thought such.
Senator Lucas. Well, you were in on the conversations, practically
all of the conversations with respect to Pearl Harbor previous to De-
cember 6, 1941 ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. As Chief of Naval Operations that was one of your
duties, to know and understand what was going on?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir, and I may say that on the contrary we
were trying to maintain peace in the Pacific.
Senator Lucas. Do you know of any man or group of men high in
the Executive branch of the Government that trapped the Japs or lied
to the Japanese to get them to attack us in Pearl Harbor in order to
make it easier to get Congressional action to declare war against
Japan ?
Admiral Stark. I did not get the first part of that question.
Senator Lucas. Do you know of any man or group of men high in,
the Executive branch of the government, including the [6049]
naval, military and diplomatic group, who trapped the Japanese
or who lied to the Japanese in order to get them to attack Pearl Har-
bor so as to make it easier for Congress to give a declaration of war?
Admiral Stark. No, I do not.
Senator Lucas. You had frequent conversations, you have told me,
with the President of the United States from time to time. You
also had frequent conversations with Col. Frank Knox, who was then
Secretary of the Navy. I take it that he was familiar with all of these
messages that were sent to Admiral Kimmel between November the
24th and December the 6th ?
Admiral Stark. He was. I had no secrets from the Secretary of
the Navy.
Senator Lucas. Well, now, from your intimate knowledge of the
diplomatic and military activities and your conversations with the
2272 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
President and the Secretary of the Navy, did the President of the
United States have every reason to believe that the naval command
in Hawaii was properly alerted for any emergency when the Japs
struck us on December the Tth, 1941 ?
Admiral Stark. He knew of the despatch that we had sent there,
he knew how I felt about it and I felt that he agreed with me.
Senator Lucas. Well, did he have every reason to believe [6050']
from all that had been done by yourself and Marshall at that time
with respect to alerting the commands that the Hawaii command at
the time was properly alerted ? That was your belief, wasn't it?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; I think he felt that they were properly
alerted. I may say, and I have hesitated to quote the President unless
I am dead certain, but I specifically recall his statement to me that he
was surprised at the attack on Pearl Harbor and he stated that to me
as late as last summer and I told him that I had just previously a day
or two before that testified to that effect myself before the Navy Court
of Inquiry. It was some comfort to me to have him reiterate it.
Senator Lucas. Well, I guess everybody was surprised except the
Japs, were they not ?
Admiral Stark. The Japs were the real cause for the attack on Pearl
Harbor, sir.
Senator Lucas. I want to refer to your statement briefly on page 7,
where you again talk about the President of the United States, in which
you stated in a letter to Admiral Kimmel on February the 10th, 1941 :
I am struggling, and I use the word advisedly, every time I get in the White
House, which is rather frequent, for additional men. It should not be necessary
[6051] and while I have made the case just as obvious as I possibly could, the
President just has his own ideas about men.
Can you elaborate a little on that?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Explain that to the committee. This was in 1941, a
short while before the crisis, some 8 months, and will you explain
that to the committee just briefly ?
Admiral Stark. I always found men the most difficult thing to get
in working on naval appropriations. I had found it difficult many
times on the Hill, I found it difficult in the budget, I found it difficult
with the President. I think many Congressmen and Senators will
recall some of the arguments we had about it.
So far as Congress was concerned I had attributed it to the fact that
while you might cut ships, ships wore out and were scratched and
scrapped. Once you increased the size of the regular military estab-
lishment it looked like a permanent increase in expense to the Govern-
ment. I was cut in a request for men during this period by Congress,
although later on practically anything that I asked for went over.
Senator Lucas. Well, in that same
Admiral Stark. May I go just a little further, sir?
[6052] Senator Lucas. Certainly.
Admiral Stark. Now, as regards the President : The President knew
the Navy, he loved it, he studied it and he spent a great deal of time
aboard ship and he had reports that the ships were overcrowded. We
had letters coming in, anonymous at times, which were sent to the
White House, about the terrible living conditions on board ship and
I "was asking to increase the number of men on board ship.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2273
He had taken trips and Koss Mclntire could probably tell you, but
I dare say one Board that he had had some cause for apprehension
from certain medical officers with regard to — ^I don't mean that Koss
was one of them but I know that he is familiar with the subject. He
had that report. He also knew that every additional man that we
put aboard ship, a considerable increase in weight was involved. I
have forgotten what it was but the Bureau of Ships objected that for
every additional man we put on at that time we would have to take
some weight off. I do not mean just the weight of the man but it
might have been two or three tons that went with him. There were a
good many things of that sort which the President considered.
Now, as regards overcrowding : Admiral Kimmel had made a very
careful study with a board and it had been shown on one ship how the
men could be placed without undue over- [6053] crowding. I
stood back of Admiral Kimmel on that. The President had to be con-
vinced of these matters, it was only right that he should and when I
struggled, I made sure, and I think I stated it here, that I had my own
way.
Now, another question. I have a letter, I do not know whether it
is on file or not, I mean I do not know whether it has been submitted,
it may have been one of those irrelevant letters, but it is not hindsight
because it was as of that time, that I first asked the President for
500,000 men. He threw back his head and laughed and there were a
lot of people in the room and he said, "Betty usually begins working
early, he starts in working a year ahead of time and he follows it up"
and I usually did. But I did struggle for additional men during the
time I was Chief of Naval Operations. I struggled back and forth;
we always had to struggle for that, and we probably will again.
Senator Lucas. These ships that the President was talking about
of course, were laid down a good many years ago, were they not?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. There were a number of things that re-
quired increases in complement. We had greatly increased the anti-
aircraft defenses on the ships. Early in 1940 we had a very careful
study made. Admiral King made it, it is laiown as the King Board,
as to how to increase our anti- [6054-] aircraft defenses. In
addition to that, heretofore we would put enough men on board a
ship to man all the guns, everything manned when we went into a
battery. We foresaw that in a war, in what we might call an air war
that it would be a very pertinent thing to consider that you might
have to keep men at the guns 24 hours a day because you could not be
sure when an air attack might develop. We could not just go to
general quarters and have look-outs in the tops for an engagement
which might come in an hour or two hours. They had to be there day
and night, particularly moonlight nights, for operations against sub-
marines and possibilities of an air attack. There were many things
that made more men necessary.
In addition to that, I personally wanted to fill the complement
up to a hundred percent complement and I wanted to run it 15 percent
over complement so that I would have a pool to draw on in the man-
ning of ships and I found a number of ships that we had coming in
that they continued to cut into the personnel that ships already had
and more or less disrupting them.
79716 — 46 — pt. 5 15
2274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Lucas. And right along that line or train of thought, the
letter from Admiral Kimmel of November 15, 1941, points out that
the fleet requires approximately 9,000 men to fill the complements.
It can utilize an additional 10,000 men.
[6055] My question is that as a result of what happened at Pearl
Harbor would 9,000 or 10,000 more men on battleships and destroyers
there have had any appreciable effect upon what happened?
Admiral Stark. I think none.
Senator Lucas. We would just have lost more men if we had 9,000
or 10,000 more men there, isn't that true ?
Admiral Stark. If that had been so we might have lost considerably
more on some ships.
Senator Lucas. Now,, in this same letter, you stated in a letter to
Admiral Kimmel on July 24 as follows :
We are pushing recruiting just as hard as we can and for budgetary purposes
you will be glad to know the President has okayed a figure of 533,000 enlisted
men and 105,000 Marines. Please give us a "not too badly done" on that. But
what a struggle it has been.
Now, here is the point that I want to direct your attention to. This
is July 1941 and you state :
If we could only have gone full speed 2 years ago —
I presume now you mean at that time, that if you could have had
533,000 enlisted men and 105,000 Marines 2 years ago?
Admiral Stark. Well, I mean if we could have gotten all that we
wanted at that time. I have forgotten just what the [6056]
figures were.
Senator Lucas. Yes. Well, why was it, Admiral Stark, back in
1939, in, say, July 1939, you were not able to get all that you wanted?
What was the reason ?
Admiral Stark. Because we could not get it by the budget. May I
have the page number that you are reading from on that?
Senator Lucas. Page 8.
Admiral Stark. Oh, yes. I may state that when I finally got what
I referred to as the green light I went directly to Senator Byrnes.
He will recall the incident, I think, very well. He called me the most
persistent, stubborn man on personnel he had ever known, but he
finally gave me what I had asked for. There were one or two other
rather amusing incidents in that conversation that it is not necessary
to go into here but we did get what we asl^ed for.
Senator Lucas. Well, you got what you asked for but the point I
am making is that you lay particular stress upon the fact, as I read
the letter, that if you could have had what you were entitled to 2
years before that you could really have been somewhere with the Navy
and that would have been in 1939, in the early part of 1939.
Admiral Stark. If we could have gotten authorization and money
for full complements plus 15 percent it would have made our problems
very much simpler and very much easier. We [6057] solved
it as best we could with what vre got and the results speak pretty well
for themselves.
Senator Lucas. I agree with you on that. Public opinion had some-
thing to do with what you got and what you did not get back in 1939,
isn't that true ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2275
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. Things were not as grave. When I went
before the Naval Committee there are some things that stand out
very clearly and we were struggling on this situation with regard to
men, pointing out that the fleet was only 85 percent manned and what
a great mistake I thought it was. I remember Congressman Ditter
turning to me and saying, "Nobody has ever talked to us like that
before about men." ''Where do you get this stuff?"
I went back to the Department and went over some of my recom-
mendations and some of the previous recommendations of what is
now known as the Bureau of Personnel. I had them back up what
I am about to say, that the Navy's pleas had been constant for men.
The Navy was cut down to a so-called 85 percent complement some
years previous when economy was a very potent subject and the Navy
Avas faced — I think Admiral Pratt was Chief of Operations at the
time — with either keeping fewer ships fully manned or a greater num-
ber of ships in commission partially manned and as I recall 85 percent
was put down as the lower limit of what we could keep ships going
with [60S8] with any degree of efficiency. So we came to ac-
cept that 85 percent and I always thought it was dangerous and the
minute I got where I could raise my voice against it, this practice
which we had gotten to accept, I started doing so.
Senator Lucas. Well, it took a national emergency almost before
you could get what you really wanted ?
Admiral Stark. It took a national emergency to blast it out; yes
sir.
Senator Lucas. And that was due to the temper of the people of
this country ?
Admiral Stark. Yes ; I think so.
Senator Lucas. That it took
Admiral Stark. At that early time.
Senator Lucas. That is right. And the people, after all, usually
make more or less the military and naval policy.
Admiral Stark. In the last analysis the man on the street is the
first line of defense.
Senator Lucas. That is right. And I think it is pertinent, too, along
this line of inquiry, to just refer just briefly to the Treaty of Limitation
of Naval Armaments signed in Washington on February 6, 1922, and
ratified by the Senate March 29, 1922, as indicating how we felt at that
particular time about peace and how far we were willing to go in
order to maintain peace.
[60-59] Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; and we found out to our very
great cost that disarmament by example did not pay.
Senator Lucas. I would like to ask you just one or two questions
about the disarmament conference and see if you
The Chairman. Senator, it is practically 12 : 30.
Senator Lucas. I can finish in 5 minutes I think.
The Chairman. All right. We want to have an executive session.
Senator Lucas. It may be 10 minutes.
The Chairman. Well, go ahead if it won't take more than five
minutes.
Senator Lucas. I want to ask Admiral Stark if he will agree with
these facts. In 1918 the United States had a total combatant tonnage
of ships 1,087,000 and had building additional tonnage of 953,876 tons.
Do you recall those figures?
2276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. I do not recall the figures but if you have it in
front of you I assume they are correct.
Senator Lucas. Well, you recall that in the 1922 disarmament con-
ference which I have talked about we sank or demilitarized 767,800
tons of combatant ships ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. We did the sinking.
Senator Lucas. And for the next eight years for all practical pur-
poses ceased to build ships of war ?
Admiral Stark. We had a period there where we practical-
[6060] ly stopped.
Senator Lucas. Let me ask you this : Did the limitation of arma-
ments conference signed at London April the 27, 1930, and ratified by
the Senate on July 1, 1930, was there anything in that treaty which
prevented construction of our antisubmarine vessels and yet per-
mitted Germany and Japan to build all the submarines they desired?
Do you recall anything about that ?
Admiral Stark. I think there was not. I think in the hearings
that — as you recall, I was nearly nine days straight morning and after-
noon early in 1940 struggling for the increase in the Navy, for what
I thought was a modest increase of 25 percent that was cut in half
by Congress. I pointed out we had not lived up to that very — ^I mean
we had not built up to the 5-5-3 ratio.
Senator Lucas. W^ had not built up to it?
Admiral Stark. We had not built up to it. We were disarming
by example and it did not pay. I do not want to let that stay in,
talking about Congress cutting it in half. They stated that; I ac-
cepted that because it was not just a straight cut in half. It was a
question whether we could get through with 25 percent and we might
lose the whole thing, but tlie figure of about 13 percent, as I recall,
was all we could consider at that time and I accepted that as some-
thing sure [6061] and was told that I could come back up
later. I did and got a very heavy increase, so it is not fair just to
say Congress cut me. It did not hurt and they did give it to me when
I came back afterwards.
Senator Lucas. Well, in 1940 when you testified before this com-
mittee Japan had as much ship tonnage, practically as much as the
United States?
Admiral Stark. I think that is correct. We did not know exactly
how much they had but they claimed that they were practically on
a 5-5 ratio with us, some of their public speakers did.
Senator Lucas. That was not true, of course.
Admiral Stark. No, but it was not 5-3.
Senator Lucas. Now, Mr. Chairman, in order to further demon-
strate the point I am trying to make here as to how public opinion
dominates the affairs of this country I want to read a statement made
by the Honorable David Walsh, Chairman of the Naval Affairs Com-
mitte, who about this same time, in April 1940, placed this very il-
luminatijig statement in the record (reading) :
From 1922 to 1925 the United States laid down no ships. In 1925 it laid down
1 submarine. la 1926 it laid down 1 cruiser and 5 river gunboats. In 1927 it laid
down 1 cruiser and 2 submarines. In 1928, 6 cruisers. In 1929 [6062]
none. In 1930, 3 cruisers and 1 submarine. In 1931, 1 aircraft carrier, 4 cruisers
and 2 submarines. In 1932, 3 destroyers. In 1933, 1 cruiser, 8 destroj'ers and 4
submarines. In 1934, 2 aircraft carriers, 1 cruiser (a), 1 cruiser (b), 21 destroy-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2277
ers and 2 patrol gunboats. In 1935, 1 cruiser (a), 7 cruisers (b), 14 destroyers
and 5 submarines. In 1936 ttie United States laid down
and that is true, that we lived up to this treaty closely while Japan did
not, as I understand it ?
Admiral Stark. We leaned over backwards the other way. We did
not build up.
Senator Lucas. In 1936 the United States laid down one aircraft
carrier, one cruiser (b), six destroyers and seven submarines. In 1937
we laid down one battleship — and I call attention to that because that
is the first battleship we laid down since at least 1922 or before, I guess.
Adrniral Stark. I think that is correct ; yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. There were no battleships laid down between 1922
and 1937 during the 15 years.
Admiral Stark. That is right.
Senator Lucas. And the date the last was laid down is not stated
here.
In 1937, 1 battleship, 14 destroyers and 6 submarines.
In 1938, 1 battleship, 14 destroyers, 4 submarines, 2 [GOGS']
destroyer tenders, 1 seaplane tender, 3 tugs, 2 oilers.
In 1939, 2 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 12 destroyers, 7 submarines,
3 sub chasers, 2 minesweepers, 1 submarine tender, 1 seaplane tender,
1 oiler.
And that is all that I have.
The Chairman. The committee will recess until 2 o'clock and the
chair asks the public to retire as rapidly as possible. We want to have
an executive session.
(Whereupon, at 12: 35 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the
same day.)
IG064] afternoon session — 2 : 45 p. m.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
The Chair wishes to announce that after the executive session the
committee has decided that following the testimony of Admiral Stark
it will recess the hearing until the 15th of January in order that the
new counsel collaborating with Mr. Mitchell and his staff may become
familiar with the testimony adduced up to now and get into the case
so he may go forward with it following the retirement of Mr. Mitchell.
Also the committee decided, upon the urgent request and in ac-
cordance with the wishes of counsel for Admiral Kimmel and Gen-
eral Short, when the committee reconvenes on the 15th of January
Admiral Kimmel will be the first witness, to be followed by General
Short when Admiral Kimmel has concluded.
You may go ahead now.
Mr. Murphy, I believe you are the next.
TESTIMONY OF ADMIEAL HAROLD E. STAEK (Eesumed)
Admiral Stark. May I make just a short statement?
The Chairman. Yes.
Adrniral Stark. My attention has been called to the fact that this
morning I stated that it was last summer that the President expressed
to me his surprise over the Pearl Harbor attack. It was a year ago
2278 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
last summer, during the [6065'\ proceedings of the Naval
Court of Inquiry which were held a year ago last summer.
The Chairman. That is an obvious error, because President Roose-
velt was not alive last summer.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. All right, Congressman.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral, I would like to direct your attention to the
message that was sent to Hawaii on the 7th of December 1941.
Do you have a copy of it ?
Admiral Stark. The 7th of December?
Mr. MuRPHT. Yes, the message of General Marshall.
Admiral Stark. I think I have it in the statement.
Mr. Murphy. As I understand it, the earliest moment you have any
recollection of being aware of the 1 p. m. message was somewhere
between 10: 30 and 11 o'clock that morning. Is that right?
Admiral Stark. I think that is right, 3^es, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And, as I understand it. General Marshall's testi-
mony was that he was aware of the 1 o'clock message sometime sub-
sequent to that on that same morning.
Admiral Stark. I believe it was sometime later.
Mr. Murphy. And then General Marshall sent a message to Hawaii,
and I would like to read that message and discuss it [6'066'\
with you a bit.
The message reads :
The Japanese are presenting at 1 : 00 p. m. Eastern Standard Time today what
amounts to an ultimatum ;
Now, setting aside for the moment the 1 p. m. part of it, you had
already told Hawaii, had you not, that negotiations had terminated
with the Japanese, and as on the 27th you sent that message setting
that particular date, did you not?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, the message continues, "also they are un-
der orders to destroy their code machine immediately."
You had, during the previous days of December, told Admiral Eam-
mel exactly that, had you not?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And continuing, "Just what significance the hour set
may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly."
And then finally, "Inform Naval authorities of this communica-
tion."
Now outside of the 1 p. m. part of that message, was there anything
in the message itself that you had not previously conveyed to Hawaii?
Admiral Stark. In my opinion there was not.
Mr. Murphy. Have you at any time looked into the matter of the
condition of the ships and planes at Hawaii on the [6067] morn-
ing of December 7, 1941 ?
Admiral Stark. I have not.
Mr. Murphy. Prior to the attack.
Admiral Stark. I had not.
Mr. Murphy. Well, there is testimony that has been adduced, and
will be adduced before the committee, as to the condition of readiness
of the ships. Assuming that vou had sent the message the very mo-
ment you had gotten it, somewliere between 10 : 30 and 11 o'clock, and'
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2279
assuming that the attack occurred about 2 : 30 — that is when it was,
was it not, about 2 : 30 Washington time?
Admiral Stark. About 1 : 57, I think, somewhere in there.
Mr. Murphy. About 1 : 57 Washington time ?
Admiral Stark. Shortly before 2.^
Mr. Murphy. Then what change in ships by way of sorties could
have occurred between 10 : 30 and 10 : 40 and 1 : 57 to 2 : 00 o'clock?
Admiral Stark. Well, if I had sent a message, assuming I got
the 1 p. m. message about 10 : 40, I have since asked the question, and
recently, from communications — if I had given them a dispatch which
they had coded and sent and decoded on the other end and delivered,
what their estimate of the time was, and they gave me an hour and 7
minutes.
Mr. Murphy. That would make it 11 : 47.
[6068] Admiral Stark. Assuming I had acted instantaneously
on the message.
Mr. Murphy. Instantaneously, yes. Without any conference at all,
if you had instantaneously acted, they would get it there at 11 : 47?
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. Does that take into consideration the decoding at
Hawaii ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Then at 11 : 47, from then until 1 : 57, what change
could be made in the position of ships at that time? That would be
approximately 2 hours, would it not ?
Admiral Stark. Approximately 2 hours. That is more or less of a
technical question. For example, I do not know which way the ships
were headed. If they were placed in docks so they were heading out
it would be one thing; if they had to be turned around it V70uld be
another. I think only Admiral Kimmel could give you real testimony
on that.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, if the battleships themselves were berthed,
8 of them, in Pearl JHarbor it would take some considerable time,
would it not, to get them out of the harbor?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. The last time we sortied out of there we
had to be turned around by tugs, but during the [6069] pre-
ceding months in which the fleet had been there they undoubtedly had
become used to being handled in there. Just what their time would
have been I do not know. They would first have to have been notified to
get under way, and assuming that they would have to raise steam for
propulsion purposes, and if tugs were required they would have to
have been brought alongside and they would then have had to be
sortied, and they would, of course, have had to have destroyers ahead
of them, and probably planes searching for submarines, which they
would do if they thought the attack might be there, and just what the
total time would have been I would rather Admiral Kimmel gave you
that.
Mr. Murphy. Well, to make a rough approximation, it would be a
matter of hours, would it not ?
Admiral Stark. AVell, you can force when you have to. Normally,
as I recall, we gave a ship with one or two boilers about 2 hours' notice
to get under way.
» Corrected to 1 : 25 p. m. Washington time. See page 2346, Infra.
2280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Murphy. That 2 hours, Admiral, would be dependent upon the
fact that as soon as Admiral Kimmel received the message from Wash-
ington he would have immediately and instantaneously had the reac-
tion that there was to be something happening at 1 o'clock ?
Admiral Stakk. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. In order to consume the time between then [6070]
and the attack, would he not ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I did not quite finish my answer.
Mr. Murphy. All right, you may finish.
Admiral Stark. If he had forced them and the emergency were
understood, they could have cut that time in half, or perhaps less than
that. They would have taken a chance on raising steam without regard
to the normal precautions of raising it slowly so as not to affect the
boilers adversely.
Mr. Murphy. That would be also assuming that his mental processes
were different than they were on the message of the 27th, which said it
was a war warning?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. That is assuming he forced them. He can
give you, I think, better testimony on that than I can, because of his
familiarity with the picture.
Mr. MuiiPHY. There has been some testimony already in the record,
and some to be covered, as to the condition of the readiness of the
planes.
As I understand it, so far as the Army and Navy planes were con-
cerned, in a great measure they required as much as 4 hours before
they could go in the air. This 2 hours difference would not have gotten
them in the air then, would it, if it required 4 hours from the time your
message arrived at Hawaii to the time of the attack?
[6071] Admiral Stark. If it required 4 hours you could not
have gotten them off in that time.
Mr. Murphy. I think there will be considerable testimony along
that line.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. So far as the planes are concerned, if they could not
get off in the air the next best thing would be to push them somewhere
for protection, would it not?
Admiral Stark. To spread them.
Mr. Murphy. To spread them?
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. Instead of having them bunched together the best
thing would be spread them and maybe get them into bunkers?
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. They did have some bunkers, there, did they not?
Admiral Stark. I do not know.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, there have been some questions asked
about the so-called bomb plot message. You know about that ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr, Murphy. That message actually was sent from Tokyo in Sep-
tember, was it not?
Admiral Stark. That is right, yes, sir.
[607£] jNIr. Murphy. It was not translated in Washington until
October 10, is that true?
Admiral Stark. T think so; sometime later.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2281
Mr. Murphy. Was there anything unusual about our diplomatic
relations in September, and was not the date of the forwarding of that
message in Tokyo prior to the submission of the Japanese note of
September — or do you know that ?
Admiral Stark. No, I do not. I am not quite sure of your ques-
tion. Mr. Murphy. . ^ , • .
Mr. Murphy. Well, my question is this: The change m Cabmet
did not occur until October 16, and on October 16 they did send a
message to the Pacific.
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, this socalled bomb plot message was al-
ready translated on October 10.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And had been forwarded from the Japanese in the
month of September. Would not there be less likelihood of that par-
ticular message being clipped or called to your particular attention
then because of the state of the relations between America and Japan
at the time?
Admiral Stark. I do not know that that would have entered into the
minds of the people who were going over that message. I would
rather be inclined to think that the message [607311 would have
stood on its merits, that they would have looked at it as a message with-
out regard to the Japanese Cabinet change.
Mr. Murphy. Then you do not know anybody that saw any par-
ticular significance in that, do you ?
Admiral Stark. No.
Mr. Murphy. It was never called to your attention, that you know
of?
Admiral Stark. It was never called to my attention, so far as I
recollect.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, this 1 o'clock message referred to 1 o'clock
on Sunday, and there has been some considerable discussion about the
fact that the Japanese were going to see the Secretary of State on
Sunday. There was a discussion that morning about that, was there
not, about the fact they were doing it on Sunday, or calling on the Sec-
retary of State on Sunday ?
Admiral Stark. When we got it we were a little puzzled as to just
why they were making it at 1 o'clock.
Mr. Murphy. And on Sunday?
Admiral Stark. And on Sunday, yes, sir. We had covered the pos-
sibility of an attack on Sunday, if it came, in a previous message.
Mr. Murphy. I was wondering if there was any discussion [6074-'\
then about the fact that we also delivered our message on Sunday.
When President Eoosevelt came back from Argentia he asked to see
the Japanese on Sunday, too, did he not ? It was Sunday afternoon
at 4 o'clock when he saw the Ambassador, was it not?
Admiral Stark. I believe it was. I am hazy on it. I recollect there
was another instance when the message was to be delivered at a certain
time. I think that occurs occasionally.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, President Eoosevelt did send a wire to
Secretary Hull and asked Secretary Hull to arrange to come to the
White House on Sunday morning, and he asked the Japaneses to see
him at the White House that afternoon, did he not ?
Admiral Stark. I recall that, yes, sir.
2282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAKL HARBOR ATTACK
[6075] Mr. Murphy. As I understand it, one of the reasons that
prompted you in delaying or in not wanting to send the 1 o'clock
message to Hawaii was that you had already sent so much you thought
maybe you might be confusing Admiral Kimmel?
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. Have you seen Admiral Kimmel's statement given to
this committee?
Admiral Stark. No, sir; I have not.
Mr. Murphy. I suggest that you have your counsel get a copy.
Mr. Chairman. In fairness to the witness I think he should have it.
We may want to ask him some questions on it at some time.
Admiral Stark. Counsel, I think, has been furnished a copy.
Mr. Murphy. Do you thing that the tenor of your papers that were
sent to Admiral Kimmel throughout the year of 1941 were such as to
take away the effect or the meaning of your war warning message ?
Admiral Stark. I do not.
Mr. Murphy. I understood you to say that you had never heard
of a war warning message in the precise words that were used having
been sent before to anyone in the Pacific.
[6076] Admiral Staek. That is true. I never heard of such a
message before.
Mr. Murphy. You had never, prior to 1941, December 1941, sent
anything to Admiral Kimmel about codes being burned ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. When j^^ou sent your message to Admiral Kimmel in
October, Admiral Kimmel wrote you a letter saying that he had sent
submarines in certain directions and that he had made certain move-
ments as a result of receiving your October message ; you recall that ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, I do.
Mr. Murphy, As I understand it Admiral Kimmel takes the posi-
tion that since he told you about what he had done subsequent to Octo-
ber and since you had not criticized the arrangement he had made
then, that he was justified in continuing the position which he had
assumed in October right on down after receiving your war warning
message. Do you think he was justified in that position?
Admiral Stark. No, I do not. The message that was sent in Octo-
ber, as I recall, he sent out some submarines to the outlying Islands,
and informed me about it by letter, and I wrote him back "O. K.,"
but the situation in December was a decidedly different one.
Mr. Murphy. You think
[6077] Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I interpose to raise the
question of propriety, as to whether or not the testimony to be given
by Admiral Kimmel should be referred to. It has been furnished to
us in confidence with a release date on it that it was not to be released
until he takes the stand.
Mr. Murphy. I would like to say
Mr. Gearhart. I don't think that should be pursued so as to destroy
the effectiveness of Admiral Kimmel's testimony.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that I think that
should be met by the committee. I have read Admiral Kimmel's
testimony in the Narrative. I have it here. I am quite familiar with
what his testimony was.
He has, however, given a statement to the committee and he has
restricted the use of it until he takes the stand. Am I to understand
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2283
that we are not to go into Admiral Kimmel's case at all and that if
there are accusations made against the witness on the stand we are
not to ask him about it ?
Mr. Gearhart. I would like to point out that the testimony is
marked plainly not to be released until the witness takes the stand.
Mr. Murphy. Do you see it here ? Where is it ? I am referring to
the Navy Narrative.
Mr. Gearhart. You are not referring to the testimony that has been
placed in our hands?
[6078] Mr. Murphy. I want to meet that now.
The Chairman. If that matter is put up to the Chair, the Chair
would hold that inasmuch as a confidential description has been put
on the advance statement of Admiral Kimmel, that it is not to be re-
leased until he goes on the stand, members of the committee would be
bound by that instruction no less than the members of the press, but
that does not restrict a member of the committee from using any testi-
mony that Admiral Kimmel may have given at the numerous hearings
at which he testified.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral Stark read this morning from the previous
testimony that the Navy Board had referred to the message as being
of the same tenor.
Do you recall reading that?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. I have Admiral Kimmel's testimony here and if the
wish is that we not go into it, I suggest that it will be necessary to recall
Admiral Stark back. At least I want to ask him some questions about
what Admiral Kimmel said.
Mr. Gearhart. I am not objecting to any reference to any other testi-
money, except that which was handed us recently with a release date
upon it.
Mr. Murphy. If you can see that here I would like to see it.
[6079] The Chairman. Go ahead.
Admiral Stark. I think we were furnished a copy of that statement.
Counsel was furnished it on New Year's Eve. I have not read it. I
didn't know that I would be questioned on it.
Mr. Murphy. I have read a small part of it but I read what he said
before.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then. Admiral, the message about which I was
asking you at the time the gentleman from California spoke about the
confidential statement of Admiral Kimmel, as I understand it it is in
this exhibit here. Do you have a copy of that? Your letters and
Admiral Kimmel's letters.
Admiral Stark. I have a copy of my letters to Admiral Kimmel and
his to me.
Mr. Murphy. You have read his letter to you and your letter to
him, where you say "O. K." ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
[6080] Mr. Murphy. At the time that you said "0. K.," would
Admiral Kimmel be justified in assuming that the preparations that
he had made subsequent to your October message had your approval
to be the same that should be applied to the war warning message?
Admiral Stark. I think not.
2284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. MuEPHY. Now, there has been reference in one of your letters
about the routing of ships, and I believe you meant to refer to the
routing of the ships througli the Torres Straits; is that right?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And in your letter you suggested that you were per-
haps making that as a preliminary move to meeting the situation when
thmgs got more critical ; is that right ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. In your judgment, was it necessary to route the ships
at the time you did through the Torres Straits, and if so for what
reason ?
Admiral Stark. It looked like trouble ahead. It was our job to
prevent capture of our merchant ships on the high seas if we could in
a sudden emergency of a declaration or war act of Japan. For that
reason we took ships off the usual routes and sent them on the southern
where they could be better protected and where there were ports to
which they could go in [6081] case of trouble. It also took
time to get vessels routed and get into a groove as to just how to handle
them, because it required routing across the broad Pacific, and we
thought it advisable to initiate it at that time, and we did.
Mr. MuBPHY. Well, at any rate, you did it as a precautionary
measure and as a security measure ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. And I might add, it was a matter of
considerable pride to us that the only ship we lost of American tonnage
was one on which we took a deliberate chance.
Mr. Murphy. Was that in the Pacific ?
Admiral Stark. It was in the Pacific. A ship we sent out for the
remaining Marines in China, and we didn't know whether we would
have time or not. She was captured.
Mr. Murphy, Were there any German raiders in the Pacific prior
to December 7, 1941 ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; there were raiders off and on in the
Pacific prior to December 7 — German raiders.
Mr. Murphy. In your judgment who was at fault, if anyone, for
the failure to have the torpedo baffles or nets on the ships on December
7, 1941? You have already testified that Ordnance was working on
it. There were three or four letters between you and Admiral Kimmel
on the subject. Do you know of anyone particularly to blame for
not having them on that day ?
[6082] Admiral Stark. I was asked this morning if I instituted
any follow-up of ni)' original request of Bureau of Ordnance to design
and build those baffles. I perhaps can best answer the question by
reading into the record the follow-ups which we made and if the
committee so desires I will read them. They are not very long.
Mr. Murphy. I think it is important enough to do it.
The Chairmak. Kead them into the record.
Admiral Stark. The original letter was in February. On April
9, Chief of Naval Operations wrote this letter to Chief of Bureau of
Ordnance, inviting attention to certain references and stating that the :
* * * the Chief of Naval Operations brought forth the necessity for experi-
mental and development work in connection with nets and booms, and especially
the need for a light anti-torpedo net. The attention of the Bureau is directed to
reference (b) which gives certain details of an apparently much lighter net now
used by the Germans.
Signed: R. B. Ingersoll, Acting.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMFFrEE 2285
On September 16, the Chief of Naval Operations wrote the Bureau
of Ordnance.
Subject : Experimental and Developmental Work on Nets and Booms.
with four references.
[6083] The letter reads :
It is suggested that in order that progress may be made in solving some of
the problems which confront us, that a small group of officers, engineers and
draftsmen be assigned exclusively to planning improvement in net and boom
designs and to development and experimental work. The group, it is suggested,
may be aided by using the facilities of the Net Depots at Tiburon and Newport.
It is suggested that these two depots appear suitable as centers for experimental
and development work.
In references (a) and (b) the Chief of Naval Operations indicated the desir-
ability of undertaking some research and development work. Among other sug-
gestions, the need for a lighter anti-torpedo net was stressed, which can be
laid and removed in harbors in a short time for temporary use, and which will
give good if not perfect protection from torpedoes fired from planes.
Designs are requested to be prepared giving A/T net protection to one or
more large ships moored in harbors against torpedo plane attack in which the
A/T net may be placed completely around one or more large ships, similar to
placing the ship or ships in a "dry dock" of A/T net. It may be assumed that the
currents inside of most harbors are not as great as at the entrances, [6084]
and the moorings of such nets may be of less weight and less extensive than for
the present A/T nets which are designed principally for harbor entrances. As
such nets may be desired for advance bases, as little weight and volume of
material as possible is desirable. As little space as possible should be taken up
by the nets in order not to take up too much anchorage space.
Designs of A-T nets which might be attached to booms on ships or floating off
of ships at anchor are requested to be prepared in conjunction with the Bureau
of Ships. In a design of this type it may be possible to do away with mooring
the nets. A net which deflects rather than stops the torpedo may possibly be
designed.
Reference (c) is a preliminary Admiralty report on the development of a tor-
pedo net defense for merchant ships at sea. It is requested that the Bureau of
Ordnance in- conjunction with the Bureau of Ships undertake a similar develop-
ment work for the protection of ships under way at sea.
It is possible that in our Navy the assumption that has been reached that
anchorages protected by nets are secure. Nets are defensive measures, and, in
general, are without destructive means. Patrol vessels are required in conjunc-
tion with net defenses, and of the two [6085] measures of defense, the
vessels, capable of offensive action, are probably the more important. It is
believed that the tests with nets conducted by the British should be accepted
as conclusive. While one test of torpedo firing against an A/T net has been con-
ducted by the Bureau, the torpedo was not equipped with cutters. No other tests
have as yet been held. It may be well to repeat and to extend the British tests.
It may be worth while to know the exact damage which will be done to an anti-
torpedo net from a torpedo fired in the net.
Until the present in great measure reliance in this mode of defense has been
placed on British designs, experiments and tests. It is considered that now we
should be in a position to take more progressive action. In this letter it is real-
ized that the requests made are not concrete and definite, but serve only to indi-
cate several of the problems toward the solution of which action may be directed.
[6086] On 3 October 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations wrote
again to the Chief of Bureau of Ordnance on the same subject, with
references and a copy of reference A, which were proceedings of meet-
ing of local joint planning committee, northern California sector,
Pacific coastal frontier, of September 17. The letter reads:
Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information.
Attention is invited to paragraph 3 of the enclosure. The Chief of Naval Oper-
ations considers it urgent to develop an anti-torpedo net which can be made up,
towed to a desired location, and quickly laid. The use of pontoons, as suggested,
does not appear to solve this question ; a reduction in the number ol moorings, at
present necessary for the standard net, would seem to be required.
2286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
That is the correspondence up to December 7 that Operations had
with the Bureau of Ordnance on that subject of getting nets.
[6087] Mr. MuRPiiY. What I was referring to previously was
the Hewitt report contained in the appendix to Narrative Statement
of Evidence which was given to me. On page 43 there is a reference
made to a letter of February 15, 1941, from you to Admiral Kimmel
and again to a letter of February IT, 1941, from you to Admiral
Kimmel and again to a letter by Admiral Bloch of March 20, 1941,
and again a letter of June 1941 from you to Admiral Kimmel, to
which you referred this morning.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. MuEPHY. Now, in the Hewitt report I find the following:
Admiral Kimmel testified that on this correspondence he based his opinion
that there was no chance of an air torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor — and that even
after the June letter, he did not think that torpedoes would run in such shallow
water. He pointed out that the Navy made no effort to place such nets in Pearl
Harbor. He later stated that he did not think an aerial torpedo attack would be
made because he did not think such torpedoes would run in Pearl Harbor and
did not give this a great deal of consideration for that reason.
In the light of the fact that Bureau of Ordnance were working on
it and none had been furnished to Hawaii was Admiral Kimmel justi-
fied in that statement ?
[6088] Admiral Stark. I think the statement is not justified in
view of the letter which I read this morning.
Mr. Murphy. The letter in June 1941 ?
Admiral Stark. Of June 13 of 1941, in which appears the para-
graph in part :
Hence it may be stated that it cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other
valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack — that is torpedo
attack — if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be
developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.
Now, you will recall that I follow that with other paragraphs which
while not changing that paragraph may have minimized it to the
extent that it would not occur.
Mr. MuRPPiY. Yes. Those letters are all in the record and you read
them this niorning.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Did Admiral Kimmel have the facilities at Pearl
Harbor for manufacturing or preparing torpedo nets?
Admiral Stark. No, sir,
Mr. Murphy. If he had gotten them wouldn't he have to get them
through the CNO or would he go direct to Ordnance ?
Admiral Stark. Well, he probably would have written us about
them. He could have written the Bureau of Ordnance but [6089]
T think he would have come to us, undoubtedly, on it.
Mr. Murphy. What is your judgment subsequent to June of 1941 ?
Should he or should he not have initiated a move to get them before
December and if he did initiate it, in your judgment would they have
been available?
Admiral Stark. Well, we had initiated it and we did not have them,
but we were pressing the Bureau of Ordnance. You will note that I
also mentioned the Bureau of Ships. I remember personally suggest-
ing to the Bureau of Ships the possibility of developing something
like our targets to be placed alongside of sliips in Pearl Harbor. Just
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2287
what they had arrived at at that time I do not know, but they had not
produced.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral, why was the President opposed to the use
of draftees on ships by the Navy?
Admiral Stark. I may state with regard to that that I also was
initially opposed to them.
Mr. Murphy. Will you explain why?
Admiral Stark. It was a matter of sentiment, a matter of pride.
We had always been a volunteer service and we think a service where
men come into it because they want to, if you can get them, is a good
thing and initially I was also opposed to it. The time came when
wages were high ashore, when a man on a merchant ship could get
several times what a man on [6090] board a Navy ship could
get, when it was not so easy for us to get volunteers. It then became
necessary for us to resort to the draft.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral, in studying the message of November 27
and in studying the testimony of Admiral Kimmel and General Short
in previous hearings I am wondering if the people in Washington and
the people at Hawaii were not influenced more by the war plans that
had been drawn up in the mind of messages and in the kind of defense
that was instituted, than they were by what actually occurred between
the end of November and the beginning of December and I refer
particularly first — I am now referring to page 23 of the appendix to
the Narrative Statement. Do you have a copy of that available,
Admiral?
Admiral Stark. Yes, there is one here. I haven't read the narrative.
Mr. Murphy. Well, you have read what I am going to speak about
l)ut it is more easy for me to refer to it here.
I would like to direct your attention first to the United States Pacific
Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five. It first sets forth the intro-
duction, mobilization, and the assumptions, and then the assumption
that would include war with Japan, imder section 1211 would be
A-2. Do you see that ?
Admiral Stark. "A", yes, sir.
[6091] Mr. Murphy. A-2.
Admiral Stark. A-2?
Mr. Murphy. A-2 would be war with Japan. A-1 would be war
without Japan.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, if you go over to the next page, page 24,
uncler section 1332 there is a statement, "It is conceived that Japanese
action will be as follows", and I read first section "a" :
a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia
(including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.
b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American
and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean,
and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.
c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.
Now, then, I do not see anything in there about Hawaii. Do you ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. He mentions there the principal offensive
effort and we approved this plan, so I will accept responsibility for it
also.
[6092] Mr. Murphy. That is right, but these places
2288 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. In another part of this plan I think he specifically
mentions possibilities of air raid even before war is declared or any-
thing done.
Mr. Murphy. I am just taking this step by step. At least, these
places that are referred to in 1-a are the places that were referred
to substantially in your telegram, weren't they ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Then you speak of defensive efforts. Then you come
over to section 1333 :
To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be
toward :
a. Capture of Guam.
b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and
the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced
bases, and by the destruction of United States and allied air and naval forces
in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.
c. Capture of Northern Borneo.
d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas
area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and
light [6093] naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.
e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval
forces.
f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying
United States positions.
Now, I do not think Hawaii is included in any of those either,
is it?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Certainly, they would not refer to our main naval
base as an outlying position, would they? That would be one of the
smaller islands, wouldn't it?
Admiral Stark. Smaller islands are referred to in that particular
section I believe, yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, the places that you refer to there in 1333 are
the places that you refer to in your telegram, are they not ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; and I think they were also referred to
in our own war plan.
Mr. Murphy. Well, I will come to that but I am trying to get what
was the background for the telegram and why Hawaii was not in-
cluded.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, in section 1334 you speak of the initial {6094^
Japanese deployment. It says :
The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:
Then you speak of A, B, C, D, and E and then when you come to F :
Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and sub-
marines in the Hawaiian area.
There is nothing about an attack on Hawaii via the air, is there?
Admiral Stark. That is correct, yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I come over to the tasks assigned by the
Navy basic plan and the mission and in section 2101 you come down
to "H", "Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific
area."
That might include Hawaii but that was offensive action, wasn't it?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2289
Mr. Murphy. Now, then I come over to section 2202 and I find,
"tasks formulated to accomplish the assigned missions" and I go.
on through "A." I come to "B" :
Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
That would definitely be Hawaii, wouldn't it?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
[6095] Mr. Murphy. And then on down to "K" :
Continue training operations as practicable.
That would be for Admiral Kimmel, wouldn't it ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. That always holds in war as well as
peace.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral, regardless of what plans there were by any-
one, the first law of nature is self-preservation, isn't it ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy, And the fleet belonged to Admiral Kimmel and those
at Hawaii, and General Short, and self-preservation, regardless of
when it was, dictated that they should protect that fleet m order to
save themselves and be able to operate, isn't that true?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then I come to "M" :
Guard against surprise attack by Japan.
That would be definitely the obligation of those at Hawaii and at
the base, would it not ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir, and, of course, they had covered that in
other plans.
Mr. Murphy. Well, Admiral, at any rate I have studied these dif-
ferent plans and I come to the air raid but it seems to me that the air
raid itself, or the possibilities of an [6096] air raid — in fact, in
the plan at Hawaii a submarine attack was listed as probable, an air
attack was listed only as possible, and I was wondering if the thought
in the Navy, particularly, perhaps, when these plans were prepared and
manufactured was not to work that air attack in Hawaii down the
line a little from what was expected in the event that war started ?
Admiral Stark. Well, I had not thought of that, particularly in
view of the special letters which were written on the subject and the
follow-up of special plans made to guard against air raid, such as the
Bellinger agreement, Bellinger-Martin agi-eement and the letters ex-
changed between Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson and the drills
which were being implemented and the fact that when we got these
very excellent plans of Admiral Kimmel we had distributed them
throughout the service.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, it is your feeling that these supplemental
plans that pertained particularly to Hawaii and the danger of an air
attack and the letter of the Secretary of War and the correspondence
you had kept that to the forefront regardless of where the attack on
Hawaii might be in these several other plans ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir, and the final letter which I read this morn-
ing dated in October, which was gotten out on [6097] that
subject.
Mr. Murphy. Now, I have this last question, Admiral. In all of
the messages that were sent to Hawaii and in all of the considerations
79716 — 46 — pt. ."5 16
2290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in Washington about the possible move to the southward, the reason
why you were fortifying the Philippines was so that the Japanese
would fear an attack on their flank specifically and, therefore, would
hesitate going into the South China Sea, that is right, isn't it ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct, yes, sir. Whether we could deter
them or not — I believe I stated that we hoped that they might have
some weight toward prevention, if not then in execution, but that flank
position, unless the Japanese had made up their minds that we would
not come in, was a serious threat to their communications to their main
offensive to the south.
Mr. Murphy. Now, isn't it also true that if the Japanese were going
to go to the South Seas that the fleet, once it was in the Pacific, was
always a danger to their flank and, therefore, had to be taken into con-
sideration every time you thought of what the Japs might do, because
they would have to get the fleet off their flank to be safe, wouldn't they ?
Admiral Stark. Ultimately they would have to lick the fleet or be
licked by the fleet.
Mr. Murphy. I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman.
[6098] The Chairman. Senator Brewster being absent. Con-
gressman Gearhart is at bat.
Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Stark, what is the tour of duty of a Chief
of Naval Operations?
Admiral Stark. The normal tour, provided an officer has that
much time in his active service left, is 4 years. That is true of the
bureau chiefs also.
Mr. Gearhart. That was not the thought I had in mind. I meant
the tour of duty on a 24-hour period.
Admiral Stark. You mean how long is he supposed to — I do not
know just what you mean. You mean how many hours a day?
Mr. Gearhart. Yes.
Admiral Stark. I do not think there is anything. It depends on
the individual and particularly on the work.
Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact. Admiral, I think under Navy
regulations he would be on clutj^ constantly during the time that he is
serving in that office.
Admiral Stark. Always available ; yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. He must never be beyond reach ; isn't that correct ?
Admiral Stark. Yes. It always must be known where he is. He
might be in the West Indies but he would still be within reach by radio
or he might be with the fleet on an exercise [6099] but his
whereabouts is always known and there is always a means of com-
munication with him.
Mr. Gearhart. That is also true of the Chief of Staff of the Army;
is it not?
Admiral Stark. I suppose so.
Mr. Gearhart. In fact, that is the rule applying to all high-rank-
ing commanding officers; is that not true?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I would say it would be true, certainly,
of the commander in chief of the fleet.
Mr. Gearhart. Then a commanding officer, a Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, should not at any time put himself beyond communication by
his subordinates; is that correct?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2291
Admiral Stark. That would be correct, except some special cir-
cumstance might arise, which would be thoroughly understood, but
I have never heard of such special circumstance.
Mr. Gearhart. And that is also true of the Chief of Staff of the
Army?
Admiral Stark. Well, I suppose it is, Mr. Gearhart.
Mr. Gearhart, When you left the office on Saturday night didn't
you leave word there as to where you were going to be and where
you could be reached on December G, 1941 ?
Admiral Stark. Yes; when I went out I always left word. I do
not recall of any time when I did not, and occasionally I had it checked
just to see if I were absent whether the [6100] follow-up
would be effective. I do not recall being out that night but I also do not
recall whether I was out or not ; so there it is.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, isn't there a record kept in the office of the
Chief of Naval Operations as to where he is every minute that he is
away from the office?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. When you leave
Admiral Stark. When you say "every minute," yes; if I were
going out at night my aide would usually leave word with the duty
officer where I could be found, assuming that my intentions to go out
were before I left the office. If after I got home I suddenly decided
to go out somewhere, I would leave word with the house and usually
call up the duty officer in addition.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, have you searched the records in the office
of the Chief of Naval Operations to ascertain where you were on
Saturday night, the 6th day of December 1941 ?
Admiral Stark. We have found nothing as to where I was and it
follows my assumption that my thought was that I was at home.
There is nothing I have been able to find out which locates where I
was that evening.
Mr. Gearhart. In view of the fact that the Chief of Staff cannot
remember where he was on that night is it pos- [6101] sible
that you and he could have been together ?
Admiral Stark. I think we had no such conspiracy at that time, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, do you shut it out as being an utter impos-
sibility that you and he could have been in each other's company that
night?
Admiral Stark. I do not shut it out as an utter impossibility that
we could have been in each other's company, but I think we were not.
Mr. Gearhart. You do not remember that.
Admiral Stark. No; but I feel that perhaps we both would have
remembered it if that had occurred.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, you not remembering where you were cer-
tainly you cannot remember that you were not with General Marshall
on that night, can you?
Admiral Stark. Well, I think that may be a reasonable assumption.
Mr. Gearhart. You were together a great deal all the time, were
you not ?
Admiral Stark. We were together either talking by telephone or
interoffice visits a great deal during office hours. We were not to-
2292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR Al^TACK
gether a great deal in the evening. Once in a while we would have
just a little family supper party but neither one — I was not going out
much at that time. I could [6102] not. If I got home in
time for dinner at half past seven I was rather lucky and my brief
case always went with me.
Mr. Gearhart. Did you, as General Marshall did, have orderlies at
your quarters at all times ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. I might add that the servants in the house
were given my address and there was one always on duty.
Mr. Gearhart. You have been informed that an effort was made to
locate you on Saturday night, have you not ?
Admiral Stark. Yes; I have heard that an effort was made to
locate me.
Mr. Gearhart. And you also have learned that a courier called at
your quarters and you were not there ?
Admiral Stark. No ; I have not heard that.
Mr. Gearhart. Did you have any telephone call that evening from
Colonel Knox, the Secretary of the Navy ?
Admiral Stark. Not tliat I recall.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, you testified in your written statement, page
51, that the Navy was in the war in the Atlantic on the Tth day of No-
vember 1941. You remember that testimony ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. If we were at war on the Tth day of November of
1941 in the Atlantic when did that war begin ?
Admiral Stark. I would like to say as to that statement [6103']
that we were at war that it should be interpreted as in effect. We were
not belligerents, we did not have the right of belligerents, but when
we had orders to shoot any German or Italian on the high seas to the
westward of the twenty-sixth meridian and when they in turn were
attacking us and we were endeavoring to sink their attacking vessels
and they were endeavoring and had wounded our vessels at that time,
we were in effect engaging them and to that extent we were at war, and
so far as the high seas were concerned when we actually entered the
war there wasn't much change in that particular case.
On the other hand, there was at one time a request come to me to
apprehend a certain vessel, a German vessel which was, we found,
approaching Germany with rubber and we refused to do it because
of the fact that we did not have belligerent rights.
On the other hand, again as regards being in war, we were in the
position of having command of Canadian vessels or they might have
of ours, or we might under certain circumstances under the shooting
order command British vessels, Britain being at war Avith Germany,
or a British officer might have command of ours, so in effect I made
the statement we were at war. There were certain belligerent rights
technically and the thing had not been openly declared, but in the ways
which the President had defined and of which he had informed the
[6104] country in his speech in September, there was practically
war on the sea for any Axis power that came within that limit.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, you described the conditions as existing on the
Tth day of November 1941 as indicating a condition of war. Now I
am asking you when did the condition come into being?
Admiral Stark. I think perhaps I might read a brief which I had
made up thinking it might be of use to the committee — primarily I
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2293
\ranted it for myself to get the sequence — of the hemispheric defense
orders and whether or not I have enough copies here to give the com-
mittee at this time I do not know.
Mr. Geaehart. Was there an order commanding commanders of
American ships in the Atlantic to fire upon German submarines or
surface ships under any conditions ?
Admiral Stark. There was.
Mr. Gearhart. Who issued that order ?
Admiral Stark. I did, by direction of the President.
Mr. Gearhart, And when was it issued ?
Admiral Stark (reading) :
On October 8, 1941 by despatch 082335 the Chief of Naval Operations ordered
the above outlined plan executed at 1400 G. C. T.
that is Greenwich Civil Time —
11 October 1941. The plan remained in effect until December 11, 1^1 at which
time the Chief of Naval Operations by despatch 111550 ordered the above out-
lined plan cancelled and [6105] replaced by WPL 46, Navy Basic War
Plan Kainbow No. 5.
I think it might be helpful if I would read this correspondence
which lays down the sequence and is a brief.
The Chairman. Go ahead and read it, Admiral.
Mr. Gearhart. I will be glad to have you do that, Admiral, with
permission of the Chair.
Admiral Stark. It is six pages long.
Mr. Gearhart. Go ahead.
Admiral Stark. But it gives the picture and consolidation of a
good many pages.
Mr. Gearhart. All right.
[6106] Digest of Hemisphere Defense Plans
Navy Hemisphere Defense Plan #2 (WPL — 49), promulgated April 21, 1941,
issued by the Chief of Naval Operations at the direction of the President, was
based on the general concept :
"Entrance into the Western Hemisphere by naval vessels and aircraft of
belligerent Powers, other than of those Powers which have sovereignty over
Western Hemisphere Territory, will be viewed as actuated by a possibly un-
friendly intent toward territory or shipping within the Western Hemisphere."
The General Task assigned the Navy was :
" * * * warn Western Hemisphere Powers against possible impending
danger, and defend United States flag shipping against attack."
The specific tasks assigned the Naval Operating Forces were :
"(a) Trail naval vessels and aircraft of belligerent Powers (other than of
those Powers which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere Territory), and
broadcast in plain language their movements at four hour intervals, or oftener
if necessary.
"(b) Trail merchant vessels of belligerent Powers (other than of those
Powers which have sovereignty [6107] over Western Hemisphere Ter-
ritory) if suspected of acting as supply vessels for, or otherwise assisting the
operations of, the naval vessels or aircraft of such belligerents. Report the
movements of such vessels to the Chief of Naval Operations.
"(c) Prevent interference with United States flag shipping by belligerents.
"(d) Avoid intervening in or interfering with the armed engagements of
belligerents."
The above plan became effective in the Atlantic on April 24, 1941, the dispatch
placing it into effect stated "The execution of this plan shall give the appearance
of routine exercises where the departure of units from port are being made."
(Chief of Naval Operations Dispatch 211520 of April 1941 to Holders of
WPL-49.)
A
2294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Hemisphere Defense Plan #4 (WPI/-51), issued by the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions on Julj' 11, 1941, at the direction of the President, was based on the
following general concepts : —
"(a) Entrance into the Western Hemisphere by naval vessels and aircraft
Of belligerent Powers, other than of those Powers which have sovereignty over
Western Hemisphere Territory, will be viewed as actuated by a possibly un-
friendly intent toward territory or shipping within the Western Hemisphere.
16108] "(b) The President of the United States, in a message to Congress
on July 7, 1941, made the following pronouncement:
'"The occupation of Iceland by Germany would constitute a serious threat
in three dimensions :
" 'The threat against Greenland and the Northern portion of the North Ameri-
can Continent, including the Islands which lie off it.
" ' The threat against all shipping in the Atlantic.
" 'The threat against the steady flow of munitions to Britain — which is a
matter of broad policy approved by the congress.
" 'It is therefore imperative that the approaches between the Americas and
those strategic outposts, the safety of which this country regards as essential
to its national security, and which it must therefore defend, shall remain open
and free from all hostile activity or threat thereof.
" 'As Commander in Chief I have consequently issued orders to the Navy
that all necessary steps be taken to insure the safety of communications in the
approaches between Iceland and the United States, as well as on the seas between
the United States and all other strategic outposts.
[6109] " 'This Government will issue the adequate defense of Iceland
with full recognition of the independence of Iceland as a soverneign state.' "
The General Tasks assigned the Navy were within the Western Hemisphere
and were as followsi:
"(a) Insure the safety of communications with United States strategic out-
posts ;
"(b) Insure the adequate defense of Iceland ;
"(c) Defend United States and Iceland flag shipping against hostile attack
or threat of attack ; and
"(d) Warn Western Hemisphere Powers against possible impending danger."
When the order to execute this plan was issued, Change #1 had been incorpo-
rated. The Tasks assigned to the Atlantic Fleet were :
"(a) Protect United States and Iceland flag shipping against hostile attack,
by escorting, covering, and patrolling, as required by circumstances, and by
destroying hostile forces which threaten such shipping.
"(b) Escort convoys of United States and Iceland flag shipping, including
shipping of any nationality which may join such convoys, between United States
ports and bases, and Iceland.
[6110] "(c) Provide protection and sea transportation for the initial
movements and continued support of United States overseas garrisons.
"(d) Trail naval vessels and aircraft of belligerent Powers (other than
of those Powers which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere Territory
and other than belligerent vessels and aircraft involved in encounters in execut-
ing a, b, and c) ; and broadcast in plain language their movements at four hour
intervals, or oftener if necessary. Amplify such broadcasts by encrypted des-
patch to the Chief of Naval Operations.
"(e) Trail merchant vessels of belligerent Powers (other than those powers
which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere Territory), if suspected of
acting as supply ships for, or otherwise assisting the operations of, the naval
vessels or aircraft of such belligerents. Report the movements of such vessels
to the Chief of Naval Operations.
"The Atlantic Fleet will be organized into Task Forces of the approximate
strength indicated:
Ocean Escort— 6 BB, 5 CA, 27 DD. 23 ODD, 48 VPB.
Striking Force— 3 CV, 4 CL (10,000 tons), 13 DD, 12 VPB.
[6111] Southern Patrol— 4 CL (7500 tons), 8 DD (1850 tons).
Force— 4 CGC (327 tons). 12 VPB."
The plan stated that Canada had made available Shelburne and Halifax as
operating bases for United States Naval vessels and pati'ol planes, and Sydney
for United States Naval vessels in case of necessity.
The Chief of Naval Operations would exchange information on movements of
British and Canadian convoys and Naval forces and United States Naval forces
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2^95
and United States and Iceland flag shipping with the British and Canadian
authorities.
On July 25, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch 251600 ordered
the above outliued'plan executed at 1200 (GCT) July 26th, except that only United
States and Iceland flag shipping was to be escorted, i. e., the words in Task (b),
"including shipping of any nationality which may join such convoys, between
United States ports and bases, and Iceland," were not to be executed until
necessary arrangements had been made.
Change #2 to WPLr-51, issued on August 13, 1941, transferred the task of
providing sea transportation for the initial movement and continued support of
the Army and Navy forces overseas, other than those which are to be transported
by the Opei'ating Forces, to the Naval Transportation Service. It also contained
detailed instructions for the [6112] operation of convoys and escorts
in the North Atlantic which were to become effective when the escort of convoys
including ships of nationality other than those of United States and Iceland was
ordered.
On 25 August, the Chief of Naval Operations informed Commander in Chief,
Atlantic Fleet by dispatch 252000 that WPL-51 was to be interpreted as requiring
Atlantic Fleet forces to destroy surface raiders which attacked shipping along the
sea lanes between North America and Iceland or which approached these lanes
sufficiently close to threaten such shipping.
Change #3, issued on September 3, 1941, stated :
"Hostile forces will be deemed to threaten United States or Iceland flag ship-
ping if they enter the general area of the sea lanes which lie between North
America and Iceland or enter the Neutrality Zone in the Atlantic Ocean described
in the Declaration of Panama of October 3, 1939."
This change revised the detailed instructions for the operation of convoys and
escorts, which were to become effective when the inclusion in United States
escorted convoys of other than United States and Icelandic ships was ordered.
Change #3 established a Southeast Pacific Sub-area consisting of that part of
the Pacific Ocean outside of [6113] territorial waters south of the Panama
Naval Coastal Frontier and north of Latitude 57° South and between the West
Coast of South America, and Longitude 100° West.
On August 28 the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch 282121 ordered Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to establish a Southeast Pacific Force of two 7500-
ton light cruisers. This force, cooperating with the Panama Naval Coastal
Frontier, was to destroy surface raiders which attacked or threatened to attack
United States flag shipping. The approach of surface raiders within the Pacific
Sector of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier or the Pacific Southeast Sub Area
was to be interpreted as a threat to United States flag shipping.
On 13 September, Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch 131816 ordered
deletion of the Task — "Trail naval vessels and aircraft of belligerent Powers,
etc."
Change #4, issued on September 3, 1941, enlarged the Western Atlantic Area
( which had been the area west of longitude 26° West, as far west as the con-
tinental land areas to the area west of the following line :
"Beginning from the North along longitude 10° West as far south as latitude
65° North, thence by rhumb line to the position lat. 53° North long. 26° West,
thence South along long. 26° West."
On 13 September the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch [6II4]
131645 ordered that commencing on September 16, 0001 (GCT), the Atlantic
Fleet was to execute the words, "including shipping of any nationality which
may join such convoys, between United States ports and bases, and Iceland."
This order also placed into effect the detailed instructions for the operations
of convoys and escorts. Under these instructions the United States assumed
responsibility for transatlantic trade convoys on the North Atlantic route when
west of the line from the North Pole along the 'Meridian 10° West to Lat. 65°
North thence to the point Lat. 53° North Long. 26° West and thence along the
Meridian of 26° West.
On 13 September 1941 Chief of Naval Operations informed Commander-in-
Chief, Atlantic Fleet, by dispatch 131855 that the President had modified pre-
vious instructions regarding convoy and escort, and that the United States
Naval vessels could escort convoys in which there were no United States or
Iceland flag vessels and that United States flag vessels could be escorted by
Canadian ships.
2296 CONUKESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Western Hemisphere Defense Plan #5 (WPL-52), issued September 26, 1941,
superseded Western Hemisphere Defense Plan #4. It was to be placed into
effect by the Chief of Naval Operations after Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic
Fleet, had submitted a readiness report.
It stated that approximately 60 Royal Navy and Royal [6115] Cana-
dian Navy destroyers and corvettes would be engaged in escorting convoy in the
Western Atlantic Area under the strategic direction of the United States. It
quoted extracts from the President's speech of September 11, such as :
"Upon our Naval and air patrol — now operating in large numbers over a vast
expanse of the Atlantic Ocean fell the duty of maintaining the American policy
of freedom of the seas — now. That means * * * our patrolling vessels and
planes will protect all merchant ships — not only American merchant ships, biit
ships of any flag — engaged in commerce in our defensive waters."
"From now on, if German or Italian vessels of war enter the waters, the
protection of which is necessary for American defense, they do so at their own
peril. 'The orders which I have given as Commander in Chief of the United States
Army and Navy are to carry out that policy — at once."
It is stated in the Concept of the Plan :
"It must be recognized that, under the concept of this plan, the United States
is not at war in the legal sense, and therefore does not have any of the special
belligerent rights accorded under United States law to States which are
formally at war.
[6116] "The operations which will be conducted under this plan are con-
ceived to form a preparatory phase for the operations of Navy Basic War Plan
Rainbow No. 5 (TFPL-y,6)."
The Tasks assigned the Atlantic Fleet were:
"(a) Protection against hostile attack United States and foreign flag shipping
other than German and Italian shipping by escorting, covering, and patrolling
as circumstances may require, and by destroying German and Italian Naval,
Land, and Air Forces encountered.
"(b) Insure the safety of sea communications with United States and stra-
tegic outposts.
"(c) Support the defense of United States Territory and Bases, Iceland, and
Greenland.
"(d) Trail merchant vessels suspected of supplying or otherwise assisting
operations of German and Italian naval vessels or aircraft. Report the move-
ments of such vessels to the Chief of Naval Operations."
On October 8, 1941, by dispatch 082335, the Chief of Naval Operations ordered
the above outlined plan executed at 1400 (GCT) October 11, 1941. This plan
remained in effect until December 11, 1941, at which time the Chief of Naval
Operations by dispatch 111550 ordered the above outlined plan cancelled and
replaced by WPL-46 (Navy Basic War Plan, [6in] Rainbow No. 5).
Mr. Geaehart, Now is this the order that you made pursuant to the
direction of the President under which the Navy began to wage war
in the Atlantic ?
Admiral Stark. It is the order under which we operated and under
which we told the Germans, and Italians in the later stages, that if
they came to the westward of the 26 Meridian, as I recall, that their
intent would be regarded as hostile and they would be dealt with ac-
cordingly, and regarding which the President had previously in-
formed the country.
Mr. Gearhart. Then pursuant to this order shells were exchanged
by American surface warships carrying American flags and German
submarines ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; we attacked German submarines under
this order.
Mr. Gearhart. How many instances can you recount at this
moment ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2297
Admiral Stark. I do not know just how many instances there were
we attacked submarines with depth charges, in cases, for example,
like when we were sending troops into Iceland, and which I mentioned.
There are three rather outstanding cases in this connection.
There was the Greer^ which was attacked, as I recall \6118^
in September. There was the Reuben James^ which was attacked and
sunk, I believe, in November. There was the Salinas, a tanker, which
was attacked and damaged and got into port about that time. There
was some one other of our destroyers.
Mr. Gearhart. Was the Reuben James one of them ?
Admiral Stark. Sir ?
Mr. Gearhart. The Reuben James, was that one of them?
Admiral Stark. The Reuben James was one. I have a paper here
on those four cases. The other one was the Kearney on October 17,
which was attacked by an enemy submarine*, position 57.04 North and
23 West, 300 miles southwest of Iceland. One torpedo struck the
boiler room. Seven men killed, four missing and ten wounded.
The Salinas, a naval tanker, was torpedoed without warning dur-
ing the night of October 29-30, 1941, in waters southwest of Iceland.
Ship was sufficiently damaged to require 6 weeks or more in drydock,
but a Navy press release stated there was no loss of life and no serious
injury to personnel.
The Reuben James was sunk west of Iceland while on convoy duty
during the night of October 30-31.
The Greer was not damaged.
We had a ship, the Robin Moore, torpedoed and sunk off Brazil
in June. There was a ship called the Steel Seafarer {6119']
I think, that was attacked. I have forgotton whether it was sunk,
but that was another case, and there was still another to which I
believe the President referred in his September speech, called the
Sessa. I have forgotten just what she was.
Mr. Gearhart, Were any American transports carrying the Amer-
ican flag transporting the troops of any of the nations that later
became our allies, after the declaration of war?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall such at the time. We were escorting
British ships at one period, carrying British troops. One of the
Queens was sent over to this side of the Atlantic and routed south and
down around the southern tip of Africa. She was sent here as a
matter of safety, that being a safer route. Whether or not we let
the British have any of our ships at that time, or allocated them to
carry troops to the Middle East I am not certain. I do not recall any
at the moment.
Mr. Gearhart. We did later?
Admiral Stark. We did later; yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Now we occupied Iceland prior to December 7, 1941,
did we not?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And our American Navy took to Iceland not
[61£0] only Marines but soldiers?
Admiral Stark. Army ; yes, sir,
Mr. Gearhart. Soldiers of the Army?
Admiral Stark. That is correct. And we established seaplanes up
there also.
2298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gearhart. We also occupied Greenland, did we not ?
Admiral Stark. We developed certain air stations, as I recall, in
Greenland, to help get aircraft across the Atlantic. I do not remember
of any occupational forces other than those in connection with air
bases.
Mr. Gearhart. And we also dispossessed some Germans who estab-
lished some air stations in Greenland, did we not ?
Admiral Stark. I think what you refer to may be some Germans
up there in connection with weather* reports.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes ; but they were German Army people, were they
not?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall whether they were German Army
or not. They were Germans.
Mr. Gearhart. Anyway, we ousted them from Greenland ?
Admiral Stark. Either ousted them or they got out themselves
at that time. I do not know what the situation was.
Mr. Gearhart. They were ousted prior to December 7, 1941?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Now" let us take a look at the Pacific. Did
16121^ you have any orders comparable to the one that you have
given me a copy of applying to tha Pacific ?
Admiral Stark, We did in the Southeast Pacific.
Mr. Gearhart. Have you a copy of that order here?
Admiral Stark. No ; I have not. I can get it.
Mr. Gearhart. Would you be so kind as to get it and have it in-
serted in the record at this point, if you come to it in time ? ^
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearthart. Now what was the substance and effect of that
order?
Admiral Stark. In the Southeast Pacific?
Mr. Gearhart. Yes.
Admiral Stark. I do not recall any incident in connection with that.
. Mr. Gearhart. What was the order ?
Admiral Stark. That commanders of the Army and Navy continue
similar, as I recall, to that as I recited in October, that if any German
or Italian raider came within the boundary line which we set there,
and which we published, they were to be engaged.
Mr. Gearhart. Did that only apply to the Germans and Italians?
Admiral Stark. They were the only ones at that time.
16122] Mr. Gearhart. What was the date of that order?
Admiral Stai^k. It is covered in this digest which you have there,
on page 5, and reads :
On August 28 the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch 282121 ordered Com-
mander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to establish a southeast Pacific force of two 7500-
ton light cruisers. This force, cooperating with the Panama Naval Coastal Fron-
tier, was to destroy surface raiders which attacked or threatened to attack
United States flag shipping. The approach of surface raiders within the Pacific
sector of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier or the Pacific Southeast Sub Area
was to be interpreted as a threat to United States flag shipping.
The effect, therefore, of that was to engage any German or Italian
raider which might appear in that area.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Now, was any order promulgated by you
which had direct application to Japan prior to December 7, 1941 ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
' Included In Hearings, Part 6, p. 2666 et seq.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2299
Mr. Gearuart. Well, did you regard the freezing of the assets of
Japan on July 26, 1941, as an overt act ?
Admiral Stark. I did not.
Mr. Gearuart. Did you regard the imposition upon Japan
[612S~\ of economic sanctions on the same date as an overt act of
the United States?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. If you read, and you have undoubtedly
read, with regard to that, there were certain stipulations there where-
by it was made possible for the unfreezing of assets as necessary
to carry on certain trad^, if we so desired to do so. It was not a loop-
liole, but it was left open for certain essentials, that it could be done.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, I think you testified, and certain other high
ranking naval officers have testified, that an expedition was being
prepared in Hawaii at the time of the attack, an expedition which
would have been instructed to fly over Truk for reconnaissance pur-
poses. If that flight had occurred, would that have constituted an
overt act under international law?
Admiral Stark. I think not. The original decree, as I recall, re-
garding the mandates made it possible, or we should have been able
to go into them at will practically at any time. They were a trust
rather than Japanese territory. Whether that had been abrogated
subsequently, I do not know, but I do recall very clearly when I
wanted to send some submarines through the mandates — ^not while
I was Chief of Naval Operations, however.
Mr. Gearhart. But regardless of the conditions under [61^4]
which Japan received the mandated islands, it was understood, was it
not, by everybody that the Japanese were not allowing any persons
to come within those areas?
Admiral Stark. She had taken that stand, and in my opinion it
was not a legal stand for her to take.
Mr. Gearhart. But legal or illegal, we were avoiding going in
there and creating an incident by reason of our presence there, is that
not correct?
Admiral Stark. That is correct; yes, sir. We had abided by her
decision not to let us go, a decision which, on our part, I thought was
wrong at the time. That went back some years. Once it had been
made, we stayed out.
Mr. Gearhart. When you considered sending an air reconnaissance
expedition over Turk, did you consider the question of whether or not
that would constitute an overt act against the Japanese ?
Admiral Stark. Those ships, airships — I am referring to aircraft-
had the;7 made that recomiaissance flight would have gone very high.
They might have been seen or might not, so the argument probably
falls out. They would then have taken the pictures. The Japanese
had been doing the same thing. We know of flights over our territory.
It was taking a chance, but we thought the chance worthwhile.
Whether it would be regarded as an overt act on our part, I do not
know. I primarily [61£S] wanted the information and I was
prepared to take the chance.
Mr. Gearhart. If Japanese planes flew over Pearl Harbor, would
you regard that as a sort of reconnaissance, the same as was to be
conducted by the United States?
Admiral Stark. At that time, if I had seen them I would have
shot them down, if I had been on the spot and in command.
2300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gearhart. Had there been any reports to you of Japanese
ships flying over Hawaii ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, you read the story in the Saturday Evening
Post of October 9, 1942, a story written by the then flying naval
lieutenant, Clarence Dickinson, did you not?
Admiral Stark. No ; I think not.
Mr. Gearhart. Did you read that story ?
Admiral Stark. No.
Mr. Gearhart. The story which is entitled "I Fly for Vengeance" ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. He recites in that story, that he flew under war
orders to keep his mission secret at all costs, to sink all Japanese ships
he encountered on the surface of the sea or in the air. How would you
classify such an order as that? Would that be considered an overt
act against the Japanese?
Admiral Stark. At what time was that?
[6126] Mr. Gearhart. That order was issued November 22,
1941, 3 weeks before Pearl Harbor was attacked.
Admiral Stark. I never heard of it. I would like to see the order.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, it was printed in the Saturday Evening Post
of October 1942. The first 6 inches of type in that story "I Fly for
Vengeance" has never, to my knowledge, been denied.
Admiral Stark. I never heard of it before. I did not read the
article, I say, I would not believe it regardless of whether it was
printed, unless I saw the authenticated original order.
Senator Lucas. Congressman, will you yield?
Mr. Gearhart. I will yield.
Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman tell me who gave the order,
according to the article ?
Mr. Gearhart. I think it was given by Admiral Halsey. That was
what I was going to inquire. I thought you might have information
about it at this time.
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. There w^s widespread publicity given to it. It was
printed ever since.
Admiral Stark. I missed it somehow. I missed it or it may have
been I just dismissed it as something crazy.
[6127] The Chairman. What was your last word?
Admiral Stark. I say it may have been I just dismissed it as some-
thing crazy, because I never had any knowledge of any such order.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, since that time the then flying Lt. Clarence
Dickinson has been twice promoted. He is known today as Com-
mander Clarence Dickinson.
Admiral Stark. Well, I would be very much interested in seeing
the order.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, you have testified that the President told you
about a year and a half ago or 2 years ago, that he was surprised when
the Japanese attacked Hawaii. That is correct, is it?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And in your statement, on page 57, you testify:
The letter points out that neither the President nor the Secretary of State
will be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2301
That is your testimony, emphasizing and repeating that which you
have said in a letter of November 27 to Admiral Kinmiel.
Admiral Stark. To Admiral Kimmel, yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. That quotation being:
The chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan are very
doubtful. This situation, coupled with a statement of the Japanese Govern-
ment [6128] and movements their naval and military forces indicate, in
our opinion, that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including
attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility.
Then, going on further down :
I held this (the letter) up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull
today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull, and it was only after a long
talk that I sent the message to you a day or so ago showing the gravity of the
situation. Will confirm that in today's meeting by the President. Neither wiU
be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. Prom many angles an attack on
the Philippines would be the most enjbarrassing that could happen to us.
Do you sense any inconsistency in your statement if I told you that
the President was surprised when tlie Japanese attacked Hawaii?
Isn't that what you said in your letter to Admiral Kimmel ?
Admiral Stark. No, I do not know that I do. I can give you prac-
tically the exact words which the President mentioned to nie a year
ago last summer. I was in the Wliite House, and he said, in effect :
"Betty, you were surprised at that attack and so was I." And my reply
was : "Yes, sir, I was, and I just testified to that fact." Now, the pre-
vious surprise I think was more general in nature. I am not trying to
make out a case for the President — I want that understood.
[61^9'] Mr. Gearhart. We just want the facts. I am not trying
to prove anything.
Admiral Stark. That neither Mr. Hull nor the President would
be surprised at a surprise attack anywhere. In my opinion, the Presi-
dent was not expecting that attack on Hawaii anymore than I was.
I had gone over the situation with him very carefully on the chart,
and the movement of vessels. He was expecting it to the southward
and so was I. We did not know whether it would hit the Philippines
or not. But I think there is no particular inconsistency there,
Mr. Gearhart. Since you referred to a meeting with the President,
I direct your attention to a meeting of the war council, of which you
are a member according to the report of the Army Board, a meeting
which occurred at the White House on the 25tli of November 1941.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
[6130] Mr. Gearhart. I will quote from Secretary Stimson's
diary as follows :
Then at 12 o'clock I went to the White House, where we were until nearly half-
past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark and myself. There
the President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the
event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as — perhaps next
Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and
the question was what we should do.
Do you remember that meeting and do you remember those remarks
by the President of the United States ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. With respect to whether or not he was surprised,
do you think there is any inconsistency between what he said then and
what you have just recited to us ?
2302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. I think not. You can look at this thing in two
or three different ways. And again I would repeat that I was sur-
prised at the attack on Pearl Harbor. And 1 want to make sure
that anything I state is not intended to weaken that, because I was
surprised. When one had been talking about the possibility of an
attack for a year or more, when you had been pressing ,for means
to counter such an attack should it come, when you had laid out
a plan to counter [6131] it, and stated that war might well
be initiated, and the most embarrassing thing that could happen to
us there was an attack on Hawaii, and you had gone over it forwards
and backwards, to that extent you were not surprised, it was not as
though it were something that suddenly came on you.
But regardless of the fact that we had been over it, we countered
and we talked about tlie possibility, and we had done what we could,
and we had made it our strongest outpost, when it came at that
particular time, and in view of the fact that we had no leads to indi-
cate it was coming at that time at Hawaii, and we did have leads only
of an amphibious force pointing to the southward, and we had no
indication that the Japanese carriers, the last thing I had in that line
was information in the Pacific of the whole Japanese Fleet laid
out as of 1 December showing the carriers in home waters — I was
surprised.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, you say that you were surprised?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. That the Japanese should attack Hawaii on the
7th day of December 1941 ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct, yes^ sir.
Mr. Gearhart. You were taken by surprise as well as the Presi-
dent was taken by surprise ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. All these things I had talked [6132']
over with the President.
Mr. Gearhart. In view of the fact that the Commander in Chief
of the United States Forces, the President of the United States, a
student of naval affairs, a frequent visitor on board ships, and you, the
Chief of Naval Operations, were taken by surprise by the news
that came that the Japanese had attacked Hawaii, does that mitigate
or does that aggravate the fact that the Commander of the Pacific
Fleet was taken by surprise ?
Admiral Stark. The possibility of that attack existed. We knew
of the possibility though we weren't expecting it. I had specifically
written, by letter, that I thought we should be on guard. We had
sent a dispatch of a war warning and we had directed the Commander
in Chief of the Asiatic and the Commander in Chief of the Pacific
to take a defensive deployment. That direction was because of the
possibility of an attack. We didn't expect it, but we felt we had
to be on guard against it.
I was surprised at the attack, and I Iso was greatly surprised that
more steps had not been taken to endeavor to guard against it and
counter it, if possible.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, if you condemn Admiral Kimmel for being
taken by surprise over there, do you not in the same breath condemn
vourself ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2303
[6133] Admiral Stark. I am not condemning Admiral Kimmel
for anything. And in my statement and in what I said I would do I
have left that up to others. I have stated the situation as I saw it.
I acted in accordance with my best judgment and I assume he did, too.
What I intended to convey apparently did not get over. Whether
the fault was mine for not having expressed it properly or whether
the fault lay elsewhere if I did express it properly is something which
is not for me to say.
Mr. Gear HART. Now
Admiral Stark. I felt I had, we all felt, that we had given warn-
ing and a directive which would have fully alerted the forces out
there, and, as I say, what we thought we had done did not materialize,
to the best* of my knowledge and iDelief, at least as far as we thought
it had. Wliat Admiral Kimmel did do he can testify to.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, the fact that you admit that you were sur-
prised when Hawaii was hit, and you inform us that the President told
you that he was surprised when Pearl Harbor was attacked, does that
not account for the fact that you left out of all these warnings that
you sent to the Islands any mention of Hawaii ?
Admiral Stark. The only specific objectives we gave were objec-
tives of an amphibious force. It is all we had. [6 13 4-] The
war warnintT was broad. The amphibious objectives we gave. And in
an earlier dispatch we put "in any direction."
Mr. Gearhart. But all of the war warnings that you sent, all that
General Marshall sent, all, after calling attention to the imminence
of war, all narrowed down to the message later on by pointing out that
you expected the attack to occur in the Far East.
Does that not spring from the fact that the President, yourself, and
General Marshall, and all of the officers that stood around you close
and advised with you, were of the opinion that Pearl Harbor was
impregnable and that it would not be attacked?
Admiral Stark. No, I never thought Pearl Harbor was impreg-
nable and that it would not be attacked. I did not think it would be
attacked at that time.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, going back again to that meeting with the
President on the 25th day of November of 1941, that was held at the
Wliite House, wasn't it ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr, Gearhart. The three Secretaries were there, the two Chiefs of
Staff were there, and the President brought up the subject of Japan
and pointed out that the Japanese were notorious for making an attack
without warning, a sneak attack, and that we might expect an attack
as soon as next \6135'] Monday, referring to the Monday fol-
lowing the 25th day of November 1941.
Do you know whether the President had any reason for believing
that an attack might occur on the 1st of December or 2d of December?
Admiral Stark. No, sir; I don't know just wliy he made that state-
ment, except that it was a guess that it might come within the next few
days. I never went — I don't know that anybody questioned it. We
had the 29th as a deadline.
2304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gearhart. That was what I was going to ask you next. Did
anybody bring up in the discussion the Japanese intercept that the
29th was a deadline ?
Admiral Stark. I don't remember that that was specifically dis-
cussed at that time. We all had it — wait a minute. I think we had it
prior to the meeting of the 25th. It was about the 22d, I think, that
we got it.
Mr. Gearhart, First they fixed the 25th as the deadline and then a
later message came through before the 25th extending it to the 29th.
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Mr. Gearhart. It could have been before you.
Admiral Stark. I think it came in about the 22d. If so, we all had
seen it.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Now, you discussed it, did you not?
[6136] Admiral Stark. It was translated on the 22d.
Mr. Gearhart. And it had been served upon you by Captain Kramer
and it had been served upon the Secretary of War and the Chief of
Staff by Colonel Bratton ; is that not correct ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. You all had knowledge of that 29th deadline?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. It had also been delivered to the White
House.
Mr. Gearhart, Did Mr. Hull bring up any discussion of his associ-
ations with Ambassador Nomura and Special Envoy Kurusu?
Admiral Stark. The situation was undoubtedly discussed. I have
forgotten the exact trend of it. It is a long time ago.
The one thing that I remember is that we went over the situation but
as to details I don't recall.
Mr. Gearhart. Did Mr. Hull
Admiral Stark. I kept no diary,
Mr. Gearhart. Did Mr, Hull say anything about the kind of mes-
sage he was going to give the Japanese in reply to the one they served
on him on the 20th ?
Admiral Stark, I do not recall, at that time. We were still thuik-
ing, at least under the impression, that he [6L37'] was still con-
sidering the modus vivendi.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Did he read you his modus vivendi?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall that he did at that time. However,
we had a copy of it in the Navy Department.
Mi". Gearhart. Were you and General Marshall disturbed by what
Secretary Hall had to say about his impending answer?
Admiral Stark. About his impending answer — you mean to the
Japanese ?
Mr. Gearhart. The one he was about to turn over to the Japanese.
[6138] Admiral Stark. Of the 20th. Well, we were playing
for time. I do not recall that what was said in the White House on
the 25th was responsible for our message of the 27th. As I have
stated, I have been unable to separate and clarify just what happened
on the dates around the 25th, which was when the Chiang Kai-shek
note was delivered, and the 26th, and the 27th, except as to what
happened during that over-all period.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2305
Mr. Gearhart. Refreshing your memory, weren't you very much
disturbed, and wasn't General Marshall very much disturbed, by what
Secretary Hull told you that he planned to do?
Admiral Stark. I don't recall at that time that he told us. We
did not know of the note of the 26th until after it was sent.
Mr. Gearhart. Didn't he tell you at that time that he was think-
ing about not answering at all, that he was thinking about ignoring
the whole thing, letting it go on?
Admiral Stark. I don't recall that he did. You are referring to
the
Mr. Gearhart. Meeting of the 25th.
Admiral Stark. To the 25th. I have stated that whether he spoke
to me about that note on the 25th or the 26th or the 27th, I am not
sure. I know that we got it, that he called me with regard to it. It
may have been the 25th, it may have been the 26th. I don't recall its
having come up at the White House meeting. It may have. I do
not recall the details.
[6139] Mr. Gearhart. This is very, very important, and I want
you to try to remember.
Admiral Stark. I have spent hours trying to recall what went on,
on the 25th, 26th, and 27th, as to time. I have discussed it with
others. We came to an impasse as to any agreement every time we
do it, and every time we start it we waste a couple of hours and get
nowhere. I cannot recall the details of just when I got that infor-
mation. I wish I could, but I just can't do it.
Mr. Gearhart. To refresh your memory, reading from the Army
report — I am not picking this out of the air — didn't Mr. Hull say in
that meeting and during the course of the discussion that he was
about ready "to kick the whole thing over and tell them (the Japa-
nese) that he had no other proposition at all"?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall that he did.
Mr. Gearhart. Then, what caused you and General Marshall to
immediately meet again together and to prepare and send to the
President immediately after that meeting of the 25th of November
1941, your memorandum recommending to the President that he
should do everything in his power to gain time?
Admiral Stark. I do not know that it was immediately after that
meeting of the 25th that we did that.
Mr. Gearhart. The instrument is dated the 27th, isn't it?
[61 40] Admiral Stark. It is dated the 27th, yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. It contains General Marshall's signature, doesn't it ?
Admiral Stark. It contains his signature which, his best judgment
is, if I recall his testimony correctly, he put on, on the 28th.
Mr. Gearhart. Either the 28th or the 26th, because he wasn't in
Washington on the 27th, the date that the instrument bears; that
is correct, isn't it ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct, yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. So if you and General Marshall worked out that
instrument which bears the date of the 27th, you had to do it on the
26th, didn't you ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
79716— 46— pt.
2306 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gearhart, Because General Marshall was not here on the 27th.
Admiral Stark. We didn't have to start it on the 26th.
When I first asked Turner about it, because it was drawn up by the
War Plans of both sections, he was under the impression — I don't
know whether he has testified on it or not — ^but my impression is, in
asking him, he thought it started about the 24th. We are not clear
just when we started that memorandum.
Mr, Gearhart, You are not in the habit of sending memoranda to
the White House without the signatures of the people [614-1]
who are responsible?
Admiral Stark, That is correct.
Mr. Gearhart. Then, it must have been prepared and signed on the
26th for delivery on the 27th; is that not correct?
Admiral Stark. No, that is not necessarily correct. I might have
signed it on the 27th. You have Marshall's testimony. I have no
reason to doubt it. You have his testimony that his best judgment is
that he signed it on the 28th when he came back.
Mr. Gearhart. Is there any reason he should have signed it on the
28th rather than the 26th ?
Admiral Stark. According to Secretary Stimson's diary, as I recall,
he made some minor changes in it on the 27th. It was not up in smooth
form at that time. I say his diary. I believe Gerow testified to that.
The Chairman. It is now 4 : 30. I presume you cannot finish soon ?
Mr. Gearhart. No, I will need 15 or 20 minutes more.
The Chairman. We will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
(Whereupon, at 4 : 30 p. m., a recess was taken until 10 a. m., Friday,
January 4, 1946.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2307
Wm PEAEL HARBOR ATTACK
FRIDAY, JANUARY 4, 1946
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation,
OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack,
'Washington^ D. C.
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in
the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Barkiey (chairman), George, Lucas, and Fer-
guson and Eepresentatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart, and Keefe.
Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A.
Gesell and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.
[6I43] The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Congressman Gearhart had not finished examining Admiral Stark.
TESTIMONY OF ADM. HAROLD E. STARK (Resumed)
Admiral Stark. May I say just a word before the examination
starts, sir?
The Chairman. Yes.
The committee will come to order.
Admiral Stark, It had reference to Senator Lucas' examination
yesterday, and I think perhaps it might be better to wait until he gets
here. I didn't realize he wasn't present.
The Chairman. All right.
Go ahead. Congressman.
Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Stark, yesterday I asked you a few very
brief questions about the flying orders under which then flying
lieutenant Clarence Dickinson flew from Pearl Harbor to Wake, or
Midway, whichever it was, on November 22, 1941.
At that time you replied you did not know about the orders that he
flew upon or anything about the incident.
Have you in the meantime discussed the subject with anybody con-
nected with the Navy Department?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. I have not pursued it at all.
Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I have referred to this [6144]
incident time and time again during the course of these hearings. On
the second or third day of these hearings I made the request that
copies of those orders be supplied me and th9ugh 6 weeks have gone
by they haven't been supplied to date.^
May I inquire as to whether or not any effort has been made to
locate those orders, and if so, whether or not they are not available?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Congressman, I beg your pardon, but I was
* See Hearings, Part 11, p. .5476.
2308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
looking at some papers and I didn't hear just what the orders were.
Mr. Geaehart. During the course of these hearings and at different
times in my cross-examination of various witnesses I have referred to
the flying orders under which then Flying Naval Lieutenant Clar-
ence Dickinson flew from Pearl Harbor to Midway or Wake, which-
ever it was, I have forgotten, on November 22, 1941, 3 weeks before
Pearl Harbor, and on the second or third day of these hearings when
I first referred to this incident I requested the orders, a copy of the
orders under which now Commander Dickinson flew. I have not
been supplied them. I was wondering why they have not been
made available.
Mr. Mitchell. Would you let us report at 2 o'clock about that ?
[6I45] Mr. Gearhart. I will be glad to do so.
Mr. Mitchell. He was in Halsey's command, was he not?
Mr. Gearhart. I think so.
Mr. Mitchell. My dim recollection is that I felt we didn't have
any written orders and that when Halsey was on the stand we would
be able to find out what orders he gave to his own people. He is
lined up as a witness. I haven't asked him myself whether he has
any orders, written orders, or if he knows what the oral orders were,
but I will check during the noon hour and try to satisfy your interest
there.
Mr. Gearhart. Commander Dickinson in his article which ap-
peared in the Saturday Evening Post of October 2 or October 9,
1942, I am not precise as to the date, somebody has helped them-
selves to my copy of the article, which is being replaced
Mr. Mitchell. In that article does he say whether he had written
or oral orders ?
Mr. Gearhart. He doesn't say whether they were written or oral,
but he definitely says what those orders were. He said he was flying
under absolute war orders, period, under instructions to sink any
Japanese ships that he encountered upon the sea and to shoot down
any flying craft that he met in the air, and to keep his mission secret
at all costs.
Now, if there were any such orders issued in the Pacific [614^^
prior to Pearl Harbor that is a fact, it is a fact of which the country
should be informed. I do hope that those orders are furnished me if
they are in writing, or if not in writing, a statement in respect to what
the situation was.
I ask about it now because under the ruling of the committee yester-
day we are going to proceed to the examination of Admiral Kimmel
and General Short upon the conclusion of the testimony of the dis-
tinguished witness who now occupies the stand. I will want to ex-
amine those witnesses in respect to those orders.
The Chairman. Might the Chair ask Admiral Stark if those were
orders, if there were any such orders, and if they were given by
Admiral Halsey, would they appear as a matter of record in the
Department here ?
Admiral Stark. I think notj sir.
The Chairman. Well, Admiral Halsey is to be a witness, I believe,
isn't he?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2309
The CHAraMAN. And, of course, if there are no written orders in
the Department, or in his files, he would be the best witness as to
whether he gave any such oral orders.
Admiral Stabk. I would think so ; yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. We may get hold of Admiral Halsey, and if it
was oral, get his statement preliminary to his going on [6147]
the stand and we can furnish it to the Congressman.
The Chairman. Yes. I imagine, in view of the very alluring
picture of the admiral in the paper this morning, you may have
difficulty in locating him today. [Laughter.]
Mr. Gearhart. That reminds me, are we going to get a chance to
see that saddle ? [Laughter.]
There is one other matter. This was not a request of mine, Mr.
Chairman, but the request was made by another member of the com-
mittee, that we be furnished with the copy of the Roberts Eeport
as it was originally submitted to the White House, together with
such changes, alterations, additions, subtractions, that were made.
I want to point out again, in view of the fact that we are going to
have Admiral Kimmel and General Short before us shortly, that
we ought to have that report before the committee at the earliest
possible moment. The request for that report and interlineations,
changes, additions, and subtractions was made the earliest day of
this hearing, and the request has been repeated by different members
of this committee. Now we are right up against the gun. We are
going to examine the witnesses concerning whom those changes and
that report are going to be material.
I am constrained to inquire as to whether or not we are going to
have the original Roberts Report with such [614^] informa-
tion as would be important to this committee in respect to changes
that were made in it.
Mr. Mitchell. The answer is that we have been searching in all
of the departments ever since then to try to find the original report,
and have failed utterly, in the War, Navy, State, and every other
Department, to find any such document. Two days ago I wrote to
Justice Roberts and told him we had failed and that tlie committee
wanted it and asked him if he could kindly give us any sort of relief
as to where to find it and who had it. That is the best we have been
able to do.
Mr. Gearhart. Thank you very much. Up to date the information
is we have not been able to locate the original report ?
Mr. Mitchell. Exactly ; not because we haven't put an effort on it,
either.
The Chairman. Proceed. It that all of the preliminary matter?
Mr. Gearhart. That is all for the moment.
The Chairman. You may proceed.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, in your statement. Admiral Stark, you re-
ferred to a Presidential direction to prepare the Navy within 30 days
for the capture and occupation of the Azores Islands?
Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir.
[57^5] Mr. Gearhart. Will you tell me something more about
the details of that direction you received from the President?
Admiral Stark. The basis for that directive was, I believe, our
apprehension that possibly Germany might go down into Spain and
2310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Portugal. We often discussed what the effect of it might be, and
particularly if Gibraltar should be taken at the same time. The
Azores in nonfriendly hands, or in Axis hands, would have been a
very great threat to our communications on the sea, and the prepara-
tion to take the Azores, if necessary, was predicated on that possibility,
namely, that Germany might go into Spain and into Portugal.
We had hoped ultimately, and ultimately we did get permission to
go into the Azores and operate from there, and it was extremely ad-
vantageous, particularly with regard to patrolling the seas with long-
range aircraft against submarines.
The President gave me that order and told me to be ready in 30
days.
Now, just why he gave it to me at that time and just why the 30
days, I don't recall. He gave me the direct order and right away I
went to preparing the plans for it. It was a good thing, in any case,
to have the plans ready.
For example, we likewise laid plans to take Martinique, if neces-
sary, on the assumption that that island might join [6150] the
Vichy Government under circumstances which would be detrimental
to our communications in the Caribbean.
Mr. Gearhart. You mentioned the Azores preparation in your
letter to Admiral Kimmel of 24 May 1941 and stated that the Presi-
dent gave you that positive direction 2 days before. That would
make the date upon which you received your instructions from the
President the 22d day of May 1941; is that approximately correct?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. It was because of action which the President was
directing from day to day against the Germans — the consequent
exchange of fire with German submarines which resulted — that
caused you to state that we were at war in the Atlantic before Pearl
Harbor ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, if you reached a conclusion sometime that we
were at war in the Atlantic prior to Pearl Harbor, there must have
been a time when that became fixed in your mind. I asked you the
question yesterday but I think we became diverted and you didn't
reply as to when you considered that the war in the Atlantic with
Germany commenced.
Admiral Stark. Well, it commenced about the time of the shoot-
ing order, along after the President talked, I would say, in Septem-
ber— that is, his talk to the Nation. And the [6131] actual
shooting orders we gave in October.
I would invite attention, however, to the fact that when I say we
were at war, we were at war in effect so far as attacking German craft,
subsurface or surface, which crossed a line which we had defined, and
which slid down the east coast of Iceland to the twenty-sixth meridian
and south on the twenty-sixth meridian, and later there was a line
drawn to the westward of the west coast of South America.
Technicallj^ or from an international standpoint, we were not at
war inasmuch as we did not have the right of belligerents because war
had not been declared, but actually, so far as the forces operating under
Admiral King in certain areas, it was war against any German craft
that came inside that area. They were attacking us and we were
attacking them.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2311
Mr. Geakhaet. As a matter of fact, actually there was no difference
between the situation which existed and which would have existed if a
formal declaration of war had been declared by Congress?
Admiral Stark. Not as regards that particular phase. I might
however, read two dispatches, they are short, which 1 think will exem-
plify the differences which I have mentioned.
On 1 December 1941 I received a dispatch from our special naval
observer in London, Vice Admiral Ghormley, which reads as follows :
[6152] The Admiralty believes that the French merchant vessel, Pierrel D.
Mas, of long cruising radius, has sailed for Europe or North Africa via Cape Horn
about 25-27 November with cargo rubber for trans-shipment to Germany. One of
German ships at Kobe believed preparing to sail for Europe carrying rubber and
nationals about 1 December. Report has been received that Germans are planning
to send ships to Europe monthly. The Admiralty asks if Navy Department will
cooperate as in the Odenwald case and intercept these vessels off Cape San Roqne.
If so information will be available as at Bad Washn.
That is, the British Admiralty detachment in Washington.
I replied to that dispatch the following day, 2 December, and the
dispatch reads :
U. S. not being at war does not enjoy full belligerent rights and Navy Depart-
ment cannot be committed to interception referenced vessels in specific locations.
Your 010922. Odenwald made mistake of flying American flag and crew aban-
doned ship thus becoming subject to boarding and salvage. Such American men
of war as may be in the vicinity can operate only under directives contained in
WPL-52 and current operation orders of Commander-in-Chief Atlantic based
thereon.
Mr. Gearhart. Despite the assertion there that we did not enjoy full
belligerent rights because we were not legally at war, what belligerent
right were we not exercising ?
[6153] Admiral Stark. That is one, the belligerent right of
what is known as visit and search.
Mr. Gearhart. Weren't we exercising that whenever the occasion
arose ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. The reason why we were not exercising it was simply
because the Germans were using submarines and it was not practical
to go aboard submarines, isn't that correct ?
Admiral Stark. Well, any vessel — a raider, we likewise would have
attacked. We laid out an area in which we told them to keep out and
if they came into that we would attack them, that is, an Axis man-of-
war.
Mr. Gearhart. Then by declaration we were already exercising the
right of search and would have exercised it if the occasion arose because
we told them that we would, is that not correct ?
Admiral Stark. We told them we would attack. In this particular
case of a merchant ship, we refused to intercept her. The Odenwald
case — I do not know whether you recall it, it was in the press at the
time — was loaded with a very valuable cargo for Germany. She was
flying a flag, the American flag, and one of our cruisers in the South
Atlantic became suspicious of her and when the cruiser approached
her the crew abandoned the vessel and as I recall — I am not sure —
prior [6154] to that had dumped a good deal of the cargo. We
took that vessel into Puerto Rico, as I recall, and the subsequent action
with regard to that vessel I think was predicated on international
law. I nave forgotten for the moment just what happened to it.
2312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gearhart. Well, on that one occasion that you point out we
did exercise the right of search, didn't we?
Admiral Stark. But the vessel had been abandoned and she was
flying — she was operating under — false colors. We did go aboard and
put a crew aboard and take her and bring her into port.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes. She was abandoned because they expected
shells from the American contingent, didn't they ?
Admiral Stark. I do not know.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, of course, as a reasonable individual you would
expect that, you would accept that inference, wouldn't you?
Admiral Stark. Well, I don't know. I think if I had been skipper
of that vessel I might have hung on until an American visit and
search party had come aboard, but she had made the mistake of flying
false colors and that put her open to capture, and she was captured
after the crew had abandoned the vessel.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Well, now, there is no use quibbling.
[6156] We were prepared to do anything that was necessary to end
Hitlerism, is that not correct ? That was the orders to the American
Navy.
Admiral Stark. No, sir. The orders to the American Navy in cer-
tain areas was to insure the safety of communications and the delivery
of the hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of material which were
being sent to Britain under the terms of the lend-lease. Congress
having made the United States Treasury practically available to manu-
facture war material and to deliver it, the President took steps to
insure the delivery of that material so far as we could by escorting,
guarding, and covering our ships across to the United Kingdom.
Mr. Gearhart. In insuring the delivery of American goods to Eng-
and we were merely indirectly insuring the destruction of Hitlerism,
were we not ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Mr. Gearhart. And that was our objective.
Admiral Stark. That was the objective of the lend-lease law, as
I understand it.
Mr. Gearhart. And there was no limit upon your belligerent rights
insofar as serving that objective, was there?
Admiral Stark. Our areas were limited. I gave them to you yes-
terday. They show what they were. For example, we were not
sending anything into the Mediterranean to fight [6516] Italy
allied with Germany, nor were we going outside of what I believe
the President defined as our waters. It was not all-out. It was lim-
ited, but it was effective, and it was war, to my mind, inside those
limits.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes, but not considering what you were not doing
but considering what you were doing, the things that the American
Navy was doing was war, wasn't it?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. As I said yesterday, when you are shoot-
ing at the other fellow and he is shooting at you, it to all intents and
purposes is war, even though of a restricted nature. We were not,
for example, flying planes over Germany.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, to quote from President Roosevelt's inspiring
speech of October 27, 1941, he says very bluntly here, in effect, that
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2313
the objective of the United States military operation upon the high
seas was to destroy Hitlerism, does he not, when he uses these words :
The forward march of Hitlerism can be stopped — and it will be stopped and
very simply and very bluntly — we are pledged to put our own oar into the destruc-
tion of Hitlerism.
That indicates very clearly what was in the mind of the President
on the 27th day of October 1941, doesn't it?
Admiral Stark. I think there is no doubt about it and [6167']
I think there was no doubt about it before that. His speech in early
September was likewise very clear.
Mr. Gearhart. In another part of his speech he says :
Many American-owned merchant ships have been sunk on the high seas. One
American destroyer was attacked on September 4th. Another destroyer was
attacked and hit on October 17th. Eleven brave and loyal American men of
our Navy were killed by the Nazis.
That shows they were making war on us, too, doesn't it?
Admiral Stark. Yes, it does. I am simply trying
Mr. Gearhart. I know, you are trying to point out the legalistic
differences.
Admiral Stark. Just the legal points. We had not gone all-out.
We were not basing planes in England to fly against Germany, all
those things that came into effect the minute war was legally de-
clared. Legally we were, in our opinion, at war on the high seas so
far as guaranteeing the safe transit of our vessels towards Iceland
and continental Europe — or the United Kingdom would be better
than continental Europe there.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Now, the activities of the American Navy that
we have just referred to constitute, do they not, legally overt acts
against the Axis.
Admiral Stark. I should say we were both making overt \6158'\
acts against each other. I was asked with regard to that by — I have
forgotten which congressional committee, I was appearing before a
number of them regularly — and I stated and it will undoubtedly be
in the record somewhere, that in my opinion it did not make much
difference what we did; that Hitler had every reason, if he wanted
to exercise it so far as international law was concerned, to go to war
with us at any time but that he would choose his own time and it
would be a cold-blooded decision with him as to when that time would
be most effective.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, an overt act against Germany in 1941 con-
stituted an overt act against Japan in law, did it not ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir; not in my opinion. We were not at war
with Japan. Japan was not at war with anybody except the Chinese.
We were endeavoring — that is, the President and Mr. Hull were, in
my opinion, and I was close to them — not to precipitate a war in the
Pacific,
Mr. Gearhart. Yes; but didn't it ever enter into your discussions
as a member of the war council consisting of the President, the three
Secretaries and the two Chiefs of Staff, didn't it ever enter into your
discussions as to whether or not an overt act of a military nature against
Germany might constitute or also constituted an overt act against the
Japan- [6159] ese?
2314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAKL HARBOK A'lTACK
Admiral Stark. I do not recall it. I had never thought of it until
you just asked the question.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, let me direct your attention to page 84 in
Peace and War. I will read you a paragraph :
On September 27, 1940 Germany, Italy and Japan signed a far reaching treaty
of alliance. In that treaty it was provided that Japan recognized and respected
the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in
Europe; tiiat Germany and Italy recognized and respected the leadership of
Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater Asia ; and that the three
countries would assist one another with all political, economic and military
means when one of the powers was attacked by a power not then involved in
the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.
Now, it would appear from that, would it not, that Japan became
obligated to attack the United States under its agreement with Ger-
many and Italy of September 27, 1940, upon the United States attack-
ing Germany?
Admiral Stark. Yes ; I think that is correct, although I believe that
the State Department might testify to the fact that Japan in the last
analysis would make her own decision as to carrying out that provision
and she would or would not, [6160] according to whether or
not it would be useful to her.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, do you agree with this conclusion which is
drawn by the writer of this book, evidently with the approval of the
Secretary of State of that day :
The last of these provisions obviously was aimed directly at the United States.
Admiral Stark. Yes ; I think that may be correct, sir. I think that
they had us in mind.
Mr. Gearhart. Then it was the belief of the State Department, and
possibly of the War Council, that Germany, Italy, and Japan had in
mind belligerent action on the part of the United States at the time they
entered into that agreement ?
Admiral Stark. I think so, at least a possibility of it. I might add
that for a long period our diplomatic effort was to pry Japan loose
from that Axis set-up or Tri-Partite agreement.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, you were familiar with the intercepts, in one
of which the Japanese in Washington, or rather, in Tokyo informed
Berlin of their steadfast adherence to the Tri-Partite agreements?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr, Gearhart. So far as anything that has ever been acquired
along the line through any of the intercepts or through any of the
discussions with the Japanese Ambassadors, no progress was made
towards separating the Japanese from their Axis [6161] obli-
gations.
Admiral Stark. No, sir ; we didn't get to first base on that.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes. And the intercepts told you, all of the time
that we were negotiating with them, that the Japanese were adhering
strictly to their Axis obligations?
Admiral Stark. I believed there was one intercept showing Ger-
many's dissatisfaction with the fact that Japan was not doing more,
at least one.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, I won't take the time.
The Chapman. The Chair understands the Congressman is through.
Mr. Gearhart. I will announce to the Chairman when I am through.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2315
The Chairman. Well, you said you would not take time.
Mr. Gearhart. I would not take time to look up that intercept
because it is already in evidence.
Now, getting back to the meeting of the war council of November
25, 1941. Now, according to the Army report there are three different
kinds of informal organizations which have been referred to col-
loquially as the war council.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I was originally a little confused as to
just which one they referred to. I believe at one time Mr. Hull re-
ferred to his meetings with the Secretary [6162] of War and
Secretary of State as a war council — or Secretary Stimson referred
to it — but I do understand when you refer to it you mean the meetings
of the Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff with the President.
Mr. Gearhart. That is right.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, there was a meeting in the morning of the
smaller war council, the three Secretaries, -in which Mr. Hull ex-
plained to them what he was trying to do with the Japanese. Ac-
cording to the Army report he explained definitely the 3 months' truce
agreement which has been referred to as the modus vivendi.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And at that meeting Mr. Hull expressed doubt as to
whether or not he would present it. To quote Secretary Stimson :
Hull showed me the proposal for a 3-months truce which he was going to lay be-
fore the Japanese today or tomorrow,
which is on the 25th that this is.
It adequately safeguarded all our interests I thought and secured it but I did
not think that there was any chance of the .Japanese accepting it because it was
so drastic.
Quoting further:
[GIGS'] We are an hour and a half with Hull and then I went back to the
Department ajid I got hold of Marshall.
Now, that indicates quite clearly and it is the conclusion of the
writers of the Army report that the Secretary of War was very much
concerned over the developing situation and very much worried as
to what the result was to be.
Now, in the afternoon or, rather, at high noon there was a meeting
of the full War Council, so-called, at the White House. You were
there, were you not?
Admiral Stark. I was ; yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. You met at 12 and those present were Hull, Knox,
Marshall, Stimson, and yourself?
Admiral Stark. That is right ; yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, did Secretary Stimson bring up the subject
of the kind of an answer that Secretary Hull was contemplating de-
livering to Mr. Nomura the next day?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall. I do not remember just what oc-
curred at that meeting. We unquestionably got together to go over
the situation and I assume that it was discussed from all angles, but
just what those discussions were I have been unable to recall.
Mr. Gearhart. Do you remember whether or not Mr. Hull said any-
thing: about being in doubt as to whether he would serve the 3-months
2316 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
truce statement or whether or not he [61 6 4.] would serve an-
other one on them or whether or not he would just do nothing at all?
Admiral Stark. I do not remember. I think perhaps the best bit
of evidence we have as to what Mr. Hull was thinking of at that time
is contained in, I think, a memorandum of the 27th when he men-
tioned, as I recall in effect, that on about the 25th, as early as the 25th
he was considering abandoning the modus vivendi and on the 26th he
did abandon it.
You recall the paper to which I refer, in which he was discussing the
matter with one of the foreign diplomats. I have that paper, it is
short, and I think that gives his viewpoint very clearly.
Mr. Gearhart. I am more interested in your memory of that pro-
ceeding than I am in any other witness who is not on the stand. I am
talking to you about that.
Admiral Stark. Yes. I do not recall it.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, weren't you very, very much disturbed by the
progress of that conference and wasn't General Marshall very much
disturbed by the progress of that conference in the things that were
said and the things that were being planned by Mr. Hull?
Admiral Stark. We were disturbed because we thought things were
heading up so fast towards a show-down, if you [6165] will,
and we wanted more time and it began to look as though we were not
going to get it.
I am sure with regard to the modus vivendi — I do not know whether
this thought has crossed your mind or not. If you read the modus
vivendi in itself it is nothing like so drastic as the so-called 10-point
note which he handed to the Japs on the 26th, but it is my understand-
ing that the 10 points mentioned in the note on the 26th were the
points which were going to be taken up, perhaps one at a time, under
the modus vivendi and that the modus vivendi would provide a period
of some weeks or 3 months to discuss these particular points and that
then the modus vivendi was thrown overboard and the points with
which you are all familiar were handed to the Japanese.'
Mr. Gearhart. It has been stated that the modus vivendi was
abandoned because Chiang Kai-shek vigorously objected to it. Was
any mention made of Chiang Kai-shek's attitude towards the modus
vivendi in that meeting of the 25th ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall that it was. I have an extremely
clear recollection of Mr. Hull telling me how he felt about the modus
vivendi separate from that meeting of the 25th.
Mr. Gearhart. Did you hear Mr. Stimson say at that meeting any-
thing about whether he approved the 3 mjonths' truce, [6166]
the modus vivendi. or not?
Admiral Stark. I have tried to reconstruct that meeting and what
was said.
Mr. Gearhart. I am trying to help you reconstruct it now. That is
why I am taking the time to talk around the question, hoping that I
will bring to life something in your memory which you have for the
moment passed by.
Admiral Stark. No ; I do not recall. I remember the tense atmos-
phere and the discussions in general of the period, that is the thing
which I am trying to reconstruct, and every time we have tried to re-
construct it for about 3 hours we just cannot do it. That is around
PKOCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2317
the 25th, 26th, and 27th. But as to what actually transpired at that
meeting and what Mr. Hull may have said and Mr. Stimson may have
said, I have been unable to recall.
Mr. Gearhart. But you do remember that the Japanese dead-line
intercept, which said that after the dead line had passed things were
going to automatically begin to happen, that was discussed; you re-
member that, don't you?
Admiral Stark. I remember the message, I remember the dispatch
very clearly and whether at that particular time it was read or dis-
cussed I could not say. It very well may have been, probably was,
but I do not recall the discussions at that meeting.
[61671 Mr. Gearhart. You heard the President say in the course
of that meeting, in substance or in effect, that we were likely to be
attacked, perhaps as soon as, perhaps next Monday ?
Admiral Stark. Yes ; I recall that. I believe that — I am not sure ;
1 think I put that down in one of my letters. What I wrote, and in
which my statement abounds, is factual, written at the time, but I do
not recall the conversation at that time. Of course, it covered the
seriousness of the situation. That was what the meeting was called
for.
[6168'] Mr. Gearhart. Do you remember that the President said
that the Japanese were notorious for making an attack without warn-
ing and that the question was what should be done about it ?
Admiral Stark. I assume he did. We at one time before had al-
ready mentioned that ourselves. Now the one thing that I do remem-
ber— and I do not know that it is necessary to read again — is my post-
script to my letter of the 25th in which you will recall that I held up
the letter for a day because of that meeting. I will read it again if you
like. It is on the record. That is what I do remember.
Mr. Gearhart. How long is it, Admiral Stark ?
Admiral Stark. It is short.
Mr. Gearhart. Eead it in again. It will make it easier to follow :
Admiral Stark. (Keading:)
I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I
have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with
him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the
situation. He confii-med it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither
would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles an
attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen
to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the
weight others do, but [6169] I included it because of the strong feeling
among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the
Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an
advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as most likely.
Then I went on to state I did not know what we would do, and the
rest of the paragraph was meant to be prepared for anything.
Mr. Gearhart. This being surprised or not being surprised reminds
me of "on again, off again, Finnegan." Why is this assertion made
one moment that the President was surprised, and the assertion made
the next moment that he was not surprised ?
Admiral Stark. I might say in regard to surprise, I was endeavor-
ing last night, in regard to surprise and war warning, to get down
to some simple statement which might show my feeling about it.
For example, one takes a step or steps, at times, to avoid being hurt,
2318 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
even though he does not really expect to be hurt or he may regard it
only as a possibility.
Now with the war warning our feeling was, except for taking the
offensive, that the officers to whom that message was addressed would
practcially assume we were at war, so far as taking measures against
surprise was concerned. I believe had we not been attacked at that
time — and I am [6170] assuming this and you can verify it
because I may be wrong — but had we not been attacked at that time
but had Japan declared war against us, we would have started re-
connaissance and those other measures in the outlying- stations to
guard against surprise.
I assumed when we stated the imminence of war that those meas-
ures would be put into effect.
For example, I doubt if anybody in Washington, or perhaps any-
body in the Hawaiian area, in Oahu, Pearl Harbor, would have
expected an attack in late 1944 or 1945 when we were knocking at
the gates of Japan, nevertheless, I dare say they were taking continu-
ous 24-hour effective measures against being caught aback by any
Japanese raid.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, to come back to the meeting of the 25th, the
War Council
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Don't you have an impression now that you left
that meeting disturbed by what Secretary Hull said he contemplated
handing to the Japanese the next day ?
Admiral Stark. I was disturbed before the meeting. As to what
he was going to hand the Japanese the next day, I have no recollec-
tion of it. You can question Admiral Schuirmann on that who was
daily at the State Department, and to the best of my knowledge and
belief the Department [61711 had no forewarning of the note
of the 26th, nor did we know that it was not sent at that time, but it
was sent later.
Mr. Gearh^vrt, You do not mean to have me infer from that an-
swer that Secretary Hull assumed the great responsibility personally
of handing the 10-point note to the Japanese without informing the
President and the War Council of his contemplated action?
Admiral Stark. I think he would not have done it without inform-
ing the President. He did do it, to the best of my knowledge and
belief, without informing either the Army or the Navy.
Mr. Gearhart. Did not he inform you and General Marshall, and
did not you and Marshall protest against the handing of the 10-point
note to the Japanese ?
Admiral Stark. Not to my knowledge or remembrance. The mem-
orandum to the President by Mr. Hull, of which I have a photosatic
copy, of November 26 states, if I may read it
Mr. Gearhart. Yes, if it is not long.
Admiral Stark (reading) :
With reference to our two proposals prepared for submission to the Japanese
Government — this is dated the 26th, the day after the meeting — 1. A proposal
in the way of a draft agreement for a broad basic peaceful settlement for the
Pacific area, which is henceforth to be made a part of the general conversations
now going on and to be [6172] carried on, if agreeable to both Govern-
ments, with a view to a general agreement on this subject.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2319
2. The second proposal is really closely connected with the conversations look-
ing toward a general agreement, which is in the nature of a modus Vivendi
intended to make more feasible the continuance of the conversations.
In view of the opposition of the Chinese Government and either the half-hearted
support or the actual opposition of the British, the Netherlands and the Australian
Governments, and in view of the wide publicity of the opposition and of the
additional opposition that will naturally follow through utter lack of an under-
standing of the vast importance and value otherwise of the modus vivendi, with-
out in any way departing from my views about the wisdom and benefit of this
step to all of the countries opposed to the aggressor nations who are interested
in the Pacific area, I desire very earnestly to recommend that at this time I call
in the Japanese Ambassadors and hand to them a copy of the comprehensive basic
proposal for a general peaceful settlement, and at the same time withhold
the modus vivendi proposal.
That is signed "Cordell Hull."
That was sent on the 26th to the President, and as I read it, asking
the President's permission to take the course which he did take, and
evidently one might infer from that, [6173] although again
I have no clear recollection of the November 25 meeting, that he had
not made such a request or possibly proposed it on the 25th.
I think there was boiling in Mr. Hull's mind the message from
Chiang Kai-shek and it jelled on the 26th.
Mr. Geakhakt. Anyway, you and General Marshall left that meet-
ing feeling it was incumbent upon you to make a last-minute appeal
in writing to the President to do everything you could to gain time ?
Admiral Stark. Whether the memorandum to the President started
then or before I do not know. I would recall our message of the 24th
showing my apprehension, and to which General Marshall agreed.
In endeavoring to fix the date that that started, about the only one
whom I have heard state anything about it, who fixes it rather clearly
in his own mind and who was one of the draftees of it, was Admiral
Turner, who believed it started about the 24th.
Mr. Geaehart. Now this meeting adjourned about 1 o'clock, did
it not ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir.
Mr. Geaehart. You returned to your office then, did you not ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Geaehart. At 1 : 54 you put in a call for General Marshall,
did you not ?
[6174-] Admiral Stark. Well, if the record shows that, I prob-
ably did; yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. It does. To refresh your memory, wasn't it for the
purpose of getting together with General Marshall immediately to pre-
pare a written memorandum pleading with the President to do what-
ever he could do to gain time for the Army and Navy ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall, Mr. Gearhart. General Marshall
and I were together on that proposition. Just when we started it I
cannot say.
Mr. Gearhart. Then at 4 : 30 in the afternoon General Marshall
called you on the phone, according to the record of White House calls.
Now was not that call to further discuss the hastily prepared memo-
randum to the President?
Admiral Stark. That is going on 5 years* ago, and when you ask
me what we said over the telephone at a certain hour in the afternoon,
I just cannot answer it.
2320 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK.
Mr. Gearhart. Then I notice in the same report on the afternoon
of November 25 at 5 p. m. you again called General Marshall. I will
ask you, to refresh your memory, wasn't it for him to come over and put
his signature on the document, or for you to send it to him where
he could put his signature on it ?
Admiral Stark. On the afternoon of the 25th?
[6175] Mr. Gearhart. On the afternoon of the 25th.
Admiral Stark. The document shows the date of the 27th.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes; but you also heard the testimony of General
Marshall that he was not in Washington on the 27th.
Admiral Stark. I knew that, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Therefore he could not sign it on the date it bears,
he had to sign it ahead of time.
Admiral Stark. Not necessarily. He thinks he signed it on the
28th. It might have been dated the 27th. It was dated the 27th for
his signature and mine, and he being absent he could not sign it until
he got back. You recall the Gerow memorandum in which he states —
The Secretaries were informed, of the proposed memorandum
this is Gerow to General Marshall —
you and Admiral Stark directed be prepared for the President. The Secretary
of War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a
recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversa-
tions. He was reassured on that point. It was agreed that the memorandum
would be shown to both Secretaries before dispatch. Both the message and the
memorandum were shown to the Secretary of War. He suggested some minor
changes in the memorandum that were made.
Now if the changes were made at that time it would not appear
probable to me that Marshall would have signed it on the 25th, particu-
larly as the memorandum bears the date of the 27th, and particularly
also in view of this memorandum.
Mr. Gearhart. Then I note in the same Wliite House record that
on 10 : 30 a. m. you called General Marshall on the 26th. It is possible
that he signed it on the 26th after the changes were made, is that not
correct? Does not the telephone call pertain to that ?
Admiral Stark. I do not know what that telephone call pertains to.
Someone has suggested to me that I had something important that
morning and wanted to delay the joint board meeting a little bit, and
that that call was for that purpose. Personally I do not recall.
Mr. Gearhart. The same White House record discloses that you
called General Marshall at 1 :25 p. m. on the 26th. Could it be possible
you called with reference to that memorandum to the President, that
you had determined with him to send to the Chief Executive?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; it could have been possible.
Mr. Gearhart. It could have been signed on the 26th? It was
within the range of possibilities?
Admiral Stark. It was ; yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. In view of the fact that the diary of Secretary Stim-
son shows that at the meeting of the 27th, when General Marshall was
out of the city, the memorandum was [6177] considered by the
War Council, that would seem that it was signed before, instead of
after the 27th, would it not?
Admiral Stark. Not necessarily. I think the best testimony we
have on that is from General Marshall himself.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2321
Mr. Gearhart. I have here the testimony of Mr. Stimson which
says:
A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the Presi-
dent was examined and the question of need for further time was discussed.
Now, that is from the diary of Secretary Stimson, and his diary
ought to be better evidence, ought it not, than the memory 5 years old
of the Chief of Staff.
Do you not think so ?
Admiral Stark. Yes j but I see nothing in there to show that General
Marshall might have signed it on the 26th, That is a discussion of
the draft of the memorandum, is it not?
Mr. Gearhart. Yes ; presented to the War Council, and discussed by
the War Council. Would it be presented to the War Council and dis-
cussed by them if it were not assented to by the Chief of Staff already ?
Admiral Stark. May I see what you are reading from ?
Mr. Gearhart. I am reading from the United States newsprint of
the Army report, reading from page 51, half way down the second
column.
Admiral Stark. That is this publication (indicating) ?
[6178'] Mr. Gearhart. Page 51, the right-hand column.
Admiral Stark. About half way down the right-hand column?
Mr. Gearhart. Yes. About one-third of the way down it says,
"Witness what it says as of the morning of the 27th of November, 1941."
I have skipped down about three paragraphs.
Admiral Stark, Yes. As I read it, it says : "I then called up the
President and talked with him about it."
That was not a War Council meeting, it was a conversation over the
telephone if I have the right paragraph.
Mr, Gearhart. It is the next paragraph :
He then took prompt action to confer with Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, and
with General Gerow, who appeared to be representing General Marshall in his
absence at maneuvers. He was concerned with revising the draft radio of General
Marshall, which became radio #472. Also, as he says, "a dx-aft memorandum from
General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President was examined and the ques-
tion of need for further time was discussed."
Admiral Stark. As I read that, the "he" refers not to the President
but to Mr. Stimson.
Mr. Gearhart. You then called up the President and talked with
him about it?
Admiral Stark. It says :
"I then called up the President [6179] and talked with him about it."
He then took prompt action to confer with Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, and
with General Gerow, who appeared to be representing General Marshall in his
absence at maneuvers. He was concerned with revising the draft radio of
General Marshall.
I think it refers to Secretary Stimson, as I read it.
Mr. Gearhart. Perhaps you are right. Do you remember the
occasion ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Then, you remember whether it was the President
who took it up with you people or whether it vras taken up by Mr.
Stimson.
Admiral Stark. It was Mr. Stimson, if I remember.
79716 — 46— pt. 5 18
2322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gearhart. Where was the meeting held ?
Admiral Stark. I think in Secretary Stimson's Office. It was in
Mr. Stimson's office, I recollect.
Going back to your record about my calls with General Marshall,
there is a note here on my co'py which we obtained that General Mar-
shall was not in, so apparently we did not discuss anything. The
message of 12 : 50 also has an "NM" on it, on the mimeographed sheet,
from which I suppose you read.
Mr. Gearhart. What does that mean ?
Admiral Stark. It means "No message". I did not get [6180]
hold of him.
Mr. Gearhart. Is that why you kept on trying?
Admiral Stark. Well, I tried to get him at that time and he was not
there. He was there in the morning. Now, as regards the late after-
noon message to which you referred, I do not see anything after that,
after 12 : 50, which did not get through to Marshall.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, this is repetition, but when did you first hear
of the 10-point message ?
Admiral Stark. I may have heard of it on the 28th. It is not clear
in my mind. I do not remember when I first heard of the 10-point
message. Undoubtedly not later than the 28th. Possibly Mr. Stimson
mentioned it. It is possible when he said Mr. Hull had thrown over
the modus vivendi and was going to send a note, that I had the sub-
stance of it. I knew approximately what the substance of that note
was, because, as I understand, those were the points that were going
to be taken up during the period which the modus vivendi was designed
to cover.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, to refresh your memory, I notice on this same
record of White House calls that Secretary Hull called you and got
through, it is marked with an "O.K." at 1 : 15 p. m. on the 26th day of
November, 1941. Does that remind you of the fact that Secretary Hull
told you what he [6181] had done previously that morning at
9 o'clock in reference to the Japanese?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. My remembrance, and my only remem-
brance, is Mr. Hull's feeling about the note, and sometime during that
period I learned that he was throwing over the modus vivendi, and
the flat statement that it was now up to the Army and Navy, which,
to my mind, pointed clearly to the fact that he had no hope of reaching
a satisfactory settlement in the Pacific through further negotiations.
That we crystallized in our dispatch of the 27th.
Mr. Gearpiart. Now, the making of a decision to abandon the
modus vivendi and to serve upon the Japanese the 10-point document,
that so many people call an ultimatum, was an important event in
the minds of all the members of the War Council, was it not?
Admiral Stark. Weil, when I learned of it I considered it very im-
portant, particularly, as we were playing for time.
Mr. Gearhart. It was so important that I am astonished that
Admiral Stark should call you on the 'phone just after he had com-
pleted the delivery, to talk with you and not say anything about it.
Admiral Stark. You mean Mr. Hull?
Mr. Gearhart. jSIr. Hull ; 3'es, sir.
Admiral Stark. As I sa}^, he may have told me at that [6182]
time about it being up to the Army and Navy. Just when I got that,
whether it was the 26th or 27th, or I may have inferred it from his
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2323
conversation on the 25th, I could not say, but I would again invite at-
tention to the fact that it was on the 26th that he asked the President's
permission to proceed on that line. What time the President got that
and what time the President O.K.'d I do not know. I doubt that Mr.
Hull would have told me he was going to do it prior to getting the
President's permission. I think he delivered the note in the late
afternoon, somewhere around 1800, as I recall, to the Japs. That can
be ascertained from the records.
Mr. Geakiiart. Are you sure as to that?
Admiral Stark. Not sure. I say it can be obtained from the rec-
ords. I have that recollection. It is probably based on some appoint-
ment, or something, of Secretary Hull with the Japs.
Mr. Gearhart. But you have no memory of the Secretary mention-
ing anything to you in his telephone call at 1 : 25 p. m. concerning what
kind of a message he was going to deliver to or had delivered to the
Japanese ?
Admiral Stark. I did not get the first part of that, Mr. Gearhart.
I was looking for something to back up my statement about the late
afternoon, and with your permission I would like to state that from
the Washington Post of the 27th [Gigs'] Washington Post,
November 27, page 4, it states, "Then came Hull to see the President.
Hull left the White House and returned to the State Department to
confer with Hornbeck, Maxwell Hamilton and Ballantine, his Far
East experts." That is the Washington Post, November 27, page 4.
These officials were still with Hull when Kurusu and Nomura arrived at 5
p. m. The note was handed to Kurusu and Nomura at this conference which
lasted until 6 : 45 p. m.
Now, that is from the Washington Post, and I assume the State
Department can verify it if such is desired.
[6184] Mr. Gearhart. What was the hour?
Admiral Stark. Sir?
Mr. Gearhart. What was the hour mentioned ?
Admiral Stark. It states the note was handed to Kurusu and
Nomura at this conference which lasted until 6 : 45 p. m. It also states
the two Japanese diplomats arrived at 5 p. m.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, the record shows that at 2 : 35 p. m. you called
Secretary Hull; refreshing your memary, did he say anything about
what kind of a document he was planning to deliver to the Japanese
later on in the day ?
Admiral Stark. I don't recall, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. When did you first hear Secretary Hull quoted as
sa,ving that lie had decided to kick the whole thing over and tell them
that he had no other proposals at all ?
Admiral Stark. That is what I have been trying to reconstruct.
The Gerow memorandum shows that we had that in the conference
on the morning of the 27th through Mr. Stimson. That is the one
definite thing in Avriting which seems to set tliat date.
Mr. Gearhart. When did you hear for the first time that Secre-
tary Hull had made the statement, as he put it :
I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of Stimson and Knox
and the Army and Navy?
Admiral Stark. Well, as I say, I heard it not later [618S]
than the 27th and on the 27th. Now, whether Mr. Hull told me that
2324 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
as his feeling earlier, I don't know, but he couldn't have made the
definite statement, I would say — and, of course, Mr. Hull is available —
prior to getting permission from the President, which was in his
memorandum of the 26th.
Mr. Geariiakt. I will ask you, Admiral Stark, in the light of all
these facts and figures and telephone calls that I have called your at-
tention to, is it not a fact that as a consequence of the meetings of
the war council of November 25 and of November 26 that you and
Marshall were very, very much disturbed because of the anticipated
and announced action of Secretary Hull and that you and he rushed
to — and did — prepare a memorandum pleading with the President to
do something which would make it possible to offset what Mr. Hull
was contemplating and to gain time for the military forces of the
United States to prepare for the inevitable conflict?
Admiral Stark. Well, the entire picture became serious around
the 23d and the 24th, as reflected in my dispatch of the 24th. Whether
that memorandum was started on the 25th or the 26th or the 24th
I am not sure. But, of course, we were disturbed. That is factual.
We were ]Dlaying for time. That is factual. And the memorandum
bears the date of the 27th.
Mr. Gearhart. That is all.
[6186] The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will
inquire.
Admiral Stark. May I now — I see Senator Lucas is here — ^bring
up the point which I started to bring up this morning and noting his
absence did not bring up, with reference to yesterday ?
The Vice Chairman. Yes; you may proceed with that.
Admiral Stark. Yesterday Senator Lucas in examining me asked if
the damage done to the Fleet in Pearl Harbor was not largely due to
torpedoes, that it was his opinion that it was, and in that I agreed.
I was particularly thinking of my old command, which I put in com-
mission as executive officer, and later commanded, the West Virginia^
whose damage was very extensive from torpedoes, and I think his
statement may still stand as correct that the great portion of the
damage was caused by torpedoes, although the Department can give
factual information on that.
However, not being too sure of my answer I checked up and I want
to offer the following, which is taken from item 15 of the Navy Folder
which is before the committee, and without reading the entire thing
I simply want to show the following in the record, which does show
great damage probably done by bombs.
You have this item 15 among your exhibits.
[618T\ The Arizona was attacked by both torpedoes and bombs.
The California was attacked by torpedoes and bombs.
The West Virginia was attacked — when I say attacked I mean hit — by tor-
pedoes and bombs.
The Oklahoma was hit only by torpedoes.
The Nevada was hit by torpedoes and bombs.
The Maryland was hit by bombs only.
The Pennsylvania was hit by bombs only.
The Tennessee was hit by bombs only.
The Helena was hit by tori>edoes only.
The Honolulu was damaged by bombs only.
The Raleigh, damaged by both torpedoes and bombs.
The Shaw, by bomb only.
The Cassin and Dotones, by bomb only.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2325
That refers to the major combatant ships and there is further data
with regard to what damage was suffered. I just touched on the
attack.
The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your statement on that,
Admiral ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral Stark, you have now given the opinion
to Senator Lucas, from the record there, on the [6188] ships.
Did the Secretary of the Navy go out to Hawaii after the attack ?
Admiral Stark. Very shortly after ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And did he bring back a report ?
Admiral Stark. He did.
Senator Ferguson. Did you examine that report with him?
Admiral Stark. The only report that I saw was the one which was
made public ; and, of course, he told us, in a long conference, a great
deal of what happened, particularly items of interest, and of the
wonderful behavior of our men, and of their wonderful spirit, et
cetera, as he saw them in the hospital wards.
I was asked, and I didn't understand the question, in the previous
investigation by the Navy, when I said I saw the report, I believe
reference was made to a special report which he made to the
President that I did not see.
Senator Ferguson. I understand you never saw the report that
went to the President?
Admiral Stark. So far as I know I never saw that report. I
don't recall it. I saw the report which was made public; and, of
course, from conversations with him I got the picture.
Senator Ferguson. Isn't it true that the report that was made
public was a different report than the one given to the President?
[6JS9~\ Admiral Stark. I understood so since, but I have not
seen it.
Senator Ferguson. How do you account for the fact that the
Secretary of the Navy did not disclose to you the facts that he dis-
closed to the President, you being the highest Navy man under him ?
Admiral Stark. I don't account for it.
Senator Ferguson. You don't account for it?
Admiral Stark. I don't. I don't recall any knowledge of it at
the time.
Senator Ferguson. Well
Admiral Stark. That he had made a special written report to the
President, if he did, and I am assuming from your question that
he did.
Senator Ferguson. And you indicated that you knew he had?
Admiral Stark. Well, I indicated to this extent, that when I was
asked the question last summer, or a year ago last summer, I should
say, if I had seen the report which Colonel Knox made, I replied
"Yes," and I gathered later that the report — the report I referred to
was that which was published, that is what I understood the question
was asked on, and I gained the understanding since that there was
another report.
2326 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Now, yesterday you made an answer to Mr.
Gearhart that I want to ask you about. You said:
[6190] I have spent hours trying to recall what went on, on the 25th,
6th and 7th, as to time. I have discussed it with others. We come to an
impasse as to any agreement every time we do it, and every time we start
it we waste a couple of hours and get nowhere. I cannot recall the details
of just when I got that information. I wish I could, but I just can't do it.
Do I understand from that answer that what you are conveying
to the committee is that you have sat down with various other
officials and tried to arrive at an agreement as to what happened
during this period, is that what I understand?
Admiral Stark. As to when it happened. My memory is clear
as to certain things which did happen and not clear as to others.
But when I try, for example, to fix in my own mind whether Mr.
Hull told me about the Chiang Kai-shek memorandum on the 25th
or 26th, I can't do it. I have talked the matter over at length on
different occasions with Admiral Schuirmann, who was in constant
touch with the State Department, and as to what he knew.
Senator Ferguson. That is not what I am getting at. Do I under-
stand that some of your answers here are because you have agreed
with somebody that that is what happened and if you can't agree then
you don't give your best answer ?
Admiral Stark. No. I have given my best answer. That [6191]
is not the inference to be drawn at all.
Senator Ferguson. That is what I wanted to straighten out on this
answer.
Admiral Stark. No; that inference is not what I intended to con-
vey. It is my effort to fix down to a date and a time as to just when I
learned, for example, of Mr. Hull's sending the 10-point note, of his
conversation about Chiang Kai-Shek, and tlie material of that sort.
Senator Ferguson. Now
Admiral Stark. But
Senator Ferguson. I will have to change the subject, because I was
talking about another thing, but you bring up another thing which
I will ask you about now, copy of the message transmitted to Secre-
tary Stimson by Mr. T. V. S;>ong, under cover of a letter dated No-
vember 25.
Will you look at that and see whether that is the Chiang Kai-shek
message that you are talking about?
Admiral Stark. That is the message, or it certainly conveys the
material which Mr. Hull talked to me about, yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, 1 understand that a copy of this memo-
randum to the Secretary of State was sent to the Secretary of War.
Do you know whether or not a copy was sent to the Secretary of the
Navy, and did it reach you in that manner?
Admiral Stark. It is my recollection, and again you can [6192]
get factual data, that this message was not only sent to Mr. Hull but
to a number of other officials in our Government.
Senator Ferguson. That is just it. Isn't it true that the Chinese
Government not only went to the Secretary of State but they went
to other agencies and Mr. Hull Avas upset about it?
Admiral Stark. Very much upset. I believe this was also made
known to people in Congress at that time.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2327
Senator Ferguson. So tlie substance of that letter not only came
to you throuo;!! Mr. Hull but it came from other sources, did it not?
Admiral Stark. I knew of the substance of it because I can recall
Colonel Knox talkinfj about people talking about this on the Hill.
Senator Ferguson. Now, when did you have a conversation — I real-
ize how long it has been, I realize that there is much water gone over
the dam, as we say, but I want to try and get the substance of some of
these conversations because what this committee has to do is to try to
get the best information they can so that "we will get all the facts, and
I hope that you wiJl bear with me on some of these questions.
Admiral Stark. I will do my best to give you all I know and any
information that I have that should be of assistance.
Senator Ferguson. I start out with the assumption, and [6J9r3]
I take it it is true, that you favor this hearing and you are willing to
cooperate.
Admiral Stark. I am delighted that this hearing came before Con-
gress where all parties would have the opportunity to tell you all they
know about' it.
Senator Ferguson. I am assuming that.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, on this information that came from the
Chinese Government in relation to this modus vivendi, it wasn't only
given to the Secretary of State, but it was given to other agencies
and even came up on the Hill, as we call the Congress ; that is true ;
isn't it?
Admiral Stark. That is my understanding, and confirmed, without
any question, by Mr. Hull's statement to me that they were crying ap-
peasement on the Hill, another thing which greatly perturbed him.
Senator Ferguson. Now — do you want to take a moment to look at
that?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. There is one paragraph here in Mr. Hull's
statement which reads
Mr, Mitchell. Is that the statement of November 29th ?
Admiral Stark. No, of November 25 : ^
Subject : Opposition of Generalissimo Cliiang Kai-Shek to modus vivendi.
[6194] Participants: Secretary Hull and the Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Hu
Shih.
And part of that reads :
I said that very recently the Generalissimo and Madam Chiang Kai-Shek almost
flooded Washington with strong and lengthy cables telling us how extremely
dangerous the Japanese threat is to attack the Burma Road through Indo-Chlna
and appealing loudly for aid, whereas practically the first thing this present
proposal of mine and the President does is to require the Japanese troops to be
taken out of Indo-China and thereby to protect the Burma Road from what
Chiang Kai-Shek said was an imminent danger —
and so forth.
I remember very clearly how upset Mr. Hull was, of his telling me
that even the Hill was crying appeasement, that the Chinese them-
selves should have supported him, because he was doing this in their
behalf, and that apparently they didn't understand it.
Also in a previous dispatch, which I read, he pointed out that the
British, he thought, were only half-way supporting it.
> Included in Exhibit No. 18.
2328 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Was it j^our understanding, or was it not youi
understanding, that to have entered into or to have sent the modus
vivendi, or agreed on the modus vivendi, that [6196] thereby
America would have been sacrificing her principles ?
Admiral Stark. No. That is not my opinion. My understanding
of the modus vivendi was that it was to insure a period of three months
to talk things over and that the material which was in the 10-point
note were the items which they were going to talk over and resolve.
Senator Ferguson. But the modus vivendi would have given an
extension of three months for negotiations and would have not, ex-
cept for that period, let's say, sacrificed the American principles?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I had no idea that Mr. Hull for one sec-
ond considered sacrificing any principles or walking backward.
Senator Ferguson. You were the highest Naval authority in the
United States?
Admiral Stark. I was.
Senator Ferguson. You were under the Secretary of the Navy but
you were the highest authority? >
Admiral Stark. By virtue of my office at that time I was.
Senator Ferguson. Therefore you were vitally interested in our
diplomatic negotiations, because, as I understand it, you have to have
your diplomatic negotiations tied in with your military authorities,
because you have got to be able to [6196] back up what you
do; isn't that the principle?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Therefore you were vitally interested in this
modus vivendi and the diplomatic negotiations; is that true?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, will you tell us why the modus vivendi
was not sent. You were one of the top officials representing the United
States Navy, and, if I might add, before you answer that, this would
be a Naval war in the Pacific, would it not ?
Admiral Stark. Largely, yes. I always looked on it as largely a
naval war.
Senator Ferguson. Therefore you would be very vitally interested
in this question as to whether or not we had a J] months period or
whether or not we didn't take that period. AVill you tell us why the
modus vivendi was not sent ?
Admiral Stark. May I add there that so was Marshall, because
Senator Ferguson. Oh, yes.
Admiral Stark. Because the defense of the Philippines, which was
an Army problem, was one of the primary reasons for that extension.
Senator Ficrouson. I don't mean to say that the ]Military, [6197]
the Army, was not vitally interested also, but it would have been, to
a greater extent, a naval war?
Admiral Stark. Yes; but holding the Philippines was something
1 took up in the first meeting I ever had in the AVhite House. There
had always been a general feeling that we couldn't hold the Philip-
pines, that we would have to abandon them. I was hoping that we
would have time to take steps to make them secure. My desire for
time was so that the Army could complete a project it had to greatly
strengthen the Philippines, and in turn the fieet could support them
in the Philippines.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2329
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Now, coming back to my previous question, why did we not use
the modus vivendi ?
Admiral Stark. Well, I can give you my opinion as to that.
Senator Ferguson. I would like to have the substance of what was
said first and then your opinion.
Admiral Stark. I gained the impression from Mr. Hull that the
Chiang Kai-shek note so disturbed him that — alon^ with other things
which have been read — that he seriously questioned, when he first in-
formed me, the desirability of his going ahead with the modus vivendi.
Subsequently he did not go ahead with it. Now —
[6298] Senator Ferguson. What were the other things ?
Admiral Stark. The other items were those which have been men-
tioned, but, as I recall, the British and the Dutch appeared not too
strongly with him; they were crying appeasement on the Hill, as he
stated to me, with regard to the course that he was taking.
Senator Ferguson. I believe that is the message that you referred
to today and it reads something like this :
They seemed to be thinking of the advantages to be derived without any par-
ticular thought of what we should pay them, if anything. Finally, when I
discovered that none of their Governments had given ihem instructions relative
to this phase of the matter, except in the case of the Netherlands Minister, I
remarked that each of their Governments were more interested in the defense
of that area of the world than this country, and at the same time they expected
this country, in case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to move in a military
way and to take the lead in defending the entire area/
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. And then there was his memorandum
dated November 29,^ in which he refers to a conference : Participants,
the Secretary of State, Hull, and the British Ambassador, Lord Hali-
fax. That was the one I was thinking about.
[6199] Senator Ferguson. All right. Will you give me the sub-
stance of that ?
Admiral Stark (reading) :
The British Ambassador called at his request and I soon discovered tliat he
had no special business except to check on the aftermath of the conversations
between the President and myself and the Japanese with special reference to
the question of the proposed modus vivendi. This caused me to remark in a
preliminary way that the mechanics for the carrying on of diplomatic relations
between the governments resisting aggressor nations are so complicated that
it is nearly impossible to carry on such relations in a manner at all systematic
and safe and sound. I referred to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek, for example,
has sent numerous hysterical cable messages to different Cabinet officers and
high officials in the Government other than the State Department, and some-
times even ignoring the President, intruding into a delicate and serious situa-
tion with no real idea of what the facts are.
There are about four or five pages to this. I do not know whether
you want me to go ahead with the rest of it as a refresher or not
Senator Ferguson. It is in, is it not?
' [6£00] Mr. Mitchell. It is in Exhibit 18.
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; it is in the record.
Admiral Stark. It is in the record, yes, sir. I might just add the
next sentence. [Reading :]
I added that Chiang Kai-shek has his brother-in-law, located here in Wash-
ington, disseminate damaging reports at times to the press and others, appar-
^ Page 3 of Memorandum of Conversation, dated November 24, 1941, included in
Exhibit No. 18.
a Included in Exhibit No. 18.
2330 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ently with no particular purpose in mind ; that we have correspondents from
London who interview different officials here, which is entirely their privilege
to do, except that at times we all move too fast without fully understanding each
other's views, et cetera, et cetera. I stated that this was well illustrated in
the case of the recent outburst by Chiang Kai-shek. In referring to this I re-
marked that it would have been better if, when Churchill received Chiang Kai-
shek's loud protest about our negotiations here with Japan, instead of passing
the protest on to us without objection on his part, thereby qualifying and virtually
killing what we knew were the individual views of the British Government toward
these negotiations, he had sent a strong cable back to Chiang Kai-shek telling him
to brace up and fight with the same zeal as the Japanese and the Germans are
displaying instead of weakening and telling the Chinese people that [6201]
all of the friendly countries were now striving primarily to protect themselves
and to force an agreement between China and Japan, every Chinese should under-
stand from such a procedure that the best possible course was being pursued and
that this calls for resolute fighting until the undertaking is consummated by
peace negotiations which Japan in due course would be obliged to enter into
with China.
And then it goes on. I think I have read enough to show how ]\Ir.
Hull felt about it and which I got the impression from him in talking
with him personally.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, all right. Did you feel the same way
about it ?
Admiral Stark. I felt the same way about the impropriety of
flooding all of Washington in the manner in which INIr. Hull stated.
I thought they slioidd have gone about it to him with all of their
troubles and not gone to the highways and byways.
Senator Fergusox. But after we are all through, it is apparent that
Mr. Hull — or is it apparent — that Mr. Hull followed just what the
Chinese wanted?
Admiral Stark. He did. He broke off so far as the modus vivendi
is concerned.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
[030:2] Admiral Stark. And he gives extensive reasons there
for it. Perhaps he may have agreed with some of Chiang Kai-shek's
thoughts that even a leak that we were — and I think it is in that
letter — a leak to the effect that the United States was going to let
Japan have oil or other materials or ease up on the freezing might
be such a blow to their morale as to make it impossible for them to
continue. But we had all those things. He talked it over, I assume,
with his chief and he came to that conchision. We were thinking
that from the military standpoint to gain time.
Senator Ferguson. But, Admiral, isn't this true, that when you
take ivhat Mr. Hull said about Chiang Kai-shek, it indicated that
he was not going to follow that route rather than that he was going
to follow wliat he wanted; it was a criticism of it.
Admiral Stark. It was a criticism of Mr. Hull bj^ tlie Chinese
you mean ?
Senator Ferguson. No; a criticism of the Chinese stand, was it
not?
Admiral Stark. By Mr. Hull ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. I do not know if he criticized so much although
he may have and did in some respects the Chinese understanding.
That, I would say, could liavo been resolved and [620r3] set
straight between Mr. Hull and the iVmbassador, but when it was
broadcast, or the impression was gained or at least talked about and
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2331
Mr. Hull gained the impression, that even here at the Capitol that
he, Mr. Hull, was being guilty of appeasement and that may also
have influenced him in the action which he took.
Senator Ferguson. Now, wait. Do I understand, then, that the
opinion that Mr. Hull was appeasing Japan may have had something
to do with him throwing out the modus vivendi and putting in the
note of the 26th?
Admiral Stark. Whether or not that criticism which was being
leveled at him in official Washington had anything to do with his
final decision, only Mr. Hull could answer. I do know that it greatly
annoyed him.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, how do you account for this note
on the 24th where he fully recognized what he is saying :
I remarked that each of their Governments was more interested in the defense
of that are'a of the world than this country, and at the same time they expected
this country, in case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to move in a military
way and take the lead in defending the entire area.
He fully recognized our position in the world when he said that,
did he not?
[6204] Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; he recognized that and I think
that probably from the other governments it is not unusual. It is a
rather human weakness to have that sort of an opinion. Every fel-
low is thinlring of himself first and perhaps sometimes from thinking
overmuch of himself loses sight of the broader picture. That is what I
gather that he means.
Senator Ferguson. Isn't that exactly what happened, just what Mr.
Hull prophesied would happen, that we would have to defend the
whole area and we would have to have the war for the whole area, isn't
that what happened ?
Admiral Stark. We would have the major role.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. The Chinese had their role and, of course, the
British also had their role and there were plans being laid.
Senator Ferguson. Now, that takes me to this : What was our role,
what was our plan in case there was an attack upon the British posses-
sions in that area ? I am talking right from this memorandum of the
24th here :
In case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to move in a military way and take
the lead in defending the entire area.
which would include the British.
Now, what was our plan, what was our role if an attack \6205']
was made upon the British possessions in the Far East ?
Admiral Stark. I do not know what it w^ould have been. It would
have been up to Congi^ess in the last analysis, had the President decided
that it was time to make a recommendation to Congress. What recom-
mendation he would have made, I do not know.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever try to find out what w^ould be your
stand ? You had to prepare for such an emergency, did you not ?
Admiral Stark. We were preparing for it.
Senator Ferguson. And you could not wait until Congress acted to
get at least prepared for such a situation ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
2332 CONGRESSIONAL IN\TESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, did you ever try to find out
what our stand would be in that case ?
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Wlio did you try to find it out from?
Admiral Stark. I had asked the President.
Senator Ferguson. What did he tell you ?
Admiral Stark. He could not answer the question and I believe
that he was sincere in stating that he did not kiiow. You will recall,
and I have stated factually — this is not hindsight — in answer to ques-
tions of this sort which Admiral Richardson asked me and that I had
asked for the answers to [6£06] those questions and could not
get them, and I quote — I believe I stated — that I thought that "there
was nobody on God's green earth who could answer them."
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, you went to the President and
you asked the specific question as to what we would do in that case if
an attack was made on the British possessions, in which case I under-
stand that he told you he did not know.
Admiral Stark. He did not answer the question.
Senator Ferguson. Well, what did he say or what did he do?_
Admiral Stark. Just that he did not know; at least he said that
he could not answer it. At one time I believe he said to me, "Don't
ask me these questions," because I feel that he could not answer them —
I felt that he could not answer them. Now, as to what he would done,
I do not know.
Senator Ferguson. Then, Admiral, how could you prepare for that
situation ? If you could not get an answer and, as you say, you knew
the President could not answer it, how could you prepare for that?
Admiral Stark. I could work on the assumption that the worst
might happen and that is what I did. For example
Senator Ferguson. Did he tell you
The Chairman. Let the witness complete his answer.
\6207'\ Senator Ferguson. I will let him answer.
Admiral Stark, ^lay I just give you an example ? You will recall
that on my own initiative, so far as getting the British over here in
early 1941, we started hearings here with the British. When I asked
them to come over initially I did not ask the President's permission
or Colonel Knox. It was more or less — there was some dynamite
in the fact that it might be known that we were holding conversations
with the British as to what we would do and how we would work with
them in case of war.
I was asked the question one day on the Hill before one of the Senate
committees, as to whether or not we were holding conversations with
the British with regards to participation with them in the war and my
answer was that I would like to put two or three questions up to the
committee. And the first one was, "Is there not some possibility of the
United States being drawn into this war, remote though it may be
and regardless of our endeavor to keep out?" They agreed that such
a possibility did exist in the world situation at that time,
^ I then asked, "Suppose that possibility develops, is there any ques-
tion on which side we would fight ? If course there was no question.
It would be opposed to the Axis.
I then answered the question and stated, "The answer is in the af-
iirmatjve" in answering you, but wouldn't I be utter- [6208'] ly
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2333
derelict in my duties if I did not prepare for the contingency so that
if and when war did eventuate that there would be ample working
plans, so far as possible, to dovetail and coordinate our effort?
The questioning of me on that subject stopped and I never was
asked about it during the course of months, during the course of those
next couple of months work with the British.
Now, as regards the Far East, we did hold conversations out there
in the A-D-B, none of which was approved, and final action, we^ put
it up to Admiral Hart and to Admiral Phillips, the British Com-
mander-in-Chief, to make their own plans as to how to work together
if we both got in it. The directions were always against any political
commitment. I have Hart's here, his despatch covering the recom-
mendations with regard to that pulling together and I have our an-
swer.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand that at any time you dis-
cussed with the President the question as to not what we would do,
but preparing for the eventuality that if they did attack the British
that you would be prepared for this country to come in ?
. Admiral Stark. I stated, and he knew with regard to the partic-
ular conversations I have just mentioned, I informed him in January,
after the committee was here, that I was going ahead with those
conversations.
[6£09] Senator Ferguson. And what did he say about that?
Admiral Stark. I told him that I would prefer to be panned for
not being ready than for being reproved when the time came and I
was not ready, and he let it go at that.
Senator Ferguson. Well, what did he say? What was the sub-
stance of what he said ?
Admiral Stark. Well, he did not pan me and after looking
Senator Ferguson. You mean after the 7th he did not pan you?
Admiral Stark. Sir?
Senator Ferguson. You mean after the Ttli of December or when?
Admiral Stark. No.
Senator Ferguson. At that time?
Admiral Stark. After I informed him of the conversations going
on. Later on all those conversations, that is, the boil-down and the
plans were shown to him.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand then, that on the 7th day
of December 1941, you as the head of the Nav}' had no plan to go into
effect if the British were attacked and we vvere not attacked?
Admiral Stark. If the British were attacked and we were
['6210] not attacked we had no plans to bring into being.
Senator Ferguson. Then I understand
Admiral Stark. I say that we did not get any.
Senator Ferguson. That is right. Then I understand that the
Winant note, the message sending the information that they were
going to the Kra Peninsula on the 6th and that they would be there
in some 14 hours, and another note, the paraphrase of a secret mes-
sage— this is on page 5507 of this record — received at the War De-
partment at 4 : 29 December 6th, that is, 4 : 29 p. m. in the aftemoon
of December 6th [reading] :
Brink advises that at one o'clock in the afternoon, following a course due. west,
were seen a battleship, five cruisers, seven destroyers and twenty-five merchanl
ships; these were seen at 106°8' E., 8° N. ; this was the first report.
2334 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The second report was that ten merchant ships, two cruisers and ten destroyers
were seen following the same course at 108°20' E., 7°35' N.
Both of the above reports came from patrols of the Royal Air Force.
Now, I understand, Admiral, that those two messages, then, would
not cause us to be alerted in and of themselves because we had no plan
if they attacked the British and it was certainly not an attack on any
of our possessions?
[62111 Admiral Stark. If they had attacked the British and not
us I would have taken no action except to continue to be alert against
an attack by them, yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand that that could account
for the fact that you were not alerted, your office was not alerted Sat-
urday afternoon, Saturday night, Sunday morning up till the time of
the attack ?
Admiral Stark. I do not understand just what you mean by "not
alerted." Our office was operating 24 hours a day.
Senator Ferguson. Well, Admiral, having those two messages and
no plan for us to take any part, were you alerted for war that after-
noon and that morning, Sunday morning the 7th ?
Admiral Stark. You mean where, in Washington or in the field ?
Senator Ferguson. No, Washington, right in your office.
Admiral Stark. Yes, we were. We were alerted. We were on duty
at all times.
Senator Ferguson. Do I understand then that by being alerted you
mean this, that at 10 : 30 on the day that war was to start that you
would get down to your office at 10 : 30 if jou were fully alerted and
expecting a war to start?
Admiral Stark. If I had expected the war to start at [6212]
that time I would have come down. I did not know the war was going
to start that morning.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know it was going to start as far as the
British was concerned on the 7th ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What about these two messages ?
Admiral Stark. Well, this message from Hart to the British
'Senator Ferguson. And the Winant message.
Admiral Stark. And the Winant message, which is practically the
same as the one from Hart, gave the movement of that and we were
trying to diagnose where they would hit.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, they were going to cross the Gulf of
Siam, were they not ?
Admiral Stark. They Avere heading south, which is in that area.
Senator Ferguson. And that fleet and that convoy would not attack
America's possessions ?
Admiral Stark. No, but there might have been another attack on
American possessions concurrently.
Senator Ferguson. Did you anticipate such ?
Admiral Stark. Did I what, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you anticipate such another attack on Amer-
ican possessions ?
[6213] Admiral Stark. We had mentioned that we could not
preclude an attack elsewhere and we had specifically included the
Philippines, which was on the flank, as a possibility in that connection
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2335
and we had sent previous messages to the effect that they might strike
anywhere.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did you figure that when they would strike
the British, which would be some time on Sunday — 14 hours, in fact,
from some time on Saturday noon — did you figure that they would
attack American possessions ?
Admiral Stark. We figured at that time, in view of the fact that
they had destroyed their codes with us and with the Dutch that there
certainly was a possibility, even a strong probability — even a prob-
ability of their attacking all three of us. That was after the destruc-
tion of codes. It certainly was an indication and a rather clear indi-
cation of their enemies. They might simply have broken off dip-
lomatic relations with us, we couldn't tell, but the presumption which
we instilled into the dispatch was war.
Senator Ferguson. Now, you say a strong probability was that they
were going to attack us as well as the British ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Then how do you account, Admiral, for the
fact that you could not be reached Saturday night
Admiral Stark. I would not want to
[6^14] Senator Ferguson. Wait until I finish my question.
Admiral Stark. Pardon me.
Senator Ferguson. And that you did not get to your office and no
one reached you until 10 : 30 that Sunday morning?
Admiral Stark. I would like to say as regards reaching me Satur-
day night, that I am still of the opinion that I was home. I am not
sure, from the testimony which has been given on that, that I was
called that night. There is room for doubt in the testimony that I
have read of each of the parties concerned with calling me, that they
might have been under the impression that the other had called and
I have never been sutc that I was called and I will continue to be in
doubt unless this committee pins it down, the fact that I was definitely
called by someone. It is not plain to me.
Senator Ferguson. Well, at least your own testimony is to the effect
that you did not get down to your office until 10 : 30 that morning or
around that time, isn't that correct?
Admiral Stark. My testimony is to the effect that it would be my
recollection, after this lapse of time, that I was in general down there
about half-past ten on Sunday morning. Others stated that I was
there earlier. That was just a guess on my usual procedure that
morning.
Senator Ferguson. Well, Admiral, this was of such importance that
the President of the United States took from the [621S] Su-
preme Court on leave Justice Roberts, named him as the head of a
committee to investigate how this thing happened at Pearl Harbor.
Isn't that true ? ^
Admiiftl Stark. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did you, the head of the Navy, knowing
that the President a few days afterwards thought it was of such im-
portance that he named a Supreme Court Justice to do the job, did
you make an investigation into your own office, into this office that
you had control of here in Washington, as to what was known in
Washington and how this thing could have happened? •
2336 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. No, I did not. I knew pretty well what had hap-
pened and what was coming in and I was then very much engaged in
fighting the war.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, you were, but you were also interested in
knowing whether or not your office was efficiently equipped and
manned in order that it could fight the war in the future, isn't that
true ?
Admiral Stark. That is true ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to leave that and I want to go to
this report of the Secretary of the Navy. This is a report by the
Secretary of the Navy to the President. The first sentence of it is:
The Japanese air attack on the Island of Oahu on [6216] December the
7th was a complete surprise to both the Army and the Navy.
Now, the Army and the Navy would be all-inclusive, would it not,
the way he has used it there, and I think a later sentence which I will
read to you indicates that the Army and the Navy were completely
surprised as far as the attack on Oahu is concerned.
Admiral Stark. That is what it says.
Senator Ferguson. That is just what it says?
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Was that your understanding?
Admiral Stark. Well, I would not want to make a statement as
sweeping as that, particularly with regard to the Army. I know that
Marshall was surprised, I know that I was surprised and I believe my
principal advisers have testified on the subject.
[6:217] Senator Ferguson. Now I want to go to the next sen-
tence :
Its initial success, which included almost all the damage done, was due to a
lack of a state of readiness against such an air attack by both branches of the
service. This statement was made to me by both General Short and Admiral Kim-
mel and both agreed that it was entirely true. Neither Army nor Navy Command
on Oahu regarded such an attack as at all likely because of the danger which such
a carrier-borne attack would confront in view of the preparedness of the American
naval strength in Hawaiian waters. While the likelihood of an attack without
warning by Japan was in the minds of both General Short and Admiral Kimmel,
both felt certain that such an attack would take place nearer Japan's base of
operations, that is, in the Far East.
Were you of the same opinion ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, I thought the attack would take place in the
Far East, from the evidence we had.
Senator Ferguson. You were then of the same opinion?
Admiral Stark. I was of that opinion as regards the most likely
place of attack, but I did not preclude an attack elsewhere.
Senator Ferguson. You were verv close. Admiral, to the admiral
in charge of plans, were you not — Admiral Turner?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
*[6218] Senator Ferguson. Did you know that his opinion was
that there was a 50-50 chance for an attack on Pearl Harbor at
that time ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall that 50-50 chance to which he has
testified.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the State Department,
Mr. Hornbeck, said that if he was a gambling man and was placing
odds on the 27th day of November 1941, that it would be 5-to-l that
there would be no attack before the 15th of December?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2337
Admiral Stark. I do not recall that.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that he had written such a
memorandum ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall it.
Senator Ferguson. Was ^here disagreement between the Navy and
the State Department on that question of whether or not there would
be an attack or no attack as far as America was concerned ?
Admiral Stark. Well, Mr. Hull stated that he would not be sur-
prised at a surprise attack. I dealt more with him than with Horn-
beck. Admiral Schuirmann dealt primarily with Dr. Hornbeck.
Senator Ferguson. Now reading from this report again:
Neither Short nor Kinimel at the time of the attack had any [6219]
knowledge of the plain intimation of some surprise move made clear in Wash-
ington through the interception of Japanese instructions to Nomura in which
a surprise move of some kind was clearly indicated by the insistence upon the
precise time of Nomura's reply to Hull, at 1 : 00 o'clock on Sunday.
Did you ever discuss that matter with Secretary Knox?
Admiral Stark. Only in the case of hindsight. No one intimated
to me that that 1 o'clock message meant an attack on Hawaii.
Senator Ferguson. Does not he indicate it in here ?
Admiral Stark. He indicates it there but after the event. I can
indicate it after the event.
Senator Ferguson. But it says here "made clear in Washington."
It says "Neither Short nor Kimmel at the time of the attack had any
knowledge of the plain intimation of some surprise move made clear
in Washmgton through the interception of Japanese instructions to
Nomura."
Admiral Stark. It is clear now. To my mind it was not clear
then. Colonel Knox never intimated that to me prior to the attack,
to the best of my recollection.
Senator Ferguson. Then he goes on, and I will read this sen-
tence
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Are you
reading from Knox's report ?
[6220'] Senator Ferguson. Yes; I am reading from Knox's
report.
Mr. Kjiefe. Is that the one he made public ; or the one he made to
the President?
Senator Ferguson. It is Secretary Knox's report to the President.
That is indicated at the top.
Senator Lucas. Is this in evidence?
Senator Ferguson. No. Might I inquire from counsel as to where
this paper was obtained from, whether from the Secretary of the
Navy's office or the White House ?
Mr. Mitchell. It came from the Navy Department.
Admiral Stark. I never have seen it.
Senator Ferguson. That is the reason I want to ask you some
questions on the facts contained in it.
Senator Lucas. May I inquire how long we have had this docu-
ment?
Mr. Mitchell. I was just going to ask that.
Senator Ferguson. I have had it a day.
Senator Lucas. It is not mimeographed and distributed to the
members ?
79716 — 46 — pt. 5 19
2338 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Mitchell. That is the only copy we have.
Senator Ferguson. So that all will get it, I will ask the admiral
to read it into the record. I think it is worth reading, because I
want to ask some questions on it. It covers your question about the
torpedoes, and that is the [6221-6222] reason I started out
on it.
Would you read it into the record ?
Admiral Stark. Starting at the beginning?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir.
Admiral Stark (reading) :
Report by the Secretary of the Navy to the President
The Japanese air attack on the Island of Oahu on December 7th was a
complete surprise to both the Army and the Navy. Its initial success, which
included almost all the damage done, was due to a lack of a state of readiness
against such an air attack, by both branches of the service. This statement
was made by me to both General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and both agreed
that it was entirely true.
Mr. Mitchell. That is not right, is it? It should be "to me,"
should it not ?
Admiral Stark. It says "by me." I think it probably means " by
me."
Mr. Mitchell. I think that is right. If you read the rest of it.
Admiral Stark (continuing) :
Neither Army or Navy Commandants in Oahu regarded such an attack as at
all likely, because of the danger which such a carrier-borne attack would con-
front in view of the preponderance of the American naval strength in Hawaiian
waters. While the likelihood of an attack without [62.23] warning by
Japan was in the minds of both General Short and Admiral Kimmel. both felt
certain that such an attack would take place nearer Japan's base of operations,
that is, in the Far East. Neither Sliort nor Kimmel, at the time of the attack,
had any knowledge of the plain intimations of some surprise move, made clear
in Washington, tlirough the interception of Japanese instructions to Nomura,
in which a surprise move of some kind was clearly indicated by the insistence
upon the precise time of Nomura's reply to Hull, at one o'clock on Sunday.
A general warning had been sent out from the Navy Department on November
27th, to Admiral Kimmel. General Short told me that a message of warning
sent from the War Department on Saturday night at midnight, before the
attack, failed to reach him until four or five hours after the attack had
been made.
Both the Army and the Navy command at Oahu had prepared careful estimates
covering their idea of the most likely and most imminent danger. General Short
repeated to me several times that he felt the most imminent danger to the Army
was the danger of sabotage, because of the known presence of large numbers of
alien Japanese in Honolulu. Acting on this assumption, he took every possible
measure to protect against this danger. This included, xuifortunately, bunching
[622'/] the planes on the various fields on the Island, close together, so that
they might be carefully guarded against possible subversive action by Japanese
agents. This condition, known as "Sabotage Alert" had been assumed because
sabotage was considered as the most imminent danger to be guarded against.
Tiiis bunching of planes, of course, made the Japanese air attack more effective.
There was, to a lesser degree, the same lack of dispersal of planes on Navy
stations, and although the possibility of sabotage was not given the same
pronn'nence in Naval minds, both arms of the service lost most of their planes on
the ground in the initial attack by the enemy. There were no Army planes in
the air at the time of the attack and no planes were warmed up in readiness to
take the air. •
The Navy regarded tlie principal danger from a Japanese stroke without
warning was a submarine attack, and consequently made all necessary provi-
sions to cope with such an attack. As a matter of fact, a submarine attack did
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2339
accompany the air attack and at least two Japanese submarines were sunk and
a third one ran ashore and was captured. No losses were incurred by the
Fleet from submarine attack. One small two-man submarine penetrated into
the harbor, having followed a vessel through the net, but because it broached
in the shallow water it was immediately discovered by the [6225] Curtis
and was attacked and destroyed through the efforts of that vessel and those of the
destroyer Monaghan. This submarine fired her torpedoes which hit a shoal
to the west of Ford Island.
The Navy took no specific measures of protection against an air attack, save
only that the ships in the harbor were so dispersed as to provide a field of fire
covering every approach- from the air. The Navy morning patrol was sent out
at dawn to the southward, where the Commander-in-Chief had reason to suspect
an attack might come. This patrol consisted of ten patrol bombers who made
no contacts with enemy craft. At least 90% of Ofiicers and enlisted personnel
were aboard ship when the attack came. The condition of readiness aboard ship
was described as "Condition Three', which meant that about one-half of the
broadside and anti-aircraft guns were manned, and all of the anti-aircraft guns
were supplied with ammunition and were in readiness.
The first intimation of enemy action came to the Navy shortly after seven
a. m., when a Destroyer in the harbor entrance radioed that she had contacted
a submarine and had (they believed) successfully depth-charged it. Thus
an attempted attack by submarine preceded the air attack by approximately
a half-hour. Quite a number of similar incidents, involving reports of sub-
marine contact, had [6226] occurred in the recent past and too great
credit was not given the Destroyer Commander's report. Subsequent investi-
gation proved the report to be correct. Admiral Bloch received the report and
weighed in his mind the possibility that it might be the start of action, but in
view of submarine contacts in the past dismissed the thought.
Tlie Army carried out no dawn patrol on Sunday, December 7th, the only
air patrol being that sent to the southward by the Navy.
The Radar equipment installed on shipboard, is practically useless when the
ships are in Pearl Harbor because of the surrounding mountains. Reliance
therefore of both branches of the service is chiefly upon three Army detector
stations on the Island of Oahu. Until 7 December, it had been customary
to operate three Radars for a large portion of the day. However, on 6 December,
permission was requested and obtained from the Control Ofiicer, to, on 7 Decem-
ber, operate only from 4 : 00 a. m. to 7 : 00 a. m. Accordingly, on 7 December,
the stations were manned from before dawn until seven a. m. when they were
closed ofiicially. However, by pure chance one Army non-com officer remained
at his post to practice on such planes as might take the air, and probably with
no thought of enemy approach. At least a half-hour before the attack was
made this Officer's Radar indicator [6221] showed a concentration of
planes to the northward, about 130 miles distant. He reported this to the Air
Craft Warning Information Center, which was the place from which it should
have been reported to Headquarters. The officer there, a Second Lieutenant,
took it upon his shoulders to pass it up, explaining that he had been told the
Enterprise was at sea, and that the planes he had located were probably from
that carrier.
Senator Ferguson. Might I interrupt you, Admiral, just one
moment? Our information has been, has it not, and yours was the
same, that he thought there were B-17's coming in? Is this the
first time you ever heard he thought they were planes from the
Enterprise?
Admiral Stark. I think he said that, and also waited for a flight
from the coast coming in at that time.
Mr. MuRPiiT. Will the gentleman yield?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. In the previous hearing it was said there were three
different sources that the planes might come from.
Senator Ferguson. I will ask the Admiral, had you any informa-
tion as to where they thought the planes were coming from, other
than what is in this messase ?
2340 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. Since that event I knew of the flight from the
coast to Oahu, which came in, I believe, during [S^^^] the
attack, and I have some recollection, although it is a little hazy, about
hearing also that he though there might have been planes from a
carrier.
Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield to a question?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. In General Short's testimony he refers to an affidavit
on that that covers three possible places where the planes might have
been coming from.
The Vice Chairman. Go ahead, Admiral.
Admiral Stark. (Reading) :
No report of this discovery of an enemy air force approaching from the north
reached either the Army or the Navy Commander. If this information had been
properly handled, it would have given both Army and Navy sufticient warning
to have been in a state of readiness, which at least would have prevented the
major part of the damage done, and might easily have converted this successful
air attack into a Japanese disaster.
[6229] The Officer at the Radar station, I was advised, showed this air
force on his instrument as they came in and plotted their approach. I have seen
the radar plot, which also included a plot of the enemy air forces returning to
the carriers from which they had come to make the attack. This latter infor-
mation did not reach the Navy until Tuesday, two days after the attack occurred,
although many and varied reports as to various locations of radio bearings on
the Japanese carriers did come to the Navy Comn:iander-in-Chief.
The activities of Japanese fifth columnists immediately following the attack,
took the form of spreading on the air by radio dozens of confusing and contra-
dictory rumors concerning the direction in which the attacking planes had
departed, as well as the presence in every direction of enemy ships. The Navy
regarded the reports of concentration of enemy ships to the southward as most
dependable and scouted at once in that direction. It is now believed that
another unit of the Japanese force, using the call letters of their carriers, took
station to the southward of Oahu and transmitted. Radio Direction Finder
bearings on these transmittals aided in the false assumption that the enemy was
to the southward. A force from the westward nioved over from there in an
attempt to intercept a Japanese force supposedly moving westward from a posi-
tion south of Oahu. Subsequent information, based upon [6230] a chart
recovered from a Japanese plane which was shot down, indicated that the Japa-
nese forces actually retired to the northward. In any event, they were not con-
tacted by either of the task forces, one of which was too far to the westward to
have established contact on. 7 December.
The Army anti-aircraft batteries were not manned when the attack was made
and the mobile units were not in position. All Army personnel were in their
quarters and the guns were not manned or in position for firing, save only those
in fixed positions. Early anti-aircraft fire consisted almost exclusively of flre
from 50-caliber machine guns.
The enemy attacked simultaneously on three Army fields, one Navy field, and
at Pearl Harbor. This attack was substantially unopposed except by very light
and ineffective machine gun fire at the fields and stations. Generally speaking,
the bombing attacks initially were directed at the air fields and tlie torpedo
attacks at the ships in the harbor. The first return fire from the guns of the
fleet began, it is estimated, about four minutes after the first torpedo was fired,
and this fire grew rapidly in intensity.
Three waves of enemy air force swept over Pearl Harbor during the assault.
As above stated, the first was substantially unopposed. The torpedo planes, flying
low, appeared first over the hills surrounding the harbor, and in probably [62S1]
not more than sixty seconds were in a position to discharge their torpedoes. The
second wave over the harbor was resisted with far greater fire power and a
number of enemy planes were shot down. The third attack over the harbor
was met by so intensive a barrage from the ships tliat it was driven off without
getting the attack home, no effective hits being made in the harbor by this last
assault.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2341
The Army succeeded in getting ten fighter planes in the air before the enemy
made the third and final sweep, and in the combat that ensued they estimate
eleven enemy craft were shot down by plane or anti-aircraft fire. The Navy
claims twelve more were destroyed by gunfire from the ships, making a total enemy
loss of twenty-three. To these twenty-three, eighteen more may be added with
reasonable assurances, these eighteen being Japanese planes which found them-
selves without sufficient fuel to return to their carriers and who plunged into
the sea. Conversation between the planes and the Japanese fleet, in plain lan-
guage, received in Oahu. is the basis for this assumption. If true, it makes a
total of forty-one planes lost by the Japanese.
The estimate of the number of planes attacking varies. This variance lies
between a minimum of three carriers, carrying about fifty planes each, and a
maximum of six carriers. This would indicate an attacking force somewhere
between [6232] one hundred fifty and three hundred planes.
From the crashed Japanese planes considerable information was obtained
concerning their general character. Papers discovered on a Japanese plane
which crashed indicate a striking force of six carriers, three heavy cruisers, and
numerous auxiliary craft including destroyers and other vessels. It is interest-
ing to note that the Japanese fighter planes were Model 0^1, equipped with radial
engines and built in early 1941. None of the planes shot down and so far ex-
amined, was fitted with any armored protection for the pilot nor were any
self-sealing gasoline tanks found in any plane. American radio and other
American-buit equipment was recovered from the wreckage. One plane was
armed with a Lewis gun of the 1920 vintage. Some observers believed that the
planes carried an unusual number of rounds of ammunition and the use of
explosive and incendiary 20-millimeter ammvmition was a material factor in
damaging planes and other objectives on the ground. The torpedo bombers were
of an old type and used Whitehead torpedoes dating about 1906, equipped with
large vanes on the stern to prevent the initial deep dive customary of torpedoes
dropped by planes. It is pleasing to note that the attack has not disclo.sed any
new or potent weapons. With this in mind, it was found that the armor-piercing
bombs employed were 15-inch A. P. projectiles, fitted with tail [6233] vanes.
In actual combat when American planes were able to take the air, American
fliers appear to have proved themselves considerably superior. One Army pilot
alone is credited with shooting down four Japanese planes. All of the pilots
who got in the air returned to the ground confident of their ability to handle
Japanese air forces successfully in the future.
At neither Army or Navy air fields were planes dispersed. At Kaneohe some
VP planes were, however, moored in the water. They, too, were destroyed by
machine gun fire, using incendiary bullets. Consequently, most of them were
put out of action by the enemy in the initial sweep. Hangars on all of the fields
were heavily bombed and many of them completely wrecked. At Hickam Field
a very large barracks building was burned with heavy loss of life. The heaviest
casualties in the Navy were incurred aboard ships subjected to torpedo attack.
The bulk of the damage done to the fleet was done by torpedoes and not by
bombs, some ships being hit by four or more torpedoes. With the sole exception
of the A7isona, bombs proved ineffectual in causing serious damage.
Many of the oflicers and men of the crews when their ships were set afire were
compelled to take to the water. A very considerable number were trapped below
decks aboard the [623^] Oklahotna and the Utah, both of which capsized.
By cutting through the bottom of these two vessels, while the attack was in
progress, twenty-six additional men were rescued alive. Throughout the action,
small boats from other ships and from the harbor swarmed over the harbor
engaged in the rescue of men who were driven overboard from their ships. The
rescue of men from drowning and the recovery and swift treatment of the wounded
was carried on throughout the engagement by both service people and civilians
with the greatest gallantry. Temporary hospital quarters were provided in half
a dozen different places and the wounded were cared for promptly. Because of
the huge number of unidentified dead, many being burned beyond recognition
and a large number having been picked up in the harbor unrecognizable after
several days in the water, several hundred were buried in a common grave on
Government land adjoining the Navy Yard. While I was still there bodies
were being recovered from the water, but all were in a condition which prevented
identification. Dispositions made by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District
(Admiral Bloch) were adequate and were efl3ciently carried out.
2342 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Of the eight battleships in Pearl Harbor when the attack was made on 7 De-
cember, three escaped serious damage and can put to sea in a matter of a few
days. These are the Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the Tennessee. The Nevada
can be raised in a month, and will then require a complete overhaul. The
California can be raised in two and one-half months, and then must be given
temporary repairs in order to send her to the Pacific Coast for a year's overhaul.
The West Virginia can be raised in three months, and will require a year and
a half to two years for overhaul. The Oklahoma, which was overturned, it is
estimated can be raised in four months. Whether she will be worth overhaul
cannot be determined now. The Artsona is a total wreck, her forward magazine
having exploded after she had been damaged by both torpedoes and bombs. The
Colorado was on the Pacific coast for overhaul.
There were six cruisers in the harbor at the time of the attack. The Detroit
put to sea at once and is uninjured. The New Orleans and the San Francisco are
now ready to go to sea. The Honolulu will be ready on December 20. The
Helena was badly damaged and may require a new engine. She will be ready to
go to the Pacific Coast for overhaul December 31. The Raleigh was flooded
throughout her machinery spaces and seriously injured in other respects. It is
estimated she will be ready for the trip to the Pacific Coast for overhaul on
January 15.
[6236] There were ten destroyers in the harbor at the time of the attack.
Seven of these put to sea at once and were uninjured. The Cassin and the
Dowries were in the same drydock with the Pennsylvania. Bombs designed for the
Pennsylvania hit the two destroyers and totally wrecked both of them. Although
both destroyers were badly burned, prompt fire fighting work saved the Petm-
sylvayiia from any danger. The destroyer Sliaw was in the floating drydock at
the time of the attack. All of this ship forward of No. 1 stack was seriously
damaged or blown off. The afterpart of the ship is still intact and can be salvaged,
and a new section can be built to replace that part of the ship now destroyed.
The mine layer Oglala was lying moored outside the Helena, and received the
impact of the torpedo attack designed for the cruiser. She is a total loss. The
airplane tender Curtis, which was bombed and injured by fire started when a
torpedo plane plunged into her crane, will be ready for service on December 17th.
The Vestal, one of the ships on the train, which was damaged, will be ready to
go to the Pacific coast on December 17th for overhaul. The old battleship Utah,
which had been converted into a training ship for anti-aircraft instruction, is a
total loss.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
There was no attempt by either Admiral Kammel or General [62S1]
Short to albi the lack of a state of readiness for the air attack. Both admitted
they did not expect it, and had taken no adequate measures to meet one if it
came. Both Kimmel and Siiort evidently regarded an air attack as extremely
unlikely because of the greut distance which the Japs would have to travel to
make the attack, and the consequent exposure of such a task force to the superior
gun power of the American fleet. Neither the Army nor the Navy Commander
expected that an attack would be made by the Japanese while negotiations were
still proceeding in Washington. Both felt that if any surprise attack was at-
tempted it would be made in the Far East.
Of course, the best means of defense against air attack consists of fighter
planes. Lack of an adequate number of this type of aircraft available to the
Army for the defense of the Island, is due to the diversion of this type before
the outbreak of the war, to the British, the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians.
The next best weapon against air attack is adequate and well-disposed anti-
aircraft artillery. There is a dangerous shortage of guns of this type on the
Island. This is through no fault of the Army Commander who has pressed
consistently for these guns.
There was evident in both Army and Navy only a very slight feeling of ap-
prehension of any attack at all, and [ff25S] neither Army nor Navy were
in a position of readiness because of this feeling.
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that there was available to the enemy
in Oahu probably the most efficient fifth column to be found anywhere in the
American possessions, due to the presence of very large numbers of alien Japanese.
The intelligence w(n-k done by thl.s fifth column before the attack, provided the
Japanese Navy with exact knowledge of all necessary details to plan, the attack.
This included exact charts showing customary position of ships when in Pearl
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2343
Harbor, exact localion of all defenses, gun power and numerous other details.
Papers captured from the Japanese submarine that ran ashore indicated that
the exact position of nearly every ship in the harbor was known and charted,
and all the necessary data to facilitate a submarine attack was in Japanese
possession. It is an interesting fact that the Utah at the time of the attack
occupied a berth normally used by an aircraft carrier, and she was sunk and is a
total loss. The work of the fifth column artists in Hawaii has only been ap-
proached in this war by the success of a similar group in Norway.
The fighting spirit of the crewS aboard ship and ashore was superb. Gun
crews remained at their station with their guns in action until they slid into
the waters from the Oklahoma's deck or were driven overboard by fires on
other [6239] ships. Men ashore manned every available small boat and
carried on rescue work saving the lives of the men who were driven overboard
while the heaviest fighting was going on. Some of the crew of the Utah, swept
from the deck of the ship as she capsized, were I'escued by destroyers leaving the
harbor to engage in an attack on the enemy forces. Although clad only in their
underclothes, they insisted on joining the crews of the destroyers which rescued
them and went to sea.
T*he evacuation of the wounded and the rescue of men from drowning was
carried on witli sueb superb courage and efticiency as to excite universal ad-
miration, and additional hospital accommodations were quickly provided so that
the wounded could be cared for as rapidly as they were brought ashore.
The removal of the convalescent wounded to the mainland promptly is impera-
tive. I recommended that the Solace should be loaded with these convalescent
wounded at once and brought to the coast with or without escort.
The reported attempted landing on the west coast of Oahu, near Lualualei
was an effort on the part of the Japanese fifth columnists to direct the efforts
of the U. S. task forces at sea and to lure these forces into a submarine trap.
Fortunately, this fact was realized before certain light forces under Rear
Admiral Draemel reached the vicinity [6241] of the reported landings.
His ships were turned away just prior to the launching of a number of tor-
pedoes by waiting submarines, which torpedoes were sighted by the vessels in
Admiral Draemel's force.
[6242] The same quality of courage and resourcefulness was displayed
by the Naval forces ashore as by the men aboard ship. This was likewise true
of hundreds of civilian employees in the yard, who participated in the fire
fighting and rescue work from the beginning of the attack.
It is of significance to note that throughout the entire engagement on 7
Decembei', no enemy airplane dropped any bombs on the oil storage tanks in
which huge quantities of oil are stored. This was one of many indications
that appear to foreshadow a renewal of the Japanese attack, probably with
landing forces, in the near future. Every effort to strengthen our air defenses,
particularly in pursuit planes and anti-aircraft artillery is clearly indicated.
T^his anticipation of a renewal of the attack is shared by both Army and Navy
Officers in Hawaii. As a matter of fact, in the ranks of the men in both
services it is hoped for. Both are grimly determined to avenge the treachery
which cost the lives of so many of their comrades. Instead of dampening their
spirits, the Japanese attack has awakened in them a stern spirit of revenge that
would be an important factor in the successful resistance of any new enemy
approach.
SALVAGE OPEKATIONS
The salvage operation involved in raising the sunken battleships is one of
the most important pieces of defense [6242] work now under way. Its
magnitude warrants that it should receive maximum attention and all facilities
in manpower and material that will further its expeditious progress, including
top priorities for material and high speed transportation facilities to and from
the mainland and Hawaii.
The Navy is fortunate that Lieutenant Commander Lemuel Curtis, who is an
ofiicer in the Naval Reserve, and who is one of the most expert salvage men in
the United States was in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. He is in full
charge of the salvage operations under Commander J. "M. Steele, USN, the repre-
sentative of the Base Force Command. AVith personnel already available and
with certain additions to be immediately provided, adequate organization to
carry on this work with maximum speed has been assembled.
2344 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I am proposing to send to Pearl H arbor a large force of partially trained men
from San Diego to assist in the salvage operations, and to be trained to form
part of the crews of the new salvage ships due to be completed next autumn.
The most rapid delivery to the job of materiel and men to expedite this salvage
work is essential, and I am proposing to arrange for the purchase or charter of
the S. S. Lurline of the Matson line, or of some other suitable high speed vessel
to be utilized primarily for this purpose. Such a ship would also be available
for returning to the United States the families of officers and men who should
be evacuated [6243] because of the dangers inherent in the Hawaiian
situation. In addition, any available cargo space in this vessel not needed for
the transfer of materiel for the salvage operations can be used to assist in the
transportation of food to Hawaii.
Lieutenant Commander Curtis is the authority for the estimates of time re-
quired for the salvage operations on the Nevada, California, West Virginia, and
Oklahoma.
BEPAIRS TO DAMAGED VESSELS
The possibility of advancing the repairs on salvaged vessels was discussed with
the Commandant and with the manager of the Yard at Pearl Harbor. A sugges-
tion that help might be rendered direct to the Navy Yard by Continental Repair
Yards did not meet with their approval for reasons that were compelling, but
the desirability of dispersing part of the Naval work on this Station resulted
in the suggestion that the Navy take over, by purchase or lease, three small
ship repair plants located in Honolulu and that these be operated under a man-
agement contract, with personnel to be furnished by private ship repair yards on
the west coast. These three plants are the Honolulu Iron Works, the Inter-
Island Steam Navigation Company and the Tuna Packers, Inc. Only so much
of these plants us are useful in ship repairs would be taken over, and the Navy
Yard would assign work to [62 U] them on destroyers, small vessels and
yard craft, thus relieving congestion and scattering the risk in case of further
possible attack. I am studying this proposal with the various interested parties.
With these added facilities, the Navy Yard can adequately handle the work
load presently to be imposed upon it.
INSTEUCnONS TO WEST COAST NAVAL DISTRICTS
Upon arrival in San Diego, I was met by the Commandants of the 11th Naval
District and Navy Yard, Mare Island, and gave them the necessary information
and instructions to post them on the Pearl Harbor attack to permit them to safe-
guard their commands so far as possible. This included all available information
about the two men submarines which might provide a serious menace to the
west coast. The Commandant of the Navy Yard, Mare Island, undertook to
pass on all of this information to the Commandant of the 12th and 13th Naval
Districts who could not attend this meeting.
SUMXLVRY AND EECOMMENDATIONS
In conclusion, may I invite particular attention to the following points in my
report and draw certain conclusions therefrom :
(1) Neither the Army or the Navy Commandant in Oahu regarded an air attack
on the Army air fields or the Navy Stations as at all likely.
[6245] (2) The Army and Naval Commands had received a general war
warning on November 27th, but a special war warning sent out by the War Depart-
ment at midnight December 7(h to the Army was not received until some hours
after the attack on that date.
(3) Army preparations were primarily based on fear of sabotage while the
Navy's were based on fear of subuiarine attack. Therefore, no adequate measures
were taken by either service to guard against a siu-prise air attack.
(4) Radar equipment manned by the Army and usually operated for a longer
period, was only operated from 4 : 00 a. m. to 7 : 00 a. m., on Docemljer 7th. This
change was authorized by the Control Officer. Accurate information of the ap-
proach of a concentration of planes 130 miles to the northward relayed to the
Aircraft Warning information center by an unofficial observer was not relayed
beyond that office. Nor was other information from Army Radar showing the
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2345
retirement of enemy aircraft to their bases received as sucli by the Navy until two
days after the attack.
(5) The first surprise attack, simultaneously on five principal objectives, caught
them all completely unprepared. It was about four minutes before the first
anti-aircraft fire by the Navy began, and as the Army aircraft batteries were not
manned nor their mobile units in position it was [6246] some time before
their anti-aircraft fire became effective.
(6) Most of the damage to Army fields and Navy stations occurred during the
first attack, which concentrated on planes, airfields and capital ships.
(7) As anti-aircraft fire increased the second and third attacks resulted in
successively less damage.
(8) The final results of the three attacks left the Army air fields and the Naval
stations very badly damaged and resulted in the practical immol)ilization of the
majority of the Navy's battle fleet in the Pacific for months to come, the loss of
75 percent of the Army's air forces on the Islands, and the loss of an even larger
I)ercentage of the Navy's air force on Oahu.
(9) Once action was joined the courage, determination and resourcefulness
i)f the armed services and of the civilian employees left nothing to be desired.
Individually and collectively the bravery of the defense was superb. In single
unit combat the American pursuit planes proved themselves superior to the
Japanese and the American personnel in the air demonstrated distinct superiority
over the Japanese.
(10) While the bulk of the damage done to Naval ships was the result of
aerial torpedoes, the only battleship that was completely destroyed was hit by
bombs and not by torpedoes. Hangers of the type used on all four stations are
[6247] a serious menace and should be abandoned for use for storage pur-
poses in possible attack areas.
(11) The loss of life and the number of wounded in this attack is a shocking
result of unpreparedness. The handling of the dead and wounded has been
prompt and eflBcient. The wounded should be evacuated to the mainland as
soon as possible.
(12) The families of combatant forces should be evacuated to the mainland
as soon as possible. Orders to this end are already in preparation.
(13) Salvage facilities and personnel are excellent and, as presently to be
augmented, will be ample to meet the Station's needs and will place the
damaged vessels in repair berths in the shortest possible time.
(14) Repair facilities are adequate to promptly carry out such repairs as
are to be made on this Naval Station. Auxiliary repair facilities are under
consideration to relieve the yard from small craft and to lesson the concentra-
tion of vessels at one harbor.
(15) In view of the attack and the serious damage inflicted by it, the use-
fulness and availability of this Naval station must be restudied. Its air de-
fenses must be strengthened immediately by the despatch of as many fighter
planes and anti-aircraft guns as can be assigned to it. Special [6248]
defenses against aerial torpedoes, such as balloon barrages and deep floats to be
moored alongside imjwrtant combatant units must be developed. Pending these
studies and the addition of satisfactory safeguards, no large concentration of
Naval vessels can be permitted at Pearl Harbor.
(16) This attack has emphasized the completeness of the Naval and military
information in the hands of the Japanese, the meticulous detail of their plans
of attack, and their courage, ability and resourcefulness in executing and press-
ing home their operations. It should serve as a mighty incentive to our
defense forces to spare no effort to achieve a final victory.
The Vice Chairman. At this time, we will recess until 2 o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 1 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m,, of the same
day.)
[6249] AFTERNOON SESSION 2 P, M.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Are you ready to resume, Senator Ferguson ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
2346 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TESTIMONY OF ADM. HAEOLD R. STARK (Resumed)
Admiral Stark. May I bring up just one thing, sir, before the
testimony resumes?
The Chairman. Yes.
Admiral Stark. Yesterday on page 6067, lines 13 and 15, in answer
to a question from Congressman Murphy, I stated that tne time of
the attack on Pearl Harbor was 1 : 57, shortly before 2 o'clock. I be-
lieve the official testimony shows the attack began at 7 : 55 a. m. Pearl
Harbor tune, Honolulu time, or 1 : 25 p. m. Washington time.
Mr. Murphy. Mr Chairman, the record would then have to be cor-
rected by anyone reading it because that would cut down the time
between 11 : 47 and the time of the actual attack.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, niay I interject a request at this
time ?
Senator Ferguson. I will yield.
Mr. Keefe. We have been provided with an instrument or docu-
ment or book, whatever it may be, entitled "Appendix [6250]
to Narrative Statement of Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investi-
gations," and in the back of that, or, the final pages of it, appears
several pages entitled "Addendum to Court's Finding of Facts,"
referring to the Navy Court.
Now, I have been interested for a long time in trying to get the
top secret report of the Navy Court of Inquiry. I have had the Army
top secret report of the Army Board. Am I to understand that this
addendum, which is labeled "Top Secret," which appears in the book
identified, is that the so-called top secret report of the Navy Court
of Inquiry?
Mr. Mitchell. That is right.
Mr. Keefe. And that is all of it ?
Mr. Mitchell. As we understand it.
Mr. Keefe. It is continually referred to in portions of this report
and what I want to be certain of is that this that appears following the
heading "Addendum to court's finding of facts" is the entire top
secret report of the Navy Board of Inquiry.
Mr. Mitchell. Everything in this book labeled "Top Secret" is the
additional material. Not only what you referred to but there are
other documents in it that are labeled "Top Secret" and they are the
withheld part of the original report.
Mr. Keefe. I am not referring, of course, to — it [6251] starts
out with the Hewitt report, this book does, and then it has after the
Hewitt Eeport, as I recall, there follows certain findings and con-
clusions signed b}' H. K. Hewitt, ending on page 180.
Then appears the Navy's third endorsement on the Naval Court of
Inquiry, and then appears the second endorsement.
Now, this second endorsement and the third endorsement are labeled
Top Secret also.
Mr. Mitchell. I think it M-ould be more accurate for me to call your
attention to the label on the front page, which I think really describes
it. You are right in your statement that the section you refer to is
the addendum to the court's finding of facts, but in addition to that
in this book it says :
Reports (formerly Top Secret) advisory to the Secretary of the Navy in
Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations. See Narrative statement of evidence at
Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2347
Mr. Keefe. That says "Report by Admiral H. K. Hewitt."
Mr. Mitchell. The page I am referring to is the first page just
after the cover. That describes what it is. There is some material
that wasn't in the original Navy Board report. It says :
Reports (formerly Top Secret) advisory to tne Secretary of the Navy in Navy
Pearl Harbor Investigations.
{6262'] Mr. Keefe. What I would like to get clear in my mind
is this : Is there one document that I may refer to, that is official and
I can put my hands on, which is the Navy Top Secret Report of the
Navy Court, disassociated from Admiral Hewitt's findings and dis-
associated from the endorsement of the Secretary of the Navy and
the report of Admiral Gatch, and so on?
That is what I am trying to find out.
Mr. Mitchell. I think my confusion, or our confusion about it,
rests on the fact that the naval order of inquiry technically didn't end
when the original naval board made its report. The inquiry went on
and that included some supplemental inquiries that were made.
I am informed by the Navy here that the part that you referred to,
"Addendum to Court's Finding of Facts," the only addition that we
know of on the original board report, is that.
Mr. Keefe. I think counsel will, readily grasp the significance of the
inquiry which I am attempting to make.
Mr. Mitchell. I certainly do. I realize the propriety of it entirely,
sir, and I am trying to give you the exact information.
Mr. Keefe. Then so I may understand, when the original Navy
report of the court of inquiry was released, it [6253] was un-
derstood that there was some top secret material which was not in-
cluded in that report and labeled "Top Secret," which was kept out,
and that that top secret material is that which is now found in the
last pages of this report under the heading of "Addendum to Court's
Finding of Facts" ?
Mr. Mitchell. The Navy says that is so, and that is my miderstand-
Mr. Keefe. And that is all of it, there are no other findings or no
other statements of a top secret character that were witliheld out
of the testimony or evidence at the time the Navy Report was first
released except that which is contained in this so-called addendum?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, let's be accurate about that. I never speak of
the transcript of the evidence as a report, although in a broad sense
it may be, but the report and the opinions and findings of a board,
just like a court, after they have heard the evidence.
If you are going to treat the narrative statement and call that part
of the report — in a broad sense it is — why, then I will have to check
against that and see.
Mr. Keefe. Of course, as lawyers, I think we agree on that, Mr.
Counsel. But may I also ask, I have seen the testimony and have
gone through it, taken by the Navy court, and tliere was a lot of that
testimony that was expurgated [6254] and transferred over
into a top secret file. Is that top secret file of testimony as well as
this top secret finding of facts, is that available ?
Mr. Mitchell. Have you got it. Senator Ferguson?
Senator Ferguson. They tell me it is in my file. I will have to check
it. I will do so right away.
2348 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Mitchell. I think Senator Ferguson lias the only copy of it, of
the testimony, the additional testimony.
Mr. Keefe. Yes. That is the expurgated testimony that was taken
out of the regular and put into a top secret?
Mr. Mitchell. That is it. This is the part taken out of the findings,
this is what we strictly call the report, it is in this book.
Now, we have a set of testimony that didn't appear in the published
report— that Ave have one copy of, and I think Senator Ferguson had
use of that.
Senator Ferguson. I will have it down. I sent my secretary after
it.
Mr. Keefe. I will be glad to come over and have you read it to me,
Senator.
The Chairman. I wonder if the other Senators might have a caucus
and have it read to them. It seems strange that only one member of
the committee can obtain these top secret documents.
[625S] Mr. Mitchell. My own personal recollection is nothing,
because this is a thing that I personally have not had to do with. I am
relying on other people.
The Chairman. I appreciate that, but every now and then we run
into a document that has been in the possession of some member of the
committee or his counsel which we know nothing of. It seems to me,
in fairness to the whole committee, that we ought to know something
fibout these secret documents that are withheld and not known about
except by someone who gets it first.
Mr. Mitchell. That is about the way it works because sometimes the
requests for the stuff come in and the pressure has been so strong to
give it that we don't have time to study it ourselves and hand it around
and we have been sniped at a good deal for delay, and we don't make
for any more delay than we can help, and then we don't have it, we
don't have an opporunity to mimeograph it, or anything of that kind.
Maybe we have been at fault in that. But we have some difficulties.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman
Senatoi- Ferguson. Mr. Chairman
Mr. Keefe. Pardon me. One question. Has this report been re-
leased to the press?
[6''2o6] Mr. Mitchelt>. This document you have in your hands
lias not been offered in evidence. We have been holding it here for
several days to put in.
Mr. Keefe. Is it confidential, has it been released to the press?
The Chairman. Copies of the first two volumes, known as the
Narrative Statement, were given to the press a week or 10 days ago,
when distributed to the members of the committee. Kecently this
addendum, the third volume, has come in, and I don't think Ihat has
been given to the press — it has been given to them but they are hold-
ing it.
Mr. Mitchell. They are holding it until I offer it.
Mr. Keefe. Of course, I don't want to get into the situation we had
here when there was some criticism over the fact that some Army top
secret report was passed around to certain people and not others.
Mr. Mitchell. Suppose I offer it now and release it to the press
and to you.
Mr. Keefe. I think it ought to be.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2349
Mr. Mitchell. I offer it now.
The Chairman. That is the three vohimes ?
Mr. Mitchell. This is an appendix to the Narrative Statement.
The Chairman. The other two vohimes that were given [6257]
to the committee as the original Narrative Statement were never made
a part of the evidence and never filed as exhibits, they were just dis-
tributed to the committee.
Now, if this third agenda, addendum, or appendix, whatever it is,
is to be filed as an exhibit, it seems to the Chair that the other two
volumes ought to be filed.
Mr. Keefe. Just a moment, Mr. Chairman, on that. This exhibit
is in a quite different category than the other two. The other two are
a narrative of conclusions and expurgations and everything else.
This is supposed to be a complete and accurate statement of existing
files and papers. I have no objection to this, but if you are going to
offer that narrative in evidence why, I think, that would be another
thing.
Mr. Mitchell. That is true.
The Chairman. I thought this was in addition to the Narrative
Statement.
Mr. Mitchell. No. The Narrative Statement is just the Navy
story that they worked up. These, as the Congressman said, are
documents themselves, and not the Navy's opinion about them.
The Chairman. There is no connection then between this and the
other volumes ?
Mr. Mitchell. No. That is why we didn't offer the others. This
one we expected to offer and I offer it now as [6258] exhibit
107.
The Chairman. It will be so ordered.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 107.")
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, so that the record may be clear
about the fact that I happened to have this particular testimony, I
obtained it a few days ago to read for the examination of Admiral
Stark. I have had no requests for its return. It has been here. All
these matters that I have had have been on a special request either by
letter or otherwise that I might see them.
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Is that not correct?
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. No special favors have been given
you, Senator.
The Chairman. I am not complaining about any special favors but
it strikes me that when a request is made by a member of the com-
mittee that instead of it being simply a personal request it ought to
be for the benefit of the whole committee if there is any benefit to
accrue to the committee from that request, and that the committee
might have the information available to them and not have to go
somewhere in order to get it because there is only one copy.
Go ahead, Admiral, and Senator.
[6259] Mr. Mitchell. I only want to say that a great deal of
this material requested by individuals turns out to be of no particular
value and so I don't make a practice of mimeographing and distribut-
ing the answers to all this stuff — any more than I did to the log of the
Boise.
2350 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Chairman. The Chair appreciates that fully.
Mr. Mitchell. So we have to use some judgment about it. When-
ever we thought a thing was of interest generally we have had it memeo-
graphed but sometimes we doubt whether anybody else will be inter-
ested. That is how it happened.
The Chairman. I appreciate that. My remarks are not intended
to be in any criticism of anybody, especially counsel, but it has oc-
curred two or three times and something has been produced here that
some of the members didn't have, although others did.
Go ahead. Admiral, and Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, where did you first get the idea that
there was a secret weapon used by the w^ay of torpedoes at Pearl
Harbor in the initial attack, when did that first come to your attention?
Admiral Stark. I don't recall any particular secret weapon. There
was nothing revolutionary, I believe, in anything they used.
Senator Ferguson. In the discussion here a few days ago, [6260\
as part of your testimony, when you were talking about these torpedo
baffles, and as to whether or not we had already equipment to meet
such an attack, the words secret weapon were used. They had a tor-
pedo that we knew nothing about and that they were able to launch
in 20 or r30 feet of water instead of, as at Taranto, where they had
launched it in 60 to 80 feet.
Admiral Stark. That was covered in the letter where they stated
no ship could now be considered safe in any depth, that is, any major
caliber depth, where there was sufficient room for the run of the tor-
pedo to arm. It was just a progressive step, which I explained in our
own experiments we were continually trying to increase the speed of
a plane in dropping a torpedo, and also increasing the altitude from
which it should be dropped. And the Japs, as shown, had progressed
very far in that. And the letter which you read this morning where
they spoke about putting some apparatus on the stern of the torpedo,
we had already been experimenting with ours, we referred to it as the
tail of the torpedo. But I think there was nothing revolutionary ex-
cept the development had gone further.
Senator Ferguson. As I understand it. the Navy Department never
had any complaint because Admiral Kimmel didn't put in these tor-
pedo nets, because they had neither furnished [6261] them to
him nor had they furnished the equipment with which he could make
them?
Admiral Stark. That is correct. He stated, in the first place, that
he thought they were not necessary from the information he had, and
which later information showed them desirable, but he had no nets
which were easy to handle, or baffles. These we were endeavoring to
develop and they had not been developed up to December 7.
Senator Ferguson. When did you first hear that there had been a
so-called secret weapon as far as the torpedoes were concerned?
Admiral Stark. Have you this [indicating document] ?
Senator Ferguson. I haven't, but I have read it, I think.
Admiral Stark. In the Navy Court of Inquiry on this subject — I
quote :
The especially designed Japanese torpedo and the technique for its use fall in
the category of the so-called secret weapon of which the robot bomb and the
magnetic mines are examples. Such weapons always give to the originator an
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2351
initial advantage which continues, until the defenses against tliem have been
perfected.
In other words, it ^A•as a development which we were all working on.
[6262] Senator Ferguson. I had in mind yesterday at page
6032, where Senator Lucas said :
Well, the Navy Board of Inquiry called this bomb a secret weapon in the nature
of a robot bomb which was unknown to the best professional opinion in America
at this time. Do you agree with that statement?
And you answered :
A robot bomb?
Admiral Stark. Well, the answer is, of which the robot bomb and
the magnetic mines are examples. I never heard it called a robot
bomb.
Senator Ferguson. I see. You would take, from what Secretary
Knox said, instead of it being a new, secret weapon, it was probably
a forgotten weapon, when he said :
The torpedo bombs were old type and used Whitehead torpedoes dating about
1906 equipped with a large vane on the stern to prevent the initial deep dive
customary of a torpedo dropped by plane.
Admiral Stark. Well, the Whitehead torpedo, I may say, is an
English type of torpedo with a reciprocating action. We abandoned it
some years ago and went into turbine torpedoes. The old Whitehead
was a good torpedo and they had developed this tail arrangement to
assist in having it make a shallow dive. We were experimenting with
the same thing. The wings [6263^ or vanes which you put on
the tail detach when it hits water.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. I yield.
Mr. Murphy. When you quoted the Admiral you said that he said
a robot bomb.
Senator Ferguson. I didn't mean to infer that
Mr. Murphy. It was a question, and on the next page he didn't
agree that it was a secret weapon.
Senator Ferguson. And he explained that now, that he didn't agree
that it was a robot bomb.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I have given you a broad picture from my
memory. The Bureau of Ordnance could give you, it you wanted it,
real technical data on that. They could give it. But we ourselves
were working with detachable vanes to assist us in having the torpedo
make a proper entry into the water so as to facilitate its not going
so deep.
Senator Ferguson. That the next sentence was, by the Secretary:
It is pleasing to note that the attack has not disclosed any new or potent
weapon.
Admiral Stark. Well, that is in line with what I have said. It was
along the line of our development.
Senator Ferguson. Now, going back to one of the summaries, where
he speaks about a general warning on the 27th and a [626^'\
special warning at midnight on Saturday, did you ever hear of that
before ?
2352 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. Not until you read it this morning. I don't know
what is referred to there.
Senator Ferguson. You haven't any idea what they might be re-
ferring to ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. That is new to me.
Senator Ferguson. Do you recall when Secretary Knox came back?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you meet him ?
Admiral Stark. Well, I saw him as soon as he came back, I reported
to him, of course, as soon as he returned.
Senator Ferguson. Were you asked to go to the conference between
the Secretary and the President?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. How do you account, if this paper which you
read this morning. Secretary Knox's report to the President, was on
file in the Navy Department that you, the operating head responsible
under the statutes, the rules and regulations, never knew about it?
Admiral Stark. Perhaps one reason is there is very little in that
report that he didn't tell a considerable number of us in his office.
All that with regard to behavior [6265] of pereonnel, with
reference to ships, we discussed it, the salvage matters, and in general
I am so familiar with what is in there to almost think that I have seen
it, but I think I have not, as set up there, just as it is, I did not see it,
to the best of my recollection.
But he discussed practically every detail of it with us.
[G266] Senator Ferguson. Did you know of any special repre-
sentatives going out to Hawaii in the summer of 1941 to get informa-
tion? Did you know a man by the name of Curtis B. Munson?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall it. When you say to get informa-
tion, will you elaborate on that a little bit, sir?
Senator Ferguson. Well, here is a man named Munson mentioned,
a representative from Washington.
The Vice Chairman. Isn't he an Army officer. Senator?
Senator Ferguson. I do not know that. ''Believed to be a Presi-
dential agent, carrying a letter from OPNAV."
Admiral Stark. OPNAV.
Senator Ferguson. That is you.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. "To open everything to him."
Do you know a man by the name of Curtis B. Munson ? I show you
this last page and see whether or not it will refresh your mtoiory
[handing document to witness]. Could I just have it back?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I do not recall that. If he was told
by OPNAV, of which I was head, that everything should be opened to
him I probably O. K.'d the letter but I do not recall just what it was.
We had a good many people traveling around one place and another.
[6267] Senator Ferguson. Now, if he went out there as a special
representative of the Navy or was believed to be a Presidential agent
and you approved his, "Open everything to him," and this was during
this critical period, did you get a report back from him ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall the incident, Senator Ferguson.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2353
Senator Ferguson, Well, let me try to refresh your memory.
Pertinent extracts from above report :
About that time Mr. Munson, a representative from Washington (believed to
be a Presidential agent) carrying a letter from OPNAV to "open everything to
him" sought me for an expression of views on probabilities and my opinion as to
what action should be taken with the Japanese here and on tlie West Coast.
Admiral Stark. Is that Colonel Knox talking?
Senator Ferguson. No, this is Captain
Admiral Stark. Zacharias?
Senator Ferguson (continuing). Zacharias talking; Ellis M.
Zacharias.
Admiral Stark. He was in Intelligence at that time.
Senator Ferguson. Zacharias is talking.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
[6268] Senator Ferguson. Now, getting back to reading this
statement :
After outlining to him my firm convictions that if Japan decided to go to war
with us it would open by an air attack on Pearl Harbor on a week end and prob-
ably Sunday morning, with all the reasons therefor, and I then stated : "You
now have two envoys in Washington. When the third one arrives you can
look for it to break immediately one way or the other." This envoy arrived
in Washington a bout the 2nd of December 1941.
Now, had that ever been called to your attention by this special
envoy ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir; I do not connect that up at all, the Decem-
ber 2. That may, however, have formed the background for a dis-
patch which you will recall has been placed in evidence here, which
was sent out there to the effect that if Japan attacked it might come
by a surprise raid on either a Sunday morning or a holiday. We sent
that out there.
Senator Ferguson. When?
Admiral Stark. It was earlier in the year and I have forgotten just
what the date was.
Mr. Mitchell. It is in Exhibit 37.
Mr. Murphy. The first dispatch in the Navy basic exhibit, I think
is what you are looking for.
[6269] Admiral Stark. That goes back to April. It was some
months previous to that.
Senator Ferguson, Very well.
Admiral Stark. I will read it if you would like to have it. It is
short.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, I would like to have you read it.
Admiral Stark. This is from OPNAV. [Reading:]
Action : Com all Nav districts *
NY Wash Governors of Guam and Samoa
Personnel of your Naval Intelligence Service should be advised that because
of the fact that from past experience shows the Axis i)owers often begin activi-
ties in a particular field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of
tire country concerned. They should take steps on such days to see that proper
watches and precautions are in effect.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know what was the cause of that
dispatch ? Was it this special representative of the President coming
back and telling you about this Intelligence ?
79716— 46— pt. 5 20
2354 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK.
Admiral Stark. Could you give me the date of that to see whether
there is any hook-up on dates?
Senator Ferguson. Well, I cannot give you the date because the
letter that has it in it, the memo is dated about [6270] the I7th
of March 1942.
Admiral Stark. 1942?
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; the I7th of March 1942, You may want to
read this whole letter, which may refresh your memory. I thought you
would only know about part of it.
Admiral Stark. That was after we were in the war.
Senator Ferguson. Yes; but his happened before you were in the
war. To make this a little clearer, this was on file in the Navy Depart-
ment and at the top of this statement I read is this : .
Washington, D. C, July 10, 1942. — I have read the personal and confidential
report of Captain E. M. Zacharias, U. S. N., as a memorandum for Admiral
Draemel, dated March 17, 1942, and desire to state that the remarks relating to
me and the outline given to me as indicated therein is exact and correct in detail.
In addition he suggested that the attack would conform to their historical proce-
dure, that of hitting before the war was declared.
Admiral Stark. Well, our dispatch is of April 1941. This memo-
randum for Admiral Draemel is dated March IT, 1942. [Reading:]
In accordance with your request after our conversation this morning, the
following memo is submitted :
[6271] My conversation with you is impelled from a sense of duty because
of what I consider a serious situation existing in Hawaii. Once before, in such
a situation, I gave concrete opinions and advice which apparently could not break
through preconceived ideas. History was about to repeat itself and no one would
believe it. I have no personal ambitions or desires regarding the subject matter
other than assuring that we have a safe and well protected base for our Fleet,
which is the sole reason for the existence of Hawaii. It has been my attitude
that it makes no difference who does a job as long as it is done eflBciently and
thoroughly.
Any ci'iticism direct or implied is offered solely from a constructive viewpoint
and is for the purpose of preventing in the future a recurrence of a disaster such
as that of 7 December.
Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral Kimniel and Captain
Smith, during the course of an hour and a half conversation with them, of the
exact events to take place on 7 December, not only as to what would happen, but
also how and when. My only error was that the Japanese were after four battle-
ships and they got five. I also gave them the reasons for my conclusions and
advised them of the steps necessary to prevent such an at- [0272] tack.
From time to time, in contact with the Staff. I would voice possibilities and only
two months before the attack, amazed at unrealistic attitudes, I said, "When
are we going to stop these surprise inspections and prepare for surprise attack."
About that same time Mr. Muiison, a representative from Washington (believed
to be a Presidential agent) carrying a letter from Opnav to "open everything to
him," sought me for an expi-ession of views on probabilities and my opinion as to
what action should be taken with the Japanese here and on the West Coast. After
outlining to him my firm conviction that if Japan decided to go to war with us it
would open by an air attack on Pearl Harbor, on a week-end and probably Sunday
morning, with all the reasons therefor, and I then stated, "You now have two
envoys in Washington. When the third one arrives you can look for it to break
immediately, one way or the other." This envoy arrived in Washington about
2 December 1941.
On the night of 27 November, after dinner with Lorriii Thurston, Head of
the Honolulu Advertiser and KGU, I related the impending possibilities as above
and he said. "Here I am a G-2 OlHcor and I haven't even been advised what to
send out over the radio in case of an attack." I advise<l him precisely to say,
"We are having a sporadic [627S] air attack, everyone should keep calm
and remain indoors. Do not go on the streets as it will prevent the military
from getting to their stations. There is nothing to worry about." On 28 No-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2355
vember I sailed with Task Force 8 for "Wake Island. Upon receipt of CincPac's
dispatch on 7 December, "The Islands are being attacked, this is no drill," I
turned on my radio and KGU was sending out my exact words. At least someone
believed it. This was probably made certain by the press announcement about
3 December that the Ambassador to Peru had arrived in Washington as a third
envoy.
Senator Ferguson. Had you ever known that before?
Admiral Stark. I have no recollection of it at all. [Reading:]
Seeing this, Mrs. Thurston reminded her husband and they were alerted.
On Friday, 5 December, having received a report of a submarine off Oahu —
one of the things I gave Admiral Kimmel as a positive indication of Intention
to attack — I listened all evening on short wave for Japanese conversation. All
was garbled conversation but the intensity of the acknowledgments (typically
Japanese) indicated to me that something was imminent. I tried to obtain a
single word which would justify me in requesting ComTaskFor [627^] 8
to advise CincPac, but nothing could be made out. I knew what the reaction
would be to a recommendation from thin air and I assumed that proper warn-
ings would be coming from Washington.
I have made it a point when ailoat to give my advice to Intelligence activities
both ashore and afloat and when necessary even to the point of "butting in."
I had tried for years to have detailed a Fleet Intelligence Officer who was not
tied up as Flag Secretary or on other jobs. Finally, two years ago Commander
Dyer advised me that Cincus was going to have a Fleet Intelligence Officer. I
recommended Lt. Commander Layton, who has consistently done a splendid job
in an office where there should have been twenty officers instead of two. Early
in November I was about to see Captain Smith and advise that he get some help
for Layton and Hudson as they were both worn down and appeared ready to
crack up. But I hesitated, wondering why should I have to advise Cincus on
the adequacy of his force. It should have been obvious to any Commander that
Intelligence at such a time was his most vital issue. I decided not to approach
Smith, because I found that Intelligence was not receiving its proper recognition.
One of the contributing factors to 7 December was [6275} the reluc-
tance of Admiral Kimmel to assume his prerogatives and tell the Commandant
to carry out directives or someone else would be obtained to do the job. The
possibilities of an unpleasant situation should have been readily apparent to
the Department when former Commander-in-Chief is put under a younger
man. Petty jealousies are bound to be present and these grow into opposition.
A typical indication was one incident which I observed closely. When I arrived
in Honolulu in November, 1940 to take command of the 'Salt Lake City, I was
asked to assist in a survey of the District Intelligence Officer which was initi-
ated by the Commander-in-Chief. It was learned then that recommendations
had been blocked and that the ofl5ce was of little value.
This survey included immediate and extensive recommendations, including
trained personnel to be taken from my old 11th District to build up the 14th
as quickly as possible.
The next day, after telling Admiral Bloch the security we enjoyed in the
11th and indicating the complete lack here, he approved all steps to remedy
the situation. Accordingly, the personnel arrived and expansion, planning and
training were rapid. During the course of a subsequent survey to outline
faults in the District, the report [6276] or digest was brought to the
attention of Admiral Bloch. This survey was made by an officer who was
working for the Commander-in-Chief and also helping the District. At the
sight of this critical survey coming from the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral
Bloch gave vent to his wrath and Intelligence activities suffered for quite a
time.
Mr. Mitchell. How mnch more of that is there? These are
Zacharias' personal papers. He is the man who claimed also that
he settled and brought peace to Japan. I am wondering how much
more there is.
.Senator Ferguson. I haven't any desire to have him read it. I
thought it would refresh his memory, that is all. Does that refresh
your memory? "
2356 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Murphy. I would like to know whether this was written before
the event or after the event.
Mr. Mitchell. Oh, yes, this is a story of one of those men with
great foresight.
Mr. Murphy. We have him listed as a witness, haven't we?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Some request was made, I don't know from
what member, for Zacharias' papers and we hunted around and there
was none in the Navy, but I understand that these are papers that
he had in his possession that the Navy asked him to produce and
then we turned them over to the member of the committee that had
asked for them.
[6277] Mr. Murphy. Before the hearings commenced there was
a reference to the fact that he had made a speech in Annapolis, and
it was after that that he was listed as a witness.
Mr. Mitchell. He is on the list here.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, I will just ask you if that refreshes
your memory, I mean after you read it all.
Admiral Stark. No, it does not.
The Chairman. Senator, may I ask you this, inasmuch as it has
been read: Who is this man referring to here when he says, "You
have two envoys in Washington and when the third arrived on the
2d or 3d of December," who is he talking about and to whom? He
speaks about two envoys here and he says that a third has arrived.
Who is he talking to ?
Senator Ferguson. He is talking about Japan.
The Chairman. Who was he talking to? He says "you."
Senator Ferguson. He was talking to Munson.
Admiral Stark. This memorandum is marked "Personal and con-
fidential memorandum for Admiral Draemel, March 17, 1942."
The Chairman. Well, he is evidently reciting a past event there.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. He exhibited a good deal of foresight because he
starts out predicting what was going to happen and then in March he
says it happened. Now, I don't know who he is [6279] talking
to when he is making that prediction.
Admiral Stark. And signed by Zacharias.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Ferquson. Well, Admiral, do you recall whether or not
it was that report from Munson that caused you to send the April
notes or order?
Admiral Stark. No, sir, I do not. The Munson report was, did
you say, dated in March?
Senator Ferguson. I don't know. I have never seen the Munson
report and I don't know as he has ever made a report. Do you know
whether he made a report ?
Admiral Stark, This is in 1942. I do not recall the incident.
Senator Ferguson. No, it was before the attack that Munson was
out there.
Admiral Stark. I do not know.
Senator Ferguson. It is clear.
Admiral Stark. It is not clear. I remember our sending out the
dispatch.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know why that dispatch was sent?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2357
Admiral Stark. No. To my mind it was one of those things which
was brought up in Intelligence as a good thing to send. I was in-
formed of it and I agreed that it was a good thing to send.
[^279] Senator Ferguson. Well, now, going to the Intelligence
branch here, that was a very important branch, was it not?
Admiral Stark. Very, yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And it was under you ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know when Admiral Kirk went in?
Admiral Stark. I have got it here somewhere. Kirk came in, as I
recall, early in — well, I won't have to rely on my memory.
Senator Ferguson. Wasn't it in May or June, or was it in April ?
Admiral Stark, 1 March.
Senator Ferguson. 1st of March?
Admiral Stark. 1 March 1941 ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know what was the occasion for
changing Intelligence officers on the 1st of March 1941?
Admiral Stark. Rear Admiral Walter Anderson had been head of
Intelligence, was anxious to go to sea, was due for sea, and went to
sea in July 1941 and Captain Jules James was acting as an interim
head of Intelligence until Kirk came in in 1941.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand then that this Intelligence
branch was treated in this way, that if a man went in there no matter
how good he was, if his time came [&2S0] around for him to
go to sea, he was taken out of the Intelligence branch and sent to sea,
and a new man put in ?
Admiral Stark. Generally speaking, that is true in the Navy. An
officer in wartime, or if the occasion demanded, I think, at any time,
might sacrifice his career, and I have brought up the point that there
may come a time when we would just have to keep people in their
billets, but the law requires an officer to have so much sea duty before
he can be promoted and if he reaches a certain age and has not had that
sea duty in the grade he may be and is likely to be held too much ashore
and not promoted.
[6*2811 Senator Ferguson. Therefore, under that rule of the
Navy, men were fearful of staying in Intelligence because they would
not get promotion ?
Admiral Stark. In Intelligence, or any other branch, it might be
the Judge Advocate's Office, it might be too much staff duty, it might
be too much radio duty, or any other shore duty too long.
Senator Ferguson. But back at March 1, 1941, things were rather
critical in our negotiations, were they not?
Admiral Stark. Yes, 1941 was a critical year, I would say.
Senator Ferguson. Then why would we change the heads of the'
Intelligence Branch ?
Admiral Stark. Well, we changed them because Anderson went to
sea in command of a battleship.
Senator Ferguson. And the Chief Assistant acting was who ?
Admiral Stark. Captain Jules James.
Senator Ferguson. He did not take that place. A new man came
in. Admiral Kirk, is that true ?
Admiral Stark. Well, James was there temporarily pending Kirk's
arrival.
2358 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Then you had a break there while Anderson
was at sea in which a temporary man by the name of \6^S2^
James and then Kirk came in ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Around March 1, 1941?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, will you tell us why Kirk was removed
from that department on the 15th of October, 1941 ?
Admiral Stark. Well, Kirk also went to sea-going command.
Senator Ferguson. Was it at his request that he left that de-
partment ?
Admiral Stark. As I recall, he was very very glad to get the job.
That does not answer the question exactly. I think he did request
a sea-going job, but I could not swear to that.
Senator Ferguson. Now we had a very critical period in October.
That was just about the time of the change of the Japanese Cabinet,
was it not ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir, it was.
Senator Ferguson. And the department under your supervision
changed at that particular time, the heads of the Intelligence Branch,
is that correct ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, will you tell us who named Admiral
Wilkinson ?
Admiral Stark. He was recommended to me. I knew [JS^SS]
Admiral Wilkinson, but not well. But I did know him to be a man
with a reputation for outstanding intelligence. I do not mean Intel-
ligence duties, but he was a highly intelligent man.
Now Personnel usually gives a list of those who are available. I
ujndoubtedly discussed that with Nimitz and with Ingersoll, and
probably with Intelligence, and Wilkinson could be made available
and was entirely acceptable.
Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss it with the President?
Admiral Stark. I think not that detail; no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Not as to who was to go in?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall discussing that with the President.
Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss it with the Secretary of the
Navy?
Admiral Stark. Unquestionably, because he was greatly interested
in the Intelligence Division, and always had been. He took a very
strong personal interest in it.
Senator Ferguson. Now did you understand that it took a special
mental attitude for an Intelligence officer?
Admiral Stark. Well, other things being equal, a man who had had
Intelligence duty, or who had a flare for it, of course, would be pref-
erable, but there was not any question in anybody's mind in regard
to the fitness of \628Jt.^ Wilkinson. He had been secretary of
the general board, one of his important duties, and I think Wilkin-
son— I can verify it — had been on one or two of the peace conferences
or reduction of navy international conferences. He was considered a
highly able man and strongly reconnnended to me, and Avas available.
I may state, when I state the Secretary of the Navy was very much
interested in Intelligence, none of these moves was made without his
personal O. K.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2359
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, at the time of the Atlantic Confer-
ence, you were called to go to that conference, were you not?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know just when the first order of shoot-
ing in the Atlantic was ? It was after that, was it not?
Admiral Stark. It was after that; yes, sir. May I state, Senator
Ferguson, in that connection, that lest my testimony this morning be
misunderstood with regard to the shooting order, the shooting order
appeared in the Western Hemispheric Defense Plans. It was in de-
fense that the shooting order was issued, not offense. It was to defend
our own comnumi cations and our own ships and our own western
Atlantic waters. The tasks assigned the Atlantic Fleet, some of them,
start out under [6285] (a) — "Protection against hostile attack
United States and flag shipping; insure safety of sea communications;
support the defense of United States territory." In other words, it
was a defensive order.
Senator Ferguson. I understand that, but I wondered whether this
would refresh your memory as to its date. On September 22, you
wrote a letter to Admiral Hart, addressed to "Dear Tommy", which
was your custom; is that right?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson (reading) :
Now, considerable has happened since I last wrote you. So far as the Atlantic
is concerned, we are all but, if not actually, in it. The President's speech of
September 21, 1941, put the matter squarely before the country. We were i-eady
for it ; in fact, our orders have been issued.
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. So prior to September 21, the orders were actu-
ally issued to shoot in the Atlantic?
Admiral Stark. They were ready for execution.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. We were in complete touch with the President on
that. Of course, we could not have done anything of that sort except
at Presidential direction. These hemispheric defense plans were
submitted to him, and he went over [6286] them before they
were issued. Where we state the President directs, it was his directive ;
no one but the President I would say could direct us to take the action
indicated in those plans.
Senator Ferguson. That would indicate, though, that congressional
approval was not necessary for an overt act. You considered that
an overt act, did you not, the shooting?
Admiral Stark. I do not know that you would call an act an overt
act if you considered it in self-defense or in defense of carrying out
what you might call the congressional will of getting material abroad.
I would say the background for it is that if we were making in this
country enormous amount of material, if the country approved that,
and Congress did approve it, they would expect to see that it got
to its destination and not let somebody else go and sink it at his will.
So, this was a defensive measure.
• Senator Ferguson. I will ask you to look at your memorandum for
the Secretary of State of the 8th of November, the postscript, and
that may help you on what you told us this morning about your
statement before a congressional meeting.
2360 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. It is the postscript on page 3 of that letter of
the 8th of October 1941.
Admiral Stark. That was to Hart or to Kimmel?
[6287] Senator Ferguson. No; it is to the Secretary of State.
It is the memorandum for the Secretary of State, 8th of October 1941.
Admiral Stark. That is included in the letter to Admiral Hart?
Senator Ferguson. To Admiral Kimmel, dated October 27. That
is the letter to Kimmel on October 27. That is not your letter.
Admiral Stark. The memorandum of the 8th of October?
Senator Ferguson. Yes. The last postscript may clear up some-
thing that you said this morning and also what I ask you about now.
Admiral Stark. Do you want me to read that postscript, sir?
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; it is A^ery short.
Admiral Stark (reading) :
I did not set down in the attached notes what I have mentioned to you before,
namely, that I do not believe Germany will declare war on us until she is good
and ready, and it would be a cold-blooded decision on Hitler's part if and when
he thinks it will pay, and not until then. He has every excuse in the world
to declare war on us now if he were of a mind to. He had no legitimate excuse
in the world except to serve his own ends to invade the countries he has. When
he is ready he will strike and not before.
[6288] I had forgotten how closely I paraphrased that this
morning. It was the same thought.
Senator Ferguson. But you put that in the memorandum to the Sec-
retary of State ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Had you been consulted or asked for that infor-
mation, as to what your opinion was on that subject?
Admiral Stark. Well, this memorandum starts out with :
This morning you asked me —
This is to Mr. Hull—
what would be the advantages and disadvantages of abolishing the combat
zones around the British Isles and elsewhere. You also inquired as to the possi-
bility of the United States naval-craft escorting all the way across the Atlantic,
also as to the disadvantages and advantages that would occur should Hitler
decfare war on the United States.
This was in reply to that.
Senator Ferguson. Now, will you just read the last paragraph?
1 think it will also clear up something that you testified on.
Admiral Stark (reading).
I might finally add that I have assumed for the past two years that our
country would not let Great Britain fall, and that ultimately, in order to prevent
this, we would have to enter the war, and as noted above, I have long felt and
have often stated, that the sooner we get in the [628.9] better.
Senator Ferguson. It would indicate you had had that opinion for
2 years?
Admiral Stark. I do not know how long.
Senator Fergson. You said, "I have assumed for the past 2 years."
Admiral Stark. "I have assumed for the past 2 years that our
country would not let Great Britain fall, that ultimately, in order to
prevent this, we would have to enter the war, and as noted above,
I have long felt." I did not say "for 2 years."
Senator Ferguson. How long had you that feeling?
Admiral Stark. I do not know just how long. I became worried
about the situation, feeling we were heading for it certainly in 1941,
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2361
and as I stated yesterday in giving a very brief, general picture it
often crossed my mind that if we waited too long it might be too late,
and we might have a job on our hands to do alone.
Senator Ferguson. That was shortly after the Atlantic Conference.
At the Atlantic Conference were you consulted in any way about the
Far East?
Admiral Stark. You mean as to any political decisions ?
Senator Ferguson. No, not political but militar3^
Admiral Stark. I was not consulted with reference to the [6290'\
Far East. We had no agenda at the Atlantic Conference. For the
most part we would have talks with Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord,
Admiral Pound, with regard to our positions, as to what we had. and
we talked over undoubtedly the ABC conversations. We talked a
good deal, as I recall, about aircraft. The British were extremely
anxious to get more flying boats in particular, and any other things
that we could give them in the way of small craft to help them out in
their fight against the submarine. But as to any special plans, or
talks or commitments with regard to getting into the Far East or
elsewhere, there were none.
Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted by the President at that
time?
Admiral Stark. We got in on very few of the conversations, if any,
on the political issue. Ours was almost all materiel, operations, naval
matters.
Senator Ferguson. I was going to ask, were you consulted by the
President at that time as to the steps essential for the defense of the
whole or any part of the Pacific area ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. We had laid out our general plan in
ABC-1, as was read into some of the testimony this morning, and that
will be shown, if you want to read it, in the final agreement made out
there regarding the division of fleets.
[6291^ Senator Ferguson. ABC-1 did not include the Pacific,
did it?
Admiral Stark. We talked over the whole ocean ; the whole world.
Senator Ferguson. Did ABC-1 include the Pacific?
Admiral Stark. Yes; it did, as I recall very plainly; yes, sir,
ABC-1 formed tlie background for Rainbow 5, which formed the
basic plan for WPI^-46, and ABC-1 was our broad investigation of
the entire effort, should we become involved.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, when did you first know that we were
building landing strips at Port Moresby, Port Darwin, Rabaul, Balik-
thean, and Singapore?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall our building those strips prior to
December 7.
Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted about that prior to that
date?
Admiral Stark. If you can give me some background for that, some
letters or something to show for it, maybe it would refresh my mem-
ory. I do not recall it at all.
Senator Ferguson. General MarshalPs testimony with relation to
furnishing bombs down there, the furnishing of equipment, some
landing strips, gas, and oil.
Admiral Stark. That may have been Army landing strips, with
which we would not have been particularly concerned.
2362 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[6292'] Senator Ferguson, You would not be consulted on that?
Admiral Stark. Well, we usually talked about everything, but I
do not recall that. I had no particular interest in its prosecution, so
far as being able to help is concerned, so probably it did not make
any permanent impression on me. I dare say he mentioned it.
Senator Ferguson. Now, when the President returned, when were
you first advised that he gave a note to the Ambassador of Japan in
relation to further movements?
Admiral Stark. That was the note of August 17?
Senator Ferguson. August 17.
Admiral Stark. My recollection is that in one of our liaison meet-
ings, I think the next day or very shortly thereafter, Mr. Sumner
Welles read us that note.
Senator Ferguson. The next day, you think ?
Admiral Stark. Very, very shortly after.
Senator Ferguson. And what did that message mean to you, in-
stead of reading it again ? You know it in substance.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. The message was a very sharp message,
and like messages of that sort, w^hen nobody knows just what may de-
develop from it. We had already frozen their assets. That hap-
pened in July, and this was August. They were clearing their ship-
ping in the Atlantic. There was not much more we could do. There
were some loopholes left. I [6293] say "loopholes," there were
places whereby we could give them certain material in exchange for
raw silk, and one thing and another. They might have been closed.
Diplomatic relations could have been severed. That was about as
far, I would say, as we could have gone without consultation with
Congress. I do not know what we would do as the result of that note.
It was a very briefly worded note.
Senator Ferguson. What would you think they might do in rela-
tion to it ?
Admiral Stark. What w^ould I think the Japs might do?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. I would not diagnose what the Japanese mind
would have thought that note was to mean otherwise than a sort of
stop, look, and listen. That is the purpose I suppose it was meant to
serve.
Senator Ferguson. Wasn't it more than stop, look, and listen? Did
not it indicate if they went further south we would take action?
Admiral Stark. As I recall the note, we reserve the right to take
any action which we thought was necessary in defense of our interest.
Senator Ferguson. It is at the bottom of the page.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; I have it here, if you would like to have
me read it. It is on page 714 of "Peace and War." [629i] The
sharp part of that note I think to which you refer is this :
Such being the case, this Goveinmeiit now finds it necessary to say to the
Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps
in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat
of force of neighboring countries the Government of the United States will be
compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary
towards safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests lof the United States
and American Nationals and towards assuring the safety and security of the
United States.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2363
Senator Ferguson. Now did you prepare to be able to back that up?
Did you have a conversation with the President about preparation to
back that up ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. I was preparing just as fast as I could
for any eventuality, and had been since I took office in 1939.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know as to whether or not Great Britain
was to give parallel action along the same line?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. I think we could assume that from what
Mr. Churchill said from time to time, and the fact if they went south
it was affecting their interests. I did not assume it, but you asked
me if I thought it might. [6.296] I was not in on the issuance
of this note and knew of it only afterwards when Mr. Welles gave it
to us.
Senator Ferguson, Had you ever heard that Great Britain did give
parallel action?
Admiral Stark. To this?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Senator Lucas. I want to submit, Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt,
the evidence up to this point shows definitely there was no parallel
action given. The Senator has constantly assumed all through the
hearing that parallel action was given.
Senator Ferguson. I was just trying to ascertain if it was given.
If I may get the Hornbeck note
Admiral Stark. I do not recall
Senator Ferguson. Just a moment until I get this paper.
(Short interruption.)
[6296] Senator Ferguson. I want to read you from Mr. Horn-
beck's statement. I had better read the whole paragraph so that I
won't be taking out one sentence.
The Vice Chairman. Wouldn't it be well to identitfy if?
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Has this an exhibit number?
Mr. Mitchell. I couldn't give it to you offhand.
Senator Ferguson. It was handed to us the other morning with
exhibit 95 and exhibit 97, but my copy doesn't seem to have a number
on it. It is an instrument by Mr. Hornbeck on the November 27
memoranda.
Admiral Stark. 1941.
Senator Ferguson. 1941.
Admiral Stark. The Marshall-Stark memorandum.
Senator Ferguson. He says :
Mr. Hornbeck had over the years frequently advanced the view that the United
States and Japan were moving toward an armed collision and that, unless Japan
changed her course or was deflected or brought to a standstill by an encounter
with sonie other country, such a collision was bound some dav to occur. During
the "exploratory conversations" of the year 1941, Mr. Hornbeck took the position
that the only "peacful settlement" which Japan was seeking was a settlement
on her own terms wherein she \6297] might have the assent of the United
States to her program of conquest in the Far East.
It is this sentence:
By August of 1941 the situation had become definitely threatening. Toward
the end of that month, the British Government and the American Government
served on Japan a strong warning against further extending of her courses of
aggression.
2364 CONGRESSIONAL, INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
It isn't my language at all. Senator Lucas can raise the question,
but it isn't my language. I am trying to get information from the
head man, that is, the head of the United States Navy, and I read you
that sentence now :
By August of 1941 the situation had become definitely threatening. Toward
the end of that month, the British Government and the American Government
served on Japan a strong warning against further extending of her courses of
aggression. From then on it was generally recognized that Japan might embark
on acts of force against Great Britain or the United States or both. Officers
of the Department of State were in constant touch with otficers of Military In-
telligence and Naval Intelligence, exchanging factual data and discussing the possi-
bilities of the situation.
Now. it is not mine. I want to know if you ever heard [6298'\
anything to the effect that Great Britain and America had given
these warnings.
Admiral Stark. I recall only our own warning of August 17.
Senator Ferguson. You have no knowledge of this ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall it at all.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think that you would remember it?
That would be an outstanding matter?
Admiral Stark. I think I would if there had been any such note
we sent, had it been called to my attention. However, I wouldn't
guarantee it.
Mr. Mitchell. There is no exhibit number attached to it. It may be
identified in the record by stating the date and from whom to whom it
was written. It was read into the record but not given a number.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. It is the Hornbeck statement attached to
"Problem of Far Eastern Relations," November 27, 1941.
Mr. Mitchell. The top document to the Hornbeck memorandum,
is it?
Senator Ferguson. I don't know.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ?
Senator Ferguson. I yield.
Mr. Murphy. I suggest it be given an exhibit number because Mr.
Keefe has already put in one Hornbeck memorandum and [6299'\
there are three or four more available to the committee, which will be
separate.
Senator Ferguson. What is the next exhibit number?
Mr. Mitchell. 108.
The Chairman. It will be ordered filed as Exhibit 108.
(The document refered to was marked "Exhibit 108.")
Mr. Mitchell. It is a memorandum entitled, "Special Assistant to
the Secretary, November 2, 1944," with the initials, "S. K. H." That
is Hornbeck. I suppose. Attached to it is a long memorandum, which
was read from, and that also has the initials "S. K. H."
The Chairman. What is the date ?
Mr. Mitchell. November 2, 1944. The memorandum attached to
it is dated February 28, 1944, and they both appear to be signed by
Hornbeck. And that which was read, was from his memorandum.
Senator Ferguson. They are both attached to the memorandum of
the 27th ; is that not correct ?
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
The Chairman. Let's clear this up first.
Mr. Mitchell. I don't find it in the paper here,
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2365
The Vice Chairman. How can a memorandum in 1944 be attached
to a memorandum in 1941 ?
[6300] Senator Ferguson, Well, it is; there it is.
Mr, Mitchell, I will straighten that out. On top is a memorandum
of November 2, 1944, signed with Hornbeck's initials, stating :
The memorandum at the bottom of this file, a memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck,
dated November 27, 1941, entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations,
and we find that memorandum dated November 27, 1941, "Problem of
Far Eastern Relations."
The Chairman, To whom is that memorandum addressed?
Mr. Mitchell, It is not addressed to anybody, but it is signed or
initialed by "S. K, H."
The Chairman, Does the paper indicate to whom it is intended
to go ?
Mr, Mitchell, No. It is just some memorandum that he had
written and was in the file. It is not addressed to anybody. Then
it goes on to say :
For purposes of the record there is now being superimposed a memorandum
by Mr. Hornbeck, of date February 28, 1944, in which certain pertinent facts are
stated and an analysis is made of the contents and true purport of the mem-
orandum of November 27, 1941.
Mr. Murphy, There was a memorandum written by Dr. [6301]
Hornbeck in 1941 and thereafter a reference made to it by Mr, Drew
Pearson, and this memorandum of 1944 is a discussion of the Drew
Pearson paper and showing it wasn't justified and showing what he
had in mind in 1941.
Mr. Mitchell. Every word in this thing is written by Hornbeck.
When he speaks of "Mr. Hornbeck" he is talking about himself.
Senator Ferguson, That is what makes it difficult to understand,
Mr. Mitchell,, It has been offered in evidence.
Senator Lucas. Is this an argument between Drew Pearson and
Hornbeck ?
The Chairman. The Chair doesn't know whether it is an argument
or whether it is an agreement.
]VIr. Murphy. There is a dispute.
The Chairman. Go ahead. The Chair might interject this obser-
vation, that the statement in the memorandum of Dr, Hornbeck that
parallel recommendations were made by this Government and Great
Britain to Japan, would not of itself be evidence that such was done,
if such a protest or representation was made by Great Britain, of
course the document itself would prove what it contained. We have
already had evidence as to the request or suggestion or urgency upon
the President to issue a parallel document, [6302] but he issued
his own warning, if that may be the proper term for it, on August 17,
which was not parrallel to what had been urged upon him. Whether
Great Britain at the time issued a similar one, or it might be called
parallel, could be proved by the document itself, regardless of what
Dr, Hornbeck may have said about it.
Senator Ferguson, Mr, Chairman, it is clear that the British papers
are not subject to our examination, so I take it that it is our duty to
present to the committee everything that we have, and particularly
those things that come out of the State Department, that would bear
upon this. •
2366 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Chairman. I am not protesting against it. It is entirely
proper to present it for whatever it is worth. But tlie mere fact that
Dr. Hornbeck said there was a parallel statement, by itself wouldn't
necessarily be proof of that fact, without in any way impugning Dr.
Hornbeck's credulity or credibility.
Senator Ferguson. I am not commenting on the weight of this in-
strument, but it certainly is evidence.
[6303] Mr. Murphy. It is my understanding that the record
shows that instead of the British sending a parallel note that Prime
Minister Churchill made a speech in the House, in London, which was
in effect their answer, or their action, pursuant to the conference.
Senator Ferguson. There is quite a bit of evidence in on this. There
is the radio broadcast of Mr. Churchill, which was sent to Mr. Grew,
indicating that that was the parallel action, and there is this.
The Chairman. This has been filed.
Senator Ferguson. There is the New York Times article.
The Chairman. It is in the record, so we will go ahead.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, you knew Mr. Hornbeck, didn't you ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. He was the political adviser, was he not ?
Admiral Stark. He was adviser to Mr. Hull on Far Eastern mat-
ters. I believe he was head of the Far Eastern Division.
Senator Ferguson. You would take for granted that he knew what
was going on on these notes and messages, as far as the Far East was
concerned ?
Admiral Stark. He should have known in detail.
[6304] Senator Ferguson. You had conferred with him and
taken his advice and you had given him your advice ?
Admiral Stark. I didn't confer with Dr. Hornbeck very often,
and when I did it would probably be in the presence of Mr. Hull.
Occasionally Mr. Hull would send for me and I might talk to him
and several State Department people, but generally I did not take up
business with Mr. Hornbeck.
Senator Ferguson. But you never found that he was mistaken as
to what had been done or not done ? That is, on these messages and
notes ?
Admiral Stark. I had no finding one way or the other on that. I
saw very little of him. I saw him occasionally, but generally speak-
ing, Admiral Schuirmann dealt with him.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether your Department dis-
agreed with Mr. Hornbeck as to the possibility or probability of war
with Japan ?
Admiral Stark. On the assumption that he thought we were head-
ing for it?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. I also thought so.
Senator Ferguson. So you agreed with him on that?
Admiral Stark. Yes, on the basis that he thought so ; I also thought
so. That was agreed.
Senator Ferguson. In this particular instrument — I [6305]
think it is this — he said it was 5 to 1 that we would not be at war
with Japan by the 15th of December. Were you that strong i
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2367
Admiral Stark. No, I didn't make those predictions, as a rule.
Those 2 to 1, 3 to 1, or 50-50 chances, or 80 to 20. I believe Mr. Hull,
at times, as the percentage went down, of his chances, I often thought
he was optimistic, but he should have known better than I, and doubt-
less did — he was working on it all the time — but I never went into that
5 to 1 business, or this or that.
The other fellow had the initiative and he was going to set the day.
Senator FerCxUSOn. You heard Mr. Welles say that there was a
change from a thousand to one to a million to one ?
Admiral Stark. On what ?
Senator Ferguson. That we would stay out.
Admiral Stark. That we would stay out of the war or get in?
Senator Ferguson. That we would get in ; it was a million to one.
Admiral Stark. It was pretty close to getting in after December —
after November 27.
Senator Ferguson. Now, the Konoye visit, had you ev.er been con-
sulted about that?
[6S06] Admiral Stark. I knew about it. I wasn't consulted
as to the advisability of his coming or not coming.
Senator Ferguson. Were you present in the room when the note
of Secretary of War Stimson was read as a memorandum at the bot-
tom of another letter where he said he had agreed he thought it would
be a bad thing to have him come, were you there ?
Admiral Stark. No; I don't recall that at all, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Had you been consulted at all as to whether or
not you advised to confer with him or not ?
Admiral Stark! No, sir. That was on a high political level.
Ssnator Ferguson. And had you ever talked that over with Mr.
Knox, the Secretary of the Navy ?
Admiral Stark. Not that I recall. As to whether he should come
or not.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever prepare any agenda or prepare any
ship to have the meeting on ?
Admiral Stark. Are you referring to the meeting where they
wanted the President ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. I thought — mv testimony may be inaccurate — ^I
was thinking of Kurusu's visit. You are talking about the meeting
on the high sea ?
[6S07] Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. Yes; I was present at some of the meetings when
that was discussed.
The Chairman. Let me ask, you said Konoye.
Senator Ferguson. I was wrong
The Chairman. You mean Kurusu ?
Senator Ferguson. I mean Prince Konoye.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. In other words, I am referring to the
proposal to have the Japanese — that he and the President meet some-
where and discuss means of settlement in the F'acific. I had heard
that discussed ; yes, sir. I don't recall that my opinion was asked, but
I was in sympathy and agreement with the stand taken that if the
President of the United States left the country to discuss matters of
2368 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
State with the Prime Minister of Japan, some sort of agenda which
offered some chances of success should be set up beforehand, and I
believe, without going into any papers on the subject, that that was
the stumbling block, that we could get nothing from Japan.
But I would say Mr. Hull would "be a far more competent witness
on that than I.
Senator Ferguson. Did you oppose such a meeting?
Admiral Stark. No ; I didn't oppose, nor did I approve it. I mean
I don't recall having expressed an opinion [6S08] except that
I do recall when it was discussed my own personal opinion was that the
President and Mr. Hull were right in not just going out to discuss
something with the Prime Minister without some ]Dreliminary agree-
ment regarding the agenda and something which might be accom-
plished.
[6309] Senator Ferguson. You mentioned in one of your state-
ments here that our fleet was being depleted at Pearl Harbor and that
while in its full strength it would be a deterrent, yet in a weakened state
it would not be, as far as Japan was concerned. Do you recall that ?
Admiral Stark. You mean as regards the numbers in that fleet?
Senator Ferguson. That is right.
Admiral Stark. Admiral Kimmel made that statement, and I was
quite in agreement with it, that the strength of the fleet, just like the
strength of the voice of the United States in international affairs, is
almost entirely dependent on its armed force.
Senator Ferguson. Now, it has been mentioned here, and I want
to clear it up, as to what Mr. Churchill said in his speech on the 27th of
January 1942 in the House of Commons, and I wanted to ask you some
questions on it.
Admiral Stark. This was December
Senator Ferguson. January 28, 1942, in the House of Commons.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Churchill speaking :
On the other hand, the probability, since the Atlantic Conference, at which
I discussed these matters with Mr. Roosevelt, that the United [6S10] States,
even if not herself attacked, would come into a war in the Far East, and thus
make final victory sure, seems to allay some of these anxieties. That expectation
has not been falsified by the events.
Did you hear that discussed at the Atlantic Conference?
Admiral Stark. I did not. I was not present at the conferences
between the President and the Prime Minister. Naturally, they were
alone much. I remember that speech of the Prime Minister.
Senator Ferguson. Tliat is tlie very thing that you were trying to
find out from the President, was it not, as to what we would do if
Britain alone was attacked?
Admiral Stark. That is true, and I was trying to find it out Jind
just what agreements were made I have no idea. I was surprised when
I heard that talk of Mr. Churchill.
Senator Ferguson. Now, I am reading further
Admiral Stark. Because the Pi-esident could not commit us to going
in, and the Prime Minister knew he could not without being backed
by Congress.
Senator Ferguson. Well, could we have gone into a nondeclared
war, such as in the Atlantic, where Congress did not sanction it?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2369
Admiral Stark. Not unless we were attacked. In the nondeclared
war in the Atlantic, again I invite attention to the [6311] fact
that it was defensive measures in support of getting material across
the Atlantic for which Congress had provided.
Senator Ferguson. To make it clear, Admiral Stark, why I am
asking these questions, this, in my mind, only leads to the one question,
of whether or not you believed that the}'^ were going to attack Great
Britain alone on the 7th, and as to what you were prepared to do, or
other people in Washington, or in the Pacific, or anywhere else. That
is the only purpose of trying to find out what you knew, whether you
knew about this.
Senator Ferguson. Whether it would cause you to do certain things
then or not to do certain things then. [Reading on from Mr.
Churchill's speech :]
It fortified our British decision to use our limited resources on the actual
fighting fronts. As time went on, one had greater assurance than if Japan
ran amok in the Pacifif^, we should not figlit alone. It must also be remem-
bered that over the whole of the Pacific scene brooded the great power of the
United States Fleet, concentrated at Hawaii. It seemed very unlikely that
Japan would attempt the distant invasion of the Malay Peninsula, the assault
upon Singapore, and tJie attack upon the Dutch East Indies, while leaving
behind them in their rear this great American fleet.
[6S12] Now, here is a former Lord of the Admiralty in Britain
speaking about our fleet being in the rear and on the flark. Did
that ever occur to you prior to the 7th of December, that Japan would
not attack Britain alone, or would not attack Britain and the Dutch
East Indies, and allow our fleet to be in the Pacific as stated by
Churchill?
Admiral Stark. I thought of every angle of that, not as a result
of any conversation between the President and Mr. Churchill, but
from my own military viewpoint.
May I, the subject of ADB has come up once or twice — may I
read you a dispatch, w^hich is not very long, showing the final termi-
nation of that?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, I would like to have any evidence you
have.
The Chairman. You may read that into the record.
Admiral Stark. We received a dispatch from Admiral Hart on
7 November 1941 :
Are there any instructions regarding ADB-2, which I understand is in the
hands of Batavia but not yet received here?
I answered that dispatch on the Llth, his dispatch having been
sent on the 7th :
Chief of Naval Operations and British Chief of Naval Staff have agreed
ADB-1 and ADB-2 are dead and a complete new [6313] approach will
be required. Your 0.50255.
The one I just read.
[In general it will consist of a joint naval operating plan drawn up by you
and Commander-in-Chief British Far Eastern Fleet who is now enroute that
station and who will probably be directed to visit Manila secretly to establish
personal contact with you and with Army high command. This naval plan
would be integrated with Dutch naval plans and Army and Air plans to be
worked out by the U. S., United Kingdom, and the Netherlands East Indies
Commands in the Far Eastern area. Letter now enroute to you by air-mail on
this subject. Additional instructions will be sent later.]
79716— 46— pt. 5 21
2370 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[6314] In response to that, which I had taken up with Admiral
Pound, I informed Hart as noted therein that Admiral Phillips of
the Royal Navy would visit him, I received the following from
Admiral Hart, which was sent December 7. This is in five parts.
Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, that was written before any
attack was made, was it not ?
Admiral Stark. That was written before the attack ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. All right.
The Chairman. Mr. Reporter, please make this notation in the
record that this document will be found commencing at page 5125
of the record.
Admiral Stark. The first two short dispatches I believe should be
put in the record at this time to make it complete. I think these are
not exhibits.
Senator Ferguson. Well, will you give us what they are ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. They are short, aren't they?
Admiral Stark. The two short ones.
Mr. Mitchell. You have just read them, haven't you?
Admiral Stark. I have read them ; yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Please give those to the reporter and he will leave
those in the transcript and strike out of the [6olo] transcript
your reading of the other documents.
Admiral Stark. I will give him both documents.
The Chairman. All right.
Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral Stark, you were familiar though,
with the fact that prior to Admiral Hart sending you that message,
he sent you Exhibit 40 :
Learn from Singapore we have assured British Ai-my support under three
or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you.
Admiral Stark. For the reason that we did not have any to give
him on that subject and the rumor that he had was false so far as
we knew. I had nothing on it.
Senator Ferguson. But as soon as you received this one that you
have just read, referred back to the correct page, vou did reply to
that?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, doesn't this amount to practically the
same thing. Exhibit 40?
Admiral Stark. Will you read that again, please?
Senator Ferguson (reading) :
Learn from Singapore we have assured Britisli Army support under three
or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you.
r That is from Admiral Hart to you.
[6-316] The Chairman. What is the date of that?
Mr. Mitchell. Dated December 6 or 7.
Senator Ferguson. 7.
Mr. MrrcHELL. 1941.
Senator Ferguson. At 6 : 45.
The Chairman. Does that letter show whether Admiral Hart said
the fleet had already been attacked ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2371
Mr. Mitchell. That dispatch was sent 3 or 4 hours before the
attack at Pearl Harbor, and that has already been read into the
lecord.
The Chairimax. That is a little deceptive, that 6:45.
Mr. Mitchell. We fif^iired it out that it was about 6 hours before
the attack.
' Senator Ferguson. Just before the attack.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Doesn't the reply in the long message that he
sent amount to practically the same thing as he was asking about?
Admiral Stark. We had been Avorking for practically a year on
this subject of endeavoring to get together out there. We had had
two or three conferences which, as 1 recall, were rejected, certainly
the first one which came in, which I think was in April 1941, because
it showed commitments and we could not make any commitments
and we had sent word that we could [6S17] not make any.
Now, that dispatch which you read me might assume that Admiral
Hart had heard that we had made commitments. We had not.
Whether this had any bearing on that I do not recall, but we got from
him, "Are there any instructions regarding A-B-D-2," which was the
last conference they had? We were taking that up with the Ad-
miralty. Both were rejected and, as I told him, they were dead and
then definitely to go ahead and make his own plan in case we became
involved in a war, but so far as I know the information that he got
that we would go in was not correct. I had never heard of it.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you consult the President about
your reply to Admiral Hart's message that is on page 5125, volume
29, of our record ? That is the one you were reading.
Admiral Stark. Consulted him about this ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes; about the long one. Before you sent the
answer did you confer with the President?
Admiral Stark. With regard to the answer that I sent?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. I undoubtedly told him about it because I kept
him pretty familiar with all that material.
Senator Ferguson. And what was the reply given to you by the
President, that is the substance of it? Did he agree [63 J8]
to it?
Admiral Stark. To this ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; your reply to Admiral Hart.
Admiral Stark. Well, it went out, it was O. K.'d. It went into oper-
ation and just whether I took that up with him or not I do not defi-
nitely recall, but in general I kept him informed of every movement we
made of this sort. I have not the distinct remembrance of this dispatch
as I have of some of the messages with regard to the Atlantic, but I
undoubtedly told him about it.
Senator Ferguson. And you would say that if you did tell him that
you undoubtedly received his consent or you would not have sent it ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; or received his O. K. that he was satisfied
with it.
Senator Ferguson. That is what I mean, his O. K.
Mr. Mitchell. Excuse me. I would like to have the record show
when the answer was sent, the hour or day.
2372 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. It was sent 7 in the evening, after the attack.
The Chairman. Not after the attack ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; after the attack.
Mr. Mitchell. That is what I wanted to know.
Admiral Stark. Our answer was sent on December 7 at [SSW]
080121.
The Chairman. What would that be in the United States ?
Admiral Stark. That would be in the United States about 3 o'clock
in the morning of December 7. That is when the
Mr. Mitchell. No.
The Chairman. No ; that could not be because you got his telegram
after that.
Admiral Stark. Oh, I was looking at the wrong number up here.
The date of that dispatch — I was looking at the top of the page — is
080121. That is 1 o'clock in the morning, 1 : 21 in the morning Green-
wich, which would be 21 hours 21, which would be 9 : 21 on the evening
of the 7th.
The Chairman. Yes.
Admiral Stark. In other words, it went out 9 o'clock that evening.
The Chairman. After the attack.
Admiral Stark. After the attack; yes, sir.
Regarding these conversations and when they started and regarding
political commitments, I sent a dispatch to Admiral Hart on February
15, 1941, reading:
Beginning February 22 British and Dutch staff conversations will be held in
Singapore.
Mr. Mitchell. I think that is alread;y in the record.
\6320'\ Admiral Stark. I would like to bring it up at this point
if I may, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. All right.
Admiral Stark (reading) :
Will be held in Singapore under conditions of the utmost secrecy. You are
advised to have your representatives participate in these conversations. He will
have the power to agree tentatively to a joint plan of operation of U. S.-English
and Dutch forces, but he will not be empowered to make any commitments of a
political nature. Agreements must have your and my approval.
I just want to accentuate that question about political commitments,
with which we were very careful.
Senator Ferguson. "Your and my approval." Who is he referring
to?
Admiral Stark. Hart's and mine.
Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral
Admiral Stark. Wait, let me check it, will you please? "Must have
your and my approval." That is Admiral Hart's and mine to start
with an, of course, ultimately it would come back to Congress before
we could do anything except in the case of a surprise attack or some-
thing of that sort.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did you come to Congress on the same kind
of a problem in the Atlantic? -Did you come to Con- [6321^
gress or did anyone come to Congress on the same kind of an ar-
rangement in the Atlantic ?
Admiral Stark. You mean with regard to making arrangements
with the British in case we got into war?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2373
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. No, sir ; we did not come to Congress.
Senator Ferguson. I am trying to find out what is the difference be-
tween the Pacific, the ABC in the Pacific and that in the Atlantic.
Admiral Stark. Not so much, sir. In the Atlantic we originally
got together and made plans to have them ready, and for which I was
responsible, in case we were drawn in. This was a similar thing, to
have a plan in case we were drawn in in the Pacific.
Senator Ferguson. But in the Atlantic with what you call technical
war — we won't go over that again — we went in without Congress. Now,
what was the difference in the ABCD in the Pacific and the ABC
in the Atlatnic ?
Admiral Stark. We had no similar problem confronting us in the
Pacific with regard to transport of materials.
Senator Ferguson. Weren't we transporting material to Iceland
and we were transporting it to the Philippines? What was the dif-
ference ?
Admiral Stark. Well, the difference was that we were be- [6322]
ing attacked in the Atlantic and we had drawn up defense plans
against that attack. We had had no attacks against any of our ships
in the Pacific subsequent to the Pa nay incident.
Senator Ferguson. What I am trying to get at is if they had gone
in against Britain — you see, we are talking about that — what would
have been our arrangement? Were they going to come to Congress
about taking the Azores? You were told to get ready with trans-
ports and all to take the Azores. Did they come to Congress about
the Azores?
Admiral Stark. There was given the order to make a military plan
for the Azores. It never was made.
Senator Ferguson. You got the ships all ready?
Admiral Stark. I got the ships ready and I brought marines around
to be prepared to do it.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. But it did not eventuate.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever have the same problem about
sending some of your marines down to Brazil ?
Admiral Stark. We sent some of our people down to Brazil.
Senator Ferguson. Did you send any marines?
Admiral Stark. I think we did. We established air stations down
there.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear that there was to be a Ger-
man attack on Brazil and that you were to get a certain \€323'\
amount of marines ready to go down, or that there had been an attack?
Admiral Stark. No, sir; I think not. Senator Ferguson. I recall
nothing about a German attack down there.
Senator Ferguson. When were the reserve marines called out?
Admiral Stark. You mean the marines who were on the retired list
or on inactive duty, when were they called ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. I do not recall just when that was. The Depart-
ment can furnish you that information.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. I am not concerned with the Atlantic,
only insofar as I am trying to get why there was a distinction between
2374 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the Atlantic and the Pacific, that is all ; I am not concerned with that.
Admiral Stark. As I see it, sir, our problems were quite different
up to the point of war because in the Atlantic we were confronted with
the problem of getting supplies through to the British, a problem
where sinkings — at one time in 1941 ships were being sunk three times
as fast as they were being built and that could only go on until we
crossed the curves in the opposite direction. It meant defeat of the
British and defeat of the sending of material over there due to Ger-
man aggression on the high seas. We had no such problem [6S£4']
in the Pacific. I do not know whether I get your question right or not.
Senator Ferguson. Well, you gave me an answer, as you see it, what
the distinction was.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Fergusox. Now, did you know whether this was a fact —
and we were interrupted when I was reading Mr. Churchill's speech.
There was one other item that I wanted to ask you about, and this is
quoting from Mr. Churchill's speech of the 27th of January 1942 in
the House of Commons.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson (reading) :
It has been the policy of the Cabinet at almost all cost to avoid embroilment
with Japan until we were sure that the United States would also be engaged.
Did 3^ou know that to be a fact ?
Admiral Stark. No ; I did not. That is his opinion. I do not know
whether he knew it to be a fact.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know of facts that would permit Mr.
Churchill to make that statement?
Admiral Stark. I do not know what his background for it was.
Senator Ferguson. Now, in the message of the 27th you use the word
"deployment" and I want to ask you. Admiral, if [6325] there
is any place in the Navy war plans where the word "deployment" is
used or defined ?
Admiral Stark. I think it may be used. I do not know that it is
defined. A deployment to a naval officer with regard to his forces, with
a specific objective in view, I tliink, has a definite meaning to him.
Senator Ferguson. Now, you used it in a little different way in
the October 16th message.
Admiral Stark. Yes. sir.
Senator Ferguson. There you say, "You will take due precaution,
including such preparatory deployment." Deployment there is pre-
paratory; and in the one on the 27th it is used "defensive"; "appropri-
ate defensive deployment."
Now, was there any place in any of the war plans where that word
was used so that these commanders in the field would know what they
were to do under a war plan ? .
Admiral Stark. Not exactly, no definite set-up as I recall. He would
use his judgment as to what this meant, or if in doubt he could ask.
Senator Ferguson. If T asked you this question, the word "deploy-
ment," is it a word of art as far as the Navy is concerned? Do you
know what I mean by that ?
Admiral Stark. Is it what?
Senator Ferguson. A word of art. Is it used by the Navy [^S26\
to designate a certain thing? '{'-'^ ^''"U, <'>' pi(;v :t ;r:s 1 -r> -i !;;-»'•['. \j;ino
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2375
Admiral Stark. Yes.' sir.
Senator Ferguson. What is the definition ?
Admiral Stark. "Well, deployment in general means a spread. You
deploy your forces, 3'ou deploy on a scouting line, you may deploy on an
attacking line.
Senator Ferguson. But there is nothing in any war plan that you
know of where it was used where he could look and say, "There is what
we are to do," or "That is what we are to do" ?
Admiral Stark. Well, as I recall the deployment which he made
in response to the dispatch of October 16 was a preliminary deploy-
ment in line with what war plans called for as one of the first moves
in the outlying islands and he did that.
Senator Ferguson. I want to read to you now what you did say
before the Roberts Commission, pages 1813 and 1814, to refresh your
memory on that :
What we expected him, Admiral Kimmel, to do was to get more planes and
personnel and so on down to Wake and Midway and, if possible, to send his task
forces, some task forces to sea in readiness to catch any raider, which he did.
He did that. We knew it. We knew all the task forces were at sea. He informed
us that one was returning from having put the people ashore at Wake, that
certain planes had been sent to Midway and were expected to go on [6327]
the fifth or sixth up down to Wake, and we knew the schedule of the ships that
were in port —
meaning you — ■
and at that time out of the three task forces there were two scheduled to meet in
port. Actually there was less than one and a half in port. He kept them at
sea. He had taken those measures, which looked absolutely sound, it was a safe
assignment and other measures sad been taken of a similar nature.
Now, do you remember that testimony before Justice Roberts ?
Admiral Stark. I recall it now that you read it, in general.
[632-8] Senator Ferguson. Is it true now?
Admiral Stark, I knew about his sending his submarines out and
deploying them after the October message. We had one dispatch indi-
cating one of the forces at sea. I do not recall the other. We knew
of the general plan, we knew of the forces in port and at sea, and
just what he had at sea at that time, or I mean in port at that time.
Since then, I haven't any recollection that we knew just what he did
have in port.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, you had a Navy board where the ships
<vere kept on the board ?
Admiral Stark. We had a Navy board, as I explained, but all the
general local movements were not kept up to date.
Senator Ferguson. Would a local movement be a movement from
Pearl Harbor to Wake?
Admiral Stark. That would be one within his province, which he
initiated.
Senator Ferguson. That was not my question. Would it be a local
movement so it would not go on your board ?
Admiral Stark. I would say so.
Senator Ferguson, Do you know whether or not j^our board did
show what he had gotten? Did you ever consult your board to
find out?
[6329'] Admiral Stark. No ; I did not consult the board for that
particular thing. He sent us a message, or a letter, I have forgotten
2376 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
which, about one of those movements to which I have testified. I
think it was the one which left the 28th, as I recall.
Senator Ferguson. Now is it not a fair summary of your testimony
that, so far as the disposition by Kimmel of the ships of the fleet was
concerned, you considered his message was sent in accordance with
the directive in your dispatch of November 27 ?
, Admiral Stark. The disposition of ships he had at that time?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. Are you including planes ?
Senator Ferguson, No ; just the ships of the fleet.
Admiral Stark. I have stated I did not know what orders he gave
to his two task forces, but that movement was in general conformance
with the strengthening of the area, and if I had known of it I certainly
would have taken no exception to it. It was all right at that time, so
far as I was concerned.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, do I understand then that we had this
very critical situation where you were notifying them of a war warn-
ing on the 27th and you were not consulting [SSSO] the board
to ascertain exactly what he was doing?
Admiral Stark. The board would not have shown exactly what
he was doing.
Mr. Mitchell. We have got all of those boards downstairs. The
Admiral stated yesterday the board did not show the position in and
out of port, of Pearl Harbor. I did not bring them up. If you want
them we can bring them up.
Admiral Stark. Lieutenant Commander Riclmiond tells me there
is a board showing the picture from the 1st to the 6th of December.
Senator Ferguson. Then it did show it ?
Mr. Mitchell. No.
Senator Ferguson. I misunderstood j'ou.
Mr. Mitchell. I tried to di-aw out whether he knew the ships were
bottled up at Pearl Harbor and I asked him about these boards, and he
said the board would not show in detail just the ships in the area,
so I dropped it.
I have the boards downstairs, and I will bring them up in the
morning.
Admiral Stark. I was going to say the simplest thing to do would
be to get the boards and look at them.
The Chairman. We will have the boards liere tomorrow morning.
Mr. Mitchell. We can bring tliem up now, if you have time.
[6331] The Chairman. We have only got about 18 minutes
more.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, am I not correct in saying that there
are two phases which modify the word "deployment" in your dispatch
of the 27th '? The first phase is defensive, is it not?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And the second phase is preparatory to carrying
out the task assigned in WPL-4G?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That is a fair statement ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ?
Senator Ferguson. Not at this moment.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2377
Now, Admiral, take the task assigned in WPL-46. That involves
certain offensive action, does it not, such as raids of the Marshall
Islands ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Fergttson. So that you directed a defensive deplojanent, but
a deployment which was also preparatory to an offensive mission, did
you not ?
Admiral Stark. Well, a defensive deployment preparatory — in
naval understanding, when you tell someone to do something prepara-
tory, it means that you will bear in mind or get ready for, and be in
readiness to execute another plan later on.
[6332] In taking a defensive deployment he would protect him-
self and be ready later on to carry on his other duties under the plan.
Senator Ferguson, But this language called on him to do two
things, that is, one was a defensive deployment and the other one was
preparatory to an offensive deployment, isn't that right ?
Admiral Stark. The other does not require actioi) in the sense that
he has got to take up a position prepared to attack the Marshalls, that
is the Eastern Marshalls. He takes a defensive deployment and it will
be in keeping with readiness to execute another plan later on.
Senator Ferguson. Did the plans use the word "J-day"?
Admiral Stark. Use what?
Senator Ferguson. The word "J-day." What was J-day ?
Admiral Stark. I think that was something that Kimmel used for
Japan day, for war. The order did not say that, and our plan did not.
Senator Ferguson. Well, you had a certain day which would be
war, and then so many days plus they were to do certain things in the
Marshalls, isn't that correct?
Admiral Stark. That would have been left to his discretion, as to
when he would have taken the raids in the Marshalls. It would be his
own plan.
[6333] Senator Ferguson. Did you know there was a law passed
in Hawaii that designated M-day ?
Admiral Stark. A law passed in Hawaii ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes; a territorial law that provided for the
declaration of M-day.
Admiral Stark. No; I do not recall that, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Mobilization day. You do not know about that ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall that ; no.
Senator Ferguson. Now isn't it true that you did not intend Ad-
miral Kimmel, in taking his deployment, to ignore preparations for
the defensive action expected of the Pacific Fleet under the war plan?
Admiral Stark. That would be correct ; yes, sir, I would not ignore
it. But I think he would also not let that subsequent movement inter-
fere with his primary mission at the time, if he considered that to be
the defense of his fleet and what he could do to protect Pearl Harbor,
which he must defend to be of further use.
Senator Ferguson. Was the situation in June 1940, between the
United States and Japan as critical as it was in November of 1941?
Admiral Stark. In June 1940?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. You were the head of Naval Operations in June
of 1940?
2378 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. At that time an all-out alert was ordered in
Hawaii, was it not, that is "Be on the alert against hostile oversea
raids" ? Do you remember that ?
Admiral Stark. That was an alert ordered b}^ the Army. Is that
the one )■ on refer to ?
Senator Ferguson. That is the one I am referring to, June 17,
1940.
Admiral Stark. My memory on that is very hazy. Apparently
we had nothing — the files have been recently searched — to show any-
thing of an unusual character to cause us to alert the fleet at that time,
and we have been unable to find it.
Senator Ferguson. Did not Admiral Richardson say that he did
receive a. message later, that it was a genuine alert and that he was
to act accordingly ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; he stated his remembrance of it was, at
first, that it was a drill, and later he sent us a message, and we replied
to it, stating, "AVar Department directive concerning alert issued as
precautionary measure after consultation with Navy and State De-
partments. Request [63S5] you continue cooperation."
But I do not recall, Senator Ferguson, that incident particularly.
It left no particular point in my memory.
Senator Ferguson. Well, there was not anything uncertain about
it, was there?
Admiral Stark. Sir?
Senator Ferguson. There was not anything uncertain about it? It
said to be on the alert against hostile overseas raids, did it not ?
Admiral Stark. Yes; but I do not recall that we were concerned
particularly with it at that time in the Navy.
Senator Ferguson. I say there was not anything uncertain about
it. An officer ought to understand that order, ought he not ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; plainly.
Senator Ferguson. Now can you tell us why that or similar lan-
guage was not used to alert them on the 27th, when there was a
danger, as you say ?
Admiral Stark. That was a War Department dispatch at that
time, and I cannot recall on what specific information it was founded,
and certainly we were not perturbed and we were not looking for war
at that time, and we have been able to find nothing to justify it.
Senator Ferguson. But if you give that kind of an alert [6336]
when you are not looking for war. and you cannot find anything to
justify it, and then you get up to the 27lh — let me relate some facts
to refresh your memory, and that is that on the 5th of November
you had a statement that the deadline was placed on the 2oth, and then
along came the days as they went by and they changed that to be the
29th, and it became certain and definite, and, as you have told us here,
the President expected an attack on the 30th, which would be the 29th
in Japan.
[6337] Admiral Stark. I said he would not be surprised, I
believe, had an attack occurred, not that he expected it.
Senator Ferguson. I am glad that you corrected that.
There is a distinction, you see, between you would not be surprised
and you would expect. Now, with all these intercepted messages,
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2379
the one to Hitler indicating that they would go to war — when you
had that tense situation, why were not the same or similar orders
given to be on the alert against hostile overseas raids?
Admiral Stark. I would invite attention to what we did send, and
which has been discussed dozens of times, in the messages of the 24th
and 27th. I think you have my standpoint on that, and they were
my best judgment. I have also stated that while I would have assumed
that that would have alerted, and had thought and had intended to
fully alert, the people in Hawaii, I was not expecting an overseas
raid on Hawaii at that time, having no evidence of it.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, do the words "deployment'"
and "alert" mean the same thing in the Navy?
Admiral Stark. Not necessarily ; no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What does "alert" mean?
Admiral Stark. Well, we do not usually use the word "alert'' in
the Navy the way the Army uses it. We talk about being alerted.
I assume that when we send a dispatch that [633^] states "This
is a war warning and the enemy is expected to attack," that that in
itself would alert the people. The language was such, without saying
"alert," that it certainly, we thought, w^ould have people ready to
intercept and take action against an invading force should it occur.
Senator Ferguson. You say you do not use the word "alert" in the
Navy. Did not they have alert Nos. 1, 2, and 3 ?
Admiral Stark. We call them condition 1, 2, and 3.
Senator Ferguson. Condition 1, 2, and 3?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. The Army uses the "alert"?
xldmiral Stark. They use the word "alert."
Mr. Mitchell. "Condition of readiness" is the term.
Senatoi"- Ferguson. If you had notified Admiral Kimmel to be in
condition of readiness No. 1, 2, or 3, what would that mean ?
Admiral Stark. One is : General quarters, all out, with us on board
shm. That refers to the condition on board ship.
Senator Ferguson. They were in 3, were they not ?
Admiral Stark. I believe he was in 3 at the time.
Senator Ferguson. Now, if you would have put him on No. 1
condition, would it have meant the same as deployment?
[6339~\ Admiral Stark. If I had told him to go into condi-
tion 1 , he probably would have wondered why I was telling him what
sort of condition to take on his individual ships. It was not my place
to prescribe to him his internal arrangements. It was my place to
give him a war warning and the gravity of the picture presented as
I could see it, and it was his responsibility to take whatever condition
on board ship, or whatever dispositions of the fleet, he thought best
to meet it.
Senator Ferguson. You answered one of Senator Lucas' questions
and I want to try and get you to elaborate a little on it.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. About the oil question, and your attitude toward
Japan. Did you not testify before the Navy court, on page 43, question
1 17, that after the imposition of economic sanctions upon Japan in
the summer of 1941 you stated that Japan would go somewhere and
take it (oil) , and that if you were a Jap you would ?
2380 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. I think that is correct. You are reading from the
record, and I stand back of it. I stated it, and I stated in the State
Department, as I recall, that if a complete shut-down was made on
the Japanese, throttling her commercial life and her internal life and
her essential normal peace life by stopping her from getting oil, that
the natural thing for l63JfO'\ a Jap was to say, "Well, I will
go down and take it."
Senator Ferguson. Did you attend the White House conference
on the 24th of July 1941 with President Roosevelt and the Secretary
of State, or Under Secretary Mr. Welles, where it was indicated to
the Japanese Ambassador that the British, the Dutch and American
Governments were about to impose upon Japan an oil embargo?
That is in Foreign Relations, volume 2, on page 527, to refresh your
memory.
Admiral Stark. Well, I recall a good many discussions about eco-
nomic sanctions. I do not recall that particular one. I remember
very clearly one meeting in the White House about that period with
the Japanese Ambassador, and I think it was Mr. Welles and not Mr.
Hull, in which we were struggling to keep the peace in the Pacific,
when Nomura stated it was necessary for them to secure themselves
regarding certain products in Indochina, food, rice, and the Presi-
dent proposed that, so far as his position could have influenced he
would endeavor to see that they got food and their minimum needs,
provided they would stop their aggression.
Senator Ferguson. Well. I got this quote from the official record,
and I wondered whether that would refresh your memory.
Admiral Stark. I do not recall that particular meaning [^.?4-?]
to which you refer.
Senator Ferguson. Do you remember on that same occasion that
the President did tell Japan, that is, through the Ambassador, that
should she then attack to get oil by force the Dutch and British would
go to war against her? That is on page 527.
Admiral Stark. That the President said, "if" — what, sir?
Senator Ferguson. That on that occasion he said to the Japanese
Ambassador should she attack to get oil by force the Dutch and Brit-
ish would go to war against her?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall that particular statement.
Senator Ferguson. On page 527.
Admiral Stark. I do not recall that particularly.
Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I have here })apers that we very recently
dug out of the State Department files, a letter of July 22, 1941, by
Admiral Stark to Mr. Welles, about the possible effect of an embargo,
and attached to it, on July 19, 1941, is Admiral Turner's analysis of
the embargo problem which was sent to Mr. Welles, with the notation
at the bottom "I concur in general. Is this the kind of picture you
wanted? HRS."
Senator Ferguson. That will help. I will quote from page 527 of
Foreign Relations:
The President said that if .Japan attempted to [6SJf2] seize oil supplies
by force in tlie Netherlands East Indies, the Dutch would, without the shadow of
a doubt, resist, the British wuulil immediately come to their assistance, war would
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2381
then result between Japan, the British and the Dutch, and, in view of our own
policy of assisting Great Britain, an exceedingly serious situation would immedi-
ately result.
Do you remember that?
I do not think you and I have the same volume.
Admiral Stark. I think we have.
Sentor Ferguson. It is at the bottom of page 527.
Admiral Stark. I do not recall it. But it undoubtedly took place,
being in here.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know whether or not shortly alter
that, in fact in about 48 hours, the embargo did go on ?
Admiral Stark. The embargo went on, as I recall, on the 26th.
This is the 24th ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, referring to page 531 of that same book,
that is the conversation between Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa
and Mr. Ballantine, were you informed on that day that the Japanese
military attache told Mr. Ballantine that Japan would have no alter-
native sooner or later but to go to Malaya and the Dutch East Indies
[6S4j3] for oil and other material ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall that, but it is in line with the thought
I had as to what to do.
Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, taking the high-ranking officials
in our Government, you said that you thought sanctions such as this
oil, and so forth, would bring war on ultimately. Who else agreed
with you ?
Admiral Stark. Well, according to Peace and War, and which
I read into my statement, I think the State Department also agreed
with it.
Senator Ferguson. Well, did General Marshall?
Admiral Stark. Well, I would rather you asked him. My recol-
lection is there was no difference of opinion amongst us with regard
to that, and this Peace and War states :
Practically all realistic authorities have been agreed that imposition of sub-
stantial economic sanctions or embargoes against any strong country, unless that
imposition be backed by a show of superior force, involves serious risk of war.
The President and heads of the Army and Navy and Department of State were
in constant consultation through this period regarding aU the aspects of tihe
diplomatic and military situation.
[6344] The Chairman. It is now 4 : 30.
Senator Ferguson. Can counsel show us what those papers are ?
Mr. Mitchell. I do not see why I should not hand the paper to the
reporter and ask him to transcribe it, and you will all see it in the
morning.
The Chairman. Let that be done.
Mr. Mitchell. Put in the record, Mr. Reporter, at this time, and
transcribe, the letter of July 22, 1941, from Admiral Stark to Mr.
Welles, relating to embargoes, and attach to it the study on the embargo
problem, dated July 19, 1941, prepared for the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions by Admiral Turner.
Senator Ferguson. Then we will all have it.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
2382 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(The matter referred to follows:)
In reply refer to Initials
and No. Op-10 Hu
Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, 22 July 19^1.
Dear Mr. Welij;8 : The latter part of last week the President asked my reac-
tion to an embargo on a number of commodities to Japan. i63Jf5] I ex-
pressed the same thought to him whicii I have expressed to you and to Mr.
Hull regarding oil, but as to the subject in general I would be glad to have War
Plans Division make a quick study. Tiiis study was finished yesterday. I sent
it to the President and told his Aide I should also like to send you a copy.
The President expressed himself as pleased with it and asked me to send a copy
to Mr. Hull, which I have done ; and to talk it over with you.
Will you send for me at your convenience?
Sincerely,
H. R. Stark
Honorable Sumner Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
State Department, Washington, D. C.
Op-12-djm.
Jul 19 1941.
SECEBT
From : The Director, War Plans Division.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject : Study of the effect of an embargo of trade between the United States
and Japan.
Enclosures :
(A) Copy of the following tables : '
(1) Exports to Japan — December 1940 through May 1941.
(2) Exports from Hawaii to Japan — December 1940 through May 1941.
[G-MG] (3) Exports from the Philippines to Japan — December 1940 through
May 1941.
(B) Copy of the following tables:
(1) Imports from Japan — December 1940 througli May 1941.
(2) Imports from Japan to Hawaii — December 1940 throujih May 1941.
(3) Imports from Japan to the Philippines— December 1940 through May 1941.
1. Purpose. — The purpose of this study is to determine tlie « ffect that would
be produced by the enforcement of an absolute or partial embargo on trade
between the United States and Japan. D.4ailfd cunsideration has not here been
given to the trade between Japan and the Philippines.
2. United States exports to Japan in 19J,0. — United States exports to Japan
in 1940 were valued at $227,000,000, a decline of $5,000,000 from 1939, and of
$13,000,000 from 1938. During the first ten months of 1940 the value of exports
advanced, due to higher commodity prices and Japan's increased demand for
American products as a result of enforced curtailment of her purchases from
Europe. However, sharp recessions in export trade during the last two months
of 1940, occasioned in part by the application of export license control to cer-
tain products, wiped out earlier gains. In November and December, particularly
sharp declines were registered in machine tools, ferro-alloys, and refined copper,
while scrap-iron exports were practically negligible.
[63//7] 3. Present trends of exports. — (a) United States exports to Japan
during the first five months of 1941 were valued at $47,000,000 as compared
with $91,500,000 for the same period of 1940. During tlie current year trade
has declined steadily from $11,336,000 in January to $6,594,000 in May (see
Enclosure (A).
(b) The principal factor affecting exports to Japan during the past year has
been the progressively restrictive effect of export control measures. The vir-
tual disappearance from the trade in 1941 of iron and steel products and of
metal-working machinery, which together accounted for shipments valued at
$67,000,000 in 1940. was the direct result of an eml)argo on shipments of these
connnodities to Japan. The sharp drop in Japanese purchases of raw cotton
during 1940, however, was the result of other infiuences.
(c) (1) During 1939 Japan purchased American raw cotton valued at $42,-
500,000, while in 1940 her purchases amounted to only $29,500,000. This drop
* The tables referred to were not submitted to the official reporter.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2383
was due to the large quantity of piece goods then on hand in Japan, the rela-
tively high price of American cotton compared to that of India and of Latin
America, and shipping requirements for items needed more urgently. In No-
vember IJMO American exports of raw cotton were valued at only $157,000 ;
they liave risen steadily since then, reaching $881,000 in May 1941.
(2) Declines in luxury items, including automobiles, [6348] are due to
a decline in purchasing power in Japan and to Japanese action in placing re-
strictions on the importation and use of these items, rather than to United
States export restrictions.
(d) Petroleum exports during 1940 increased by $9,300,000, or 21%, over the
figure for 1939. Exports for the first five months of 1941 were valued at
$27,200,000, or 50% of the total for the entire year 1940. This is contrary to the
general trend of exports.
(e) Sharp reductions in available ship tonnage has contributed to the fall
in exports. Due to withdrawals from trade of additional vessels, future exports
to Japan will be even less, regardless of export restrictions.
4. Imports from Japan. — (a) Imports from Japan to the United States during
1039 were $161,000,000 and in 1940, $158,000,000. For the first four months of
1941, imports amounted to $40,000,000, a decline of only $8,200,000 from the same
peiiod in 1940 ; this compares with a decline in our exports of $37,300,000. Our
exports to Japan exceeded our imports from that country, during the period 1
January to 30 April, 1941, by only about $500,000, much less than usual. One
result of the system of export control is thus seen to be the arrival at a balance
between exports and imports. This fact permits Japan to pay in kind for all
goods sent to her from this country, and a continuation of the [63Jf9] pres-
ent trend may soon make her our creditor.
( b ) The following table shows items of imports valued at more than $1,000,000
during 1940 :
Value of 19 JtO
Item imports
Crabmeat $3, 269, 000
Tea 8, 190, 000
Cotton cloth, bleached 2, 263, 000
Raw silk 105, 311,000
Silk fabric, except pile 1, 661, 000
Hats, bonnets, and hoods 1,143,000
China and porcelain ware 2, 423, 000
Earthen and stoneware 1,096,000
Total $120, 356, OOO
These eight items account for 76% of our imports and indicate where curtail-
ment might start if it is decided to take steps to reduce Japan's markets.
5. Effect of further restrictions on exports. — (a) The most important fields
for exercising further restrictions on exports are petroleum products and raw
cotton, which accounted for 74% and 13%, respectively, of the trade in May,
1941.
(b) It is generally believed that shutting off the American supply of petroleum
will lead promptly to an invasion of the Netherlands East Indies. While prob-
able, this is not necessarily a sure immediate result. Japan doubtless knows
[6350] that wells and machinery probably would be destroyed. If then en-
gaged in war in Siberia, the necessary force for southward adventures might
not be inuuediately available. Furthermore, Japan has oil stocks for about
eighteen months war operations. Expox-t restrictions of oil by the United States
should be accompanied by similar restrictions by the British and Dutch.
(c) Restrictions on the export of raw cotton would probably be serious for
Japan only if India, Peru, and Brazil should apply the same restrictions. CottOD
stocks in Japan are believed to be rather low at present.
(d) It will, of course, be recognized that an embargo on exports will auto-
matically stop imports from Japan.
[6351] (e) An embargo on exports will have an immediate severe psycho-
logical reaction in Japan against the United States. It is almost certain to inten-
sify the determination of those now in power to continue their present course.
Ftirthermore, it seems certain that, if Japan should then take military measures
against the British and Dutch, she would al'-o include military action against
the Philippines, which would immediately involve us in a Pacific war. Whether
2384 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
or not such action will be taken immediately will doubtless depend on Japan's
situation at that time with respect to Siberia.
(f) Additional export restrictions would hamper Japan's war efEort, but not
to a very large extent since present restrictions are accomplishing the same
result, except with regard to oil, raw cotton, and wood pulp. Thus, the economic
weapon against Japan has largely been lost, and the effect of comijlete embargo
would be not very great from a practical standpoint.
6. Effect on the United States of a loss of imports from Japan. — (a) As pre-
viously mentioned, exports and imports are approaching a balance. If exports
cease, imports will also cease, as Japan would not have the means to continue
her purchases. The same effect would be produced if we stopped [6352^
buying from Japan, but attempted to continue our exports.
(b) In 1940, raw silk formed 69 percent of United States imports from Japan.
Silk is processed here. It is used in industry and for certain munitions, particu-
larly powderbags. The armed services have large stocks of raw silk, and could
get along without further imports, though silk substitutes are not entirely satis-
factory. Doubtless industry could manage without silk, although the lack of it
would cause a considerable dislocation of labor now employed in the industry.
The effect of stopping the purchase of silk would also have an adverse psycho-
logical reaction on the part of Japan, though possibly not so great as would an
export embargo.
(c) Stopping other imports from Japan would not cause any great hardship
in the United States, although the general effect on industry would be adverse.
7. Conclusions. — (a) Present export restrictions, plus reductions of available
ship-tonnage for use in Japanese trade have greatly curtailed both exports and
imports.
(b) The effect of an embargo would hamper future Japanese war efEort, though
not immediately, and not decisively.
(c) An embargo would probably I'esult in a fairly early attack by Japan on
Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, [6354] and possibly would in-
volve the United States in early war in the Pacific. If war in the Pacific is to
be accepted by the United States, actions leading up to it should, if practicable,
bo postponed until Japan is engaged in a war in Siberia. It may well be that
Japan has decided against an early attack on the British and Dutch, but has
decided to occupy Indo-China and to strengthen her position there, also to attack
the Russians in Siberia. Should this prove to be the case, it seems probable that
the United States could engage in war in the Atlantic, and that Japan would not
intervene for the time being, even against the British.
8. Recommendat ion . — That trade with Japan not be embargoed at this time.
R. K. TUKNER
("Written in longhand:)
I concur in general.
Is this the kind of picture you wanted
H. R. S.
The Chairman. The committe will stand adjourned until 10 o'clock
tomorrow morning.
(Whereupon, at 4 : 30 p. m., an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m.,
Saturday, January 5, 1946.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2385
\635h-\ PEAEL HARBOK ATTACK
SATURDAY, JANUARY 5, 1946
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
or the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington^ D, 0.
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, and Fergu-
son; and Kepresentatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart, and Keefe.
Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A.
Gesell, Jules M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the
joint committee.
[6355'\ The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
TESTIMONY OP ADM. HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)
The Chairman. Senator Ferguson will resume. Do you want to
make a statement. Admiral ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; I have one or two things I would like to
bring up.
The Chairman. All right, we will proceed.
Admiral Stark. Senator Ferguson yesterday, at page 6326 of the
record, called my attention to my testimony before the Roberts com-
mission concerning what I expected Admiral Kimmel to do, and con-
cerning what I knew about his dispositions at the time of the attack.
He read to me an extract from my testimony which I believe was taken
from pages 1813-1814 of the Roberts commission record. I would like
to refer to this again and also refer to my earlier testimony before
this committee.
In my testimony before the Roberts commission there appears the
following :
The Chairman. Well, for General McNarney's purpose, all he wants to know
is whether you expected him (Admiral Kimmel) to carry out his part of the
Joint Coastal Defense Plan, whatever it was.
Admiral Staek. Well, significant as to the state of readiness to be expected at
Pearl Harbor were the steps [6356'] that he took for other than the Pearl
Harbor defense plan. What we expected him to do was to get more planes and
personnel, and so on, out to Wake and Midway, if possible, and to send his task
forces — some task forces to sea in readiness to catch any raiders, which he did.
He did that. We knew it. We knew these task forces were at sea. He informed
us that one was returning from having put people ashore at Wake, that certain
planes had been sent to Midway and were expected to go on the 5th or 6th day
down to Wake, and we knew the schedule of the ships that were in xwrt, and at
79716 — 46— pt. 5 22
2386 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that particular time out of the three task forces there were two scheduled to be
in port. Actually there was less than one and a half in port.
The Chairman. Yes.
Admiral S'tark. He kept the others at sea. And because he had taken those
measures, which looked absolutely sound, it was a safe assumption that other
measures had been taken of a similar nature.
In passing, Senator Ferguson, I might point out that this quotation
is not transcribed exactly at pages 6326-6327 of vokime 34 of the com-
mittee record. The differences are minor, but I thought you would
want to know that there is a difference.
In my testimony of Wednesday, Mr. Mitchell asked me what
[6S57'\ I knew about location of ships in the Pacific Fleet. His
questions and my answers appear at pages 5727-5728, and read as
follows :
Mr. MiTCHEix. You had a map in your room somewhere in the N'avy Depart-
ment that showed the precise location of ships in the Pacific Fleet day by day, did
you not?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did not you have a ship movement division there that kept track
of where the fleet was?
Admiral Stark. Not in detail, sir. The ships were in the Hawaiian area, but
their departures from Pearl Harbor, for example, to their target practice ground
or other local maneuvers, and that sort of thing, to my best knowledge and belief
we did not know. I know I did not know it. He was not required to report that.
If he wanted to move the fleet to the west coast, for example, he would have not
done it without asking our permission, but if he wanted to go 100 miles in this
or that direction, or if he wanted to go out for some special maneuver or for target
practice, or what not, he would not have reported that to us.
Mr. Mitchell. You did not then have a system of keeping track of the daily
location of ships or of the fact that ships were or were not in Pearl Harbor?
[6358] Admiral Stark. No, sir.
I believe the Senator is interested in clearing up what he considers
an inconsistency in these two statements.
In order to clarify the matter, I wish to point out to the committee
that in my testimony before the Koberts Commission, which was given
on January 19, 1942, I indicated that "* * * we knew it. We
knew these task forces were at sea * * *." I must have been re-
ferring, apparently, to the carrier force which Admiral Kimmel had
sent out on the 28th of November and to the regular task force which
we knew generally from his quarterly operating plan was due to be
at sea. I could not have referred to the carrier force which Admiral
Kimmel sent out on December 5, for I had no information as to its
composition and movement.
Specifically, as to the task force which departed from Pearl Harbor
on November 28, and which, I later learned, included the Enterprise,
I stated, at page 5729 of the committee record, that :
* * * But the order to go at that time was his (Admiral Kimmel's) own,
and as I recall, we were told, in answer to the dispatch asking him as to the
advisability, and other things, about the Enterprise, I believe it was, which left
around the 28th.
Mr. Mitchell then suggested to me that the Lexington left December
5. I replied, at page 5730 :
Yes. I do not [6359] recall, and I recollect of no evidence of his report-
ing to us about the movement of the Lexitigtan which left the 5th.
Mr. Mitchell then inquired :
* * * Did not you know that the movement was taking place right about the
time that you were sending these warning messages out there?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2387
I replied :
Not until his message came in in reply to the one in which we asked his advice
on the relief— on the movement of certain Army troops, nor do I recall that we
ever were informed about the movement of the Lexington.
Tliis referred to his (Admiral Kimmel's) dispatch of November 28
stating in part
Twelve marine fighters leave November 28 in carrier for Wake. Expect send
other marine planes to Midway later. On December 1 sending 12 patrol planes
Midway to Wake and replacing those at Midway from Pearl. * * *
These patrol planes, of course, flew out there under their own power.
I think my statement before the Koberts Commission and my state-
ment before this committee are correct and are essentially consistent.
Then, sir, there was another question raised by Senator Ferguson
yesterday as to whether there was any difference between the circum-
stances surrounding our advance planning with the British in ABC-
1 — which covered both the Atlantic and the Pacific areas — and our
advance planning in the so-called \6360~\ American-British-
Dutch conversation concerning the far eastern area.
I am afraid my answers yesterday did not make the matter very
clear.
You will note that ABC-1 covered not only our advance planning
in case we were drawn into the war in the Atlantic, but also contained
our advance planning in case we were drawn into a war in the Pacific.
This is shown in annex II and in annex III of ABC-1, which gives
considerable detail concerning the responsibility, tasks, and forces in
the Atlantic and the Pacific area, including the Far East.
I considered it my duty as Chief of Naval Operations to be ready
with plans for coordinating our efforts with the British if we should
be drawn into the war in the Atlantic. Having in mind, however,
that I was not empowered to commit the United States to any course
of action, there was written into the agreement, that is, ABC-1, the
following :
* * * The agreements herewith submitted are subject to confirmation by:
(a) The Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy; the Chief of Staff,
United States Army ; the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet in the
United Kingdom.
(b) The Government of the United States and His [636i] Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom.
This agreement formed the basis for WPL-46, the Navy's basic
war plan.
As to whether we obtained the approval of Congress before engag-
ing in so-c^alled overt acts in the Atlantic, I can only say, as I have
already said, that the people of the United States, through the Con-
gress, had established their policy of aid to Britain in the Lend-
Lease Act passed on March 10, 1941. We considered that the Hemi-
sphere defense plans, calling for the defense of the sea lanes through
which any effective aid to Britain must pass, was in accordance with
this policy.
There was no difference in the circumstances surrounding our con-
versations with the British and the Dutch in the Far East. In my
dispatch of February 15, 1941, to Admiral Hart, directing him to
2388 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
have a representative participate in conversations with the British
and Dutch at Singapore, I stated, with respect to this representative :
• * * He will have the power to agree tentativey to a joint plan of opera-
tion of U. S., English, and Dutch forces, but he will not be empowered to make
any commitments of a political nature. Agreements must have your and my
approval. * * * Strategic plans adopted should be completely realistic in
nature. Due to the fact that doubt exists as to vphether the Congress would
declare war [6S62] in case of Jap aggression against any country but
the United States, your representative will express my view that any strategic
arrangements of the British and Dutch which depend for their efficacy upon
intervention by us would not be sound. * * *
I am sure that Admiral Hart and his representative at the various
conversations in the Far East were well aware of my injunction
against any political commitments and my caution that all planning
must be done subject to the will of Congress, and so far as I know,
these restrictions were fully complied with.
There was one other point that I am not sure that I got over to the
committee with regard to the difference in the Atlantic, where the
hemispheric defense plan was in full operation in defending our com-
merce and the fact that no such order was issued in the Pacific, except
on the Southeast Pacific.
The reason for that is that we were at peace with Japan. Japan
had not attacked any of our shipping and it had been unnecessary to
call into being any such plan. The hemispheric defense plan was not
a war plan in the sense that it involved offensive movements on a
broad scale anywhere the enemy might be located. It was a defensive
plan for the Western Hemisphere and our shipping.
[6363] Now, there was one other item and one which Senator
Ferguson asked me to check up and that is as to who Mr. Curtis Munson
was and if I could get any further information on him.
On the 23d of October the State Department sent word to us that
Mr. Curtis Munson was desired by the President for a mission to study
Japanese-American relations on the west coast and in Hawaii. As a
result of that request by the State Department on us there was a
dispatch sent by OPNAV, released by Admiral Wilkinson on 24 Octo-
ber 1941, which reads as follows:
On confidential mission Mr. Curtis Munson for President of the United States
to determine exact status of Japanese-American relations on West Coast and
in Territory of Hawaii. Allow him access to all information on Japanese activi-
ties in files of District Intelligence Offices. Mr. Munson now in California.
I did not have time to get further information but I learned just
oefore coming up here that Mr. Munson made either two or three
reports, I assume to the President, copies of which reports are in the
files of Naval Intelligence and can be produced if the committee desires
Admiral Colclough to produce them.
Senator Ferguson. Well, I would like, Admiral, to now ask counsel
to get the entire files on Munson from the White [636 4] House
or the Navy file.^ You have not seen those files, I take it. Admiral.
Admiral Stark. No, sir; they came in just as I was leaving; they
are rather long reports and I did not even read the first word of them.
Senator Ferguson. I meant at the time that they came in. This was
October what? When did he come out there, October
Admiral Stark. My dispatch was October 24. The request was
made on us on the 23d and it was stated at that time he was on the
west coast.
* Included in Hearings, Part 6, p. 2680 et seq.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2389
Senator Ferguson. So you did not see the reports when they came
in in 1941 ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall them. I might add that I stated
this dispatch was sent by Admiral Wilkinson. I did not state to
whom. It was sent to the commandants of the eleventh, twelfth,
thirteenth, and fourteenth districts, which are San Diego, San Fran-
cisco, Puget Sound, and Hawaiian districts.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, do I take it then that in this ABCD
arrangement that we were speaking about yesterday you felt there
was an implied approval of Congress as to what was done in the
Atlantic because we had passed the lend-lease bill ?
Admiral Stark. I felt so in that it was being done to protect what
Congress had provided for and the President also [6365] made
it very plain to the country I think in his address of early September.
Senator Ferguson. But there was no difference in the plans in fact.
In the Pacific you were going to do the same thing as you had done
in the Atlantic if the facts required it?
Admiral Stark. That would be conjecture and I assume that it is a
proper conjecture.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. In other words, this was a tentative plan.
It would go into effect under certain circumstances.
Admiral Stark. Well, now I am not sure which plan you are talking
about. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. The one in the Pacific.
Admiral Stark. The broad plan was the Rainbow 5. I thought at
first my answer to your question was based on the assumption that you
were talking about the hemispheric defense plan. That is the one
which has the so-called shooting order in it.
Senator Ferguson. What I am trying to get at is why we ordered
three small boats out to watch for these ships going down to the British
possessions, why we sent these airplanes out on December 2d on a spe-
cific order out scouting to see this movement to the British possessions,
if we did not have a tentative plan which involved a movement against
England ?
[6366] Admiral Stark. We did have a tentative plan, but only
based on if and when we got in.
[6367] Senator Ferguson. But if they attacked Britain and not
America, why were you concerned witli going over there and scouting
to see whether they were going to attack Britain and not scouting to
see whether or not they w^ere going to attack our own possessions f
Admiral Stark. Our scouting would have given us information as
to where they were going, and we were very anxious to get that infor-
mation, and the dispatch states that that was the purpose of the dis-
patch— in other words, to find out what was going to happen.
Senator Ferguson. Now you
Admiral Stark. May I go just a little further on that. Senator
Ferguson ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. I gather — and if I am not correct, you can inform
me — that what you are getting at is the possibility, at least, that if
Japan attacked the British or the Dutch we might automatically
come in.
Senaor Ferguson. That is exactly what I want to know, whether
that was not what was in your mind, and then, going further, that
2390 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
being true, as Churchill said in his speech, that they would not allow
our Heet to remain on their flank, and therefore it should have been
anticipated that they would attack at Pearl Harbor. Churchill is the
one that raises [6368] this question in his speech.
Admiral Stark. Well, now, as regards that being true, I can only
reiterate that in my initial orders regarding those plans I stated spe-
cifically that no political commitment could be made ; that the plans,
when they first came out, I rejected. When I read the paragraph from
which one might infer that we were going to do certain things if Japan
attacked the British or the Dutch, I rejected the plan right there, and
what I read this morning further verifies that.
This is all from the record, to which I tried to stick so far as I
possibly could.
I also, in my replies to Joe Richardson as to what we would do if
Japan attacked the British or the Dutch, I did not know, and I did not
think there was anybody on God's green earth that could tell me.
That was wide, and it was meant to be wide, and I did not know, and
in the dispatch this morning I stated I did not know what the Congress
would do.
Now to go one step further with regard to Mr. Churchill's speech, I
can only reiterate what I stated yesterday in regard to that, that I do
iiot know his background for that statement.
Senator Ferguson. I understand you cannot make a treaty. No one
can make a treaty without the approval of Congress. But you, as the
head of the Navy, had a plan that in case [6^^^] certain things
happened you would be in a position to move and to defend America.
I am not criticizing the plan.
Admiral Stark. I understand that, sir.
■ Senator Ferguson. I want to know whether that was in your mind,
and, therefore, I ask the next question : That being true, did not the
high officials in the Navy and Army anticipate an attack upon
America ?
Admiral Stark. We knew it to be a possibility. Later on we antici-
pated it, and even almost a year before it happened, in both the
Atlantic and Pacific the times were fraught with that possibility, and
I endeavored to be prepared for that should it eventuate. It was very
much in my mind. It was my job.
Senator Ferguson. Now, for instance, on page 12 of your memo to
the committee you have struck out these words "and by the Presi-
dent." You were saying, "Based on the understanding arrived at in
the ABC-1 the Army and Navy developed a joint basic war plan
known as Rainbow 5, which was approved by the Secretaries of War
and the Navy," and you struck out these words "and by the President."
Now, when you drafted this instrument you believed that the Presi-
dent had approved that plan ; is that true ?
Mr. Mitchell. May I interrupt?
[6370] Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Have you forgotten the exhibit that is in evidence, in
which the President expressly refused ?
Senator Ferguson. I have not forgotten that, but I am asking for
the opinion of this gentleman.
Mr. Mitchell. Excuse me.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2391
Senator Ferguson. I haven't forgotten that at all. I want to know,
when you put that in there, whether you were of the opinion person-
ally that that had been approved by the President?
Admiral Stark. I was. I had forgotten the later document show-
ing that he had not specifically approved it, but stated if we got in the
war, as I recall the document, to then bring it back to him and he
would approve it. At least that was my assumption from the memo-
randum, I believe, from Pa Watson.
Senator Ferguson. Now, you
Admiral Stark. Just a second further.
Senator Ferguson. Go ahead.
Admiral Stark. I took that out because I had no documentary proof
of it. I do know the President, except officially, approved of it,
although it shows he was not willing to do it officially until we got into
the war. Nevertheless, I sent that plan out on April 3. This is also
from the record. [6S71] I think it is in my statement, and in
a letter to Admiral Kimmel.
Senator Ferguson. I would like to have you go to your letter of
April 4.
Admiral Stark. Of April 4 ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. I told Kimmel and told Tommy — Admiral Hart —
that I had read to the President my official letter of April 3 and that
the President had approved it and knew I was sending it out. There-
fore, I think it is safe to say that the President certainly approved of
it. He approved my sendmg it out, although he had not officially
approved it.
Senator Ferguson. Now, on April 4 you said this in your letter :
I make a two-weeks' inspection trip in the West Indies and our activities in
the United States south of Washington and just about as I got back the President
shoved off, so I had no close liaison with him until his return this week.
This is the part I want to call your attention to.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson (reading) :
I spent over 3 hours with him day before yesterday and another hour yesterday.
My official letter on the staff conversations had some flaws in it as the result of
that conference. I may tell you and Hart and [6372] King in the strictest
confidence — and I mean by that nobody but you and Hart and King — that I read
to the President the official secret letter which I mailed you three yesterday and
received his general assent to it.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That explains the situation because that hap-
pened at the time, did it not?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; that is right.
Senator Ferguson. Going to the next page of your letter :
I am also enclosing a memorandum which I regard as vitally secret
Admiral Stark. Is this my letter of 4 April ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. Will you read the first letter ?
Senator Ferguson. It is the third paragraph down on the second
page of that letter :
I am enclosing a memorandum which I regard as vitally secret and which I
trust you will burn as soon as you have read it covering the President's talk with
Ghormley
2392 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. Yes ; that is Vice Admiral Ghormley
Senator Ferguson. "And me yesterday."
Now, what was in that memorandum that was ordered to be burned?
Admiral Stark. I do not specifically recall what was [6373']
in that memorandum. There is nothing in it that I would not be glad
to have this committee see, if I could put my hands on it.
I went to the White House with Ghormley. I understand that
Admiral Ghormley is now in Washington, should you desire to call
him. I went to the Wliite House with Admiral Ghormley in order
that he might talk to the President and the President to him prior
to his going over as our special naval observer in London. We talked
about ABC-1, as I recall, at that time, and I particularly pointed
out something that I had always stressed, and that is generally with
reference to the so-called "plan dog" as our guiding principle and
as a simplified WPL-46 regarding the principal enemy.
I also distinctly recall the President's warnings to Ghormley not
to, by any possible chance, make any commitments or say or do any-
thing which would lead the British to think that we were going into
the war. Nevertheless, he wanted Ghormley to find out all he could
with regard to the British thoughts, and he authorized me to let
Ghormley sit in over there — two Army officers were sent over at the
same time — on conversations with regard to plans in case we got in.
Senator Ferguson. Now you
Admiral Stark. Just a minute.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir. I want to get as complete \637If\
an analysis of that as I can, that secret memorandum that was to be
burned. That is the only instrument I find that you mentioned was
to be burned or destroyed.
Admiral Stark. In all this correspondence?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. There was one other letter which I wrote, and I
think with which the committee is familiar, which I asked to be de-
stroyed as soon as read. The letter turned up in the hearings before
the naval court of inquiry and has been given this committee.
Senator Ferguson. Well, there should be a copy of this memoran-
dum in the Navy files, should not there? You would not send the
only one over there and have it burned ?
Admiral Stark. I do not know that a copy was retained. I have
given you my remembrance of it.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. Admiral Ghormley can give you his remembrance
of it, and I will ask that a search be made, or if counsel will ask the
Department to make the search.
Senator Ferguson. I will now ask counsel to do that.^
Admiral Stark. I do not have it in my personal files.
Senator Ferguson. I want to know. Admiral, where you kept these
personal letters when you were active with the Navy.
Admiral Stark. They were kept in the files of the Navy [6375]
Department. My secretary kept tliem.
Senator Ferguson. Would the file be marked "personal" so when
you would leave the letters would go with you ?
1 See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5502, for a memorandum from the Navy Department in this
connection.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2393
Admiral Stark. I left them in the Department under lock and key.
Senator Ferguson. Whose lock ?
Admiral Stark. I say under lock and key. They are in the files
which I generally kept under lock in the Chief of Naval Operations'
office.
Senator Ferguson. They were not kept by you personally ?
Admiral Stark. Not at the time I first went abroad. Later on I
got them.
Senator Ferguson. Later on did you remove them from the Navy
files?
Admiral Stark. Yes, I got them to study them.
Senator Ferguson. You felt they were your personal correspond-
ence?
Admiral Stark. They were, yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. I assume when Admiral Kimmel got a personal
letter from you it did not remain in the Commander in Chief's files
there so that the succeeding Commander in Chief would have access to
that file, any more than your successor would have access to yours ?
Admiral Stark. I do not know. You may recall when Kimmel
[6S76] relieved Admiral Richardson I wrote him and asked him to
read the correspondence which I had had with Admiral Richardson
as affording a good background, and that in the court of inquiry in the
summer of 1944, when I got my letters together, I also told Admiral
Kimmel I had them, and if he would be lacking anything I would be
glad to furnish him anything I had.
Senator Ferguson. Now I am going to go to some other items which
will be rather disconnected, because I do not want to cover anything
that has been covered. I want to try to clear up some matters in my
own mind at least.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. As the Chief of Naval Operations you were re-
sponsible for the operation of the Navy, were you not ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And under article 433, that is the act of 30
March 1915, it states that you shall :
under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operation
of the Fleet, and with preparation and readiness of plans for use in war.
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. You were charged with that statutory duty ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I think some misunderstanding might
naturally arise in the minds of those who might read [6377]
that, to think that I was actually operating the fleet. I believe the com-
mittee, after the testimony given, would not be under that impression.
Senator Ferguson. But you were charged
Admiral Stark. May I go a little ahead, a little further, sir ?
Senator Ferguson. I want you to complete your answer.
Admiral Stark. There was what they call the force employment
plan, which was made out usually to cover a year, made out on a yearly
basis. It gave broad directives. It showed when ships were going
into the navy yard for repair; it showed the areas in which they
were to operate ; it would show a block when fleet maneuvers were to
be held; it showed target practice periods, a general broad outline
which the Commanders in Chief afloat and CNO reconciled, and then
issued a plan.
2394 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Now the details of operation under that plan, that is the operations
within an area in which the fleet was to base, that was up to the Com-
manders in Chief.
Do I make myself plain, sir ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes. But you were also charged, as a matter
of statutory law, with the preparedness and readiness of plans to be
used in war.
Admiral Stark. That is quite true, and it was one of [63781 '
the first things that I took up when I went to Washington, and I am
responsible for the plans which were drawn up and which I insisted
be realistic. We even drew up things as to what we might have and
might not have. The plans drawn up here were
Senator Ferguson. Who was authorized
The Chairman. Let him finish.
Senator Ferguson. Pardon me.
Admiral Stark. The plans drawn up here were realistic. The allo-
cation of forces was based on the forces that we actually had, and the
plan was disseminated, I think, on May 26, 1941.
Senator Ferguson. Could you have ordered the fleet to mobilize?
Was that your responsibility ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, I could. But the fleet was mobilized.
Another thing that I did almost as soon as I became Chief of Naval
Operations — I would like to give the committee this background — some
of you may remember my coming on the Hill for special appropria-
tions. My experience and my knowledge of previous wars in which
we had engaged was that we entered them with a large number of
ships in what we might call a reserve, and when I became Chief of
Naval Operations we had a large number of ships in reserve, destroyers,
submarines, some cargo vessels, some tankers. It was my [6379]
ambition that if we got caught there would not be a single ship left on
the Navy list which would be of use to us which was not ready. I
went on that basis immediately, I went to Congress, with the Presi-
dent's permission, to ask for special appropriations for money for
getting the large number of destroyers we had into commission, and
the submarines and other ships, and Congress granted the funds for
that purpose. It was tough on the forces afloat in some respect, be-
cause they had to give up enough experienced men to form a nucleus
around which we put recruits to get these ships going.
But in December of 1941 we were practically mobilized.
The commander in chief of the Pacific corroborates that in his owji
war plan when he states that he was virtually mobilized.
Senator Ferguson. You could do that on your own responsibility,
and did it, even without consulting the President ?
Admiral Stark. I tried to sell the President on it. I had to go on
the Hill, for special appropriations for the destroyers, for example.
Senator Ferguson. Do you remember having any discussion with
the President in 1941 about mobilizing the fleet for war in the Pacific?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. The President knew that I was working
on getting everything we had ready.
[6380] Senator Ferguson. So then you take it it was an under-
standing between you and the President that you were mobilizing the
fleet?
Admiral Stark. Perfectly, and requesting men in that connection.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2395
Senator Ferguson. Now, was it your duty
Admiral Stark. May I add to that also ?
Senator Ferguson". Yes.
Admiral Stark. The Congress knew it, because before the com-
mittees I went asking for money, it was thoroughly explained what I
wanted it for, and it was to get these ships that were tied up in the
Philadelphia Navy Yard and San Diego, Puget Sound, San Fran-
cisco, and elsewhere. Congress knew why I was asking for that
money. I was asking for money for all sorts of purposes, for our shore
bases, and I have often stated, and I would like to state publicly here,
as I told President Knox
Senator Ferguson. You mean Secretary Knox ?
Admiral Stark. Secretary Knox. That the work done by Admiral
Moreell in getting the bases ready, that Midway might not have been
possible, and the great victory that turned the point we had there, had
it not been for the work done on those shore bases.
I would like to say also that the dock, the big drydock, [63811
in Hawaii, which was available the day after Pearl Harbor, was fin-
ished months ahead of time, and I had to come up on the Hill to defend
myself against having made contracts which were perhaps not quite
according to Hoyle in order to push on the work, as some of you may
recall, not only in connection with my endeavor to double the size of
the fleet but also to build up the shore bases to support the fleet, and
particularly in the Pacific, and not only in the Central Pacific, but in
the Aleutians.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, was it your duty as Chief of Naval
Operations to evaluate the effect of diplomatic representations upon
the countries to whom they were addressed ?
Admiral Stark. I was necessarily interested in it.
Senator Ferguson. Was it your duty ?
Admiral Stark. I would consider it my duty to keep in touch with
that so far as I possibly could, and to keep the commanders in the field
informed of my evaluation.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did I understand you the other day to say
that you only read part of the magic ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral Ingersoll read part?
Admiral Stark. I suppose it would depend a good deal on how busy
he was. He might also have read only the messages which were clipped
as of importance.
[6S8B] Senator Ferguson. Did you read all that were clipped ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. When you were away, what happened ?
Admiral Stark. Well, when I was away, the duty would be carried
on largely by Admiral Ingersoll, and, of course, the others who were
there.
Senator Ferguson. Whose duty was it to clip the messages that you
would or would not read ?
Admiral Stark. That duty was performed in Intelligence.
Senator Ferguson. Who in Intelligence had the responsibility of
clipping, with paper clips, I take it, what you were to read ?
Admiral Stark. I think the initial clipping was done by Kramer,
and McCollum was our far eastern officer, and he was also very much
interested in it. Whether Captain Safford also clipped, I do not know.
2396 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Now, did they clip for you these so-called ship-
movement messages ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall specifically about the ship-move-
ment messages. I kept in touch with them generally, with War Plans.
Mr. Mitchell. He is talking about ship locations.
Senator Ferguson. I am talking about these messages in volume 2,
in the yellow book.
[6383] Admiral Stark. You are referring to the ships at certain
points?
Senator Ferguson. The intercepts, at certain areas.
Admiral Stark. I thought you were talking about the broad
problem.
Senator Ferguson. I was talking about something different.
Admiral Stark. Your question is what ?
Senator Ferguson. Did they clip for you these intercepted ship-
movement messages or ship-location messages, as they are known as,
the Japanese messages, the military installations and ship move-
ments, and so forth, in exhibit 2 ?
[6384] Admiral Stark. I can only say with regard to the par-
ticular messages to which I believe you refer what I said previously,
that I do not recall having seen those messages, and to the best of my
knowledge and belief I did not see them, but I may have seen them.
In any case, it was my over- all responsibility.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, which was of the most importance,
when Japan was going to strike or where Japan was going to strike,
or was there any distinction between those two points ?
Admiral Stark. I would say they were both so important as to be
No. 1 priority.
Senator Ferguson. I am trying to get at why the same effort was
not put on the translations or deciphering as to where they were going
to strike as was put on the diplomatic messages.
Admiral Stark. Senator Ferguson, that gets down into a matter of
detail which I think my subordinates could give you much better than I.
I can give you my own knowledge of the thing but it is very general. It
is not specific and I might be in error.
Senator Ferguson. After all, 3^ou were responsible, under the rules,
for the conduct of the officials under you ; were you not ?
[6385] Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. The over-all responsibility
was mine ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, without reading some of these ship mes-
sages, they have been read, I want to call your attention to some that
I think have not been read.
You say it is of ec^ual importance where they were going to strike
as when they were going to strike.
The message on page 12 was read to you. I won't read that again.
It has been used as indicating a plan of Pearl Harbor, indicating a
desire to get a plan of Pearl Harbor exactly, each part of the water,
where the ships would be.
I go to the next message which is the 29th of September.
Admiral Stark. That is on page 13 ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And there the message reads :
The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location of vessels.
Indicating exactly what kind of a code will be used to tell where these
ships are.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2397
Navy docks in the navy yard (the ten ten pier) .
Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island.
Along side in Ford Island : (East and west sides will be differentiated by A' and
B respectively.)
Relayed to Washington, San Francisco.
We get that on "10-10-41" indicating that the Japanese [6386]
have a code method of telling Tokyo exactly our plan at Pearl Harbor.
Would jou say that is true ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Let's take the next message. Who was Togo in
1941 ?
Admiral Stark. Tojo, as I recall, was Prime Minister and Togo
was-
Senator Ferguson. Wasn't he Foreign Minister at that time ?
Admiral Stark. I think he was Minister of Foreign Affairs. I
thought I had them straightened out between Tojo and Togo.
Senator Ferguson. He was a high official in the Japanese military
hierarchy ?
Admiral Stark. I think so.
Senator Ferguson. Let's take the short message, the 15th of Novem-
ber. That is after we get the dead-line message of the 25th. It is not
translated until 12-3.
As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your
"ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week.
Now, it is a "in harbor report."
♦ * * irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are
no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.
[6S87] Wouldn't that be of great significance ? You have a dead
line and here is a message going from a high official in Tokyo to Hono-
lulu— to Togo. They want to get their reports irregular but they
want them twice a week. Wouldn't that be very impressive at that
time; wouldn't it indicate something? You have a dead line. They
want to get these reports twice a week.
Admiral Stark. Well, assuming that that "ships in harbor report"
is not just the normal ships in port, which they were giving in ports
like San Francisco and Puget Sound and in the Canal, but that it
referred to the previous two dispatches, it does not say so, but assum-
ing that it does refer to the previous two dispatches, it would be very
important.
Taken of itself, without the background of the other two, I wouldn't
consider it so important.
Senator Ferguson. Take it by itself, take this language :
As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical.
Not that they want this because they are trading with America and
want to know when ships are leaving, but "the relations are most criti-
cal and, therefore, we want these twice a week, in the harbor." What
could any intelligence officer read in that?
Admiral Stark. It is an important dispatch.
Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that was called to [6388]
your attention?
Admiral Stark. I do not. Again I say it might have been, but I
have no recollection of it.
Senator Ferguson. On the 3d of December, when it was translated,
this most critical period, this important language, you can't now recall
whether that was called to your attention ; you say you cannot ?
2398 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. I do not recall it.
Senator Ferguson. Let's take page 14. This is from Honolulu to
Tokyo. It is a message showing that they are using the one on page 12,
which much stress has been put on here and many questions asked,
they are using those areas and that method.
Area A — A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.
I want to go down to paragraph 3 and see whether we can analyze
that. This is obtained on the 6th. It came in on November 18. That
is why I asked you if it was not just as important to ascertain where
they were going to attack as when they were going to attack.
Here we had a pilot message on the 6th indicating that a reply to
ours of the 26th was going to be received. We had the message over in
Berlin that they were going to break relations and anticipated war.
We had all of the information. [OoSQ] We have coming into
the Navy this information.
Admiral Stark. I would like to say in regard to all that informa-
tion, even if it is reiteration, bear in mind our messages of the 24th
and the 27th — the war warning message, with all of its directions.
Senator Ferguson. I understand.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Here is what they say on the 18th. This is after
the deadline has been set :
At ten o'clock a. m. on the morning of the 17th, S destroyers were observed
entering the harbor. Their course was as follows : In a single file at a distance of
1,COO meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor.
From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which
they were moored, they changed course five times each time roughly 30 degrees.
The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A
after passing the water reservoir on the eastern side.
Relayed to .
Now, wouldn't that information indicate that they wanted to get the
exact court, where there were no mines, so that if they wanted to use
submarines, and later they did use submarines, or tried to use them,
wouldn't this indicate to you that they wanted to know exactly where
they could travel [6o90] in our harbor?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; it would, and, of itself, they probably
wanted that and got it everywhere they could, just as we did on enemy
harbors. If you could find out where the swept channel was it was
always important to know.
I don't say that in mitigation of the inference from these dispatches,
but I W'ant to point out that that particular information is something
that any military naval man would want to know.
Senator Ferguson. Knowing all these other facts, he wouldn't want
to know of it just to file in liis fik\ would he?
Admiral Stark. No. It might be useful to him, and it was asked
in this case, in the light of hindsight, for a specific purpose.
Senator Ferguson. You think that specific purpose was to use it
for small submarines to come in ?
Admiral Stark. I would say, in the light of the knowledge we now
have, it may very well have been for that purpose. At that time
we didn't know they had the small submarines.
Senator Ferguson. You mean that our Intelligence was such that
we didn't even know that Japan had these small submarines ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2399
Admiral Stark. That is my remembrance, and I might suggest that
you ask committee counsel to certify that with [6390-A\ In-
telligence.
Senator Ferguson. I certainly want to get that information.
Admiral Stark. To see if we did have any knowledge of them
or not.
Senator Ferguson. We didn't know they had the last four battle-
ships, our Intelligence was such that we didn't know that?
Admiral Stark. My appearance at hearings on the Hill will show
how litle knowledge we had of what the Japs had. You will recall
a day or so ago my stating that when trains went by certain Japanese
navy yards the curtains were pulled down so that people could not
see out and also my statement that it was sometime felt we didn't
get much inside the 3-mile limit. I have covered that in previous
testimony.
\^6391'\ Senator Ferguson. Yes. We won't repeat if we can
help it. We weren't getting this kind of information in the Japanese
harbors, were we ?
You say that was probably one of those things that any military
agency would get but we weren't getting it because we had no idea
of attacking Japan?
Admiral Stark. We undoubtedly had Japanese channels. I can-
not recall that we had any swept channels at that time. But if we
had been able to get anything of that sort and our people could have
picked it up I have no doubt they would have.
Senator Ferguson. Here in our Intelligence Branch, at least on
the 6th, we have this message.
Let's go to the next message. We got that the day before, on the
5th. This is from Tokyo (Togo) to Honolulu. November 18, trans-
lated on the 5th. So, we get it Friday.
Please repoi't on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein.
Not moving vessels. But the following areas — they want to know
what ships are anchored in them.
Area N — Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, Honolulu —
"Honolu" is writen up in the margin.
and the areas adjacent there to. Make your investigation with great secrecy.
In other words, don't let America know that you are [6392]
doing this, but we w^ant to know what ships and we want to know
what is in those adjacent areas. We translated that on the 5th.
Let's go to the next. This one comes on November 20. Getting
nearer this dead line.
Strictly secret.
This we get on Thursday before.
Please investigate comprehensively the fleet.
This is from Tokyo to Honolulu, from Togo, a high official.
Please investigate comprehensively the fleet— bases in the neighborhood of the
Hawaiian military reservation.
Now, "military reservation" would be where the antiaircraft was,
wouldn't it ? And they wanted comprehensive analysis.
2400 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. I would say it would mean bases anywhere.
Wliere the fleet was located, in the neighborhood of Hawaii. I don't
know just why he states "military reservation" there, but I would
say they wanted any information they could get.
Senator Ferguson. But they wanted it comprehensively.
Admiral Stark. They always wanted it comprehensively, whatever
it was.
Senator Ferguson. Let's go to the next. Here is another message
from Tokyo. Here are three messages from Tokyo seeking informa-
tion on the 5th, 4th, and 6th, immediately preceding the attack on
Pearl Harbor. Here is Tokyo concentrating on [6393'] get-
ting information.
By the way, this next message is dated November 29, which is the
day before the dead line, and it would be the day before the Presi-
dent had indicated that there might be an attack.
Now, here is what they want to know.
We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future
will you also report even when there are no movements.
Indicating that they want to keep, isn't it true, they want to keep
exact information on every ship in our harbor at Pearl Harbor, not
moving but in the harbor ?
Admiral Stark. That is not unusual. It is my recollection that
I sent Admiral Hart a similar message with regard to his scouting,
to report not only what he saw but to report daily if he didn't see
anything. We get that from the war games also. It is simply to
insure that it was sent out properly and got through, by getting a
message each day. I think that is the significance of it.
Senator Ferguson. You had no rule that this information was not
to come over your desk?
Admiral Stark. No.
Senator Ferguson. As you understood it, this same information
that went to the Secretary of the Navy went to the President?
[6394] Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. As far as the Navy was concerned ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. On the 2 days we get these three messages. In
fact, on the 3 days— on 4 days: 12/3, 12/6, 12/5, 12/4, and 12/5—
these five messages would normally come across your desk, and they
don't strike any responsive chord at all now that you saw them?
Admiral Stark. They would normally come across my desk if they
were evaluated as of particular significance and interest. I can only
repeat what I have already said, that so far as I know the signifi-
cance of these messages at that time, among the great mass of infor-
mation that was coming in, was not realized as we realize it now,
laying them out subsequent to the event.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral Stark, isn't it true that you had offi-
cials that were culling the insignificant from the significant? And
here we have had delivered to us just these. I don't know how much
came in that may have been considered not significant. But these
have been delivered to us and would normally go across your desk.
I wonder whether you have ever made an investigation to point out
whether they did go across your desk.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2401
Admiral Stark. Well, I wouldn't make an investigation
[639 Jf- A ] on something I didn't know had happened. Occasionally
I would go through, if I had time, and I was pressed for time continu-
ously, I might read through the entire file that came in to me — not the
entire file that was in the Navy Department — as a check-up. And my
aide, Commander Wellborn, who was a very brilliant and able young
man, occasionally did that also.
Now, I can see exactly how this looks now. I can only say that
to the best of my knowledge and belief, and from anything that I
have, it was not so appreciated at that time. I can repeat in more
detail what I said originally, but I can't add anything to it.
Senator Ferguson. But America had placed her safety in officials
whose duty it was to evaluate the evidence before them in order that
America might be protected; isn't that true?
Admiral Stark. That is true, and I will say further that they
were good men, going through these dispatches daily.
Senator Ferguson. But you told me yesterday that on the 15th of
October you changed the Intelligence Branch, had Admiral Wilkin-
son, who had never had any previous experience in intelligence work;
isn't that a fact ?
Admiral Stark. That is a fact, but these dispatches came to him
after being looked over further down, and it required no particular, I
would say, no special previous [6395] experience in intelli-
gence to handle something of this sort. Wilkinson is a brilliant man.
He is known as such. Just what happened to these dispatches, and
what went on where they came in, obviously they came in to Intelli-
gence. They couldn't get out of Intelligence. And I understand you
are asking other people to testify on these. I won't add anything to
what I have already stated with regard to them.
Senator Ferguson. Has there ever been any disciplinary action
against anyone in the Navy, court martial or otherwise, for either
failing to translate these within a reasonable time after, or not getting
them to you and not calling your attention to the significance of
them?
Admiral Stark. I would say that the only man who has been cen-
sored with regard to this and other matters is myself, by the Secretary
of the Navy.
Senator Ferguson. I understand. But there has not been anyone
down the line that was similarly acted upon for neglect of duty?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. Tliese dispatches came to light a couple
of years after the event. I say they came to light. That is my under-
standing. I do not recall having seen them until they were produced.
And while it would have been, perhaps, in view of what has happened
since, a good thing at the time to have gone through everything, I
was busy. We had [6396] the war in the Pacific on our hands,
and in addition what was going on in the Atlantic, and elsewhere. But
I was doubly busy right after the event and during my continued duty
in Washington until I went abroad. I was thinking more of handling
the job and getting on with the war than I was on possible post
mortems at that time.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, the action of the Secretary of the Navy
as to you has been very recent, in 1945 ?
Admiral Stark. The action of what ?
79716 — 46 — pt. 5 "3
2402 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Of the Secretary of the Navy, which you men-
tioned.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And prior to that you had been decorated, prior
to the criticism of the Secretary of the Xavy you had been decorated
by the President, had you not ?
Admiral Stark. I had been, and one of the finest — well, I don't
know that I might mention it — but I received a letter from Colonel
Knox also when I left, of which I am very proud. Incidentally — well,
I won't mention it.
Senator Ferguson. You were decorated by the President after that?
Admiral Stark. I was, yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Wliat was the decoration ?
Admiral Stark. I have a brief of that citation here, [6397'\
and I also have kept in my file, ever since coming up here I have kept
it with me, the letter from the Secretary of the Navy.
The Chairman. Suppose we have those both printed as part of the
record.
The Vice Chairman. Read them at this time.
The Chairman. Read them. They are not very long ?
Admiral Stark. They are not very long ; no, sir.
The Chairman. Read them now.
Admiral Stark. The other thing which I started to mention bore
on my duty abroad, from the Army.
Senator Ferguson. When the King went back to Norway you were
delegated by the President to be his representative at that ceremony,
were you not ?
Admiral Stark. The President of the United States sent me on a
mission to Norway and also Denmark, rather a nice diplomatic mis-
sion. It was of no great significance. I haven't mentioned any
foreign decorations. I don't imagine you would want to go into that.
Senator Ferguson. But they were given you
Admiral Stark. The British gave me one of the highest decora-
tions, as a result of the action by the Chiefs of Staff, that it was within
their power to give. The one from Norway, by King Haakon, of
whom I had seen considerable in London, [6398] was the
highest decoration that they could give.
The French also gave me a high decoration in connection with the
Normandy invasion.
[6399] ' The Vice Chairman. Yes, Admiral, go ahead and read
it, please.
Admiral Stark. This letter is dated 21 March, from Colonel &iox.
The Vice Chairman. AVliat year, please?
Admiral Stark. 1942. It reads :
I have just signed the order assigning yow to your new command in London.
You know, of course, that you take with you from me my heartiest best wishes
for success in this most responsible post, but I do not want to terminate the
relationship which has existed between us for the past two years via a coldly
formal letter.
I came to this present task of mine with little besides good intentions,
energy, and a desire to serve my country in a very grave crisis. No one in
the Navy has been of greater assistance and help to me in my efforts to be a
constructive and helpful force in the Navy than you. In every possible official
way, you have aided me and supported me. However, this is but a minor part
of the story. In a warmly personal wa,y, you have been my friend and counselor
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2403
throughout. I can think of scores of times when you have saved me from
serious missteps and, in everything that I have attempted, designed to promote
efficiency in the Navy, especially in its administra- [64OO] tion, you have
been a tower of support and strength.
In all of a fairly long and busy life, I have never had a more dependable,
constructive, and self-effacing associate. As Chief of Naval Operations, during
two and a half of the most critical years in American naval history, you have
discharged the duties of your high office with brilliance, single-minded devo-
tion to the Navy and to the country and in a manner which will leave an in-
delible impression on the naval establishment for many years to come.
You take with you as you leave your post here for the one in London
the affectionate regard and the most heart-felt good wishes of the entire
establishment. May God go with you and bless you in all that you do. I
shall hope to hear from you occasionally in an informal and personal way
as well as officially.
Yours sincerely,
Feank Knox.
The citation from the President reads :
The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the Gold
Star in lieu of the Second Distinguished Service Medal to
ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK, UNITED STATES NAVY
for services set forth in the following :
[G4OI] CITATION
"For exceptionally meritorious service to the Government of the United States
in a duty of great responsibility during his tenure of office as Chief of Naval
Operations from 1939 to 1942 when he was charged with the responsibility of
building and administering the largest peacetime Navy in the history of this
country.
"Due to his exceptional qualities of leadership and his outstanding ability,
full reliance was placed upon his advice and counsel by the Secretary of the
Navy, by the Congress and by the President of the United States as evidenced
by the executive and legislative measures adopted for the Naval Service to effect
a high state of training for war and the building of a 'two ocean Navy.' "
Mr. MtJEPHY. May I have the date of that ?
Senator Ferguson. What is the date of that, Admiral ?
Admiral Stark. The date of it is April 9, 1942.
Senator Ferguson. Now, what was your assignment to London ?
Admiral Stark. I was in command of the naval forces in Europe,
originally less the Mediterranean and north Africa, which theater
was added in 1944.
Senator Ferguson. And you stayed on that post how long ?
Admiral Stark. I stayed on the post until the war was \^6Jfi^']
over.
Senator Ferguson. So you completed that assignment until the war
was over ?
Admiral Stark. I completed that assignment and the items of this
sort, as I stated, came from the Army.
The Chairman. Do you mean the war in Europe ?
Senator Ferguson. The war in Europe I have in mind, but when
did you leave ?
Admiral Stark. I left after Japan had surrendered. We had also
had VJ-day.
Senator Ferguson. Thanks for the correction, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Stark. I had received orders shortly before Japan sur-
rendered but I actually did not leave until the 16th of August.
Senator Ferguson. Now, Mr. Chairman, I won't touch on what is
2404 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in these messages but I would ask to have printed in the record what
is in this yellow book, exhibit 2, here at this place in the record from
page 16 to page 29, inclusive. It is to bring to us in the printed
record and at one place all of the messages that we have been handed
in this book showing ship movements or harbor locations, which were
the messages translated after December the 7th, but I think all of
them received prior to that date.
[64^)3] The Chairman. They have not heretofore been printed
in the record ?
Senator Ferguson. They have not been printed in our official rec-
ord, as I understand it.
The Chairman. It will be so ordered.
Mr. Mitchell. They have been introduced in an exhibit but never
included in the transcript, in the daily transcript.
Senator Ferguson. I just do that to call attention to them, because
I do not want to review it with the witness
The Chairman. Without objection the pages indicated will be in-
cluded in the transcript at this point.
Senator Ferguson. To complete my sentence — because he had not
seen them because they were not translated.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. Have you included in that series the one about Manila,
where they want the information about the airplanes and the number
of fields. J
Senator Ferguson. Well, it would be in there, I am sure.
Well, now. Admiral, to move along, did you know
Mr. Mitchell. Excuse me. You see, this Exhibit 2 is divided up
into groups relating to Hawaii, Panama Canal, Philippines, and they
are all separated, and what the Senator has asked to put in is the
messages relating to Hawaii which [6404] were intercepted
prior to December 7 and not translated until after the attack.
Mr. Murphy. I would like to have, in addition, this one particular
dispatch as to Manila which seems to be more elaborate and in greater
detail than the others.
Senator Ferguson. Will you point it out ?
Mr. Murphy. I will give the stenographer a memorandum as to
where it is in the record.
The Chairman. All right.
(The excerpts from Exhibit No. 2 referred to follow:)
[6405] K. MESSAGES TRANSLATED AFTER 7 DECEMBER 1941
From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokyo
November 24, 1941.
#234. (Part of 2)
Re your #114.'
Strictly Secret.
1. According to normal practice, the fleet leaves Pearl Harbor, conducts ma-
neuvers and forthwith returns.
2. Recently the fleet has not remained for a long period of time nor conducted
maneuvers in the neighborhood of Lahaina Roads. Destroyers and submarines
are the only vessels who ride at anchor there.
I6i06] « Not available.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2405
3. Battleships seldom, if ever, enter the ports of Hilo, Hanalei, or Kaneohe.
Virtually no one has observed battleships in maneuver areas.
4. The manner in which the fleet moves:
Battleships exercise in groups of three or five, accompanied by lighter craft.
They conduct maneuvers for roughly one week at sea, either to the south of Maui
or to the southwest. Aircraft carriers maneuver by themselves, whereas sea
plane tenders operate in concert with another vessel of the same class. Airplane
firing and bombing practice is conducted in the neighborhood of the southern
extremity of the island of Kahoolawe.
ARMY 26351 (Japanese) Trans. 12-] 6-41 (2)
From : Honolulu.
To : Tokyo.
November 24, 1941.
#234 (Part 2 of 2).
The heavy cruisers in groups of six carry on their operations over a period of
two to three weeks, doubtless going to Samoa. The length of time that they
remain at anchor in Pearl Harbor or tied up at docks is roughly four or five days
at a stretch.
The liglit cruisers in groups of five spend one to two weeks in operations. It
would seem that they carry on their maneuvers in the vicnity of Panama.
The submarines go out on 24-hour trips Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.
The destroyers, in addition to accompanying the principal units of the fleet,
carry on personnel training activities in the waters adjacent to Hawaii.
Mine layers (old-style destroyers) in groups of , have been known to
spend more than three weeks in operations in the area.
Furthermore, on the night of the 23rd, five mine layers conducted mine laying
operations outside Manila harbor.
[6407] ARMY 26352 (Japanese) Trans. 12/16/41 (2)
From: Tokyo (Togo).
To : Honolulu.
November 28, 1941.
#119 Re your message #243\
Secret outside the Department.
Intelligence of this kind which are of major importance, please transmit to us
in the following manner :
1. When battleships move out of the harbor if we report such movement but
once a week the vessels, in that interval, could not only be in the vicinity of the
Hawaiian Islands, but could also have travelled far. Use your own judgment
in deciding on reports covering such movements.
2. Report upon the entrance or departure of capital ships and the length of
time they remain at anchor, from the time of entry into the port until the de-
parture.
ARMY 25880 JD-7158 Trans. 12/8/41 (S)
From : Honolulu.
To : Tokyo.
November 28, 1941.
#238.
Military report :
[6408] (1) There are eight "B-17" planes at Midway and the altitude
range of their antiaircraft guns is (5,000 feet?).
(2) Our observations at the Sand Island maneuvers are : number of shots — 12 ;
interval of flight — 13 seconds ; interval between shots — 2 minutes ; direct hits —
none.
(3) 12,000 men (mostly marines) are expected to reinforce the troops in Hono-
lulu during December or January.
* Available in code under study.
2406 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(4) There has usually been one cruiser in the waters about (15,000 feet?)
south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance to the harbor.
ARMY 25928 JD-7212 Trans. 12-8^1 (7)
From: Honolulu (Kita).
To: Tokyo
1 December 1941
#241 (In 2 parts, complete).
Re your #119*.
Report on ship maneuvers in Pearl Harbor :
1. The place where practice maneuvers are held is about 500 nautical miles
southeast of here.
Direction based on :
(1) The direction taken when the ships start out is usually southeast by south
and ships disappear beyond the horizon in that direction.
(2) Have never seen the fleet go westward or head for [6^09] the
"KAIUI" straits northwards.
(3) The west sea of the Hawaiian Islands has many reefs and islands and is
not suitable as a ocean maneuver practice sea.
(4) Direction of practice will avoid all merchant ship routes and official travel
routes.
Distance based on ;
(1) Fviel is plentyfull and long distance high speed is possible.
(2) Guns can not be heard here.
(3) In one week's time, (actually the maneuvers mentioned in my message
#231** were for the duration of four full days of 144 hours), a round trip to a
distance of 864 nautical miles could be reached (if speed is 12 knots), or 1152
nautical miles (if speed is 16 knots), or 1440 nautical miles (if speed is 20 miles)
is possible, however, figuring on 50% of the time being used for maneuver tech-
nicalities, a guess that the point at which the maneuvers are held would be point
of about 500 miles from Pearl Harbor.
2. The usual schedule for departure and return of the battleships is : leaving
on Tuesday and returning on Friday, or leaving on Friday and returning on
Saturday of the following week. All ships stay in port about a period of one
week.
mm
JD— 1:7294 26053 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
December 2, 1941
#123 (Secret outside the department.)
In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane
carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your
ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are
any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that
they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided
with anti-mine nets.
Note. — This message was received here on December 23.)
ARMY 27065 JD 8007 (Japanese) Trans. 12/30/41 (5)
From: Honolulu (Kitz)
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
#247
Ship report.
2nd. Military transport (name unknown) sailed out toward mainland.
3rd. RARIN came into port from San Francisco.
26065
JD-1: 7309 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)
•JD-l : 7158.
••Available, dated 23 November.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2407
\6411] From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
#245 (In 2 parts, complete)
(Military secret)
From Ichiro Fuji to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters ;
1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following :
I, Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows :
Meaning
Signal
Battleship divisions including scouts
and screen units.
A number of carriers
Battle ship divisions
Carriers
Battleship divisions
Carriers
Carriers
Preparing to sortie
Preparing to sortie
All departed between 1st and 3rd
Several departed between 1st and 3rd.
Several departed between 1st and 3rd.
All departed between 4th and 6th
Several departed between 4th and 6th
All departed between 4th and 6th
26145
2. Signals.
I. Lanikai* Beach. House will show lights during the night as follows :
Signal
One light between 8 and 9 p. m 1
9 and 10 p. m 2
10 and 11 p. m 3
11 and 12 p. m 4
II.
Two lights " 12 and 1 a. m 5
1 and 2 a. m. 6
16413] Two lights between 2 and 3 a. m 7
3 and 4 a. m 8
III. Lanikai* Bay, during daylight. <»
If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates 1,
2, 3, or 4.
If there is a "star" and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.
IV. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House** will indicate the following:
Times Signal
1900-2000 3
2000-2100 4
2100-2200 5
2200-2300 6
2300-2400 7
OOOO-OIOO , , 8
V. K. G. M. G.*** Want Ads.
A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P. O box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.
B. CHIC. Co farm etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.
C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P O box 1476 indicates signal
5 or 8.
[6414] 3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made
from Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanato-
rium**** at a point halfway between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road
(latitude 20°40' N., longitude 156°19' W., visible from seaward to the south-
* Between Waimanalo and Kailua Beaches on east coast of Oahu.
**A beach village on east coast of Oahu, 1 mile north of Lanikai.
***A radio broadcast station in Honolulu.
****At latitude 20-42-45 N., longitude 156-20-20 W.
2408 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
east and southwest of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be madfe
daily until your EXEX signal is received :
Time Signal
From 7-8 3 or 6
From 8-9 4 or 7
From 9-10 5 or 8
JD-1: 7370 (M) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7)
From: Honolulu (Kita).
To : Tokyo
3 December 1941
#248
Ship report.
December 3rd. Wyoming and 2 seaplane tenders left port. No other move-
ments.
26066
JD-1:7310 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)
[6415]
From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokio
December 4, 1941
#249
On the afternoon of the 3rd one British gunboat entered Honolulu harbor.
She left port early on the morning of the 4th. She was roughly of the 1,100 ton
class. She had but one funnel and carried one 4 inch gun fore and aft.
Furthermore, immediately after the vessel entered port a sailor took some mail
to the Brtish Consular OflSce and received some mail in return.
ARMY 26161 (Japanese) Trans. 12/12/41 (2)
From: Honolulu (Kita).
To: Toyko.
5 December 1941 *
#252
(1) During Friday morning the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my
message #239* arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.
(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.
(3) The following ships wei'e in port on the afternoon of the 5th:
[6416] 8 battleships.
3 light cruisers.
16 destroyers.
Four ships of the Honolulu class and were in dock.
•Available, dated 29 November.
26029
JD-1: 7280 (D) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To : Honolulu
December 6, 1941
#128
Please wire immediately re the latter part of my #123 ' the movements of the
fleet subsequent to the fourth.
ARMY 26158 JD 7381 (Japanese) Trans. 12/12/41 (5)
■ Not available.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2409
From : Honolulu
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941
#253 Re the last part of your #123.^
1. On the American Continent in October the Army began trammg barrage
balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four
or five hundred balloons, but [6-^7] it is understood that they are con-
sidering the use of these balloons in the defense of Haveaii and Panama. In so far
as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighbor-
hood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they
selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any
training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present
time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult
to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actu-
ally made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and
land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford, and
Ewa," there are limits to tlie balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that
in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a
surprise attack against these places.
2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are
not known. I will report the results of my investigation.
ARMY 25877 Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)
[6418] From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941
#254
1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were
— and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on
the 6th:
9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addi-
tion there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers
and airplane carriers have all left).
2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.
ARMY 25874 JD-7179 Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)
[6P9] Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, do you have any
knowledge that some time in August they stopped sending Admiral
Kimmel what was known as "magic"?
Admiral Stark. No, I do not recall having any knowledge of that
or of the fact that those messages had been sent previous to that time.
Senator Ferguson. Was it possible that in the Navy Department
we did not appreciate or did not recognize the value of air as an
offensive weapon over ships in harbor, that this might happen ?
Admiral Stark. I think the Navy was very much alive to that.
Air power
Senator Ferguson. If they were very much alive to it how do yoii
account for it happening?
Admiral Stark. I do not just understand your question.
Senator Ferguson. Well, you say they were very much alive to the
weapon. Now, how do you account for that happening then? How
did this happen ? How did we get surprised ?
Admiral Stark. You mean how did what happen, the Japanese
Senator Ferguson. Yes, how were you surprised then if we were
fully cognizant of the ability of air power to destroy a fleet ir ~
harbor?
» Not available.
" Kana scelling.
2410 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. Well, the correspondence shows how air- [64-20'\
minded we had been with regard to a possible attack on Pearl Harbor
and in laying plans to prevent it. The question as to why we did not
detect it or why we were not making reconnaissance is the question
which I imagine you are asking in connection with it?
Senator Ferguson. That is right.
Admiral Stark. Well, in Washington, as I have stated, that is in
the Navy Department, we had intended to convey the critical situation
and the possibiltiy of an air attack in the messages which we had
sent and we had felt, I had felt that when I sent the message starting
out with, "This is a war warning," and in view of what had gone
before and the subsequent dispatches with regard to, or without
regard to the subsequent dispatches but, certainly, reenforced by sub-
sequent dispatches on the burning of the codes, that those in the field,
in the Pacific, both in the Asiatic and in the Central Pacific would
have been on the lookout for a surprise attack from any direction.
Senator Ferguson. In June of 1940 you said in effect, "Look out
for an air raid."
Admiral Stark. No.
Senator Ferguson. Or "Look out for a raid."
Admiral Stark. No ; I did not say, "Look out out for a raid."
Senator Ferguson, No, no ; you did not, but the order did.
[6431] Admiral Stark. Sir?
Senator Fergson. The alert did.
Admiral Stark. Well, I had assumed that they would be on the
lookout for it from what I stated as a possibility to be guarded against
even though only a possibilty.
Senator Ferguson. This is very difficult to read but that message
was:
War Department directive concerning alert issued as precautionary measures
after consultation with the Navy and State Department.
Mr. Mitchell. Apparently he is talking about the Herron alert.
Senator Ferguson. The Herron order.
Admiral Stark. Yes, I get that now. I thought you were talking
about the raid which was made.
Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, yesterday you said that the Navy
and State and the Army opposed the embargoes. What department
of government or who was for them and how did they come to get
that if three departments were against it?
Admiral Stark. With regard to your statement that I opposed them,
I pointed out whenever it was brought up to me the seriousness that
such an embargo would have or might have on our relations with
the Japanese. When you throttle a nation's economic life she has
got to do something if she thinks she [64^2] can, particu-
larly with regard to oil, which I always stressed. Now, that was a
military or a naval man's estimate with regard to it.
There was a political significance also in connection with that which
was not within my province, except to say what I thouo;ht as re-
gards its implications on the military so tliat the implication of
those could only be — the placing of such could only be by the State
Department and I assume with the approval of tlie President.
Senator Ferguson. Well, then, I understand that it is a fair con-
clusion to say that the political situation outweighed the military
and they were put on ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2411
Admiral Stark. All things were considered, must have been con-
sidered, our opinions and the political and the decision was made
higher up.
Senator Ferguson. Were you ever consulted as to whether or not
if they were put on and it meant war that we had the military
might to defend our action ?
Admiral Stark. We discussed all angles of that picture and that
picture was thoroughly known by the high authorities in the Gov-
ernment.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. What was your opinion in July, that
we had the military might to back it up ?
Admiral Stark. We had the military might to implement
the [64^3] war plan. When you say to back it up
Senator Ferguson. Well, it is a layman's expression.
Admiral Stark. We knew, as I stated, again quoting from my
letter, "It would be a H of a war, particularly to start with."
I may state my sizing up of that. I think I stated it before Con-
gress. At the first press conference — and I did not hold one except
when I had to — in England, which was a very large conference
and particularly many of our own correspondents to start out, occa-
sionally, that asked me for my opinion. I stated what I felt at that
time, which was what I felt earlier, that in view of the conditions
then existing in 1942, the year 1942 would be a very tough year, that
we would be on the defensive in the Pacific, seizing an opportunity
which might give us a chance for attack, or creating one when we
could.
That in 1943 we would be gathering our strength and perhaps a
limited oifensive, but certainly we would be gathering our strength
and beginning to go after the enemy and that in 1944, which I used
to state I could hardly wait to come around, we would then be realiz-
ing from the legislation and the earlier authorizations and would be
able to go all out and that we would win in 1945. That statement
was made back in 1942.
Now, I also told Admiral Nomura, and an officer when I was in
London pulled a memorandum on me of what I had told him,
[S4^4] Avhich happened to be a good guess, that initially with the
initiative in their hands and a readiness and a plan they probably
would have a considerable initial success but that we would completely
break them before we got tlirough. It was inevitable because they
could not replace their losses and we could not only replace ours but
continue to gain and it was a simple matter of arithmetic.
I said "Therefore, if you attack us you insure the destruction of
tlie Japanese Empire." I am inclined to think that he agreed with
me but I could not state so. That was my feeling of the situation.
I did not feel that we were then ready to go all out and finish the thing
up, I knew we could not, but I felt we were strong enough to hold until
we could go all out and win.
Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, were you one of those in the Navy
that felt that we would lose the Philippines if we went to war in the
fall of 1941 ? We have had testimony here by other men that that was
true.
Admiral Stark. Well, my hope was to put up a good, stiff fight.
I would not say that I would have thought that we could have held
them with what we had at that time, and you will recall that I stated
2412 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
almost in my first meeing in the White House, I can remember it, to
the President, with Marshall, recounting the fact — and this goes back
to 1939 — [6J^2S~\ that always in war plans, which had been go-
ing on for many years, we conceded that we would lose the Philip-
pines and that how much easier it would be if we could hold them
rather than to lose them and fight to get them back and in the hope
that we could strengthen them, which we had not been able to. We
did not have the material.
Senator Ferguson. You did discuss it with the President?
Admiral Stark. I did ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That we would lose them?
Admiral Stark. He was thoroughly familiar with the picture and
so was Marshall. I remember in that conversation Marshall recount-
ing what we could do.
Senator Ferguson. And that was not considering the possibility
that we would lose the fleet we had waiting in Pearl Harbor, the Pearl
Harbor fleet. Your view was without losing tlie fleet, so it was much
worse when we lost our fleet.
Admiral Stark. It was tougher because of the vessels we lost, and I
think perhaps there may be some surprise over the fact that of the 112
vessels in Pearl Harbor as I recall
Senator Ferguson. Yes; you explained that yesterday, how many
were lost.
Admiral Stark. That a great number were not touched.
Senator Ferguson. That leads me to this question. In your letter of
November 25, the last page — would [64^6] counsel show it
to the Admiral ? The postscript. I will read it because I want to ask
you some questions about it :
"I held this up pending" — this is the 25th, just 4 days before the
dead line, the last dead line, which they said they meant and they even
said what time it would end.
I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hi;ll today. I
have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk
with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of
the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President.
Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack.
Now, this is the question I want to ask you :
From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarassing
thing that could happen to us.
What were 3'Ou talking about there?
Admiral Stark. I was thinking that we might lose them.
Senator Ferguson. Did you talk with the President about that on
that day ?
Admiral Stark. We had talked Avith the President — I don't know
about that day. Probably. We had talked over that situation many
times.
[64^7] Senator Ferguson. Now, indicating a change — this is a
letter which was modified because it went to him after; at least it
reached him after he got the cables.
Admiral Stark. It reached him — I believe I was asked when it
reached him and I believe they reached him on 3 December, some 6'
days after the message of the 27th and 9 davs after the message of the
24th.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2413
Senator Ferguson. But it says :
I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance in Thailand, Indochina,
Burma Road area as the most likely.
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't that be misleading to him ? Yon have
got possibilities and probabilities and now we come to the words "most
likely."
Aclmiral Stark. Well, I did not think so. I was giving him the
evidence I had and which had been given in the dispatch, or which he
had. I think it was in the dispatch of the 24th.
Senator Ferguson. I am not quite clear on this :
From many angles an attack on the Phillipines would be the most embarrassing
thing that could happen to us.
Suppose they took Wake, suppose they took Guam or — I mean sup-
pose they attacked Wake? Suppose they attacked at [64^8]
Guam or at Pearl Harbor? That wouldn't be embarrassing to us?
Admiral Stark. Any one of them would have been embarrassing to
us. The Philippines was on the flank. To lose the Philippines was
costly. The probability of their loss was recognized due to their
insufficient state of nreparedness. Therefore, if that was correct and
we did lose them we knew it was a big fight to get them back ; also it
left the Japanese flank secure from that attack on the continual
support of their movement south.
Senator Ferguson. Do you disagree with Churchill that the fleet
at Hawaii was on the flank also ?
Admiral Stark. Well, there is some 4,000 miles or 3,000 miles differ-
ence in the flank and with no places to go after you go out there to
support you. We had to build a chain of bases up all the way across
before we could go out there and we had to build a train which could
support the fleet after they got out there. The fleet in Hawaii was
not, except for submarine work, and they did wonderful work as you
know, was not in position to seriously threaten Japanese communica-
tions going south until it was strong enough to go out there itself.
Raids occasionally under auspicious circumstances, yes, but not con-
tinued pressure.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, wasn't the only deterrent in the Pacific
as far as Japan was concerned the fleet at Hawaii ?
[64£9] Admiral Stark. Yes; I think that is a fair statement.
The United States Fleet, but sitting as a threat on the flank; Hawaii
was a long ways away.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, on the 25th of February 1941 you
spoke about sending four cruisers, nine destroyers and some carriers to
the Philippine Islands by the southern route and let it leak out that
they were going out there. I found that in your book. Had you ever
discussed that with the President ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, and the President backed me up
Senator Ferguson. What was that?
Admiral Stark. If I may just finish.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. And the President backed me up in my recom-
mendation not to send a detachment to the Philippines. You will
recall a day or two ago my xeading a memorandum to the President
opposing the sending of a detachment to the Philippines and the Pres-
2414 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ident accepted that memorandum. The proposal was from the State
Department.
I noted that one paper in the press took that memorandum as though
I were opposed to the President's desire to send them out there
Senator Ferguson. You were opposing the State Department.
Acbniral Stark [continuing] . And it stated so. I was giving that
to the President backing me up, to back me up in [64^0'] my
arguments against those who wanted to send them out there and the
President was with me. He was not for if.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, why did the State Department
want to send this fleet, a part of the fleet, to the Philippines ?
Admiral Stark. I think they thought that it might have a further
deterrent effect on Japan. That could have been, in my opinion, their
only reason for such a request.
[6431] Senator Ferguson. Was there anything said about send-
ing a much smaller one so in case you lost the loss would not be so
heavy ?
Admiral Stark. I think so. We might have sent something light
out there. My reaction to all that was : Get them out there. Then you
would be divided up still further if attacked at sea, or you might lose
what you had, or if you started to pull them back, then there might be
an argument against weakness.
Senator Ferguson. Had not you heard from Grew that there might
be war ?
Admiral Stark. I quoted a part of Grew's letter in my previous
testimony, in my memorandum to the President, and in it Grew
agreed with me. You will recall I stated to the President
Senator Ferguson. On February 7.
Admiral Stark. That I was obviously quoting that part of Grew's
letter which supported me.
Senator Ferguson. On February 7. Could I ask counsel whether
they know whether that is in the white papers, that memo from Grew?
It is as follows : "I have just read a telegram on the 7th of February
from the American Embassy at Tokyo which the State Department
has furnished. In it appears the following:
[6432] Eisk of war wonkl be certain to follow increased concentration of
American vessels in the Far East, and it is not possible to evaluate with certainty
the imponderable factors which such risk constitutes. The risk should not be
taken unless our country is ready to force hostilities.
Even Grew was notifying the State Department, and were they
still insisting on sending this out there even though it meant war?
Admiral Stark. Well, it was at the State Department's request. I
was delighted to have it from Grew.
Senator Ferguson. Did that help you in keeping them from going
out there?
Admiral Stark. The President decided not to do it. I am in-
clined to think he would agree with me even though he had not seen
the Grew memorandum. That, however, is conjecture.
Senator Ferguson. Then, on April 19, 1941, you said :
I wrote about the Australian detachment. The President said, incidentally,
"When I open to you that way I do not expect you to quote the President and
I know there is nobody who can keep a thing secret better than you can."
Just as soon as those ships come back from Australia or New Zealand, or perhaps
a little before, I want to send some more out.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2415
[6433] You are quoting the President as wanting to send some
more out.
I just want to keep them popping np here and there and to keep the Japs
guessing. This, of course, is riglit down the State Department's alley. I might
say a lot of State Dei)artmcnt suggestions and recommendations are no less
than childish. Don't quote me, as I have practically said so in so many words
in the presence of all concerned, but after 13 months they finally got it going.
Of course, I recognize some merits, if exercised with some discretion, and that
is where the Navy has to count on FDR for reserves. So we did have to send
ships into Singapore, and we did keep them on a tlank, to be in a position to
go to work or to retire if something broke.
At that time did not you consider Hawaii the flank?
Admiral Stark, I considered Hawaii more of a central covering
position for the United States, the Canal, and the Aleutians. You
can look at it as the flank, I have no objection to it. But when I sent
ships farther to the westward, much farther, I did not want them to
get into what might be called a central hole like the Philippines, but
felt if they were well down on the flank away from Japan, where they
could retire or perhaps take care of themselves in [64341 case
of emergency, that I could see some merit in it, and that is what the
President approved. But as to sending them beyond and into Singa-
pore, I always opposed it.
Senator Ferguson. Counsel has just advised me that he searched
widely and has not found the February 7 message.
Mr. Mitchell. That Grew message?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. We asked the State Department for that on the day
that Admiral Stark furnished us his statement and they have not
reported yet.^
Senator Ferguson. All right.
Now, this was popping you. You were going to have the ships
around the various ])laces, and the State Department was very active
to have that done. I want to read what you said on the next page :
Now, when the question of popping up everywhere came and having in mind
keeping on the flank, I said to the President, "How about going north?" He said,
"Yes, yoii can keep any position you like and go anywhere." There was a little
method in my madness as to the northern cruise. I thought for once, if I could,
I would give the State Department a shock which might make them hold back.
Incidentally, that northwest cruise may have many good points. It still con-
forms to the [6435] flank and a detachment on an occasional sortie or in
an unexpected direction might be good ball, and if you ever want to make such a
cruise yourself of your own initiative, don't hesitate to ask. Of course you can
see what a striking force on the position I gave you and known to the Japs would
mean to them in view of their unholy fear of bombing, and a striking detachment
would have been right in position for most anything. I had a broad awkward
.smile when the State Department in effect said, "Please, Mr. President, don't let
him do it," or words to that effect. It was a little too much for them.
What did you have in mind there ?
Admiral Stark. Well, I had in mind what I produced but, as I
stated, it also had some merit, and there was some merit in ships pop-
ping up here and there, provided we still maintained them in a position
where we could concentrate where necessary, and not isolate them from
the rest of the fleet. My recollection of that is that I suggested we
might take a carrier, probably accompanied by the usual support of
four fast cruisers ancl destroyers and send them well to the northwest-
^ The message referred to appears in Hearings, Part 6, p. 2917 et seq.
2416 CONGRESSIONAI< INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ward or that we might send a couple of ships on in advance, or on
either flank, and let them start some radio work first one place and
then another one a thousand [64^6] miles to the southward, all
in connection with this, and that they would be in a position to with-
draw, but at the same time it was in line with keeping the Japs
guessing. v^.j- ■- ;
Senator Fekguson. Is this a fair evaluation of this situation about
the ships popping up, that the State Department wanted to use the
United States Navy in a diplomatic way as a deterrent to Japan, or a
threat to Japan ? Is that a fair estimate ?
Admiral Stark. In supporting diplomacy in a way in which they
thought would be effective, and to a degree, as regards exposed posi-
tions, I interposed the strongest objections I knew how.
Senator Ferguson. Were we doing this very thing? Were we using
the United States Navy in November or early December as a weapon
with our diplomacy, or had we got away from that because of your
victory on that point ?
Admiral Stark. The fleet was then all in Hawaiian waters, except
for one or two cruisers doing escort duty, and which, of course, they
have to pick up as soon as war began or beforehand, if it was deemed
advisable, and it was, and also for those vessels in the Asiatic Fleet.
Senator Ferguson. When did you last use the Navy for popping
up purposes in aid to diplomacy ?
Admiral Stark. The best of my recollection is that \6437'\
cruise to Australia was the last and the only move we made of that
kind. Well, I would say it was the only one of that kind, unless you
would consider the movement of the fleet under secret orders and
radio silence when it went out in June, I believe it was, in 1940 for a
specific purpose and was kept absent for a week.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, on June 10, 1941, did not you say,
in one of those instruments for the Secretary of the Navy, or memo
for the Secretary of the Navy, that it was apparent to Japan that the
United States Pacific Fleet was no longer strong enough to be a
threat 'I How do you reconcile that with some of the other testimony
about our fleet ?
Admiral Stark. That would be a threat in the Far East, and which
I have mentioned this morning we were not strong enough, nor did
we have the facilities in the Far East to keep the fleet there as a threat,
as an effective threat, or strong enough to interpose against a southern
movement.
Senator Ferguson. On December 2, 1941, a message went out
Admiral Stark. What date was that, sir?
Senator Ferguson. December 2. It was from CinCAF to OpNav.
Admiral Stark. That is from Hart to me.
Senator Ferguson. From Hart to Stark?
[^4^5] Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Part of it states, "Calling Isabel from current
Mission," and we got a memorandum yesterday on that same Isabel.
What mission was she on ? That is the ship that the President had
directed to be used as one of the men-of-war?
Admiral Stark. We authorized Admiral Hart to use her in con-
nection with reconnaissance as one of the three vessels if he so desired.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2417
Admiral Stark. I take it his recalling her from a mission means
that he recalled her from where he had her. I do not know just what
the disposition was at that time. I do know that he was deployed
to some extent. He had sent some ships south. He had certain sub-
marines out looking for whatever they could find, and so forth.
Senator Fei. '"x. Now, on the same day in the same message, the
last line, I want to ask you some questions about that.
Admiral Stark. I might add, I replied to that dispatch and said,
''''Isabel may be replaced by chartered vessels at your discretion."
Senator Ferguson. The last part states, "When it is considered
called for will increase air patrols and send out [6439] more
subs." Now, he had the same message at that time that Kimmel had'^
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What was he speaking of, or do you know?
He said, "When it is considered called for will increase air patrols" —
that is reconnaissance ?
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. "And send out more subs."
Now, if you had a war warning out, I am wondering what he had
in mind there and what he was asking you to do.
Admiral Stark. That meant that when in his judgment further
vessels should be sent out he would do so. The record will show
what he had out. The Army was scouting over there, and he was
scouting over there. He had submarines out. I am not sure just
where his destroyers were at that time. He had sent some ships to
the southward. He had kept in Manila Bay ready for further scout-
ing, if necessary, or for attack in case we were attacked, a certain
number of submarines.
Senator Ferguson. Don't mind me now. Admiral, for just a moment.
Mr. Chairman, I ask to put in the record this message, because it
is not in the record yet.
The Chairman. Which one is that ?
[6.U0] Senator Ferguson. The one dated December 2, 1941,
from CinCaf for action, OpNav.
[644^] It starts out :
My views are as follows: The Jap movement down the Indo-Chinese coast is
already defined but it remains to be seen whether aimed against the Malay
Peninsula, Borneo, or both. That the British can meet their commitment to
guard as far as Cape Padaran and we should use what have left after guarding
against descent on Luzon in watching for one on Borneo.
W^hat could he be there talking about ? That the British can meet
their commitment to guard as far as Cape Padaran?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson (reading) :
And we should use what have left after guarding against descent on Luzon in
watching for on,e on Borneo. Am recalling Isabel from current mission and
sending toward Padaran. She is too short radius to accomplish much and since
we have few fast ships her loss would be serious. Therefore have to recom-
mend against carrying out Isabel's movement though it is improbable that can
start any chartered craft within two days.
It is improbable, he said. That is the one that the President had
ordered, I take it.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
79716— 46— pt. 5 24
2418 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson (reading) :
Am searching for vessels for charter that are suitable but cannot yet estimate
time required to [^^-^2] obtain and equip with radio.
Army planes are reconnoitering sector northerly from Luzon and eastward
from Sanbernardino. Navy planes northwesterly from Luzon, also covering
Balabac Strait and joining up with Dutch to cover Mindanao-Halmahera line,
effectiveness is problematical but as great effort as available forces can sustain
continuously. Two cruisers, two desdivs —
what is that ?
Admiral Stark. Destroyer divisions.
Senator Ferguson (reading) :
Two desdivs are deployed well south, remainder surface forces on local mis-
sions or repairing.
Have five submarines out now, remainder either placed in readiness for de-
fensive missions or held here prepared for offensive tasks. When it is con-
sidered called for will increase air patrols and send out more subs.
Now that gave you a definite statement as to what Admiral Hart
was doing?
Admiral Stark. That was a very comprehensive picture.
Senator Ferguson. Now was not he operating on a plan with the
British and Dutch even though the attack would not have been on
America ?
Admiral Stark. The dispatch shows that he was, to some extent,
dovetailing where he was searching. It states there, I believe, that
he was covering up to a certain point, and [^44^] then the
Dutch were covering, and in a previous dispatch you may recall I had
told him where the British were searching.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral Stark, we can assume that the Jap-
anese knew what we were doing as far as these ships were concerned
on December 2, 1941 ?
Admiral Stark. I think we could not assume that they knew where
his submarines were.
Senator Ferguson. Outside of the subs.
Admiral Stark. Outside of the submarines I dare say they had the
picture.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. And therefore, to all intent and pur-
poses, on the surface it would look as if the British, the Dutch, and
the United States had one plan in relation to an attack on the Kra
Peninsula?
Admiral Stark. Their searches were made in coordination.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now that beino; true, was it not also ap-
parent to America that if the Japs were going to attack one it meant
war with all ?
Admiral Stark. I can only repeat what I have said before, that I
did not know, and I do not know now, if Japan had attacked one or
two and left us out
Senator Ferguson (interposing). That was not my question. My
question was from the Japanese viewpoint.
Admiral Stark. What is that, sir?
[6M] Senator Ferguson. From the Japanese viewpoint of
what was going on with this plan, Avoitld not it be apparent to the
Japanese, in what we were going to do, apparent to the Japanese that
if they attacked the British it would mean war with all three ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2419
Admiral Stark. I think that would depend a good deal on how
they had sized up the situation, and the opinions of the American
people and a political estimate as to what our Congress might do,
and I would say that would have been a tall order. I do not know.
[644-5] Senator Ferguson. On the 23d of September 1941 you
wrote to Kimmel
Admiral Stark. What date was that?
Senator Ferguson. The 23d of September 1941.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. On the second page of that letter you said this :
The operations of the Pacific Fleet ought not to be considered separately from
the operations of the Asiatic Fleet and the British and Dutch forces in the
Far East.
Now, that is just what we were doing on the 2d of December 1941,
isn't that true ?
Admiral Stark. That is true, and that is what we were planning.
We had to know what our possible allies would do if we were to get in.
Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral Stark, did it become aware to
you in the meetings with the President, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Chief of Staff
that Japan's stand was that, if the American-Japanese negotiations
fell, the result would be war in the Pacific?
Admiral Stark. If the Japanese negotiations fell, there would
be war in the Pacific ?
[644-6] Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. It was likely. We stated, I believe, in one letter
it might possibly mean a breaking up of negotiations. After the
destruction of codes it looked definitely like Japan would attack all
three, and we took no chance even before that, but that she might.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, in December 1941 were we breaking
the Jap Navy code ?
Admiral Stark. December 1941 ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. We were breaking some of their codes, but not all
of them. We had broken, as I recall — I would be glad if j^ou would
verify this, but one of the codes that w^e had not broken and which
had been assigned to the unit in Hawaii was the Japanese naval code.
I think that was not broken at that time. What other codes were not
broken, I do not know. We did not break them all.
Senator Ferguson. Was the movement into the Kra Peninsula a
rejection of the note of the I7th of August, or was it a rejection of
the note of the 26th of November ?
Admiral Stark. Well, I would say it was a rejection of what they
knew we were opposed to. It was further military extension by Japan,
something to which they knew we were opposed.
[6446-A] Senator Ferguson. Will you refer to your letter of
August 28 ?
Admiral Stark. 1940 or 1941 ?
Senator Ferguson. 1941.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; I have it.
[644'^] Senator Ferguson. You referred in that letter, on the
second page of that letters, Admiral, down, "Once again thanks for the
2420 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
human side of the news," and this is what I want to call your
attention to :
With regard to the general situation in the Pacific, about all I can say is that
the Japs seems to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods. I
can only intimate to you that some very strong messages have been sent to them,
but just what they are going to do I don't know.
What messages were you referring to, to Kimmel ?
Admiral Stark. I think
Senator Ferguson. You said you could only intimate to him. What
were those messages ?
Admiral Stark. I think the message to which I undoubtedly
referred there was the message which had been sent by the State
Department, as I recall, on 17 August, and to which you have made
reference previously.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. This letter
Senator Ferguson. Refers to that message ?
Admiral Stark. I think so ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, if the movement on the Kra was a rejec-
tion of the note of the l7th of August and also a rejection of the note
of the 26th, wasn't the 14-part [644'^-A] message only a
confirmation of that rejection ?
Admiral Stark. I thought the 14-part message first set up a con-
firmation of what they had said before and put it all together and
finally stated what, as I testified, we had said in substance some days
earlier, namely, that negotiations were broken off.
Senator Ferguson. Was there anything said at the Atlantic Con-
ference about babying them along for 3 months, or anything to that
effect?
Admiral Stark. I never heard of it until it came up in recent
months.
Senator Ferguson. Do you remember preparing an instiTiment with
the Chief of Staff which provided a line beyond which the Japs were
not allowed to go ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Will you tell me whether you conferred with
the President on that before you drew it up ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall that we did. He got it, of course,
after we had drawn it up.
Senator Ferguson. Was it ever acted upon ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Was it turned down by the President ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall any action with regard to it. He
had the information, I know, and I feel that he was [644^]
endeavoring to and was backing Mr. Hull in his efforts to maintain
peace, but as to giving us any clear indication, or any indication of
what he would do if they went beyond this line, I have no recollection
of his ever having given us any intimation on that.
Senator Ferguson. On the 2-tth of November Senator Pepper in a
speech at Boston said that a line had been marked in the Pacific, and if
the Japs crossed that line, the United States Navy would shoot without
a declaration of war. Had you ever heard of that before ?
Admiral Stahk. You mean before right now ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2421
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. I may have. I would not have given it any weight
at the time.
Senator Ferguson. Here is j^our memorandum of the l7th — no, of
the 5th — where you put down a line, but you say it has never been
agreed to. Here is Senator Pepper on the 24th, the same month, saying
that a line had been marked in the Pacific and that if the Japs crossed
that line the United States Navy, and that is your department, would
shoot without a declaration of war.
Was that a fact ?
Admiral Stark. If the Senator is available may I suggest you ask
him.
[644^] Senator Ferguson, No ; I am asking you. As far as you
knew, was it a fact ?
Admiral Stark. Not so far as I knew ; no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You knew of no such line, that if they crossed
that your Navy was going to shoot ?
Admiral Stark. We had no commitment or any intimation that we
would shoot until we were attacked, in which case we would have done
it without any orders from anybody, depending on the scale.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I would like to know how far we are
going into these irresponsible statements that United States Senators
previous to Pearl Harbor made. If we get into that, we will never get
through.
Senator Ferguson. I am through with the statement. I merely
wanted to find out whether that was a fact, insofar as the admiral
knew, and he was in charge of our Navy, and he said it was not a fact.
And I take it for granted. Admiral, that you are the man that would
have known ?
Admiral Stark. I think so.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. You say that our fleet was on a war basis.
You still say that is a fact ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And that was done without consultation, [6450^
necessarily, with the President, merely with his assistant ?
Admiral Stark. The President knew that I was going to do that ;
I was getting everything readv as fast as possible, had started in on
that in 1939.
Senator Ferguson. I don't think that this particular question has
been asked you. Admiral.
What was the cause of the sending of the message of the 24th ? What
was in your mind when that message was sent, what caused you to
send a message ?
Admiral Stark. Well, in general, of course, it was the developing
seriousness of the situation. We had at that time the first dead-line
message. We had the Jap note also as background, of September
20
Mr. Mitchell. November 20.
Admiral Stark. November 20. We were getting nowhere and the
situation, the gravity of the situation was just generally increasing,
and my own feeling was, after talking with Mr. Hull, where I got
most of my background, that the chances of favorable conclusions, or
favorable outcome of our negotiations, were growing less and less, if
2422 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
they hadn't ah^eady practically disappeared. That background, un-
questionably, was influenced by conversations with Mr. Hull.
Senator Ferguson, At the time you got it you even had the change
of the date, put over to the 29th, where they [SJ^Bl'] stressed
the "repeat 29th"?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. In your conference at the White House on the
25th, which was the day following, with the President, Mr. Hull, Mr.
Stimson, Mr. Kjiox, and General Marshall, was the matter contained
in these intercepts that you have been given, about the deadline, dis-
cussed ?
Admiral Stark. As I said before, Senator Ferguson, I don't recall
just what we discussed at that time. I think everyone present had
seen those messages, knew about them, and we may have discussed
them, but certainly it was common knowledge to us at the time.
Senator Ferguson. Well, couldn't that have placed the date the
President thought might, there was some talk about being an attack
by the next Monday, because that would be the very date —
Admiral Stark. Monday would not have been the 29th, would it?
Senator Ferguson. Monday was the 30th.
Admiral Stark. The 30th.
Senator Ferguson. Wliich was our 29th.
Admiral Stark. I don't know just why he made that statement as
regards Monday. It may have been a considered statement or it may
have just been one of those statements [64^2] which we all
make at times, "Well, I wouldn't be surprised if they attacked by next
Monday." I don't know.
Senator Ferguson. Was this discussed, that Japan was a nation that
would probably attack before a declaration of war?
Admiral Stark. We all knew that, that was common knowledge.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the President left for Warm
Springs on the night before he anticipated that there would be an
attack ?
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. He went on the 29th.
Admiral Stark. Yes. I knew it.
Senator Ferguson. And the conversation was about the attack com-
ing on the 30th. How do you account for that, was there any conver-
sation is what I have in mind.
Admiral Stark. His plan was to go. He did go. He knew that he
could be called back if necessary. And, incidentally, Mr. Hull asked
me about calling him back and I said I hated to do it but I advised
that he come back before his vacation was over. He needed the rest.
He had planned it. Wherever he would have been we would have
been in constant touch with him by telephone, if necessary, and a trip
by plane would have brought him back to Washington very quickly.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral Stark, as I get the picture [6453]
from what you have told us the President was greately interested in
all these moves, all these intercepted messages, they were being de-
livered to him daily, or hourly, as the case might be, and it was antici-
pated that the deadline would be on the 30th, and notwithstanding
that on the afternoon of the 20th the President went to Warm Springs!
Admiral Stark. He did.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2423
Senaor Ferguson. Now, did you have any conversation with him
about his messages, that would come through your Navy, these inter-
cepted codes, and. so forth, while he was at Warm Springs ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall having any conversation with him
while at Warm Springs ?
Senator Ferguson. To whom
Admiral Stark. While he was at Warm Springs.
Senator Ferguson. To whom were the messages delivered while the
President was at Warm Springs?
Admiral Stark. I don't recall that detail.
Senator Ferguson. That is a little more than a detail, isn't it?
Admiral Stark. Well, it is a detail ; arrangements were made to get
the President's mail to him by pouch, usually flown down, locked pouch,
or by courier, and they may very well have been sent that way, or to
his naval aide, I don't [64o4-] recall it. I don't recall having
taken the matter up. Arrangements for his mail were generally made
by his aide.
Senator Ferguson. Well, at least, you don't recall any conversation
about that ?
Admiral Stark. No, I do not, sir.
Senator Ferguson. There wasn't any doubt in your mind that the
President knew about the deadline being set on the 29th?
Admiral Stark. None.
Senator Ferguson. None whatever?
Admiral Stark. None whatever. When I say "none whatever,"
those messages were being delivered regularly to the White House and
I assume that he saw them, and that is what I base my answer on.
Senator Ferguson. That is right.
Do you know whether you ever had any discussions about these
important messages ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. As I stated, we were talking that situa-
tion over more or less continuously.
Senator Ferguson. With all that has been gone over about these
various messages, of the 27th and 26th, do you now recall anything
that you want to add, that you had conversations about with anyone,
as to why you sent one message on the 27th, why you sent another, of
a different [64S5-64S6] text, on the 28th?
Admiral Stark. Nothing beyond
Senator Ferguson. Or, the 29th.
Mr. Mitchell. What messages are they ?
Admiral Stark. Our messages and Army messages?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. No, I think I have covered that in my testimony
rather fully.
Senator Ferguson. You don't know of any conversations you had
with the President or Secretary of War or Navy on that question ?
Admiral Stark. Beyond what I have testified to, which is the fact
they were familiar with them.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether you ever discussed with
the President the message which was intercepted from Tokyo to Ber-
lin on the 30th, it is at page 204 of our exhibit 1 ?
2424 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. Are you referring to that part of the message which
stated :
Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly
break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of
arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker
than anyone dreams.
[64-57] Senator Ferguson. Yes. You knew there was a tie-up
between Hitler and the Japs and you had this message in your posses-
sion on the 1st. It was translated on the 1st. Did you ever discuss
that with the President?
Admiral Stark. I may have. The message was undoubtedly sent
to him. I had anticipated the effect of that message by having previ-
ously stated in a dispatch that it might come within the next few days,
that dispatch being of the 27th, and Marshall having stated it might
come any time.
Senator Ferguson. Was this called to your attention, that we inter-
cepted parts 1 and 3 of that very vital and important mesage, but we
don't have part 2 here — and I want to read you the first line of part 3 :
If when you tell them this
Which would be referring to what was in part 2.
If when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our
attitude towai'd the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward
the Russians in our statement of last July.
Was there anything said about this missing part of this important
message ?
Admiral Stark. I don't recall it.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not anyone got in touch
with the Philippines, where they were intercepting [64'58'] the
same kind of messages, to see whether or not part 2, which seemed to
be vital in this language, was ever intercepted ?
Mr. Mitchell. What about page 211? They are scattered around.
Senator Ferguson. That is a different number. I have written to —
or asked coimsel's office to write and try to locate why they didn't get
part 2 and why we don't have it. That is why I am questioning the
Admiral.
Admiral Stark. I don't recall it. We probably didn't get every-
thing. There may be gaps here and there all through this.
Senator Ferguson. Here is a very vital message. There are three
places that they are being intercepted and decoded. One is the British.
One at the Philippines. One is here. I am wondering whether this
wasn't called to your attention or whether you didn't notice in reading
these dispatches, whether you didn't notice it and say, "Wliere is
part 2."
It says :
If, when j'ou. tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you
Which indicates what was said in number 2.
Admiral Stark. I don't recall it, Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. You don't recall it at all ?
[64S9] Admiral Stark. No, I have no memory with regard to it,
but it may be that you can get that from other witnesses.
Senator Ferguson. But at least it didn't strike any chord in your
mind?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2425
Admiral Stark. It doesn't now, no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And doesn't even now ?
Admiral Stark. It does not now. I don't recall it.
Senator Ferguson. You don't think that that could be a very sig-
nificant message — did you ever try to get it from the British?
Admiral Stark. I don't recall the incident. I believe we were
exchanging with the British almost continuously. It is my recollection
that we had a British Officer right in our group in Corregidor and
that we had an officer right in their group in the Singapore area.
[64.60] Senator Ferguson. Did we have them in London with
them?
Admiral Stark. I don't recall that. We probably — well, I don't
recall. You can get that from the Department.
Senator Ferguson. Did you get over your desk. Admiral, admi-
ralty messages?
Admiral Stark. Well, I got over my desk any admiralty messages
which were intended for me.
Senator Ferguson. Well, I am talking about admiralty messages
on this question of intercepts. For instance, they wired that about
the Kra Peninsula.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; I got that.
Senator Ferguson. Ship movement.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. Those messages would come through the
same channels through which messages from our own people came,
and they would be delivered to me in the same manner.
Senator Ferguson. Do you recall ever getting this part 2 ?
Admiral Stark. I don't recall the thing at all; no, sir. The answer
is no.
Senator Ferguson. Do you recall part 1 and part 3 ?
Admiral Stark. I recall the one about the war breaking out. To
the best of my remembrance, I saw that at the time. That sort of
rang the bell somewhere. But some of this is [6461~\ pretty
difficult to separate after the intervening years, as to whether you are
thinking in terms of what you are reading now or what you saw then.
But I do think that I saw that particular message.
Senator Ferguson. When you take that with the previous message
on the 29th from Berlin to Tokyo, where they hadn't given them any
information, then when the deadline comes along we get this im-
portant information going right into Berlin, doesn't that impress you
that you knew about that ?
Admiral Stark. I was greatly impressed when I sent out a message
stating it was a war warning and that the Japs were expected to
strike in the next few days. I don't know how I could have made it
stronger or more unequivocal.
Senator Ferguson. Of course, this all came after you sent the war-
warning message.
Admiral Stark. This particular message did. The previous one
you referred to did not. It was confirmatory of our evaluation which
we had made and sent out.
Senator Ferguson. Do you recall where you were when you received
the word of the attack ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
. Senator Ferguson. Where were you ?
2426 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. I was in the office.
Senator Ferguson. Whose office?
[6462] Admiral Stark. My own.
Senator Ferguson. Were you with the Secretary of the Navy when
he received his message ?
Admiral Stark. You mean the 1300 message ? I was not with him
when he received that. I believe he received that very shortly after
I did. It was delivered to him in the State Department.
Senator Ferguson. I mean the attack message.
Admiral Stark. The attack message.
Senator Ferguson. This is a raid, not a — what do you call it when
it is not maneuvers — no drill?
Admiral Stark. This was a raid. With regard to the Secretary's
moves at that time, you know that there had been some telephone calls
recorded, and I had been asked what they were, and trying to get
back in my memory what they were, and I recently saw someone who
was going up North, and endeavoring to check back on that, and I
have learned this, and with full authority.
Secretary Knox had intended this morning going to Chicago with
Mr. O'Keefe, who, I believe, was manager of his paper. His plane
was standing by. He stopped in at the State Department. And
after that conference, according to Mrs. Knox, who was waiting for
him and expecting him to go on, he changed his plan and O'Keefe
went on separately. The Secretary went [6463] on down to
the /Sequoia, his naval yacht, for lunch, and she remarked they were
not ready for them, and not expecting them. My guess would be that
he received the dispatch while on the /Sequoia. He came to the office
later and remained in the office, getting home that night about 2
o'clock in the morning.
Senator Ferguson. Were you in the Secretary of the Navy's office
between 12 and 12 : 30 on Sunday ?
Admiral Stark. I don't recall, Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. To refresh
Admiral Stark. The clear thing that stands out in my memory is
the discussion of the 1300 dispatch.
Senator Ferguson. Now, the 1300 dispatch is the 1 o'clock dispatch?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. My memory is extremely clear on that.
Senator Ferguson. Does this refresh you memory, that the Secre-
tary of the Navy received that as you and he came out of your office —
out of his office ? He made a remark about it. I am trymg to get the
remark, if you remember.
Admiral Stark. I do not remember discussing it with him. As to
the time of delivery, the dispatches were delivered, I believe, by
Kramer, who is going to be a witness here, and it is my understanding
that immediately after bringing the message [6464] to my
office, about 10 : 40, as I recall, he went directlj'^ to the State Depart-
ment and delivered the message, delivered Colonel Knox a copy of
that message.
The Chairman. It is now past recess time.
Senator Ferguson. I can't finish in the next few minutes.
The Chairman. We will recess until 2 o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 12: 30 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the
same day.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2427
[6465] AFTERNOON SESSION — 2 P. M.
The Vice Chairman. The committee will be in order.
TESTIMONY OF ADM. HAEOLD R. STARK (Resumed)
The Vice Chairman. Dues counsel have anything now ?
Mr. Mitchell. Not just at present.
The Vice Chairman. Admiral, do you have anything to present
before you proceed ?
Admiral Stark. Sir?
The Vice Chairman. Do you have anything you want to present
at this time ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson will resume his inquiry.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, did you know of any diplomatic rela-
tions being carried on with Japan along the same questions that we
were carrying them on, by the British Empire, by London or by the
Netherlands ?
Admiral Stark. I gather the question is
Senator Ferguson. During the period that we were negotiating.
Admiral Stark. Did I know whether Great Britain or the
Netherlands were carrying on ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
[6466] Admiral Stark. No, sir, I did not know.
Senator Ferguson. You had no information on that subject?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, when you were moving the vessels
around in the Pacific was it called to your attention, or did you ever
get any information to the effect that Japan made a protest that our
fleet in effect had surrounded one of their task forces or their fleet
in the Pacific ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You never heard of that in 1940?
Admiral Stark. I never heard of that at any time.
Senator Ferguson. We had no particular lanes laid out at that
time?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That had never been called to your attention,
that there was a protest filed ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct, it never had. When I state that
we had no particular lanes laid out, there were certain areas wherein
the fleet exercised.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, as far as our fleet was concerned.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir, as far as our local exercise in an area.
Senator Ferguson. Well, it was also true when we were exercising
that we had some difficulty with parts of the Jap [6467] fleet
getting in there and observing those ?
Admiral Stark. We seldom had fleet maneuvers when I was in the
fleet on the west coast that some time or other during the maneuvers
a Japanese tanker or Japanese fishermen were not present. That
goes back a number of years.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. So we felt at that time they were even
using that means of obtaining information ?
2428 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. Always regarding our fleet formations and how we
were maneuvering.
Senator Ferguson. It was no surprise then for us to learn how much
in detail they had obtained the information at Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the statement made in
exhibit 16 by Admiral Schuirmann in relation to the note of August
17?
Admiral Stark. That it was an ultimatum?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. I did not know about that or did not recall it until
after the discussion of that here before the committee that there was an
ultimatum and somebody discussed that. We have had a lot of fun
with Admiral Schuirmann about it but I have no recollection of it
otherwise.
Senator Ferguson. In exhibit 45, Admiral, there is one [6468]
sentence I would like to talk with you about in order to get your
explanation of it.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson (reading).
The Secretary of War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be
construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen
the conversations. He was assured on that point. It was agreed that the
memorandum would be shown to both, Secretaries before dispatch.
Will you explain that as far as your knowledge was concerned, as
to what it was?
Admiral Stark. Well, as I recall, the changes suggested by Colonel
Stimson were very minor and also, as I recall, he did not want us to
put the President in a position, or recommend in any way that he go
back to the Japanese in any way which would walk back anything we
had said. My recollection is not too clear. I do not think it amounted
to a great deal. The memorandum stands about as it was. If he
comes before the committee he can give it himself and I would rather
he would. My remembrance is that we did not want to be put in a
position of — or, rather, Colonel Stimson did not want to be, of walking
back on anything we had done.
Senator Ferguson. I had felt that there was some doubt [64(>9]
that he might appear and that is the reason that you, being a top,
high-ranking officer of the Navy and being a party to this instrument,
in effect drawing it up, that you would be able to explain that as far as
the Navy was concerned.
Admiral Stark. Well, I think that is what it was.
Senator Ferguson. You have no better or different recollection than
that?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Was it considered that that was part of the dip-
lomatic-political angle that you were not to be concerned with that
you were strictly to keep to the military?
Admiral Stark. No.
Senator Ferguson. Was that explained to you in any way?
Admiral Stark. No, sir; we had the right to say anything we
wanted to. I think the message speaks for itself. Primarily, and
as I recall this message of the 27th so stated, either that or the one of
the 5th or both — we were primarily concerned with getting time.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2429
Senator Ferguson. Did you understand this the same as I under-
stood that Admiral Turner understood, the memo of the 27th was
brought about by the British, that they wanted it drafted and that
they were after that information? It was to be given to the Presi-
dent so that he could pass upon a question that they wanted in rela-
tion to sending out some reconnaissance [64-70] planes ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall the British prompting having any-
thing to do with this memorandum.
Senator Ferguson. Well, you recall in one of the diplomatic notes
there is evidence that we were to send out three scouting planes?
Admiral Stark. Yes. I do not know about the diplomatic notes.
I remember having directed Admiral Hart to do that and stating that
the British were — I remember what you are talking about now.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. And that the British were scouting a certain area
and this dovetailed with it. That may have been in response to either
a request of theirs or of their stating where they were looking and
asking what we were doing and, as a matter of fact, I think I am cor-
rect in stating that Admiral Hart was already doing that before we
told him.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now. Admiral Turner gave us the infor-
mation that one of our planes in scouting had gone over Formosa
and there was a protest. Did you ever see that protest ?
Admiral Stark. I remember his stating it. I had forgotten the
incident.
Senator Ferguson. You have no knowledge of that ?
[647J] Admiral Stark. I had forgotten it. I have knowledge
of it now.
Senator Ferguson. You say you did have knowledge ?
Admiral Stark. I say I had forgotten it. I have knowledge of it
now from the statement which has been made.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know what was done about the pro-
test ? Had you any conversation with the President about it ?
Admiral Stark. Not that I recall. I think not. I do not know
what was done about the protest, whether it was let go or what not.
They were flying over us in spots regularly and we knew it and they
knew it.
Senator Ferguson. That was not one of the things that made the
wording "Avoid the first overt act" to be put in the note? I assume
that that was after the note was given.
Admiral Stark. That is with respect to the Army note?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. I am not sure. I do not recall of the President
having directly told us not to put it in the dispatch, certainly we did
not put it in, not to commit the first overt act. That, however, I
knew to be general policy.
Senator Ferguson. It was the general policy ?
Admiral Stark. General policy; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Are you familiar with Admiral Kimmel's
retirement ?
[647^'] Admiral Stark. Well, I knew that he had retired; yes,
sir.
Senator Ferguson. And will you tell us what you know about it?
Were you consulted or conferred with ?
2430 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. I was directed.
Senator Ferguson. Who directed you ?
Admiral Stark. It came to me from Colonel Knox regarding the
relief of Kimmel ; regarding his detachment.
Senator Ferguson. Yesterday, when you read the memo of Secre-
tary Knox to the President you did not find anything there critical
about his removal.
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, when did Colonel Knox first talk with you
about the removal of or detachment of Kimmel ?
Admiral Stark. Shortly after he came back and after coming from
the White House he directed that Kimmel be relieved. There is a
dispatch from the Secretary of the Navy to the commander in chief.
Pacific, 162105 ; that would be 16 December.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark (reading) :
You will very shortly receive dispatch orders detaching you as CINC Pacific and
Commander in Chief U. S. Fleet and ordering you report Com. 14 for temporary
duty.
[6Jf73] Inform Pye.
That is Admiral Pye.
He will be your temporary relief.
That is from the Secretary of the Navy and it bears my initials and
also those of Admiral Nimitz, who was Chief of Personnel at that time.
Senator Ferguson. So you had no conversation with him as to the
cause, merely that you were approving or initialing the order doing it?
Admiral Stark. I received my orders regarding Kimmel. I was not
consulted beforehand.
Senator Ferguson. Did he say he had any conversation with the
President about his removal or his detachment?
Admiral Stark. A commander in chief would not be removed with-
out the President's permission.
Senator Ferguson. "Well, of course, there is a distinction between
permission and a directive.
Admiral Stark. I say without his permission or without his O. K.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether it was on his direction ?
Admiral Stark. Well, I know that the Secretary told me to send
that dispatch and that the Secretary had been in touch with the Presi-
dent. I never asked the Secretary whether the President directed it
initially or whether he did or whether [04'H] it was Colonel
Knox's recommendation to the President and the President so ordered.
Senator Ferguson. But you took it then that it was on at least the
President's order ?
Admiral Stark. In effect ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. And how many days would you say that
was after Colonel Knox returned from the Pacific ?
Admiral Stark. I think it might be best to get the fact on that.
Senator Ferguson. Well, I do not have the information.
Admiral Stark. It was shortly after, I would say that.
Senator Ferguson. Was it hours or days or a week ?
Admiral Stark. Well, I would say shortly. By "shortly" I mean
perhaps in a day or two.
Senator Fei^guson. Then he retired to the coast ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2431
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did you have any conversation with him
or anyone else about his resignation or retirement ?
Admiral Stark. I wrote him, as I recall, with regard to his retire-
ment and I have not seen a copy of that letter. Whether it was official
or whether Admiral Kimmel may have a copy of it, I do not know.
Senator Ferguson. Well, what did you say? What was the sub-
stance of the letter you wrote him about his retirement? [64-751
Now, when you said "official" did you mean whether you were acting
as an official or personal ?
Admiral Stark. Whether I wrote him an official note from Chief of
Operation to Admiral Kimmel or whether it was one of my "Dear
Kimmel" letters ?
Senator Ferguson. Well, it would amount to the same thing about
his retirement?
Admiral Stark. It would be notifying him ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What did you write him ?
Admiral Stark. My recollection — and I want to make it plain that
this is recollection — is that I discussed the matter from one angle or
another, suggested that I was not trying unduly or even to influence
him, pointed out that Short had requested retirement and that he
might want to parallel that or he might not and asked him to advise
me. I wish I could find that correspondence and whether Admiral
Kimmel has a copy of it or not I do not know.
Senator Ferguson. Did you write that after conference with
anyone ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; with the Secretary of the Navy.
Senator Ferguson. Was it on his request that you do it in that way,
which was at least a polite suggestion, wasn't it?
Admiral Stark. Well, he was familiar with it. Wliether [6p'6]
it was my suggestion or his, I am not certain.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever call anyone at the Mare Navy
Yard in relation to it ?
Admiral Stark. At where ?
Senator Ferguson. At Mare Island.
Admiral Stark. I think I did talk to Kimmel or to the officer out
there at the time with reference to getting some word to him. Kimmel
afterwards came to Washington.
Senator Ferguson. Do you remember what was said in that con-
versation about asking him to retire ?
Admiral Stark. No. I only remember the general subject of retire-
ment and that it was taken up.
Senator Ferguson. And he did retire on your suggestion then?
Admiral Stark. He retired
Senator Ferguson. That is, your suggestion from the Secretary.
Admiral Stark (continuing). On his own volition. We did not
force him at all as I remember it. I never knew of a man to put up
a manlier, straighter, finer front than did Admiral Kimmel in this
entire picture at that time. His whole bearing was exemplary and
what I would have expected of him.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. I understand that the information or
opinion that you had was if he had not retired he [64.77] would
have been removed?
2432 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. If he had not retired I do not know just what action
might have been taken.
Senator Ferguson. Well, had you a conversation with the Secretary
about that ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall that, when I got it. We did not
have to.
Senator Ferguson. You felt that he would do it on the suggestion ?
Admiral Stark. He did it. He did do it, I think, after sizing up
all the considerations and, as he said, he had only the best interests
of the Navy and of the country at heart, I believe almost in those
words and what happened to him he was not so concerned with at
that time, the war was on, and I believe his own size-up of the situation
was that the best thing for him to do at that time was to retire. Now,
if I am mistaken in that he can correct it and I would abide by anything
that he stated with regard to it.
Senator Ferguson. And did the Secretary of the Navy say that he
had had a conversation with the President or not about his retirement ?
Was that a matter that only the President could pass on ?
Admiral Stark. I imagine that had been discussed with the Presi-
dent because the future of those two officers at that time [64-78]
was on a high level.
Senator Ferguson. Well, you assumed that that was true when you
were talking to the Secretary of the Navy?
Admiral Stark. I think Colonel Knox undoubtedly told the Presi-
dent just what we were doing because I had kept Colonel Knox fully
informed.
Senator Ferguson. And how long was that after your letter to him
that he retired?
Admiral Stark. That he actually retired ?
Senator Ferguson. That he actually retired ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. I do not remember the date of his retirement, sir.
Counsel can also get that from the Navy Department if it is desired.
Senator Ferguson. Now, one or two questions on the wind message.
Did you ever see the message that came from Batavia in relation to
the wind message, that had a little different angle to it than ours.
Instead of diplomatic relations being broken off it used the word
"war."
Admiral Stark. My recollection is very hazy on that entire subject.
I heard it discussed so much since then, before the Navy Court of In-
quiry and what has been testified to, I know exactly to what you are
referring; whether my remembrance is in the light of what I have
heard since or before t am not sure. I do not recollect it except as it
has come to us later [64-79] but I may have known it at the time.
Senator Ferguson. Well, it would be very significant, would it not,
that they expected if relations were broken off, it meant war?
Admiral Stark. It was very likely to mean war.
Senator Ferguson. That was your opinion whether you would have
had that message or not ?
Admiral Stark. If we broke off relations?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; I thought we were heading for it pretty
well anvwav.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2433
Senator Ferguson. Well, then, the message that they sent of 14
parts was more than an ultimatum, was it not? There was no chance
to comply with that at all and never was intended.
Admiral Stark. That broke off negotiations.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. In other words, you described that the
other day as an ultimatum. It was more than that, was it not?
Admiral Stark. I described it as an ultimatum?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. I do not recall, but it was to break off all nego-
tiations.
Senator Ferguson. It was more than an ultimatum because
[64>80] we could not even, comply with it if we wanted to. They
intended war.
Admiral Stark. The message stands for itself, I think. Senator
Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, did you hear before the Pres-
ident sent this message to the Emperor that he was going to send
one? Were you consulted about that?
Admiral Stark. I believe I knew about that ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. How long before the evening of the 6th were
you informed about that message?
Admiral Stark. I do not remember just when. I knew that there
was talk about the President sending the message as one last hope for
continuing the peace in the Pacific. I could not say just when I
knew about it. I may have known about it shortly after it was
conceived, to which I believe Secretary — I do not know whether
Secretary Hull has testified as to that date or not.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have any opinions or was any opinion
sought by the President from you on that ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall that it was. It was one of those
things that might do some good, could do no harm. The issue was
pretty well drawn at that time. It was what might be called a last
hope. I recall the President's message with regard to the European
war before it broke out, and it is [64>81'] one of those things
which I believe we have always done.
Senator Ferguson. Now, in relation to that, as I am informed
and I will ask you, Did you hear that broadcast on the radio on Sat-
urday evening, that the message had been sent ?
Admiral Stark. I do not remember.
Senator Ferguson. That would be a very important matter,
w^ouldn't it ?
Admiral Stark. Important that I heard it over the radio ?
Senator Ferguson. No, no ; that you did hear it. You say you do
not remember hearing it.
Admiral Stark. Well, I do not know that it would have been par-
ticularly important if I knew it was going that I happened to hear it
over the radio.
\6JfS2'] Senator Ferguson. Now you had said in the message of
the 27th that diplomatic negotiations had ceased. Now I want to get
your opinion on how that would be construed in the field, hearing it on
the radio and knowing from press reports that on the 2d or 3d of De-
cember the President had made another request from the Japanese,
and that was in relation to going into Indochina, or Thailand, I do
not have that message here at the present time.
79716 — 46— pt. 5 25
2434 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. I do not know to just what message you refer about
the 2d or the 3d.
Senator Ferguson. There was a message sent on December 2d. In
the white book we have quite a number of conversations. In fact we
have on page 777 of Foreign Kelations one where Mr. Ballantine had
an appointment with Mr. Terasaki, and one on December 1 stating
"The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at their request at
the Department. Mr. Kurusu said that he noted that the President
was returning to Washington in advance of his schedule and inquired
what the reason for this was," and so forth.
Another note on December 2 handed by the first secretary of the
Japanese Embassy (Terasaki) to Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine on Decem-
ber 2, 1941.
Another memorandum of a conversation on December 2, 1941. An-
other memorandum on December 5 between the Japanese [6483^
Ambassador and the Department of State, stating, "The German Am-
bassador and Mr. Kurusu called at their request at the Department."
Admiral Stark. I remember those, or at least I have seen them
within the last few months. I thought you were referring to a mes-
sage which had been sent out from Washington.
Senator Ferguson. These are messages delivered by Washington,
or memoranda of conversations.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now that being true, and Admiral Kimmel not
knowing that the message of the 26th had gone, and we were waiting
for the reply on that message, and you saying it had practically
ceased, and all this information going out from the articles in the
newspapers, and the President personally negotiating with the
Emperor on the night of the 6th, would not that cause a belief that your
former message about "they had ceased" was not exactly true?
Admiral Stark. I think the Commander in Chief knew that I
would not make such a flat statement and of such gravity without full
consideration, and he would believe that if I said it, and said it to him
officially, it was so. I believe that that again backed up by the burning
of the codes, and even the burning of the codes in Honolulu, would
have outweighed anything else in his mind, or if he were in [^-^<54]
doubt he could have asked me, and I feel he would have thought that I
would have changed my message if there had been any reason to
change it.
Senator Ferguson. Now did not your message, when you sent him a
copy of the Army message, weaken it ?
Admiral Stark. I did not think so.
Senator Ferguson. You did not think so?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Reading it now, what would yoa say ?
Admiral Stark. No, I do not think so. I think my message stands
for itself.
Senator Ferguson. When was Singapore alerted, to your
knowledge ?
Admiral Stark. Singapore?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. By the British?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, the British in Singapore.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2435
Admiral Stark. I do not know.
Senator Ferguson. Had you any knowledge on that ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that on the 6th, and right before
the 7th, troop ships were sailing out of our west coast at San
Francisco ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, I probably did know that. I recall
[64^5] we were sending troops out, and I recall the action taken
the next day when we were wondering if submarines might not be
in that area.
Senator Ferguson. Did you see the Roberts report before it was
filed?
Admiral Stark. I do not think I did.
Senator Ferguson. Were you requested to make any changes in it ?
Admiral Stark. I beg pardon, sir ?
Senator Ferguson. I say were you requested to make some changes
in it ? Do you have some information that you want to get ?
Admiral Stark. This was information on my statement about
sailings. I think I have covered that.
Senator Ferguson. You cannot recollect seeing the Roberts report
before it was filed?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You were not consulted on it ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. What I saw about the Roberts report
was the printed report.
Senator Ferguson. Nothing but the printed report, after it was
printed ?
Admiral Stark. That is all I recall ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And you have not, I take it, then [64B6']
seen the original Roberts report since ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir; I have not. This is the document which
I saw [indicating]. Docket 159, Seventy-seventh Congress.
Senator Ferguson. That is the printed report. I want to ask you
now if you can recall going to the Secretary of the Navy's office at
noon prior to the 1300 message that we talked about this morning,
the one on attack, and talking with the Secretary for some 30 minutes ?
Admiral Stark. No; I have no recollection of that.
Senator Ferguson. Trying to refresh your memory, and only for
that purpose, when you and the Secretary were walking out of the
office the message was handed to the Secretary advising him about
the attack. Does that refresh your memory ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall it.
Senator Ferguson. You do not recall anything being discussed
with the Secretary of the Navy on the morning of the 7th ?
Admiral Stark. No, I do not.
Senator Ferguson. Now I will ask you when you first talked with
the President on Sunday, the 7th of December 1941 ?
Admiral Stark. I do not remember when I first talked to him. It
is my impression that I did talk to him after I had talked to Pearl
Harbor, but I do not remember the times of [64S7] those
calls.
Senator Ferguson. Now to again refresh your memory, and only
that, from the evidence that has appeared in one of the previous
hearings
2436 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Of Captain McCullom coming to your office and
giving you a message and you indicated that you were going to talk
to the White House and lifted up the phone and he left ?
Admiral Stark. That was after the attack?
Senator Ferguson. No ; before the attack. Do you recall any con-
versation with the President prior to the attack ?
Admiral Stark. No ; I do not.
Senator Ferguson. Do you recall any with him that day after the
attack ?
Admiral Stark. I think I did. It would ha"»^e been the most natural
thing in the world and in accordance with my regular procedure of
giving him anything of importance, any news of importance which
I had, and I had been in touch with the commander of Pearl Harbor
as regards what had happened out there. I either would have told
him personally or made sure that he would have gotten it through
Colonel Knox or his aide. Usually I picked up the phone and without
hesitation gave the President everything I had of interest.
[6488] Senator Ferguson. Do you know what his remark was
to you about the attack when you did discuss it with him, not saying
when the time was?
Admiral Stark. No, sir; I do not. I do not remember what his
expression was at that time when it occurred.
Senator Ferguson. Do you recall whether or not vou ever notified
CINCPAC and CINCAF of the orders to the Atlantic Fleet to start
shooting German subs?
Admiral Stark. I think I covered that in my statement, about
telling them about the order.
Senator Ferguson. There was no official order ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. It would be in that letter that I read to you this
morning, or that you read to me?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall having informed them officially. I
believe I sent them copies of the order and told them in a personal
letter.^
Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, is there anything that you want
to add on this record or that you want to take from the record as far
as any of my questions or any other questions are concerned?
Admiral Stark. No, sir; I think of nothing at this time. I will
read the record over very carefully. I liave not had an opportunity
to do it. If there is anything I will write [6489] a letter to the
committee. I was trying to think during the noon hour if there was
anything — thinking of your questions — anything that I could add that
would be helpful. I could think of nothing that I could subtract and
I cannot think of anything that has not been pretty well covered, as
far as I am concerned.
Senator Ferguson. Then what you want to tell us is that at least
you have had a fair hearing, and a complete hearing, that you have
had an opportunity to give all your versions and views before this
committee ?
Admiral Stark. Absolutely ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Whether the questions were asked or not, you
have had that opportunity ?
1 See Hearings, Part 6, p. 2668 et seq., for a letter from Adm. Stark and list of Naval
commands receiving Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 5.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2437
Admiral Stark. That is correct. If I thought there was anything
of any importance, or if I do think of anything which I have left out,
I would not hesitate to send it up.
Senator Ferguson. That was the purpose of my questions to you.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; I understand.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. I yield.
The Vice Chairman. Are you through, Senator?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. It seems at the time the Senator from Michigan
164^0] placed in the record a series of messages between certain
dates and at certain pages to Pearl Harbor he left out one particular
message in exhibit No. 2. I find that the message in regard to the
Philippines is not there, but since there has been so much testimony
about the bomb plot at Hawaii and some questions particularly by
Mr. Gesell that the other messages were mostly ship movements, there
has been some testimony by General Marshall to the effect that there
were other messages that were not ship-movement messages.
I would like to place in the record at this time reference to the
entries in exhibit No. 2 at page 34 which pertains to maps and charts
of the Panama Canal Zone ; at page 36, which speaks of a transfer of
an air depot at Panama Canal, about the petroleum supply tanks being
camouflaged, about the amount of food supplies there, about the shift-
ing around of the use of the ammunition loading pier.
I would like also to place in the record the entry at page 122, again
thinking about taking the maps of the Panama Canal out by plane
so they would not be picked up.
Again, I would like to place in the record the message at page 125,
and particularly this quotation:
Since the beginning of the German-Soviet war the naval authorities here
have tightened up on watch and are engaged in naval preparations by enforc-
ing various [6491] exercises to meet any eventuality.
And again I quote :
Evidently the preparations are intended for defense against Japan.
And again:
Lately the departure of craft from the bay has become infrequent but since the
war, those craft which do go out seldom return, even through it be Saturday
or Sunday.
I would like also to place in the record the entry at page 123 out-
lining the preparations which the Russians made in the month of
June at Vladivostok.
I would also ask to have placed in the record the entry at page 38
about the inspection for the location of airplane bases and the con-
struction of airports at Panama Canal.
Also the entry at page 39, dated October 18, 1941, where the state-
ment is made, "In order to find out the plans of the Canal Command, I
inspected the military establisliment at the Pacific end on the 10th."
And again, "goin^ on at a rapid rate and the whole area is being
covered with fortifications. Specifically, at Albrook Field, 3 large
hangars, storehouses for airplane parts, underground tanks, and 8
barracks to accommodate 200 men each."
2438 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
As well as the entry at page 40 in regard to gun emplace- [64^2]
ments. The entry at page 51 — and I would like to call particular
attention to that entry, wherein the following language is used — it was
sent on the 22d of November 1941 and not translated until December
25, 1941, but the language is used :
The United States Government is going on the assumption that the attack on
the Canal will be made from both air and sea.
I would like also to put in the entry at page 52, which speaks of the
antiair defenses on Lock No. 1, which is now being used, are being
improved. It states :
Of course, there are anti-air defenses at Lock No. 3. The naval defense area,
patrolled against possible lightning attacks, extends in the north from Saliona
Cruz on the Tehuantepec Isthmus to Monepene on the Gulf of Fonesca. The
southern limits extend to the air base on the Galapagos Islands.
[6493] Present Army strength is 47,000; naval, 10,000; Air Force, 5,000. In
addition, it is estimated that there is approximately twice this general total, made
up of the families and laborers,
and so on.
I would like also to call your attention to the entries at pages 58, 70,
71, 79, 81, 82, 88, 89, 91, 92, 94, and 96 none of which are ship-movement
reports but in effect specific inquiries about the Aleutians and Alaska,
about the Panama Canal Zone, about the Philippines, as well as the
west coast of the United States.
And I would like to call the particular attention of the committee
to the master plan for espionage at page 117.
The Vice Chairman. All of those pages are in exhibit 2?
Mr. Murphy. All in exhibit 2.
The Vice Chairman. All right, it will be so ordered.
Do you have something, Admiral ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I understand the committee asked me
for the time of transmission by radio to Honolulu of certain of our
dispatches, and I have it here. I will give it to counsel. It just gives
the time groups.
There is the message of the 24th, with which you are all familiar,
in which the time of transmission was 24 — 2355, and it runs down
through from that message of the 27th and those with regard to the
codes. I do not know who asked for it, [GlfdJ^] but counsel
informs me that someone did.
Senator Ferouson. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt for a mo-
ment and ask if you obtained the Munson reports yet, or were they
delivered to you ?
Admiral Stark. I think they have not yet come up. Counsel wag
going to ask for them.
Senator Ferguson. At least they have not come to your attention?
Admiral Stark. I will follow it up personally, to make sure that
they come through.
Mr. Mitchell. While we are on it, I will ask the reporter to write
into the daily transcript this memorandum that has just been fur-
nished by the admiral, giving the times. These were received by the
naval radio station at Honolulu and are expressed in Greenwich
civil time.
The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2439
(The memorandum referred to follows:)
[6405] Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington 25, D. C, 5 Jan 1946.
In reply refer to Initials
and No.
Op-20-4-blp
Serial 0003n03P20
(SC)A17-24(1)
Top Secret
Memorandum for Captain John F. Walsh, USN.
Subj : Congressional Investigation of Pearl Harbor Attack.
Ref : (a) Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark, dtd 3 Jan 46.
1. The following information is submitted in accordance with reference (a).
The times given represent time received by Naval Radio Station, Honolulu, T. H.,
and are expressed in Greenwich Civil Time :
Originator
Date/time
group
Month and year
Time of trans*
mission to
radio Hono-
lulu
OPNav --
242005
272337
290110
031850
031855
270038
270040
November 1941
242355
OPNav
November 1941..
280106
OPNav
November 1941
290238
OPNav
December 1941 ._
031S56
OPNav
December 1941
031S52
OPNav
November 1941
270:09
OPNav
November 1941
270568
[64.96]
/S/ Joseph R. Redman,
Joseph R. Redman,
Rear Admiral, USN,
Chief of Naval Communications.
\_6Ji97'] The Vice Chaikman. Is there anything else, Admiral?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir, just one short letter. You may recall
that in my testimony, when the question came up of dawn at Honolulu,
I stated I thought it was at least an hour before the 7 : 55 time which
was reported as the time of the attack, and that I could get something
definite on that from the Naval Observatory. I made a request of the
Superintendent of the Naval Observatory, and I have his report, which,
if you would like to have it, I will read. It will clear up that matter.
The Vice Chairman. You may proceed.
Admiral Stark (reading) :
On December 7, 1941, sunrise at Pearl Harbor occurred at 0627 —
that is 6 : 27—
time of 157°. 5 meridian (Zone+10'' 80'"). National twilight began 52 minutes
before sunrise, at 0535; and civil twilight 24 minutes before sunrise, at 0603.
Civil twilight is conventionally taken to begin in the morning when the sun is
still 6° below the horizon, and is intended to cover the somewhat indefinite
period during which the natural illumination usually is sufficient for ordinary
outdoor operations to be carried on.
That was at 3 minutes after 6 : 00.
Nautical twilight begins when the sun is 12° below the horizon, a time inter-
mediate [6498] between complete darkness and civil twilight. Actually,
the illumination varies greatly according to weather conditions at the time.
The moon was a few days past full (full moon occurred on Dec. 3). The moon
rose at 2005—
that is 8 : 05 p. m. —
2440 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
on the evening of December 6 and set at 0925 on the morning of December 7
(Zone 10'' 30'" time) at Pearl Harbor.
The times of sunrise, and of moonset, are for the instant when the tipper limb
appears on the horizon.
That is, you get the round sun, and the upper limb is the tangent
to the horizon.
The Vice Chairman, Is that all, Admiral ?
Admiral Stark. That is all, yes, sir. I think the important thing
in that message is, in addition to the moonlight, that at 6 : 03, the time
of civil twilight, is a period when natural illumination usually is
sufficient for ordinary outdoor operations to be carried on.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, in that connection I would like to call
the attention of the committee to the fact that in the narrative there is a
statement by the commander of one of the destroyers going into Pearl
Harbor that visibility was good between 5 and 6 that morning.
[6499] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the admiral
one question on that ?
The Vice Chairman. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Would the mountains make any difference in
Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Stark. I think very little. Of course you would not get
the direct sun rays just as the sun comes above the water, but I think
that time is all right, and particularly because of the fact that the
moonlight out there is frequently brilliant.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keef e of Wisconsin will inquire, Admiral.
[6500] Mr. Keefe. I assume at this time, Mr. Chairman, that
everybody connected with this examination has exhausted every pos-
sible question that could be asked of Admiral Stark, and I hesitate
to take much of Admiral Stark's time, but I think there are a few
things that I think this record ought to show.
Admiral, when were you relieved of your duties as Chief of Naval
Operations ?
Admiral Stark. I was relieved in March 1942.
Mr. Keefe. And was the letter which 3'ou read into the record this
morning from Secretary Knox dated at that time?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. You were then assigned as commander of the European
Fleet?
Admiral Stark. The United States naval forces in Europe; yes,
sir.
Later on, the fleet was known over there as a fleet, and I was given
additional orders.
I have a short and rather pithy transcript here that I had made up
some days ago in case this question should be asked me.
Mr. Keefe. I haven't any objection, but I would like to shorten
this up as much as I can and ask some very simple questions that can
be answered rather easily and without going into too nmch length.
[6501] Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. This is rather short.
Mr. Keefe. What does it have reference to ?
Admiral Stark. My duties in Europe.
Mr. Keefe. All right.
Admiral Stark. Upon my detachment as Chief of Naval Operations,
1 was designated commander, United States naval forces in Eu-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2441
rope with headquarters in London. In 1943, as preparations for the
invasion progressed, I was given additional duty by the commander
in chief, United States Fleet, as commander. Twelfth Fleet. Also
in 1943, I was given additional duty by the Secretary of the Navy
as United States Naval Advisor to the European Advisory Commis-
sion, an organization in London of representatives of the Big Three
Powers, which was charged with making recommendations concern-
ing problems arising out of the war in Europe, In November 1944, 1
reached the statutory retirement age, but continued in my command.
In April 1945, the United States naval forces in the Mediterranean-
North African area were added to my command. On 16 August 1945,
I was relieved by Admiral Hewitt.
During the preinvasion, invasion, and postinvasion phases of the
liberation of France, Belgium, and Holland, and the conquest of Eu-
rope, COMNAVEU was at all times the representative of the Navy
Department in Europe and in direct control of all matters relating to
convoys and shipping, anti- [650'2'] submarine warfare in gen-
eral, the logistic support of all naval forces in Europe (less Mediter-
ranean) and the screening agency through which all logistic require-
ments for the United States Army, British Navy, and the navies of
governments in exile funneled. COMNAVEU-COM-12 was in ad-
ministrative control of the submarine and surface forces of the United
States Navy which operated with the British Fleet in European waters '
(less Mediterranean) , of the air squadrons which operated with coastal
command, RAF, and of the naval forces and shore establishments which
were placed under the control of General Eisenhower and the allied
naval commander in chief for the invasion of France. As the senior
United States naval officer in Europe, COMNAVEU and commander
Twelfth Fleet received copies of all orders regarding the operational
control of naval forces under the afore-mentioned commands and was
in constant touch with their dispositions and requirements. His
assistance in bringing about any needed adjustments was constantly
sought by submarine, air force, surface force commanders, and com-
mander Task Force 122. Vice Admiral Kirk," United States Navy,
was in command of this task force. He was the operational com-
mander of the United States' naval task forces engaged in the invasion
of Normandy. COMNAVEU was the senior naval adviser to the
United States Ambassador to Great Britain, Ambassador to govern-
ments in exile, and, in effect, to the commanding general, European
theater of operations. General [6503] Eisenhower, and subse-
quently the supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces.
Both port organizations and shipping were at all times under the
control of COMNAVEU and commander Twelfth Fleet.
Mr. Keefe. Now, I assume that the carrying out of the responsibili-
ties incident to that position required the exercise of some superior
judgment, did it not?
Admiral Stark. With all due modesty, I may say I thought it did.
Mr. Keefe. When you were relieved of your command, did you
receive any word from General Eisenhower, the supreme allied com-
mander ?
Admiral Stark. I received a dispatch from him, which I greatly
prize, and prior to that, and after the Normandy invasion, the Army
awarded me the Distinguished — ^Army Distinguished Service Medal.
2442 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Ejeefe. Wliat date was that award made, and will you produce
the message from General Eisenhower?
Admiral Stark. The message from General Eisenhower reads
Mr. Keefe. What is the date of it ?
Admiral Stark. It is an Army message. In the iTth of August.
Mr. Keefe. 1945?
Admiral Stark. 1945 ; yes, sir.
[6504] Mr. Keefe. All right.
Admiral Stark. I read his message :
I have no words to express my appreciation for the great help you have given
the Forces under my command over the past three years. Your assistance has
been vital and the spirit in which it was rendered has been the acme of generous
cooperation.
Good bye and good luck.
(Signed) Eisenhower.
Mr. Keefe. When was the citation from the Army by which you
received the Distinguished Service Medal ?
Admiral Stark. It was initiated and bears the date of July 15, 1944.
Mr. Keefe. Now, have you that citation?
Admiral Stark. I have it.
Mr. Keefe. Will you read it into the record, please?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; I will eliminate the first part which refers
to previous decorations and Army requirements. It starts with :
Recommendation for Award of Distinguished Service Medal. * * *
For Distinguished Service Medal : Admiral Stark, while serving in support
of the Army of the United States, distinguished himself by exceptionally meri-
torius service [6505] to the Government in a duty of great responsibility.
Admiral Stark, as Commander of the United States Naval Forces in Euroi)e,
was charged with the planning and preparation of the United States naval aspects
of the launching of the campaign for the liberation of Europe. These plans were
coordinated with the United States Army and the Armies of the Allies, as well as
the Navies of the other participating countries. From an Army standpoint, the
attack on Europe would have been impossible without the complete support of the
U. S. Navy.
More than 4,000 naval ships and craft and over 100,000 naval officers and men
were used in the V-Day assault. The fact that these ships and men were avail-
able is directly attributable to the efforts of Admiral Stark. The successful
planning for the needs and employment of these ships and for the officers and
men was accomplished through the untiring efforts of Admiral Stark and the
close cooperation which he maintained with the appropriate Army commanders
and their staffs. Every desire of the Army commanders for naval craft, per-
sonnel and materiel was met in a most efficient manner.
The planning for this assault was complete to the smallest detail on the part
of the United States Naval [6506] Forces and served to make the combined
Naval and Ground Forces of the United States an integrated unit.
The efficient planning of Admiral Stark enabled the United States Navy to
assemble and maintain — in spite of unfavorable weather — a list of a substantially
greater assault force than was first anticipated by the Army commanders. The
results so far accomplished in this assault on the Fortress of Europe would have
been impossible without the complete and wholehearted support on the part of
the Navy.
The service for this award as recommended has been completed, as the original
assault has been sucessfully concluded.
And the proposed citation reads :
Admiral Harold Raynsford Stark, Commander, United States Naval Forces in
Europe, for exceptionally meritorious service to the (Jovernnient in a duty of
great responsibility. Admiral Stark was responsible for the planning, prepara-
tion and coordination of the United States naval aspects of the launching of
the campaign for the liberation of Europe. Through keen foresight and excep-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2443
tioiial administrative ability, Admiral Stark was able to plan for and meet the
necessary personnel and mat(§riel requirements for this enormous operation.
Only through his untiring [6507] efforts was the accomplishment of this
successful invasion completed. The services rendered by Admiral Stark reflect
great credit upon himself and the Armed Forces of the United States. Entered
Naval Service from Pennsylvania.
(Signed) Dwight D. Eisenhower,
General, U. 8. Army,
Supreme Commcmder, Allied Expeditionary Forces.
May I add, of course that would have been impossible for any
commander to attain without a wonderful lot of personnel under him.
I might mention, for example, that an initial goal of readiness of
the 4,000-odd craft ; that is, of a large portion of them, was put at 85
percent readiness, which was higher than any other power had put it.
We kept raising that, and in the last visit I made, particularly to the
workmen, with their torches and whatnot, at all of the large number of
stations we had, my consant plea was for 100 percent, and they all
said they would give it. They were working day and night. They
practically attained it. The over-all result for all stations being 99
percent plus. And what was accomplished was entirely due to the
subordinate commands, which were the finest in the world.
\^6508] Mr, Kjeefe. Admiral Stark, to get this matter chronolog-
ically in one piece, as a result of your service as Chief of Naval Opera-
tions you were cited by the President and awarded, as I understood
your testimony, a gold star ; is that right ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. At the termination of your service as Chief of Naval
Operations you were given the letter from the Secretary of the Navy
which you have read into the record this morning?
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Mr. Ejeefe. You then embarked upon service as commander of the
naval forces in the European area and as a result of that service
rendered during the war you were decorated with the Distinguished
Service Cross from the Navy — from the Army ?
Admiral Stark. Distinguished Service Medal from the Army.
Mr. Keefe. Distinguished Service Medal, I should say, from the
Army, together with a citation from General Eisenhower and also a
personal letter from General Eisenhower, which you have read into
the record, when you left that service ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. That was a dispatch.
Mr. Keefe. In addition you were decorated by at least three foreign
governments ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
[6509'] Mr. Keefe. Now during this period of time between
December 7, 1941, and the time of your relief from duty as commander
of the United States naval forces in the European area, did you know
of any action taken by Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King with respect to
your conduct as Chief of Naval Operations prior to December 7,
1941?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. KJEEFE. When did you first learn that Admiral King had rec-
ommended to the Secretary of the Navy that you be relegated to a
position not requiring the exercise of superior judgment and to a
position, and I quote, "in which lack of superior judgment may not
result in future errors" ?
2444 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. I learned that after I returned home and when I
was on what has become to be known as terminal leave. In other
words, my service had terminated. I am still waiting orders for retire-
ment. I first saw that, as I recall, in the press.
Mr. Keefe. Were you officially notified by a finding by the Secre-
tary of the Navy that you should be retired under circumstances so
that you could never again serve in the Navy in a position that might
require the exercise of superior judgment?
Admiral Stark. Not until it was published. I had no previous
knowledge of it.
[6510] Mr. Keefe. So upon your return from your service in
Europe, after receiving citations from the President of the United
States, from the Navy Department, from the War Department, and
from at least three foreign governments, you learned for the first time,
in the press, that you had been retired under these circumstances which
I have just related?
Admiral Stark. That I was to be retired.
Mr. Keefe. Were to be retired ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Have you been retired ?
Admiral Stark. Not yet, sir. I was placed on 4 months' leave, as is
customary. That 4 months was up on December 24, but in view of
these hearings I have not yet been retired. My service was over really
when I returned home.
Mr. Keefe. Is it accurate for me to say, as a layman, that during all
your service as Chief of Naval Operations you were the opposite num-
ber of General Marshall ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes.
Mr. Keefe. You as Chief of Naval Operations and he as the Chief
of General Staff were opposite numbers ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. He having responsibility on the Army side and you on
the Navy side ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
[6511] Mr. Keefe. And from your testimony that you have given
before this committee I conclude that you feel that as Chief of Naval
Operations you did everything which you considered possible and
proper for you to do to alert the Navy prior to December 7 ?
Admiral Stark. I thought so.
Mr. Keefe. At Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Stark. I thouglit so ; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And you say that principally because, as you have re-
iterated time and again, you sent the message of November 24 and the
war warning message of November 27 ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; plus the code dispatches.
Mr. Keefe. Plus the code-burning dispatch that followed on the 3d
of December?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; and plus the background of many months
before.
Mr. Keefe. Well, plus the background of information relating to
the general situation which you knew was in the possession of Admiral
Kimmel, our commander on the Navy side at Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Stark. What I had sent and the efforts that we had made
in preparation.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2445
Mr. Keefe. Let me ask you this ; it is one of the things that bothers
me as a layman : When you sent this order, or [6512] this mes-
sage of November 27, you stated in it, in substance, that Admiral Kim-
mel was to take certain deployment measures?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. You stated that it was a war-warning message?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now^, specifically what were the deployment measures
that you expected Admiral Kimmel to take?
Admiral Stark. A deployment means a spread. A defensive de-
ployment means a spread for defense. And I would take it, and I
believe it would be generally accepted, to intercept and guard against
surprise. My first thought would have been a conference of Admiral
Kimmel with his key people and with the Army.
Mr. Keefe. Now, will you permit me to interrupt at that point :
Admiral Kimmel was in command on the Navy side ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. General Short was in command on the Army side ?
Admiral Stark. True.
Mr. Keefe. You would expect, would you not, that there would be
close liaison between Admiral Kimmel and General Short?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; and I have no reason to believe that
there was not.
Mr. Keefe. General Short received his directions from [6513']
General Marshall?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Iyeefe. Kimmel received his from you as Chief of Naval
Operations?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. The evidence in this case shows that you sent your
message on the 27th, Marshall likewise sent a message to Short on
that day, and asked General Short to report. You recall that, do you
not?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Did you ask or expect Admiral Kimmel to report to
you as to measures taken?
Admiral Stark. No ; I did not.
Mr. Keefe. Why not?
Admiral Stark. That was not Navy custom. It was not my
practice to ask the people in the field — I gave them a broad directive,
expected them to carry out the details. You may recall that Ad-
miral Kimmel asked me not to send him any categorical instruc-
tions, in one of his letters, but to give him only broad general ob-
jectives. Prefacing that request with the fact that I could not know
or be too well informed of the conditions confronting him on the spot.
It was not my practice, it never has been, to tell the "how to do,"
but rather the "what to do."
[6514] Mr. Keefe. All right. Now, Admiral, am I to under-
stand from that statement that having sent your message of No-
vember 27 you had performed your full and complete duty as Chief
of Naval Operations, and having given him this war warning and
ordered him to take a defensive deployment, you had no further
responsbility in the matter to see that the order which you had given
was carried out?
2446 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. I felt that way about it, that it was then up
to him.
Mr. Keefe. Well, I am not asking how you felt, Admiral. I am
asking you whether or not there was, in connection with your
responsibilities of Chief of Naval Operations, a responsibility on
your part to see that the order which you had given was carried
out?
Admiral Stark. No; I did not feel that there was a responsi-
bility on my part to see that the order was carried out. I gave the
order and assumed that it would be carried out. I had the right
to make that assumption.
Mr. Keefe. Is there a written order or booklet defining the respon-
sibilities of the Chief of Naval Operations that covers that situation?
Admiral Stark. Not that particular point. I think it is Navy, gen-
eral Navy custom, for a senior to give a subordinate an order and leave
it to the subordinate to carry it out.
[651S^ Mr. Keefe. In that respect apparently there was a dif-
ference between the Navy and the Army because, as I recall General
Marshall's testimony, he felt that it was his responsibility to see to it
that his orders were carried out.
Admiral Stark. Well
Senator Lucas. The Congressman is wrong about that.
The Chairman. He didn't say that.
[6516] Admiral Stark. Well, I do not know just what their
practice is. Our practice
Mr. Keefe. So far as the Navy is concerned you have stated them to
be as just indicated?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. In other words, Kimmel was supreme commander out
there in the Pacific area and when you gave him an order it was as-
sumed by you that that order would be carried out ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And you did not feel that you were under any respon-
sibility to pursue the matter to see that it was carried out, is that right?
Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now, then, you expected Kimmel and Short to get to-
gether and compare notes to determine what they should do ; did you
not?
Admiral Stark. I did ; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. It is to be assumed that they did get together out there
after receiving these messages, is it not?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Because I believe on the next day, on November 28, you
sent what purported to be a copy of the Army message to Admiral
Kimmel ; did you not ?
Admiral Stark. I sent it to him for information ; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. I understand, for information.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Well, now, supposing these men got together and Short
says, "Here is a message from Kimmel, read this over," and Kimmel
says, "Here is one we got from Stark," and Short says, "Here is one
I just got from G-2, from Miles and I have answered and here is what
I have answered to Marshall, that I am alerted against sabotage, liai-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2447
son with the Navy" ; you were in constant contact with General Mar-
shall here, were you not?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. You said you were in the closest contact with him
Admiral Stark. That is right.
Mr. Keefe (continuing). Day after day during that period of time.
Admiral Stark. Yes ; I was ; we always were.
Mr. Keefe. Well, now, if the Army had paid any attention to Short's
reply stating that he was alerted against sabotage only they perhaps
would have discussed that with you, would they not ?
Admiral Stark. Well, I do not know that they would. That was
something between them and their field commander. I [66181
may say that the first I learned of the Short dispatch was at the
Roberts Commission. I did not know of it before that.
Mr. Keefe. Well, now. Admiral Stark, it certainly must have been
of concern to the Navy to know what measures were put into force by
the Army because the Army was there to defend the fleet, wasn't it?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; and the Army had
Mr. Keefe. Your fleet would have been in bad shape without the
protection that should have been afforded by the Army; isn't that
true ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; but the outstanding things in the Army
message to me was that war might come at any moment and directed
Short to make a reconnaissance and I had directed Kimmel to make
a defensive deployment. The two hooked up together. Short had
the stations on Hawaii, the radar stations as one element for reconnais-
sance, he had a few planes, not many, but that is where he would have
been helped out in his direction for reconnaissance by Kimmel, who
had under the Martin-Bellinger agreement assumed responsibility for
the so-called offshore reconnaissance with planes.
Mr. Keefe. Now, you as Chief of Naval Operations at any time
between the 27th of November and the 7th of December did not know
of your own knowledge that Kimmel was in fact alerted, did you?
[6519] Admiral Stark. No ; I did not.
Mr. Keefe. You simply assumed that he would follow your com-
mand?
Admiral Stark. I thought that that message was so outstanding,
I had worked for hours over it and particularly the war warning,
which was all out, that I thought it would convey what I intended it
should convey. I thought it was very plain and it flew all the danger
signals.
Mr. KJEEFE. The difficulty that I find in my thinking. Admiral Stark,
and I want you to help me if you can, I have heard you say repeatedly
you did not expect an attack at Pearl Harbor; you were surprised,
the President was surprised. General Marshall was surprised, you
were all surprised, you did not expect an attack at Pearl Harbor and
yet you expected Kimmel with less information than you had of the
situation, even conceding this order which was given on the war warn-
ing, you expected him to be prepared against an attack which none
of you thought would take place. Now, it is difficult for me to recon-
cile those two positions.
Admiral Stark. Well, I reconcile it this way, that I had sent
to Kimmel for action a war warning signal containing a directive
2448 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and containing what information we had, but the signal was sent to
him for action and he was directed to take a deployment and it
started out with, "this is a war warning."
[6620^ A surprise attack on Hawaii was known to be a possi-
bility, I did not expect it, I was surprised that it took place at
that time, but we all recognized it to be a po.,--. iity and we had
worked and pressed for months with regard to drilling for it, if you
will recall, training once a week for this thing,-, > had pressed for
weapons to repel it, we had pressed for planes •{■ ,je there, we had
talked about it by letter and by official letter, \v,v> had pointed out
that war might be preceded by it and here was vf.r at our door and
with all that background and with the statement, "This is a war
warning" and to take a defensive deployment, we thought that that
would put them on a war footing out there so far as any surprise
was concerned. It did not but we had expected it would.
Mr. Keefe. Well, now, Admiral, I appreciate your statement exactly
but I still am in a fog to a certain extent and am unable to understand
your position and see if I can make myself clear.
You say you were surprised that an attack took place, you say you
did not expect an attack to take place at Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Stark. At that time.
Mr. Keefe. Yet you say it was possible for an attack to take
place and you had spent your time getting ready to repel
that attack but in your warning to Kimmel you called
his at- [6521] tention to the place where you thought the
attack would take place, which was way off thousands of miles
away, down in the China Sea, Samoa, and Kra Peninsula, and so on.
Admiral Stark. That is true, but the attack which we envisaged
down there, we stated that the makeup, and so forth, of this am-
phibious expedition, not a raiding force or a carrier force but an am-
phibious expedition, and the points of that amphibious expedition
might be so and so.
There was no question, there had not been in my mind at any time
of an amphibious expedition against the Hawaiian Islands. Now,
the points mentioned there were in line with what had gone before
and that was the information that we had, but one of the things that
means a lot, I think, to the average naval officer when he gets a
message — that part of the message was information. We could have
sent that simply out as a separate dispatch had we so willed, just
to him for information, it could have been left out, but when we sent
the dispatch to him for action it was with the idea that there was
a war warning and that the attack might come in any direction.
Mr. Keefe. Well, now, let me understand this. Now, the thing
that I cannot understand is this and I hope you will try and make
it clear to a layman : Evidently you had a war plan. Rainbow No.
5, which I hold in my hand, this big document. I understood you
to say this morning that that was the [6522] outgrowth in its
final form of your ABCD.
Admiral Stark. ABC-1 was the Basic War Plan for both the
Army and Navy, Rainbow 5, and that, if it is the WPL-46, is the
Navy plan.
Mr. Keefe. Will you kindly tell me where in this plan, which I as-
sume was in the possession and within the knowledge of both General
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2449
Short and Admiral Kimmel, where is the specific program set out that
covers this so-called deployment business preparatory to actual war ?
Admiral Stark. You mean as to where any phrase in connection
with deployment is used ?
Mr. Keefe. Where can I look in this plan to see what the com-
mander, Kimmei, s to do when you told him to execute a defensive
deployment? If there is anything in this war plan, I would like to
have you point * t.
Admiral Star There is one place where deployment is mentioned.
I do not think thti.e is any place in the plan where it would tell him
what to do in conn ction with a defensive deployment. That would be
of his initiative to make a defensive deployment which he thought was
proper.
Mr, Keefe. Well, in the name of conscience then how am I as a mem-
ber of this committee to determine whether Admiral Kimmel carried
out the order that you gave to him if nobody knows what the order
means and what the deployment is to be ? \6523'] Supposing he
took one ship and took it out to sea, that would be a deployment, would
it not?
Admiral Stark. That would be a partial deployment ; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Well, is there anything in the Navy record or in the files
or in the war plans that I can point to which says when an order is
given to a commander to take a defensive deployment he is to do A B,
C, D, E ?
Admiral Stark. I think you will not find that anywhere. From
long naval experience a defensive deployment means a spread in de-
fense. That would be my definition of it.
Mr. Keefe. Would that mean then that he should take his fleet out
of Pearl Harbor and spread it out on the ocean, or what does it mean ?
Admiral Stark. Well, it would mean, in my opinion, scouting with
his planes, it would mean the disposition of other forces such as sub-
marines or light forces or perhaps aircraft in accordance with his best
judgment for defense. It was a defensive deployment. Now, he did
have, as we now know, certain forces on the sea. He may have con-
sidered them as part of a defensive deployment. He can testify as to
that.
Mr. Keefe. Well, now, he had the Enterprise out, did he not, with
planes in the air ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
[66^4] Mr. Keefe. Scouting around. Admiral Newton had the
Lexington out with a task force, also with planes in the air ; and the
balance of the fleet, except a destroyer that went out that morning, I
guess, was in Pearl Harbor. Now, would you consider the fact that
the Enterprise was engaged in the specific task of taking planes to
Wake and the Lexington was engaged in the specific task of taking
planes to Midway, as I recall — those would not be defensive deploy-
ments, would they, in accordance with your order?
Admiral Stark. If he had been sweeping ahead of him, and, as I re-
call, he did sweep ahead of him and if he were flying any planes and
I dare say they were and scouting around the horizon it might very
well be considered part of a defensive deployment.
Mr. Keefe. Well, all right. Now, then, assume that he did that.
That, then, is at least a partial compliance with your order then, is
it not ?
79716— 4G—pt. 5 26 ,.:,-
2450 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. It very well might be according to what they were
doing and what we told them.
Mr. Keefe. Now, we lost a lot of ships in Pearl Harbor and a lot
of men. Do you conceive that your order and directive to make a
defensive deployment involved the ships that were in the harbor and,
if so, how?
Admiral Stark. Well, as I have stated, I left that up [6525]
to him. It was impossible — not impossible but generally we did not
know the ships that were in or what their condition was or just what was
out there, but the planes were one of the means which could have
oeen used and how many destroyers he might have had at that time
to accompany his battleships if he wanted to put them out, and it is
an open question whether or not it would have been best to have them
out or have them where they were, provided they were ready, in other
respects, to meet this attack.
I would hesitate to state without full knowledge and without being
on the spot at the time just what I would have done there at that
time. My feeling
Mr. Keefe. Well, now, with full knowledge as to what he did do — -
Admiral Stark. My feeling is that I certainly would have had my
planes out, I would have had my radar going, and I would have been
using my submarines and perhaps
Mr. Keefe. Now, just a moment before you go further, if you will
pardon the interruption. You say you certainly would have used
your radar. You mean ships' radar?
Admiral Stark. No, sir; I mean — and I am glad you picked that
up — the Army radar.
Mr. Keefe. Well, now, then, let us talk about Kimmel and then
we will get to Short after a while. Let us stick [6526] right
with Kimmel. Certainly his radar would not be any good with the
ships located in Pearl Harbor and with these mountains on all sides,
would it?
Admiral Stark. Very little, if any.
Mr. Keefe. Well, now, Admiral, what I am trying to get at, and
I wish we would stick right with that point, I want you to tell this
committee, if you can, what did Admiral Kimmel fail to do .with
respect to this order which 3^ou gave for him to take a defensive
deployment; specifically state what he failed to do.
Admiral Stark. Well, if I may say so, I would rather the com-
mittee judge of his failure. My feeling is that if I would have had
this job and what we thought Avhen we gave the order, that one of
the first things that he would have done would have been to scout
continuously with what aircraft he had in the direction which he
would have worked out as being the most likely point from which an
attack might come.
Mr. Keefe. All right. Now, did he have these aircraft out?
Admiral Stark. I believe he did not.
Mr. Keefe. And thus you say he defaulted, because he did not have
proper reconnaissance by aircraft ; that is number one, is that right?
Admiral Stark. I say what I would have done and he did
[6527] and it is hindsight. It is hindsiglit and it is not hind-
sight. You have asked me to state specifically what I think I would
have done and that is what I think I would have done and I assumed
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2451
that is what was done. We were assuming that they were scouting
with everything they had in the air.
Mr. Keefe. Admiral Stark, if I may be so bold as to interrupt.
1 am just a layman and I think most of the members of the committee
are laymen. You gave this Admiral, as Chief of Naval Operations,
an order to do a certain thing, to take a defensive deployment. Now,
you must have had in your mind as Chief of Naval Operations that
that placed the responsibility upon Admiral Kimmel to do some
specific thing. Now, your answer to us is that that was in the dis-
cretion of Admiral Kimmel, that he could do what he thought was
the proper thing to do. I am asking you what did you contemplate
you intended him to do when you issued that order to him, that is
what I would like to know ?
Admiral Stark. Well, the answer to that is, starting out again, if
T may, first conference with the Army. We had told Kimmel to take
a defensive deployment, we had said that war might come in a few
days, we had stated the war warning. Short was told war might
come at any minute. He was told to make reconnaissance.
Now, confining myself to what I intended and what I [65^81
thought Admiral Kimmel would do, I thought that they undoubtedly
were considering if an attack did come where it would come from
and, of course, I would assume that it would be air and submarine,
either or both.
A defense against such an attack, either air or submarine or both,
is scouting with planes. Therefore, I would have assumed that he
would have scouted with his planes to the best of his ability with
what he had. I would have assumed that he would have used his
submarines to assist him in that scouting and I would have assumed
he would have weighed the rest of the force he had, what he had at
sea, what he had in port, as to whether he had the best balance pos-
sible also to assist in that scouting. He had fast task forces at sea,
which are well adapted to that sort of work, carriers whose planes
can cover a wide area, accompanied by defensive units such as we
usually have in a fast carrier task force, namely, cruisers and de-
stroyers. Those are the basic things I would have assumed.
Mr. Keefe. Well, then, am I to assume or is the committee to as-
sume that in the event that Admiral Kimmel states here on the stand
that he considered as the Commander out there that it was the proper
thing to do to have this fleet deployed in Pearl Harbor as he had it,
that he having exercised that judgment was clearly within his rights
and that no [6S29] criticism can attach to him because he
exercised that judgment under the circumstances? Are we to under-
stand that?
Admiral Stark. He was within his rights to exercise his judgment
and when you have heard his judgment I assume then you will be in
position to weigh what I have said and his judgment.
Mr. Keefe. Well, I realize the delicacy of these questions. Admiral
Stark, because Admiral Kimmel is your friend and he has been all
through.
Admiral Stark. One of the closest and finest I ever had and one of
the finest I ever knew.
Mr. Keefe. Almost as close as a brother to you and because of
that I shall not press it any further at this time except that I want
2452 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to call your attention to the fact that in this war plan Rainbow No. 5
on page 17 of this photostat that I have it says :
Upon the receipt of the following OpNav dispatch the naval establishment will
proceed with the execution of this plan in its entirety, including acts of war :
Execute Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5.
(b) The date of the above dispatch will be M-day unless it has been otherwise
designated.
Admiral Stark. Not until after the attack.
Mr. Keefe. Then was such a dispatch sent ?
I6r530] Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; at once.
Mr. Keefe. Then that put in operation the entire Rainbow No. 5
plan ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Upon the sending of that dispatch?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. It put it in effect against Japan.
Mr. Keefe. Yes, exactly. Now, then, so prior to the sending of
that dispatch. ''Execute Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5" these
other dispatches did not have reference to anj^thing contained in this
War Plan Rainbow No. 5?
Admiral Stark. I believe the dispatch of the 2Tth directing the
defensive deployment stated preparatory to carrying out the tasks
herein, being to him for action, further showing, in my opinion, that
we were expecting an attack and that this would come in effect.
[6-531] Mr. Keefe. All right ; now, Admiral, but there is no
similar document on the part of the Navy showing what a Navy
commander situated as Kimmel was, was to do before the receipt of this
"execute" message ?
Admiral Stark. Admiral Kimmel's own plan drew up certain things
which he contemplated doing, or might consider necessary to do
before actual hostilities in his own Pacific plan, which was predicated
largely and necessarily on WPL-46.
Mr. Keefe. All right. Now I want to ask you a few questions
about this 1940 alert.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. KJEEFE. You were Chief of Naval Operations at that time ?
Admiral Stark. I was.
Mr. Keefe. And General Marshall, through Adams, sends a message
to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter,
stating :
Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-
Pacific raid, to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or
provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver
basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communica-
tion direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly.
[6532] Acknowledge.
Signed, "Adams."
Now, you were in close liaison Avith General Marshall at that time,
were you not ?
Admiral Stark. I was; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Did not he ever discuss with you, as Chief of Naval
Operations, the background and the facts which prompted him to
send this alert order on the 17th of June, 1940 ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2453
Admiral Stark. I have stated that I do not recall that clearly, and
1 can only assume that the reason I do not recall it clearly is that I was
not impressed, so far as the Navy was concerned, with any particular
gravity at that time. That is the reason that I did not initially send
Admiral Richardson anything in regard to it, and I nuist have looked
on it, I assume I looked on it largely, as an Army affair.
Mr. Keefe. Well, that is not what I asked you. Admiral Stark, and
that is not a direct answer to my question. My question is whether or
not you discussed this alert with General Marshall. Now, if you
didn't discuss it, or if you do not remember it, that is one thing.
Admiral Stark. That is what I meant to convey. I do not recall
that alert.
[OSo')] Mr. Keefe. Well, now, yon had some communications
with Admiral Richardson in reference to it, did you not?
Admiral Stark. Yes; there were dispatches exchanged, but the
one thing I did recall when I came up here, and which I checked upon
later, was that Admiral Richardson had written me and requested, if
anything like that occurred again, he would like to be informed
beforehand .
Mr. Keefe. Did you give Richardson any orders for the deployment
of the fleet? '
Admiral Stark. No, sir. We told him, in response to his question
with regard to it, to continue cooperation with the Army. They were
already working with the Army on it out there, without any directive
from me.
Mr. Keefe. Did you know that during this alert Admiral Richard-
son took the fleet out of Pearl Harbor and went to a secret rendezvous,
giving the impression that he was sailing to the Panama Canal, in
order to try to stir up the saboteurs of the Canal ?
Admiral Stark. I remember that.
Mr. Keefe. Did you give that order ?
Admiral Stark. I remember that very clearly. I think the fact
that it happened at this time was a coincidence. I remember very
distinctly telling Joe to take the fleet out and to provide for a leak.
When it was brought up to me, I said [6534] "Yes," and I
also recall extending his time 2 days, which I also verified, the time
was extended 2 days. We told him to maintain radio silence, to start
as theoretically heading southeastward, in case any Japanese ship
should see him. It was an exercise at sea, but the primary purpose
was that the Canal authorities thought, if war came, that the fleet
was going into the Atlantic, and that some of their agents would
commit considerable sabotage down there. They were anxious to
apprehend these people, and we thought we might precipitate action
on their part. So after the Army had provided to catch these people
if they did start anything, and to break this thing up, we then agreed
and we sent the fleet to sea. But that it happened at the same time
as this alert is, in my opinion, just a coincidence.
I have a dispatch here
Mr. Keefe. I think it is already in evidence.
Admiral Stark. I think I have covered the thing.
Mr. Keefe. I offered it in evidence, I think, heretofore.
Admiral Stark. That I do recollect quite clearlj^, but the other
I do not.
2454 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Keefe. Well, now, Admiral Stark, when General Marshall
ordered that alert on the I7th of June 1940, he clearly must have felt
that there was some possible breach in the relations with Japan that
prompted him to put Hawaii on the [65SS] alert?
Admiral Stark. He has so testified, I believe.
Mr. Keefe. Yes; he testified, but the reasons for it did not come
in until after he left. I sought to get those, and we have them in
the record now, the reasons which prompted that alert.
Now, 3'ou cannot recall any of the conversations that took place
between you and General Marshall which prompted Marshall to order
an all-out alert in 1940 ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir; I cannot.
Mr. Keefe. All right. Now I would like to ask a question which
bothered me, with respect to this Rainbow No. 5, which places the
island of Guam in what is called category F.
Admiral Stark. I have the category here.
Mr. Keefe. Now will you state for the record what category F
means ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; we have that, I am sure. This is out of
Joint Action, Army and Navy, and refers to degrees of preparation,
and they are put in categories of defense A, B, C, D, E, and F.
Mr. Keefe. Well, take Guam to start with. That is in F. Now
give us what category F means.
Admiral Stark. Category F : "Positions beyond the continental
limits of the United States which may be subject [6536'\ to
either minor or major attack for the purpose of occupation but which
cannot be provided with adequate defense forces. Under this cate-
gory the employment of existing local forces and local facilities will
be confined principally to the demolition of those things it is desirable
to prevent falling into the hands of the enemy."
[6537] Mr. Keefe. Then, so far as Guam was concerned, at
the time this basic war plan was devised it was the considered opinion
of both the Army and Navy that it could not be defended and it
therefore was placed in category F that required those on the island,
through demolition or otherwise, to destroy anything of value to the
enemy and to permit it to be taken ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And to surrender ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. That is right, is it not ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now, in what category was Wake placed under this
war plan ?
Admiral Stark. I will have to look that up under the war plans,
sir. I think it is misplaced here.
Mr. KJEEFE. Well, I would like to get it also for Midway and Samoa.
Admiral Stark. I think it is a safe assumption that Wake may not
be specifically mentioned, but it is included in the Hawaiian Naval
Coastal Frontier, and on that assumption the category of defense
would be D. I will check the war plans carefully, and if that assump-
tion is inaccurate, I will notify the committtee.
The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier was in category D.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2455
[OSSS] Mr. Keefe. Then, I will ask to have placed in the record,
Mr. Chairman, this document that has been presented to us, to which
we may make reference to the record, as to these war plans.
Mr. Mitchell. I would like to find out where it comes from. I have
been trying to locate it.
Admiral Stark. The reference I think is given at the top. It is
from Joint Action of the Army and Navy.
Mr. MiTciiEix. Well, in the book, Exhibit 44, we have as item 6,
Joint Coastal Defense Plan. Is that what it is ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir; it is a book which has been approved by
both the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy that covers
joint action. I think it is FTP-145.
Mr. Mitchell. You mean it is not in any of the war plans we have
had here at all ?
Admiral Stark. No. Here it is. I think the assistant counsel
has it.
Senator Ferguson. Was it in effect prior to December 7, 1941 ?
Achniral Stark. Yes, sir; it has been in effect for a number of
years, with several changes.
The Chairman. That is Chapter V out of that book, is it?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. This is taken right out of the book.
[6539] Mr. Mitchell. This is the printed publication of the
Public Printing Office, prepared by the Joint Board, and revised by
the Joint Board, 1935,
Admiral Stark. If I said FTP-145 I should have said 155.
Mr. Mitchell. I do not find anything like that on the title page.
Admiral Stark. It is FTP-155.
Mr. MrrCHELL. What does FTP stand for?
Achniral Stark. Fleet training publication.
Mr. KJEEFE. Will you also give me the information as to Midway ?
The Chairman. Let us settle the question whether this is to be
printed at this point in the record, to which I assume there is no
objection.
Mr. Mitchell. No. It can be transcribed in the daily transcript,
but I wanted it identified. It says, "Joint Action of the Army and
the Navy, Chapter V, Coastal Frontier Defense," but it does not say
what volume it comes from.
The Chairman. That has been identified.
Admiral Stark. It states, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy."
That might very well be clear enough.
Mr. Mitchell. It is a Public Printing Office publication of 1935.
[6540] The Chairman, All right. It will be printed at this
point in the transcript,
(The document referred to follows:)
[6541] Confidential
Joint Action of the Abmy and the Navy
CHAPTER V — coastal FBONTIER DEFENSE
SECTION III — CATEGORIES OF DEIENSE AND REQUIREMENTS AND MEANS TO BE PROVIDED
30. Degree of preparation. — The degree of preparation in coastal frontier
defense and the frontier defense measures to be taken, including the strength of
2450 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the forces to bo provided, depend upon the enemy and the character of the enemy
operations to which coastal frontiers may be subjected in the early stages of a war.
For the purpose of indicating the extent of the frontier defense measures to be
taken under specific situations, categories of defense are established as listed
below. Decisions as to the "category of defense" required for each coastal frontier
are included in all joint basic war plans except those for wars of a minor nature.
These decisions constitute a directive to the Army and Navy commanders of the
joint organization for coastal frontier defense as to the extent of the frontier
defense measures to be taken. They likewise constitute a directive to the
[65^2] War and Navy Departments as to the allocation of the means required
for this defense. Defensive sea areas will be proclaimed in time of actual or
impending war as necessitated by the nature of the war and the iirobable enemy.
31. Categories of defense.
a. Category A. — Coastal frontiers that probably will be free from attack, but
for which a nominal defense must be provided for ix)litical reasons. Under this
category, only a sufticient part of the gunfire elements of harbor defense will
be manned in the strength required to create a show of preparedness. The
strength required will be that considered necessary to repel small naval raids. A
nominal offshore patrol will be maintained.
b. Category B. — Coastal frontiers that may be subject to minor attacks. Under
this category, the harbor defenses will be provided with one manning relief, and
a part of the obstacles will be prepared but not put in place. Certain defensive
sea areas may be established and a limited offshore patrol may be instituted,
with a limited control of shipping entering and leaving harbors.
c. Category C. — Coastal frontiers that in all probability will be subject to
minor attack. Under this category, the coastal defense area should be provided,
in general, with the means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet
the following enemy naval operations : those incident to con- [C5^3] trolling
the sea ; those against shipping ; and minor attacks against land areas. The
harbor defenses should be fully manned and air support arranged. Longe range
air reconnaissance will be provided, if practicable. If sufficient forces are
available, outposts will be established outside of harbor defenses along the sensi-
tive areas of the shore line. Tlie inner mine barrages will, in general, be estab-
lished ; a full inshore patrol and complete control of shipping will, as a rule,
be instituted ; and certain outer mine barrages and defensive sea areas may be
established, and a limited offshore patrol instituted.
d. Category D.- — Coastal frontiers that may be subject to major attack. Under
this category, the coastal defense areas should, in general, be provided with the
means of defense, both Army and Navy, recpiired to meet enemy naval operations
preliminary to joint operations. All available means of defense will generally
find application, and a stronger outpost and a more extensive patrol, inshore
and offshore, than for Category C, will be required. ITnder this category certain
defensive sea areas will be established. In addition, an antiaircraft gun and
machine-gun defense of Lmpoi'tant areas outside of harbor defenses should be
organized ; general reserves should be strategically located so as to facilitate
prompt reinforcement of the frontiers ; and plans should be developed for the
defense of specific areas likely r6\5,J-{] to become theaters of operations.
Long range air recoiuiais.sance will be provided and plans made for use of the
GHQ air force.
e. Category E. — Coastal frontiers that in all probability will be subject to
major attack. Under this category, in addition to the measures required for
Category D, there will be required generally the concentration of the troops
necessary to defend the area against a serious attack in force, together with
additional naval forces to provide intensive inshore and offshore patrols. De-
fensive sea areas will be established. Air defense will be provided as in Category
D. All or a part of the GHQ air force may be ordered to the threatened area
to operate either under direct control of Army GHQ or under that of the Army
commander of the theater of operations or frontier.
f. Category F. — Possessions beyond the continental limits of the United States
which may be subject to either minor or major attack for the purpose of oc-
cupation, but which cannot be provided with adequate defense forces. Under
this category, the employment of existing local forces and local facilities will be
confined principally to the demolition of those things it is desirable to prevent
falling into the hands of the enemy.
g. Oeneral.
(1) Where Categories D and E are applicable [6545] initially, local
defense plans should provide for the initial employment of such forces of the
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2457
Army and the Navy as may be required in addition to those forces which are
ordinarily available for the initial defense of the coastal frontier in question,
and which can be diverted from the mobilizaliou and concentration of the Army
forces, from tlie United States Fleet, and from other naval forces, during the
period of mobilization and concentration, without materially interfering with
or seriously delaying the operations to be undertaken in the principal theater of
operations.
(2) Under all categories of defense, the Army coastal frontier or Army sector
commander is responsible for the antiaircraft defense within the corps area and
naval district extending inland from the frontier or sector, such antiaircraft
defense to include an aircraft warning service. Cases involving the antiair-
craft defense of Army GHQ airdromes and those where one corps area borders
on two coastal frontiers, will be specifically covered in appropriate Army stra-
tegical plans.
l6S4-6'\ Mr. Keefe. Can you now state, Admiral, the category
in which Midway was placed ?
Admiral Stark. That would be in the same category as the Hawaiian
Coastal Frontier.
Mr. Keefe. And what about Samoa ?
Admiral Stark, Samoa would be also in D.
Mr, Keefe. The same category ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr, Keefe, Now, at the time of the attack on Guam and the capture
of Guam by the Japs were improvements on the harbor being made
at that time or had they been completed ?
Admiral Stark, They had not been completed. Of course, I recall
very clearly the legislation with regard to that. I do not know just
what their status was at this moment. I had obtained from Congress
the appropriation, I believe it was $6,000,000, for certain improvements
to the harbor. You recall the first year I lost it by six votes, and the
following year it went through almost unanimously, only one vote
being opposed to it. Just how far we had gotten along with that I
do not recall at the moment.
Mr. Keefe. With those improvements completed, Guam would still
be in Category F, would it not ?
Admiral Stark. In the same category, category D, The imporve-
ments were not such as improved the defense of Guam [6547^
but very little,
Mr, Keefe, Even w^ith the improvements that were requested and
contemplated the Island of Guam, in the opinion of the Joint Army
and Navy Board, could not be successfully defended due to the power
that Japan had in the mandated islands surroimding it, is that right?
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
Admiral Stark. May I state for the record when I said category
D a minute ago that should be F, which Congressman Keefe men-
tioned.
Mr. Keefe. Now, just a couple of other questions to make the rec-
ord clear. Admiral Stark: You have referred repeatedly to the ex-
perience which you have had over the period of time that you were
Chief of Naval Operations in coming to the Congress for appropria-
tions.
And I would like to make this record crystal clear as to that pro-
cedure, which I am sure you are familiar with and which I know
many members on this committee are quite familiar with. When
the Navy or the Army prepares its annual request for appropriations,
2458 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
they must first be submitted to the Bureau of the Budget, is that not
true?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And the presentation of requests for appropria-
[6548] tions is always first made to the Bureau of the Budget?
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. And the Budget tells you how much money you can
spend ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. KJEEFE. So far as they are concerned ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, That is our guide from then on.
Mr. Keefe. And that action of the Bureau of the Budget is then
translated into the President's budget which he submits to the Con-
gress ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Whether it be his annual budget or supplementary
budget ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. It is our guide. When we are through
with the Budget and they tell us how much we can have; my own
naval experience is we stick within that.
Mr. Keefe. That same thing holds true for any supplementary
estimates. The same procedure is indulged in, is it not?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. We cannot come up here for supple-
mental estimates without first getting the permission of the Budget.
Mr. Keefe. So, when you made the statement about coming up to
the Hill for money, asking for appropriations on the Hill, [6S49]
you had to proceed first and get authority from the Bureau of the
Budget and the Bureau of the Budget transmitted your request to the
Congress in the form of a budget estimate ?
Admiral Stark. That is true.
Mr. Keefe. By the President; isn't that true?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. There were times, of course, when I
went directly to the President without going through the budget
for money, and he would grant it to me.
Mr. Keefe. And then submit a supplementary estimate to the
Congress ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. Then, we would inform the Budget.
Mr. Keefe. Now then, you appeared before the House Subcom-
mittee on Naval Appropriations, did you not?
Admiral Stark. Yes, I have, at a great many hearings.
Mr. Keefe. And also before the Senate Committee?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. When you appeared before either the Senate or the
House Subcommittees on Appropriations asking for funds, were you
not under a direction and injunction from the President not to justify
any item that was not contained in the Presidential budget?
Admiral Stark. Well. I knew that I could not do it. Nobody ever
had to give me an injunction. I just did not have [6550'] to do
it, and I did not c]o it. The Commander in Chief having set for us a
limit, we stayed within it.
Mr. Keefe. So every time you came to a committee of the Congress
you came up to justify and defend the Budget estimate submitted to
the Congress by the President ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2459
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. Yes. And that has been the universal practice, has it
not, during all the period that you were Chief of Naval Operations?
Admiral Stark. Once or twice in response to questions, we went
outside, when the question was asked us, initiated by someone on the
committee.
Mr. Keefe. Well, if a member of the committee, or the committee
itself, saw fit to ask you questions as to wlietlier or not you did re-
quest additional funds from the Bureau of the Budget you would
answer those questions ?
Admiral Stark. If the committee asked me, I would.
Mr. Keefe. Yes. Otherwise not?
Admiral Stark. Otherwise, I would not initiate it.
Mr. Keefe. Now, as a matter of fact, there has been placed in the
record here a statement of the appropriation request made by the
Navy and Army to the Bureau of the Budget, the action taken thereon
by the Bureau of the Budget, and the action taken thereon by the
Congress. You have seen that [65S1] calculation, have you
not?
Admiral Stark. I have seen it; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
Now, in both cases, in the case of the Army and Navy, over the fiscal
years 1934 to 1941, inclusive, those figures show that the Congress ex-
ceeded the Presidential Budget estimate, do they not, in the matter of
appropriations ?
Admiral Stark. Which years did you say ?
Mr. Keefe. The total years from 1933, I believe, or 1932. I think
those figures start from 1932 and go to 1941, inclusive, excluding the
contract authorizations provided for by the Congress and referring to
just cash appropriations. Leave out, if you please, the contract au-
thorizations.
Admiral Stark. Well, assuming that the arithmetic here is cor-
rect
Mr. KJEEFE. Well, those are my figures, and I think they are correct.
Admiral Stark. They show appropriations requested by the Navy
Department $9,434,271,533. Budget estimates submitted to the Con-
gress, $7,428,240,190. Amounts made available by the Congress, ap-
propriations, $7,256,896,276, along with a contract authority for $1,-
029,038,112. The total of appropriations plus contract authority from
Congress was $8,285,934,388 as opposed to I believe to what you want
to check it on, a \656'2'\ budget of seven-billion-ocld dollars.
The Chairman. Congressman, don't those figures speak for them-
selves, and is it necessary to make Admiral Stark add them up again ?
Mr. Keefe. Yes, I think they speak for themselves.
The Chairman. Yes, assuming they are correct.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And nobody has challenged it.
Mr. Keefe. I am asking these questions because of the fact that
Admiral Stark himself sort of indicated the difficulty that he had ex-
perienced in getting appropriations in order to increase the personnel
of the Navy. You made reference to that in your testimony, did you
not?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
2460 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
The CiiAiR:\rAN. That may have been a different item from the ones
in these categories of figures. The}^ were more or less sporadic efforts,
on your part, as I understand it, to get more men.
Admiral Stark. Well, they were continuous. We finally got au-
thority to ask for what we needed.
Mr. Keefe. One other question. Admiral Stark, and perhaps you
can clear this up. It is minor in character. When Admiral Wilkin-
son was on the stand, there was placed in [6553] evidence a
written or printed statement showing his responsibility as Chief of
Naval Intelligence. A dispute arose between Admiral Wilkinson and
Admiral Turner, Chief of Naval War Plans, as to whose responsibility
it was for certain things. Admiral Wilkinson contended that the
written orders or printed orders specifying the duties of the Chief of
Naval Intelligence had been changed, the Schedule of Organization,
I believe it was called, had been changed by you in verbal instructions
to Admiral Kirk, his predecessor, so that when he, Wilkinson, came
into the office and tried to ascertain what his duties were he went over
this schedule of orders, and so on, that were issued by you as Chief
of Naval Operations but was told by Kirk that there were certain
things in there that he did not have to do, that were transferred over
to Turner, Chief of War Plans, and Turner specifically denied that
any other change had taken place, so far as he was concerned, and
stated that that schedule of organization was the law, so far as he was
concerned, today, and that there never had been any change made,
and thus Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Turner clashed very defi-
nitely on that issue.
Now, I want to ask you the simple question whether or not, when a
written order was issued by you as Chief of Naval Operations specify-
ing the duties and responsibilities of an office — whether those orders
were subject to be changed b}'^ verbal communications to the incum-
bent?
[6554^] Admiral Stark. Where one or two people were con-
cerned and there was a mistake in understanding, they would
naturally go, as provided in the publication, to Admiral Ingersoll,
which tJiey did, as I understand, in this instance. And what was re-
ferred to, I believe, was that it was AVar Plans' duty to make up the
war plan, including the estimate of the situation. It had to be fun-
neled through one source. It couldn't be sent out from two. Ingersoll
spoke to me about it. I was in complete agreement with him. I never
felt that there was any real difficulty there. In the first place, these
people were working together every day. Intelligence had to give
the material, all it had, to War Plans, on which they could base their
estimate. I think they continued to do it and continued to evaluate
it for that purpose. I know that they did and were continually work-
ing together. But the final estimate, which went into the war plan,
on that sort of thing, rested with War Plans. And, so far as I know,
as a result of tJiat, there was never any gap or hiatus that was created
anywhere, or any conflict or any trouble about it. I was surprised when
the situation developed the way it did up here.
Mr. Keefe. Now, Admiral, I still don't have an answer to my ques-
tion. Was that written order ever changed verbally in any respect?
Admiral Wilkinson claimed it was. Admiral Turner claimed it was.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2461
You are the one who is supposed to [6S55] have changed it
verbally to Admiral Kirk. All I want to know is, did you change the
order verbally or didn't you?
Admiral Stark. Well, I know that when it came to me with Inger-
soll's recommendation, and with regard to the getting out of the
probable intentions for incorporation into the war plan, that I stated
that that was War Plans' duty, but that the material in connection
with it would continue to be supplied, as it had been in the past, by
Intelligence. I don't
Mr. Keefe. Do you mean by that the evaluation of the material was
to be the duty of Intelligence who would in turn transmit that to War
Plans?
Admiral Stark. They continued to give it, with their evaluation,
but the final over-all set-up in the war plan was Turner's.
For example, in the Fortnightly Summaries we got out there were
evaluations there being made right along by Intelligence.
I would like to read, in that connection, if I might, three paragraphs
in this same publication.
Mr. Keefe. Well, I don't care for that myself. Admiral. All I
want is an answer to a very simple question. If it can't be answered,
all right. We have gone all over that with Admiral Wilkinson and
Admiral Turner, and they were in complete [6556^ disagree-
ment as to the proposition, and Admiral Wilkinson had gone to the
trouble to send over and get some statement from Admiral Kirk over
in the Mediterranean, as I recall. It was a question as to their respec-
tive responsibilities, one claiming that he was complying strictly with
the order as written, the other claiming that that order had been
changed verbally by you to Admiral Kirk, predecessor to Admiral
Wilkinson.
Admiral Stark. I remember some of their testimony, and I thought
they were nothing like as far apart as might appear. There was one
part of Admiral Wilkinson's testimony in particular with regard to
the meat of it, and one part of Admiral Turner's testimony, as I
studied it, that were very much in line. I never felt there was any
real difficulty between them.
Mr. KJEEFE. I guess you weren't here in the room then to see the
clashes that ^passed when that incident occurred or you wouldn't
think so.
Admiral Stark. I wasn't here.
Mr. Keefe. I thought the}^ were very much disturbed at each other.
Admiral Stark. I would like to read these three paragraphs, if I
may.
Mr. Keefe. Can't you answer my question, did you or did you not
change that order through verbal instructions to \[6557^ Ad-
miral Kirk ?
Admiral Stark. I decided, when it came to me, that the estimate
of the situation in War Plans would be made by War Plans, and
War Plans would be responsible for it.
Mr. Keefe. Is that in accordance with the written order ?
Admiral Stark. That is where they seem to have a good deal of
trouble. In my opinion it is not
Senator Lucas. It is not clear.
2462 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. It is not clear and it is not worth while. The
written order states :
Secure all classes of pertinent information, especially that affecting disposition
and probable intentions.
Wilkinson contined to get all classes of information and he con-
tinued to give it to Turner, who, where the main war plan was con-
cerned, finally evaluated it and put it in.
The paragraphs that I mentioned are overriding considerations and
I would like to read them to you. This was not given on the sheets
that were given you. I would like to have you have them.
Matters which are of paramount interest to any one division shall be handled
by that division.
Responsibility for necessary liaison with other interested divisions shall rest
with the director of [6558] the division having paramount interest, who
shall keep other divisions informed of action taken.
The director of each division is responsible, in matters assigned to its cog-
nizance, for necessary liaison and coordination of effort within the Navy Depart-
ment.
Now, the staff was an integrated staff. It is almost impossible to
write up a set of regulations where things dovetail in as closely as they
do in an organization such as we have, so as to lay down just what each
person will do specifically.
Those paragraphs were meant to cover and get the people together
on them, and my feeling is that Turner and Wilkinson always did
work together closely and without any trouble on this.
Senator Ferguson. Might I inquire, Mr, Chairman, where these
three paragraphs are from ?
Admiral Stark. They are from the same pamphlet.
Mr. Keefe. It is the Operational Order ?
Admiral Stark. The Operational Order. It is sort of an over-
all picture to show that you just can't get down and say, "Well, you
stop there, and you stop there," when people are working together
and seeing each other all the time.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I want to express my thanks [6559^
to Admiral Stark for his great patience, he having been here a long
time, and I am not going to ask him any further questions.
Admiral Stark. There is one thing that occurred to me this after-
noon in Mr. Keefe's questioning. Whether it would be helpful or
not, I don't know. I would just like to take a minute or so to glance
at the so-called tasks assigned in WPLi-46 or in Kimmel's orders.
(Short pause.)
Admiral Stark. This is reading
The Chairman. What are you reading from ? •
Admiral Stark. From Admiral Kinnnel's war plan, which in turn
was based on WPL-46.
Mr. Mitchell. It is not labeled that way officially. Identify it
for the record.
Admiral Stark. It is U. S. Pacific Fleet Publication W. P. Pac. 46,
promulgated July 25, 1941.
Mr. Keefe was asking about just prior to plans coming in, and I
remembered that Admiral Kimmel had covered that, and thought pos-
sibly this might be of assistance, and, regarding which, of course,
he will have a more intimate knowledge than I have, but I had re-
membered that he had done that.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2463
Chapter II, page 25, under the heading, "Tasks Formulated to Ac-
complish the Assigned Missions." It is an outline of [6660^
tasks.
It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based
upon Assumption A2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating
tasks the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption Al and divides
the tasks to be accomplished by the Pi^cific Fleet into phases, as follows :
a. PHASE I — Initial tasks, Japan not in the war,
b. PHASE HA — Initial tasks, Japan in the war.
c. PHASE II, etc. — Succeeding tasks.
Phase I tasks are as follows:
a. Complete mobilizatiton and prepare for distant operations ; thereafter main-
tain all types in constant readiness for distant service.
b. Maintain fleet security at bases and ancliorages and at sea.
c. Transfer the Atlantic reinforcement, if ordered.
d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific force, if ordered.
e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific southern and
a similar force to Pacific northern naval coastal frontier on M-day.
f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific northern
naval coastal frontier on M-day.
[SSdl] g. Protect the communications and territory of the Associated
Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western
Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action
of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces
south of the Equator as far west as Longitude 155 degrees East.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, at this point :
You are referring to the plan of Admiral Kimmel now, which
relates to M-day, are you not?
Admiral Stark. This is phase I, which he designates as "Initial
tasks, Japan not in the war."
Mr. Keefe. But he refers to M-day? You just referred to it.
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific southern and a
similar force to Pacific northern naval coastal frontier, on M-day.
I read this :
Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific northern
naval coastal frontier on M-day.
Protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers and prevent
the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrol-
ling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups
[6562] as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south
of the Equator as far west as Longitude 155 degrees East.
h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.
And you might recall that he had already done that. He called
it a defensive submarine patrol.
i. Observe, with sul)marines outside the 3-mile limit, the possible raider bases
in the Japanese mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Department.
.1. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway,
Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam, and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.
And you will note that he was strengthening those, some of those
places, by sending planes.
k. Continue training operations as practicable.
1. Move the maximum practicable portion of Second Marine Division to
Hawaii for training in landing operations.
m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.
That is in his phase known as "Japan not in the war." He has
covered there some of the things that have been talked about, and it
2464 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
occurred to me, when you were asking me questions, that it might be
of interest to you to know about that. [65GS] I assume that he
will be able to testify on it.
The Chairman. Does counsel for Admiral Stark wish to ask any
questions ?
Mr. Obear. No questions.
The Chairman. Does counsel wish to ask further questions?
Mr. Mitchell. No.
The Chairman. I have one or two questions.
Senator Lucas, you may go ahead if you have some questions.
Senator Lucas. No ; wou go ahead.
The Chairman. Admiral Stark, Admiral Richardson testified that
when he was relieved of command of the Pacific Fleet, he submitted
to the Navy Department a list of men whom he recommended from
whom the successor be chosen, and he testified that on that list was
the name of Admiral Kimmel ; is that your recollection ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. There was universal regard for the
right caliber of Admiral Kimmel. I think he would have been on
anybody's list. He was on mine also.
The Chairman. Was the appointment of Admiral Kimmel made
by you or the Secretary of the Navy ?
Admiral Stark. That appointment always goes to the President
for the final selection or at least the O. K. [6564] I remember,
when the President mentioned Kimmel, he said, "He has been a
White House aide," he remembered him very well.
The Chairman. A good deal has been said about this word "de-
ployment." It is not a new word in military and naval matters,
is it?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
The Chairman. It has been used ever since Hannibal, hasn't it ?
Admiral Stark. I think so ; yes, sir.
The Chairman. Doesn't every Naval Academy graduate, when he
goes out, know what it means ?
Admiral Stark. He certainly learns what it means before long
from war games.
The Chairman. It is used in the arrangement of ground forces,
in military matters, as well as upon the high seas, in regard to ships,
isn't it?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir, it is used ; it was used in our war plans.
It was incorporated in Kimmel's war plan. I didn't read it this after-
noon. That was another thing I thought of. But it is there.
The Chairman. In other words, it is the arrangement of troops or
ships in order to accomplish a definite purpose, whether it is defense
or offense?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
[6565] The Chairman. And the word "deployment" as I have
read in the history of battles in all our wars, it has ben used in the
sense that General So-and-So deployed his forces by putting so many
over yonder on the right and so many over on the left, so many in
the rear, depending upon the character of battle it was to be, and
whether he was to defend his ground or whether he was to make
an attack upon the enemy.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2465
Admiral Stark. That is true, and it occurs particularly in our
tactical instructions where we deploy for battle.
The Chairman. Any naval officer of the rank of admiral or vice
admiral or rear admiral would know, whether he was instructed to
deploy his forces, what that meant, wouldn't he'^
Admiral Stark, Yes, sir; in my opinion he would.
The Chairman. He might be, of course, expected to use his own
judgment as to how he deployed them, but the particular arrange-
ment under which he was to carry out the instructions was within
his discretion, was it not?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Admiral, you were asked if it was your duty to
see to it that the orders were carried out. When you gave an order
to a naval officer in any part of the world, you had the right, under
his responsibility* to expect that he would carry it out?
Admiral Stark. That is right.
[66{]6] The Chairman. You couldn't see that they were carried
out, yourself, unless you went out there and did it?
Admiral Stark. Or unless I directed him to report whether or not
he had done it.
The Chairman. Even if he reported that and hadn't done what you
ordered him to do, you could reiterate your orders, but if you saw they
were actually executed personally, you would have to be on the ground ;
would you not ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. The details were his.
The Chairman. And the Navy Department, and you, had confi-
dence in all our officers in all theaters of war, so far as the Navy was
concerned, that they knew what orders would mean and how to carry
them out?
Admiral Stark. I did ; yes, sir.
The Chairman. In regard to the situation in the Atlantic that has
been talked about, there was nothing secretive about that at the time ;
was there ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
The Chairman. About the orders to shoot in defending the ship-
ment of our materials which Congress had authorized, there wasn't any
secret about that ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. It was wide open.
The Chairman. The President made speeches; my recollection is
that he reported to Congress on it.
[6S66-A] Admiral Stark. I don't remember about that, but his
speech in September was wide open on that.
The Chairman. Anyhow, at the time it was going on, the American
people knew it, and the President issued public statements and made
speeches about it, so that there was nothing secret at all in regard to it?
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
The Chairman. I believe that is all.
Senator Lucas.
Senator Lucas. Admiral Stark, have you ever had a conversation
with Admiral Kimmel since December 7, 1941, about what happened
at Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Stark. No; I have not talked to him about it at all in
detail.
7971G~-4G--pt. 5 27
2466 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[6567] Senator Lucas. When you left the service as Chief of
Naval Operations you went directly to London ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. And there became the Admiral of the American
Fleet?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. That was operating then with the English ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. The operational commanders, of course,
were those in immediate command, like Kirk for the Normandy inva-
sion ; the forces we had at Scapafiow had their own admiral ; we had
a man in command of Air Forces.
Senator Lucas. What was your exact title there ?
Admiral Stark. Commander, United States Naval Forces, Europe.
Later on I was given the additional title of commander of the
Twelfth Fleet, of which these other forces would be made a task force
under the commander of the Twelfth Fleet.
Senator Lucas. How long did you remain in that position ?
Admiral Stark. I reported there, it was the last day of April in
1942, and I was detached on the 16th of August 1945 — something over
3 years.
Senator Lucas. Well, I take it that in that important position which
you held it required that you exercise superior judgment, did it not,
from time to time?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; I think so. I think the Army [6568]
citation on that — apparently the Army thought so.
Senator Lucas. For exercising that superior judgment during those
long years you were awarded several citations by different govern-
ments and our own ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. You said in the early part of your examination that
you failed to send Admiral Kimmel any of the ultra or magic codes
because it might compromise the source, did you not ?
Admiral Stark. Senator Lucas, will you repeat that?
The Chairman. I think you have the wrong man.
Senator Lucas. I will withdraw the question.
Admiral Stark. I didn't testify to that.
Senator Lucas. Anyhow, you realized and appreciated the secrecy
of magic as it was being intercepted by our Government ?
Admiral Stark. It was a very powerful weapon, or might be one ;
yes, sir.
[6569] Senator Lucas. And you had a certain group of officers
in the Navy here in Washington that knew about the secret code ?
Admiral Stark, Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Let me ask you whether or not Admiral Kimmel
knew about the secret code at the time ?
Admiral Stark. Of our breaking the codes in Washington?
Senator Lucas. Yes.
Admiral Stark. Senator Lucas, I have asked myself that question.
I took it for granted, not that he had them but that he knew that we
were breaking them, because I have found out since that messages
showing these were being sent out there, and some of the messages
that we sent showed where these dispatches were coming from. So, I
am under the impression that he did know, but I have never asked
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2467
him personally whether he knew. At least, I don't recall it. I would
rather that he would clinch that with you.
Senator Lucas. One other question that intrigues me a little. They
have some bearing upon my own judgment and may not be of particu-
lar importance here. It is in respect to the Battle of Midway. Who
was in command, who was the commander of the Pacific Fleet at that
time?
Admiral Stark. That was about 6 months after Pearl Harbor,
something like that, and Nimitz was in command.
Senator Lucas. You were not Chief of Naval Operations?
[6570] Admiral Stark. No. King had relieved me by that time,
and Nimitz was commander in chief of tlie Pacific.
Senator Lucas. I was just wondering what kind of an order King
gave to Nimitz with respect to the Battle of Midway, if he gave him
any order at all.
Admiral Stark. I don't know. I know that King published a paper
when he was commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet calling atten-
tion to the fact that people should not give specific detail to subordi-
nates, but what I said earlier, tell them what to do, not how to do it.
Senator Lucas. The only reason I asked the question was to try to
determine what kind of an order King may have given to Nimitz at
that time, to make a comparison with the order you gave to Kimmel
and to see whether or not Nimitz carried through the responsibilities
and whether the orders were similar and just what responsibility was
given to that command at that particular time.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Do you have any notion about that at all?
Admiral Stark. No, I have nothing, but I do know that in the
Normandy invasion, the plans were worked out entirely in Europe
and copies simply sent back to the Department. Our relations with
the Department at that time were simply in the plea for the material,
men, ships, equipment, et cetera, that [6671] we needed to
implement orders which we had drawn up.
Senator Lucas. In other words, you drew up the orders?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; the operational people. Kirk, for exam-
ple, drew up the orders for the actual ships and which came down
the line for higher authority.
Senator Lucas. And the subordinates in the Normandy invasion
assumed the responsibility, after they got the command, for either suc-
cess or failure ?
Admiral Stark. The subordinates down the line drew their cue,
so to speak, from over-all orders higher up, and they in turn issued
their own orders.
Senator Lucas. Now, one other question with respect to the break-
ing of the Japanese code. Who, in your immediate naval family, knew
that we were breaking the Japanese code at that time ?
Admiral Stark. The President knew it. Colonel Knox knew it.
IngersoU, of course, knew it. The radio people, certain ones, knew it.
Intelligence and certain people there knew it. War Plans people, I
don't know just how many of them, such as Turner, as the head of
War Plans, Knew it.
The Chairman. May I interject? When you say, "radio" you mean
naval radio?
2468 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I am speaking about our communications
division. Perhaps that would have been a better term to [6572]
use. But it was kept rather close. For example, in the morning ses-
sions which we had we were very careful about talking about anytliing
of that sort ; or in the big conferences, which we held on Thursday,
with all the chiefs of bureaus, materiel bureaus, and so forth, that sort
of thing was never mentioned.
Senator Lucas. Did you give any specific and direct orders to your
subordinates that knew about magic with respect to keeping it a
secret ?
Admiral Stark. I think at that time we had to sign up a paper, I
am not sure. I know we have since. For example. Lieutenant Com-
mander Richmond, assisting me here, he has pretty near signed his
death warrant, and if he were to give anything out about it, he would
be doing that, but it is all out now.
Senator Lucas. I understand. Practically everything that has
ever been known about breaking the codes is known now to the world.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Primarily, through this Pearl Harbor hearing.
Admiral Stark. Before that happened, anybody who was let in on
that had to sign a paper never to disclose it, practically so long as he
lived, or ever to talk about it. And, as a [6S73~\ matter of fact,
people coming to Europe, we did it there, too. Not only people com-
ing to Europe, we did it there, too. Not only people coming to Europe,
but if anybody came in my office and I started to talk to them about
things, regardless of their rank, I would not discuss such things with
them because I didn't know whether they knew the codes were being
broken or not, and I didn't dare bring up subjects which might be
unknown to them, because of that.
Senator Lucas. Did it ever come to your attention at any time while
you were Chief of Naval Operations that there was a leak in any part
of your Department with respect to giving aAvay this secret to someone ?
Admiral Stark. Not in my Department. There was an incident
that occurred, I am not very clear on it, where a reporter, or some-
one connected with the press in the Pacific, mentioned the breaking
of codes, while the war was still on. The Navy Department could
give you the details. I recall only the one incident.
Senator Lubas. Well, there was nothing that ever came to your
attention, as I understand it, that would imply that anyone under your
immediate control was letting the secret out?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Senator Lucas. Now, there have been a lot of questions asked you,
Admiral Stark, about the so-called purported agree- [^57^]
ments that were made between this country and the Dutch and the
British.
Admiral Stark. I did not get the first part of that.
Senator Lucas. I say, a great many questions have been asked you
by members of the committee with respect to the so-called agreements
that were made between America, the British, and the Dutch.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. And some assumptions have been made here from
time to time in this committee that there might have been some agree-
ments of some kind. But, if I understand you correctly, insofar as
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2469
you know, while you discussed, you and your officers in tlie Navy
discussed, from time to time matters with the British and the Dutch
about what should be done in the event that you all got into war, at
no time was there any formal agreement drawn up or any commitments
made that were approved by the President of the United States?
Admiral Stark. And on which would be predicated a forecast that
if Britain or the NEI were attacked we would come in ?
Senator Lucas. Yes.
Admiral Stark. No, sir; I know of no such agreement.
Mr. Keefe. Do you include the Canadian agreement?
Senator Lucas. No ; I do not include that.
Mr. Mitchell. The Canadian agreement was a defensive agree-
[(^JTkJ] ment for defending our own territory. I imagine the
President could do that without a declaration of war.
Mr. Keefe. I ask so that there would not be any question.
Senator Lucas. I do not include the Canadian agreement. The
Dutch didn't have anything to do with the Canadian agreement.
Admiral Stark. No, sir; these ABD are the American, Dutch,
British.
[6576] Senator Lucas. It was a necessary procedure for the
Navy to make all plans that it could possibly conceive of for the de-
fensive purposes of this Nation of ours at that time?
Admiral Stark. That is the way I felt about it and that is what I
thought.
Senator Lucas. And you did more or less what the country was doing
at that time in view of the passage of lend-lease and other measures to
aid England and the Dutch ; you were working out or at least you were
talking about plans that might come into being in the event that we
were drawn in ?
Admiral Stark. That is true, and in that connection there is a dis-
tinction between the so-called hemispheric defense plans and WPL-46.
Senator Lucas. I want to direct your attention to exhibit 33, which
is the estimates of the military intelligence, and read a paragraph or
two from that exhibit with respect to economic sanctions and whether
or not you agree or disagree.
Admiral Stark. What page, sir ?
Senator Lucas. It is on page — well, it is the July 25th memorandum
that was prepared by General Miles for the Cliief of Staff, entitled
"Sanctions Against Japan," Exhibit 33. I do this because there has
been so much insinuation or, rather, so many questions asked of you
about economic sanctions, and I want to read paragraph 9, on page 2,
of that letter.
[6577] Effective economic sanctions against Japan imposed by us, today,
would not, in the opinion of this Division, force Japan to take any steps in tlie way
of aggressive action which she does not plan to take anyway, when a favoi-able
opportunity arises, nor would they precipitate a declaration of war on us by
Japan. Such action on oiir part need not and should not distract our attention
from the main theater of operations. On the contrary, by adopting such a policy
we will be able to conserve for Britain and for ourselves supplies which from
the viewpoint of our national defense, are being worse than wasted when we place
them in .Japanese hands.
And then on the bottom of that :
• Recommendation : That this paper be referred to the Joint Board with a view to
initiating plans whose execution will place a complete export and import embargo
on our trade with Japan.
2470 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Then the latter was stricken out and there is a penciled notation
which says :
This memo was written prior to receipt of information regarding embargo
decision.
In other words, it appears here at that time that the G-2 of the
Army was in full accord with the economic-sanction program that
was then being discussed by the State Department [6S7S] and
I was wondering whether or not you agreed at that particular time
with Miles with respect to economic sanctions?
Admiral Stark. Well, in the last analysis under the conditions
obtaining in the Government of Japan I felt that the military would
control. Nevertheless, I did think that certainly the impositions of
economic embargoes, economic sanctions might possibly precipitate
hostilities, if not make the time closer when they would occur inasmuch
as they might trottle Japanese life. Now, against that had to be
balanced an opinion that ultimately we would go to war with them
anyway and if we did not impose these they might take it as a sign
of weakness, it also might hasten it and it also might have them better
equipped if war did come about.
Senator Lucas. Well, there were two schools of thought on that
question at that particular time.
Admiral Stakk. Well, there was a balance there and the economic
sanctions, as I recall, were imposed after Japan had made her move
into Indochina and it may have been just another way of saying,
"Keep this up and here is our reply to your going on the rampage."
Senator Lucas. Well, I would like to call the committee's attention
to this same exhibit. From time to time Miles expresses the same
opinion as I just read, without reading them, I will turn to the
one of December the 5, 1941, [6579] in his memorandum to
the chief of staff, the latter part of it, in which he says :
Our influence in the Far Eastern Theater lies in the threat of our Naval power
and the effort of our economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents against
Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner.
In other words, I merely call attention to the fact that even up to
the very last the intelligence chief of the Army was asking and
recommending to the Chief of Staff economic sanctions against Japan.
Now, I have placed these matters before you in the record for the
purpose of more or less answering some of the questions, at least some
of the insinuations that have been placed here in the record that
economic sanctions was the thing that more or less drove Japan into
this war.
I want to state this for the record while I am discussing economic
sanctions : You will recall. Admiral Stark, that there were a great
number of people from 1936 to 1941 that were asking that we do apply
the embarko on oil and scrap iron and other things, do you not ?
Admiral Stark. Among the general public; yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. And, on the other hand, there was another group
of people, big business and small business, that were insisting that we
sell to Japan oil and scrap iron and these [6580] other things.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I remember them very well because I
expressed myself strongly against the imposition on oil unless we were
prepared to fight.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2471
Senator Lucas, All rip;ht. Now, liere are the figures that I want
to offer into the record for whatever they are worth :
In 1936 this country sold to Japan — I don't say this country, but
the business interests of this country sold to Japan 27,781,999 barrels
of crude petroleum, natural gasoline, gasoline, and other petroleum
motor fuel in bulk, and so forth, besides millions of pounds of greases
and paraffin wax, and so forth.
In 1937 the business interests of this country sold 28,377,381 barrels
of the same commodities.
In 1938, 31,354,050 barrels.
In 1939, 28,012,000 barrels.
In 1940, 22,796,748 barrels, and this does not include, and I will
not read it, the millions of pounds of lubricating greases and pe-
troleum coke and petroleum jelly and other things that were used in
connection with getting ready for war.
In 1941 it fell off to 6,986,517 barrels.
In other words, you have one group of people in this country that
was doing everything that they knew how to sell this [6581] oil
to Japan knowing that they were aggressors at that time and doing
what they were doing. On the other hand, you have another group
that are attempting to apply economic sanctions for the purpose of
stopping the aggression, and right along that line, if I may, I will read
this into the record.
Right at that particular time American business firms made ship-
ments of scrap iron to Japan :
In 1936, 1,057,000 tons.
In 1937, 1,900,000 tons.
In 1938, 1,380,000 tons.
In 1939, 2,000,000 tons.
In 1940, 960,000 tons.
So we did pretty well as far as supplying the Japs in those years
with oil and scrap iron and I am not so sure but that if we had applied
economic sanctions sooner it would have been better for us. That is
all, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart.
Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Stark, I hate to detain you at this late
hour but this is my last chance, I suppose, to tender interrogatories
to you.
Yesterday when I was examining you I referred to the story which
appeared in the Saturday Evening Post of October of 1942, an
article which was written by Lt. Clarence E. Dickinson, United States
Navy, and which was entitled, [SrSS^I "I Fly for Vengeance."
At that time my questions were from memory. Today I have had the
Congressional Library send me a photostat of that article and with
your indulgence I will read the first two paragraphs:
You would damn well remember Pearl Harbor if you had seen the great naval
base ablaze as we of Scouting Squadron 6 saw it from the air, skimming in
ahead of our homeward-bound carrier. The shock was especially heavy for us
because this was our first knowledge that the Japs had attacked on that morn-
ing of December seventh. We came upon it stone cold, each of us looking
forward to a long leave that was due him.
It wasn't that we pilots didn't sense the tension that gripped the Pacific. You
could feel it everywhere, all the time. Certainly the mission from which we
were returning had the flavor of impending action. We had been delivering a
batch of twelve Grumman Wildcats of Marine Fighting Squadron 211 to Wake
Island, where they were badly needed. On this cruise we had sailed from
2472 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Pearl Harbor on November twenty-eighth under absolute war orders. Vice
Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., the commander of the Aircraft Battle Force,
had given instructions that the secrecy of our mission was to be protected at
all costs. We were to shoot down anything we saw in [6583^ the sky
and bomb anything we saw on the sea In that way, there could be no leak to
the Japs.
Mow assuming that the then Lieutenant and now Commander
Clarence E, Dickinson correctly records in this paragraph the nature
of the orders under which he flew, absolute war orders as he calls
them, orders which directed him to sink without a trace any Japanese
ships that he encountered, to shoot down any Japanese planes he
encountered in the air, would you say that those orders did not con-
stitute an overt act against the Japanese?
Admiral Stark. When you previously questioned me on this I did
not have the detail which you give there, I do not know the route
they took and I would ratlier not express an opinion unless I knew
more about it. For example, I stated that if I had been on the Island
of Oahu and Japanese planes came over I would shoot them down.
Kimmel stated and informed me that he had given orders to bomb
any submarine which came in that area. I thought it was a perfectly
proper order.
Now, if I had been going close by a Japanese mandate and a scout-
ing plane had appeared within reach of my guns I do not know that
I would have shot it down unless I had felt that there was pretty
good reason to believe that it was going to attack. It is a rather
difficult thing to answer but if Bill Halsey felt that it was necessary
from where he was going to give those orders I would not differ with
him until I knew more about why he issued them.
[6-584] ]Mr. Gearhart. Well, there isn't so much left out of this
paragraph that I have read to you. You know from it that the mis-
sion was from Hawaii to "Wake and from Wake back to Hawaii, do
you not ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. Well, regarding the overt act, anything
that he did in self-defense he was authorized to do. The Navy Regu-
lations covered that.
I had invited Kimmel's attention to that when he asked me about
shooting orders in the Pacific. I think I put it in ftiy statement.
Anyway, it is available to the committee in my correspondence. He
told me what he was doing. I agreed with him on ever}' point, as to
what he was doing.
But if out on the high seas, out of sight of everything, to take the
other extreme, that force had run into a Japanese merchant ship on
the horizon and a plane saw her and deliberately bombed her and sank
her, I will say it would be an overt act.
If a Japanese submarine had popped up close aboard, I would say
it would be self-protection to have sunk that submarine and not an
overt act. Between the two is a line of judgment which must be left
up to the man in the field.
Mr. Gearhart. But under this order that was issued it would have
been the duty of Commander Dickinson and his copilots to have sunk
a merchant ship, if it had encountered it on the sea, because they were
under absolute orders to keep [6-j8o] their mission secret at all
costs. That is an absolute war order, is it?
Admiral Stark. I would say so if it were issued, but I would like to
have Halsey's version of that before I would be prepared to accept it.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMIITEE 2473
Mr. Geariiart. All ri^lit. But assiimin<^ the facts as they are
stated here by Clarence E. Dickinson, who has been twice promoted
and never reconniiended for this article or criticized for writing it in
all the years since it was published, if these facts are accepted as true,
that he, as he said, was ''Hying on absolute war orders with instructions
to keep my mission secret at all cost," "under orders to sink any Japa-
nese ship I encountered on the surface of the seas and to shoot down
any Japanese airplanes that I encountered in the air," that is war,
isn't it?
Admiral Stark. Well, from the illustration that I have given you
of what might be regarded perhaps as an innocent merchant ship on
the horizon, not bothering anybody, perhaps even headed home for
Japan, why, I just have difficulty in understanding that Halsey would
have expected them to sink such a ship.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, Admiral, how could he keep his mission a
secret if he allowed a merchant ship to observe him in the air, allow
it to radio the information that he had gone [6586]^ by? If he
did not sink such a ship, he would certainly not have lived up to the
letter of the war orders that had been given to him, would he?
Admiral Stark. He would not have lived up to the orders that he
states were given him.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes,
Admiral Stark. He might, however, change the course of his flight
so that the merchant ship could not see him. If he had spotted the
merchant ship from the air, perhaps 100 miles away, in that case he
would not have had to change his course.
Mr. Gearhart. Does the fact that Admiral Halsey gave that order
to Commander Dickinson when he had before him your message, "This
is a war warning," have any influence on your answer to these ques-
tions ?
Admiral Stark. No ; I have not been thinking of it in that connec-
tion, except for the tenseness of the period. I think in all those cases
a matter of judgment comes in. If there were no question of being
seen, and coming back to the merchant ship example, where a plane
might be well up in the air and where a merchant ship might not see
the plane because the plane could see her a long ways off, for the plane
to go out of his way to sink that merchant ship, I just rather doubt
that Halsey intended that to be done.
[6S87"] Mr. Gearhart. That is all right. Let us doubt it, but
assuming that Vice Admiral Halsey ordered Lieutenant Dickinson to
keep his mission secret at all cost, what would you say then ?
Admiral Stark. Then it comes to whether it would have been a
secret or not. With all the assumptions that you put in there, and on
the merchant ship example which I have given it might be regarded
as an overt act.
Mr. Gearhart. Then it follows as a logical conclusion, assuming all
that Lieutenant Dickinson says is true, that we were at war in the
Pacific on the 28th day of November 1941 ?
Admiral Stark. No ; I would not say so.
Mr. Gearhart. All right. Then, point out why.
Admiral Stark. Because we were not.
Mr. Gearhart. AVhen we are directing our fleet commanders to
sink without a trace we are not at war ?
2474 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark, Well, you are drawing up a premise here which I
do not think holds.
Mr. Gearhart. I am asking you to assume what Lieutenant Dickin-
son said. Assume that that is true ; I am asking you as a naval expert,
based upon that assumption, that carries with it the acceptance of
the idea that Clarence Dickinson was under orders to sink without a
trace any ship that he [dSSS] encountered upon the sea, I want
to know whether or not, on that assumption, you will say we were not
at war on the 28th day of November 1941 in the Pacific ?
Admiral Stark. And you are assuming that he sees the ship and he
is sure that ship would have information of him, and that that infor-
mation of one single plane which he might never see, would disclose
Mr. Gearhart. You are asking me to pass on the question of whether
or not
Admiral Stark. I am asking you ; yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. You are asking me to pass on the question of whether
or not a certain situation constitutes keeping his mission a secret at
all costs. Now, you can pass on that same situation. Is he keeping
his mission a secret at all costs if he flies by a merchant ship that he
might encounter on the sea ?
Admiral Stark. What do you consider keeping his mission a
secret? If his main body is here [indicating] and off here on the
horizon, maybe 100 miles away, is a merchant ship and which the
plane can see probably from such a distance and the merchant ship
cannot see him, I would say that is not giving the secret away.
Mr. Gearhart. Then, he is under orders to sink that ship, isn't he ?
[6S89] Admiral Stark. May I finish, sir?
You said that his orders are such as to have him go out of his way
to sink that ship, and I say in that case it might be regarded as an overt
act. Somebody might ultimately have to pass judgment on it. But
in my opinion, also, under those conditions, the merchant ship would
not discover what Admiral Halsey's mission was.
Mr. Gearhart. That hasn't got anything to do with the question
I am propounding to you. If he is under orders to keep his mission
secret is he not under orders to sink every ship that he encounters
carrying the Japanese flag?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. In the first place, the Jap might not see
the plane, and, in the second place, if he did see it what can he gather
from it?
Mr. Gearhart. How would Lieutenant Dickinson or any American
oflficer know whether the Jap saw him, or if he saw him plainly on the
sea? Would not he, as a reasonable man, have to assume that the ship
saw him ?
Admiral Stark, Not necessarily ; no, sir. But in any case, suppose
he did see him, would the short picture of one plane indicate what
Halsey's mission was 100 miles away?
Mr. Gearhart. He was flying with the squadron.
Admiral Stark. Well, you are further amplifying it now. Was he
deployed on the scouting line ?
[6690] Mr. Gearhart. That does not make any difference,
Admiral.
It does not make any difference at all. The question is: We are
officially issuing orders to keep a mission secret at all costs, to sink
all ships encountered.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2475
Admiral Stark. Which might
Mr. Geariiart (interposing). No, no; there is not any "whicli
might" there. There is no. question as to whether the Japs saw or
not.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I think the witness ought to be
treated with some courtesy here.
Mr. Geariiart. Do you think I am discourteous, Admiral?
Admiral Stark. I have no objection. That is all right.
Mr. Gearhart. You do not need the protection of the gentleman
from Illinois?
Admiral Stark. No.
Mr. Geariiart. You have got a pretty good reputation as a fight-
ing man, yourself, haven't you?
Admiral Stark. In some ways.
The Chairman. Let us not get into an argument on that either.
Mr. Geariiart. I am asking you to assume that the orders issued
to Clarence Dickinson were as he says they were. Now, can a man
fly on the Pacific under those orders and next be flying under abso-
lute war orders, as he says he was, himself ?
[6951] Admiral Stark. Congressman Gearhart, I understand
that the orders were premised on the fact that the objective was that
Halsey's mission should not become known to the Japs.
Mr. Geariiart. That is right.
Admiral Stark. "Well, I submit that one plane — you say there was
a squadron, but if they were out searching they would not be bunched,
I do not believe. It might be that they were looking for an enemy,
and if an enemy came close by, if he had discovered a Japanese force
at that time heading eastward, that would have been one thing, but
if they were deployed on the scouting line and the ship, way outside
of Halsey's force, were to see a Japanese merchant ship — we have
gotten into that phase of it, that that would disclose Halsey's inten-
tions, but I do not believe it would, and assuming that, if he were
out there for the purpose of protecting the secrecy of Halsey's posi-
tion, he would not have been required, under the orders, I would say,
to sink the ship.
[6592] Mr. Gearhart. We were to shoot down anything we saw
in the sky ?
Admiral Stark. Anything.
Mr. Gearhart. And bomb anything we saw on the sea. Is there
anything equivocal about that ?
Admiral Stark. Isn't that, "shoot down anything we saw or bomb
anything we saw on the sea which might disclose our mission or
threaten it" ?
Mr. Geariiart. Yes ; that is the purport of it.
The Chairman. In view of the fact that Admiral Halsey is going
to be here as a witness, wouldn't it be advisable to let him in on this ?
Mr. Gearhart. I want a definite answer. I think you can answer
the question definitely. Can those orders be issued and not be war
orders ?
Admiral Stark. Under certain circumstances, yes, sir. If I had
been in Halsey's shoes — and he didn't need anybody else's shoes — and
he had started on this mission, say a couple of hundred miles, or a
hundred miles, from Oahu, and he had met this Japanese task force
headed eastward, Bill would have hit it, and so would I, and I believe
2476 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
anybody else would. Under that circumstance he was justified in it.
How far he would have gone, and of which I drew an extreme one
way and an extreme the other way, I don't know. Just [6593]
whether his orders to shoot down what he saw were further qualified
by some reasoning as to position and threat, I don't know.
In other words, I am telling you frankly where I would have shot.
You might stretch it. Say they were 400 miles away, I still think
I would have let him have it. Supposing he were 800 miles north of
Oahu and were headed south. 1 certainly would have let him have it
then. But if I saw a single merchant ship
Mr. Gearhart, You are not talking about the order. You are
talking about what you would have done. You say you expected
Admiral Kimmel to do certain things under your very loosely drawn
order. Here is a positive order. You are finding ways of avoiding
observing it by pointing out fanciful situations which fly in the face
of the order to sink everything encountered on the sea and shoot down
everything encountered in the air.
Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield ?
Mr. Gearhart. I yield, and that is all.
The Chairman. What you are being asked, Admiral, is, if that
article in the Saturday Evening Post is true, and the orders were given,
it constituted an overt act which justified an attack on Pearl Harbor.
That is what you are being asked.
Mr. Gearhart. I am trying to find the facts. I have no [6o94]
one to defend, no one to prosecute, and no cause to. serve save the truth.
Let's have it.
The Chairman. Are there any further questions?
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, as part of the record of Admiral
Stark, he has brought in and given to counsel these maps showing
the location of the ships
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Turner.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral Turner — but he was also asked about it,
whether or not they show the ships, and they are here, from the 1st
to the 6th, inclusive, and I would like to have them in evidence as an
exhibit.
The Chairman. Yes; they will be marked. Wliat is the next
number ?
Mr. Hannaford. 109.
(The document referred to was marked as "Exhibit No. 109.")
The Chairman. Admiral, have you any further statement that you
would like to make in addition to what you have already stated?
Admiral Stark. No, sir ; I can't think of anything that I know that
I haven't told you or of anything that I can suggest that hasn't been
covered.
The Chairman. The committee thanks you for your very manifest
efi'ort to give it all the information within your [6505] knowl-
edge. You have been patient and courteous and you have demeaned
yourself before this committee as befits your rank and your record
as an admiral of the United States Navy, and we appreciate it.
Admiral Stark. Thank you, sir. I also appreciate the opportunity
to come before you all. I was hoping that it would happen, both for
Admiral Kimmel and myself, and I am delighted to have the oppor-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2477
tiinity ; and I also want to thank the committee for its courtesy in every
instance.
The Chairman. All ri^lit; <rood, luck, Admiral.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman
Admiral Stark. I take it you will not want we again ?
The Chairman. No, not so far as the committee knows.
Senator Lucas. AVe might want you here when Admiral Halsey is
here to answer that last question.
Admiral Stark. I think Bill can take care of himself.
Senator Lucas. It is very important.
(The witness was excused temporarily.) ^
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chaii-nian, we have a great number of documents
here that have already been distributed to the committee, and instead
of holding the committee, I would like the committee's permission to
have Mr. Hannaford dictate certain statements to the stenographer
referring to those exhibits and place them in the record. They are
not things that you would want to rule against or anything of that
kind. [6596] They are before the committee members but they
are to be put in as formal exhibits, and I thought, with your permis-
sion, Mr. Hannaford could dictate that into the daily transcript and
you would have the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, they will go in as part of the
daily transcript.
I would like to say to the committee that I possibly might want to
have a brief executive session Tuesday in regard to a matter Mr.
Richardson might want to bring up.
Mr. Hannaford. First, I have two letters from the Chief of Naval
Operations to the Commander in Chief United States Fleet, dated
November 17, 1940, and February 10, 1941. The committee will recall
that exhibit 9 contains the correspondence between Admiral Richard-
son and Admiral Stark. There are two letters in this exhibit from
Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark, to which the two letters to
which I have just referred are replies. I would, therefore, like to have
these two letters of December 17, 1940, and February 10, 1941, inserted
in exhibit 9 at the appropriate places.
In Admiral Stark's prepared statement he quoted excerpts of certain
letters he had written to Admiral Hart. In order that the records of
the committee may be complete. Admiral Stark has requested that
the file containing the complete copies of the letters be introduced
in evidence as an exhibit. [6597] I therefore offer these letters
from Admiral Stark to Admiral Hart as exhibit 110.
(The letters referred to were marked as "Exhibit No. 110.")
Mr. Hannaford. Admiral Stark has asked that the following docu-
ments be inserted in the daily transcript of the hearing. They are
the following :
First is his letter of June 11, 1941, to the holders of WPL-46.
(The letter referred to is as follows :)
[6598] SECKETT
Navy De2»artment,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Washington, June 11, 1941.
Op-12B-5-McC (SC) A16/EM Serial 063712
From : The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Distribution List (attached).
Subject : Order of priority in the preparation of war plans.
^ Adm. Stark's subsequent testimony appears in Hearings, Part 11,
2478 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Reference :
(a) CNO Secret Letter Op-12B-5-McC. (SO) A16/EN, Serial 03112 of Jan-
uary 8, 1941.
(b) Paragraph 3302, WPL-8.
1. Reference (a) is hereby cancelled.
2. In accordance with the provisions of reference (b), the highest priority in
the preparation of war plans is assigned to the plans required by WPL-46. It
is directed that the preparation and distribution of these plans be accomplished
with the least possible delay.
3. WPLr-13, WPLr-14, WPL-42, and WPI^^4, and subordinate plans, are placed
in an inactive status. WPL-1 is also placed in an inactive status.
4. The subject matter of subordinate plans prepared in accordance with the
directives of WPL-42 and WPL-44 may be used where applicable in the sub-
ordinate plans required by WPL-46.
[6599] 5. A copy of this letter will be placed in the front of each volume
of WPLs-1, 13, 14, 42, and 44, in your custody.
6. The urgency of deliery of this document is such that it will not reach the
addressees in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore
authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the
continental limits of the United States.
(S) H. K. Stark.
Second, his memorandum of January 9, 1941, to the Chief of Staff
of the U. S. Army, relating to the installations of aircraft -detection
equipment.
(The letter referred to is as follows :)
[6600] Op-12A-4-dro 1/9/41 (SC) Hl-16 Ser. 04312
Secret January 9, 1941.
MEMORANDUM
From : The Chief of Naval Operations.
To : The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.
Subject : Installation of Aircraft Detection Equipment.
1. The Navy Department considers that improvement of the antiaircraft de-
fenses, and particularly of the aircraft detection components of those defenses, in
the Hawaiian Islands is urgently necessary for the protection of the fleet units
there present. It is believed that in the spring and summer of 1941 enemy air
operations are much more likely to take place in the Hawaiian area and in
Alaska than in Puerto Rico, Panama, and the Continental United States.
2. For the foregoing reason the intended priority of permanent installation of
the fixed antiaircraft detection equipment l)eing procured i)y the Navy is as
follows: Midway, Johnston, Guam, Palmyra, Samoa, Wake, Guantanamo. It is
requested that consideration be given to revising schedules of delivery so as to
provide Army installations in the Hawaiian Islands and at Kodiak, Dutch Harbor,
and Sitka before completing installations at Panama and before proceeding with
installations in Puerto Rico and the continental United [6601] States.
3. Confirmation is also requested of the understanding reached on 8 January
1941, in a conference between the Director of Naval Communications, the Chief
Signal Office, and representatives of the War Flans Divisions of both services,
that the Navy Department will be given priority in deliveries of seven sets of
mobile equipment and at least eight of the eighteen sets of antiaircraft equip-
ment for the use of Marine Defense Battalions.
4. It was learned in the conference on 8 January that delays are anticipated
in obtaining steel for use in completing this equipment. It is i-ecommended
that the highest priority be given to production of this equipment and supplying
the material needed. The Navy Department wiil be glad to cooperate in obtain-
ing the necessary priorities.
R. E. INGERSOLL, Acting.
Copy to : Op-12, Op-20, Op-23, Op-30.
[6602] Mr. Hannaford. Third, a memorandum of July 25,
1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark, with reference to
WPPac-46, and Admiral Stark's reply thereto, dated September 9,
1941.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2479
(The documents referred to are as follows:)
[6603] Op-12B-2-djm (SC)A16/EF12 Serial 098912 0-33056
Secret Sep 9 1941.
From : The Chief of Naval Operations.
To : The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: The U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow No. 5' (Navy Plan
0-1, Rainbow No. 5) WPPac^6, review and acceptance of.
Reference: (a) CinCPac Secret let. Serial OCAW of 25 July, 1941.
1. The Chief of Naval Operations has reviewed subject Plan and accepts it.
2. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the
addressee in time by the next available officer courier. Tlie originator therefore
authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the con-
tinental limits of the United States.
/s/ H. R. Stark.
United States Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
A16/WPPac-46(16)
[6604] Serial 064W
Secret
Pearl Harbor, T. H., Julu 25, 19^1.
From : Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan— Rainbow Five (WPPac-46).
Reference: (a) AVPL-46.
Enclosure: (A) Six (6) copies of WPPac-46, registered numbers 1 to 6 inclusive.
1. As required by reference (a), the subject Plan is submitted herewith for
approval.
2. In order that the task force commanders of the U. S. Pacific Fleet might have
a basis for planning, and for action in case of an early outbreak of war, this Plan
has been distributed prior to its approval by the Chief of Naval Operations.
3. The Plan required by paragraph 3215 a.2 of reference (a) will be sub-
mitted when completed.
4. Plans for other operations are under investigation and will be submitted as
they are developed.
5. This 0-1 Plan is the best that this conunand has been able to evolve for
carrying out the tasks assigned in the Basic Plan. Every investigation of pro-
spective op- [6605] erations among the Japanese Mandated Islands shows
that risk of serious damage from enemy submarines and shore-based aircraft
must be incurred. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet finds himself
severely handicapped for any such operations, because of the limited forces made
available to him, particularly by the small number of destroyers and other anti-
submarine vessels, and the lack of transports and a properly trained and
equipped marine force.
6. If this Plan is put into effect in whole or in part the actual conduct of any
particular operation must be adjusted to accord with the situation actually
existing and the forces actually available.
(s) H. E. Kimmel.
Secret
[6606] Mr, Hannaford. Yesterday, we offered as Exhibit 107
rjie unpublished portions of the various Navy Pearl Harbor reports,
ihe findings, conclusions and action by the Secretary of the Navy
were not bound in the volume with the other reports. In order that
the record may be perfectly clear I suggest that the findings, conclu-
sions and action by the Secretary of the Navy, which is a separate
document, be marked as exhibit 107-A.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 107-A.")
2480 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Hannaford. Exhibit 8 contains various reports from General
MacArthur's headquarters relating to the Japanese plans for the attack
on Pearl Harbor. We have received a subsequent report from General
MacArthur's headquarters dated December 13, 1945, with reference to
this subject. I request that this document be received in evidence as
Exhibit 8-D.
(The document referred to was marked as ''Exhibit 8-D.")
Mr. Hannaford. From time to time, the witnesses who have ap-
peared before this committee have submitted memoranda to counsel
suggesting corrections in the transcript of their testimony. I have
before me a memorandum from Mr. Grew dated December 18, 1945,
which is in reply to a memorandum from Mr. Mitchell dated December
1, 1945; a memorandum from Lt. [6607 \ Col. Harmon Dun-
combe, dated December 21, 1945, prepared on behalf of General
Marshall; a memorandum dated December 21, 1945, from Admiral
AVilkinson, and three memoranda from General Miles, dated December
12, 1945; and a memorandum from General Gerow dated December
26. 1945 ; all suggesting changes in the transcript of their testimony.
I request that these memorandum be spread upon the daily
transcript.
(The memoranda referred to follow:)
[6608] [Copy]
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
December 1, 19^5.
Memorandum for Mr. Grew.
Regarding changes you desire to make in the transcript of your testimony, it
will not be possible to allow any changes in the existing transcript in matters of
substance — only errors of spelling. Consequently, in order to record your desire
to have changes made in your testimony, you should write us a memorandum
referring to the pages of the transcript where you want the corrections to be
made, and in that memorandum state the words you want stricken out and the
words you want substituted. There will be no changes in the existing transcript,
but your memorandum requesting those changes will be put in evidence and form
a part of the transcript.
William D. Mitchell.
WDM/CBN
[6609] 2840 Woodland Drive,
Washington, D. C, December 18, 1945.
Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell.
With reference to your memorandum of December 1, 1945, 1 enclose two
papers :
1. List of errors of spelling in the transcript of my testimony before the Joint
Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.
2. Corrections in the transcript of my testimony. I do not wish to change
my testimony in any respect. Here and there the stenographer appears to have
heard my words incorrectly and these corrections are intended merely to give
an accurate record of what I actually said before the Committee.
I SI Joseph C. Gi-ew.^
Joseph C. Grew.^
Corrections in Spelling in the Transcript of Testimony of Joseph C. Grew
Before the Joint Committee on the Inv'estigation of the Pearl
Harbor Attack
November 26, 19Jf5 (Moniinc/ Session)
Page 1502; line 12: "Kasa" should be altered to "Kase".
Page 1503 ; line 19 : "Gogi" should be altered to "Gogai".
^ Mr. Grew's testimony appears in Hearings, Part 2, pp. 560-603, 615-773.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2481
[6610] November 26, 19J,5 (Afternoon Session)
Page 1554 ; line 10 : "Chaing" sliould be altered to "Chiang".
Page 1555; line 9: (same correction)
Page 155G; line 19: (same correction)
November 2T, 1945 (Morning Sessio7i)
I'age 16-18; line IS: "Toyda" should be altered to "Toyoda".
November 27, 19/,5 (Afternoon Session)
Page IGSO; line 24: "Chaing" slionkl be altered to "Chiang"
Page 1()81 ; line 20: (same correction)
Page 1751 ; line 17 : (same correction)
November 28, 1945 (Morning Session)
Page 1S39 ; line 5 : "KGI" should be altered to "KGEI".
November 28, 1945 (Afternoon Session)
Page 1902; line 23: "Shanghi" should be altered to "Shanghai"
Page 1926 ; line S : "Eugene F. Dooman" should be altered to "Eugene H
Dooman . *
Page 1929 ; line 17 : "omniescient" should be altered to "omniscient"
Page 1946; line 19: "Hiramuna" should be altered to "Hiranuma"*
Page 1947 ; line 3 : (same correction)
[6611] COKKECTIONS IN THE TBANSCEIPTION OF TESTIMONY. EaCH LINE IS
Gi^N Completely as it Should Pbopebly Read.
November 26, 1945 (Morning Session)
Page 1474 :
Line 14 : Mr. Geew. Joseph Clark Grew.
Page 1497 :
Line 6 : army went into Manchuria and that inevitably brought the
Line 7 : military into a position of control.
Page 1498 :
Line 11 : of Admiral Yonai, who was a naval officer.
Line 13 : in Japan for many years.
Page 1501 :
Pag?i502-^^^^^°''^'^ ^^ ■^''" ^°'''^''''' ^^^ Counselor of the Embassy, to stand by.
prient your""^"' "'^ ^''''^'^'' Ministei—and the Minister finally said, "I wiU
-.T^o November 26, 1945 (Afternoon Sessio7i)
Page 1523:
Line 13 : Mr. Grew. A military and a naval attache and
Page 1528:
Line 6 : Mr. Geew. I said that is correct, sir.
16612] Page 1533:
Line 17 : garden, and just chatting about things, and I said :
Line 8 : Mr. Grew. No, sir ; it did not.
Page 1539 :
Line 15 : called their co-prosperity sphere, first economic control to
Pa e" 1542- *^^ Japanese military was in the way of implementing that
Page'l546'- ^^^ ™°'^ difficult their economic position became. They however had
Line 22: his salt if, in case he felt he couldn't conscientiously carry out that
that."' ^ ''' ^^ '^""'"^ """"^^^ ^" "^^^- T^^^« ^-^^ be no queSon aboSt
Page 1557 :
Line 10 : Mr. Grew. Yes, perfectly.
Page 1562 :
Line 2U: that they were ostensibly fighting for. I do not say what
70716 — 46 — pt. 5 28
2482 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Page 1569:
Line 11 : Very probably, but I have had no evidence to be able to
[06 13] Page 1580:
Line 9: before the Konoye Cabinet fell, Admiral Toyoda, the Foreign Minister,
Line 10: asked me to call and said the Ambassador "was fatigued" and he
Line 14 : he could not mention his name to uie, but he just wanted me to
Line 15 : know he was going to have to send somebody over for the reason he
Line 16: had stated and he hoped I would cooperate in getting plans ready as
quickly as
Line 17 : possible. Before he could act the Konoye Cabinet fell and
Line IS : the Tojo Cabinet came in, and in my first interview with the
Line 19 : Foreign Minister, he brought up this point at once. He
Line 23 : Nomura's reports of the conversations in Washington were always
Page 1581 :
Line 14 : an American wife, and I had negotiated with him, and I had seen
him
Line 15 : in a personal way often. I always regarded him as
[6614] Line 16: pro-American in his outlook and sentiments, and the
Page 1582 :
Line 10 : him over here — to support and cooperate with Admiral Nomura.
Line 22: conversations did not come to a sntisfactory conclusion that
November 27, 19. '(5 (Morning Session)
Page 1625 :
Line 5 : absence in 1939 and when I saw the President he said. When
Page 1639 :
Line 22 : 1. Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941, published
in 1943.
Line 25 : 2. Foreign Relations of the United States ; Japan, 1931-1941.
Page 1640 :
Line 3 : 3. My book entitled "Ten Years in Japan".
Line 20 : been misinterpreted by foreign governments, and points of
Page 1649 :
Line 4 : that record of a conversation with the Foreign Minister.
November 27, 19^5 (Afternoon Session)
Page 1668 :
Line 12 : as comment in my diary. I considered that September was one of
Page 1669 :
Line 10 : Mr. Grew. No, sir, that is a telegram from our then Legation
Line 15 : Mr. Gkbw. Mr. Steele was a prominent correspondent in the
Page 1674 :
Line 16 : It would be short-sighted, however.to deny their existence or
Page 1677 :
Line 8 : used. Once that conviction is shaken it is possible that
Page 1680 :
Line 12 : East and from time to time my recommendations as to what
Line 13 : policy should be followed in Washington.
Page 1682 :
Line 8 : into East Asia. They were potentially
Page 1684 :
Line 24 : "Only insuperable obstacles will prevent the Japanese
Page 1692 :
Line 2 : Mr. Grew. Yes, as I remember it, we might
Line 3 : have. Let me see how that was stated.
Page 1740 :
Line 17 : Mr. Grew. Senator, I did not go into those stra-
Page 1753 :
Line 20 : with the responsibility for some of the worst acts of banditry
Page 1757 :
Line 18 : 29, Senator. I think I had better stick to the record here.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2483
November 28, lO-'i^ [Moniirn; Session)
Page 1S02 :
Line 8 : the United States inevitable may come witli dramatic and
Page 1837 :
Line 5: Mr. Grew. Tliat would be 14 hours earlier. I understand
Page 1841 :
Line 15: Mr. Grew. Fourteen hours earlier. That, in Washinglon.
November 28. l!)Jf5 (Afternoon Scs.sion)
Page 1880 :
Line 12: ing from Japf|.n in August 1942 submitted a \()(>17] report to
Mr. Hull.
Page 1901 :
Line 20: prime minister Hiranuma was also attacked. His throat was cut and
Page 1904 :
Line 11 : and it is all on the record — I had better read you exactly what
Page 1908 :
Line 13: Mr. Kkefi:. When did the Konoye Cabinet fall?
Line 14 : Mr. Grew. October 16, 1941.
Page 1909 :
Line 0: this meeting with the President took place the Konoye Cabinet
Page 1917 :
Line 7 : a purely tecbnical point ; it is a point as to what is meant
Line 17 : in it so much as whether further negotiations continued after
November 29, 19^5 (Morning Session)
Pag 1994 :
Line IS : might have been the Counselor of the Embassy ; it might have
[6618] War Department,
Washington, D. G., 21 December 1945.
^lemorandum for INIr. ]Mitchell.
It is requested that the following corrections be made in the transcript of the
testimonv of General Marshall.^
[6619]
Page
Line
Correction
2766
4
Change "McNary" to "McNair".
2767
4
Omit "Of".
2767
18
Change "priority" to "priorities".
2767
25
Change "point" to "part".
2769
9
Change "the" to "their".
2769
10
Change "representation" to "presentation".
2787
11
Change "Hart" to "Stark".
2790
6
Change "Squadron" to "Squadrons".
2790
18
Change "times" to "time".
2822
6
Change "brough" to "brought".
2825
14
Change "known" to "not".
2830
15
Change "eacch" to "each".
2834...
21
Chage "approved" to "approve".
2836
7
Change "operations" to "operation".
2850
4
Change "outweight" to "outweigh".
2868
11
Omit "for", change "operation" to "operational".
3874
9
Omit "Mr. Mitchell."
2874
12
Change "General Marshall" to "Mr. Mitchell".
2874
13
Change "Mr. Mitchell" to "General Marshill".
2874.__
14
Omit "General Marshall".
2885
20
Change "Aid de Memoirs" to "Aide Memoire".
2891
12
Change "far" to "for".
2895
8
After "Japanese", insert "Expedition",
2896
10
Change "on" to "in".
2986
18
Change "on" to "at"; capitalize "Joint Board".
2901
5
Change "sources" to "resources".
2914
Change page No. from "2194" to "2914".
2914
16
Change "from 7 to 9" to "before dinner time"
2918
4
Change "from" to "for".
2925
11
Change "is" to "was".
2928
11
Change "olTicers" to "opposite".
2929
13
Change "Dean" to "Deane".
2930
4
Remove comma after "authentic".
2933
17
Ch.'mge "officer" to "opposite".
2933
21
Change "officer" to "opposite".
2038
t
Change "transportation" to "transmission".
^ Gen. Marshall's testimony appears in Hearings, Part 3. pp. 1049-1358, 1377-1541.
2484 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Page
Line
Correction
[6619]
2939
5
Ciianue "Bundy" to "Bratton".
2953-A
15
Change "materiel" to "material".
[66S0]
2953-A
21
Change "thev" to "the".
2956
25
Change "B-lv's" to "B-17's".
2960
18
Change "Hawayy" to "Hawaii".
2973
2
Change "Ferguson" to "Lucas".
2979
2
Change "to" to "the".
2989
2
Change "Clark" to "Clarke".
2994
24
Change "it a matter of record" to "another effort".
2995
2
Change "telephone" to "telephoned".
2996
4
After "Mr. Bell", insert "but not".
2997
12
Change "Vissell" to "Bissell".
2997
15
Do.
2997
19
Do.
2997...
22
Do,
2997
24
Do.
2998
7
Do.
2998
13
Do.
2998
17
Do.
3003
20
Do.
3004
2
Do.
3004
6
Do.
3009
6
Change "quadron" to "squadron".
3016.. _
8
Change "measure" to "message".
3037
14
Change "arrived" to "were away".
[66S1]
3056
25
Chance "to him" to "to me".
3061
14
Chance "Philippine" to "Philippine".
3063
3
Change "Backking" to "backing".
3109
8
After "fact" insert "as far as I recall,". (See p. 3515, line 9.)
3111
24
Chance "ready" to "already".
3112
24
Change "some" to "someone".
3113
4
Chance "knew the" to "was the only".
3116
18
Chance "there" to "then"; "any" to "it a".
3132
25
Chance "chief of" to "Oeneral".
3145..
6
Chance "at 7:00 o'clock" to "on the 7th".
3147
18
Change "suversive" to ".subversive".
3156
14
Change "ythis" to "this".
3164
10
Ch.ange "his" to "my".
3171
17
Change "hear" to "head".
3172
3
Change "advise" to "advice".
3178
21
Chance "8:30" to "6:30"; "American" to "A. M.".
3182
9
Chance "presented" to "prevented".
3189
4
Chance "applied" to "implied".
3194
5
Chance "from" to "near".
3195
20
Chance "on" to "all"; "and" to "on".
3195
25
13
Chance "Hawaii" to "Panama"; "we" to "I".
Change "attack" to "attacked".
3235
166SS]
3253
6
Change "Marshall" to Marshal",
3256
4
After "Washington" insert "to".
3260
23
After "that" insert "we".
3270
11
Change "concerning" to "concerned".
3276
11
Change "was" to "war".
3315
25
Change "though" to "thought".
3316
5
Change "emphazied" to "emphasized".
3321
4
Change "scope" to "slash".
3327
15
Change "sent" to "send".
3344
10
Change "night" to "morning".
3352
13
Change "C. S. 0." to "C. N. 0."; "S. 0. S." to "C. 0. S."
3352
19
Change "C. S. 0." to "C. N. O."; "S. 0. S." to "C. 0. S."
3353
6
Change "seee" to "see".
3359
8
Change "kept on with our" to "felt no fear for".
3364
15
Change "Winane" to "Winant".
3364
22
Chance "7th" to "6th".
3371
12
Chance "possible" to "possibly".
3405
17
Change "exchange" to "change".
3419
11
Change "chance" to "change".
3427
2
Chance "indicate" to "indicative".
3451.
22
Change "somewhere" to "interrupted with somethinc".
[662S]
3453
23
Cliange "terne" to "tern".
3455
16
Change "know" to "knowing".
3472-
18
After "message" insert "indicate".
3472
20
Change "thatm" to "that".
3473
13
Change "too" to "to".
3480
4
Change "n" to "do".
3480
16
Change "Dennv" to "Deane".
3501.. -
6
Change "gto" to "to".
3506
23
Change "deligated" to "delegated".
3543..-
25
After "1941" insert "called".
3548
11
Change "point" to "joint".
3555
7
Change "proceedures" to "procedures".
3558
22
Change "MacArthur" to "Herron",
3565..
14
Before "prompted" insert "that".
3621
Should be page "3622".
Should be page "3621".
3622.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2485
Page
Line
Correction
3027
2
Chanpro "cxhause" to "exhaust".
.S(i40
2
Chanfre "(listribtitod" to "disipprovcd".
3(152
3
Chance "iliscnssion" to "diseuss".
3052-B
4
ChaiiL'e "Docxtiiher" to "Doceniber".
3062
C
After "Yes, Sir" start a new paragraph and insert "Mr. Keefe", capitalize
"And".
3680
17
Change "thought" to "thoush".
3G85
18-20
Omit lines "IS to 20".
IGG14] 3724
2
Chance "siwlit" to "with".
3729
7
Chanue "iiiukkina" to "making".
3734
8
Change "presnmalv" to "presumably".
3747
6
Change "Rinienko" to "Semanko".
3747
7
Change "Spearman" to "Speaman".
3754
12
Change "contraet" to "contact".
3766
7
Change "Corp" to "Corps".
3971
14
Change "Dean" to "Deane".
3972..
25
Change "is" to "was".
3983 _
18
Chagne "Short" to "Strong".
3984
20
After "to" insert "get".
4032 _
23
Change "Genera" to "General".
4040
10
Change "nto" to "to".
4057
7
Change "hour into" to "out to".
4060
23
Change "Normany" to "Normandy".
4071
7
Change "vinal" to "final".
4073
3
Ciiange "port and" to "important".
4075
5
Change "Dean" to "Deane".
4080
24
Change "be" to "me".
(S) Harmon Duncombe,
Lt. Col, GSC.
[6625] Navy Department,
Washington, D. C, 21 BGceml)er 1945.
My Dear Mr. Mitcheix : In the record of my testimony in the current hearings
before the Joint Committee I note a few stenographic errors, due doubtless to
my over-rapid replies, which I believe should be corrected in the interest of
clarity and accuracy.
Record of December 18
Page 4754
Line 20.
Line 21.
Line 22.
Page 4759 :
Line 21
Page 4766 :
Line 17
Page 4773 :
Line 12.
Line 15.
Page 4791 :
Line 8. Change "Kirk" to "'King".
Page 4800:
Line 1. Change "fleets" to "planes".
Page 4806:
Line 5. Change "fleet" to "field".
Page 4897:
Line 23. Change "not" to "now".
Page 4900 :
Line 24. Change "communications" to "intentions
Change "a 55" to "the 5th".
Strike out "the translation is inadequate".
Change "which" to "each".
Strike out "not".
Change "Marshalls" to "Carolines".
Change "for" to "by".
Strike out "and again".
[6626]
Record of December 19
Change "but not" to "or".
Page 4947 :
Line 21.
Page 4963 :
Line 1. Change "certain" to "the Anglo-Saxon".
Page 4964 :
Line 11. Change "it" to "they" and "out of the" to 'on"
2486 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Page 4986 :
Line 14. Change "days" to "years".
Page 4996 :
Line 9. Strike out "Admiral Wilkinson".
Page 5018 :
Line 4. Change "20th" to "25th".
Page 5019 :
Line 3. Change "November" to "September".
Page 5033 :
Line 11. Strike out "and".
Line 12. Change "Ingersoll" to "Stark".
Page 5057 :
Line 3. Change "and It was an" to 'in the".
Also, for clarity, though an emendation and not a stenographic correction,
there should be added to Page 50(53, line 7, the following: "The fortnightly
summary of that date, but not the memorandum of December 1 discussing the
Japanese movements into the South China Sea".
Very truly,
(S) T. S. WiLKINvSON,!
T. S. Wilkinson,
Vice Admiral, U. 8. Navy.
Mr. W. D. MiTCHEXL,
Counsel to the Joint Committee.
[6627] War Department.
Room 4D 761, The Pentagon,
Washington, D. C, 12 December 1943.
Memorandum for Mr. Gesell.
I request that the following corrections be made in the reporter's transcript
of my testimony on 4 December :
Page
Line
Correction
2425
13
Insert period after the word "message".
2425
14
Delete words "so that".
2425
15
Insert conima after word "message".
2425
22
Change "this" to "that".
2425
23
Change "up" to "my attention to".
2428 -.-
21
Insert words "those two" after "except".
2450
4
Change first "that" to "with".
2454
7
Change first "it" to "there".
2481
24
Change "place" to ".status".
2485
15
Chanec "have" to "had".
2485
20
Change "it" to "they".
2486
23
Insert comma after word "read".
2486
24
Chanae "over" to "addressed".
2487
16
Insert comma and the word "as" after "record".
2488
5
Change "written" to "read".
2495
20
Change "intercepting" to "decoding".
\66m 2507
15
Insert comma and the word "then" after "one".
2507
16
Delete comma after "code".
2516..
6
Insert com.nia after "checked"; insert "if" after "and".
2516
7
Change "if" to "then".
2524
4-5
Change comma after "Japan" to period and delete remainder of sentence.
2527
14
Insert "that" after the comma.
2527
15
Change commas around phrase "and I thmk I can say always" to paren-
theses.
2527
16
Insert comma after "messages".
2536 .._
16
Chance "Atlantic" to "Pacific".
2543
18
Change "concentration" to "control '.
2548
8
Chanee "would have" to "when it".
2554
6
Change "from" to "to"; change "at" to "after".
2574
15
Change period to colon: change "The" to "that the".
2574
16
Change "indicated" to "indicate".
2574
17
Change "was" to "he".
2575
6
Line should read ". . . ABC (not D) agreement . . .
2582
12
Insert "not" after "of".
(S) Sherman Miles,
Maj. Qen., USA.
1 Admiral Wilkinson's testimony appears in Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1723-1782. 1794-1911.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2487
[6629] Wau Dei'autmknt,
Room 4D761, The Pentagon,
Washington, D. C, 12 December JDJ/r).
Memorandum for Mr. Gesell:
I request that the following corrections be made in the reporter's transcript of
my testimony on 30 November :
Page
[6GS0]
[6631]
2133
13
2133
17
2133
20
2133
24
2134
3-4
2135
3
2136
3
2136 -
12
2136
18
2137
23
2137
24
2137
25
2146...
14
2146
15
2153
19
2157 --
12
2157
13
2157
22-23
2161
3
2161
5
2161
6
2162
17
2163
13-14
2164
15-16
2165
19
2165
23
2169
U
2173
9
2173
10
2173
13
2176
6
2182
5
2205
23
2205
24
2208
17-18
2209
3
2209
5
2209
6
2210
15
2214
19
Line
Correction
Change "the same" to "some".
Change "in" to "with".
Chaiitie "hemispheric" to "hemisphere".
Change "hemispheric" to "hemisphere".
Change the lines to read "Intelligence Branch, Military Intelligence Divi-
sion, with eight subsections".
Delete the "g" from "bulletings".
Deli'tc the word "controls".
Insert a comma after the second "gauge".
Change the line to read "for maps of all sorts, and we were coordinating —
we were the".
Change "for" to "in".
Change "for" to "with".
Chance line to read "Army — I mean the next to the last war. I served
other times".
Insert comma after "Staff"; delete "and".
Change line to read "of the War Plans Division, and the Secretary of War,
were, from then".
Change "by that" to "on".
Change "a" to "the".
Change "twice" to "once".
Change lines to read "the Dutch, the Siamese, the British, the Chinese or
the Russians".
Change "message" to "messages".
Change line to read "was only one of many. There were more, actually,
that indicated an attack".
Change "anil" to "or".
Insert "a" after "being".
Change lines to read "^lany times I have drawn up a maneuver or war
game situation on the assumption of a Japanese attack fol-".
Change lines to read "General ^' iles: Many times I have drawn up a maneu-
ver or war game situation under the assumption of an all out".
Delete the word "all".
Change "in" to "or"; change "situations" to "situation".
Change "wild" to "wide"; delete "in".
Insert quotation marks after "efficiency".
Delete quotation marks after "it".
Insert the word "successfully" after "she".
Insert the word "that" after "learn".
Change line to read "the Commanding General himself had put an alert in
his".
Change "Deputy" to "Chief of".
Delete word "General".
Consolidate lines and change to read "ference by direction. In other
words, I was the one who was raising".
Delete comma after "to".
Delete words "limiting it only".
Delete word "to"; change "against" to "about".
Change "General" to "Colonel".
Substitute "Japanese" for "American".
MR. GESELL'S QUESTION
2238
4
Change "StafT" to "a division".
2238
11
Insert "there was also the" after "end".
2245
8
Change line to read "day that I have counted 56 of those that were de-
ciphered * * '"
2246
19
Change second "the" to "that it is".
2246
20
Delete comma following "probable".
22.51.
16
Change "and would he a" to "since they were".
[66SS]
2251
17
Change line to read "meaningless messages to the person sending them."
2254
3-4
Change lines to read "could add, however, of course, that we knew the
Japanese were followmg".
2254
10
Change "there" to "it".
2258
10
Change "running" to "writing".
2488 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Miles has also requested the following corrections in the reporter's
transcript of his testimony on 3 December:
Page
2314.
2314_
2315.
2315.
2315.
2315.
Line
2316.
2316.
2316.
[66SS] 2316.
2316.
2316-
2318
2319-
2320-
232.3
2323
2324.
2332.
2337.
2338.
2367.
2367.
2367.
2371.
2373.
2374.
2374.
2383.
23S4.
2384.
[663i]
2384-
2389-
2389.
2390.
2391.
2394.
2399.
2399-
2405-
2408-
2409-
2409.
2419.
Correction
Change line to read "General Miles: The possibility or the probability of".
Delete the word "it".
Delete the words "Now" and "have".
Change line to read "You ask me whether I thought it was a".
Change comma to period after "surprise"; capitalize "w" in "we".
Change Ime to read "in war with us, might attack Hawaii, and we took
action".
Change "This" to "The".
Change "billeted" to "established".
Change line to read "We also followed, I think, the second principle. We".
Change "he" to "they".
Change "very" to "great".
Change "he" to "they".
Change "Yes" to "No".
Delete words "a mine".
Change "control" to "controlled".
Change "sent" tn "seem".
Insert wnr-l "by" after "believe".
Delete words "or might not".
Change "waters" to "province".
Change "close" to "closer".
Change "officially" to "generally".
Insert word "was" after "question".
Change "their" to "otir".
Change line to read "the risking of this secret by using the two codes.
We were".
Change "Brunert" to "Grunert".
Delete words "knew, and".
Change "of the" to "and train".
Change "people" to "the agents"; change "why" to "what".
Insert word "we" after "which".
Change "he is" to "his".
Delete wcrd "good".
Change "You" to "I".
Delete words "one of".
Change line to read "sole function".
Delete period and add "in our army".
Add " — a" after "that".
Inset "and" after "department".
Change line to read "Marshall's warning message of November 27. Con-
cerning my message of".
Delete words "did" and "and".
Delete ".Admiral Turner".
Change "authority" to "authorities".
Change line to read "those codes. But the Japanese could not jump our
headquarters".
Change "take" to "attack".
Change conmia to period after "citizens"; capitalize "b" in "but".
(S)
Sherman Miles,
Maj. Oen., USA.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2489
[6685]
Memorandum for Rlr. Gesell.
I request that the fdllowin
moiiy which I
War Dp:paktme:nt,
Room 4D7G1, The Pentacon,
Washinrjtnn, D. C, 12, IDJ/S.
corroctions be made in tlio transcript of the testi-
ave on November 29:
[66S6]
Page
Lino
Correction
206") .._
10
Strike the word "the".
2066
16
Strike the word "Keneral".
2067
9
Strike the word "with".
2067
10
Chansie "eommanders" to "commands".
2074
23
Cliance "not" to "now".
2083
6
Chanse "nor was G-2" to "nor was Naval Communications".
20S4
11
Chansc "Ilugh" to "Jules".
2108.
9
Chari'jrc "of" to "or".
2111
17
Strike the word "few".
2111
2t
Strike the word "it".
2115
10
Strike the word "preceding".
2115
11
Change "April" to "August".
2115
14
Chanee "battle foi- the Levte Gulf" to "battle for Leytc Gulf".
2116
13
Change the line to read "gagged by the Chief of Staff or was it in any way
sugiiested that I".
2125
23
Insert "and" after "economic".
2127
Chanse the line to read "War Department, the Chief of Staff, and the
Secretary of War that wo".
2100
14
Change "right" to "light".
(S) Sherman Miles,*
Maj. Gen., USA.
[6637]
War Dj:partment,
Room 4D761, The Pentagon,
Washington, D. C, 26 December 1945.
Memorandum for Mr. Gesell.
I request that the following con-ections be made in the reporter's transcript of
my testimony on 5 December :
Page
Line
2603
10
2603 __
22
2641
4
2641
5
2645
19
2668...
8
2668
99
2668
22
2669
12
2672
2
2672
5
2688
4
2691
13
2708
25
2709
10
2711
6
2714
24
2714
25
2715
9
2715
12
2725
6
2728
25
2743
2
2743
4
Correction
Delete comma.
Delete "of"; substitute comma.
Change "means" to "mission".
Change "means" to "missions".
Change "means of" to "missions, the".
Insert "that" after "conclusion".
Change "earning" to "warning".
Change "that" to "as".
Change "article" to "obstacle".
Change "aircract" to "aircraft".
Change "autmenting" to "augmenting".
Change "there" to "these".
Change "drafing" to "drafting".
Insert "not" after "is" and before "necessarily".
Change "sent" to "send".
Change "Galey" to "Oailey".
Change "Bandy" to "Bundy".
Change "Bandy" to "Bundy"?
Change "Bandy" to "Bundy".
Change "Bandy" to "Bundy".
Strike "from".
Strike line (duplicated top of next paee).
Insert "I saw" between the words "time" and "the'
Delete "was".
Gen. Miles' testimony appears in Hearings, Fart 3, pp. 1360-1375, 1541-1583.
2490 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The following corrections should be made in the transcript of my testimony
on 14 December :
Page
Line
4248
3
24
24
19
11
4254
4262.
4271
4307
Change "preeiipitate" to "precipitate".
Change "Memoirs" to "Memoire".
Insert "do not" before "believe".
Change "Commanding" to "Command and'
Change "Bad Nomen" to "Bad Nauheim".
(S) L. T. Geeow/
Lieut. Getiei-al.
[6639] Mr. Hannaford. At pages 4164 and 5038-40 of the
transcript Congressman Gearhart lequested information concerning
any all-out air alert at Army airfields in Hawaii from December 1 to
December G, 1941. We have received two memoranda from the War
Department, dated December 27, 1945, and January 2, 194G, in reply
to Congressman Gearhart's i-equest. I request that these memoranda,
together with the attachments, be spread upon the daily transcript at
this point.
(The memoranda referred to follow:)
[GGJfO-dGJfl] War Depautmeni'. Washington, D. C,
Room 4D757, The Pentagon.
2 Januanj 191,6.
Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell.
With reference to Congressman Gearhart's request for information con-
cerning any all-out air alert at Army airfields in Hawaii from 1 to 6 December
1941, there is inclosed a further report from the Commanding General in Hawaii.
(S) Harmon Duncombe,
Harmon Duncombe,
Lt. Col., GSC.
1 Incl.
, COPY
War Department
classified message center
Incoming Clear Message
1 January 1946.
From : CG USAF MIDPAC Ft Shafter TH.
To : War Department.
Nr : MP 18038.
To the Chief of Staff TTSA Washn DC Attn Assistant Chief [6642] of
Staff Operations Div info CINCAFPAC Admin CINCAFPAC Adv MP 18038
MPGCT Richardson.
See following references :
A WCL 30471 DTG 2001 38Z Dec
B AFMIDPAC radio MP 17177 DTG 2205n4Z Dec
An intensive and thorough search of all records of this Hqs and Air Corps Hqs
on Oahu fail to disclose info requested in reference A). — End.
Note : MP 17177 is MC-IN-62666 (22 Dec 45) OPD
Action : OPD
Info : L & L D
MC-IN-50590 (2 Jan 46)
DTG 010720Z rmw
Unclassified
COPY
' Gen. Gerow's testimony appears in Hearings, Part 3, pp. 983-1048 ; Part 4, pp. 1592-
1640 and 1643-1673.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2491
WAK DEa>ABTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C,
Room 4D757, Thk Pentagon,
21 December 1945.
Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell.
At pages 4164 and 5038-40 of the transcript, Congressman Gearhart requested
complete information concerning any [66^3] all-out air alert at Army air-
fields in Hawaii from 1 to 6 December 1941. A thorough search has disclosed no
information in the War Department files concerning such an alert. Inclosed
herewith are (1) a 19 December 1945 cable on the subject from the War Depart-
ment to the Commanding General in Hawaii and (2) a preliminary reply dated
22 December 1945.
(S) Harmon Duncombe,
Harmon Duncombe,
Lt. Col., GSC.
Incls. (2).
19 December 1945.
COPY
War Department
CLASSIFIED message CENTER
Outgoing Clear Message
Operations Division WDGS.
Current Group WAROPDIV 74676.
COMGENAFMIDPAC Ft. Shafter T H
INFORMATION :
CINCAFPAC Admin Manila P I
Number : WCL 30471
From WARSEC
Joint Congressional Committee has requested infor- [6644] mation
whether orders were issued placing Hickam, Wheeler or any other Army airfield
in Hawaiian Department on alert during first week December 1941 and also
whether any such alerts were cancelled on or about 6 December. Request imme-
diate thorough investigation of available records and other sources of informa-
tion relating to any such alerts. If alerts were placed in effect or cancelled, send
by cable the text of all such orders and specify by whose authority they were
issued. Give details as to nature of alerts and any other pertinent information. —
End.
ORIGINATOR: OPD
INFORMATION : L & L D
MC-OUT-30471 (Dec 45) DTG 200136Z Is
COPY
U7iclassified
COPY
War Department
cLASSniED message center
Incoming Clear Message
Urgent
From : CG, Fort Shafter, Honolulu, TH.
To : War Department
Nr : M 17177
22 December 1945.
[6645] To the Chief of Staff United States Army Washington 25 DC Atten-
tion Assistant Chief of Staff Operations Division info Commander in Chief Army
2492 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Forces Pacific Admin Commander in Chief Army Fores Pacific Adv M 17177
Signed Ilichardson. •^ J-iJ-U.
See urad WCL 30471 DTG 200138 z December 194^
Ilecords searched to date have not disclosed information reauested in snMonf
rad.o. All possible sources and records are being ..asseranJany Se?HnPnf
information found will be forwarded immediately - ^ peitinent
ACTION :OPD
INFO : L&LD
MG-IN-62Ce (22 Dec 45) DTG : 220554Z blw
Unclassified
[6646] Mr Hannaford. At page 5904 of the transcript Senator
Geoige requested the nmnber and type of ships attached to the Pacific
and Asiatic Fleets on December 7, 1941. This request was repeated
by Congressman Gearhart. The information requested aDDears on
membt?s '' ''' ""^'"' '^ ""^''^ ^'^^' ^^^^ f urnSfd toToS^^
In addition Congressman Gearhart asked for the specific location on
December 7 1941, of the ships in the Pacific Fleet. Th s ii f o?ma?ion
IS contamed in Exhibit 6, which is the Navy folder of maps chiTs InH
statements. Item 1 of that exhibit shows t'lie disposifoStt Pacific
Fleet m graphic form, and item 5 shows the same information in writ-
ten form. Item 8 shows the disposition of the ships in Pearl nXr
da&r;?5,\V46fa'tK'm^.1 ''^'^"""^^' "" ''''''' ''''''' ^"^^-
Part 6— January 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1916— follows
X
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