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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEAEL HARBOE ATTACK 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 and 49 

(79th Congress) 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTIONS AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THEr.ETO 



PART 5 

DECEMBER 31, 1&45, AND JANUARY 2, 8, 4, AND 5, 194Q 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

«^c...joiOT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEARL HAKBOE ATTACK 

CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSIONS 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 and 49 

(79th Congress) 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 5 

DECEMBER 31, 1945, AND JANUARY 2, 3, 4, AND 5, 1946 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
79710 WASHINGTON : 1946 






JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL 
HARBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Miclii- tive from California 

gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from 

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin 
North Carolina 



COUNSEL 
(Through January 14, 1946) 
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel 
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel 
Jule M. HAnnaford, Assistant Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 1946) 
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel 
Samuel H. Kaufman. Associate General Counsel 
John E. Mastkn, Assistant Counsel 
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel 
Logan J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 



HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 


Pages 


Transcript 




Hearings 


No. 




pages 






1 


1- 399 


1- 1058 


Nov. 


. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 


2 


401- 982 


1059- 2586 


Nov, 


. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945. 


3 


983-1583 


2587- 4194 


Dec. 


5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945. 


4 


1585-2063 


4195- 5460 


Dec. 


14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 


5 


2065-2492 


5461- 6646 


Dec. 


31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946. 


6 


2493-2920 


6647- 7888 


Jan. 


15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946. 


7 


2921-3378 


7889- 9107 


Jan. 


22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946., 


8 


3379-3927 


9108-10517 


Jan. 


30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 


9 


3929-4599 


10518-12277 


Feb. 


7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 


10 


4601-5151 


12278-13708 


Feb. 


15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 


11 


5153-5560 


13709-14765 


Apr. 


9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946. 



EXHIBITS OP JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 

No. Exhibits Nos. 

12 1 through 6. 

13 7 and 8. 

14 9 through 43. 

15 44 through 87. 

16 88 through 110. 

17 111 through 128. 

18 129 through 156. 

19 157 through 172. 

20 173 through 179. 

21 ISO through 183, and Exhibits-IUustrations. 

22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings. 

26 Hart Inquirj' Proceedings. 

27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings, 

34 Clarlie Investigation Proceedings. 

35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 

Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 

in 



IV 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 






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VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


I I Im 1 I 1 I 1 I I ! ! ! I I I N-"o"'^''[n \ I§00*CO'(N 

^ ; i iS ; i i i I i ; i i : ; i r^% i igS??f 

iiiTt^iiiiiiiiiiiii coiiTt<iyi 

11! 1 1 ! 1 1 1 ! 1 1 1 ! 1 1 "^ 1 ; cooJi 
III 1 ! 1 ! ! 1 ! 1 1 ! ! ! 1 II <N'**i> 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

428-432 
414-417 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

212-213 

166-161 
182 

"'166-161" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


;2 1 1 1 1 j 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 j j 1 1 1 i i i ! 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

;Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 

1070-1076 
461-469 

""763-772" 
816-851 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


lO— ii'^iiOC-lilii'-J^t^iii lOOil 

lOlt^ It^ 1 1 ■>*"* 1 1 1 Ir-Hi-I III lt^ 1 1 

S lOOi IIN 1 KNOS 1 1 1 i(N05 III It- 1 1 
o,i(Nt;Oi| ii|(Nllli(Nt-illl l| II 
.« 1 1 1 1 ^ 1 1 t- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 III 1 10 1 1 
fin lOt^ 1 ■* 1 lO-* 1 1 1 iO-J< III !■* 1 1 

iiroio iCA 1 i(Nco 1 1 1 10^ III ii> 1 1 

lOOi iia5illi(N<35ill 1 II 

KNtOi iilNiiiKN-Hiii 1 II 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
417-436 


Joint 

Committee 

E.'chibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941. 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 

1571-1574" 

1664-1676 
"'469-473' 




Hamilton, Maxwell M., State Dept 

Hannum, Warren T., Brig. Gen 

Harrington, Cyril J 

Hart, Thomas Charles, Senator 

Rayes, Philip, Maj. Gen 

Heard, William A., Capt., USN 

Henderson, H. H., Lt., USA 

Herron, Charles D., Maj. Gen 

HiU, William H., Senator 

Holmes, J. Wilfred., Capt., USN 

Holtwick, J. S., Jr., Comdr 

Hoppough, Clay, Lt. Col 

Hornbeck, Stanley K 

Home, Walter Wilton 

Howard, Jack W., Col 

Hubbell, Monroe H., Lt. Comdr 

Huckins, Thomas A., Capt., USN 

Hull, Cordell 

Humphrey, Richard W. RM 3/c 

Hunt, John A., Col 

IngersoU, Royal E., Adm 

Ingiis, R. B., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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X 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


OI1II110500 IIIII ^-rO 1 1 

CO 1 1 1 1 1 lOcO till iS^O 1 1 

ici C2C0II i2;sc^ii 

.loiiiiii-^i iiiiiiiiiii;^|f4iciii 

g,i6 iiiiiiOi^iiiiiiiiiiil-Lioii 

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ftiio 00 1 1 1 1 1 1 oS^ ' ' 

lO -* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i^^"^ ' ' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(He-vvitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

541-553 
182-292 

"'140^142" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

103 
107-112 

186 
219-222 

102 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


1 1— 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II 

^ Mill 1 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


lllllloOiiiiiCOiiiloliO II 

iliiiii— iiiiiiTt<iiiiTttiOO II 

gilliiiiCJiiliiCOiiiit^iOO II 

§• 1 1 I 1 1 1 14 ! 1 1 1 lob 1 ! I I4i !c<i ! ! 

ft,lllllliOiilii(Niilif0i>0 11 
lllllliOl COiiiit^iOO 11 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

2665-2695" 
3028-3067 

1161-1185' 

2787-2802" 
1014-1034 
1678-1694 
3226-3250 

2362-2374" 

2-54" 

T. S. 2-52, 

192-226 

3126-3152 

1816-1913 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 to it» 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II 

1 1 1 1 1 1 |(N ICO 1 1 1 1 1 1 II 

«iliilii(NiCO 1 II 

& : ! ! ; 1 1 14 Ic^ ! ! 1 ! 1 1 ! 1 ! ! : ! I 

A 1 T-i ICO 1 1 1 1 11 

1 1 1 1 1 1 i(N iCO 1 1 1 1 1 II 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

toJan. 23, 1942) 


iicOi^KNiOiiiOiiii^iiiiO iC^-jOl 

1 1 lo 1 1>- 1 CO as 1 1 100 1 1 1 lO 1 1 lO 1 10 00 lO 

•jii^i^HilOiiifNiiiiiCiiiOO iCOTfCO 

« 1 ,,_i ,,_i iT^i,-, 1 1 1 ,_, 1 1 1 , 1 1 1 irt , ico^-i 
« 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 id> 1 1 1 1 10--H 

0, 1 ICD ICO 1 00 1 1 ilM 1 1 1 lO 1 1 ICO i(N 
ii-^iiOi cDiiit>iiiiiOiiiOi iCO 
iii-ii^i OiiilMiiii iiit^ 1 


3 


Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN 

Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen 

Landreth, J. L., Ens 

Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/0 

Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col 

Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC 

Lawton, William S., Col 

Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN 

Leahy, William D., Adm 

Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm 

Lewis, Fulton, Jr 

Litell, S. H 

Locey, Frank H 

Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA 

Lorencc, Walter E., Col 

Lumsden, George, Mai 

Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN 

Lynch, Paul J 

Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr 

MacArthur, Douglas, Gen 

Marshall, George C, Gen 

Marston, Morrill W., Col 

Martin, F, L., Maj. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XI 






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XII 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 

5210 
4933-5009 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

"387-388" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

14S 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 
45-46 

"179-181" 

232 

76^77" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Invcstisation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


i \\\ ill ill ; ; i i i i i i 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


1 iiO III III -„-^cfrC(N 1 iCD 1 1 00 00 
1 i05 III III Z^ ?J j2 00 CO lO 1 i'!}< 1 lOO 

E 1 IT III III Tc^^S::^ 1 IT 1 1? ^ 

1 i if: i i i i i i "i=!iicia. i ii i Hj. 

11^ III III C^iO§2l2ll'** II^^O 

*ll III III I— (i-HrHII llrH 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

1107-1160," 
1240-1252 

3636^3640 
2375-2398, 
3990-3996 
3153-3165 
2923-2933 
3885-3915 

1968^1988" 
1035-1070 

778-789 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

147-169 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Comjnission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


II II 1 1 1 1 ^ 1 1 1 1 

1 1 ^~t^ rt< 1 1 CD 1 ,^,_-00 1 1 1 CO rt< 1 1 1 1 
1 iJ^OOOl 1 1 lO 1^12'^ ' ' '0000 1 1 1 1 

1 1 l^7i2 1 1 2 177^ ! I 1^°? 1 1 1 1 
(^ 1 \ii^ 1 ! ci Ig^ 1 I Icili 1 1 1 1 


i 


Pettigrew, Moses W., Col 

Phelan, John, Ens 

Phillips, Walter C, Col 

Pickett, Harry K., Col 

Pierson, Millard, Col 

Pine, Willard B 

Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov 

Powell, Boiling R., Jr., Maj 

PoweU, C. A., Col . 

Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr 

Prather, Louise _ 

Pratt, John S., Col 

Pye, WUliam S., Vice Adm 

Rafter, Case B 

Raley, Edward W., Col 

Ram.sey, Logan C, Capt., USN 

Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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XrV CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


IS Illl IgS 1 IS 1 :s!;SSS? 1 lo» 1 1 : 
, iS i i i i iSS I lg 1 ip^Sg ; ;j| ; ; ; 

? i§ i i i i igs i ii i iiiSP i iii i i i 

;*^ III; ;S=^ 1 l'^ 1 |°mSS^ I ;;*;^ | ; ; 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11. 1945) 


II iio>ii»o IIIIII III leoi 

II 1 1 1 1 It^ Ill IrH 1 

311 iiTtiiico IIIIII III i-«*ii 

c::^ 1 1 II 1 ' 1 IIIIII III 1 1 1 
Oil II illO IIIIII III IrHI 

ft. CO IIIIII III li-l 1 

CO IIIIII III 1^ > 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No.. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

--- 

195-197 

203-204 
185' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarko 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


II 1 1 i(N 1 1 1 1 iM 1 1 III III 
t\\ \ \ \ 11 ill 1 J 1 1 1 III 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


lo 1IIII<N ^III l_J-_J-0 III III 
it^ illlil>OOiiii^^^ III III 

E 17 !! 1 1 17 2 1 I 1 \^^^ 111 111 
S, \i I 1 1 ! 1?5 ri I 1 ! 1^^^ III III 

\'^ I 1 1 I 1"= ^ 1 1 1 1 w"^ 111 111 

1 lllll ,— 1 1 1 1 1 III III 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

3644-3650 

276-541, 

4411-4445 

3265-3286' 

1539^1575' 
4037-4094 
C 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

32-65' 
323-334 


Joint" 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


lOJt^iC IM 1 lOOO III III 

iCO-^iClilil i-^iiClO III III 

g 1 .-H CD ■* lllll 1 t>. 1 1 r-H CO III III 
0. 'J '-'A lllll It-I 1 1— li-H III III 

fti 1 CO t^ 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 00 1 1 CD lO 111 III 

Ir-HTfllllll ICOIIOOO III III 
ICD lllll ll>llrH0O 


1 


Short, Arthur T 

Short, Walter C, Maj. Gen 

Shortt, Creed, Pvt 

Sisson, George A 

Smedberg, William R., II, Capt. USN.- 

Smith, Ralph C, Maj. Gen 

Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen 

Smith, William W., Rear Adm 

Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN 

Smoot, Perry M., Col 

Sonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr 

Spalding, Isnac, Brig. Gen 

Staff, W. F, CH/CM 

Stark, Harold R., Adm 

Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR 

Stilphen, Benjamin L 

Stimson, Henry L 

Stone, John F 

Street, George 

Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XV 






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XVI CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HAR-BOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945. 

to May 31, 

1946 


1 : ! 1 1 ;:: 1 : ; i : ; : 1 ! : i :g:s i 

;2 I I : ; ! ! 1 : : i ; :g?s : 

giiiiiii'iiiiiiii iiiitfi 1 

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o , 1 1 1 1 , c<i 1 1 1 1 1 1 , , 1 1 , 1 «^ O 1 

"^ t^ ^co 1 

1 i : ; 1 r ; : 1 ; 1 1 1 : ; ; i ;w« ; 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


iiiiiioliiiiiCDCOiMiOiii 1 

1,1111^1, ,,,,00iOOiiOiii 1 

»;,,iiiiTt<iiiiiiCOiOCOi-^iii 1 

& 1 1 ; ; : ;^ : ; ; ; : :^J.ti ir^ i : i i 

i^iiiiiiooi i>-<j<a)i'iiii 1 

iii,iiCOiiiiiieO"3"3i-<tiii 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 la> i 1 1 1 Ico 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

1 lOO 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

1 i i i i i i i^ i i i ^ ijb i I i i i i i 

tti 00 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1,1,1 1 


Joint 

Committeo 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


~ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 j ; I 1 ; 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


! 1 ! ! 1 ! 1 1 1 1 !o 1 i 1 1 ! 1 1 1 1 

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l05 

« 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

C 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1-H 1 1 1 1 1 , , 1 1 

^ : : ; : icJb ; i : 

1,1 00 1 1 

1 1 1 1 1 lO II 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

2722-2744 
3120-3124 

1989^2007" 

2456-2478 

1345^1381' 

910-931 
3663-3665 

3677-3683' 

3750-3773 
3357-3586" 

2580a-2596 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15. 1944) 


Pages 
""279-288" 

37^382 


Joint 

Committee 

E.\hibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

toJan.23, 1942) 


Pages 
1311-1329 
496-499 
1830-1842 

1334^1340' 

""247-259" 

152.5^1.5.38" 
1683-1705 


1 
1 


Wells, B. II., Maj. Gen 

West, Melbourne H., Lt. Col 

Whaling, William J., Lt. Col 

White, William R., Brig. Gen 

Wichiser, Rea B 

WDke, We-slie T 

Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm 

Wllloughby, C. A., Maj. Gen 

Wilson, Durward S., Maj. Gen 

Wilson, Erie M., Col 

Wimer, Benjamin R., Col 

Withers, Thomas, Rear Adm 

Wong, Ahoon H 

Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR 

Woodward, Farnsley C, Lt. (jg), USN. 

Woollev, Ralph E 

Wright, Wesley A., Comdr 

Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col 

York, Yee Kam 

Zacharias, Ellis M., Capt., USN 

Zucca, Emil Lawrence 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2065 



[5my PEAKL H4EB0R ATTACK 



MONDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1945 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., 
in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, and Ferguson and 
Kepresentatives Cooper (vice chairman), Murphy, and Gearhart. 

Also present: William D, Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. 
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the 
joint committee. 

[S46£] ' The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Counsel informed the Chair that they first wish to put in some 
documents as part of the record before going ahead with the testimony. 

Mr. Gesell. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

We have laid some of the documents before the members of the 
committee this morning. Some of the others we will refer to can be 
spread upon the transcript or made exhibits. 

I would like to call attention to the very large bulky volume which 
is at the bottom of the pile of material before the members of the 
committee. That contains the testimony of General Short given in 
prior proceedings. We thought we would make that available in that 
form to each member of the commitete for study and we are pre- 
paring a similar volume containing all the prior testimony of Admiral 
Kimmel which will be distributed as soon as it is received from the 
Navy. 

The Chairman. What number will that be ? 

Mr. Gesell. That is not going to be given a number, I simply wanted 
to call attention to it. It occurred to us that each member of the 
committee would be particularly anxious to read that testimony before 
General Short appears as a witness. 

At page 4477 of the transcript, when we were last presenting mate- 
rial covering responses to various committee member requests, I made 
reference to a draft of November 16 [5463] of the August 17 
statement which the United States Government delivered to the Jap- 
anese. We have now obtained a photostat copy of that and I would 
like to offer it to be included with the other material as Exhibit 22-A.2 

The Chairman. 22-A ? 

Mr. Gesell. 22-A. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 22-A.") 

Senator Ferguson. Have you marked these in any way? 

^ Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of 
testimony. 

=* See Hearings, Part 4, p. 1694. 

79716 — 46— pt. 5 2 



2066 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gesell. No, they are not marked and that is not among the 
material before you. It is just another draft of that message, Sen- 
ator, which we have presented several drafts on. 

At page 1824 of the transcript there was a request by Senator 
Ferguson for the number of messages sent by Ambassador Grew to 
the State Department between November 26 and December 7, 1941. 
The State Department advises us that there were 58 telegrams, num- 
bers 1853 to 1910, inclusive, and 15 dispatches, numbers 5993 to 6006, 
inclusive, and 6008, sent during that period. We have examined this 
material and it appears to be, for the most part, administrative docu- 
mentation, the dispatches and telegrams, and if the actual documents 
are desired by Senator Ferguson we can arrange to have them photo- 
stated by the Department of State. Some of them, of course, are 
already in the record. 

\_6Jf6Jf\ At page 1728 there was a request by Senator Ferguson 
for any information received by Ambassador Grew from the State 
Department as to the probability of the United States coming into 
armed conflict with the Japanese Government if Japan was at war 
with the British in the Pacific. The State Department informs us 
that they cannot find any record of any such information being 
sent by the Department of State to Ambassador Grew. 

At page 1831 to 1835 of the transcript there was a request by 
Senator Ferguson for any instructions sent by the Department of 
State to Ambassador Grew concerning the destruction of codes. The 
State Department has informed us that on December 7 there were 
in existence standing instructions to all American diplomatic and 
consular offices authorizing the destruction of codes and confidential 
files in case of necessity. 

On December 5, 1941, the State Department sent Ambassador Grew 
the telegram, which includes instructions concerning burning of codes, 
which appears in the transcript at page 1967. It will be recalled that 
Mr. Grew stated in the transcript, at page 1966, that he did not think 
he had ever received that telegraph. 

On December 18, 1941, after the Swiss Government had undertaken 
to represent the United States interests in Japan, the State Depart- 
ment sent a telegram to the American Legation \6Jt65'\ at 
Bern, Switzerland, to be transmitted to the American diplomatic 
and consular offices in Japan and the Far East. 

Paragraph 7 of this message refers specifically to the question of 
the destruction of records, and reads as follows : 

OflScers shall destroy* all seals, codes, ciphers, true readings, protectograph 
(lies, confidential files, et cetera. Fee stamps should be destroyed by burning 
in the presence of at least two competent witnesses, who shall prepare affidavits 
concerning the destruction. 

I will ask to have the entire dispatch, which constitutes an addi- 
tional dispatch on this matter of code burning, designated as the next 
exhibit, Exhibit 90. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 90.") 
Mr, Gesell. At page 1853 of the transcript there is a request by 
Senator Ferguson for any records of conversations between Secretary 
Hull and Ambassador Grew while the latter was in this country. The 
State Department informs us that they cannot locate in their files 
any record of any such conversations. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2067 

At page 1951 of the transcript, there is a request by Congressman 
Keefe for memoranda dated December 1, 1941, prepared by Stanley 
K. Hornbeck. These have been obtained from the War Department 
files and delivered to Mr. Keefe. 

[5466] At page 1996 of. the transcript there is a request by 
Senator Ferguson for the time when Ambassador Grew destroyed his 
codes. In that connection we have several exhibits which we will 
ask to have all marked under the next exhibit number, number 91. 

First there are two dispatches dated December 15, 1941 from 
Ambassador Grew to the Department of State concerning the burn- 
ing and destruction of codes, ciphers, and cipher devices. I will 
simply state that we have not photostated the entire dispatches 
since they contain considerable reference to code designations. We 
simply left that part of the dispatch blank. 

Senator Lucas. What was the date of that ? 

Mr. Gesell. That is a dispatch of. December 15, 1941. 

Another dispatch dated February 16, 1942, regarding destruction 
of confidential material in the reporting section of the Embassy 
iri Tokyo. Another dispatch dated March 25, 1942 regarding de- 
struction of confidential material in Embassy files. These dispatches 
show no destruction of confidential codes prior to December 8 Japa- 
nese time or December 7 our time. 

Those simply will be offered as an exhibit. 

The Chairman. All in one ? 

Mr. Gesell. I should think so, yes. 

The Chairman. They will be so marked. They are all attached? 

[S4j67] Mr. Gesell. Yes. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 91.") 

Mr. Gesell. At transcript page 2002 Senator Ferguson asked 
whether Ambassador Grew had any knowledge of the withdrawal 
of United States shipping from Japanese areas. No record can be 
found in the Department of State files of the sending of any infor- 
mation regarding the re-routing of the shipping to Ambassador 
Grew. 

At transcript page 2014 a request by Congressman Keefe for af- 
fidavits in connection with the burning of codes in the Embassy at 
Tokyo. In this connection we would like to point out that the 
material already previously introduced in Exhibit 90 shows that an 
affidavit was required only in connection with the burning of fee 
stamps; also as shown by the telegram dated December 5 to Am- 
bassador Grew. 

The photostats of Ambassador Grew's dispatches concerning code 
burning include certificates of the witnesses so that the material I 
offered a moment ago answers that request as well. 

[6468'] Mr. Gesell. At page 2045 of the transcript a request by 
Congressman Gearhart for any instructions sent to American con- 
suls in Japan during the last 3d of November and the first 7 days 
of December directing the destruction of codes and code machines. 

The State Department has found nothing in its files on this other 
than the telegram of December 5 and December 15 previously re- 
ferred to and, of course, the standing instructions which were in 
effect for burning in the event of necessity. 

At transcript page 2046 a request by Senator Ferguson for Army 
messages to the military attache at Tokyo concerning the burning 



2068 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of codes. I simply want to note that that material was placed in 
the transcript at page 2223. 

At transcript page 1881 a request by Senator Ferguson for Am- 
bassador Grew's reports to the State Department on his return to the 
United States in 1942. I believe other members of the committee 
expressed some interest in those reports as well. 

We have examined approximately 30 written dispatches delivered 
by Ambassador Grew to the State Department upon his return in 
1942 and except for two having to do with the destruction of con- 
fidential files and ciphers, which we have just introduced, the reports 
do not to us appear to be per- [5469] tinent. They relate al- 
most entirely to administrative matters. We can arrange to have 
those documents photostated and made available if any of the mem- 
bers of the committee wish. 

At transcript page 1630 a request by Senator Ferguson for material 
relating to the proposal of Prime Minister Hiranuma in the spring of 
1939. That is also discussed at pages 1947 and 1948. That, I believe, 
is the so-called peace proposal made by Baron Hiranuma prior to 
the outbreak of the war in Europe.^ 

We have obtained from the State Department a series of seventeen 
documents relating to that subject, which I will transmit today to 
Senator Ferguson's office for his inspection. I won't take the time 
of the committee to read the list of the documents. There are some 
seventeen in number. 

Senator Lucas. Wliat is the date of that ? 

Mr. Gesell. Those documents preceded the breaking out of war 
in Europe. 

Senator Ferguson. In 1939 ? 

Mr. Gesell. In 1939, yes. They went up, I think, until August 
1939. 

In the transcript at page 1288, a request by Senator Lucas for the 
official report of Prime Minister Churchill's speech of January 27, 
1942, before the House of Commons. 

We offer that report, a photostat of that, as the next exhibit, num- 
ber 92, furnished by the Library of Congress, [5469-A'\ pho- 
tostating pages 591 to 618 of volume 377 of the Official Reports of 
the Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons. 

'^The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 92.") 

[S47O'] Senator Ferguson. What was the date of that speech? 
Was that January 27 ? 

Mr. Gesell. That is the January 27, 1942, speech. 

Senator Ferguson. Thank you. 

Mr. Gesell. I believe a text of that speech is already in the tran- 
script and this is simply the official record of the speech. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I think the record ought to be 
clear on this last statement. I do not think the whole speech was in 
before, just certain transcripts out of it at the time. 

Mr. Gesell. Perhaps I was mistaken on that. 

The Chairman. Well, if that is true probably the whole speech 
ought to be made a part of the record and not simply as an exhibit. 

Mr. Gesell. Very well, then, we will have that spread upon the 
transcript after making a double check. It is a substantial typing 
job. I am probably in error. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

* See Exhibit No. 177, subsequently Introduced. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2069 

Mr. Gesell. At page 4930 there was read into the record a series 
of intercept messages during the period of January 1 to July 1, 1941 
indicating varying degrees of knowledge by the Japanese or suspicions 
by the Japanese that [S4.71] their codes were being read. 

The Army has completed the search and there are four additional 
messages which have turned up, which were submitted to us by the 
Army under date of December 19 and I will ask to have these mes- 
sages spread upon the transcript to complete that part of the inquiry. 

The Chairman. That will be done. 

Mr. Gesell. I can advise the committee at this time that the Navy 
has completed its search, but that its search has not disclosed any 
messages which the Army search has not disclosed, so we now believe 
we have the complete documentation on that subject. 

(The documents referred to follow:) 

[5^721 WAR DEPARTMENT, 

Washington, D. C. Room 4D761, The Pentagon, 19 December 1945. 
Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell : 

Completion of the search of Signal Intelligence Sei-vice flies has disclosed four 
additional messages, here inclosed, during the period 1 January-1 July 1941, which 
may be pertinent to the question of the extent of Japanese suspicions that their 
code messages were being read. 

/s/ Haemon Buncombe, 
BB 

Lt. Col. GSC. 



From: Tokyo (Matuoka) 
To: Panama (Koshi) 
23 January, 1941 
(J17-K6) 
#004 

(Chief of Office Routing) 

The statement issued by the president of the Japanese Association and others 
during (April ?) of last year, regarding the manipulation of the books in your 
office, was apparently based on communications between your office and mine. 

This raises a very serious question of security. How did [5^73] the con- 
tents of these official communications leak out to the above persons? Please in- 
vestigate this matter immediately and submit a report. 

We questioned Matumoto concerning this matter recently, and he explained 
that it was of your doing. Please explain. 
JD-1: 568 14073 23 January, 1941 Navy trans. 1-29-41 (S) 



From: Tokyo (Matuoka). 
To: Chicago (Rioyoji). 
7 February, 1941. 
(J17K6). 

#002. 

(Secret) 

If it is Impossible to remove the code safe and transfer the telegraphic duties 
to the official residence, there is no way out (in view of the fact that certain 
circumstances require giving the codes added protection) except for your office 
to discontinue secret communication. You will have to rely on the nearest office 
to handle your secret communications. 

For this reason, will you transfer the following codes to the Embassy in Wash- 
ington for safekeeping, at the earliest opportunity : 

"G" 

"i" (H-D* 

"ho" (KO) 

"hen" 

"oite" (PA-K2)* 



2070 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[5^7^] "Tu" (J 17)* 

"So" (New Orleans Only) P-1)* 

Please have the Embassy send us a receipt. 

Relay copies of this message, as a "Minister's Instruction" to Los Angeles and 
Portland ; also to Washington for information. 

•Insert by translator. 
jD-1: 956 14610 7 February, 1941 Navy Trans. 2-14-41 (S). 



From : Berlin. 
To: Tokyo. 
April 14, 1941. 
Purple. 

#407. 

Intelligence wires emanating from our offices in the Near East and Egypt to 
our offices in Germany and Italy should be appropriately paraphrased before 
transmitting their contents to the German and Italian authorities. This pro- 
cedure is advisable in order that there be no danger of giving the German and 
Italian authorities clues in decoding our codes. Therefore, in intelligences of 
this type emanating from the area, the "I" * code and the "SO" '' code should be 
discontinued, using only the more efficient "O" "^ code. In communicating other 
secret matters I would like to have you use the "TSU" ** code and other appro- 
priate codes. Please follow this procedure. 

[5^75] Relayed to Italy and Turkey. 

» An auxiliary code. 

"P-l. 

«PA (K-2). 

<> J series codes. 

(J-18 (K7) now under study.) 
Army 16312 Trans. 4-16-41 (W) 



From: San Francisco (Muto). 

To: Tokyo. 

May 28, 1941. 

J-18. 

#86. (Part 1 of 2) 

(Strictly Secret) 

While the Nichi Shin Maru, of the Pacific Whaling Steamship Company, was 
coming into Port Costa (approximately 20 miles from San Francisco) in order 
to take on petroleum, under suspicion of carrying contraband drugs the interior 

of the ship was searched by customs officials about noon on the ''. In order 

to burn them, should the need arise. Naval "SA" code," secret Naval documents 
in the custody of the captain, secret wireless telegraphy documents in the cus- 
tody of the Chief Radio Operator, meteorological codes belonging to the Central 
Meteorological Bureau, planning board codes, and other secret document, 
[5476] under pretext of passing inspection were taken away. As soon as 
I had been informed of this by telephone, I immediately filed a protest with 
the local customs officials and demanded the return of these documents. They 
replied that they had decided to return these documents at a later date to the 
fishing vessel after an investigation had been made into the facts of the case. 

» -y^iafele tie i denti fy this code a* pf-eeefttr (NL) fully available. Now cancelled. 

''29th. 
Army 18037 Trans. 6-11-41 (2) 

[6477] Mr. GESEiiL. At pages 4102 and 3 of the transcript Sena- 
tor Ferguson asked whether the British notified the United States 
prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor that they were fully alerted at 
Singapore. 

The Army has submitted in response to that request two documents : 
First, a copy of a December 1, 1941, UP dispatch from Singapore as 
appearing in the New York Times and, second, a photostat of a 2 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2071 

December report, received in the War Department, G-2, April 12, 
1942, from the United States military observer in Smgapore, concern- 
ing the status of the alerts. The net effect of that is that there was 
newspaper publicity about Singapore being alerted but that the official 
report, while sent on the 2d of December, did not reach here until April 
12 1942, 

i will ask to have both the official report and the UP dispatch placed 
in the transcript. 

The Chairman. It is so ordered. 

(The documents referred to follow:) 

Copy No. 6-1 
For Record Section Only 
[5^781 Secret 

Military Intelligence Division 

war department general staff 

Military Attache Report : Malaya 

(Stamp:) REC'D-G-2 APR 13 1942 
Subject : ALERTING OF MALAYAN COMMAND I. G. No. 6900 
Source : BRITISH— OFFICIAL 
Reliability : EXCELLENT. 
Summarization of Report : 

1. System of Alerting. 

2. Present State of Alert. 

1. System of Alerting. 

a. States of Alert in the Malayan Command are prescribed as three "degrees of 
readiness", each degree being indicated by a code word. 

(1) The 3rd, or lowest degree of readiness is designated by the code word 
"AWAKE". When this code word is transmitted by Command Headquarters to 
the H. Q. Ill Indian Corps, Singapore Fortress; Australian Imperial Forces, 
Malaya, and to Sarawak and Borneo it has the following meaning : "The inter- 
national situation is getting worse and you should malie certain, as far as possible 
without causing public uneasiness, that all your precautionary measures are 
ready to be brought into operations at very short notice. Civil authorities have 
been informed accordingly." 

[5^79] (a) Commanders will take the following action upon receipt of 
the code message "AWAKE" : "Ensure that all schemes are in readiness for in- 
stant action and will take such precautionary measures as may be possible cov- 
ertly or under the guise of an exercise. Officers and other ranks on leave 
within Malaya will be recalled, but no movement of units to war stations without 
previous reference to Command Headquarters". 

(2) The second degree of readiness is indicated by the code word "SEA VIEW". 
Upon receipt of this code message the following will ensue : 

(a) Beach defenses will be manned on a skeleton basis and a constant night 
watcli maintained. 

(b) A. A. defenses fully deployed. 

(c) Fixed defenses fully deployed. 

(d) Commanding General III Indian Corps will secure the northern frontier. 

(e) All other regular forces will be at not more than 12 hours notice to take 
up initial positions. 

(f ) Mobilization of impressed civilian motor transport to be put into effect as 
far as required for [5480] mobilization of Volunteers when and if ordered. 

(g) Booms across rivers will be put into place. 

(h) Off shore and river patrol vessels to be fully manned and on patrol, 
(i) Operations room and Headquarters all organizations will be manned 
continuously on a skeleton basis. 

(3) The first degree of readiness is called for by the code message "RAFFLES". 
Upon its receipt, tlie following steps will be taken : 

(a) All forces will be deployed and ready for action. 

(b) All airdrome defense schemes will be brought into operation. 

(c) Operations rooms and Headquarters all units fully manned. 

(d) War Code for communications go into effect 12 hours after origin of 
message "RAFFLES". 



2072 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

&. Other precautionary measures. 

(1) Mobilization of Volunteer forces is called for by the code word "OILCAN" 
followed by the date of mobilization in words. Upon receipt, Volunteer force 
commanders prepare to mobilize on the date indicated. They report comple- 
tion of mobilization to Headquarters Malayan Command. 

(2) Guarding of vulnerable points. This is [5481] called for by the 
code message ARMOUR. Full precautions against sabotage is called for by 
this message. All military vulnerable points will be constantly guarded. Troops 
will leave barracks only on duty and will be under arms at all times. 

(3) The code message "BROWNOUT" calls for the following: 

(a) Permanently dismantle all advertisement lighting. 

(b) Extinguish street and all other outside lighting. 

(c) Shade interior lighting and lights on vehicles. 

(d) Institute complete blackout on sounding of air raid signals. 

(4) Internment of enemy aliens will probaly take place in 3 stages, i. e. : 

(a) First phase, indicated by code message "COLLAR". This calls for arrest 
and detention of dangerous Japanese known to police. 

(b) Second phase, indicated by code word "TROUSERS". All male Japanese 
will be interned. 

(c) Third phase, "COLOUR". All Japanese will be interned. 

(5) Complete closing of Thailand frontier is [5482] indicated by code 
word "BUNKER". Minor degrees of frontier restriction are indicated by other 
code words. 

2. Present State of Alert in Malaya. 

a. Malaya was placed in the second degree of readiness by the code message 
"SEAVIEW" on Monday, December 1, 1941. 

b. Guarding of vulnerable points, prevention of sabotage, and restriction of 
troops to barracks, etc. was called for by the message "ARMOUR" on the pre- 
ceding day, November 30, 1941. 

/S/ B. A. TORMEY. 

Distribution : 

6 copies to AC of S, G-2, Major, General Staff. WD. 
3 copies to AC of S, G-2, HPD. 
1 copy to file. 

(Stamp:) 1st Ind(?) U. S. Military Observer, Singapore, 12/4, 1941 (?) To: 
AC of S, G-2, WD., 

Approved : 

/S/ Francis G. Brink. 
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff. 



[5483] [Extract from The New York Times, 1 December 1941, page 9, 
column 2.] 

Singapore Placed Under Emekgency — Volunteers Called Out — New Forces 
Landed in BxmMA to Meet Japanese Threat 

AUSTRALIANS TO CONFER — ^BRITISH NAVAL AID TO U. 8. IN FAR EAST STRESSED BY 
FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY 

Singapore. Monday, Dec. 1 (UP). — The Governor today signed a proclamation 
declaring that a state of emergency existed in the Straits Settlements, British 
Crown Colony. He called out the volunteer army, air and naval forces. 

The proclamation was issued by Governor Sir Shenton Thomas after he had 
conferred with Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, chief of the 
British forces in the Far East. 

[S484-] Mr. Gesell. Senator Lucas requested certain informa- 
tion concerning the Philippines, to wit, the following : 

The total number of airplanes in the Philippines on 7 December 
1941, that request being made at pages 3993 and 4404 of the tran- 
script ; the number of bombers at Clark Field when the Japanese at- 
tacked, that request being made at page 3994 of the transcript, and 
any report on the number of bombers lost at Clark Field in that attack, 
that request being made at page 4405 of the transcript. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2073 



The War Dei^artment has submitted the best information which is 
available bearing on these requests at the present time in the War 
Department, in the form of a memorandum three pages in length 
containing the information in detail and I think the best procedure for 
handling it, again, would be to have it spread upon the transcript. 

The Chairman. It is so ordered. 

(The document referred to follows :) 

[5485] 27 Decembeb 1945. 

Memorandum for L & L Division 

Att : Lt. Col. Duncombe 
Subject : Information re Philippine Plane Situation 

1. Reference is made to memorandum from Lt. Col. Duncombe to Lt. Col. 
Eoot, dated IS December 1945, concerning request of Senator Lucas on pages 
3993 and 4404 of the transcript for the number of planes in the Philippines on 7 
December 1941, and on pages 8994 and 4404 for the number of bombers on Clark 
Field and the number of bombers lost there. 

2. Information bearing on the above requests, supplied by the Army Air Forces, 
is inclosed herewith. No more definite information is at present available in 
the War Department. 

3. Inclosure No. 1, a report by the Office of Statistical Control, AAF, regarding 
the status of aircraft in the Philippines 1-31 December 1941, indicates that 317 
planes were on hand as of 1 December. Inclosure No. 2, an extract from the 
"History of the Fifth Air Force and Its Predecessors, December 1941 Installment" 
indicates that, of the total of 35 B-17's on hand, 20 to 23 were at Clark Field on 
8 December prior to the attack. The 8 December cable from the Philippines on 
plane losses, noted in inclosure No. 1, states that 17 heavy bombers remained 
after the attack, but does not disclose how many of the bombers lost were lost 
at Clark Field. 

/S/ E. E. PvOOT, 

Lt. Col. G8C 
Ctirrent Oroup, OPD 
[5486] 2 Incls— 

Copy Status of Aircraft in Philippines 1-31 Dec 41. 

Copy Table III, pages 8 & 9, "History of Fifth Air Force and Its Prede- 
cessors, Part I, December 1941 Installment" (on file at AAF Historical 
Offlt^e). 

Restricted 
Status of aircraft in Philippines, 1-Sl December 1941 



Model 


On hand 

as of 1 
Dec 1941 


Losses* 
during 
month 


On hand 
as of 31 
Dec 1941 


Model 


On hand 

as of 1 
Dec 1941 


Losses* 
during 
month 


On hand 
as of 31 
Dec 1941 


B-17 


35 
12 
18 

8 

15 

51 

13 

141 

1 


21 
11 
16 

8 

15 

51 

13 

141 

1 


14 

1 
2 


0-46 


7 
3 
10 

1 
1 
1 


7 

3 

10 

1 




B-10 


0-49 




B-18- 


0-52 




A-27._- 


OA-9 




P-26 




C-39 


1 


P-35 




C-49 


1 




P 39 




Total 




P-10 

0-19 




317 


299 


18 









•Due to the lack of adequate aircraft reporting facilities [5487] during the early part of the war, the 
cause of these losses and the dates on which they occurred are both incomplete and inaccurate. However, 
after extensive research and based on the few cable reports which were transmitted, the following observa- 
tions are made: 

1. Cable from Philippines dated 8 December 1941 states: "After attack now have 15 P-35's, 17 heavy 
bombers and 50-55 P-40's; no losses other types". This would indicate that 18 B-17's, 36 P-35's, and 86-91 
P-40's were lost before or on 8 December 1941. 

2. Cable from Philippines dated 12 December 1941 states: "Must conserve to maximum the 27 P-40's for 
reconnaissance to make a show of strength." This would further indicate that approximately 23-28 P-^'s 
were lost between the 9th and 12th of December 1941. 

3. We have no way of determining how or when the balance of the losses were incurred. 

Office of Statistical Control 

18 December 1945 AFSSC-2B 



2074 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



[5J/88] A True Copy as found in History of the Fifth Air Force (and its 
Predecessors) . Part I, December, 1941, Installment. 

(S) Richard L. Watson, Jr. 

Maj. A. C. 

FEAF Dispositions on Dec. 7, 1941 

Table III. — Status and location of aircraft (44) 



CO. 


Unit 


Location 


Type 


Number 
operat. 


Major 0. L. Qrover 


24 Pur. Qrp 








Lt. W. B. Putman 


Hq. &Hq. Sq 

3rd Pur. Sq 


Clark 






Lt. H. Q. Thorne 


Iba 


P-40E 


18 


1st Lt. Boyd Wagner... 


17th Pur 


Nichols 


P-40E 


18 


1st Lt. J. H. Moore 


20th Pur 


Clark 


P-40B 

P-35 


18 
18 


1st Lt. Sam Marett 


21st Pur 


Del Carmen. 

Nichols 


1st Lt. W. E. Dyess 


34th Pur 


P-40E 


18 












Total pursuit 1 


90 


Opt. J. Y. Parker 


2nd Obs.-- 


Clark 


0-46, 52, 79 


10-12 


Lt. Col. Eugene L. Eubank 


19th Bomb Q Group.. 




Captain MacDonald 


Hq. & Hq. Sq 


Clark 






Major C. E. Combs 


93rd Sq 


Del Monte 

Del Monte 

Clark 


B 17D 


} - 
} « 

12 


Major E. 0. O'DonneU 


14th Sq 


B 17D 


Major Wm. Fisher 


28th Sq 


B-17D 

B-17D 


Major H. Qibbs. 


30th Sq 


Clark 


Note: Two planes out of com- 
mission at Clark, also three 
planes of 93rd and 14th Squad- 
ron at Clark. 
6th Pursuit (Phil. Air Force): 


6th Sq 


Batangas 


P-26 


Captain Jesus A. Villamour. 




(Clark 


[b-is 




Miscellaneous 


Wichois 


10 






[Neilson 


1 
B-10 






Cabantuan 

Clark.. . 


3 






A-27 


2 






Del Monte 


B-18 


2 











ffli'^^L Total first line Operational Aircraft Dec. 7th (19 Bomb. 24th Pursuit 2nd Obsv.) 135 or 137 

All other operational tactical planes 29 

Grand total operational _ 164 or 166 

44. This table has been compiled from the History 24th Pur. Grp. * * ♦ and 
Journal 19 Bomb -Gp. * * * Gen. Marshall in his biennial report gives the 
number of P^O's as 107. The discrepancy is due to the fact that table III 
above, is of planes operational on Dec. 8th, and excludes planes not erected or 
out (of commission. 

Copy 

[64W] Mr. Gesell. At page 3273 of the transcript, Senator 
Ferguson requested that the records be checked for any memorandum 
by General Marshall concerning our preparedness, similar to the 
memoranda for the President of 5 November and 27 November 1941 
signed by General Marshall and Admiral Stark. A search of the 
War Department files for the year 1941 has disclosed no such mem- 
orandum. 

At pages 4178-79 of the transcript. Senator Ferguson asked what 
codes the so-called ^inds messages had been sent in. Both messages — 
SIS Nos. 25432 and 25392— were sent not in the "Purple" code, but in 
the code known as "J-19". 

At pages 3758 and 3760 of the transcript, Congressman Keefe asked 
when the first Army troops were sent to Iceland, and when the Army 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2075 

relieved the Marines there. Records of the Adjutant General in con- 
nection with the memorandum we have received from the War De- 
partment indicate the following : • a j 

The first Army unit on Iceland was the 33d Pursuit bquadron, 
which arrived 6 August 1941. 

The first Army ground troops arrived 16 September 1941. 

The Marines in Iceland were not relieved at the time the Army 
ground troops arrived; by a Presidential directive of 22 September 
1941 they were placed under General Bonesteel, the Army commander. 

At page 4235 of the transcript Congressman Murphy asked 
[S4S1] for the initials of Colonel Bundy, head of the Plans Section 
of the War Plans Division in 1941. The Army Register for 1940 
gives Colonel Bundy 's name as Charles W. Bundy. 

On December 22, 1945, the War Department advised as follows 
with respect to a request appearing at page 4104 of the transcript made 
by Senator Ferguson, who asked when the Batavia message from 
Thorpe for Miles (CR0222) was received in G-2--that is the so-called 
Batavia "winds" message. The Army has submitted to us a photostat 
of page 2 of the December 5, 1941, register of incoming cables of the 
G-2 record section, indicating that the message in question was re- 
ceived in that section at 8 : 16 a. m., 5 December 1941. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 93. ) 

Mr. Gesell. On December 10, 1945, the War Department made its 
reply to a request by Senator Ferguson and Senator Brewster con- 
cerning the original Opana plot. These requests were made at pages 
372 and 373 of the transcript and at other points. 

In response to these requests they have made available to us the 
following information which we have available for Senator Brewster's 
and Senator Ferguson's inspection : , tt j 

Letter dated 24 November 1945 from the Adjutant General, Head- 
quarters United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific, inclosing the 
original radar plot of the Opana station, and various related original 
records 

Letter dated 21 November 1945 from the Adjutant General, Head- 
quarters United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific, in- [5492] 
closing 4 original plots of radar stations in operation on Oahu, 7 
December 1941, as plotted at the information center and covering 
the period from 10:43 a. m. to 12 p. m., local Hawaiian time, 7 
December 1941. 

Letter dated 18 November 1945 from Assistant Adjutant General, 
Headquarters United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific, with 6 
inclosures. . . , , 

At page 4051 of the transcript, Senator Ferguson inquired about 
orders relating to the relief of General Short in addition to the cable 
of 16 December 1941 read into the record at pages 4050 and 4051 of 
the transcript. 

Two photostats of two cables on this subject, dated December 17, 
1941, and January 6, 1942, have been made available to us by the 
Army and I will ask to have them spread upon the transcript. 

The Chairman. It wiU be so ordered. 

(The documents referred to follow:) 



2076 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[5493] [Telegram] 

From : War Department 
Bureau : Secretary, GS 
OCS: WBS 

December 17, 1941. 
Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short, 
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, 

Fort Shafter, Hawaii. 
For general Short only stop Chief of Staff believes it important that you 
remain in Hawaii during the presence there of the President's Commission stop 
Orders for you will issue later stop Regards end 

Bbyden. 
I hereby certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the 
public service. 

[S] W. B. Smith, 
W. B. Smith, 
Colonel, General Staff, 
Secretary, General Staff. 



[Telegram] 
From : War Department 
Bureau : A. G. O. 

AG 210.31 (1-5-42) OD-F. 
JED-hrm-hg-1509-1. 

JANUABY 6, 1942. 
Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Department, 

Fort Shafter, T. H. 
[5494] Secretary of War relieves Major Generals Walter C. Short O dash 
1621 US Army and Frederick L. Martin O dash 2507 US Army present assign- 
ment and duty in Hawaiian dept effective upon departure of Roberts Commis- 
sion then assigns them to western defense command presidio of San Francisco, 
Calif to proceed that station and report to CG for duty stop travel directed 
necessary military service stop FD 1401 P 1 dash 06 comma 15 dash 06 A 
0410 dash 2 

Adams. 
Official : 

/S/ J. E. Daly, 
Adjutant General. 

[54^51 Mr. Gesell. I would like to read at this time a memo- 
randum submitted to us by the War Department under date of De- 
cember 21, 1945, in response to a request made by counsel's office for 
certain information which will be apparent. The memorandum reads 
as follows: 

In response to your request, the records of the Signal Intelligence Service have 
been searched to ascertain if Japanese messages were intercepted which contained 
the word "haruna" (specified in the messages at page 215 of Exhibit 1 as the 
word to be used to signal compliance with Tokyo's orders for destruction of 
codes). The records disclose that messages containing the single word "haruna" 
were transmitted from the following places on the dates listed (the date on which 
the intercept reached S. I. S. is also given in those instances where it is shown by 
the records. 

This memorandum, the full text of which will be put into the record, 
discloses that the word "haruna", which was the code word, was sent 
by Japanese offices on December 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 located at the following 
points : 

Panama, New York, New Orleans, Havana, Hollywood, Vancouver, 
Portland, Menado, Surabaya, Seattle, Ottawa, San Francisco, 
Chicago, Washington, Dublin, Songkhla. 

I will ask to have the whole memorandum put in. I thought that 
that would be of benefit to the committee to show that [54^6] 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2077 



that word "haruna" was in fact implemented and followed up and 
transmitted from these various points. 

The Chairman. Do you want that put in as part of the transcript? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes, I think we should put that whole thing in the 
record and have the whole memorandum spread of record. 

The Chairman. It will be so ordered. 

Senator Ltjcas. As a matter of information, Mr. Chairman, may I 
ask counsel if that is a record showing that the messages went to 
these various places just indicated? 

Mr. Gesell. It was the reverse. Senator. The Japanese sent out 
a circular message which asked for the destruction of codes and said, 
"When you have destroyed the codes, send the word back to show 
that you have done it," and on these various dates these various 
points reported to Tokyo that they had destroyed their codes. 

Senator Lucas. Thank you. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether all of 
these had been intercepted and deciphered prior to the time of the 
attack ? Is there any showing of that ? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes, there is a showing to the extent available, Senator 
Ferguson. Apparently the records in not every instance are com- 
plete as to whether or not they were intercepted and received, but 
there appear to be in that group [54^7] nine which were inter- 
cepted and received prior to that time and then a group of five on 
December 8, 10, 12, and 17 which were not received until later. 

Senator Ferguson. Thank you. 

Mr. Gesell. That will all appear in the full body of the memo- 
randum in the transcript. 

Senator Ferguson. Thank you. 

{The document referred to follows :) 

Wab Department, 
Washington, D. C, Room 4D761, The Pentagon, 21 December 1945. 
Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell : 

In response to your request, the records of the Signal Intelligence Service 
have been searched to ascertain if Japanese messages were intercepted which 
contained the word "haruna" (specified in the messages at page 215 of Exhibit 
1 as the word to be used to signal compliance with Tokyo's orders for destruc- 
tion of codes). The records disclose that messages containing the single word 
"haruna" were transmitted from the following places, on the dates listed (the 
date on which the intercept reached S. I. S. is also given in those instances 
where it is shown by the records) : 

[5498] 



Message sent by 
Japanese ofiEice at— 


Date transmitted 
by Japanese 


Date 

Intercept 

received 

by SIS 


Message sent by 
Japanese office at— 


Date transmitted 
by Japanese 


Date 

intercept 

received 

by SIS 




2Dec 


4 Dec. 
3 Dec. 
3 Dec. 

3 Dec. 

5 Dec. 
5 Dec. 

4 Dec. 
?. 


Surabaya 


3Dec 


(?). 




2 Dec- -.- - 


Seattle 


4 Dec 


5 Dec. 




2 Dec 


Ottawa 


4 Dec 


6 Dec. 




2 Dec 


San Francisco 

Chicago-- 


4Dec 


8 Dec. 




2 Dec 


6Dec.-_ --- 


8 Dec. 


Vancouver . - . . 


2 Dec 


Washington 

Dublin 


6 Dec. 8:21 p. m.-- 
? 


10 Dec. 


Portland 


3 Dec 


12 Dec. 




3 Dec 


Songkhla 


7Dec 


17 Dec. 













/S/ Harmon Buncombe, 
BB 
Harmon Duncombe, 

Lt. Col, GSC. 



2078 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[54^9] Mr. Gesell. Another request made by counsel related to 
obtaining the intercept, if any, from Washington to Tokyo transmit- 
ting Secretary Hull's message of November 26, 1941. That intercept 
has been obtained and we would like to have it marked as Exhibit 94. 

The Chairman. It will be so marked. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 94." 

Mr. Gesell. I would now like to read into the record a memorandum 
from the War Department dated December 31, 1945, reading as 
follows : 

At page 4114 of the transcript, Senator Ferguson asked for (a) the informa- 
tion which G-2 had between 26 November and 12 noon 7 December 1941 indi- 
cating that Japanese ships were moving southward, and (b) the War Department 
copy of the 6 December 1941 cable from Ambassador Winant to the State De- 
partment concerning Japanese ship movements. 

All the documents found in the G-2 files relating to the first request are con- 
tained in Inclosures No. 1-ld. In addition, MID was on the distribution for 
the ONI Intelligence Reports for 26 November (#65), 27 November (#66), 29 
November (#68), 29 November (#70), 1 December (#71), and 3 December 
1941 (#72-41) — all contained in Exhibit 85. Also, attached as Inclosure 
[5500] No. 2, is a 26 November 1941 Memorandum for the President from 
the Secretary of W^ar concerning a possible Japanese convoy movement toward 
Indo-China. 

A thorough search of the War Department files has disclosed no evidence that 
a copy of the Winant cable was received in the War Department. However, 
Inclosure No. 3 shows that the 6 December despatch from CINCAF to CNO 
(Exhibit 66), containing similar information, was received by the Executive 
Officer, War Plans Division of the War Department at 1710, 6 December 1941, 
and the G-2 comment in item Id. of Inclosure No. 1 shows that the contents of 
that despatch were known to G-2. 

That is a very comprehensive memorandum covering that request 
and I think the best way of handling it would be not to read the 
various enclosures but to have them appear in the transcript immedi- 
ately following this memorandum. 

(The document referred to follows :) 

[5501] SECRET 

Controlled Information 
Re ; Operations of Friendly Powers 

PABAPHRASE of a SEXatET CONFIDENTIAL RE^STEICTED MESSAGE RECEIVED AT WAK 

Dept., at 11 : 05 a. m. Dex^mbeb 1, 1941 

From London : Filed 4 : 22 p. m. December 4, 1941 
Received in I. H. 8 : 15 a. m. December 5, 1941 No. 1275 

1. Libya: Authentic information here indicates the British have at this 
time approximately 180 tanks ready for battle in Libj'la after reinforcements 
were rushed to the Desert. British estimates have placed Axis tank strength 
at the outbreak of hostilities at 500 light tanks, 400 of which were tanks of nine 
tons or over. Estimates on their strength, admitted to be pretty much guesswork, 
were at the beginning of the present let-up in fighting around 120 tanks in combat 
trim. 

2. Far East: Japanese movement for the present appears to be all out-boimd, 
supposedly moving southward. The Commander-in-Chief at Hong Kong is the 
only late news from the Far East also reports there are no signs evident of 
Japanese concentration on Hong Kong. 

3. Russia: British Ambassador Sir Stafford Cripps is protesting to the Soviet 
Government on the very incomplete information given the British Military 
Mission in Russia. The Mission Chief, still in Kuiblshev, is being given nothing 
more [5502] than official Red Army communiques. 

ROTCE. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2079 

Paraphrase of a Sex'Ret Message Received at War Dept. at 8 : 45 a. m. 
December 2, 1941 

From London : Filed 1 : 40 p. m. 

Received in I. B. : 11 : 30 a. m. December 2, 1941 No. 1249 

The following is the December 1st estimate by the War OflSce of Japanese 
dispositions : 

Centrlal China Army 8 Divs.^, 3, 13, 6, 15, 22, 34, 40. 

Ind. Brigs.— 11, 12. 13, 14, 17, 18, 20. 

South China Army — Canton 3 Divs. — 104, 48, 18. 

Swatow 1 Ind. Brig. — 19th. 

Formosa Army 3 Div. — 28, 116, one unidentified. 

Hainan Army 1 Div. unidentified. 

Indo-China Army (north) 1. Div. — Guards. 

(south) 3 Divs.— 5, 38, 88 (from Formosa). 

Navy — 

Hainan 4 large cruisers. 

Saigon 1 sm'all submarine. 

[5503] The 2nd and 3rd China fleets moving South made up of 4 heavy and 
12 light cruisers, 4 aircraft carriers, 52 destroyers, and 18 submarines. 

Air Force Distribution: 

Formosa 71 pursuit 

24 light bombers 
42 heavy bombers 
9 reconnaissance 
10 seaplanes 

Total 156 

South China and Hainan 103 pursuit 

lOO light bombers 
129 heavy bombers 
14 seaplanes 

Total 346 

French Indo-China 64 pursuit 

58 light bombers 
55 heavy bombers 
9 reconnaissance 

Total 186 

[55041 Air Ministry's note as to Indo-China airforce states that 157 of 
these planes are in the south and the plane strength may be reinforced in the 
near future. The light bombardment planes seem to be equipped with extra gas 
tanks for distant reconnaissance. 

ROYCE. 



Paraphrase of a Secret Message Received at War Dept. at 12 : 53 p. m. 

December 2, 1941 

From Manila, P. I. Filed 11 : 29 a. m. December 1. 1941 
Received in I. B. 4 : 05 p. m. December 2, 1941 No. 1038 

A reliable American source reports that since November 10th, 6 Japanese 
Divisions (100,000 men) have landed at Haiphong. Also: 

150 medium bombers 
350 fighters 
450 light tanks 
50 medium tanks 
200 75 mm. guns. 

Source states figures taken from ship manifests. 

Source states 6 Japanese Divisions on Formosa, and 3 light cruisers and 20 
Japanese destroyers at Saigon. 

Englehart. 



2080 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[5505] G-2 Comment : 

Doubtful that Japanese transports have manifests which could be checked as 
indicated. The troops reported disembarked at Haiphong (in this 20-day period) 
are almost three times the unloading capacity of the port (ONI estimate), al- 
though on November 25th the Consul at Hanoi stated that within the last few 
days troop landings had mounted to 4,000 a day. On November 29th, however, the 
Consul at Hanoi reported "past few days no great increase in number of Japanese 
troops." Consular reports from Saigon, on the other hand, since November 21st, 
have indicated heavy arrivals to include the end of the month. G-2 accepts this 
radiographic report with reserve, and believes that the bulk of this force about 
80,000 may have been landed in Southern rather than Northern Indo-China. 
(With 25,000 in Northern Indo-China the total is about 105,000.) Estimated also 
that not more than 3 divisions are on Taiwan, 3 on Hainan, and 2 «n transports 
located December 1, in Camranh Bay (N. E. of Saigon). 



[5506] confidential 

Wae Department 
wae depabtment general staff 

Military Intelligence, Division G-2 

Washington, Decemher 4, 19/fl. 
Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 : 
Subject : Japanese Troop Movements. 

1. The following information has just been received from the State Depart- 
ment: 

a. Taingtao, Shantung Province, North Cliina, December 1. In the past ten 
days an average of 3 loaded troop transports has left this port daily. The men 
are believed to be from the Yangtze Valley, as they wore summer uniforms, 
whereas all troops in this area are in winter uniforms. (Note: This is estimated 
to imply a movement of 15,000-30,000 men, that is, one or two divisions. It prob- 
ably supplements to some extent the previous sea-borne movements reported.) 

&. Canton, December 2. Large land troop movements continue through Can- 
ton. Estimated 8,500 men passed eastward through the city up to noon today. 
It is now believed that these movements are local and indicate oijerations to the 
north and east of Canton, rather than preparations for overseas move- [5507] 
ment. 

2. It is recommended that the foregoing be not brought specifically to the atten- 
tion of the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War. They are details of the general 
picture that is already known. 

In the absence of Colonel Kramer. 

(S) TJB 
T. J. B. 



SECBETT 



Paraphrase of a Secret Message REcEi\rED at War Dept. at 4 : 29 P. M. 

December 6, 1941 

From Singapore: Filed 5: 13 p. m. December 5, 1941 
Received in I. B. : 1 : 35 a. m. December 7, 1941 No. 96 

Brink advises that at one o'clock in the afternoon, following a course due 
west, were seen a battleship, five cruisers, seven destroyers and twenty-five 
merchant ships ; these were seen at 106° 8' E., 8° N. ; this was the first report. 

The second report was that ten merchant ships, two cruisers and ten destroyers 
were seen following the same course at 106° 20' E., 7° 35' N. 

Both of the above reports came from patrols of the Royal Air Force. 

Bbink 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2081 

G-2 Comment: It is G-2's opinion that these are the same convoys reported in 
ONI's December 6 from "C in O China" [5508] through "C in CAF." 



SECfiET 

November 26. 1941. 
Memorandum for the President : 
Subject : Japanese Convoy Movement towards Indo-China. 

About a month and a half ago we learned through Magic that the Japanese 
Government informed the Vichy Government that they proposed to move approxi- 
mately 50,000 troops into Indo-China in addition to the 40,000 already there by 
previous agreement. 

Today information has accumulated to the effect that a convoy of from 10 
to 30 ships, some of 10,000 tons displacement, has been assembled near the mouth 
of the Yangtse River below Shanghai. This could mean a force as great as 
50,000, but more probably a smaller number. Included in this ship concentration 
was at least one landing-boat carrier. The deck-load of one vessel contained 
heavy bridge equipment. Later reports indicate that this movement is already 
under way and ships have been seen south of Formosa. 

The officers concerned, in the Military Intelligence Division, feel that unless 
we receive other information, this is more or less a normal movement, that is, 
a logical follow-up of their previous notiiication to the Vichy Government. 

[5509] I will keep you informed of any other information in this particular 
field. 

[s] sgd 
OCS/18136-125 10 Secretary of War. 



ART 411 (P COMINST, 1939) 
Paraphrased versions of translations of secret messages may be prepared on the 
authority of the flag or commanding officer in cases where necessary. . . . They 
shall have the same classification as the original messages, and shall be safe- 
guarded accordinglj'^ as prescribed by navy regulations. Their possession shall 
be vouched for by signed receipts retained by the communication officer, to 
whom they should be surrendered for destruction when no longer required. 

Note: This is the only copy of this secret message being distributed in the Navy 
Department. When no longer required, it should be returned to the Navy Depart- 
ment Communication Officer, Room 2625, for destruction and return of receipt. 

Dec, 6, 1941. 
Received from the Navy Department Communication Officer one paraphrased 
copy of CINCAF dispatch (secret) with [5510] reference numbers 
061255 CR 0151. 

/s/ C. R. Gabung, 

Maj. GSC. 

Orig 

Action 

Cog Army 

Record Copy: 
Delivered at 1710, by 

/S/ H. S. HALL. 

NAVCOM-15 



79716 — 46— pt. 5- 



2082 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[SSll] Mr. Gesell. Now there is before each member of the 
committee a mimeographed statement of four pages in length entitled 
"Information from Documentary Evidence on Messages at pages 14:- 
29 of Exhibit 2." These are the messages in the so-called set of military 
intercepts. 

The Vice Chairman. Is that this paper? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes ; that is it. Exhibit 2 of the military intercepts at 
pages 14-29 are the various intercepts which were translated on the 
days of the 5th and 6th of December, and some of them translated 
subsequently. 

The committee has expressed interest in what documentary infor- 
mation there is as to those various messages, as to when they were inter- 
cepted, when they were enciphered, when they were decoded, and when 
they were translated. The documentary material is summarized in 
this memorandum, which I think should also be spread upon the tran- 
script at this point. 

This is prepared along the lines of the memorandum which has 
already been submitted to the committee concerning the 14-part, 1 
o'clock messages, and will facilitate subsequent testimony before the 
committee concerning these messages. 

The Chairman. That will be spread upon the record. 

(The document referred to follows:) 

15512] INFOEMATION FbOM DOCUMENTABY EVIDENCE ON MESSAGES AT PP. 14-29 

OF Exhibit 2 

Note. — Information based on documents in Navy files indicated by "(N)"; 
information based on documents in Army files indicated by "(A)". 

SIS 25817, dated 18 November, translated 6 December, sent in code system 
J-19 (Exhibit 2, p. 14). 

Intercepted at Army Station 2, San Francisco, 18 November (A). Air- 
mailed to Army SIS; received by Army SIS on or before 21 November (A), 
Enciphered in a key not recovered until about 3 December (A). 
Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A). 
SIS 25773, dated 18 November, translated 5 December, sent in code system 
J-19 (Exhibit 2, p. 15). 

Intercepted by Navy Station S, Bainbridge Island, IS November (N & A). 
Airmailed to Navy ; received by Navy, 21 November (N) . 
Sent by Navy to Army SIS. 

Enciphered in a key not recovered until about 3 December (A). 
Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A). 
SIS 25694, dated 20 November, translated 4 December, sent in code system J-19 
(Exhibit 2, p. 15). 

Intercepted by Navy Station S, Bainbridge Island, [5513] 20 No- 
vember (N). 

Airmailed to Navy ; received bv Navy 24 November (N), 
Sent by Navy to Army SIS. 
Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A). 
SIS 25823, dated 29 November, translated 5 December, sent in code system 
J-19 (Exhibit 2, p. 15). 

Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, 29 November (N). 
Airmailed to Army SIS; received by Army SIS, 1 December (A). 
Sent by Array SIS to Navy, 1 December (A). 
Decoded by Navy, 3 December (N). 
Translated by Navy (N). 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2083 

SIS 26351 (Part 1) and SIS 26352 (Part 2), dated 24 November, translated 
16 December, sent in code system J-19 (Exhibit 2, pp. 16-17). 

Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, 25 November (A), 
Airmailed to Army SIS ; received by Army SIS, 26 November (A). 
Enciphered in a key not recovered until about 16 December (A). 
Decoded by Army SIS, 16 December (A). 
Translated by Army SIS (A). 
SIS 25880, dated 28 November, translated 8 December, sent in code system 
J-19 (Exhibit 2, p. 18). 

[5514] Intercepted by Navy Station S, Bainbridge Island, 28 Novem- 
ber (A). 

Airmailed to Navy; received by Navy, 2 December (N). 
Sent by Navy to Army SIS. 

Enciphered in a key not recovered until about 7 December (A). 
Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A). 
SIS 25928, dated 28 November, translated 8 December, sent in code system 
J-19 (Exhibit 2, p. 19). 

Intercepted by Army Station 7, Fort Hunt, Va., 28 November (A). 
Received by courier by Army SIS, 29 November (A). 
Enciphered in a key not recovered until about 7 December (A). 
Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A). 
SIS 26053, dated 1 December, translated 10 December, sent in code system 
J-19 (Exhibit 2, p. 20). 

Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, 2 December (N) . 
Airmailed to Army SIS, received by Army SIS, 4 December (A) . 
Sent by Army SIS to Navy, 4 December (A). 
Enciphered in a key not recovered until about 8 December (N). 
Decoded by Navy, 9 December (N). 
Translated by Navy (N). 
SIS 27065, dated 2 December, translated 30 December, sent in code system J-19 
(Exhibit 2, p. 21). 

Decoded and translated by Army SIS. The translated [5515] mes- 
sage contains the notation : "This message was received here on December 23." 
This decode and translation was based on a copy of the Japanese coded 
text received by Army SIS on 23 December, by airmail from Station 5, 
Hawaii (A) . It had been mailed from Station 5 on or after 11 December (A) . 
The files also contain a copy of the coded text, which is marked "dupe" 
("duplicate") and therefore appears to have been received by Army SIS 
later than the airmailed copy noted above ; the "dupe" copy is on a Mackay 
Radio (Honolulu office) form, and appears to have been the basis of the 
airmailed version forwarded by Station 5.* 
SIS 26065, dated 3 December, translated 10 December, sent in code system 
PA-K2 (Exhibit 2, p. 21). 

Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, 4 December (N) . 
Airmailed to Army SIS (A). 
Sent by Army SIS to Navy, 5 December (A). 
Decoded by Navy, 8 December (N). 
Translated by Navy (N). 
[5516] SIS 26145, dated 3 December, translated 11 December, sent in code 
system PA-K2 (Exhibit 2, pp. 22-24). 

Intercepted by Army Station 7, Fort Hunt, Va., 3 December (N). 

Received by Army SIS by courier. 

Sent by Army SIS to Navy, 4 December (A). 

Decoded and translated by Navy (N). 



•A transmission of the message was Intercepted by Navy Station S. Bainbridge Island, 
at 1131 GMT on 2 December (N). This version, received by the Navy on 6 December by 
airmail, was badly garbled and was not further processed (N). 



2084 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

818 26066, dated 3 December translated 10 December, sent in code system PA-K2 
(Exhibit 2, p 24). 

Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, 4 December (N). 
Airmailed to Army SIS. 
Sent by Army SIS to Navy, 5 December (A). 
Decoded by Navy, 8 December (N), 
Translated by Navy (N). 
SIS 26161, dated, 4 December, translated 12 December, sent in code system 
PA-K2 (Exhibit 2, p. 25). 

Intercepted at Army Station 2, San Francisco, 5 December (A) . 
Airmailed to Army SIS ; received by Army SIS 8 December (A). 
Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A). 
SIS 26029, dated 5 December, translated 10 December, sent in code system 
PA-K2 (Exhibit 2, p. 26). 

Intercepted by Army station 2, San Francisco, 6 December (N). 
Airmailed to Army SIS ; received by Army SIS, 8 December (A). 
Sent by Army SIS to Navy. 
Decoded by Navy, 9 December (N). 
Translated by Navy (N). 
[5517] SIS 26158, dated 6 December, translated 12 December, sent in code 
system PA-K2 (Exhibit 2, p. 26). 

Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A). 

This decode and translation was on the basis of a Japanese coded text 
received by Army SIS by radio from Army Station 5, Hawaii, apparently 
on 11 December. The files do not show whether the Japanese text was 
obtained by intercepting the transmission or from the commercial cable 
company (the date on which it was obtained is now shown).* 
SIS 25877, dated 6 December, translated 8 December, sent in code system 
PA-K2 (Exhibit 2, pp. 27-28). 

Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, at 0022 GMT, 7 December 
(7: 22 p. m., Washington time, 6 December) (A). 

Sent by teletype to Army SIS (A). Teletype sheet does not show time 
sent by teletype. Another copy, sent by courier by Army Station 7, Fort 
Hunt, Va., was received by Army SIS not later than 7 December (time now 
shown), and is marked "dupe" (A), indicating that the teletype copy had 
arrived previously. 

Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A). 
[5518] SIS 25S7.'i, dated 6 December, translated 8 December, sent in code 
system PA-K2 (Exhibit 2, p. 29). 

Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, at 0542 GMT, 7 December 
(12 : 42 a. m., 7 December, Washington time) (A). 

Sent by teletype to Army SIS (A). Teletype sheet does not show time 
sent by teletype. Another copy, sent by Station 2 by airmail, was received 
by Army SIS at 2 : 33 p. m., 8 December, and is marked "dupe" (A), indi- 
cating that the teletype copy had arrived previously. 

Mr. Gesell. 'Now I come to the somewhat confused question of Dr. 
Stanley K. Hornbeck. We have had a number of requests concern- 
ing his memoranda, and I will try, if I can, to make clear to the 
committee the present situation as to those memoranda. 

There was first a request by Congressman Keefe, to which I have 
already referred, asking for memoranda dated December 1. Those 
were made available to him, and I believe were read into the record 
by him at that time. 

Mr. Murphy. Just one. The other one was not. 

Mr. Gesell. I believe there Mas one that was read, you are right, 
Congressman Murphy, and the other was not. 



♦The Army files also contain a copy intercepted by Navy Station S, Bainbridge Island, 
which was received by the Navy by airmail on 8 December (N), and sent by the Navy to 
Army SIS. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2085 

There was a request by Senator Ferguson for Dr. Hornbeck's memo- 
randum read at the Joint Board meeting of November 3, which 
should be included among the documents relating to the [S519] 
November 5 joint memorandum, and we have obtained Dr. Horn- 
beck's memorandum of October 31, 1941, which I would like to intro- 
duce at this time and have spread upon the transcript in response to 
that request. 

The Chairman. So ordered. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the one dated October 31 ? 

Mr. Gesell. October 31, 1941. That is before the members of the 
committee. 

The Vice Chairman. Is that the one I hold here, Mr. Gesell ? 

Mr. Gesell. I think so, Congressman. 

The Vice Chairman. Dated October 31, 1941? 

Mr. Gesell. That is the one. 

The Vice Chairman. Which is headed "Memorandum by Doctor 
Hornbeck"? 

Mr. Gesell. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. And it does not show to whom it was dis- 
tributed? 

Mr. Gesell. No. It was read at the Joint Board meeting. 

The Vice Chairman. I see. 

Mr. Gesell. The people attending that meeting appear in the other 
documentation. I think it is tied in. I think it was not addressed 
because he simply had it before him to read, apparently. 

(The document referred to follows:) 

[5520] Memorandum by Doctor Hornbeck Octobee 31, 1941 

I believe that there is warrant for an opinion that for several days the Japa- 
nese have been see-sawing in an effort to come to a decision. While watching 
the situation in Europe and on the Atlantic, they have been putting addi- 
tional troops at the rate of about "1,000 per day" and some equipment into 
Indo-China and have been carefully watching to see whether we say or do 
anything indicative of any determined objection on our part. They have 
been given no indication of any intention on our part to place any effective 
obstacle in the way of their continued penetration of Indo-China. It is 
my feeling that, in the absence of such indication, they have about made up 
their minds to go ahead more strongly. It is my further feeling that if such 
an indication were given by us now, the interjection of that indication might 
substantially influence the situation and cause the Japanese further to post- 
pone coming to a decision. 

Another line of action, not exclusive of the line above suggested, open to 
us is to rush aid, especially planes and pilots, with or without parallel action 
by the British, to the Chinese. This would, of course, involve a difficult 
decision and it is perhaps politically impracticable, but it is not physically 
impossible. 

Another course open to us is — to do nothing. 

I am convinced that it would be highly inadvisable politically to make to 
Chiang Kai-Shek any evasive, noncommittal [5521] or merely hortatory 
reply. 

If we are not prepared and willing to follow one or the other or both of 
the first two courses outlined above, it would, in my opinion, be best that 
we at this moment preserve silence. 

If we do not follow one or the other or both of those courses, we should expect 
to see the situation in the Far East deteriorate rapidly. If we will follow one 
or the other or both of those courses there is a chance that Japan will continue 
to hesitate and that Chinese resistance will continue, temporarily at least, at its 
present level of defensive effectiveness. 

That there is risk in making firm representations to the Japanese no one can 
deny or should try to deny, but that there is greater risk in not making such 



2086 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

representations I for one am and long have been convinced. By taking the risk 
which such action would entail, we at least have the chance of further restraining 
Japan. By not taking that risk we would permit it to become almost a certainty 
that Japan will strike hard at the Chinese and Chinese power to resist (to say 
nothing of morale) will be substantially diminished. 

If, having taken the risk, we should find armed hostilities between Japan and 
ourselves thrust upon us, there would then exist a situation than which a good 
many other conceivable situations might be worse. 

[5522] With Japan as comparatively weak as she is today and with this 
country as comparatively strong as it is today, we need not fear unduly the military 
outcome — or even the immediate consequences — of such a conflict. This country 
is physically capable now of waging a properly conducted war with Japan and 
at the same time carrying on in the Atlantic all operations which it would be 
advantageous for us to make our business up to such time as production of 
materials on our part may make it practicable for the British, with or without 
us as associates in war, to take the offensive in the struggle with Germany. 

Mr. Gesell. Now there was also a request made by Senator Fergu- 
son for certain specific memoranda of Dr. Hornbeck bearing various 
dates. One of those was for any memorandum dated November 27, 
1941. 

That memorandum of Dr. Hornbeck has been located by the Depart- 
ment of State. It is dated November 27, 1941, entitled "Problem of 
Far Eastern Relations." When it was found in the files there were 
attached to it two subsequent memoranda, apparently provoked by 
some reference to this memorandum that appeared in Mr. Drew Pear- 
son's colunin. Accordingly, we have had reproduced all of the memo- 
randa, not only Dr. Hornbeck's memorandum of November 27, but 
his subsequent comments on it. That is the document the top page of 
which is dated November 2, ISSSSI 1944, memorandum of "Dr. 
Hornbeck to the Special Assistant to the Secretary. 

Senator Feegtjson. Do we have that ? 

Mr. Gesell. That is before the members of the committee. I ask 
that all of these memoranda be spread upon the record. 

The Chairman. It will be so ordered. 

(The documents referred to follow:) 

[In handwriting :] Not to be removed from file except with permission of Chief. 

(Signature illegible.) 

Depabtmknt of State 

special assistant to the seceetaey 

November 2, 1944. 

The memorandum at the bottom of this file, a memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck, 
dated November 27, 1941, entitled "problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate 
of situation and certain probabilities," indexed as 711.94/2512 PS/GD., Confiden- 
tial File, is a memorandum regarding the contents of which there have been 
leaks and misrepresentation.. 

For purposes of the record there is now being superimposed a memorandum 
by Mr, Hornbeck, of date February 28, 1944, in which certain pertinent facts 
are stated and an analysis is made of the contents and true purport of the 
memorandum of November 27, 1941. 

(s) SKH 
SA/H;SkH:MZS 



[55241 February 28, 1944. 
On Sunday evening, February 20, Mr. Drew Pearson made in his radio broad- 
cast certain statements regarding Mr. Stanley Hornbeck. Among these, as 
reported to Mr. Hornbeck on February 21 by the State Department's recorder, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2087 

was a statement that : "On November 22, 1941 Hornbeck drafted a memorandum 
stating Japan would not attack this country. Just fifteen days later she did 
attack Pearl Harbor." 

On February 27, Mr. Pearson made in his column of that day certain state- 
ments regarding Mr. Hornbeck. There, inter alia, he stated that : "* • * on 
November 22, 1941, just 15 days before Pearl Harbor, he wrote an important 
memorandum to the Secretary of State advising that Japan never would attack 
the United States." 

Such charges warrant attention. What are the facts? 

Mr. Hornbeck did not write on November 22, 1941 any memorandum of esti- 
mate or prediction. He did on November 27 write a memorandum giving an 
estimate of "probabilities." Knowledge of the existence of such a memorandum 
was at some time before the end of August 1942 imparted by someone who had 
knowledge thereof to some member or members of the press. There appeared 
in a Washington newspaper in August 1942 under the dateline "By United 
Press" an article purporting to compare the record of prophecy of Mr. Grew 
with that of Mr. Hornbeck — unfavorable to the latter. In the course of th(at 
article there was given an account of "Hornbeck's 5-1 odds," as follows : 

"In contrast to that record (citations of occasions on which Mr. Grew had 
'advised the United States to guard against a possible surprise attack') was 
the vievppoint of the State Department adviser on political relations, Stanley 
Kuhl Hornbeck. Hornbeck was of the opinion, even after the truculent state- 
ments of Japan's two ambassadors, Kichisaburo Nomura and Sabusu Kurusu, 
that Japan was bluflQng. 

"Hornbeck's idea was that Japan would not dare attack the United States, that 
it was bogged down in China and that the most that need be feared was an 
intensified campaign against the Burma Road. 

"In mid-November, Hornbeck told consultants that if the situation was viewed 
as a gambling proposition the odds should be 5 to 1 that the United States and 
Japan would still be at peace a month later. He said it was even money that 
the United States and Japan would not be at war some months later." 

The contents of that story indicate that there was a "leak," with apparently 
prejudicial purpose, somewhere and at some time antedating the moment of the 
publication of the UP article under reference. It may be presumed that Mr. 
Pearson [5S26] has had knowledge of that article or has been told by 
someone somewhere a story identical with or similar to the story on which the 
statements in that article were based. 

Now what are the facts regarding a memorandum which Mr. Hornbeck is 
alleged to have written to the Secretary of State on November 22? 

To begin with, Mr. Hornbeck did not write on November 22 any memorandum 
of the type indicated. With regard to a memorandum which Mr. Hornbeck did 
write (on November 27), see infra. 

Mr. Hornbeck had over the years frequently advanced the view that the 
United States and Japan were moving toward an armed collision and that, unless 
Japan changed her course or was deflected or brought to a standstill by an 
encounter with some other country, such q. collision was bound some day to 
occur. During the "exploratory conversation" of the year 1941, Mr. Hornbeck 
took the position that the only "peaceful settlement" which Japan was seeking 
was a settlement on her own terms wherein she might have the assent of the 
United States to her program of conquest in the Far East. By August of 1941 
the situation had become definitely threatening. Toward the end of that 
month, the British Government and the American Government served on Japan 
a strong warning against further extending of her courses of aggression. From 
then on it was generally recognized that Japan might embark on acts of 
[5527] force against Great Britain or the United States or both. Officers 
of the Department of State were in constant touch with officers of Military In- 
telligence and Naval Intelligence, exchanging factual data and discussing the 
possibilities of the situation. 

On September 3, in the light of all information at that time available to him, 
Mr. Hornbeck expressed an opinion that Japan would not attack the United 
States within the next three months. 

On November 3, Mr. Hornbeck advised that the last remaining United States 
landed armed forces in China be promptly withdrawn. 

On November 20, Messrs. Nomura and Kurusu presented to the Secretary of 
State the last of various proposals advanced by the Japanese Government or 
agents thereof during 1941 or an agreement between Japan and the United 
States. Six days later, on November 26, the Secretary of State gave to Messrs. 



2088 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Nomura and Kurusu papers which became the last of the statements of counter- 
proposal made by the American Government during the course of the "exploratory 
conversations" which had been going on for several montlis. 

On the next day, November 27, Mr. Hornbeck wrote an informal memorandum 
entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of Situation and Cer- 
tain Probabilities." That memorandum began with a statement, "The Japa- 
nese Government has [5528] made certain plans, some of which are abso- 
lute and some of which are conditional, for new military operations." He then 
stated that Mr. Kurusu's mission had had two principal objectives, and that 
Mr. Kurusu had achieved neither of those objectives. He then moved into the 
field of "forming conclusions as to what is probable". He stated that in his 
opinion, "The Japanese intend at this moment to persevere in and to intensify 
their operations toward 'bringing China to her knees' " ; he expressed the opin- 
ion that, "The Japanese Government does not desire or intend or expect to 
have forthwith armed conflict with the United States" ; and he said that, "were 
it a matter of placing bets", he would give odds of 5 to 1 that the United States 
and Japan would not be at "war" on or before December 15, lie would wager 
3 to 1 that the United States and Japan would not be at "war" on or before the 
15th of January, and he would wager even money that the United States and 
Japan would not be at "war" on or before March 1. "Stated briefly", he said, 
"the undersigned does not believe that this country is now on the immediate 
verge of 'war' in the Pacific." Continuing, he said : "The reasonable probability 
is that Japan's new military operations of the near future will be directed 
either toward gaining position in Thailand or operations against Yunnan and 
the Burma Road or both." And, in conclusion, he said: "There is no warrant 
for any feeling on our part that the situation in the Pacific has been made 
worse, as regards [55291 the interests of the United States, by refusal 
on the part of the American Government to make a deal with Japan in terms of 
'concessions' by us in return for 'pledges' (qualified and hedged around pledges) 
by Japan to keep the peace while continuing to make war and to prepare for 
more war. Japan has been at war in eastern Asia and the western Pacific for 
several years past. Japan has threatened to make war on each and every one 
of her near neighbors and even on the United States. No price that we might 
have paid to Japan would buy or produce peace in the Pacific or security for 
the United States (and/or Great Britain and/or China and/or Russia) in the 
Pacific. The question of more war or less war in the Pacific rests at this moment 
in the control of minds and hearts in Tokyo, not in the control of minds and 
hearts in Washington." 

Examination of the whole content of the memorandum of November 27, 1941 
shows that its author was offering not a long-range forecast but an estimate of 
situation in terms of short-range prohahiUties ; that he nowhere suggested that 
Japan would not (or that she "would never") attack the United States.; that, 
although he was of the opinion that the Japanese Government was not intending 
"to have armed conflict forthxoith with the United States", he clearly perceived — 
and so indicated, as he had done many times before — that the situation was rapidly 
moving toward such conflict. In suggesting odds of 5-to-l against "war" within the 
next three [5530] weeks, at 3-to-l against "war" within the next seven 
weeks, and at 1-to-l against "war" within the next fourteen weeks ; in affirming 
that within that period "there may be some armed encounters similar to those to 
which we have been and are a party in the Atlantic" ; and in refraining from even 
a tentative prognostication beyond that period, he implied that he considered 
that the sands were fast running out. In stating, in conclusion : "The question of 
more war or less war in the Pacific rests at this moment in the control of minds 
and hearts in Tokyo, not in the control of minds and hearts in Washington", 
he both admitted and affirmed that in the situation thpn prevailing in American- 
Japanese relations almost anything might before long happen. 

All this is a far cry from the purport of the charge that "On November 22 {sic), 
1941, just fifteen days before Pearl Harbor he (Hornbeck) wrote an important 
memorandum to the Secretary of State advising that Japan would never attack the 
United States." 

Especially to be noted regarding this whole matter is the fact that Mr. Horn- 
beck's memorandum under reference was written not on November 22 (which was 
during the period while the question of reply to be made to the Japanese proposals 
of November 20 was under consideration) but on November 27 (which was after 
the American* Government had reached its [55^1] decision and the Secre- 
tary of State had — on November 26 — made this Government's reply). 

(Note. — The memorandum of November 27, 1041 is in the confidential files of 
the Department of State under index number 711.94/2512.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2089 

NOMCMBEK 27, 1941. 

Problem of Fab Eastern Relations — Estimate of Situation and Certain 

Pkobabilities 

' The Japanese Government has made certain plans, some of which are absolute 
and some of which are conditional, for new military operations. 

Mr. Kurusu's mission has had two principal objectives: (1) to obtain, if possi- 
ble, from the United States, terms of agreement favorable to Japan; (2) to ascer- 
tain, if possible, what action, positive or negative, the United States might, 
may or will take in the event of certain moves by Japan. 

The American Government has now given clear indication that it has no inten- 
tion of making "concessions" to Japan which would be inconsistent with the 
declared principles and the general objectives of American foreign policy and 
that it does not intend to condone or give countenance to policies and practice, 
past and present and future, or ag- [5532] gression on Japan's part. 

(Handwritten note) : Tallied to PA/H on Dec. 4, 1941 and returned to file on 
November 8, 1944. (Signature illegible). 

Mr. Kurusu has not achieved the first objective of his mission. 

The Japanese Government has given, during the course of the "exploratory 
conversations", clear evidence that it is not that Government's intention at the 
present time to disassociate Japan from the Tripartite Alliance ; or to give up its 
objective of conquering China, conquering other regions in tlie Far East, and 
establishing a "new order" and a "co-prosperity sphere" in eastern Asia and the 
western and southern Pacific. It has persevered in distribution and disposal 
of its armed forces on a pattern clearly designed for offensive rather than 
merely defensive operations. It has shown that it clearly intends to persevere 
in pursuit of its general and its particular objectives by the methods of threat of 
force or use of force — which means continuance of contribution to instability 
rather than stability of situation in the Pacific and eastern Asia. 

The United States has not shown what action it will take on the positive side 
in the event of Japan's taking one or another of several possible steps. Mr. 
Kurusu may have gained certain impressions, but he cannot be sure. Mr. Kurusu 
has not achieved the second major objective of his mission. 

The business of prophesying involves a procedure of [5533] examining 
facts and, as among various developments conceived to be possible, forming 
conclusions as to what is probable. 

A prophecy is an expression by an individual or a group of individuals of an 
opinion as to what is going to happen. 

In the opinion of the undersigned, the Japanese intend at this moment to 
persevere in and to intensify their operations toward "bringing China to her 
knees". They have hoped that out of the conversations with the American 
Government they would extract something which would facilitate their effort 
toward that objective. Even now, they have not entirely abandoned hope of 
getting from us either positive or negative action helpful to them in pursuit of 
that objective. 

In the opinion of the undersigned, the Japanese Government does not desire 
or intend or expect to have forthivith armed conflict with the United States. 
The Japanese Government, while launching new offensive operations at some 
point or points in the Far East, will endeavor to avoid attacking or being attacked 
by the United States. It therefore will not order or encourage action by its 
agents (foremost among which are its armed forces) which, if taken, would lead 
toward use by the United States of armed force by way of retaliation or resist- 
ance. So far as relations directly between the United States and Japan are 
concerned [553^] there is less reason today than there was a week ago 
for the United States to be apprehensive lest Japan make "war" on this country. 
Were it a matter of placing bets, the undersigned would give odds of five to one 
that the United States and Japan will not be at "war" on or before December 15 
(the date by which General Gerow has afiirmed that he would be "in the clear" 
so far as consummation of certain disi>osals of our forces is concerned) : would 
wager three to one that the United States and Japan will not be at "war" on or 
before the 15th of January (i. e., 7 weeks from now) ; would wager even money 
that the United States and Japan will not be at "war" on or before March 1 (a 
date more than 90 days from now, and after the period during which it has been 
estimated by our strategists that it would be to our advantage for us to have 
"time" for further preparation and disposals). These ventures into the field of 
speculative prediction are posited on an assumption that our definition of "war" 



2090 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

must be the same in reference to activities and events in the Pacific that it is in 
regard to activities and events in the Atlantic ; the indicated wagers are offered 
on an assumption that, although there may be some armed encounters similar to 
those to which we have been and are a party in the Atlantic, there will not be 
a recognized "state of war" such as to disrupt substantially or put an end to the 
present program of our Army and Navy for disposal [5535] within the 
periods mentioned of equipment and men for "defensive" and general purposes — 
Stated briefly, the undersigned does not believe that this country is now on the 
immediate verge of "war" in the Pacific. 

Japan has her disposals so made that she might now move against Russia 
or move against the Dutch East Indies or move against Thailand or launch 
some new operations in and against China. But, a move against Russia would 
be a major operation involving very substantial hazards for Japan ; and it 
would be a move from which, once begun, it would be hard for Japan to with- 
draw. A move by Japan against the Dutch East Indies would involve for Japan a 
risk of armed embroilment with Great Britain and possibly the United States ; 
it would involve a risk of developing into a major operation. 

A move by Japan now against Thailand would be a move which need not re- 
quire great effort or involve great risk; if made, it would have a twofold 
objective, on the one hand and exploration of British and American reaction, and 
on the other hand a possible gaining of advantageous position in connection with 
and for operations against the Burma Road and therefore toward bringing closer 
to an end the "China incident". A move on Japan's part via Indochina into 
Yunnan and toward putting the Burma Road out of commission (especially 
by continuous air attack) would involve little risk of embroilment with Great 
Britain or the United States, [5536] would not necessarily involve a major 
effort, and could be halted or be withdrawn from at any time should develop- 
ments in the general situation render such action advisable in the opinion 
of Japan's military leaders. 

The reasonable probability is that Japan's new military operations of the near 
future will be directed either toward gaining position in Thailand or operations 
against Yunnan and the Burma Road or both. 

If, when and as Japan makes either or both of those moves, Japan will ipso 
facto be further disclosing what are her political and military policies and will 
be further extending herself as regards military disposals and effort and as 
regards burden and draft upon her national capacity (economic, social, political 
and military) ; she will be weakening her position in the event of there coming, 
later, armed confiict between herself and the United States: she will be expos- 
ing herself to naval and air attack on flank and from rear, if and when, by 
the United States; and she will be adding to the number of her enemies and 
the weight of a public opinion adverse to her in the United States and the 
British Empire. 

There is no warrant for any feeling on our part that the situation in the 
Pacific has been made worse, as regards the interests of the Ignited States by 
refusal on the part of the American Government to make a deal with Japan 
in terms [5-5571 of "concessions" by us in return for "pledges" (qualified 
and hedged around pledges) by Japan to keep the i)eace while continuing to 
make war and to prepare for more war. Japan has been at war in eastern 
Asia and the western Pacific for several years past. Japan has threatened to 
make war on each and every one of her near neighbors and even on the United 
States. No price that we might have paid to Japan would buy or produce 
peace in the Pacific or security for the United States (and/or Great Britain 
and/or China and/or Russia) in the Pacific. 

The question or more war or less war in the Pacific rests at this moment in 
the control of minds and hearts in Tokyo, not in the control of minds and hearts 
in Washington. 

/s/ SKH" 
PA/H : SKH : FLB 

Mr. Gesell. Now there was also a request made and an interest 
expressed in memoranda of Dr. Hornbeck relating? to the question of 
the basin^j of the fleet. We have now in hand three memoranda 
which seem to have some relation to that subject. 

The first is a memorandum dated July 12, 1940, which contains a 
handwritten note on the front page with the initials of Captain 
Schuirmann and Admiral Stark saying: 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2091 

Hornbeck is anxious to liave you read tliis. The high ranking oflBcer 
153SS] mentioned is Admiral Richardson. 
I think the paper is slightly academic. 

That memorandum apparently refers to a conversation between Ad- 
miral Kichardson and Dr. Hornbeck of July 11, 1940. I would like 
to have it marked as an exhibit. 

The Chairman. So ordered. 

Senator Ferguson. May we get that exhibit number? 

Mr. Gesell. Number 95. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 95.") 

Mr. Gesell. The next is a very slibstantial document of 50-some 
pages in length, which is before the members of the committee, bear- 
ing the date July 16, 1940, the second sheet of which gives the title 
of the memorandum as follows : "Keflections on Certain Features of 
the Far Eastern Situation and Certain Problems of U. S. Far Eastern 
Policy. July 4, 1940." 

I would like to call the committee's attention to the fact that from 
page 7 to page 15 is a detailed discussion of the question of the basing 
of the fleet at Pearl Harbor. We have reproduced the entire memo- 
randum feeling we should not take any portion of it out of context. 
This memorandum is not signed by Dr. Hornbeck but we believe it is 
Dr. Hornbeck's memorandum, since in the Navy Department files it 
appears with his other memoranda and, as best can be told from sur- 
rounding circumstances, it is in his style. 

IS5S9] The Chairman. What do you want to do with it ? 

Mr. Gesell. That will be Exhibit 96, Senator, if you please. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 96.") 

Mr. Gesell. Now I have here a series of memoranda of which the 
top one is dated September 21, 1940, prepared by Dr. Hornbeck and 
made available by the Department of State, also relating to the ques- 
tion of the fleet dispositions, which we will have marked Exhibit 97. 

The Chairman. So ordered. 

(The docmnents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 97.") 

Mr. Gesell. Now, in addition, there are a number of Hornbeck 
memoranda which relate to other topics bearing various dates, Decem- 
ber 1940, November 20, 1941, May 20, 1941, November 30, 1941, and 
others as well, obtained from the Navy files or Arni}^ files and State 
Department files. 

These memoranda we have bunched together and are sending to 
Congressman Keefe in response to his request for all memoranda of 
Dr. Hornbeck. I believe that the ones we have here cover the matters 
in which the committee has expressed particular interest. 

The Chairman. Do we have that memorandum before us in this 
file? 

[SS^O] Mr. Gesell. You have all the ones we introduced. 

The Chairman. I mean the one you sent to Congressman Keefe. 

Mr. Gesell. No. 

The Chairman. Why not let us all have that? 

Mr. Gesell. We thought perhaps he would send those around. We 
will try to reproduce them, if you wish. 

The Chairman. I thought maybe you had them here. 

Mr. Gesell. No, we haven't any copies. We have not been able to 
find anything in them that is pertinent, but perhaps they may be of 
background value. 



2092 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. We will see how that will work out after you pass 
them out. 

Mr. Gesell. Now our attention was called to a matter which we 
felt we should immediately bring to the committee's attention. 

The committee will recall that the G-2 estimates were introduced 
when General Miles was on the stand in the pink volume designated 
Exhibit 33. Among those was an estimate dated October 2, 1941. 
Examination of the memorandum in its photostatic form — that was 
the memorandum to the Chief of Staff, October 2, 1941, subject: 
Japanese-American Relations, signed by Hayes A. Kroner, Colonel, 
General Staff — discloses there is written on a copy, which is appar- 
ently the copy distributed to Secretary Stimson, a note in his hand- 
writing, [SS4.1] and in order to make the record complete I 
would like to read that note into the record now, and offer the photo- 
stat of that particular memorandum as a related exhibit to exhibit 
33, that is. Exhibit 33-A. 

The note reads: 

Quite independently I have reached similar conclusions and hold them 
strongly. I believe, however, that during the next three months while we are 
re-arming the Philippines great care must be exercised to avoid an explosion 
by the Japanese army. Put concretely this means that while I approve of 
stringing out negotiations during that period, they should not be allowed to 
ripen into a personal conference between the President and P. M.— 

I think that means Prime Minister and not a New York newspaper. 

I greatly fear that such a conference if actually held would produce concessions 
which would be highly dangerous to our vitally important relations with China. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 33-A.") 

Senator Lucas. Who was responsible for that memorandum? 

Mr. Gesell. Col. Hayes A. Kroner, who was General Miles' chief 
assistant, and Secretary Stimson wrote what I have just read. 

The Chair]vean. That handwriting is the handwriting of Secretary 
Stimson and not Colonel Kroner? 

[554^] Mr. Gesell. That is right. It is on his copy which was 
distributed to him. He was one of the distributees. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I try to get this straight a 
moment? This is the memorandum that came out of the Secretary 
of War's files? 

Mr. Gesell. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. And you found that note written only on his 
paper ? 

Mr. Gesell. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. That is not in any of the other papers in other 
files? 

Mr. Gesell. That is right. Senator. So that the record is clear 
on it we offer the actual document with his handwriting in the record. 

The Chairman. Do you want that printed or made an exhibit? 

Mr. Gesell. Made an exhibit. I read the portion that we want in 
the record. Copies of that are before each member of the committee. 
You will find one among your set. 

Senator Ferguson. Does counsel undertake to say it is in the hand- 
writing of the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson ? 

Mr. Gessell. Yes. As Exhibit 48-A, simply to complete the docu- 
mentation, I would like to introduce the memorandum from the Chief 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2093 

of Staff to General Gerow concerning the subject matter of exhibit 48 
which General Marshall made [5543] available after his tes- 
timony. It is of no particular importance, but simply fills out the 
documentation. 

The Chairman. So ordei-ed. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 48-A.") 

[5544] Mr. Gesell. Also, we would like to oflfer as the next 
exhibit, Exhibit 98, a memorandum from the Secretary of War, Mr. 
Stimson, to the President, dated November 26, 1941, concerning the 
Japanese convoy movements toward Indochina. 

The Chairman. Do we have that? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. That is before the members of the committee. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 98.") 

Mr. Gesell. Now, there has been distributed to the committee, but 
we noted that we have failed to introduce it as an exhibit, a mimeo- 
graphed statement of two pages entitled "Telephone calls from out- 
side through White House switchboard on 11/25-26, 11/27, and 
11/28/41 as compiled from operators' notes available." I think it 
might be well to have that memorandum spread upon the transcript 
so it becomes a matter of record. 

The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered. 

(The document referred to follows:) 

[6545] TELEPHONE CALLS MADE FROM OUTSIDE THROUGH WHITE HOUSE SWITCH- 

BOARD ON 11/25, 11/26, 11/27, AND 11/28/41 as compiled from operator's 
notes available 

Nov. 25. 

730A VP Wallace eld Secv Wickard— OK. 

854A AG eld VP Wallace— LWC— OK 940A. 

930A Judge Patterson eld Robert Lovett — OK. 

1050 A Judge Patterson eld McCloy— O of C— OK. 

1045 A Secy Ickes eld AG— LWC— OK 1130A 

11AM Mr. Stettinius eld Jesse Jones^OK. 

1205P Jesse Jones eld PMG— OK. 

121 5P Mr. Blandford eld Secv Wickard— OK. 

1227P PMG eld Secv Hull— LWC— OK 330P 

1245P Secy Wickard eld Mr. Blandford— OK. 

1254P Mr. Blandford eld Wickard— OK. 

lOOP Secy Jones eld Mr. Knudsen — at Lunch — NM. 

154P Ad'm. Stark eld Gen. Marshall— LWC. 

259P Mr. Stettinius eld Gen. Marshall— LWC. 

345P Gen. Marshall eld Ed. Stettinius— OK. 

405P PMG eld Secv Hull— OK. 

415P Secy Knox eld PMG— OK. 

420P General Marshall— eld Ad'm. Stark— OK. 

425P Secy Stimson eld Secy State Hull— OK. 

500P Ad'm. Stark eld Gen. Marshall— OK. 

510P General Marshall eld Ed. Stettinius— OK. 

[5546] 510P James Forrestai eld Secy Stimson — Talked Judge Patterson — OK 

515P James Forrestai eld Knudsen — OK. 

520P Wavne Cov eld Judge PattersonPP — OK. 

530P PMG eld Secy Hull— LWC— 530P OK. 

Nov. 26. 

707A Secy Stimson eld Gen. Marshall — OK. 

91 5A Secy Stimson eld Secy Hull— OK. 

950A Secy Stimson eld Secy Hull— OK. 

1022A Mr. Forrestai eld Donald Nelson— OK. 

1025 A Mr. Forrestai eld Leon Henderson — OK. 

1030A Mr. Forrestai eld Judge Patterson— OK. 

1030A Ad'm. Stark eld. General Marshall, Miss Thomas talked — OK. 

115P Secv Hull eld Ad'm. Stark— OK. 



2094 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

125P Ad'm. Stark eld General Marshall— NM. 

159P Secy Perkins eld Wells— LWC. 

235P Ad'm Stark eld Seey Hull— OK 345P 

253P Gov'r. McNutt eld Secy Stimson— OK. 

508P Secy Welles eld Secy Perkins— OK. 

530P James Forrestal eld Judge Patterson — OK. 

615P Ad'm Stark eld Secy Knox— OK. 

Nov. 27. 

852A Mr. Forrestal eld Sumner Welles— LWC— RTD Call 954A. 

853A Mr. Forrestal eld Secy Morgenthau— LWC— OK 11AM. 

[5547] 9 17 A Seev Stimson eld Secy Hull— OK. 

1025A James Forrestal eld Secy Welles — OK. 

1044A Secv Knox eld Ad'm. Stark— OK. 

1045A Secy Stimson eld Secy Hull— LWC— 11 AM OK. 

1048A Ad'm. Stark eld Seey Hull— LWC— OK 11 A. 

1135A Seey Morgenthau eld Ben. Cohen — OK. 

1230P James Forrestal eld Jesse Jones — OK. 

1240P Judge Patterson eld Wayne Coy— LWC. 

302P Wayne Coy eld Mr. Stettinius— OK. 

337P Judge Patterson eld Mr. Forrestal— LWC. 

350P Seey Stimson eld Secy Hull— OK. 

41 OP Jesse Jones eld James Forrestal — LWC. 

500P Seey Hull eld Ad'm. Stark— LWC— O of C, Capt. Sherman talked— OK. 

530P James Forrestal eld Judge Patterson — OK. 

545 P James Forrestal eld Jesse Jones — OK. 

842P J. Rowe eld Miss McDonough— LWC— Mr. Rowe WCAM. 

900P Jesse Jones eld Secv Hull — OK. 

901 P Jesse Jones eld AG — OK. , 

Nov. 28. 

839A Ad'm, Stark eld Gen. Marshall— OK. 

900A Judge Patterson eld Robert Lovett — OK. 

1032A Ag eld VP.— OK. 

1058A Jesse Jones eld Knudsen — OK. 

1129A Jesse Jones eld James Forrestal — OK. 

[5548] 1150A Judge Patterson eld Wayne Coy— LWC. 

1230P James Forrestal eld Don Nelson — 

1245P Secy Welles eld Ad'm. Stark— in Conf— NM. 

207P VP eld Secv Morgenthau— OK. 

217P VP eld Nelson Rockefeller— LWC. 

249P Ad'm. Stark eld Secv Hull— Talked to Mr. Stone— OK. 

411 P Wayne Coy eld Dir. Smith— OK. 

525P Seey Stimson eld Secy Hull— Talked with Hornbeck— OK. 

525P Seey Stimson eld Secy Knox — OK. 

[SS4^] Mr. Gesell. In order to complete the documentation as 
we go along on the events of the Gth and 7th vre "would like also to 
introduce and have designated as the next exhibit, Exhibit 99, a 
memorandum prepared by Mr. Ballantine and Mr. Hamilton, Depart- 
ment of State, dated September 26, 1944, stating their then recollection 
of what took place in Secretary Hull's office on December 7 concerning 
the Japanese intercepted messages. That has already been dis- 
tributed to the committee at an earlier date. 

The Chairman. It will be so ordered. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 99.") 

Mr. Gesell, It may be helpful to have it set forth in the transcript, 
for the convenience of the committee. It is a short memorandum. 

The Chairman. It mav be copied in the transcript. 

(Exhibit No. 99 follows:) 

[5550] Depaetment of State, 

Office of Fab Eastern Afpaibs, 

September 26, 19U- 
Top Secret 

There is attached a page from the Congressional Record of September 21, 1944, 
In which there is a statement by Congre&sman Church in respect to the delivery of 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2095 

a message to the State Department on December 7, 1941, by Lieutenant Com- 
mander Kramer of the Navy Department. 

Our recollection of the matter is as follows : At about 10 a. m. on December 7 
Mr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Ballantine came to the outer office of the 
Secretary of State to discuss the general situation of relations with Japan. They 
were shown by Mr. John Stone, a Foreign Service officer then serving as an as- 
sistant in the office of the Secretary, a document the contents of which were 
pertinent to the subject of what they were going to discuss with the Secretary and 
which had then been delivered to the outer office by Lieutenant Commander 
Kramer, then on duty in the Navy Department. Lieutenant Commander Kramer 
was present in the room. The document contained no reference to any Japanese 
military movement. Mr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Ballantine are posi- 
tive that no statement was made in their presence by Lieutenant Commander 
Kramer, as alleged, to the [5551] effect that "this looks like a sunrise 
attack upon Pearl Harbor and a midnight attack upon the Philippines." 

The conversation in the Secretary's outer office was intermittent and scattered 
amwng those present in the room. In other words, each person was not a party 
to all of the conversation. Mr. Hornbeck has a distinct impression that there 
was brought up Japanese naval disposition with specific mention of most recent 
advices of Japanese naval movements in the Gulf of Siam. 

Mr. Hamilton recollects also that Lieutenant Commander Kramer remarked on 
that occasion, in reference to the matter of an appointment for the Japanese 
Ambassador to see the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. on December 7, that the 
naming of the hour might mean that it was the hour for some Japanese movement. 
No mention was made of Pearl Harbor or of Hawaii or of the Philippines. 

With regard to the statement that Lieutenant Commander Kramer then went 
to the White House and delivered the message, they have no knowledge whether 
this was a fact. 

/s/ JWB. 
FE: Ballantine: HST 

/s/ M. M. H. 

{&S52'] Mr. Gesell. Nov\;', there is also a committee request for 
copies of the interrogation made by intelligence officers of the Japanese 
prisoner of war No. 1, a Japanese officer in charge of the midget sub- 
marine taken prisoner at Bellows Field December 8, 1941, We have 
made copies of that available to each member of the committee. This 
document was previously used as exhibit 68 in the Hewitt investigation. 
I would like to have it designated as the next exhibit, Exhibit 100. 
Copies of it are available to the members of the committee. 

The Chairman. So ordered. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 100.") 

Mr. Gesell. Also to make the record complete we have the question 
of the logs of the U. S. S. Enterprise and U. S. S. Lexington. Those 
logs were made available to Congressman Keefe and used by him in 
questioning Admiral Turner, I believe. We subsequently obtained 
them back and had them photostated. I think we would like at this 
time to introduce as Exhibit 101 a duplicate copy of the log of the 
U. S. S. Enterprise covering the period November 24, 1941, to Decem- 
ber 16, 1941, and as Exhibit 102 a duplicate copy of the log of the 
U. S. S. Lexington covering the period of December 5, 1941, through 
December 8, 1941, and Exhibit 103 a duplicate copy of the action 
reports of the air group of the U. S. S. Enterprise., Serial No. 579 of 
December 15, 1941, and as Exhibit 104 a duplicate copy of the war diary 
l5r5SS] of the JJ. S. S. Lexington for December 7, 1941. 

The Chairman. So ordered. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 101, 102, 
103, and 104, respectively.) 

Mr. Gesell. The Navy Department has advised that according to 
the Office of Naval Kecords and Library there are no action reports 



2096 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of the U. S. S. Enterprise and the U. S. S. Lexington previous 
to February 1942. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question on that last ? 

The ChxMrman. Senator Lucas. 

Senator Lucas. Is there anything in those exhibits which bears 
directly on things that the committee ought to know ? 

Mr. Gesell. Those exhibits cover the activities of the Enterprise^ 
for example, in the period immediately preceding Pearl Harbor. They 
establish the time when the planes were launched from the Enterprise^ 
which subsequently became engaged in combat with the Japs over 
Pearl Harbor. They will undoubtedly be useful to the committee 
when Admiral Halsey, who was in command of the Enterprise and 
who is on the list of witnesses, is a witness. I think they are useful 
background information. 

Now, we have obtained clearance from the British for the so-called 
British estimates, and I would like to introduce that as the next exhibit, 
Exhibit 105, dated October 21, 1941, and {555^1 November 21, 
1941, respectively. They are before the members of the committee. 
I introduce them as one exhibit. 

Senator Ferguson. That will be what number ? 

Mr. Gesell. No. 105, Senator Ferguson. 

The Chairman. So ordered. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 105.") 

Mr. Gesell. I think that completes the partial report on the 
committee's requests for various material. In connection with some of 
the requests, we are going to be in a position to distribute in the next 
day or so material in response to those requests. 

The Chairman. The committee thanks the counsel for their dili- 
gence in making the interim report on the various requests made. 

Are you ready now to proceed ? 

Mr. Mitchell. We are ready to call Admiral Stark. 

The Chairman. Admiral Stark. 

[5555'] TESTIMONY OF A-DM. HAROLD R. STARK, UNITED STATES 

NAVY^ 

(Admiral Stark was first duly sworn by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Counsel will proceed. 

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Stark, what is your present rank and 
station ? 

Admiral Stark. Admiral, United States Navy. I am on terminal 
leave. 

Mr. Mitchell. You served as Chief of Naval Operations from 
August 1, 1939, until March 25, 1942? 

Admiral Stark. I did. 

Mr. Mitchell. I understand that you have a statement you would 
like to present to the committee at this time. Is that right? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct, yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Before you refer to the statement, I would like to 
offer in evidence as Exhibit 106 a file, which the committee has, giving 
Admiral Stark's letters to Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Kimmel's 
replies. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 106.") 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, Admiral, if you will present your statement. 

1 See suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by Adm. Stark in Hearings, Part 6, 
p. 2671 et seq. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2097 

The Vice Chairman. Pardon nie a moment, please, General Mitch- 
ell. It is noted here on the receipt to be si<Tned for [6SS6] this 
document, "Please hand the bearer for delivery volume entitled 'H. 
K. Stark letters to Admiral H. E. KimmeP which is superseded by the 
volume referred to above." It is understood that this covers all 
correspondence between Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel ? 

Mr. Mitchell. All papers that they were asked to surrender. That 
came about this way : The letter was written by Admiral Stark at one 
time and was replied to by Admiral Kimmel at another time, so we 
just put them together in one volume in chronological order. 

The Vice Chairman. I am sure the committee appreciates that 
ver}' valuable assistance given by the counsel. 

Mr. Mitchell, This does not contain all the correspondence be- 
tween them, because they had some letters that were personal, that 
had no relation to the case. These are the letters that both Admiral 
Stark and Admiral Kimmel agree, as I understand it, are the ones 
to be brought to the attention of the committee. 

The Vice Chairman. My purpose of inquiring was to know whether 
I could disregard the previous copies that were furnished and con- 
sider that this contains everything that is pertinent to this inquiry, as 
to the letters passing between Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, sir. 

[J557] Senator Ferguson. May I make an inquiry in order to 
straighten out a matter that is in my mind? Are there any new 
letters in this volume that are not in the two previous volumes ? 

Mr. Gesell. I think there are one or two new letters in there. 
In the main, they cover the material in the other two documents. 

Senator Ferguson. Sometime will counsel point out what the new 
ones are? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes ; we will do that after the recess. 

Senator Lucas. As I understand now, counsel for Admiral Stark 
and counsel for Admiral Kimmel agree that these are the letters 
that are pertinent and material to the inquiry ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think that is the understanding. 

Admiral, will you proceed with your statement, please ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I should like to ask the indulgence of 
the committee. This statement is rather long and there are a good 
many parts in it that have already appeared in the testimony, some 
of which I will not read, with the committee's permission. 

Also it was made, with the exception of possibly four words which 
have been deleted, before any of the hearings before this committee. 

In other words, this statement has been influenced not [6558] 
at all by what came out before this committee. It is the picture as 
I wanted to present it at this time, not knowing whether I would be 
the first witness or the last. 

The Chairman. You will indicate. Admiral, such parts, when you 
read them in your statement, that you will leave out ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. But the whole document will go in as your state- 
ment. 

[S559] Admiral Stark (reading) : 

1. I served as Chief of Naval Operations from 1 August 1939 until 
25 IV^arch 1942. During that time the position of Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO) and that of Commander in Chief, United States 

79716 — 46 — pt. 5 -4 



2098 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Fleet (CINCUS), were not combined, but were separate. The Com- 
manders in Chief, United States Fleet, during the period from 1 
August 1939 to 7 December 1941, were Admiral Claude C. Bloch 
(29 January 1938 to 6 January 1940), Admiral James O. Kichardson 
(6 January 1940 to 1 February 1941), and Admiral Husband E. 
Kimmel (1 February 1941 to 17 December 1941). 

2. Navy Kegulations, made pursuant to an act of Congress, charge 
the Chief of Naval Operations, under the direction of the Secretary 
of the Navy, with the general direction of the fleet and with the 
preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war. 

3. When I became Chief of Naval Operations, the situation in 
Europe was tense, and war broke out early in September, The Presi- 
dent immediately (5 September 1939) proclaimed the neutrality of 
the United States and declared the existence of a national emergency 
(8 September 1939). He also authorized an increase in the enlisted 
strength of the Navy and Marine Corps to 145,000 and 25,000, 
respectively. 

[5660] DUTY TO PRESENT NAVy's NEEDS TO CONGRESS 

4. In November 1939, I appeared before the subcommittee of the 
House Approjjriations Committee for the funds necessary to bring 
enlisted strength of the Navy and Marine Corps up to the numbers 
authorized by the President. The Department was also asking for 
funds to recommission 80 ships, including 68 destroyers and support- 
ing units, to safeguard our neutrality. I pointed out that in spite 
of the Navy's feeling that our ships should always be 100 percent 
manned, we had been getting along for years with allowances which 
were only 85 percent of complement. The additional men for which 
funds were requested immediately were only enough to enable us to 
man the recommissioned ships ana increase the allowances on all ships 
to an average of just over 89 percent. I told the Committee that it 
was essential that the fleet be at least 100 percent manned. I felt it 
highly desirable that we be 15 percent overmanned in order to provide 
a seagoing reservoir to assist in the manning of ships going into com- 
mission— 4)oth old and new. At that time, however, the Bureau of 
the Budget permitted us to request only sufficient increases in man- 
power to put new ships in commission and to maintain our allowances 
at about 90 percent of complement. In this connection, I told the 
Committee that the Department expected to ask for funds for enough 
men in the next regular appropriation bill to bring the fleet up to 
100 percent of complement. 

{5561] 5. In January 1940 I appeared before the House Naval 
Affairs Committee, in support of an increase of 25 percent in the size 
of the Navy. I would like to read an extract from the statement I 
made at that time : 

The international situation has altered substantially. World conditions today 
presage a greater menace to our peace than was the case a year ago. The events 
which have taken place since then are so fresh in the mind of everyone that 
I do not need to detail them. I believe everyone will agree that the international 
situation has deteriorated and that there is no immediate prospect that it will 
improve. The situation is rife with possibilities of a general European war and, 
in conjunction with Far Eastern conditions, presents a threat of world 
conflagration. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2099 

In the world of today it seems only a fair and moderate statement to say 
that the best interests of our Nation will be served by keeping our own force 
suflaciently strong to be an effective deterrent against foreign aggression. 

Although the building programs of other naval powers are not definitely known, 
and in some cases not even approximately known, it is a reasonable supposition 
that those nations now at war are building to the maximum augmented war- 
time capacity of their shipbuilding industries. All other conside,rations aside, if 
the United States does not take [5562] immediate action toward increas- 
ing the strength of its fleet, the end of the present war will find us in a relatively 
weak naval position. 

Therefore, it is my considered opinion, as I believe it will be that of the great 
majority of our people, when the significance of the situation is understood, 
that a substantial expansion, approximately 25 percent, of our Navy should be 
planned and undertaken at once. 

6. The bill, as passed by the House, provided only an 11 percent 
increase, and although I pressed the Senate Committee in April 1940 
to restore the provision for a 25 percent increase, the bill as finally 
approved carried only 11 percent. While the result was not what we 
wanted, it did not substantially hamper our development, for it 
allowed us all we could start work on at that time with the facilities 
then available to us. 

7. In May 1940, we asked Congress to authorize us to acquire as 
many planes as might be necessary to maintain the stock of useful 
naval planes at not less than 10,000. As a part of our request for a 
25 percent increase in the Navy as a whole, we asked that the au- 
thorized number of naval aircraft be increased from 3,000 to 6,000. 
After that program was submitted, the international situation became 
much worse, and it was apparent that we would need even more naval 
aircraft. In presenting the program for 10,000 planes to the House 
and Senate [5563] Naval Affairs Committee, I said: 



We have in the world today classic examples of the lack of preparedness and 
readiness which are being borne home to every thinking man and woman. 

The importance of time, which I stressed when last before this committee 
and which every student of war appreciates, has also been brought home to us, 
as it has to those in their life and death struggle, and where in some cases there 
has already been written "too late". 

We have been prone to criticize others, feeling that somehow or other we 
have been sitting over here in comparative security. That feeling, too, has been 
given some rude jolts in recent weeks and I believe that wishful thinking is 
finally being replaced by consideration of cold facts and the necessity that we 
ourselves take immediate steps toward greater preparedness in order that we 
too may not some day write "too late". The word "speed" has taken on new 
significance. 

***** 4: 

We can put our trust only in ourselves and it is self-evident we must be strong, 
both within and without, to have any real sense of security. 

Nations desiring peace must be stronger than those desiring war. 
[5564] ******* 

* * * rpjie need for immediate and expedited rearmament has become more 
apparent. The handicap to a Navy engaged in continuous war operations at 
sea, of an inadequate naval air arm, has received, and continues to receive, 
tragic demonstration. The indispensability of naval aircraft constructed for, 
trained for, and organized for prompt and continuous action at sea with ships, 
and against ships and aircraft has challenged the attention of all. 

****** 

The number of aircraft provided in this bill is adjusted to the initial war 
needs as they can be estimated at this time. Such a number is not obtainable 
in the immediate future unless available construction capacity is quickly and 
drastically expanded. Aviation expansion can only be accomplished by large 
appropriations, appropriations for procurement of aircraft, appropriations for 



2100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

aircraft facilities, and appropriations for increases in aircraft personnel and 
for their training. 

* * * If we really wish to face at this time the needs of the future, as 
now indicated — authorization and appropriation must contemplate a greatly 
expanded aircraft procurement program, the establishment of facilities, and 
a [5565] personnel program that will provide before the event of war, not 
less than the naval aviation strength set forth in this bill. To meet these 
needs, we are placing the immediate stress on training. 

Naval operations in the Atlantic in protection of the Western Hemisphere 
should be supported by such naval aircraft as can be ship-based by carriens, 
cruisers, and battleships, and by naval shore-based or tender-based aircraft 
strategically distributed, wherever it may be necessary to oppol^e enemy naval 
operations, or to oppose the approach overseas of enemy forces of any character. 

In the Pacific, in addition to ship- and tender-based aircraft, it is necessary 
to provide naval aircraft distributed throughout the United States possessions, 
as well as along our west coast, and also to be ready to provide for a suitable 
distribution of naval aircraft off the Pacific approaches to the Panama Canal. 

8. This bill, as finally enacted, authorized us to acquire 10,000 naval 
aircraft. However, as the committee well knows, the passage of this 
bill did not give us overnight 10,000 planes. We next had to come 
back to Congress for funds with which to procure them. 

9. Early in June, the House subcommittee held hearings on the bill 
to give us the money necessary to begin the acquisition of these planes. 
We also asked for money to implement [6566^ the 11 percent 
increase authorized in the size of the Navy. At this time, we had 1,813 
useful airplanes on hand and 933 on order toward our immediate goal 
of 10,000. 

10. On June 16, 1940, France fell. The seriousness of the situa- 
tion, which had not been fully appreciated in many quarters before, now 
became apparent. On June 18, I appeared before the House Naval 
Affairs Committee and recommended a further increase in our Navy 
by some 200 combatant ships with an over-all tonnage increase of 
about 1,250,000 tons. This represented an increase in combatant ton- 
nage of something over 70 percent. We also requested an additional 
20 auxiliaries of 100,000 tons. 

11. Congress granted the 70 percent increase and the funds to im- 
plement it, and thus the foundation was laid for the so-called two 
ocean Navy. 

12. Hand in hand with the expansion of the fleet went the con- 
tinued building up of facilities on shore to support the fleet and its 
air arm. Once funds were obtained the work was pushed, for ex- 
ample the big drydock at Pearl Harbor Avas finished some months 
ahead of time, fortunately in time to accommodate ships almost 
immediately after Pearl Harbor. 

13. During my tour as Chief of Naval Operations I was under 
continual pressure from the successive commanders in chief of the 
fleet — Admirals Bloch, Richardson, and Kimmel — to bring personnel 
allowances up to 100 percent and to provide extra men \6fj67] 
for training to man new construction. The inevitable result of not 
having these extra men was to reduce the efficiency of existing ships 
in order to obtain the experienced men necessary to form basic crews 
for new construction. I explained some of the difficulties in getting 
more men for the expanding Navy and to increase allowances to 100 
percent in a letter to Admiral Kimmel on February 10, 1941 : 

I am struggling, and I use the word advisedly, every time I get in the White 
House, which is rather frequent, for additional men. It should not be necessary 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2101 

and while I have made the case just as obvious as I possibly could, the President 
just has his own ideas about men. I usually finally get my way but the cost 
of effort is very great and of course worth it. 1 feel that I could go on the Hill 
this minute and get all the men I want if I could just get the green light from 
the White House. As a matter of fact what we now have was obtained by my 
finally asking the President's permission to go on the Hill and state our needs 
as I saw them at that time and his reply was "go ahead, I won't veto anything 
they agree to." However, the struggle is starting all over again and just 
remember we are going the limit, but I cannot guarantee the outcome. 

14. In July 1941, 1 wrote Admiral Kimmel as follows: 

We are pushing recruiting just as hard as we can [5568] and for 
budgetary purposes you will be glad to know the President has okayed a figure 
of 533,000 enlisted men and 105,000 Marines. Please give us a "not too badly 
done" on that. But what a struggle it has been. If we could only have gone 
full speed two years ago but that is water over the dam and I am only hoping 
and praying we can take care of what we have in sight to man. 

15. As late as November 15, 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote me as 
follows: 

Greater permanence of personnel is required to obtain that ship, unit and 
fleet, efficiency so essential for readiness to fight. Reduction of changes to a 
minimum especially in key positions, must be accomplished. Detachment of 
officers and men has already dangerously reduced efficiency of this fleet and 
they continue. * * * 

This fleet requires approximately 9,000 men to fill complements ; it can utilize 
an additional 10,000. 

16. As badly as I wanted to reply that we could and would give him 
what he wanted and what we knew he needed, I had to tell him on 
November 25, 1941, that : 

Regarding personnel, we have at last succeeded in getting the President to 
authorize our use of draftees. I have been after this for months. Now that 
I have got permission it will take some time to get it through the Congress as 
we have to [5569'] have special legislation to use our funds for this 
purpose. * * * 

Believe it or not, the Reuhen James set recruiting back about 15 percent. We 
are increasing our advertising campaigns extensively ; not only that, but Navi- 
gation is hiring civilian managers to assist in recruiting. Draftees, however, 
constitute something sure and I only wish I could have gotten them months ago. 
The President in giving final approval said he just hated to do it ; but sentiment 
is fast getting out of my system, if there is any left in it on this war. 

17. Another large program which was developed under my direction 
and which Congress approved in February 1942, was the 1,799 ships 
and other items for the British under Lend-Lease at a cost of approxi- 
mately $4,000,000,000. The ships included a large number of landing 
craft and escort vessels. I assured Congress at the time — and it was 
thoroughly understood by the British when this bill was passed — that 
we reserved the right to retain anything in this program which we 
felt we needed, and that final allocation would be made only when 
units were completed. 

18. Everything I said and did to increase the size, strength and 
efficiency of the Navy as a fighting force was motivated by what I 
considered the absolute necessity of preparing as quickly as possible 
for war. 

[6570] DUTY TO MAKE ADEQUATE AND REALISTIC WAR PLANS 

19. Shortly after I became Chief of Naval Operations the War 
Plans Division began devoting their energies to bringing our war 



2102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

plans up to date. Late in 1940 we completed work on the plan known 
as Rainbow No. 3, and copies were sent to the Commander in Chief, 
U. S. Fleet, and to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet. 
In transmitting the plan to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic, on 12 
December 1940 I wrote : 

1. The Commandei" -in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet is informed that a plan designed 
for governing naval operations in case of war with Japan, Germany, and Italy, 
and entitled "RAINBOW 3" has been prepared. Two copies of this plan are for- 
warded to you by special officer messenger. While it is not to be considered as 
the policy of the United States Government to become involved in war under this 
plan, such a war appears at this time to be a possible eventuality. You are re- 
quested, therefore, to give a high priority to the preparation of your operating 
plans, and also to the preparation of your vessels, aircraft, and personnel. 

2. The officer messenger carrying this plan. Commander J. L. McCrea, U. S. N., 
is authorized to remain in the Manila area for about nine days. He [5571] 
is prepared to present you the general views of the Chief of Naval Operations as 
to various political and strategical matters which have influenced the preparation 
of "RAINBOW 3." You are requested to make a study of the plan and to for- 
ward to the Departiuent via Commander McCrea recommendations and sugges- 
tions for changes which may appear desirable to you at this time. It may be 
stated, however, that it does not seem practicable, under the existing situation, to 
effect material changes in the Assumptions of the plan. 

3. One of the assumptions of the plan is that war would be fought with the 
United States, the British, and the Dutch Colonial Authorities as Allies. Staff 
conversations with the British, of a limited nature, have been undertaken in Lon- 
don and Washington, but so far as concerns an allied operating plan and com- 
mand arrangements in the Far East, the only useful staff conversations would 
appear those which the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet might be able to hold 
with the British and Dutch Supreme War Commanders in that region. It is be- 
lieved that you may be able to hold such conversations with the British. There 
is a considerable doubt as to the extent [5572] of the conversations which 
may become possible with the Dutch, owing to their fear of repercussions in 
Japan. 

Commander McCrea had left a copy of the plan at Pearl Harbor on 
his way to Manila, and returned via Pearl Harbor to get the reaction 
of Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and his staff. 

20. I avoided, wherever I could, giving specific and categoric in- 
structions to the commanders in chief. War plans developed under 
my direction as Chief of Naval Operations were broad outlines of 
tasks and objectives, leaving the detailed operating plans to the com- 
manders in chief, who were on the spot and familiar wth the peculiar 
problems affecting their own forces. Kainbow No. 3 was such a plan. 

21. In our planning, we assumed that if the United States was drawn 
into war, it would be alined with Great Britain and against the Axis 
Powers. We also knew that while our most immediate concern was 
with the war then in progress in the Atlantic and in Europe, we might 
also be faced — perhaps concurrently — with a war in the Pacific. With 
these thoughts in mind, we held extensive staff conversations with the 
British and Canadians early in 1941 and the report of these conversa- 
tions was embodied in a document known as ABC-1, dated March 27, 
1941. 

[6573] 22. Based on the understandings arrived at in ABC-1, 
the Army and the Navy developed a Joint Basic War Plan, known as 
Rainbow No. 5, which was approved by the Secretaries of War and 
the Navy. 

[SS74-] You will note that I have crossed out the words "and by 
the President." That is the only change made in this statement 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2103 

23. In May 1941, the Navy's Basic War Plan, implementing Rain- 
bow No. 5, was promulgated. The highest priority was assigned to 
the detailed planning which had to be done by the fleets to fill in the 
broader outlines of the Navy's Basic War Plan, referred to sometimes 
by the short title— WPL^6. 

24. In connection with WPL-46, two things must be kept in mind. 
First, that the Atlantic and European area was considered to be the 
initial decisive theater. The Joint Army and Navy Plan, Rainbow 
No. 5, in the chapter entitled "Concept of the War," provided: 

Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic 
and European area is considered to be the decisive theater. The principal United 
States military effort will be exerted in that theater, and operations of United 
States forces in other theaters will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate 
that effort. 

Second, the plan was a realistic one ; that is, it was predicated on the 
availability of forces actually in hand. There were not initially avail- 
able to tlie Associated Powers all the facilities necessary to wage all-out 
war in both [<5575] oceans. We were not able to give the 
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, all the ships and men he wanted ; 
but neither were we able to put in the Atlantic or in the Asiatic Fleet 
the strength we knew they wanted. 

25. Tlie Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (Admiral Kimmel) , was 
fully advised of the situation confronting me as Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions, for we had discussed it at length during his trip to Washington 
in the summer of 1941. On 7 November 1941, I called his attention 
again to the fact that we just didn't have the ships needed to go around 
when I wrote : 

I note the great desirability of many things for the Pacific Fleet — particularly 
destroyers and cruisers. We just haven't ani/ destroyers or cruisers to give you 
at the moment, nor is the prospect bright for getting any for you in the near 
future. I fully appreciate your need for them. We could profitably employ 
twice the number we now have if they were available. I will not burden you 
with a recital of King's troubles 

Admiral King at that time was Commander in Chief of the Atlantic 
Fleet- 
but he is up against it for DDs for escort — and defense against raiders. 

26. Admiral Kinunel pointed out that he could not fight an all-out 
war in the Pacific with the forces allocated to him. [5576] On 
15 November 1941, he wrote : 

In repeated correspondence I have set forth to you the needs of the Pacific 
Fleet. These needs are real and immediate. I have seen the material and 
personnel diverted to the Atlantic. No doubt they are needed there. But I must 
insist that more consideration be given to the needs of the Pacific Fleet. 

In case of war in the Pacific we shall have a problem difficult of solution under 
any circumstances ; one requiring a major effort to bring the war to a successful 
conclusion. During preparation for such an effort we must be in a position to 
make Japanese operations costly and of limited effectiveness. The strength of 
this fleet limits our freedom of action and lack of modern equipment in ships we 
now have limits their effectiveness. 

We must be in a position to minimize our own losses, and to inflict maximum 
damage to Japanese fleet, merchant shipping, and bases. We should have suf- 
ficient strength in this fleet for such effective operations as to permit cruising 
at will in the Japanese Mandated Island area, and even on occasions to Japa- 
nese home waters. We should have [5577] the strength to make any 
enemy operations against Wake a highly hazardous undertaking. To do these 
things substantial increase of the strength of this Fleet is mandatory. 



2104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Greater permanence of personnel is required to obtain that ship, unit and fleet 
efficiency so essential for readiness to fight. Reduction of changes to a minimum 
especially in key positions, must be accomplished. Detachment of officers and 
men has already dangerously reduced efficiency of this fleet and they continue. 
Well qualified officers are in many instances, detached to fill billets much less 
Important, in my opinion than those filled in this fleet. Battleship Captains 
must be chosen for proficiency regardless of seniority. 

This fleet requires approximately 9,000 men to fill complements ; it can utilize 
an additional 10,000. 

If this fleet is to reach and maintain a satisfactory degree of readiness for 
offensive action, the foregoing requirements must be met; and it must not be 
considered a training fleet for support of the Atlantic Fleet and the shore es- 
tablishment. 

27. We are painfully aware of the situation. On 25 November, I 
replied : 

[5578] This is in answer to yours of 15 November. If I didn't appreciate 
your needs as well as Tommy Hart's and King's, I would not be working almost 
literally eighteen hours a day for all three of you. 

We have sweat blood in the endeavor to divide adequately our forces for 
a two ocean war; but you cannot take inadequate forces and divide them into 
two or three parts and get adequate forces anywhere. It was for this reason 
that almost as soon as I got here I started working on increasing the Navy. 
It was on the basis of inadequate forces that ABC-1 and Rainbow 5 were pred- 
icated and which were accepted by all concerned as about the best compro- 
mise we could get out of the situation actually confronting us. 

I agree with you for example that to cruise in Japanese home waters you 
should have substantial increase in the strength of your fleet but neither ABC-1 
nor Rainbow 5 contemplate this as a general policy. After the British have 
strengthened Singapore, and under certain auspicious conditions, opportunity 
for raids in Japanese waters may present themselves, but this will be the ex- 
ception rather than the rule. 

It might interest you to know that King strongly recommended his taking 
the destroyers which we now [5575] have in our West Coast ports, and 
the Secretary was sold on it; however it has been successfully I'esisted to date. 
King said that if they were out with you on the firing line he would not make 
such recommendation, but where they were he thought they were legitimate 
prey. He, too, you know is up against it for sufficient forces to perform his 
tasks. Just stop for a minute and realize that into his heavy routine escort 
work he has added at the moment large U. S. troop transports for Iceland on 
the one hand, British on another in Northern waters, and stiU another of 
20,000 which have been brought over and are now on their way down to Cape 
Town and possibly to Durban because of submarines operating off Cape Town. 
Obviously these troop movements are highly secret. We are at our wit's end in 
the Atlantic with the butter spread extremely thin and the job continuously in- 
creasing in toughness. 

******* 

Regarding permanence of personnel I have been over with Nimitz in detail 
some of the recent changes — Nimitz at that time was Chief of Bureau of Per- 
sonnel — and he will write you the details. There is a problem here as well 
as elsewhere ; and while we expect you and want you to hammer away on your 
own difficulties, just occasionally remember that we fully realize our only 
[5580] existence here is for the Fleet and that we are doing the best we 
can with increasingly vexing problems. 

Your letters at least give us ammunition, if not much comfort. 

I asked Nimitz last week to give me the figures showing the i)ercentage of men 
now on board on the basis of the old complements. Enclosed is a table he has 
just handed me. It may be poor consolation but at least it is something to know 
that the Fleet has more men now than at any time since the last war. I do not 
have the data for tlie last war. This does not mean that we are at all satisfied 
with it, but it is something I have been following. I assure you every effort is 
being made to improve it. It is steadily improving, but all too slowly to satisfy 
any of us. 

One thing I forgot to mention was your "the Pacific Fleet must not be consid- 
ered a training fleet for support of the Atlantic Fleet and the Shore Establish- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2105 

ment". I'll hand tliat one to King. Once in a while something happens which 
gives real interest. I thing I'll have a gallery ready to see King when he reads 
that, particularly after a recent statement of his that he noted he was getting 
fewer men and had less percentage of complement than did the Pacific Fleet, 
etc. etc. 

IS5S1] 28. There were shortages and deficiencies in material and 
manpower, both for the Navy and the Army forces in Hawaii, beyond 
our ability to remedy, limited as we were by considerations of indus- 
trial capacity and time. However, the ships and planes available were 
allocated to the fleets and forces according to the tasks assigned to them 
in the War Plan. I considered, as did my principal advisers, that 
the forces allocated to the Pacific Fleet were adequate for the execution 
of the tasks assigned. 

DUTY TO ORDER MOVEMENTS OF THE FLEET IN A MANNER NOT INCONSISTENT 

WITH THE WAR PLAN 

29. It seems appropriate at this point to say something about the 
movements of the United States Fleet during my tour of duty as Chief 
of Naval Operations. In October, 1939, the so-called Hawaiian De- 
tachment was sent from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor. This detach- 
ment consisted of 8 heavy cruisers, 1 aircraft carried and 18 destroyers 
plus certain auxiliaries. I felt that basing such a detachment at 
Pearl Harbor would demonstrate the weaknesses of that most impor- 
tant base and that the remedies for those weaknesses would thereby 
be facilitated. I wrote Admiral Bloch, then Commander in Chief, 
U. S. Fleet, to that effect on 8 September, 1939. My letter reads in part 
as follows: 

Again I urge you to keep your eyes toward the [5582] West for I feel 
most anything may happen any time. 

Not only from a strategic, psychological standpoint do I believ the sending of a 
good detachment to Pearl Harbor to be worthwhile, but I also am hopeful it will 
show up the weakness in the habitability of that yard to support even a moderate 
sized force. I am out to plug every hole I can as soon as I can. 

30. Moreover, basing a detachment on Pearl Harbor offered a valu- 
able opportunity for training and for familiarizing officers and men 
with our various island possessions in the mid-Pacific area. I ex- 
plained to Adimral Richardson on 15 March 1940 that : 

My original ideas in regard to the Hawaiian Detachment were that possibly, in 
fact probably, the Commander of this Detachment would be able to carry out 
the regular schedule of gunnery firings and for training would be able to visit 
the various island possessions in the mid-Pacific area to familiarize himself with 
these possessions and their potential uses in time of war. 

I still think that the decision to send the Detachment to Hawaii under present 
world conditions is sound. No one can measure how much effect its [5583] 
presence there may have on the Orange (Japanese) foreign policy. The State 
Department is strong for the present setup and considers it beneficial; they 
were in on all discussions, press releases, etc. 

31. The Pacific Fleet held its spring maneuvers in the Hawaiian 
area in 1940, and after the maneuvers were completed, the fleet was 
ordered to remain in that area temporarily. At first it was thought 
that the delay in returning to the West Coast would be not more than 
two weeks, but the stay was extended from time to time. On 22 May 
1940, Admiral Richardson wrote me, asking why the fleet was being 



2106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

kept in the Hawaiian area and how long it would probably remain 
there. I answered him on 27 May as follows : 

You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence 
may have on the Japs going into the East Indies. In previous letters I have 
hooked this up with the Italians going into the war. The connection is that with 
Italy in, it is thought the Japs might feel just that much freer to take inde- 
pendent action. We believe both the Germans and the Italians have told the 
Japs that so far as they are concerned she, Japan, has a free hand in the 
Dutch East Indies. 

******* 

[5584] Along the same line as the first question presented you would 
naturally ask — suppose the Japs do go into the East Indies? What are we going 
to do about it? My answer to that is, I don't know and I think there is nobody 
on God's green earth who can tell you. I do know my own arguments with re- 
gard to this, both in the White House and in the State Department, are in line 
with the thoughts contained in your recent letter. 

I would point out one thing and that is that even if the decision here were 
for the U. S. to take no decisive action if the Japs should decide to go into the 
Dutch East Indies, we must not breathe it to a soul, as by so doing we would 
completely nullify the reason for your presence in the Hawaiian area. Just 
remember that the Japs don't know what we are going to do and so long as 
they don't know they may hesitate, or be deterred. These thoughts I have 
kept very secret here. 

The above I think wil answer the question "why you are there." It does not 
answer the question as to how long you will probably stay. Rest assured that the 
minute I get this information I will communicate it to you. Nobody can answer 
It just now. [5585\ Like you, I have asked the question, and also — like 
you — I have been unable to get the answer. 

[6686] I pointed out to Admiral Richardson that I hoped the 
time spent in the Hawaiian area would have some indirect or incidental 
results, such as : 

(a) Solving the logistic problems involved including not only supplies from the 
U. S. but their handling and storage at Pearl Harbor. 

(b) Training, such as you might do under war conditions. 

(c) Familiarity of Task Forces with the Midway, Aleutian, Palmyra, Johnston, 
Samoa general area, in so far as may be practicable. 

(d) Closer liaison with the Army and the common defense of the Hawaiian 
area than has ever previously existed between Army and Navy. 

(e) Solving of communication problems involved by joint action between Army 
and Navy and particularly stressing the air communications. 

(f) Security of the Fleet at anchor. 

(g) Accentuating the realization that the Hawaiian group consists of con- 
siderably more than just Oahu. 

Admiral Richardson pointed out the deficiencies of Pearl Harbor as 
a Naval Base. These deficiencies were appreciated, both by the Navy 
Department and by the President, [6687] but it was decided as 
a matter of policy to keep the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area. 
During 1940 and 1941, many of the shortcomings of Pearl Harbor as a 
base, disclosed by the long stay of the Pacific Fleet, were remedied. 
The Annual Report of the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific 
Fleet for the year ending 30 June 1941, states : 

(h) Bases 
* * * * * * • 

(3) . Haicaiian Area. 

Pearl Harbor. Many of the deficiencies of this base, disclosed by the prolonged 
stay of the U. S. Pacific Fleet in this area, listed in last year's report, cither 
have been or are now in process of correction. The commissioning of the Naval 
Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, and the stationing of 3 patrol plane squadrons there has 
relieved the congestion, for planes of this type, at Ford Island. However, facili- 
ties for carrier groups are still inadequate and considerable congestion still exists. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2107 

It Is probable that this condition, while being ameliorated by progress of current 
projects at Ford Island, will not be completely satisfactory until completion of 
the work at Barber's Point — sometime in the future. 

Work on additional shops, the new drydocks, the net depot and target repair 
base at Bishop's Point is continuing and being accelerated as fast as delivery 
of material and availability of workmen permit. It is expected that, with the 
completion of the additional workmen from the mainland, the industrial capacity 
of the yard will be materially increased. 

Remaining deficiencies, on which satisfactory progress is not being made, are : 

(a) Insufficiency in numbers and types of small craft to adequately service a 
large fleet, particularly in the supply of oil, gasoline, provisions, water, general 
stores and ammunition. Provision for augmented means for delivery of fresh 
water, made necessary by reduced capacity of ship's distilling plants due to con- 
taminated waters of Pearl Harbor, is a present pressing need. 

(b) Inadequate local defense forces to provide for the safety of the Fleet 
in harbor and for the Important functions of shipping control and other re- 
quirements of the Fourteenth Naval District. Specifically, the situaion in regard 
of such forces is as follows : 

(1) Insufficient patrol craft, particularly anti-submarine types. 

(2) District patrol and observation aircraft, [5589'] though allocated 
in the aircraft expansion program, not yet available. 

(3) Insufficient army anti-aircraft guns actually available. 

(c) Provision of additional torpedo overhaul and storage facilities. 

34. We recognized the deficiencies in small craft and local defense 
forces referred to by the Commander in Chief, but again it was a mat- 
ter of not having enough vessels. I summed up this situatiton in a 
letter to Admiral Kimmel dated 10 February 1941 : 

I wish we could send Admiral Bloch more local defense forces for the 14th 
Naval District but we simply haven't got them. If more are needed I see no 
other immediate solution than for you to supply them. I am moving Heaven and 
earth to speed up a considerable program we have for small craft and patrol 
vessels for the Districts but like everything else, it takes time and "dollars cannot 
buy yesterday." 

Again, on 28 August 1941, 1 wrote Admiral Kimmel : 

I note what you say about not resting until you get the patrol vessels you 
have requested in official correspondence. I might add "neither will I." You 
know I am keenly alive to your needs. At present we [5590] are con- 
stantly fighting material shortage and priorities. You are thoroughly familiar 
with the building program and the dates of completion so no need to comment on 
it. We are ahead of schedule at present but the steel situation grows more 
critical daily and at last I believe the blocks are going to be put on unnecessary 
civilian needs." 

35. That fleet gunnery improved during the stay at Pearl Harbor is 
demonstrated by Admiral Kimmel's letter of 12 August 1941 : 

I feel that gunnery in the Fleet is better than we have any right to expect 

considering the enormous changes in personnel and the lack of permanency of 

the officers. We have of course stressed battle procedures above everything 

else and you well know how much more experience and training it takes to be 

' prepared for battle than for a target practice. * * * 

Recent directives from the Office of Fleet Training have put our target prac- 
tices on a much more realistic and practical basis. We feel that in the event of 
hostilities we will be forced to make very few changes, if any, in these directives. 
We are scheduling our services and area assignments in accordance with these 
directives now and I hear from all sides that it is [5591] considered much 
more satisfactory than anything we have ever had before. 

36. About mid-1941, to meet the immediate needs in the Atlantic, 
we moved certain forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic. This shift 
was contemplated by the Navy Basic War Plan, WPL-46. 



2108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

37. In this connection, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, ex- 
pressed concern in a letter to me dated 12 September 1941 regarding 
possible further transfers from the Pacific to the Atlantic. He wrote : 

The emphasis, in the Pi-esident's speech, on the Atlantic also brings up the 
question of a possible further weakening of this Fleet. A strong Pacific Fleet 
is unquestionably a deterrent to Japan — a wealier one may be an invitation. I 
cannot escape the conclusion that the maintenance of the "status quo" out here 
is almost entirely a matter of the strength of this Fleet. It must not be reduced, 
and, in event of actual hostilities, must be increased if we are to undertake a 
bold offensive. 

On 23 September 1941, 1 wrote Admiral Kimmel : 

We have no intention of further reducing the Pacific Fleet except that pre- 
scribed in Rainbow 5, that is the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month 
[5592] after Japan and the United States are at war. The existing force 

in the Pacific is all that can be spared for the tasks assigned your fleet, and new 
construction will not make itself felt until next year. 

38. We had pursued the policy of making no transfers of units from 
one fleet to another except as such transfers were provided for in 
WPL-46. The last transfers prior to 7 December 1941 of surface 
combatant units from the Pacific to the Atlantic were accomplished 
in June 1941. A comparison of the forces allotted the Pacific Fleet 
in the Navy Basic War Plan (May 1941) with the Administrative 
Organization of the Pacific Fleet published 1 October 1941 (13CN-41) 
shows that the forces — both surface units and aircraft — under the 
command of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, immediately 
prior to 7 December 1941 were — with no substantial differences — in 
accordance with the Navy Basic War Plan. 

39. In accordance with WPL-46, there were assigned to the Pacific 
Fleet 107 patrol planes suitable for long-range reconnaissance. Of 
this number, 24 planes of PATWING 4 were in the United States or 
Alaska just prior to 7 December. Of the remaining 83 patrol planes, 
approximately 60 were available in the Hawaiian area during the 
period immediately preceding the Japanese attack. 

[SS93] DUTY TO KEEP FLEET COMMANDERS INFORMED 

OF POmTICAL ANt) MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS 

40. During my tour of duty as Chief of Naval Operations, my office 
maintained a close liaison with the State Department and the Army. 
The Central Division — a part of the Office of the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions — was charged with the duty of keeping in touch with activities 
of the State Department which affected the Navy. The head of the 
Central Division met frequently with representatives of the Far East- 
ern Division of the State Department, and he kept me informed regard- 
ing important diplomatic and political developments in the Far East. 
I was a member of a liaison committee which was established by the 
State, War, and Navy Departments for the consideration of matters 
of mutual concern, the committee consisting of the Under Secretary 
of State, the Chief of Staff (Army) and the Chief of Naval Operations 
(Navy). This committee usually met weekly, and in addition, I had 
many conferences with the Secretary of State. I consulted with 
General Marshall concerning military matters, and we worked very 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2109 

closely together, either by telephone or by personal visits. My duties 
also required frequent consultation with the President. 

41. In addition to the information gained from the above sources, 
I had available the information obtained by the [5594-^ Office 
of Naval Intelligence, A meeting was held in the Office of the Sec- 
retary of the Navy each morning which was attended by the heads of 
the various divisions of Operations and certain other key officers in 
the Navy Department. At these meetings the Director of Naval Intel- 
ligence gave a resume of the information received since the last meet- 
ing on the military situation throughout the world, and other infor- 
mation such as that on international politics which he believed to be 
of value. He also brought to me at other times such information as 
he considered important. From time to time the Director of War 
Plans prepared estimates of the military situation in the Pacific for 
my information, and the information of the key officers of my staff. 

42. It was my duty, of course, to keep the fleet commanders in 
Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic waters informed of significant develop- 
ments in political and military matters of concern to them. It was 
always my purpose to give these commanders the best information 
and estimates of the situation available to me, not only through offi- 
cial letters and dispatches, but also by means of frequent and regular 
personal letters. I might point out, in passing, that there was nothing 
unusual in this so-called "personal" correspondence between the Chief 
of Naval Operations and the Commanders in Chief — it was a long- 
established custom when I took office. 

[5695] 43. Admiral Kichardson became Commander-in-Chief, 
Pacific Fleet, and Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, on 6 Jan- 
uary 1940. On 18 January, I wrote him in part as follows : 

* * * I have a letter from Tommy Hart (Admiral Hart, Commander-in- 
Chief, Asiatic Fleet), Just received, in which he thinks the situation in the Far 
East is very serious and that this year may prove to be a crucial and critical 
one. As I have written Bloch (Admiral Bloch, retiring CommandeiMn-Chief, 
U. S. Fleet), and as you undoubtedly know, I have continually asked him to bear 
in mind what is going on to the Westward which in this particular period in this 
old world's history may be far more important to us than the troubles in Europe, 
especially if something should break and break quickly and without warning. It 
is something, in my humble opinion, for which you should be mentally prepared. 
Anything in this wide world I can do to help, of course I will ; that is my only 
reason for existing here. * * * 

44. Throughout 1940, 1 continued to write these personal letters to 
Admiral Richardson two or three times a month and during some 
periods as often as once a week. On several questions raised by Ad- 
miral Richardson, my answers were in- [5596] definite and as 
unsatisfactory to him as they were to me. I was entirely sympathetic 
with his desire for information and for the answers to such questions 
as, "How long is the fleet to stay in the Hawaiian Area"?, or 'Suppose 
the Japs to go into the East Indies, what are we going to do about it?" 
I, too, wanted the answers to those questions and to similar questions. 
I had asked them myself in the White House and in the State Depart- 
ment, but like Admiral Richardson, I was unable to get the answers. 
Moreover, my honest opinion was that no one knew the answers to 
such questions. 

45. During this same period, Admiral Hart also had questions he 
wanted me to answer. I was up against the same situation — they were 



2110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

not matters on which I had the final say, and I was unable to get 
answers for him. On 22 October 1940, 1 wrote Admiral Hart : 

I wish there was something I could give you from the State Department but 
there isn't. I think I may say safely, however, that there will be no backdown 
anywhere by the United States in the Far East, unless there is a right-about-face 
in present day policy. 

46. On 12 November 1940, I wrote Admiral Hart, giving him the 
current picture as I saw it, sending a copy of this letter to Admiral 
Richardson. It is an example of the estimates of the situation which 
I passed to the fleet commanders from time [6597] to time and 
reads in part as follows : 

"The Navy can, of course, make no political commitments. Therefore, we 
can make no specific military plans for an allied war. However, as I told you in 
my despatch, you can perform a useful service by laying, with the British and 
possibly the Dutch, a framework for a future plan of cooperation, should we be 
forced into the war. I rather doubt, however, that the Dutch will talk freely 
with you. If they do my idea would be that you would explore the fields of : 

Command arrangements. 

General objectives ; 

General plan of cooperative action, including the approximate naval and mili- 
tary deployment. 

"I do not believe Japan will attack us if she can avoid doing so. 

I invite attention to the fact that this letter was written in November 1940. 

"In fact, I believe she will go far to avoid hostilities with the United States. It 
is even doubtful if she wishes, at this time to fight the British or the Dutch. It 
seems more likely that she would prefer, while maintaining a position of readi- 
ness, to consolidate Indo-China with her positions further north, and to begin a 
more or less [5598] gradual economic penetration of the Netherlands 
East Indies and Siam. Should we refrain from imposing additional economic 
sanctions, present conditions, including the recent 1,800,000 ton oil contract, 
might be stabilized over a considerable period of the future. Our State Depart- 
ment, as you may know, had a hand in the execution of that contract. 

"But we never can tell. Should a war develop between Japan and an alliance 
of British, Dutch, and Americans, I believe that Japan will plan to : 

"(a) Occupy Guam, and reinforce the Mandates with troops, submarines, and 
some air ; 

"(b) Establish naval control of Philippine Waters by destroying our naval and 
air forces, basing her main fleet in the Pescadores and a strong, fast detachment 
in Halmahera ; 

"(c) Capture Luzon with troops now b-ised in Formosa and Hainan; 

"(d) Capture Borneo, to be followed by a campaign against the Dutch directed 
from East to West. 

"I believe that the allied objective should be to reduce Japan's offensive power 
through economic starvation ; the success of the blockade would surely depend 
upon allied ability to hold the major portion of the Malay Barrier. Tour own 
action would, of course, be based upon your view as to the [5599] most 
effective method of contributing to the attainment of the ultimate objective. 

"One thing (and this is for your ears alone) you can depend upon is that we 
would support you, probably by sending a naval reenforcement to you at Soerabaja 
or Singapore, and by other means. I would be glad to get your views as to the 
size and composition of such a reenforcement; but in making your recommenda- 
tion I trust you will keep in mind that our Navy must hold in the Mid-Pacific, that 
we may also be in the war against the other two Axis Powers, and that the col- 
lapse of Britain would force us to a major re-orientation toward the Atlantic. 

"You may well appreciate that I do not welcome such a war (British Collapse)." 

47. In the last letter I wrote to Admiral Richardson as Commander 
in Chief, U. S. Fleet— on 23 December 1940—1 said: 

There is little that I can add which is not repetition, but I shall repeat just 
the same that every 24 hours past is just one day nearer to actual hostilities and 
that your flag officers and captains should be completely in the frame of mind that 
we will be in the fighting business most any time, and purely as a guess on my 
own part, I would say at any time after the [5600] next 90 days. Our 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2111 

heads and our hearts and every ounce of energy that we have should be devoted 
exclusively to the business of war and keeping fit — and I don't mean maybe. 

48. Admiral Kimmel succeeded Admiral Richardson as Commander 
in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, on 1 
February 1941. On 13 January, just after his selection for Com- 
mander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, I wrote Admiral Kimmel in part as 
follows : 

* * * I am hoping J. O. (Admiral Richardson) will turn over the personal 
letters I have written him. They give all the slants here that I know and they 
show the urgency as I see it. In my humble opinion, we may wake up any day 
with some mines deposited on our front door step or with some of our ships 
bombed, or whatnot, and find ourselves in another undeclared war, the ramifica- 
tions of which call for our strongest and sanest imagination and plans. 

I have told the Gang here for months past that in my opinion we were heading 
straight for this war, that we could not assume anything else and personally 
I do not see how we can avoid, either having it thrust upon us or of our delib- 
erately going in, many months longer. And of course it may be a matter of 
weeks or of days. I would like to feel that I could be perfectly complacent if 
some day someone opens [5601] the door of my office and reports that 
the war is on. I have been moving Heaven and Earth trying to meet such a 
situation and am terribly impatient at the slowness with which things move here, 
even though I know much has been accomplished, there still remains much to 
be done. 

My estimate of the situation which I presented to the Secretary and Rainbow 
3, both of which you should have, will give you fairly clearly my own thoughts. 
Of course I do not want to become involved in the Pacific, if it is possible to 
avoid it. I have fought this out time and time again in the highest tribunals 
but I also fully realize that we may become involved in the Pacific and in the 

Atlantic at the same time; and to put it mildly, it will be one H of a job, 

and that is one reason why I am thankful that I have your calm judgment, 
your imagination, your courage, your guts and your good head, at the seagoing 
end. 

49. It was my constant endeavor to keep Admiral Kjmmel in- 
formed of significant events of a political or military nature which 
affected the interests of the United States. 

On 10 February 1941 1 wrote : 

I continue to press Marshall to reinforce Oahu and elsewhere. You now know 
that he is sending out 81 fighters to Oahu, which will give that place 50 fairly 
good ones and 50 of the latest type. I jumped to give him the [5602] trans- 
portation for them in carriers when he requested it. I hope too, you will get the 
Marines to Midway, .Johnston and Palmyra, as soon as you can. They may have 
to rough it for a time until barracks are built, and the water supply, if inadequate, 
will have to be provided somehow just like it would be if they had captured an 
enemy atoll. 

Speaking of Marshall, he is a tower of strength to us all, and I couldn't conceive 
of a happier relationship than exists between him and me. He will go to almost 
any length possible to help us out and sometimes contrary to his own advisors. 

51. On 25 February 1941, 1 wrote: 

I hesitated to take the chance of upsetting you with my despatch and letter 
concerning a visit of a detachment of surface forces to the Far East. I agree with 
you that it is unwise. But even since my last letter to you, the subject has twice 
come up in the White House. Each of the many times it has arisen, my view has 
prevailed, but the time -might come when it will not. I gave you the information 
merely as a sort of advance notice. 

The difliculty is that the entire country is in a dozen minds about the war — to 
stay out altogether, to go in against Germany in the Atlantic, to concentrate 
against Japan in the Pacific and the Far East — I simply can not predict the 
outcome. Gallup polls, editorials, talk on [560S] the Hill (and I might 
add, all of which is irresponsible) constitute a rising tide for action in the Far 
East if the Japanese go into Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies. This can 
not be ignored and we must have in the back of our heads the possibility of having 



2112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to swing to that tide. If it should prevail against Navy Department recom- 
mendations, you would have to implement Rainbow III, and forget my later 
despatch concerning "Plan Dog." This would mean that any reinfox'cement to 
the Atlantic might become impossible, and, in any case, would be reduced by 
just so nmch as we would send to the Asiatic. And that might be a very serious 
matter for Britain. 

52. Enclosed with this last letter was a memorandum for the Presi- 
dent in which I had recommended against sending a detachment of 
the Pacific Fleet to the Philippines. In this memorandum, I said : 

If we are forced into the war our main effort as approved to date will be 
directed in the Atlantic against Germany. We should, if possible, not be drawn 
into a major war in the Far East. I believe the Pacific Fleet should at least at 
first remain strong until we see what Japan is going to do. If she remains quiet, 
or even if she moves strongly toward Malaysia, we could then vigorously attack 
the Mandates and Japanese communications in order to weaken Japan's attack 
on the British and Dutch. We would also then [5604] be able to spare 
forces for the Atlantic. 

******** 

I have just read a paraphrase of a telegram of 7 February from the American 
Embassy at Tokyo, which the State Department has furnished us. In it appears 
the following: 

"Risk of war would be certain to follow increased concentration of American 
vessels in the Far East. As it is not possible to evaluate with certainty the 
imponderable factor which such risks constitute, the risk should not be taken 
unless our country is ready to force hostilities." 

You undoubtedly have seen the entire despatch and obviously I am picking out 
the portion which supports my view. 

53. Admiral Kimmel, in a letter dated February 19^11. had asked 
that the responsibility for sending him secret intelligence information 
be fixed in order that he would miss nothing of interest to the Fleet. 
In my reply of 22 March, I wrote : 

With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and 
responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to CincUS, Kirk informs 
me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately 
informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal ele- 
ments within the United States. He further says that information concerning 
the location of all Japanese merchant vessels is forwarded by airmail weekly 
[5605] to you and that, if you wish, this information can he issued more fre- 
quently, or sent by dispatch. As you know, ONI 49 contains a section devoted 
to Japanese trade routes, the commodities which move over these trade routes, 
and the volume of shipping which moves over each route. 

[6606'\ 54. On 26 April — a month before the promulgation of 
Rainbow No. 5 — I wrote : 

This is just to get you mentally prepared that shortly a considerable detach- 
ment from your fleet will be brought to the Atlantic. 

You will recall from my last letter what that detachment was and what the 
President cut it to. but only for the time being, awaiting some further clue to the 
Japanese situation. 

Not only do I anticipate the reinforcing of the Atlantic by the 3 BBs, ICV, 
4CLs and 2 squadrons of destroyers, but also by further reinforcements. 

King has been given a job to do with a force utterly inadequate to do it on 
any efficient scale. 

I am enclosing a copy of his last order which implements the changed Hemis- 
pheric Defense Plan No. 1 and is now known as Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 2 
or WPL^9. 

Even the Press and those who wanted to go all out in the Pacific are now 
rounding to and clamoring for an all out in the Atlantic. You know my thoughts 
with regard to this which were set down in my Memo about what is now known 
as Plan Dog and which will shortly be covered by Rainbow 5. 

[5607] Action on the above, that is transfer to the Atlantic, may come at 
any time, and in my humble opinion is only a matter of time. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2113 

No other news for the moment and this letter is the result of a long conference 
yesterday in the White House. 

I am sending a copy as usual to Tommy Hart. 

55. On 14 May 1941, 1 sent a letter to the commandants of 12 of the 
naval districts, including Panama and Hawaii, with copies to Ad- 
mirals King, Kimmel and Hart, in which I said : 

What will happen to the Pacific is anyone's guess ; but here, too, there is only 
one safe course ; that is to be prepared, so far as humanly possible. Though the 
danger of mines, raiding and diversions, and even of sporadic or stunt air 
attack, may be more remote in the Eastern Pacific, we cannot discount it, and 
hence should likewise be bending every ounce of effort of which we are capable 
not to be caught napping in that area. Japan may come in the second Germany 
does — possibly preplanned joint action. Russia is still a ? 

56. My letter to Admiral Kimmel of 24 May 1941 points up some 
of the problems we were facing with respect to both the Atlantic and 
the Pacific. I wrote: 

You have probably been surprised over the movements of transports, Marines, 
hospital ships, etc., to [560S'i the east coast, which you have, or will have 
shortly received. Please keep the following with regard to it highly secret, 
known only to your trusted few whom I assume you keep informed regarding 
such matters. In this I include Bloch. 

Day before yesterday afternoon the President gave me an over all limit of 30 
days to prepare and have ready an expedition of 25,000 men to sail for, and to 
take the Azores. Whether or not there would be opposition I do not know but 
we have to be fully prepared for strenuous opposition. You can visualize the 
job particularly when I tell you that the Azores recently have been greatly re- 
inforced. The Army of course will be in on this but the Navy and the Marines 
will bear the brunt. 

I know your reaction will be "Why didn't we get the transports and assemble 
such a force months and months ago." My only answer to that is that such 
thoughts are water over the dam. and I am confronted with the problem as is 
and not one as I would like to have had it, and for which I would like to have 
been ready long ago. I simply could not get authority to acquire and prepare 
the necessary train. 

King of course is active and operating in connection with Atlantic problems — 
our own and the British. He has nothing like what he would like to have or 
what we [5609] would like to give him if we had it to give. I do not 
contemplate for the moment ordering anything additional to the Atlantic except 
auxiliaries in connection with the Azores task and except possibly later four 
CA's as per Rainbow 5. However, I am not the final "Boss of this show." 

The Force which we are preparing to go to North Ireland and Scotland on 
the outbreak of war is coming along in good shape so far as the Navy is con- 
cerned but the Army has neither the equipment, the ammunition nor the aircraft 
to defend these bases; fall again being the earliest date when they can do 
this for us. Meanwhile we will try and find some way of solving it with Marines 
and British help if we are in the war before that time. God knows what will 
happen if we are not in by that time though personally I give the British a longer 
time than do most people here in their ability to hold out. I most emphatically 
do not believe they can hold out indefinitely without effective aid from us. We 
are being pressed for ammunition and material from the South American Re- 
publics — not a h^ppy situation — and not to mention British requests for more 
DD's etc. 

57. Admiral Kimmel had raised the matter of the un- [5610] 
certainty of his information before his trip to Washington in mid-1941. 
Among other things he mentioned his uncertainty as to the future 
strength of his fleet. In a letter dated 26 May 1941, he said: 

The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is 
far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing 
situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, 
reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to 
evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of 

79716— 46— pt. 5 5 



2114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically 
affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information 
is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contra- 
venes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so 
necessary to the conduct of military operations. 

It is realized that, on occasions, the rapid developments in the inter- 
national picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even 
the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may 
militate against the furnishings of timely information, but certainly 
the present situation is susceptible to marked improve- [6611] 
ment. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and ob- 
jectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Com- 
mander in Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even reorient his 
possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is 
particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the 
necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be 
carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this 
training, by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending 
eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, 
the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, 
particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island de- 
velopment, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander 
in Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather 
than by categorical instructions. 

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Com- 
mander in Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all im- 
portant developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means 
available. 

58. Admiral Kimmel brought this letter with him when he came to 
Washington. I considered the matters raised so important that I had 
the letter circulated among the principal [5612] officers of the 
Department and later assembled them for a full discussion of these 
problems with Admiral Kimmel. While there was no formal reply to 
this letter, I feel sure that when Admiral Kimmel left Washington, 
he was fully informed of the situation as we knew it. 

59. On 24 July 1941, I wrote Admiral Hart, sending a copy of the 
letter to Admiral Kimmel. I told them that : 

Yesterday, before Nomura went to the State Department, I had a two hour 
talk with him ; A'ery interesting, as my previous talks with him have been, and 
of course he is worried. I believe him to be genuinely sincere in his desire that 
Japan and the United States do not come to an open rupture. Of course, I have 
that same desire, but there are many flies in the ointment, and in my talks with 
him I have not minced matters one particle, or minimized the dilBculties, or in 
any way condoned Japan's present course of action, or hesitated to discuss per- 
fectly frankly the shallowness of some of the reasons she is putting out in defense 
of her actions. We have had very plain talk. I like him and, as you know, he 
has many friends in our Navy. Nomura dwelt at length on his country's need 
for the rice and the minerals [5613} of Indo-Chlna. My guess is that 
with the establishment of bases in Indo-China, they will stop for the time being, 
consolidate their positions, and await world reaction to their latest move. No 
doubt they will use their Indo-China bases from which to take early action against 
the Burma Road. Of course, there is the xwssibility that they will strike at 
Borneo. I doubt that this will be done in the near future, unless we embargo oil 
shipments to them. Tliis; question of onUiargo has been up many times and I have 
consistently opposed it just as strongly as I could. My further thought is that 
they will do nothing in I'egard to the Maritime provinces until the outcome of 
the German-Russian war on the continent is more certain. If the Russians are 
well beaten down, I think it highly probable that they will move into Siberia. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 21l5 

Meanwhile, they are merrily going their way and just where it all will end I dN 
not know. 

I had a talk with the President after the Cabinet meeting last Friday and 
again yesterday after my chat with Nomura, and have succeeded in securing 
an appointment with the President for him today. I hope no open rupture will 
come, particularly at this time, but it would be wishful thinking to eliminate 
such a [5614] possibility or to think that conditions are getting better 
rather than worse. However, we can still struggle for something better, and 
I want you to kuow that I am. 

[5616] 60. On 26 July 1941, following the Japanese move into 
Indochina, the President issued an executive order freezing Japanese 
assets in the United States in the same manner in which assets of vari- 
ous European countries were frozen on 14 June 1941. I sent a priority 
dispatch to commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, commander in chief 
Asiatic Fleet, and commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet, on July 25 
reading as follows : 

This Is a joint despatch from the CNO and the Chief of Staff U. S. Army. 
Appropriate adees deliver copies to Commanding Generals Hawaii, Philippines 
and Caribbean defense command and to General Chaney in London. 

You are advised that at 1400 GCT July 26th United States will Impose economic 
sanctions against Japan. It is expected these sanctions will embargo all trade 
between Japan and the United States subject to modification through a licensing 
system lor certain material. It is anticipated that export licenses will be 
granted for certain grades of petroleum products, cotton, and possibly some 
other materials and that import licenses may be granted for raw silk. Japanese 
assets and funds in the United States will be frozen except that they may be moved 
if licenses are granted for such movement. It is not, repeat not, expected 
[5616] that Japanese merchant vessels in United States ports will be seized 
at this time. United States Flag merchant vessels will not at present be ordered 
to depart from or not to enter ports controlled by Japan. CNO and COS do not 
anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military 
means but you are furnished this information in order tliat you may take appro- 
priate precautionary measures against possible eventualities. Action being ini- 
tiated by the United States Army to call the Philippine Army into active service 
at an early date. 

This despatch is to be kept secret except from immediate Navy and Army 
subordinates. SPENAVO inform CNS but warn him against disclosure. 

61. The foreign policy of the United States has never been very 
clearly defined — certainly not fixed — and it must have been necessary 
for the President and the State Department to feel their way along 
carefully in many situations. It was impossible, however, for the 
Navy to plan on the basis of a well-known and clearly defined foreign 
policy, desirable as that might have been. In discussing our planning 
problems in a letter to Admiral Hart dated 9 February 1940, 1 wrote : 

In view of the actual situation existing today in the Far East and elsewhere, 
we might well say that [5617] we need "Tension Plans" as well as "War 
Plans." But to prepare well considered "Tension Plans" we need a planning 
machinery that includes the State Department and possibly the Treasury De- 
partment as well as the War and Navy Departments. Of course, we have plan- 
ning machinery for the Army and Navy which now provides for a better coordi- 
nation of planning effort than has existed in the past. We do not, however, 
have regularly set up planning machinery that brings in the State Department. 
It is true that we have frequent consultation with the State Department, but 
things are not planned in advance, and often we do not receive advance informa- 
tion of State Department action which might well have affected our own 
activities. 

It is also true, of course, that the State Department must in a country such as 
ours feel its way allong to a large extent. This is unavoidable. In view of this 
the State Department is probably unable always to set up, in advance, concrete 
programs of their intentions. 

******* 



2116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Undoubtedly the disposition of your forces could be better guided if you could 
be kept advised in advance of actions contemplated by the State [5618] 
Department. Whenever it is possible to do so, we vs^ill keep you so advised, and 
whenever State Department policies for either temporary or longer contem- 
plated periods can be set forth, I will keep you informed of them. 

62. We had gone on record at the State Department with our views 
regarding an embargo on oil. I made it plain to the State Depart- 
ment — as I had in my letter to Admirals Kimmel and Hart — that I 
believed if Japan's oil supply were cut off, she would go to war to get 
it. I did not think that necessarily meant war with us, but with some 
power from which she could take oil. 

63. In its official publication "Peace and War," the State Depart- 
ment confirms the fact that the State, War, and Navy Departments 
all understood this position. It states at page 88 : 

Throughout this period (1938-1940) the United States Government had under 
active consideration various ways and means which might be used to induce 
Japan to renounce its policies and programs of conquest and domination tli rough 
the use of force or threat of force. Among other methods, this Government 
frequently had under consideration the question of applying economic pressure — 
advocated in many quarters [5619] as a means of checking Japanese 
aggression. It was tlie opinion of the responsible officials of the Government, 
including the highest military and naval authorities, that adoption and applica- 
tion of a policy of imposing embargoes upon strategic exports to Japan would be 
attended with serious risk of retaliatory action of a character likely to lead to 
this country's becoming involved in war. Practically all realistic authorities 
have been agreed that imposition of substantial economic sanctions or embargoes 
against any strong country, unless that imposition be backed by show of superior 
force, involves serious risk of war. 

The President and the heads of the Army and the Navy and the Department of 
State were in constant consultation throughout this period in regard to all 
aspects of the military and diplomatic situation confronting the United States. 
******* 

They were in agreement that prevailing public opinion in this country and, 
with the imminence of and finally the outbreak of war in Europe, the compara- 
tive military unpreparedness of this country were such as to render it inadvisable 
to risk, by resort to drastic economic measures against Japan, involvement in 
war. 

[S6201 The Chairman. The hour of 12 : 30 having arrived, we 
will recess until 2 o'clock. Admiral. 

Admiral Stark. All right, sir. 

(Whereupon, at 12 : 30 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m., of the 
same day.) 

[6621'\ AFIERNOON SESSION 2 p. M. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 
Admiral Stark, you may proceed with your statement. 

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed) 

Admiral Stark. The top of page 41, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. 6-1. On 28 August 1941, 1 wrote Admiral Kimmel : 

With regard to the general situation in the Pacific about all I can say is the 
Japs seem to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods. I can 
only intimate to you that some very strong messages have been sent to them but 
just what they are going to do I don't know. 

I told one of their Statesmen this morning that I felt another move, such 
as one into Thailand, would go a long way towards destroying before the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2117 

American public what good-will still remained. As you know, I have had some 
extremely frank talks with them. 

I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but I could wish 
the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender. 

65. On 22 September 1941, I wrote Admiral Hart, sending 
[56^2] Admiral Kimmel a coj)y of my letter. It shows not only 
the picture existing at that time in the Pacific, but also reminds us 
of our pressing and immediate problems in the Atlantic. I quote: 

So far as the Atlantic is concerned, we are all but, if not actually, in it. The 
President's speech of September 11, 1941 put the matter squarely before the 
country and outlined what he expected of the Navy. We were ready for this; 
in fact, our orders had been issued. 

In addition to the incidents cited by the President, other and probably equally 
compelling reasons lay behind his decision. For some time, the British have 
found the problem of getting supplies across the Atlantic a difficult one. They 
have never had enough ships suitable for escort duty. Their forces are thinly 
spread and, as a result of casualties, the spreading has had to be thinner and 
thinner as the campaign has progressed. If Britain is to continue, she has to 
have assistance. She will now get it openly. King's forces, too, are thinly 
spread, working as he is from 20 South to the Iceland area. 

In a nutshell, we are now escorting convoys [562S] regularly from the 
United States to points in the Iceland area, where these convoys are picked 
up by the British and escorted to the British Isles. In addition to our own 
escort vessels, the Canadians are participating. Both forces (Canadian and 
our own) are operating under King's direction. 

This will be a boon for the British. It will permit them to strengthen their 
forces elsewhere, both with heavy and light ships, particularly in critical areas 
through which convoys for the Near East via the Cape of Good Hope, must pass. 
It will further help the British to meet the ever-present threat of a raid on 
troop or merchant ship convoys by heavy units, in that it will narrow the area 
in which the British heavy units will be required to be responsible. Moreover, 
ships for other possible activities, such as duty in the Mediterranean, etc., will 
thus be released. 

The area which we regard as ''our ocean" is roughly outlined as follows: all 
west of a line 10° West Longitude to Latitude 65° North, thence by rhumb line 
to a position 53° North, 26° West, thence south on 26°. Unless the Axis powers 
withdraw their menof-war from this area, contacts are almost certain [5624] 
to occur. The rest requires little imagination. 

That line, sir, rims up 26, which runs through the Azores and then 
it slopes up to the eastward of Iceland and then on north. 

* * * * i)s ^ m 

Iceland has, of course, in recent months, taken on much significance for us. 
Since the President's speech, it has taken on added significance. Since July, we 
have had 4500 Marines there, and on Monday last we landed some 6000 Army. 
While this Army convoy was enroute, the Germans had by far the strongest con- 
centration of U-Boats that they have ever had in the North Atlantic. It was so 
strong and so active that it raised the very devil with a British-escorted convoy, 
the Germans claiming 28 ships sunk. About half that number is more nearly 
correct and admitted by the British. Our own Army troop convoys was in the 
immediate vicinity of the attack and had to be re-routed by despatch several times 
in an effort to avoid the area of action. At that, seven SS contacts were had. 
We should have gotten at least one SS, which was attacked under favorable 
circumstances. 

As to conditions in your part of the world, Mr. Hull has not yet given up hope 
of a satisfactory [2625] settlement of our differences with Japan. 
Chances of such a settlemen are, in my judgment, very slight. Admiral Nomura is 
working hard on his home government and while he appears to be making some 
progress, I am still from Missouri. It looks like a dead-lock ; but I suppose as 
long as there is negotiation there is hope. 

The press is making much at the moment of the way the Far Eastern situation 
has apparently quieted down. One can not help being impressed with the opti- 
mistic note of the editorial writers and columnists in this regard. For my own 
part, I feel that false hopes are beng raised. While on the surface the Japanese ap- 



2118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

pear to be making some effort at reaching a satisfactory solution, I can not disre- 
gard the possibility that they are merely stalling for time and waiting until the 
situation in Europe becofes more stablized. If Russa falls, Japan is not going to 
be easily pried away from her Axis associations. She will no doubt grab any op- 
portunity that presents itself to improve her position in Sbera. If Russa can hold 
out (which at the moment, hardly appears possible), I feel that there might be 
more hope of some sort of an agreement with Japan. 

The same sort of false hopes are being raised [5626] in our press with 
reference to the German-Russian situation. There is no question but that the 
Greece and Crete incidents delayed Germany's move on their Eastern front. I 
think it quite probable that they intended to move against Russia earlier in the 
year. If the delay incident to the two campaigns noted above have introduced 
sufficient delay in their time table, which, coupled with Russian resistance, will 
permit the Russians to carry on some sort of a front this winter, then possibly 
those two debacles were not entirely without compensation. The Hun is after 
the Russ Army. It has proved far more of a stumbling block than Hitler had 
imagined. However, the Germans are making steady progress. The Russian 
losses in men and material are great, and production of essential war materials 
is being much lessened. When the Harriman mission returns from Moscow (Ad- 
miral Standley is our senior Navy member), we will probably get some real news. 
Harry Hopkins saw only Stalin. The Russian Military Mission that is now in the 
United States has presented very large requests for war materials, and it makes 
our own planning an ever changing affair. 

[5627] You now have our reply to your official recommendation concerning 
the withdrawal of the Marines from China. We recognize the soundness of all 
your arguments, pro and con, and we put more weight on those questioning with- 
drawal. We feel that a complete withdrawal of our forces from China would 
create a reaction in that country and in Japan and in our own, that would be bad. 
So, for the moment at least, we will hang on. I know you will open it up again 
by letter or despatch if you consider it should be again reviewed; and it very well 
may be — there is little that is static in this old world at present. 

I would be less than frank if I did not tell you that I am not fully supported in 
the above view. Tommy Holcomb wants to withdraw, lock, stock and barrel. 

Tommy Holcomb was major general of the Marine Corps, major 
general commandant. 

I can easily see his point of view. He wants to avoid, if at all possible, "blood 
letting." In this, he is supported by Colonel Peck. That officer feels that all or 
none of the marines should come out. Peck is against leaving a "token force." 
He feels that to do so, we are inviting trouble and that the "token force" can be 
of little support to the local police. In that, I agree. But, something bigger is 
at stake. So far as China is concerned, we have [5628] "our foot in the 
door — the door that once was "open," and if I had the say so, it would remain 
there until I was ready to withdraw it — or until the door opened to such a point 
that I could gracefully withdraw if and when I saw fit. I agree that proper tim- 
ing may be extremely difficult. You may be right that they should come now. 
I hope I am right in holding on. Ultimately, I hope we may both see alike. I 
don't enjoy not being 100 per cent with you. 

You know how I have long felt about reinforcing the Philippines. The en- 
closed memorandum shows what is in the wind. Personally, I am delighted, 
and I am sure you will be, too. I think it should have a pronounced effect in 
prevention — or, if not, then in execution. 

66. In sending a copy of the foregoing letter to Admiral Kimmel, 
I sought to also put at rest some fears he had expressed about the pos- 
sibility of taking additional units from the Pacific to bolster our thinly 
spread forces in the Atlantic. I told him, in a letter dated 23 Sep- 
tember 1941 : 

We have no intention of further reducing the Pacific Fleet except that pre- 
scribed in Rainbow 5. that is the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month 
after Japan and the United States are at war. The existing force in the Pacific 
is all that can be spared for the tasks assigned your fleet, and new construction 
will not make itself felt [5629] until nest year. 

In this same letter I also added : 

I have held this letter up pending a talk with Mr. Hull who has asked me to 
bold it very secret. I may sum it up by saying that conversations icith the Japs 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2119 

have practically reached an impasse. As I see it we can get nowhere towards 
a settlement and peace in the Far East until and unless there is some agreement 
between Japan and China — and just now that seems remote. Whether or not 
their inability to come to any sort of understanding just now — is — or — is not — 
a good thing — I hesitate to say. 

Admiral Nomura — that is Ambassador Nomura — came in to see me this morn- 
ing. We talked for about an hour. He usually comes in when he begins to feel 
near the end of his rope ; there is not much to spare at the end now. I have 
helped before but whether I can this time or not I do not know. Conversations 
without results cannot last forever. If they fall through, and it looks like they 
might, the situation could only grow more tense. I have again talked to Mr. Hull 
and I think he will make one more try. He keeps me pretty fully informed and 
if there is anything of moment I will, of course, hasten to let you know. 

67. I would like to point out that while I have stressed, in the ex- 
tracts I have read, the information I gave the [S630'] com- 
manders in chief on political and military developments affecting the 
international situation, I also maintained a very great interest in 
seeing that the commanders in chief were adequately informed on 
technical matters affecting their forces. For example, on 26 July 
1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote me a six-page letter, most of which had 
to do with material preparations for a Pacific war. It raised ques- 
tions concerning such matters as additional transports, ordnance 
equipment for the Marines, anununition handling and stowage facili- 
ties, the further development of the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard to make 
major overhauls of large ships possible, additional personnel, the 
equipping of light craft with depth charges and listening gear, small 
craft for patrol purposes, the supply of communication, radio, radar, 
and sound equipment, and the many requirements for aviation. 

68. I distributed extracts from this letter to the appropriate bureau 
chiefs and asked for their comments. As a result, a 22-page letter 
went out to Admiral Kimmel on 22 August 1941, giving him all the 
information on these matters available at that time. This is only one 
example of letters giving the commander in chief information concern- 
ing progress on material problems. 

69. The fall of the Japanese Cabinet on 16 October 1941 marked the 
beginning of a critical stage in Far Eastern af- [S6S1] fairs. 
On that day I sent a secret priority dispatch to commander in chief, 
Atlantic Fleet, commander in chief. Pacific Fleet, and commander in 
chief, Asiatic Fleet, which reads as follows : 

The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation. If a 
new Cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti- 
American. If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate 
under a new mandate which will not include rapproachment with the U. S. 

In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility. 

Since the U. S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present 
desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two 
powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including 
such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor consti- 
tute provocative actions against Japan. 

Second and third adees inform appropriate Army and Navy District Au- 
thorities. Acknowledge. 

70. It is noteworthy that also on 16 October, I diverted all our 
merchant shipping in the Far East to the south in order to get it out of 
the danger zone in case Japan attacked [S632] us. I kept it 
diverted until war broke. As a result, we lost only one merchant 
ship — and that was one on which we deliberately took a chance. 

71. On the following day (17 October 1941), I wrote to Admiral 
Kimmel (with a copy to Admiral Hart), commenting on the dispatch 



2120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

concerning the Cabinet change and enclosing an estimate regarding the 
change prepared by the head of the Central Division. In this letter 
I said: 

Things have been popping here for the last twenty-four hours but from our 
despatches you know about all that we do. 

Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message 
I sent you merely stated the "possibility" ; in fact I tempered the message handed 
to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long 
pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least until 
something indicates the trend. 

If I recall correctly I wrote you or Tommie Hart a forecast of the fall of the 
Japanese Cabinet a couple of weeks ago after my long conference with Nomura 
and gave the dope as I saw it. 

You will also recall in an earlier letter when War Plans was forecasting 
a Japanese attack on Siberia in [5633] August, I said my own judgment 
was that they would make no move in that direction until the Russian situation 
showed a definite trend. I think this whole thing works up together. 

With regard to mercsant shipping it seemed an appropriate time to get the 
reins in our hands and get our routing of them going. In other words, take the 
rap now from the Hill and the Press and all the knockers, so that if and when 
it becomes an actual necessity to do it, it will be working smoothly. 

We shall continue to strive to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. How 
long it can be kept going I don't know, but the President and Mr. Hull are 
working on it. 

The stumbling block, of course, is the Chinese incident and personally without 
going into all its ramifications and face-saving and Japanese Army attitude, 
civil attitude and Navy attitude, I hardly see any way around it. I think 
we could settle with Nomura in five minutes but the Japanese Army is the 
stumbling block. Incidentally, the Chinese also think that they will lick Japan 
before they get through and are all for keeping going rather than giving way 
anywhere. A nice setup for not sounding the gong. 

Offhand without going into the "ins" and "outs" I see no reason for your 
stopping your normal visits to the Coast. The ships concerned constitute self- 
contained task [56341 forces. We have left it up to you and I am just 
giving you my reaction. 

The memorandum referred to reads as follows — that is a memoran- 
dum prepared by the central division, which I sent out so that I might 
get that division's point of view. 

I believe we are inclined to overestimate the importance of changes in the 
Japanese Cabinet as indicative of great changes in Japanese political thought 
or action. 

The plain fact is that Japanese politics has been ultimately controlled for 
years by the military. Whether or not a policy of peace or a policy of further 
military adventuring is pursued is determined by the military based on their 
estimate as to whether the time is opportune and what they are able to do, not 
•by what cabinet is in power or on diplomatic maneuvering, diplomatic notes 
or diplomatic treaties. 

Prince Konoye has been Premier and Konoye Cabinets in oflSce for the most 
of the last five years. Time and again he and his Foreign Ministers have ex- 
pressed disapproval of the acts committed by the Japanese Military, but remedial 
action has not been taken. 

Konoye was Premier when the attack on China began, he declared Japan's 
policy was to beat China to her knees. 

[5635] The most that can be claimed for the last Konoye Cabinet is that it 
may have restrained the extremists among the military not that it has opposed 
.Lapan's program of expansion by force. When opportunities arise, during the 
coming months, which seem favorable to the military for further advance, they 
will be seized. 

At the present time the influence of the extremists goes up and down depending 
on the course of the war in Russia. 

[5636] The same bill of goods, regarding the necessity of making some con- 
cession to the "moderates" in order to enable them to cope with the "extermists" 
has been offered to the United States since the days when Stimson was Secretary 
of State and Debuchi Ambassador. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2121 

Present reports are that the new cabinet to be formed will be no better and no 
worse than the one which has just fallen. Japan may attack Russia, or may 
move southward, but in the final analysis this will be determined by the military 
on the basis of opportunity, and what they can get away with, not by what cabinet 
is in power. 

72. I invite attention to the fact that both the despatch and the letter 
speak of war against the United States only as a possibility. Based 
on the information available to me at the time (17 October 1941), I 
felt that such language was all the then existing situation warranted, 
and in my letter I told Admiral Kimmel that I had tempered the orig- 
inal draft of the message, because I did not think the Japs were going 
to sail into us. I recognized the possibility, however, and for that 
reason thought we should be "on guard," 

73. On 22 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote me, telling me of 
the action he had taken and the dispositions he had made following 
receipt of my despatch regarding the change [5637] in the 
Japanese cabinet. 

74. On November — just a month before the attack — I O. K.'d the 
dispositions he had made, and added : 

* * * The big question is— "What next?! 

Tnings seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when 
it will break, no one can tell. The principal reaction I have to it all is what I 
have written you before ; it continually gets "worser and worser" ! A month may 
see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies can not go forever — 
particularly if one party can not live with the set up. It doesn't look good. 

75. My letter was sadly prophetic. One month did see "most any- 
thing" — the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor — exactly one month 
from the date of this letter. 

76. Also on 7 November, I wrote Admiral Hart as follows : 

Events are moving rapidly toward a real showdown, both in the Atlantic and 
in the Pacific. The Navy is already in the war of the Atlantic, but the country 
(iosen't seem to realize it. Apathy, to the point of open opposition, is evident in a 
considerable section of the press. Meanwhile, the [5638] Senate is drag- 
ging out the debate with reference to the arming of the merchantmen. Whether 
tlie country knows it or not, ive are at war. 

« * * ,K * * * 

You no doubt have noted in the press the conversations going on between the 
State Department and the Japanese Foreign Oflace. Mr. Kurusu's trip to the 
United States has its dramatic appeal, but I am dubious of it having any real 
influence. 

And on 8 November, I again wrote Admiral Hart a letter which con- 
tained a paragraph quite similar to that quoted from my letter to 
Admiral Kimmel of 7 November. It read : 

The Japanese situation looks almost like an impasse to me, and I wouldn't 
be surprised at anything happening in the next month or two. I imagine your 
picture of that is just about as close as mine. The two points of view appear 
to be simply irreconcilable. But of this, more should be in the open before long. 

77. On 14 November, I wrote Admiral Kimmel : 

The next few days hold much for us. Kurusu's arrival in Washington has 
been delayed. I am not hopeful that anything in the way of better understanding 
between the Uniter States and Japan [5639] come of his visit. I note 
this morning in the Press despatches a listing of a number of points by the 
Japan Times and Advertiser upon which concession by the United States was 
necessary for the "solution of the Pacific Crisis." Complete capitulation by the 



2122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

United States on every point of difference between the Japanese and this country 
was indicated as a satisfactory solution. It will be impossible to reconcile such 
divergent points of view. 

And I enclosed an estimate of the Far Eastern situation which Gen- 
eral Marshall and I had prepared for the President. I think the whole 
of that memorandum will bear reading : 

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have reexamined the 
military situation in the Far East, particularly in the light of messages recently 
received from the American Ambassador to Chungking, the Magruder Mission, 
and the United States Naval Attach^. These despatches have indicated it to 
be Chiang-Kai-Shek's belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming is imminent, 
and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of 
United States and British air units, is the sole hope for defeat of this threat. 
The [5640] Secretary of State has requested advice as to the attitude 
which this Government should take toward a Japanese offensive against Kun- 
ming and the Burma Road. 

There is little doubt that a successful Japanese offensive against the Burma 
Road would be a very severe blow to the Chinese Central Government. The 
result might even be the collapse of further effective military resistance by that 
Government, and thus the liquidation by Japan of the "China incident." If use 
of the Burma Road is lost, United States and British Commonwealth aid to 
China will be seriously curtailed for some months. If resistance by the Chinese 
Central Government ceases, the need for Japanese troops in China will be 
reduced. These troops can then be employed elsewhere, after the lapse of time 
sufficient to permit their withdrawal. 

Concentration of Japanese troops for the contemplated offensive, based in north- 
ern Indo-China, cannot be completed in less than about two months, although 
initial offensive operations might be undertaken before that time. The advance 
toward Kunming over nearly three hundred miles of rough country, with 
[5641] poor communications, will be extremely difficult. The maintenance 
of supply lines will not be easy. The Chinese, or favorable defense terrain, 
would have a good chance of defeating this offensive by the use of ground troops 
alone, provided these troops are adequate in quality and numbers. 

The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have 
taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in 
undertaking offensive military operations with U. S. forces against Japan, to pre- 
vent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations, 
however well-3isguised, would lead to war. 

At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the 
Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the 
Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened 
by withdrawing practically all naval vessels from the Atlantic except those 
assigned to local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet 
would require tremendous merchant tonnage, which coiild only be withdrawn 
from services now considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the 
Atlantic of [56.'i2'\ naval and merchant strength might well cause the 
United Kingdom to lose the Battle of the Atlantic in the near future. 

The only current plans for war against .Japan in the Far East are to conduct 
defensive war, in cooperation with the British nnd Dutch, for the defense of the 
Philippines and the British nnd Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now 
being reinforced. The present combined naval, air. and ground forces will make 
attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of Decem- 
ber, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines will have 
become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The 
U. S. Array air forces in the Philippines will have reached its projected strength 
by February or March. 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased 
to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring .Japan in oper- 
ations in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time, additional 
British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived. The gen- 
eral defensive strength of the entire southern area ngainst possible Japanese 
[56431 operations will then have reached impressive proportions. 

Until such time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can he extended to Chiang- 
Kai-Shek by measures which probably will not result in war with Japan. These 
measures are: continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying in- 
creasing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and 
acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2123 

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the 
following conclusions : 

(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United 
States-British Staff Conversations remain sound. The primary objective of 
the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Ger- 
many remain undefeated, decision will still have not been readied. In any 
case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, 
since such a war would greatly wealien the combined effort in the Atlantic 
against Germany, the most dangerous enemy. 

[56^4] (b) War between the United States and Japan should be 
avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time 
as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the 
United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan 
should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies : 

(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the terri- 
tory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Common- 
wealth, or the Netherlands East Indies ; 

(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 
100° East or South of 10° North ; or into Portuguese Timor, New Cale- 
donia, or the Loyalty Islands. 

(e) If war with Japan can not be avoided, it should follow the strategic 
lines of existing war plans; i. e., military operations should be primarily 
defensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening [5645] 
Japan's economic position. 

(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, 
into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would 
not justify intervention by the United States against Japan. 

(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended 
to the Chinese Central Government. 

(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete co- 
ordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be 
undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and 
the Netherlands East Indies. 

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommended that the 
United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions. 

"Specifically, they recommend : 

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for interventon against Japan 
in China be disapproved. 

That material aid to China be accelerated [5646] consonant with the 
needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces. 

That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to 
the maximum practicable extent. 

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan. 

78. On 24 November, I sent the following despatch for action to 
Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Commander in Chief, Pacific 
Fleet, Commandants 11th, 12th, 13th and 15th naval Districts, and 
for information to Special Naval Observer, London, and Commander 
in Chief, Atlantic Fleet. 

I do not know whether the Committee is familiar with those 
Districts. 

Starting south, the 11th at San Diego, the 12th at San Francisco, 
the 13th at Puget Sound, and we jump to Hawaii for the 14th, and 
back down to the Panama Canal for the 15th. 

The Far Eastern, Manila, is the 16th. 

This is the despatch which was sent for action : 

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This 
situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their 
naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive move- 
ment in any direction including attack on Philippines [56-^7] or Guam is a 
possibility. 

Chief of Staff has seen this despatch, concurs and requests action adees to 
inform senior Army Officers their areas. 



2124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation 
or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately. 

79. On November 25, 1 wrote Admiral Kimmel a letter which ends 
with these two paragraphs (the only part bearing on the dispatch of 
November 24) : 

I held this (the letter) up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull 
today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long 
talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the 
gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the 
President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From 
many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing 
that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I 
do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling 
among some people. [56^8] You know I have generally held that it was 
not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still 
rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the 
most likely. 

I wan't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will 
be dam»ned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may 
do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we 
may do nothing — I think it is more likely to be 'anything'. 

80. This letter gave the background for the dispatch and indicated 
opinions which went to make up the dispatch. It must be understood 
that official dispatches, though sent in the name of and on the responsi- 
bility of the Chief of Naval Operations, often reflected not only his 
personal opinion but also a consensus of the opinions of his principal 
advisers ; and at times in cases as represented here, those of the State 
and War Departments and of the White House. The letter points out 
that neither the President nor the Secretary of State would be surprised 
over a Japanese surprise attack. Some felt that such an attack would 
come in the Philippines because of the consequent embarrassment to us. 
While appreciating this, I did not give it the weight some [5649'] 
of my advisers did, but stressed more strongly the attack in southeast 
Asia. They keynote that the letter and the dispatch were intended to 
convey was the possibility of "a surprise aggressive movement in any 
direction," and the necessity of being prepared for anything. 

81. On November 27 Mr. Hull informed us that negotiations with the 
Japanese had ceased and that it was now up to the Army and Nav3\ I 
later learned that a note had been handed to the Japanese on November 
26 — the so-called ten-point note. I feel confident in stating that I 
did not see or know of this note at the time it was given to the Japanese 
Ambassador. 

82. General Marshall and I completed and sent to the President a 
memorandum dated November 27, stressing that — 

The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to gain time. 

and thati — 

Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided as long as con- 
sistent with national policy. 

83. On November 27, I sent to commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet 
and to commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, for action, and to commander 
in chief, Atlantic Fleet, and special naval observer, London, for infor- 
mation, the following priority dispatch : 

[56501 This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with 
Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an 
aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2125 

The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval 
task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, 
Tai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. 

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the 
tasks assigned in WPL-46. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar 
warning is being sent by War Department. SPANAVO inform British. Conti- 
nental districts Guam, Samoa directed to take appropriate measures against 
sabotage. 

84. This message begins with the words "This dispatch is to be 
considered a war warning." These words were carefully weighed and 
chosen after considerable thought and discussion with my principal 
advisors and with the Secretary of the Navy. The words "war warn- 
ing" had never before been used in any of my dispatches to the 
commander in chief, Pacific Fleet. They were put at the beginning 
of the message to accentuate the extreme gravity of the situation. 
We considered the picture as we saw [5651'] it and we felt 
that there was grave danger of Japan striking anywhere. We wanted 
our people in the Pacific to know it, and we used language which we 
thought would convey what we felt. 

85. The message further stated that certain signs indicated an 
"amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or the 
Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo." This indication from evidence 
we had, did not, in our opinion, rule out or preclude an attack else- 
where. Our dispatch of the 24th (only 3 days before) should be read 
in connection with the dispatch of the 27th. I warned against "a 
surprise aggressive movement in any direction." 

86. We went to what we thought was an all-out on this dispatch of 
the 27th. We considered it an unequivocal war warning. Previously, 
we had talked about possibilities, but by this dispatch we intended 
to convey the thought that war was imminent. In fact, we gave most 
careful consideration before making this a war warning, for we had 
no definite information or evidence indicating an attack on the United 
States. We could not tell whether Japan in her next move would 
or would not attack United States territory. The only movement of 
which we had definite knowledge, indicated an amphibious expedition, 
with the Philippines, Thai, the Kra Peninsula, or Borneo as its po- 
tential objectives. We decided, [56521 however, that the situ- 
ation was so grave that we should warn our forces to be prepared for 
the worst. 

87. I had long shared the concern of the commanders in chief for 
the security of the fleet in Pearl Harbor and of the vital elements 
of the Naval Establishment in the Hawaiian area. After the success- 
ful attack by the British Fleet Air Arm on the Italian Fleet at 
Taranto, my concern increased, and on November 22, 1940, 1 wrote to 
the then commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral Richardson, as 
follows : 

Since the Taranto incident my concern for the safety of the Fleet in Pearl 
Harbor, already great, has become even greater. This concern has to do both 
with possible activities on the part of Japanese residents of Hawaii and with 
the possibilities of attack coming from overseas. By far the most profitable 
object of sudden attack in Hawaiian waters would be the Fleet units based 
in that area. Without question the safety of these units is paramount and 
imposes on the Commander-in-Chief and the forces afloat a responsibility in 
which he must receive the complete support of Commandant Fourteen, and of 
the Army. I realize most fully that you are giving this problem compre- [5653] 
hensive thought. My object in writing you is to find out what steps the Navy 



2126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Department and the War Department should be taking to provide additional 
equipment and additional protective measures. 

******* 

I would like to have you take up the whole question upon your return to 
Hawaii with Comfourteen and with the Army, and let me know of any deficiencies 
which will require remedial action here in Washington. 

88. I asked that the matter be considered with the Army because 
"Joint Action of the Army and the Navy," approved by the Secre- 
taries of War and the Navy, and in effect during 1941, provided for 
coordination by the Army and Navy in meeting attacks against our 
coastal frontiers, of which the Hawaiian coastal frontier was one. 
Joint action states that in carrying out its functions, the Army will 
provide and operate or maintain among other things : 

(1) Guns on land, both fixed and mobile, with necessary searchlights and fire- 
control installations. 

(2) Aircraft operating in support of harbor defenses; in general coastal 
frontier defense ; in support of or in lieu of naval forces. 

[5654] (3) A communication and intelligence system to indue an aircraft 
warning service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the 
prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy. 

The Navy, in carrying out its functions, will provide and operate, 
among other things : 

(a) A system of offshore scouting and patrol to give timely warning of an 
attack, and, in addition, forces to operate against enemy forces in the vicinity 
of the coast. 

(b) A communication and intelligence system among the elements of the sea 
defense, with provisions for the prompt exchange of information or instructions 
with the Army. 

Joint action also states the functions of Army and Navy air com- 
ponents, and in order to minimize duplication, it provides : 

(a) The functions assigned to the Army Air component require the Army 
to provide and maintain all types of aircraft primarily designed for use in sup- 
port of military operations, or in the direct defense of the land and coastal 
frontiers of continental United States and its [5655] overseas posses- 
sions, or in repelling air raids directed at shore objectives or at shipping with- 
in our harbors, or in supporting naval forces to assure freedom of action of the 
fleet 

(b) The functions assigned to the Navy air component require the Navy 
to provide and maintain all types of aircraft primarily designed and ordinarily 
used in operations from aircraft carriers or other vessels, or based on aircraft 
tenders, or for operations from shore bases for observation, scouting and patrol- 
ling over the sea, and for the protection of shipping in the coastal zones. These 
aircraft may be required to operate effectively over the sea to the maximum 
distance within the capacity of aircraft development. 

In accordance with joint action, the commandant of the Fourteenth 
Naval District and the commanding general, Hawaiian Department 
had entered into a "joint coastal frontier defense plan" for the Ha- 
waiian coastal frontier dated April 25, 1941. Among other things, 
this agreement assigned responsibility for the aircraft warning serv- 
ice and antiaircraft and fighter defenses to the Army, while respon- 
sibility for distant re- [5656] connaissance was assigned to 
the Navy. 

89. On receipt of the reply from Admiral Richardson — in reply to 
the letter in which I had asked his comment on how the War and Na^^ 
Departments could help them out out there — and largely predicated on 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2127 

it, I caused the Secretary of the Navy, on January 24, 1941, to send 
the following letter to the Secretary of War : 

The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl 
Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department 
and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in 
part, promoted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, 
and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks 
on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily 
possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or 
the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor. 

In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the fleet or 
naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase 
the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character 
mentioned [5657] above. 

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are con- 
sidered to be: 

(1) Air bombing attack. 

(2) Air torpedo plane attack. 

(3) Sabotage. 

(4) Submarine attack. 

(5) Mining. 

(6) Bombardment by gun fire. 

Defense against all but the first two — that is, air attack, both bombing and tor- 
pedo — of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactorily. The 
following paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion of the problem 
encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which I consider to be of 
primary importance. 

Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively, 
simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated. 
The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons, 
and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of 
carriers and their supporting vessels. 

The coimter measures to be considered are : 

[5658] (a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting 
vessels before air attack can be launched ; 

(b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their 
objectives ; 

(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire; 

(d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke; 

(e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages. 
The operations set forth in (a) — 

that is, the location and the engagement of the enemy carriers and 
their destruction — 

are largely functions of the Fleet but, quite possibly, might not be carried out 
in case of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war. 

Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required 
for the operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit 
aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that while the organization and equipping 
of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control equipment 
is in progress, the present [5659] system relies wholly on visual observa- 
tion and sound locators which are only effective up to four miles. 

Available Army anti-aircraft batteries appear inadequate if judged by the 
standards of the war in Europe. There are now in Oahu 26 3" fixed anti-air- 
craft guns (of which something over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor), 
56 mobile 3" guns, and 109 .50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft bat- 
teries are manned in part by personnel which is also required to man parts of the 
sea coast artillery. Should an attack on Oahu combine air attack with a gun 
bombardment, one or the other countering fires would suffer from lack of men. 
If the prevailing high ceiling is taken into account the caliber of the anti- 
aircraft guns might be inadequate against high altitude bombing attack. 

By late summer the defenses will be considerably strengthened by additions 
in guns, planes, and radio locators. It is understood, sixteen additional 3" 
mobile twenty-four 90 mm., and one hundred twenty 37 mm. guns will be on 



2128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK: 

hand ; the pursuit aircraft strength is to be expanded to a total of 149 ; the new 
radio locators will have an effective range of [5660] 100 miles. Although 
the caliber of the guns will still be small for effective action against high altitude 
bombers, this augmentation will markedly improve the security of the Fleet. 
It does not, of course, affect the critical period immediately before us. 

The supplementary measures noted in (d) and (e) might be of the greatest 
value in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Balloon barrages have demonstrated 
some usefulness in Europe. Smoke from fixed installations on the ground might 
prove most advantageous. 

To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals: 

(1) That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit 
aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net 
in Hawaii. 

(2) That the Army give consideration to the question of balloon barrages, 
the employment of smoke, and other special devices for improving the defenses 
of Pearl Harbor. 

[566 1] (3) That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination 
of naval and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun 
fire, against surprise aircraft raids. 

(4) That the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of 
joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids 
against Pearl Harbor. 

(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu 
for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long 
as the present uncertainty continues to exist. 

Your concurrence in these proposals and the rapid implementing of the meas- 
ures to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the seciirity 
of the Fleet, will be met with the closest cooperation on the part of the Navy 
Department. 

90. Copy of this letter was sent to the then Commander in Chief, 
United States Fleet, Admiral Kimmel. On February 18, 1941, Ad- 
miral Kimmel wrote : 

I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is 
a possibility. We [5662] are taking immediate practical steps to minimize 
the damage inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force will pay. We need 
anti-submarine forces, — destroyers and patrol craft. The two squadrons of 
patrol craft will help when they arrive. 

91. In the meantime on 7 February 1941 the Secretary of War had 
replied to the letter of 24 January as follows : 

In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise 
attacks upon the Fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express com- 
plete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our 
making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian 
Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues 
to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of 
the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet. 

The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit planes. 
There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes; nineteen of these are P-36's 
and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty- 
one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to [566S] 
Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This 
will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and 
seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-B 
pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assem- 
bled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii. 

"There are at present in the Hawaiian Island.^; eighty-two 3-inch AA guns, 
twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA 
machine guns. The total projects calls for ninety-eight 3-inch AA guns, one 
hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA 
machine guns. 

With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has 
been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for 
installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. In- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2129 

quiry develops the information tliat delivery of the necessary equipment can- 
not be made at an earlier date. 

The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give 
immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages 
[560J,] and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. 
Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation and cannot 
be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on 
hand and eight-four being manufactured — forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, 
and the remainder by September. The Budget nov? has under consideration 
funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke 
for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion 
is that atmosfioheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment 
of smoke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, the Com- 
manding General will look into this matter again. 

With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a 
copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian De- 
partment, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities 
in making those measures effective. 

Copies of this reply were sent to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, 
and commandant. Fourteenth Naval District. 

92. Subsequent to the receipt of the letter of 7 February [5665] 
from the Secretary of War, the matter of antiaircraft defense and of 
planes for the defense of Hawaii was the subject of frequent con- 
versations with General Marshall and I offered to transport planes via 
carrier whenever they could be made ready. On at least two occasions 
during 1941, I sent a carrier from the west coast to Pearl Harbor to 
ferry Army fighter planes. 

93. You will note that the Secretary of War in his letter of 7 Feb- 
ruary stated that the equipment for the aircraft warning service had 
been ordered and would be delivered in Hawaii in June 1941, and that 
all arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the 
equipment is delivered. I was informed that this equipment was 
delivered in Hawaii about the middle of 1941. 

94. On 31 March 1941, Rear Admiral Bellinger, who was Com- 
mander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor and Commander of 
Pacific Fleet Task Force Nine, made, with the Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Air Force, a joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy 
air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or fleet 
units in the Hawaiian area and entered into an agreement covering 
joint air operation. A copy of this agreement and estimate was for- 
warded to the Chief of Naval Operations by the Commandant, 
Fourteenth Naval District on 1 May 1941. The estimate, under the 
[5666] heading "Possible Enemy Action," reads in part as follows : 

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by: 

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area. 

2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl 
Harbor. 

3. A combination of these two. 

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU 
would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would 
most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach 
inside of three hundred miles. 

On 20 June 1941, I sent a copy of this agreement entitled "Joint 
Security Measures, Protection of Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base" to the 
Commandants of all the naval districts and to the Commanders in 
Chief of the Atlantic, Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, calling their attention 
to the importance of the problems presented therein. 

79716—46 — pt. 5 6 



2130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

95. Admiral Kimmel left with me, during his trip to Washington 
in mid-1941, a memorandum dated 4 June, which reads as follows : 

The agreement entered into betwixt tlie Commanding General, Hawaiian 
Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth [5667] Naval District, in 
regard to joint action of the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii provides : 

(a) That in activities in the defense of Oahu and the other islands against 
enemy bombing attacks the command shall be vested in the Army Air Corps 
assisted by Navy fighters which may be available. 

(b) That in a mission which involves bombing of enemy ships the command 
shall be vested in the Navy Air Commander in charge of the Base. Briefly, 
when an alarm is sounded the Navy patrol planes take off to locate the enemy 
ships and when located the Navy directs the efforts of the Army and Navy 
bombers in the offensive action which they take against the enemy ships. 

The liaison betwixt the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satisfactory 
and weekly drills in air raid alarms with the two services acting in unison are 
held. These drills have developed many weaknesses but the conditions are 
steadily improving and it is felt they are in much better shape now than they 
were a few months ago. The conditions will continue to be unsatisfactory until 
certain equipment has been supplied [5668] and the personnel drilled in 
its use. 

There are about 140 light Army planes (fighters and light bombers) and 21 
heavy bombing Army planes now in the Islands. These in addition to some 
obsolescent bombers and fighters. It is believed that the number of Army bombers 
in the Islands should be at least four times the number that they have there 
now and it is felt these planes should be sent out as soon as it is practicable 
to do so. 

"There are not now a sufficient number of Army pilots to man all the 
Army planes in the Islands." 

96. In mentioning the Army's responsibilities with respect to the 
defense of Pearl Harbor, I don't mean to minimize the problems which 
were facing the Army at that time. They, too were faced with a short- 
age of equipment and men. 

97. My war warning despatch of 27 November must be considered 
in the light of what had gone before. Commander in Chief, Pacific 
Fleet, and Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, were action addressees 
of the war warning despatch, and they were directed to "execute an 
appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the 
tasks assigned in WPL-46" (Navy Basic War Plan) . 

98. I might mention that on 26 November, we sent to Commander 
in Chief, Pacific Fleet, two despatches asking his [5669] reac- 
tion to the possibility of reinforcing Wake and Midway by Army units. 
These were routine matters having to do with the general strengthen- 
ing of our Pacific bases — a matter we had long been pushing. 

99. The same day that I sent the war warning, the Army also sent 
a despatch to its field commanders. In order that Navy coastal fron- 
tier commanders and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet might be 
informed of what had been sent their Army opposites, I sent the 
following priority despatch on 28 November to Commander, Pacific 
Northern Naval Coastal Frontier and Commander, Pacific Southern 
Naval Coastal Frontier for action and to Commander in Chief, Pacific 
Fleet and Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Frontier for informa- 
tion: 

* * * Army has sent following to Commander Western Defense Command : 
"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes 
with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come 
back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile 
action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat not, be avoided the 
United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This [5670] 



Proceedings of joint committee 2131 

policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action 
that might jeopardize your defense. 

"Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such recon- 
naissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should 
be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. 
Report measures taken. 

[5671] "A separate message is being sent to G-2 Ninth Corps Area re sub- 
versive activities in United States. Should hostilities occur you will carry out 
the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dis- 
semination of this highly secret information to minimum essential oflBcers." 

WPL52 is not applicable to Pacific area and will not be placed in effect in that 
area except as now in force in Southeast Pacific sub-area and Panama Naval 
Coastal Frontier. Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an 
overt act. Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL46 so far as they apply 
to Japan in case hostilities occur. 

100. On 30 November, I sent a despatch to Commander in Chief, 
Asiatic Fleet, making Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet an informa- 
tion addressee, which reads as follows : 

Indications that Japan about to attack points on Kra Isthmus by overseas 
expedition. 

In order to ascertain destination this expedition and for security our position 
in the Philippines desire you cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on three 
days commencing upon receipt this despatch. Instruct planes to be observe only. 
They must not approach so as to appear to be attacking but must defend them- 
selves if attacked. 

Understand British Air Forces will search arc [5672] 180 miles from 
Tedta Bharu and will move troops to line across Kra Isthmus near Singora. 

If expedition is approaching Thailand inform MacArthur. British Mission here 
informed. 

101. On 3 December, we sent to Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, 
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval 
District and Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District the following 
priority despatch : 

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instruc- 
tions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong, 
Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their 
codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret 
documents. 

102. Also on 3 December, I sent a priority despatch to Commander 
in Chief, Asiatic Fleet and Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District for 
action, and to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Commandant, 
Fourteenth Naval District for information, which reads as follows: 

Circular Twenty Four Forty Four from Tokyo one December ordered London, 
Hongkong, Singapore and Manila to destroy purple machine. Batavia machine 
already sent to Tokyo. December second Washington also directed destroy purple, 
all but one copy of other systems, and all secret documents. [5673] British 
Admiralty London today report Embassy London has complied. 

103. I considered that the urgent destruction by the Japanese of 
their codes and ciphers and secret documents was one of the most 
telling items of information we had received, and our despatch inform- 
ing Commanders in Chief, Asiatic Fleet and Pacific Fleet and Com- 
mandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts of this fact 
was one of the most important despatches we ever sent. We felt that 
war was just a matter of time. 

104. On 4 December, because of Guam's highly vulnerable position, 
we sent her the following message : 

Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified mat- 
ter except that essential for current purposes and special intelligence, retaining 



2132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential commanications with 
CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 14, COM 16 and OPNAV. Be prepared to destroy 
instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain. Report crypto 
channels retained. 

Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Com- 
mandant, Fourteenth Naval District and Commandant, Sixteenth Naval Dis- 
trict were all information addresses on this despatch. 

105. We were also concerned lest Commander in Chief, Pacific 
Fleet, might feel that he needed specific authorization [56741 
from US before he could authorize destruction of secret papers and 
codes in the outlying Pacific Islands. Accordingly, we sent him a 
despatch on 6 December which reads as follows : 

In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying 
Pacific Islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confi- 
dential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency. Means 
of commimication to support our current operations and special intelligence 
should of course be maintained until the last moment. 

106. In the few days immediately preceding 7 December, Admiral 
Ingersoll (then Assistant Chief of Naval Operations), Admiral Tur- 
ner (then head, War Plans Division), and I went over the informa- 
tion we had sent to the fleet commanders. ' We were all of the opinion 
that everything we could do had been done to get them ready for war, 
and that we had sent them sufficient information and directives. 

107. During the night and early morning of 6-7 December, the 
Japanese transmitted to their Ambassador in Washington an answer 
to the ten-point note which had been handed to the Japanese on 26 
November by Mr. Hull. The answer was in fourteen parts, the four- 
teenth part being received some time early Sunday morning, December 
7. I was not acquainted with this despatch until I arrived at my office 
Sunday forenoon. I would like [5675] to invite attention to 
the meat of the fourteenth part of this message and compare it with 
the meat of my war warning message. The Japanese message con- 
cludes : 

* * * Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Jap- 
anese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific 
through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost. 

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Gov- 
ernment that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but 
consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations. 

Our war warning message stated f 

* * * Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions 
in the Pacific have ceased * * *. 

Thus, what we learned on the morning of 7 December only con- 
firmed what we had sent out on 27 November. 

108. During the morning of Sunday, 7 December 1941, we had in- 
formation to the effect that the Japanese Ambassador was to pre- 
sent his Government's reply to the 10-point note to the Secretary 
of State at 1 p. m. that same day. I was discussing this note and 
the time of its presentation with the head of the Central Division 
(Captain Schuirmann) when General Marshall called me on the 'phone 
to ask if I knew of it. I told him [567(^] I did, and he asked 
me what I thought about sending the information concerning the time 
of presentation on to the various commanders in the Pacific. My 
first answer to him was that we had sent them so much already that 
I hesitated to send more. I hung up the 'phone, and not more than 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2133 

a minute or two later I called him back, stating that there might be 
some peculiar significance in the Japanese Ambassador calling on 
Mr. Hull at 1 p, m. and that I would go along with him in sending 
the information to the Pacific. I asked him if his communications 
were such that he could get it out quickly because our communications 
were quite rapid when the occasion demanded it. He replied that he 
felt he could get it through very quickly. I then asked him to include 
in the despatch instructions to his people to inform their naval op- 
posites. 

I am informed that this despatch''' was sent "First Priority" to 
the Army Forces in the Far East (Philippines), Caribbean [5677] 
Defense Command (Canal Zone), Hawaiian Department, and the 
Fourth Army (San Francisco). I am told that the message was sent 
at 1217 EST (0G47 Honolulu time) to the Hawaiian Department, but 
was not delivered in Hawaii until after the attack. 

109. My presentation of the manner in which I discharged my 
responsibility to keep the fleet commanders fully informed of all sig- 
nificant military and political developments would not be complete 
without a reference to certain very secret information which we were 
receiving during this period. This information was gathered by the 
intelligence centers at the headquarters of Commandant, Sixteenth 
Naval District (Cavite), Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District 
(Pearl Harbor), and the Office of Naval Intelligence (Washington). 
There was a considerable volume of this material received in Washing- 
ton during 1941, but it increased substantially during the last half 
of the year. The volume was so great and the personnel qualified to 
handle it so limited that we shared the work with the Army — they 
processed the material one day, we did it the next. 

110. To be useful, the diplomatic information obtained from this 
source required careful evaluation, a task which could be better per- 
formed here in Washington where the officers charged with this task 
had access to other sources of information, such as the State and War 
Departments. 

111. After this information was evaluated and distilled — [5678] 
so to speak — we sent our conclusions and recommendations to the fleet 
commanders for their information and guidance. 

112. I considered that the letters and despatches I sent to Com- 
mander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet 
were sufficient to keep them informed on the important military and 
political developments in the Pacific as we knew them, and that they 
had received adequate information and directives to be on guard. 

113. I have gone into considerable detail — though by no means men- 
tioning all my letters and despatches — to indicate to the committee 
how I discharged my duties as Chief of Naval Operations with ref- 
erence to the expansion of the entire naval establishment, its strength 
and efficiency ; with reference to plans for the use of the fleet in war ; 
with reference to assignment of forces available in accordance with 
war plans ; and with reference to keeping the fleet commanders in- 
formed of important political and military developments affecting 
them. 



♦The text is quoted for the convenience of the committee : 

"Japanese are presenting at one p. m. eastern standard time today what amounts to an- 
ultimatum ; also thev are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. 

".lust what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accord- 
ingly. Inform naval authovHiea of this communication." 



2134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

114. I have endeavored to stick to the record of events as they hap- 
pened, rather than to give present impressions of what has happened, 
or of conjectures as to what might have happened if some things had 
been done differently. 

115. My correspondence with the Commanders in Chief in the Pa- 
cific during the years 1940 and 1941 indicated that for almost two 
years before the attack on Pearl Harbor the lack [6679'] of 
physical resources was fully known to all the Navy officers in critical 
positions, and that the danger of war with Japan and a possible sur- 
prise attack on Pearl Harbor and methods of meeting it had been 
fully considered. 

116. By way of summary, I would like to point out that during the 
vjritical period October, November, and December 1941, I sent the 
following specific warnings to the Commanders in the Pacific : 

(a) Secret dispatch, dated 16 October 1941, containing the state- 
ment: 

The resignation of the Japanese cabinet has created a grave situation. If a 
new cabinet is fox'med it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti- 
America. * * * Since the U. S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan 
for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may 
attack these two powers. * * * 

(b) My letter to Admiral Kimmel, copy to Admiral Hart, dated 17 
October 1941, containing the following words: 

Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message 
I sent you merely stated the "possibility" ; in fact I tempered the message handed 
to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after 
long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least 
until something indicates the trend. 

[5680] (c) My letter to Admiral Kimmel, dated 7 November 
1941, containing the paragraph : 

Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when 
it will break, no one can tell. The principal reaction I have to it all is what I have 
written you before ; it continually gets "worser and worser" ! A month may 
see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable polices cannot go on forever — 
particularly if one party cannot live with the set up. It doesn't look good. 

(d) My letter to Admiral Kimmel, dated 14 November 1941, in 
which I stated : 

* * ♦ I note this morning in the press despatches a listing of a number of 
points by the Japan Times and Advertiser upon which concession by the United 
States was necessary for the "solution of the Pacific Crisis". Complete capitula- 
tion by the United States on every point of difference between the Japanese and 
this country was indicated as a satisfactory solution. It will be impossible to 
reconcile such divergent points of view. 

With this letter, I enclosed a memorandum for the President, pre- 
pared jointly by General Marshall and me, in which the following con- 
clusion is stated : 

War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building 
up defensive forces in the Far East, [5681] until such time as Japan 
attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of 
very great importance. 

and in which we recommended : 

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2135 

[5682] (e) Secret dispatch, dated 24 November 1941, stating 

that 

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This 
situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their 
naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive 
movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a 
possibility. 

(f) My letter to Admiral Kimmel, dated 25 November 1941, includ- 
ing the statement that neither the President nor Mr. Hull 

would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. 

(g) Secret dispatch, dated 27 November 1941, including the para- 
graph : 

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan 
looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggres- 
sive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. * * * Execute an 
appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned 
in WPL-46 (the war plan). 

(h) Secret dispatch, dated 3 December 1941, stating: 

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent in- 
structions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts 
[56SS] at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to 
destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important 
confidential and secret documents. 

(i) Secret dispatch, dated 3 December 1941, stating : 

Circular Twenty Four Forty Four from Tokyo one December ordered London, 
Hongkong, Singapore and Manila to destroy purple machine. Batavia machine 
already sent to Tokyo. December second Washington also directed destroy 
purple, all but one copy of other systems, and all secret documents. British 
Admiralty London today report Embassy London has complied. 

(j) Secret dispatch, dated 4 December 1941, stating: 

Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified 
matter except that essential for current purposes and special intelligence re- 
taining minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications 
with CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 14, COM 16 and OPNAV. Be prepared to 
destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain. Report 
crypto channels retained. 

(k) Secret dispatch, dated 6 December 1941, stating: 

l568Jf] In view of the international situation and the exposed i)Osition 
of our outlying Pacific islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret 
and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency. 
Means of communication to suport our current operations and special intelligence 
should of course be maintained until the last moment. 

That concludes the statement. 

[S68S] Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Stark, in 1940, when the dis- 
cussion arose between Admiral Richardson, then Commander of the 
Pacific Fleet, and officials in Washington, about basing the fleet at 
Pearl Harbor, according to the record we have to take, no question was 
raised by anybody prior to November 1940 about the safety of the 
fleet while in Pearl Harbor ; is that in accord with your recollection ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall anything up until the letter 
which 

Mr. Mitchell. Which you wrote ? 

Admiral Stark. Which I wrote at that time. There may have been. 



2136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. MiTCiiELL. Admiral Richardson gave the Secretary of the 
Navy a memorandum dated September 12 in which he listed all the 
objections he had to keeping the fleet based at Pearl Harbor, and in 
that list there was no suggestion about the dangers to the fleet while 
in Pearl Harbor. Can you remember any instance where the safety 
of the fleet was discussed before that ? I mean, safety while in Pearl 
Harbor. 

Admiral Stark. I do not, specifically. I have a rather hazy re- 
membrance that before I wrote Admiral Richardson asking him to 
get data with Com. 14, with the Army, I had written Admiral Bloch, 
in fact, I think a letter to Admiral Richardson stated that I had 
gotten some information but it wasn't specific [66861 or com- 
plete enough for our purposes, and we wanted the entire situation 
gone over. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the first document in evidence we have in this 
case that anybody was worrying about the safety of tl^e fleet while in 
Pearl Harbor is your letter of November 22, 1910. written to Admiral 
Richardson in which you referred to a dispatch that you had sent in 
October to Admiral Bloch asking him for a report on the question of 
safety. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. What inspired you to write that letter, how did it 
happen that it occurred? 

Admiral Stark. The incident at Taranto and the British success 
there in torpedoing ships at anchor in harbor. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, that was an attack that the British made on 
the Italian fleet in the harbor with torpedo planes, was it? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And bombers. Which was quite successful? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. Of course, we had long and often 
thought of an attack on Pearl Hnrlwr as a possibility and something 
which might some day be pnlled. Our fleet exercises always con- 
tained an exercise of an attack in which the two sides, the attacking 
force wanted to get in, if it could, and the defending force, of course, 
would first want to get the [56S71 attacking forces carriers. 
I mean, it has been much discussed. So, I am answering your ques- 
tion by saying that was the first time T am thinking of what docu- 
mentary evidence I can recall at the moment. Whether or not T had 
mentioned it ])reviou?ly in some of my letters to Admiral Richardson, 
T would have to look it up. 

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Richardson didn't raise any question about 
the safety of the fleet as a reason for going back to the coast? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Mr. IMiTCHELL. You agreed with him. didn't yon, about the better 
training facilities? 

Admiral Stark. I did agree with him, yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. You didn't raise any question at that time about the 
safety of the fleet? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. It was after the decision had been made to keep the 
fleet out there and a little time had passed that then you began to 
think about the problem; is that it? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. When the fleet went out there for 
that fleet problem I had no thought, and so far as I know, no one else 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE ' 2137 

had any thought whatsoever of the fleet remaining there. It all de- 
velopecl when we talked about bringing the fleet back. We had not, not 
having envisaged the [S6'88] fleet going out there, we had not 
sent many things which they would need to carry on their routine 
target practice, which was one of the things Admiral Kicharclson was 
worried about. The fleet had left with the idea of coming back. The 
people on the coast all expected the fleet to come back. The question 
of morale came up. Of reenlistments. In other words, personnel 
and morale and material conditions affecting training of the fleet, and 
also getting it ready for war quickly, that was what he was concerned 
about. Now, the drill out there, and so forth— rancl we did get them 
ready, but if he came back to the coast he could strip a ship more 
effectively and quicker than he could out there. It could be done out 
there. But those were his primary reasons. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, as the result of your letter to Admiral Rich- 
ardson of November 22, 1940, you remember he undertook an inquiry. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. He went right out into the Army defenses and 
inspected those, did he not? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. We asked — the letter to him stated not 
only the fleet but the commandant of the naval district, and also the 
Army — so that all hands out there would be in on that estimate. 

[S689] Mr. Mitchell. Well, do you recall that it was as a result 
of an inquiry, started and conducted in that way, that Admiral Bloch 
made his report of December 30, which is in evidence here? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. The report came in and our reply was 
largely predicated on it. 

Mr. Mitchell. I notice here 

Admiral Stark. That is, our action, I should say. 

Mr. Mitchell. There has been handed me a copy of the letter from 
the Chief of Naval Operations to the Director of Naval Districts Divi- 
sion, dated December 31, 1940, a memorandum signed by R. E. Inger- 
soll, Acting Chief of Naval Operations. I have never seen it before. 
Have you any knowledge of that ? 

Admiral Stark. I would like to see it. 

(Short pause.) 

Mr. Mitchell. This is one of the papers that j^ou have in the brown 
envelope. 

The Chairman. You mean the one we got today ? 

Mr. Mitchell. In the same envelope. 

[6600] Admiral Stark. I think I saw that. It had slipped my 
mind for the moment. 

Mr. Mitchell. That letter was written before Bloch's report came 
in, wasn't it? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. His report was dated the 30th of December, indorsed 
by Richardson at Hawaii on the 7th of January. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I would like to put that in evidence and I will read 
it into the record. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Mitchell. It is (reading) : 



2138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

From : The Chief of Naval Operations. 
To : Director, Naval Districts Division. 
Subject : Defense of Pearl Harbor by Army. 

1. The Chief of Naval Operations has for some time felt considerable concern 
over whether the Army's anti-aircraft defense of the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, 
including vessels of the United States Fleet berthed there, is adequate in view of 
the probability of an early surprise attack by carrier aircraft if Japan decides to 
make war on the United States. 

2. It is, therefore, requested that information be obtained concerning the details 
of the Army's Hawaiian defense plan in this regard. We should be informed as 
to their present and also the projected anti-aii"craft defense, including such 
features as the following : 

(a) Number, caliber, and proposed location of anti-aircraft guns, including 
machine guns. 

(b) Use that is to be made of smoke screens from either fixed or mobile sources. 

(c) Number and location of pursuit planes to be used for this purpose, with 
probable percentage of availability. 

(d) The character and extent of the wraning net to be used, from shore or 
floating stations, and the present i)ercentage of availability of such stations. 

(e) Whether or not the present defense elements have received adequate 
training. 

R. E. Ingeirsoll, 

Acting. 

Now, here is another letter dated January 9, 1941, that has not yet 
been offered in evidence, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the 
Chief of Staff. That is again signed by Admiral Ingersoll. Did you 
know of that at the time it was sent to the Chief of Staff? 

Admiral Stark. January 9th ? 

Mr. Mitchell. January 9th 

[5692] Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; I think I saw that. I think 
I have seen that despatch. 

Mr. Mitchell. I will read that into the record. [Reading :] 

January 9, 1941. 
From : The Chief of Naval Operations : 
To : The Chietf of Staff, U. S. Army. 
Subject : Installation of Aircraft Detection Equipment. 

1. The Navy Department con.><iders that improvement of the antiaircraft 
defenses, and particularly of the aircraft detection components of thosei de- 
fenses, in the Hawaiian Islands is urgently necessary for the protection of the 
fleet units there present. It is believed that in the spring and summer of 1941 
enemy air operations are much more likely to take place in the Hawaiian area 
and in Alaska than in Puerto Rico. Panama and the Continental United States. 

2. For the foregoing reason the intended priority of permanent installation 
of the lixed anti-aircinft detection equiimiciit being procnieil by the Navy is a^' 
follows: Midway, Johnston, Guam, Palmyra. Samoa, Wake, Gnantanamo. It is 
r^uested that consideration be given to revising schedules of delivery so as to 
provide Army installations in the Hawaiian Islands and at Kodiak, Dutch 
Harbor and Sitka before completing installations at Panama and before pro- 
ceeding with [569S] installations in Puerto Rico and the continental 
United States. 

.S. Confirmation is also requested of the understanding reached on 8 Janu- 
ary 1941 in a conference between the Director of Naval Communications, the 
Chief Signal Office, and representatives of the War Plans Divisicmis of both 
services, that the Navy Department will be given priority in deliveries of seven 
sets of mobile equipment and at least eight of the eighteen sets of antiaircraft 
equipment for the use of Marine Defense Battalions. 

4. It was learned in the conference on S January that delays are anticipated 
in obtaining steel for use in completing this equipment. It is recommended 
that the highest priority be given to production of this eqi;ipment and supplying 
the material needed. The Navy Department will be glad to cooperate in obtain- 
ing the necessary priorities. 

R. E. Ingersoll. 

Acting. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2139 

Now, following that this Bloch report came in. You remember 
that? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Mitchell. In which he condemned the situation at Hawaii 
as inadequate for defense against an air attack ? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir. 

\6€9Jf] Mr. Mitchell. And then you said in your statement 
today that you caused that letter to be written by Secretary Knox to 
Secretary of War Stimson ? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. 

Mr. Mitchell. What part did you take in that ? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Turner said that he did, too. 

Admiral Stark. That letter was formed in the War Plans Division, 
gone over very carefully in the front office and then submitted to the 
Secretary for signature. 

Mr. Mitchell. You were in full accord with the conclusions in that 
letter? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; in complete accord with it. 

Mr. Mitchell. From that time on, following that letter to the 
Secretary of War, steps were taken by both the Army and the Navy 
to prime the defense, both naval and military, in Hawaii against a 
possible air attack, were they not? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, we have had here in much of the correspond- 
ence between General Marshall and General Short, as to the latter's 
desire for more planes and guns and other equipment. What did 
the Navy do? What did you do toward supplying Admiral Kimmel 
with any additional equipment that he needed or that was available 
for defense against an air [6695'] attack in the way of anti- 
aircraft equipment on the ground or fighter planes or reconnaissance 
planes, PBY's? 

Admiral Stark. We increased — I have forgotten just how much, 
of course it is a matter of record — the number of squadrons he had 
out there capable of long distance reconnaissance. With regard to 
surface vessels, we were able to do very, very little for him and we 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, were surface vessels of real significance in the 
detection of an incoming enemy carrier force ? 

Admiral Stark. They would have been helpful, yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. They would have had a great deal of ground to 
cover, would they not ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, they would have had a great deal of ground 
to cover but still you will note in his letters his constant request for 
them and my statement to him that we could not supply them. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I inferred from his letters that he was refer- 
ring a good deal to patrols against submarines. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, but they might have helped him in an emer- 
gency to use his eyes. For example, we told him that we did not have 
them and that he would have to detail such craft from his own fleet, 
which meant a detail of destroyers. I told him — I think it appears 
in one of these personal [S69S] letters — that statement and 
we also sent him an official letter to that extent. 



2140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. Am I wrong in thinking that that patrol by sur- 
face craft was merely for the purpose of determining submarines 
approaching and vessels ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, it was all to be used in that, in the distance. 
It would have helped him for use in shore patrol, but he might have 
extended them. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you were familiar with the plans that were 
made from time to time thereafter affecting Hawaii, directed toward 
the coordination and the union of action between the Army and Navy 
forces in defense against an air attack ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember the Martin-Bellinger report? 

Admiral Stark. Very clearly, yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. In which they practically described the Jap attack 
as it afterwards occurred? 

Admiral Stark. Well, we thought that report was so good when it 
came in that we distributed it as noted in the statement. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, in August 1941 there was a report 
or study by General Martin, the Army air commander, [6697] 
that went directly to the Chief of the Army Air Forces. Did you 
see that, that study of reconnaissance by Martin? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall having seen it at the time. I may 
have. I have seen it since. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, that report showed very clearly that in order 
to insure against the complete thwarting of an air attack by the Japs 
it would be necessary to detect their carriers at sea the afternoon be- 
fore and bomb them ? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. 

Mr. Mitchell. That was the conclusion that Martin and Bellinger 
reached together, was it not? 

Admiral Stark. Well, the conclusion was to spot them, if you could, 
before they could launch their planes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, that is what I am leading up to. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. IMiTCiiELL. Now, in order to be sure that your fleet was not 
going to be bombed from the air they agreed that you would have to 
catch the carriers before their planes were launched, did they not? 

Admiral Stark. Tliat is correct, yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And they figured out that the natural way for the 
Japs to come in there would be at daylight, that is', with the planes. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

[56981 Mr. Mitchell. And it would be necessary to run a recon- 
naissance out for seven or eight or nine hundred or a thousand miles 
and detect them the afternoon or the ninht before in order to damage 
them before their planes were launched, is that right ? 

Admiral Stark. It is always the objective to get the carriers before 
they can launch their planes. 

Mr. Mitchell. And it was also equally true, as they said, that 
actually if you could not do that, if you had to rely on catching the 
planes in the morning after they had left tlie carriers and had been 
launched at a distance up to two or three or four liundred miles, they 
could not be confident that the attack would not get home to some 
extent. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2141 

Admiral Stark. It is pretty difficult to stop all of an air attack once 
it gets started. You might break up its effectiveness somewhat but 
some planes, we have always felt, are very likely to get in. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, as a result of all those studies and all 
those plans, which indicated very clearly that unless you had a certain 
number of reconnaissance planes and a certain number of bombers you 
could not count on discovering the Japs before they had launched their 
planes, you were taking some hazards by having your fleet in Pearl 
Harbor, isn't that correct? 

[S699] Admiral Stark. There is always a hazard to have a fleet 
on the firing line, sir, or in an exposed position and there has been ever 
since the war started. 

Mr. Mitchj:ll. The number of planes that the Army had and the 
number of planes that the Navy had were admittedly known at both 
ends, both at Hawaii and in Washington by the Army and Navy to be 
inadequate to run a full reconnaissance over a 360-clegree circle at a 
distance of seven or eight hundred miles, is that true? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct, yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And isn't it a fact that your PBY's, plus the bombers 
that were there for the Army, were so limited in number that the best 
you could put out, or that the commander out there could put out would 
be to run a sectional reconnaissance, taking one sector one afternoon 
or morning and another one another day ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. He did not have enough for a 360-degree 
search. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, even assuming that he left out the west and 
southwest, where your task forces were operating and Guam and Mid- 
way intervening and all that, and he even tried to cover the area to 
the north, which was apparently the dangerous area, there being little 
traffic up there, the commanders out there could not have run a recon- 
naissance that would [5700] cover more than a third of the 
area in one day, could they? 

Admiral Stark. Well, 1 do not understand just what you mean by 
"a third of the way" or "a third of the area." 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I am speaking of a sector. There is 180 de- 
grees on the north side on a horizontal line. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I am speaking of a reconnaissance to the north. 

Admiral Stark. Yes. He did not have enough for that whole 
northern semicircle. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, could they have covered more than a third of 
that northern semicircle daily? 

Admiral Stark. The air people have testified on that, as to what 
they could cover, or if they have not testified they can testify, con- 
sidering the upkeep of their planes and their pilots, and so forth, 
and I hesitate to get into detail on that. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Martin said he needed 189 big four-motored 
planes to run a 360-degree reconnaissance daily out to a distance of 700 
or 800 miles. That would mean half that number at least to run the 
180-degree sector, would it not, and you did not have that many? 

Admiral Stark. Kimmel had available, without regard to Army 
planes, approximately 60 operating planes at that time. [6701] 
He had 82, I believe, out there, of which 60 were operating. There 
are always a certain number laid up for repairs. 



2142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, he had a little less than a third of the planes 
that Martin reported he needed for the 360 degrees. 

Admiral Stark. As I say, that has been studied both by the Army 
and the Navy. There has been testimony submitted, not before this 
court, but I believe before the Navy last summer, or perhaps before 
the Army, as to what could have been done and witnesses can be 
called for that. I would hesitate to pronounce an opinion. 

Mr. Mitchell. I was hoping possibly that you had given that sub- 
ject some thought in 1941 when the question of the safety of the fleet 
was at stake and that maybe you had formed some ideas yourself about 
the extent of the hazards and the difficulty of their discovering the 
Jap carrier fleet in that way. Did you not give it some attention men ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. What we did was to give them in distribut- 
ing all we had to different areas, all that we felt that they needed — 
all that we felt that we could give them. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is right. 

Admiral Stark. They needed more, 

Mr. Mitchell. You gave them everything you had. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

[5702] Mr. Mitchell. But it was not quite enough. 

Admiral Stark. No, it was not. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is just what I am getting to. I think I am not 
making any statement exactly as to what the record will show, but 
the impression one gains from it to date is that admittedly they were 
away short of the reconnaissance planes, fighting planes and anti- 
aircraft of Hawaii and that the chances of detecting a carrier force 
in time to destroy the carriers before the planes were launched was a 
rather slim chance, as Mr. Churchill said about the Chinese. 

Admiral Stark. When you haven't got enough planes to search 
the entire area which you would like to search, whether it is planes or 
what not, you narrow down to where you think is the most likely area 
of travel and your next study is how can you cover that or how much 
of it you can cover. That had been studied out, I believe, and wit- 
nesses who have made that study can be available. 

Mr. Mitchell. I was trying to get your views on it. 

Admiral Stark. I know it only by hearsay. I never made a per- 
sonal study of the number of degrees they could cover, and so forth. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, were you troubled about the possibility of an 
air attack at Hawaii after the 1st of November 1941 as a possibility? 
Did it seem to you to be a real [5703] hazard ? 

Admiral Stark. We always recognized the possibility. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, when you had a fleet out there and you 
did not have an adequate antiaircraft defense why were you not wor- 
ried about the safety of the fleet in Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Stark. 1 stated in my letter that I was worried about it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, that is in November 1940. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I am bringing you down now to the period between 
November 27th and December 7, 1941. Had you lost your fear of an 
air attack? 

Admiral Stark. No, I won't say that I was fearing an air attack. 
We recognized the possibility of it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, had you changed your views? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2143 

Admiral Stark. And we recognized that we should be ready so far 
as what we had available to use. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, suppose you did not have enough and you 
thouglit there was a substantial hazard, didn't tlie question arise in 
your mind and those of your staff here as to what you ought to do, 
whether you ought to move the fleet east a ways or make arrangements 
to keep a smaller number of the vessels in the harbor at a time and 
things of that kind ? 

[6704] Admiral Stark. There are certain hazards which you 
have to anticipate. As to just what should be kept in port and what 
should be kept at sea of what was out there, that was clearly up to the 
man on the spot. 

Mr. Mitchell. Your idea was that having done everything you could 
for him and given him all the equipment that you could scrape up and 
he was still inadequately prepared to defend against an air attack, that 
the responsibility of just what he did to meet that situation was up to 
him, is that the idea ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. That was all we could do, except we were 
pressing continually to get more material. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, 1 know, but I am talking now about on Novem- 
ber 27th, when the clock had struck and the codes were being burned 
and war was a matter of days and you could not get any material in 
that length of time. You were up against a second problem, weren't 
you, of how to handle the fleet at Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, it was then up to the Commander in Chief 
on the spot. I would not have presumed, sitting at a desk in Washing- 
ton, to tell him what to do with his fleet. There were many factors in- 
volved, of which he was the only person who had the knowledge, and 
once I had started, if I had started, to give him directives, I would have 
been [570-5] handling the fleet. That was not my job. 

Mr. Mitchell. I was wondering why when you sent the warning 
message at that time, what does this "defensive deployment" mean 
that was in your message of November 27th ? Wliat does that mean as 
applied to the conditions that existed there ? 

Admiral Stark. My thought in that message about the defensive 
deployment was clear all-out security measures. Certainly, having 
been directed to take a defensive deployment, the Army having been 
directed to make reconnaissance, but regardless of the Army, our 
message to Admiral Kimmel, that the natural thing — and perhaps 
he did do it — was to take up with the Army right away in the gravity 
of the situation, the plans that they had made, and then make dis- 
positions as best he could against surprise for the safety not only of 
the ships which he decided to keep in port but also for the safety of 
the ships which he had at sea. He had certain material which he 
could use for that and we naturally expected he would use it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the word "deployment," at least in the Army 
sense, is to scatter, isn't it ? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct, yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Is that what you meant when you applied it to the 
Navy command? 

[S706] Admiral Stark. He should deploy what planes he had ; 
submarines are splendid craft to see without being seen. They might 
have been employed. He could have used a light force if he had seen 



2144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

fit and had them available. He had certain forces at sea. We were 
not handling them. That was his force. Just what deployment he 
was using them for, that also was up to him. He could search — I am 
not stating that he should and it is difficult to testify on this, par- 
ticularly in the light of hindsight. 

Mr. Mitchell. I know. 

Admiral Stark. It is awfully difficult to keep away from it. 

Mr. Mitchell. I am just trying to get a translation of the words 
"defensive deployment." 

Admiral Stark. Well, a defensive deployment would be to spread 
and to use his forces to the maximum extent to avoid surprise and, 
if he could, to hit the other fellow and in conjunction with the Army, 
to implement the arrangements which had previously been made for 
just this sort of thing. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you think the possibilities of a successful sur- 
prise attack by the Japs in the way that it was done was increased 
by moving the shipping out of the northern ship lanes in October? 
Did that give the Japs a little better chance to get through without 
being observed ? 

[S707] Admiral Stark. It never occurred to me, I never thought 
of it in that light until I heard it brought up recently, because there 
were not many ships up there, not an awful lot anj^way. It was easy 
to cross the lanes. A fleet that does not want to be seen and that has 
adequate air scouting does not have to be seen as a rule. They can 
steam darkened at night. Also, they can searcli out the night area 
that they propose to go through and I would not have said that it had 
any bearing. 

Mr. Mitchell. You were aware, of course, that the Jap espionage 
system in Hawaii was working without any real hindrance ? 

Admiral Stark. The Jap what, sir? 

Mr. Mitchell. The Jap espionage system, their spies in Hawaii. 

Admiral Stark. We had always felt — and again there are other 
witnesses available to 3^011 there who can tell you just what the Japs 
were doing. We had felt that not only in Hawaii but at practically all 
our given posts tlie Japs knew everything we were doing. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you told us here, and you, yourself, knew then 
in 1941, that the Japs not only had every opportunity to watch 
the movements in Hawaii and to know whether the forces there were 
alert or not alert, but tliey also had other means of communicating it 
to their superiors in Tokyo. They liad access to the radio and to the 
cable companies ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; that is correct. 

Mr. Mitchell. Don't you think that really the key to this attack 
at Pearl Harbor was not only the fact that our forces were not alerted 
but that the Japs knew it ? 

Admiral Stark. You mean they knew our forces were not alerted? 

Mr. ]\Iitchell. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. That would be conjecture. I do not know, sir. 
They may have, but I do not know. We have nothing, I believe, of 
record to show it. I think it is very likely. 

Mr. Mitchell. We have plenty in this record to show they were 
getting dispatches from Hawaii every day telling exactly what was 
going on and they were inquiring about the conditions there. Some 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2145 

of these dispatches that we did get and decoded in time talk about air- 
craft reconnaissance and all that sort of thing. 

Admiral Stark. That is true, yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. It is a fact, isn't it, that they must have known every- 
thing he was doing and had every means of reporting that fact to their 
government. 

Admiral Stark. That is true, yes, sir. Just what they reported in 
the last hours I do not know, but what you say is [5709] quite 
true. 

Mr. Mitchell. I do not mean over the last hours but I mean over 
the last weeks. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. As a matter of fact, that was a considerable hazard 
normally in the Japs making an attack of that kind, a hazard to them, 
was it not ? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct, yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And in order to decide whether they would take it 
or not they would have to know something about the extent of pre- 
paredness at the other end, wouldn't they? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you know here in Washington between Novem- 
ber 27 and December 7, 1941, that our D. F. system, direction finder 
system, had lost track of all but two divisions of Jap carriers and that 
they did not pick them up again before the 7th ? 

Admiral Stark. I was familiar at that time in general with the 
general picture. It is a long time ago and what I heard recently that 
is so definite on that. Just how much I am colored by hindsight on 
that I do not know. I do distinctly recall their changes of call signs 
and that sort of material and also we asked — it shows in the record, I 
believe — the Army to make reconnaissance over the Mandates 
[5710] and we were not too sure at that time, in fact I say we were 
not too sure ; the last information we had as to the carriers had come in 
some time previously as I recall. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, your report sheets that we have here about 
the location of carriers seem to differ a little bit from the ones that 
they were using out in Hawaii. Didn't you get your inf ormtaion from 
Hawaii or did you pick it up directly here in the Navy Department? 

Admiral Stark. The information that came in with regard to mate- 
rial of that sort came from the field. That is, it came from Hawaii and 
it came from the Philippines. We were dependent upon them for 
that information. 

Mr. Mitchell. You had about the same data to work on that they 
did? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, there are two in one of the old records that 
has not been presented yet here, there is evidence by one of the officers 
in charge of that work in Hawaii, of the direction finding reports and 
ship locations, that they lost track of the Jap carriers around the 26th 
or 27th of November and that he reported it to his chief. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did anything like that occur around that time? 
Did anybody call it to your attention anything to [5711] that 
effect? 

79716 — 46— pt. 5 7 



2146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. I have no recollection of it now. 

The Chairman. Are you ready to suspend? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

The Chairman. The committee will stand in recess until 10 o clock 
on Wednesday morning. The chair desires to hold a brief executive 
session with the committee and everybody else will please retire from 

the room. . 

(Whereupon, at 4 : 10 p. m., December 31, 1945, an adjournment was 
taken until 10 a. m., Wednesday, January 2, 1946.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2147 



[57m PEAEL HARBOE ATTACK 



WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 2, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF the Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington^ D. C. 
The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, and Fergu- 
son, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman). Murphy, and 
Gearhart. 

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. 
Gesell and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the Joint Committee. 

[6713^ The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 
Counsel may proceed with Admiral Stark. 

TESTIMONY OF ADM. HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed) 

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Stark, there is a letter from you to Admiral 
Richardson dated December 23, 1940, in which you offered the predic- 
tion that war with Japan would come at any time after the next 90 
days and tlien I notice on October 17, 1941, there is a letter from you 
to Admiral Kimmel in which you state : "Personally I do not believe 
the Japanese are going to sail into us." 

What caused your change in view about the possibility or proba- 
bility of war with Japan during that period ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, it was the information that developed as 
time went on. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, just what information was it that indicated 
any less tension with Japan up to October 1941 that led you to reach 
that conclusion ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, it is the information which is on file and 
which I have read, you may recall, I think, in my statement, I remem- 
ber distinctly of having written it, that at one point in 1941 Japan 
seemed to have developed one of those waiting attitudes, that there 
was sort of a lull, and tiiat may have accounted for that. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was your view the same as that expressed [5714] 
here by Admiral Wilkinson, that you thought the Japs would nudge 
along slowly and grab what it could without a fight ? Did you have 
the same view as Wilkinson about that? 

Admiral Stark. Well, I had in mind and I think — well, I will say 
that I had in mind the possibility of Japan playing the same game that 
Hitler did, that is, one at a time. That was just one factor. 



2148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, when it came to November 24, 1941, and 
your warning of November 27 you changed back to the view then that 
war with Japan was only a matter of days. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. It is the message of November 27, 1941. 

Admiral Staek. The message of the 27th or the 24th ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Both of them I should have said. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I am referring now to the two messages of November 
24 and 27 which you sent to Admiral Kimmel, the warning messages 
in which you then appeared to have the view that war was only a matter 
of days. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. What was that based on ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, we had at that time the intercepts giving dead 
lines, which I think you will recall, the first being the 25th, the next 
the 29th. That furnished some [o71S] background. We had 
the note of the Japanese of November 20, I believe it was, which was 
irreconcilable with our viewpoint. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have before you the intercepts which Japan 
had sent to their Ambassadors here, which said that unless they get 
an affirmative agreement from us to abandon China and start fur- 
nishing them oil that they would go ahead, or something would auto- 
matically happen? 

Admiral Stark. Well, I had that also. I have forgotten just when 
the intercept came in. I may also state, since you included the mes- 
sage of the 27th, we had Mr. Hull's reaction to the Chiang Kai-Shek 
notes regarding the modus vivendl. 

Mr. Mitchell. You mean you learned from him that he had aban- 
doned the idea of the modus vivendi because of the objections of Chiang 
Kai-Shek that it would collapse China's army ? 

Admiral Stark. I may state with regard to the message from Chiang 
Kai-Shek that Mr. Hull called me up, I am not sure just when, it may 
have been the 25th or it may have been the 26th, I kept no record and 
I have tried to straighten that out, but he called me up stating how 
very much he was put out by the action of Chiang Kai-Shek in sending 
that despatch and rather broadcasting it and it worried him very 
greatly and I gathered that that, along with other reactions that he 
had, might lead him to abandon the modus vivendl^ and then we had 
1^5716^ also his statement about that time that it was now up to 
the Army and Nav}^ It was the first time that Mr. Hull had stated 
definitely to me, indicated to me, that he considered there was no chance 
of a settlement through diplomatic intercourse with the Japs. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, in your warning messages of November 
24 and 27, 1941, you had taken into account and evaluated all these 
Japanese diplomatic intercepts and the exchanges which showed the 
dead line and the refusal of Japan to go along unless we affirmatively 
agreed to their ideas, you took all that into account and evaluation? 

Adniiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, assuming for the present at least that you gave 
your commander at Pearl Harbor a sufficient warning of the imminence 
of immediate war generally with Japan in a few days, I am interested 
in knowing what your attitude was about the possibility of that war 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2149 

involving an attack on Pearl Harbor. They are quite two different 
things, are they not? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, the commanders at Hawaii were evidently of 
the opinion that there wasn't any chance of an air attack and what 
I am interested in bringing out is what the views and the attitude of 
the high command in the Navy Depart- [5717] ment were on 
that very point. Now, what was your personal view about the possi- 
bility of an air attack on Hawaii as of November 27 to December 7, 
1941'? 

Admiral Stark. I was not expecting an air attack on Hawaii at 
that time. I was surprised at that attack. I knew it to be a possi- 
bility, which I think is plain from the letters that I have written and 
our efforts to help them out there to be in position to guard against 
such an attack, but as to actually expecting an attack at that time, 
I did not. The evidence which we had and the only tangible evidence 
was that the action, the initial attacks by the Japs, would come in the 
Far Eastern area. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, did your view accord with that of your 
chief assistants in the Navy Department? 

Admiral Stark. I believe Admiral Ingersoll is to be one of the wit- 
nesses here and in his testimony of last summer it is my recollection 
that he stated that he also was surprised at that attack. 

Mr. Mitchell. I am referring not so much to his testimony given 
since as to their expressions at the time you had consultations with 
them. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir, it is my recollection that he was surprised 
at that time. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, before the attack did Admiral Inger- 
16718] soil or any other of your assistants in their consultations 
with you make any expressions to you as to their views about an air 
attack before December 7? Was it the subject of discussion? 

Admiral Stark. It was a subject of discussion so far as possibility 
is concerned. As I recollect, we went into all phases of it but we 
did not have anything definitely pointing toward an air attack. How- 
ever, it was our intention to put the forces in the Pacific, to put Hawaii 
on guard against an air attack. It is my recollection that the words 
"in any direction" appearing in the message of November 24 was at 
my suggestion. In other words, we had some definite indications of 
an attack in certain directions, and which proved to be correct as re- 
gards the main campaign, but that did not preclude attack elsewhere, 
and by the words "in any direction" we intended to convey that it 
might come anywhere, but personally I did not expect an attack on 
such a broad scale by Japan in the initial stages, that is, not only all 
oyer the Far East but as far east as Hawaii. I knew it to be a possi- 
bility; and as regards submarines, I would not have been a bit sur- 
prised if some submarines had appeared, for example, off San 
Francisco or anywhere else in the Pacific, but we looked for the main 
effort in the Far East but it was our intention to convey to Hawaii 
the possibility of an attack there; that is, it was [5719] our 
intention, at least, to put them on guard against such an attack and 
we thought we had done so. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, if you had that in your mind when you 
wrote these messages of November 24 and November 27, why did you 



2150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

say merely, "Including the Philippines and Guam" as a possibility, 
or mention even Borneo as a possibility? Why didn't you say some- 
thing to the effect that an attack on Hawaii is a possibility ? 

Admiral Stark, Well, the Philippines and Borneo and that area 
in general and Guam was in our thoughts not only as a possibility 
but as a likely point of attack. I think perhaps my best answer to 
your question would be that we did not put Hawaii down as likely 
of attack as we did these other places. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I know but, still, if you thought that there 
was any possibility, if your intention was to put the commanders at 
Hawaii on alert against a local attack, why not say so in the mes- 
sages? Doesn't the message really reflect your view, your personal 
opinion that Hawaii was really not in substantial hazard of any 
attack ? 

Admiral Stark. No, I would not go that — I would not say that, 
sir, because if we had thought that there was no possibility or no 
danger of that we would not have given them the directive which 
we did, which directive was intended to have them take up a position 
or take action against surprise ; [6730'] that is the directive to 
make a defensive deployment. 

May I just refer to this message of the 27th for a minute and look 
at it? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. It will be noted that when w^e stated "Japan is 
expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days" we 
stated, which was from the information we had, that "the number 
and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task 
forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philip- 
pines or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo," and then we gave 
the directive. We gave the information which we had. We had 
nothing which we thought at that time — I may say certain messages 
have been developed since regarding which I assume you will ask me. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. But at that time we had nothing, or at least I do 
not recall having anything which indicated an attack on Hawaii, 
while we did have rather definite information regarding an amphibi- 
ous expedition and an attack in southeast Asia. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, who prepared this warning message of 
November 27th and the one of the 24th ? 

Admiral Stark. Those war warnings were initially prepared in 
War Plans, Admiral Turner. 

[57^i] Mr. Mitchell^ Who suggested that you mention Borneo 
as a possibility? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall who mentioned it. The NEI was 
always a possibility. 

Mr. Mitchell. Wlien you were drawing those messages, did the 
people that helped you ])repare them and yourself have any discussion 
as to whether Hawaii might be an object of attack? 

Admiral Stark. Well, it is my recollection that we discussed all 
phases of the matter. I do not specifically recall just what the con- 
versations were. I may state, though, that regardless of anything 
which I say now or hereafter in the development of this as you may 
ask me that I was surprised at the attack on Pearl Harbor. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2151 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, the messages really reflect the view that 
you had that Pearl Harbor was not in substantial hazard, do they not, 
at the time they were drawn, that were in your mind ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, they were in my mind also and, as I stated, 
we had intended to convey that an attack there was a possibility and 
to that extent that we should be on guard. I also want to make that 
real plain. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you intended to do so, but what is there in 
your messages that said so ? 

[67^2] Admiral Stark. There is nothing in the message, that 
is, there is no definite statement in the messages which we sent to Ad- 
miral Kimmel or, as I recollect, in any of the messages of that time, 
which mentioned Pearl Harbor as a possibility in so many words, 
but we did mention that we expected war, we mentioned that it might 
come in any direction and we directed a development, which we thought 
would put them on guard against such a possibility. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was that warning message of November 27 sent 
to the President before it was issued? 

Admiral Stark. I did not put that in my statement because I could 
not swear, for example, that it was, but it is my rather clear recol- 
lection. If he were here I would have verified it with him, if I could 
have, and put it in. The message was of such importance that I went 
personally to see the Secretary of the Navy about it because it was an 
all-out. 

We had nothing definite at that time to say that Japan was going 
to attack the United States. It was an inference on our part and 
I remember at tlae time that I thought I might be taking my hand off 
my number a little bit in going so far, but we had to make a decision. 
Time was creeping up on us, this thing had been going on for a long 
time. We had the State Department reaction, as I have mentioned 
before, that it was now up to us. I either told the President before- 
hand [S723'] or immediately after. I do know that within 24 
hours, if not before, that it had his full approval and that he gave 
us an O. K. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, my attention was attracted by the fact that 
this message you sent said nothing about not committing the first 
overt act and that appears to have been the point that the President 
was very much interested in, so it raises a question as to whether he 
saw it before it was sent. Your idea is that he saw it either before 
or afterwards, you are not sure which, is that right? 

Admiral Stark. I think it w^as before but I would not like definitely 
to say so. 

Mr. Mitchell. Had you a copy of the Army message before you 
at the time you sent your own ? ' 

Admiral Stark. We had discussed it; yes, sir. Gerow came over to 
my office, as I recollect, on the afternoon of the 27th with that mes- 
sage and I sent for Turner, probably also Ingersoll because Ingersoll 
generally was called in on everything of that sort, just as was Turner. 
As a matter of fact they usually came through Admiral Ingersoll first 
and 

Mr. Stark. Well, Gerow had been advised on the 26th that the 
President wanted this overt act business in the warning message and 
if he saw you don't you think he brought that to your attention? 



2152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[57^4] Admiral Stark. I am certain that he did — you mean that 
who brought it to my attention ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Gerow. 

Admiral Stark. The President or Gerow ? 

Mr. MiTCHFXL. Gefow. You say you saw him and conferred with 
him about the warning messages and your messages before they were 
sent and Gerow certainly was impressed by the need for following 
the President's direction about that. 

Admiral Stark. Well, the Army despatch differs in some particulars 
from our despatch. It was their despatch and I personally was not 
worried about an overt act in Hawaii, in the Hawaiian area so far 
as the Navy was concerned. You will recall, for example — I think 
it is in an exhibit here, I am not sure, but I recall Admiral Kimmel 
having told me about his orders to bomb a submarine which should 
come within certain areas in the Hawaiian area and I took no exception 
to that whatever. 

[6725^ Mr. Mitchell. Well, your only statement in the message 
of November 27 which you think put the people in Hawaii on guard 
against an attack at Pearl Harbor was this direction to conduct an 
appropriate defensive deployment under WPL-46? 

Admiral Stark. Preparatory. 

Mr. Mitchell. Preparatory ? 

Admiral Stx\rk. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now the main part of WPL-46 involved an offensive 
attack against the Jap Mandate, did it not ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Preparatory defensive deployment according to 
WPL-46 miglit well be construed to be some preliminary movement 
preparatory to carrying out that offense against the Japanese Man- 
dated Islands, might it not ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. And was it not susceptible to that interpretation by 
the man who received the message? 

Admiral Stark. It was, but along with it a defensive deployment 
which we regarded as taking a position as best he could with what 
he had for the defense of his fleet, whatever he had either at sea or 
in port, to the best of his ability and to guard against being caught 
unawares. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, your idea is when you told him to [5726] 
take defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out that WPL-46, 
which involved mainly offensive action against the Jap Mandate, 
you mean that in doing that he might incidentally be guarding him- 
self against an air attack, is that the idea? 

Admiral Stark. I would say it was more than incidental. I would 
say the defensive deployment was to guard against being caught by 
surprise, and the preparatory to carrying out WPL-46 we thought 
showed, in our minds, that war might eventuate at any time and that 
WPL-46 would then come into full sway. If he were to take these 
measures it would be the first measures to be followed in case of war 
by the implementation of the war plan. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, did this defensive deployment which 
you mentioned in the message of November 27 involve the movement 
of battleships in Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Stark. I left that entirely to Admiral Kimmel. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2153 

Mr. Mitchell. I am asking you whether your idea in carrying out 
this defensive deployment with a view for the preparation of WPL-46 
called for the movement of any battleships out of the harbor of Pearl 
Harbor? 

Admiral Stark. I did not consider that particular point at that 
time, so far as I recall. It is very difficult to give any categorical 
answer as to what I believe is the purport of your question — if I do not 
will you correct me — [S727] as to whether he should have left 
the Fleet in Pearl Harbor or taken it out. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is not what I am asking you. I am asking 
you whether or not the directive for further deployment of the Fleet 
with the view to carrying out WPL— to, a defensive deployment, would 
reasonably call for the movement of battleships to sea— not an air 
attack movement but a deployment. 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall that I thought at that time of that 
particular detail. It was a matter entirely within his province. 

There were many factors which would affect the movement of ships, 
with regard to what he had available in the air there at that time, and 
a number of other things. That was his job and I did not go into it. 

Mr. Mitchell. You had a map in your room somewhere in the Navy 
Department that showed the precise location of ships in the Pacific 
Fleet day by day, did you not? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did not you have a ship movement division there 
that kept track of where the Fleet was? 

Admiral Stark. Not in detail, sir. The ships were in the Hawaiian 
area, but their departures from Pearl Harbor, for example, to their 
target practice ground or other local maneuvers, and that sort of thing, 
to my best knowledge and [6728] belief we did not know. I 
know I did not know it. He was not required to report that. If he 
wanted to move the Fleet to the West coast, for example, he would 
not have done it without asking our permission, but if he wanted to 
go 100 miles in this or that direction, or if he wanted to go out for some 
special maneuver or for target practice, or what not, he would not 
have reported that to us. 

Mr. Mitchell. You did not then have a system of keeping track of 
the daily location of ships or of the fact that ships were or were not in 
Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you know that the battleships were in Pearl 
Harbor prior to the 7th, that they were collected there ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall at that time. I might say with 
regard to the previous answer that there were certain things laid down 
in the schedule calling for repairs of ships at a certain time which had 
to be dovetailed with the shore establishment, and those what might be 
called fixed positions we knew, but as for the general movement in and 
out of Pearl Harbor under his local arrangements, we did not know 
that. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I believe on November 26, at the very same 
time that this message was sent or thereabout, orders were given to 
Admiral Kimmel to send two of his carriers to the west, the Lexington 
and Enterprise, that is, [5729'] he was ordered to do it if he 
considered it feasible. 



2154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

You knew that his 2 carriers had left to the west with their air 
screen? That was the movement that called for the shipment of 25 
Army pursuit planes to Wake and 25 to Midway from Pearl Harbor, 
and was stripping Pearl Harbor to that extent of defenses against an 
air attack. 

Now do you think that was a movement that you ordered, or at least 
suggested he take, was consistent with the idea that Pearl Harbor was 
in immediate or possible danger of an air attack ? 

Admiral Staek. With regard to the movement of those carriers, 
the order for carrying that out at that particular time was Admiral 
Kimmel's order, not the Department's. We had taken up the move- 
ment to which you refer, as I recall, a month or a little over a month 
before hand. Admiral Kimmel had made a plan as to how that move- 
ment was to be made also as I recall about 3 weeks prior to its being 
made in which he directed how it should be made. He stated, as I re- 
call, in that order that he would implement it later on, which he did. 
But the order to go at that time was his own, and as I recall, we were 
told, in answer to the dispatch asking him as to the advisability, and 
other things, about the Enterprise, I believe it was, which left around 
the 28th. 

Mr. Mitchell. The Lexington left December 5. 

[5730] Admiral Stark. Yes. I do not recall, and I recollect 
of no evidence of his reporting to us about the movement of the Lex- 
ington which left the 5th. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you knew that they were both designed to move 
to the west, that plans had been made to carry the planes out there. 

Admiral Stark. Yes ; but the date was set by him. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I know 

Admiral Stark. We had covered that over a month beforehand. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you know that they had not departed prior to 
November 27 ? Did not you know that the movement was taking place 
right about the time that you were sending these warning messages 
out there? 

Admiral Stark. Not until his message came in in reply to the one in 
which we asked his advice on the relief — on the movement of certain 
Army troops, nor do I recall that we ever were informed about the 
movement of the Lexington. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you knew that 25 Army pursuit planes to Wake 
and 25 to Midway were to be taken from Hawaii, did you not? 

Admiral Stark. I think you are referring to the message of the 
26th. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

[6731] Admiral Stark. In which we put up a proposal 

Mr. Mitchell. It is on page 42 of your correspondence, I think. I 
guess I have the wrong place here. What dispatch have you before 
you. Admiral ? 

Admiral Stark. I have the dispatch 270038 and it bears the date 
of 26 November, which was the one I was looking for and to which 
I thought you referred. 

Mr. Mitchell. Would you. read that into the record, please? 

Admiral Stark (reading:) 

In order to keep the planes of tl>e Se<'ond Marine Aircraft Wing available for 
expeditionary use OPNAV has requested and Army has agreed to station lio Army 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2155 

iniisuit planes at Midway and the similar number at Wake provided you consider 
this feasible and desirable. 

This being to CincPac. 

Mr, MrrcHELL. Your dispatch to Kimmel ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and si'ound crews from 
Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier. Planes will be flown off at desti- 
nation and ground personnel landed in boats. Essential spare parts tools and 
amuuinition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips on regular Navy supply 
vessels. Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents. Navy must 
be resjwnsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army 
supplies. Stationing these planes [5732] must not be allowed to interfere 
with planned movements of Army bombers to the Phillippines. Additional park- 
ing areas should be laid promptly if necessary. Navy bombs now at outlying 
positions to be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those positions for sup- 
porting Navy operations. Confer with Commanding General and advise as soon 
as practicable. 

I note in the dispatch that we state "provided you consider this 
feasible and desirable," and he is also requested to "confer with the 
Commanding General" out there about it, and to advise us as soon 
as practicable. 

Now Admiral Kimmel's answer to that, if you would like to 
have it 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Let me inquire, does that dispatch appear in 
the exhibit? 

Senator Ferguson. Exhibit 37 is the one it should be in. 

Mr. Mitchell. It is not in Exhibit 37, the basic Navy dispatch. 

The Chairman. Does this dispatch appear in any of the exhibits? 

Mr. Mitchell. It does not. It is something we have put our hands 
on more lately. I am bringing it out this morning. It is the dis- 
patch dated November 26 from the Chief of Naval [5733] Op- 
erations to Kimmel and provides for the removal of 25 pursuit planes 
from Hawaii to Wake and to Midway as on the 26th of November, 
the day before the warning message was sent. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to get the time 
of sending it, if they have it. 

Mr. Mitchell. The hour you mean ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; when it arrived out there. 

Admiral Stark. Our message number is 270038, which means 
38 minutes after midnight on the 27th, Greenwich time. 

Mr. Mitchell. What time is that in Washington ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, Washington is fivei hours earlier, so the 
message actually went out on the 26th Washington time. 

The Chairman. About 7 or 8 o'clock ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, 5 from 12 would be 7. I should say about 
half-past 7. 

Senator Ferguson. Morning or evening? 

Admiral Stark. In the evening. 

Mr. Mitchell. The evening of the 26th ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 



2156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. Don't you think that the fact of your agreeing to 
take 25 pursuit planes out of Hawaii and sending them to Wake and 
Midway on the 26th indicated pretty plainly to the Commander at 
Hawaii that you did not think they were needed there for defense 
cigainst an air attack? 

[5734-] Admiral Stark. We left that to him to balance against 
the needs. 

Mr. Mitchell. I know you left it to him, but I am trying to find 
out what your frame of mind was and what inferences he could fairly 
draw as to your attitude about it. 

Admiral Staek. I do not know what he drew from our attitude 
except as w^as answered by his dispatch. 

Mr. Mitchell. He thought it was all right because he was not 
worrying about an air attack, and you thought it was all right be- 
cause you were not worrying about an air attack, isn't that the plain 
fact about it? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. It was toward strengthening that general 
area, and it strengthened it obviously against an air attack should it 
occur further westward in those outlying islands. 

Mr. Mitchell. It obviously strengthened Wake and Guam and'it 
weakened the most important base you had — Hawaii. 

Admiral Stark. This was Wake and Midway. 

Mr. Mitchell. I mean Wake and Midway, yes. 

Admiral Stark. And we considered Midway in particular a very 
vital point because of its closeness to Hawaii. Wake stuck out in 
a sort of an area which we realized would be difficult to defend from 
the fleet standpoint, but we were sending planes to the Philippines 
via those two islands at [5735] that time. That movement 
was also important, and this was in connection with it. 

Mr. Mitchell. What did Admiral Kimmel reply? Would you 
read that, so we will have it in the record ? 

Admiral Stark. His message is dated 28 November 1941. The 
time group on it is 280627. That is 6:27 in the morning, which 
would be 1 o'clock our time, and 5i/2 hours earlier his time. 

Mr. Gesell. That is the sending time ? 

Admiral Stark. It would be back on the 25th. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is the sending time, is it? 

Admiral Stark. I mean the 27th. That is the sending time, yes. 
He refers to our two dispatches 270038 and 2700-40; the last one I 
believe I have not read yet. 

Mr. INIrrciiELL. Suppose you read 270040 before you read his 
reply ? 

Admiral Stark. 270040 dispatch reads as follows — 

The CHAiiRMAN. What is the date ? 

Admiral Stark. That is the 27th also, just after midnight, our 
dispatch, which would have been about 7 o'clock in the evening nf 
the 26th. 

Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for reinforcing de- 
fense battalions now on station if you consider this desirable. Army also pro- 
poses to prepare [5736] in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases 
which you may occupy but is unable at this time to provide any anti-aircraft units. 
Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable number 
of troops desired and recommend armament. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2157 

Mr. Mitchell. Does that relate to the garrisons of some of these 
Islands to the west? 

Admiral Stakk. That is right ; j^e's, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now read his reply. 

Admiral Stark. In his reply he refers to the two mesasges from the 
Chief of Naval Operations which I have read, and he states : 

Wright now at Wake to discharge ground crews and material to operate one 
squadron Marine planes. Afterwards proceeds Midway to land similar items. 

Already arranged to send each those places leaving Pearl about 1 December 
essential ground material for temporary operation 12 B-17 Army bombers, but 
at present only 6 such planes of the 12. on Oahu in operating condition. 

Acute shortage Army bombs precludes any shipment to outlying bases but Navy 
bombs now available there usable by Anny with minor alteration. 

Doubtful capability Army pursuit planes to operate over 20 miles offshore 
radically limits their usefulness for [5737] insular defense. Their use 
possible but inability to land on carrier freezes them to island where landed. 
Flexibility disposition thereby curtailed. 

Additional AA guns required this area for Army and Marine defense battalions. 
Plans for Army troop reinforcement outlying bases being made however con- 
sider such use inadvisable as long as Marines available. All outlying forces must 
be exclusively under Naval command. 

Twelve Marine fighters leave 28 November in carrier for Wake. Expect send 
other Marine planes to Midway later. On December 1 sending twelve patrol 
planes Midway to Wake and replacing those at Midway from Pearl. Will in- 
vestigate more thoroughly feasibility and advisability of relieving Marine planes 
with Army pursuit. 

Now I would like to state that, so far as I know or recall, the part of 
that dispatch which I read, which speaks about the 12 Marine fighters 
leaving on 28 November in a carrier for Wake was the only informa- 
tion sent to us giving the definite time of the movement of the Lexing- 
ton group or the Enterprise group. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes ; he did refer in that message to a later shipment 
to be made without giving a date. 

Admiral Stark. Well, the earlier shipment he informed us about 
probably were not carriers. 

[5738] Mr. Mitchell. What is that? 

Admiral Stark. The Wright was out there with supplies, if you 
are referring to the first part of the dispatch. 

Mr. Mitchell. In the last part of it he saj^s "we are going later 
to send some bombers out there." 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. How were they to be sent ? 

Admiral Stark. He says "on December 1 sending 12 patrol planes 
Midway to Wake and replacing those at Midway from Pearl." They 
would fly. 

Mr. Mitchell. They M^ould fly? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

[5739'] Mr. Mitchell. Did Admiral Kimmel 

Admiral Stark. Would you like my reply to that, sir? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, if you have it available. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire: Is his reply 
in exhibit 37? 

Mr. Mitchell. No. These are new messages. We have not had 
them available for the committee before, or ourselves for that matter. 

Admiral Stark. We have a file that we have had made up covering 
that which I am sure, if the committee so requires, the Navy Depart- 



2158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ment will be glad to furnish. It covers the dispatches I have just 
read and other matters bearing on the matter. 

The Chairman. I suggest that'copies be prepared for distribution 
to the committee. You may read them into the record now and they 
will become part of the hearings, but for convenience it might be 
well for the committee to have copies. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I think they should be made avail- 
able in connection with the dispatches from October 17 on, when 
this thing started. There are dispatches from October 17 giving the 
reasons for these things. They are already in the record of the 
Navy Board at page 321 on — the Navy narrative. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, during the noon hour we will 
review the file and get them together. 

[6740] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I might say that the 
narrative is not an official document. 

Mr. Murphy. I am just saying that they are available. They have 
been available. 

The Chairman. The narrative is not an official document but it is 
available here. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Admiral, you have another document that you 
want to read ? 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I ask, just to have the record 
clear on that matter — may I ask counsel if he would get the time from 
the witness now, so that it will be at this place in the record, as to when 
the Navy prepared the document that he is now reading from ? 

The Chairman. Will counsel inquire as to that ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't know what he is reading^f rom. 

Senator Ferguson, He indicated that the Navy had made up a file 
on this matter and other matters. I would like to get the time when 
the Navy made it up. 

Mr. Mitchell. Who made that file up for you ? 

Admiral Stark. I directed it be prepared, because the question of 
movement of these carriers came up in the hearings last summer, and 
I thought it possible it might come up again, and I wanted put to- 
gether the dispatches in convenient form, which I have here. 

['57^1] Mr. Mitchell. And who did the work? 

Admiral Stark. I wanted it in convenient form for reference. The 
work was done by counsel. 

Mr. Mitchell. Your counsel ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. It is mv own. I mean, the Navy Depart- 
ment did not do this for me. I asked for these from the Navy De- 
partment. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. May I ask one question. Mr. Cliairman ? 

Does the document that the admiral now holds in his hands cover all 
of the messages that were sent by the admiral and received by Admiral 
Kimmel on this question ? 

Admiral Stark. I think it does ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. How many documents are there? You have read 
three of them. 

Admiral Stark. Well, there is another dispatch, and then there is 
the order to which I referred where Admiral Kimmel laid the plans 
for this movement. 

Mr. Mitchell. Suppose you read the other dispatches ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2159 

The Chairman. The Chair wouhl like to ask if this is something that 
you have had dug out from the Navy Department or whether the 
Navy has dug it out for you that they didn't dig out for us. 

Mr. MncHELii. He exphiined that it was dug out by his counsel. 

[5742] The Chairman. Why didn't the Navy dig it out for us? 

Admiral Stark. The Navy had not dug anything out for me, sir. 
I have done my own digging. 

Mr. Mitchell. I didn't ask him for it. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, does that indicate that if we 
don't inquire about it that we are not getting it from the Navy ? 

The Chairman. I don't know that it necessarily indicates that. 
Probably Admiral Stark knew about it, and nobody else did, and 
nobody, certainly outside of the Navy, would have known about it. 
I can't explain why it wasn't included in these other documents, 
although it is included in the narrative story furnished by the Navy. 

I think it advisable that all these be read into the hearings and made 
a part of the record. 

Mr. Mitchell. These dispatches — there is nothing secret about it — 
I understand that they were dug up in previous hearings. The sig- 
nificance of them didn't strike us very hard at one time, and now it 
has, so we are going into it. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I think the record should show that 
the message of the 26th is on page 325 of volume 2 of the narrative ; 
it is Exhibit 70 in the Hewitt Report, Document No. 24, Exhibit 70, 
in the Hewitt Report ; it is Exhibit 38 at page 50 in the Naval Court of 
Inquiry. So there is nothing [S74S] secretive about it. This 
matter has been in the hands of the committee for at least the last 
month. 

[5744] The Chairman. Let us make it a part of the record here. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, in order that there is no question, 
I make the suggestion that the liaison man from the Navy who is 
handling these documents make a further search on behalf of the 
committee to ascertain whether or not there are any more documents 
bearing upon this question. 

Mr. Mitchell. You mean on this question of shipping planes? 

Senator Lucas. Upon this one question. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

The Chairman. I think you were about to make an observation, 
Mr. Mitchell, when I interrupted you. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I have forgotten what it was. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, Admiral, suppose you read the rest of this file 
into the record now so that we will have it there and we can get 
mimeographs of it afterward. 

Admiral Stark. If I may interject : I don't want any inference made 
from my remark about the Navy not digging out material for me that 
it has held back anything or not given me everything I have asked 
for, but I have done my own digging. 

Shall I take this up in sequence ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Take it up in sequence and omit the three you have 
already read. 

[5745] Admiral Stark. The. first dispatch here is 17 October 
1941 and reads : 

Because of the great iiuportance 



2160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR Al^TACK 

The Vice Chairman. From whom to whom? 

Admiral Stark. From the Chief of Naval Operations to Com- 
mander in Chief Pacific. 

Because of the great importance of continuing to reinforce the Philippines 
with long-range Arnay bombers you are requested to take all practical precau- 
tions for the safety of the air fields at Wake and Midway. 

The next paper I have bearing on this is from the Commander in 
Chief United States Fleet to the Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, 
and Commander Patrol Wing Two. 

Subject : Naval Air Station Wake and Naval Air Station Midway — Basing 
of Aircraft at. 

1. In order to be able to meet emergency requirements for basing of aircraft 
at Wake and Midway, while minimizing logistic demands of these places for 
the present, the Commander in Chief desires that the following action be taken 
immediately : 

(a) Make preparations at Wake for basing : 

(1) 12 patrol planes. 

(2) 12 Marine scout bombers or 12 Marine fighters. 

(b) Make preparations at Midway for basing : 
[57.^6] (1) 12 additional patrol planes (total 24). 
(2) 18 Marine scout bombers or 19 Marine fighters. 

2. These preparations shall include the following provisions and assumptions : 

(a) When the aircraft movements are ordered, it shall be necessary only to 
fly the patrol planes and land planes (from a carrier in the latter case) to the 
designated places and it shall be practicable to operate on arrival without attend- 
ant transportation of material or personnel by ship. 

(b) It shall be practicable to continue operations on this basis for a period 
of six weeks, at the end of which time relief may be expected, either by air 
exchange of planes and flight crews or by provision of additional support trans- 
ported by ship, or by combination of the two. 

(c) Preparations shall, accordingly, include transportation to Wake and 
Midway of : 

(1) Necessary tools, spares and equipment for minor repairs, adjustments and 
checks. 

(2) Necessary minimum number of ground personnel to meet the requirements 
of subparagraph 2 (b) above, assuming the full availability of Naval Air Sta- 
tion personnel and Marine defense personnel already present for non-technical 
manpower assistance. 

(3) Necessary additional bombs, with necessary [5747] additional 
bomb handling equipment. (Note: With delivery of the 48 1,000-pound bombs 
appi'oved for the patrol planes at Wake the bomb situation for patrol planes 
will be satisfactory at both Wake and Midway. The following additional 
bombs are needed for the Marine planes: Wake, 12 1,000-pound, 24 500-pound; 
Midway, 18 l.OCO-pound, 36 500-pound, l.W 100-pound bombs each, of those 
already available at Wake and Midway, should be designated for the Marine 
planes. Aircraft machine gun ammunition already at Wake and Midway is 
sufficient). 

(d) Patrol plane personnel at Wake shall base and subsist in excess accom- 
modations available in Contractor's Camp No. 2 near the air station site. Patrol 
plane personnel at Midway shall base and subsist at the Naval Air Station with 
additional accommodations, if and as necessary, to be provided by the use of 
Contractor's space. 

(e) Marine squadi'on personnel at Wake shall base and subsist adjacent to 
the land plane runways. Marine squadron personnel at Midway shall base and 
subsist on Eastern Island. At both places it is necessary to set up a suitable 
tent camp. The assistance of Marine defense personnel shall be used to accom- 
plish this. 

(f) Commander Patrol Wing Two shall provide, by patrol plane tender, the 
necessary personnel and material transportation [57^8] for both patrol 
plane and Marine aircraft preparations. 

3. By copy of this letter the Commandant 14tli Naval District is directed 
to take immediate steps to : 

(a) Make available the 48 1,000-pound bombs still due for patrol planes at 
Wake and the additional bombs for the Marine planes. 
2 (b) (3) above. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2161 

(b) Provide for necessary stowage of bombs and ammunition for Marine land 
planes adjacent to land plane runways at Wake and Midway. 

(c) Make available the Contractor's accommodations needed for patrol 
squadron personnel at Wake and Midway. 

(d) Cover the bulk subsistence and potable water requirements of the per- 
sonnel of the foregoing preparatory parties arid anticipate the additional re- 
quirements resulting from actual aircraft basing. 

(e) Expedite expansion of tank storage of aviation gasoline at Wake and 
anticipate the aviation gasoline and lubricating oil requirements at both Wake 
and Midway resulting from actual aircraft basing. 

(f) Provide lumber needed for the tent camps of Marine aircraft personnel 
at Wake and Midway. 

(g) Make available the needed assistance from Naval Air Station and Marine 
defense personnel for camp construction [57^9] and, on arrival of air- 
craft, for aircraft operations. 

Copies of this preparatory letter of Admiral Kimmel's were sent to : 
COMBATFOR 
COMSCOFOR 
COMBASEFOR 
COMAIRSCOFOR 
COM-14 
NAD, OAHU 

C. O., MARINE AIR GROUP 21 
Copy was not sent to Chief of Naval Operations. It was a local 
operation order of Admiral Kimmel to his own people on how to carry 
out that which he directed. 

The next message is 270038, the message which I have already read. 
The next message is 270040, wherein I stated Army has offered to 
make available some units and which I have also read. 

The next message was the message from CINCPAC to OPNAV, 
28 06 27, which was in reply to the two previous ones. 

The next message, which I have not read, is 282054 from the Chief 
of Naval Operations to Commander in Chief Pacific. 
The Vice Chairman. The date ? 

Admiral Stark. The 28th, sir. 2054, which would be 10 [5750] 
hours and a half earlier, which would be about 10 o'clock in the morn- 
ing on the 28th. From Admiral Kimmel to the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions. 

Arrangements described in your 280624 appear to be best that can be done under 
the circumstances but suggest advisability of transporting VMP221 from San 
Diego to Hawaii via Saratoga period War Department will instruct commanding 
general Hawaiian department to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army 
pursuit planes and army troops in support of landings period War Department 
will endeavor to expedite plans for increase of anti-aircraft defenses but it is 
doubtful if much improvement is possible soon period Marine Corps will shortly 
receive sixteen thirty-seven mm. anti-aircraft guns and receive ammunition in 
February period Do you desire these guns for Midway and Wake period Re- 
quest air mail report on present effective defenses of all outlying bases and 
increases planned in immediate future period 

That is from the Chief of Naval Operations to CINCPAC. 

The next dispatch is a dispatch from Admiral Kimmel to his own 
people, namely, to the Commander of Task Force Two and to the 
Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and for information to 
Combat Wing Two, COMBATFOR, and COMBASEFOR. 

It is dated the 28th of November, 0447, which would bring it, in our 
time, back to the 27th, about 6 o'clock : 

[57.51] Twelve planes marine fightrnn two eleven are to base Wake accord- 
ance myser 101825 of 10 November period Enterprise provide transportation 

79716— 46— pt. 5 8 



2162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

period After departure Pearl on 28 November form task force eight consisting of 
Enterprise Chester Northampton Salt Lake City and Desron six and past com- 
mand task force two to Rear Admiral Draemel with orders task force two carry 
out normal operations in Hawaiian area period Proceed to arrive 200 miles 070 
degrees from Wake period At 0700 on 3 December period Fly off marine planes 
that vicinity and upon receiving info that planes have arrived Wake return Pearl 
period Enroute to and from Wake pass through Point Afirm 400 miles south of 
Midway period Patrol planes from Midway and Wake will cover your route and 
provide security while at Wake period Communications radio condition nine- 
teen guard MPM primary fox continuously period Comfourteen inform Wake 
that planes expected arrive there 0830 on 8 December and direct Wake report 
comfourteen by coded dispatch when planes available there period Comfourteen 
furhish this final arrival information to comtaskfor eight period Wake sub- 
marine patrol Tambor Triton will be advised period. Narwhal and Dolphin are 
enroute Pearl at 1200 GCT on 27 November they were about 300 miles east of 
Wake period 

The next message is 040237, which is 4 December, 2 o'clock, 
[67S2'\ 0237, Greenwich. We would be 5 hours earlier, which 
would be half-past nine, and the time in Hawaii would have been 
about 4 o'clock in the afternoon on the 3rd. 

Myser 01825 of 10 November Marine Scoron two three one will base eighteen 
planes Midway period Lexington provide transportation period on five December 
after sortie Pearl form task force twelve under comcruscofor consisting of Leam- 
ington Chicago Astoria Portland desron five less desdiv ten period task force 
twelve proceed by direct route to arrive four hundred miles 130 degrees from 
Midway at 2230 October on seven December period from that vicinity fly off 
Marine planes to Midway period return operating area and resume normal 
operations after planes have arrived Midway period comtaskfor nine direct 
patrol planes from Midway cover Lexington flying off position provide security 
while that area and guard Marine plane flight period communications radio 
condition nineteen guard continuously MPM primary fox period comfourteen 
inform Midway planes expected arrive about 0200 GCT on eight December and 
require Midway report arrival to comfourteen by coded dispatch period com- 
fourteen pass this report to comtaskfor twelve period Midway submarine patrol 
will be advised period 

That last message, I believe I didn't give you the heading. It is from 
CINCPAC, to COMTASKFOR 3, COMFOURTEEN, [5753^ 
and COMPATWING 2, by mailgram, and info to COMBATFOR, 
COMBASEFOR, COMAIRBATFOR, Lexington, also by mailgram. 

[5754] ^Jti*- Mitchell. That completes the file, does it? 

Admiral Stark. That completes it so far as the correspondence on 
that particular subject. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, in order to complete the record on this item I 
call the committee's attention to a letter in Exhibit 106, which is 
already in evidence, which is the file marked, "Correspondence between 
Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel", and that letter is a letter dated 
December 2, 1941 from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark and it 
refers to these despatches. 

I won't read it all, it is in evidence, unless you want it read into the 
record. 

Mr. Murphy. 1 was wondering, Mr. Mitchell. There is only one 
letter here and there were two written on that day by Kimmel on the 
same subject. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, this document is not paged. It is December 
2, 1941. 

The Chairman. Well, it might go into the record at this point, unless 
the committee wants it read, as if read. 

Mr. Mitchell. Suppose I have the reporter transcribe it in the rec- 
ord without my reading it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2163 

To get the thing cleared up here, the thing that the Congressman is 
asking about, I only see one letter. 

Mr. Murphy. There is only one in the exhibit, but there [S7S6] 
were two letters written. The second letter is referred to on page 528 
of the narrative. 

Mr. Mitchell. Is it a letter relating to this subject? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes, and covered in the previous inquiry. 

Mr. Mitchell. Both the same date? 

Mr. MuRPHT. Both the same date. 

Mr. Mitchell. Both the same subject? 

Mr. Murphy. Apparently. One is at page 528 of the narrative 
and the other is on page 524. 

The Chairman. Suppose both letters are printed here then. 

Mr. Mitchell. We will have both letters put in the transcript here, 
the one I have in Exhibit 106 and the other one of the same date which 
the Congressman has referred to. 

Mr. Gesell. I think the other one is an official letter and would 
not be in this folder. 

Mr. Mitchell. This is one of these personal letters and not an 
official communication. 

Mr. Murphy. I don't know, but it is in regard to the same subject. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, then we will put them both in. I only want 
to mention one thing in this letter that is now being written into the 
record of December 2 that is rather suggestive. 

[5766'] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, might I 

Mr. Mitchell. Could I finish this, please? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. On this question of moving marines and antiair- 
craft equipment out to Wake and Midway, Admiral Kimmel says this : 

On inquiry and conference with the Army I find that the army in Hawaii 
has no guns, either surface or anti-aircraft, available for outlying bases. They 
can supply some .30 caliber machine guns and rifles. I have frequently called 
to your attention the inadequacy of the Army anti-aircraft defense in the 
Pearl Harbor area with particular reference to the shortage of anti-aircraft 
guns. So far, very little has been done to improve this situation. With nothing 
but .30 caliber machine guns and rifles the replacement of Marines by Army 
at outlying bases now will result in an increased number of Marines in Oahu 
with no Suitable equipment as Army would require all of the Marine equipment 
now in the islands. 

(The letters of December 2, 1941, referred to follow :) 

[5757] commandee-in-chief 

united states pacific ft.eet 
u.s.s. pennstlvania 

flagship 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., 
December 2, 194 1. 
Ser. #8 
Secret 
Dear Betty : — 

We had your despatches in regard to reinforcing the outlying islands with 
Army pursuit planes and Army personnel. With regard to the use of Army 
pursuits on the island bases, some time ago we investigated the feasibility of 
putting some kind of fighters on the outlying islands and decided at the time 



2164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that our best chance of quickly reinforcing the islands and to make the minimum 
demands upon the supplies in the island that we should send a minimum number 
of ground crews to Wake and Midway in order when the time came, to be in a 
position to fly off the Marine planes from a carrier or to send them direct from 
Pearl to Midway in the case of the SBD's. At the time your despatch in regard 
to Army pursuits was received we had the WRIGHT at Wake discharging the 
Marine ground crews and she arrives at Midway tomori-ow, December 3, to 
discharge Marine ground crews there. 

Halsey, in the ENTERPRISE, with three heavy cruisers and a squadron of 
destroyers, will fly off 12 Marine fighting planes for Wake tomorrow morning 
after which he returns to Pearl. We have been covering his advance by 2 VP 
squadrons operating [5758] from Johnston, Midway and Wake. Upon 
Ihe completion of the movement we now plan to return one VP squadron to Pearl 
and leave the other one at Midway awaiting further developments. I will hold 
the Marine SBD's at Pearl awaiting further developments as they can fly under 
their own power from Pearl to Midway. 

During all the period that I have been in command the question of the develop- 
ment of supply and defense of these outlying bases has been a very difficult one. 
We cannot expect to supply Wake quickly and expeditiously until we have a 
space to put a ship alongside for loading and unloading. The Commandant of 
the District has been and is exerting every effort to obtain this objective. As 
you know, ships have been delayed in unloading at W^ake lor as long as 28 days, 
due to bad weather, and it is not unusual for a ship to take as much as 7 or 8 
days. This, in the face of any opposition, presents an impossible situation. Pres- 
ent facilities at Wake must be improved, particularly as to storage of fuel oil, 
aviation gas, food and ammunition. This work should not stop and the 1,000 
defense workers at Wake are essential to keep this work moving as rapidly as 
material can be supplied. A recent estimate by Bloch sets the time for the 
completion of the ship channel to about the first of May. I hope, and so does he, 
that this date can be anticipated. At the present time we cannot support more 
personnel on Wake than we now have there. As you will remember, we put six 
5" guns and twelve 3" anti-aircraft guns, together with a number of machine 
guns on [5759] the island, well, knowing that we did not have sufficient 
marine personnel to man them. However, I think good progress has been made 
in organizing the defense workers to assist in the manning of the battery at Wake. 
In case the present situation should cease, we can readily withdraw the Marine 
fighters from Wake in order to decrease the demands upon the facilities there 
and also in order to keep up the training of the pilots of these planes. 

The situation at Midway is somewhat better than at Wake. You will note 
from our report of the defenses submitted today that we have shipped three of 
the four 7" guns to Midwa.v. Also we have shipped, or are shortly shipping, 
four of the 3"-50 anti-aircraft guns to Midway. These, in addition to the bat- 
teries already installed there, which comprise six 5"-ol"s and twelve 3" anti- 
aircraft. You will also note from our official letter submitted today that the 
defenses of Johnston and Palmyra, while not what we would like to have, are 
nevertheless not entirely Inadequate. 

Your despatches in regard to the use of Army personnel and the organization 
of Army defense forces to be used in outlying islands is being given earnest 
consideration. I know yon appreciate the difficulties of mixing Army, Marine 
Corps and Navy personnel in a small island base. I believe you will subscribe to 
the principle that all these outlying bases must be under Navy command and the 
forces there must be subject to the orders of the Commander in Chief without 
any qualification whatsoever. I anticipate some difficulties along this line when 
Army personnel [5760] is injected into the picture unless a very clear 
directive is issued jointly by the War and Navy Department. On inquiry and 
conference with the Army I find that the Army in Hawaii has no bases. They can 
suppl.v some .30 caliber machine guns and rifles. I have frequently called to your 
attention the inadequacy of the Army antiaircraft defense in the Pearl Harbor 
area with particular reference to the shortage of antiaircraft guns. So far, very 
little has been done to improve this situation. With nothing but .30 caliber 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2165 

machine guns and rifles the replacement of Marines by Army at outlying bases 
now will result in an increased number of Marines in Oahu with no suitable 
equipment as Army would require all of the Marine equipment now in the islands. 
The Marines in the outlying islands are trained, acclimated and efficient beyond 
standards immediately obtainable by the Army even if they took over the present 
Marine equipment. We cannot appreciably increase the number of military 
personnel in the outlying islands unless we remove the defense workers. We can- 
not afford to remove the defense workers if we expect ever to reach a satisfactory 
condition in the islands. Essential items include, as I have previously stated, 
provision to berth a ship at Wake, completion of air fields at Palmyra and John- 
ston and completion of fuel, ga.soline. food and ammunition housing at all bases. 
I am proposing in ofllcial correspondence that: (a) the Army organize 3 defense 
battalions of approximately SOO men each ; that steps be taken in Washington to 
supply [5761] them with guns, both surface and antiaircraft; supply them 
with .37 mm. or .50 caliber machine guns ; to make up a well-balanced defense 
battalion ; that prior to the time the equipment of these organizations is supplied 
that they drill with the 5-inch guns of the Fourth Defense Battalion now at Pearl 
as long as the equipment is available here. If it is decided to supply these bat- 
talions with some other caliber of guns, that sufficient number of guns of the type 
to be used be shipped to Oahu to be utilized for training purposes; (b) that these 
Army defense battalions be held in readiness to (1) furnish replacement to pre- 
sently occupied islands (2) to relieve battalions in presently occupied islands 
(3) to garrison islands to be occupied. 

The Marine garrisons now at Midway, Johnston and Palmyra should be 
retained there for the present. They will not be withdrawn until arms and 
equipment for the Army defense battalions have been received and the Army 
trained. At this time a decision can be made according to the situation then 
existing. 

That the Army organize three IS-plane pursuit squadrons and keep them 
in an expeditionary status ; maintain the ground crews organized and ready 
to man them ; maintain the planes ready to be transported by carrier when 
ordered. 

The Army has oi'ders to defend Canton and Christmas. We are turning 
over to them two five-inch 51 guns for use at Canton. These they will man 
with Army personnel and supplement with some obsolete anti-aircraft guns 
and machine guns. The expedi- [5762] tion is now due to leave here 
on December ninth. 

The Army is also sending some obsolete guns and a garrison to Christmas. 
I will let you know more definitely what they send when I find out exactly. 

I feel that we cannot determine the defenses of Canton and Christmas until 
we find out how much personnel can be maintained there. Meanwhile the 
Army is sending some forces there. 

In view of the foregoing I am unable to understand the reason for the 
despatches from the War and Navy Department directing us to utilize the 
Army in the defense of the outlying bases, as we can hope for no relief from 
this quarter until they have been supplied with suitable equipment. 

I feel the wiser course is to continue to organize Marine defense battalions 
and supply them with the necessary equipment. I believe we can train Marine 
defense battalions just as rapidly as the Army can do so and probably as 
rapidly as the equipment can be supplied. If there is any prospect of the 
immediate supply of considerable quantities of suitable equipment I can see 
some reason for injecting the Army into the picture. 

I think it would be well for you to read the despatch sent by the War 
Department to the Commanding General on this subject. It differs considerably 
from the one you sent to us in that the War Department says they will take 



2166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

over the defense of some outlying bases from the Navy in accordance with an 
[576S] agreement to be reached by the Commanding General and myself. 
Your despatch left me with the conviction that the Army was to reinforce 
the Naval and Marine forces on the outlying bases in case of necessity. I feel 
that this should be clarified. 

We have one transport in commission which, due to a delay in the sailing 
of the Wharton we are now obliged to use for one trip to transport essential 
Naval personnel from the West Coast to the Fleet. The other transports, to a 
total of six, are in various stages of completion. The Marines at San Diego 
are in urgent need of transport training and will not be ready to come to 
Hawaii until some time in February. I can see very little chance for any 
overseas expendition even on a small scale until that date. Eventually this 
war will require a much greater number of transports and supply ships in 
the Pacific. We are working on an estimate of the requirements. This esti- 
mate, in addition to some thirty or forty transports and an equal number of 
supply ships must also include a thirty to fifty percent increase in the fighting 
strength of the Fleet before we can occupy the Marshall's and Caroline's in an 
advance across the Pacific. 

With these considerations in mind I am at loss to understand the considera- 
tions which injected the Army into the picture. 

With kindest regards and best wishes, always. 
Most sincerely yours, 
[576^1 H. E. KiMMEL. 

P. S. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Detachment made the 
statement in conference that his pursuit planes could not operate farther than 
15 miles from land. If this be the case, I can see very little use for Army 
pursuit planes in an outlying island. This, added to the inability of this type 
plane to land on a carrier, makes them practically useless for an overseas 
expedition of any kind. Except for the four-engined Army bombers, we must 
depend upon Navy and Marine Corps planes to support any overseas expedition 
apd to man outlying bases. This is and has been one of my reasons for urging 
the supply of all types of carrier planes. 

P. S. You will note that I have issued orders to the Pacific Fleet to depth bomb 
all submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area. 

H. E. K. 

Admiral H. R. Staek, U. S. Navy, 
Chief of Naval Operations, 

Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 

P. S. In connection with the development of outlying bases by the Army, I 
must invite your attention to the fact that when the War Department issued 
orders to the Commanding General out here to develop these bases they author- 
ized him to charter [5765] ships and to take all other necessary steps to 
insure the early completion of the project. He has already taken over three 
large inter-island vessels and has caused some army transports and other ship- 
ping to be diverted to the supply of Christmas and Canton. He has also 
chartered a number of smaller vessels such as tugs and sampans. 

I feel he has done an excellent job. I feel that the Navy personnel in this 
area with equal authority would have their efforts much facilitated. I do 
not know the considerations which prompted the Navy to turn over the develop- 
ment of the island bases to the Army; I do know that it has complicated our 
problems considerably. 

The Commanding General is keeping me informed of what he is doing but 
frequently the information is so late that I have been unable to plan adequate 
protection. I am sure it is no fault of his because he informs me as soon as he 
himself is informed. I have nothing but the highest praise for the way General 
Short has taken hold of this problem which was dropped in his lap. 

H. E. KiMMEL. 

P. S. From correspondence which General Short has furnished me I note that 
the Army is engaged in developing air fields in Fiji and New Caledonia. This 
will involve questions of supply and protection both of shipping and the fields 
themselves. The Australians I understand are loath to assume the protection 
[5766] of the field in New Caledonia. The Navy is bound to be ivolved 
in these affairs. I fear we may become so much concerned with defensive roles 
that we may become unable to take the offensive. Too much diversion of effort 
for defense will leave us an inadequate force with which to take the offensive. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2167 

With regard to the escort of convoys by using a single cruiser to escort not 
to exceed 8 ships, we endeavor to limit the number of cruisers so occupied at 
one time to four. We now find that routing via Torres Strait to Manila, we are 
going to have seven cruisers continuously occupied with convoy duty. This 
without any consideration for such protection as may eventually be required 
from San Francisco to Oahu. I realize of course that the demands for trans- 
Pacific escorts may decrease if it becomes impossible to route ships to Manila 
but it will still be necessary to supply the Asiatic Fleet and our allies inj' the 
Far East. 

(S) H. E. KiMMEL. 



[J767] 

EG61/(16) 

Serial 0114W 

Secret Pearl Haebob, T. H., 

2 Dec. 1941. 
From : Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 
To : The Chief of Naval Operations. 
Subject: Defense of Outlying Bases. 
References : 

(a) OpNav despatch 270038 of November 1941. 

(b) OpNav despatch 270040 of November 1941. 

(c) Cincpac despatch 28067 of November 1941. 

(d) OpNav despatch 282054 of November 1941. 

(e) War Dept. despatch 48 of Nov. 29, 1941. 

(f ) Cincpac secret serial 0113W of December 3, 1941. 

(g) Cincpac secret serial 090W of October 21, 1941. 

1. Reference (a) advised that Army pursuit planes, could be made available 
for Wake and Midway in order to retain 2d Marine Aircraft Wing available for 
expeditionary use. Reference (b) advised that Army could make infantry avail- 
able to reinforce defense battalions now on station, and that Army proposed to 
prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which the commander in 
chief, Pacific Fleet, might occupy but that they could provide no antiaircraft 
units. 

2. Reference (c) outlined certain measures that the commander in chief, 
Pacific Fleet, had already taken to [5768] strengthen the air defenses of 
Midway and Wake and others, including Army air cooperation, that were in 
progress. Reference (d) approved of the arrangements made and stated that 
the War Department would instruct the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and Army 
troops in support of Marines. It also asked for report on present defenses of 
outlying bases and increases planned in immediate future. The report is fur- 
nished in reference (f). 

3. Reference (e) from the War Dfparlment to the Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Department, which referred to commander in chief. Pacific Fleet's 
280627, is somewhat at variance with Chief of Naval Operation despatches in 
that it states the War Department has offered to take over defense of Pacific 
advanced bases from the Navy except for furnishing AA equipment. It also 
stated that the War Department has assumed responsibility for defense of Christ- 
mas and Canton Islands. 

4. Reference (g) contained a study by the commander in chief. Pacific Fleet, 
of the defenses of outlying bases and recommendations as to personnel and 
equipment therefor. 

5. It is not completely clear whether or not the Navy Department has in mind 
that the Army will ultimately relieve the Marine Defense Battalions. If so, it is 
assumed that such action would be taken in order to have those battal- [5769] 
lions and their equipment available to garrison positions taken by assault 
in the Marshalls and the Carolines. Should such assumption be correct, it is 
pertinent to note that transports, trained assault troops, etc., are not now avail- 
able to make the seizures. Moreover, the local Army authorities are not only 
short of antiaircraft equipment, but of most other armament necessary for 
defense of an advanced island base. If the Marine Defense Battalions 'were 
withdrawn at this time it would be necessary to leave behind most of their 
equipment, and they would have none for use elsewhere. 



2168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

6. To clarify the current situation to some extent, certain information and 
considerations that may not otherwise be readily available in the Department 
are mentioned below : 

(a) Army is not only lacking AA guns for outlying bases, but has a serious 
shortage on Oahu. It has insufficient suitable guns for replacing Marine 7" and 
5" guns without weakening the defenses of Hawaii. By taking 155-mm. guns 
from Hawaii and Marine 5" guns might be replaced but the 155-mm. guns would 
either cover a limited arc or else their mobility would be lost. 

(b) Army can spare no .50 caliber machine guns but can supply rifles and 
.30 caliber machine guns. 

(c) Army has a limited number of 37 mm. guns, badly needed for defenses 
in Hawaii, but some few might be made available by weakening the defenses 
here; particularly as a [5770] considerable increase in the number of 
such guns is expected in the near future. At present there is a marked shortage 
of ammunition for 37 mm. 

(d) (1) Army pursuit planes are available in sufficient numbers to send at 
least one squadron each to Midway and "Wake. 

(2) Tlie fighting capabilities of those planes is superior to that of Marine 
lighters or light bombers. 

(3) They have no offensive capabilities against hostile surface craft or sub- 
marines. 

(4) They lack navigational equipment, their personnel are inexperienced in fly- 
ing over water and are much averse to operations more than fifteen miles from 
land. 

(5) Pursuit planes once having landed at Midway or Wake, cannot fly off 
to carriers. It would be virtually impossible to take them out of Wake; and a 
very slow and difficult undertaking to remove them from Midway. 

(e) Army has personnel available in sufficient numbers to reenforce or relieve 
the Marine Defense Battalions. The Marines have been organized, equipped, 
and trained for work of this particular character. They are already established, 
habited to the mode of life, and experienced in fitting their activities to accord 
with the various other naval activities in these outlying places. It is no reflec- 
tion upon the Army to say that their units would require considerable time 
[5771] to acquire the proficiency in this specialized work that the Marines 
already have. 

(f) In emergency Army personnel might replace casualties or reenforce 
Marines, but it would, for very obvious reasons, be highly preferable to have 
other Marines available for that purpose. 

(g) No spare armament for defense battalions is available. In fact, some 
deficiencies in equipment for existing battalions exist ; and the recommenda- 
tions of reference (g) as to armament for the outlying bases have not been 
completely filled. Armament and equipment for any new defense battalions 
have not been assembled. 

(h) The bases are being developed to facilitate fleet operations. Irrespective 
of the source of defense forces, various other naval activities will continue at 
these outlying bases. Placing the defenses in Army hands would bring some 
difficult problems of command relationships. Such problems woiild not, of course, 
be insurmountable, but they would be avoided if the Marines are not replaced. 

(i) TSvelve Marine fighting pianos are now on Wake; a quadron of Marine 
light bombers is in readiness to fly to Midway. Tliese planes are accustomed to 
long operations over water, and from carriers. Tlie bombers have offensive power 
against surface ships or submarines. 

(j) Arrangements exist or will shortly exist on [5772] both Midway 
and Wake for temporary offensive operations of Army B-17 bombers, using 
Navy bombs. Only six such bombers on Oahu are now in operating condition. 

(k) Personnel and equipment, up to the liujits given in reference (g), are 
being transferred to the outlying bases as rapidly as available and the conditions 
at those bases made feasible. 

(1) Prior to receipt of reference dispatches, arrangements for Army cooper- 
ation in certain respects had been made; and clo.se cooperation and liaison 
will continue. 

(m) Essential work is being pushed at outlying bases, and it is not intended 
to withdraw civilian workei's if hostilities develop. Plans have been made 
to incorporate such workers into the defense organization insofar as practicable. 

7. From the foregoing, it is concluded that at this time: 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2169 

(a) Marine armament can be withdrawn from outlying islands to a very 
limited extent. 

[5773] (b) If the Marines are replaced, the personnel relieved, lacking 
equipment, will be valueless as a defense battalion. 

(c) Replacing the Marines will very materially weaken the defenses because 
of less proficient personnel. 

(d) Considering all aspects of the matter, marine planes are more valuable 
in the Advance Bases than Army pursuit planes. 

8. The presence of Army forces on outlying bases will inevitably bring up 
the question of command. Midway, Wake, Johnston and Palmyra are Naval 
Air Stations, designed and built primarily to support Fleet operations. Any 
other activities there, including defense, must be subordinate to this purpose. 
Defense itself exists solely for the purpose of insuring the availability of 
the bases. The establishments are small and close coordination of all activities 
is mandatory, extending to joint use of material and equipment and even to 
joint participation by all hands in unusual tasks. This can be accomplished 
only by unity of command, which must be vested in the one oflScer qualified 
to insure that the base fulfill^ its purpose, whether under attack or not and 
no matter what organization operates the defenses. The interests of the Navy 
are paramount and unity of command must be vested in the Commanding 
Officer of the Station. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as already 
[5774] brought out in his despatches, cannot too strongly emphasize this 
point. 

9. The Commander-in-Chief i*ecognizes that unforeseen events may rapidly 
develop that would necessitate replacement of Marines by Army personnel, pro- 
vided suitable equipment is available. He has had conferences with the Com- 
manding General, Hawaiian Department, on the matter and arrangements are 
in progress looking toward 

(a) Organization of three Army defense battalions of approximately 800 
men each (organization along the lines of Marine Defense Battalions) ; 

(b) Training of such units with equipment. Army or Marine, available on 
Oahu; 

(c) Army steps to obtain requisite armament comparable to that called for 
in reference (g) for use in the Advance Bases; 

(d) Army organization of three 18-plane pursuit squadrons to be kept in ex- 
peditionary status with crews, ground crews and equipment ready for transporta- 
tion, on short notice, to Advanced Bases — planes to be transported by aircraft 
carrier and flown off near destination ; 

(e) Bringing aforementioned units to a satisfactory state of readiness and 
keeping them available for (1) i-elieving, supporting, or furnishing replacements 
for Marine Defense Battalions, or (2) for garrisoning other islands or [5775] 
developments not now manned by Marines. 

10. In connection with this whole question, the major point for the moment 
appears to be that the Advanced Bases we now have are, to a greater or lesser 
extent, going concerns. Their development and provisions for defense have been 
evolved after much work and study. The internationl situation is such that 
active defense against hostile forces may be required on extremely short notice. 
Any radical change in the defense arrangements should be made only if there is 
compelling necessity therefor ; and a definite indication of clear cut gain for over 
all operations. 

11. The Commander-in-Chief is not aware of the particular circumstances 
which have opened up the questions under discussion. If additional Advanced 
Bases in our own or friendly territory are contemplated, it is highly important 
that further information on the subject be furnished the Commander-in-Chief. 

12. If, during the progress of tlie war, enemy positions are taken and require 
garrisons tliey should, of course, be defended by Marine Defense Battalions. It 



2170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

would be preferable to have Marine battalions with full equipment available for 
such duty without disrupting the defenses of existing bases. At present, our 
Advanced Bases should be defended by the most competent personnel available, 
viz, the Marine Defense Battalions. If our progress in the war has brought more 
[5776'] advanced positions under our control, then the most seasoned and ex- 
perienced personnel should be in the more exposed positions ; and the present Ad- 
vanced Bases which, by virtue of our forward movement, would be less liable to 
enemy attack, could be manned by less skilled personnel. Even so, it would be 
better to have new Marines rather than the Army take over their defense, but 
the Army should be ready and qualified to do so. In any event, the battalions 
projected into the new bases must have their full equipment without withdraw- 
ing that in the present bases. 

13. The foregoing discussion has had particular application to Midway, Wake, 
Johnston, and Palmyra. The situation as to Samoa is not greatly different. 
(Construction of Army airfields at Canton and Christmas Islands has brought 
those places into the picture. The Commander-in-Chief has felt that some de- 
fense at Canton should be provided at once against an enemy raider. As the 
Army has no suitable guns available for the purpose, he has arranged to send two 
five inch guns with fire control equipment from the Fourth Defense Battalion to 
meet temporarily the existing situation, pending clarification of the Department's 
policy regarding Canton. These guns will be manned by Army personnel. 

14. Meantime, the Commander-in-Chief is making a study as to minimum re- 
quirements for the defenses of Canton. This will be forwarded separately 
within the next few days. [5777] The defenses contemplated will call for 
not more than two or three batteries of three inch AA guns, not more than two 
batteries of five inch guns and a limited number of smaller weapons. It is 
expected that not more than 300 men will be required for manning the defensive 
armament. It is probable that the requirements for Christmas would be less 
rather than more than that for Canton. 

15. In view of the Commanding General's information that the War Depart- 
ment has assumed responsibility for defense of Christmas and Canton Islands, 
no steps have been taken toward defending Christmas, and agreement has been 
made locally with Army authorities that Marine equipment now going to Canton 
would be replaced as soon as possible. 

16. It seems appropriate here to express the growing concern of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief over the increase in number of Army and Navy stations that 
may require support from the Fleet. Such support may involve logistics, 
keeping open lines of communications, or active defense. Establishments at 
Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Samoa are already well advanced. Our 
Army is now engaged in building air fields at Christmas, Canton, Fiji, and 
New Caledonia, and consideration is being given to other installations in the 
New Hebrides and Solomon Islands. In addition, discussion has been made 
from time to time over establishment of American bases in the Gilberts, 
Bismarck Archipelago, and [5778] other places. 

17. Whether or not the Navy is initially concerned in the building or logistics 
or defense installations of these far flung establishments, it inevitably will become 
involved with them if war develops. Such involvement may seriously interfere 
with offensive operations of the Fleet. It can not be too strongly emphasized 
that new development of this nature must be curtailed, and only those permitted 
that will definitely contribute toward success in the Western Pacific. A Fleet 
in being behind a series of defensive positions in the Central and South 
Pacific can not contribute very much toward victory over a power some 
thousands of miles to the westward. 

18. To summarize : the Commander-in-Chief considers that the current setup 
in the existing bases is in accordance with long and well considei*ed plans 
that should not now be changed. He intends to : 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2171 

(a) Continue the Marine Defense Battalions at Wake, Midway, Johnston, and 
Palmyra ; , 

(b) Continue use of Marine planes at such of those places as circumstances 
require ; 

(c) Transfer a battery of five inch guns to the Army for use by Army 
personnel at Canton until the Army can obtain suitable replacement; 

(d) Continue cooperation and liaison with local [5779] Army authori- 
ties to develop and maintain in readiness Army units and equipment that may, 
on short notice, reenforce or relieve Marines at aforementioned bases in whole 
or in part. 

19. It is recommended that: 

(a) Deficiencies in armament at existing Advance Bases, and in ex- 
isting Marine Defense Battalions, be remedied as rapidly as possible (see 
reference (g) ) ; 

(b) Fourth Defense Battalion and proposed new Defense Battalion be main- 
tained as mobile battalions in Pearl Ilarbov in accordance with existing plans; 
and that the organization and acquirement of equipment for this new additional 
battalion be expedited ; 

(c) At least two additional defense battalions be organized and equipped at 
San Diego, with plans to use these battalions and those mentioned in (b) above 
for garrisoning positions captured in the Marshalls; 

(d) An understanding with Army be reached now that in case Army takes 
over defense of Advance Bases, command of such bases will remain in the Navy 
(see paragraph 8) ; 

(e) Commitments to further island developments in the Central and South 
Pacific be held to a minimum as to number and logistic requirements ; 

(f) No plans lie made for relieving Marine Defense Battalions; [5780- 
.57^/] or air units until Army has organized, equipped and trained for co- 
ordinated action suitable units for taking over. 

20. Transmission via U. S. Registered air mail is hereby authorized. 

H. E. KlMMEL. 

Copy to : C. G., Haw. Dept. Com-14. 

[6782] Mr. Mitchell. Now, Senator, what did you have to say ? 

Senator Fekguson. I just wanted to get the record clear on this 
Exhibit 106. Did I understand counsel to say that that only has the 
personal letters and not all official letters? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is it. That is a correspondence file and the 
official letters would have a way of starting out, "From the Chief of 
Naval Operations." 

' Senator Feeguson. Now, do we have any exhibit that has the official 
letters in them so that we would know where to find this other letter 
that Congressman Murphy talks about, being an official letter? 

Mr. Mitchell. I do not think we have ever compiled a separate 
document with the official letters, have we? They have been put in 
from time to time in evidence but there has never been any compilation 
made of them as we have in the correspondence file. 

The Chairman. May I ask counsel whether this thick document 
here, which is a compilation of Admiral Stark's letters to Admiral 
Kimmel and his letters back, are to be regarded as official or personal ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, they are official but they are written in the 
personal style as distinguished from a formal communication. This 
is in the personal style. Those formal com- [57831 munica- 
tions were phrased differently. They did not call each other "Dear 
Betty" and so on in them. They start out with, "From : Chief of Naval 
Operations to CINCPAC. Subject : So and so and paragraph so an so." 
They are more formal in style, but Admiral Stark obviously had a 
practice of communicating in this form with his commanders. 

The Chairman. All right. 



2172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. Sometimes he would send a formal dispatch and 
then he would write a letter about it afterward. 

The Chairman. They are mixed in here, I see. Here are some from 
the commander in chief to the Naval Operations and others addressed 
"Dear Betty" and "Dear Mustapha." I suppose that was a nickname 
given to Admiral Kimmel because it sounded like Mustapha Kemal 
of Turkey. 

Mr. Mitchell. That may be so. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; that was the reason for my addressing 
him in that way. That was an affectionate term I had of addressing 
him by Mustapha Kimmel. 

The Chairman. How did you get the nickname Betty? 

Admiral Stark. A lot of people have asked me that question, sir. 

The Chairman. You might as well clear it up now. 

Admiral Stark. When I went to the Naval Academy the history 
Avhich we studied there ha'd the statement of old General [6784] 
John Stark, who was one of my forebears, that "We win today or 
Betty Stark will be a widow tonight." The histories that I had always 
studied at home were, "We win today or Molly Stark will be a widow 
tonight." 

I was called both Molly and Betty off and on for a number of months 
and finally dropped into the name of Betty and I have been known as 
Betty Stark ever since. Every time an upper classman came in my 
room when I was a plebe I had to get up and say, "We win today or 
Betty Stark will be a widow." I did the same thing when I went 
from the youngster floor; that is, the third-class floor, up to the fourth- 
class floor, I would stop and say, "We win today or Bett}' Stark will 
be a widow." 

That name has stuck. It probably will be given to all Starks sub- 
sequent to my time. For example, Governor Stark of Missouri was 
known as Molly Stark, which is how names carry on as a rule in the 
Naval Academy. 

The Chairman. You came very near being a widow at Pearl Harbor. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, just so that we may keep this 
record straight : Now, in Exhibit 106, they are the personal letters and 
not the official letters, but I find, for instance, on July 10, 1941 a 
memorandum for [6785] Admiral Hart, Admiral Kimmel, 
Admiral King, commander of all Naval Districts, signed "H. R. Stark." 
Now, would that be classified as a personal one or an official one, so 
that we get the record straight? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the record will show for itself. There are 
some communications interspersed in this Exhibit 106 that are in the 
formal form. 

The Chairman. Well, let us proceed. 

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Stark, did Admiral Kimmel ever inform 
you that he had made a decision not to conduct any air reconnaissance 
after November 27 around Hawaii? 
Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I call your attention to some intercepts in exhibit 2. 
As I understand it, the intercepted and decoded Jap diplomatic mes- 
sages and military messages that were decoded by the Army and Navy 
were delivered to you regularly, copies of them. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2173 

Admiral Stakk. If you are referring to certain particular dis- 
patches, I ^YO^kl like to see them. Generally 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I am talking about the practice. The record, 
I think, shows that the Army and Navy at Washington here had those 
means of decoding and translating the secret Jap messages and we 
have one volume here. Exhibit 1, that was what we call diplomatic 
intercepts, that were mes- [S786] sages between the Tokyo 
government and its diplomatic representatives abroad back and forth, 
and then we have in as Exhibit 2 another type of those messages that 
the Japs sent out to representatives abroad, that are of a military 
nature and not a diplomatic nature. You are familiar with that, 
are you not ? 

Admiral Stakk. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, there was a system for having these mes- 
sages decoded and translated by sometimes the War Department, some- 
times the Navy Department. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And a regular dissemination or distribution or de- 
livery to certain officials. You were one of the officials to whom it 
was the practice to deliver copies of those intercepts, were you not? 

Admiral Stark. I was ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And you got them regularly ? 

Admiral Stark. I got them regularly. I would state with regard 
to that that when the book came to me, which usually came through 
my 'aide, there were clipped certain dispatches which they considered 
important that I should read. Those not clipped were considered not 
necessary for me to read. I always read those clipped. Those not 
clipped I might sometimes go through the file just to check up to see 
whether I [5687] was getting all that in my opinion was also 
important. I believe my aide generally went through all of them. 
The same book that I read Admiral IngersoU read. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did it come to you in one of the pouches ? 

Admiral Stark. Locked ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Locked pouch ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And it was a book in which the messages were bound 
or tied together? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And when you say "clipped" you mean with little 
paper clips, that little paper clips were stuck on those that you were 
expected to read ? 

Admiral Stark. Tliat is correct: yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I will call your attention now to exhibit 2 
commencing at page 12. That is an intercepted Jap message from 
Tokyo to Honolulu dated September 24, 1941, translated 

Admiral Stark. Did you say page 2, sir? 

Mr. ISIiTCHELL. Page 12, translated October 9, 1941. It is the mes- 
sage with which we are familiar, that divides the waters of Pearl 
Harbor into five areas and requests information as to the location 
of ships in those areas and you will note on pages 13, 14, and 15 there 
is a series of messages [5783] relating to that subject, all of 
them translated and available here in English form before December 7. 

Did those messages come to your attention at or about the time they 
were received ? 



2174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. I have no recollection of having seen those par- 
ticular messages. I believe that I did not see them. However, I may 
have seen them. They naay have been brought to me and they may 
have slipped my mind, but I think I did not see them. 

Mr. Mitchell. Why do you believe you did not see them ? 

Admiral Stark. Because I have no recollection of them, and if I 
may go on I would like to comment on these messages. 

Mr. Mitchell. All right. 

Admiral Stark. These messages are of a class of message which 
gives positions of ships in harbor, gives locations. The message, 
however, is distinctly different from the usual type of ship report, 
which simply would say, "So many ships," or give their names, in 
Pearl Harbor. This dispatch is different in that it calls for the loca- 
tion of a ship in the harbor in her particular berth. 

I recall no such request from Tokyo to the field; that is, to the 
Japanese people, to report like that except for Pearl Harbor. There 
might have been. We did not see it. I believe there are one or two 
places where ships were reported, [S7S9] like in Puget Sound, 
in a certain berth or a dock, alongside of a dock, but this dispatch 
while of a class is of a character which is different. 

In the light of hindsight it stands out very clearly, with what we 
can read into it now, as indicating the possibility or at least the 
groundwork for a Japanese air raid on Pearl Harbor. That sig- 
nificance which we now have in the light of hindsight was not pointed 
out to me by anyone, nor do I have the slightest recollection of any- 
body ever having given that significance at the time. 

Mr. Mitchell. Whose hands would this message pass through 
in the Navy besides your own — in the Department I mean ? 

Admiral Stark. That message would come in and be decoded and 
translated and go to the office of naval intelligence, it being informa- 
tion. If naval intelligence had thought it important enough — and 
there were good men looking over those dispatches in intelligence — 
if they had thought it important or of unusual significance, they 
had full authority to send it out. 

Mr. Mitchell. Send it out to whom? 

Admiral Stark. Send it out to the field. This particular dis- 
patch would have been of particular interest, if they had so considered 
it, to Admiral Kimmel. They could have simply sent it out as it 
was. If they had thought it vital, they [5790'] could have 
also brought it to what we call the front office; that is, to IngersoU 
or myself, or come through Turner, but I have no recollection of this 
dispatch having been discussed, certainly not with regard to what in 
the light of hindsight we would now read into it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it is clear in the light of handsight what it 
means, we will agree to that, but how about foresight? Don't you 
think this message, because of the very things you point out, would 
have been or ought to have been a very significant thing to a careful 
intelligence man before the attack at Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Stark. It is very difficult to separate hindsight from 
foresight. I can only say that it went through our people, it went 
through the Army, who were likewise vitally interested in the defense 
of Pearl Harbor, and I do not recollect anyone having pointed it out. 
There was literally a mass of material coming in. We knew the Japa- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2175 

nese appetite was almost insatiable for detail in all respects. The 
dispatch might have been put down as just another example of their 
great attention to detail. 

If I had seen it myself I do not laiow what I would have done. 
I might have said, "Well, my goodness, look at this detail," or I 
might have read into it because it is different, I might have said, 
''Well, this is unusual. I wonder why they [6791] want it?" 
I might have gone on, and diagnosed it or I might not. I simply do 
not know. We read it now in the light of what has happened. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it was of interest to the Army, but don't you 
think because it asked for ships and ship locations that it was a little 
more pertinent to the Navy Intelligence to analyze it and evaluate it 
than it was the Army people ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, both were analyzing, but it is of a naval 
color. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. It is also of an air raid color. 

Mr. Mitchell. What could it mean ? Looking at it now and read- 
ing the words of it what could it mean other than the formation of 
a target plan? What do you conceive would be the purpose of the 
Japs in having the precise location by areas of the ship's location in 
each section in Pearl Harbor unless it was that ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, as I look at it now in the light of what I 
know 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I did not ask you to do that. I am asking 
you what it could have meant? Read it and tell us what it could 
have meant if it did not mean that? 

Admiral Stark. Well, it could have meant that they were just 
down to getting the detail. Whether a submarine might [6792'] 
have come in, whether the small submarines might have come in, 
whether the so-called suicide, one-man submarine attack might have 
been in their minds, that might have been possible. I am thinking 
now in the light of hindsight. I did not see the messages. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, that was of vital interest if it were all of 
those things to Admiral Kimmel, wasn't it ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes; if it could have meant that, if it had been 
clear at the time. 

Mr. Mitchell. If it meant sabotage or small submarines or air 
attack or anything, and it must have meant one of them at the time, it 
was very important for him to know that, wasn't it ? 

Admiral Stark. It meant they wanted to know what was in par- 
ticular spots and its significance now is quite clear. 

Mr. Mitchell. What was your impression prior to December 7, 
1941, as to whether Admiral Kimmel or the Navy out at Pearl Harbor 
had the equipment or the forces trained to decode and translate these 
diplomatic and military messages to which I have referred, these 
Jap messages ? 

Admiral Stark. I inquired on two or three occasions as to whether 
or not Kimmel could read certain dispatches when they came up and 
which we were interpreting and sending our own messages and I was 
told that he could. However, I want [5793] to make it plain 
that that did not influence me in the slightest regarding what I sent. 



2176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I felt it my responsibility to keep the commanders in the field and to 
see to it that they were kept informed of the main trends and of 
information which might be of high interest to them. Regardless of 
what dispatches I might have seen, they may have formed background 
for me bnt I saw that affirmative action was taken from the Chief of 
Naval Operations to the commanders in the field on matters which I 
thought they should have. 

[67d4] Mr. Mitchell. Well, if it was your responsibility, and 
you say it was, to keep him informed, was it not of vital importance 
that you know what means of information he had by himself ? What 
sort of a system is it when the commander in chief of the Navy De- 
partment having the duty of keeping his field commanders well 
posted does not know whether the field commander has certain means 
of informing himself? 

Admiral Stark. Well, I took the means to inform him. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you ignored the fact then that you felt he 
had it all anyway and gave him what you thought was worth while ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; I worked on the principle that it was 
my responsibility and by official letter dispatch and personal letter 
endeavored to give him my thoughts. 

Mr. Mitchell. Don't you think if he already had copies of these 
intercepts that his forces had decoded out there that it was taking 
some chances for you to expose your code-breaking system by sending 
him copies over the wires of those same messages ? 

Admiral Stark. I had confidence in the security of our highest 
codes. 

Mr. Mitchell. More than you had in the Japs ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. So far as we know, they had not been 
broken. 

[■5796] Mr. Mitchell. Well, as a matter of fact, notwithstanding 
somebody told you Admiral Kimmel had a decoding and decrypting 
outfit out there, you did send him from time to time not only the sub- 
stance but practically verbatim copies of some of these Jap intercepts, 
did you not ? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. 

Mr. Mitchell. Who was it that told you that they had a system 
out in Honolulu or Pearl Harbor of decoding and decrypting Jap 
messages? 

Admiral Stark. Admiral Turner. 

Mr. Mitchell. Wliat did he say he had done to try to find out about 
it? 

Admiral Stark. He did not say. As I said, I remarked to him — I 
remembered on one or two occasions not of having talked with Admiral 
Turner but I recall last summer that I was under the impression 
Kimmel could translate these messages. I do not mean that he could 
have translated all of them. The volume was very great at times. It 
is my understanding that people, who I believe you have down on the 
call, can give you far more than I can. 

There was a mass 

Mr. Mitchell. Who was it in the Navy Department 

Admiral Stark. May I finish? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

[5796] Admiral Stark. There was a mass of material that came 
in and a portion of it was decoded into the book, part of that which we 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2177 

thought was worth while was, and furthermore it was clipped, that 
which was really important. 

Mr. Mitchell. Who was it in the Navy Department here that did 
know whether Admiral Kimmel had the decrypting and decoding of 
the code available to him? 

Admiral Stark. People who were doing the same work for us in 
the Department. 

Mr, Mitchell. To find the tiutli out it was only necessary to go to 
them and ask them, was it not? 

Admiral Stark. Well, when Admiral Turner told me he could do 
it I did not consider it necessary to go any further. 

Mr. Mitchell. How is that? 

Admiral Stark. I say when Admiral Turner told me that he could 
do it, I mean Admiral Kimmel could do it, I did not consider it neces- 
sary to go any further. 

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Kimmel came here on a visit at one time, 
and he wrote a letter in which he said how important it was that he 
should know all about the diplomatic negotiations, and that sort of 
thing. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did not you know at that time, and in the discussion 
did not it come to light that he did not have any [5797] diffi- 
culty in decoding these diplomatic top messages? 

Admiral Stark. No ; he did not mention that. I do remember dis- 
tinctly his wanting everything which was pertinent. We had con- 
ferences on everything he wanted, and I told him all I knew, the main 
trends at that time, and I continued to tell him. 

I might make this observation at this time and that is that the 
intercepts formed only a part, though a very vital part, of informa- 
tion which we here in Washington had. 

Mr. Mitchell. I understand that, Admiral. I am driving at the 
question of how it came about that Admiral Kimmel came here, and the 
letter that he presented personally, asking that he be informed of all 
of these political developments and diplomatic developments, and you 
thought he had a code decrypting outfit there that would break these 
messages, why the subject was not mentioned? Why he should be 
asking for these things if he had a system of his own of getting 
them? 

Admiral Stark. Well, there was more than just the material that 
came from Japan, much more, and that is their interpretation, such 
as you could get from the State Department, Mr. Hull, from the White 
House, from the Army and other sources, the Treasury, that we had 
and which we welded together as our responsibility and sent them out. 
Our picture was [5798] complete, and I felt it was our job to 
send him that. Of course I would have far rather sent him too much 
than too little. I felt I was keeping him informed. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you haven t any recollection, in your confer- 
ence when he was here about that subject, of ever having mentioned 
the subject of having a crypt analytical unit out in Honolulu? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir ; I do not recall it. 

Mr. Mitchell. You say that between November 27 and December 7 
you had some conferences with people in your department over the 
situation as to whether any other messages were needed by way of 
warning. 

79716— 46— pt. 5 9 



2178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. In. any of those discussions did any of your people 
or yourself mention or bring the question up as to whether Pearl 
Harbor was at any risk from an air raid ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, as I have stated before, we went into the 
picture continuously. 

Mr. Mitchell. I asked you before with reference to the prepara- 
tion of the November 27 message. Now I am talking about the con- 
ference you say you had after that, between the 27th and the 7th of 
December, in. which you reviewed the warnings you sent. That is 
M'hat I am asking about now. 

Admiral Stark. No ; I do not recall that we particularly [5799'] 
mentioned an air raid after we had sent out our messages. We did go 
into what we received subsequent to that time. We felt that we had 
received nothing which would change or strengthen the messages 
which we sent out on the 24th and 27th, except the fact that the Japs 
were destroying their means of communication with their representa- 
tivetives in the American, British, and Dutch Governments. 

Mr. Mitchell. Can you tell us when the last time was that any 
communication was exchanged between you and Admiral Kimmel that 
mentioned the question of an air raid ? We have this record that you 
initiated yourself of November 22, 1940, bringing out the necessity for 
investigating that problem and that was followed by the Clarke Re- 
port, the Knox-Stimson letter, and great activity for months on the 
Army and Navy part in reviewing- the situation, estimating the dan- 
ger, how it would happen and how to defend against it. 

The last official document I have seen of that kind was the Martin 
Report of August 21. Now I am wondering if there is anything you 
know of a communication between you and Admiral Kimmel that 
took place after September, October, November, or December, up to 
the 7th, that mentioned the air attack possibility. We have read a 
letter this morning of December 

Admiral Stark. I was going to say talking about anti- [6800'] 
aircraft. 

Mr. Mitchell. December 2, or 1, it was, a letter from Admiral 
Kimmel, in which he mentions the fact that he thought the anti- 
aircraft defenses of Hawaii were inadequate and he complained about 
it, and they had not been remedied. 

Admiral Stark. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. I wondered whether you could lead us to any other 
communication in which you raised the point, or he raised it. There 
may be some. It is a hard question to answer, but I am looking for 
a pointer in some document that maybe we have not noticed. 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall at present. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you look it up? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. And come back later, if j'^ou will, please, and see if 
we can dig up anything more on that subject. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I want to say I do not recall anything 
except our general discussion and pressure to increase the antiaircraft 
defenses. I will look into what I have got and see if I can find 
anything. 

Mr. Mitchell. How late did that take place in the year, about ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2179 

Admiral Stark. It was mentioned in what we read this morning. 

[SSOl] Mr. Mitchell. That is right. 

Admiral Stark. That you mentioned a minute ago. I think I 
know what you want, sir, and I will endeavor to find it. 

[S802] Mr. Mitchell. I want to find out when the idea vanished 
completely from the people's mind here and in Pearl Harbor, if I 
can, the idea of an air attack. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Have you finished your observation on what you 
were trying to find out ? 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, in connection with 

The Chairman. Just a moment. Have you finished your observa- 
tion on what you were trying to find out about when the idea vanished ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes; I have finished. I wanted to find out when 
the idea of an air attack vanished from people's minds, that was 
lively for a while. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, in that connection I would like to 
suggest that there is a reference in the letter of November 25 to it. 

Mr. Mitchell. November 25 ? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. In the Stark-Kimmel communications ? 

Mr. Murphy. In the Stark-Kimmel communications, in the post- 
script. 

Admiral Stark. Yes ; I remember that letter, and I would like to 
state that the idea of an air raid had not vanished from our minds. 

[5803]' Mr. Mitchell. I am looking for documentary proof 
of that fact. 

Admiral Stark. After the White House meeting on the 25th, in 
a postscript to a letter to Admiral Kimmel — I better get the document. 
My remembrance is I told him that neither the President nor Mr. 
Hull would be surprised. I will read that. It is the letter of the 
25th of November. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is in Exhibit 106. 

Admiral Stark. Shall I read that ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes ; we would like to have it. 

The Chairman. Go ahead and read it. 

Admiral Stark (reading) : 

I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. 
I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk 
with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity 
of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. 
Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles 
an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could 
happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not 
give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling 
among some i)eople. You know I have generally held that it was not time 
for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still [58041 
rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the 
most likely. 

Mr. Mitchell, Where do you find anything in that that talks about 
a surprise attack on Hawaii ? 
Admiral Stark. That does not talk about an air raid on Hawaii. 
Mr. Mitchell. That what? 

Admiral Stark. It does not mention an air raid on Hawaii. 
Mr. Mitchell. That is what I am asking about. 



2180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. I will endeavor to see if I can find anything subse- 
quent to the date you gave. 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to suggest there is one more paragraph 
that was not read. The paragraph says that was the only thing to be 
prepared for. 

Admiral Stark. The final paragraph in that postscript was in my 
statement, in which I stated : 

I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will be 
damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do 
most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for ; or we may 
do nothing — I think it is more likely to be "anything". 

Mr. Mitchell. What are you reading from there ? 

Admiral Stabk. I am reading from the postscript of that [S805'\ 
letter of the 25th of November, which was also in my statement and 
in which I stated that the letter and the dispatch were intended to 
convey to be ready for anything. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, if you will just read that again, you will 
see when you are talking about "anything" you are talking about what 
tve are going to do and not what the Japs are going to do, if you read 
that carefully. It is what we are going to do. We may do anything 
or nothing. 

Admiral Stark. No; but I state, "The only thing J do know is that 
we ma}^ do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be pre- 
pared for" — in other words, the dispatch and this postscript I had 
hoped would convey the thought that anything might happen and we 
should be prepared for anything, and I think that is what if states. 

Mr. Mitchell. It states we will be prepared for anything we may 
want to do. That is the plain English of it, isn't it ? 

Admiral Stark. I would take it, when I say "we" — "We have got 
to be prepared for anything," that means the men in the field. 

Mr. Mitchell. You are referring to the last sentence in the post- 
script ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, let me read it. It may be wasting time to dis- 
cuss English. 

I won't go into the pros or cons [3806] of what the United States may 
do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is 
that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared 
for — 

that is to say, prepared for anything we may decide to do. That is not 
in preparation against anything the Japs may want to do, is it ? 
Admiral Stark. My thought here, when I said — 

we may do most anything — 

I was telling the men in the field we might do anything, and as I 
stated — 

that's the only thing I know to be prepared for. 

In other words, they should be prepared for anything. 

Mr. Mitchell. I think it was Lord Bacon who said that the man 
who wrote the document was the poorest man to interpret it, because 
he was always thinking of what he meant to say instead of what he 
did say. 

Admiral Stark. I will have to stand by what other people think 
of that. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2181 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, let me turn your attention to the mysterious 
document known as the winds message for a moment. You are 
familiar now with the Jap decoded secret messages appearing on the 
bottom of page 154 of Exhibit 1, arc you? You just look at them 
at the bottom of page 154. That is the message from Tokyo to 
Washington, a diplomatic intercept, dated November 19, 1941, and 
translated November 28, 1941. It [6807] states: 

"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and 
the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be 
added in the middle of the daily Japanese Language shortwave news broadcast", 
and in which certain Japanese words were "east wind rain", "north wind 
cloudy", "west wind clear", if used in the broadcast meant diplomatic relations 
were in danger or broken, and to burn the codes. 

Did you see that message prior to December 7, that is, the message 
setting up that code system ? 

Admiral Stark. My recollection is not clear on the winds message. 
I undoubtedly saw it. 

Mr. MrrcHELL. Now, when you saw the winds message, the question 
is whether this is the one message that everybody knows was received, 
and there is another real question as to whether any such code message 
was ever later sent out. I would like to be clear as to what you are 
referring to. 

Admiral Stark. I probably saw this message setting up the code 
at the time it was received. 

Mr. MrrcHELL. When you say "probably," you heard it talked 
about recently ? 

Admiral Stark. I heard it pretty well covered. 

Mr. Mitchell. You cannot remember what you knew prior to 
[5808] December 7? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. We talked about it a lot since. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you know prior to December 7 that any naval 
monitoring stations had been alerted to try to intercept such message? 

Admiral Stark. No, I did not know — I did not get your question. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you know prior to December 7, 1941, that any 
Navy monitoring station had been alerted to try and listen in on 
Japanese weather broadcasts? 

Admiral Stark. I undoubtedly knew that. 

Mr. Mitchell. You undoubtedly knew it? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. If you knew that then you must have seen this 
message. 

Admiral Stark. I said I assumed that I did. 

Mr. Mitchell. Wlien you say you undoubtedly knew it, you assume 
you knew it, but do you know now that you knew it then? 

Admiral Stark. I know now. 

Mr. Mitchell. But you cannot really support your memory before 
and after the 7th of December to say what you did know about this 
code system prior to that date ? 

Admiral Stark. I am anticipating your next question which I sup- 
pose will be as to whether I knew of its implementation. 

[5809] Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I haven't gotten to that yet. 

Admiral Stark. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. I will in a minute. 



2182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. When this message came in it was undoubtedly 
brought to my attention. I state I must have seen it. I do not recol- 
lect particularly the details of it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you have any present recollection that you did 
see this code system message prior to December 7 ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, that is not clear, sir. I have seen it so 
much since then 

Mr. Mitchell. It is hard to tell. 

Admiral Stark. I assume I undoubtedly saw it at the time, but it 
is one of those things. My mind has not been burdened with it for 
over the 4 years in question. 

Mr. Mitchell. Would you have the same answer with respect to 
the message at the top of page 155, which was on the same date and 
used an abbreviated system, with the Japanese words "east, north or 
west" instead of "east wind rain, north wind cloudy jand west wind 
clear," which was to be used in general intelligence broadcasts. Do 
you remember ever seeing that prior to December 7 ? 

Admiral Stark. I assume I saw it. I do not remember the details 
of the "Higashi" and "Kita," and the rest that went with it. 

[5810] Mr. Mitchell. Prior to December 7, 1941, was there ever 
brought to your attention any copy or any information about the im- 
plementing message sent out by the Japs in a weather broadcast which 
used the significant words that were set up in this code ? 

Admiral Stark. No, there was not, sir. I am sure of that. 

Mr. SIitchell. How about a message sent out under the second 
code system set up at the top of page 155 of Exhibit 1, which was an 
abbreviated system to be used in general intelligence broadcasts? 

Prior to December 7, was any implementing message under that 
brought to your attention ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you ever hear, prior to December 7, of any 
implementing message under this winds code system, or a message 
thought to be that, having been received and decoded in the Navy 
Department ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. The Federal Communications station was alerted I 
think by the Army to try to listen in on these Japanese weather broad- 
casts to see what they could get, and their report shows the two mes- 
sages between November 28 and December 7 that did not quite fit the 
exact wording of the [5S11] code system but came pretty close 
to it in regard to a possible war with Russia. Did you see those? 
Were they brought to your attention ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recollect. I have heard it discussed since 
in all its detail. I do not recollect the Russian situation at that time. 

Mr. Mitchell. I will next call your attention to what we have been 
calling here the 14-part and 1 p. m. message. It appears of record 
here that on December 6 there was intercepted and decoded here in 
Washington a pilot message sent from the Jap Government to their 
ambassadors here stating there would come shortly a longer message 
containing their answer to the American Government's position, and 
then it appears on the evening and before midnight December 6-7, the 
first 13 parts of that message were translated, decoded, and made 
available to certain officials here, and on the next morning, the 14tb 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2183 

part and 1 p. m. part, which directed the presentation of the message 
to our Secretary of State at 1 p. m. on the 7th, were translated and 
disseminated. When did any part of that message first come to your 
attention ? 

Admiral Stakk. It first came to my attention Sunday forenoon 
when I came to the office in the Navy Department. I had no informa- 
tion of it prior to that time. 

[S812] Mr. Mitchell. Nobody endeavored to reach you, that 
you know of, Saturday evening, about the early 13 parts? 

Admiral Stark. Nobody reached me. 

Mr. Mitchell. Where were you, if you know ? 

Admiral Stark. I don't know, sir. I thought I was home but if 
they had tried to reach me I should have been there. Also if I were 
not there word would have been left where I was. Also the duty offi- 
cer was generally informed of my whereabouts. Unfortunately, Mrs. 
Stark has destroyed her date calendar of that time. I have tried to 
run down two or three blinds. There was a party given in the 
Navy yard that night for Governor Edison, ex-Secretary of the Navy. 
I knew that I had been there on a party with him. I wrote the Com- 
mandant at that time. He said that he had completely forgotten 
they had given the party and his wife said she was sure I wasn't 
there, in any case. So that blind went by the board. 

Mr. Mitchell. The record shows that Secretary Knox had it that 
night ; your Chief of Naval Intelligence had it that night. 

Admiral Stark. That is right. 

Mr. Mitchell. And Knox called up and made an appointment with 
Stimson and Hull the next morning. You didn't hear anything 
about that? 

[5S13] Admiral Stark. No, sir, not a word. 

Mr. Mitchell. In the afternoon of the Saturday before, during 
office hours, this pilot message came in, which was the preliminary 
message from the Japs to their ambassadors stating that they were 
going to send this message along. 

Did you see that ? 

Admiral Stark. I have no recollection of having seen or heard of 
the pilot message. The first information that I had on the subject was 
Sunday forenoon. 

Mr. Mitchell. I noticed in your statement about this incident you 
make no mention of the hour you got in the office or the hour you first 
saw this 13- or 14-part message Sunday morning. Have you no recol- 
lection about the hour ? 

Admiral Stark. I can only guess on that and I did guess last sum- 
mer. I usually got down to the office Sunday mornings around 10 :30 
and I just assumed that I had gotten there somewhere around 10 :30 
or 11 o'clock. I was lazy on Sunday mornings unless there was some 
special reason for getting up early. I usually took a walk around the 
grounds and greenhouse at the Chief of Naval Operations' quarters 
and didn't hurry about getting down and my usual time, as I recall, 
was about 10 :30 or 11. What time it was on this particular Sunday 
morning I couldn't go beyond that. 

Mr. Mitchell. I believe there are some officials in [58J4,] 
your Department, who have not yet been called as witnesses, Avhose 
job it was to deliver and consider messages of that type, who think 



2184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

you got there at 9 o'clock and saw a part of this message as early as 
that and the balance of it, the fourteenth part, at least by 1 : 30. 

Would that be contrary to the fact if they should so testify? 

Admiral Stark. They have told me the same thing and they are also 
estimating. You will have those people before you. And as regard- 
ing the 1 o'clock message I think you will have, probably, from one of 
the witnesses who kept some track of his time, the fact that he got to 
my office, and he can testify, about 10 :40, with the 1 o'clock message, 
but I have no recollection. 

Mr. Mitchell. The records show, the White House phone records 
show that General Marshall called you at 11 :30 about it, he had writ- 
ten out a message to Pearl Harbor, to the Army commander there 
about this 1 p. m. business. 

Do you recall that ? 

Admiral Stark. That is the one thing on that morning which stands 
out very clearly in my memory, w^as General Marshall's call to me 
about that message. At that time I was talking over that message with 
Admiral Schuirmann, as to what it might mean. He pointed out, he 
said, we don't [5815] know what the significance of it is, but 
it might mean something, and he- said he thought it would be a good 
thing to inform the people in the Pacific. 

My first reaction was that we had sent so much out that — and as 
there was no deduction from the message, as to what it meant, at least 
w^e had made none at that time, that it would be just as well not to 
send it. A few days previous, when we had a discussion whether to 
send out anything more, the question came up, be careful not to send 
too much, it might create the story of "wolf." 

That was my first conversation with General INIarshall. 

I put the phone up and, as I recall it, I put it up and stopped, and in 
a matter of seconds, or certainly only a few minutes, and thought, 
well, it can't do any harm, there may be something unusual about it, 
General Marshall states he doesn't know what the significance is, but 
there might be something, and I turned back and picked up the phone, 
he had not yet sent the message, and I said, perhaps you are right, 
I think you had better go ahead and I would like to have you make 
sure that it goes to the naval opposites where this message was going, 
which was throughout the commands in the broad Pacific. 

I also asked General Marshall, knowing that the time was rather 
short, whether or not he would get it out quickly. [ 5816] I told 
him our own system under pressure was very fast. And he said, no, 
that he was sure he could get it out quickly also. And with that I did 
nothing more. 

Mr. MrrcHELL. What was your system? 

Admiral Stark. Radio. 

Mr. Mitchell. You had a powerful sending apparatus, did you? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; very. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, ff we are right in our assumptions as to the 
fact that you had this 1 p. m. message in your hands an hour before 
Marshall did, that is at least 10 : 30 — you are not willing to concede 
that, are you ? 

Admiral Stark. My remembrance, as I said, was 10 : 40. When 
you say "at least 10 : 30," I think you will find testimony to that effect 
by a witness, and if he states that, and I think he probably has good 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2185 

siipportinc: data, I accept it, that it was delivered to my office and 
then after that was given, by whomever he gave it, to me. 

Mr. Mitchell. Is it fair to say that if Marshall hadn't spotted that 
message and started to send word out to Pearl Harbor that you prob- 
ably wouldn't have sent anything? 

Admiral Stark. I don't know that I would. I think that might be 
a fair deduction. 

Mr. Mitchell. Noav didn't you have somebody more than [5817] 
Schuirmann in there discussing this 1 p. m. business? 

Admiral Stark. Well, sir 

Mr. Mitchell. Didn't Commander Kramer 



Mr. Gesell. I believe one witness says there were 15 officers in there. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral Schuirmann. 

Admiral Stark. Admiral Schuirmann. I said when Marshall called 
I was talking it over with Schuirmann. 

Mr, Mitchell. After you got the 1 p. m. message wasn't there some 
discussion in your office then about it? 

Admiral Stark. There may have been. I don't recall it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Commander Kramer 

Admiral Stark. I can give you what I know by hearsay. 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't want that. I just want whether any of these 
officers spoke to you about it. 

Admiral Stark. I don't recollect it that morning. I recollect it 
since. 

Mr. Mitchell. There were some younger officers that spotted the 1 
p. m. business and made some suggestion about it being daylight at 
Honolulu ? 

Admiral Stark. I am certain nobody mentioned Honolulu with ref- 
erence to a daylight attack. I am positive of that. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, this was what we lawyers call a last clear 
chance. These people were not ready at Pearl Harbor; [6818] 
the Jap Fleet was piling in ; here was a chance to get a message to them 
that might have saved them; it reached your hands, we will say, at 
10 : 40 ; the chance wasn't taken. 

Does that sum up the situation as you see it? 

Admiral Stark. Well, I gather from your 

Mr. Mitchell. You might have intervened and done something. 

Admiral Stark. I gather from your question you are now pointing 
that dispatch directly at Pearl Harbor. It didn't mention Pearl 
Harbor. It gave no inference with regard to Pearl Harbor any more 
than it did the Philippines or the Netherlands East Indies. 

Mr. Mitchell. Are you right about that? 1 p. m. here was dawn 
at Pearl Harbor and 1 p. m. here was in the middle of the night in 
the Philippines. 

Admiral Stark. I would say that dawn at Pearl Harbor was about 
an hour— -that can be checked by the Naval Observatory — before the 
time specified in the message; and as regards midnight in the Philip- 
pines, as to whether that would mean anything, that could have been 
an attack at night. Taranto was an attack just a few minutes after 
midnight. 

Mr. jVIitchell. Why not send a message to all three of those places 
saying something is liable to happen at 1 p. m. Washington time? 

Admiral Stark. In the light of hindsight, if we had read [SSW] 
into that message that it meant an attack at that hour, and had sent it 



2186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

out, of course, it would have been helpful. I wish such an inference 
could have been drawn. 

Mr. Mitchell. The fixing of an exact hour to deliver the diplomatic 
message and rout out the Secretary of State on a Sunday at 1 p. m., 
wasn't it obvious that there was some special significance, having in 
mind the history of the Japs striking first and declaring war after- 
wards? 

Admiral Stark. If so, Mr. Mitchell, I would like to say that so far 
as I know the Secretary of War didn't read that inference into it, the 
Secretary of State didn't read that inference into it, the Secretary of 
the Navy didn't read that inference into it. General Marshall and his 
staff didn't read that inference into it, and nobody mentioned it to me. 

Mr. Mitchell. Are you quite right about General Marshall ? The 
first thing he did was to spot that message and he wouldn't even allow 
his answer to be typed, he put it into longhand and told them to encode 
it without typing it. 

Admiral Stark. May I read his dispatch? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, we are all familiar with it. 

Admiral Stark. I would like to read this : 

Just what significance the hour set may have been we do not know. 

[S820] Mr. Mitchell. Of course, you didn't know. 
Admiral Stark, (reading) : 

But be on the alert accordingly. 

Mr. Mitchell. That means, to you, being alerted at 1 p. m. Wash- 
ington time, doesn't it ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; but I would like to invite attention also 
to the fact that we had thought that they were on the alert. I am 
not attempting to argue the fact, sir, that I don't think it would have 
been a good thing to have gotten this message out, drawn the inference 
and sent it. I wish we could have. We didn't. 

Mr. Mitchell. You didn't know they weren't on the alert ? 

Admiral, Stark. No, sir. On the contrary, we felt they were. 

Mr. Mitchell. You don't know what time Stimson and Hull got 
this 1 p. m. message, do you, or saw it? 

Admiral Stark. I think, if I may say so, Kramer can tell you 
that. And if Kramer says that message was delivered to my office at 
10 : 40, 1 accept it. 

Mr. Mitchell. It has been suggested to me that Kramer may have 
told you about the text of that message before delivery of the docu- 
ment. Do you recall that ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I think I will not ask the admiral any [SS^l] 
more questions. Do you want to go on with the committee examina- 
tion or take it up at 2 o'clock ? 

The Chairman. Inasmuch as we want to have an executive session 
we might suspend now until 2 o'clock, 

(Whereupon, at 12 :25 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock 
p. m. of the same day.) 

[58'22'] afternoon session — 2 p. m. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. The chair 
understands counsel wishes to ask some further questions. 
Mr. Gesell. a few additional questions, Mr. Chairman. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2187 

TESTIMONY OF ADM. HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed) 

Mr. Geselli. First, Admiral Stark, with respect to the events of the 
6th and 7th. With respect to your whereabouts on December 6th, did 
you have a duty officer at your home on the evening of the 6th ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. If someone had wanted to reach you in a hurry could 
they have gotten you ? 

Admiral Stark. I left word at home when I went out as to where I 
could be reached ; also before leaving the Department the duty officer 
in Operations was informed if I would be out. 

Mr. Gesell. Was it generally known that the duty officer knew 
your whereabouts in the Navy Department ? 

Admiral Stark. I think so. Also it was a general Navy custom or 
at least it was a departmental custom, they would probably have called 
one of my aides. 

Mr. Gesell. Was there anyone at your home on the 6th who could 
have taken the calls if you were absent ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. There was always a servant avail- [68£3] 
able at the telephone. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, did your servant, or did the duty officer at the 
Navy Department, or did any of your aides ever telephone that any- 
one had sought to reach you at any time on the 6th ? 

Admiral Stark. No. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, with respect to the 7th, I think we want to have 
a little clearer idea of when you got to your office. Admiral Wilkin- 
son testified that you reached your office at least by 9 :15 that morning 
because his recollection is that at 9 : 15 he discussed the first thirteen 
parts of the message with you or handed them to you. Do you recall 
that you were at your offiee that early ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not. I may have been but I do not recall just 
what time I got down that Sunday morning. I made a guess when I 
was asked at the hearing before the Naval Court of Inquiry last sum- 
mer about half past 10. 

Mr. Gesell. Your best recollection is that you got there at half 
past 10 ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, that was about the usual time and I had no 
reason to think otherwise. I may have gotten in earlier. 

Mr. Gesell. Whenever it was you got there was your first order 
of business the 14-part message ? 

[S824-] Admiral Stark. I do not recall that. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, do you recall when you saw the fourteen part 
message first ? 

Admiral Stark. I saw it after I got in the office. Just what time 
I do not recall. 

Mr. Gesell. You do not recall how soon after you got to your office 
that you saw it ? 

Admiral Stark. No. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, do you recall anyone telling you that the 1 o'clock 
message was in before you were shown the text of the 1 o'clock message ? 

Admiral Stark. No ; I do not. 

Mr. Gesell. You do not recall that Captain Kramer or anyone else 
passed oral word into your office that the 1 o'clock message was in ? 



2188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. I not only do not recall it, I think I had no such 
word. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, during the 6th and the 7th prior to the attack, 
did you have any conversations with anyone at the White House, 
President Roosevelt or anyone else? 

Admiral Stark. I may have ; I do not recall. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall any conversation that you had with any- 
one at the White House concerning the ll-part message and the 1 
o'clock message ? 

[S8£5] Admiral Stark. No ; I do not. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you have any conversations prior to the attack 
concerning those messages with Secretary Knox? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall that I did. I may have. I simply 
don't remember. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, there are two or three other points, picking 
up some loose ends at this time, which are somewhat unrelated and I 
will just go right down them with you. 

General Marshall indicated that he was not certain what the length 
of time was which the Navy had in mind as being the minimum neces- 
sary for it to get ready for combat in the Pacific. Did you have some 
date in mind and, if so, did you state your estimate of that at any 
time? 

Admiral Stark. I am not sure of your question unless you mean 
the delay that we wanted in connection with the Philippines ? 

Mr. Gesell. I believe that is it ; yes. 

Admiral Stark. If that it what you refer to and I believe he testi- 
fied I wanted somewhat longer. 

Mr. Gesell. That is right. 

Admiral Stark. And if I go a little further, I believe he testified 
that he thought by 10th December or something of that sort he would 
be ready and that I wanted that into Feb- [-5826] ruary. 

Mr. Gesell. I was not clear about that. He was not clear how long 
you wanted and that is what I am trying to get now. 

Admiral Stark. That is to what you refer ? 

Mr. Gesell. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. I was asking for 3 months. I based that request 
on the Army air schedule which, as I recall, they anticipated complet- 
ing their quota of planes out there in February or March and, of 
course, the Army can give you that testimony. 

Mr, Gesell. And when you say you were asking for three months 
who were you asking for three months ? To whom were you talking ? 

Admiral Stark. Largely Mr. Hull, in endeavoring to keep the nego- 
tiations going if possible until the Army schedule was completed. 

Mr. Gesell. Did Mr. Hull keep you advised of the progress of the 
negotiations with the Japanese? 

Admiral Stark. Mr. Hull kept me I think rather closely advised 
as to the progress of negotiations. It was his habit frequently, some- 
times day 'after day, to call me up in the late afternoon and let me 
know if there was any progress. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, you said, I think, in your pre- [SSS?] 
pared statement something to the effect that you do not recall seeing 
the 10-point note of November 26th at or about the time that it was 
delivered. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2189 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. 

Mr. Gesell. The evidence here shows that that note was intercepted 
in the regular course and was among the Japanese intercepts; in other 
words, the text of the note being transmitted by the Japanese repre- 
sentatives here to Tokyo. 

Admiral Stark. That is true. I think that was on the 28th. 
Mr. Gesell. Do you think you saw it then on the 28th? 

Admiral Stark. I could not be sure. I would like to say with 
regard to that 10-point note, while not recollecting having seen it at 
that time, that I had discussed in the State Department a memoran- 
dum by Mr. Morgenthau and expressed my opinion on it and confirmed 
it in writing. The note of the 26th, the iO-point note, as I recall con- 
tained nothing, or at least very little or only minor differences from 
the note of the Secretary of the Treasury and also did not contain 
anything which I had objected to in the other note, so in general^ I 
knew of the substance of that note but as to having seen it in its 
actual form when it went out or whether I saw it on the 28th I could 
not say. 

Mr. Gesell. With respect to the basing of the fleet in [S8£8'\ 
Pearl Harbor we have had a great deal of discussion concerning 
whether or not the fleet should have been based out there in 1940. Did 
you state any opinion or take any position as the days grew more 
critical in 1941 as to whether or not the fleet should be based at Pearl 
Harbor? 

Admiral Stark. In my opinion when the situation was tense and 
critical the fleet should have been in Pearl Harbor ; that is, should 
have been based in that area. 

Mr. Gesell. Commencing in your opinion at about what date, 
Admiral Stark? 

Admiral Stark. Well, I never tried to narrow that down. It would 
be purely a guess. If I may go back a little bit, I do not want that 
confused with the fact that when the fleet first stayed out there I 
pointed out, and pointed out very clearly, in conversations with the 
President the advantages from the standpoints which Admiral 
Richardson mentioned of the fleet's return. 

Mr. Gesell. We are talking now about a wholly different thing. 

Admiral Stark. Yes ; I know we are. 

Mr. Gesell. You testified that you were in agreement with Admiral 
Richardson on his position that he took in 1940. 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. 

Mr. Gesell. Now what I am asking you is what view you [6829'] 
took, if any, with respect to the basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor as 
the days became critical in 1941 ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, the fleet was then based at Pearl Harbor. 
I would say that by the time Admiral Kimmel had command of the 
fleet we had practically wiped out of our minds, or at least we no 
longer considered and talked about bringing the fleet back. 

Mr. Gesell. And you have stated that it was your opinion that at 
least by the last quarter of 1941 the place for the fleet was in the 
Hawaiian waters? 

Admiral Stark. In my opinion that was a covering position in 
the Pacific. 



2190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gesell. Now, what information did you have in the latter part 
of 1941 as to the preparedness of the fleet for combat? Was it ready 
for war or was it not ready for war ? 

Admiral Stark. In my opinion it was. Of course, no commander 
in chief is ever satisfied, even those we had in Europe, they were not 
satisfied. I know of no one who was ever satisfied but generally speak- 
ing I have quoted from Admiral Kimmel's annual report. I did 
not mention that he also — I think it was in the same letter — he said 
that his shooting was good judged by any standards, which showed 
that the fleet was performing satisfactorily in target practice, and he 
also said the morale was good. 

[6380'] Mr. Gesell. So that it was your opinion that the fleet 
was ready for war at that time and was that opinion shared by other 
officers advising you ? 

Admiral Stark. I think so. Now, when you say "ready for war" 
it is subject to two interpretations there. It was ready for war in 
accordance with the war plans. It was not ready for an advance into 
the western Pacific, which would have required a large train and 
which we did not have. 

Mr. Gesell. It still had no train and was not ready for offensive 
action? 

Admiral Stark. It was ready for offensive action in the way of 
raids as envisaged by the war plans and it had a train of certain 
dimensions but it did not have the great fleet of supply vessels required 
to take it and maintain it in the western Pacific. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, what about this dispatch that the President 
sent concerning the placing of three reconnaissance or patrol vessels 
in the China Sea, in the South China Sea waters? We have in evi- 
dence the dispatch, which I believe you were the issuing officer of, 
which was sent at the direction of the President asking that three 
patrol vessels be put out there. Do you remember that? 

Admiral Stark. Very well. 

Mr. Gesell. Before we discuss the circumstances I want [5831'] 
to get one thing clear in my mind. Was that ever done ? Were those 
vessels put out there or weren't they? 

Admiral Stark. They were not. The ship Isabel I think got out 
there just about the time the attack broke, was out a few hours and 
came back. That, to my recollection. Admiral Hart told me. The 
other vessels were not sent out. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, did the President give the direction for the send- 
ing of that dispatch to you personally ? 

Admiral Stark. He did. 

Mr. Gesell. Will you state to the committee what discussion you 
had with him at that time, please, sir? 

Admiral Stark. Well, if I may read the dispatch, I think the 
dispatch speak for itself as to why it was. 

Mr. Gesell. We have the dispatch in mind I think, Admiral. I 
don't mind your reading it as part of your answer, but what I am 
anxious to have in addition to that is any conversatiofi you may have 
had with President Roosevelt concerning the surrounding circum- 
stances. 

Admiral Stark. Well, of course, at that time I was discussing with 
the President, as we were discussing in the Department, what might 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2191 

happen ; that is, as to where this expedition going south was likely to 
hit. His thought was the Kra Peninsula. I was in complete agree- 
ment with that. The Philippines was a possibility and the other 
places which have [5832] been mentioned, the East Indies, and 
just where it would go we did not Imow and these three small vessels 
were to assist in that determination. 

Mr. Gesell. I think we have fairly well in mind the points where 
the vessels were. 

Admiral Stark. Well, if you have fairly well in mind the points 
where the vessels were you will see where the President put them 
they were well placed to get information either positive or negative 
and it was for that reason and for the reasons as stated in the dispatch, 
to get information, that he directed that be done ; and I would like to 
state and just take out of the dispatch what the reasons were. 

He says "to form a defensive information patrol ; to accomplish a 
purpose which is to observe and report by radio Japanese movements 
in the West China Sea and Gulf of Siam," and then he himself desig- 
nated where those vessels were to be placed and they were well placed 
for the purposes for which he wanted them. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, did he indicate to you in any way why he wanted 
the information, other than the general desire to have information con- 
cerning Japanese movements? 

Admiral Stark. No, that is all. We are all after information. 
We were scouting by air, and I simply think that he thought that 
was additional precautions. He was intensely [5833] inter- 
ested in ever}^ move at that time, as we all were. 

Mr. Gesell. Now, you attended these various war council meetings 
which were held immediately preceding these warning messages, did 
you not, with General Marshall and the Secretaries of War and Navy 
and President Roosevelt ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall President Koosevelt stating at one of 
those meetings that he thought it was possible that there would be a 
surprise attack before the following Monday ? 

Admiral Stark. I think he stated "as early as the following Mon- 
day." Yes, I recall that. 

Mr. Gesell. You heard General Marshall's testimony concerning 
those meetings, did you not? 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I have that answer again? I had 
difficulty in hearing the Admiral. 

Admiral Stark. I said yes, sir, I recall it. I think that he stated 
"possibly as early as next Monday." I have forgotten just exactly 
what his exact words were, but that is my impression. 

Mr. Keefe. When did that occur? 

Admiral Stark. That was the Monday after the 25th, I believe it 
was at that time. 

Mr. Gesell. I believe we computed that on a calendar which was 
furnished us, w^hich is in evidence and I think it [5834] showed 
December 1 as the Monday. 

You heard General Marshall testify concerning those meetings, did 
you? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. 



2192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gesell. Did you hear or read Secretary Hull's testimony con- 
cerning those meetings ? 

Admiral Stark. I am not sure that I did. 

Mr. Gesell. Well, have you anything to add to what General 
Marshall said concerning what took place at those meetings? Have 
you a more detailed recollection of the discussions ? 

Admiral Stark. No, nothing more than I mentioned in the post- 
script of my letter to Admiral Kimmel which was mentioned this 
morning. We went over the situation and we looked at the charts and 
were wondering when they were going to strike and where. 

Mr. Gesell. Was there any discussion of Hawaii in those meetings 
as a possible point where they would strike ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall that there was. 

Mr. Gesell. You participated in the drafting and preparation of 
the joint memorandum signed by yourself and General Marshall to the 
President of Xovember 27, did you not ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, General Marshall and I were responsible for 
it. 

[S8SS] Mr. Gesell. Eight. 

Admiral Stark. That was formed up by the two war plans di- 
visions. 

Mr. Gesell. Can you tell us under what circumstances that was 
written? It is still a little vague on the record why that particular 
memorandum was written. 

Admiral Stark. Primarily we wanted to gain time. I was ex- 
tremely anxious to gain time and Marshall was, too. We stood to- 
gether on that. We had going out in December — and again the Army 
could give you perhaps more accurate information — but as I recall 
twenty-odd thousand troops and that meant a lot in the Philippines. 
The air program as I recall involved about 600 planes, Army. It 
meant a good deal to us to get them out there. Also the Philippine 
Scouts were being trained. 

I might mention a point which I think has not been brought out 
before, that I directed Admiral Hart to lay his mines in tlie Philip- 
pines for protecting Manila Bay. it was either June or Jidy. At 
that time I considered the situation such that we had better get that 
job done and not be suddenly confronted with it. But the primary 
reason for that was to gain time and that is what the memorandum 
sought to stress. 

Mr. Gesell. In other words, what you were doing was stressing 
how much you could tolerate in the way of activity [6836] by- 
Japan before you felt some action liad to be taken by this country? 

Admiral Star"k. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. Can you tell us when that memorandum was delivered 
to the President? I notice it is typed on the stationery of the Navy 
Department. It is dated November 27. General Marshall did not get 
back until late that night and did not get to his oflice until the morn- 
ing of the 28th. Now, he has identified his signature on the message 
as being his own signature, so with that before us the question of 
when the memorandum was delivered to the White House is now be- 
fore us and I wondered if you could help us on that. 

Admiral Stark. I am sorry I cannot. We have gone over the 
dates, I have personally, and tried to recall that 4-year-ago picture, 
particularly of the 25th, 26th, and 27th, with regard to the Chiang 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2193 

Kai-shek note, with regard to the joint board meeting of the 26th, 
with regard to just when Mr. Hull first informed us. I believe he has 
testified that he came to that conclusion on the 25th or the 28th. He 
mentioned the Army and Navy taking over. 

In my statement I said that he informed me on the 27th and, as I 
stated, that statement was completely written before hearings here 
started and I may be wrong on that. I may have gotten it from him 
on tlie 2Cth. I was in very close touch with [5837] him and 
whether or not, when he called me greatly perturbed about the Chiang 
Kai-shek note, he told me at that time he was going to throw it over, 
or whether he did later on the 27th, whether he called me on the 25th 
or the 2Gth I do not k]iow. Now, Marshall left the joint board meet- 
ing on the 26th and whether he signed it on the 28th or not, I do not 
know. 

Now, to come back to the White House part of that question, we 
have done our best to try and find that out, but we have been unable 
to. We do know that it was in the White House, we have ascertained 
that, but just when the President got it I do not know. 

[S8S8] Mr. Gesell. Well, now, one other question closely re- 
lated to that perhaps has to do with this question of overt act. 

You testified this morning that the Navy message of November 27 
did not contain any direction that Japan should commit the first overt 
act. However, we have in evidence here a dispatch sent by you under 
date of November 28 transmitting an Army message, but in addi- 
tion to reciting the text of the Army message it has some additional 
Navy direction in it, and included in that direction is a direction con- 
cerning the overt act in these terms "Undertake no offensive action 
until Japan has committed an overt act." That indicates that some- 
time between your message of the 27tli and your message of the 28th 
this idea of an overt act came forward. 

Your dispatch was not sent to Admiral Kimmel except for his 
information ? 

Admiral Stark. That is right. 

Mr. Gesell. It was sent to the west coast department, but I won- 
dered if that in any way refreshed your mind as to the conferences 
and discussions on this question of the overt act. 

Admiral Stark. At this time I could not say positively as to just 
why we put that in. I do know, for example, that we used to 
worry somewhat about the location of the Japs [S8S9] around 
our naval ammunition depot, for example, up in Puget Sound. The 
same was true in Los Angeles harbor. It may possibly have been 
if they had gotten this message they may have corraled some of the 
people who were close by, some that they had suspected. It was only 
the continental districts, as I recall it, that were covered in that 
dispatch. 

Mr. Gesell. That is correct. 

Admiral Stark. Who were ordered not to make an overt act. The 
Army had issued a similar warning to those people, and it may have 
been to go along with that. 

I could not answer the question definitely, but I know it is there. 

Now as far as going along with the Army, that might not necessarily 
hold, because we did not go along with them in the Hawaiian Islands, 
and again it might hold because their problem in the Hawaiian Islands 

79716 — 46 — pt. 5 10 



2194 COiNGKESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

was quite different from ours. With the large Japanese population 
we were thinking more in terms of the high seas. i ,^i ^• 

Mr. Gesell- You attended the meeting at Argentina, the Atlantic 
conference meeting, did you not? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. . . 

Mr. Gesell. Did you at that time, or at any other time prior to 
December 7, receive any information or advice to the effect that the 
United States Government had undertaken [6840] to declare 
war against Japan in the event Great Britain was attacked m the 

Pacific? 

Admiral Stark. Never. 

Mr. Gesell. I think that completes the questions I have. 

Mr. Mitchell. Just one that I would like to ask you, Admiral. 

This morning you spoke about the fact that the Navy Department 
was not volunteering any help to you in preparation for your testi- 
mony. I understand you did not mean that the Navy was delinquent 
in any way. 

Admiral Stark. I qualified that later. I thought it was possible 
that an inference might have been drawn that the Navy Department 
might have been withholding something from me. 

Mr. Mitchell. What you meant was that they were not volunteer- 
ing aid to you but they were giving you everything that you asked for. 

Admiral Stark. That is correct; they were giving me everything 
that I asked for, and helping me out wherever they could, or they 
detailed to help me, and Lieutenant Commander Richmond was de- 
tailed to help me, and Lieutenant Johnson, and in general the depart- 
ment has been cooperative in giving me help where I have asked for it. 
But in attempting to prepare myself for this investigation, I have done 
it [6S4I] largely on my own memory as to what I wanted to 
bring out. 

Mr. Mitchell. Have you had any difficulty or lack of cooperation 
in the office of the counsel of the committee in giving you everything 
that you wanted? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir, everything has been fine, and I might say 
it has been all right with the Navy Department. 

The Chairman. Admiral, the Pacific Fleet was sent out to the 
Hawaiian area early in 1940, was it? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Ostensibly on maneuvers, is that true? 

Admiral Stark. That is true; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Well, of course the Government had spent a large 
sum of money in blasting through the land to get into what is now 
Pearl Harbor, with a view of making it a suitable base for the fleet 
over the years. 

Admiral Stark. That is correct, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Now apparently the fleet was kept out there longer 
than Admiral Richardson either knew or thought that it would be 
kept, ancl he kept prodding you to find out why it was kept out there, 
and in the letter he wrote you prior to his visit to Washington in 
October 1940, and in many of these letters, he wanted to know why 
he was out there, why the fleet was out there, and in a good many of 
your letters, at least one or two of them, you wrote back that you did 
not [S84£] know why it was out there, that you wished you 
did know why it was out there. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2195 

How long did that lack of information on your part as to what the 
Navy was doing out there remain ? 

Admiral Stahk. I think I might say, Mr. Chairman, if I may sug- 
gest to yon, where yon stated I said I did not know why they were 
out there, I did not know how long they were going to remain there. 
The reason for their being there, which I wrote Admiral Richardson, 
was that their presence there might act as a deterrent against Japanese 
aggression in the Pacific. 

When they went out there I tliought they were coming back, and 
Admiral Richardson did, and I might say so far as I know the Presi- 
dent had no other thought when those maneuvers began. 

But when it came time for them to come back, in view of the condi- 
tions in the Pacific it was decided to keep them there for a while. 
We did not know how long. 

The Chairman. I might have misquoted you, because I am referring 
to your letters from memory. I do not have them before me. I over- 
looked bringing them down this morning. I remember in one or two 
of your letters you stated you did not know how long they were to 
be kept there, and 1 got the impression you stated also in your early 
correspondence with Admiral Richardson that you did not know why 
they were being [SS4^] kept there. 

If I am mistaken about that I want to be corrected. 

Admiral Stark. Here is a letter in which I reply to Admiral Rich- 
ardson, and I quote: 

"Why are you in the Hawaiian area?" Answer: This was my an- 
swer, "You are there because the deterrent effect which it is thought 
your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies." 

[5844-] The Chairman. What was the date of that letter? 

Admiral Stark. 27 May. 

The Chairman. Obviously, Admiral Richardson was not convinced 
of the wisdom of your course, because when he came back here in 
October he and the President evidently engaged in a very earnest ar- 
gument as to the wisdom of the policy of keeping the Navy out there 
as a deterrent. Were you present at any of the conferences between 
the President and Admiral Richardson ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir; I was not. Admiral Richardson went over 
himself. 

The Chairman. Did Admiral Richardson talk with you about his 
conference with the President? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; he gave me, as I recall, a short memoran- 
dum on the subject of the discussion, so that I would have it. 

The Chairman. That was in October. By that time, had you 
reached an agreement with the attitude of the President, the Secretary 
of State and others, to keep the fleet in the Hawaiian area or Pearl 
Harbor was a wise course, as a possible deterrent against Japan ? 

Admiral Stark. It was one of those things which at that time, as 
I recall, was carrying along because, if I also recall correctly — and 
I will check this, and if it is not [S<S4r5] correct I will ask for 
a change in the record — as I recall at one time we had about come to 
the conclusion we might bring the fleet back in the fall or for Christ- 
mas in that year, I am not certain, and that later we decided not to 
do it but to keep it there, and after that time, about the last of 1940, 
it just became a fixed policy to retain the fleet there. 



2196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Inasmuch as the fleet was out there, no matter what 
the purpose for which it was originally sent, to have withdrawn it 
back to the Pacific Coast had possibilities of misinterpretation on the 
part of Japan and on the part of our own people, did it not? 

Admiral Stark. It might have. Also sending it back again might 
have been more difficult. I testified this morning I thought that was 
the place for the fleet when things were tense might also have its 
disadvantages. 

The Chairman. That was my next question. If it had never been 
sent to Pearl Harbor in the spring of 1940, had not remained out there, 
if it had remained on the Pacific Coast where. Admiral Richardson 
testified there were better facilities for reaction and training, and one 
thing and another, it did not have anj^thing to do with the safety of 
the fleet, but if it had been kept on the Pacific coast until thingrs 
became tense and then sent to the Pearl Harbor region or the Ha- 
waiian area, what would have been the effect of such a movement as 
that at the time [S846] when things did become critical ? 

Admiral Stark. Of course, no one knows, but it might have been 
difficult diplomatically to do it. It might have been interpreted by 
the Japs as a move for our getting ready for war out there in the 
Pacific, and it might possibly have precipitated something. 

The Chairman. Of course, everybody understood, I suppose, in- 
cluding the Japanese, that the Hawaiian Islands were American ter- 
ritory and Pearl Harbor was an American base and we had a right 
to send our fleet out there whenever we saw fit. 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. 

The Chairman. Without giving an explanation. 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. 

The Chairman. In view of the critical situation as it developed 
and tenseness of relations between the two countries, to have kept the 
fleet back at the Pacific Coast and then have sent it out there in the 
midst of one of these tense situations you think might have given 
rise to the feeling that it was a threat against Japan and therefore, 
in a sense, might have been a sort of moral overt act ? 

Admiral Stark. It might have been; j-es, sir. I might say, Mr. 
Chairman, that when we first decided not to bring the fleet back — 
and I was talking to the President about the advantages, from a 
materiel and personnel standpoint of bringing it back, [S847] 
balanced against the political reasons, I can remember just as though 
it happened seconds ago; the silence — I was with the President 
alone — and the tense thought that he gave to it then for a few minuteg, 
and he finally looked up and he said — and you may have heard him 
say the same'thing — "Well, I hardly know, but," he said, "when I am 
in doubt and I am not sure just what is best, I am inclined to sit tight," 
and he said, "I think we better do that for the present." That 
continued. 

The Chairman. That was with reference to keeping the fleet out 
there? 

Admiral Stark. That was with reference to keeping it out or bring- 
ing it back, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you recall, as a naval officer, that a similar situ- 
ation existed in the Far East back in 1932 following the Shanghai 
incident, I believe, when the American fleet was kept out there in 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMIT'TEE 2197 

those Pacific waters, followinj^ the Japanese attack upon China, or 
followino; lier invasion of Manchuria, and following the Shanghai 
affair, that the fleet was out there and was kept there, according to 
Secretary Stimson, who was at that time Secretary of State, for a 
similar purpose, that it would have its moral effect upon Japan. Do 
you recall anj^thing about that? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall the fleet, as we usually [584^] 
refer to the fleet, being out there at that time. We had an Asiatic 
squadron. 

The Chairman. It may not have been a full fleet, but it was a 
detachment of the Navy. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; and it may have been kept in Chinese 
waters at that time rather than possibly used for a cruise south in 
the wintertime, or something of that sort. 

The Chairman. Now, you referred this morning to a couple of 
letters or dispatches that you sent to Admiral Kimmel between the 
24th and 27th of November, with reference to the sending of certain 
airplanes from Hawaii to Midway and Wake. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I did not get very clearly in my mind whether 
they were sent. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; they were sent. 

The Chairman. Were they the planes that were on the Lexing- 
ton that was supposed to be headed west while the Enterprise was 
headed east from the Philippines? 

Admiral Stark. No. There were two detachments of Marine fight- 
ers, I believe, that were sent. One carrier took some to Wake and one 
to Midway. The dates of the sailing of those carriers were fixed by 
Admiral Kimmel. We gave no specific dates for it. We knew of one 
of the sailings, which was in answer to another dispatch of ours, and 
as to the other we were [<5<§^] not informed. 

I would like to state in that connection, if I may, I do not know 
whether or not there has been the impression created in the com- 
mittee that by doing that the defenses in that area were decreased. 
Pearl Harbor was mentioned. If you look at the map you will find, 
of course, that Midway is — I have forgotten — 1,000 or 1,200 miles 
farther westward, and Wake is still farther. That was a general 
area of defense. Anything we could find in those areas, from scout- 
ing or otherwise, lent itself just that much to the defense of Oahu. 
So it was strengthening the general island position tiiere. That was 
particularly true with regard to the patrol squadrons, of which I 
think one squadron was sent to Wake, and two to Midway. It enlarged 
the scouting area. It might have decreased it temporarily in a con- 
centrated way around Oahu, but as against that there was the getting 
of information, or the possibility of getting it, farther west, and also 
of defending those carriers. 

Incidentally, originally General Marshall asked us to watch for and 
to give them any warning we could, because we were ferrying planes 
to the Philippines via those two outposts. 

The Chairman. With regard to the purpose for sending them to 
Wake and Midway, in view of what happened it may have been bet- 
ter if they had all been there? 



2198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[58S0] Admiral Stark. We would have lost fewer of them ; yes, 
sir. 

The Chairman. The fewer ships and planes were at Pearl Harbor, 
tlie fewer we would have lost? 

Admiral Stark. That would have been incidental to what happened. 

The Chairman. It would have been incidental to what happened, 
but still it would have probably happened. 

Now, in regard to the overt act, of course it was in view of the fact 
that both you and General Marshall, as heads of the Army and Navy, 
were seeking to gain time and to postpone any conflict as long as possi- 
ble, it was perfectly consistent with that attitude not to commit an 
overt act on the part of the United States and not precipitate a war 
which you were seeking to avoid or postpone as long as possible, would 
it not? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Regardless of the omission of this phrase in your 
telegram in regard to an overt act, were the commanders in the field, 
m the Pacific area, Panama, and on the Pacific coast and the Philip- 
pines and Pearl Harbor, sufficiently aware of that general attitude of 
our Government so that they knew it ? 

Admiral Stark. I think so. 

The Chairman. Without having it especially called to their atten- 
tion in a message on any particular date ? 

Admiral Stark. I think so. They all knew we wanted to [S851'] 
avoid war in the Pacific if possible. Each one of them was a very re- 
sponsible man, and I think none would have created an overt act if 
they could have avoided it. On the other hand, each one unquestion- 
ably would have defended himself. 

The Chairman. Oh, yes. 

Admiral Stark. The message which Kimmel sent, which is in one 
of his letters backing up a dispatch about bombing submarines within 
a certain area, I think was thoroughly justified, and I would not have 
called it an overt act I think if a submarine was found there without 
any business. 

The Chairman. You were assuming that everybody in authority, 
while holding off actual hostilities, if they had to come, was to pre- 
pare, as well as it was possible under all the circumstances, for any 
eventuality whenever it did come ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, in your message to Admiral Kimmel on the 
24th, which has been read into the record several times, you say, "The 
chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. 
This situation, coupled with statements of Japanese Government and 
movements their naval and military forces inclicate, in our opinion, that 
a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on 
the Philippines or Guam is a possibility." 

Did you know at that time, at the time you sent that [5862] 
first paragraph of your message, what the movement of the Japanese 
naval and military forces was ? 

Admiral Stark. The movement of which we had knowledge was 
the movement south, the amphibious movement. 

The Chairman. You knew at the time you sent this message of the 
24th of November that they were moving south ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2199 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. With a considerable naval and military force? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And then you say, "An aggressive movement is 
indicated in any direction." That would include the whole 360° of 
the circle, would it? 

Admiral Stark. It included the broad Pacific. 

The Chairman. Well, it included any direction from Tokyo? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Which would raean anywhere they could come ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That might be an offensive movement against us? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. My thought was it covered widely a 
movement against us anywhere. 

The Chairsian. Yes. Now, you go on to state, "The Chief of Staff 
has sent this dispatch and requests action addressees", and so forth. 
This dispatch of yours of November 24 does not [S8S3~\ seem 
to correspond with any similar correspondence dispatched on that 
date. Was it to be distributed to the Army officers ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I showed that dispatch to Marshall and 
he agreed with it. I generally took things of that sort up with him, 
and he with me, and we put that memorandum in about showing it to 
Army opposites. 

The Chairman. On the next day you wrote Admiral Kimmel a 
letter. It went by the ordinary course of sending letters. Do you 
know when that letter was received ? 

Admiral Stark. I think we have that. As I recall, it was about 
5 December, but I think the letter shows it. 

The Chairman. At any rate it was not received until after you sent 
the message of the 27th of November ? 

Admiral Stark. It was received on the 3d of December. 

The Chairman. On the 3d ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. That was about 6 days after he had received 
the war warning of the 27th, or about 9 days after he received the war 
warning of the 24th. 

The Chairman. Then, on the 27th you sent your other message, 
in w^hich you start out by saying: "This dispatch is to be considered a 
war warning." Did you understand and did you intend that that lan- 
guage should make this message of the 27th more acute and empha- 
size more the danger than the one of the 24th in which you said that 
the Japanese might start an [5854-] aggressive movement in 
any direction? 

Admiral Stark, I consider the message of the 27th much stronger. 
I never had heard of the words "war warning" in any message before 
anywhere, at any time. 

[S8SS] The Chairman. This may be speculative, but if you 
had not seen fit to send the message of the 27th and had relied on 
the message of the 24th, would you have regarded the terms of that 
message of the 24th sufficient to require that the Naval Forces in Pearl 
Harbor and in the Hawaiian area be constantly on the alert for any 
movement in any direction? 

Admiral Stark. Well, it showed the possibility and to that ex- 
tent — and again I may say it is difficult to get away from hindsight 



2200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. I know. 

Admiral Stark. But my feeling is that if I had received a mes- 
sage that the Japs might make a surprise aggressive movement in any 
direction, I would say, well, we better look out and be ready for it. 

The Chairman. That is the purpose you had in sending this message 
of tJie 24th? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; but we made a much more positive mes- 
sage on the 27th, because on the 24th we stated that favorable outcome 
of negotiations with Japan very doubtful; there was left a loophole 
there that there still might be a change, through negotiations, to obtain 
a settlement in the Pacific. We closed that loophole in the message 
of the 27th. 

But even so I think the message of the 24th showed the imminence 
of trouble anywhere. 

[S8S6] The Chairman. In your message of the 24th you say 
that the Japs are liable "to make an aggressive movement in any 
direction", and after saying in the 27th message that "this message is 
to be considered a war warning," you say "negotiations with Japan 
looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased. 
An aggressive movement by Japan is expected within the next few 
days." 

In that language you did not say "in ni}" direction." 

Admiral Stark. No, sir ; I did not. 

The Chairman. Did you intend for that to implement your message 
of the 24th or did you intend to withdraw the suggestion that they 
might make an aggressive movement in any direction ? 
- Admiral Stark. No, we did not intend to withdraw it, and I think 
the two messages tie up together. Probably it might have been better 
if we had put it in. Iput it in personally in the message of the 24th 
and I do not recall discussing it with the message of the 27th. 

The Chairman. Is it regarded in Naval circles as logically follow- 
ing a warning given to a commanding officer anywhere tJiat a nation 
is liable to make an aggressive movement against us, is the mere send- 
ing of such a message to an officer of that kind within any possible 
area of attack regarded in Naval circles as a warning that they should 
be [S8S7] on the alert? 

Admiral Stark. I thought so at the time. 

The Chairman. Wouldn't that be the rule in any Navy? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir, I think so. 

The Chairman. And any commanding officer in a responsible posi- 
tion, like Admiral Hart, Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Block, or any 
other commanding officer, would know what that meant if he received 
such a message ? 

Admiral Stark. I think so, yes, sir. It is something that doesn't 
happen very often. 

The Chairman. Now, when you used the words in your message of 
the 24th, in the middle paragraph "the number and equipment of 
Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an 
amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, the Kra 
Peninsula, or possibly Borneo," did you mean or intend that to be 
interpreted as in any way modifying your message of the 24th that 
an aggressive movement might be in any direction ? 

Admiral Stark. No, we did not. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2201 

The Chairman. If I understand you, your purpose in sending this 
message was to emphasize the greater possibihty, in your mind, of an 
attack on the Philippines or Thai or the Kra Peninsula, or possibly 
Borneo, than elsewhere, particularly even the Hawaiian Islands ? 

ISS58] Admiral Stark. Our purpose was the imminence of war, 
that so far as looking toward stabilization of peace in the Pacific 
negotiations were through, and then we gave the information we had, 
and the only direct information we had, of what the Japanese were 
doing, that is, that the information we had indicated that southern 
movement. 

I think it should be read in connection with the message of the 24th. 

The Chairman. You laiew that that movement was in progress? 

Admiral Stark. We had definite information of that and we gave 
that information. 

The Chairman. You didn't know what else was to be done or was 
in process of being done by the Japs ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

The Chairman. You didn't know anything about the 6 carriers 
that had sneaked out from the Island north of Japan and were going 
through this unfrequented lane? 

Admiral Stark. We had no information pn that, sir. 

The Chairman. So that obviously this moving of this big con- 
tingent of ships and men down through the China Sea toward the 
south was for the purpose of deceiving you and everybody else with 
respect to their immediate action against Pearl Harbor, by the send- 
ing of this force of 6 airplane carriers and the three hundred-some-odd 
planes ; is that your interpretation ? 

[SS59] Admiral Stark. I don't think it was deceit. That was 
a carefully planned campaign, that expedition south. 

The Chairman. Well, they didn't go to pains to conceal that? 

Admiral Stark. They couldn't very well. 

The Chairman. No, but they didn't go to any pains to conceal it, 
but rather ostentatiously let it be known that they were heading that 
way, while at the same time sending this other force to the north to 
make the attack on Pearl Harbor if the situation justified it when they 
got there ; is that not correct ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir, that may have been in their thoughts. 

The Chairman. The truth is that they just outsmarted everybody 
didn't they ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, they certainly concealed their intentions so 
far as we were concerned of any definite indication of any attack on 
Pearl Harbor. 

The Chairman. That is not an unusual situation when an assassin 
intends to attack someone, he knows what he is going to do, but the 
other fellow does not. 

Admiral Stark. We play that in our war games. 

The Chairman. That is the part of the war games, not to let the 
other fellow know what you are going to do ? 

[SS60] Admiral Stark. That is true. 

The Chairman. And a nation planning a sudden surprise attack 
has the advantage over the nation that may be thinking one may 
occur but doesn't know where or when it will occur, any more than 
a man going along a highway knows that a man is concealed in the 



2202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

corner of a fence and is going to shoot him. He may have his pockets 
full of guns but unless he knows the man is there he won't have them 
ready. Is that a fair simile ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Did you have your suspicions aroused by the fact 
that this task force, or this force of airplane cai-riers, was missing, that 
for several days there was no report about them, or did that come to 
your attention ? 

Admiral Stark. I don't recall any suspicion directly bearing on 
that. We, in locating the Japanese Fleet, you might put certain sliips 
on what you might call a pinpoint. You would know where they are. 
In other cases you would get them in an area by your cuts from them 
and radio intelligence. If they went to a navy yard, just as when our 
ships go to a navy yard, their radios are bottled up, the shore station 
may do it for you, and there are people down the line who will testify 
more directly on just how they evaluated that information, but the 
ship going into a home port, for [SS61] example, you might 
not hear from her for a while, and they might assume that she was still, 
there until they did hear from her again. 

And, of course, at this particular time they had changed call signs. 
I remember that feature of it very well. And it takes time to pick 
up and identify again. 

But as to whether or not we discussed at that particular time these 
6 carriers I have no remembrance of it. I do have a distinct remem- 
brance of our request of the Army to take a look at the Marshalls and 
the Carolines and their fitting up two planes to do that for us about 
that time, and which I recall not in connection, perhaps, with these 
6 carriers, but with two other carriers that we had rumors were in 
there. We wanted to get anything we could of anything in the eastern 
Marshalls or further to the westward. And that reconnaissance, 
due to bad weather, and other things, was held up, we didn't get it. 
It wouldn't have been helpful, except as negative information. 

The Chairman. Did the Japs have better facilities for locating 
our ships than we had for locating theirs ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, we had, I would say, very little, if any, but 
there again the people in Naval Intelligence might give you something 
on that, of locating ships in Japanese ports. That is, telling us what 
was in Tokyo Bay, or elsewhere, [5S62] out there. But in 
Hawaii, in the Canal, in the Los Angeles area, in San Francisco area, 
in the Puget Sound area, the Japanese we felt were reporting regu- 
larly with regard to our movements. 

In one or two places I think we got hold of their people who were 
doing that reporting. I am not too clear on that. 

The Chairman. Probably they had a more universal spy system 
than we did ? 

Admiral Stark. They had an enormous spy system. 

The Chairman. In view of your message to Admiral Kimmel of the 
24th and the 27th, and Genera! Marshall's dispatch to General Short of 
the same date, that is, the 27th, which he instructed him to convey 
to Admiral Kimmel, what was the duty of the naval commander there 
during the days following the receipt of that message on the 27th? 

Admiral Stark. Well, my thought was, we assumed that there 
would be a conference between the senior Army and Navy commanders 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2203 

there, that a conference would occur, and that they would implement 
( heir plans against surprise, and in the protection of the Island of Oahu, 
])articularly of the Fleet, Pearl Harbor, for what ships were kept thei-e, 
and the alerting of ships at sea, with the fact that Japan was expected 
to attack and the oflicers in charge of tlie ships at [586-3] sea, 
of course, would be very much on the alert against surprise anywhere. 

The Chairman. Did that alertness include day and night? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. In view of these instructions contained in the Army 
and Navy dispatches to Pearl Harbor, was it or was it not in com- 
pliance with or in violation of them not to have any reconnaissance, 
say on the 6th day of December, the day before the attack. The evi- 
dence shows there was no reconnaissance of any kind on that day. I 
am speaking now of the 6th. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. We had assumed when we sent out dis- 
patch that reconnaissance would be started and kept up. 

The Chairman. That is from the 27th or the 24th ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, I would say from the 27th in any case. 

The Chairman. 27th. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you know whether it was kept up from the 27th 
until the attack? 

Admiral Stark. I don't know just what they did at that time. Mar- 
shall's dispatch particularly directed reconnaissance. Ours directed 
the deployment. And just what action was taken there I don't know. 

[SS64] The Chairman. Deployment means the arrangements of 
whatever forces there are, the grouping or separation or movement in 
such a way as to facilitate the greatest possible defense in the event of 
an attack? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Well, you didn't answer my question as to whether 
if there was no reconnaissance of any kind on the 6th that that would 
be considered as being in violation of the orders or in compliance. 

Admiral Stark. I would say it would be not carrying them out. 

The Chairman. That is a very diplomatic way to answer my ques- 
tion. It was not in compliance with the instructions. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

.The Chairman. It was not? 

Admiral Stark. It was not. 

The Chairman. In other words, they did not obey the instructions 
that were received? 

Admiral Stark. That is my understanding, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That is, if they had no reconnaissance at all on that 
day, that was in disobedience? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, do you agree with — first, did you hear Ad- 
miral Turner's testimony in which he said that if [5865] they 
had been properly alerted, with the material and with the men they 
had, and the forces they had, if they had been alerted on the day of 
the attack, that the damage done to us might have been considerably 
lessened and the damage done to the Japanese might have been con- 
siderably increased and thereby lessening the success of the raid — 
what is your view on that? 



2204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. I agree with that. That is, of course, on the 
assumption they might have scouted for that Japanese attack and 
might have missed it. But there was a chance of their getting it. 
And if they had located it, if the radar station which did pick it up, 
if that had been reported, there was a chance of the Army fighters 
being in the air, and other measures which could have been taken with 
antiaircraft batteries which, I think, unquestionably would have 
considerably lessened the damage which the Japs inflicted. 

The Chairman. It is conceivable the planes might have gone up 
and missed the Japanese planes, but if they didn't go up they were sure 
to miss them. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. It made it easy for the Japanese planes? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. If they had used everything 
they had they still might have missed that flight ; depending on where 
they made their estimate as to where the [6866] Japanese 
might come in. 

The Chairman. You mean if they had gone out it would have been 
possible to have gone out on a reconnaissance and not discovered the 
approaching Japanese airplanes? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. 

The Chairman. Now, whose duty was it, whose obligation or re- 
sponsibility was it to decide whether this Fleet should have been in 
Pearl Harbor at that particular time, or at any other particular 
time? 

Admiral Stark. That was the Commander in Chief Pacific. 

The Chairman. That was Admiral Richardson's responsibility 
when he was Commander of that Fleet and it became Admiral Kim- 
mel's after he took charge? 

Admiral Stark. That is right. 

The Chairman. And the frequency of the visits of the fleet to 
Pearl Harbor and the length of its stay was altogether then within 
the control of the Commanding Officer out there? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And were there any general instructions from 
Washington about that, or was that left entirely to the Commanding 
Officer? 

Admiral Stark. That was left to the Senior Officer there. There 
may have been a general understanding of the fact on the so-called 
employment schedule that ships periodically have [5867] cer- 
tain periods assigned for repairs, but generally speaking, which I be- 
lieve you refer to, the fleet going in or out, except for vessels that 
might be sent to the navy yard, or might be repairing there on a 
periodic overhaul, that was up to the Commander in Chief there. 

The Chairman. I believe that is all. 

Congressman Cooper. 

The Vice Chairman. Admiral Stark, how long have you been in 
the Navy, please, sir? 

Admiral Stark. I have been in the Navy a little over 46 years. 

The Vice Chairman. When did you enter the Academy? 

Admiral Stark. I entered the Academy in October 1899. 

The Vice Chairman. From what State? 

Admiral Stark. From Pennsylvania. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2205 

The Vice Chairman. And during what period of time did you 
serve as the Chief of Naval Operations? 

Admiral Stark. From August 1939 to March 1942. 

The Vice Chairman. Did your period of service as Chief of Naval 
Operations compare with the usual length of time that an officer served 
in that capacity? 

Admiral Stark. The appointment as a rule is for 4 years. It some- 
times happened that an officer's term was up before his 4 years — I 
mean, he retired before his 4 [686S] years was up. I did not 
serve out the full term of 4 years. 

The Vice Chairman. Have you at any time during your long period 
of service in the Navy been stationed at Hawaii ? 

Admiral Stark. Not stationed there; no, sir. I have been there 
with the fleet but I have never been stationed there. 

The Vice Chairman. You never were in command there? 

Admiral Stark. Never in command there ; no, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you consider war with Japan inevitable ? 

Admiral Stark. Ultimately I considered it inevitable. Do you want 
me to enlarge on that ? 

The Vice Chairman. I would like you to be as specific as you can, 
sir, whether you ever considered war with Japan as inevitable. 

Admiral Stark. I did, and, to come down to a specific term, I con- 
sidered it inevitable the latter part of November. Mr. Hull had been 
working continuously, he had not given up hope, and as long as there 
was negotiations there was some hope. I couldn't say that it was in- 
evitable until we had come practically to the final clinch. I considered 
it possible. I went on the basis, in everything I did, on the assumption 
that it was going to happen. It was the only safe, sane, sensible course 
to take and my record here, what I had to say before Congress and 
in everything I did, bears that out. [S869] But we might have 
reached an agreement in late 1941. I couldn't say we wouldn't until 
we knew that that agreement was practically unattainable. The 
chances grew more and more slender. 

The Vice Chairman. I can understand that, but I am trying to 
ascertain as to whether you in your own mind ever reached the point 
that you considered war with Japan as inevitable. 

Admiral Stark. Well, I did at that time. 

The Vice Chairman. When was that ? 

Admiral Stark. That was in late November. 

The Vice Chairman. 1941 ? 

Admiral Stark. 1941 ; but I stated in some of my letters that I 
considered that we were heading straight for this war long earlier. 

The Vice Chairman. When did you reach the conclusion that we 
were heading straight for war with Japan? About what time? I 
don't mean the hour or minute or day. About what time ? 

Admiral Stark. I am thinking over the whole picture. When 
Japan jointed the Axis, which I believe was in September of 1940, 
there certainly was a distinct danger sign flying there. I thought — 
I didn't^ see how we could avoid sooner or later, the way things were 
shaping up, getting in this [S870] world conflict that put Japan 
on the other side of the fence from us. I have forgotten just the dates 
of my letters, but I continually stressed the fact I didn't see how we 
could avoid it, either by being forced into it or getting into it. I stated 



2206 CONGRESSIONAL IN\'ESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

in a letter of November 7 — I made Avrong estimates at other times — 
I happened to hit it then — that I didn't see how it could last, didn't see 
liow -we could avoid it more than another month. 

I pointed out that there were two irreconcilable forces and one side 
couldn't live with the set-up. I also always thought that the China 
incident, so-called, was a stumbling block we could not get around 
until either Japan backed or we backed, and, as I wrote Admiral 
Kimmel. or Admiral Hart. I have forgotten which, I didn't think there 
would be any change here. I felt we were heading for it at least a 
year before we got into it. 

As to the inevitability of it. by just saying, here. Mr. Hull, you might 
as well stop, don't try any more, of course we were playing for time, 
it was in the fall of 1941. it just looked like we couldn't keep out or 
from being attacked much longer. 

[587 1'\ The Vice Chaie^ian. Well. I can well understand, of 
course. You have made it quite clear that you wanted and the Presi- 
dent wanted and General Marshall wanted and all responsible officials 
of the Government wanted to stay out of war if possible. 

Admiral Stark. We were extremely anxious to avoid a two-front 
war. 

The Vice Chalraiax. And I can well understand that, we all shared 
that view, but what I was tiying to get at. you. the head of the United 
.States Navy, holding that responsible position, whether you reached 
the conclusion in your own mind that war with Japan was inevitable { 

Admiral Staek. Well. I believed we were going to get in it many, 
many months before we did. 

The Vice Chaie3ian. But you say that in November 1941 that you 
reached the conclusion that war with Japan was inevitable. 

Admiral St.^k. That is the time when we thought so and it is when 
we said it definitely. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, Admiral Turner was j'our Chief of War 
Plans, wasn't he ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

The Vicx Chair3ian. He has testified here that he reached the con- 
clusion aVxjut June or July 1941 that war with Japan \'jH72] 
was inevitable and that he discussed it with you and I got the impres- 
sion from what he said that you were in agreement with him. ^ 

Admiral .Stark. Well, of course, as to just what "inevitable" means. 
I have tried to give different points of view I have had on that. About 
that time the freezing of assets took place, that was in July as a matter 
of fact, and, as I say. when Japan joined the Axis I had written I 
thought we were heading for this war and I thought that that would 
pull us all in together. I would not have differed with anyone who 
had told me at that time that they thought we were surely going to get 
into it. I would not have wanted to differ with them so far as getting 
ready for it was concerned. 

The Vice Chairman. Do you recall that Admiral Turner did dis- 
r-u.ss that with you about that time ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, we discussed it more or less continuously. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you ever think an attack would be made 
on Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Stark. Again I knew an attack on Pearl Harbor was a 
possibility. We had .stressed it in all our rorresponderire. wf had 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2207 

endeavored to build up ii^rainst it, we had talked to them out there 
about it. we had approved their plaus which also envisacred such a 
thing happenino; and we thouglit it nnght [oS73] very well 
happen some day. but as to that particular time. — and I previously 
testified that I did not want anything that I miglit say to be construed 
as otherwise than the fact that at that time I was not expecting an at- 
tack on Peai;l Harbor. 

The Vice Chairman. Even though you saw the li-part message 
and the so-called pilot message and the 1 o'clock message you still did 
not think an attack would be made on Pearl Harbor at the time it was 
made ? 

Admiral Stark. I was thinking of the situation so far as actual 
action was concerned ftirther to the westward. On the other hand, 
I recognized the possibility clearly that they might hit there or else- 
where and on that possibility I had sent a message which I had thought 
would convey to them that possibility and that they would be on guard 
against it and I wrote to that etfect also, about being on guard. 

The Vice Chairman. And that was A"our messaire of November 24, 
1941? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now. what was the purpose of that message? 

Admiral Stark. The message of the 27th and the 24th ? 

The A'iCE Chairman. Well, first take the messaire of November 24, 
1941. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

[S874] The Vice Chairman. "\Miat was the purpose of that 
message ? 

Admiral Stark. The purpose of the message of the 24th i 

The Vice Chairman. Of the 24th. 

Admiral Stark. "Was to show the situation regarding the negotia- 
tions, about which we had corresponded so much. "We were not getting 
anywhere. It looked like a break-down. The break-down had not 
yet actually occurred. Also w-e had the definite information of the 
movement south, which looked like eTapan was going to strike some- 
where to the southward. "VMiether it might hit the Philippines or the 
Kra Peninsula or Borneo. I think the despatch covered it. I will 
check it. 

The Vice Chairman. Those points are mentioned in the November 
27 message but they are not mentioned in the November 24 message. 

Admiral Stark. AVell, the message of November 24 states: 

Naval and military foi'ces indicate in our opinion that a siirin"i>=e aggressive 
movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a 
possibility. 

And that message was meant to show the critical situation then 
existing. 

The Vice Chairman. "Well, did you intend the message of Novem- 
ber 24. 1941, to Admiral Kimmel as a war wariiing message? 

Admiral Stariv. "Well, I think if I had gotten it I would have con- 
sidered that it was a war warning. 

[oS?o] The Vice Chairman. And that was your intention in 
sending it then ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

The Vice CiiAiitxiAN. All riffht. 



2208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. In the critical situation that something might 
break. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, then, your message of November 27, 
also sent out to Admiral Kimmel as well as Admiral Hart, was cer- 
tainly intended as a war warning message because it so states in the 
opening expression of the message, doesn't it? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. It is stronger. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, in these two messages. Admiral, the one 
of November 24, in which it is stated : 

Indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, 
including an attack on ttie Philippines or Guam is possible — 

and in the message of November 27, 1941, among other things it states : 

The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval 
task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, 
Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. 

Now, in neither of those messages is any direct reference made to 
Hawaii, is there? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir; there is not. 

[6876] The Vice Chairman. And all of the points mentioned in 
both of these messages are not within the area coming within the 
responsibility of Admiral Kimmel, are they? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. We in those despatches gave 
the information we had. In my opinion an attack elsewhere was not 
precluded by the fact that we had no tangible evidence of an attack 
elsewhere. It was for that reason that, take the message of the 24th, 
it was not only sent to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Force 
and the Pacific ; it also went to the Canal and to the commandant of 
the Eleventh, Twelfth and Thirteenth Districts, which are on the 
west coast. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, then, the message of November 27, 1941, 
also includes this language : 

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the 
tasks assigned in WPL 46. 

That would be a direct order to the commander of the Pacific Fleet, 
wouldn't it ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And I believe, as jou stated to the chairman 
in response to his question, at least that part of the order was not 
complied with by the commander, was it? 

Admiral Stark. So far as the use; I said, so far as I knew with 
regard to the use of patrol planes he had not complied with it. 

[5877] The Vice CHAiR]\rAN. Well, do you know of anything he 
did to comply with that part of the order? 

Admiral Stark. I do not know what orders he had given to his two 
task forces which were sent out. I do not know what order he had 
given to his submarines. He may have given orders there. I do not 
know just what additional orders he may have given to his ships in 
Pearl Harbor with regard to tintiaircraft batteries, and so forth. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, the fact that practically all of his fleet 
was caught in the harbor 6 days after this message was sent to him 
would not indicate that he moved many of tliem out, would it? 

Admiral Stark. Well, he had a considerable portion out in the two 
task forces. 



1 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2209 

The Vice Chairman. How many battleships did he have out? 

Admiral Stark. I think he had no battleships out. 

The Vice Chairman. How many cruisers did he have out? 

Admiral Stark. The ships attached to the Pacific Fleet that were 
at sea or located at bases other than Pearl Harbor on the date of the 
attack — this is information from the Office of Naval Intelligence — 
there was 1 battleship not there, which was on the west coast, the 
Colorado^ under repair. His 3 carriers were not in Pearl Harbor. He 
had 10 of his heavy cruisers that were out, 10 out of 12 if I re- 
[5878'] call correctly. Three of his light cruisers were out and of 
his destroyers 24 were out. 

The Vice Chairman. Do you know how many of those, if any, were 
moved out after he received your message of the 27th? 

Admiral Stark. I think most of them. 

The Vice Chairman. Left the harbor after he received your mes- 
sage ? 

Admiral Stark. I think so. He can testify to that but I think that 
they were in the two task forces, one of which left on the 28th as I recall 
and the other early in December. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, most all these vessels that you have men- 
tioned as not being in the harbor at the time of the attack were in the 
task forces, were they? 

Admiral Stark. In the task forces ; yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Except for one battleship which was under 
repair on the Pacific coast? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. Most of the others you have mentioned as not 
being in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack were in the two task 
forces ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I think it is not generally understood 
that our fast ships, what might be called our fast striking forces were 
not much hurt at Pearl Harbor. I doubt if people realize how many 
ships were in Pearl Harbor that [5879'] were not hurt. I told 
the President the morning after the attack, or the afternoon or night, 
I think it was the morning after, while there wasn't much comfort in 
the fact, but that I wanted him to understand that our fast striking 
forces were practically intact. 

Now, I will just give you a list of ships which were not in Pearl 
Harbor at the time. It might be of interest to you to know what was 
there and was unhurt. 

The Vice Chairman. It would be. 

Mr. Mitchell. Just a moment, please. 

The Vice Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Congressman, if I am not mistaken the commit- 
tee has a mimeographed copy of the exhibit that he apparently is now 
using, that was distributed, which shows all these figures about that. 

The Vice Chairman. I think that is true, yes. It has already been 
put in evidence, has it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, but I was going to suggest that it be put in right 
now and read into the record at this time. 

The Vice Chairman. All right, go ahead. 

Mr. Mitchell. We will just hand it to the reporter. I did not mean 
to interrupt your examination. 

79716— 46— pt. 5 11 



2210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. I am glad you did. 
(The document referred to follows:) 

[5880] Statistical Section, 

Division of Navat. Intelligence, 

Nov 6 1945. 
Confidential 

Names of Major Vessels in Pacific Ocean on December 7, 1941 

I. SHIPS SUNK OB put OUT OF COMMISSION AT PEARL HABBOK 

Date stricken or returned to duty 

BB Arizona Stricken 12/1/42. 

BB Oklahoma Striclten 11/22/44. 

BB Pennsylvania Available for sea 1/28/43. 

BB Nevada Ready for sea 12/12/42. 

BB Tennessee Repaired and converted 5/10/43. 

BB California Repaired and converted 1/1.5/44. 

BB Maryland Repairs completed 2/21/42. 

BB West Viryinia Repaired and converted 7/1/44. 

CL Helena Ready for sea 7/14/42. 

CL Honolulu Ready for sea 3/16/42. 

CL Raleigh Ready for sea 6/— /42. 

DD Cassin Repairs completed 2/19/44. 

DD Downs Repairs completed 12/1/43. 

DD Shaw Repairs completed 7/13/42. 

CM Oglala Ready for sea 12/7/42. 

AG Utah Stricken 11/13/44. 

[5081] AV Curtis Ready for sea 12/15/41. 

AR Vestal Ready for sea 12/17/44. 

Total 18 

IL SHIPS AT PE;AKL HARBOR BUT UNHURT IN THE ATTACK 



CA Neiv Orleans 
CA San Francisco 
CL Phoenix 
CL St. Louis 
CL Detroit 
DD Phelps 
DD Dewey 
DD Hull 
DD McDonough 
DD Warden 
DD Farragut 



DD Dale 
DD Aylwin 
DD Monagham 
DD Conyngham 
DD Reid 
DD Case 
DD Cumings 
DD Tucker 
DD Self ridge 
DD Blue 
DD Helm 



DD Henley 
DD Bagley 
DD Mugford 
DD Ralph Talbot 
DD Jarvis 
DD Patterson 
DD Allen 
DD Chew 
DD Schley 
DD Ward 



lU. SHIPS ATTACHE© TO PACIFIC FLEEfr BUT AT SEA OR LOCATED AT BASES OTHER THAN 

PEABfL HARBOR 



[5882] BB Colorado 

CV Enterprise 

CV Lexington 

(^V Saratoga 

CA Northampton 

CA Chester 

CA Salt Lake City 

CA Chicago 

CA Portland 

CA Astoria 

CA Minneapolis 

CA Indianapolis 

CA Louisville 

CA Pensacola 



CL Concord 
CL Richmond 
CL Trenton 
DD Batch 
DD Maury 
DD Craven 
DD Gridley 
DD McCall 
DD Diinlap 
DD Benham 
DD Fanning 
DD EIHe* 
DD Porter 
DD Drayton 



DD Flusscr 
DD Lamson 
DD Mahan 
DD C/f/rA- 
D'DCushing 
DD Perkins 
DD Preston 
DD Smith 
DD Rathburnc 
DD Dent 
DD TflZbo^ 
DD Wafers 
DD Litchfield 



[588S] 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2211 

Ntmibers of vessels in Pacific Fleet on December 7, lOJfl 



Sunk or put out of com- 
mission at Pearl Harbor 


Unhurt in 

the attack 

on Pearl 

Harbor 


At sea or 
located at 
bases other 
than Pearl 

Harbor 


Sunk or put out of com- 
mission at Pearl Harbor 


Unhurt in 

the attack 

on Pearl 

Harbor 


At sea or 

located at 

bases other 

than Pearl 

Harbor 


BB. 8 




1 
3 
10 
3 
24 
17 


AVD 

AVP._ _._ 

AV.._ _ 1 

ASR 

AS _ 

AG _ .._. 1 

AR 1 

AO 

Misc - 

Total 18 


3 
2 
1 

1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
8 


2 


CV 




3 


CA 


2 
3 

27 
5 


1 


CL. 3 

DD 3 

SS... 

CM. 1 


1 
1 


DM .__ 


8 
4 
6 
2 




9 


DMS 


9 
3 


10 


AM..._ 

AD _ _ 




78 


97 







>884] 



Admiral Stark, It shows that 10 of his 12 cruisers were 



out. The other 2 of the fast heavy cruisers were in, not damaged. 
There were 3 light cruisers not damaged. And of the destroyers in 
port there were about 27 that were not damaged. So practically 
out of his destroyers of, as I recall, somewhere around 55 or 60, there 
was only 1 damaged. I do not see anything about submarines here, 
so I assume no submarine was damaged. The battleships were the 
worst sufferers in proportion to their strength by far. 

The Vice Chairman. Does that complete the reading of that docu- 
ment? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman, Then I beelieve you have already stated. 
Admiral, that you considered the messages of November 24 and 
especially the message of November 27 as adequate and sufficient war 
warning message to the Commander of the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii? 

Admiral Stark. We thought so. We sent them for that purpose. 

The Vice Chairman. And in response to the question by the Chair- 
man, if the naval forces there had been on the alert as you had ex- 
pected to place them by your message and likewise the Army com- 
mand there had been properly on the alert, you think the damages 
inflicted upon our forces would have been [S885] much less? 

Admiral Stark. I think so ; yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. I thank you. 

The Chairman. Senator George. 

Senator George. Admiral, in talking about war being inevitable 
with Japan I gather that you mean to say that we were moving towards 
war and you felt that a conflict would actually come at some time? 

Admiral Stark. I felt so. 

Senator George. But you did not necessarily think that a conflict 
was imminent until late in 1941, that is, in October or November of 
1941? 

Admiral Stark. That is true; yes, sir. 

Senator George. You did not see, I believe you testified tliis morn- 
ing, the intercepted Japanese message of September 24, the one re- 
ferring to Pearl Harbor and the location of ships, the tie-up at docks, 
and so forth, in Pearl Harbor of the Fleet. I believe it is contained 
in Exhibit 2 at page 12. 

Admiral Stark. I have no recollection of ever having seen that 
dispatch until I saw it recently. 



2212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator George. Well, Admiral, that dispatch is more than a mere 
ordinary message or dispatch dealing with the movement of ships, 
isn't it? 

Admiral Stark. It is ; yes, sir. 

[5S86] Senator George. Decidedly so. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. Now, did you ever hear that message of Septem- 
ber discussed by anyone in your department or division ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir ; I did not. 

Senator George. So far as you know Admiral IngersoU did not 
know anything of it or did not see it ? 

Admiral Stark. Admiral IngersoU has told me that he did not 
see it. 

Senator George. Well, I mean of your knowledge prior to Decem- 
ber 7? 

Admiral Stark. No ; I have no recollection of ever having seen that 
message or of any conversation or reference with regard to it before 
December 7 and I also stated that it might be that my memory is 
faulty there, but I have no recollection of it whatsoever. 

Senator George. Did you testify this morning that you did not see 
the 1 o'clock message, I believe it is designated as the 1 o'clock mes- 
sage of December 7, the one directing the delivery of the fourteen part 
message to the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock, until about 10 : 40 or 
something like that ? 

Admiral Stark. Until somewhere around, I would say not before, 
10 : 40 and I am basing that on what I have since heard. [58871 
My own recollection is not clear. I believe Captain Kramer will be 
able to give a rather definite time on that, which I will accept if he 
does. 

Senator George. You did say that you did recollect the discussion 
of the 1 o'clock message or intercept when you were called by General 
Marshall, Chief of Staff. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. It is the only clear 

Senator George. It is the only really outstanding recollection that 
you have of it? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, it is, because thinking the whole thing over 
afterwards that message is the only thing of that morning that stands 
out like a beacon light. 

Senator George. Well, now, so far as you know no information 
reached Admiral Kimmel about that 1 o'clock message until after the 
attack ? 

Admiral Stark. I think that is correct. I know it is, yes, sir. 

Senator George. You did not make an effort to send, except direct 
a request that Admiral Kimmel be notified in the Marshall message? 

Admiral Stark. That is true ; yes, sir. 

Senator George. But you did not know that the Marshall message, 
the Chief of Staff's message, had not gone through ? 

Admiral Stark. No; I did not. 

[S888] Senator George. You did not, however, take any steps 
to send directly to Admiral Kimmel a notice of that 1 o'clock message ? 

Admiral Stark. No ; I did not parallel it. 

Senator George. You did not parallel it. 

Admiral Stark. And that is the thought I have often had since, that 
if I had paralleled it it might have gone through. I let it go the way 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2213 

it was. That is, Marshall stated that he would get it through. I 
offered to get it through but I did not. I had no reason to believe 
hat he would not get it through just as quickly. 

Senator George. Admiral, tliere was a time, as you have testified 
about and others, other officers in the Army and Navy, when the 
possibility and strong, maybe, probability of an air attack on Pearl 
Harbor was discussed in Army and Navy circles, that is in 1940 and 
up during some early months even of 1941 and in your correspondence 
with the commander of the Pacific Fleet you did discuss the possibility 
of an air attack? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. And then there did seem to come a time when 
there was a lapse of interest in that point down here in Washington ; 
isn't that true? 

Admiral Stark. I w^ouldn't say there was a lapse of interest. We 
initially pointed out wdiat we thought was necessary [68S9] 
and we took steps to correct the deficiencies as far as we could and 
my conversations with Marshall on that continued, not only with 
regard to radar and things for which the Army was responsible, but 
also craft and antiaircraft weapons. We continued to talk about that 
and the war plans covered what we had to give them and which were 
made available substantially as the war plans stated. 

We had received and O.' K.'cl what we thought was a very splendid 
arrangement out there for meeting the situation and from then on, 
except to follow up on materiel, there was no particular mention, as 
I recall, about the continued danger. We had set it forth. We did 
not talk particularly about other types of attack which might occur, 
but I think you are right in stating that. I do not recall of it having 
been specifically mentioned. I will look through the record and see 
if I can find anything. 

[5890'\ Senator George. I did not mean that you had lost all 
interest in the possibility of an air attack, but I have been unable to 
escape the conclusion that little emphasis was placed upon the possi- 
bility of an air attack at Pearl Harbor late in the year 1941. That is 
what I meant to say. Of course, you did not have adequate preparation 
at any of the outlying posts, especially you did not consider that you 
had all of the preparation that you needed at Pearl Harbor to repel an 
air attack or a combined attack. 

Admiral Stark. That is true. I think I might say. Senator George, 
what Ave said earlier in the year still stood. 

Senator George. I understand that. I understand you now to say 
that we are to take it that that still stood, that nothing happened to 
change that or no changes had been made and you were relying upon 
the plans as they had been developed. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. And the conversations as they had gone on during 
the previous months. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. And you were making an effort to strengthen your 
defenses at Pearl Harbor. 

Adrniral Stark. Yes, sir ; and we also had word about tlieir carrying 
on their weekly drills, and so forth. 

Senator George. I believe you have agreed, Admiral, [S891] 
and I recall also General Marshall's agreement, that while we did not 



2214 CONGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

luive as strong defenses at Pearl Harbor as we desired, as we expected 
to build up. that if the two services, that is, the Army and Xavv, had 
been fully alerted ilurinir the week precedin<r December 7 the attack 
niitrht have been diverted or miirht have been so broken up as to have 
saved the losses to the Navy in men as well as materiel, or substantial 
injury at that time. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. Now, I just want to ask you a few questions about 
what seems to me to be the two important messac;es that you have sent 
out, that is the message of November :24 — that did go to Achniral 
Kimmel ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. And then the message of November '27 also went to 
Admiral Kimmel ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator (teorge. Then, there was a message of November '28 in which 
you quoted the full message of the Chief of Staff to the conunanders of 
the Armed Forces. Did that go to Admiral Kimmel? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. That reached him ? 

Admiral Stark. That went to him, as I recall, for informa- 
[oS9.^] tion. The other two were for action. 

Senator George. That went to "INFO." That means "Informa- 
tion"? 

Admiral Stark. "Information", yes, sir. 

Senator George. That did not go to him as a connnand message, or 
an action message? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Senator George. There was subjoined to the quoted Army message 
a further statement which he was, of course, assumed or presumed to 
recognize and follow, was he not ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. And that cautioned against offensive action until 
Japan had committed an overt act ? 

Admiral Stark. That part of it for action was to the two naval 
coastal frontier on the West coast. It was sent to Admiral Kimmel 
for information. 

Seiuitor George. I see. The whole of it was in the nature of in- 
formation, as far as Admiral Kinnnel was concerned? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I might mention. Senator George, in 
that connection that the two action addressees in the dispatch auto- 
matically came under Admiral Kimmel in case of war, as shown in 
AVPL— to, so we wanted Admiral Kimmel to know what we had told 
the naval coastal frontiers. 

Senator (George. I see. They automatically came under [SSOo] 
his control in the case of war? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. Do you know what time Admiral Kimmel received 
that message ? 

Admiral Stark. Of the 28th? 

Senator (teorge. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Stark. I do not know. sir. We obtained from naval 
comnimiications the fact that that message was sent out at half past 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2215 

2 on the morning of the 29th. That would mean Hawaiian time half 
past 2. He probably got that in the late afternoon or early evening 
on the 28th. 

Senator Gkokge. Could you give us the time of receipt by Admiral 
Kimniel of tlie November 27 message, or at least the date of the 
receipt ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, we obtained the infoi-mation from com- 
munications that that message went out, Greenwich Time 2801 — or, 
rather, OlOG in tlie morning of the 28th. You take 10 hours and a 
half off from that and he probably got that the afternoon of the 27tli. 

Senator Geok(;p:. Admiral, have you before you the several messages 
regarding codes and the destruction of codes? 

Admiral Stakk. I think they are in this file. I remember them. 

Senator George. Beginning, I believe, December 2 or [S894 \ 
3. the one I am referring to, and going through, maybe, to the 5th 
of December. I merely wish to ask you about those messages, whether 
they were addressed to or received by Admiral Kimmel. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; they were sent to Admiral Kimmel and 
Admiral Hart, the commandants of their two naval districts. 

Senator George. That statement is generally true of all of those 
code destruction messages? 

Admiral Stark. The next one was sent to CINC Asiatic and COM 
If) for action, and to CINCPAC, Admiral Kimmel, and COM 14 for 
information. That is the one that speaks about Singapore, Manila. 
(lestro34ng j^urple machines, Batavia, and so forth. 

Senator George. But the receipt by Admiral Kimmel either for ac- 
tion or for information 

Admiral Stark. It was for information, sir. 

Senator George. Is indicated with respect to all of those messages 
referring to the destruction of codes ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. Admiral as to the message of November 27, which 
is the strongest war warning message that was sent to Admiral Kim- 
mel, a portion of that message is also by way of information, is it not ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. It was sent to him for action [5895] 
but the message does contain certain information. 

Senator George. The message does contain certain informational 
matter ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. It contains, for instance, this statement, the factual 
statement that the negotiations with Japan had broken down, had 
ceased, and that Japan is expected "within the next few days, to com- 
mence an aggressive move," or to make an aggressive move, and then 
reference is made to the size of the Japanese forces that were being 
mobilized or put in action, and then this statement is made, "an am- 
phibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, Kra Penin- 
sula or possibly Borneo" is specifically pointed out. That is by way 
of information, is it? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. By way of information of what was in the minds 
here, in "Washington, that you thought? 

Admiral Stark. They gave them what we had. 

Senator George. Wliat you had? 



2216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. In other words, that statement is based on the 
evaUiation you made of all of the information that you received or 
that you had? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. 

[S896] Senator George. Then you come to the action 

Admiral Stark. I might state with regard to that, about all the 
information we had with regard to the rest of the Japanese Fleet, 
any information that we had concerning that was also known to the 
commanders in the chief in the Pacific, because they were the ones 
that sent us information on that. 

In other words, the stations could cut in and locate and evaluate the 
information as to the whereabouts of the Japanese Fleet, that informa- 
tion which blowed into the department came from Admiral Kimmel 
and Admiral Hart. So any other information that was available, that 
would have been available to us, they already had. 

Senator George. Admiral, the enumeration of the possible points 
of attack with no reference whatever to Pearl Harbor was calculated, 
was it not, to weaken the warning message, so far as Admiral Kimmel 
was concerned? 

Admiral Stark. I can only say with regard to that, that that did 
not occur to me, and, so far as I know, did not occur to anyone else. 
We gave the war warning. It was sent to the two commanders in 
chief for action with a directive, and what information we had and 
what indications we had we sent along as information. Now, the 
reaction that it had in the minds of the commanders in chief is some- 
thing to which they can testify. I can only state that we thought we 
had given them [S897] an unequivocal war warning to be on 
the alert against any possibility. Wliether what we sent was suffi- 
cient or insufficient is something I would say for the committee to 
decide. We thought it was, and we intended to convey that. 

Senator George. Your message of November 2-i had definitely stated 
that action in any direction might be anticipated. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. Might be expected. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. But in this message there is, of course, no mention 
of Pearl Harbor, and there isn't any message, in late November at 
least or early in December, that did specifically refer to Pearl Harbor, 
and the enumeration of possible points of attack which omitted Pearl 
Harbor might, will you not say, tend to weaken the force of the warning 
to a commander of a fleet who was at Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Stark. I can only say we did not think so at the time. In 
the light of hindsight it may have. 

Senator George. Now, the very concluding sentence in this war mes- 
sage is : 

"Continental District Guam-Samoa directed to take appropriate measures 
against sabotage." 

Isn't that also calculated to indicate a complete, all-out defense or 
reconnaissance was meant to be undertaken by Admiral Kimmel, or 
might have led him to believe that he was not to take an all-out 
[5898] reconnaissance? 

Admiral Stark. I do not think so. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2217 

Senator George. You did not think so ? 

Admiral Stark. No, I did not. If I had thought so I would have 
worded the message or caused it to be worded differently. About the 
only thing that Guam could do was to take action against sabotage. 
We knew that Guam could not hold out. And about the only thing 
the continental district could. do was to take action against sabotage. 

Senator George. I am not asserting, admiral, that these points that 
I am pointing out in this message were calculated in fact to weaken the 
effect of this warning message, so far as the commander of the Pacific 
Fleet at Pearl Harbor was concerned, but I am asking you as an 
experienced officer in the Navy if the enumeration of certain points 
of possible attack with no reference to Pearl Harbor and with the 
reference that is contained here to Guam, Samoa, continental districts, 
and so forth, might not have the effect of leaving the Commander 
of the Pacific Fleet in some doubt as to what action he should take 
to defend his position ? 

Admiral Stark. I can only say we did not think so. I can also 
agree with you now that it might have, particularly in the light of 
hindsight. However, we did not think so. In mentioning those 
places we simply indicated the information we [S899] had. 
It was not necessary for us to tell Admiral Kimmel to be prepared 
against sabotage or destruction of codes, for example, which we also 
mentioned for Guam, because he would automatically take care of 
that, although we did, so far as the outlying islands were concerned, 
authorize it. We, in sending that message to him for action — not for 
information but for action — had thought it would activate his com- 
mand, and we gave him the only information we had. If we had 
had any indication of an air attack from the movement of ships we 
would have given it. We had nothing. But the absence of that 
information, in my opinion, did not preclude the possibility of an 
attack. 

Senator George. Admiral, I believe that you said earlier in your 
testimony that you regarded the fleet reasonably secure at Pearl Har- 
bor. Did you state that? 

Admiral Stark. Reasonably secure? » 

Senator George. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Senator George. Based at Pearl Harbor. 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall having stated that they were rea- 
sonably secure. I stated that I would not have hesitated to put the 
fleet there. The fleet, even though it was a dangerous position or 
not a dangerous position, it was the furthest point westward that 
we could approach at that time. 

[SOOOI I pointed that out shortly after Pearl Harbor in a meet- 
ing of Senators in which I was called about the position of the fleet 
and the danger to the west coast, and the question about bringing the 
fleet back to the west coast, and they were very much perturbed that 
the attack might come on the west coast. I remember the meeting 
very well. General Marshall was called before it. I pointed out the 
place of the fleet was as far west as we could put it, and we would 
continue to push it back until it accomplished its purpose of defeat- 
ing Japan. But I would not state that the fleet was secure there, in 
view of the possibility of an attack. The fleet was never secure in the 



2218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

possibility of war, unless it was back in the navy yards somewhere on 
the home coast. 

Senator George. It was reasonably secure against submarine 
attack? 

Admiral Stark. Against submarine attack in port quite secure; 
yes, sir. 

Senator George. That comes down to this last and final question. 
Admiral. What proportion of the fleet in the Pacific, that is, our en- 
tire naval forces in the Pacific, were concentrated at Pearl Harbor 
the first week in December, or late November and early December? 
What proportion of the entire naval forces in the Pacific area was 
concentrated there or based there ? 

[6W1] Admiral Stark. Was based in Pearl Harbor? 

Senator George. Yes, at Pearl Harbor. I am not asking what spe- 
cific ships were there at that time, but what proportion of our entire 
naval strength was there. 

Admiral Stark. Of our entire naval strength ? 

Senator George. Yes, in the Pacific. 

Admiral Stark. In the Pacific? 

Senator George. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. I could work that out as a percentage. I might 
state Admiral Hart at that time had two cruisers, and 13 destroyers — 
if that is not correct, I would have to refresh my memory on it — 28 
submarines, 28 or 29 patrol planes. 

The Chairman. While you are looking that up I might say to one 
or two of the members of the committee who were absent Monday, the 
committee formally agreed to sit to 4: 30 in the afternoon until Con- 
gress reassembles. 

Admiral Stark. Senator George, I want to make sure I have got the 
question right. 

Senator George. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. You do not mean the percentage of the whole 
Navy? 

Senator George, No, 

Admiral Stark. But the percentage of the ships that were in the 
Pacific? 

[5902] Senator George. In the Pacific area. 

Admiral Stark. The percentage that were in the Hawaiian area? 

Senator George. Yes, sir. Now, admiral. I do not care to have you 
go to the trouble of making an accurate statement, or a mathematically 
accurate statement, but just about the proportion of the strengh. 

Admiral Stark, Of course, he had the very great proportion. 

Senator George. Well, admiral, you may put it in the record if you 
wish to. I will be very glad to have you do so. 

Admiral Stark. All right, sir. I can give it to you from memory — 
I thought I had it here — which would be fairly accurate, but I think 
it would be better to give you a detailed statement. For example, 
there w^ere 13 heavy cruisers in the Pacific of which the Pacific Fleet 
had 12 and Hart had 1. There were 45 new submarines in the Pacific 
of which — well, I may be 2 or 3 out. It is just as well, I think, to give 
you this accurately. There were no battleships in the western Pacific. 

Senator George. No battleships? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2219 

Admiral Stark. No battleships out there. There were 18 destroy- 
ers. In the southeast Pacific, there were 2 destroyers. I will give 
you the table in the morning. 

Senator George. If you do tliat will be sufficient for my purposes. 

\SWS] Mr. Mitchell. How do you make the comparison ? 

By so many destroyers in the Atlantic and so many destroyers in the 
Pacific, so many battleships figuring the weight in metal, or how would 
you give the relative strength of the fleet? 

[6904] Admiral Stark. I have a table which has just that on 
it. I thought I had it with me. I think it shows it fairly accurately. 

Mr. Mitchell. You can present it then in the morning and we 
will put in the record.^ 

Senator George. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. When you come to strength it is a very difficult 
(hiing. Until we reinforced the Atlantic, for example, by three 
l)attleships, we had on paper three battleships in the Atlantic. They 
were battleships. Any aged cruiser in clear weather could take its 
lange on them, outside of those three battleships' guns, and pound 
( hem to pieces, because they were old. 

When you get in to the strength and penetrative effect of 12, 14, 
16-inch guns, and so forth, it would be a pretty tough problem, and if 
any such evaluation as that were wanted I suggest the Navy De- 
partment, but I will give you the number of ships. 

Mr. Geariiart. Along this line I wonder if the Admiral will give 
the figures so as to show the number and type of ships in the Asiatic 
PTeet and the number and type in the Pacific Fleet, and in giving the 
strength of the Pacific Fleet if you would indicate how much was 
in Pearl Harbor and how much was out of Pearl Harbor on De- 
vember 7 it would be [S905] very interesting to me. 

For instance, there were two task forces at sea, as you remember, 
under Admiral Halsey, and another admiral whose name I don't re- 
member — Admiral Newton. Then there was one battleship, I think, 
on the Pacific coast in drydock or for overhauling. 

Admiral Stark. That is correct ; the Colorado. 

Mr. Gearhart. So if we could have the figures reflecting not only 
the number of ships in the Pacific but where they were it would be 
very illuminating.^ 

Admiral Stark. It is very easy to obtain. As a matter of fact, 
I think it is in the exhibits now. But I have one of my own and I 
will fix it up from the data furnished me by the Department and a 
table Avhich I think will make it very plain. 

Mr. Gearhart. In making this present request I don't want to 
interfere with the requests made by the Senator from Georgia. 

Senator George. No, no, no. 

The Chairman. I think they are practically identical anyway. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. I merely wish to get a rough view of the relative 
strength. 

[6906'] That is all, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Congressman Clark. 

Mr. Clark. I believe some of the witnesses here. Admiral, probably 
including General Marshall, have testified that a surprise attack by 
air w^as considered the chief danger to Pearl Harbor. 

1 See Mr. Hannaford's statement on p. 2492, infra. 



2220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Do you agree with that ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. In this message of the 27th, in which you referred to 
the possibilit}^, or maybe likelihood, of an attack on the Philippines 
or the Kra Peninsula, and Borneo, and so forth, when you were under- 
taking to tell what the Japanese were likely to do, based on your 
information 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; we stated "our information indicated". 

Mr. Clark. Yes. 

Now, if it had then occurred to you that a surprise attack on Pearl 
Harbor was at all likely, you would have included that, perhaps? 

Admiral Stark. If we had expected it at that time I certainly would 
have included it. If I had been expecting it. 

Mr. Clark. You did not expect it ? 

Admiral Stark. I was surprised. I was not expecting it. I was 
thinking of what was going on further west. 

[5907] Mr. Clark. Still the circumstances that existed then 
really created almost an ideal situation for such an attack, did they 
not ? 

Admiral Stark. As it existed, yes, sir; and we thought 

Mr. Clark. I am referring to the diversionary movement southward 
by the Japanese, the fact that traffic had been diverted to the north 
and south across the Pacific, and so forth. Wouldn't that indicate 
to a strategist an opportune momement for a surprise air attack? 

Admiral Stark. Of course, in a surprise attack the other fellow 
had the initiative, and he took it and it proved that his estimate was 
correct, that it was a good time. 

Mr. Clark. Now, may I ask you this, please, sir : At the time you 
were preparing this message as to what the Japs were doing, did 
you even then consider the likelihood of a surprise air attack, or had 
you dropped that consideration ? 

Admiral Stark. No, we hadn't dropped it. And with regard to 
the message of the 24th, my memory on that is very clear, although 
I didn't mention air attack, to include the words "in any direction," 
and if an attack had come on Hawaii, that would have been the most 
dangerous form. 

It might have come that way. It might also have, of course, come 
from submarines. And, as I have already said, it might have come 
on the Pacific coast. I was thinking of [S90S] the broad Pa- 
cific, not only Hawaii but our other points of possible attack, at 
that time. 

Mr. Clark. Well, I am completely ignorant of all matters military 
and some of my questions may sound rather silly to you, but I was 
trying to get at the time when you were framing this message to 
the man in charge of the fleet out there, as to what the Japs were 
doing and what the Japs were likely to do, at which time they were 
making this movement to the southward, and did lead you actually to 
believe that is where they were going to strike. 

Why did you not then consider the likelihood at that time of a 
surprise air attack? 

Admiral Stark. Well, I think we did consider it to the extent that 
we gave a directive to take a deployment preparatory to putting a war 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2221 

plan into effect, a defense deployment. That was what we intended 
it. It was a direct order to that effect. 

Mr. Clark. Yes. I see that, admiral. I appreciate that. 

Admiral Stark. Perhaps my background on that could be explained, 
for not having diagnosed the thing as it did happen, and which I 
didn't, by stating that I wasn't expecting, in view of the magnitude of 
the attack which might come, and we expected it to come and it did 
come, much farther west, that they would strike all over the Pacific, 
practically. [S909] That is, as far as Hawaii, at that time. I 
just didn't expect it. I was surprised. I don't know that I can add 
much to it. I knew it was a possibility. I thought we had gone at 
the thing from every angle before. 

If we had not thought of it being a possibility we could have just 
sent that message to Hart for action, but we included Kimmel in it, 
and thought — we had intended to alert them against an attack, which 
we said might come anywhere, in the 24th and the w^ar warning of 
the 27th. 

Now 

Mr. Clark. If you will pardon me just a moment, admiral. I 
thoroughly understand that. I heard you say it. My point was this, 
when in the later message you undertook to point out, as Chief of 
Naval Operations, where you thought they were likely to strike, and 
what you thought they were likely to do, you entirely omitted any like- 
lihood or possibility of an air attack. Is that because you didn't think 
of it at that time or because you didn't think it likely or possible? 

Admiral Stark. I don't recall a discussion of an air attack on Ha- 
waii at that time. Now, I was thinking only in general terms other 
than information we had. 

Mr. Clark. You mentioned specific points where the attack might 
go. 

\6910] Admiral Stark. We had information indicating that. 

Mr. Clark. Yes, sir. You knew, of course, that there was a move- 
ment that way and that there was a set-up there that would be almost 
ideal for a surprise air attack, did you not ? 

Admiral Stark. In Hawaii ? 

Mr. Clark. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. That there the situation was ideal? 

Mr. Clark. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. I wouldn't call it ideal. I think there was a great 
deal of risk involved. 

Mr. Clark. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. Assuming that the radar stations had been in full 
effect, that Marshall's order to make reconnaissance had been in ef- 
fect, that everything had been manned, and so forth, I think they 
might have given a right good account of themselves. 

Mr. Clark. I agree entirely with that, but I had in mind the move- 
ment of Japanese forces south, and, of course, you didn't know it, but 
it seemed to have been a fact that there was a report or reports being 
made from Hawaii that there was not any reconnaissance down there, 
the Japs seemed to have known that, although the Navy here didn't 
seem to know it; but taking those circumstances into account, I was 
[5911] trying to find whether, as you framed that message, it 



2222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

passed into your mind at all that there mip;ht be a surprise attack on 
Pearl Harbor. I believe I have asked you that question. 

Admiral Stark. I can only say that we always thoug;ht it possible 
but I was not looking for it at that time and 1 was surprised that it 
occurred. 

Mr. Clark. You were as much surprised as Admiral Kimmel was, 
of the air attack? 

Admiral Stark. I was surprised at the air attack. I also was sur- 
prised that there were no steps, or that certain steps had not been 
taken to intercept it and be on the lookout for it. 

Mr. Clark. That brings me to another question that I would like 
to ask you, if it is a proper question : 

As an experienced naval officer, having long and fine experience, if 
you had been in command at Pearl Harbor, with the equipment that 
was there, and liad received the message that Admiral Kimmel did 
receive, of the 27th of November, exactly what would you have done? 

Admiral Stark. Separating the answer from hindsight, it is so 
easy for me to say what I would have done which would have caught 
this attack. 

Mr. Clark. 1 don't think it is a question of hindsight. I am asking 
you this simple, plain question, leaving hindsight [5912] out 
of it. 

Admiral Stark. Well, my thought is that I certainly would have 
started the radar going 24 hours a day. 

Mr. Clark. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. That I would have made an estimate, and, I believe 
estimates had been made, as to where an attack, if it came by air, might 
come, from what direction. I would have known, of course, he did 
know, how many planes he had that were usable for reconnaissance 
at that time, long distance reconnaissance. I would have assumed that 
that would have been put into effect. 

I don't know just how many submarines he had available at that 
time, but I certainly think I would have used them to supplement my 
other means for getting early information of a possible attack. 

As to the light forces, I don't know just what I would have done 
with them. The carriers. I don't know what orders he had given 
them. They were on an expedition to the westward. He may have 
given them orders, either by radio or before they went out. about 
sweeping and assisting in reconnaissance. If the carriers had been 
available to him he might have sent them out in a certain direction, 
supplementing his other efforts. In other words, used what he had 
as best he could to avoid being caught aback. 

[691o] Mr. Clark. One other question. It may be that I am 
anticipating and if so counsel will advise me and I will wait. 

With regai'd to this message that divided uj) the harboi- into sections, 
which you say you are not sure you saw, have you looked at that since? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Was it clipped ? 

Admiral Stark. AVas it what? 

Mr. Clark. Was it clipped? 

Admiral Stark. I don't know. ^lost of those dispatches werp 
burned, except the file copy. Wlien you say have I looked at it since, 
I don't recall having seen the dispatch at all before. I have seen it. It 
has been photostated and copied from the file copy in the Navy Depart- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2223 

ment. It was one of those things that in going through the mass of 
material, it was one of those dispatches that was picked out. 

Mr. Clark, I didn't know whether the fact that it was or was not 
clipped might enable you to say whether you had seen it or not.*" 

Admiral Stark. Well, there is nothing left clipped in the Navy 
Department now. I think all those dispatches have been burned 
except the file copy. 

Mr. Clark. Who exactly would be the one to determine — [5914] 
well, I will say, to clip the messages, as you referred to in youi" 
testimony ? 

Admiral Stark. They were clipped in Intelligence. And I think 
you have Captain McCollum down. There were two or three of them 
working there. McCollum, Kramei-. Which one did the initial clip- 
ping I am not sure. And that booklet also would go on up to the liead 
of Intelligence. 

Mr. Clark. Now, just one other thing. It appears in the record 
here that there are some intercepts that were intercepted but not 
decoded and made available. 

In other words, some, what we call magic, appear. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Intercepted but intercepted prior to December 7 and 
not decoded until after that date. I was wondering whether after this 
situation reached tJie crucial stage, say the 24th, 25th, 27th of Novem- 
ber, any effort was made to give priority to the decoding of these mes- 
sages from Japan over the great mass of stuff that you have testified 
was intercepted. 

Admiral Stark. I think that the people who actually handled that 
would be better qualified to answer that question than I could. My 
understanding is that they at times would look at a message and see 
right away that it wasn't particularly imjDortant and throw it aside 
and look for something more [5916] important and use the 
best judgment they had with the people they had available to get the 
maximum amount of important stuff into our hands. But they can 
tell you the procedure better than I. I am not familiar with just how 
they did it. 

Mr. Clark. You did not yourself initiate any movement or give any 
direction to give priority so far as possible to decoding the Jap inter- 
cepts after, say, the 27th of November ? 

Admiral Stark. No, I did not. There were people working on that 
who I think fully realized the situation. 

Mr. Clark. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator Lucas. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, it is 4 : 25. I don't believe I can 
finish in 5 minutes with the admiral. 

I would like to recess at this time until tomorrow morning. 

The Chairman. Not taking that as a precedent for any future re- 
cesses earlier than 4:30, the committee will recess until 10 o'clock 
to morrow morning. 

(Pursuant to Senator Ferguson's request at p. 2068, supra, Exhibit 
No. 92 follows:) 

[5916] Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now 
adjourn." — (Mr. James Stuart.) 

Mr. Stephen (Camlachie). May I ask whether, if a Vote of Confidence is t<» 
be put on the Paper, it will be in the hands of Members today? 



2224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Primej Ministeir (Mr. Churchill). That will be for the next Sitting Day. 

From time to time in the life of any Government there come occasions which 
must be clarified. No one who has read the newspapers of the last few weeks 
about our affairs at home and abroad can doubt that such an occasion is at 
hand. 

Since my return to this country, I have come to the conclusion that I must 
ask to be sustained by a Vote of Confidence from the House of Commons. This 
is a thoroughly normal, constitutional, democratic procedure. A Debate on the 
war lias been asked for. I have arranged it in the fullest and freest manner for 
three whole days. Any Member will be free to say anything he thinks fit about 
or against the Administration or against the composition of personalities of the 
Government, to his heart's content, subject only to the reservation which the 
House is always so careful to observe about military secrets. Could you have 
anything freer than that? Could you have any higher expression of democracy 
than that? Very few other countries have institutions strong enough to sustain 
[5917] such a thing while they are fighting for their lives. 

I owe it to the House to explain to them what has led me to ask for their 
exceptional support at this time. It has been suggested that we should have 
a three days' Debate of this kind in which the Government would no doubt be 
lustily belaboured by some of those who have lighter burdens to carry, and that 
at the end we should separate without a Division. In this case sections of the 
Press which are hostile — and there are some whose hostilitiy is pronounced — 
could declare that the Government's credit was broken, and, it might even be 
hinted, after all that has passed and all the discussion there has been, that it 
had been private intimated to me that I should be very reckless if I asked for a 
vote of Confidence from Parliament. 

And the matter does not stop there. It must be remembered that these 
reports can then be flashed all over the world, and that they are repeated in 
enemy broadcasts night after night in order to show that the Prime Minister 
has no right to speak for the nation and that the Government in Britain is 
about to collapse. Anyone who listens to the fulminations which come from 
across the water know that that is no exaggeration. Of course, these state- 
ments from foreign sources would not be true, but neither would it be helpful 
to anyone that there should be any doubt about our position. 

There is another aspect. We in this Island for a long [5918] time 
were alone, holding aloft the torch. We are no longer alone now. We are 
now at the centre and among those at the summit of 26 United Nations, com- 
prising more than three-quarters of the population of the globe. Whoever 
speaks for Britain at this moment must be known to speak, not only in the 
name of the people — and of that I feel pretty sure I may — but in the name 
of Parliament and, above all, of the House of Commons. It is genuine public 
interest that requires that these facts should be made manifest afresh in a 
formal way. 

We have had a great deal of bad news lately from the Far East, and 1 
think it highly probable, for reasons which I shall presently explain, that 
we shall have a great deal more. Wrapped up in this bad news will be many 
tales of blunders and shortcomings, both in foresight and action. No one will 
pretend for a moment that disasters like these occur without there having 
been faults and shortcomings. I see all this rolling tt)war(ls us like the waves 
in a storm, and that is another reason why I require a formal, solemn Vote 
of Confidence from the House of Conmions, which hitherto in this struggle 
has never flinched. The House would fail in its duty if it did not insist upon 
two things, first, freedom of debate, and, secondly, a clear, honest, blunt Vote 
thereafter. Then we shall all know where we are, and all those witli whom we 
have to deal, at home and abroad, friend or foe, will know where we are and 
where they ai'e. It is because we are to [5919] have a free Debate, in 
which perhaps 20 to 30 Members can take part, that I demand an expression 
of opinion from the 300 or 400 Members who will have sat silent. 

It is because things have gone badly and worse is to come that I demand 
a Vote of Confidence. This will be placed on the Paper to-day, to be moved 
at a later stage. I do not see why this should hamper anyone. If a Member 
has helpful criticisms to make, or even severe corrections to administer, that 
may be perfectly consistent with thinking that in respect of the Administration, 
such as it is, he might go farther and fare worse. But if an hon. Gentleman 
dislikes the Government very much and feels it in the public interest that it 
should be broken up, he ought to have the manhood to testify his convictions 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2225 

in the Lobby. There is no need to be mealy-mouthed in debate. There is no 
objection to anything being said, plain, or even plainer, and the Government 
will do their utmost to conform to any standard whlcli may be set in the course 
of the Debate. But no one need to be mealy-mouthed in debate, and no one 
should be chicken-hearted in voting. I have voted against Governments I have 
been elected to support, and, looking back, I have sometimes felt very glad that 
I did so. Everyone in these rough times must do what he thinks is his duty. 

Mr. Shinwell (Seaham). A free vote? 

The Pkimk Minister. A vote under all the conditions [5920] which 
hitherto have made the conduct of Parliamentary government possible. Surely 
the hon. Gentleman is not the man to be frightened of a Whip? The House of 
Commons, which is at present the most powerful representative Assembly in the 
world, must also — I am sure, will also — bear in mind the effect produced abroad 
by all its proceedings. We have also to remember how oddly foreigners view 
our country and its way of doing things. When Rudolf Hess flew over here 
some months ago he firmly believed that he had only to gain access to certain 
circles in this country for what he described as "the Churchill clique" 

Mr. Thorne (Plaistow). Where is he now? 

The Prime Minister. Where he ought to be — to be thrown out of power and 
for a Government to be set up with which Hitler could negotiate a magnanimous 
peace. The only importance attaching to the opinions of Hess is the fact that he 
was fresh from the atmosphere of Hitler's intimate table. But, Sir, I can assure 
you that since I have been back in this country I have had anxious inquiries 
from a dozen countries, and reports of enemy propaganda in a score of countries, 
all turning upon the point whether His Majesty's present Government is to 
be dismissed from power or not. This may seem silly to us, but in those months 
abroad it is hurtful and mischevious to the common effort. I am not asking 
for any special, personal favours in these circumstances, but I am [5921'] 
sure the House would wish to make its position clear ; therefore I stand by the 
ancient, constitutional, Parliamentary doctrine of free debate and faithful 
voting. 

Now I turn to the account of the war, which constitutes the claim I make 
for the support and confidence of the House. Three or four months ago we had 
to cope with the following situation. The German invaders were advancing, 
blasting their way through Russia. The Russians were resisting with the utmost 
heroism. But no one could tell what would happen, whether Leningrad, Moscow 
or Rostov would fall, or where the German winter line would be established. No 
one can tell now where it will be established, but now the boot is on the other 
leg. We all agree that we must aid the valiant Russian Armies to the utmost 
limit of our power. His Majesty's Government thought, and Parliament upon 
reflection agree with them, that the best aid we could give to Russia was in sup- 
plies of many kinds of raw materials and of munitions, particularly tanks and 
aircraft. Our Forces at home and abroad had for long been waiting thirstily 
for these weapons. At last they were coming to hand in large numbers. At 
home we have always the danger of invasion to consider and to prepare against. 
I will speak about the situation in the Middle East presently. Nevertheless we 
sent Premier Stalin — for that I gather is how he wishes to be addressed ; at 
least, that is the form in which he telegraphs to me— exactly what he [5922] 
asked for. The whole quantity was promised and sent. There has been, I 
am sorry to say, a small lag due to bad weather, but it will be made up by the 
early days of February. This was a decision of major strategy and policy, and 
anyone can see that it was right to put it first when they watch the wonderful 
achievements, unhoped for, undreamed of by us because we little knew the 
Russian strength, but all the more glorious as they seem — the wonderful achieve- 
ments of the Russian Armies. Our munitions were of course only a contribu- 
tion to the Russian victory, but they were an encouragement in Russia's darkest 
hour. Moreover, if we had not shown a loyal effort to help our Ally, albeit at 
a heavy sacrifice to ourselves, I do not think our relations with Premier Stalin 
and his great country would be as good as they are now. There would have been 
a lack of comradeship, and the lack of comradeship might have spread reproaches 
on all sides. Far from regarding what we did for Russia, I only wish it had 
been in our power — but it was not — to have done more. 

Three or four months ago, at a time when the German advance was rolling 
onwards, we were particularly concerned with the possibility of the Germans forc- 
ing the Don River, the capture of Rostov and the invasion of the Caucasus, and the 

79716—46 — pt. 5 12 



2226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

reaching of the Baku oil wells before the winter by the Panzer spearheads of the 
German Army. Everyone who has been giving careful study and independent 
thought to this war, knows [5923] how deep an anxiety that was in all our 
breasts three or four months ago. Such an advance would not only have given the 
Germans the oil which they are beginning seriously to need, but it would have 
involved the destruction of the Russian Fleet and the loss of the command of the 
Black Sea. It would have affected the safety of Turkey, and it would, in due 
course, have exposed to the gravest dangers Persia, Iraq, Cyria and Palestine, 
and beyond those countries, all of which are now under our control, it would 
have threatened the Suez Canal, Egypt and the Nile Valley. At the same time 
as this menace defined itself with hideous and increasing reality as it seemed, 
General von Rommel, with his army of 10 German and Italian divisions en- 
trenched in his fortified positions at and behind the Halfaya Pass, was prepar- 
ing to make a decisive attack on Tobruk as a preliminary to a renewed advance 
upon Egypt from the West. The Nile Valley was therefore menaced simul- 
taneously by a direct attack from the West and by a more remote but in some 
ways more deadly attack from the North. In such circumstances it is the 
classical rule of war, reinforced by endless examples — and some exceptions — 
that you prepare to fight a delating action against one of the two attacks and 
concentrate, if possible, overwhelming strength against the other and nearer 
attack. We therefore approved General Auchinleck's plans for building up a 
delaying force in the vast region from Cyprus to the Caspian Sea, along what 
I may call the Levant- [5924] Caspian front, and preparing installations, 
airfields and communications upon which larger forces could be based, as time 
and transport allowed. On the other flank, the Western flank, we prepared to 
set upon Rommel and try to make a good job of him. For the sake of this 
battle in the Libyan Desert we concentrated everything we could lay our hands 
on, and we submitted to a very long delay, very painful to bear over here, so 
that all preparations could be perfected. We hoped to recapture Gyrenaiea and 
the important airfields round Benghazi. But General Auchinleck's main ob- 
jective was more simple. He set himself to destroy Rommel's army. Such was 
the mood in which we stood three or four months ago. Such was the broad 
strategical decision we took. 

Now, when we see how events, which so often mock and falsify human effort 
and design, have shaped themselves, I am sure this was a right decision. 

General Auchinleck had demanded five months' preparation for his campaign, 
but on 18th November he fell upon the enemy. For more than two months in the 
desert the most fierce, continuous battle has raged between scattered bands of 
men, armed with the latest weapons, seeking each other dawn after dawn, fighting 
to the death throughout the day and then often long into the night. Here was a 
battle which turned out very differently from what was foreseen. All was dis- 
persed and confused. Much depended on the individual soldier and the [5925] 
junior officer. Much, but not all ; because this battle would have been lost on 
24th November if General Auchinleck had not intervened himself, changed tlie 
command and ordered the ruthless pressure of the attack to he maintained 
without regard to risks or consequences. But for this robust decision we should 
now be back on the old line from which we had started, or perhaps further back. 
Tobruk would possibly have fallen, and Rommel might he marching towards the 
Nile. Since then the battle has declared itself. Cyrenaica has been regained. 
It has still to be held. We have not succeeded in destroying Rommel's army, but 
nearly two-thirds of it are wounded, prisoners or dead. 

Perhaps I may give the figures to the House. In this strange, sombre battle of 
the desert, where our men have met the enemy for the first time — I do not say 
in every respect, because there are some things which are not all that we had 
hoped for — but, upon the whole, have met him with equal weapons, we have lost 
in killed, wounded and captured about 18,000 ofticers and men, of whom the 
greater part are British. We have in our possession 36,500 prisoners, including 
many wounded, of whom 10,500 are Germans. We have killed and wounded at 
least 11,500 Germans and 13,000 Italians — in all a total, accounted for exactly, of 
61,000. There is also a mass of enemy wounded, some of whom have been evacu- 
ated to the rear or to the Westwai'd — I cannot tell how many. Of [5926] 
the forces of which General Rommel disposed on ISth November, little more than 
one-third now remain, while 852 German and Italian aircraft have been destroyed 
and 336 German and Italian tanks. During this battle we have never had in 
action more than 45,000 men, against enemy forces — if they could be brought to 
bear — much more than double as strong. Therefore, it seems to me that this 
heroic, epic struggle in the desert, though tliere have been many local reverses and 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2227 

many obbs and flows, has tested our manhood in a searching fashion and has 
l>roved not only that our men can die for King and country — everyone knew 
(hat — but that they can kill. 

I cannot tell what the position at the present moment is on the Western front 
in Cyrenaica. We have a very daring and skillful opponent against us and, may 
1 say across the havoc of war, a great General. He has certainly received rein- 
forcements. Another battle is even now in progress, and I make it a rule never 
lo try and prophesy beforehand how battles will turn out. I always rejoice that 
I have made that rule. (An Hon. Member: "What about the SkaggerakV") That 
was hardly a battle. Naturally, one does not say in a case like that that we have 
not a chance, because that is apt to be encouraging to the enemy and depre.ssing 
to our own friends. In the general upshot, the fact remains that, whereas a .year 
ago the Germans were telling all the neutrals that they would be in Suez by May, 
when some people talked of the iwssibility of a German [5927] descent 
ui)on Assiut, and many people were afraid that Tobruk would be stormed and 
others feared for the Nile Valley, Cairo, Alexandria and the Canal, we have con- 
ducted an effective offensive against the enemy and hurled him backward, inflict- 
ing upon him incomparably more — well, 1 should not say incomparably, because 
I have .iust given the comparison, but far heavier losses and damage — than we 
have suffered ourselves. Not only has he lost three times our losses on the 
battlefield, approximately, but the blue waters of the Mediterranean have, thanks 
to the enterprise of the Royal Navy, our submarines and Air Force, drowned a 
large number of the reinforcements which have been continually sent. This 
process has had further important successes during the last few days. Whether 
you call it a victory or not, it must be dubbed up to the present, although II 
will not make any promises, a highly profitable transaction, and certainly is an 
episode of war most glorious to the British, South African, New Zealand, Indian, 
Free French and Polish soldiers, sailors and airmen who have played their part 
in it. The prolonged, stubborn, steadfast and successful defence of Tobruk 
by Australian and British troops was an essential preliminary, over seven bard 
months, to any success which may have been achieved. 

Let us see what has happened on the other flank, the Northern flank, of the 
Nile Valley. What has happened to Palestine, Syria, Iraq and Persia? There we 
must thank Russia. [5928] There the valour of the Russian Armies has 
warded off dangers which we saw and which we undoubtedly ran. The Caucasus 
and the precious oilfields of Baku, the great Anglo-Persian oilfields, are denied' to 
the enemy. Winter has come. Evidently we have the time to strengthen still fur- 
ther our Forces and organisations in those regions. Therefore, sir, I present to 
you, in laying the whole field open and bare and surveying it in all its parts, for 
all are related, a situation in the Nile Valley, both West and East, incomparably 
easier than anything we have ever seen, since we were deserted by the French Bor- 
deaux-Vichy Government and were set upon by Italy. The House will not fail 
to discern the agate points upon which this vast improvement has turned. It is 
only by the smallest margin that we have succeeded so far in beating Rommel in 
Cyrenaica and destroying two-thirds of his forces. Every tank, every aircraft 
squadron was needed. It is only by the victories on the Russian flank on the 
Black Sea coast that we have been spared the overrunning of all those vast lands 
from the Levant to the Caspian, which in turn give access to India, Persia, the 
Persian Gulf, the Nile Valley and the Suez Canal. 

I have told the House the Story of these few months, and Hon. Members 
will see from it bow narrowly our resources have been strained and by what a 
small margin and by what st:rokes of fortune — for which we claim no credit — 
we have \5929] survived — so far. Where should we have been, I wonder, 
if we had yielded to the clamor which was so loud three or four months ago that 
we should invade France or the Low Countries? We can still see on the walls 
the inscription. "Second Front Now." Who did not feel the appeal of that? 
But imagine what our position would have been if we had yielded to this 
vehement temptation. Every ton of our shipping, every flotilla, every aeroplane, 
the whole strength of our Army would be committed and would be fighting for 
life on the French shores or on the shores of the Low Countries. All these' 
troubles of the Far East and the Middle East might have sunk to insignificance 
compared with the question of another and far worse Dunkirk. 

Here, let me say, I should like to pay my tribute to one who has gone from 
us since I left this country, Mr. Lees-Smith, who. I remember, spoke with so 
much profound wisdom on this point at a moment when many opinions were 
in flux about it. His faithful, selfless and wise conduct of the important work 



2228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Which he discharged in this House was undoubtedly of great assistance to us 
nil, not only to the Government but to us all, in the various stages of the war. 
His memory as a distinguished Parliamentarian will long find an honored 
place In the recollection of tliose who had the fortune to he his colleagues. 
■ Sometimes things can be done by saying, "Yes," and sometimes things can be 
done by saying "No." Yet I suppose there [5930] are some of those who 
were vocal and voluble, and even claimant, for a second front to be opened in 
France, w;ho are now going to come up bland and smiling and ask why it 
is that we have not ample forces in Mala.ya, Burma, Borneo and the Celebes. 
There are times when so many things happen, and happen so quickly, and time 
seems to pass in such a way that you can neither say it is long or short, that 
it is easy to forget what you have said three months before. You may fail to 
connect it with what you are advocating at the particular moment. Throughout 
a long and variegated Parliamentary life this consideration has led me to try 
and keep a watchful eye on that danger myself. You never can tell. There 
are also people who talk and bear themselves as if they had prepared for this 
war with great armaments and long, careful preparation. But that is not true. 
In two and a half years of fighting we have only just managed to keep our 
heads above water. When I was called upon to be Prime Minister, now nearly 
two years ago, there were not many applicants for the job. Since then, perhaps, 
the market has improved. In spite of the shameful negligence, gross muddles, 
blatant incompetence, complacency, and lack of organising power which are 
daily attributed to us — and from which chidings we endeavor to profit— we 
are beginning to se our way through. It looks as if we were in for a very bad 
time, but provided we all stai-t together, and provided we throw in the last 
spasm of our strength, it [5931] also looks, more than it ever did before, as 
if we were going to win. 

While facing Germany and Italy here and in the Nile Valley we have never 
had any power to provide effectively for the defence of the Far East. My 
whole argument so far has led up to that point. It may be that this or that 
might have been done which was not done, but we have never been able to 
provide effectively for the defence of the Far East against an attack by Japan. 
It has been the policy of the Cabinet at almost all costs to avoid embroilment 
with Japan until we were sure that the United States would also be engaged. 
We even had to stoop, as the House will remember, when we were at our very 
Weakest point, to closf the Burma Road for some months. I remember that 
some of our present critics were very angry about it, but we had to do it. 
There never has been a moment, there never could have been a moment, when 
Great Britain or the British Empire, single-handed, could fight Germany and 
Italy, could wage the Battle of Britain, the Battle of the Atlantic and the Battle 
of the Middle East — and at the same time stand thoroughly prepared in Burma, 
the Malay Peninsula, and generally in the Far East against the impact of a' 
vast military Empire like Japan, with more than 70 mobile divisions, the third 
navy in the world, a great air force and the thrust of SO or 00 millions of hardy, 
warlike Asiatics. If we had started to scatter our forces over these immense 
areas in the [5932] Far East, we should have been ruined. If we had 
moved large armies of troops urgently needed on the war fronts to regions 
which were not at war and might never be at war we should have been alto- 
gether wrong. We should have cast away the chance, which has now become 
something more than a chance, of all of us emerging safely from the terrible 
plight in which we have been plunged. 

We therefore have lain — I am putting it ns bluntly as I can — for nearly two 
years under the threat of an attack by Japan with which we had no means of 
coping. But as time has passed the mighty United States, under the leader- 
ship of President Roosevelt, from reasons of its own interest and safety but 
also out of chivalrous regard for the cause of freedom and democracy, has 
drawn ever nearer to the confines of the struggle. And now that the blow 
has fallen it does not fall on us alone. On the contrary, it falls upon united 
forces and unified nations, which are unquestionably capable of enduring the 
struggle, of retrieving the losses and of preventing another such stroke ever 
being deliverpd again. 

There is an arsrument with which I will deal as I pass along to sursue my 
theme. It is said by some. "If only you had organised the munitions production 
of this country properly and had had a Minister of Production (and that is not 
a question which should be dogmatised upon either way) it would have made 
evervthing all right. There would have been [5983] enough for all needs. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2229 

We should have had enough supplies for Russia, enough well-equipped squadrons 
and divisions to defend the British Islands, to sustain the Middle East and to 
arm the Far East effectively." But that is really not true. As a matter of 
fact, our munitions output is gigantic, has for some time been very large indeed, 
and it is bounding up in a most remarkable manner. In the last year, 1941, al- 
though we were at war in so many theatres and on so many fronts, we have 
produced more than double the munitions equipment of the United States, which 
was arming heavily, though of course a lap behind on the road. This condition 
will naturally be rapidly removed as the full power of American industry come 
into full swing. But, Sir, in the last six months, thanks to the energies of Lord 
Beaverbrook and the solid spadework done by his predecessors and the passage 
of time — he particularly asks me to say that — (An Hon. Member : "Who didV") — 
Lord Beaverbrook ; I should have said it anyway — our munitions output has 
risen in the following respects : We are producing more than twice as many 
far more complicated guns every month than we did in the peak of 1917-18 war 
period, and the curve is rising. The guns are infinitely more complicated. Tank 
production has doubled in the last six months. Small arms production is more 
than twice what it was six months ago. Filled rounds of ammunition have 
doubled in the last six months. 1 could go on with the catalogue, but these are 
not doublings [5.93^] from early very small totals, they are doublings from 
the totals we boasted about, as far as we dared six months ago. There has been 
an immense leap forward. In aircraft production there is a steady increase not 
only in the numbers but also in the size and quality of the aircraft, though I 
must say there has not been all the increase which I had hoped for. 

But all this has nothing to do with the preparations it was open to us to make 
in Malaya and Burma and generally in the Far East. The limiting factor has 
been transport, even assuming we had wished to take this measure and had had 
this great surplus. From the time that this present Government was formed, 
from the moment it was formed I may say, every scrap of shipping we could 
draw away from our vital supply routes, every U-boat escort we could divert from 
the Battle of the Atlantic, has been busy to the utmost capacity to carry troops, 
tanks and munitions from this Island to the East. There has been a ceaseless 
flow, and as for aircraft they have not only been moved by sea but by every route, 
some very dangerous and costly routes to the Eastern battlefields. The decision 
was taken, as I have explained, to make our contribution to Russia, to try to beat 
Rommel and to form a stronger front from the Levant to to Caspian. It fol- 
lowed from that decision tliat it was in our power only to make a moderate and 
partial provision in the Far East against the hypothetical danger of a [5935] 
Japanese onslaught. Sixty thousand men, indeed, were concentrated at Singa- 
pore, but priority in modern aircraft, in tanks, and in anti-aircraft and anti-tank 
artillery was accorded to the Nile Valley. 

For this decision in its broad stagetic aspects, and also in its diplomatic 
policy in regard to Russia, I take the fullest i>ersonal responsibility. If we 
have handled our resources wrongly, no one is so much to blame as me. If 
we have not got large modern air forces and tanks in Burma and Malaya 
tonight no one is more accountable than I am. Why then should I be called 
upon to pick out scapegoats, to throw the blame on generals or airmen or 
sailors? Why, then, should I be called upon to drive away loyal and trusted 
colleagues and friends to appease the clamour of certain sections of the British 
and Australian Press, or in order to take the edge off our reverses in Malaya 
and the Far East, and the punishment which we have yet to take there? I would 
be ashamed to do such a thing at such a time, and if I were capable of doing 
it, believe me, I should be incapable of rendering this country or this House 
any further service. 

I say that without in the slightest degree seeking to relieve myself from 
my duties and responsibility to endeavour to make continual improvements in 
Ministerial positions. It is the duty of every Prime Minister to the House, 
but we have to be quite sure that they are improvements in every case, and 
[5936] not only in every case but in the setting. I could ,not possibly 
descend to, as the German radio repeatedly credits me with, an attempt to 
get out of difficulties in which I really bear the main load by offering up scape- 
goats to public displeasure. Many people, many very well-meaning people, begin 
their criticisms and articles by saying, "Of course, we are all in favour of the 
Prime Minister because he has the people behind him. But what about the 
muddles made by this or that Department; what about that general or this 
Minister?" But I am the man that Parliament and the nation have got to 



2230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

blame for the general way in which they are served, and I cannot serve them 
effectively unless, in spite of all that has gone wrong, and that is going to go 
wrong, I have their trust and faithful aid. 

I must linger for a moment on our political affairs, because we are conducting 
the war on the basis of a full democracy and a free Press, and that is an 
attempt which has not been made before in such circumstances. A variety of 
attacks are made upon the composition of the Government. It is said that it 
is formed upon a party and political basis. But so is the House t>f Commons. 
It is silly to extol the Parliamentary system and then, in the next breath, to 
say, "Away with party and away with politics." From one quarter I am told 
that the leaders of the Labour party ought to be dismissed from the Cabinet. 
This would be a return to party Government pure and simple. From [5937] 
opposite quarters it is said that no one who approved of Munich should be 
allowed to hold office. To do that would be to cast a reflection upon the great 
majority of the nation at that time, and also to deny the strongest party in 
the House any proportionate share in the National Government, which again, 
in turn, might cause inconvenience. Even my right hon. Friend the leader of 
the Liberal party— (An HON. MEMBER: "Who is he?")— the Secretary of 
State for Air, whose help today I value so much and with whom, as a lifelong 
friend, it is a pleasure to work, even he has not escaped unscathed. If I were 
to show the slightest weakness in dealing with these opposite forms of criticism, 
not only should I deprive myself of loyal and experienced colleagues, but I 
should destroy the National Govermnent and rupture the war-time unity of 
Parliament itself. 

Other attacks are directed against individual Ministers. I have been urged to 
make an example of the Chancellor of the Duchy of liaucaster, who is now return- 
ing from his mission in the Far East. Thus, he would be made to bear the blame 
for our misfortunes. The position of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 
at the head of the Council which he had been instructed to form at Singapore 
was rendered obsolete by the decision which I reached with the President of the 
United States to set up a Supreme Commander for the main fighting zone in the 
Far East. The whole conception of a Supreme [5938] Commander is that, 
under the direction of the Governments he serves, he is absolute master of all 
authorities in the region assigned to him. This would be destroyed if political 
functionaries representing the various nations — for it is not only this country 
which would be represented ; others would have to be represented as well as ours — 
were clustered around him. The function of the Chancellor of the Duchy was 
therefore exhausted by the appointment of General Wavell to the Supreme Com- 
mand. I may say that regret was expressed at his departure by the New Zealand 
and Australian Governments, and still more by the Council he formed at Singa- 
pore, which, in a localised and subordinate form, it has been found necessary to 
carry on. When I am invited, under threats of unpopularity to myself or the 
Government, to victimise the Chancellor of the Duchy, and throw him to the 
wolves, I say to those who make this amiable suggestion, I can only say to them, 
"I much regret that I am unable to gratify your wishes," — or words to that effect. 

The outstanding question upon which the House should form its judgment for 
the purposes of the impending Division is whether His Majesty's Government were 
right in giving a marked priority in the distribution of the forces and equipment 
we could send overseas, to Russia, to Libya, and, to a lesser extent, to the Levant- 
Caspian danger front, and whether we were right in accepting, for the time being, 
a far lower [5939] standard of forces and equipment for the Far East 
than for these other theatres. The first obvious fact is that the Far Eastern 
theatre was at peace and that the other theatres were in violent or imminent war. 
It would evidently have been a very improvident use of our limited resources — as 
I pointed out earlier — if we had kept large masses of troops and equipment spread 
about the immense areas of the Pacific or in India, Burma and the Malay Penin- 
sula, standing idle, month by month and perhaps year by year, without any war 
occurring. Thus, we should have failed in our engagements to Russia, which has 
meanwhile stjuck such staggering blows at the German Army, and we should have 
lost the battle in Cyrenaica, which we have not yet won. and we might now be 
fighting defensively well inside the Egyptian frontier. There is the question on 
which the House should make up its mind. We had not the resources to meet 
all the perils and pressures that came upon us. 

But this question, serious and large as it is by itself cannot be wholly decided 
without some attempt to answer the further question — what was the likelihood 
of the Far Eastern theatre being thrown into war by a Japanese attack ? I have 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2231 

explained how very delicately we walked, and how painful it was at all times, 
how very careful I was every time that we should not be exposed single-handed 
to this onslaught which we were utterly incapable of meeting. But it seemed 
irrational [59-^0] to suppose that in the last six months — which is what I 
am principally dealing with — the Japanese, having thrown away their oppor- 
tunity of attacking us in the autumn of 1940, when we were so much weaker, 
so much less well-armed, and all alone, should at this period have plunged into 
a desperate struggle against the combined Forces of the British Empire and 
the United States. Nevertheless, nations, like individuals, commit irrational 
acts, and there were forces'^t work in Japan, violent, murderoiis, fanatical and 
explosive forces, which no one could measure. 

[5941] On the other hand, the probability, since the Atlantic Conference, at 
which I discussed these matters with Mr. Roosevelt, that the United States, even 
if not herself attacked, would come into a war in the Far East, and thus make 
linal victory sure, seemed to allay some of these anxieties. That ex:pectation 
had not been falsified by the events. It fortified our British decision to use our 
limited resources on the actual fighting fronts. As time went on, one had 
greater assurance that if Japan ran amok in the Pacific, we should not fight 
alone. It must also be remembered that over the whole of the Pacific scene 
brooded the great power of the United States Fleet, concentrated at Hawaii. 
Tt seemed very unlikely that Japan would attempt the distant invasion of the 
Malay Peninsula, the assault upon Singapore, and the attack upon the Dutch 
East Indies, while leaving behind them in their rear this great American Fleet. 
However to strengthen the position as the situation seemed to intensify we sent 
the Prince of Wales and the Repulse to form the spear-point of the considerable 
battle forces which we felt ourselves at length able to form in the Indian Ocean. 
We reinforced Singapore to a considerable extent and Hong Kong to the extent 
which we were advised would be sufficient to hold the island for a long time. 
Besides this in minor ways we took what precautions were open to us. On 7th 
December the Japanese, by a sudden attack, delivered while their envoys were still 
negotiating at Washington, crippled for the [55^2] time being the Ameri- 
can Pacific Fleet, and a few days later inflicted very heavy naval losses on us 
by sinking the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. 

For the time being, therefore, naval superiority in the Pacific and in the 
Malaysian Archipelago has passed from the hands of the two leading naval 
Powers into the hands of Japan. How long it will remain in Japanese hands is 
a matter on which I do not intend to speculate. But at any rate it will be long 
enough for Japan to inflict very heavy and painful losses on all of the United 
Nations who have establishments and possessions in the Far East. The Japanese 
no doubt will try to peg out claim and lodgments over all this enormous area, 
and to organise, in the interval before they lose command of the seas, a local 
command of the air which will render their expulsion destruction a matter of 
considerable time and exertion. 

Here I must point out a very simple strategic truth. If there are 1,000 islands 
and 100 valuable military key points and you put 1,000 men on every one of 
them or whatever it may be, the Power that has the command of the sea and 
carries with it the local command of the air, can go around to every one of these 
places in turn, destroy or capture their garrisons, ravage and pillage them, 
ensconce themselves wherever they think fit, and then pass on with their circus 
to the next place. It would be vain to suppose that such an attack could be met 
by local defence. You might disperse 1,000,000 men over these [5943] im- 
mense areas and yet only provide more prey to the dominant Power. On the 
other hand, these conditions will be reversed when the balance of sea power 
and air power changes, as it will surely change. 

Such is the phase of the Pacific war into which we have now entered. I cannot 
tell how long it will last. All I can tell the House is that it will be attended 
by very heavy punishment which we shall have to endure, and that presently, 
if we persevere, as I said just now about the Russian front, the boot will be on 
the other leg. That is why we should not allow ourselves to get rattled because 
this or that place has been captured, because, once the ultimate power of the United 
Nations has been brought to bear, the opposite process will be brought into play, 
and will move forward remorselessly to the final conclusion, provided that we 
persevere, provided that we fight with the utmost vigour and tenacity, and pro- 
vided, above all, that we remain united. 

Here I should like to express, in the name of the House, my admiration of the 
splendid courage and quality with which the small American Army, under General 



4 

2232 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

MacArthur, has resisted brilliantly for so long, at desperate odds, the hordes of 
Japanese who have been hurled against it by superior air power and superior 
sea power. Amid our own troubles, we sent out to General MacArthur and his 
soldiers, and also to the Filipinos, who are defending their native soil with vigour 
and [59f{Jt\ courage, our salute across those wide spaces which we and 
the United States will presently rule again together. Nor must I fail to pay 
a tribute, in the name of the House, to the Dutch, who, in the air and with their 
submarines, their surface craft, and their solid fighting troops, are playing one 
of the main parts in the struggle now going on in the Malaysian Archipelago. 

We have to turn our eyes for a moment to the hard-fought battle which is 
raging upon the approaches to Singapore and in the Malay Peninsula. I am 
not going to make any forecast about that now, except that it will be fought to 
the last inch by the British, Australian and Indian troops, which are in the line 
together, and which have been very considerably reinforced. The Hon. Member 
for the Eye Division of Suffolk (Mr. Granville) had a very sound military idea 
the other day, when he pointed out the importance of sending reinforcements 
of aircraft to assist our ground forces at Singapore and in Burma. I entirely 
agree with him. In fact, we anticipated his suggestion. Before I left for the 
United States, on 12th December, the moment, that is to say, when the situation 
in Singapore and Pearl Harbor had disclosed itself, it was possible to make a 
swift redistribution of our Forces. The moment was favourable. General 
Auchinleck was making headway in Cyrenaica ; the Russian front not only stood 
unbroken but had begun the advance in a mignificent counter-attack, and we were 
able to order a large number of measures, which there is no need to elaborate, 
but which will [5.9^5] be capable of being judged by their i-esults as the 
next few weeks and the next few months unfold in the Far East. 

When I reached the United States, accompanied by our principal officers and 
large technical staffs, further important steps were taken by the President, with 
my cordial assent, and with the best technical advise we could obtain, to move 
from many directions everything that ships could carry and all air power that 
could be flown transported and serviced to suitable points. The House would be 
very ill-advised to suppose that the seven weeks which have passed since 7th 
December have been weeks of apathy and indecision for the English-speaking 
world. Odd as it may seem qiiite a lot has been going on. But we must not 
nourish or indulge light and extravagant hopes or suppose that the advantages 
which t"he enemy have gained can soon or easily be taken from him. However, 
to sum up the bad and the good together, in spite of the many tragedies past 
and future, and with all pity for those who have suffei'ed and will suffer, I must 
profess my profound thankfulness for what has happened throughout the whole 
world in the last two months. 

I now turn for a short space — I hope I am not unduly wearying the House, 
but I feel that the war has become so wide that there are many aspects that 
must be regarded — to the question of the organization, the international, inter- 
Allied or inter-United Nations organization, which must be developed to meet 
the fact that we are a vast confederacy. To hear some [5496] people talk, 
however, one would think that the way to win the war is to make sure that every 
Power contributing armed forces and every branch of these armed forces is 
represented on all the councils and organizations which have to be set up, and 
that everybody is fully consulted before anything is done. That is in fact the 
most sure way to lose a war. You have to be aware of the well-known danger 
of having "more harness than horse," to quote a homely expression. Action to be 
successful must rest in the fewest number of hands possible. Nevertheless, now 
that we are working in the closest partnership with the United States and have 
also to consider our Alliance with Russia and with China, as well as the bonds 
which units us with the rest of the 26 United Nations and with our Dominions, 
it is evidence that our system must become far more complex than heretofore. 

I had many discussions with the President upon the Anglo-American war 
direction, especially as it affects this war against Japan, to which Russia is 
not yet a party. The physical and geogi-aphical difficulties of finding a common 
working centre for the leaders of nations and the great staffs of nations which 
cover the whole globe are insuperable. Whatever plan is made will be open 
to criticism and many valid objections. There is no solution that can be found 
where the war can be discussed from day to day fully by all the leading military 
and political authorities concerned. I have, however, arranged [59-}7] 
with President Roosevelt that there should be a body in Washington called the 
Combined Chiefs of the Staff Committee, consisting of the three United States 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2233 

Chiefs of the Staff, men of the highest distinction, and three high oflScers 
representing and acting under tlie general instructions of the Britisli Chiefs of 
tlie Staff Committee in London. This body will advise the President, and in 
the event of divergence of view between the British and Amerjican Chiefs of 
the Staff or their representatives, the difference must be adjusted by personal 
agreement between him and me as representing our respective countries. We 
must also concert together the closest association witli Premier Stalin and 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek as well as with the rest of the Allied and 
Associated Powers. We shall, of course, also remain in the closest touch with 
one anotlier on all important questions of policy. 

In order to wage the war effectively against Japan, it was agreed that I should 
propose to those concerned the setting-up of a Pacific Council in London, on the 
Ministerial plane, comprising Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the 
Dutch Government. Assisted by the British Chiefs of the Staff and the 
great stall's organisations beneath them, I was to try to form and focus a united 
view. This would enable the British Commonwealth to act as a wliole and 
form part of plans — plans which are at present far advanced- — for collaboration 
at the appropriate levels in tlie spheres of defence, foreign affairs [55^8] 
and supply. Thus the united view of the British Commonwealth and the Dutch 
would be transmitted, at first, on the Chiefs of the Staff level, to the combined 
Chiefs of the Staff Committee sitting in Washington. In the event of differences 
between the members of the Pacific Council in London, dissentient opinions 
would also be transmitted. In the event of differences between the London and 
Washington bodies, it would be necessary for the President and me to reach 
an agreement. I must point out that it is necessary for everybody to reach 
an agreement, for nobody can compel anybody else. 

The Dutch Government, which is seated in London, might be willing to agree 
to this arrangement, but the Australian Government desired and the New 
Zealand Government preferred that this Council of the Pacific should be in 
Washington, where it would work alongside the Combined Chiefs of the Staff 
Committee. I have therefore transmitted the views of these two Dominions 
to the President, but I have not yet received, nor do I expect for a few days to 
receive, his reply. I am not, therefore, in a position to-day to announce, as I 
had booed, the definite and final arrangements for the Pacific Council. 

I should like to say, however, that underlying these structural arrangements 
are some very practical and simple facts upon which there is full agreement. 
The Supreme Commander has assumed control of the fighting areas in the South- 
west Pacific called the "A. B. D. A." area— A. B. D. A.— called after the [59Ji9] 
countries which are involved, not the countries which are in the area but the 
countries which are involved in that area, namely, America, Bi'itain, Dutch and 
Australasia. We do not propose to burden the Supreme Commander with fre- 
quent instructions. He has his general orders, and he has addressed himself 
with extraordinary buoyancy to his most difficult task, and President Roosevelt 
and I, representing, for my part, the British Government, are determined that 
he shall have a chance and a free hand to carry it out. The action in the Straits 
of Macassar undertaken by forces assigned to this area apparently has had very 
considerable success, of the full extent of which I am not yet advised. The 
manner in which General Wavell took up his task, the speed with which he 
has flown from place to place, the telegrams which he has sent describing the 
methods by which he was grappling with the situation and the forming of the 
central organism which was needed to deal with it — all this has made a most 
favourable impression upon the high officers, military and political, whom I met 
in the United States. This is all going on. Our duty, upon which we have been 
constantly engaged for some time, is to pass reinforcements of every kind, espe- 
cially air, into the new war zone, from every quarter and by every means, with 
the utmost speed. 

In order to extend the system of unified command which has been set up in 
the "A. B. D. A." area — that is to say, the South-West Pacific — where the actual 
fighting is going on, [5950] in order to extend that system) to all areas 
in which the forces of more than one of the United Nations — because that is 
the term we have adopted — will be operating, the Eastwai'd approaches to Aus- 
tralia and New Zealand have been styled the Anzac area, and are under United 
States command, the communications between the Anzac area and America are 
a United States responsibility, while the communications across the Indian Ocean 
and from India remain a British responsibility. All this is now working, while 
the larger constitutional, or semi-constitutional, discussions and structural ar- 



2234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

rangements are being elaborated by telegrams passing to and fro between so 
many Governments. All this is now working fully and actively from hour to 
hour, and it must not, therefore, be supposed that any necessary military action 
has been held up pending the larger structural arrangements which I have 
mentioned. 

Now I come to the question of our own Empire or Conmionwealth of Nations. 
Tlie fact that Australia and New Zealand are in the immediate danger zone 
reinforces the demand' that they should be represented in the War Cabinet of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. We liave always been ready to form an 
Imperial War Cabinet containing the Prime Ministers of the four Dominions. 
Whenever any of them have come here they have taken their seats at our 
table as a matter of course. Unhappily, it has not been possible to get them all 
here together at once. General Smuts may not be able to come over from South 
Africa, [5951] and Mr. MacKenzie King could unfortunately stay only 
for a short time. But Mr. Fraser was with us, and it was a great pleasure to 
have him, and we had a three months' visit from Mr. Menzies, which was also a 
great success, and we were all very sorry when his most valuable knowledge 
of our affairs and the war position, and his exceptional abilities, were lost. For 
the last three months we have had Sir Earle Page representing the Common- 
wealth Government at Cabinets when war matters and Australian matters were 
under discussion and also, in similar circumstances upon the Defence Committee. 
As a matter of fact this has always been interpreted in the most broad ami 
elastic fashion. The Australian Government have now asked specifically, "that 
an accredited representative of the Commonwealth Government should have 
the right to be heard in the War Cabinet in the formulation and the direction 
of policy." We have of course agreed to this. New Zealand feels bound to ask 
for similar representation, and the same facilities will of course be available to 
Canada and South Africa. The presence at the Cabinet table of Dominion 
representatives who have no power to take decisions and can only report to 
their Governments evidently raises some serious problems but none, I trust. 
which cannot be got over with good will. It must not, however, be supposed 
that in any circumstances the presence of Dominion representatives for certain 
purposes could in any way affect the collective responsibility of liis Majesty's 
Servants in Great [5952] Britain to Crown and Parliament. 

I am sure we all sympathise with our kith and kin in Australia now that 
the shield of British and American sea power has, for the time being, been 
withdrawn from them so unexpectedly and so tragically and now that hostile 
bombers may soon be within range of Australian shores. We shall not put any 
obstacle to the return of the splendid Australian troops who volunteered for 
Imperial service to defend their own homeland or whatever part of the Pacific 
theatre may be thought most expedient. We are taking many measures in con- 
junction with the United States to increase the security of Australia and New 
Zealand and to send them reinforcements, arms and equipment by the shortest 
and best routes. I always hesitate to express opinions about the future, because 
things turn out so very oddly, but I will go so far as to say that it may be that 
the Japanese, whose game is what I may call "to make hell while the sun shines," 
are more likely to occupy themselves in securing their rich prizes in the Philip- 
pines, the Dutch East Indies and the Malayan Archipelago and in seizing island 
bases for defensive purposes for the attack which is obviously coming towards 
them at no great distance of time— a tremendous onslaught which will charac- 
terise the future in 1942 and 1943. (An HON. MEMBER: "1944 and 1045?") 
No, I do not think we can stretch our views beyond those dates, but, again, we 
must see how we go. I think they are much more likely to be arranging them- 
selves in those dis- [595S] tricts which they have taken or are likely to 
take than to undertake a serious mass invasion of Australia. That would seem 
to be a very ambitious overseas operation for Japan to undertake in the pre- 
carious and limited interval before the British and American navies regain — 
as they must certainly regain, through the new building that is advancing, and 
for other reasons — the unquestionable command of the Pacific Ocean. However, 
everything in human power that we can do to help Australia, or persuade America 
to do, we will do; and meanwhile I trust that reproaches and recriminations 
of all kinds will be avoided, and that if any are made, we in Britain will not 
take part in them. 

Let me, in conclusion, return to the terrific changes which have occurred in 
our affairs during the last few months and particularly in the last few weeks. 
We have to consider the prospects of the war in 1942 and also in 1943, and, as 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2235 

I said just now, it is not useful to look further ahead than that. The moment 
that the United States was set upon and attacked by Japan, Germany, and Italy — 
that is to say, within a few days of December 7, 1941 — I was sure it was my 
duty to cross the Atlantic and establish the closest possible relationship with the 
President and Government of the United States, and also to develop the closest 
contacts, personal and professional, between the British Chiefs of Staff and 
their trans-Atlantic deputies, and with the American Chiefs of Staff who were 
there to meet them. 

[59o-'f] Havini? crossed the Atlantic, it was plainly my duty to visit the 
great Dominion of Canada. The House will have read with admiration and 
deep interest the speech made by the Prime Minister of Canada yesterday on 
Canada's great and growing contribution to the common cause in men, in money, 
and in materials. A notable part of that contribution is the financial offer which 
the Canadian Government have made to this country. The sum involved is 
one billion Canadian dollars, about £225,000,000. I know the House will wish 
nie to convey to the Government of Canada our lively appreciation of their timely 
and most generous offer. It is unequalled in its scale in the whole history of 
the British Empire, and it is a convincing proof of the determination of Canada 
to make her maximum contribution towards the successful prosecution of the 
war. 

During those three weeks which I spent in Mr. Roosevelt's home and family, 
I established with him relations not only of comradeship, but, I think I may 
say, of friendship. We can say anything to each other, however painful. When 
we parted he wrung my hand, saying, "We will fight this through to the bitter 
end, whatever the cost may be." Behind him rises the gigantic and hitherto 
unmobilised gigantic power of the people of the United States, carrying with 
them in their life and death struggle the entire, or almost the entire. Western 
hemisphere. 

At Washington, we and our combined staffs surveyed the entire [5955] 
scene of the war, and we reached a number of important practical decisions. 
Some of them affect future operations and cannot, of course, be mentioned, but 
others have been made public by declaration or by events. The vanguard of 
an American Army has already arrived in the United Kingdom. Very consider- 
able forces are following as opportunity may serve. These forces will take 
their station in the British Isles and face with us whatever is coming our way. 
They impart a freedom of movement to all forces in the British Isles greater 
than we could otherwise have possessed. Numerous United States fighter and 
bomber squadrons will also take part in the defence of Britain and in the ever- 
increasing bombing offensive against Germany. The United States Navy is 
linked in the most intimate union with the Admiralty, both in the Atlantic and 
the Pacific. We shall plan our Naval moves together as if we were literally 
one i)eople. 

In the next place, we formed this league of 26 United Nations in which the 
principal partners at the present time are Great Britain and the British Empire, 
the United States, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics of Russia, and the 
Republic of China, together with the stout-hearted Dutch, and the representatives 
of the rest of the 26 powers. This Union is based on the principles of the At- 
lantic Charter. It aims at the destruction of Hitlerism in all its forms and 
manifestations in every corner of the globe. We will march forward together 
until every ves- [59561 tige of this villainy has been extirpated from 
the life of the world. 

Thirdly, as I have explained at some length, we addressed ourselves to the war 
against Japan and to the measures to be taken to defend Australia. New Zealand, 
the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, Burma, and India against Japanese attack 
or invasion. 

Fourthly, we have established a vast common pool of weapons and munitions, 
of raw materials and of shipping, the outline of which has been set forth in a 
series of memoranda which I have initialled with the President. I had a talk 
with him last night on the telephone, as a result of which an announcement 
has been made in the early hours of this morning in the United States, and I have 
a White Paper for fthel House which will be available, I think, in a very 
short time. Many people have been staggered by the figures of prospective Ameri- 
can output of war weapons which the President announced to Congress, and the 
Germans have affected to regard them with incredulity. I can only say that 
Lord Beaverbrook and I were made acquainted lieforehand with all the bases 
upon which these colossal programmes were founded, and that I myself heard 



2236 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

President Roosevelt confide their specific tasks to the chiefs of American industry 
and I heard these men accept their prodigious tasks and declare that they would 
and could fulfill them. Most important of all is the multiplication of our joint 
tonnage [5957] at sea. The American programmes were already vast. 
They have been increased in the proportion of 300 to nearly IGO. If they are 
completed, as completed I believe they will be, we shall be able to move across 
the ocean spaces in 1943 two, three or even four times as large armies as the 
considerable forces we are able to handle at sea at the present time. 

I expect — and I have made no secret of it — that we shall both of us receive 
severe ill-usage at the hands of the Japanese in 1942, but I believe we shall 
presently regain the naval command of the Pacific and begin to establish an 
effective superiority in the air, and then later on, with the great basic areas in 
Australasia, in India, and in the Dutch East Indies, we shall be able to set 
about our task in good style in 1943. It is no doubt true that the defeat of Japan 
will not necessarily entail the defeat of Hitler, whereas the defeat of Hitler would 
enable the whole forces of the united nations to be concentrated upon the de- 
feat of Japan. But there is no question of regarding the war in the Pacific as a 
secondary operation. The only limitation applied to its vigorous prosecution 
will be the shipping available at any given time. 

It is most important that we should not overlook the enormous contribution 
of China to this struggle for world freedom and democracy. If there is any 
lesson I have brought back from the United States that I could express in one 
word, it would be "China." That is in all their minds. When we feel the 
[5958'\ sharp military qualities of the Japanese soldiery in contact with our 
own troops, although of course very few have as yet been engaged, we must 
remember that China, ill-armed or half-ai*med, has, for four and a half years, 
single handed, under its glorious leader Chiang Kai-Shek, withstood the main fury 
of Japan. We shall pursue the struggle hand in hand with China, and do every- 
thing in our power to give them arms and supplies, which is all they need to 
vanquish the invaders of their native soil and play a magnificent part in the 
general forward movement of the United Nations. 

Although I feel the broadening swell of victory and liberation bearing us and 
all the tortured peoples onwards safely to the final goal, I must confess to feeling 
the weight of the war upon me even more than in the tremendous summer days 
of 1940. There are so many fronts which are open, so many vulnerable points 
to defend, so many inevitable misfortunes, so many shrill voices raised to take 
advantage, now that we can breathe more freely, of all the turns and twists of 
war. Therefore. I feel entitled to come to the House of Commons, whose servant I 
am, and ask them not to press me to act against my conscience and better judg- 
ment and make scapegoats in order to improve my own position, not to press 
me to do the things which may be clamovu'ed for at the moment but which will 
not help in our war effort, but, on the contrary, to give me their encouragement 
and to give me their aid. I have never ventured to predict the future. I stand 
by my original programme, blood, [5959'\ toil, tears and sweat, which is 
all I have ever offered, to which I added, five months later, "many shortcomings, 
mistakes and disappointments." But it is because I see the light gleaming be- 
hind the clouds ajid broadening on our path, that I make so bold now as to 
demand a declaration of confidence of the House of Commons as an additional 
weapon in the armoury of the united nations. 

(Whereupon, at 4:25 p. m., an adjournment was taken until 10 
a. m., Thursday, January 3, 1946.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2237 



[6960] PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



THURSDAY, JANUARY 3, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, and Fer- 
guson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, 
Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. 
Gesell and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee. 

[596 l] The Vice CiixVirman. The committee will please be in 
order. 

Does counsel have anything at this time ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I have here a letter from 
Admiral Turner dated December 26, 1945, addressed to the counsel. 
He asked to have some corrections and changes made in his testi- 
mony, in line with our practice. 

(The letter referred to follows :) 

Department of the Navy 
GENER.VL Board 
Washington MMK 

26 December 1945. 

The Honorable William D. Mitchell, 

Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation 
of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C- 
Dear General Mitchell : 

Subject: Amplication and Correction of Testimony of Admiral Richmond 
Kelly Turner, U. S. Navy, on December 21, 1945. 

Reference: (a) Volume 30 of Report of Proceedings of the Joint Committee. 
Enclosures: (A) Copies of Documents relating to reenforcement of Midvs^ay 
and Wake Islands. 

(1) CNO Secret Despatch 171450 of October 17, 1941. 

(2) CincPac Confidential Ltr. L24/VZ/(95) Serial 01825 of November 

10, 1941. 

(3) CNO Secret Despatch 270038 of November 26, 1941. 

(4) CNO Secret Despatch 270040 of November 26, 1941. 

(5) CincPac Secret Despatch 280627 of November 28, 1941. 
[59621 (6) CNO Secret Despatch 282054 of November 28, 1941. 

(7) CincPac Secret Despatch 280447 of November, 1941. 

(8) CincPac Secret Despatch 040237 of December, 1941. 

(B) Copies of photogi-aphs of OpNav Fleet Location Boards of 1 to 7 
December 1941, with explanation diagram. 
1. There are two series of questions in reference (a) to which I believe I 
unintentionally did not give clear and explicit answers; I, therefore, believe 
that my answers should be clarified. These are : 

(a) The questions from page 5444 to page 5450, relating to the employment 
of two carriers for the reenforcement of Midway and Wake Islands. Enclosure 
(A) constitutes a series of papers relating to these operations. 



2238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(b) Included in the foregoing are certain questions, from page 5444 to page 
5446, concerning information shown on the Cliief of Naval Operations' daily 
chart of ship locations. Enclosure (B) consists of photostats of tlie photo- 
graphs of the daily set-up of the chart from December 1 to December 7, 1941. 

2. You will note, from Enclosures (A) (1) and (A) (G), that the task for 
the reenforcement of Midway and Wake, with forces attached to the Pacitic 
Fleet had in October been placed entirely in the hands of the Commander in 
Chief of the Pacific [5963] Fleet, for execution at his discretion. Tlie 
Commander in Chief's plan and directive. Enclosure (A) (2), was not sent to 
Ihe Chief of Naval Operations. Therefore, the exact status of the reenforce- 
ment plan was not known in the Department until the receipt of Enclosure (A) 
(5), replied to by Enclosure (A) (6). The chief point in the clarification of 
my testimony is that the orders for the movement of reenforcements to Midway 
and Wake were issued by the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and not 
by the Chief of Naval Operations. 

3. From Enclosure (B) it will be noted that exact locations of the ships of 
the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian Area are not shown on the daily location 
charts, but only the main concentration itself. My recollection is that, though 
the Ship Movements Division had an accurate list of the ships of the concentra- 
tion, it was, not informed as to details of the deployment. I trust this informa- 
tion will serve to clarify my testimony. 

4. In addition, it is requested that the following corrections be made to other 
parts of my testimony shown in reference (a) : 

(a) Page 5321, line 21, insert the word "not" after the word "would". 

(b) Page 5342, line 6, change the words "such material" to the words "decryp- 
tion means and personnel". 

(c) Page 5344, lines 11 and 12, delete the words "and three members from the 
Army". 

(d) Page 5350, line 25, change the word "agree" to the [.1.96//] word 
"disagree". 

(e) Page 5367, line 8, delete the word "boat". 

(f) Page 5373, lines 5 and 6, delete the words "my report", and insert in their 
place the words "me mistaken". 

(g) Page 5380, line 18, replace the word "proper" with the word "preliminary", 
(h) Page 5381, lines 7 and 8, change the last sentence in the paragraph to 

read, "the only war warning sent was that on the twenty-seventh". 

Line 10, change the comma after the word "overhaul" to a iieriod. 

Change the sentence after this period to read as follows: ^'Reconnaissance 
planes can be operated over a long period of time under more severe conditions 
than he had there in Pearl Harbor or Kaneolie", replace the word "sheltered" 
with the phrase "or in partly sheltered watei's". 

(i) Page 5383, lines 6, 7, and 8, delete all after the word "Kimmel", and replace 
the deleted words with the following: "because when Admiral Richardson was 
there, the Naval Air Stations at Johnston Island and at Midway had not been 
activated". Line 9, replace the word "radii" wnth the words "air stations". 

(j) Page 5386, line 2, replace the words "the Axis" with the word "Japan". 

[5965] (k) Page 5400, line 14, insert the words "Admiral Turner" at the 

beginning of the line to show that this was an answer by the witness. 

(1) Page 5412, line 10, after the word "situation", insert the words "so far 
as possible". 

(m) Page 5415, line 5, after the word "not", insert the word "written". 

(n) Page 5416, line 7, change the word "have" to "had". 

Co) Page 5423. line 6, change the word "it" to read "we". 

(p) Page 5442, line 4, change the word "other" to read "his". 

(q) Page 5444, line l.j, change the word "have" to the word "had". 

(r) Page 5447, line 19, change the answer to read. "Correct. Planes were to 
go to Midway and Wake". 

(s) Page 5448. line 22, after the word "on" insert the words "the enemy force 
attacking". 

(t) Page 5449, in line 12, change the word "cruiser" to the word "cruisers"; 
line 17, change to read "the carriers could then be free to act on the offensive". 

(u) Page 5452. in line 11, change to read "down in the Gilbert Islands, which 
was certainly to be expected" : line 21, change the word "the" to "by", the word 
"patrol" to "patrols", and delete the word "areas". 

Respectfully, 

/S/ R. K. Turner, 
R. K. Turner, 
Admiral, U. 8. Navy. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2239 

[S966] Mr. Mitchell. Now all the enclosures lie refers to there 
were read into the evidence yesterday, so I need not describe those. 

Now paragraph 3 was written in relation to the questions I asked 
Admiral Stark as to whether he did not here in Washington know day 
by day what ships were actually in Pearl Harbor, and the enclosure 
(B) that he refers to are the ship location maps, or copies of them, 
taken from tlie Navy Department which were in use here today, and 
we will have them available if anybody wants to look at them, or the 
witness wants to refer to them. 

Now I have two other documents that counsel for Admiral Stark 
would like to put in the record now, with the idea that the subject 
of it may be subject to further examination. 

I will read the letter of May 1 for the information of the com- 
mittee. You have copies of it before you. I will ask that it be just 
spread upon the record instead of being labeled with an exhibit number. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered. 

Mr. Mitchell. "Office of the Commandant Fourteenth Naval Dis- 
trict and Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U. S. A. 

S-A16-3/A7-3 (.3 ) /ND14 

(0410) 

Secret 1 May 1941 

From : Commandant Fourteenth Naval District 

To : Chief of Naval Operations 

[5967] Subject : Air Defense of Pearl Harbor 

Reference: (a) Correspondence between the Secretaries of War and Navy on 

this subject dated 24 January 1941 and 7 February 1941. 
Inclosures : 

(A) Copies of two joint letters HHD-14ND dated 14 February 1941. 

(B) Annex No. VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (JCD-42). 

That is part of Exhibit 44 in the record. 

(C) Joint Estimate by Commander Hawaiian Air Force and Commander 

Naval Base Defense Air Force. 

1. In connection with reference (a) there are enclosed herewith for your infor- 
mation copies of the principal directives issued in cooperation vi'ith the local Army 
authorities in accordance witli whicli operation plans have been prepared, put 
into effect, and are in process of test and improvement, to provide for the joint 
defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and ships of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian 
waters against surprise raids or air attacks. 

2. Inclosure ( A) , two joint letters HHD-14ND dated 14 February 1941, initiated 
study by joint committees of Army and Navy officers of the joint problems of the 
defense which were mentioned in reference (a), and also included study of addi- 
tional problems which were raised by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. 

3. Inclosure (B). Annex No. VII of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, is 
a neM^ joint agi-eement with the local [5968} Army authorities which per- 
tains to joint security measures. Section II in particular relates to joint air 
operations. 

I will interpolate by saying that that is also in Exhibit No. 44. 

4. Inclosure (C), Joint Estimate by Commander Hawaiian Air Force and 
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, serves as the basis of joint air oper- 
ation orders which have been issued, placed in effect, and are in process of test, 
with a view to improvement in their effectiveness. 

5. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to 
phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other tham 
secret. 

6. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the 
addressee in time by the next available ofiicpr courier. The originator therefore 
authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the conti- 
nental limits of the United States. 

/s/ C. C. Bloch. 



2240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The other document which I will read into the record is dated June 
20, 1941. 

OP-30B2-BP 

(SC)A7-2(2)/FFl 
Serial 059230 

Navy Department 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 

Washingtofi, Jun 20 1941 
Secret 

From : The Chief of Naval Operations 
[5969] To: The Commandants, All Naval Districts 

The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet 

The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet 

The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet 

Subject : Joint Security Measures for the Protection of the Fleet and Pearl Har- 
bor Base. 
Enclosure: (A) Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements of the Joint 
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and 
Fourteenth Naval District. 

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information. Attention is invited to the 
importance of the problems presented in the subject matter. 

2. Transmission by registered mail within the continental limits of the United 
States is authorized. 

/s/ H. R. Stark 



Headquarters Headquarters, 

14th Naval District Hawaiian Department 

Pearl Harbor, T. H. Fort Shafteb, T. H. 

JOINT 

COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND 
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT 1939 

28 March 1941 

Annex No. VII Section VI * Joint Agreements 
Joint Secltsity Measures, Protection of Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base 
[5970] I. general 

1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the tleet 
and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air 
attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization 
for war, the following agreements, supplementary to the provisions of the 
HCF-39, (14ND-JCD-13), are adopted. These agreements are to take effect at 
once and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their 
renouncement in whole or in part. Frequent revision of these agreements to 
incorporate lessons determined from joint exercises will probably be both desir- 
able and necessary. 

II. joint aib operations 

2. When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval 
Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that 
the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such 
action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to 
make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the 
air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint opera- 
tions may be conducted in accordance with the following plans. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2241 

a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the 
tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine 
the Army bombardment [5911] strength to participate in each mission. 
With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bom- 
bardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. 
This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, 
until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control, 

h. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will 
be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense 
Officer will determine the Navy lighter strength to participate in these missions. 
With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter 
aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force 
will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for main- 
tenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situa- 
tion, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, 14th 
Naval District), and reverts to Navy control. 

c. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search opera- 
tions, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the 
tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations. 

d. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for 
the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will 
pass to the [5972] tactical control of the Navy until completion of the 
mission. 

in. JOINT COMMUNICATIONS 

3. To facilitate the prompt interchange of "information relating to friendly 
and hostile aircraft, and to provide for the transmission of orders when units 
of one service are placed under the tactical control of the other service, Army 
and Navy communications personnel will provide for the installation and opera- 
tion, within the limitations of equipment on hand or which may be procured, 
of the following means of joint communication. 

a. Joint Air-Antiaircraft page printer teletype circuit with the following 
stations : 

ARMY NAVY 

Hawaiian Air Force Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor 

18th Bombardment Wing Naval Air Station, Kaneohe 

14th Pursuit Wing Ewa Landing Field 

Hq. Prov. AA Brigade Waialupe Radio Station 

6. Joint radio circuit on 219 kilocycles with the following stations : 

ARMY NAVY 

♦Headquarters Hawaiian Department Waialupe Radio Station 

Headquarters, HSCA Brigade Senior Officer Present Afloat 

Hq. Prov. AA Brigade Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor 

Hq. Hawaiian Air Force Naval Air Station, Kaneohe 

Marine Air Group, Ewa 

♦Net Control Station. 

[5973] 18th Bombardment Wing S« ' 

14th Pursuit Wing 

0. Direct local battery telephone lines as follows : 

ARMY NAVY 

Hq. Haw. Dept. (G-3 Office) 14th Naval District 

CP, H. S. C. A. B, 14th Naval District 

CP, Pearl Harbor Gpmt (Ft. Kam) 14th Naval District 

d. Radio frequencies to be employed during joint air operations both during 
combat and joint exercises, for communication between airplanes in flight will 
be as agreed upon by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, and the 
Commander, Base Defense Air Force. 

4. To facilitate the prompt interchange of information relating to the move- 
ments of friendly and hostile naval ships and of commercial shipping. Army 
and Navy communications personnel will provide for the installation and opera- 
tion, within the limitations of equipment on hand, or which may be procured, 
of the following means of joint communication : 

a. Joint page printer teletype circuit connecting the Harbor Control Post 
with the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade loop. 

79716 — 46— pt. 5 13 



2242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

b. Joint radio circuit on 2550 kilocycles with the following stations : 

ARMY NAVY 

CP, PH Gpmt. Ft. Kamehameah Waialupe 

[597^] CP, Hon. Gpmt, Ft. Ruger, Destroyer Patrol 

Additional Stations that may be deter- Mine Sweepers 
mined to be necessary 

c. Telephone circuits as provided in par. 3 c. above. 

5. Pending the establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, the Army will 
operate an Antiaircraft Intelligence Service which, using wire and radio broad- 
casts, will disseminate information pertaining to the movements of friendly 
and hostile aircraft. It should be understood that the limitations of the AAAIS 
are such that the interval between receipt of a warning and the air attack will 
in most cases be very short. Radio broadcasts from the AAAIS will be trans- 
mitted on 900 kilocycles. All information of the presence or movements of 
hostile aircraft off-shore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels 
will be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Provisional Anti- 
aircraft Brigade. 

6. Upon establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, provision will be made 
for transmission of information on the location of distant hostile and friendly 
aircraft. Special wire or radio circuits will be made available for the use of 
Navy liaison officers, so that they may make their own evaluation of available 
information and transmit them to their respective organizations. Information 
relating to the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu 
which is secured through Navy cjiannels will be transmitted without delay to the 
Aircraft Warning Service [5975] Information Center. 

7. The several joint communications systems listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 
above, the Antiaircraft Intelligence Service, and the Aircraft Warning Service 
(after establishment) will be manned and operated during combat, alert periods, 
joint exercises which involve these communications systems, and at such other 
periods as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Depart- 
ment and the Naval Base Defense Officer. The temporary loan of surplus com- 
munication equipment by one service to the other service to fill shortages in joint 
communication nets is encouraged where practicable. Prompt steps will be taken 
by the service receiving the borrowed equipment to obtain replacements for the 
borrowed articles through their own supply channels. 

rV. JOINT ANTIAIRCRAFT MEASURES 

S. AiTivnJ and Drparturr Proccdnre, Aircraft. 

During joint exercises, alert periods, and combat and at such other times as 
the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense 
Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) may agree upon, all Army 
and Navy aircraft approaching Oahu or leaving airfields or air bases thereon will 
conform to the Arrival and Departure Procedure prescribed in Inclosure A. This 
procedure will not be modified except when a departure therefrom is essential 
due to combat (real or sinuilated during exei-cises) or due to an [5976] 
emergency. 

9. Balleon barrages. 

Reports from abroad indicate the successful development and use of balloon 
barrages by European belligerents both British and German. Although de- 
tailed information is not available, the possibilities of balloon barrages in the 
Oahu area are recognized. Further investigation and study is necessary both 
locally and by the War and Navy Departments in order to determine the 
practicability of this phase of local defen.se. 

10. Marine Corps Antiaircraft ArtiJIrry. 

When made available by the Naval Base Defense Officer, (Commandant. 14th 
Naval District), Marine Corps units manning anti-aircraft artillery present on 
Oahu will be placed under the tactical control of the Conunanding General, 
Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade. 

11. Aircraft Warning Service. 

The Army will expedite the installation and placing in operation of an Air- 
craft Warning Service. During the period prior to the completion of the AWS 
installations, the Navy, through use of RADAR and other appropriate means, 
will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2243 

V. MUNITIONS, JOINT USE OF 

12. Army and Navy Officers charged with the storage and issue of ammunition 
and bombs will exchange informa- [5.977] tion concerning the types, quan- 
tities, and locations of these munitions which are suitable for use by the other 
service. Studies will be instituted and plans prepared for the prompt transfer 
of ammunition from one service to the other. No such transfer of munitions 
will be made without specitic authority granted by the commander concerned 
for each transfer. 

VI. SMOKE SCREENS 

13. Smoke screens will not be employed for screening the Pearl Harbor — 
Hickam Field area from air attacks. 

VII. HARBOR CONTROL POST 

14. A joint harbor control post, as described in Inclosure B, will be established 
without delay. This system will be actively manned during joint exercises, alert 
periods, and combat and for such other periods as may be agreed upon by the 
Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer 
(Commandant, 14th Naval District). 

Approved: 2 April 1941. 

(Signed) C. C. Bloch 
C. C. Bloch, 
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, 

Commandant, 
Fourteenth Naval DiMriet. 
(Signed) Walter C. Short 
Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant (icneral, U. S. Army, 

Commanding, 
Ifaiaaiian Departnient. 

Inclosure A 
Annex No. VII HCF-S9; IJf ND—JCD—IS. 
[5978] Aircraft Departure, Approach, and Recof/nition Procedure 

Oahu Area 
To Be PuWshed Later 



Inclosure B 

Annex No. VII. HCF-39; Ui ND--JCD—13 

Harhor Control Post, Honolulu and Pearl Harbors, Oahu, T. H. 

To be published later. Pending publication of this inclosure, the Harbor 
Control Post will be established, as far as practicable in accordance with the 
recommendations contained in the report (dated 17 March 1941) of the Joint 
committee (Chairman, Commander H. B. Knowles, USN) convened to study 
and report upon the establishment of a Harbor Control Post and Measures for 
Communication, Coordination, and Liaison between the Inshore Patrol and the 
Harbor Defenses.) 

Mr. Mitchell, I think that is all, Mr. Chairman. 



2244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed) 

The Vice Chairman. Admiral Stark, do you have anything you want 
to present to the committee before the committee resumes questioning 
you? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I have one or two things [5979] 
which the committee asked for yesterday. 

The Vice Chairman. You may proceed. 

Admiral Stark, I would also like to comment on the so-called 
Narrative Statement of the Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investi- 
gations, which the committee had before it and mentioned yesterday. 

I am sure the committee appreciates full well that this only repre- 
sents the idea of some representative or representatives of the Navy 
Department as to what the evidence in the previous proceedings 
will show. 

I have not had an opportunity to study this statement — it is some 
700 page — but I do want to point out to the committee what, to 
my mind, is a very imporant error. There may be others. 

On page 699 of volume 2 and also on page 699 of the loose pages 
distributed yesterday, you will find the paragraph beginning: 

Althoiigh there may be some basis foi* the comment that prior to 27 November 
1941 there was a certain sameness of tone in the communication sent by 
Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, it should be noted that the message of 
November 27 vpas stronger than any message which Admiral Stark sent previ- 
ously to Admiral Kimmel. 

In this paragraph, the stateemnt goes on to quote what purports 
to be my war warning message, and at the top of [5980] page 
700 it omits a part of the concluding sentence. The last two sentences 
of the quoted material read : 

A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Appropriate measures 
against sabotage. 

This should read : 

A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Spenavo inform 
British X Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures 
against sabotage. 

As the message stands in this so-called narrative statement, it is 
so inaccurate as to be misleading. I am very anxious to have this 
error corrected if the document is to be referred to by the committee. 

Now, the committee asked me yesterday to search my correspond- 
ence to see if I found anything additional in the way of air comment 
to Admiral Kimmel, and I would like to read this as my answer. 

I have searched my personal correspondence with Admiral Kimmel 
and also the official documents I have secured from the Navy Depart- 
ment for any mention, subsequent to August 1941, of anythmg which 
would indicate my continuing concern over the possibility of an air 
attack on Pearl Harbor. 

I find no such letters in this later period. I would like to point 
out, however, that on May 1, 1941, the commandant of the Fourteenth 
Naval District — Admiral Bloch at Pearl Harbor — sent me an official 
letter on the subject of air defense of [59S1] Pearl Harbor. 
That letter referred to the correspondence between the Secretaries of 
War and Navy on the subject of the air defense of Pearl Harbor 
dated January 24, 1941, and February 7, 1941, to both of which letters 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2245 

I have referred in my statement and with wh^ch I am sure the com- 
mittee is familiar. Enclosed with the commandant's letter were 
three documents. The first does not appear pertinent here. The 
second was annex VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan 
entitled, "Joint Security Measures, Protection of Fleet and Pearl 
Harbor Base." Among its provisions were those for joint air opera- 
tions and joint antiaircraft measures, including an aircraft warning 
service. The third enclosure was a joint estimate by the commander, 
Hawaiian Air Force, and commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, 
commonly Imown before this committee as the Martin-Bellinger 
agreement. 

This estimate included a summary of the situation which reads as 
follows : 

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, un- 
certain, and varying. 

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration 
of war. 

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on 
Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western 
Pacific for a long period. 

[59S2] (d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the 
operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface 
or submarine force which initiates hostile action. 

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast 
raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our 
intelligence service. 

The estimate also included, under posible enemy action, the following 
two paragraphs : 

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by : 

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area. 

2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl 
Harbor. 

3. A combination of these two. 

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU 
would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would 
most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably 
approach inside of three hundred miles. 

A copy of the letter of May 1, 1941, had been sent to the commander 
in chief, Pacific Fleet, by the commandant. Fourteenth Naval District. 

[5983] After reviewing these documents I was impressed with 
the soundness of the arrangements arrived at between commanding 
general of the Hawaiian Department and the commandant of the 
Fourteenth Naval District with respect to joint security measures 
at Pearl Harbor. In fact, on June 20, 1941, I caused copies of the 
joint agreement to be sent to the commandants of all naval districts 
and to the commanders in chief of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic 
Fleets, and in my forwarding letter I stated : 

Attention is invited to the importance of the problems presented in the subject 
matter. 

I had shown considerable concern, as far back as the fall of 1940, 
for the security of the fleet and the base at Pearl Harbor against air 
attack, and I had caused the people in Hawaii to make an exhaustive 
investigation, which Admirals Bloch and Eichardson followed by a 
report to me at the beginning of 1941. I then caused the Secretary 
of the Navy to write to the Secretary of War, pointing out the danger 



2246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, to which the Secretary of War 
]-eplied, recognizing flie danger and setting forth the steps which 
the Army had taken and proposed to take to meet this danger. I 
further mentioned from time to time during the first half of 1941 
the matter of an air attack, and when Admiral Kimmel was here 
in May and early June I discussed fully with him the joint measures 
which were being taken, and he left with me a memorandum dated 
June 4, 1941, on this [5984] subject. 

As I said, I was so impressed with the agreement made at Pearl 
Harbor that I sent it out to all concerned, stressing the importance 
of the subject matter. 

In view of the fact that the matter of the air defense of Pearl Harbor 
had been surveyed and machinery put in action to implement the de- 
fense, and in view of the fact that the authorities at Pearl Harbor had 
arrived at a satisfactory joint arrangement for the air defense of Pearl 
Harbor, with which I was thoroughly familiar, I felt it no longer nec- 
essary to emphasize this matter in my letters. 

I assumed that having made this agreement and having agreed with 
me that the danger of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was present, the 
commander in chief, Pacific fleet, would continue his efforts to prepare 
himself to meet the possible air attack. 

I feel sure my assumption was well founded, for he wrote on October 
14, 1941, in the revision of his confidential fleet letter on the subject of 
security of fleet at base and in operating areas, as follows : 

The security of the Fleet, operating and based in the Hawaiian area, is predi- 
cated, at present, on two assumptions : 

(a) Is left out as being nonrelevant. 

(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by: (1) a surprise attack on 
ships in [5.985] Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships 
in operating area, (3) a combination of these two. 

This letter also provided, under the head "Defense against air at- 
tack," the following: 

(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, 
plus all fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu. will augment the local air defense. 

(6) The Commandant 14th Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer 
(NBDO). As such he shall: 

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against 
air attack. 

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns implaced. 

(c) Exercise supervisory control over Naval shore-based aircraft, arraiigiiig 
through Commander Patrol Wing 2 for coordination of the joint air effort by 
the Army and Navy. 

A copy of this confidential fleet letter was distributed to the Chief 
of Naval Operations. 

I had no reason to believe, from any communications which came 
to me from the Pacific Fleet, that the concern shown by the responsible 
officers there over a possible air attack on [SOSd] Pearl Harbor 
had diminished in any respect during 1941. I am certain that my 
concern had not. 

Now, the other paper, sir, I have is the table 

Mr. Mitchell. Just a minute. Do you want to add to that state- 
ment a reference to the letter of December 2. 1941, from Admiral Kim- 
mel to you in which, among other things, he made this statement : 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2247 

With respect to sending aircraft equipment farther to the west to the outlying 
islands I have fi'equently called to your attention the inadequacy of the Army 
anti-aircraft defense of Pearl Harbor, with particular reference to the shortage 
of anti-aircraft guns. So far very little has been done to improve this situation. 

Have you found any other references than those you mentioned ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. It is perfectly satisfactory to me to in- 
clude what you have just read. 

Mr. Mitchell. I remembered this one. 

Admiral Stark. We searched primarily my letters to him. 

Mr. Mitchell. Not his to you? 

Admiral Stark. Not his to me, over that period. 

Mr. Mitchell. I see. 

Admiral Stark. We have this official document of his of October. 

Mr. Mitchell. All right. 

[5987] Admiral Stark. If you would like, I will go through his 
letters to me and bring the subject up tomorrow. 

Mr. Mitchell. I wanted to be sure we had everything. 

Admiral Stark. I will search and if I find anything I will bring 
it up. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, you had another statement ? 

Admiral Stark. The other statement is the table which I was asked 
to prepare yesterday on the distribution'of our fleet. 

I think I have covered everything. It won't take but a minute to 
read it. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, before going into that I would like to 
say that we already have in the record the distribution of the fleet. 
You got that in the first exhibit in the Navy folder. 

The Vice Chairman. I think it would be well to have this clear, 
concise statement at this point in the record, because questions have 
been asked General Stark directly on this point. 

Admiral Stark. Aye, aye, sir. 

In each case, I will first read the total number of ships in the Navy : 

Battleships, 15 : Total in the Atlantic, 6. That does not include the 
North Carolina and 'Washington^ both of which were on trials. Total 
in the Asiatic, none. Total in the Pacific, nine. Total in Pearl Har- 
bor — that is, on December 7 — eight. Total sunk or put out of com- 
mission at Pearl Harbor, eight. 

\5988\ Then, under the next heading is, "Total Pacific Fleet, 
vessels undamaged : Battleships in Pearl Harbor, none." In the task 
forces, 8 and 12, which, you will recall, included the Enterprise and 
the Lexington which we discussed yesterday. 

None of those was hurt. 

Fleet vessels elsewhere in the Pacific not hurt, was one, and which 
was the Colorado^ under overhaul. 

In the next heading, I put carriers. We had a total of seven. Four 
were in the Atlantic. That excludes the Hornet^ which was on trial, 
and it includes the first of the so-called escort carriers, the converted 
Long Island. In the Asiatic Fleet, no carriers. In the Pacific Fleet, 
three. Total in Pearl Harbor, none. Total put out of commission or 
sunk at Pearl Harbor, none. And then the next, the latter column, 
shows that two of these carriers, the Lexington and the Enterprise, 
were absent in connection with distribution of planes at Wake and 
Midway, and the one other I just put down "Elsewhere." 



2248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I would like to point out that the data I am giving here is from 
Exhibit 86. I haven't gone behind that in any way. 

Heavy cruisers : The Navy had a grand total of 18 — 5 in the Atlan- 
tic ; 1 in the Asiatic ; 12 in the Pacific ; 2 were in Pearl Harbor. None 
were put out of action. None were damaged in Pearl Harbor. Six 
of them were accompanying the two task forces previously referred to. 
And elsewhere in the Pacific [5989] outside of Pearl Harbor 
were four, undamaged. 

Of light cruisers, we had 19. Eight were in the Atlantic. That 
excludes the light cruisers Jimeau, Atlantic, San Diego, and San Juan 
which had not yet joined the fleet but were in the process of completion 
and shakedown. One in the Asiatic, and that excludes the Boise, 
which was escorting in Asiatic waters but attached to the Pacific Fleet. 
Ten in the Pacific Fleet. That included the Boise. In Pearl Harbor 
at the time of the attack, six. Total sunk or put out of action, three. 
In Pearl Harbor, undamaged — which were undamaged — three. And 
vessels elsewhere in the Pacific, four. The location of those four is 
shown in detail in the Navy folder, item 5. My recollection is that 
two were in the Southeast Pacific and two were on escort work, but the 
exhibit will show that if the committee wants to follow it up. 

Destroyers, 159: 92 in the Atlantic; 13 in the Asiatic; 54 in the 
Pacific, which includes four destroyers assigned to the fourteenth 
Naval District, and does not include the destroyers which were assigned 
to the west coast naval districts. There were 30 in Pearl Harbor, of 
which three were sunk or put out of conunission, leaving undamaged 
in Pearl Harbor, 27. And there were 14 destroyers which were accom- 
panying the two task forces previously mentioned, and there were ten 
on other missions in the Pacific. 

[5990] Of submarines, we had 111. There were 158 in the Atlan- 
tic, 29 in the Asiatic Fleet ; 24 in the Pacific Fleet ; and of which the 
status of two of them was not clear. I took that from the former 
exhibit and didn't follow it up as to why it is not clear. Total in Pearl 
Harbor on December 7, five ; none of which were damaged. And else- 
where in the Pacific were 19 submarines. So that left 98 vessels of the 
Pacific Fleet undamages. And of the 51 which were in Pearl Harbor, 
14 were sunk and variously damaged from light to heavy damage. 

Now, if that table is what the committe wanted, I will let it stand 
as is. If there is anything further that is wanted I will be glad to get 
it. 

Mr. Mitchell. I suggest that the table be placed in the transcript in 
the tabulated form right at this point. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered. 

(The table referred to follows :) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2249 



[5991} 



Dispositions of Atlantic, Asiatic, and Pacific Fleets on 
Dec. 7, 1941 





Grand 
total 


Total if 

Atlantic 

Fleet 


Total in 
Asiatic 
Fleet 


Total in 
Pacific 
Fleet 


Total in 

Pearl 

Harbor 


Total 
sunk 
or put 
out of 
commis- 
sion at 
Pearl 
Harbor 


Total Pacific Fleet vessels 
undamaged 


Types 


In 

Pearl 

Harbor 


In task 
Forces 
No. 8 1 

and 
No. 122 


Fleet 
vessels 
else- 
where 
in Paci- 
fic 3 


Battleships 

Carriers . 


15 
7 
18 
19 
159 
111 


^6 

19 4 

5 
'8 
92 
58 




1 

81 

13 
29 


9 
3 

12 
»10 

10 11 54 

12 24 


8 

2 
6 
30 
5 


8 


3 
3 





2 
3 

27 
5 



2 
6 

14 



1 
I 


Heavy cruisers 

Light cruisers 

Destroyers 

Submarines __ 


4 

4 

10 

"19 






Total -- 


329 


173 


44 


112 


51 


14 


37 


22 


39 










98 





■ Task Force No. 8 included Enterprise. 

2 Task Force No. 12 included Lexington. 

3 Locations of these ships shown in detail in Navy folder, item 5. 

• Excludes North Carolina and Washington, both on trials. 
' Excludes Hornet on trials. 

• Includes Long Island, escort carrier. 

' Excludes Juneau, Atlanta, San Diego and Son Juan carried on Atlantic Fleet lists but not completed 
or commissioned. 
' Excludes Boise escorting in Asiatic waters but attached Pacific Fleet. (See (9).) 

• lucludes Boise which at that time was escorting in Asiatic waters. 

'" Includes 4 destroyers assigned Fourteenth Naval District (Pearl Harbor). 
1' Does not include destroyers assigned other west coast naval districts. 
12 Status of 2 submarines not clear. 

Source: Exhibit 86 and transcript, pp. 5880-5883. 

[6992] Mr. Mitchell. I call attention to the fact that you have 
two prior sources of information. One is the one that Congressman 
Murphy has calleci attention to, put in by Admiral Inglis, giving 
the statistics at Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December 1941, and later 
we have Exhibit 86, which tabulated the fleets in both oceans. 

The Vice Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. I might mention that the committee will note that 
this includes only major categories of vessels. I haven't got down net 
tenders and that type of ship. It is just combatant ships of major 
categories. 

The Vice Chairman. Does that complete the material you desired 
to submit to the committee at this time? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Does counsel have anything further? 

Mr. Mitchell. No. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe. 



2250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. KJEEFE. Before proceeding with the examination of Admiral 
Stark, I feel it necessary to call to the attention of the committee the 
fact that quite some time ago I made a request of counsel that he secure 
from the State Department and make available to the committee a 
memoranda prepared by Mr. Lawrence Salisbury to the Secretary of 
State, Mr. Hull, [5993] which was delivered, according to the 
information which I had, some 3 months prior to the resignation of 
Mr. Salisbury from the Far Eastern Section of the State Department. 

I had already placed in evidence some material of Dr. Hornbeck 
and my advices were that this communication from Mr. Salisbury to 
the Secretary of State contains material very material to this inquiry. 

Counsel has submitted to me this morning his correspondence with 
the State Department in respect to my request and includes a copy 
of a letter dated December 19, 1945, from Dean Acheson, Acting 
Secretary of State, in which he concludes that the Department is 
unable to comply with my request and gives as the reason that Senate 
Concurrent Resolution 27 establishing the Joint Committee on the 
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack provides that the commit- 
tee shall "make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating 
to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the attack 
made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of 
Hawaii on December 7, 1941." Mr. Acheson continues in his letter : 

The President's Order of October 23, 1945 addressed to this and other depart- 
ments instructs the Secretary of State to make available to the Joint Committee, 
for such use as the committee may determine any information in his [599^] 
possession "material to the investigation." In pursuance of this order, this 
Department has made available to the Committee Counsel all information in its 
possession which is material to the investigation. 

The memorandum requested by Congressman Keefe relates exclusively to ex- 
changes of American and Japanese nationals after the war began. In these 
circumstances the Department does not understand how this memorandum 
could possibly be considered material to the Committee's investigation within 
the meaning of the President's Order of October 23, 1945. The Department is 
therefore unable to comply with the request of Congressman Keefe. 

Now, Mr. Chairman, if I interpret this letter correctly it is to the 
effect that the State Department is determining in advance whether 
or not material requested by a member of this committee is in its 
judgment material to this inquiry, having before it the full text of 
the statement which I requested. I have not seen that text, and yet I 
am foreclosed from a determination of materiality as a member of this 
committee by the determination of the Acting Secretary of State, 
Mr. Acheson, who concludes that in his opinion it is not material and 
therefore is not to be made available to tlie committee. 

It seems to me that this presents to the committee a very definite 
question as to the responsibility of this investigat- [S995\ ing 
committee. I may say that I have very definite and certain informa- 
tion that this communication which I have asked for is material and 
while it may contain some matters which are not material, it does con- 
tain matters which are definitely material and are necessary in order 
that I may pursue the introduction at a subsequent date of certain 
memoranda prepared for the War and Navy departments by Dr. 
Hornbeck. 

Now, I want to ask this question : When a request is made by a mem- 
ber of this committee to the State Department or any other depart- 
ment of Government, am I, as a member of this committee, to be 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2251 

bound by the determination of an executive department of Govern- 
ment that in their opinion the material which I requested is not mate- 
rial to this inquiry and therefore I am not permitted to see it? 
The Chairman. Is that a question propounded to the Chair? 
Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

The Chairman. Well, it has not been the Chair's understanding 
that an individual member of the committee could determine the mate- 
riality of any evidence requested of a department, but that the com- 
mittee as a whole had jurisdiction and authority to determine that 
matter, and if the committee as a whole determined that any record 
was material its determination governed instead of that of the execu- 
tive officer who might assume to pass upon the question. 

[S996] Mr. Keefe. May I ask then, Mr. Chairman, that the 
State Department be directed to bring this communication to the 
committee in order that the committee, itself, in executive session, may 
determine whether or not it is material. 

How can the committee, or any member of the committee, determine 
that question in the absence of seeing the communication itself ? That 
is the point I am getting at. 

The Chairman. That is a matter we might well discuss in executive 
session without taking the time of the hearing, but inasmuch as it 
has been brought up, before any action is taken, the Chair would 
like to ask counsel if he has additional information about that, in 
regard to Mr. Acheson's letter ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I have never seen the document, so I do not know 
whether it is material or not. Heretofore when any question has been 
raised, I haven't found that the State Department has objected to 
somebody looking at certain material. They haven't yet closed the 
♦door on me. I don't see any reason why I shouldn't agree with Mr. 
Keefe that the committee ought to have an opportunity to examine 
it for the whole committee to decide whether it is material. 

The Chairman. From the beginning it was the committee's under- 
standing — it was certainly mine — that the committee would deter- 
mine the materiality of evidence and not the Secretary of State or any 
officer of any department, and if it [S997] is agreeable to the 
committee, the committee will request counsel to get that document and 
submit it to the committee for its determination as to whether it is 
material. 

[5998] Mr. Keefe. My point, Mr. Chairman, is that if it ap- 
pears upon an inspection of the document in connection with other 
matters which they have submitted that it is immaterial and not 
material to this controversy, certainly I would not want, nor would 
I expect, to pursue the matter. 

The Chairman. The Chair thinks the point made by the Congress- 
man is well taken and the committee will take such action. 

Mr. Keefe. Very well. 

The Chairman. Senator Lucas will now examine. 

Senator Lucas. Admiral Stark, throughout the course of these 
hearings it becomes more clear as we move along that Japan knew 
everything that we were doing in this country previous to Pearl 
Harbor and apparently we knew little or nothing about what Japan 
was doing. 



2252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Let me ask you just briefly about our naval and military intelli- 
gence service in Japan at that time. How many people did we have 
employed in Japan in December 1941 who were actively engaged in 
obtaining military and naval intelligence for this country? 

Admiral Stark. I do not know, Senator Lucas, of any, and infor- 
mation of that kind could come far better from Intelligence, I am 
not familiar with the details. My recollection is we had none. I 
may be wrong. I hesitate to testify [6999] as to the details 
of who we had and where. 

Senator Luoas. Well, upon yesterday you testified before the com- 
mittee that in your opinion Japan had a complete spy system in this 
country through which they were obtaining and forwarding intelli- 
gence to their home country about every movement that took place 
in our naval and military circles here in America. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. My thought in asking you this question was 
whether or not in view of the fact that you have been a naval officer 
all of these years that you could suggest to this committee as to what 
Congress might do in the future to remedy what seemed to be a very, 
very serious situation in Hawaii and other command posts when the 
Japs struck us in December 1941. 

Admiral Stark. Well, only a considered answer, I think, should be 
given to that question and I would not like to make an otfhand 
answer to it. 

Senator Lucas. All right. I appreciate it may be somewhat a sur- 
prise question to you, but it does seem to me to have very considerable 
importance in connection with this hearing as I move along and 
listen to the testimony, that Japan knew every move that we were 
making in connection with the movement of ships in and out of Pearl, 
Harbor and had all [(jOOO] this information and apparently 
we were getting nothing from Japan. While I appreciate that under 
our form of government it is almost impossible to keep anything a 
secret, yet, on the other hand, looking to the defense of this country 
in the future, it does occur to me that perhaps Congress might be 
able to do some things to remedy certain conditions that existed at 
that time and I thought perhaps you might have given it some 
thought. 

Admiral Stark. Well, I quite agree with you that it would be well 
to look into the subject and the question of legislation to correct it. 
I am hazy on just what we had proposed but I do recall that there was 
some legislation proposed, I think, which did not get through, about 
our ability to arrest people on suspicion and that sort of thing, but 
it has been studied and in the light of present experience, in my 
opinion, and I take it in yours, I am agreeing with you, should again 
be reviewed with a view to our not getting into such a position again 
if it is possible to avoid it. 

Senator Lucas. Well, now, how many naval attaches did you have 
in Tokyo at the time, do you remember that? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir; I do not. Of course, there was one naval 
attache and some assistants and usually we had language students 
over there, but I haven't got the details. 

Senator Lucas. Well, from whom did you get this informa- 
[6001] tion upon which you based your reports for certain evalua- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2253 

tion and certain information that you had to send your commands 
in the field? 

Admiral Stark. We got it from what we got from the State Depart- 
ment, the War Department, sometimes the Treasury Department, 
intercepts from our people in the field, which was rather world-wide. 

For example, in Hawaii we had the district intelligence officer and 
the fleet intelligence officer and a radio communication man studying 
those subjects. We had them spread in different places in China 
and, in fact, a rather broad coverage. We also, of course, in con- 
nection with the movements of the fleet had the stations which were 
constantly, through radio, studying through direction finder and 
through the system of calls to assist us in location, but we used to 
say, and I may possibly have expressed to you in some of the hear- 
ings, that as regards Japan, even in peacetime, we felt our informa- 
tion more or less stopped at the 3-mile limit. 

For example, they built stockades around their navy yards, they 
pulled down the curtains, I have been told, in trains if they passed a 
section where people might look out to see what was being done. 

You will recall when I w\as asked how many battleships Japan had 
we could only estimate. We could get their hearings, [6002] 
For example, we could get from the amounts of money they had appro- 
priated and working on every scrap of information that we could get, 
backed by previous experience, we would make an estimate, but over 
here, as you will recall, a Japanese frequently sat in committee hearings 
and knew everything about what we w^ere proposing. 

I remember when I was asking for the large increases shortly after 
I became Chief of Naval Operations, seeing a Japanese naval attache 
among those listening to the hearings and in which we put all our 
cards on the table. 

Senator Lucas. Well, the reason that I asked these preliminary 
questions is followed by this one: According to the report received 
from the supreme commander of the Allied forces in the Pacific, and 
which has been made a part of the record, that part of the Japanese 
Fleet which attacked Pearl Harbor was sent by the Imperial Head- 
quarters of the Naval Staff on December 7, 1941, to a place which I 
cannot pronounce, which is spelled H-i-t-o-k-a-p-p-u. 

Now, I was wondering whether or not you as Chief of Naval 
Operations were familiar with that Japanese harbor previous to Pearl 
Harbor ? 

Admiral Stark. We knew of the harbor; yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Were any of our Intelligence men or any of the 
Navy men working in there at any time, or did they ever [6008] 
get in there to make an inspection and see what that bay was like? 

Admiral Stark. Not that I know of. It might be that you will get 
something on that if you repeat the question to our far-eastern man 
who is due here. 

Senator Lucas. Well, at least as far as you are concerned j^'ou do 
not recall that in the information you received any direct report about 
this particular bay in the months of, say, September, October, Novem- 
ber, and December of 1941 ? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. I think it might be helpful with 
regard to what has been termed the "lost carriers" and which were 
not lost so far as we knew at that time, but whose appearance later 



2254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

showed that our estimates as to where they were were incorrect, you 
will recall tliere has been introduced into the testimony that on De- 
cember 24 Admiral Wilkinson sent a dispatch to the two commanders 
in chief in the Pacific regarding their size-up of where the Japanese 
fleet was. 

You will notice that sometimes there were conflicts, but that we felt 
the estimates made by Admiral Hart, who had a very large force 
working on it and was very much closer to Japan, were probably the 
best we had. 

Now. I would also like to point out that, of course, Admiral Kimmel 
was informed of that, it went to Kimmel and to [6004] Hart 
and there was a complete interchange. 

Senator Lucas. You meant November 24. You said December 24. 
Admiral Stark. Well, if you say so that is all right. On November 
24. I will read that dispatch if you would like to have it read. It is 
short. 

The Chairman. You said "December," Admiral. 
Admiral Stark. Oh. I am sorry. 
The Chairmax. We are asking to have it corrected. 
Admiral Stark. There was a conflict. We thought that Hart's 
estimates appeared to us to be the better, but Kimmel had estimates, 
Kimmel had his estimates. Hart had Kimmel's estimates, we had both 
their estimates and all three of us were working on that. Now, on 

the 26th 

Senator Lucas. Just before you get to the 26th. With respect to 
those estimates, they were not the same. Hart had one set of figures 
showing where the carriers were and Kinnnel had another set of figures 
which were different. 

Admiral Stark. I am coming to that. 
Senator Lucas. All right, sir. 

Admiral Stark. On the 26th we received two dispatches, one from 
Kimmel, who thought that possibly there might be some carriers in 
the eastern Marshalls, and one from Hart putting them in home waters. 
[6005] You will recall that we endeavored to get a coverage on 
the eastern ISLarshalls but due to weather were not able to do so. Hart 
put them in home waters. 

On the 28th and again on the 1st we had from the Asiatic no change, 
which still put, in his opinion, the carriers in the home waters from 
what he had been able to gatlier or not gather. On the 1st of December 
Intelligence made an estimate, our own Office of Naval Intelligence, 
to me and from the information as they sized it up from Hart and from 
Kimmel they put them in home waters. So we thought we knew where 
the carriers were. You never can be certain in the absence of any- 
thing definite in the way of call signs and cutting them in. 

Senator Lucas. In other words, you accepted the information that 
Admiral Hart gave you with respect to this task force or this supposed 
lost fleet and concluded that the fleet was not lost but it was in home 
waters some place? 

Admiral Stark. That was the best we had to go on. Yes, sir; we 
accepted them. 

Senator Lucas. Well, do you know whether Admiral Kimmel ac- 
cepted that same viewpoint and in view of that he gave you a report 
that the fleet was lost? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2255 

Admiral Stark. The only difference that I recall in Admiral Kim- 
mel's information was that there might be two carriers in the eastern 
Marshalls and, of course, as time went on [6006\ and there 
was no further change, or in the absence of information, why, one 
might wonder, but the best at the time we had from those who were 
making the estimates was that the carriers were in home waters. 

Senator Lucas. Well, that is what you are telling the committee at 
(his time, that upon the information that you evaluated at the time 
and sent to the commanders in the field it was your opinion that there 
was no lost fleet but that the ships of the Japanese Navy were all ac- 
counted for through the Hart report? 

Admiral Stark, We did not send it out. That estimate was just 
given to me by Intelligence. Hart and Kimmel both had their own 
estimates and whether Admiral Kimmel after receiving Admiral Hart's 
hitest information agreed with him or not, whether his Intelligence 
officer did, I do not know. 

Senator Lucas. Well, you will agree that that was an extremely 
important message that came from Admiral Hart at that particular 
time with respect to the location of the Japanese fleet, was it not? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; but I will say, and the people in the field, 
I believe, would bear it out, that it was the best information we had. 
You never could count on it a hundred percent of accuracy. Every 
naval officer knows that ships can maintain radio silence. 

[6007] Senator Lucas. I appreciate that. Well, now, after this 
task force went into this bay the name of which I cannot pronounce, 
they were ordered, according to the report that is in the record here, 
to stay there until November the 22, 1941, and take on supplies and 
then upon that date they were to sail for the Hawaiian waters. 

Now, as I understand it, there was no one in the Hawaiian area con- 
nected with the fleet, there was no one in the Asiatic area that was 
connected with the fleet that ever heard a single thing about this task 
force being at this bay or having the slightest knowledge of when it 
went there or when it sailed. 

Admiral Stark. I think that is correct. I would suggest. Senator 
Lucas, that you repeat that question to McCollum and Kramer as to 
whether or not Admiral Hart in making that evaluation, — that would 
be home waters, and whether he had them there or not I am not 
certain. 

Senator Lucas. Well, I thought. Admiral Stark, in view of the crisis 
that we were fast approaching with Japan that you as Chief of Naval 
Operations would have probably known about any movements of ships 
in the Japanese waters at that time ; that was the reason I was asking 
you the question. 

Admiral Stark. Well, the data they gave me was home waters. I 
have the dispatches here, if you would like to hear [60081 just 
what they sent in. 

Senator Lucas. All right, please read those dispatches. 

Admiral Stark. This dispatch is of November 26, from the com- 
mandant, Fourteenth District, Fourteenth Naval District, which is 
Hawaii, to OPNAV and for information of the commander in chief 



2256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of the Pacific and the commander in chief of the Asiatic and the com- 
mandant of the Sixteenth Naval District. It reads : 

For past mouth commander Second Fleet has been organizing a task force 
which comprises following units : 

Second Fleet, Third Fleet including first and second base forces and First 
Defense Division, combined airforce, Desron Three, Airon Seven, Subron Five 
and possible units of BatDiv Three from First Fleet. 

In messages concerning these units South China Fleet and French Indochina 
force have appeared as vpell as the naval station at Sama Bako and Takao. 

Third base force at Palao and Rno Palao have also been engaged in extensive 
communications with Second Fleet Commander. 

Combined air force has assembled in Takao v^ith* indications that some compo- 
nents have moved on to Hainan. 

Third Fleet units believed to be moving in direction of Takao and Bako. 

[6009] Second base force appears transporting equipment of air forces to 
Taivpan. 

Takao radio today accepted traffic for unidentified Second Fleet unit and 
Submarine Division or Squadron. 

CruDiv Seven and Desron Three appear as an advance unit and may be en- 
route South China. 

There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air groups in 
the Marshalls which comprise Airrou Twenty Four at least one Carrier Division 
unit plus probably one third of the submarine fleet. 

Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in South 
Eastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palao and Marshalls. 

From Com. 16, that is Asiatic, to the CINCPAC and to OPNAV 
and to COM 14 and to CINCAF, which was Admiral Hart. 

Morning comment — 

Mr. Mitchell. The date of that ? 
Admiral Stakk. This is the 26th. 
Mr. Mitchell. Of November? 
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Morning comment Comfourteen two' one ten of twenty-sixth — 

The message I just read bears "2613"— it refers to the [6010] 
one I just read, which was Admiral Bloch's dispatch. 

"Morning comment Comfourteen," to the despatch I have just read 
from Hawaii. [Reading :] 

Morning comment Comfourteen two one ten of twenty sixth X Trafiic analysis 
past few days indicate Cine second directing units of first second third fleets and 
subforce in a loose knit task force organization that apparently will be divided 
into two sections X For purposes of clarity units expected to operate in south 
China area will be referred to as first section and units expected to operate in 
mandates will be referred to as second section X Estimated units in first section 
are Crudiv seven X Airron six defense division one X Desron three and subron 
six XX Second section — 

which is the one he put in the Marshalls — 

Crudiv five X Cardiv three Ryujo and one Maru X Desrons two and four X 
Subron five X Desdiv twentythree X First base force of third fleet X Third 
base force at Palao X Fifth base force at Saipan and lesser units unidentified 
XX Crudiv six and Batdiv three may be included in first and second sections 
respectively but status cannot be clarified yet XX Balance third fleet units in 
doubt but may be assumed that these vessels including Desron five will take 
station in Formosa Straits or further south X There are slight indications 
[6011] today that Desron three Crudiv seven and Subron six are in Takao area 
X Combined airforce units from Empire are at Paklioi Hoihow Saigon Takao 
and other bases on Taiwan and China coast X Cannot confirm supposition that 
carriers and submarines in force are in mandates X Our best indications are 
that all known first and second fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure area X Our 
lists indicate Cine combined in Nagato X Cine first in Hyuga and Cine second in 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2257 

Atago in Kure area X Cine third in Ashigara in Sasebo area X Cine fifth In 
Chichijima area X Comdr subforce in Kashima in Yokosulia area but this 
considered unreliable XX South China fleet appears to have been strengthened 
by units from central or north China probablj' torpedo l)oats XX Southern 
expeditionary fleet apparently being reinforced by one base force unit XX Direc- 
tives to the above task forces if such are directed to individual units and not to 
complete groups X Special calls usually precede formation of task force used in 
area operations X Cine second X Third and Cine southern expeditionary fleet 
appear to have major roles X Traffic from Navminister and Cngs to Cincs of 
fleet appear normal X Evaluation is considered reliable. ^ 

That shows differences in opinion as to at least the carriers in the 
Marshalls. 

[601'2] Senator Lucas. In view of subsequent events, Admiral 
Kimmel's report was more accurate than Admiral Hart's? 

Admiral Stark. I beg pardon, Senator Lucas ? 

Senator Lucas. In view of subsequent events. Admiral Kimmel's 
report was more reliable than Admiral Hart's with respect to where 
the Japanese carriers were ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not know that either one of them was reliable. 
I do not know yet whether there were any carriers in the eastern Mar- 
shalls, and I have been unable to ascertain. 

Senator Lucas. Well, it is a certainty, however, there was a task 
force that was lost, and Kimmel in his message was talking about the 
loss of part of a fleet that he could not find ; isn't that true ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes ; and Admiral Hart thought they were in home 
waters. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. And the very carriers that Admiral Hart 
talked about being in home waters turned out to be in the task force 
that struck Pearl Harbor ; that is correct, isn't it ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. I think the iniormation is they were not in 
the eastern Marshalls. 

Senator Lucas. I do not know where they were. At least they were 
lost and were finally discovered where they were on December 6, 1941 ? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. 

[6013'] Senator Lucas. Assuming you had taken the other posi- 
tion. Admiral Stark, that there was a lost fleet out in the Pacific, would 
that give you any greater concern with respect to the Hawaiian area ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, it might have. I do not know. That would 
be hindsight. 

Senator Lucas. What was the Navy's principal business in the 
Pacific Ocean ? What was our chief problem out there in the Pacific ? 

Admiral Stark. To protect the United States interests. 

Senator Lucas. Yes ; to protect the United States with what ? With 
what would we protect them ? 

Admiral Stark. With the fleet. 

Senator Lucas. After all, the fleet was the chief interest of the 
United States, was it not ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. That should have been the chief interest of every 
naval officer in the Navy, both here in Washington and in the Pacific? 

Admiral Stark. Well, it was. 

Senator Lucas. Now, no one knew where the Japs were going to 
attack, but whether it was the Philippines or Wake or any other Amer- 
ican possessions, the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor was the watch- 

79716 — 46— pt. 5 14 



2258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

dog for American safety and security, [6014-] not only for our 
possessions but for the continental United States as well; is that not 
correct ? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. 

Senator Lucas. In other words, it seems to me, in view of the fact 
that the fleet was in the Hawaiian area, the sole purpose being the 
defense of our country and our possessions, that there should not have 
been anything left undone on the part of any naval officer either in 
Washington or in the Pacific area to protect that fleet, because without 
it we were in pretty bad shape, were we not ? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Now, any of these places that you mentioned, any of 
the places tliat were mentioned there in those messages, like the Kra 
Peninsula, Borneo, Philippines, and other sjDots, if they had been 
struck by the Japs there would not have been any danger to our fleet, 
would there ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. You are speaking of the southern 

Senator Lucas. I am speaking now of the message that you sent to 
the commander of the Pacific Fleet and the commander of the Asiatic 
Fleet wherein you mentioned certain points that you thought, from the 
information you had, Japan might strike. 

Admiral Stark. Well, if Japan struck the Philippines, that part of 
our fleet out there was certainly in danger. 

[6015] Senator Lucas. That part of our fleet was in danger, but 
the principal part was based at Hawaii, and insofar as the principal 
part of the fleet was concerned it was not in danger with respect to any 
of those places that were mentioned in the message; isn't that correct? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct, so far as the places mentioned in 
the message. I would like to point out. Senator Lucas, with regard to 
the places mentioned in the message, that they referred to an attack by 
an amphibious force. 

Senator Lucas. Well, what would an amphibious force be. Admiral 
Stark? 

Admiral Stark. Well, an amphibious force — for example, there 
were somewhere in the neighborhood of 30 transports in that force. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. It was a force of ships with men for landing and 
with equipment for landing, and with boats for landing them, such, 
for example, as our own amphibious forces when they strike. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. We mention in that dispatch, or I think it may 
have been read into the dispatch and perhaps understood, that the 
dispatch referred only to that. I would like to go through that dis- 
patch once again, if I may. 

[6016] We state that— 

negotiations * * * looking towards a stabilization of conditions in the Pacific 
liave ceaSed and an aggressive move by .Tapan is expected vrithin the next few 
days. 

That is an aggressive move. 
Now, we state that — 

the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task 
forces indicates an amphibious expedition — 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2259 

and the amphibious expedition, not any strike that might come but 
this amphibious expedition, to be either against the Philippines or 
Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Then we go on with— 

execute au appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the 
tasks assigned in WPL-46. Inform district and army autliorities. 

Now, Ave knew there was an amphibious force and we knew its pos- 
sible objectives. We had stated in a previous dispatch that an attack 
might be coming in any direction. This dispatch speaks of a surprise 
aggressive movement. 

Senator Lucas. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Stark. The fact that it is sent to any man for action means 
that we are thinking of him with reference to the material contained 
in this dispatch. If it were simply inf ormatory and of interest to him 
we would have on there, as has been pointed out, "for information." 
I think the distinction between "for information" and "for action" 
should be cleared up. 

[6017] Senator Lucas. That is right. 

Admiral Stark. We would not have sent this to Admiral Kimmel 
for action unless we had been thinking of him and the possibility of 
an attack in his direction, and for that reason he was put down "for 
action." I do not know whether I made that point clear before, as 
to the difference between "for action" and "for information." 

Senator Lucas. I appreciate the distinction and it was very fairly 
put to us by General Marshall on that score. However, it does seem to 
me that whenever, even in a command action of that type, where you 
mentioned these various places as the theater and Hawaii was not 
mentioned, it just occurred to me it was calculated to take just a little 
away, perhaps, from Hawaii. Maybe I am wrong. 

Admiral Stark. Again, I invite your attention to the point that we 
were putting down the points of a possible attack of an amphibious 
expedition. We had no thought of an amphibious expedition striking 
at Hawaii. We were not thinking of an assault on Hawaii and a 
landing on Hawaii as a result of an amphibious expedition. 

Senator Lucas. Assuming that they did strike as was suggested, 
which they did later on 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; the forecast was correct. 

Senator Lucas. The point I am trying to make is tliat none 
[6018] of that information that was sent was as vital as the pro- 
tection of the fleet in Pearl Harbor. That was the main thing, was 
it not? 

Admiral Stark. And for that purpose we gave a directive to take 
a defensive deployment; yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Admiral Stark, do you believe, as Chief of Naval 
Operations, that in November and December 194:1, you exercised that 
high degree of care and caution which the nearing Japanese crisis 
compelled you to do in sending to Admiral Kimmel all the informa- 
tion, and the timely information, upon which he could base a wise 
decision ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; I had thought so. 

Senator Lucas. And you still believe it? 

Admiral Stark. I still think so ; yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. You know he had many difficult decisions to make 
out there? 



2260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR A'rPACK 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And, of course, you had many difficult decisions to 
make here. 

Admiral Stark. I not only had many to make here with regard to 
the Pacific, but we were operating and were practically at war on the 
high seas in the Atlantic with the Department alerted for material 
coming in, dodging submarines, and troop convoys, and so forth, day 
and night. We had attacked [6019] for example, between 
September and the 1st of December, as I recall, three destroyers that 
were attacked, one sunk. We also had the Salinas attacked but it 
managed to get in; it was torpedoed. We had attacks going back as 
far as June. That was in addition to all the rest of the build-up, and 
so forth. We were extremely occupied with many heavy problems. 

Senator Lucas. I appreciate that. I want to ask you one other 
question along that same line. Do you feel that on the morning of 
December 6, 1941, when you received the last part of the 14-part 
message 

Mr. Mitchell. December 7. 

Senator Lucas. I mean December 7, 1941, when you received the 
last part of the 14-part message, that you acted with that high degree 
of care that you should have under those circumstances in sending or 
failing to send, rather, a message to Admiral Kimmel at that time? 

Admiral Stark. I thought so, because if j'ou take out one or two 
words in the Japanese 14-part message, just took the meat of it, it is 
almost a paraphrase of what we had sent. I read that in my state- 
ment, and if you would like I will read it again. 

Senator Lucas. You took the position at that time, as I recall, when 
you first talked to General Marshall, that you had already sent suffi- 
cient information to Admiral Kimmel, [6020] and if you sent 
him more it might confuse him. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I thought there was a possibility of send- 
ing too much. That was with reference to the 1 o'clock message which, 
as I have stated, was the thing which stood out so clearly, because 
naturally, in the face of hindsight and in thinking that situation over, 
and in searching my conscience for what I might have done that I did 
not, I stated both to the Naval Committee and to the Roberts Com- 
mission, in looking over the whole field, I had, in the light of hindsight, 
regretted that I had not paralleled the Army message rather than just 
let the Army message go for me as well as for the Army. But I did 
not diagnose it to mean an attack at that time, and, as I stated a day 
or two ago, no one else pointed that out to me. Marshall said he did 
not understand the significance; nevertheless, it did alert him to the 
point that he thought something ought to go out. He read into it a 
possibility which I had not up until the time he called me. 

Senator Lucas. Admiral Stark, you had much communication with 
Admiral Kimmel, both from the standpoint of letter writing and the 
standpoint of messages. Let me ask you if you ever talked to him over 
the telephone? 

Admiral Stark. I never had talked to Admiral Kimmel over the 
telephone. 

[6021] Senator Lucas. And it did not occur to you on the Sun- 
day morning there that this message was important enough that you 
should call him on the telephone and give him the contents of the last 
part of the message? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2261 

Admiral Stark. It did not. I brought that out before the Roberts 
Commission as one of the things, and that is one thing I have thought 
so much about since, and that was the use of the teleplione. I frankly 
did not think of it. I never heard it mentioned by anyone else until 
I volunteered the fact that I did not think of it. 

Senator Lucas. It is true that had you immediately picked up the 
telephone at that time, or even sent a message at 10 : 30 or 10 : 40, that 
morning, to Admiral Kimmel, giving him the complete digest of the 
fourteenth part of the 1 4-part message, it would have placed Kimmel 
on a complete war alert, would it not? 

Admiral Stark. I do not know. 

Senator Lucas. Why do you say that ? 

Admiral Stark. Because I do not. I did not know what his re- 
action would have been to the fourteenth part of that message, which 
was merely confirmatory of what we had sent. After the 1 o'clock 
message, if I had told him that the message had come in from the Japs 
as confirming what we had already told him, with the simple statement 
that they were directed to deliver that to the State Department, to Mr. 
[6022] Hull, at 1 o'clock, I do not know what his reaction would 
have been. That is all it stated. As to whether he might have read a 
significance in it which nobody here read into it, I do not know. He 
might have. 

benator Lucas. In other words, you go back to the message of 
November 27 and state to the committee now, if Admiral Kimmel was 
not on the alert on December 6 as the result of the message you sent 
him of November 27, then whatever you might have given him subse- 
quently on December 7 would not have made much difference? 

Admiral Stark. For example, I sent him that information. If I 
had made the evaluation which we now make in the light of hindsight, 
and told him that, that would be one thing, but if I simply sent him the 
information, whether or not he would have read into it what we did 
not read into it here, I do not know. 

Senator Lucas. Now, you sent him some four or five messages, as I 
recall, between November 24 and December 6. Do you feel that you 
sent him all of the vital and material information that was necessary, 
upon which he could properly alert the naval command of the Pacific 
at that time ? 

Admiral Stark. I do; yes, sir. I feel that the message about the 
burning of the codes was just about as strong in its implications as 
anything could be. Now, as you Imow — [6023'] and I haven't 
mentioned it before — I have been criticized by the Department, for 
example, for not having sent out Mr. Hull's 10-point note. 

Senator Lucas. I was going to ask you that in the next question. 

Admiral Stark. I was hoping it would come up. I did not want 
to volunteer it. 

Senator Lucas. I have it here. I want to ask you whether you are 
familiar with the 10-point note that was prepared by Mr. Hull and 
given to the Japs. 

Admiral Stark. With the ground work ; yes. Just when I saw it, 
I do not know, but if you read my message of the 27th carefully, as to 
what it says, with the knowledge that I did not know of the 10-point 
note at that time, and if I knew of it subsequently and had sent it to 
Admiral Kimmel, I do not know what he would have thought, but it 
could be said, "Here is a note from Stark that negotiations have 



2262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ceased ; here is one from Mr. Hull which offers to carry on negotia- 
tions, or may be considered an ultimatum," there has been much argu- 
ment about that, but, in any case, it could not have strengthened the 
unequivocal statement which I made. It might have confused him or 
it might have weakened the statement. If he was confused he could, 
of course, have sent me the dispatch, "You state the negotiations are 
over; here is an offer to [602^^ continue." Unless I told him 
Mr. Hull's own opinion was that the whole thing was over, it could 
have confused him. That opinion was expressed in my dispatch of the 
27th. My own feeling, even in the light of hindsight and careful study 
of the message, is that to have sent it would have either weakened my 
dispatch of the 27th or would have been confusing to the man at the 
other end of the line. 

Senator Lucas. In your opinion the 10-point message of Mr. Hull, 
had it been sent to Admiral Kimmel verbatim, would have confused 
the issue rather than have clarified the issue ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; or weakened it. 

Senator Lucas. Now, your message of November 24 merely states — 

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. 

Then, on November 27, as I get the distinction in the two messages, 
you said : 

Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the 
Pacifiic have ceased. 

Now, that is the message that went on to Kimmel, is it? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; and to Hart. 

Senator Lucas. And Admiral Hart. That was a command message ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And it was a message that anyone who could read 
the English language ought to be able to understand, [6025] 
was it not ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. When diplomatic negotiations between two coun- 
tries have ceased — and that is all that Admiral Kimmel knew at that 
time — it means that imminent and serious danger between these two 
countries is near at hand ; isn't that true ? 

Admiral Stark. It is, coupled with the statement that this was a 
war warning. 

Senator Lucas. That is right. Now, there has also been some com- 
plaint about your failure, as I understand it, not to send to Admiral 
Kimmel the message that you received on November 27, 1941, in which 
Japan informed Hitler that war with the Anglo-Saxon powers would 
break out sooner than anyone dreamed. Do you think that would help 
Admiral Kimmel any, to have sent that out to him ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. I think that dispatch was pretty well 
distilled and covered by our own which said that Japan is expected 
to make an aggressive move within the next few days. I think it was 
also distilled, so to speak, in the Army dispatch which said war might 
happen any minute. 

Senator Lucas. In other words, if I understand you correctly, it is 
your contention that the messages of the 24th and the 27th, especially 
the last one, which commands, that every commander at every post 
should have thoroughly [60£6] understood the important sig- 
nificance of it and acted accordingly ? 



PKOCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2263 

Admiral Stark. We felt so; yes, sir; and we studied that situation, 
as to sending anything more out, and decided that the message stood 
and we qualified it in no way whatever. We supported it in the "codes 
burning" message. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. And with respect, Admiral Stark, to the 
"codes burning" message, do you know of any time in history where 
nations have burned codes that war was not imminent and did not 
take place? 

Admiral Stark. I do not know of any. There might be some, but 
I do not know of any. 

Senator Lucas. There may be, but it is the exception rather than 
the rule, is it not, that that takes place ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. We thought it pointed right toward war. 
We thought it was just perfectly confirmatory of what we had sent. 

Senator Lucas. And there was no question but what Admiral Kim- 
mel knew about the burning of the Japanese codes in Hawaii at that 
time ? 

Admiral Stark. No. We got our information of the burning of 
codes in Hawaii from Hawaii. 

Senator Lucas. That is what I say. There is no question but what 
he knew about it ? 

[6027] Admiral Stark. There was no question in our minds; 
no, sir. 

Senator Lucas. It was through his command that you received the 
information that they were burning codes, am I correct about that? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. The dispatch came from Com. 14, which 
was Admiral Bloch, to us, and we assumed that Admiral Kimmel was 
familiar with it. 

Senator Lucas. Was that on December 5 ? 

Admiral Stark. December 6. - 

Senator Lucas. December 6 ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. The dispatch reads, "local consul has de- 
stroyed all but one system, although presumably not included your 
18005 of the 3rd." 

Senator Lucas. Then you b^ent a message to Admiral Kimmel fol- 
lowing that, to destroy certain papers, did you not ? 

Admiral Stark. We sent a message out on the 6th, authorizing him 
to authorize at his discretion his outlying islands to destroy their codes, 
retaining such as were necessary for talking with him up until the 
last minute, is the way the dispatch finished up. 

Senator Lucas. Now let me ask you this question. Admiral Stark. 
When these messages went to Admiral Kimmel between November 
24 and December 6, and especially the mesages of [602S] the 
24th and 26th, and "code burning" messages 

Admiral Stark. You mean the 27th, don't you. Senator? 

Senator Lucas. The 27th; yes, sir. To whom in the fleet would 
that information be distributed ? What officers in the fleet should have 
received that information besides Admiral Kimmel? I am especially 
referring to your war messages. 

[6029] Admiral Stark. Well, the distribution in the fleet 
would be by Admiral Kimmel. We addressed it to the Commander 
in Chief of the Fleet. The distribution within his command would 
be at his direction. 



2264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. In other words, that would be under his jurisdic- 
tion, as to whom he delivered the contents of that message? 

Admiral Stark. Entirely ; yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And you wouldn't have anything to do with that on 
this end of the line? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Do you know now who Kimmel talked with about 
the message that was sent on November 27 ? 

Admiral Stark. I couldn't be sure ; no, sir. 

Senator Lucas. If you had been in command of the fleet at that 
time and had received a war warning message, what officers in the 
Fleet would you have talked to ? 

Admiral Stark. My feeling is that I would have brought in my 
key officers. 

Senator Lucas. Wlio would they have been? 

Admiral Stark. COMFOURTEEN would be one of them, my bat- 
tleship commanders, submarine commanders. In general the people 
in command of task forces and my air force commander. And we 
would have gone over the situation. And, of course, [60301 out 
there we would have assumed also that he would have taken it up, and 
he probably did, he can tell you, with General Short. 

Senator Lucas. Now, if there was any question about the proper in- 
terpretation of any of these messages, if Admiral Kimmel was con- 
fused in any way as to what they meant, there was nothing in Navy 
regulations which would not have permitted him to have gotten you 
on the telephone or obtained from you by message just exactly what 
you did mean, was there? 

Admiral Stark. Nothing whatever in Navy regulations, and my 
knowledge of Kimmel, and his of me, from that I would have expected 
that if he didn't understand what I sent him he would have asked 
me. 

Senator Lucas. There is nothing that prevented Kimmel from con- 
ferring with you at any time upon any situation ? 

Admiral Stark. Nothing whatsoever. 

Senator Lucas. And did you receive anj' replies from Admiral 
Kimmel to any of these messages between the 24th and the 6th of 
December which would give you any indication whatsoever that Ad- 
miral Kimmel didn't thoroughly understand what these messages 
meant ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir, I did not. 

Senator Lucas. Admiral Stark, I want to talk just a moment with 
you about the anti-torpedo baffles that were [6031] discussed 
between yourself and Admiral Kimmel, as I recall, along in the spring 
of 1941. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. I have before me an exhibit that is not in evidence 
here, a statement made by Admiral Kimmel, in which he refers to an 
official letter which you wrote and which is a part of Exhibit 49 in 
the Naval Court of Inquiry, in which is stated the following : 

Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T baffles within Pearl 
Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. It is considered that the 
relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl 
Harbor. In addition, the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room 
limit the practicability of the present type of baffles. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2265 

Certain limitations and considerations are advised to be borne in mind in 
planning the installation of auti-torpedo baffles within harbors, among which 
the following may be considered : 

(a) A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to suc- 
cessfully drop torpedoes from planes. 150 feet of water is desired. The maxi- 
mum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250 feet. Launch- 
ing speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. Desirable height of [6032] 
dropping is 60 feet or less. About 200 yards of torpedo run is necessary before 
the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered. 

Now, at one time you considered seriously placing these anti-tor- 
pedo nets in Pearl Harbor to protect the battleships ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator LtrcAS. And you, as I understand it, made an exhaustive 
search with the British as well as our own naval experts and engineers, 
scientific men, with respect to what could or could not be done in 
shallow water? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. 

Senator Lucas. And this letter that you wrote is the consequence 
of that, am I right? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Well, the Navy Board of Inquiry called this bomb 
a secret weapon in the nature of a robot bomb which was unknown to 
the best professional opinion in America at this time. Do you agree 
with that statement? 

Admiral Stark. A robot bomb ? 

Senator Lucas. This torpedo bomb was in the nature of a secret 
weapon, they said, along the lines of a robot bomb, which was unknown 
to the best professional opinion in America and Britain at that time. 

I ask if you agree with that? Do you agree that it was \_6033'] 
unknown to the best American and British opinion at that time, that 
a bomb of that kind could not operate in water as shallow as it was 
in Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Stark. No, I did not agree with that. There is a later 
letter of ours that states that no capital ship was safe in any water 
which she could float in, where there was sufficient run for the torpedo 
to arm itself. 

However, the letter was further qualified by stating depths which 
were desirable. I have got the letter here. 

Senator Lucas. I wish you would produce that letter and read it 
into the record, as I have been under the impression that there was 
an. opinion among British and American experts that you couldn't 
use a bomb of that kind in that shallow water. 

Admiral Stark. That was true at the time it was written. There 
is a later letter of 13 June from the Chief of Naval Operations. 

Senator Lucas. 1941 ? 

Admiral Stark. 1941. To the Commandant, 1st, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 
7th, 8th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th Naval Districts. 
The subject is: 

Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks. 

Then there is a reference to the letter of 17 February, {603^'] 
which I believe may be the one you just mentioned : 

1. In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the em- 
ployment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles 
especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the Fleet in their 
respective harbors and especially at the major Fleet bases. 



2266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

In paragraph 3 were itemized certain limitations to consider in 
the use of A/T bailies among which the following was stated: 

A minlnuim depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to suc- 
cessfully drop torpedoes from planes. About 200 yards of torpedo run is 
necessai-y before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered. 

That was in the letter you just referred to. 2: 

Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes 
may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as 300 feet, and in some 
cases make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent 
runs. Hence, it may be stated that it cannot be assumed that any capital 
ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack 
if surrounded by water at a sulRcient distance to permit an attack to be 
developed and a sufhcieut run to arm the torpedo. 

I would like to read the rest of that. If the letter [6035'] 
stopped right there, there wouldn't have been any doubt, but it 
does show that possibility. 

Paragraph 3 : 

While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be anchored 
can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack, 
it may be assumed that depths of water will be one of the factors considered 
by any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 
fathoms or more) is much more likely. 

4. As a matter of information the torpedoes laimched by the British at 
Taranto were, in general, in 13 to 15 fathoms of water, although several tor- 
pedoes may have been launched in 11 or 12 fathoms. 

In other words, we pointed out the danger that any ship was 
subject to if she were afloat, had enough water to float in and enough 
room to fire the torpedo, if they could get the appro:^.ch, and enough 
length of run for arming, and we then go on to say, and I would like 
to repeat that "it cannot be assumed that an}'^ capital ship or other 
valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if 
surrounded by water," from this type of attack, and then we go on 
to say that we feel the attacks are more likely where the depth of 
water is greater. 

Senator Luc^s. That letter was written in June, 1941? 

[6036] Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; and a copy of that letter was 
sent to the commander in chief. Pacific; commander in chief, At- 
lantic; commander in chief, Asiatic; and commander in chief of 
some of the naval net depots, Bureau of Ordnance, and OP-12. 

Senator Lucas. In view of that discovery in June of 1941 that 
these torpedo bombs could operate in shallow water, was there any- 
thing done by the Navy Department toward the construction of 
torpedo nets to go into Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Stark. "We had directed the Bureau of Ordnance, I have 
forgotten the date, but it is here, to go ahead and design and develop 
antitorpedo nets for harbor work. The letter of February 11, which 
I would like to read, shows the action we took as far back as that, 
because of this possible contingency. 

Senator Lucas. Is it a long letter? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir; one page. 

Senator Lucas. All right. 

Admiral Stark (reading) : 

1. Reference (a) requested information concerning all promising experimental 
and development work on nets and booms done by the U. S. Navy since March 
1940. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2267 

2. As far as this Office is aware, no such work has been done other than the 
making of minor modifications to the Admiralty designs. It is considered that 
experimental and development work should be undertaken. If necessary, 
[6037] additional personnel for this purpose should be secured. 

3. There appears an urgent need for an anti-torpedo net which can be laid 
and removed in certain harbors in a short time for temporary use, and which 
will give good if not perfect protection from torpedoes fired from planes. The 
present Admiralty type net is designed to withstand torpedoes and with cutters, 
and its appurtenances are very heavy. A lighter net which will stop a 
torpedo not armed with cutters would furnish some protection, especially against 
torpedoes which would explode on contact with a metal net. 

4. Effort should he made to reduce the weights of the present Admiralty nets 
and booms and their appurtenances witliout reducing their efficiency in order 
that they may be more readily handled. As a beginning, it is also suggested 
that plans be made to test sections of the old A/S net and of the new, as well 
as indicator nets, by attacking submarines. While such tests may duplicate 
British experiments, valuable lessons may be learned. It is requested that this 
office be kept informed of development work and all tests and experiments con- 
ducted with nets and booms. 

That was our initial letter on directing the Bureau of Ordnance 
to go ahead with that work. 

Senator Lucas. The date is February 1941? 

Admiral Stark. February 11, 1941; yes, sir.- 

[6038] Senator Lucas. When did you first get any nets? 

Admiral Stark. We didn't get any nets until 1942. 

Senator Lucas. Do you know why? 

Admiral Stark. I have forgotten the date but we did not have 
them up to the time of Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Lucas. Do you know why the delay? 

Admiral Stark. The Bureau of Ordnance just didn't produce on it. 

Senator Lucas. Was any follow-up made on that letter of February 
11 with respect to the Bureau of Ordnance insisting that the nets be 
produced ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; there were several. 

Senator Lucas. A lot of ships could have been saved at Pearl Har- 
bor if the nets had been out ; isn't that right ? 

Admiral Stark. If an effective baffle had been there it undoubtedly 
would have minimized the effect. Of course, the bombs also did 
considerable damage. 

Senator Lucas. I understand the torpedo planes did the real dam- 
age to the battleships, according to previous testimony; more than 
altitude bombs. 

Admiral Stark. I think that is correct. 

Senator Lucas. Do you know how long it took us to perfect this 
type of bomb that we could use in shallow water ? 

Admiral Stark. No; I do not have that information. The 
[6039] Bureau of Ordnance could furnish it. 

Senator Lucas. And you don't have the information as to how 
long it took the Japanese to perfect that type of bomb? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. I remember the original specification. 
I was Chief of Bureau of Ordnance. Our first specification was 100 
knots and 100 feet. We were continually trying to raise the speed 
and increase the altitude from which they could be fired. 

Senator Lucas, LTndoubtedly Japan had Pearl Harbor in mind 
when she first started experimenting with this type of bomb ; do you 
agree? 



2268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. Unquestionably she had us in mind, just as we had 
any possible enemy in mind. We were all after a high-dive and 
shallow -water run. 

Senator Lucas. Very few harbors are as shallow as Pearl Harbor, 
however ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, it was a shallow-water harbor. So is Colon. 
So is Guantanamo. So are many others. Too shallow in many cases 
for comfort. 

Senator Lucas. I want to change the course of the questioning 
just a little and ask you this. Admiral. 

Did you have any definite or direct advance information that 
Japan was going to strike us? 

[6O4O] Admiral Stark. No ; I did not. 

Senator Lucas. You have told the committee the various sources 
from which you obtained information in the Far East and upon 
which you made your evaluations and estimates and which were sent 
to the respective naval commands. 

Have you given to the committee every source of information that 
you had, including magic and information from Intelligence offi- 
cers, and what not, upon which you based these estimates and upon 
which your Intelligence officers made the proper evaluations? 

Admiral Stark. I think so, yes, sir. I can't think of anything 
more at the moment which I msiy have omitted. 

Senator Lucas. And the Army exchanged its information with 
you as to what they received in the Hawaiian area, through the East- 
ern Asiatic section of the world? 

Admiral Stark. Complete and daily exchange and very close liai- 
son and continuous between General Marshall and myself. 

Senator Lucas. You also had the advantage of seeing all the diplo- 
matic messages that came in through the codes, at least? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; such as were considered as important 
were given to me ; and I had confidence in the people, as to their selec- 
tions. 

Senator Lucas. You were in frequent communication with 
[60U] the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, and the President of the 
United States, Mr. Roosevelt, at that time? 

Admiral Stark. Very frequent, yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Now, as a result of your close association and your 
intimate loiowledge with all the cabinet officers, with all the people 
in the Executive Branch of the Government at that time, do you know 
of a single man in the Army or Navy, State Department or other 
branches of the Executive Government, who had any direct, clear- 
cut information that Japan was going to attack this nation ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not. 

Senator Lucas. Do you Ivnow of any individual in the Executive 
Branch of the Government, including the Navy, Army and State 
Department, that had any information as to the precise point and 
hour that Japan was going to attack this country? 

Admiral Stark. I do not. 
^ Senator Lucas. So far as you know all these rumors and specula- 
tions, newspaper articles that have been written in the past, that men 
high in the Navy, Military, and official life of Washington knew the 
precise time and place the Japanese would attack was utterly without 
frvnndation in fact? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2269 

Admiral Stark. That is my opinion. 

^senator Lucas. Admiral Stark, as Chief of Naval Operations 
[6O42] you appeared, in April 1940, before the Naval Aifairs 
Committee of the United States Senate as a witness in behalf of 
HK-8026. Do you recall that? 

Admiral Stakk. I recall the number. I don't recall the subject 
matter of the bill. 

Senator Lucas. You recall the time you appeared before the Naval 
Affairs Committee, of which I was a member, at that time ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. As a roember of that committee I remembered a 
statement you made, a statement which I have never forgotten, and 
I had occasion over the week-end to review these hearings in order 
that I might find your direct quotation. You made the following 
statement after a colloquy with the Senator from Maryland, Mr. 
Tydings, the late Senator from New Jersey, Mr. Barbour, and the 
Senator from Illinois, here it is — it is on page 92. You stated, in 
answer to a question of Senator Tydings : 

If we can get peace on earth and good will to men we are all for it. The 
Naval officers are not in favor of war. If there is any ofiicer in existence who 
wants a war I would like to find him. Our recommendations are solely with 
the view of the peaceful interests of this country in mind. If anything happens 
we have got to bear the brunt of 16043} it. Our job is taking care of 
you people. 

Do you remember making that statement? 

xA^dmiral Stark. I recall it now, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What is the date of that ? 

Senator Lucas. That is under date of April 1940, when Admiral 
Stark appeared before the Conmiittee on Naval Aifairs. Admiral 
Stark, that was your position in April 1940 ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Was that your position in November and December 
of 1941? 

Admiral Stark. That has always been my position. 

Senator Lucas. Do you know of a single high ranking officer in 
the Army or Navy in November or December of 1941 who wanted 
to plunge this country into war with any nation ? 

Admiral Stark. With any nation ? 

Senator Lucas. Yes, Japan or any other nation. 

Admiral Stark. I certainly didn't want to with Japan. I would 
like to say with regard to Hitler that I spent many hours speculating 
myself as to what was the best course for this nation to pursue. Every 
thinking man of responsibility did. I had seen Hitler's game of one 
at a time. I felt that without our help England might fail. That 
along with that picture came the possibility of a break-up of the 
British Empire and its control by Germany and a Europe controlled 
[6044] by Germany. 

That was also paralleled by the possibility of a war in Asia. 
And the combination might have worked a squeeze play on us which 
would have been a terrible thing for this country. We might have 
armed to the teeth and steered a course that would have kept us out, 
but it may just have postponed the day. That was something over 
which I thought a sreat deal. 



2270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

However, I did have this background, that Congress, through lend- 
lease, and the knowledge of what we were doing, had, in my opinion, 
taken the position and the country was committed to seeing that Hitler 
should not win, and on that basis I felt we might wait too late, and I 
therefore, recommended that if we were going to get in, and if we were 
going to have a war psychology which would produce what it was 
necessary to produce, and if we did not wait until it was too late, 
that, in my opinion, the time had come for us to get in it, based on 
what I considered the country's policy. 

[6045] Senator Lucas. Well, that was your feeling towards 
Hitler at that particular time? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And that, of course, was not followed out by the 
President of the United States. War was not declared upon Germany 
until Germany declared war upon us. 

Admiral Stark. That is true. 

Senator Lucas. Let me ask you this question : In your connections 
with the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of War, the Secretary 
of State, and the President of the United States did you reach the 
conclusion that any one of these men, or any group of men, wanted 
to take this country into war with Japan for the sole purpose of just 
going to war. 

Admiral Stark. No, I did not. To the best of my knowledge and 
belief all were in sympathy from the military standpoint to avoid 
that war if we could do it without walking back on our principles. 

Senator Lucas. In other words, the high ranking Navy, War, State, 
and other officials of the executive branch of the Government were 
seeking through an honorable way to obtain peace with Japan but at the 
same time preparing ourselves for war in the event Japan and other 
dictator nations attacked this Nation or any of our possessions? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

[6046] Senator Lucas. Do you agree with me that if we had 
followed any other course it would have been necessary for us to yield 
to this new order of might, which would have meant that we would 
have had to give up the freedom of the seas, we would have been sub- 
mitting to mass subjection and the world trade would have been run 
by the edicts or decrees of the dictators of this world ? 

Admiral Stark. I think that might very well have happened and 
I think Mr. Hull's testimony and his writings and what he was after 
shows that it was not just theory with him but working on what 
Japan had done and was doing where she controlled, that any ex- 
tension by her would have been very restrictive to our own intersts. 

Senator Lucas. You are familiar with the testimony of Mr. Hull, 
are you not ? 

Admiral Stark. With most of it I think, yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Do jj'ou agree in principle with what he said before 
this committee? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Do 3^ou agree with me that had we yielded to Japan 
at that time we would have been yielding to might and we would have 
deserted every belief and every liberty and every tradition and every 
concept on which this Nation is founded? 

[6O47] Admiral Stark. I think so, yes, sir. My feeling with 
regard to a Pacific war and in which my letters state this fact, I think, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2271 

many times was that we would not forsake China and back out from 
the stand we had taken and that Japan, on the otlier hand, also would 
not back out and that regardless of all else there was a stumbling block 
which could not be overcome. 

Senator Lucas. That is what you continually say in your letters to 
the Commander of the Pacific Fleet. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. You go over that several times, as I recall it. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. You talk about irreconcilable conflicts here that 
exist between Japan and this country. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. That some day they would probably meet and have 
to be decided through war. I think that was your position. 

Admiral Stark. That is true, yes, sir. Other things Japan might 
have promised she would do, but personally I had no faith in her 
promises and there is good factual data to base that on. 

Senator Lucas. One other question : From your intimate [6O4B'] 
knowledge of the naval, military and diplomatic conditions as they 
existed in the United States in tlie summer and fall of 1941 was there 
any one man or group of men who maneuvered the Japanese crisis so 
as to deliberately invite the Pari Harbor attack? 

Admiral Stark. Not to my knowledge, or I had never thought such. 

Senator Lucas. Well, you were in on the conversations, practically 
all of the conversations with respect to Pearl Harbor previous to De- 
cember 6, 1941 ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. As Chief of Naval Operations that was one of your 
duties, to know and understand what was going on? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir, and I may say that on the contrary we 
were trying to maintain peace in the Pacific. 

Senator Lucas. Do you know of any man or group of men high in 
the Executive branch of the Government that trapped the Japs or lied 
to the Japanese to get them to attack us in Pearl Harbor in order to 
make it easier to get Congressional action to declare war against 
Japan ? 

Admiral Stark. I did not get the first part of that question. 

Senator Lucas. Do you know of any man or group of men high in, 
the Executive branch of the government, including the [6049] 
naval, military and diplomatic group, who trapped the Japanese 
or who lied to the Japanese in order to get them to attack Pearl Har- 
bor so as to make it easier for Congress to give a declaration of war? 

Admiral Stark. No, I do not. 

Senator Lucas. You had frequent conversations, you have told me, 
with the President of the United States from time to time. You 
also had frequent conversations with Col. Frank Knox, who was then 
Secretary of the Navy. I take it that he was familiar with all of these 
messages that were sent to Admiral Kimmel between November the 
24th and December the 6th ? 

Admiral Stark. He was. I had no secrets from the Secretary of 
the Navy. 

Senator Lucas. Well, now, from your intimate knowledge of the 
diplomatic and military activities and your conversations with the 



2272 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

President and the Secretary of the Navy, did the President of the 
United States have every reason to believe that the naval command 
in Hawaii was properly alerted for any emergency when the Japs 
struck us on December the Tth, 1941 ? 

Admiral Stark. He knew of the despatch that we had sent there, 
he knew how I felt about it and I felt that he agreed with me. 

Senator Lucas. Well, did he have every reason to believe [6050'] 
from all that had been done by yourself and Marshall at that time 
with respect to alerting the commands that the Hawaii command at 
the time was properly alerted ? That was your belief, wasn't it? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; I think he felt that they were properly 
alerted. I may say, and I have hesitated to quote the President unless 
I am dead certain, but I specifically recall his statement to me that he 
was surprised at the attack on Pearl Harbor and he stated that to me 
as late as last summer and I told him that I had just previously a day 
or two before that testified to that effect myself before the Navy Court 
of Inquiry. It was some comfort to me to have him reiterate it. 

Senator Lucas. Well, I guess everybody was surprised except the 
Japs, were they not ? 

Admiral Stark. The Japs were the real cause for the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, sir. 

Senator Lucas. I want to refer to your statement briefly on page 7, 
where you again talk about the President of the United States, in which 
you stated in a letter to Admiral Kimmel on February the 10th, 1941 : 

I am struggling, and I use the word advisedly, every time I get in the White 
House, which is rather frequent, for additional men. It should not be necessary 
[6051] and while I have made the case just as obvious as I possibly could, the 
President just has his own ideas about men. 

Can you elaborate a little on that? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Explain that to the committee. This was in 1941, a 
short while before the crisis, some 8 months, and will you explain 
that to the committee just briefly ? 

Admiral Stark. I always found men the most difficult thing to get 
in working on naval appropriations. I had found it difficult many 
times on the Hill, I found it difficult in the budget, I found it difficult 
with the President. I think many Congressmen and Senators will 
recall some of the arguments we had about it. 

So far as Congress was concerned I had attributed it to the fact that 
while you might cut ships, ships wore out and were scratched and 
scrapped. Once you increased the size of the regular military estab- 
lishment it looked like a permanent increase in expense to the Govern- 
ment. I was cut in a request for men during this period by Congress, 
although later on practically anything that I asked for went over. 

Senator Lucas. Well, in that same 

Admiral Stark. May I go just a little further, sir? 

[6052] Senator Lucas. Certainly. 

Admiral Stark. Now, as regards the President : The President knew 
the Navy, he loved it, he studied it and he spent a great deal of time 
aboard ship and he had reports that the ships were overcrowded. We 
had letters coming in, anonymous at times, which were sent to the 
White House, about the terrible living conditions on board ship and 
I "was asking to increase the number of men on board ship. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2273 

He had taken trips and Koss Mclntire could probably tell you, but 
I dare say one Board that he had had some cause for apprehension 
from certain medical officers with regard to — ^I don't mean that Koss 
was one of them but I know that he is familiar with the subject. He 
had that report. He also knew that every additional man that we 
put aboard ship, a considerable increase in weight was involved. I 
have forgotten what it was but the Bureau of Ships objected that for 
every additional man we put on at that time we would have to take 
some weight off. I do not mean just the weight of the man but it 
might have been two or three tons that went with him. There were a 
good many things of that sort which the President considered. 

Now, as regards overcrowding : Admiral Kimmel had made a very 
careful study with a board and it had been shown on one ship how the 
men could be placed without undue over- [6053] crowding. I 
stood back of Admiral Kimmel on that. The President had to be con- 
vinced of these matters, it was only right that he should and when I 
struggled, I made sure, and I think I stated it here, that I had my own 
way. 

Now, another question. I have a letter, I do not know whether it 
is on file or not, I mean I do not know whether it has been submitted, 
it may have been one of those irrelevant letters, but it is not hindsight 
because it was as of that time, that I first asked the President for 
500,000 men. He threw back his head and laughed and there were a 
lot of people in the room and he said, "Betty usually begins working 
early, he starts in working a year ahead of time and he follows it up" 
and I usually did. But I did struggle for additional men during the 
time I was Chief of Naval Operations. I struggled back and forth; 
we always had to struggle for that, and we probably will again. 

Senator Lucas. These ships that the President was talking about 
of course, were laid down a good many years ago, were they not? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. There were a number of things that re- 
quired increases in complement. We had greatly increased the anti- 
aircraft defenses on the ships. Early in 1940 we had a very careful 
study made. Admiral King made it, it is laiown as the King Board, 
as to how to increase our anti- [6054-] aircraft defenses. In 
addition to that, heretofore we would put enough men on board a 
ship to man all the guns, everything manned when we went into a 
battery. We foresaw that in a war, in what we might call an air war 
that it would be a very pertinent thing to consider that you might 
have to keep men at the guns 24 hours a day because you could not be 
sure when an air attack might develop. We could not just go to 
general quarters and have look-outs in the tops for an engagement 
which might come in an hour or two hours. They had to be there day 
and night, particularly moonlight nights, for operations against sub- 
marines and possibilities of an air attack. There were many things 
that made more men necessary. 

In addition to that, I personally wanted to fill the complement 
up to a hundred percent complement and I wanted to run it 15 percent 
over complement so that I would have a pool to draw on in the man- 
ning of ships and I found a number of ships that we had coming in 
that they continued to cut into the personnel that ships already had 
and more or less disrupting them. 

79716 — 46 — pt. 5 15 



2274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. And right along that line or train of thought, the 
letter from Admiral Kimmel of November 15, 1941, points out that 
the fleet requires approximately 9,000 men to fill the complements. 
It can utilize an additional 10,000 men. 

[6055] My question is that as a result of what happened at Pearl 
Harbor would 9,000 or 10,000 more men on battleships and destroyers 
there have had any appreciable effect upon what happened? 

Admiral Stark. I think none. 

Senator Lucas. We would just have lost more men if we had 9,000 
or 10,000 more men there, isn't that true ? 

Admiral Stark. If that had been so we might have lost considerably 
more on some ships. 

Senator Lucas. Now,, in this same letter, you stated in a letter to 
Admiral Kimmel on July 24 as follows : 

We are pushing recruiting just as hard as we can and for budgetary purposes 
you will be glad to know the President has okayed a figure of 533,000 enlisted 
men and 105,000 Marines. Please give us a "not too badly done" on that. But 
what a struggle it has been. 

Now, here is the point that I want to direct your attention to. This 
is July 1941 and you state : 

If we could only have gone full speed 2 years ago — 

I presume now you mean at that time, that if you could have had 
533,000 enlisted men and 105,000 Marines 2 years ago? 

Admiral Stark. Well, I mean if we could have gotten all that we 
wanted at that time. I have forgotten just what the [6056] 
figures were. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. Well, why was it, Admiral Stark, back in 
1939, in, say, July 1939, you were not able to get all that you wanted? 
What was the reason ? 

Admiral Stark. Because we could not get it by the budget. May I 
have the page number that you are reading from on that? 

Senator Lucas. Page 8. 

Admiral Stark. Oh, yes. I may state that when I finally got what 
I referred to as the green light I went directly to Senator Byrnes. 
He will recall the incident, I think, very well. He called me the most 
persistent, stubborn man on personnel he had ever known, but he 
finally gave me what I had asked for. There were one or two other 
rather amusing incidents in that conversation that it is not necessary 
to go into here but we did get what we asl^ed for. 

Senator Lucas. Well, you got what you asked for but the point I 
am making is that you lay particular stress upon the fact, as I read 
the letter, that if you could have had what you were entitled to 2 
years before that you could really have been somewhere with the Navy 
and that would have been in 1939, in the early part of 1939. 

Admiral Stark. If we could have gotten authorization and money 
for full complements plus 15 percent it would have made our problems 
very much simpler and very much easier. We [6057] solved 
it as best we could with what vre got and the results speak pretty well 
for themselves. 

Senator Lucas. I agree with you on that. Public opinion had some- 
thing to do with what you got and what you did not get back in 1939, 
isn't that true ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2275 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. Things were not as grave. When I went 
before the Naval Committee there are some things that stand out 
very clearly and we were struggling on this situation with regard to 
men, pointing out that the fleet was only 85 percent manned and what 
a great mistake I thought it was. I remember Congressman Ditter 
turning to me and saying, "Nobody has ever talked to us like that 
before about men." ''Where do you get this stuff?" 

I went back to the Department and went over some of my recom- 
mendations and some of the previous recommendations of what is 
now known as the Bureau of Personnel. I had them back up what 
I am about to say, that the Navy's pleas had been constant for men. 
The Navy was cut down to a so-called 85 percent complement some 
years previous when economy was a very potent subject and the Navy 
Avas faced — I think Admiral Pratt was Chief of Operations at the 
time — with either keeping fewer ships fully manned or a greater num- 
ber of ships in commission partially manned and as I recall 85 percent 
was put down as the lower limit of what we could keep ships going 
with [60S8] with any degree of efficiency. So we came to ac- 
cept that 85 percent and I always thought it was dangerous and the 
minute I got where I could raise my voice against it, this practice 
which we had gotten to accept, I started doing so. 

Senator Lucas. Well, it took a national emergency almost before 
you could get what you really wanted ? 

Admiral Stark. It took a national emergency to blast it out; yes 
sir. 

Senator Lucas. And that was due to the temper of the people of 
this country ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes ; I think so. 

Senator Lucas. That it took 

Admiral Stark. At that early time. 

Senator Lucas. That is right. And the people, after all, usually 
make more or less the military and naval policy. 

Admiral Stark. In the last analysis the man on the street is the 
first line of defense. 

Senator Lucas. That is right. And I think it is pertinent, too, along 
this line of inquiry, to just refer just briefly to the Treaty of Limitation 
of Naval Armaments signed in Washington on February 6, 1922, and 
ratified by the Senate March 29, 1922, as indicating how we felt at that 
particular time about peace and how far we were willing to go in 
order to maintain peace. 

[60-59] Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; and we found out to our very 
great cost that disarmament by example did not pay. 

Senator Lucas. I would like to ask you just one or two questions 
about the disarmament conference and see if you 

The Chairman. Senator, it is practically 12 : 30. 

Senator Lucas. I can finish in 5 minutes I think. 

The Chairman. All right. We want to have an executive session. 

Senator Lucas. It may be 10 minutes. 

The Chairman. Well, go ahead if it won't take more than five 
minutes. 

Senator Lucas. I want to ask Admiral Stark if he will agree with 
these facts. In 1918 the United States had a total combatant tonnage 
of ships 1,087,000 and had building additional tonnage of 953,876 tons. 
Do you recall those figures? 



2276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall the figures but if you have it in 
front of you I assume they are correct. 

Senator Lucas. Well, you recall that in the 1922 disarmament con- 
ference which I have talked about we sank or demilitarized 767,800 
tons of combatant ships ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. We did the sinking. 

Senator Lucas. And for the next eight years for all practical pur- 
poses ceased to build ships of war ? 

Admiral Stark. We had a period there where we practical- 
[6060] ly stopped. 

Senator Lucas. Let me ask you this : Did the limitation of arma- 
ments conference signed at London April the 27, 1930, and ratified by 
the Senate on July 1, 1930, was there anything in that treaty which 
prevented construction of our antisubmarine vessels and yet per- 
mitted Germany and Japan to build all the submarines they desired? 
Do you recall anything about that ? 

Admiral Stark. I think there was not. I think in the hearings 
that — as you recall, I was nearly nine days straight morning and after- 
noon early in 1940 struggling for the increase in the Navy, for what 
I thought was a modest increase of 25 percent that was cut in half 
by Congress. I pointed out we had not lived up to that very — ^I mean 
we had not built up to the 5-5-3 ratio. 

Senator Lucas. W^ had not built up to it? 

Admiral Stark. We had not built up to it. We were disarming 
by example and it did not pay. I do not want to let that stay in, 
talking about Congress cutting it in half. They stated that; I ac- 
cepted that because it was not just a straight cut in half. It was a 
question whether we could get through with 25 percent and we might 
lose the whole thing, but tlie figure of about 13 percent, as I recall, 
was all we could consider at that time and I accepted that as some- 
thing sure [6061] and was told that I could come back up 
later. I did and got a very heavy increase, so it is not fair just to 
say Congress cut me. It did not hurt and they did give it to me when 
I came back afterwards. 

Senator Lucas. Well, in 1940 when you testified before this com- 
mittee Japan had as much ship tonnage, practically as much as the 
United States? 

Admiral Stark. I think that is correct. We did not know exactly 
how much they had but they claimed that they were practically on 
a 5-5 ratio with us, some of their public speakers did. 

Senator Lucas. That was not true, of course. 

Admiral Stark. No, but it was not 5-3. 

Senator Lucas. Now, Mr. Chairman, in order to further demon- 
strate the point I am trying to make here as to how public opinion 
dominates the affairs of this country I want to read a statement made 
by the Honorable David Walsh, Chairman of the Naval Affairs Com- 
mitte, who about this same time, in April 1940, placed this very il- 
luminatijig statement in the record (reading) : 

From 1922 to 1925 the United States laid down no ships. In 1925 it laid down 
1 submarine. la 1926 it laid down 1 cruiser and 5 river gunboats. In 1927 it laid 
down 1 cruiser and 2 submarines. In 1928, 6 cruisers. In 1929 [6062] 
none. In 1930, 3 cruisers and 1 submarine. In 1931, 1 aircraft carrier, 4 cruisers 
and 2 submarines. In 1932, 3 destroyers. In 1933, 1 cruiser, 8 destroj'ers and 4 
submarines. In 1934, 2 aircraft carriers, 1 cruiser (a), 1 cruiser (b), 21 destroy- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2277 

ers and 2 patrol gunboats. In 1935, 1 cruiser (a), 7 cruisers (b), 14 destroyers 
and 5 submarines. In 1936 ttie United States laid down 

and that is true, that we lived up to this treaty closely while Japan did 
not, as I understand it ? 

Admiral Stark. We leaned over backwards the other way. We did 
not build up. 

Senator Lucas. In 1936 the United States laid down one aircraft 
carrier, one cruiser (b), six destroyers and seven submarines. In 1937 
we laid down one battleship — and I call attention to that because that 
is the first battleship we laid down since at least 1922 or before, I guess. 

Adrniral Stark. I think that is correct ; yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. There were no battleships laid down between 1922 
and 1937 during the 15 years. 

Admiral Stark. That is right. 

Senator Lucas. And the date the last was laid down is not stated 
here. 

In 1937, 1 battleship, 14 destroyers and 6 submarines. 

In 1938, 1 battleship, 14 destroyers, 4 submarines, 2 [GOGS'] 
destroyer tenders, 1 seaplane tender, 3 tugs, 2 oilers. 

In 1939, 2 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 12 destroyers, 7 submarines, 
3 sub chasers, 2 minesweepers, 1 submarine tender, 1 seaplane tender, 
1 oiler. 

And that is all that I have. 

The Chairman. The committee will recess until 2 o'clock and the 
chair asks the public to retire as rapidly as possible. We want to have 
an executive session. 

(Whereupon, at 12: 35 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the 
same day.) 

IG064] afternoon session — 2 : 45 p. m. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

The Chair wishes to announce that after the executive session the 
committee has decided that following the testimony of Admiral Stark 
it will recess the hearing until the 15th of January in order that the 
new counsel collaborating with Mr. Mitchell and his staff may become 
familiar with the testimony adduced up to now and get into the case 
so he may go forward with it following the retirement of Mr. Mitchell. 

Also the committee decided, upon the urgent request and in ac- 
cordance with the wishes of counsel for Admiral Kimmel and Gen- 
eral Short, when the committee reconvenes on the 15th of January 
Admiral Kimmel will be the first witness, to be followed by General 
Short when Admiral Kimmel has concluded. 

You may go ahead now. 

Mr. Murphy, I believe you are the next. 

TESTIMONY OF ADMIEAL HAROLD E. STAEK (Eesumed) 

Admiral Stark. May I make just a short statement? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Adrniral Stark. My attention has been called to the fact that this 
morning I stated that it was last summer that the President expressed 
to me his surprise over the Pearl Harbor attack. It was a year ago 



2278 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

last summer, during the [6065'\ proceedings of the Naval 
Court of Inquiry which were held a year ago last summer. 

The Chairman. That is an obvious error, because President Roose- 
velt was not alive last summer. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. All right, Congressman. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, I would like to direct your attention to the 
message that was sent to Hawaii on the 7th of December 1941. 

Do you have a copy of it ? 

Admiral Stark. The 7th of December? 

Mr. MuRPHT. Yes, the message of General Marshall. 

Admiral Stark. I think I have it in the statement. 

Mr. Murphy. As I understand it, the earliest moment you have any 
recollection of being aware of the 1 p. m. message was somewhere 
between 10: 30 and 11 o'clock that morning. Is that right? 

Admiral Stark. I think that is right, 3^es, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And, as I understand it. General Marshall's testi- 
mony was that he was aware of the 1 o'clock message sometime sub- 
sequent to that on that same morning. 

Admiral Stark. I believe it was sometime later. 

Mr. Murphy. And then General Marshall sent a message to Hawaii, 
and I would like to read that message and discuss it [6'066'\ 
with you a bit. 

The message reads : 

The Japanese are presenting at 1 : 00 p. m. Eastern Standard Time today what 
amounts to an ultimatum ; 

Now, setting aside for the moment the 1 p. m. part of it, you had 
already told Hawaii, had you not, that negotiations had terminated 
with the Japanese, and as on the 27th you sent that message setting 
that particular date, did you not? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, the message continues, "also they are un- 
der orders to destroy their code machine immediately." 

You had, during the previous days of December, told Admiral Eam- 
mel exactly that, had you not? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And continuing, "Just what significance the hour set 
may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly." 

And then finally, "Inform Naval authorities of this communica- 
tion." 

Now outside of the 1 p. m. part of that message, was there anything 
in the message itself that you had not previously conveyed to Hawaii? 

Admiral Stark. In my opinion there was not. 

Mr. Murphy. Have you at any time looked into the matter of the 
condition of the ships and planes at Hawaii on the [6067] morn- 
ing of December 7, 1941 ? 

Admiral Stark. I have not. 

Mr. Murphy. Prior to the attack. 

Admiral Stark. I had not. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, there is testimony that has been adduced, and 
will be adduced before the committee, as to the condition of readiness 
of the ships. Assuming that vou had sent the message the very mo- 
ment you had gotten it, somewliere between 10 : 30 and 11 o'clock, and' 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2279 

assuming that the attack occurred about 2 : 30 — that is when it was, 
was it not, about 2 : 30 Washington time? 

Admiral Stark. About 1 : 57, I think, somewhere in there. 

Mr. Murphy. About 1 : 57 Washington time ? 

Admiral Stark. Shortly before 2.^ 

Mr. Murphy. Then what change in ships by way of sorties could 
have occurred between 10 : 30 and 10 : 40 and 1 : 57 to 2 : 00 o'clock? 

Admiral Stark. Well, if I had sent a message, assuming I got 
the 1 p. m. message about 10 : 40, I have since asked the question, and 
recently, from communications — if I had given them a dispatch which 
they had coded and sent and decoded on the other end and delivered, 
what their estimate of the time was, and they gave me an hour and 7 
minutes. 

Mr. Murphy. That would make it 11 : 47. 

[6068] Admiral Stark. Assuming I had acted instantaneously 
on the message. 

Mr. Murphy. Instantaneously, yes. Without any conference at all, 
if you had instantaneously acted, they would get it there at 11 : 47? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Does that take into consideration the decoding at 
Hawaii ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Then at 11 : 47, from then until 1 : 57, what change 
could be made in the position of ships at that time? That would be 
approximately 2 hours, would it not ? 

Admiral Stark. Approximately 2 hours. That is more or less of a 
technical question. For example, I do not know which way the ships 
were headed. If they were placed in docks so they were heading out 
it would be one thing; if they had to be turned around it V70uld be 
another. I think only Admiral Kimmel could give you real testimony 
on that. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, if the battleships themselves were berthed, 
8 of them, in Pearl JHarbor it would take some considerable time, 
would it not, to get them out of the harbor? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. The last time we sortied out of there we 
had to be turned around by tugs, but during the [6069] pre- 
ceding months in which the fleet had been there they undoubtedly had 
become used to being handled in there. Just what their time would 
have been I do not know. They would first have to have been notified to 
get under way, and assuming that they would have to raise steam for 
propulsion purposes, and if tugs were required they would have to 
have been brought alongside and they would then have had to be 
sortied, and they would, of course, have had to have destroyers ahead 
of them, and probably planes searching for submarines, which they 
would do if they thought the attack might be there, and just what the 
total time would have been I would rather Admiral Kimmel gave you 
that. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, to make a rough approximation, it would be a 
matter of hours, would it not ? 

Admiral Stark. AVell, you can force when you have to. Normally, 
as I recall, we gave a ship with one or two boilers about 2 hours' notice 
to get under way. 

» Corrected to 1 : 25 p. m. Washington time. See page 2346, Infra. 



2280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. That 2 hours, Admiral, would be dependent upon the 
fact that as soon as Admiral Kimmel received the message from Wash- 
ington he would have immediately and instantaneously had the reac- 
tion that there was to be something happening at 1 o'clock ? 

Admiral Stakk. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. In order to consume the time between then [6070] 
and the attack, would he not ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I did not quite finish my answer. 

Mr. Murphy. All right, you may finish. 

Admiral Stark. If he had forced them and the emergency were 
understood, they could have cut that time in half, or perhaps less than 
that. They would have taken a chance on raising steam without regard 
to the normal precautions of raising it slowly so as not to affect the 
boilers adversely. 

Mr. Murphy. That would be also assuming that his mental processes 
were different than they were on the message of the 27th, which said it 
was a war warning? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. That is assuming he forced them. He can 
give you, I think, better testimony on that than I can, because of his 
familiarity with the picture. 

Mr. MuiiPHY. There has been some testimony already in the record, 
and some to be covered, as to the condition of the readiness of the 
planes. 

As I understand it, so far as the Army and Navy planes were con- 
cerned, in a great measure they required as much as 4 hours before 
they could go in the air. This 2 hours difference would not have gotten 
them in the air then, would it, if it required 4 hours from the time your 
message arrived at Hawaii to the time of the attack? 

[6071] Admiral Stark. If it required 4 hours you could not 
have gotten them off in that time. 

Mr. Murphy. I think there will be considerable testimony along 
that line. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. So far as the planes are concerned, if they could not 
get off in the air the next best thing would be to push them somewhere 
for protection, would it not? 

Admiral Stark. To spread them. 

Mr. Murphy. To spread them? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Instead of having them bunched together the best 
thing would be spread them and maybe get them into bunkers? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. They did have some bunkers, there, did they not? 

Admiral Stark. I do not know. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, there have been some questions asked 
about the so-called bomb plot message. You know about that ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Murphy. That message actually was sent from Tokyo in Sep- 
tember, was it not? 

Admiral Stark. That is right, yes, sir. 

[607£] jNIr. Murphy. It was not translated in Washington until 
October 10, is that true? 

Admiral Stark. T think so; sometime later. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2281 

Mr. Murphy. Was there anything unusual about our diplomatic 
relations in September, and was not the date of the forwarding of that 
message in Tokyo prior to the submission of the Japanese note of 
September — or do you know that ? 

Admiral Stark. No, I do not. I am not quite sure of your ques- 
tion. Mr. Murphy. . ^ , • . 

Mr. Murphy. Well, my question is this: The change m Cabmet 
did not occur until October 16, and on October 16 they did send a 
message to the Pacific. 

Admiral Stark. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, this socalled bomb plot message was al- 
ready translated on October 10. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And had been forwarded from the Japanese in the 
month of September. Would not there be less likelihood of that par- 
ticular message being clipped or called to your particular attention 
then because of the state of the relations between America and Japan 
at the time? 

Admiral Stark. I do not know that that would have entered into the 
minds of the people who were going over that message. I would 
rather be inclined to think that the message [607311 would have 
stood on its merits, that they would have looked at it as a message with- 
out regard to the Japanese Cabinet change. 

Mr. Murphy. Then you do not know anybody that saw any par- 
ticular significance in that, do you ? 

Admiral Stark. No. 

Mr. Murphy. It was never called to your attention, that you know 
of? 

Admiral Stark. It was never called to my attention, so far as I 
recollect. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, this 1 o'clock message referred to 1 o'clock 
on Sunday, and there has been some considerable discussion about the 
fact that the Japanese were going to see the Secretary of State on 
Sunday. There was a discussion that morning about that, was there 
not, about the fact they were doing it on Sunday, or calling on the Sec- 
retary of State on Sunday ? 

Admiral Stark. When we got it we were a little puzzled as to just 
why they were making it at 1 o'clock. 

Mr. Murphy. And on Sunday? 

Admiral Stark. And on Sunday, yes, sir. We had covered the pos- 
sibility of an attack on Sunday, if it came, in a previous message. 

Mr. Murphy. I was wondering if there was any discussion [6074-'\ 
then about the fact that we also delivered our message on Sunday. 
When President Eoosevelt came back from Argentia he asked to see 
the Japanese on Sunday, too, did he not ? It was Sunday afternoon 
at 4 o'clock when he saw the Ambassador, was it not? 

Admiral Stark. I believe it was. I am hazy on it. I recollect there 
was another instance when the message was to be delivered at a certain 
time. I think that occurs occasionally. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, President Eoosevelt did send a wire to 
Secretary Hull and asked Secretary Hull to arrange to come to the 
White House on Sunday morning, and he asked the Japaneses to see 
him at the White House that afternoon, did he not ? 
Admiral Stark. I recall that, yes, sir. 



2282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAKL HARBOR ATTACK 

[6075] Mr. Murphy. As I understand it, one of the reasons that 
prompted you in delaying or in not wanting to send the 1 o'clock 
message to Hawaii was that you had already sent so much you thought 
maybe you might be confusing Admiral Kimmel? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. Have you seen Admiral Kimmel's statement given to 
this committee? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir; I have not. 

Mr. Murphy. I suggest that you have your counsel get a copy. 

Mr. Chairman. In fairness to the witness I think he should have it. 
We may want to ask him some questions on it at some time. 

Admiral Stark. Counsel, I think, has been furnished a copy. 

Mr. Murphy. Do you thing that the tenor of your papers that were 
sent to Admiral Kimmel throughout the year of 1941 were such as to 
take away the effect or the meaning of your war warning message ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not. 

Mr. Murphy. I understood you to say that you had never heard 
of a war warning message in the precise words that were used having 
been sent before to anyone in the Pacific. 

[6076] Admiral Staek. That is true. I never heard of such a 
message before. 

Mr. Murphy. You had never, prior to 1941, December 1941, sent 
anything to Admiral Kimmel about codes being burned ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. When j^^ou sent your message to Admiral Kimmel in 
October, Admiral Kimmel wrote you a letter saying that he had sent 
submarines in certain directions and that he had made certain move- 
ments as a result of receiving your October message ; you recall that ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, I do. 

Mr. Murphy, As I understand it Admiral Kimmel takes the posi- 
tion that since he told you about what he had done subsequent to Octo- 
ber and since you had not criticized the arrangement he had made 
then, that he was justified in continuing the position which he had 
assumed in October right on down after receiving your war warning 
message. Do you think he was justified in that position? 

Admiral Stark. No, I do not. The message that was sent in Octo- 
ber, as I recall, he sent out some submarines to the outlying Islands, 
and informed me about it by letter, and I wrote him back "O. K.," 
but the situation in December was a decidedly different one. 

Mr. Murphy. You think 

[6077] Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I interpose to raise the 
question of propriety, as to whether or not the testimony to be given 
by Admiral Kimmel should be referred to. It has been furnished to 
us in confidence with a release date on it that it was not to be released 
until he takes the stand. 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to say 

Mr. Gearhart. I don't think that should be pursued so as to destroy 
the effectiveness of Admiral Kimmel's testimony. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that I think that 
should be met by the committee. I have read Admiral Kimmel's 
testimony in the Narrative. I have it here. I am quite familiar with 
what his testimony was. 

He has, however, given a statement to the committee and he has 
restricted the use of it until he takes the stand. Am I to understand 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2283 

that we are not to go into Admiral Kimmel's case at all and that if 
there are accusations made against the witness on the stand we are 
not to ask him about it ? 

Mr. Gearhart. I would like to point out that the testimony is 
marked plainly not to be released until the witness takes the stand. 

Mr. Murphy. Do you see it here ? Where is it ? I am referring to 
the Navy Narrative. 

Mr. Gearhart. You are not referring to the testimony that has been 
placed in our hands? 

[6078] Mr. Murphy. I want to meet that now. 

The Chairman. If that matter is put up to the Chair, the Chair 
would hold that inasmuch as a confidential description has been put 
on the advance statement of Admiral Kimmel, that it is not to be re- 
leased until he goes on the stand, members of the committee would be 
bound by that instruction no less than the members of the press, but 
that does not restrict a member of the committee from using any testi- 
mony that Admiral Kimmel may have given at the numerous hearings 
at which he testified. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral Stark read this morning from the previous 
testimony that the Navy Board had referred to the message as being 
of the same tenor. 

Do you recall reading that? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. I have Admiral Kimmel's testimony here and if the 
wish is that we not go into it, I suggest that it will be necessary to recall 
Admiral Stark back. At least I want to ask him some questions about 
what Admiral Kimmel said. 

Mr. Gearhart. I am not objecting to any reference to any other testi- 
money, except that which was handed us recently with a release date 
upon it. 

Mr. Murphy. If you can see that here I would like to see it. 

[6079] The Chairman. Go ahead. 

Admiral Stark. I think we were furnished a copy of that statement. 
Counsel was furnished it on New Year's Eve. I have not read it. I 
didn't know that I would be questioned on it. 

Mr. Murphy. I have read a small part of it but I read what he said 
before. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then. Admiral, the message about which I was 
asking you at the time the gentleman from California spoke about the 
confidential statement of Admiral Kimmel, as I understand it it is in 
this exhibit here. Do you have a copy of that? Your letters and 
Admiral Kimmel's letters. 

Admiral Stark. I have a copy of my letters to Admiral Kimmel and 
his to me. 

Mr. Murphy. You have read his letter to you and your letter to 
him, where you say "O. K." ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

[6080] Mr. Murphy. At the time that you said "0. K.," would 
Admiral Kimmel be justified in assuming that the preparations that 
he had made subsequent to your October message had your approval 
to be the same that should be applied to the war warning message? 

Admiral Stark. I think not. 



2284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. MuEPHY. Now, there has been reference in one of your letters 
about the routing of ships, and I believe you meant to refer to the 
routing of the ships througli the Torres Straits; is that right? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And in your letter you suggested that you were per- 
haps making that as a preliminary move to meeting the situation when 
thmgs got more critical ; is that right ? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. In your judgment, was it necessary to route the ships 
at the time you did through the Torres Straits, and if so for what 
reason ? 

Admiral Stark. It looked like trouble ahead. It was our job to 
prevent capture of our merchant ships on the high seas if we could in 
a sudden emergency of a declaration or war act of Japan. For that 
reason we took ships off the usual routes and sent them on the southern 
where they could be better protected and where there were ports to 
which they could go in [6081] case of trouble. It also took 
time to get vessels routed and get into a groove as to just how to handle 
them, because it required routing across the broad Pacific, and we 
thought it advisable to initiate it at that time, and we did. 

Mr. MuBPHY. Well, at any rate, you did it as a precautionary 
measure and as a security measure ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. And I might add, it was a matter of 
considerable pride to us that the only ship we lost of American tonnage 
was one on which we took a deliberate chance. 

Mr. Murphy. Was that in the Pacific ? 

Admiral Stark. It was in the Pacific. A ship we sent out for the 
remaining Marines in China, and we didn't know whether we would 
have time or not. She was captured. 

Mr. Murphy, Were there any German raiders in the Pacific prior 
to December 7, 1941 ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; there were raiders off and on in the 
Pacific prior to December 7 — German raiders. 

Mr. Murphy. In your judgment who was at fault, if anyone, for 
the failure to have the torpedo baffles or nets on the ships on December 
7, 1941? You have already testified that Ordnance was working on 
it. There were three or four letters between you and Admiral Kimmel 
on the subject. Do you know of anyone particularly to blame for 
not having them on that day ? 

[6082] Admiral Stark. I was asked this morning if I instituted 
any follow-up of ni)' original request of Bureau of Ordnance to design 
and build those baffles. I perhaps can best answer the question by 
reading into the record the follow-ups which we made and if the 
committee so desires I will read them. They are not very long. 

Mr. Murphy. I think it is important enough to do it. 

The Chairmak. Kead them into the record. 

Admiral Stark. The original letter was in February. On April 
9, Chief of Naval Operations wrote this letter to Chief of Bureau of 
Ordnance, inviting attention to certain references and stating that the : 

* * * the Chief of Naval Operations brought forth the necessity for experi- 
mental and development work in connection with nets and booms, and especially 
the need for a light anti-torpedo net. The attention of the Bureau is directed to 
reference (b) which gives certain details of an apparently much lighter net now 
used by the Germans. 

Signed: R. B. Ingersoll, Acting. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMFFrEE 2285 

On September 16, the Chief of Naval Operations wrote the Bureau 
of Ordnance. 

Subject : Experimental and Developmental Work on Nets and Booms. 

with four references. 

[6083] The letter reads : 

It is suggested that in order that progress may be made in solving some of 
the problems which confront us, that a small group of officers, engineers and 
draftsmen be assigned exclusively to planning improvement in net and boom 
designs and to development and experimental work. The group, it is suggested, 
may be aided by using the facilities of the Net Depots at Tiburon and Newport. 
It is suggested that these two depots appear suitable as centers for experimental 
and development work. 

In references (a) and (b) the Chief of Naval Operations indicated the desir- 
ability of undertaking some research and development work. Among other sug- 
gestions, the need for a lighter anti-torpedo net was stressed, which can be 
laid and removed in harbors in a short time for temporary use, and which will 
give good if not perfect protection from torpedoes fired from planes. 

Designs are requested to be prepared giving A/T net protection to one or 
more large ships moored in harbors against torpedo plane attack in which the 
A/T net may be placed completely around one or more large ships, similar to 
placing the ship or ships in a "dry dock" of A/T net. It may be assumed that the 
currents inside of most harbors are not as great as at the entrances, [6084] 
and the moorings of such nets may be of less weight and less extensive than for 
the present A/T nets which are designed principally for harbor entrances. As 
such nets may be desired for advance bases, as little weight and volume of 
material as possible is desirable. As little space as possible should be taken up 
by the nets in order not to take up too much anchorage space. 

Designs of A-T nets which might be attached to booms on ships or floating off 
of ships at anchor are requested to be prepared in conjunction with the Bureau 
of Ships. In a design of this type it may be possible to do away with mooring 
the nets. A net which deflects rather than stops the torpedo may possibly be 
designed. 

Reference (c) is a preliminary Admiralty report on the development of a tor- 
pedo net defense for merchant ships at sea. It is requested that the Bureau of 
Ordnance in- conjunction with the Bureau of Ships undertake a similar develop- 
ment work for the protection of ships under way at sea. 

It is possible that in our Navy the assumption that has been reached that 
anchorages protected by nets are secure. Nets are defensive measures, and, in 
general, are without destructive means. Patrol vessels are required in conjunc- 
tion with net defenses, and of the two [6085] measures of defense, the 
vessels, capable of offensive action, are probably the more important. It is 
believed that the tests with nets conducted by the British should be accepted 
as conclusive. While one test of torpedo firing against an A/T net has been con- 
ducted by the Bureau, the torpedo was not equipped with cutters. No other tests 
have as yet been held. It may be well to repeat and to extend the British tests. 
It may be worth while to know the exact damage which will be done to an anti- 
torpedo net from a torpedo fired in the net. 

Until the present in great measure reliance in this mode of defense has been 
placed on British designs, experiments and tests. It is considered that now we 
should be in a position to take more progressive action. In this letter it is real- 
ized that the requests made are not concrete and definite, but serve only to indi- 
cate several of the problems toward the solution of which action may be directed. 

[6086] On 3 October 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations wrote 
again to the Chief of Bureau of Ordnance on the same subject, with 
references and a copy of reference A, which were proceedings of meet- 
ing of local joint planning committee, northern California sector, 
Pacific coastal frontier, of September 17. The letter reads: 

Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information. 

Attention is invited to paragraph 3 of the enclosure. The Chief of Naval Oper- 
ations considers it urgent to develop an anti-torpedo net which can be made up, 
towed to a desired location, and quickly laid. The use of pontoons, as suggested, 
does not appear to solve this question ; a reduction in the number ol moorings, at 
present necessary for the standard net, would seem to be required. 



2286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

That is the correspondence up to December 7 that Operations had 
with the Bureau of Ordnance on that subject of getting nets. 

[6087] Mr. MuRPiiY. What I was referring to previously was 
the Hewitt report contained in the appendix to Narrative Statement 
of Evidence which was given to me. On page 43 there is a reference 
made to a letter of February 15, 1941, from you to Admiral Kimmel 
and again to a letter of February IT, 1941, from you to Admiral 
Kimmel and again to a letter by Admiral Bloch of March 20, 1941, 
and again a letter of June 1941 from you to Admiral Kimmel, to 
which you referred this morning. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MuEPHY. Now, in the Hewitt report I find the following: 

Admiral Kimmel testified that on this correspondence he based his opinion 
that there was no chance of an air torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor — and that even 
after the June letter, he did not think that torpedoes would run in such shallow 
water. He pointed out that the Navy made no effort to place such nets in Pearl 
Harbor. He later stated that he did not think an aerial torpedo attack would be 
made because he did not think such torpedoes would run in Pearl Harbor and 
did not give this a great deal of consideration for that reason. 

In the light of the fact that Bureau of Ordnance were working on 
it and none had been furnished to Hawaii was Admiral Kimmel justi- 
fied in that statement ? 

[6088] Admiral Stark. I think the statement is not justified in 
view of the letter which I read this morning. 

Mr. Murphy. The letter in June 1941 ? 

Admiral Stark. Of June 13 of 1941, in which appears the para- 
graph in part : 

Hence it may be stated that it cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other 
valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack — that is torpedo 
attack — if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be 
developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo. 

Now, you will recall that I follow that with other paragraphs which 
while not changing that paragraph may have minimized it to the 
extent that it would not occur. 

Mr. MuRPPiY. Yes. Those letters are all in the record and you read 
them this niorning. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Did Admiral Kimmel have the facilities at Pearl 
Harbor for manufacturing or preparing torpedo nets? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir, 

Mr. Murphy. If he had gotten them wouldn't he have to get them 
through the CNO or would he go direct to Ordnance ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, he probably would have written us about 
them. He could have written the Bureau of Ordnance but [6089] 
T think he would have come to us, undoubtedly, on it. 

Mr. Murphy. What is your judgment subsequent to June of 1941 ? 
Should he or should he not have initiated a move to get them before 
December and if he did initiate it, in your judgment would they have 
been available? 

Admiral Stark. Well, we had initiated it and we did not have them, 
but we were pressing the Bureau of Ordnance. You will note that I 
also mentioned the Bureau of Ships. I remember personally suggest- 
ing to the Bureau of Ships the possibility of developing something 
like our targets to be placed alongside of sliips in Pearl Harbor. Just 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2287 

what they had arrived at at that time I do not know, but they had not 
produced. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, why was the President opposed to the use 
of draftees on ships by the Navy? 

Admiral Stark. I may state with regard to that that I also was 
initially opposed to them. 

Mr. Murphy. Will you explain why? 

Admiral Stark. It was a matter of sentiment, a matter of pride. 
We had always been a volunteer service and we think a service where 
men come into it because they want to, if you can get them, is a good 
thing and initially I was also opposed to it. The time came when 
wages were high ashore, when a man on a merchant ship could get 
several times what a man on [6090] board a Navy ship could 
get, when it was not so easy for us to get volunteers. It then became 
necessary for us to resort to the draft. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, in studying the message of November 27 
and in studying the testimony of Admiral Kimmel and General Short 
in previous hearings I am wondering if the people in Washington and 
the people at Hawaii were not influenced more by the war plans that 
had been drawn up in the mind of messages and in the kind of defense 
that was instituted, than they were by what actually occurred between 
the end of November and the beginning of December and I refer 
particularly first — I am now referring to page 23 of the appendix to 
the Narrative Statement. Do you have a copy of that available, 
Admiral? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, there is one here. I haven't read the narrative. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, you have read what I am going to speak about 
l)ut it is more easy for me to refer to it here. 

I would like to direct your attention first to the United States Pacific 
Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five. It first sets forth the intro- 
duction, mobilization, and the assumptions, and then the assumption 
that would include war with Japan, imder section 1211 would be 
A-2. Do you see that ? 

Admiral Stark. "A", yes, sir. 

[6091] Mr. Murphy. A-2. 

Admiral Stark. A-2? 

Mr. Murphy. A-2 would be war with Japan. A-1 would be war 
without Japan. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, if you go over to the next page, page 24, 
uncler section 1332 there is a statement, "It is conceived that Japanese 
action will be as follows", and I read first section "a" : 

a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia 
(including the Philippines) and Hong Kong. 

b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American 
and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean, 
and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions. 

c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only. 

Now, then, I do not see anything in there about Hawaii. Do you ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. He mentions there the principal offensive 
effort and we approved this plan, so I will accept responsibility for it 
also. 

[6092] Mr. Murphy. That is right, but these places 



2288 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. In another part of this plan I think he specifically 
mentions possibilities of air raid even before war is declared or any- 
thing done. 

Mr. Murphy. I am just taking this step by step. At least, these 
places that are referred to in 1-a are the places that were referred 
to substantially in your telegram, weren't they ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Then you speak of defensive efforts. Then you come 
over to section 1333 : 

To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be 
toward : 

a. Capture of Guam. 

b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and 
the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced 
bases, and by the destruction of United States and allied air and naval forces 
in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon. 

c. Capture of Northern Borneo. 

d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas 
area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and 
light [6093] naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet. 

e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval 
forces. 

f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying 
United States positions. 

Now, I do not think Hawaii is included in any of those either, 
is it? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Certainly, they would not refer to our main naval 
base as an outlying position, would they? That would be one of the 
smaller islands, wouldn't it? 

Admiral Stark. Smaller islands are referred to in that particular 
section I believe, yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, the places that you refer to there in 1333 are 
the places that you refer to in your telegram, are they not ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; and I think they were also referred to 
in our own war plan. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, I will come to that but I am trying to get what 
was the background for the telegram and why Hawaii was not in- 
cluded. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, in section 1334 you speak of the initial {6094^ 
Japanese deployment. It says : 

The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows: 

Then you speak of A, B, C, D, and E and then when you come to F : 

Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and sub- 
marines in the Hawaiian area. 

There is nothing about an attack on Hawaii via the air, is there? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct, yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I come over to the tasks assigned by the 
Navy basic plan and the mission and in section 2101 you come down 
to "H", "Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific 
area." 

That might include Hawaii but that was offensive action, wasn't it? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2289 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then I come over to section 2202 and I find, 
"tasks formulated to accomplish the assigned missions" and I go. 
on through "A." I come to "B" : 

Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea. 

That would definitely be Hawaii, wouldn't it? 
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 
[6095] Mr. Murphy. And then on down to "K" : 

Continue training operations as practicable. 

That would be for Admiral Kimmel, wouldn't it ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. That always holds in war as well as 
peace. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, regardless of what plans there were by any- 
one, the first law of nature is self-preservation, isn't it ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy, And the fleet belonged to Admiral Kimmel and those 
at Hawaii, and General Short, and self-preservation, regardless of 
when it was, dictated that they should protect that fleet m order to 
save themselves and be able to operate, isn't that true? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then I come to "M" : 

Guard against surprise attack by Japan. 

That would be definitely the obligation of those at Hawaii and at 
the base, would it not ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir, and, of course, they had covered that in 
other plans. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, Admiral, at any rate I have studied these dif- 
ferent plans and I come to the air raid but it seems to me that the air 
raid itself, or the possibilities of an [6096] air raid — in fact, in 
the plan at Hawaii a submarine attack was listed as probable, an air 
attack was listed only as possible, and I was wondering if the thought 
in the Navy, particularly, perhaps, when these plans were prepared and 
manufactured was not to work that air attack in Hawaii down the 
line a little from what was expected in the event that war started ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, I had not thought of that, particularly in 
view of the special letters which were written on the subject and the 
follow-up of special plans made to guard against air raid, such as the 
Bellinger agreement, Bellinger-Martin agi-eement and the letters ex- 
changed between Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson and the drills 
which were being implemented and the fact that when we got these 
very excellent plans of Admiral Kimmel we had distributed them 
throughout the service. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, it is your feeling that these supplemental 
plans that pertained particularly to Hawaii and the danger of an air 
attack and the letter of the Secretary of War and the correspondence 
you had kept that to the forefront regardless of where the attack on 
Hawaii might be in these several other plans ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir, and the final letter which I read this morn- 
ing dated in October, which was gotten out on [6097] that 
subject. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, I have this last question, Admiral. In all of 
the messages that were sent to Hawaii and in all of the considerations 

79716 — 46 — pt. ."5 16 



2290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

in Washington about the possible move to the southward, the reason 
why you were fortifying the Philippines was so that the Japanese 
would fear an attack on their flank specifically and, therefore, would 
hesitate going into the South China Sea, that is right, isn't it ? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct, yes, sir. Whether we could deter 
them or not — I believe I stated that we hoped that they might have 
some weight toward prevention, if not then in execution, but that flank 
position, unless the Japanese had made up their minds that we would 
not come in, was a serious threat to their communications to their main 
offensive to the south. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, isn't it also true that if the Japanese were going 
to go to the South Seas that the fleet, once it was in the Pacific, was 
always a danger to their flank and, therefore, had to be taken into con- 
sideration every time you thought of what the Japs might do, because 
they would have to get the fleet off their flank to be safe, wouldn't they ? 

Admiral Stark. Ultimately they would have to lick the fleet or be 
licked by the fleet. 

Mr. Murphy. I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman. 

[6098] The Chairman. Senator Brewster being absent. Con- 
gressman Gearhart is at bat. 

Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Stark, what is the tour of duty of a Chief 
of Naval Operations? 

Admiral Stark. The normal tour, provided an officer has that 
much time in his active service left, is 4 years. That is true of the 
bureau chiefs also. 

Mr. Gearhart. That was not the thought I had in mind. I meant 
the tour of duty on a 24-hour period. 

Admiral Stark. You mean how long is he supposed to — I do not 
know just what you mean. You mean how many hours a day? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. I do not think there is anything. It depends on 
the individual and particularly on the work. 

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact. Admiral, I think under Navy 
regulations he would be on clutj^ constantly during the time that he is 
serving in that office. 

Admiral Stark. Always available ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. He must never be beyond reach ; isn't that correct ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. It always must be known where he is. He 
might be in the West Indies but he would still be within reach by radio 
or he might be with the fleet on an exercise [6099] but his 
whereabouts is always known and there is always a means of com- 
munication with him. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is also true of the Chief of Staff of the Army; 
is it not? 

Admiral Stark. I suppose so. 

Mr. Gearhart. In fact, that is the rule applying to all high-rank- 
ing commanding officers; is that not true? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I would say it would be true, certainly, 
of the commander in chief of the fleet. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then a commanding officer, a Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions, should not at any time put himself beyond communication by 
his subordinates; is that correct? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2291 

Admiral Stark. That would be correct, except some special cir- 
cumstance might arise, which would be thoroughly understood, but 
I have never heard of such special circumstance. 

Mr. Gearhart. And that is also true of the Chief of Staff of the 
Army? 

Admiral Stark. Well, I suppose it is, Mr. Gearhart. 

Mr. Gearhart, When you left the office on Saturday night didn't 
you leave word there as to where you were going to be and where 
you could be reached on December G, 1941 ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes; when I went out I always left word. I do 
not recall of any time when I did not, and occasionally I had it checked 
just to see if I were absent whether the [6100] follow-up 
would be effective. I do not recall being out that night but I also do not 
recall whether I was out or not ; so there it is. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, isn't there a record kept in the office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations as to where he is every minute that he is 
away from the office? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. When you leave 

Admiral Stark. When you say "every minute," yes; if I were 
going out at night my aide would usually leave word with the duty 
officer where I could be found, assuming that my intentions to go out 
were before I left the office. If after I got home I suddenly decided 
to go out somewhere, I would leave word with the house and usually 
call up the duty officer in addition. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, have you searched the records in the office 
of the Chief of Naval Operations to ascertain where you were on 
Saturday night, the 6th day of December 1941 ? 

Admiral Stark. We have found nothing as to where I was and it 
follows my assumption that my thought was that I was at home. 
There is nothing I have been able to find out which locates where I 
was that evening. 

Mr. Gearhart. In view of the fact that the Chief of Staff cannot 
remember where he was on that night is it pos- [6101] sible 
that you and he could have been together ? 

Admiral Stark. I think we had no such conspiracy at that time, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, do you shut it out as being an utter impos- 
sibility that you and he could have been in each other's company that 
night? 

Admiral Stark. I do not shut it out as an utter impossibility that 
we could have been in each other's company, but I think we were not. 

Mr. Gearhart. You do not remember that. 

Admiral Stark. No; but I feel that perhaps we both would have 
remembered it if that had occurred. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, you not remembering where you were cer- 
tainly you cannot remember that you were not with General Marshall 
on that night, can you? 

Admiral Stark. Well, I think that may be a reasonable assumption. 

Mr. Gearhart. You were together a great deal all the time, were 
you not ? 

Admiral Stark. We were together either talking by telephone or 
interoffice visits a great deal during office hours. We were not to- 



2292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR Al^TACK 

gether a great deal in the evening. Once in a while we would have 
just a little family supper party but neither one — I was not going out 
much at that time. I could [6102] not. If I got home in 
time for dinner at half past seven I was rather lucky and my brief 
case always went with me. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did you, as General Marshall did, have orderlies at 
your quarters at all times ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. I might add that the servants in the house 
were given my address and there was one always on duty. 

Mr. Gearhart. You have been informed that an effort was made to 
locate you on Saturday night, have you not ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes; I have heard that an effort was made to 
locate me. 

Mr. Gearhart. And you also have learned that a courier called at 
your quarters and you were not there ? 

Admiral Stark. No ; I have not heard that. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did you have any telephone call that evening from 
Colonel Knox, the Secretary of the Navy ? 

Admiral Stark. Not tliat I recall. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, you testified in your written statement, page 
51, that the Navy was in the war in the Atlantic on the Tth day of No- 
vember 1941. You remember that testimony ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. If we were at war on the Tth day of November of 
1941 in the Atlantic when did that war begin ? 

Admiral Stark. I would like to say as to that statement [6103'] 
that we were at war that it should be interpreted as in effect. We were 
not belligerents, we did not have the right of belligerents, but when 
we had orders to shoot any German or Italian on the high seas to the 
westward of the twenty-sixth meridian and when they in turn were 
attacking us and we were endeavoring to sink their attacking vessels 
and they were endeavoring and had wounded our vessels at that time, 
we were in effect engaging them and to that extent we were at war, and 
so far as the high seas were concerned when we actually entered the 
war there wasn't much change in that particular case. 

On the other hand, there was at one time a request come to me to 
apprehend a certain vessel, a German vessel which was, we found, 
approaching Germany with rubber and we refused to do it because 
of the fact that we did not have belligerent rights. 

On the other hand, again as regards being in war, we were in the 
position of having command of Canadian vessels or they might have 
of ours, or we might under certain circumstances under the shooting 
order command British vessels, Britain being at war Avith Germany, 
or a British officer might have command of ours, so in effect I made 
the statement we were at war. There were certain belligerent rights 
technically and the thing had not been openly declared, but in the ways 
which the President had defined and of which he had informed the 
[6104] country in his speech in September, there was practically 
war on the sea for any Axis power that came within that limit. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, you described the conditions as existing on the 
Tth day of November 1941 as indicating a condition of war. Now I 
am asking you when did the condition come into being? 

Admiral Stark. I think perhaps I might read a brief which I had 
made up thinking it might be of use to the committee — primarily I 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2293 

\ranted it for myself to get the sequence — of the hemispheric defense 
orders and whether or not I have enough copies here to give the com- 
mittee at this time I do not know. 

Mr. Geaehart. Was there an order commanding commanders of 
American ships in the Atlantic to fire upon German submarines or 
surface ships under any conditions ? 

Admiral Stark. There was. 

Mr. Gearhart. Who issued that order ? 

Admiral Stark. I did, by direction of the President. 

Mr. Gearhart, And when was it issued ? 

Admiral Stark (reading) : 

On October 8, 1941 by despatch 082335 the Chief of Naval Operations ordered 
the above outlined plan executed at 1400 G. C. T. 

that is Greenwich Civil Time — 

11 October 1941. The plan remained in effect until December 11, 1^1 at which 
time the Chief of Naval Operations by despatch 111550 ordered the above out- 
lined plan cancelled and [6105] replaced by WPL 46, Navy Basic War 
Plan Kainbow No. 5. 

I think it might be helpful if I would read this correspondence 
which lays down the sequence and is a brief. 

The Chairman. Go ahead and read it, Admiral. 

Mr. Gearhart. I will be glad to have you do that, Admiral, with 
permission of the Chair. 

Admiral Stark. It is six pages long. 

Mr. Gearhart. Go ahead. 

Admiral Stark. But it gives the picture and consolidation of a 
good many pages. 

Mr. Gearhart. All right. 

[6106] Digest of Hemisphere Defense Plans 

Navy Hemisphere Defense Plan #2 (WPL — 49), promulgated April 21, 1941, 
issued by the Chief of Naval Operations at the direction of the President, was 
based on the general concept : 

"Entrance into the Western Hemisphere by naval vessels and aircraft of 
belligerent Powers, other than of those Powers which have sovereignty over 
Western Hemisphere Territory, will be viewed as actuated by a possibly un- 
friendly intent toward territory or shipping within the Western Hemisphere." 

The General Task assigned the Navy was : 

" * * * warn Western Hemisphere Powers against possible impending 
danger, and defend United States flag shipping against attack." 

The specific tasks assigned the Naval Operating Forces were : 

"(a) Trail naval vessels and aircraft of belligerent Powers (other than of 
those Powers which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere Territory), and 
broadcast in plain language their movements at four hour intervals, or oftener 
if necessary. 

"(b) Trail merchant vessels of belligerent Powers (other than of those 
Powers which have sovereignty [6107] over Western Hemisphere Ter- 
ritory) if suspected of acting as supply vessels for, or otherwise assisting the 
operations of, the naval vessels or aircraft of such belligerents. Report the 
movements of such vessels to the Chief of Naval Operations. 

"(c) Prevent interference with United States flag shipping by belligerents. 

"(d) Avoid intervening in or interfering with the armed engagements of 
belligerents." 

The above plan became effective in the Atlantic on April 24, 1941, the dispatch 
placing it into effect stated "The execution of this plan shall give the appearance 
of routine exercises where the departure of units from port are being made." 
(Chief of Naval Operations Dispatch 211520 of April 1941 to Holders of 
WPL-49.) 



A 
2294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Hemisphere Defense Plan #4 (WPI/-51), issued by the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions on Julj' 11, 1941, at the direction of the President, was based on the 
following general concepts : — 

"(a) Entrance into the Western Hemisphere by naval vessels and aircraft 
Of belligerent Powers, other than of those Powers which have sovereignty over 
Western Hemisphere Territory, will be viewed as actuated by a possibly un- 
friendly intent toward territory or shipping within the Western Hemisphere. 

16108] "(b) The President of the United States, in a message to Congress 
on July 7, 1941, made the following pronouncement: 

'"The occupation of Iceland by Germany would constitute a serious threat 
in three dimensions : 

" 'The threat against Greenland and the Northern portion of the North Ameri- 
can Continent, including the Islands which lie off it. 

" ' The threat against all shipping in the Atlantic. 

" 'The threat against the steady flow of munitions to Britain — which is a 
matter of broad policy approved by the congress. 

" 'It is therefore imperative that the approaches between the Americas and 
those strategic outposts, the safety of which this country regards as essential 
to its national security, and which it must therefore defend, shall remain open 
and free from all hostile activity or threat thereof. 

" 'As Commander in Chief I have consequently issued orders to the Navy 
that all necessary steps be taken to insure the safety of communications in the 
approaches between Iceland and the United States, as well as on the seas between 
the United States and all other strategic outposts. 

[6109] " 'This Government will issue the adequate defense of Iceland 
with full recognition of the independence of Iceland as a soverneign state.' " 

The General Tasks assigned the Navy were within the Western Hemisphere 
and were as followsi: 

"(a) Insure the safety of communications with United States strategic out- 
posts ; 

"(b) Insure the adequate defense of Iceland ; 

"(c) Defend United States and Iceland flag shipping against hostile attack 
or threat of attack ; and 

"(d) Warn Western Hemisphere Powers against possible impending danger." 

When the order to execute this plan was issued, Change #1 had been incorpo- 
rated. The Tasks assigned to the Atlantic Fleet were : 

"(a) Protect United States and Iceland flag shipping against hostile attack, 
by escorting, covering, and patrolling, as required by circumstances, and by 
destroying hostile forces which threaten such shipping. 

"(b) Escort convoys of United States and Iceland flag shipping, including 
shipping of any nationality which may join such convoys, between United States 
ports and bases, and Iceland. 

[6110] "(c) Provide protection and sea transportation for the initial 
movements and continued support of United States overseas garrisons. 

"(d) Trail naval vessels and aircraft of belligerent Powers (other than 
of those Powers which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere Territory 
and other than belligerent vessels and aircraft involved in encounters in execut- 
ing a, b, and c) ; and broadcast in plain language their movements at four hour 
intervals, or oftener if necessary. Amplify such broadcasts by encrypted des- 
patch to the Chief of Naval Operations. 

"(e) Trail merchant vessels of belligerent Powers (other than those powers 
which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere Territory), if suspected of 
acting as supply ships for, or otherwise assisting the operations of, the naval 
vessels or aircraft of such belligerents. Report the movements of such vessels 
to the Chief of Naval Operations. 

"The Atlantic Fleet will be organized into Task Forces of the approximate 
strength indicated: 

Ocean Escort— 6 BB, 5 CA, 27 DD. 23 ODD, 48 VPB. 
Striking Force— 3 CV, 4 CL (10,000 tons), 13 DD, 12 VPB. 

[6111] Southern Patrol— 4 CL (7500 tons), 8 DD (1850 tons). 
Force— 4 CGC (327 tons). 12 VPB." 

The plan stated that Canada had made available Shelburne and Halifax as 
operating bases for United States Naval vessels and pati'ol planes, and Sydney 
for United States Naval vessels in case of necessity. 

The Chief of Naval Operations would exchange information on movements of 
British and Canadian convoys and Naval forces and United States Naval forces 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2^95 

and United States and Iceland flag shipping with the British and Canadian 
authorities. 

On July 25, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch 251600 ordered 
the above outliued'plan executed at 1200 (GCT) July 26th, except that only United 
States and Iceland flag shipping was to be escorted, i. e., the words in Task (b), 
"including shipping of any nationality which may join such convoys, between 
United States ports and bases, and Iceland," were not to be executed until 
necessary arrangements had been made. 

Change #2 to WPLr-51, issued on August 13, 1941, transferred the task of 
providing sea transportation for the initial movement and continued support of 
the Army and Navy forces overseas, other than those which are to be transported 
by the Opei'ating Forces, to the Naval Transportation Service. It also contained 
detailed instructions for the [6112] operation of convoys and escorts 
in the North Atlantic which were to become effective when the escort of convoys 
including ships of nationality other than those of United States and Iceland was 
ordered. 

On 25 August, the Chief of Naval Operations informed Commander in Chief, 
Atlantic Fleet by dispatch 252000 that WPL-51 was to be interpreted as requiring 
Atlantic Fleet forces to destroy surface raiders which attacked shipping along the 
sea lanes between North America and Iceland or which approached these lanes 
sufficiently close to threaten such shipping. 

Change #3, issued on September 3, 1941, stated : 

"Hostile forces will be deemed to threaten United States or Iceland flag ship- 
ping if they enter the general area of the sea lanes which lie between North 
America and Iceland or enter the Neutrality Zone in the Atlantic Ocean described 
in the Declaration of Panama of October 3, 1939." 

This change revised the detailed instructions for the operation of convoys and 
escorts, which were to become effective when the inclusion in United States 
escorted convoys of other than United States and Icelandic ships was ordered. 

Change #3 established a Southeast Pacific Sub-area consisting of that part of 
the Pacific Ocean outside of [6113] territorial waters south of the Panama 
Naval Coastal Frontier and north of Latitude 57° South and between the West 
Coast of South America, and Longitude 100° West. 

On August 28 the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch 282121 ordered Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to establish a Southeast Pacific Force of two 7500- 
ton light cruisers. This force, cooperating with the Panama Naval Coastal 
Frontier, was to destroy surface raiders which attacked or threatened to attack 
United States flag shipping. The approach of surface raiders within the Pacific 
Sector of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier or the Pacific Southeast Sub Area 
was to be interpreted as a threat to United States flag shipping. 

On 13 September, Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch 131816 ordered 
deletion of the Task — "Trail naval vessels and aircraft of belligerent Powers, 
etc." 

Change #4, issued on September 3, 1941, enlarged the Western Atlantic Area 
( which had been the area west of longitude 26° West, as far west as the con- 
tinental land areas to the area west of the following line : 

"Beginning from the North along longitude 10° West as far south as latitude 
65° North, thence by rhumb line to the position lat. 53° North long. 26° West, 
thence South along long. 26° West." 

On 13 September the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch [6II4] 
131645 ordered that commencing on September 16, 0001 (GCT), the Atlantic 
Fleet was to execute the words, "including shipping of any nationality which 
may join such convoys, between United States ports and bases, and Iceland." 

This order also placed into effect the detailed instructions for the operations 
of convoys and escorts. Under these instructions the United States assumed 
responsibility for transatlantic trade convoys on the North Atlantic route when 
west of the line from the North Pole along the 'Meridian 10° West to Lat. 65° 
North thence to the point Lat. 53° North Long. 26° West and thence along the 
Meridian of 26° West. 

On 13 September 1941 Chief of Naval Operations informed Commander-in- 
Chief, Atlantic Fleet, by dispatch 131855 that the President had modified pre- 
vious instructions regarding convoy and escort, and that the United States 
Naval vessels could escort convoys in which there were no United States or 
Iceland flag vessels and that United States flag vessels could be escorted by 
Canadian ships. 



2296 CONUKESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Western Hemisphere Defense Plan #5 (WPL-52), issued September 26, 1941, 
superseded Western Hemisphere Defense Plan #4. It was to be placed into 
effect by the Chief of Naval Operations after Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic 
Fleet, had submitted a readiness report. 

It stated that approximately 60 Royal Navy and Royal [6115] Cana- 
dian Navy destroyers and corvettes would be engaged in escorting convoy in the 
Western Atlantic Area under the strategic direction of the United States. It 
quoted extracts from the President's speech of September 11, such as : 

"Upon our Naval and air patrol — now operating in large numbers over a vast 
expanse of the Atlantic Ocean fell the duty of maintaining the American policy 
of freedom of the seas — now. That means * * * our patrolling vessels and 
planes will protect all merchant ships — not only American merchant ships, biit 
ships of any flag — engaged in commerce in our defensive waters." 



"From now on, if German or Italian vessels of war enter the waters, the 
protection of which is necessary for American defense, they do so at their own 
peril. 'The orders which I have given as Commander in Chief of the United States 
Army and Navy are to carry out that policy — at once." 

It is stated in the Concept of the Plan : 

"It must be recognized that, under the concept of this plan, the United States 
is not at war in the legal sense, and therefore does not have any of the special 
belligerent rights accorded under United States law to States which are 
formally at war. 

[6116] "The operations which will be conducted under this plan are con- 
ceived to form a preparatory phase for the operations of Navy Basic War Plan 
Rainbow No. 5 (TFPL-y,6)." 

The Tasks assigned the Atlantic Fleet were: 

"(a) Protection against hostile attack United States and foreign flag shipping 
other than German and Italian shipping by escorting, covering, and patrolling 
as circumstances may require, and by destroying German and Italian Naval, 
Land, and Air Forces encountered. 

"(b) Insure the safety of sea communications with United States and stra- 
tegic outposts. 

"(c) Support the defense of United States Territory and Bases, Iceland, and 
Greenland. 

"(d) Trail merchant vessels suspected of supplying or otherwise assisting 
operations of German and Italian naval vessels or aircraft. Report the move- 
ments of such vessels to the Chief of Naval Operations." 

On October 8, 1941, by dispatch 082335, the Chief of Naval Operations ordered 
the above outlined plan executed at 1400 (GCT) October 11, 1941. This plan 
remained in effect until December 11, 1941, at which time the Chief of Naval 
Operations by dispatch 111550 ordered the above outlined plan cancelled and 
replaced by WPL-46 (Navy Basic War Plan, [6in] Rainbow No. 5). 

Mr. Geaehart, Now is this the order that you made pursuant to the 
direction of the President under which the Navy began to wage war 
in the Atlantic ? 

Admiral Stark. It is the order under which we operated and under 
which we told the Germans, and Italians in the later stages, that if 
they came to the westward of the 26 Meridian, as I recall, that their 
intent would be regarded as hostile and they would be dealt with ac- 
cordingly, and regarding which the President had previously in- 
formed the country. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then pursuant to this order shells were exchanged 
by American surface warships carrying American flags and German 
submarines ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; we attacked German submarines under 
this order. 

Mr. Gearhart. How many instances can you recount at this 
moment ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2297 

Admiral Stark. I do not know just how many instances there were 
we attacked submarines with depth charges, in cases, for example, 
like when we were sending troops into Iceland, and which I mentioned. 
There are three rather outstanding cases in this connection. 

There was the Greer^ which was attacked, as I recall \6118^ 
in September. There was the Reuben James^ which was attacked and 
sunk, I believe, in November. There was the Salinas, a tanker, which 
was attacked and damaged and got into port about that time. There 
was some one other of our destroyers. 

Mr. Gearhart. Was the Reuben James one of them ? 

Admiral Stark. Sir ? 

Mr. Gearhart. The Reuben James, was that one of them? 

Admiral Stark. The Reuben James was one. I have a paper here 
on those four cases. The other one was the Kearney on October 17, 
which was attacked by an enemy submarine*, position 57.04 North and 
23 West, 300 miles southwest of Iceland. One torpedo struck the 
boiler room. Seven men killed, four missing and ten wounded. 

The Salinas, a naval tanker, was torpedoed without warning dur- 
ing the night of October 29-30, 1941, in waters southwest of Iceland. 
Ship was sufficiently damaged to require 6 weeks or more in drydock, 
but a Navy press release stated there was no loss of life and no serious 
injury to personnel. 

The Reuben James was sunk west of Iceland while on convoy duty 
during the night of October 30-31. 

The Greer was not damaged. 

We had a ship, the Robin Moore, torpedoed and sunk off Brazil 
in June. There was a ship called the Steel Seafarer {6119'] 
I think, that was attacked. I have forgotton whether it was sunk, 
but that was another case, and there was still another to which I 
believe the President referred in his September speech, called the 
Sessa. I have forgotten just what she was. 

Mr. Gearhart, Were any American transports carrying the Amer- 
ican flag transporting the troops of any of the nations that later 
became our allies, after the declaration of war? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall such at the time. We were escorting 
British ships at one period, carrying British troops. One of the 
Queens was sent over to this side of the Atlantic and routed south and 
down around the southern tip of Africa. She was sent here as a 
matter of safety, that being a safer route. Whether or not we let 
the British have any of our ships at that time, or allocated them to 
carry troops to the Middle East I am not certain. I do not recall any 
at the moment. 

Mr. Gearhart. We did later? 

Admiral Stark. We did later; yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now we occupied Iceland prior to December 7, 1941, 
did we not? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. And our American Navy took to Iceland not 
[61£0] only Marines but soldiers? 

Admiral Stark. Army ; yes, sir, 

Mr. Gearhart. Soldiers of the Army? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. And we established seaplanes up 
there also. 



2298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gearhart. We also occupied Greenland, did we not ? 

Admiral Stark. We developed certain air stations, as I recall, in 
Greenland, to help get aircraft across the Atlantic. I do not remember 
of any occupational forces other than those in connection with air 
bases. 

Mr. Gearhart. And we also dispossessed some Germans who estab- 
lished some air stations in Greenland, did we not ? 

Admiral Stark. I think what you refer to may be some Germans 
up there in connection with weather* reports. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes ; but they were German Army people, were they 
not? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall whether they were German Army 
or not. They were Germans. 

Mr. Gearhart. Anyway, we ousted them from Greenland ? 

Admiral Stark. Either ousted them or they got out themselves 
at that time. I do not know what the situation was. 

Mr. Gearhart. They were ousted prior to December 7, 1941? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now" let us take a look at the Pacific. Did 
16121^ you have any orders comparable to the one that you have 
given me a copy of applying to tha Pacific ? 

Admiral Stark, We did in the Southeast Pacific. 

Mr. Gearhart. Have you a copy of that order here? 

Admiral Stark. No ; I have not. I can get it. 

Mr. Gearhart. Would you be so kind as to get it and have it in- 
serted in the record at this point, if you come to it in time ? ^ 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearthart. Now what was the substance and effect of that 
order? 

Admiral Stark. In the Southeast Pacific? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall any incident in connection with that. 
. Mr. Gearhart. What was the order ? 

Admiral Stark. That commanders of the Army and Navy continue 
similar, as I recall, to that as I recited in October, that if any German 
or Italian raider came within the boundary line which we set there, 
and which we published, they were to be engaged. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did that only apply to the Germans and Italians? 

Admiral Stark. They were the only ones at that time. 

16122] Mr. Gearhart. What was the date of that order? 

Admiral Stai^k. It is covered in this digest which you have there, 
on page 5, and reads : 

On August 28 the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch 282121 ordered Com- 
mander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to establish a southeast Pacific force of two 7500- 
ton light cruisers. This force, cooperating with the Panama Naval Coastal Fron- 
tier, was to destroy surface raiders which attacked or threatened to attack 
United States flag shipping. The approach of surface raiders within the Pacific 
sector of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier or the Pacific Southeast Sub Area 
was to be interpreted as a threat to United States flag shipping. 

The effect, therefore, of that was to engage any German or Italian 
raider which might appear in that area. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Now, was any order promulgated by you 
which had direct application to Japan prior to December 7, 1941 ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

' Included In Hearings, Part 6, p. 2666 et seq. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2299 

Mr. Gearuart. Well, did you regard the freezing of the assets of 
Japan on July 26, 1941, as an overt act ? 

Admiral Stark. I did not. 

Mr. Gearuart. Did you regard the imposition upon Japan 
[612S~\ of economic sanctions on the same date as an overt act of 
the United States? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. If you read, and you have undoubtedly 
read, with regard to that, there were certain stipulations there where- 
by it was made possible for the unfreezing of assets as necessary 
to carry on certain trad^, if we so desired to do so. It was not a loop- 
liole, but it was left open for certain essentials, that it could be done. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, I think you testified, and certain other high 
ranking naval officers have testified, that an expedition was being 
prepared in Hawaii at the time of the attack, an expedition which 
would have been instructed to fly over Truk for reconnaissance pur- 
poses. If that flight had occurred, would that have constituted an 
overt act under international law? 

Admiral Stark. I think not. The original decree, as I recall, re- 
garding the mandates made it possible, or we should have been able 
to go into them at will practically at any time. They were a trust 
rather than Japanese territory. Whether that had been abrogated 
subsequently, I do not know, but I do recall very clearly when I 
wanted to send some submarines through the mandates — ^not while 
I was Chief of Naval Operations, however. 

Mr. Gearhart. But regardless of the conditions under [61^4] 
which Japan received the mandated islands, it was understood, was it 
not, by everybody that the Japanese were not allowing any persons 
to come within those areas? 

Admiral Stark. She had taken that stand, and in my opinion it 
was not a legal stand for her to take. 

Mr. Gearhart. But legal or illegal, we were avoiding going in 
there and creating an incident by reason of our presence there, is that 
not correct? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct; yes, sir. We had abided by her 
decision not to let us go, a decision which, on our part, I thought was 
wrong at the time. That went back some years. Once it had been 
made, we stayed out. 

Mr. Gearhart. When you considered sending an air reconnaissance 
expedition over Turk, did you consider the question of whether or not 
that would constitute an overt act against the Japanese ? 

Admiral Stark. Those ships, airships — I am referring to aircraft- 
had the;7 made that recomiaissance flight would have gone very high. 
They might have been seen or might not, so the argument probably 
falls out. They would then have taken the pictures. The Japanese 
had been doing the same thing. We know of flights over our territory. 
It was taking a chance, but we thought the chance worthwhile. 
Whether it would be regarded as an overt act on our part, I do not 
know. I primarily [61£S] wanted the information and I was 
prepared to take the chance. 

Mr. Gearhart. If Japanese planes flew over Pearl Harbor, would 
you regard that as a sort of reconnaissance, the same as was to be 
conducted by the United States? 

Admiral Stark. At that time, if I had seen them I would have 
shot them down, if I had been on the spot and in command. 



2300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gearhart. Had there been any reports to you of Japanese 
ships flying over Hawaii ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, you read the story in the Saturday Evening 
Post of October 9, 1942, a story written by the then flying naval 
lieutenant, Clarence Dickinson, did you not? 

Admiral Stark. No ; I think not. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did you read that story ? 

Admiral Stark. No. 

Mr. Gearhart. The story which is entitled "I Fly for Vengeance" ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. He recites in that story, that he flew under war 
orders to keep his mission secret at all costs, to sink all Japanese ships 
he encountered on the surface of the sea or in the air. How would you 
classify such an order as that? Would that be considered an overt 
act against the Japanese? 

Admiral Stark. At what time was that? 

[6126] Mr. Gearhart. That order was issued November 22, 
1941, 3 weeks before Pearl Harbor was attacked. 

Admiral Stark. I never heard of it. I would like to see the order. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, it was printed in the Saturday Evening Post 
of October 1942. The first 6 inches of type in that story "I Fly for 
Vengeance" has never, to my knowledge, been denied. 

Admiral Stark. I never heard of it before. I did not read the 
article, I say, I would not believe it regardless of whether it was 
printed, unless I saw the authenticated original order. 

Senator Lucas. Congressman, will you yield? 

Mr. Gearhart. I will yield. 

Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman tell me who gave the order, 
according to the article ? 

Mr. Gearhart. I think it was given by Admiral Halsey. That was 
what I was going to inquire. I thought you might have information 
about it at this time. 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. There w^s widespread publicity given to it. It was 
printed ever since. 

Admiral Stark. I missed it somehow. I missed it or it may have 
been I just dismissed it as something crazy. 

[6127] The Chairman. What was your last word? 

Admiral Stark. I say it may have been I just dismissed it as some- 
thing crazy, because I never had any knowledge of any such order. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, since that time the then flying Lt. Clarence 
Dickinson has been twice promoted. He is known today as Com- 
mander Clarence Dickinson. 

Admiral Stark. Well, I would be very much interested in seeing 
the order. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, you have testified that the President told you 
about a year and a half ago or 2 years ago, that he was surprised when 
the Japanese attacked Hawaii. That is correct, is it? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. And in your statement, on page 57, you testify: 

The letter points out that neither the President nor the Secretary of State 
will be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2301 

That is your testimony, emphasizing and repeating that which you 
have said in a letter of November 27 to Admiral Kinmiel. 
Admiral Stark. To Admiral Kimmel, yes, sir. 
Mr. Gearhart. That quotation being: 

The chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan are very 
doubtful. This situation, coupled with a statement of the Japanese Govern- 
ment [6128] and movements their naval and military forces indicate, in 
our opinion, that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including 
attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility. 

Then, going on further down : 

I held this (the letter) up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull 
today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull, and it was only after a long 
talk that I sent the message to you a day or so ago showing the gravity of the 
situation. Will confirm that in today's meeting by the President. Neither wiU 
be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. Prom many angles an attack on 
the Philippines would be the most enjbarrassing that could happen to us. 

Do you sense any inconsistency in your statement if I told you that 
the President was surprised when tlie Japanese attacked Hawaii? 
Isn't that what you said in your letter to Admiral Kimmel ? 

Admiral Stark. No, I do not know that I do. I can give you prac- 
tically the exact words which the President mentioned to nie a year 
ago last summer. I was in the Wliite House, and he said, in effect : 
"Betty, you were surprised at that attack and so was I." And my reply 
was : "Yes, sir, I was, and I just testified to that fact." Now, the pre- 
vious surprise I think was more general in nature. I am not trying to 
make out a case for the President — I want that understood. 

[61^9'] Mr. Gearhart. We just want the facts. I am not trying 
to prove anything. 

Admiral Stark. That neither Mr. Hull nor the President would 
be surprised at a surprise attack anywhere. In my opinion, the Presi- 
dent was not expecting that attack on Hawaii anymore than I was. 
I had gone over the situation with him very carefully on the chart, 
and the movement of vessels. He was expecting it to the southward 
and so was I. We did not know whether it would hit the Philippines 
or not. But I think there is no particular inconsistency there, 

Mr. Gearhart. Since you referred to a meeting with the President, 
I direct your attention to a meeting of the war council, of which you 
are a member according to the report of the Army Board, a meeting 
which occurred at the White House on the 25tli of November 1941. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

[6130] Mr. Gearhart. I will quote from Secretary Stimson's 
diary as follows : 

Then at 12 o'clock I went to the White House, where we were until nearly half- 
past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark and myself. There 
the President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the 
event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as — perhaps next 
Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and 
the question was what we should do. 

Do you remember that meeting and do you remember those remarks 
by the President of the United States ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. With respect to whether or not he was surprised, 
do you think there is any inconsistency between what he said then and 
what you have just recited to us ? 



2302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. I think not. You can look at this thing in two 
or three different ways. And again I would repeat that I was sur- 
prised at the attack on Pearl Harbor. And 1 want to make sure 
that anything I state is not intended to weaken that, because I was 
surprised. When one had been talking about the possibility of an 
attack for a year or more, when you had been pressing ,for means 
to counter such an attack should it come, when you had laid out 
a plan to counter [6131] it, and stated that war might well 
be initiated, and the most embarrassing thing that could happen to 
us there was an attack on Hawaii, and you had gone over it forwards 
and backwards, to that extent you were not surprised, it was not as 
though it were something that suddenly came on you. 

But regardless of the fact that we had been over it, we countered 
and we talked about tlie possibility, and we had done what we could, 
and we had made it our strongest outpost, when it came at that 
particular time, and in view of the fact that we had no leads to indi- 
cate it was coming at that time at Hawaii, and we did have leads only 
of an amphibious force pointing to the southward, and we had no 
indication that the Japanese carriers, the last thing I had in that line 
was information in the Pacific of the whole Japanese Fleet laid 
out as of 1 December showing the carriers in home waters — I was 
surprised. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, you say that you were surprised? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. That the Japanese should attack Hawaii on the 
7th day of December 1941 ? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct, yes^ sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. You were taken by surprise as well as the Presi- 
dent was taken by surprise ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. All these things I had talked [6132'] 
over with the President. 

Mr. Gearhart. In view of the fact that the Commander in Chief 
of the United States Forces, the President of the United States, a 
student of naval affairs, a frequent visitor on board ships, and you, the 
Chief of Naval Operations, were taken by surprise by the news 
that came that the Japanese had attacked Hawaii, does that mitigate 
or does that aggravate the fact that the Commander of the Pacific 
Fleet was taken by surprise ? 

Admiral Stark. The possibility of that attack existed. We knew 
of the possibility though we weren't expecting it. I had specifically 
written, by letter, that I thought we should be on guard. We had 
sent a dispatch of a war warning and we had directed the Commander 
in Chief of the Asiatic and the Commander in Chief of the Pacific 
to take a defensive deployment. That direction was because of the 
possibility of an attack. We didn't expect it, but we felt we had 
to be on guard against it. 

I was surprised at the attack, and I Iso was greatly surprised that 
more steps had not been taken to endeavor to guard against it and 
counter it, if possible. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, if you condemn Admiral Kimmel for being 
taken by surprise over there, do you not in the same breath condemn 
vourself ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2303 

[6133] Admiral Stark. I am not condemning Admiral Kimmel 
for anything. And in my statement and in what I said I would do I 
have left that up to others. I have stated the situation as I saw it. 
I acted in accordance with my best judgment and I assume he did, too. 

What I intended to convey apparently did not get over. Whether 
the fault was mine for not having expressed it properly or whether 
the fault lay elsewhere if I did express it properly is something which 
is not for me to say. 

Mr. Gear HART. Now 

Admiral Stark. I felt I had, we all felt, that we had given warn- 
ing and a directive which would have fully alerted the forces out 
there, and, as I say, what we thought we had done did not materialize, 
to the best* of my knowledge and iDelief, at least as far as we thought 
it had. Wliat Admiral Kimmel did do he can testify to. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, the fact that you admit that you were sur- 
prised when Hawaii was hit, and you inform us that the President told 
you that he was surprised when Pearl Harbor was attacked, does that 
not account for the fact that you left out of all these warnings that 
you sent to the Islands any mention of Hawaii ? 

Admiral Stark. The only specific objectives we gave were objec- 
tives of an amphibious force. It is all we had. [6 13 4-] The 
war warnintT was broad. The amphibious objectives we gave. And in 
an earlier dispatch we put "in any direction." 

Mr. Gearhart. But all of the war warnings that you sent, all that 
General Marshall sent, all, after calling attention to the imminence 
of war, all narrowed down to the message later on by pointing out that 
you expected the attack to occur in the Far East. 

Does that not spring from the fact that the President, yourself, and 
General Marshall, and all of the officers that stood around you close 
and advised with you, were of the opinion that Pearl Harbor was 
impregnable and that it would not be attacked? 

Admiral Stark. No, I never thought Pearl Harbor was impreg- 
nable and that it would not be attacked. I did not think it would be 
attacked at that time. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, going back again to that meeting with the 
President on the 25th day of November of 1941, that was held at the 
Wliite House, wasn't it ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Gearhart. The three Secretaries were there, the two Chiefs of 
Staff were there, and the President brought up the subject of Japan 
and pointed out that the Japanese were notorious for making an attack 
without warning, a sneak attack, and that we might expect an attack 
as soon as next \6135'] Monday, referring to the Monday fol- 
lowing the 25th day of November 1941. 

Do you know whether the President had any reason for believing 
that an attack might occur on the 1st of December or 2d of December? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir; I don't know just wliy he made that state- 
ment, except that it was a guess that it might come within the next few 
days. I never went — I don't know that anybody questioned it. We 
had the 29th as a deadline. 



2304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gearhart. That was what I was going to ask you next. Did 
anybody bring up in the discussion the Japanese intercept that the 
29th was a deadline ? 

Admiral Stark. I don't remember that that was specifically dis- 
cussed at that time. We all had it — wait a minute. I think we had it 
prior to the meeting of the 25th. It was about the 22d, I think, that 
we got it. 

Mr. Gearhart, First they fixed the 25th as the deadline and then a 
later message came through before the 25th extending it to the 29th. 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. 

Mr. Gearhart. It could have been before you. 

Admiral Stark. I think it came in about the 22d. If so, we all had 
seen it. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Now, you discussed it, did you not? 

[6136] Admiral Stark. It was translated on the 22d. 

Mr. Gearhart. And it had been served upon you by Captain Kramer 
and it had been served upon the Secretary of War and the Chief of 
Staff by Colonel Bratton ; is that not correct ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. You all had knowledge of that 29th deadline? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. It had also been delivered to the White 
House. 

Mr. Gearhart, Did Mr. Hull bring up any discussion of his associ- 
ations with Ambassador Nomura and Special Envoy Kurusu? 

Admiral Stark. The situation was undoubtedly discussed. I have 
forgotten the exact trend of it. It is a long time ago. 

The one thing that I remember is that we went over the situation but 
as to details I don't recall. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did Mr. Hull 

Admiral Stark. I kept no diary, 

Mr. Gearhart. Did Mr, Hull say anything about the kind of mes- 
sage he was going to give the Japanese in reply to the one they served 
on him on the 20th ? 

Admiral Stark, I do not recall, at that time. We were still thuik- 
ing, at least under the impression, that he [6L37'] was still con- 
sidering the modus vivendi. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Did he read you his modus vivendi? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall that he did at that time. However, 
we had a copy of it in the Navy Department. 

Mi". Gearhart. Were you and General Marshall disturbed by what 
Secretary Hall had to say about his impending answer? 

Admiral Stark. About his impending answer — you mean to the 
Japanese ? 

Mr. Gearhart. The one he was about to turn over to the Japanese. 

[6138] Admiral Stark. Of the 20th. Well, we were playing 
for time. I do not recall that what was said in the White House on 
the 25th was responsible for our message of the 27th. As I have 
stated, I have been unable to separate and clarify just what happened 
on the dates around the 25th, which was when the Chiang Kai-shek 
note was delivered, and the 26th, and the 27th, except as to what 
happened during that over-all period. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2305 

Mr. Gearhart. Refreshing your memory, weren't you very much 
disturbed, and wasn't General Marshall very much disturbed, by what 
Secretary Hull told you that he planned to do? 

Admiral Stark. I don't recall at that time that he told us. We 
did not know of the note of the 26th until after it was sent. 

Mr. Gearhart. Didn't he tell you at that time that he was think- 
ing about not answering at all, that he was thinking about ignoring 
the whole thing, letting it go on? 

Admiral Stark. I don't recall that he did. You are referring to 
the 

Mr. Gearhart. Meeting of the 25th. 

Admiral Stark. To the 25th. I have stated that whether he spoke 
to me about that note on the 25th or the 26th or the 27th, I am not 
sure. I know that we got it, that he called me with regard to it. It 
may have been the 25th, it may have been the 26th. I don't recall its 
having come up at the White House meeting. It may have. I do 
not recall the details. 

[6139] Mr. Gearhart. This is very, very important, and I want 
you to try to remember. 

Admiral Stark. I have spent hours trying to recall what went on, 
on the 25th, 26th, and 27th, as to time. I have discussed it with 
others. We came to an impasse as to any agreement every time we 
do it, and every time we start it we waste a couple of hours and get 
nowhere. I cannot recall the details of just when I got that infor- 
mation. I wish I could, but I just can't do it. 

Mr. Gearhart. To refresh your memory, reading from the Army 
report — I am not picking this out of the air — didn't Mr. Hull say in 
that meeting and during the course of the discussion that he was 
about ready "to kick the whole thing over and tell them (the Japa- 
nese) that he had no other proposition at all"? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall that he did. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then, what caused you and General Marshall to 
immediately meet again together and to prepare and send to the 
President immediately after that meeting of the 25th of November 
1941, your memorandum recommending to the President that he 
should do everything in his power to gain time? 

Admiral Stark. I do not know that it was immediately after that 
meeting of the 25th that we did that. 

Mr. Gearhart. The instrument is dated the 27th, isn't it? 
[61 40] Admiral Stark. It is dated the 27th, yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. It contains General Marshall's signature, doesn't it ? 

Admiral Stark. It contains his signature which, his best judgment 
is, if I recall his testimony correctly, he put on, on the 28th. 

Mr. Gearhart. Either the 28th or the 26th, because he wasn't in 
Washington on the 27th, the date that the instrument bears; that 
is correct, isn't it ? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct, yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. So if you and General Marshall worked out that 
instrument which bears the date of the 27th, you had to do it on the 
26th, didn't you ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 



79716— 46— pt. 



2306 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gearhart, Because General Marshall was not here on the 27th. 

Admiral Stark. We didn't have to start it on the 26th. 

When I first asked Turner about it, because it was drawn up by the 
War Plans of both sections, he was under the impression — I don't 
know whether he has testified on it or not — ^but my impression is, in 
asking him, he thought it started about the 24th. We are not clear 
just when we started that memorandum. 

Mr, Gearhart, You are not in the habit of sending memoranda to 
the White House without the signatures of the people [614-1] 
who are responsible? 

Admiral Stark, That is correct. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then, it must have been prepared and signed on the 
26th for delivery on the 27th; is that not correct? 

Admiral Stark. No, that is not necessarily correct. I might have 
signed it on the 27th. You have Marshall's testimony. I have no 
reason to doubt it. You have his testimony that his best judgment is 
that he signed it on the 28th when he came back. 

Mr. Gearhart. Is there any reason he should have signed it on the 
28th rather than the 26th ? 

Admiral Stark. According to Secretary Stimson's diary, as I recall, 
he made some minor changes in it on the 27th. It was not up in smooth 
form at that time. I say his diary. I believe Gerow testified to that. 

The Chairman. It is now 4 : 30. I presume you cannot finish soon ? 

Mr. Gearhart. No, I will need 15 or 20 minutes more. 

The Chairman. We will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. 

(Whereupon, at 4 : 30 p. m., a recess was taken until 10 a. m., Friday, 
January 4, 1946.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2307 



Wm PEAEL HARBOR ATTACK 



FRIDAY, JANUARY 4, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation, 

OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

'Washington^ D. C. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkiey (chairman), George, Lucas, and Fer- 
guson and Eepresentatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, 
Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. 
Gesell and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee. 

[6I43] The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Congressman Gearhart had not finished examining Admiral Stark. 

TESTIMONY OF ADM. HAROLD E. STARK (Resumed) 

Admiral Stark. May I say just a word before the examination 
starts, sir? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

The committee will come to order. 

Admiral Stark, It had reference to Senator Lucas' examination 
yesterday, and I think perhaps it might be better to wait until he gets 
here. I didn't realize he wasn't present. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Go ahead. Congressman. 

Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Stark, yesterday I asked you a few very 
brief questions about the flying orders under which then flying 
lieutenant Clarence Dickinson flew from Pearl Harbor to Wake, or 
Midway, whichever it was, on November 22, 1941. 

At that time you replied you did not know about the orders that he 
flew upon or anything about the incident. 

Have you in the meantime discussed the subject with anybody con- 
nected with the Navy Department? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. I have not pursued it at all. 

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I have referred to this [6144] 
incident time and time again during the course of these hearings. On 
the second or third day of these hearings I made the request that 
copies of those orders be supplied me and th9ugh 6 weeks have gone 
by they haven't been supplied to date.^ 

May I inquire as to whether or not any effort has been made to 
locate those orders, and if so, whether or not they are not available? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Congressman, I beg your pardon, but I was 

* See Hearings, Part 11, p. .5476. 



2308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

looking at some papers and I didn't hear just what the orders were. 

Mr. Geaehart. During the course of these hearings and at different 
times in my cross-examination of various witnesses I have referred to 
the flying orders under which then Flying Naval Lieutenant Clar- 
ence Dickinson flew from Pearl Harbor to Midway or Wake, which- 
ever it was, I have forgotten, on November 22, 1941, 3 weeks before 
Pearl Harbor, and on the second or third day of these hearings when 
I first referred to this incident I requested the orders, a copy of the 
orders under which now Commander Dickinson flew. I have not 
been supplied them. I was wondering why they have not been 
made available. 

Mr. Mitchell. Would you let us report at 2 o'clock about that ? 

[6I45] Mr. Gearhart. I will be glad to do so. 

Mr. Mitchell. He was in Halsey's command, was he not? 

Mr. Gearhart. I think so. 

Mr. Mitchell. My dim recollection is that I felt we didn't have 
any written orders and that when Halsey was on the stand we would 
be able to find out what orders he gave to his own people. He is 
lined up as a witness. I haven't asked him myself whether he has 
any orders, written orders, or if he knows what the oral orders were, 
but I will check during the noon hour and try to satisfy your interest 
there. 

Mr. Gearhart. Commander Dickinson in his article which ap- 
peared in the Saturday Evening Post of October 2 or October 9, 
1942, I am not precise as to the date, somebody has helped them- 
selves to my copy of the article, which is being replaced 

Mr. Mitchell. In that article does he say whether he had written 
or oral orders ? 

Mr. Gearhart. He doesn't say whether they were written or oral, 
but he definitely says what those orders were. He said he was flying 
under absolute war orders, period, under instructions to sink any 
Japanese ships that he encountered upon the sea and to shoot down 
any flying craft that he met in the air, and to keep his mission secret 
at all costs. 

Now, if there were any such orders issued in the Pacific [614^^ 
prior to Pearl Harbor that is a fact, it is a fact of which the country 
should be informed. I do hope that those orders are furnished me if 
they are in writing, or if not in writing, a statement in respect to what 
the situation was. 

I ask about it now because under the ruling of the committee yester- 
day we are going to proceed to the examination of Admiral Kimmel 
and General Short upon the conclusion of the testimony of the dis- 
tinguished witness who now occupies the stand. I will want to ex- 
amine those witnesses in respect to those orders. 

The Chairman. Might the Chair ask Admiral Stark if those were 
orders, if there were any such orders, and if they were given by 
Admiral Halsey, would they appear as a matter of record in the 
Department here ? 

Admiral Stark. I think notj sir. 

The Chairman. Well, Admiral Halsey is to be a witness, I believe, 
isn't he? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2309 

The CHAraMAN. And, of course, if there are no written orders in 
the Department, or in his files, he would be the best witness as to 
whether he gave any such oral orders. 

Admiral Stabk. I would think so ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. We may get hold of Admiral Halsey, and if it 
was oral, get his statement preliminary to his going on [6147] 
the stand and we can furnish it to the Congressman. 

The Chairman. Yes. I imagine, in view of the very alluring 
picture of the admiral in the paper this morning, you may have 
difficulty in locating him today. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Gearhart. That reminds me, are we going to get a chance to 
see that saddle ? [Laughter.] 

There is one other matter. This was not a request of mine, Mr. 
Chairman, but the request was made by another member of the com- 
mittee, that we be furnished with the copy of the Roberts Eeport 
as it was originally submitted to the White House, together with 
such changes, alterations, additions, subtractions, that were made. 

I want to point out again, in view of the fact that we are going to 
have Admiral Kimmel and General Short before us shortly, that 
we ought to have that report before the committee at the earliest 
possible moment. The request for that report and interlineations, 
changes, additions, and subtractions was made the earliest day of 
this hearing, and the request has been repeated by different members 
of this committee. Now we are right up against the gun. We are 
going to examine the witnesses concerning whom those changes and 
that report are going to be material. 

I am constrained to inquire as to whether or not we are going to 
have the original Roberts Report with such [614^] informa- 
tion as would be important to this committee in respect to changes 
that were made in it. 

Mr. Mitchell. The answer is that we have been searching in all 
of the departments ever since then to try to find the original report, 
and have failed utterly, in the War, Navy, State, and every other 
Department, to find any such document. Two days ago I wrote to 
Justice Roberts and told him we had failed and that tlie committee 
wanted it and asked him if he could kindly give us any sort of relief 
as to where to find it and who had it. That is the best we have been 
able to do. 

Mr. Gearhart. Thank you very much. Up to date the information 
is we have not been able to locate the original report ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Exactly ; not because we haven't put an effort on it, 
either. 

The Chairman. Proceed. It that all of the preliminary matter? 

Mr. Gearhart. That is all for the moment. 

The Chairman. You may proceed. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, in your statement. Admiral Stark, you re- 
ferred to a Presidential direction to prepare the Navy within 30 days 
for the capture and occupation of the Azores Islands? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir. 

[57^5] Mr. Gearhart. Will you tell me something more about 
the details of that direction you received from the President? 

Admiral Stark. The basis for that directive was, I believe, our 
apprehension that possibly Germany might go down into Spain and 



2310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Portugal. We often discussed what the effect of it might be, and 
particularly if Gibraltar should be taken at the same time. The 
Azores in nonfriendly hands, or in Axis hands, would have been a 
very great threat to our communications on the sea, and the prepara- 
tion to take the Azores, if necessary, was predicated on that possibility, 
namely, that Germany might go into Spain and into Portugal. 

We had hoped ultimately, and ultimately we did get permission to 
go into the Azores and operate from there, and it was extremely ad- 
vantageous, particularly with regard to patrolling the seas with long- 
range aircraft against submarines. 

The President gave me that order and told me to be ready in 30 
days. 

Now, just why he gave it to me at that time and just why the 30 
days, I don't recall. He gave me the direct order and right away I 
went to preparing the plans for it. It was a good thing, in any case, 
to have the plans ready. 

For example, we likewise laid plans to take Martinique, if neces- 
sary, on the assumption that that island might join [6150] the 
Vichy Government under circumstances which would be detrimental 
to our communications in the Caribbean. 

Mr. Gearhart. You mentioned the Azores preparation in your 
letter to Admiral Kimmel of 24 May 1941 and stated that the Presi- 
dent gave you that positive direction 2 days before. That would 
make the date upon which you received your instructions from the 
President the 22d day of May 1941; is that approximately correct? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. It was because of action which the President was 
directing from day to day against the Germans — the consequent 
exchange of fire with German submarines which resulted — that 
caused you to state that we were at war in the Atlantic before Pearl 
Harbor ? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, if you reached a conclusion sometime that we 
were at war in the Atlantic prior to Pearl Harbor, there must have 
been a time when that became fixed in your mind. I asked you the 
question yesterday but I think we became diverted and you didn't 
reply as to when you considered that the war in the Atlantic with 
Germany commenced. 

Admiral Stark. Well, it commenced about the time of the shoot- 
ing order, along after the President talked, I would say, in Septem- 
ber — that is, his talk to the Nation. And the [6131] actual 
shooting orders we gave in October. 

I would invite attention, however, to the fact that when I say we 
were at war, we were at war in effect so far as attacking German craft, 
subsurface or surface, which crossed a line which we had defined, and 
which slid down the east coast of Iceland to the twenty-sixth meridian 
and south on the twenty-sixth meridian, and later there was a line 
drawn to the westward of the west coast of South America. 

Technicallj^ or from an international standpoint, we were not at 
war inasmuch as we did not have the right of belligerents because war 
had not been declared, but actually, so far as the forces operating under 
Admiral King in certain areas, it was war against any German craft 
that came inside that area. They were attacking us and we were 
attacking them. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2311 

Mr. Geakhaet. As a matter of fact, actually there was no difference 
between the situation which existed and which would have existed if a 
formal declaration of war had been declared by Congress? 

Admiral Stark. Not as regards that particular phase. I might 
however, read two dispatches, they are short, which 1 think will exem- 
plify the differences which I have mentioned. 

On 1 December 1941 I received a dispatch from our special naval 
observer in London, Vice Admiral Ghormley, which reads as follows : 

[6152] The Admiralty believes that the French merchant vessel, Pierrel D. 
Mas, of long cruising radius, has sailed for Europe or North Africa via Cape Horn 
about 25-27 November with cargo rubber for trans-shipment to Germany. One of 
German ships at Kobe believed preparing to sail for Europe carrying rubber and 
nationals about 1 December. Report has been received that Germans are planning 
to send ships to Europe monthly. The Admiralty asks if Navy Department will 
cooperate as in the Odenwald case and intercept these vessels off Cape San Roqne. 
If so information will be available as at Bad Washn. 

That is, the British Admiralty detachment in Washington. 
I replied to that dispatch the following day, 2 December, and the 
dispatch reads : 

U. S. not being at war does not enjoy full belligerent rights and Navy Depart- 
ment cannot be committed to interception referenced vessels in specific locations. 
Your 010922. Odenwald made mistake of flying American flag and crew aban- 
doned ship thus becoming subject to boarding and salvage. Such American men 
of war as may be in the vicinity can operate only under directives contained in 
WPL-52 and current operation orders of Commander-in-Chief Atlantic based 
thereon. 

Mr. Gearhart. Despite the assertion there that we did not enjoy full 
belligerent rights because we were not legally at war, what belligerent 
right were we not exercising ? 

[6153] Admiral Stark. That is one, the belligerent right of 
what is known as visit and search. 

Mr. Gearhart. Weren't we exercising that whenever the occasion 
arose ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. The reason why we were not exercising it was simply 
because the Germans were using submarines and it was not practical 
to go aboard submarines, isn't that correct ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, any vessel — a raider, we likewise would have 
attacked. We laid out an area in which we told them to keep out and 
if they came into that we would attack them, that is, an Axis man-of- 
war. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then by declaration we were already exercising the 
right of search and would have exercised it if the occasion arose because 
we told them that we would, is that not correct ? 

Admiral Stark. We told them we would attack. In this particular 
case of a merchant ship, we refused to intercept her. The Odenwald 
case — I do not know whether you recall it, it was in the press at the 
time — was loaded with a very valuable cargo for Germany. She was 
flying a flag, the American flag, and one of our cruisers in the South 
Atlantic became suspicious of her and when the cruiser approached 
her the crew abandoned the vessel and as I recall — I am not sure — 
prior [6154] to that had dumped a good deal of the cargo. We 
took that vessel into Puerto Rico, as I recall, and the subsequent action 
with regard to that vessel I think was predicated on international 
law. I nave forgotten for the moment just what happened to it. 



2312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, on that one occasion that you point out we 
did exercise the right of search, didn't we? 

Admiral Stark. But the vessel had been abandoned and she was 
flying — she was operating under — false colors. We did go aboard and 
put a crew aboard and take her and bring her into port. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. She was abandoned because they expected 
shells from the American contingent, didn't they ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not know. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, of course, as a reasonable individual you would 
expect that, you would accept that inference, wouldn't you? 

Admiral Stark. Well, I don't know. I think if I had been skipper 
of that vessel I might have hung on until an American visit and 
search party had come aboard, but she had made the mistake of flying 
false colors and that put her open to capture, and she was captured 
after the crew had abandoned the vessel. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Well, now, there is no use quibbling. 
[6156] We were prepared to do anything that was necessary to end 
Hitlerism, is that not correct ? That was the orders to the American 
Navy. 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. The orders to the American Navy in cer- 
tain areas was to insure the safety of communications and the delivery 
of the hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of material which were 
being sent to Britain under the terms of the lend-lease. Congress 
having made the United States Treasury practically available to manu- 
facture war material and to deliver it, the President took steps to 
insure the delivery of that material so far as we could by escorting, 
guarding, and covering our ships across to the United Kingdom. 

Mr. Gearhart. In insuring the delivery of American goods to Eng- 
and we were merely indirectly insuring the destruction of Hitlerism, 
were we not ? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. 

Mr. Gearhart. And that was our objective. 

Admiral Stark. That was the objective of the lend-lease law, as 
I understand it. 

Mr. Gearhart. And there was no limit upon your belligerent rights 
insofar as serving that objective, was there? 

Admiral Stark. Our areas were limited. I gave them to you yes- 
terday. They show what they were. For example, we were not 
sending anything into the Mediterranean to fight [6516] Italy 
allied with Germany, nor were we going outside of what I believe 
the President defined as our waters. It was not all-out. It was lim- 
ited, but it was effective, and it was war, to my mind, inside those 
limits. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes, but not considering what you were not doing 
but considering what you were doing, the things that the American 
Navy was doing was war, wasn't it? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. As I said yesterday, when you are shoot- 
ing at the other fellow and he is shooting at you, it to all intents and 
purposes is war, even though of a restricted nature. We were not, 
for example, flying planes over Germany. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, to quote from President Roosevelt's inspiring 
speech of October 27, 1941, he says very bluntly here, in effect, that 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2313 

the objective of the United States military operation upon the high 
seas was to destroy Hitlerism, does he not, when he uses these words : 

The forward march of Hitlerism can be stopped — and it will be stopped and 
very simply and very bluntly — we are pledged to put our own oar into the destruc- 
tion of Hitlerism. 

That indicates very clearly what was in the mind of the President 
on the 27th day of October 1941, doesn't it? 

Admiral Stark. I think there is no doubt about it and [6167'] 
I think there was no doubt about it before that. His speech in early 
September was likewise very clear. 

Mr. Gearhart. In another part of his speech he says : 

Many American-owned merchant ships have been sunk on the high seas. One 
American destroyer was attacked on September 4th. Another destroyer was 
attacked and hit on October 17th. Eleven brave and loyal American men of 
our Navy were killed by the Nazis. 

That shows they were making war on us, too, doesn't it? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, it does. I am simply trying 

Mr. Gearhart. I know, you are trying to point out the legalistic 
differences. 

Admiral Stark. Just the legal points. We had not gone all-out. 
We were not basing planes in England to fly against Germany, all 
those things that came into effect the minute war was legally de- 
clared. Legally we were, in our opinion, at war on the high seas so 
far as guaranteeing the safe transit of our vessels towards Iceland 
and continental Europe — or the United Kingdom would be better 
than continental Europe there. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Now, the activities of the American Navy that 
we have just referred to constitute, do they not, legally overt acts 
against the Axis. 

Admiral Stark. I should say we were both making overt \6158'\ 
acts against each other. I was asked with regard to that by — I have 
forgotten which congressional committee, I was appearing before a 
number of them regularly — and I stated and it will undoubtedly be 
in the record somewhere, that in my opinion it did not make much 
difference what we did; that Hitler had every reason, if he wanted 
to exercise it so far as international law was concerned, to go to war 
with us at any time but that he would choose his own time and it 
would be a cold-blooded decision with him as to when that time would 
be most effective. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, an overt act against Germany in 1941 con- 
stituted an overt act against Japan in law, did it not ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir; not in my opinion. We were not at war 
with Japan. Japan was not at war with anybody except the Chinese. 
We were endeavoring — that is, the President and Mr. Hull were, in 
my opinion, and I was close to them — not to precipitate a war in the 
Pacific, 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes; but didn't it ever enter into your discussions 
as a member of the war council consisting of the President, the three 
Secretaries and the two Chiefs of Staff, didn't it ever enter into your 
discussions as to whether or not an overt act of a military nature against 
Germany might constitute or also constituted an overt act against the 
Japan- [6159] ese? 



2314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAKL HARBOK A'lTACK 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall it. I had never thought of it until 
you just asked the question. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, let me direct your attention to page 84 in 
Peace and War. I will read you a paragraph : 

On September 27, 1940 Germany, Italy and Japan signed a far reaching treaty 
of alliance. In that treaty it was provided that Japan recognized and respected 
the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in 
Europe; tiiat Germany and Italy recognized and respected the leadership of 
Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater Asia ; and that the three 
countries would assist one another with all political, economic and military 
means when one of the powers was attacked by a power not then involved in 
the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict. 

Now, it would appear from that, would it not, that Japan became 
obligated to attack the United States under its agreement with Ger- 
many and Italy of September 27, 1940, upon the United States attack- 
ing Germany? 

Admiral Stark. Yes ; I think that is correct, although I believe that 
the State Department might testify to the fact that Japan in the last 
analysis would make her own decision as to carrying out that provision 
and she would or would not, [6160] according to whether or 
not it would be useful to her. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, do you agree with this conclusion which is 
drawn by the writer of this book, evidently with the approval of the 
Secretary of State of that day : 

The last of these provisions obviously was aimed directly at the United States. 

Admiral Stark. Yes ; I think that may be correct, sir. I think that 
they had us in mind. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then it was the belief of the State Department, and 
possibly of the War Council, that Germany, Italy, and Japan had in 
mind belligerent action on the part of the United States at the time they 
entered into that agreement ? 

Admiral Stark. I think so, at least a possibility of it. I might add 
that for a long period our diplomatic effort was to pry Japan loose 
from that Axis set-up or Tri-Partite agreement. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, you were familiar with the intercepts, in one 
of which the Japanese in Washington, or rather, in Tokyo informed 
Berlin of their steadfast adherence to the Tri-Partite agreements? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Gearhart. So far as anything that has ever been acquired 
along the line through any of the intercepts or through any of the 
discussions with the Japanese Ambassadors, no progress was made 
towards separating the Japanese from their Axis [6161] obli- 
gations. 

Admiral Stark. No, sir ; we didn't get to first base on that. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. And the intercepts told you, all of the time 
that we were negotiating with them, that the Japanese were adhering 
strictly to their Axis obligations? 

Admiral Stark. I believed there was one intercept showing Ger- 
many's dissatisfaction with the fact that Japan was not doing more, 
at least one. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, I won't take the time. 

The Chapman. The Chair understands the Congressman is through. 

Mr. Gearhart. I will announce to the Chairman when I am through. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2315 

The Chairman. Well, you said you would not take time. 

Mr. Gearhart. I would not take time to look up that intercept 
because it is already in evidence. 

Now, getting back to the meeting of the war council of November 
25, 1941. Now, according to the Army report there are three different 
kinds of informal organizations which have been referred to col- 
loquially as the war council. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I was originally a little confused as to 
just which one they referred to. I believe at one time Mr. Hull re- 
ferred to his meetings with the Secretary [6162] of War and 
Secretary of State as a war council — or Secretary Stimson referred 
to it — but I do understand when you refer to it you mean the meetings 
of the Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff with the President. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is right. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, there was a meeting in the morning of the 
smaller war council, the three Secretaries, -in which Mr. Hull ex- 
plained to them what he was trying to do with the Japanese. Ac- 
cording to the Army report he explained definitely the 3 months' truce 
agreement which has been referred to as the modus vivendi. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. And at that meeting Mr. Hull expressed doubt as to 
whether or not he would present it. To quote Secretary Stimson : 

Hull showed me the proposal for a 3-months truce which he was going to lay be- 
fore the Japanese today or tomorrow, 

which is on the 25th that this is. 

It adequately safeguarded all our interests I thought and secured it but I did 
not think that there was any chance of the .Japanese accepting it because it was 
so drastic. 

Quoting further: 

[GIGS'] We are an hour and a half with Hull and then I went back to the 
Department ajid I got hold of Marshall. 

Now, that indicates quite clearly and it is the conclusion of the 
writers of the Army report that the Secretary of War was very much 
concerned over the developing situation and very much worried as 
to what the result was to be. 

Now, in the afternoon or, rather, at high noon there was a meeting 
of the full War Council, so-called, at the White House. You were 
there, were you not? 

Admiral Stark. I was ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. You met at 12 and those present were Hull, Knox, 
Marshall, Stimson, and yourself? 

Admiral Stark. That is right ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, did Secretary Stimson bring up the subject 
of the kind of an answer that Secretary Hull was contemplating de- 
livering to Mr. Nomura the next day? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall. I do not remember just what oc- 
curred at that meeting. We unquestionably got together to go over 
the situation and I assume that it was discussed from all angles, but 
just what those discussions were I have been unable to recall. 

Mr. Gearhart. Do you remember whether or not Mr. Hull said any- 
thing: about being in doubt as to whether he would serve the 3-months 



2316 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

truce statement or whether or not he [61 6 4.] would serve an- 
other one on them or whether or not he would just do nothing at all? 

Admiral Stark. I do not remember. I think perhaps the best bit 
of evidence we have as to what Mr. Hull was thinking of at that time 
is contained in, I think, a memorandum of the 27th when he men- 
tioned, as I recall in effect, that on about the 25th, as early as the 25th 
he was considering abandoning the modus vivendi and on the 26th he 
did abandon it. 

You recall the paper to which I refer, in which he was discussing the 
matter with one of the foreign diplomats. I have that paper, it is 
short, and I think that gives his viewpoint very clearly. 

Mr. Gearhart. I am more interested in your memory of that pro- 
ceeding than I am in any other witness who is not on the stand. I am 
talking to you about that. 

Admiral Stark. Yes. I do not recall it. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, weren't you very, very much disturbed by the 
progress of that conference and wasn't General Marshall very much 
disturbed by the progress of that conference in the things that were 
said and the things that were being planned by Mr. Hull? 

Admiral Stark. We were disturbed because we thought things were 
heading up so fast towards a show-down, if you [6165] will, 
and we wanted more time and it began to look as though we were not 
going to get it. 

I am sure with regard to the modus vivendi — I do not know whether 
this thought has crossed your mind or not. If you read the modus 
vivendi in itself it is nothing like so drastic as the so-called 10-point 
note which he handed to the Japs on the 26th, but it is my understand- 
ing that the 10 points mentioned in the note on the 26th were the 
points which were going to be taken up, perhaps one at a time, under 
the modus vivendi and that the modus vivendi would provide a period 
of some weeks or 3 months to discuss these particular points and that 
then the modus vivendi was thrown overboard and the points with 
which you are all familiar were handed to the Japanese.' 

Mr. Gearhart. It has been stated that the modus vivendi was 
abandoned because Chiang Kai-shek vigorously objected to it. Was 
any mention made of Chiang Kai-shek's attitude towards the modus 
vivendi in that meeting of the 25th ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall that it was. I have an extremely 
clear recollection of Mr. Hull telling me how he felt about the modus 
vivendi separate from that meeting of the 25th. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did you hear Mr. Stimson say at that meeting any- 
thing about whether he approved the 3 mjonths' truce, [6166] 
the modus vivendi. or not? 

Admiral Stark. I have tried to reconstruct that meeting and what 
was said. 

Mr. Gearhart. I am trying to help you reconstruct it now. That is 
why I am taking the time to talk around the question, hoping that I 
will bring to life something in your memory which you have for the 
moment passed by. 

Admiral Stark. No ; I do not recall. I remember the tense atmos- 
phere and the discussions in general of the period, that is the thing 
which I am trying to reconstruct, and every time we have tried to re- 
construct it for about 3 hours we just cannot do it. That is around 



PKOCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2317 

the 25th, 26th, and 27th. But as to what actually transpired at that 
meeting and what Mr. Hull may have said and Mr. Stimson may have 
said, I have been unable to recall. 

Mr. Gearhart. But you do remember that the Japanese dead-line 
intercept, which said that after the dead line had passed things were 
going to automatically begin to happen, that was discussed; you re- 
member that, don't you? 

Admiral Stark. I remember the message, I remember the dispatch 
very clearly and whether at that particular time it was read or dis- 
cussed I could not say. It very well may have been, probably was, 
but I do not recall the discussions at that meeting. 

[61671 Mr. Gearhart. You heard the President say in the course 
of that meeting, in substance or in effect, that we were likely to be 
attacked, perhaps as soon as, perhaps next Monday ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes ; I recall that. I believe that — I am not sure ; 
1 think I put that down in one of my letters. What I wrote, and in 
which my statement abounds, is factual, written at the time, but I do 
not recall the conversation at that time. Of course, it covered the 
seriousness of the situation. That was what the meeting was called 
for. 

[6168'] Mr. Gearhart. Do you remember that the President said 
that the Japanese were notorious for making an attack without warn- 
ing and that the question was what should be done about it ? 

Admiral Stark. I assume he did. We at one time before had al- 
ready mentioned that ourselves. Now the one thing that I do remem- 
ber — and I do not know that it is necessary to read again — is my post- 
script to my letter of the 25th in which you will recall that I held up 
the letter for a day because of that meeting. I will read it again if you 
like. It is on the record. That is what I do remember. 

Mr. Gearhart. How long is it, Admiral Stark ? 

Admiral Stark. It is short. 

Mr. Gearhart. Eead it in again. It will make it easier to follow : 

Admiral Stark. (Keading:) 

I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I 
have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with 
him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the 
situation. He confii-med it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither 
would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles an 
attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen 
to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the 
weight others do, but [6169] I included it because of the strong feeling 
among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the 
Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an 
advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as most likely. 

Then I went on to state I did not know what we would do, and the 
rest of the paragraph was meant to be prepared for anything. 

Mr. Gearhart. This being surprised or not being surprised reminds 
me of "on again, off again, Finnegan." Why is this assertion made 
one moment that the President was surprised, and the assertion made 
the next moment that he was not surprised ? 

Admiral Stark. I might say in regard to surprise, I was endeavor- 
ing last night, in regard to surprise and war warning, to get down 
to some simple statement which might show my feeling about it. 
For example, one takes a step or steps, at times, to avoid being hurt, 



2318 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

even though he does not really expect to be hurt or he may regard it 
only as a possibility. 

Now with the war warning our feeling was, except for taking the 
offensive, that the officers to whom that message was addressed would 
practcially assume we were at war, so far as taking measures against 
surprise was concerned. I believe had we not been attacked at that 
time — and I am [6170] assuming this and you can verify it 
because I may be wrong — but had we not been attacked at that time 
but had Japan declared war against us, we would have started re- 
connaissance and those other measures in the outlying- stations to 
guard against surprise. 

I assumed when we stated the imminence of war that those meas- 
ures would be put into effect. 

For example, I doubt if anybody in Washington, or perhaps any- 
body in the Hawaiian area, in Oahu, Pearl Harbor, would have 
expected an attack in late 1944 or 1945 when we were knocking at 
the gates of Japan, nevertheless, I dare say they were taking continu- 
ous 24-hour effective measures against being caught aback by any 
Japanese raid. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, to come back to the meeting of the 25th, the 
War Council 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Don't you have an impression now that you left 
that meeting disturbed by what Secretary Hull said he contemplated 
handing to the Japanese the next day ? 

Admiral Stark. I was disturbed before the meeting. As to what 
he was going to hand the Japanese the next day, I have no recollec- 
tion of it. You can question Admiral Schuirmann on that who was 
daily at the State Department, and to the best of my knowledge and 
belief the Department [61711 had no forewarning of the note 
of the 26th, nor did we know that it was not sent at that time, but it 
was sent later. 

Mr. Gearh^vrt, You do not mean to have me infer from that an- 
swer that Secretary Hull assumed the great responsibility personally 
of handing the 10-point note to the Japanese without informing the 
President and the War Council of his contemplated action? 

Admiral Stark. I think he would not have done it without inform- 
ing the President. He did do it, to the best of my knowledge and 
belief, without informing either the Army or the Navy. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did not he inform you and General Marshall, and 
did not you and Marshall protest against the handing of the 10-point 
note to the Japanese ? 

Admiral Stark. Not to my knowledge or remembrance. The mem- 
orandum to the President by Mr. Hull, of which I have a photosatic 

copy, of November 26 states, if I may read it 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes, if it is not long. 
Admiral Stark (reading) : 

With reference to our two proposals prepared for submission to the Japanese 
Government — this is dated the 26th, the day after the meeting — 1. A proposal 
in the way of a draft agreement for a broad basic peaceful settlement for the 
Pacific area, which is henceforth to be made a part of the general conversations 
now going on and to be [6172] carried on, if agreeable to both Govern- 
ments, with a view to a general agreement on this subject. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2319 

2. The second proposal is really closely connected with the conversations look- 
ing toward a general agreement, which is in the nature of a modus Vivendi 
intended to make more feasible the continuance of the conversations. 

In view of the opposition of the Chinese Government and either the half-hearted 
support or the actual opposition of the British, the Netherlands and the Australian 
Governments, and in view of the wide publicity of the opposition and of the 
additional opposition that will naturally follow through utter lack of an under- 
standing of the vast importance and value otherwise of the modus vivendi, with- 
out in any way departing from my views about the wisdom and benefit of this 
step to all of the countries opposed to the aggressor nations who are interested 
in the Pacific area, I desire very earnestly to recommend that at this time I call 
in the Japanese Ambassadors and hand to them a copy of the comprehensive basic 
proposal for a general peaceful settlement, and at the same time withhold 
the modus vivendi proposal. 

That is signed "Cordell Hull." 

That was sent on the 26th to the President, and as I read it, asking 
the President's permission to take the course which he did take, and 
evidently one might infer from that, [6173] although again 
I have no clear recollection of the November 25 meeting, that he had 
not made such a request or possibly proposed it on the 25th. 

I think there was boiling in Mr. Hull's mind the message from 
Chiang Kai-shek and it jelled on the 26th. 

Mr. Geakhakt. Anyway, you and General Marshall left that meet- 
ing feeling it was incumbent upon you to make a last-minute appeal 
in writing to the President to do everything you could to gain time ? 

Admiral Stark. Whether the memorandum to the President started 
then or before I do not know. I would recall our message of the 24th 
showing my apprehension, and to which General Marshall agreed. 
In endeavoring to fix the date that that started, about the only one 
whom I have heard state anything about it, who fixes it rather clearly 
in his own mind and who was one of the draftees of it, was Admiral 
Turner, who believed it started about the 24th. 

Mr. Geaehart. Now this meeting adjourned about 1 o'clock, did 
it not ? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Geaehart. You returned to your office then, did you not ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Geaehart. At 1 : 54 you put in a call for General Marshall, 
did you not ? 

[6174-] Admiral Stark. Well, if the record shows that, I prob- 
ably did; yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. It does. To refresh your memory, wasn't it for the 
purpose of getting together with General Marshall immediately to pre- 
pare a written memorandum pleading with the President to do what- 
ever he could do to gain time for the Army and Navy ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall, Mr. Gearhart. General Marshall 
and I were together on that proposition. Just when we started it I 
cannot say. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then at 4 : 30 in the afternoon General Marshall 
called you on the phone, according to the record of White House calls. 
Now was not that call to further discuss the hastily prepared memo- 
randum to the President? 

Admiral Stark. That is going on 5 years* ago, and when you ask 
me what we said over the telephone at a certain hour in the afternoon, 
I just cannot answer it. 



2320 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then I notice in the same report on the afternoon 
of November 25 at 5 p. m. you again called General Marshall. I will 
ask you, to refresh your memory, wasn't it for him to come over and put 
his signature on the document, or for you to send it to him where 
he could put his signature on it ? 

Admiral Stark. On the afternoon of the 25th? 

[6175] Mr. Gearhart. On the afternoon of the 25th. 

Admiral Stark. The document shows the date of the 27th. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes; but you also heard the testimony of General 
Marshall that he was not in Washington on the 27th. 

Admiral Stark. I knew that, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Therefore he could not sign it on the date it bears, 
he had to sign it ahead of time. 

Admiral Stark. Not necessarily. He thinks he signed it on the 
28th. It might have been dated the 27th. It was dated the 27th for 
his signature and mine, and he being absent he could not sign it until 
he got back. You recall the Gerow memorandum in which he states — 

The Secretaries were informed, of the proposed memorandum 

this is Gerow to General Marshall — 

you and Admiral Stark directed be prepared for the President. The Secretary 
of War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a 
recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversa- 
tions. He was reassured on that point. It was agreed that the memorandum 
would be shown to both Secretaries before dispatch. Both the message and the 
memorandum were shown to the Secretary of War. He suggested some minor 
changes in the memorandum that were made. 

Now if the changes were made at that time it would not appear 
probable to me that Marshall would have signed it on the 25th, particu- 
larly as the memorandum bears the date of the 27th, and particularly 
also in view of this memorandum. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then I note in the same Wliite House record that 
on 10 : 30 a. m. you called General Marshall on the 26th. It is possible 
that he signed it on the 26th after the changes were made, is that not 
correct? Does not the telephone call pertain to that ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not know what that telephone call pertains to. 
Someone has suggested to me that I had something important that 
morning and wanted to delay the joint board meeting a little bit, and 
that that call was for that purpose. Personally I do not recall. 

Mr. Gearhart. The same White House record discloses that you 
called General Marshall at 1 :25 p. m. on the 26th. Could it be possible 
you called with reference to that memorandum to the President, that 
you had determined with him to send to the Chief Executive? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; it could have been possible. 

Mr. Gearhart. It could have been signed on the 26th? It was 
within the range of possibilities? 

Admiral Stark. It was ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. In view of the fact that the diary of Secretary Stim- 
son shows that at the meeting of the 27th, when General Marshall was 
out of the city, the memorandum was [6177] considered by the 
War Council, that would seem that it was signed before, instead of 
after the 27th, would it not? 

Admiral Stark. Not necessarily. I think the best testimony we 
have on that is from General Marshall himself. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2321 

Mr. Gearhart. I have here the testimony of Mr. Stimson which 
says: 

A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the Presi- 
dent was examined and the question of need for further time was discussed. 

Now, that is from the diary of Secretary Stimson, and his diary 
ought to be better evidence, ought it not, than the memory 5 years old 
of the Chief of Staff. 

Do you not think so ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes j but I see nothing in there to show that General 
Marshall might have signed it on the 26th, That is a discussion of 
the draft of the memorandum, is it not? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes ; presented to the War Council, and discussed by 
the War Council. Would it be presented to the War Council and dis- 
cussed by them if it were not assented to by the Chief of Staff already ? 

Admiral Stark. May I see what you are reading from ? 

Mr. Gearhart. I am reading from the United States newsprint of 
the Army report, reading from page 51, half way down the second 
column. 

Admiral Stark. That is this publication (indicating) ? 

[6178'] Mr. Gearhart. Page 51, the right-hand column. 

Admiral Stark. About half way down the right-hand column? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. About one-third of the way down it says, 
"Witness what it says as of the morning of the 27th of November, 1941." 

I have skipped down about three paragraphs. 

Admiral Stark, Yes. As I read it, it says : "I then called up the 
President and talked with him about it." 

That was not a War Council meeting, it was a conversation over the 
telephone if I have the right paragraph. 

Mr, Gearhart. It is the next paragraph : 

He then took prompt action to confer with Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, and 
with General Gerow, who appeared to be representing General Marshall in his 
absence at maneuvers. He was concerned with revising the draft radio of General 
Marshall, which became radio #472. Also, as he says, "a dx-aft memorandum from 
General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President was examined and the ques- 
tion of need for further time was discussed." 

Admiral Stark. As I read that, the "he" refers not to the President 
but to Mr. Stimson. 

Mr. Gearhart. You then called up the President and talked with 
him about it? 

Admiral Stark. It says : 

"I then called up the President [6179] and talked with him about it." 
He then took prompt action to confer with Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, and 
with General Gerow, who appeared to be representing General Marshall in his 
absence at maneuvers. He was concerned with revising the draft radio of 
General Marshall. 

I think it refers to Secretary Stimson, as I read it. 

Mr. Gearhart. Perhaps you are right. Do you remember the 
occasion ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then, you remember whether it was the President 
who took it up with you people or whether it vras taken up by Mr. 
Stimson. 

Admiral Stark. It was Mr. Stimson, if I remember. 

79716 — 46— pt. 5 18 



2322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gearhart. Where was the meeting held ? 

Admiral Stark. I think in Secretary Stimson's Office. It was in 
Mr. Stimson's office, I recollect. 

Going back to your record about my calls with General Marshall, 
there is a note here on my co'py which we obtained that General Mar- 
shall was not in, so apparently we did not discuss anything. The 
message of 12 : 50 also has an "NM" on it, on the mimeographed sheet, 
from which I suppose you read. 

Mr. Gearhart. What does that mean ? 

Admiral Stark. It means "No message". I did not get [6180] 
hold of him. 

Mr. Gearhart. Is that why you kept on trying? 

Admiral Stark. Well, I tried to get him at that time and he was not 
there. He was there in the morning. Now, as regards the late after- 
noon message to which you referred, I do not see anything after that, 
after 12 : 50, which did not get through to Marshall. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, this is repetition, but when did you first hear 
of the 10-point message ? 

Admiral Stark. I may have heard of it on the 28th. It is not clear 
in my mind. I do not remember when I first heard of the 10-point 
message. Undoubtedly not later than the 28th. Possibly Mr. Stimson 
mentioned it. It is possible when he said Mr. Hull had thrown over 
the modus vivendi and was going to send a note, that I had the sub- 
stance of it. I knew approximately what the substance of that note 
was, because, as I understand, those were the points that were going 
to be taken up during the period which the modus vivendi was designed 
to cover. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, to refresh your memory, I notice on this same 
record of White House calls that Secretary Hull called you and got 
through, it is marked with an "O.K." at 1 : 15 p. m. on the 26th day of 
November, 1941. Does that remind you of the fact that Secretary Hull 
told you what he [6181] had done previously that morning at 
9 o'clock in reference to the Japanese? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. My remembrance, and my only remem- 
brance, is Mr. Hull's feeling about the note, and sometime during that 
period I learned that he was throwing over the modus vivendi, and 
the flat statement that it was now up to the Army and Navy, which, 
to my mind, pointed clearly to the fact that he had no hope of reaching 
a satisfactory settlement in the Pacific through further negotiations. 
That we crystallized in our dispatch of the 27th. 

Mr. Gearpiart. Now, the making of a decision to abandon the 
modus vivendi and to serve upon the Japanese the 10-point document, 
that so many people call an ultimatum, was an important event in 
the minds of all the members of the War Council, was it not? 

Admiral Stark. Weil, when I learned of it I considered it very im- 
portant, particularly, as we were playing for time. 

Mr. Gearhart. It was so important that I am astonished that 
Admiral Stark should call you on the 'phone just after he had com- 
pleted the delivery, to talk with you and not say anything about it. 
Admiral Stark. You mean Mr. Hull? 
Mr. Gearhart. jSIr. Hull ; 3'es, sir. 

Admiral Stark. As I sa}^, he may have told me at that [6182] 
time about it being up to the Army and Navy. Just when I got that, 
whether it was the 26th or 27th, or I may have inferred it from his 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2323 

conversation on the 25th, I could not say, but I would again invite at- 
tention to the fact that it was on the 26th that he asked the President's 
permission to proceed on that line. What time the President got that 
and what time the President O.K.'d I do not know. I doubt that Mr. 
Hull would have told me he was going to do it prior to getting the 
President's permission. I think he delivered the note in the late 
afternoon, somewhere around 1800, as I recall, to the Japs. That can 
be ascertained from the records. 

Mr. Geakiiart. Are you sure as to that? 

Admiral Stark. Not sure. I say it can be obtained from the rec- 
ords. I have that recollection. It is probably based on some appoint- 
ment, or something, of Secretary Hull with the Japs. 

Mr. Gearhart. But you have no memory of the Secretary mention- 
ing anything to you in his telephone call at 1 : 25 p. m. concerning what 
kind of a message he was going to deliver to or had delivered to the 
Japanese ? 

Admiral Stark. I did not get the first part of that, Mr. Gearhart. 
I was looking for something to back up my statement about the late 
afternoon, and with your permission I would like to state that from 
the Washington Post of the 27th [Gigs'] Washington Post, 
November 27, page 4, it states, "Then came Hull to see the President. 
Hull left the White House and returned to the State Department to 
confer with Hornbeck, Maxwell Hamilton and Ballantine, his Far 
East experts." That is the Washington Post, November 27, page 4. 

These officials were still with Hull when Kurusu and Nomura arrived at 5 
p. m. The note was handed to Kurusu and Nomura at this conference which 
lasted until 6 : 45 p. m. 

Now, that is from the Washington Post, and I assume the State 
Department can verify it if such is desired. 

[6184] Mr. Gearhart. What was the hour? 

Admiral Stark. Sir? 

Mr. Gearhart. What was the hour mentioned ? 

Admiral Stark. It states the note was handed to Kurusu and 
Nomura at this conference which lasted until 6 : 45 p. m. It also states 
the two Japanese diplomats arrived at 5 p. m. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, the record shows that at 2 : 35 p. m. you called 
Secretary Hull; refreshing your memary, did he say anything about 
what kind of a document he was planning to deliver to the Japanese 
later on in the day ? 

Admiral Stark. I don't recall, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. When did you first hear Secretary Hull quoted as 
sa,ving that lie had decided to kick the whole thing over and tell them 
that he had no other proposals at all ? 

Admiral Stark. That is what I have been trying to reconstruct. 
The Gerow memorandum shows that we had that in the conference 
on the morning of the 27th through Mr. Stimson. That is the one 
definite thing in Avriting which seems to set tliat date. 

Mr. Gearhart. When did you hear for the first time that Secre- 
tary Hull had made the statement, as he put it : 

I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of Stimson and Knox 
and the Army and Navy? 

Admiral Stark. Well, as I say, I heard it not later [618S] 
than the 27th and on the 27th. Now, whether Mr. Hull told me that 



2324 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

as his feeling earlier, I don't know, but he couldn't have made the 
definite statement, I would say — and, of course, Mr. Hull is available — 
prior to getting permission from the President, which was in his 
memorandum of the 26th. 

Mr. Geariiakt. I will ask you, Admiral Stark, in the light of all 
these facts and figures and telephone calls that I have called your at- 
tention to, is it not a fact that as a consequence of the meetings of 
the war council of November 25 and of November 26 that you and 
Marshall were very, very much disturbed because of the anticipated 
and announced action of Secretary Hull and that you and he rushed 
to — and did — prepare a memorandum pleading with the President to 
do something which would make it possible to offset what Mr. Hull 
was contemplating and to gain time for the military forces of the 
United States to prepare for the inevitable conflict? 

Admiral Stark. Well, the entire picture became serious around 
the 23d and the 24th, as reflected in my dispatch of the 24th. Whether 
that memorandum was started on the 25th or the 26th or the 24th 
I am not sure. But, of course, we were disturbed. That is factual. 
We were ]Dlaying for time. That is factual. And the memorandum 
bears the date of the 27th. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is all. 

[6186] The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will 
inquire. 

Admiral Stark. May I now — I see Senator Lucas is here — ^bring 
up the point which I started to bring up this morning and noting his 
absence did not bring up, with reference to yesterday ? 

The Vice Chairman. Yes; you may proceed with that. 

Admiral Stark. Yesterday Senator Lucas in examining me asked if 
the damage done to the Fleet in Pearl Harbor was not largely due to 
torpedoes, that it was his opinion that it was, and in that I agreed. 
I was particularly thinking of my old command, which I put in com- 
mission as executive officer, and later commanded, the West Virginia^ 
whose damage was very extensive from torpedoes, and I think his 
statement may still stand as correct that the great portion of the 
damage was caused by torpedoes, although the Department can give 
factual information on that. 

However, not being too sure of my answer I checked up and I want 
to offer the following, which is taken from item 15 of the Navy Folder 
which is before the committee, and without reading the entire thing 
I simply want to show the following in the record, which does show 
great damage probably done by bombs. 

You have this item 15 among your exhibits. 

[618T\ The Arizona was attacked by both torpedoes and bombs. 
The California was attacked by torpedoes and bombs. 

The West Virginia was attacked — when I say attacked I mean hit — by tor- 
pedoes and bombs. 

The Oklahoma was hit only by torpedoes. 

The Nevada was hit by torpedoes and bombs. 

The Maryland was hit by bombs only. 

The Pennsylvania was hit by bombs only. 

The Tennessee was hit by bombs only. 

The Helena was hit by tori>edoes only. 

The Honolulu was damaged by bombs only. 

The Raleigh, damaged by both torpedoes and bombs. 

The Shaw, by bomb only. 

The Cassin and Dotones, by bomb only. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2325 

That refers to the major combatant ships and there is further data 
with regard to what damage was suffered. I just touched on the 
attack. 

The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your statement on that, 
Admiral ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Stark, you have now given the opinion 
to Senator Lucas, from the record there, on the [6188] ships. 
Did the Secretary of the Navy go out to Hawaii after the attack ? 

Admiral Stark. Very shortly after ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And did he bring back a report ? 

Admiral Stark. He did. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you examine that report with him? 

Admiral Stark. The only report that I saw was the one which was 
made public ; and, of course, he told us, in a long conference, a great 
deal of what happened, particularly items of interest, and of the 
wonderful behavior of our men, and of their wonderful spirit, et 
cetera, as he saw them in the hospital wards. 

I was asked, and I didn't understand the question, in the previous 
investigation by the Navy, when I said I saw the report, I believe 
reference was made to a special report which he made to the 
President that I did not see. 

Senator Ferguson. I understand you never saw the report that 
went to the President? 

Admiral Stark. So far as I know I never saw that report. I 
don't recall it. I saw the report which was made public; and, of 
course, from conversations with him I got the picture. 

Senator Ferguson. Isn't it true that the report that was made 
public was a different report than the one given to the President? 

[6JS9~\ Admiral Stark. I understood so since, but I have not 
seen it. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for the fact that the 
Secretary of the Navy did not disclose to you the facts that he dis- 
closed to the President, you being the highest Navy man under him ? 

Admiral Stark. I don't account for it. 

Senator Ferguson. You don't account for it? 

Admiral Stark. I don't. I don't recall any knowledge of it at 
the time. 

Senator Ferguson. Well 

Admiral Stark. That he had made a special written report to the 
President, if he did, and I am assuming from your question that 
he did. 

Senator Ferguson. And you indicated that you knew he had? 

Admiral Stark. Well, I indicated to this extent, that when I was 
asked the question last summer, or a year ago last summer, I should 
say, if I had seen the report which Colonel Knox made, I replied 
"Yes," and I gathered later that the report — the report I referred to 
was that which was published, that is what I understood the question 
was asked on, and I gained the understanding since that there was 
another report. 



2326 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Now, yesterday you made an answer to Mr. 
Gearhart that I want to ask you about. You said: 

[6190] I have spent hours trying to recall what went on, on the 25th, 
6th and 7th, as to time. I have discussed it with others. We come to an 
impasse as to any agreement every time we do it, and every time we start 
it we waste a couple of hours and get nowhere. I cannot recall the details 
of just when I got that information. I wish I could, but I just can't do it. 

Do I understand from that answer that what you are conveying 
to the committee is that you have sat down with various other 
officials and tried to arrive at an agreement as to what happened 
during this period, is that what I understand? 

Admiral Stark. As to when it happened. My memory is clear 
as to certain things which did happen and not clear as to others. 
But when I try, for example, to fix in my own mind whether Mr. 
Hull told me about the Chiang Kai-shek memorandum on the 25th 
or 26th, I can't do it. I have talked the matter over at length on 
different occasions with Admiral Schuirmann, who was in constant 
touch with the State Department, and as to what he knew. 

Senator Ferguson. That is not what I am getting at. Do I under- 
stand that some of your answers here are because you have agreed 
with somebody that that is what happened and if you can't agree then 
you don't give your best answer ? 

Admiral Stark. No. I have given my best answer. That [6191] 
is not the inference to be drawn at all. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I wanted to straighten out on this 
answer. 

Admiral Stark. No; that inference is not what I intended to con- 
vey. It is my effort to fix down to a date and a time as to just when I 
learned, for example, of Mr. Hull's sending the 10-point note, of his 
conversation about Chiang Kai-Shek, and tlie material of that sort. 

Senator Ferguson. Now 

Admiral Stark. But 

Senator Ferguson. I will have to change the subject, because I was 
talking about another thing, but you bring up another thing which 
I will ask you about now, copy of the message transmitted to Secre- 
tary Stimson by Mr. T. V. S;>ong, under cover of a letter dated No- 
vember 25. 

Will you look at that and see whether that is the Chiang Kai-shek 
message that you are talking about? 

Admiral Stark. That is the message, or it certainly conveys the 
material which Mr. Hull talked to me about, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, 1 understand that a copy of this memo- 
randum to the Secretary of State was sent to the Secretary of War. 
Do you know whether or not a copy was sent to the Secretary of the 
Navy, and did it reach you in that manner? 

Admiral Stark. It is my recollection, and again you can [6192] 
get factual data, that this message was not only sent to Mr. Hull but 
to a number of other officials in our Government. 

Senator Ferguson. That is just it. Isn't it true that the Chinese 
Government not only went to the Secretary of State but they went 
to other agencies and Mr. Hull Avas upset about it? 

Admiral Stark. Very much upset. I believe this was also made 
known to people in Congress at that time. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2327 

Senator Ferguson. So tlie substance of that letter not only came 
to you throuo;!! Mr. Hull but it came from other sources, did it not? 

Admiral Stark. I knew of the substance of it because I can recall 
Colonel Knox talkinfj about people talking about this on the Hill. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, when did you have a conversation — I real- 
ize how long it has been, I realize that there is much water gone over 
the dam, as we say, but I want to try and get the substance of some of 
these conversations because what this committee has to do is to try to 
get the best information they can so that "we will get all the facts, and 
I hope that you wiJl bear with me on some of these questions. 

Admiral Stark. I will do my best to give you all I know and any 
information that I have that should be of assistance. 

Senator Ferguson. I start out with the assumption, and [6J9r3] 
I take it it is true, that you favor this hearing and you are willing to 
cooperate. 

Admiral Stark. I am delighted that this hearing came before Con- 
gress where all parties would have the opportunity to tell you all they 
know about' it. 

Senator Ferguson. I am assuming that. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, on this information that came from the 
Chinese Government in relation to this modus vivendi, it wasn't only 
given to the Secretary of State, but it was given to other agencies 
and even came up on the Hill, as we call the Congress ; that is true ; 
isn't it? 

Admiral Stark. That is my understanding, and confirmed, without 
any question, by Mr. Hull's statement to me that they were crying ap- 
peasement on the Hill, another thing which greatly perturbed him. 

Senator Ferguson. Now — do you want to take a moment to look at 
that? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. There is one paragraph here in Mr. Hull's 
statement which reads 

Mr, Mitchell. Is that the statement of November 29th ? 

Admiral Stark. No, of November 25 : ^ 

Subject : Opposition of Generalissimo Cliiang Kai-Shek to modus vivendi. 
[6194] Participants: Secretary Hull and the Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Hu 
Shih. 

And part of that reads : 

I said that very recently the Generalissimo and Madam Chiang Kai-Shek almost 
flooded Washington with strong and lengthy cables telling us how extremely 
dangerous the Japanese threat is to attack the Burma Road through Indo-Chlna 
and appealing loudly for aid, whereas practically the first thing this present 
proposal of mine and the President does is to require the Japanese troops to be 
taken out of Indo-China and thereby to protect the Burma Road from what 
Chiang Kai-Shek said was an imminent danger — 

and so forth. 

I remember very clearly how upset Mr. Hull was, of his telling me 
that even the Hill was crying appeasement, that the Chinese them- 
selves should have supported him, because he was doing this in their 
behalf, and that apparently they didn't understand it. 

Also in a previous dispatch, which I read, he pointed out that the 
British, he thought, were only half-way supporting it. 

> Included in Exhibit No. 18. 



2328 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Was it j^our understanding, or was it not youi 
understanding, that to have entered into or to have sent the modus 
vivendi, or agreed on the modus vivendi, that [6196] thereby 
America would have been sacrificing her principles ? 

Admiral Stark. No. That is not my opinion. My understanding 
of the modus vivendi was that it was to insure a period of three months 
to talk things over and that the material which was in the 10-point 
note were the items which they were going to talk over and resolve. 
Senator Ferguson. But the modus vivendi would have given an 
extension of three months for negotiations and would have not, ex- 
cept for that period, let's say, sacrificed the American principles? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I had no idea that Mr. Hull for one sec- 
ond considered sacrificing any principles or walking backward. 

Senator Ferguson. You were the highest Naval authority in the 
United States? 

Admiral Stark. I was. 

Senator Ferguson. You were under the Secretary of the Navy but 
you were the highest authority? > 

Admiral Stark. By virtue of my office at that time I was. 
Senator Ferguson. Therefore you were vitally interested in our 
diplomatic negotiations, because, as I understand it, you have to have 
your diplomatic negotiations tied in with your military authorities, 
because you have got to be able to [6196] back up what you 
do; isn't that the principle? 
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Therefore you were vitally interested in this 
modus vivendi and the diplomatic negotiations; is that true? 
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you tell us why the modus vivendi 
was not sent. You were one of the top officials representing the United 
States Navy, and, if I might add, before you answer that, this would 
be a Naval war in the Pacific, would it not ? 

Admiral Stark. Largely, yes. I always looked on it as largely a 
naval war. 

Senator Ferguson. Therefore you would be very vitally interested 
in this question as to whether or not we had a J] months period or 
whether or not we didn't take that period. AVill you tell us why the 
modus vivendi was not sent ? 

Admiral Stark. May I add there that so was Marshall, because 

Senator Ferguson. Oh, yes. 

Admiral Stark. Because the defense of the Philippines, which was 

an Army problem, was one of the primary reasons for that extension. 

Senator Ficrouson. I don't mean to say that the ]Military, [6197] 

the Army, was not vitally interested also, but it would have been, to 

a greater extent, a naval war? 

Admiral Stark. Yes; but holding the Philippines was something 
1 took up in the first meeting I ever had in the AVhite House. There 
had always been a general feeling that we couldn't hold the Philip- 
pines, that we would have to abandon them. I was hoping that we 
would have time to take steps to make them secure. My desire for 
time was so that the Army could complete a project it had to greatly 
strengthen the Philippines, and in turn the fieet could support them 
in the Philippines. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2329 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Now, coming back to my previous question, why did we not use 
the modus vivendi ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, I can give you my opinion as to that. 

Senator Ferguson. I would like to have the substance of what was 
said first and then your opinion. 

Admiral Stark. I gained the impression from Mr. Hull that the 
Chiang Kai-shek note so disturbed him that — alon^ with other things 
which have been read — that he seriously questioned, when he first in- 
formed me, the desirability of his going ahead with the modus vivendi. 
Subsequently he did not go ahead with it. Now — 

[6298] Senator Ferguson. What were the other things ? 

Admiral Stark. The other items were those which have been men- 
tioned, but, as I recall, the British and the Dutch appeared not too 
strongly with him; they were crying appeasement on the Hill, as he 
stated to me, with regard to the course that he was taking. 

Senator Ferguson. I believe that is the message that you referred 
to today and it reads something like this : 

They seemed to be thinking of the advantages to be derived without any par- 
ticular thought of what we should pay them, if anything. Finally, when I 
discovered that none of their Governments had given ihem instructions relative 
to this phase of the matter, except in the case of the Netherlands Minister, I 
remarked that each of their Governments were more interested in the defense 
of that area of the world than this country, and at the same time they expected 
this country, in case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to move in a military 
way and to take the lead in defending the entire area/ 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. And then there was his memorandum 
dated November 29,^ in which he refers to a conference : Participants, 
the Secretary of State, Hull, and the British Ambassador, Lord Hali- 
fax. That was the one I was thinking about. 

[6199] Senator Ferguson. All right. Will you give me the sub- 
stance of that ? 

Admiral Stark (reading) : 

The British Ambassador called at his request and I soon discovered tliat he 
had no special business except to check on the aftermath of the conversations 
between the President and myself and the Japanese with special reference to 
the question of the proposed modus vivendi. This caused me to remark in a 
preliminary way that the mechanics for the carrying on of diplomatic relations 
between the governments resisting aggressor nations are so complicated that 
it is nearly impossible to carry on such relations in a manner at all systematic 
and safe and sound. I referred to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek, for example, 
has sent numerous hysterical cable messages to different Cabinet officers and 
high officials in the Government other than the State Department, and some- 
times even ignoring the President, intruding into a delicate and serious situa- 
tion with no real idea of what the facts are. 

There are about four or five pages to this. I do not know whether 
you want me to go ahead with the rest of it as a refresher or not 

Senator Ferguson. It is in, is it not? 
' [6£00] Mr. Mitchell. It is in Exhibit 18. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; it is in the record. 

Admiral Stark. It is in the record, yes, sir. I might just add the 
next sentence. [Reading :] 

I added that Chiang Kai-shek has his brother-in-law, located here in Wash- 
ington, disseminate damaging reports at times to the press and others, appar- 

^ Page 3 of Memorandum of Conversation, dated November 24, 1941, included in 
Exhibit No. 18. 

a Included in Exhibit No. 18. 



2330 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ently with no particular purpose in mind ; that we have correspondents from 
London who interview different officials here, which is entirely their privilege 
to do, except that at times we all move too fast without fully understanding each 
other's views, et cetera, et cetera. I stated that this was well illustrated in 
the case of the recent outburst by Chiang Kai-shek. In referring to this I re- 
marked that it would have been better if, when Churchill received Chiang Kai- 
shek's loud protest about our negotiations here with Japan, instead of passing 
the protest on to us without objection on his part, thereby qualifying and virtually 
killing what we knew were the individual views of the British Government toward 
these negotiations, he had sent a strong cable back to Chiang Kai-shek telling him 
to brace up and fight with the same zeal as the Japanese and the Germans are 
displaying instead of weakening and telling the Chinese people that [6201] 
all of the friendly countries were now striving primarily to protect themselves 
and to force an agreement between China and Japan, every Chinese should under- 
stand from such a procedure that the best possible course was being pursued and 
that this calls for resolute fighting until the undertaking is consummated by 
peace negotiations which Japan in due course would be obliged to enter into 
with China. 

And then it goes on. I think I have read enough to show how ]\Ir. 
Hull felt about it and which I got the impression from him in talking 
with him personally. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, all right. Did you feel the same way 
about it ? 

Admiral Stark. I felt the same way about the impropriety of 
flooding all of Washington in the manner in which INIr. Hull stated. 
I thought they slioidd have gone about it to him with all of their 
troubles and not gone to the highways and byways. 

Senator Fergusox. But after we are all through, it is apparent that 
Mr. Hull — or is it apparent — that Mr. Hull followed just what the 
Chinese wanted? 

Admiral Stark. He did. He broke off so far as the modus vivendi 
is concerned. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

[030:2] Admiral Stark. And he gives extensive reasons there 
for it. Perhaps he may have agreed with some of Chiang Kai-shek's 
thoughts that even a leak that we were — and I think it is in that 
letter — a leak to the effect that the United States was going to let 
Japan have oil or other materials or ease up on the freezing might 
be such a blow to their morale as to make it impossible for them to 
continue. But we had all those things. He talked it over, I assume, 
with his chief and he came to that conchision. We were thinking 
that from the military standpoint to gain time. 

Senator Ferguson. But, Admiral, isn't this true, that when you 
take ivhat Mr. Hull said about Chiang Kai-shek, it indicated that 
he was not going to follow that route rather than that he was going 
to follow wliat he wanted; it was a criticism of it. 

Admiral Stark. It was a criticism of Mr. Hull bj^ tlie Chinese 
you mean ? 

Senator Ferguson. No; a criticism of the Chinese stand, was it 
not? 

Admiral Stark. By Mr. Hull ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. I do not know if he criticized so much although 
he may have and did in some respects the Chinese understanding. 
That, I would say, could liavo been resolved and [620r3] set 
straight between Mr. Hull and the iVmbassador, but when it was 
broadcast, or the impression was gained or at least talked about and 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2331 

Mr. Hull gained the impression, that even here at the Capitol that 
he, Mr. Hull, was being guilty of appeasement and that may also 
have influenced him in the action which he took. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, wait. Do I understand, then, that the 
opinion that Mr. Hull was appeasing Japan may have had something 
to do with him throwing out the modus vivendi and putting in the 
note of the 26th? 

Admiral Stark. Whether or not that criticism which was being 
leveled at him in official Washington had anything to do with his 
final decision, only Mr. Hull could answer. I do know that it greatly 
annoyed him. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, how do you account for this note 
on the 24th where he fully recognized what he is saying : 

I remarked that each of their Governments was more interested in the defense 
of that are'a of the world than this country, and at the same time they expected 
this country, in case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to move in a military 
way and take the lead in defending the entire area. 

He fully recognized our position in the world when he said that, 
did he not? 

[6204] Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; he recognized that and I think 
that probably from the other governments it is not unusual. It is a 
rather human weakness to have that sort of an opinion. Every fel- 
low is thinlring of himself first and perhaps sometimes from thinking 
overmuch of himself loses sight of the broader picture. That is what I 
gather that he means. 

Senator Ferguson. Isn't that exactly what happened, just what Mr. 
Hull prophesied would happen, that we would have to defend the 
whole area and we would have to have the war for the whole area, isn't 
that what happened ? 

Admiral Stark. We would have the major role. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. The Chinese had their role and, of course, the 
British also had their role and there were plans being laid. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, that takes me to this : What was our role, 
what was our plan in case there was an attack upon the British posses- 
sions in that area ? I am talking right from this memorandum of the 
24th here : 

In case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to move in a military way and take 
the lead in defending the entire area. 

which would include the British. 

Now, what was our plan, what was our role if an attack \6205'] 
was made upon the British possessions in the Far East ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not know what it w^ould have been. It would 
have been up to Congi^ess in the last analysis, had the President decided 
that it was time to make a recommendation to Congress. What recom- 
mendation he would have made, I do not know. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever try to find out what w^ould be your 
stand ? You had to prepare for such an emergency, did you not ? 

Admiral Stark. We were preparing for it. 

Senator Ferguson. And you could not wait until Congress acted to 
get at least prepared for such a situation ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 



2332 CONGRESSIONAL IN\TESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, did you ever try to find out 
what our stand would be in that case ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Wlio did you try to find it out from? 

Admiral Stark. I had asked the President. 

Senator Ferguson. What did he tell you ? 

Admiral Stark. He could not answer the question and I believe 
that he was sincere in stating that he did not kiiow. You will recall, 
and I have stated factually — this is not hindsight — in answer to ques- 
tions of this sort which Admiral Richardson asked me and that I had 
asked for the answers to [6£06] those questions and could not 
get them, and I quote — I believe I stated — that I thought that "there 
was nobody on God's green earth who could answer them." 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, you went to the President and 
you asked the specific question as to what we would do in that case if 
an attack was made on the British possessions, in which case I under- 
stand that he told you he did not know. 

Admiral Stark. He did not answer the question. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, what did he say or what did he do?_ 

Admiral Stark. Just that he did not know; at least he said that 
he could not answer it. At one time I believe he said to me, "Don't 
ask me these questions," because I feel that he could not answer them — 
I felt that he could not answer them. Now, as to what he would done, 
I do not know. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, Admiral, how could you prepare for that 
situation ? If you could not get an answer and, as you say, you knew 
the President could not answer it, how could you prepare for that? 

Admiral Stark. I could work on the assumption that the worst 
might happen and that is what I did. For example 

Senator Ferguson. Did he tell you 

The Chairman. Let the witness complete his answer. 

\6207'\ Senator Ferguson. I will let him answer. 

Admiral Stark, ^lay I just give you an example ? You will recall 
that on my own initiative, so far as getting the British over here in 
early 1941, we started hearings here with the British. When I asked 
them to come over initially I did not ask the President's permission 
or Colonel Knox. It was more or less — there was some dynamite 
in the fact that it might be known that we were holding conversations 
with the British as to what we would do and how we would work with 
them in case of war. 

I was asked the question one day on the Hill before one of the Senate 
committees, as to whether or not we were holding conversations with 
the British with regards to participation with them in the war and my 
answer was that I would like to put two or three questions up to the 
committee. And the first one was, "Is there not some possibility of the 
United States being drawn into this war, remote though it may be 
and regardless of our endeavor to keep out?" They agreed that such 
a possibility did exist in the world situation at that time, 
^ I then asked, "Suppose that possibility develops, is there any ques- 
tion on which side we would fight ? If course there was no question. 
It would be opposed to the Axis. 

I then answered the question and stated, "The answer is in the af- 
iirmatjve" in answering you, but wouldn't I be utter- [6208'] ly 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2333 

derelict in my duties if I did not prepare for the contingency so that 
if and when war did eventuate that there would be ample working 
plans, so far as possible, to dovetail and coordinate our effort? 

The questioning of me on that subject stopped and I never was 
asked about it during the course of months, during the course of those 
next couple of months work with the British. 

Now, as regards the Far East, we did hold conversations out there 
in the A-D-B, none of which was approved, and final action, we^ put 
it up to Admiral Hart and to Admiral Phillips, the British Com- 
mander-in-Chief, to make their own plans as to how to work together 
if we both got in it. The directions were always against any political 
commitment. I have Hart's here, his despatch covering the recom- 
mendations with regard to that pulling together and I have our an- 
swer. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand that at any time you dis- 
cussed with the President the question as to not what we would do, 
but preparing for the eventuality that if they did attack the British 
that you would be prepared for this country to come in ? 
. Admiral Stark. I stated, and he knew with regard to the partic- 
ular conversations I have just mentioned, I informed him in January, 
after the committee was here, that I was going ahead with those 
conversations. 

[6£09] Senator Ferguson. And what did he say about that? 

Admiral Stark. I told him that I would prefer to be panned for 
not being ready than for being reproved when the time came and I 
was not ready, and he let it go at that. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, what did he say? What was the sub- 
stance of what he said ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, he did not pan me and after looking 

Senator Ferguson. You mean after the 7th he did not pan you? 

Admiral Stark. Sir? 

Senator Ferguson. You mean after the Ttli of December or when? 

Admiral Stark. No. 

Senator Ferguson. At that time? 

Admiral Stark. After I informed him of the conversations going 
on. Later on all those conversations, that is, the boil-down and the 
plans were shown to him. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand then, that on the 7th day 
of December 1941, you as the head of the Nav}' had no plan to go into 
effect if the British were attacked and we vvere not attacked? 

Admiral Stark. If the British were attacked and we were 
['6210] not attacked we had no plans to bring into being. 

Senator Ferguson. Then I understand 

Admiral Stark. I say that we did not get any. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. Then I understand that the 
Winant note, the message sending the information that they were 
going to the Kra Peninsula on the 6th and that they would be there 
in some 14 hours, and another note, the paraphrase of a secret mes- 
sage — this is on page 5507 of this record — received at the War De- 
partment at 4 : 29 December 6th, that is, 4 : 29 p. m. in the aftemoon 
of December 6th [reading] : 

Brink advises that at one o'clock in the afternoon, following a course due. west, 
were seen a battleship, five cruisers, seven destroyers and twenty-five merchanl 
ships; these were seen at 106°8' E., 8° N. ; this was the first report. 



2334 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The second report was that ten merchant ships, two cruisers and ten destroyers 
were seen following the same course at 108°20' E., 7°35' N. 

Both of the above reports came from patrols of the Royal Air Force. 

Now, I understand, Admiral, that those two messages, then, would 
not cause us to be alerted in and of themselves because we had no plan 
if they attacked the British and it was certainly not an attack on any 
of our possessions? 

[62111 Admiral Stark. If they had attacked the British and not 
us I would have taken no action except to continue to be alert against 
an attack by them, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand that that could account 
for the fact that you were not alerted, your office was not alerted Sat- 
urday afternoon, Saturday night, Sunday morning up till the time of 
the attack ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not understand just what you mean by "not 
alerted." Our office was operating 24 hours a day. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, Admiral, having those two messages and 
no plan for us to take any part, were you alerted for war that after- 
noon and that morning, Sunday morning the 7th ? 

Admiral Stark. You mean where, in Washington or in the field ? 

Senator Ferguson. No, Washington, right in your office. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, we were. We were alerted. We were on duty 
at all times. 

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand then that by being alerted you 
mean this, that at 10 : 30 on the day that war was to start that you 
would get down to your office at 10 : 30 if jou were fully alerted and 
expecting a war to start? 

Admiral Stark. If I had expected the war to start at [6212] 
that time I would have come down. I did not know the war was going 
to start that morning. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know it was going to start as far as the 
British was concerned on the 7th ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What about these two messages ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, this message from Hart to the British 

'Senator Ferguson. And the Winant message. 

Admiral Stark. And the Winant message, which is practically the 
same as the one from Hart, gave the movement of that and we were 
trying to diagnose where they would hit. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, they were going to cross the Gulf of 
Siam, were they not ? 

Admiral Stark. They Avere heading south, which is in that area. 

Senator Ferguson. And that fleet and that convoy would not attack 
America's possessions ? 

Admiral Stark. No, but there might have been another attack on 
American possessions concurrently. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you anticipate such ? 

Admiral Stark. Did I what, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you anticipate such another attack on Amer- 
ican possessions ? 

[6213] Admiral Stark. We had mentioned that we could not 
preclude an attack elsewhere and we had specifically included the 
Philippines, which was on the flank, as a possibility in that connection 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2335 

and we had sent previous messages to the effect that they might strike 
anywhere. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you figure that when they would strike 
the British, which would be some time on Sunday — 14 hours, in fact, 
from some time on Saturday noon — did you figure that they would 
attack American possessions ? 

Admiral Stark. We figured at that time, in view of the fact that 
they had destroyed their codes with us and with the Dutch that there 
certainly was a possibility, even a strong probability — even a prob- 
ability of their attacking all three of us. That was after the destruc- 
tion of codes. It certainly was an indication and a rather clear indi- 
cation of their enemies. They might simply have broken off dip- 
lomatic relations with us, we couldn't tell, but the presumption which 
we instilled into the dispatch was war. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you say a strong probability was that they 
were going to attack us as well as the British ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then how do you account, Admiral, for the 
fact that you could not be reached Saturday night 

Admiral Stark. I would not want to 

[6^14] Senator Ferguson. Wait until I finish my question. 

Admiral Stark. Pardon me. 

Senator Ferguson. And that you did not get to your office and no 
one reached you until 10 : 30 that Sunday morning? 

Admiral Stark. I would like to say as regards reaching me Satur- 
day night, that I am still of the opinion that I was home. I am not 
sure, from the testimony which has been given on that, that I was 
called that night. There is room for doubt in the testimony that I 
have read of each of the parties concerned with calling me, that they 
might have been under the impression that the other had called and 
I have never been sutc that I was called and I will continue to be in 
doubt unless this committee pins it down, the fact that I was definitely 
called by someone. It is not plain to me. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, at least your own testimony is to the effect 
that you did not get down to your office until 10 : 30 that morning or 
around that time, isn't that correct? 

Admiral Stark. My testimony is to the effect that it would be my 
recollection, after this lapse of time, that I was in general down there 
about half-past ten on Sunday morning. Others stated that I was 
there earlier. That was just a guess on my usual procedure that 
morning. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, Admiral, this was of such importance that 
the President of the United States took from the [621S] Su- 
preme Court on leave Justice Roberts, named him as the head of a 
committee to investigate how this thing happened at Pearl Harbor. 
Isn't that true ? ^ 

Admiiftl Stark. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you, the head of the Navy, knowing 
that the President a few days afterwards thought it was of such im- 
portance that he named a Supreme Court Justice to do the job, did 
you make an investigation into your own office, into this office that 
you had control of here in Washington, as to what was known in 
Washington and how this thing could have happened? • 



2336 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. No, I did not. I knew pretty well what had hap- 
pened and what was coming in and I was then very much engaged in 
fighting the war. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, you were, but you were also interested in 
knowing whether or not your office was efficiently equipped and 
manned in order that it could fight the war in the future, isn't that 
true ? 

Admiral Stark. That is true ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to leave that and I want to go to 
this report of the Secretary of the Navy. This is a report by the 
Secretary of the Navy to the President. The first sentence of it is: 

The Japanese air attack on the Island of Oahu on [6216] December the 
7th was a complete surprise to both the Army and the Navy. 

Now, the Army and the Navy would be all-inclusive, would it not, 
the way he has used it there, and I think a later sentence which I will 
read to you indicates that the Army and the Navy were completely 
surprised as far as the attack on Oahu is concerned. 

Admiral Stark. That is what it says. 

Senator Ferguson. That is just what it says? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that your understanding? 

Admiral Stark. Well, I would not want to make a statement as 
sweeping as that, particularly with regard to the Army. I know that 
Marshall was surprised, I know that I was surprised and I believe my 
principal advisers have testified on the subject. 

[6:217] Senator Ferguson. Now I want to go to the next sen- 
tence : 

Its initial success, which included almost all the damage done, was due to a 
lack of a state of readiness against such an air attack by both branches of the 
service. This statement was made to me by both General Short and Admiral Kim- 
mel and both agreed that it was entirely true. Neither Army nor Navy Command 
on Oahu regarded such an attack as at all likely because of the danger which such 
a carrier-borne attack would confront in view of the preparedness of the American 
naval strength in Hawaiian waters. While the likelihood of an attack without 
warning by Japan was in the minds of both General Short and Admiral Kimmel, 
both felt certain that such an attack would take place nearer Japan's base of 
operations, that is, in the Far East. 

Were you of the same opinion ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, I thought the attack would take place in the 
Far East, from the evidence we had. 

Senator Ferguson. You were then of the same opinion? 

Admiral Stark. I was of that opinion as regards the most likely 
place of attack, but I did not preclude an attack elsewhere. 

Senator Ferguson. You were verv close. Admiral, to the admiral 
in charge of plans, were you not — Admiral Turner? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

*[6218] Senator Ferguson. Did you know that his opinion was 
that there was a 50-50 chance for an attack on Pearl Harbor at 
that time ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall that 50-50 chance to which he has 
testified. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the State Department, 
Mr. Hornbeck, said that if he was a gambling man and was placing 
odds on the 27th day of November 1941, that it would be 5-to-l that 
there would be no attack before the 15th of December? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2337 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall that. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that he had written such a 
memorandum ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall it. 

Senator Ferguson. Was ^here disagreement between the Navy and 
the State Department on that question of whether or not there would 
be an attack or no attack as far as America was concerned ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, Mr. Hull stated that he would not be sur- 
prised at a surprise attack. I dealt more with him than with Horn- 
beck. Admiral Schuirmann dealt primarily with Dr. Hornbeck. 

Senator Ferguson. Now reading from this report again: 

Neither Short nor Kinimel at the time of the attack had any [6219] 
knowledge of the plain intimation of some surprise move made clear in Wash- 
ington through the interception of Japanese instructions to Nomura in which 
a surprise move of some kind was clearly indicated by the insistence upon the 
precise time of Nomura's reply to Hull, at 1 : 00 o'clock on Sunday. 

Did you ever discuss that matter with Secretary Knox? 

Admiral Stark. Only in the case of hindsight. No one intimated 
to me that that 1 o'clock message meant an attack on Hawaii. 

Senator Ferguson. Does not he indicate it in here ? 

Admiral Stark. He indicates it there but after the event. I can 
indicate it after the event. 

Senator Ferguson. But it says here "made clear in Washington." 
It says "Neither Short nor Kimmel at the time of the attack had any 
knowledge of the plain intimation of some surprise move made clear 
in Washmgton through the interception of Japanese instructions to 
Nomura." 

Admiral Stark. It is clear now. To my mind it was not clear 
then. Colonel Knox never intimated that to me prior to the attack, 
to the best of my recollection. 

Senator Ferguson. Then he goes on, and I will read this sen- 
tence 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Are you 
reading from Knox's report ? 

[6220'] Senator Ferguson. Yes; I am reading from Knox's 
report. 

Mr. Kjiefe. Is that the one he made public ; or the one he made to 
the President? 

Senator Ferguson. It is Secretary Knox's report to the President. 
That is indicated at the top. 

Senator Lucas. Is this in evidence? 

Senator Ferguson. No. Might I inquire from counsel as to where 
this paper was obtained from, whether from the Secretary of the 
Navy's office or the White House ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It came from the Navy Department. 

Admiral Stark. I never have seen it. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the reason I want to ask you some 
questions on the facts contained in it. 

Senator Lucas. May I inquire how long we have had this docu- 
ment? 

Mr. Mitchell. I was just going to ask that. 

Senator Ferguson. I have had it a day. 

Senator Lucas. It is not mimeographed and distributed to the 
members ? 

79716 — 46 — pt. 5 19 



2338 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. That is the only copy we have. 

Senator Ferguson. So that all will get it, I will ask the admiral 
to read it into the record. I think it is worth reading, because I 
want to ask some questions on it. It covers your question about the 
torpedoes, and that is the [6221-6222] reason I started out 
on it. 

Would you read it into the record ? 

Admiral Stark. Starting at the beginning? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Stark (reading) : 

Report by the Secretary of the Navy to the President 

The Japanese air attack on the Island of Oahu on December 7th was a 
complete surprise to both the Army and the Navy. Its initial success, which 
included almost all the damage done, was due to a lack of a state of readiness 
against such an air attack, by both branches of the service. This statement 
was made by me to both General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and both agreed 
that it was entirely true. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is not right, is it? It should be "to me," 
should it not ? 

Admiral Stark. It says "by me." I think it probably means " by 
me." 

Mr. Mitchell. I think that is right. If you read the rest of it. 

Admiral Stark (continuing) : 

Neither Army or Navy Commandants in Oahu regarded such an attack as at 
all likely, because of the danger which such a carrier-borne attack would con- 
front in view of the preponderance of the American naval strength in Hawaiian 
waters. While the likelihood of an attack without [62.23] warning by 
Japan was in the minds of both General Short and Admiral Kimmel. both felt 
certain that such an attack would take place nearer Japan's base of operations, 
that is, in the Far East. Neither Sliort nor Kimmel, at the time of the attack, 
had any knowledge of the plain intimations of some surprise move, made clear 
in Washington, tlirough the interception of Japanese instructions to Nomura, 
in which a surprise move of some kind was clearly indicated by the insistence 
upon the precise time of Nomura's reply to Hull, at one o'clock on Sunday. 

A general warning had been sent out from the Navy Department on November 
27th, to Admiral Kimmel. General Short told me that a message of warning 
sent from the War Department on Saturday night at midnight, before the 
attack, failed to reach him until four or five hours after the attack had 
been made. 

Both the Army and the Navy command at Oahu had prepared careful estimates 
covering their idea of the most likely and most imminent danger. General Short 
repeated to me several times that he felt the most imminent danger to the Army 
was the danger of sabotage, because of the known presence of large numbers of 
alien Japanese in Honolulu. Acting on this assumption, he took every possible 
measure to protect against this danger. This included, xuifortunately, bunching 
[622'/] the planes on the various fields on the Island, close together, so that 
they might be carefully guarded against possible subversive action by Japanese 
agents. This condition, known as "Sabotage Alert" had been assumed because 
sabotage was considered as the most imminent danger to be guarded against. 
Tiiis bunching of planes, of course, made the Japanese air attack more effective. 
There was, to a lesser degree, the same lack of dispersal of planes on Navy 
stations, and although the possibility of sabotage was not given the same 
pronn'nence in Naval minds, both arms of the service lost most of their planes on 
the ground in the initial attack by the enemy. There were no Army planes in 
the air at the time of the attack and no planes were warmed up in readiness to 
take the air. • 

The Navy regarded tlie principal danger from a Japanese stroke without 
warning was a submarine attack, and consequently made all necessary provi- 
sions to cope with such an attack. As a matter of fact, a submarine attack did 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2339 

accompany the air attack and at least two Japanese submarines were sunk and 
a third one ran ashore and was captured. No losses were incurred by the 
Fleet from submarine attack. One small two-man submarine penetrated into 
the harbor, having followed a vessel through the net, but because it broached 
in the shallow water it was immediately discovered by the [6225] Curtis 
and was attacked and destroyed through the efforts of that vessel and those of the 
destroyer Monaghan. This submarine fired her torpedoes which hit a shoal 
to the west of Ford Island. 

The Navy took no specific measures of protection against an air attack, save 
only that the ships in the harbor were so dispersed as to provide a field of fire 
covering every approach- from the air. The Navy morning patrol was sent out 
at dawn to the southward, where the Commander-in-Chief had reason to suspect 
an attack might come. This patrol consisted of ten patrol bombers who made 
no contacts with enemy craft. At least 90% of Ofiicers and enlisted personnel 
were aboard ship when the attack came. The condition of readiness aboard ship 
was described as "Condition Three', which meant that about one-half of the 
broadside and anti-aircraft guns were manned, and all of the anti-aircraft guns 
were supplied with ammunition and were in readiness. 

The first intimation of enemy action came to the Navy shortly after seven 
a. m., when a Destroyer in the harbor entrance radioed that she had contacted 
a submarine and had (they believed) successfully depth-charged it. Thus 
an attempted attack by submarine preceded the air attack by approximately 
a half-hour. Quite a number of similar incidents, involving reports of sub- 
marine contact, had [6226] occurred in the recent past and too great 
credit was not given the Destroyer Commander's report. Subsequent investi- 
gation proved the report to be correct. Admiral Bloch received the report and 
weighed in his mind the possibility that it might be the start of action, but in 
view of submarine contacts in the past dismissed the thought. 

Tlie Army carried out no dawn patrol on Sunday, December 7th, the only 
air patrol being that sent to the southward by the Navy. 

The Radar equipment installed on shipboard, is practically useless when the 
ships are in Pearl Harbor because of the surrounding mountains. Reliance 
therefore of both branches of the service is chiefly upon three Army detector 
stations on the Island of Oahu. Until 7 December, it had been customary 
to operate three Radars for a large portion of the day. However, on 6 December, 
permission was requested and obtained from the Control Ofiicer, to, on 7 Decem- 
ber, operate only from 4 : 00 a. m. to 7 : 00 a. m. Accordingly, on 7 December, 
the stations were manned from before dawn until seven a. m. when they were 
closed ofiicially. However, by pure chance one Army non-com officer remained 
at his post to practice on such planes as might take the air, and probably with 
no thought of enemy approach. At least a half-hour before the attack was 
made this Officer's Radar indicator [6221] showed a concentration of 
planes to the northward, about 130 miles distant. He reported this to the Air 
Craft Warning Information Center, which was the place from which it should 
have been reported to Headquarters. The officer there, a Second Lieutenant, 
took it upon his shoulders to pass it up, explaining that he had been told the 
Enterprise was at sea, and that the planes he had located were probably from 
that carrier. 

Senator Ferguson. Might I interrupt you, Admiral, just one 
moment? Our information has been, has it not, and yours was the 
same, that he thought there were B-17's coming in? Is this the 
first time you ever heard he thought they were planes from the 
Enterprise? 

Admiral Stark. I think he said that, and also waited for a flight 
from the coast coming in at that time. 

Mr. MuRPiiT. Will the gentleman yield? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. In the previous hearing it was said there were three 
different sources that the planes might come from. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask the Admiral, had you any informa- 
tion as to where they thought the planes were coming from, other 
than what is in this messase ? 



2340 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. Since that event I knew of the flight from the 
coast to Oahu, which came in, I believe, during [S^^^] the 
attack, and I have some recollection, although it is a little hazy, about 
hearing also that he though there might have been planes from a 
carrier. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield to a question? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. In General Short's testimony he refers to an affidavit 
on that that covers three possible places where the planes might have 
been coming from. 

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead, Admiral. 

Admiral Stark. (Reading) : 

No report of this discovery of an enemy air force approaching from the north 
reached either the Army or the Navy Commander. If this information had been 
properly handled, it would have given both Army and Navy sufticient warning 
to have been in a state of readiness, which at least would have prevented the 
major part of the damage done, and might easily have converted this successful 
air attack into a Japanese disaster. 

[6229] The Officer at the Radar station, I was advised, showed this air 
force on his instrument as they came in and plotted their approach. I have seen 
the radar plot, which also included a plot of the enemy air forces returning to 
the carriers from which they had come to make the attack. This latter infor- 
mation did not reach the Navy until Tuesday, two days after the attack occurred, 
although many and varied reports as to various locations of radio bearings on 
the Japanese carriers did come to the Navy Comn:iander-in-Chief. 

The activities of Japanese fifth columnists immediately following the attack, 
took the form of spreading on the air by radio dozens of confusing and contra- 
dictory rumors concerning the direction in which the attacking planes had 
departed, as well as the presence in every direction of enemy ships. The Navy 
regarded the reports of concentration of enemy ships to the southward as most 
dependable and scouted at once in that direction. It is now believed that 
another unit of the Japanese force, using the call letters of their carriers, took 
station to the southward of Oahu and transmitted. Radio Direction Finder 
bearings on these transmittals aided in the false assumption that the enemy was 
to the southward. A force from the westward nioved over from there in an 
attempt to intercept a Japanese force supposedly moving westward from a posi- 
tion south of Oahu. Subsequent information, based upon [6230] a chart 
recovered from a Japanese plane which was shot down, indicated that the Japa- 
nese forces actually retired to the northward. In any event, they were not con- 
tacted by either of the task forces, one of which was too far to the westward to 
have established contact on. 7 December. 

The Army anti-aircraft batteries were not manned when the attack was made 
and the mobile units were not in position. All Army personnel were in their 
quarters and the guns were not manned or in position for firing, save only those 
in fixed positions. Early anti-aircraft fire consisted almost exclusively of flre 
from 50-caliber machine guns. 

The enemy attacked simultaneously on three Army fields, one Navy field, and 
at Pearl Harbor. This attack was substantially unopposed except by very light 
and ineffective machine gun fire at the fields and stations. Generally speaking, 
the bombing attacks initially were directed at the air fields and tlie torpedo 
attacks at the ships in the harbor. The first return fire from the guns of the 
fleet began, it is estimated, about four minutes after the first torpedo was fired, 
and this fire grew rapidly in intensity. 

Three waves of enemy air force swept over Pearl Harbor during the assault. 
As above stated, the first was substantially unopposed. The torpedo planes, flying 
low, appeared first over the hills surrounding the harbor, and in probably [62S1] 
not more than sixty seconds were in a position to discharge their torpedoes. The 
second wave over the harbor was resisted with far greater fire power and a 
number of enemy planes were shot down. The third attack over the harbor 
was met by so intensive a barrage from the ships tliat it was driven off without 
getting the attack home, no effective hits being made in the harbor by this last 
assault. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2341 

The Army succeeded in getting ten fighter planes in the air before the enemy 
made the third and final sweep, and in the combat that ensued they estimate 
eleven enemy craft were shot down by plane or anti-aircraft fire. The Navy 
claims twelve more were destroyed by gunfire from the ships, making a total enemy 
loss of twenty-three. To these twenty-three, eighteen more may be added with 
reasonable assurances, these eighteen being Japanese planes which found them- 
selves without sufficient fuel to return to their carriers and who plunged into 
the sea. Conversation between the planes and the Japanese fleet, in plain lan- 
guage, received in Oahu. is the basis for this assumption. If true, it makes a 
total of forty-one planes lost by the Japanese. 

The estimate of the number of planes attacking varies. This variance lies 
between a minimum of three carriers, carrying about fifty planes each, and a 
maximum of six carriers. This would indicate an attacking force somewhere 
between [6232] one hundred fifty and three hundred planes. 

From the crashed Japanese planes considerable information was obtained 
concerning their general character. Papers discovered on a Japanese plane 
which crashed indicate a striking force of six carriers, three heavy cruisers, and 
numerous auxiliary craft including destroyers and other vessels. It is interest- 
ing to note that the Japanese fighter planes were Model 0^1, equipped with radial 
engines and built in early 1941. None of the planes shot down and so far ex- 
amined, was fitted with any armored protection for the pilot nor were any 
self-sealing gasoline tanks found in any plane. American radio and other 
American-buit equipment was recovered from the wreckage. One plane was 
armed with a Lewis gun of the 1920 vintage. Some observers believed that the 
planes carried an unusual number of rounds of ammunition and the use of 
explosive and incendiary 20-millimeter ammvmition was a material factor in 
damaging planes and other objectives on the ground. The torpedo bombers were 
of an old type and used Whitehead torpedoes dating about 1906, equipped with 
large vanes on the stern to prevent the initial deep dive customary of torpedoes 
dropped by planes. It is pleasing to note that the attack has not disclo.sed any 
new or potent weapons. With this in mind, it was found that the armor-piercing 
bombs employed were 15-inch A. P. projectiles, fitted with tail [6233] vanes. 

In actual combat when American planes were able to take the air, American 
fliers appear to have proved themselves considerably superior. One Army pilot 
alone is credited with shooting down four Japanese planes. All of the pilots 
who got in the air returned to the ground confident of their ability to handle 
Japanese air forces successfully in the future. 

At neither Army or Navy air fields were planes dispersed. At Kaneohe some 
VP planes were, however, moored in the water. They, too, were destroyed by 
machine gun fire, using incendiary bullets. Consequently, most of them were 
put out of action by the enemy in the initial sweep. Hangars on all of the fields 
were heavily bombed and many of them completely wrecked. At Hickam Field 
a very large barracks building was burned with heavy loss of life. The heaviest 
casualties in the Navy were incurred aboard ships subjected to torpedo attack. 
The bulk of the damage done to the fleet was done by torpedoes and not by 
bombs, some ships being hit by four or more torpedoes. With the sole exception 
of the A7isona, bombs proved ineffectual in causing serious damage. 

Many of the oflicers and men of the crews when their ships were set afire were 
compelled to take to the water. A very considerable number were trapped below 
decks aboard the [623^] Oklahotna and the Utah, both of which capsized. 
By cutting through the bottom of these two vessels, while the attack was in 
progress, twenty-six additional men were rescued alive. Throughout the action, 
small boats from other ships and from the harbor swarmed over the harbor 
engaged in the rescue of men who were driven overboard from their ships. The 
rescue of men from drowning and the recovery and swift treatment of the wounded 
was carried on throughout the engagement by both service people and civilians 
with the greatest gallantry. Temporary hospital quarters were provided in half 
a dozen different places and the wounded were cared for promptly. Because of 
the huge number of unidentified dead, many being burned beyond recognition 
and a large number having been picked up in the harbor unrecognizable after 
several days in the water, several hundred were buried in a common grave on 
Government land adjoining the Navy Yard. While I was still there bodies 
were being recovered from the water, but all were in a condition which prevented 
identification. Dispositions made by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District 
(Admiral Bloch) were adequate and were efl3ciently carried out. 



2342 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Of the eight battleships in Pearl Harbor when the attack was made on 7 De- 
cember, three escaped serious damage and can put to sea in a matter of a few 
days. These are the Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the Tennessee. The Nevada 
can be raised in a month, and will then require a complete overhaul. The 
California can be raised in two and one-half months, and then must be given 
temporary repairs in order to send her to the Pacific Coast for a year's overhaul. 
The West Virginia can be raised in three months, and will require a year and 
a half to two years for overhaul. The Oklahoma, which was overturned, it is 
estimated can be raised in four months. Whether she will be worth overhaul 
cannot be determined now. The Artsona is a total wreck, her forward magazine 
having exploded after she had been damaged by both torpedoes and bombs. The 
Colorado was on the Pacific coast for overhaul. 

There were six cruisers in the harbor at the time of the attack. The Detroit 
put to sea at once and is uninjured. The New Orleans and the San Francisco are 
now ready to go to sea. The Honolulu will be ready on December 20. The 
Helena was badly damaged and may require a new engine. She will be ready to 
go to the Pacific Coast for overhaul December 31. The Raleigh was flooded 
throughout her machinery spaces and seriously injured in other respects. It is 
estimated she will be ready for the trip to the Pacific Coast for overhaul on 
January 15. 

[6236] There were ten destroyers in the harbor at the time of the attack. 
Seven of these put to sea at once and were uninjured. The Cassin and the 
Dowries were in the same drydock with the Pennsylvania. Bombs designed for the 
Pennsylvania hit the two destroyers and totally wrecked both of them. Although 
both destroyers were badly burned, prompt fire fighting work saved the Petm- 
sylvayiia from any danger. The destroyer Sliaw was in the floating drydock at 
the time of the attack. All of this ship forward of No. 1 stack was seriously 
damaged or blown off. The afterpart of the ship is still intact and can be salvaged, 
and a new section can be built to replace that part of the ship now destroyed. 

The mine layer Oglala was lying moored outside the Helena, and received the 
impact of the torpedo attack designed for the cruiser. She is a total loss. The 
airplane tender Curtis, which was bombed and injured by fire started when a 
torpedo plane plunged into her crane, will be ready for service on December 17th. 
The Vestal, one of the ships on the train, which was damaged, will be ready to 
go to the Pacific coast on December 17th for overhaul. The old battleship Utah, 
which had been converted into a training ship for anti-aircraft instruction, is a 
total loss. 

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 

There was no attempt by either Admiral Kammel or General [62S1] 
Short to albi the lack of a state of readiness for the air attack. Both admitted 
they did not expect it, and had taken no adequate measures to meet one if it 
came. Both Kimmel and Siiort evidently regarded an air attack as extremely 
unlikely because of the greut distance which the Japs would have to travel to 
make the attack, and the consequent exposure of such a task force to the superior 
gun power of the American fleet. Neither the Army nor the Navy Commander 
expected that an attack would be made by the Japanese while negotiations were 
still proceeding in Washington. Both felt that if any surprise attack was at- 
tempted it would be made in the Far East. 

Of course, the best means of defense against air attack consists of fighter 
planes. Lack of an adequate number of this type of aircraft available to the 
Army for the defense of the Island, is due to the diversion of this type before 
the outbreak of the war, to the British, the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians. 

The next best weapon against air attack is adequate and well-disposed anti- 
aircraft artillery. There is a dangerous shortage of guns of this type on the 
Island. This is through no fault of the Army Commander who has pressed 
consistently for these guns. 

There was evident in both Army and Navy only a very slight feeling of ap- 
prehension of any attack at all, and [ff25S] neither Army nor Navy were 
in a position of readiness because of this feeling. 

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that there was available to the enemy 
in Oahu probably the most efficient fifth column to be found anywhere in the 
American possessions, due to the presence of very large numbers of alien Japanese. 
The intelligence w(n-k done by thl.s fifth column before the attack, provided the 
Japanese Navy with exact knowledge of all necessary details to plan, the attack. 
This included exact charts showing customary position of ships when in Pearl 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2343 

Harbor, exact localion of all defenses, gun power and numerous other details. 
Papers captured from the Japanese submarine that ran ashore indicated that 
the exact position of nearly every ship in the harbor was known and charted, 
and all the necessary data to facilitate a submarine attack was in Japanese 
possession. It is an interesting fact that the Utah at the time of the attack 
occupied a berth normally used by an aircraft carrier, and she was sunk and is a 
total loss. The work of the fifth column artists in Hawaii has only been ap- 
proached in this war by the success of a similar group in Norway. 

The fighting spirit of the crewS aboard ship and ashore was superb. Gun 
crews remained at their station with their guns in action until they slid into 
the waters from the Oklahoma's deck or were driven overboard by fires on 
other [6239] ships. Men ashore manned every available small boat and 
carried on rescue work saving the lives of the men who were driven overboard 
while the heaviest fighting was going on. Some of the crew of the Utah, swept 
from the deck of the ship as she capsized, were I'escued by destroyers leaving the 
harbor to engage in an attack on the enemy forces. Although clad only in their 
underclothes, they insisted on joining the crews of the destroyers which rescued 
them and went to sea. 

T*he evacuation of the wounded and the rescue of men from drowning was 
carried on witli sueb superb courage and efticiency as to excite universal ad- 
miration, and additional hospital accommodations were quickly provided so that 
the wounded could be cared for as rapidly as they were brought ashore. 

The removal of the convalescent wounded to the mainland promptly is impera- 
tive. I recommended that the Solace should be loaded with these convalescent 
wounded at once and brought to the coast with or without escort. 

The reported attempted landing on the west coast of Oahu, near Lualualei 
was an effort on the part of the Japanese fifth columnists to direct the efforts 
of the U. S. task forces at sea and to lure these forces into a submarine trap. 
Fortunately, this fact was realized before certain light forces under Rear 
Admiral Draemel reached the vicinity [6241] of the reported landings. 
His ships were turned away just prior to the launching of a number of tor- 
pedoes by waiting submarines, which torpedoes were sighted by the vessels in 
Admiral Draemel's force. 

[6242] The same quality of courage and resourcefulness was displayed 
by the Naval forces ashore as by the men aboard ship. This was likewise true 
of hundreds of civilian employees in the yard, who participated in the fire 
fighting and rescue work from the beginning of the attack. 

It is of significance to note that throughout the entire engagement on 7 
Decembei', no enemy airplane dropped any bombs on the oil storage tanks in 
which huge quantities of oil are stored. This was one of many indications 
that appear to foreshadow a renewal of the Japanese attack, probably with 
landing forces, in the near future. Every effort to strengthen our air defenses, 
particularly in pursuit planes and anti-aircraft artillery is clearly indicated. 
T^his anticipation of a renewal of the attack is shared by both Army and Navy 
Officers in Hawaii. As a matter of fact, in the ranks of the men in both 
services it is hoped for. Both are grimly determined to avenge the treachery 
which cost the lives of so many of their comrades. Instead of dampening their 
spirits, the Japanese attack has awakened in them a stern spirit of revenge that 
would be an important factor in the successful resistance of any new enemy 
approach. 

SALVAGE OPEKATIONS 

The salvage operation involved in raising the sunken battleships is one of 
the most important pieces of defense [6242] work now under way. Its 
magnitude warrants that it should receive maximum attention and all facilities 
in manpower and material that will further its expeditious progress, including 
top priorities for material and high speed transportation facilities to and from 
the mainland and Hawaii. 

The Navy is fortunate that Lieutenant Commander Lemuel Curtis, who is an 
ofiicer in the Naval Reserve, and who is one of the most expert salvage men in 
the United States was in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. He is in full 
charge of the salvage operations under Commander J. "M. Steele, USN, the repre- 
sentative of the Base Force Command. AVith personnel already available and 
with certain additions to be immediately provided, adequate organization to 
carry on this work with maximum speed has been assembled. 



2344 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I am proposing to send to Pearl H arbor a large force of partially trained men 
from San Diego to assist in the salvage operations, and to be trained to form 
part of the crews of the new salvage ships due to be completed next autumn. 
The most rapid delivery to the job of materiel and men to expedite this salvage 
work is essential, and I am proposing to arrange for the purchase or charter of 
the S. S. Lurline of the Matson line, or of some other suitable high speed vessel 
to be utilized primarily for this purpose. Such a ship would also be available 
for returning to the United States the families of officers and men who should 
be evacuated [6243] because of the dangers inherent in the Hawaiian 
situation. In addition, any available cargo space in this vessel not needed for 
the transfer of materiel for the salvage operations can be used to assist in the 
transportation of food to Hawaii. 

Lieutenant Commander Curtis is the authority for the estimates of time re- 
quired for the salvage operations on the Nevada, California, West Virginia, and 
Oklahoma. 

BEPAIRS TO DAMAGED VESSELS 

The possibility of advancing the repairs on salvaged vessels was discussed with 
the Commandant and with the manager of the Yard at Pearl Harbor. A sugges- 
tion that help might be rendered direct to the Navy Yard by Continental Repair 
Yards did not meet with their approval for reasons that were compelling, but 
the desirability of dispersing part of the Naval work on this Station resulted 
in the suggestion that the Navy take over, by purchase or lease, three small 
ship repair plants located in Honolulu and that these be operated under a man- 
agement contract, with personnel to be furnished by private ship repair yards on 
the west coast. These three plants are the Honolulu Iron Works, the Inter- 
Island Steam Navigation Company and the Tuna Packers, Inc. Only so much 
of these plants us are useful in ship repairs would be taken over, and the Navy 
Yard would assign work to [62 U] them on destroyers, small vessels and 
yard craft, thus relieving congestion and scattering the risk in case of further 
possible attack. I am studying this proposal with the various interested parties. 
With these added facilities, the Navy Yard can adequately handle the work 
load presently to be imposed upon it. 

INSTEUCnONS TO WEST COAST NAVAL DISTRICTS 

Upon arrival in San Diego, I was met by the Commandants of the 11th Naval 
District and Navy Yard, Mare Island, and gave them the necessary information 
and instructions to post them on the Pearl Harbor attack to permit them to safe- 
guard their commands so far as possible. This included all available information 
about the two men submarines which might provide a serious menace to the 
west coast. The Commandant of the Navy Yard, Mare Island, undertook to 
pass on all of this information to the Commandant of the 12th and 13th Naval 
Districts who could not attend this meeting. 

SUMXLVRY AND EECOMMENDATIONS 

In conclusion, may I invite particular attention to the following points in my 
report and draw certain conclusions therefrom : 

(1) Neither the Army or the Navy Commandant in Oahu regarded an air attack 
on the Army air fields or the Navy Stations as at all likely. 

[6245] (2) The Army and Naval Commands had received a general war 
warning on November 27th, but a special war warning sent out by the War Depart- 
ment at midnight December 7(h to the Army was not received until some hours 
after the attack on that date. 

(3) Army preparations were primarily based on fear of sabotage while the 
Navy's were based on fear of subuiarine attack. Therefore, no adequate measures 
were taken by either service to guard against a siu-prise air attack. 

(4) Radar equipment manned by the Army and usually operated for a longer 
period, was only operated from 4 : 00 a. m. to 7 : 00 a. m., on Docemljer 7th. This 
change was authorized by the Control Officer. Accurate information of the ap- 
proach of a concentration of planes 130 miles to the northward relayed to the 
Aircraft Warning information center by an unofficial observer was not relayed 
beyond that office. Nor was other information from Army Radar showing the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2345 

retirement of enemy aircraft to their bases received as sucli by the Navy until two 
days after the attack. 

(5) The first surprise attack, simultaneously on five principal objectives, caught 
them all completely unprepared. It was about four minutes before the first 
anti-aircraft fire by the Navy began, and as the Army aircraft batteries were not 
manned nor their mobile units in position it was [6246] some time before 
their anti-aircraft fire became effective. 

(6) Most of the damage to Army fields and Navy stations occurred during the 
first attack, which concentrated on planes, airfields and capital ships. 

(7) As anti-aircraft fire increased the second and third attacks resulted in 
successively less damage. 

(8) The final results of the three attacks left the Army air fields and the Naval 
stations very badly damaged and resulted in the practical immol)ilization of the 
majority of the Navy's battle fleet in the Pacific for months to come, the loss of 
75 percent of the Army's air forces on the Islands, and the loss of an even larger 
I)ercentage of the Navy's air force on Oahu. 

(9) Once action was joined the courage, determination and resourcefulness 
i)f the armed services and of the civilian employees left nothing to be desired. 
Individually and collectively the bravery of the defense was superb. In single 
unit combat the American pursuit planes proved themselves superior to the 
Japanese and the American personnel in the air demonstrated distinct superiority 
over the Japanese. 

(10) While the bulk of the damage done to Naval ships was the result of 
aerial torpedoes, the only battleship that was completely destroyed was hit by 
bombs and not by torpedoes. Hangers of the type used on all four stations are 
[6247] a serious menace and should be abandoned for use for storage pur- 
poses in possible attack areas. 

(11) The loss of life and the number of wounded in this attack is a shocking 
result of unpreparedness. The handling of the dead and wounded has been 
prompt and eflBcient. The wounded should be evacuated to the mainland as 
soon as possible. 

(12) The families of combatant forces should be evacuated to the mainland 
as soon as possible. Orders to this end are already in preparation. 

(13) Salvage facilities and personnel are excellent and, as presently to be 
augmented, will be ample to meet the Station's needs and will place the 
damaged vessels in repair berths in the shortest possible time. 

(14) Repair facilities are adequate to promptly carry out such repairs as 
are to be made on this Naval Station. Auxiliary repair facilities are under 
consideration to relieve the yard from small craft and to lesson the concentra- 
tion of vessels at one harbor. 

(15) In view of the attack and the serious damage inflicted by it, the use- 
fulness and availability of this Naval station must be restudied. Its air de- 
fenses must be strengthened immediately by the despatch of as many fighter 
planes and anti-aircraft guns as can be assigned to it. Special [6248] 
defenses against aerial torpedoes, such as balloon barrages and deep floats to be 
moored alongside imjwrtant combatant units must be developed. Pending these 
studies and the addition of satisfactory safeguards, no large concentration of 
Naval vessels can be permitted at Pearl Harbor. 

(16) This attack has emphasized the completeness of the Naval and military 
information in the hands of the Japanese, the meticulous detail of their plans 
of attack, and their courage, ability and resourcefulness in executing and press- 
ing home their operations. It should serve as a mighty incentive to our 
defense forces to spare no effort to achieve a final victory. 

The Vice Chairman. At this time, we will recess until 2 o'clock. 
(Whereupon, at 1 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m,, of the same 
day.) 

[6249] AFTERNOON SESSION 2 P, M. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 
Are you ready to resume, Senator Ferguson ? 
Senator Ferguson. Yes. 



2346 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

TESTIMONY OF ADM. HAEOLD R. STARK (Resumed) 

Admiral Stark. May I bring up just one thing, sir, before the 
testimony resumes? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. Yesterday on page 6067, lines 13 and 15, in answer 
to a question from Congressman Murphy, I stated that tne time of 
the attack on Pearl Harbor was 1 : 57, shortly before 2 o'clock. I be- 
lieve the official testimony shows the attack began at 7 : 55 a. m. Pearl 
Harbor tune, Honolulu time, or 1 : 25 p. m. Washington time. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr Chairman, the record would then have to be cor- 
rected by anyone reading it because that would cut down the time 
between 11 : 47 and the time of the actual attack. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, niay I interject a request at this 
time ? 

Senator Ferguson. I will yield. 

Mr. Keefe. We have been provided with an instrument or docu- 
ment or book, whatever it may be, entitled "Appendix [6250] 
to Narrative Statement of Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investi- 
gations," and in the back of that, or, the final pages of it, appears 
several pages entitled "Addendum to Court's Finding of Facts," 
referring to the Navy Court. 

Now, I have been interested for a long time in trying to get the 
top secret report of the Navy Court of Inquiry. I have had the Army 
top secret report of the Army Board. Am I to understand that this 
addendum, which is labeled "Top Secret," which appears in the book 
identified, is that the so-called top secret report of the Navy Court 
of Inquiry? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is right. 

Mr. Keefe. And that is all of it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. As we understand it. 

Mr. Keefe. It is continually referred to in portions of this report 
and what I want to be certain of is that this that appears following the 
heading "Addendum to court's finding of facts" is the entire top 
secret report of the Navy Board of Inquiry. 

Mr. Mitchell. Everything in this book labeled "Top Secret" is the 
additional material. Not only what you referred to but there are 
other documents in it that are labeled "Top Secret" and they are the 
withheld part of the original report. 

Mr. Keefe. I am not referring, of course, to — it [6251] starts 
out with the Hewitt report, this book does, and then it has after the 
Hewitt Eeport, as I recall, there follows certain findings and con- 
clusions signed b}' H. K. Hewitt, ending on page 180. 

Then appears the Navy's third endorsement on the Naval Court of 
Inquiry, and then appears the second endorsement. 

Now, this second endorsement and the third endorsement are labeled 
Top Secret also. 

Mr. Mitchell. I think it M-ould be more accurate for me to call your 
attention to the label on the front page, which I think really describes 
it. You are right in your statement that the section you refer to is 
the addendum to the court's finding of facts, but in addition to that 
in this book it says : 

Reports (formerly Top Secret) advisory to the Secretary of the Navy in 
Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations. See Narrative statement of evidence at 
Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2347 

Mr. Keefe. That says "Report by Admiral H. K. Hewitt." 
Mr. Mitchell. The page I am referring to is the first page just 
after the cover. That describes what it is. There is some material 
that wasn't in the original Navy Board report. It says : 

Reports (formerly Top Secret) advisory to tne Secretary of the Navy in Navy 
Pearl Harbor Investigations. 

{6262'] Mr. Keefe. What I would like to get clear in my mind 
is this : Is there one document that I may refer to, that is official and 
I can put my hands on, which is the Navy Top Secret Report of the 
Navy Court, disassociated from Admiral Hewitt's findings and dis- 
associated from the endorsement of the Secretary of the Navy and 
the report of Admiral Gatch, and so on? 

That is what I am trying to find out. 

Mr. Mitchell. I think my confusion, or our confusion about it, 
rests on the fact that the naval order of inquiry technically didn't end 
when the original naval board made its report. The inquiry went on 
and that included some supplemental inquiries that were made. 

I am informed by the Navy here that the part that you referred to, 
"Addendum to Court's Finding of Facts," the only addition that we 
know of on the original board report, is that. 

Mr. Keefe. I think counsel will, readily grasp the significance of the 
inquiry which I am attempting to make. 

Mr. Mitchell. I certainly do. I realize the propriety of it entirely, 
sir, and I am trying to give you the exact information. 

Mr. Keefe. Then so I may understand, when the original Navy 
report of the court of inquiry was released, it [6253] was un- 
derstood that there was some top secret material which was not in- 
cluded in that report and labeled "Top Secret," which was kept out, 
and that that top secret material is that which is now found in the 
last pages of this report under the heading of "Addendum to Court's 
Finding of Facts" ? 

Mr. Mitchell. The Navy says that is so, and that is my miderstand- 

Mr. Keefe. And that is all of it, there are no other findings or no 
other statements of a top secret character that were witliheld out 
of the testimony or evidence at the time the Navy Report was first 
released except that which is contained in this so-called addendum? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, let's be accurate about that. I never speak of 
the transcript of the evidence as a report, although in a broad sense 
it may be, but the report and the opinions and findings of a board, 
just like a court, after they have heard the evidence. 

If you are going to treat the narrative statement and call that part 
of the report — in a broad sense it is — why, then I will have to check 
against that and see. 

Mr. Keefe. Of course, as lawyers, I think we agree on that, Mr. 
Counsel. But may I also ask, I have seen the testimony and have 
gone through it, taken by the Navy court, and tliere was a lot of that 
testimony that was expurgated [6254] and transferred over 
into a top secret file. Is that top secret file of testimony as well as 
this top secret finding of facts, is that available ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Have you got it. Senator Ferguson? 

Senator Ferguson. They tell me it is in my file. I will have to check 
it. I will do so right away. 



2348 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mitchell. I think Senator Ferguson lias the only copy of it, of 
the testimony, the additional testimony. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. That is the expurgated testimony that was taken 
out of the regular and put into a top secret? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is it. This is the part taken out of the findings, 
this is what we strictly call the report, it is in this book. 

Now, we have a set of testimony that didn't appear in the published 
report— that Ave have one copy of, and I think Senator Ferguson had 
use of that. 

Senator Ferguson. I will have it down. I sent my secretary after 
it. 

Mr. Keefe. I will be glad to come over and have you read it to me, 
Senator. 

The Chairman. I wonder if the other Senators might have a caucus 
and have it read to them. It seems strange that only one member of 
the committee can obtain these top secret documents. 

[625S] Mr. Mitchell. My own personal recollection is nothing, 
because this is a thing that I personally have not had to do with. I am 
relying on other people. 

The Chairman. I appreciate that, but every now and then we run 
into a document that has been in the possession of some member of the 
committee or his counsel which we know nothing of. It seems to me, 
in fairness to the whole committee, that we ought to know something 
fibout these secret documents that are withheld and not known about 
except by someone who gets it first. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is about the way it works because sometimes the 
requests for the stuff come in and the pressure has been so strong to 
give it that we don't have time to study it ourselves and hand it around 
and we have been sniped at a good deal for delay, and we don't make 
for any more delay than we can help, and then we don't have it, we 
don't have an opporunity to mimeograph it, or anything of that kind. 

Maybe we have been at fault in that. But we have some difficulties. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman 

Senatoi- Ferguson. Mr. Chairman 



Mr. Keefe. Pardon me. One question. Has this report been re- 
leased to the press? 

[6''2o6] Mr. Mitchelt>. This document you have in your hands 
lias not been offered in evidence. We have been holding it here for 
several days to put in. 

Mr. Keefe. Is it confidential, has it been released to the press? 

The Chairman. Copies of the first two volumes, known as the 
Narrative Statement, were given to the press a week or 10 days ago, 
when distributed to the members of the committee. Kecently this 
addendum, the third volume, has come in, and I don't think Ihat has 
been given to the press — it has been given to them but they are hold- 
ing it. 

Mr. Mitchell. They are holding it until I offer it. 

Mr. Keefe. Of course, I don't want to get into the situation we had 
here when there was some criticism over the fact that some Army top 
secret report was passed around to certain people and not others. 

Mr. Mitchell. Suppose I offer it now and release it to the press 
and to you. 

Mr. Keefe. I think it ought to be. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2349 

Mr. Mitchell. I offer it now. 

The Chairman. That is the three vohimes ? 

Mr. Mitchell. This is an appendix to the Narrative Statement. 

The Chairman. The other two vohimes that were given [6257] 
to the committee as the original Narrative Statement were never made 
a part of the evidence and never filed as exhibits, they were just dis- 
tributed to the committee. 

Now, if this third agenda, addendum, or appendix, whatever it is, 
is to be filed as an exhibit, it seems to the Chair that the other two 
volumes ought to be filed. 

Mr. Keefe. Just a moment, Mr. Chairman, on that. This exhibit 
is in a quite different category than the other two. The other two are 
a narrative of conclusions and expurgations and everything else. 
This is supposed to be a complete and accurate statement of existing 
files and papers. I have no objection to this, but if you are going to 
offer that narrative in evidence why, I think, that would be another 
thing. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is true. 

The Chairman. I thought this was in addition to the Narrative 
Statement. 

Mr. Mitchell. No. The Narrative Statement is just the Navy 
story that they worked up. These, as the Congressman said, are 
documents themselves, and not the Navy's opinion about them. 

The Chairman. There is no connection then between this and the 
other volumes ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No. That is why we didn't offer the others. This 
one we expected to offer and I offer it now as [6258] exhibit 
107. 

The Chairman. It will be so ordered. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 107.") 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, so that the record may be clear 
about the fact that I happened to have this particular testimony, I 
obtained it a few days ago to read for the examination of Admiral 
Stark. I have had no requests for its return. It has been here. All 
these matters that I have had have been on a special request either by 
letter or otherwise that I might see them. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that not correct? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. No special favors have been given 
you, Senator. 

The Chairman. I am not complaining about any special favors but 
it strikes me that when a request is made by a member of the com- 
mittee that instead of it being simply a personal request it ought to 
be for the benefit of the whole committee if there is any benefit to 
accrue to the committee from that request, and that the committee 
might have the information available to them and not have to go 
somewhere in order to get it because there is only one copy. 

Go ahead, Admiral, and Senator. 

[6259] Mr. Mitchell. I only want to say that a great deal of 
this material requested by individuals turns out to be of no particular 
value and so I don't make a practice of mimeographing and distribut- 
ing the answers to all this stuff — any more than I did to the log of the 
Boise. 



2350 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. The Chair appreciates that fully. 

Mr. Mitchell. So we have to use some judgment about it. When- 
ever we thought a thing was of interest generally we have had it memeo- 
graphed but sometimes we doubt whether anybody else will be inter- 
ested. That is how it happened. 

The Chairman. I appreciate that. My remarks are not intended 
to be in any criticism of anybody, especially counsel, but it has oc- 
curred two or three times and something has been produced here that 
some of the members didn't have, although others did. 

Go ahead. Admiral, and Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, where did you first get the idea that 
there was a secret weapon used by the w^ay of torpedoes at Pearl 
Harbor in the initial attack, when did that first come to your attention? 

Admiral Stark. I don't recall any particular secret weapon. There 
was nothing revolutionary, I believe, in anything they used. 

Senator Ferguson. In the discussion here a few days ago, [6260\ 
as part of your testimony, when you were talking about these torpedo 
baffles, and as to whether or not we had already equipment to meet 
such an attack, the words secret weapon were used. They had a tor- 
pedo that we knew nothing about and that they were able to launch 
in 20 or r30 feet of water instead of, as at Taranto, where they had 
launched it in 60 to 80 feet. 

Admiral Stark. That was covered in the letter where they stated 
no ship could now be considered safe in any depth, that is, any major 
caliber depth, where there was sufficient room for the run of the tor- 
pedo to arm. It was just a progressive step, which I explained in our 
own experiments we were continually trying to increase the speed of 
a plane in dropping a torpedo, and also increasing the altitude from 
which it should be dropped. And the Japs, as shown, had progressed 
very far in that. And the letter which you read this morning where 
they spoke about putting some apparatus on the stern of the torpedo, 
we had already been experimenting with ours, we referred to it as the 
tail of the torpedo. But I think there was nothing revolutionary ex- 
cept the development had gone further. 

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it. the Navy Department never 
had any complaint because Admiral Kimmel didn't put in these tor- 
pedo nets, because they had neither furnished [6261] them to 
him nor had they furnished the equipment with which he could make 
them? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. He stated, in the first place, that 
he thought they were not necessary from the information he had, and 
which later information showed them desirable, but he had no nets 
which were easy to handle, or baffles. These we were endeavoring to 
develop and they had not been developed up to December 7. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you first hear that there had been a 
so-called secret weapon as far as the torpedoes were concerned? 
Admiral Stark. Have you this [indicating document] ? 

Senator Ferguson. I haven't, but I have read it, I think. 
Admiral Stark. In the Navy Court of Inquiry on this subject — I 
quote : 

The especially designed Japanese torpedo and the technique for its use fall in 
the category of the so-called secret weapon of which the robot bomb and the 
magnetic mines are examples. Such weapons always give to the originator an 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2351 

initial advantage which continues, until the defenses against tliem have been 
perfected. 

In other words, it ^A•as a development which we were all working on. 
[6262] Senator Ferguson. I had in mind yesterday at page 
6032, where Senator Lucas said : 

Well, the Navy Board of Inquiry called this bomb a secret weapon in the nature 
of a robot bomb which was unknown to the best professional opinion in America 
at this time. Do you agree with that statement? 

And you answered : 

A robot bomb? 

Admiral Stark. Well, the answer is, of which the robot bomb and 
the magnetic mines are examples. I never heard it called a robot 
bomb. 

Senator Ferguson. I see. You would take, from what Secretary 
Knox said, instead of it being a new, secret weapon, it was probably 
a forgotten weapon, when he said : 

The torpedo bombs were old type and used Whitehead torpedoes dating about 
1906 equipped with a large vane on the stern to prevent the initial deep dive 
customary of a torpedo dropped by plane. 

Admiral Stark. Well, the Whitehead torpedo, I may say, is an 
English type of torpedo with a reciprocating action. We abandoned it 
some years ago and went into turbine torpedoes. The old Whitehead 
was a good torpedo and they had developed this tail arrangement to 
assist in having it make a shallow dive. We were experimenting with 
the same thing. The wings [6263^ or vanes which you put on 
the tail detach when it hits water. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. I yield. 

Mr. Murphy. When you quoted the Admiral you said that he said 
a robot bomb. 

Senator Ferguson. I didn't mean to infer that 

Mr. Murphy. It was a question, and on the next page he didn't 
agree that it was a secret weapon. 

Senator Ferguson. And he explained that now, that he didn't agree 
that it was a robot bomb. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I have given you a broad picture from my 
memory. The Bureau of Ordnance could give you, it you wanted it, 
real technical data on that. They could give it. But we ourselves 
were working with detachable vanes to assist us in having the torpedo 
make a proper entry into the water so as to facilitate its not going 
so deep. 

Senator Ferguson. That the next sentence was, by the Secretary: 

It is pleasing to note that the attack has not disclosed any new or potent 
weapon. 

Admiral Stark. Well, that is in line with what I have said. It was 
along the line of our development. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, going back to one of the summaries, where 
he speaks about a general warning on the 27th and a [626^'\ 
special warning at midnight on Saturday, did you ever hear of that 
before ? 



2352 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. Not until you read it this morning. I don't know 
what is referred to there. 

Senator Ferguson. You haven't any idea what they might be re- 
ferring to ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. That is new to me. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall when Secretary Knox came back? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you meet him ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, I saw him as soon as he came back, I reported 
to him, of course, as soon as he returned. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you asked to go to the conference between 
the Secretary and the President? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you account, if this paper which you 
read this morning. Secretary Knox's report to the President, was on 
file in the Navy Department that you, the operating head responsible 
under the statutes, the rules and regulations, never knew about it? 

Admiral Stark. Perhaps one reason is there is very little in that 
report that he didn't tell a considerable number of us in his office. 
All that with regard to behavior [6265] of pereonnel, with 
reference to ships, we discussed it, the salvage matters, and in general 
I am so familiar with what is in there to almost think that I have seen 
it, but I think I have not, as set up there, just as it is, I did not see it, 
to the best of my recollection. 

But he discussed practically every detail of it with us. 

[G266] Senator Ferguson. Did you know of any special repre- 
sentatives going out to Hawaii in the summer of 1941 to get informa- 
tion? Did you know a man by the name of Curtis B. Munson? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall it. When you say to get informa- 
tion, will you elaborate on that a little bit, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. Well, here is a man named Munson mentioned, 
a representative from Washington. 

The Vice Chairman. Isn't he an Army officer. Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. I do not know that. ''Believed to be a Presi- 
dential agent, carrying a letter from OPNAV." 

Admiral Stark. OPNAV. 

Senator Ferguson. That is you. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. "To open everything to him." 

Do you know a man by the name of Curtis B. Munson ? I show you 
this last page and see whether or not it will refresh your mtoiory 
[handing document to witness]. Could I just have it back? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I do not recall that. If he was told 
by OPNAV, of which I was head, that everything should be opened to 
him I probably O. K.'d the letter but I do not recall just what it was. 
We had a good many people traveling around one place and another. 

[6267] Senator Ferguson. Now, if he went out there as a special 
representative of the Navy or was believed to be a Presidential agent 
and you approved his, "Open everything to him," and this was during 
this critical period, did you get a report back from him ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall the incident, Senator Ferguson. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2353 

Senator Ferguson, Well, let me try to refresh your memory. 

Pertinent extracts from above report : 

About that time Mr. Munson, a representative from Washington (believed to 
be a Presidential agent) carrying a letter from OPNAV to "open everything to 
him" sought me for an expression of views on probabilities and my opinion as to 
what action should be taken with the Japanese here and on tlie West Coast. 

Admiral Stark. Is that Colonel Knox talking? 

Senator Ferguson. No, this is Captain 

Admiral Stark. Zacharias? 

Senator Ferguson (continuing). Zacharias talking; Ellis M. 
Zacharias. 

Admiral Stark. He was in Intelligence at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Zacharias is talking. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

[6268] Senator Ferguson. Now, getting back to reading this 
statement : 

After outlining to him my firm convictions that if Japan decided to go to war 
with us it would open by an air attack on Pearl Harbor on a week end and prob- 
ably Sunday morning, with all the reasons therefor, and I then stated : "You 
now have two envoys in Washington. When the third one arrives you can 
look for it to break immediately one way or the other." This envoy arrived 
in Washington a bout the 2nd of December 1941. 

Now, had that ever been called to your attention by this special 
envoy ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir; I do not connect that up at all, the Decem- 
ber 2. That may, however, have formed the background for a dis- 
patch which you will recall has been placed in evidence here, which 
was sent out there to the effect that if Japan attacked it might come 
by a surprise raid on either a Sunday morning or a holiday. We sent 
that out there. 

Senator Ferguson. When? 

Admiral Stark. It was earlier in the year and I have forgotten just 
what the date was. 

Mr. Mitchell. It is in Exhibit 37. 

Mr. Murphy. The first dispatch in the Navy basic exhibit, I think 
is what you are looking for. 

[6269] Admiral Stark. That goes back to April. It was some 
months previous to that. 

Senator Ferguson, Very well. 

Admiral Stark. I will read it if you would like to have it. It is 
short. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I would like to have you read it. 

Admiral Stark. This is from OPNAV. [Reading:] 

Action : Com all Nav districts * 

NY Wash Governors of Guam and Samoa 

Personnel of your Naval Intelligence Service should be advised that because 
of the fact that from past experience shows the Axis i)owers often begin activi- 
ties in a particular field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of 
tire country concerned. They should take steps on such days to see that proper 
watches and precautions are in effect. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know what was the cause of that 
dispatch ? Was it this special representative of the President coming 
back and telling you about this Intelligence ? 

79716— 46— pt. 5 20 



2354 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK. 

Admiral Stark. Could you give me the date of that to see whether 
there is any hook-up on dates? 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I cannot give you the date because the 
letter that has it in it, the memo is dated about [6270] the I7th 
of March 1942. 

Admiral Stark. 1942? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; the I7th of March 1942, You may want to 
read this whole letter, which may refresh your memory. I thought you 
would only know about part of it. 

Admiral Stark. That was after we were in the war. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; but his happened before you were in the 
war. To make this a little clearer, this was on file in the Navy Depart- 
ment and at the top of this statement I read is this : . 

Washington, D. C, July 10, 1942. — I have read the personal and confidential 
report of Captain E. M. Zacharias, U. S. N., as a memorandum for Admiral 
Draemel, dated March 17, 1942, and desire to state that the remarks relating to 
me and the outline given to me as indicated therein is exact and correct in detail. 
In addition he suggested that the attack would conform to their historical proce- 
dure, that of hitting before the war was declared. 

Admiral Stark. Well, our dispatch is of April 1941. This memo- 
randum for Admiral Draemel is dated March IT, 1942. [Reading:] 

In accordance with your request after our conversation this morning, the 
following memo is submitted : 

[6271] My conversation with you is impelled from a sense of duty because 
of what I consider a serious situation existing in Hawaii. Once before, in such 
a situation, I gave concrete opinions and advice which apparently could not break 
through preconceived ideas. History was about to repeat itself and no one would 
believe it. I have no personal ambitions or desires regarding the subject matter 
other than assuring that we have a safe and well protected base for our Fleet, 
which is the sole reason for the existence of Hawaii. It has been my attitude 
that it makes no difference who does a job as long as it is done eflBciently and 
thoroughly. 

Any ci'iticism direct or implied is offered solely from a constructive viewpoint 
and is for the purpose of preventing in the future a recurrence of a disaster such 
as that of 7 December. 

Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral Kimniel and Captain 
Smith, during the course of an hour and a half conversation with them, of the 
exact events to take place on 7 December, not only as to what would happen, but 
also how and when. My only error was that the Japanese were after four battle- 
ships and they got five. I also gave them the reasons for my conclusions and 
advised them of the steps necessary to prevent such an at- [0272] tack. 
From time to time, in contact with the Staff. I would voice possibilities and only 
two months before the attack, amazed at unrealistic attitudes, I said, "When 
are we going to stop these surprise inspections and prepare for surprise attack." 
About that same time Mr. Muiison, a representative from Washington (believed 
to be a Presidential agent) carrying a letter from Opnav to "open everything to 
him," sought me for an expi-ession of views on probabilities and my opinion as to 
what action should be taken with the Japanese here and on the West Coast. After 
outlining to him my firm conviction that if Japan decided to go to war with us it 
would open by an air attack on Pearl Harbor, on a week-end and probably Sunday 
morning, with all the reasons therefor, and I then stated, "You now have two 
envoys in Washington. When the third one arrives you can look for it to break 
immediately, one way or the other." This envoy arrived in Washington about 
2 December 1941. 

On the night of 27 November, after dinner with Lorriii Thurston, Head of 
the Honolulu Advertiser and KGU, I related the impending possibilities as above 
and he said. "Here I am a G-2 OlHcor and I haven't even been advised what to 
send out over the radio in case of an attack." I advise<l him precisely to say, 
"We are having a sporadic [627S] air attack, everyone should keep calm 
and remain indoors. Do not go on the streets as it will prevent the military 
from getting to their stations. There is nothing to worry about." On 28 No- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2355 

vember I sailed with Task Force 8 for "Wake Island. Upon receipt of CincPac's 
dispatch on 7 December, "The Islands are being attacked, this is no drill," I 
turned on my radio and KGU was sending out my exact words. At least someone 
believed it. This was probably made certain by the press announcement about 
3 December that the Ambassador to Peru had arrived in Washington as a third 
envoy. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever known that before? 

Admiral Stark. I have no recollection of it at all. [Reading:] 

Seeing this, Mrs. Thurston reminded her husband and they were alerted. 

On Friday, 5 December, having received a report of a submarine off Oahu — 
one of the things I gave Admiral Kimmel as a positive indication of Intention 
to attack — I listened all evening on short wave for Japanese conversation. All 
was garbled conversation but the intensity of the acknowledgments (typically 
Japanese) indicated to me that something was imminent. I tried to obtain a 
single word which would justify me in requesting ComTaskFor [627^] 8 
to advise CincPac, but nothing could be made out. I knew what the reaction 
would be to a recommendation from thin air and I assumed that proper warn- 
ings would be coming from Washington. 

I have made it a point when ailoat to give my advice to Intelligence activities 
both ashore and afloat and when necessary even to the point of "butting in." 
I had tried for years to have detailed a Fleet Intelligence Officer who was not 
tied up as Flag Secretary or on other jobs. Finally, two years ago Commander 
Dyer advised me that Cincus was going to have a Fleet Intelligence Officer. I 
recommended Lt. Commander Layton, who has consistently done a splendid job 
in an office where there should have been twenty officers instead of two. Early 
in November I was about to see Captain Smith and advise that he get some help 
for Layton and Hudson as they were both worn down and appeared ready to 
crack up. But I hesitated, wondering why should I have to advise Cincus on 
the adequacy of his force. It should have been obvious to any Commander that 
Intelligence at such a time was his most vital issue. I decided not to approach 
Smith, because I found that Intelligence was not receiving its proper recognition. 

One of the contributing factors to 7 December was [6275} the reluc- 
tance of Admiral Kimmel to assume his prerogatives and tell the Commandant 
to carry out directives or someone else would be obtained to do the job. The 
possibilities of an unpleasant situation should have been readily apparent to 
the Department when former Commander-in-Chief is put under a younger 
man. Petty jealousies are bound to be present and these grow into opposition. 
A typical indication was one incident which I observed closely. When I arrived 
in Honolulu in November, 1940 to take command of the 'Salt Lake City, I was 
asked to assist in a survey of the District Intelligence Officer which was initi- 
ated by the Commander-in-Chief. It was learned then that recommendations 
had been blocked and that the ofl5ce was of little value. 

This survey included immediate and extensive recommendations, including 
trained personnel to be taken from my old 11th District to build up the 14th 
as quickly as possible. 

The next day, after telling Admiral Bloch the security we enjoyed in the 
11th and indicating the complete lack here, he approved all steps to remedy 
the situation. Accordingly, the personnel arrived and expansion, planning and 
training were rapid. During the course of a subsequent survey to outline 
faults in the District, the report [6276] or digest was brought to the 
attention of Admiral Bloch. This survey was made by an officer who was 
working for the Commander-in-Chief and also helping the District. At the 
sight of this critical survey coming from the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral 
Bloch gave vent to his wrath and Intelligence activities suffered for quite a 
time. 

Mr. Mitchell. How mnch more of that is there? These are 
Zacharias' personal papers. He is the man who claimed also that 
he settled and brought peace to Japan. I am wondering how much 
more there is. 

.Senator Ferguson. I haven't any desire to have him read it. I 
thought it would refresh his memory, that is all. Does that refresh 
your memory? " 



2356 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to know whether this was written before 
the event or after the event. 

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, yes, this is a story of one of those men with 
great foresight. 

Mr. Murphy. We have him listed as a witness, haven't we? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Some request was made, I don't know from 
what member, for Zacharias' papers and we hunted around and there 
was none in the Navy, but I understand that these are papers that 
he had in his possession that the Navy asked him to produce and 
then we turned them over to the member of the committee that had 
asked for them. 

[6277] Mr. Murphy. Before the hearings commenced there was 
a reference to the fact that he had made a speech in Annapolis, and 
it was after that that he was listed as a witness. 

Mr. Mitchell. He is on the list here. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, I will just ask you if that refreshes 
your memory, I mean after you read it all. 

Admiral Stark. No, it does not. 

The Chairman. Senator, may I ask you this, inasmuch as it has 
been read: Who is this man referring to here when he says, "You 
have two envoys in Washington and when the third arrived on the 
2d or 3d of December," who is he talking about and to whom? He 
speaks about two envoys here and he says that a third has arrived. 
Who is he talking to ? 

Senator Ferguson. He is talking about Japan. 

The Chairman. Who was he talking to? He says "you." 

Senator Ferguson. He was talking to Munson. 

Admiral Stark. This memorandum is marked "Personal and con- 
fidential memorandum for Admiral Draemel, March 17, 1942." 

The Chairman. Well, he is evidently reciting a past event there. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. He exhibited a good deal of foresight because he 
starts out predicting what was going to happen and then in March he 
says it happened. Now, I don't know who he is [6279] talking 
to when he is making that prediction. 

Admiral Stark. And signed by Zacharias. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Senator Ferquson. Well, Admiral, do you recall whether or not 
it was that report from Munson that caused you to send the April 
notes or order? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir, I do not. The Munson report was, did 
you say, dated in March? 

Senator Ferguson. I don't know. I have never seen the Munson 
report and I don't know as he has ever made a report. Do you know 
whether he made a report ? 

Admiral Stark, This is in 1942. I do not recall the incident. 

Senator Ferguson. No, it was before the attack that Munson was 
out there. 

Admiral Stark. I do not know. 

Senator Ferguson. It is clear. 

Admiral Stark. It is not clear. I remember our sending out the 
dispatch. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why that dispatch was sent? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2357 

Admiral Stark. No. To my mind it was one of those things which 
was brought up in Intelligence as a good thing to send. I was in- 
formed of it and I agreed that it was a good thing to send. 

[^279] Senator Ferguson. Well, now, going to the Intelligence 
branch here, that was a very important branch, was it not? 

Admiral Stark. Very, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And it was under you ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know when Admiral Kirk went in? 

Admiral Stark. I have got it here somewhere. Kirk came in, as I 
recall, early in — well, I won't have to rely on my memory. 

Senator Ferguson. Wasn't it in May or June, or was it in April ? 

Admiral Stark, 1 March. 

Senator Ferguson. 1st of March? 

Admiral Stark. 1 March 1941 ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know what was the occasion for 
changing Intelligence officers on the 1st of March 1941? 

Admiral Stark. Rear Admiral Walter Anderson had been head of 
Intelligence, was anxious to go to sea, was due for sea, and went to 
sea in July 1941 and Captain Jules James was acting as an interim 
head of Intelligence until Kirk came in in 1941. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand then that this Intelligence 
branch was treated in this way, that if a man went in there no matter 
how good he was, if his time came [&2S0] around for him to 
go to sea, he was taken out of the Intelligence branch and sent to sea, 
and a new man put in ? 

Admiral Stark. Generally speaking, that is true in the Navy. An 
officer in wartime, or if the occasion demanded, I think, at any time, 
might sacrifice his career, and I have brought up the point that there 
may come a time when we would just have to keep people in their 
billets, but the law requires an officer to have so much sea duty before 
he can be promoted and if he reaches a certain age and has not had that 
sea duty in the grade he may be and is likely to be held too much ashore 
and not promoted. 

[6*2811 Senator Ferguson. Therefore, under that rule of the 
Navy, men were fearful of staying in Intelligence because they would 
not get promotion ? 

Admiral Stark. In Intelligence, or any other branch, it might be 
the Judge Advocate's Office, it might be too much staff duty, it might 
be too much radio duty, or any other shore duty too long. 

Senator Ferguson. But back at March 1, 1941, things were rather 
critical in our negotiations, were they not? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, 1941 was a critical year, I would say. 

Senator Ferguson. Then why would we change the heads of the' 
Intelligence Branch ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, we changed them because Anderson went to 
sea in command of a battleship. 

Senator Ferguson. And the Chief Assistant acting was who ? 

Admiral Stark. Captain Jules James. 

Senator Ferguson. He did not take that place. A new man came 
in. Admiral Kirk, is that true ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, James was there temporarily pending Kirk's 
arrival. 



2358 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Then you had a break there while Anderson 
was at sea in which a temporary man by the name of \6^S2^ 
James and then Kirk came in ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Around March 1, 1941? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you tell us why Kirk was removed 
from that department on the 15th of October, 1941 ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, Kirk also went to sea-going command. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it at his request that he left that de- 
partment ? 

Admiral Stark. As I recall, he was very very glad to get the job. 

That does not answer the question exactly. I think he did request 
a sea-going job, but I could not swear to that. 

Senator Ferguson. Now we had a very critical period in October. 
That was just about the time of the change of the Japanese Cabinet, 
was it not ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir, it was. 

Senator Ferguson. And the department under your supervision 
changed at that particular time, the heads of the Intelligence Branch, 
is that correct ? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you tell us who named Admiral 
Wilkinson ? 

Admiral Stark. He was recommended to me. I knew [JS^SS] 
Admiral Wilkinson, but not well. But I did know him to be a man 
with a reputation for outstanding intelligence. I do not mean Intel- 
ligence duties, but he was a highly intelligent man. 

Now Personnel usually gives a list of those who are available. I 
ujndoubtedly discussed that with Nimitz and with Ingersoll, and 
probably with Intelligence, and Wilkinson could be made available 
and was entirely acceptable. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss it with the President? 

Admiral Stark. I think not that detail; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Not as to who was to go in? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall discussing that with the President. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss it with the Secretary of the 
Navy? 

Admiral Stark. Unquestionably, because he was greatly interested 
in the Intelligence Division, and always had been. He took a very 
strong personal interest in it. 

Senator Ferguson. Now did you understand that it took a special 
mental attitude for an Intelligence officer? 

Admiral Stark. Well, other things being equal, a man who had had 
Intelligence duty, or who had a flare for it, of course, would be pref- 
erable, but there was not any question in anybody's mind in regard 
to the fitness of \628Jt.^ Wilkinson. He had been secretary of 
the general board, one of his important duties, and I think Wilkin- 
son — I can verify it — had been on one or two of the peace conferences 
or reduction of navy international conferences. He was considered a 
highly able man and strongly reconnnended to me, and Avas available. 

I may state, when I state the Secretary of the Navy was very much 
interested in Intelligence, none of these moves was made without his 
personal O. K. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2359 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, at the time of the Atlantic Confer- 
ence, you were called to go to that conference, were you not? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know just when the first order of shoot- 
ing in the Atlantic was ? It was after that, was it not? 

Admiral Stark. It was after that; yes, sir. May I state, Senator 
Ferguson, in that connection, that lest my testimony this morning be 
misunderstood with regard to the shooting order, the shooting order 
appeared in the Western Hemispheric Defense Plans. It was in de- 
fense that the shooting order was issued, not offense. It was to defend 
our own comnumi cations and our own ships and our own western 
Atlantic waters. The tasks assigned the Atlantic Fleet, some of them, 
start out under [6285] (a) — "Protection against hostile attack 

United States and flag shipping; insure safety of sea communications; 
support the defense of United States territory." In other words, it 
was a defensive order. 

Senator Ferguson. I understand that, but I wondered whether this 
would refresh your memory as to its date. On September 22, you 
wrote a letter to Admiral Hart, addressed to "Dear Tommy", which 
was your custom; is that right? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

Now, considerable has happened since I last wrote you. So far as the Atlantic 
is concerned, we are all but, if not actually, in it. The President's speech of 
September 21, 1941, put the matter squarely before the country. We were i-eady 
for it ; in fact, our orders have been issued. 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. So prior to September 21, the orders were actu- 
ally issued to shoot in the Atlantic? 

Admiral Stark. They were ready for execution. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. We were in complete touch with the President on 
that. Of course, we could not have done anything of that sort except 
at Presidential direction. These hemispheric defense plans were 
submitted to him, and he went over [6286] them before they 
were issued. Where we state the President directs, it was his directive ; 
no one but the President I would say could direct us to take the action 
indicated in those plans. 

Senator Ferguson. That would indicate, though, that congressional 
approval was not necessary for an overt act. You considered that 
an overt act, did you not, the shooting? 

Admiral Stark. I do not know that you would call an act an overt 
act if you considered it in self-defense or in defense of carrying out 
what you might call the congressional will of getting material abroad. 
I would say the background for it is that if we were making in this 
country enormous amount of material, if the country approved that, 
and Congress did approve it, they would expect to see that it got 
to its destination and not let somebody else go and sink it at his will. 
So, this was a defensive measure. 

• Senator Ferguson. I will ask you to look at your memorandum for 
the Secretary of State of the 8th of November, the postscript, and 
that may help you on what you told us this morning about your 
statement before a congressional meeting. 



2360 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It is the postscript on page 3 of that letter of 
the 8th of October 1941. 

Admiral Stark. That was to Hart or to Kimmel? 

[6287] Senator Ferguson. No; it is to the Secretary of State. 
It is the memorandum for the Secretary of State, 8th of October 1941. 

Admiral Stark. That is included in the letter to Admiral Hart? 

Senator Ferguson. To Admiral Kimmel, dated October 27. That 
is the letter to Kimmel on October 27. That is not your letter. 

Admiral Stark. The memorandum of the 8th of October? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. The last postscript may clear up some- 
thing that you said this morning and also what I ask you about now. 

Admiral Stark. Do you want me to read that postscript, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; it is A^ery short. 

Admiral Stark (reading) : 

I did not set down in the attached notes what I have mentioned to you before, 
namely, that I do not believe Germany will declare war on us until she is good 
and ready, and it would be a cold-blooded decision on Hitler's part if and when 
he thinks it will pay, and not until then. He has every excuse in the world 
to declare war on us now if he were of a mind to. He had no legitimate excuse 
in the world except to serve his own ends to invade the countries he has. When 
he is ready he will strike and not before. 

[6288] I had forgotten how closely I paraphrased that this 
morning. It was the same thought. 

Senator Ferguson. But you put that in the memorandum to the Sec- 
retary of State ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you been consulted or asked for that infor- 
mation, as to what your opinion was on that subject? 

Admiral Stark. Well, this memorandum starts out with : 

This morning you asked me — 

This is to Mr. Hull— 

what would be the advantages and disadvantages of abolishing the combat 
zones around the British Isles and elsewhere. You also inquired as to the possi- 
bility of the United States naval-craft escorting all the way across the Atlantic, 
also as to the disadvantages and advantages that would occur should Hitler 
decfare war on the United States. 

This was in reply to that. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you just read the last paragraph? 

1 think it will also clear up something that you testified on. 
Admiral Stark (reading). 

I might finally add that I have assumed for the past two years that our 
country would not let Great Britain fall, and that ultimately, in order to prevent 
this, we would have to enter the war, and as noted above, I have long felt and 
have often stated, that the sooner we get in the [628.9] better. 

Senator Ferguson. It