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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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HEARINGS 

BEFORE THB 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 

OF THE PEARL HAEBOS AHACK 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

SECO>fD SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress) 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OP THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 6 

JANUARY 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, AND 21, 1946 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

-^?r..s. JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEAEL HARBOE ATTACK 

conctEess of the united states 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S, Con. Res, 27 

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress) 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 6 

JANUARY 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, AND 21, 1946 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on tlie Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




UNITED STATES 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON : 1946 




f^ 



JOINT COMMITTEE OX THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL 
HARBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARKLET, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 
\YALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 
SrOTT W. LUCAS. Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Miclii- tive from California 

gan FRANK B. KEEFB, Representative from 

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from \Yisconsin 
North Carolina 



COUNSEL 



(Tlirough January 14, 1946) 
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel 
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel 
JULE M. Hannaford, Assistant Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 1946) 
Seth ^V. Richardson, General Counsel 
Samuel H. Kaufman. Associate General Counsel 
JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel 
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel 
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 



HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 


Pages 


Transcript 




Hearings 


No. 




pages 






1 


1- 399 


1- 1058 


Nov, 


, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 


2 


401- 982 


1059- 2580 


Nov 


. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945, 


3 


983-1 583 


2587- 4194 


Dec. 


5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945. 


4 


1585-2063 


4195- 5460 


Dec. 


14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 


5 


2065-2492 


5461- 6646 


Dec. 


31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946, 


6 


2493-2920 


6647- 7888 


Jan. 


15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946. 


7 


2921-3378 


7889- 9107 


Jan. 


22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946., 


8 


3379 3927 


9108-10517 


Jan. 


30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 


9 


3929-4599 


10518-12277 


Feb. 


7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 


10 


4601-5151 


12278-13708 


Feb. 


15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 


11 


5153-5560 


13709-14765 


Apr. 


9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946. 



EXHIBITS OP JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 

No. « Exhibits Nos. 

12 1 through 6. 

13 7 and 8. 

14 9 through 43. 

15 44 through 87. 

16 88 through 110. 

17 111 through 128. 

18 129 through 156. 

19 157 through 172. 

20 173 through 179. 

21 180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations. 

22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings. 

26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings. 

35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



IV 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Paget 

5269-5291 

3814-3826 
3450-3519 

""5089-5122 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 J 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 
""471-516" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

64" 

194 
59-63 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944: July 

13 to Au<?. 

4, 1945) 


1 1 , 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 l(M 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
""660-688" 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Ilarbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

3105-3120" 

2479-2491 

4022-4027" 
148-186 

2567-25^5" 

3972-3988 

2492-2515 

1575-1643" 

3720-3749" 
1186-1220 

1413-1442" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
'"391-398" 

"'115-134" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. IS. 1941, 

toJan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 
203-209 

1127-1138" 
1033-1038 

1719-1721" 

1219-1224' 

"886-951' 
1382-1399 

""377-389' 
1224-1229 

""314-320" 


a 

i 


Allen, Brooke E., Maj 

Allen, Riley H 

Anderson, Edward B., Maj 

Anderson, Ray 

Anderson, Walter S., Rear Adm 

Anstey, Alice 

Arnold, II. H., Gen 

Asher, N. F., Ens ^ 

Ball, N. F., Ens 

Ballard, Emma Jane 

Barber, Bruce G 

Bartlett, George Francis 

Bates, Paul M., Lt. Comdr 

Beardall, John R., Rear Adm 

Beardall, John R., Jr., Ens .,__ 

Beatty, Frank E., Rear Adm 

Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Adm 

Benny, Chris J 

Benson, Henry P 

Berquist, Kenneth P., Col 

Berry, Frank M., S 1/c 

Betts, Thomas J., Brig. Gen 

Bicknell, George W., Col 

Bissell, John T., Col 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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VI 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945. 

to May 31, 

1940 


Pages 

5080-5089 
'""3826-3838 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

163-181 

""418-423" 
""451-464" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


1 icS'-'^ iiiiiii-rficD'-'^iii 

1 IIIIII I'TO liiiiiiCMCDCOiOill 
g ' 't-IM 1 1 1 1 1 1 iC;1 1 C^ 1 1 1 1 

S. 1 IIIIII ij^ I 1 1 1 1 1 1 I ire 1 o 1 1 1 

,f>i ^ iiiiiiicOCDCS-^ill 

ft< 1 IIIIII 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 (M c; IM III 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 C^J "^ C<1 III 

! IIIIII I 1 1 1 1 1 1 li^ '^^ ! ! I 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

fi'ipt. 14 to 

Ifi, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


1 1 i ; I i i I i i 1 M ; 


Joint 

Comraitteo 
Exhibit No. 

14fi 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
495-510 


Joint 
Comrailtea 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

4125-4151 

1695-1732 

2745-2785 
4186-4196 

3190-3201" 
1928-1965 

3642-3643 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
179-184 

""ios-iii" 

96-105 

74-85 

"'368-378' 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

toJan.23, 1942) 


Pages 
478-483, 
301-310 

1171-1178' 

1178-1180' 
1659-1663, 
170-198 

"812-843,' 
1538-1571 
504-509 

2-32' 
365-368 

1747-1753' 




Craige, Nel-vin L., Lt. Col 

Creighton, John M., Capt. (USN) 

Crosley, Paul C, Comdr 

Curley, J. J. (Ch/CM) 

Curts, M. E., Capt., USN 

Daubin, F. A., Capt^^^ USN 

Davidson, Howard C., Maj. Gen 

Davis, Arthur C, Rear Adm 

Dawson Harry L 

Deane, John R., Maj. Gen 

DeLany, Walter S., Rear Adm 

Dickens, June D., Sgt 

Dillingham, Walter F 

DiUon, James P 

Dillon, .John IL, Maj 

Dingeman, Ray E., Col 

Donegan, William Col 

Doud, Harold," Col 

Dunlop, Robert H., Col 

Dunning, Mary J 

Dusenburv, CarHsle Clyde, Col 

Dyer, Thomas H., Capt., USN 

Earle, Frederick M., W/0 

Earle, John Bayliss, Capt., USN 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



VII 



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VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


« 7 T 1 1 ^ 7'=0'^<^ 

1 !. ! itl 1 : 1 ; 1 1 1 ; 1 1 : ! ici^-g? : ij.w'^co 
iS : : :s ; 1 1 1 1 1 ! ! I ; 1 ! :sS§& i i^^-^oTot 
■^ ! ! ;^ : ! 1 1 1 1 1 : : I : ! 1^ ^ i 1^777 

111 1 ! ! 1 1 ! 1 ! ! ! ! ! 1 *« : ; ^0.0 
111 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ! 1 1 ; ; c<t^t> 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry. 

May 14 to 

July 11. 1945) 


Pages 

428-432 
414-417 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


CO 1.-11M -< 1 1 1 1 1 

— .OOOiiliiOi llil 

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a" I 1 1 1 1 1 1 (N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

a,iiiiiii,-iio iiiiioi iiii 

llllllKMlrH lllllr-ll llll 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


§ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 111! 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

;Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
1070-1076 

461-469 

"'763-772" 

816-851 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

2636-2666" 
3957-3971 

""241-274" 

""267-246" 
2934-2942 

2266-2214 
1914-1917 

"'745-778' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lO 1 

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ICO 1 

« 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 llll 1 1 Tji 1 

a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 111! 

^1111111111111111:1 ! 1^ ! 
II 1 11 1 1^ 1 

III II 11 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No; 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

toJan.23, 1942) 


Pages 

1571-1574" 

1664-1676 
""469-473' 


3 


Hamilton, Maxwell M., State Dept 

Hannum, Warren T., Brig. Gen 

Harrington, Cyril J 

Hart, Thomas Charles, Senator 

Hayes, Philip, Maj. Gen 

Heard, William A., Capt., USN 

Henderson, H. H., Lt., USA 

Herron, Charles D., Maj. Gen 

Hill, William H., Senator 

Holmes, J. Wilfred., Capt., USN 

Holtwick, J. S., Jr., Comdr 

Hoppough, Clay, Lt. Col 

Hornbeck, Stanley K 

Home, Walter Wilton 

Howard, Jack W^, Col 

Hubbell, Monroe H., Lt. Comdr 

Huckins, Thomas A., Capt., USN 

Hull, Cordell 

Humphrey, Richard W. RM 3/c 

Hunt, Jolin A., Col 

IngersoU, Royal E., Adm 

Inglis, R. B., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



IX 



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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Oii'iiiOOOiiiiiiiiiii f-,- -o 1 1 
CD 1 1 1 1 1 lOO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 iS^JO 1 1 
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ft,iO 1 1 1 1 1 lOD 1 1 1 1 . 1 X^^ ' ' 

^ ' ' ' ' 1 ;^ ;;;;;; 1 1 1 1 iS^*^ ; ; 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


1 1 ^ 1 I CO 1 <M 1 1 1 1 i 1 1 i' 1 i IM 1 1 II 

llllllCiO Il-T^ll II 

giiiiiiOiCSl iiii,-iii II 

„o 1 1 1 1 1 --1 1 (N 1 1 1 Oil II 

Ds -^lOOiiiiiiiiiiTfiii II 

iiiiiiOi^iii .-Ill II 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

103 
107-112 

186 
219-222 

102 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


^ ; ; i i i i i i i i i I ; i i i i i i i i i 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 

904^918 

628-643 

""734-746' 

""852-885" 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

2665-2695" 
3028-3067 

1161-1185" 

2787-2802" 
1014-1034 
1678-1694 
3226-3250 

2362-2374" 

2-.54" 

T. S. 2-52, 

192-226 

3126-3152 

1816-1913 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

214-225 
303-367 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

toJan. 2:5, 1942) 


1 1 CD 1 .—1 1 <M 1 1 1 10 1 1 1 1 -^ 1 1 t 10 1 C^ 1 05 

1 1 10 it^ icoo; 1 1 100 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 loooio 

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ii-^iiCi oiiit^iiiiOiiio leo 

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?3 

o 
C 


Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN 

Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen 

Landreth, J. L., Ens 

Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/O 

Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col 

Laswell, Alva B., Col. IJSMC 

Lawton, William S., Col 

Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN 

Leahy, William D., Adm 

Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm 

Lewis, Fulton, Jr 

Litell, S. II 

Locey, Frank II 

Lockard, .Joseph L., Lt., USA 

Lorenco, Walter E., Col 

Lumsdcn, George, Mai 

Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN 

Lynch, Paul J 

Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr 

Mac Arthur, Douglas, Gen 

Marshall, George C, Gen.. _._ 

Marston, Morrill W., Col 

Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XI 



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XII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 

5210 
4933-5009 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 
""387-388" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

14S 

(Clausen 

Investication, 

Nov. 2.3, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 
45-46 

""179-181" 

232 

76^77" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Chirke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


;2 1 I I III III j III 1 1 1 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


1 1 lO .--,-„-(N t^'lN 1 1 CD 1 1 00 00 

I lOJ III III ZliZiZ'Xi'n^ 1 1^ 1 lOO 

E 1 IT 111 III Vc^l^s::;: i iT i i?:^ 

1 i if: ill ill "i^^ciO. i ii i \il 

11^ 111 111 c^Js§2;2 1 \^ 1 I'^g 

II 111 III I— 1— IrHII 111— 1 


Joint 
Committee 
E.\hibit No. 

145 
(Army Poarl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

1107-1160," 
1240-1252 

3636^3640 
2375-2398, 
3990-3996 
3153-3165 
2923-2933 
388^3915 

1968^1988" 
1035-1070 

778-789 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
147-169 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roiierts 

Commission, 

Dec. IS, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


11 11 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 1 1 

1 1 ^t^ Tt< 1 1 CD 1 ,-,-,--00 1 1 1 CO ^ 1 1 1 1 
1 i^OOOl 1 1 lO ligt^fN 1 1 ICOOO 1111 

1 1 l^-^S 1 1 2 l«^"^ ! ! I^°f 1111 

^ 1 ic^^4< 1 1 i ig^ ! 1 ici;^ 1 1 ^ 1 


i 

3 


Pettigrew, Moses W., Col 

Phelan, John, Ens 

Phillips, Walter C, Col 

Pickett, Harry K., Col 

Pierson, Millard, Col 

Pine, Willard B 

Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov 

Powell, Boiling R., Jr., Maj 

Powell, C. A., Col 

Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr 

Prather, Louise 

Pratt, John S., Col 

Pye, William S., Vice Adm 

Rafter, Ca.se B 

Raley, Edward W., Col 

Ramsey, Logan C, Capt., USN 

Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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XIV CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1915, 

to May 31, 

1940 


;S ; I i I ;gS 1 ,g , ,|gg|| , log 1 I I 

l;§ III 1 ;^§ 1 II 1 liH^^ Wi^lW 


Joint 

Committee 

Exliibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

4-9 
335-375 

411-413 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

--- 
195-197 

203-204 
185" 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to AuR. 

4, 1945) 


I ! 1 1 !(N 1 1 1 1 Ic4 1 1 111 III 
. II 111 II III II 111 III 

§ 1 I III 1 ! Ill 1 ! Ill 1 1 I 

II 111 II III II 111 III 
11 111 II III 11 111 III 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


lo 1111I(N ,hIII I_J-_^'0 111 111 
it^ Illlit^OOilli^,^— 1 III III 

2 1? 1 I 1 I If 2 1 1 1 l2co°f ; 1 1 III 
1 1^ 1 1 1 1 l?5 tl 1 1 1 1^^^ III 1 I I 

iM iiiiiio llllll Sii> 

1 O 1 1 1 1 " 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 
3644-3650 
276-541, 
4411-4445 

3265-3286" 

1539^1575" 
4037-4094 
C 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

32-65" 
323-334 


Joint 

Committee 

E.v!ul)it No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


lOlt^iOiilii iC<>iiO00 III 111 
iCO^uOlilll iit<iiC50 111 111 

« ii-ito^ 1 1 1 1 1 it^ 1 I.-IOO 1 

^Ij^llllll l^ll^i-H 111 111 

.o il^ 1 <N 1 1 1 1 1 llllll 1 

ft.icot^'Oiiiii lobiicoio 111 111 

i.-H-^iilll iCOiiCOO 111 111 
iCD t^ll^OO 111 III 


s 


Short, Arthur T 

Short, Walter C, Maj. Gen 

Shortt, Creed, Pvt 

Sisson, George A 

Smedberg, William R., II, Capt. USN.. 

Smith, Ralph C, Maj. Gen 

Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen 

Smith, William W., Rear Adm 

Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN 

Smoot, Perry M., Col 

Sonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr 

Spalding, Isaac, Brig. Gen 

Staff, W. F, CH/CM 

Stark, Harold R., Adm 

Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR 

Stilphen, Benjamin L 

Stimson, Henry L 

Stone, John F 

Street, George 

Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XV 



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XVI CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR .'On' AC K 



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Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


JINHIINiNN NNiii 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

"389^410" 

376-386 
541-553 
597-602 

442-450 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

187-189 
105-106 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4. 1945) 


^,111,11111,1111 11,1, I 
•^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquirv, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 

1083-1090 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Ilarbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 194-1) 


Pages 

3120-3124 

1989^2007" 
2456-2478 

134.5^1381" 

910-931 
3663-3665 

3677-3683^ 

3750-3773 
3357-3586" 

2580a-2596 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Flart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
""279-288" 

37^382 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 
1311-1329 
496-499 
1830-1842 

1334^1340" 

""247-259" 

152.5-1538" 
1683-1705 


a 


ells, B. II., Maj. Gen 

est, Melbourne II., Lt. Col 

waling, William J., Lt. Col 

lite, William R., I3rig. Gen 

chiser, Rea B 

Ike, Weslie T 

Ikinson, T. S., Rear Adm 

lloughby, C. A., Maj. Gen 

Ison, Durward S., Maj. Gen 

Ison, Eric M., Col 

mer, Benjamin R., Col 

thers, Thomas, Rear Adm 

ang, Ahoon H 

Dodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR 

Dodward, Farnsley C, Lt. (jg), USN. 

ooUey, Ralph E 

right, Wesley A., Comdr 

vman, Theodore, Jr., Col 

rk, Yee Kam 

charias, Ellis M., C^pt., USN 

cca, Emil Lawrence 


p:^i5:pSfSjSpJp;sSi$f£fS:j5:^^ ^p:pS>^s3 N 1 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2493 



{.Gom ^ PEAEL HARBOE ATTACK 



TUESDAY, JANUARY 15, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington, D. G. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m. 
in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator 
Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Ferguson 
and Brewster, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, associate general counsel: John E. Masten, Edward P. 
Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee. 

[6'6'^5] The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Counsel, I believe, desire to have some documents put into the rec- 
ord before we begin the testimony. 

]SIr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I am requested by counsel for 
General Short to have the name of Lt. Col. Randolph Karr added 
to the: list of his counsel, as shown by the record, volume 1, page 11.^ 

His address is 2601 Munitions Buildings, and his telephone is 
REpublic 6700, extension 78109. 

The Chairman. That will be done. 

Mr. Richardson. I would like also, Mr. Chairman, to read into 
the record some correspondence between Miss Tully and Mr. Mitchell, 
and some correspondence between Justice Roberts and Mr. Mitchell 
with reference to the whereabouts of the original Roberts report, 
which was requested by Senator Ferguson at page 3180 of the tran- 
script, and was again referred to by Mr. Mitchell at page 6148 of the 
transcript. 

By reading it into the record, it will avoid making an exhibit of it. 

The Chairman. Go ahead. 

Mr. Richardson. Go ahead, Mr. Masten. 

Mr. Masten. The first is a letter dated December 21, 1945, ad- 
dressed to Miss Tully from Mr. Mitchell. 

Dear Miss Tully : 

[Ctf^i*] The Committee has requested, and I therefore wish you would 
obtain for us, a photostatic copy of the original signed report of the Roberts 
Commission as fil'^d with President Roosevelt, together with any drafts of the 
report which may be available in the files of President Roosevelt. 
Sincerely yours, 

(Signed) William D. Mitckbll. 

1 Italic fisures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of 
testimony. 

^ Hearings, Part 1, p. 4. 

79716— 46— pt. 6 2 



2494 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Miss Tully's answer, dated December 27, 1945, is as follows: 

Deak Mb. Mitchell: 

I have your note of December 21st, requesting a copy or draft of the report of 
the Roberts Commission. I am sorry, indeed, that I cannot find tliis report, or 
any reference to it, in the files of the late President Roosevelt. 
Very sincerly yours, 

(Signed) Grace G. Tully. 

Under date of January 2, 1946, Mr. Mitchell wrote the following 
letter to Justice Owen J. Roberts: 

Dear Justice Roberts : 

The Committee is attempting to locate the original report submitted by the 
Commission, of which you were Chairman, which investigated the Pearl Harbor 
matter. We have been advised that the report is not in the files [66Jf9-A] 
of the White House or the files of the late President Roosevelt. 

I would appreciate a note from you, at your convenience, advising just wliat 
procedure was followed in submitting the report and to whom it was submitted. 

The Committee is particularly anxious, apparently, to determine whether any 
portions of the report were stricken or amended following your submission of 
the report, presumably to the President. 

I am sorry to bother yoij again. 
Very truly yours, 

(Signed) William D. Mitchell. 

Justice Roberts' reply, under date of January 4, 1946, is as follows : 

166501 Hon. William D. Mitchell, 

Counsel, Joint Committee on Investigations of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 
Congress of the United States, Washington, D. C. 

Dear Mr. Mitchell: I have your letter of January 2. I am glad of the 
opportunity to answer it. The report of the Commission of which I was Chair- 
man was signed by the Commission in duplicate originals. When it was ready 
for presentation to the President on the afternoon of Friday, January 23, 1942, 
I telephoned the White House and inquired whether the President desired the 
report transmitted to him by messenger, delivered to him by the Commission in 
a body, or delivered to him by me as its Chairman. The President's secretary 
later telephoned that the President desired I should present the report as Chair- 
man of the Commission to him in person, and would see me for that purpose 
at eleven o'clock on Saturday [66511 morning, January 24, 1942. 

At the time named I called at the White House and handed the President, at 
his desk in his study on the second floor, the two duplicate original copies of the 
report. He read the entire report in my presence, asking questions and making 
comments concerning the facts disclosed. The interview lasted over two hours. 

At the conclusion of his i)erusal, the President inquired whether any of the 
facts stated in the report, if given publicity, might embarrass our military or 
naval operations or give the enemy information which ought not to be disclosed. 
I i-eplied that the Commission had submitted the fact findings (but not the report) 
to the Secretaries of War and Navy and had been advised by each of them that 
there could be no objection to the publication of the facts as the Commission 
had stated them in its report. 

The President then said he saw no reason why the report should not be given 
to the press in full. I replied that it would be a satisfaction to the Commission 
if this were done. He thereupon rang for his secretary, Mr. Mclntyre, and when 
the latter arrived said to him that the report should be released to the press in 
its entirely, for publication on the following day, Sunday, January 25, 1942. 
Mr. Mclntyre said he would have mimeographed copies for the press prepared 
at once. I am not certain whether he handed [66521 both duplicate orig- 
inals to Mr. Mclntyre, but I believe that he did. I have never since seen the 
originals. I subsequently read the report in mimeograph, as given out by the 
White House. The mimeographed sheets looked as if a number of stenographers 
had worked simultaneously on different portions of the report. I also read the 
report as printed in the New York Times, and as printed as a public document 
pursuant to Congressional direction. I can assure you the report thus published 
was full and complete, as submitted by the Commission, without deletion or 
alteration. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE ' 2495 

One copy of the report was retained by each member of the Commission 
I have my copy, which I believe to be a carbon copy of the original handed to 
the President. 

tours sincerely, 

(S) Owen J. Robebts. 
Senator Brewster. In connection with that, is it clear as to whether 
there were any changes at the time the original statement was submit- 
ted to the Army and Navy concerning the facts, as to whether there 
were eliminations [6653} at that time incident to the war sit- 
uation then ? 

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, we have no information with ref- 
erence to this report, except as contained in this letter. We have en- 
•S^°T^.?-^^i ^"^^ ^^^^ original report, but we cannot. It would be pos- 
sible, I think, to ascertain very likely from Mr. Justice Roberts whether 
there was any change in the findings after they were presented to the 
military authorities. 

Senator Brewster. That was the pomt. I was not clear from the 
letter whether that would be clarified or not. I think whatever is the 
most practical and convenient should be done. 

Mr. RiciiARDsoN. We will endeavor to get some information on that, 
because this letter does not cover that.^ 

Senator Brewster. It might well have been proper to eliminate cer- 
tain findings of fact at that time, due to the war situation, but that 
would not be material now, I presume. Whether that is the case I do 
not know. ' 

Mr. Richardson. Mr Chairman, there has come to our attention 
some correspondence relating to the idea that Mr. Wendell Willkie 
would take a trip to Australia and other points in the Southwest Pa- 
cific. We have gathered together letters from the Under Secretary 
of fetate a memorandum for the President in connection therewith 
and a letter issued by the President to Mr. Willkie, and some post- 
scripts thereto, ^ 

\:6653-A-] This correspondence is, I think, complete so far as our 
files are concerned, with reference to the Willkie correspondence, and 
1 would like permission to offer it in evidence as Exhibit 111 

Copies have already been distributed to the committee. 

n\Q Chairman. That will be done. 

^ Ji]?,?'^^^^?T°^^.^^^^ referred to was marked "Exhibit No. Ill ") 

\^m\ Mr. Richardson. Now, Mr. Chairman, in connection 
with the examination of Admiral Kimmel, his statement, which has 
been circulated and which he proposes to read here today, makes ref- 
erence to a large number of documents and other evidence, much of 
which has already been offered in evidence as exhibits in this proceed- 
ing, but there are a large number of those documents referred to bv 
Admiral Kimmell in his statement which are not in evidence yet as 
exhibits, and Admiral Kimmel and his counsel have prepared a com- 
pilation reciting m detail the dispatches and other material which are 
referred to m the footnotes to the statement which he proposes to read 

With possibly a very few exceptions, these documents that are set 
torth m this compilation are not yet in evidence, but there may be 
in a very tew instances a duplication of exhibits that are already in 

Inasmuch as this compilation would be of very great convenience to 
the committee in the examination of Admiral Kimmpl'« «tnfomnr.f ^z. 



2496 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

would like to present it and have it marked as an exhibit in order that 
the source authority which is contained in that compilation may be 
exhibitively before the committee for examination, subject, of course, 
to the understanding that if it should be hereafter found that there 
were any typographical or other reportorial errors in the compilation 
they can be corrected, as, of course, we [6655] have not had 
time to go over this entire compilation and compare word for word 
the copies here with the original. 

The Chairman. Is that the same document which has been dis- 
tributed to the members of the committee? 

Mr. Richardson. That is right; it has been distributed to all mem- 
bers of the committee. 

The Chairman. It will be filed as Exhibit 112. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 112.") 

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I desire to present to the commit- 
tee Admiral Kimmel, who has a statement that he desires to present to 
the committee. 

Senator Breavster. Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire what are 
the facts regarding the release of the previous confidential testimony 
of Admiral Kimmel. x4lS I have had various inquiries with regard to 
that I want to know what the committee's records are in the matter. 

Mr. Richardson. I have this to say in answer to the inquiry that 
when the prior testimony of Admiral Kimmel was collated we had it 
mimeographed. After consultation with my staff, I directed that it 
be given to the members of the committee, with a notation that we did 
not propose to release it until after Admiral Kimmel had m^de his 
statement on the stand. 

The next I heard of it were the press notices, that indicated 
[6656] that the press had had access to one of those copies. Since 
none were issued by our otlice. it must have been that one of the copies 
that went to the members of the committee went to the press, concern- 
ing which the committee is as familiar as I am. 

That is all the information I have. 

Senator Brewster. Then there was exactly the treatment accorded 
the previous confidential testimony of Admiral Kimmel so far as the 
committee officially was concerned as was accorded to Admiral Stark 
and General Marshall, so far as your knowledge goes? 

Mr. Richardson. My associate advises me, as I understood the fact 
to be, that, we at no time, had a compilation of Admiral Stark's prior 
testimony. With reference to General Short, there was a compilation 
of his prior testimony and that, as I understood it, was released by the 
committee to the press direct, and it was because of that release that I 
thought it well not to release the Kimmel testimony until after 
Admiral Kimmel testified. 

The Chairman. The Chair recalls that when General Short's prior 
testimony was distributed among the members of the committee, and 
also I think copies given to the press, it was stated here in the com- 
mittee that so far as previous records were concerned, as I recall it, it 
might be released. That was not done, so far as I recall, in regard to 
Admiral [6657] Kimmel. The fact that it was done illus- 
trates what probably was an error and an unfairness on the part of 
the committee in releasing General Short's testimony because it dis- 
counted in advance what he would say to this committee. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2497 

It seems to me that regardless of what happened in these prior 
instances, that prior testimony of witnesses ought not to be made 
avaihible for publication until the witness goes on the stand. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

The Chairman. That will be the rule hereafter so far as the Chair 
can control it. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I am not quite clear. It looks 
to me as if there might be some confusion. I was wondering whether 
Senator Brewster was referring to the copies of the statement that 
Admiral Kimmel expects to make here today. 

Senator Brewster, No ; not at all. It was his prior evidence. 

I am very glad to hear the statement of the Chairman in the matter. 

The Chairman. Frankly, I was away last week and I haven't seen 
the newspaper reports about this prior testimony nor the editorials, 
which I understand were somewhat critical of the committee on ac- 
count of it, but the committee is out to observe the rule that until a 
witness goes on the stand neither [6668] his statement to the 
committee now or previous testimony should be released for publica- 
tion, because it inevitably discounts the testimony in advance. It is 
unfair to the committee and to the witness, too. 

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, if I might make one further sug- 
gestion. If it should be determined by the committee, or a member 
of the committee, that such testimony should be released, and the 
committee should determine that it is to be released, if the committee's 
decision could be routed through me, I can then furnish to the members 
of tlie press copies of that testimony. 

Now, our difficulty, one of them, has been to have quite a group of 
newspapermen descend on us and ask for copies of Kimmel's testi- 
mony because someone got a copy of his testimony. 

The Chairman. Yes. That illustrates the difficulty. 

Mr. Eichardson. That is all. 

The Chairman. Admiral, will you be sworn. 

TESTIMONY OF REAE ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES 

NAVY (EETIEED)^ 

The Chairman. You may be seated. 

The Chair understands that you have a written statement which 
you desire to read to the committee. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct, sir. 

Tlie CiiAUiMAN. You may proceecl, sir. 

[6669] Admiral Kimmel. Thank you. 

The Chairman. The Chair wishes to announce before Admiral Kim- 
mel begins his testimony that new counsel succeeding Mr. Mitchell and 
his assistant, Mr. Gesell, are here. Mr. Seth W. Eichardson and 
associate counsel, Mr. Samuel H. Kaufman, of New York. 

Now, you may proceed, Admiral. 

Admiral Kimmel. Thank you. 

This is the first opportunity I have had to speak to the representatives 
of the American people. I propose to give an account of my steward- 
ship as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. My statement has 
four main parts. 

1 Footnotes and subtitles throughout Admiral Kimmel's statement are his own. 



In part 1, i shall describe the Jr'acmc i^ leet m 1941, its base at Pearl 
Harbor, its assigned tasks under the war plans, its program of 
preparation for war, and the measures I took to provide for its readiness 
at sea and its security in port. 

In part II, I shall set forth the information I had prior to the 
attack and my conclusions and actions based upon it. 

In part III, I shall describe how the Pacific Fleet was deprived of a 
fighting chance to avert the disaster of December 7, 1941, because the 
Navy Department withheld information which indicated the prob- 
ability of an attack at Pearl Harbor at the time it came. 

[6660] In part IV, I shall outline previous investigations into 
the Pearl Harbor catastrophe. 

Part I. The condition and activities of the Pacific Fleet in the 
year 1941. 

I took command of the Pacific Fleet on February 1, 1941. I had 
served for more than 40 years in the Navy. I entered the Naval Acad- 
emy in 1900 and graduated in the class of 1904. I went around the 
world with the fleet in 1908 as a junior officer. During World War I 
I served on Admiral Rodman's staif. He was in command of the 
United States battleships operating with the British Grand Fleet. 
I commanded a destroyer division in the Asiatic Fleet, and did addi- 
tional duty in the Philippines and China from 1923 to 1925. 

After a tour of duty at the Naval War College and in the Office 
of the Chief of Naval Operations, I commanded a destroyer squadron 
in the Battle Fleet from 1928 to 1930. 

I was Director of Ship Movements in the Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations from 1930 to 1933. 

I commanded the battleship New York in 1933 and 1934, and during 
the next year served as chief of staff to Admiral Craven, commander, 
battleships of the fleet. 

I was budget officer of the Navy Department from 1935 to 1938. As 
a rear admiral, I commanded a heavy cruiser division of the Scouting 
Force of the fleet in 1938. 

[6661] I was type commander of the cruisers in the Battle 
Force in 1939. I held this position until I was appointed Commander 
in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. 

The facts as to my acquaintance with President Eoosevelt are 
briefly stated. Six months after my appointment as Commander 
in Chief, and in June of 1941, I came to Washington on official 
business and called on the President. This was the first time that 
I had had any conversation or communication with him since 1918. 

My appointment as Commander in Chief came as a complete sur- 
prise to me. My reactions at the time are stated in a letter to the 
Chief of Naval Operations dated January 12, 1941 : 

When I got the news of my prospective assignment, I was perfectly stunned. 
I hadn't had any intimation that Richardson's relief was even being considered ; 
and even had I known that his relief was being considered, I did not in my wildest 
dreams really think that I would get the job. Nevertheless, I am prepared 
to do everything I can when I take over on about the first of February. 

Wlien I assumed command, the decision to base the fleet in the 
Hawaiian area was an historical fact. The target and base facilities 
required to train the fleet for war were in the process of being 
moved from the west coast to Hawaii. The fleet haclbeen practically 



without gunnery practice for nearly a year due to the previous un- 
certainty as to the location of its' base. Any further uncertainty 
would have delayed the availability of the mobile facilities to 
maintain, repair, and train the fleet. The resulting loss of time in 
starting intensive training would have been disastrous. 

This was my view when I took command. My appointment was 
in no wise contingent upon any acquiescence on my part in a decision 
already made months before to keep the fleet in Hawaiian waters. 

The fleet was not ready for war in 1940.^ I set out to make it 
ready. This required an intensive training program. In carrying 
out this program, we were handicapped by the detachment, from time 
to time, of officers and men in large numbers to meet the demands of 
the expanding procurement and training agencies on shore, and the 
supply of trained personnel to man new ships. 

My concern about this is reflected in my correspondence in 1941. 
On February 7, in an official letter to the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions, I stated : ^ 

[6663] We are forced to operate our ships as they are and the number 
of men required to man them has been determined by the considered judg- 
ment of the best officers we have available. In view of the large numbers of 
men required for newly commissioned ships, both now and in the future, and 
in view of the fact that only at sea can men-of-warsmen be adequately trained, 
every seagoing ship should be filled to capacity now. In this connection it 
cannot be too strongly emphasized that stabilization of personnel, both officers 
and enlisted, will contribute more to the efficiency of the Fleet than any othfer 
single factor. 

On February 16, 1941, I wrote to Admiral Nimitz, Chief of the 
Bureau of Navigation, now the Bureau of Personnel, that ^ — 

I realize in some degree the necessity for the services of competent personnel 
under the Bureau of Ordnance. I am, however, faced with a very real situa- 
tion here in the Fleet. During the past year the detachment of so many com- 
petent officers has reduced the number of experienced officers remaining in 
ships of the Fleet to such a point that I consider it dangerous to make further 
considerable reductions in our best officer personnel at this time. The Fleet 
is [66641 just now recovering from the heavy officer personnel shake-up 
which it has experienced. 

******* 

While I appreciate to some extent the deficiencies of the Bureau of Ordnance 
and the urgent necessity to remedy them, I must sound a note of warning that 
we cannot spare any considerable number of qualified officers from the Fleet 
without assuming an enormous risk. The condition of the Fleet now and in 
the near future may well be of much greater importance to the nation than 
the production of a two-ocean Navy by 1946. 

******* 

While on this subject of personnel, I would like to add that the continued 
detachment of qualified officers and enlisted men renders it next to impossible 
for the ships to reach the high state of efficiency demanded by a campaign. 
This Fleet must be kept ready to fight, and that is impossible unless we stabilize 
the personnel to a much greater degree than has been done in the past. * * ♦ 

On March 3, 1941, Admiral Nimitz, in reply to my letter wrote:* 

* * * Soon to be superimposed on our Navy ordnance [6665] prob- 
lems through the administration of the Lend-Lease bill is the task of procurement, 
inspection and delivery of enormous — almost astronomical— quantities of ord- 
nance supplies for the British Navy and any Allies which may survive to fight 

(See footnote 1, p. 2497, supra.) 

* Record, te.stimony Admiral Richardson, p. 777. 
*CinC file. P16-3/(0217). 

« Personal letter to Admiral Nimitz, Feb. 16, 1941. 

* See file letters Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel. 



2500 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATT'.CK 

the dictators. I do not know if you have been informed of all the new ordnance 
plants that are being erected in various parts of the country to start from scratch 
the manufacture of various items of ordnance * * * 

Admiral Nimitz pointed out that these conditions made it necessary 
to detach trained officer personnel from the fleet. 

In addition, the aviation expansion program required that trained 
aviation personnel from the fleet be sent to the mainland to train others. 
For example, we were required to send from the fleet to the main- 
land 12 trained patrol plane crews each month. In the same letter 
Admiral Nimitz stated : 

The situation regarding aviators is not unlike that of Ordnance P. G.'s. In 
order to build up our aviation we must of necessity have the services of qualified 
aviators to get all our air training stations going. We know the new aviation 
officers lack a great deal in being ready to serve the Fleet when they first report, 
and we also know you will do your best to provide the additionaf training and 
[6G66] experience needed. 

The naval expansion program required the fleet to supply large 
numbers of trained officer and enlisted personnel to man the new ships. 
The building and procurement program for all classes of naval vessels 
and material also required naval personnel from the fleet for inspec- 
tion and supervisory duties. 

[6667] The detachment of trained officer and enlisted personnel 
continued until December 7, 1911. The corresponding need for train- 
mg new personnel continued. Because of this situation, the man- 
power needs of the fleet were never satisfied. In a letter to the Chief 
of Naval Operations dated November 15, 1941 I wrote : 

This Fleet requires approximately 9,000 men to fill complements; it can utilize 
an additional 10,000. 

More than 50 percent of the officers of the fleet were newly commis- 
sioned reserve officers. With constantly changing personnel, both 
officers and enlisted men, and the induction of new personnel, there 
were times when 70 percent of the men on board individual ships had 
never heard a gun fired. Training and target practice w^ere impera- 
tively needed for every ship's crew and every plane's crew. The men 
and officers who were detailed to the engine room, to the guns, to the 
radio, to the ship control, to the lookouts, to the electrical installations, 
to the fire control for the guns, to the signals, to the commissary, and 
numerous other billets, had to be trained before they were competent. 
Unless they were trained, the most modern equipment was useless. 
Break-down or insufficiency in any category might well be very costly 
in time of war. 

_ There were other factors that made the training activi- [6668] 
ties of vital importance. In addition to individual ship training I had 
to provide for coordinated training of ships, divisions, and squadrons 
as part of the fleet as a whole. New weapons and new techniques were 
an every-day product of the war in Europe. New methods had to be 
devised, tested, and perfected to meet new threats. For instance, the 
antiaircraft defense of large formations had to be improved to meet 
pos;sible Japanese air tactics in the event of war. Our previous 
training, chiefly dictated by safety con.siderations, had been largely 
confined to individual ship practices in defense against individual 
attacks. It was now necessary to develop means and methods of 
countering mass attacks by coordinated fire, in maximum volume, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2501 

from as many ships as could bring their gmis to bear with reasonable 
prospect of hitting the target and allowing for acceptable hazards to 
other ships. 

Again, the advent of radar with all of its implications, particu- 
larly the necessity for wide extension of existing communication chan- 
nels required to take full advantage of its latent possibilities, posed 
an entirely new problem for which no solution was to be found in past 
experience. We had to visualize and set up new situations in order 
even to indicate a solution. It was only throu,gh wide experience, 
covering a period of months and crowding in as much work as possible, 
that the new apparatus could be utilized to its fullest poten- [0669] 
tial. We were handicapped by the few ships equipped with this 
device, making it all the more important that advantage be taken of 
every opportunity that could be stolen from the few days or weeks 
that'might remain to us prior to actual hostilities. 

Radar, also, gave promise of completely revolutionizing the art of 
night warfare. This possibility was especially important as it was 
known that the Japanese attached great importance to night action. 
Measures, such as steaming and maneuvering in complete darkness in 
large and complex formations, with abridged accent on safety, had to 
be perfected. Most of this program was, for us, experimental, because 
large-scale and complicated maneuvering at night was new to our 
Navy. 

In addition to all this, we needed all the time w^e could get to try out 
and perfect the operations we had set up for the opening phases of the 
war, if it came, against Japan. These operations, too, were largely 
new and untried, and handicapped by lack of facilities and personnel, 
particularly in the case of amphibious landings. These exercises gave 
birth to the Fast Carrier Task Force, later found so elfective in the 
prosecution of the war. 

Our training activities were not just routine training or peace- 
time training. They were intensified training ac- [6670] 
tivities indispensable to the creation of fighting; efficiency in the fleet. 

At the same time the ships needed substantial repair and main- 
tenance w'ork. We had before us, and I believe I accomplished, the 
task of preparing practicall}?^ every ship to a high degree of material 
readiness. The engines and motive equipment were overhauled and 
retuned. The ship's crew engaged in many tasks of installation, 
repair, and alteration to the limit of their ability while in port. 
This included the installation of splinter protection, degaussing, the 
installation of listening gear, and in general, the application to the 
fleet so far as the supplies were available, of the lessons of war in 
the Atlantic and Mediterranean. On April 4, 1941, the Chief of 
Naval Operations advised me by dispatch "to strip ship in accord- 
ance with orders." ^ This operation alone consumed considerable 
time for every ship in port. 

On May 26, 1941, the Navy Department promulgated its Basic 
War Plan. This plan set forth the Navy's tasks under the Joint 
Army and Navy Basic War Plan which had been drawn up after 
staff conversations with the British in February and March of 1941. 

In February and March of 1941 Great Britain and the United 
States had staff conversations. The report of these conversations un- 

= Dispatch, Op.Nav to CinCPac, April 4, 1941, 041700. 



2502 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

der date of March 27, 1941, bore the short title [6671] "ABC- 
1." ^ On the basis of these, the Army and Navy prepared the Joint 
Army and Navy Basic War PLan. This joint plan was approved by 
the Secretary of the Navy on May 28, 1941, and by the Secretary of 
War on June 2, 1941. It bore the short title "Rainbow No. 5." ' ' On 
the basis of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan the Navy 
Department promulgated the Navy Bas'ic War Plan on May 26, 194i. 
This plan bore the short title "W PL^6." « The Pacific Fleet was 
directed to prepare its own war plan supporting the Basic Navy 
War Plan. This was done. The War Plan of tha Pacific Fleet was 
distributed on July 25, 1941 "> and thereafter, on September 9, 1941, 
approved by the Chief of Naval Operations.^" This plan bore the 
short title, ''WPPac-46." . 

The Joint Army-Navy War Plan primarily emphasized the defeat 
of Germany. Admiral R. K. Turner, war plans officer for the Chief 
of Naval Operations in 1941, in his testimony before Admiral Hart 
described these objectives of the War Plan m these words : ^^ 

The plan contemplajed a major effort on the part of both the principal 
Associated Powers against Germany, initially. It was felt in the Navy Depart- 
ment, that there might be a possibility of war with Japan without the involve- 
ment of Germany, but at some length and over a considerable period this matter 
was discussed and it was [6672] determined that in such a case the 
United States '^ould, if possible, initiate efforts to bring Germany into the war 
against us in order that we would be enabled to give strong support to the 
United Kingdom in Europe. We felt that it was encumbent on our side to 
defeat Germany, to launch our principal efforts against Germany first, and 
to conduct a limited offensive in the Central Pacific, and a strictly defensive 
effort in the Asiatic. 

In accordance with this statement of principles, the Basic War 
Plan of the Army and Navy, Rainbow No. 5, provided in section 4, 
paragraph 13 (a) : 

Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic 
and European are^ is considered to be the decisive theatre. The principal 
United States Military effort will be exerted in that theatre, and operations of 
United States forces in other theatres will be conducted in such a manner as 
to facilitate that effort. 

Again, section 4, paragraph 13 (d) of the plan provided : 

Even if .Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis 
Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their 
forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does 
enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The 
United States does not [6673] intend to add to its present Military 
strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet 
offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, 
and to support the defense of the Malay Barrier by diverting Japanese strength 
away from Malasla. The United States intends so to augment its forces in 
the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be 
in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East. 

The following tasks were assigned the United States Pacific Fleet in 
section one, paragraph 3212 of the Navy Basic War Plan, W. P. L. 46 : 

a. TASK 

Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy 
strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of 

« Exhibit 49. 

7 Ofticiiil letter CNO to CinCPac, April ."5, 1941, serial 03S612. 

8 Official Iftter CND. May 20, 1941, Serial 000512. 

■ Official letter CinCPac, .July 25, 1941, Serial 00.3W. 

" Otliclal letter CNO to CinCPac, September 9. 1941, Serial 098912. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2503 

positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications 
and positions ; 

b. TASK 

Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall 
Island area, and to establish an advanced Fleet Base in Truk ; 

c. TASK 

Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or [66741 destroying ves- 
sels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy ; 

d. TASK 

Support British Naval forces in the area south of the Equator as far west 
as longitude 155° east; 

e. TASK 

Defend Samoa in Category "D" ; 

f. TASK 

Defend Guam in Category "F" ; 

g. TASK 

Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, cover- 
ing, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raid- 
ing forces (see Part III, Chapter V, Section 1) : 

h. TASK 

Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and prevent 
the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroy- 
ing hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the 
enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere : 

i. TASK 

Cover the operations of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces ; 

[6675] j. TASK 

Establish Fleet control zones, defining their limits from time to time as cir- 
cumstances require; 

k. TASK 

Route shipping of Associated Powers within the Fleet control zones. 

These tasks were to be carried out in "the Pacific area." The 
Pacific area included the ocean areas from the coast of North America 
and north of the Equator to a line extending to the westward of the 
Marianas up to latitude 30 north, where the area was extended to 
include the reaches of the ocean all the way to the Asiatic Continent 
and from about 700 miles off the coast of South America south of the 
Equartor, to a short distance from the Australian coast. 

I changed the wording to make it a little more accurate, that is all. 

It was this vast expanse which I had to consider the prospective 
theater of operations for my forces. It was in this area that the 
Pacific Fleet was to divert enemy strength by the denial and capture 
of positions in the Marshalls, destroy Axis sea communications, and 
protect the territory of the associated powers. To build the fleet 
into a fighting machine capable of meeting these assigned tasks, and 
to solve the manifold problems of supply and logistics required con- 
[6676] siderable planning. 

It became apparent soon after I took command that the existing 
organization of the United States Fleet was not a proper one to meet 
the tasks which would be required in a Pacific war. Early in 1941, 
therefore, the vessels of the Pacific Fleet were reorganized into three 
task forces, including one fast carrier task force, one amphibious 
task force and one battleship task force. In their operations at sea, 
these task forces were operated under wartime conditions. Fueling 
at sea, a requirement for long-range operations, was stressed. 

The operating schedule was so arranged that there was always at 
least one of these task forces, and usually two, at sea. Frequently 
during fleet maneuvers the entire fleet was at sea. Periods in port 
were of course necessary for all ships. At no time during 1941 were 

nil nf tlio cliiT->o of tliQ floof in Pqoi-1 TTn v.V> /->^ 



2504 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

It was recognized that the Pacific Fleet was inferior to the Japanese 
Fleet in every category of fighting ship.^- No one in authority ex- 
pected that the Pacific Fleet could meet the Japanese head on. 

Admiral King's official report, Our Navy at War, transmitted to 
the Secretary of the Navy on March 27, 1944, completely dispelled 
previous public misconceptions about the strength of the Pacific Fleet 
prior to Pearl Harbor. Admiral [6677] King stated : 

Had we not suffered these losses (at Pearl Harbor), however, our fleet could 
not have proceeded to Manila as many people supposed and there relieved our 
hard pressed forces. Such an undertaking at that time, with the means at hand 
to carry it out and support it, would have been disastrous. 

Japan, at the outbreak of hostilities, had nine aircraft carriers in 
commission and operating. We had three carriers in the Pacific and 
those did not have their full quota of planes." Although the battle- 
ships of the fleet were all approximately the same age as the heavy 
ships' of the Japanese Navy, our ships were particularly deficient in 
short-range antiaircraft weapons. 

The fuel problem affected every decision. At this time both the 
reserve stocks in the Hawaiian area and the facilities for getting fuel 
from storage tanks into combatant ships were not adequate. The 
Pacific Fleet had only 11 tankers. Of these, only four had the 
speed and mixed-cargo characteristics suitable for fueling other ships 
at sea: It required from 24 to 36 hours to refuel a task force in Pearl 
Harbor. Shortly after I organized the fleet in three major task forces, 
I attempted to keep two of the three forces at sea and only one in Pearl 
Harbor. I quickly found that fuel deliveries were [6678] fall- 
ing behind consumption. The reserves were being depleted at a time 
when it was imperative to increase them. It was this fact, and this 
alone, which made it necessary to have two task forces simultaneously 
in Pearl Harbor at certain periods. It was not advisable, unless an 
attack on Pearl Harbor was known to be imminent, to keep the fleet 
at sea and fuel it by sending detachments into Pearl Harbor at night 
even if there had been adequate fuel reserves in port. Operations at 
sea would have been then restricted to a small area. The increase in 
submarine risk would have been unjustified. 

A destroyer at full power exhausts its fuel in 30 to 40 hours, at 
medium speed in 4 to 6 days. War experience has proven the necessity 
of fueling destroyers every third day, and heavy ships about every 
fifth day to keep a fighting reserve on board. To have kept the entire 
fleet at sea for long periods would have required not 11 tankers but 
approximately 75, with at least one-third of them equipped for under- 
way delivery. I did not have adequate reserves. There were no facili- 
ties for delivering stored reserves to the ships at a rate which would 
permit fueling more than about one-fourth of the fleet in any one 
24-hour day or one-eighth of it in any one period of darkness. To 
keep the fleet at sea and exhaust our resources, only to find that such 
expenditures were unnecessary, or, still worse, to have the entire fleet 
short of fuel [6670] when action was joined, were contingencies 
too grave to be accepted on indefinite information or conjecture. 

"See .Toint Memorandum, Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations, November 5. 
1941. exhibit 16. 

ja See exhibit 8R, also Record, p. 4840, also personal letter Admiral Kimmel to Admiral 
Stark, August 22, 1941. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2505 

We had one newly commissioned Navy troop transport in the Pacific 
and a handful of partially trained marines at San Diego. These, with 
the marines stationed at Pearl Harbor and the outlying islands, con- 
stituted our landing force. 

On May 24, 1941, Admiral Stark wrote me that he had "an over-all 
limit of 30 days to prepare and have ready an expedition of 25,000 
men to sail for, and to take the Azores." In connection with this pro- 
posed expedition in May and June of 1941, practically all the trained 
and equipped marines on the west coast, several small transports, and 
some other small craft were transferred from the Pacific to the 
Atlantic.^* They were never returned. 

In April and May of 1941, 1 aircraft carrier, 3 battleships, 4 cruisers, 
and 18 destroyers were detached from the Pacific Fleet and transferred 
to the Atlantic.^^ In a letter to me on April 19, 1941, Admiral Stark 
advised me of this proposed transfer. He described the fleet units to 
be detached as "the first echelon of the Battle of the Atlantic." He 
added : "I am telling you ; not arguing with you." This transfer took 
away approximately one-fourth of the fighting ships of the Pacific 
Fleet and resulted in a striking reduction in its power. The details of 
the transfer must have [6680] been quickly known in Japan. 

When I was in Washington in June 1941, it was seriously proposed 
to transfer from the Pacific to the Atlantic an additional detachment 
to consist of three battleships, four cruisers, two squadrons of de- 
stroyers, and a carrier. I opposed this strenuously. The transfer 
was not made. 

The tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet under the War Plans indicate 
that it was not based in the Hawaiian area for the sole purpose of 
defending Pearl Harbor. Tlie War Plans required fleet action far 
from the Hawaiian Islands. They did not contemplate that the re- 
sources of the fleet were to be devoted exclusively or even primarily for 
the defense of Hawaii. 

A naval base exists primarily for the support of the fleet. The 
Naval Court of Inquiry, in paragraph VIII of its findings, states : 

A naval base exists solely for the support of the Fleet. The fundamental 
requirement that the strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured 
demands that the defense of a permanent naval base be so effectively provided 
for and conducted as to remove any anxiely of the Fleet in regard to the security 
of the Base, or for that of the vessels within its limits * * * ^q superimpose 
upon these essentials the further requirement that the seagoing personnel shall 
have the additional respon- [6681] sibility for security from' hostile action 
while within the limits of a permanent Naval Base, is to challenge a fundamental 
concept of naval warfare. 

This principle has long been recognized by both the Army and the 
Navy. In the "Joint Action Army and Navy, 1935" the responsibility 
for the defense of Pearl Harbor was vested in the Army. That spe- 
cifically provided : 

Strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured. The Fleet must have 
no anxiety in regard to the security of its base. 

When I took command of the fleet, the exchange of letters between 
the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy ^^ indicated that 

" Dispatch, OPNAV to CinCPac, May 24, 1941, 242130. 

'5 See disnatch, OPNAV to CinCPAC, May 13, 1941, 132019 ; CinCPac to OPNAV, May 15, 
1941, 150625. 

18 Exhibit 10. 



the provisions ot the agreement would be carried out and that existing 
deficiencies in the defense of Pearl Harbor would be corrected. How- 
ever, it was never my disposition to assume that high echelon agree- 
ments or correspondence were panaceas. At all times in 1941 I was 
concerned with the security of the fleet base at Pearl Harbor, I did 
everything within my power to strengthen and improve the base 
defense. 

Pearl Harbor was the only refueling, replacement, and repair point 
for ships operating in the Hawaiian area. Lahaina Roads off the 
Hawaiian Island of Maui could not be used as an operating base. 
About a month before I took command, Admiral Richardson issued 
orders that no ship was to be anchored [6682] at Lahaina be- 
cause it was not safe against submarine attack. I agreed with and 
continued those orders in effect. 

Pearl Harbor had but one entrance. Because of the topography of 
the island and the narrowness of the channel, the capital ships were 
obliged to move in and out in single file. We had frequent training in 
this maneuver even at night under war conditions without lights. To 
complete a sortie of the fleet required at least 3 hours. The danger 
that the channel would be blocked was always present. 

The defense of such a base before the outbreak of hostilities is quite 
different from its defense in war. 

During hostilities, when the fleet is not required to wait until the 
potential enemy commits the first overt act, our own offensive opera- 
tions protect the base. 

Pearl Harbor was included within an area defined as the Hawaiian 
coastal frontier in annex 1, page 9, Joint Army and Navy War Plan, 
Rainbow 5.^' The defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier, which in- 
cluded Oahu and all the land and sea areas required for the defense 
of Oahu, was entrusted by this plan to the commanders of the Hawaiian 
coastal frontier, who were designated as follows : ^^ 

Army — The Commanding General Hawaiin Department 

Navy — The Commandant, 14th Naval District, who is designated as the Con»- 
mander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Fron- [66831 tier. This officer also 
commands the assigned Naval local defense force and will arrange for its joint 
tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army. 

The local naval-base defense forces under the commandant of the 
Fourteenth Naval District were negligible. On October 17, 1941, the 
commandant wrote requesting the Navy Department to send a number 
of small fast craft, equipped with listening gear and depth charges, 
and two squadrons of patrol planes. He said : ^^ 

The only increment that has been made to these forces during the past year, 
exclusive of net vessels, is the USS Sacramento which has no batteries, to speak 
of, with.which the vessel can fight, and no speed with which she can run. 

I forwarded the commandant's letter with the following endorse- 
ment : ^° 

There is a possibility that the reluctance or inability of the Department to 
furnish the Commandant, 14th Naval District, with forces adequate to his needs 
may be predicated upon a conception that, in an emergency, vessels of the United 



" Exhibit 44, item 3, p. 3. 

» B^xhibit 44, item 3, p. 3. 

M Official letter Com 14 to CNO, October 17, 1941, ND 14 (01084). See exhibit 46, Naval 
Court of Inquiry. 

soCOMinCH 1st endorsement to Com 14 letter A16-1/ND 14. See exhibit 46, Naval 
Court of Inquiry. 



states Pacific Fleet may always be diverted for these purposes. If such be the 
case, the premise is so false as to hardly warrant refutation. A fleet, tied to its 
base by diversions to other purposes of light forces necessary for its [6664] 
security at sea is, in a real sense, no fleet at all. Moreover, this Fleet has been 
assigned, in the event of war, certain definite tasks, the vigorous prosecution 
of which requires not only all the units now assigned but as many more as can 
possibly be made available. The necessities of the case clearly warrant exti'aor- 
dinary measures in meeting the Commandant's needs. 

The commanders of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, General Short, 
and Admiral Bloch, had no means to conduct distant air reconnaissance 
from the island of Oahii. The War Department had allocated on 
paper 180 flying fortresses to the Hawaiian Department. General 
Short had only 12 of these planes in Hawaii prior to the attack of 
which but 6 were in flying condition. 

The Navy Department had allocated on paper one-hmidred-odd 
patrol planes to the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. He 
never received a single patrol plane. 

As a consequence, the base defense against air attack was predicated 
on borrowing Fleet patrol planes for distant searches. Under the 
war plans these fleet patrol planes were ear-marked for operations 
with the fleet thousands of miles from Hawaii when war broke out. 
Their primary mission was always connected with fleet operations. 
They were frequently based on the outlying islands — Midway, Wake, 
Johnston, and Palniyra. [6685] They had to train with the 
fleet and search areas in which the fleet operated. Under these cir- 
cumstances, they were available for distant search from Oahu, only 
when and if the fleet did not need them for its own operations, actual 
or impending. They were not at any time sufficient in number to 
conduct distant searches from Pearl Harbor as a regular routine. 

The local defense plan against air attack, submitted to the War 
and Navy Departments, clearly provided that effective distant air 
reconnaissance from Oahu could not be made as a routine matter. 
It was only to be instituted when there was information from other 
sources that a carrier strike against the islands was probable within 
narrow time limits,'^ This was a makeshift plan, but none better 
was possible with the means at hand. 

The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District wrote letters 
to the Chief of Naval Operations on December 30, 1940,- May 7, 
1941,^ and October 17, 1941* pointing out that the had no planes 
and that he needed planes. . Each of his letters was strongly and favor- 
ably endorsed by the Commander in Chief of the Fleet. On November 
25, 1041, 2 weeks before the attack, the Chief of Naval Operations 
informed the Commandant : -* 

The Department has no additional airplanes available for assignment to the 
14th Naval District. Allocations of new aircraft squadrons which become avail- 
able [6686] in the near future will be determined by the requirements of 
the strategic situation as it develops. 

Under my standing orders I placed the guns of the fleet at the dis- 
posal of the local antiaircraft defense. My Security Order 2 CL 41 ^^ 

" Exhibit 44, item 8, p. 4. 

22 Letter from Com 14 to CNO. December 30, 1940, ND 14 (629), exhibit 28, Naval Court 
or Inquiry. 

t'c^'^^i*''' ^""""^ *^''™- l"* ^° <^N0' May 7, 1941, exhibit 41, Naval Court of Inquiry (ND 14). 
*See footnote 20. ^ j \ 1 

" CNO to ClnCPAC and Com 14, November 25, 1941, serial 0135412. 
^ Exhibit 44, item 12. 



2508 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

prescribed a plan for berthing ships in sectors to develop in each 
sector tlie maximum antiaircraft fire. I designated the Commandant 
of the Fourteenth Naval District Naval Base Defense Officer because 
he was permanently stationed in Pearl Harbor and would always be 
familiar with local conditions. I delegated to him the duty of advis- 
ing the Senior Officer Present Afloat (exclusive of the Commander in 
Chief) , what condition of readiness to maintain in the ships in port. 
This was a flexible system designed to use the fleet's resources in port 
in the base defense. 

In addition, I issued standing orders for all ships that ammunition 
for all antiaircraft guns, 5'\ 3", 1.1 and 50 caliber, be kept available 
in the ready ammunition boxes at the guns at all times, day and night. 
These orders also required that there be on board at all times a suf- 
ficient number of trained personnel to man completely all the guns 
of the antiaircraft battery. All double bottom and lower deck com- 
partments of the ships in harbor were to be kept closed except when 
work required they be temporarily opened. No higher state of ma- 
terial readiness could long be continued without serious [6687] 
reduction in the morale and physical condition of men and the ac- 
complishment of necessary work on the ships. 

At the time of the attack, the orders in effect required that one- 
fourth to one-half of the antiaircraft guns, depending upon the type 
of ships, be manned at all times in port. At the time of the attack the 
guns were so manned. Admiral Inglis has testified that on the morn- 
ing of the attack all the antiaircraft batteries on all the ships were 
manned and firing within 4 to 7 minutes.^'^ The men of the fleet on 
December 7, 1941, made the transition from peace to war with speed 
and courage. 

[6638] I might add that immediately after that attack I was in- 
formed that in the first flight of torpedo planes, the ships shot down 
three out of the first flight, and I have never seen that contradicted. 

In his letter to the Secretary of War on January 24, 1941, the Sec- 
retary of the Navy listed an air torpedo plane attack as one of the 
possible forms of hostile action against Pearl Harbor. Subsequently, 
the Chief of Naval Operations forwarded to the Fleet and the Com- 
mandant, 14th Naval District, detailed technical advice which prac- 
tically eliminated from consideration an air torpedo plane attack as a 
serious danger to ships moored in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor. 

The depth of water in Pearl Harbor is 30 feet or less, excei)t in 
the channels where it was generally 40 feet. The Chief of Naval 
Operations on February 15, 1911, wrote to me on the subject of anti- 
torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks on Pearl 
Harbor stating :-' 

Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T (antitorpedo) baffles 
within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedd plane attack. It is con- 
sidered that the relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti- 
toriMjdo nets in Pearl Harbor. In addition, the congestion and the necessity 
for maneuvering room limit the practicability of the present type of 
baffles * * * 

[6GS9] * * * A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed 
necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. 150 feet of water is de- 
sired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 



w Record, p. 124. ,„ ^, 

z'Offloial iPtter, CNO to CinCPac, February 15, 1941, Serial 09330, exhibit 49, Naval 
Court of Inquiry. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2509 

250 feet. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. The desirable 
height for dropping is 60 feet or less. About 200 yards of torpedo run is neces- 
sary before the exploding device is armed but this may be altered. 

In the same letter he underlined the fact that the depths of water 
in which torpedoes were launched in the successful attacks at Taranto 
vrere between 14 and 15 fathoms ; that is, 84 to 90 feet of water. A 
letter of similar tenor was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to 
the commandants of various naval districts, including the 14th 
Naval District.-^ 

On June 13, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent another letter 
on the same subject to the commandants of the various naval dis- 
tricts, including the Commandant of the 14th Naval District a copy 
of which was sent to me.^'' After reading this letter, my staff and I, 
as well as the Commandant of the 14th iSTaval District, believed that 
the danger of a successful airplane torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor 
was negligible. 

[0690] The Naval Court of Inquiry concluded that the torpedoes 
launched by the Japanese in the shallow water of Pearl Harbor con- 
stituted, in effect, a secret weapon in the category of the robot bomb, 
which was unknown to the best professional opinion in Great Britain 
and the United States at the time.'*" The Secretary, in his endorsement 
to that report, stated that the Navy Department had information from 
British sources that aircraft torpedoes were successfully launched in 
42 feet of water in the j^ear 1940. Such information was never sup- 
plied to me. 

In any event, the Navy Department apparently decided that tor- 
pedo baffles in Pearl Harbor were not required and exhibited no con- 
cern at their absence. 

In his letter to me of February 15, 1941, the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions stated, in effect, that existing torpedo nets were so cumbersome 
that their installation in Pearl Plarbor would interfere with the move- 
ment of ships and the ability of the Fleet to get away on short notice. 
He stated : 

There is apparently a great need for the development of a light efBcient torpedo 
net which could be laid temporarily and quickly within protective harbors and 
which can be readily removed. 

[6691] The fleet did not have facilities in Hawaii to manufac- 
ture anti-torpedo nets or baffles. If the light efficient net described by 
the Chief of Naval Operations was ever developed by the Navy Depart- 
ment in 1941, we never heard of it or received it. Admiral King, in 
his endorsement to the record of the Naval Court tersely stated : 

The decision not to install torpedo baffles appears to have been made by the 
Navy Department. 

My relations with General Short, which were once the subject of 
considerable confusion in the public mind, have now been clarified by 
exhaustive investigations. The committee has all the evidence on this 
subject. I need not labor it. It has been established that our official 
and social relations were friendly, that we frequently conferred on 
official matters of common interest and invariably did so when either 



-^ CNO to several commandants, February 17, 1941, Serial 010230, exhibit 54, Naval 
Court of Inquiry. 

2" CNO to several commandants, June 13, 1941, Serial 055730, exhibit 55, Naval Court 
of Inquiry. 

^o Naval Court of Inquiry, finding XV. 

79716 — 46 — pt. 6—3 



of US received messages which had any bearing on the development of 
the United States-Japanese situation, or on our several plans in pre- 
paring for war. As the Naval Court of Inquiry summarized the 
matter : ^^ 

Each was mindful of his own responsibility and of the responsibilities vested 
in the other. Each was informed of measures being undertaken by the other in. the 
defense of the base to a degree sufficient for all useful purposes. 

[6692] General Short and I were not "opposite numbers" in 
the sense that our total concerns and duties were coextensive. The 
responsibilities of the fleet under w^ar plans were far flung and offen- 
sive. Those of the Hawaiian Department were local and defensive. 
Because I was interested in the security of the fleet and the Hawaiian 
Islands I gave General Short all the assistance I could, even in con- 
nection with local defensive measures which were exclusively under 
the Army's control. The Aircraft Warning Service is a case in point. 
I took Army personnel to sea with the fleet so that they could be 
trained as radar operators. I assigned to the Army a naval oflEicer 
who had experience in Britain with radar to give any advice and 
assistance he could in connection with the aircraft warning net in 
Hawaii. General Short informed me his radar was operating and 
could give a 100-mile coverage. In joint Army-Navy drills it did 
perform satisfactorily. In the period before December 7 I was 
informed that the Army's radar was manned. It was so manned.^ It 
was only the day before the attack that some subordinate Army officer 
gave the permission to shut down at 7 a. m. on Sunday. Even despite 
this, one of the stations was operating after 7 a. m. on the morning 
of December 7, and obtained information both about the incoming and 
outgoing planes. This information was not passed on to the Navy. 

[6693] My relations with my staff. Task Force Commanders 
and senior flag officers were excellent. This is another subject dealt 
with exhaustively in the testimony of previous investigations now 
before the committee. My staff was composed of superior officers 
whose records in the war have demonstrated their abilities. I was 
accessible to them. We had full and frank discussions about the 
various decisions which it was my responsibility to make. The so- 
called "war warning" dispatch I also discussed with the senior task 
force commanders. Admiral Pye, commander of Task Force 1; Ad- 
miral Halsey, commander of Task Force 2; Admiral Brown, com- 
mander of Task Force 3; Admiral Calhoun, commander, base force; 
and Admiral Bloch, the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval 
District. 

I did not personally show that dispatch to or discuss it with Admiral 
Newton or Admiral Bellinger. The orders sending Admiral Newton 
to JNIidway were issued by me to Admiral Brown, who was in com- 
mand of Task Force 3,^- and under whom Admiral Newton served. 
Admirals Newton and Brown conferred before the former set out to 
Midway.^^ Admiral Newton proceeded under complete war condi- 
tions. As for Admiral Bellinger, he served directly under Admirals 
Bloch and [6694] Brown, who were familiar with all impor- 
tant developments. I was fully aware of the conditions in Admiral 

31 Naval Court of Inquiry, finding IV. 

M Secret dispatch, CinCPac to COMTASKFOR 3, COM 14, December 4, 1941, 040237. 

33 Hart investigation, testimony Admiral Newton, p. 320, question 45. 



iiellmger's patrol plane lorce, knew and had approved his schedule 
of operations. Had I seen any need for him to change his course of 
action, I would have issued orders to him to that effect directly. 

A description of the measures I took for the security of fleet units at 
sea remains to be given. The Naval Court of Inquiry has described 
them as follows : ^* 

The task forces operating at sea were screened defensively by aircraft and 
destroyers. Torpedo defense batteries were manned day and night, ammunition 
was at hand, and depth charges were ready for use. Watertight integrity was 
maintained, horizon and surface battle lookouts were kept posted, the ships 
steamed darkened at night, and the use of the radio was restricted to a minimum. 

The court concluded : 

It is a fact that the precautions taken by Admiral Kimmel for the security of 
his fleet while at sea were adequate and effective. 

In summary, the Pacific Fleet in 1941 established and maintained 
the highest degree of security measures at sea and in port consistent 
with our assigned mission of intensive [6695] preparation for 
war. We had our difficulties with shifting personnel and an exposed 
and inadequately defended base. We had much to do in preparing a 
fleet then unready for war. We were proud of having a hard job to 
do. Admiral Hewitt, in his report to the Secretary, made this finding 
which has never been made public.^^ 

Throughout his encumbency as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral 
Kimmel was energetic, indefatigable, resourceful, and positive in his efforts to 
prepare the Fleet for War * * *. 

We maintained as a regular procedure a high state of daily alertness 
which, with a very short time, could be. intensified to deal with a 
particular hazard when and if it developed. We needed one thing 
which our own resources could not make available to us. That vital 
need was the information available in Washington from the intercepted 
dispatches which told when and where Japan would probably strike. 
I did not get this information. 

PART II — INFORIMATION RECEIVED AND ACTION TAKEN 

In this part of my statement, I shall describe the information avail- 
able to me prior to the attack and the actions which I took upon the 
basis of that information. [6696] I shall deal with the follow- 
ing topics : 

First, the information furnished to me by the Navy Department, 
prior to October 16, 1941 ; j f , 

Second, the dispatches sent to me by the Navy Department from 
October 16, 1941, to and including November 27, 1941 ; 

Third, the meaning of the so-called war warning dispatch of No- 
vember 27, and related information ; 

Fourth, my decisions and actions from November 27 to the time of 
the attack. 

1. Information and dispatches, January-Octoher 1914.— In Feb- 
ruary 1941, when I became commander in chief, I was somewhat fa- 
miliar with the tense situation in the Pacific. During the year 1941 
I received dispatches and letters from the Chief of Naval Operations 

** Naval Court of Inquiry, finding X. 
■" Hewitt report, conclusion 25, p. 779. 



2512 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

which might be broadly described as "war warnings." On January 
21, 1941, he sent a dispatch to the commander in chief ^ which stated : 

The international situation continues to deteriorate. It now appears to me 
that if war eventuates its general character will be according to plan DOG my 
memorandum to the Secretary. If this estimate proves correct I contemplate 
ordering mobilization according to plan RAINBOW THREE with following modi- 
fications Atlantic Fleet principal concentration New England and Canada execute 
all tasks except aflBim [6697] expect early reenforcement from Pacific 
and much stronger British Isles detachment. Pacific Fleet waiting attitude or 
execute assigned tasks in Area eastward of 160 degrees east depending on action 
by Japan. Asiatic Fleet cannot expect early reenforcement alert status or carry 
out tasks according to circumstances. 

On February 3, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a dis- 
patch from the United States naval attache in London which stated : ^ 

I have been oflScially informed that Japanese are apparently planning an offen- 
sive on a large scale presumed against Indo-China Malay Peninsula or the Dutch 
East Indies no doubt to be coordinated with attack on Great Britain approxi- 
mately February 10. It is definite that the Jap and German relations are becoming 
more intimate and that the Japs are conducting a hatred campaign against the 
British even in ordinarily pro-English press also two large Japanese merchant 
^essels sailings have been cancelled. Reports believed reliable state that all Jap 
shipping being called home to be taken over by the government. Request your 
knowledge of this. The Japanese mediating Thai Indo China scene meeting 
abroad Jap cruiser. Price of umpire's services unreliably reported to be bases 
on the west coast of Siam [6G9S] that are usable by light craft for cutting 
Singapore communications via the Malacca Straits. 

On July 13, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a dispatch 
which stated : ^ 

The unmistakable deduction from information from numerous sources is that 
the Japanese Government has determined upon its future policy which is sup- 
ported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. This policy 
probably involves war in the near future. An advance against the British and 
Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out. However, CNO holds the opinion that Jap 
activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development 
of Naval, Army and Air bases in Indo-China * * * 

The dispatch predicted that Japan's major military effort would 
be against Russian maritime provinces. It also stated that all Japa- 
nese vessels in United States Atlantic ports had been ordered to be 
west of the Panama Canal by the 1st of August. 

On Jidy 3, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me another 
dispatch.* This reported that the Japanese Government had issued 
orders that certain Japanese vessels in the North Atlantic and Carib- 
bean areas pass through the Panama Canal to the Pacific. Under 
tliese orders all Nipponese [6699] merchant vessels would be 
clear of the Caribbean and North Atlantic areas by July 22. It re- 
lated information from unusually reliable Chinese sources that within 
two weeks Japan would abrogate the neutrality treaty with Russia 
and attack. The dispatch concluded as follows : 

That present strength and deployment of Nip Army in Manchuria is defensive 
and the present distribution of the Japanese Fleet appears normal, and that is 
capable of movement either north or south. That a definite move by the Japanese 
may be expected during the period July 20-August 1 is indicated by the foregoing. 
[Italics supplied.] 



1 Dispatch CNO to CinCUS, January 21, 1941, 212155. 

3 Dispatch ALUSNA, London to Opnav, February 3, 1941, 031400, passed to CinCUS as 
OrNAV0.S2300. 
s Exhibit 37. p. 4. 
*Exhil>it 37. p. 5. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2513 

On July 25, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a dispatch in 
which the Chief of Staff joined.^ This advised that on July 25 the 
United States would employ economic sanctions against Japan. It 
stated in part : 

* * * The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff do not anticipate 
hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means but you are fur- 
nished this information in order that you may talie appropriate precautionary 
measures against possible eventualities. Action being initiated by the United 
States Army to call the Philippine Army into active service at an early date. 
This dispatch is [6700] to be kept secret except from immediate Army and 
Navy subordinates. • • * 

In addition to these dispatches the Chief of Naval Operations' letters 
to me show recurrent tension in the international situation during 
1941. His letters use such expressions as : 

What will happen in the Pacific is anyone's guess. (Memorandum of May 
14, 1941.) 

An open rupture was described as a possibility on July 24, 1941, 
"Obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; 
this is one thing that is factual." (July 31, 1941.) 

* * * Also the seriousness of the Pacific situation which continues to de- 
teriorate. (August 21, 1941.) 

I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but I could wish 
the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender. (August 28, 1941.) 

P. S. I have held this letter up pending a talk with Mr. Hull who has asked 
me to hold it very secret. I may sum it up by saying tJiat conversations with the 
Japs have practically reached an impasse. (September 23, 1941.) 

None of these letters or dispatches warned of an attack in the 
Hawaiian area, or indicated that an attack there was imminent or 
probable. None of these letters or dispatches [6701^ directed 
an alert in the Hawaiian area against an overseas attack. 

Oh the contrary, on February 1, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations 
wrote me on the subject of "Rumored Japanese attack on Pearl Har- 
bor." s 

He stated that Mr. Grew had telegraphed the State Department on 
January 27, 1941 : 

The Peruvian minister has informed a member of my staff that he has heard 
from manV sources, including a Japanese source that in the event of trouble 
breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intend to make 
a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all of their strength and employing 
all of their equipment. The Peruvian minister considered the rumors fantastic. 
Nevertheless, he considered them of sufficient importance to convey this infor- 
mation to a member of my staff. 

The letter from the Chief of Naval Operations added : 

The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these rumors. Fur- 
thermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and employ- 
ment of Japanese naval and army forces, no move against Pearl Barhor appears 
imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future. [Italic supplied.] 

[6702] This estimate as to the improbability of a move against 
Pearl Harbor was never withdrawn. 

Consider my situation as Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet 
at the time I received, by letter and dispatch, these ominous predic- 
tions of Japanese aggression in the Far East. 



5 Exhibit 3T, p. 14. 
« Exhibit 15. 



2514 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I was carrying out an intensive training program to prepare the 
fleet for war, I was under specific injunction to continue that pro- 
gram. In an official letter to me on April 31, 1941 (Serial 038612), 
the Chief of Naval Operations wrote : 

In the meantime I advise that you devote as much time as may be available to 
training your forces in the particular duties which the various units may be 
called upon to perform under your operating plans. The time has arrived, I 
believe, to perfect the technique and the methods that will be required by the 
special operations which you envisage immediately after the entry of the United 
States into war. 

[6703] On November 24, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations 
sent me a dispatch stating that the chances of a favorable outcome of 
negotiations with Japan were very doubtful and that, in his opinion, 
an aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the 
Philippines or Guam was a possibility.'^ Admiral Stark testified be- 
fore the Naval Court of Inquiry that he did not intend that the Pacific 
Fleet should discontinue its training program upon receipt of this 
dispatch, 2 weeks before the attack.^ 

I was not expected to discontinue training for all-out security meas- 
ures, concentrated on the defense of the Hawaiian Islands, every time 
an alarming dispatch was received from Washington predicting Japa- 
nese aggression in the Far East. Indeed, had I done so, the training 
program would have been curtailed so drastically that the fleet could 
not have been prepared for war. 

During the time these dispatches were sent, the Navy Department 
knew just what my program in Hawaii was. My fleet-operating 
schedules were filed with the Navy Department,^ [p^OA] 
where the location and movement of substantially every ship in the 
fleet was known at all times. No dispatch or letter contained any 
order or suggestion for departure from my operating schedules. On 
May 24, 1941, the Navy Department sent me the following djspatch.^'* 

The Department in the interest of morale will consider visits of small detach- 
ments or individual ships to the Pacific Coast. It is not desired that detachments 
of such size make these visits as to indicate the breaking up or reducing the 
Hawaiian concentration. Your recommendations are requested. [Italics sup- 
plied.] 

When the War and Navy Departments wishes to put the forces in 
Hawaii on alert against attack, they could and did use appropriate 
language to that end. The dispatch of June 17, 1940, from the War 
Department to the Hawaiian garrison demonstrated this. That dis- 
patch stated : ^^ 

Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans- 
Pacific raid, to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or pro- 
voking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis 
Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct 
with Chief of Staff [6705] be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge. 

In reply to Admiral Richardson's dispatch reporting the actions 
taken by the fleet forces to cooperate with the Army in maintaining 
the "alert", the Navy Department directed him to continue such 
cooperation.^^ 



■'Exhibit 37, p. 32. 

' Navnl Court of Inquiry. Tostimony of Admiral Stark, questions Nos. 142, 404, and 405. 
•CinCPac file No. A4-3/FF12/(13), Serial 01254, August 13, 1941, received OpNav 
September 3. 1041. 

" Dispatch OpNav to CinCPac, 24 May 1941, 242150. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2515 

It is one thing to warn commanders at a particular base of the prob- 
able outbreak of war in theaters thousands of miles aw^ay, knowing 
and expecting that they will continue their assigned tasks and missions 
after the receipt of such warning, and that the very nature of the warn- 
ing emphasizes to them the necessity for continuing such tasks and 
missions. 

It is quite another thing to warn commanders at a particular base of 
an attack to be expected in their own locality. 

In 1941, we of the Pacific Fleet had a plethora of premonitions, of 
generalized warnings and forebodings that Japan might embark on 
aggressive action in the Far East at any one of the variously pre- 
dicted dates. After receipt of such warnings, we were expected to 
continue with renewed intensity and zeal our own training program 
and preparations for war rather than to go on an all-out local alert 
against attack. 

[6706] In the year 1941, the international situation was grave 
and, at times, tense. However, preparing the fleet for war through 
an intensive training program had to go on. There was a vital ele- 
ment of timing involved in determining when the fleet should curtail 
training for all-out war measures. Maximum security measures, con- 
sistent with the maintenance of the training program, were already 
in effect in the fleet. When would Japanese -American relations reach 
the point that all training should cease and all-out war dispositions 
should be made ? This was what we needed to know in the Pacific in 
the year 1941. 

Throughout 1941, the Navy Department had several courses open. 
It could furnish me directly with the best evidence of Japanese inten- 
tions and plans — the intercepted Japanese military and diplomatic 
messages. This would have given me an opportunity to judge for 
myself the gravity and intensity of the crisis as December 7, 1941, 
approached, and the probability of a Japanese attack on Hawaii. The 
Navy Department failed to do this. The Navy Department did not 
permit me to evaluate for myself the intercepted Japanese military 
and diplomatic messages. 

Another course of action then remained. That was to issue an 
order which would have directed dispositions of the fleet to guard 
against an attack in Hawaii. The message [6707] of June 17, 

1940, "be on the alert against hostile overseas raid," was such an oi'der. 
It would have had the same effect in December of 1941 as it had in 
June of 1940. Such an order was not given. 

Further, the War and Navy Departments could have ordered the 
local commanders of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Admiral Bloch 
and General Short, to execute the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense 
Plan. This was not done. 

The Navy Department could have given the order to mobilize under 
the War Plan. This order would have had a definite meaning. It 
would have placed the fleet on an all-out war basis. The order to mo- 
bilize did not authorize acts of war.^^ xhe dispatch of January 21, 

1941, indicated that mobilization would be ordered when war was 
imminent." The order to mobilize was not siven. 



"Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5, cli. II, sec. 2, sections 0221, 0222, 0223. 

" Dispatch CNO to CinCUS, January 21, 1941, 212155, "If this estimate proves correct 
I contemplate ordering mobilization according to Eainbow Three with following modifica- 
tions. * ♦ ♦" 



2516 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

In the dispatches I received on and after October 16, 1941, I was 
not given available information as to the actual status of Japanese- 
American negotiations and as to Japanese military plans; nor was I 
given orders for alert against an attack on Hawaii. These dispatches 
had the same tenor as the warnings which had previously been sent 
in February, June, and July 1941 predicting probable Japanese action 
[6708] thousands of miles from the Hawaiian area. 

2. Dispatches from October 16, 1941, to and including November 
27, 191^1— On October 16, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent the 
commanders in chief, Atlantic, Asiatic, and Pacific Fleets, the fol- 
lowing dispatch :^^ 

The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation. If a 
new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-Ameri- 
can. If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under 
a new mandate which will not include reapprociiement with the U. S. 

In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility. 
Since the U. S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate 
situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. 
In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such 
preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute 
provocative actions against Japan. 

The term "preparatory deployments" used in this dispatch is non- 
technical. It has no especial significance other than [6709] its 
natural meaning. After receiving this dispatch, I made certain 
preparatory deployments. I ordered submarines to assume a war 
patrol off both Wake and Midway.^*' I reinforced Johnston and Wake, 
with additional marines, ammunition, and stores and also sent addi- 
tional marines to Palmyra Island. I ordered the commandant of the 
Fourteenth Naval District to direct an alert status in the outlying 
islands. He did so and reported his action to me.^^ 

I placed on 12 hours' notice certain vessels of the fleet which were in 
west coast ports, held six submarines in readiness to depart for Japan, 
delayed the sailing of one battleship which was scheduled to visit a 
west coast navy yard. I dispatched 12 patrol planes to Midway with 
orders to carry out daily patrols within 100 miles of the island,^^ and 
placed in effect additional security measures in the fleet operating 
areas. 

On October 22, 1 reported by letter all these dispositions to the Chief 
of Naval Operations. 

[6710] I might say I stimmarized all these movements in a letter 
and the reports had previously been made in movement reports. 

By letter dated November 7, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations 
specifically approved these dispositions. He wrote : 

OK on the dispositions which you made in connection with the recent change 
in the Japanese Cabinet. 

The naval court of inquiry found : 

He (Admiral Kimmel) did not interpret the dispatch of IG October as directing 
or warranting that he abandon his preparations for war. He held daily confer- 
ences with his subordinate commanders and the members of his Staff, all ex- 
perienced officers of long service and sought by every means to ascertain wherein 
his interpretation might be incorrect. The consensus throughout was that no 
further steps were warranted by the information at hand. 



"E\liil)it 37, p. 18. 

"Dispatch, CinCPac to ComSubScoFor 170354 and 170426, October 17, 1941. 
" Dispatch. CinCPac to Conil4, 170319, October 17, 1941, and dispatch Coml4 to 
CinCPac 1703rifi. 

" Dispatch, CinCPac to Compatwing 2, 170429, October 17, 1941. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2517 

In the dispatch of October 16, 1941, I was advised that there was a 
possibility Japan would attack the United States and Great Britain. 
But this advice was given a definite meaning by the Chief of Naval 
Operations in a letter to me on October 17, in which he said : 

Personally I do not believe the Japanese are going to sail into us and the 
message I sent you merely stated the [6111] "possibility" ; in fact I tem- 
pered the message handed to me considerably. (Italic supplied.) 

This letter made it clear to me that when Admiral Stark stated cer- 
tain Japanese action to be "possible," he mennt that it was not probable. 

In his letter of October IT, 1941, the Cliief of Naval Operations 
enclosed a "Memorandum for the CNO" from Captain R. E. Schuir- 
manii, who was in charge of the Navy's liaison with the State Depart- 
ment. Admiral Stark stated in his letter that this memorandum by 
Captain Schuirmann "sums up my thoughts better than I have been 
able to set them down." 

The dispatch of October 16 and the Schuirmann memorandum were 
not consistent. The dispatch of October 16 began : "The resignation 
of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave crisis." The memorandum 
began : "I believe we are inclined to overestimate the importance of 
changes in the Japanese Cabinet as indicative of great changes in 
Japanese policy of thought or action." 

The memorandiun stated : 

Present reports are that the new Cabinet to be formed will be no better and no 
worse than the one which has just fallen. 

The memorandum was to the effect that the Japanese military would 
determine Japan's policy regardless of the [6712] Cabinet in 
power. 

On November 24, I received a dispatch from the Chief of Naval 
Operations which was addressed to me, the Commander in Chief of 
the Asiatic Fleet, and the commandants of the Eleventh, Twelfth, 
Thirteenth, and Fifteenth Naval Districts. This dispatch read as 
follows : ^9 

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This 
situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their 
Naval and Military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive 
movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possi- 
bility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees 
to inform Senior Army Officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order 
not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam 
will be informed separately. 

Under date of November 25, the Cliief of Naval Operations wrote 
me a letter which reached me on December 3. This leister contained a 
postscript added after a "meeting with the President and Mr. Hull 
today." The dates of the conference and the postscript are not known 
to me. In the postscript he wrote : 

[67^3] * * * From many angles an attack on the Philippines rcould be 
the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here tcho 
think it likely to occur. I do not give it the iveight others do, but I included it 
because of the strong feeling among some people. You knoic I have generally 
held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. 
Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indochina, Burma Road 
.area as the most likely. 



» Exhibit 37, p. 32. 



I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will be 
damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do 
most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may 
do nothing — I think it more likely to be "anything". (Italic supplied.) 

On November 27, the Chief of Naval Operations sent to me and. to 
the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, the following dispatch : ^^ 

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan 
looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an ag- 
gressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and 
equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates 
an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Thai or Kra Peninsula 
or possibly Borneo. [6714] Execute an appropriate defensive deployment 
preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46. Inform District and 
Army authorities. -A similar warning is being sent by War Department. 
SPENAVO inform British. Continental Districts Guam Samoa directed take 
appropriate measures against sabotage. 

On the same day I received two other dispatches from the Chief of 
Naval Operations, which affected my current estimate of the situation, 
as well as my subsequent dispositions. 

The first of these dispatches was as follows : ^^ 

Ai-my has offered to make available some units of infantry for reenforcing de- 
fense battalions now on station if you consider this desirable. Army also pro- 
poses to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which you may 
occupy but is unable at this time to provide any antiaircraft units. Take this 
into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable number of troops 
desired and recommended armament. 

The second of these dispatches was as follows : ^^ 

In order to keep the planes of the 2nd marine aircraft wing available for ex- 
peditionary use OpNav has requested and Army has agreed to station 25 Army 
pursuit planes at Midway [1615^ and a similar number at Wake provide 
you consider this feasible and desirable. It will be necessary for you to trcnsport 
these planes and ground creios from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier. 
Planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats es- 
sential spare parts tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later 
trips of regular Navy supply vessels. Army understands these forces must be 
quartered in tents. Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence 
and transporting other Army supplies. Stationing these planes must not be al- 
lowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to Philippines. Ad- 
ditional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary. Can Navy bombs 
now at outlying positions be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those 
positions for supporting Navy operations. Confer with Commanding General 
and advise as soon as practicable. (Italics supplied.) 

3. Analysis of the so-called '-'"war warning'''' dispatch of November 
27, 1941, and related information. — The so-called "war warning" dis- 
patch of November 27 did not warn the Pacific Fleet of an attack in 
the Hawaiian area. It did not state expressly or by implication that 
an attack in the Hawaiian area was imminent or probable. It did 
not repeal or modify the advice previously given me by \^116'\ 
the Navy Department that no move against Pearl Harbor was immi- 
nent or planned by Japan. The phrase "war warning" cannot be made 
a catch-all for all the contingencies hindsight may suggest. It is a 
characterization of the specific information which the dispatch con- 
tained. 



2» Exhibit 37, p. 36. 

" Dispatch CNO to CinCPac, November 26, 1941, 270040. 

w Dispatch CNO to CinCPac, November 26, 1941, 270038. 



The dispatch warned of war — where? 
In the Far East. The dispatch stated : 

The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of Naval 
task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, 
Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. 

Thus the Philippines, Thai, and the Kra Peninsula were stated 
to be expected objectives of Japan. When it came to "possible" 
objectives, Borneo was the only one specified. Hawaii was not men- 
tioned. As the Naval Court of Inquiry points out, "No reference was 
made to the possibility of an aggressive movement in any direction 
as had been done in the dispatch of 24 November." This indicated 
to us in the fleet that since the earlier dispatch, the Navy Department 
had obtained later information, on the basis of which it could specify 
both probable and possible Japanese objectives. 

Moreover, the two other dispatches which I received on November 
27, in addition to the so-called "war warning" [i6'7i7] dis- 
patch were affirmative evidence that the War and Navy Departments 
did not consider hostile action on Pearl Harbor imminent or probable. 

One of these dispatches proposed ^-^ that I send 25 Army pursuit 
planes by aircraft carrier to each of the islands of Wake and Midway. 
The other dispatch ^-^ proposed the reenforcement of Marine defense 
battalions on Midway and Wake with Army troops. 

About the same time General Short received a dispatch ^^ from 
the War Department which stated that the Army proposed to take 
over the defense of these islands from the marines. 

Thus, the dispatches sent from the War and Navy Departments were 
in disagreement on the very fundamentals of the project. 

The proposed exchange of Army troops for marines on the outlying 
island bases was not feasible. General Short and I had extensive 
conferences on the subject. I learned that the Army had no guns, 
either surface or antiaircraft to equip any troops which might re- 
lieve or reenforce the marines. Thus, if the marines were withdrawn, 
their equipment and arms would have to be left for the Army. I 
did not have sufficient [6718^ additional supplies to reequip 
and rearm the marines removed. The marines stationed on the 
island were trained, acclimated and efficient beyond standards which 
could be immediately obtained by Army troops relieving them. The 
Army had nothing in its organization comparable to a Marine defense 
battalion, so that the Army garrison would have required a new table 
of organization. The proposed relief of the marine garrisons by 
Army troops would necessarily disrupt the defense of the islands 
during the period that one garrison was preparing to depart and the 
other was being installed. 

Furtherm.ore, at Wake, the more westerly of the two islands, there 
were no harbor facilities or anchorage. Material and personnel had 
to be landed from ships under way in an open seaway. Ships had 
been delayed in unloading at Wake for as long as 28 days due to 
bad weather. It was not unusual for a ship to take as much as 7 
or 8 days. Extensive unloading of men and material from ships at 
Wake, in the face of any enemy operation, would be impossible. 

=2« See footnote 22. 
^^ See footnote 21. 

=« Messajre No. 489, November 29, 1941, War Department to Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Department. 



2520 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I believe that responsible authorities in Washington would not 
plan or propose a project for shifting garrisons under such circum- 
stances, if they considered that enemy action against these outlying 
bases was imminent. 

1 promptly recommended to the Chief of Naval Operations that 
the marines should not be withdrawn from the outlying [67J9^ 
islands until the Army had received arms and equipment for its 
defense battalions and had adequately trained them.-^ 

The replacement of Marine planes on the islands of Wake and 
Midway with Army pursuit planes, as proposed by Washington, was 
also impracticable. At conferences with the Army on this matter, 
the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Detachment stated 
that the Army pursuit planes could not operate more than fifteen 
miles from land, nor could they land on a carrier. Consequently, 
once they were landed on one of the outlying islands they would be 
frozen there. Their fifteen-mile limit of operation radically re- 
stricted their usefulness in the island's defense. I so advised the 
Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch and letter.^* ^^ 

[6720] The Army pursuit planes which it was proposed to send 
to outlying islands from Oahu on November 27 constituted approxi- 
mately 50 percent of the Army's pursuit strength on Oahu. The 
very fact that the War and Navy Departments proposed their trans- 
fer from Hawaii indicated to me that responsible authorities in 
Washington did not consider an air raid on Pearl Harbor either 
imminent or probable. 

In brief, on November 27, the Navy Department suggested that I 
send from the immediate vicinity of Pearl Harbor the carriers of the 
fleet which constituted the fleet's main striking defense against an 
air attack. 

On November 27, the War and Navy Departments suggested that 
we send from the island of Oahu, 50 percent of the Army's resources 
in pursuit planes. 

[6731] These proj^osals came to us on the very same day of the 
so-called "war warnmg," 

In these circumstances no reasonable man in my position would 
consider that the "war warning" was intended to suggest the likeli- 
hood of an attack in the Hawaiian area. 

From November 27 to the time of the attack, all the information 
which I had from the Navy Department or from any other source, 
confirmed, and was consistent, with the Japanese movement in south- 
east Asia described in the dispatch of November 27. 

On November 30, the Navy Department sent me for information a 
dispatch addressed to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet.^® 



2* Dispatch CinCPac to OpNav, November 28. 1941, 280627; Official letter CinCPac to 
CNO, December 2, 1941, Serial 0114W; personal letter to Admiral Starls, December 2, 
1941. 

" In the "Narrative Statement of Evidence (sic) at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations" 
prepared by the Navy Department for the Senate Naval Affairs Conimitte and distributed 
to this committee, the following statement is made (pp. 326 and 327) : "It appears from 
the evidence that Admiral Kimmel and General Short had a conference abont the subject 
of the dispatches concerning the Army's willingness to garrison Alidway and Wake Islands, 
and that the project fell through because these two area Commanders could not agree as to 
whom should command the Army troops. Each insisted he should be supreme." This 
statement is not accurate. The dpcisions not to send the Army pursuit planes and not to 
relieve the marines with Army troops were made for the reasons I have outlined and 
whirh firp stated in my dispatch, and official and personal letters. 

" Exhibit 78, p. 2. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2521 

This stated there were indications that Japan was about to attack 
points on the Kra Isthmus by overseas expedition. The Commander 
in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet was directed to scout for information of 
Japanese movements in the China Sea. 

On December 1, the Navy Department sent me for information an- 
other dispatch which it addressed to the Commander in Chief of the 
x\siatic Fleet,^^ describing a Japanese intrigue in Malaya. Japan 
planned a landing at Khota Baru in Malaya in order to entice the 
British to cross the frontier from Malay into Thailand. Thailand 
would then call Britain an aggressor, and call upon Japan for aid. 
This would facilitate the Japanese entry into Thailand as a full- 
fledged ally, and give Japan [6722'] air bases in the Kra Penin- . 
5ula, and a position to curry out any further operations along Malaya. 

From the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, from the China 
coast, and other sources, we had reports of the development of a 
Japanese amphibious expedition headed south. Movements of troops, 
tanks, amphibian boats, landing craft, transports, and naval vessels 
had been sighted moving to the Kra Peninsula.-^ 

On December 6, 1941, the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet 
reported various large Japanese forces apparently making for Koh- 
tron,-*^ These consisted of one 25-ship convoy with an escort of 6 
cruisers and 10 destroyers, and another 10-ship convoy with 2 cruisers 
and 10 destroyers. The scouting force of the Asiatic Fleet had sighted 
30 ships and one large cruiser anchored in Camranh Bay in Indochina. 
Incidentally, Kohtron is in Indochina. 

In short, all indications of the movements of Japanese military and 
naval forces which came to my attention confirmed the information in 
the dispatch of 27 November — that the Japanese were on the move 
against Thailand or the Kra Peninsula in southeast Asia. 

The fortnightly "Summary of Current National Situations" issued 
by the Office of tlie Chief of Naval Operations under date of Decem- 
ber 1, 1941, stated on page 1 "Strong indications [6723'] point 
to any early Japanese advance against Thailand." '^^ 

The same publication, on page 9, under the heading "The Japanese 
Naval Situation," stated definitely "Major capital ship strength re- 
mains in home waters as well as the greatest portion of the carriers." 

On December 3, 1941, 1 received intelligence that Japanese consular 
and diplomatic posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, 
Washington, and London had been ordered to destroy most of their 
codes.'^^ This dispatch stated "most of their codes and ciphers" — 
not all — a point which was noted by me and my staff at the time. 
This information appeared to fit in with the information we had 
received about a Japanese movement in southeast Asia. Japan would 
naturally take precautions to prevent the compromise of her communi- 
cation system in the event that her action in southeast Asia caused 
Britain and the United States to declare war, and take over her diplo- 
matic residences. 



•■'■' Dispatch OPNAV to CinCAF, info CinCPac, 1 Dec, 011400. See also Hewitt testimony, 
Captain Layton, pp. 216, 217. 

2s Dispatch OpNav to CinCAF, info CinCPao, November 28, 1941, 281633. See also 
Hewitt testimony, Captain I.avton, p. 201. 

=9 Dispatch CinCAF to OpNav. info CinCPac, December 6, 1941. 061255. 

'« Exhibit 80. 

« Exhibit 37, p. 40. 



2522 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[6724^ In addition to actual observation, there was another way 
of obtaining some indications of Japanese Fleet movements. This 
was the system of so-called traffic analysis. It rested on an attempted 
identification of call signs of various enemy ships and of subdivision 
commanders in the enemy fleet. The call sign is a group of letters 
and numbers used by a ship to identify itself much as a radio station 
announces itself as "Station WABC." The location of the ships from 
whence the call signs emanate is made by direction finders. In 1941 
we had direction finders at Manila, Guam, and Pearl Harbor. We 
made a daily traffic analysis. I went over the material with care. 

Under the best of circumstances the accuracy of estimates of enemy 
fleet movements based upon traffic analysis is open to serious doubts. 
To illustrate : On December 8, 1941, the commandant of the Sixteenth 
Naval District sent a dispatch to the Chief of Naval Operations, and 
to me for information. This dispatch was based upon traffic analysis 
made by the Communication Intelligence Unit in Manila. It stated : ^^ 

The following Japanese distributions are based upon radio call recoveries 
since December first and are conservative : 

* * * Radio bearings indi(?ate that Akagi is moving south from Empire 
and is now in Nansei Islands area. 

This dispatch therefore placed the Japanese carrier Akagi 
[672-5] early on December 8 in Empire waters proceeding south 
from Japan. As a matter of fact, we now know — and you have the 
evidence before you (record, p. 450) — that the carrier Akagi was 
in the striking force that attacked Pearl Harbor and could not possibly 
be moving south from Japan on December 8. 

I was familiar with the vagaries of traffic analysis, which this dis- 
patch illustrates. May I point out how these mistaken estimates arise ? 

Let us assume a radio call sign "KAGA" is heard, and that direction 
finders locate in the China Sea the ship from which this call sign issues. 
The crucial question still remains: What ship is using the call sign 
"KAGA"? Is it a battleship, a cruiser, a destroyer, a carrier, or 
some auxiliary? The actual intelligence transmitted by the ship 
having the call sign "KAGA" affords the best clue to her identity. 
The analyst, however, does not have that intelligence unless he knows 
the text of the message which the ship is sending. Until then his 
estimate of the identity of the ship from her call sign alone rests on 
assumptions which are open to question, and may be in error. 

When the call signs of the flagship and individual ships in a fleet 
are changed, there is a considerable period during which the location 
of these fleet units, through traffic analysis, is practically impossible. 

[6726] The Japanese Navy changed its call signs on May 1, 
1941. It took about a month thereafter before sufficient signs had 
been identified to make the location and identification of ships and 
subdivisions of the fleet sufficiently accurate to merit any real consid- 
eration. 

Again on November 1, 1941, the call signs of the Japanese Navy were 
changed. About the end of November we had reached a point where 
the number of identified calls made the data as reliable as such data 
can be. Then on December 1, 1941, the call signs of the Japanese Navy 
were again K^hanged. This second change within 1 month was entirely 
consistent with preparation for the anticipated movement to southeast 
Asia by Japan. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2523 

From December 1 to December 7, 1941, as a consequence of the change 
in call signs, the data which we obtained from traffic analysis was frag- 
mentary. Out of 20,000 calls involved in the change, only 200 service 
calls had been partially identified.^^ After December 1, practically 
all Japanese navel traffic was in a code which we were unable to read. 

During the days from December 1 to December 7, 1941, there was 
a heavy volume of unidentified radio traffic of the Japanese Fleet. 
The Japanese carrier calls were not identified, nor were the calls of 
the major part of the Japanese Fleet. [6727~\ The failure to 
identify carrier traffic did not indicate that the carriers were en route 
to Pearl Harbor. There was a similar failure to identify the calls 
on other major units of the Japanese Fleet, which did not come to 
Pearl Harbor. The failure to identify the carrier calls did not indi- 
cate that the carriers were not a part of the fleets which were known to 
be moving to southeast Asia. 

Nor did the failure to identify carrier calls mean that the carriers 
were preserving radio silence. It was entirely possible that the car- 
riers were originating traffic and that their traffic was included within 
the great volume of unidentified ti'affic. Even on the assumption that 
the Japanese carriers were not originating radio traffic, it would not 
follow that the carriers were engaged on a secret mission. When ships 
are within the immediate location of shore stations, they do not ordi- 
narily transmit over long distances, because their traffic is handled 
through shore stations. Consequently, even radio silence may merely 
mean that the ships are at anchor in some port in home waters. 

The failure to identify Japanese carrier traffic, on and after Decem- 
ber 1st when the call signs changed, was not an unusual condition. 
During the 6 months preceding Pearl Harbor, there were seven periods 
of 8 to 14 days each, in which there was a similar uncertainty about the 
location of [67^8] the Japanese battleships. During the 6 
months preceding Pearl Harbor, there was an almost continual absence 
of positive indications of the locations of the cruisers of the Japanese 
First Fleet, and eight periods of 10 to 20 days each, in which the loca- 
tion of the greater numbers of cruisers of the Japanese Second Fleet 
was uncertain. 

[6729] As to the Japanese carriers, during the 6 months pre- 
ceding Pearl Harbor, there existed a total of 134 days — in 12 separate 
periods — each ranging from 9 to 22 days, when the location of the 
Japanese carriers from radio traffic analysis was uncertain.^* 

In brief, in the week immediately prior to Pearl Harbor, I had no 
evidence that the Japanese carriers were en route to Oahu. Radio 
traffic analysis did not locate their positions. But this was not a new 
or unusual condition. It was inherent in the changes of call signs. 
It had existed on 12 other occasions over a 6-months' period. 

The dispatch of November 27 stated that Japanese-American ne- 
gotiations looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific 
had ceased. The Navy Department did not let this statement stand 
without modification. On November 29, 2 days later, the Navy De- 

'' Hewitt testimony, Captain Layton, p. 224. 

^* See memorandum for the Roberts Commission from Lt. Comdr. E. T. Layton, Intelli- 
gence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet, dated January 5, 1942. 



2524 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR Al^ACK 

partment sent me a dispatch,^^ which quoted the War Department's 
message to General Short of November 27. It stated : 

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated with only the barest pos- 
sibility of resumption. [Italic supplied.] 

[6730] This dispatch came to me near the end of "the next few 
days" set forth in the dispatch of November 27 as the period within 
which the Japanese action would come. Further, there was a public 
resumption of Japanese-American negotiations after November 27. 
The public press and radio news broadcasts contained accounts that 
negotiations were continuing after November 27 and after November 
29. In the absence of more authoritative information, I took ac- 
count of this public information as to diplomatic developments. This 
suggested a lessening of the emergency which prompted the so-called 
"war warning" dispatch. 

The Navy Department did not inform me of the contents of the 
American note to Japan on November 26, or that the prevalent 
opinion in the Navy Department was that the proposals contained 
in that note were so drastic as to make Japanese acceptance of them 
impossible.^" In a letter of November li, the Chief of Naval Op- 
erations sent me a copy of a memorandum for the President signed 
by himself and General Marshall. This memorandum advised against 
direct United States intervention in China and recommended speci- 
ficall}^ that "no ultimatum be delivered to Japan. ^ 

I was not informed that the Japanese were continuing the [6731] 
negotiations after November 26 onl}' as a device to cover up their plans. 
The Nav}^ Department knew this to be the f act.^' I was not informed 
that, upon receipt of the American note of November 26th, the Jap- 
anese considered that negotiations had not merely ceased but that rela- 
tions with this country were ruptured. The Navy Department knew 
this to be the fact.^® 

The statement in the Navy Department's dispatch to me to the 
effect that negotiations had ceased on November 27 was a pale reflec- 
tion of actual events; so partial a statement as to be misleading. 
The parties had not merely stopped talking. They were at swords' 
points. So far as Japan was concerned, the talking which went on 
after November 26 was play-acting. It was a Japanese stratagem to 
conceal a blow which Japan was preparing to deliver. Tliat strata- 
gem did not fool the Navy Department. The Navy Department knew 
the scheme. The Pacific Fleet was exposed to this Japanese strata- 
gem because the Navy Department did not pass on its knowledge of 
the Japanese trick. 

In the November 29 dispatch after quoting the Army message, 
the Chief of Naval Operations added the following direction: 

WPL-52 is not applicable to Pacific Area and will [6132] not be placed 
in effect in that area except as now in foce in South East Pacific Sub Area and 
Panama Naval Coastal Frontier. Undertake no offensive action until .Japan 
has committed an overt act. Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in W1'L-4G 
so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur. 

WPL-r)2 was the Navy Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 5. 
Under this plan the Atlantic Fleet had shooting orders. It was 



»' Exhibit ^1, p. 38. 

=<" Sr>p Finding XVI, Naval Court of Inquiry. 

»' S(>o exliil)it 1, pp. 101, 105, 199. 

3' Soe exhibit 1, pp. 204, 180. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2525 

charged with the task of destroying German and Italian naval, land, 
and air forces encountered in the area of the western Atlantic. The 
southeast Pacific sub area covered the area from the coast of South 
America to a distance of 700 miles westward. Here the southeast 
Pacific naval force had similar shooting orders and a similar task. 
In the dispatch of November 29, the Chief of Naval Operations in- 
formed me that WPL-52 was not applicable to the Pacific. This was 
to impress upon me the fact that 1 did not have shooting orders and 
that 1 was not to shoot until Japan had committed an overt act. 
Although this dispatch was sent me for information I was as much 
bound by these orders as though I had been an action addressee. 

Incidentally, when I received that dispatch, I considered that a 
modification of the orders I have received in the war-warning dispatch, 
and that I was to be governed by the [6733] provisions of this 
dispatch. I can see no other interpretation, and I thought that the 
Navy Department liad been brought into accord with the orders that 
had been issued by the War Department, and I thought that was what 
they were doing when they sent that dispatch. 

I'his same note of caution is in the dispatch of October 16, 1941: 

You will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will 
not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan. 

Again in the War Department dispatch, quoted to me by the Chief 
of Naval Operations in his message of November 29: 

The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. * * * 
Measui'es should be carried out so as not repeat not alarm civil population or 
disclose intent. 

The Pacific Fleet was based in an area containing over 130,000 Jap- 
anese, any one of whom could watch its movements. You can appre- 
ciate the psychological handicaps orders of this kind placed upon us. 
In effect, I was told : 

Do take precautions. 

Do not alarm civilians. 

Do take a preparatory deployment. 

Do not disclose intent. 

Do take a defensive deployment. 

[6734] Do not commit the first overt act. 

One last feature of the so-called "war- warning" dispatch remains 
to be noted. This is the directive with which it closed : 

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carry out the 
tasks assigned in WPL-46. 

Under WPL-46 the fir.st task of the Pacific Fleet was to support the 
forces of the Associated Powers (Britain, the Netherlands, and the 
United States) in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away 
from the Malay barrier. 

The Navy Department emphasized this instruction b}^ repeating it 
on November 29. The dispatch of that date directed : 

Be prepared to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 so far as they apply to 
Japan in ca^e hostilities occur. 

Thus in two separate dispatches I was ordered by the Navy Depart- 
ment to have the Pacific Fleet ready to move against the Marshalls 
upon the expected outbreak of war in the Far East. 

79716—40 — pt. 6 4 



2526 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

This was a determinative factor in the most difficult and vital de- 
cisions I had to make thereafter. There was not a hint in these two 
dispatches of any danger in the Hawaiian area. 

The Chairman. The recess having arrived, the committee [67S5'\ 
will stand in recess until 2 p. m. 

(Whereupon, at 12; 30 p. m., the committee recessed to 2 p. m., of 
the same day.) 

[6736'\ AFTERNOON SESSION — 2 P. M. 

(The hearing was resumed at 2 p. m.) 

The Chairman. You may proceed, Admiral. 

TESTIMONY OF REAE ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL (Resumed) 

Mr. Keefe. Mr, Chairman, before we proceed, I have a request that 
I would like to submit to the committee and counsel. 

We have been provided with the testimony of Admiral Kimmel and 
General Short given at previous hearings before the Army Board and 
the Navy Board. 

Admiral Stark has testified as a witness before this committee. I 
have not yet had an opportunity to examine the testimony given by 
Admiral Stark before the other examining bodies, and I believe that, 
in the interests of a proper determination as to the weight to be given 
to certain testimony by Admiral Stark before this committee, the 
committee should have the benefit of the same prior analysis of testi- 
mony that has been furnished in the case of Admiral Kimmel and 
General Short. 

I wonder if that testimony is available ? 

The Chairman. The Chair will ask counsel to answer that ques- 
tion. I think none of the members of the committee \^6737'\ 
have been as yet furnished with the previous testimony of Admiral 
Stark. 

Mr. Richardson. We have one copy of that testimony, but it has 
never been duplicated as yet, in the same way that we have duplicated 
the testimony of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. It can be 
duplicated and furnished to the committee if the committee so desires. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, as one member of the committee I do 
desire it, and I think it is quite advisable that we have that testimony. 

The Chairman. Without objection the committee will ask counsel 
to provide that duplicate. 

Mr. Keefe. May I also suggest at this time, in view of the fact that 
I understand Admiral Bloch will also be a witness before this commit- 
tee, that we also have the benefit of the prior testimony given by 
Admiral Bloch. 

Mr. Richardson. The some thing that is true of Admiral Stark is 
also true of Admiral Bloch. That can be furnished to the committee 
if the committee desires it. 

Mr. Keefe. I think the committee ought to have it prior to the time 
that Admiral Bloch takes the stand as a witness. 

The Chairman. Wliat is the desire of the committee on that? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2527 

[67S8] Senator Brewster. I would think it would certainly be 
appropriate and would probably expedite the consideration if that can 
be done. 

The Chairman. Without objection counsel will furnish the com- 
mittee with the previous testimony of Admiral Bloch. 

Senator Brewster. I think the same consideration, as far as I know, 
applies to the previous testimony of General Marshall. 

Mr. RicH.ARDSON. Bejr pardon? 

Senator Brewster. The previous testimony of General Marshall is 
in the same status. 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. 

Senator Brewster. I would like to make the same motion in regard 
to that. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, just where does the committee want to fix 
or draw the line on that? Is there to be a manifold duplication of 
the testimony of all of the earlier hearings ? You suggested General 
Marshall, Admiral Bloch, and Admiral Stark. Are there any 
others ? 

If we could have the committee's ideas as to just what they wanted, 
then we could do this job only once. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I anticipate there are some 
other witnesses coming on, such as Safford, Cramer, Bratton, and 
various other witnesses, ancl it certainly would [OVSO] be very 
beneficial for the committee members to have that testimony of these 
important witnesses before they take the stand. 

I anticipate the committee should, at the end at least, put into the 
record the previous testimony of all of the witnesses before all the 
boards. 

The Chairman. That involves quite an order. If you mean by 
putting in the testimony having it printed as part of these hearings, 
or making it in the form of exhibits available to the committee 

Senator Ferguson. I had in mind an exhibit, so it can be released 
to the public, showing what the previous reports were based upon. 
That would include the Roberts report. That is so the public may 
know what the reports are. 

The Chairman. The immediate matter is the duplication of Ad- 
miral Bloch's, Admiral Stark's, and General Marshall's testimony, 
and without objection, the counsel will be asked to do that. 

As these other witnesses come along we can probably discuss that 
later. Personally, I have no objection to any of it being made avail- 
able. It would involve quite a lot of printing. 

Mr. Richardson. It will take weeks to get all of that record dupli- 
cated, if it is to be duplicated. 

[6740] Mr. Keefe. May I ask counsel as to whether or not he 
has received from the State Department the Hornbeck statement 
which I requested? 

The Chairman. I might say. Congressman, that Secretary Acheson 
called me yesterday and said he would like to bring that statement 
over and let you go over it and see exactly what it is, and then we 
can determine whether his estimate of its pertinency or our own 
would govern. He said he would be glad to do that. 

It has not been received yet officially, but he wanted to show it to you. 
so you could see it yourself. 



2528 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. That is perfectly all right. Of course, all I wanted to 
do was to see it. 

The Chairman. There is no purpose to withhold it. It seems that 
this statement, from what I gather, only made an indirect reference 
to Dr. Hornbeck. You can determine for yourself when you see it. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. 

The Chairman. All right ; we will proceed. 

Mr. KicHARDsoN. Mr. Chairman, just one word. We have, of 
course, copies of the testimony previously given by Safford and 
Kramer, and all of the witnesses just discussed, and that testimony 
is available to any member of the committee who wants to examine it. 

L^/^l] It might be worthy of consideration to see whether the ex- 
amination of that testimony could be so spelled between the members 
of the committee that it would not be necessary to go to the trouble of 
having mimeographs made of all of that testimony, because we are 
already rushing the mimeogTaph facilities almost to the limit. 

That constitutes a pretty big order, 

Mr. Keefe. May I say, Mr. Chairman, I have specifically limited 
my request, because I have had the opportunity to read carefully the 
testimony of General Marshall, Captain Kramer and Captain Sanord, 
and also Colonel Bratton. I have read that testimony and the memo- 
randum received, and as far as I am concerned personally I do not 
need the copies, but I have not been able to see the testimony of Admiral 
Stark. 

The Chairman. It is entirely possible that all the members of the 
committee would want to take the time to read in detail all of the 
testimony of these former witnesses, and if it could be arranged that 
those who are interested in reading it in order to make a comparison, 
wish to do so, and it can be made available to them, it would save a 
considerable item of printing, and the work of the mimeographing 
machines if that is done. 

Senator Ferguson. I was not inquiring for my own use. 

"[674^] The Chairman. No doubt some of the members of the 
committee will not have the time to read all of the previous testimony 
in order to make a comparison with this testimony. 

Those who are interested in it, I am sure it can be made available to 
them. 

Senator Brewster. I think that is an excellent idea. You will recall 
that some rather, it seemed to me, unkind comments came from our 
former counsel occasionally of how this procedure was interrupted 
by members of the committee getting single documents. I gather that 
this counsel will not be troubled with that. It is also true if any 
member of the committee wants to read this information it is much 
easier to have 10 copies than 1. 

That is what happened with Admiral Kimmel's evidence in this pre- 
vious case. I do not suggest that as the reason why it should be 
duplicated at all. 

The Chairman. I think there will be no difficulty in making a 
satisfactory arrangement. 

Mr. Richardson. Then, as I understand it, we are to furnish you 
with the former testimonv of General Marshall, Admiral Bloch, and 
Admiral Stark? 

The Chairman. That is riffht.^ 



■• The complete records of all prior investipations of the Pearl Harbor attack have 
been admitted to this committee's official record as Exhibits Nos. 143, 144, 145, 146, 
147, 148, and 149. (See Index of Exhibits; see also Index of Witnesses.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2529 

All right, Admiral, you may proceed. 

1674>3] You were at the top of page 58, 1 believe. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

4. Action taken and decisions made after November 27, 1941. — 
The War Plan of the Pacific Fleet (W. P. Pac-4G) prescribed a 
definite plan of operations to enable the fleet to carry out its basic 
task of diverting Japanese strength away from the Malay barrier, 
through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls. 

The Chairman. "The Marshalls" refers to the islands and not to the 
general ? 

Admiral Kimmel, How is that? 

The Chairman. The word "Marshall" there refers to the islands 
and not to the general? 

Admiral Kimmel. This refers to the Marshall Islands to the east 
of the Carolina Islands in the Pacific. 

The Chairman. Go ahead. 

Admiral Kimmel. This plan was called the Marshall reconnais- 
sance and raiding plan.^^ Under the plan, Task Force 2, under the 
command of Admiral Halsey, ,was to depart from Pearl Harbor 
one one J-day ; i. e., one day after hostilities with Japan began. This 
task force, consisting of the carrier Enter'prise with battlesiiips and 
destroyers, was to proceed toward Taongi Atoll in the northern Mar- 
shalls. [0744] Task Force 1 under the command of Admiral 
W. S. Pye, was to depart Pearl Harbor above five J-day, so as to 
rendezvous with Admiral Halsey's task force at a designated point 
on eleven J-day. From six J-day to nine J-day, Admiral Halsey's 
task force was to reconnoiter by air the atolls of the Marshall Is- 
lands for the purpose of determining the best objectives for a raid. 
About 10 J-day, Task Force 3, under the command of Admiral Wil- 
son Brown, was to join Task Force 2 under Admiral Halsey, and there- 
after operate as a part of that force. After the rendezvous of the 
task force on 11 J-day, the commander in chief of the fleet would 
direct Admiral Halsey to commence the attacks one the selected 
islands of the Marshalls group. Admiral Plalsey's battleships would 
then be transferred to Task Force 1, which would operate as a cover- 
ing force for Halsey's raiding force. On about 13 J-day, Task Force 
2 would attack the selected objectives with air and surface forces. 

Thus our plans called for a strike at the Marshalls very shortly 
after J-day — when hostilities commenced. We were conscious of the 
great value of speed in setting this expedition in motion. Its prime 
purpose was to divert Japanese strength from the Malay Barrier. 
If it were delayed, its entire purpose and value would be frustrated. 

Under this plan of operations, the patrol planes of [674-5] 
the Pacific Fleet had an essential role. The plan provides : ^° 

(d) Task Force Xirie (Patrol Plane Force) coordinate operations of patrol 
planes with those of other forces as follows: 

(1) Prior to Five .T-Day advance maximum practicable patrol plane strength 
to WAKE, MIDWAY, and JOHNSTON, leaving not less than two operating 
squadrons at OAHU. 

(2) JOHNSTON-based planes, during passage of units of other forces to 
the westward, seaiTh along the route of advance from the vicinity of JOHN- 
STON to longitude one hundred seventy-eight degrees west. 



"» W. p. Pac-46, annex II. 

« W. P. Pac-46, annex II, p. 7, subpar. (d) (1), (2), (3), (4), (5). 



2530 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(3) MIDWAY-based plaues search sectors to the southwestward of MIDWAY 
to prevent surprise attack across that sector on units operating toward the 
MARSHALLS. 

(4) WAKE-based planes make preliminary air reconnaissance of TAONGI 
and BIKAR on Five J-Day, or as soon thereafter as practicable, and acquaint 
Commander Tusk Force Two with the results. Thereafter, conduct search, to 
the extent that available planes and supplies will permit, to prevent surprise 
attack from the westward by enemy surface forces on own units operating 
toward the MARSHALLS. 

(5) On completion of the raiding operations of Task Force Two resume normal 
operations as required by paragraph 3242 b. of the Fleet Oi>erating Plan. 

[67JiS~] The mere recitation of these tasks demonstrates the vital 
air reconnaissance required of the patrol plane force. Without it, 
the task forces might be exposed to surprise attack if they entered the 
dangerous Marshall area. It was an indispensable feature of the 
entire operation. 

Beginning November oO, 1941. I made a daily memorandum en- 
titled '"Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war within the 
next 24 hours." The last form of this memorandum I reviewed and 
approved on the morning of December 6, 1941. In it I attempted to 
keep the basic plan of the raid on the Marshall Islands up to date 
and in conformity with the existing dispositions of fleet units. The 
last issue of this memorandum, dated December 6, 1941, is as follows : 

1. Send dispatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced. 

2. Send dispatch to task force commanders : 

(a) WPL 46 effective (Execute 0-lA R5 except as indicated in (b) and (c) 
below). (The submarine and patrol plane plans will become effective without 
special reference to them.) 

(b) Commence sweeping plan, including cruiser operations west of Napo Shoto, 
cancelled. 

(c) Raiding and reconnaissance plan effective, [67-//7] modified as fol- 
lows: Delay reconnaissance until Task Forces Two and Three are joined; 
Batdiv One join Task Force One ; Commander Base Force send two tankers 
with utmost dispatch to rendezvous with Task Force Three to eastward of 
Walce at rendezvous to be designated. 

(d) Comairbatfor and imits in company with him (Taskfor 8) return to Pearl 
at high speed, fuel and depart with remainder of Taskfor Two, less BBs, to join 
Task Force Three. 

(e) Lexington land Marine aircraft at Midway as planned (p. m. 7 Dec) and 
proceed with ships now in Company (Taskfor 12) to vicinity of Wake. 

(f) Comtaskfor Three proceed to join Lexington group. Return DMS to 
Pearl. 

3. (a) Do not modify the movements of Regulus at Midway (departing 9th), 
nor sliips bound to Christmas and Canton. 

(b) Direct that William Ward Burrows continue to Wake but delay arrival 
until 10th. Direct that Lexington group send two destroyers to join Burrows 
prior to her arrival at Wake. 

(c) Do not withdraw any civilian workmen from outlying islands. 

[67^8] (d) Provide two destroyers to escort Saratoga from longitude 150° 
west to Pearl Harbor. 

(e) Do not change passage of shipping to and from Manila, nor send any 
added escorts, nor dispose any cruisers toward California or Samoa until further 
developments occur. 

The provisions of the memorandum were coordinated with the basic 
plan for the Marshall raid. The "VP plans" which were to "become 
effective without special reference" were the plans for the operation 
of the patrol-plane force. Paragraphs 2 (c), (d), and (e) had ref- 
erence to the existing disposition of fleet units on December 5 and 6. 
Admiral Halsey at that time was returning from an expedition to 
Wake Island with a task force specially constituted for that purpose 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2531 

and called Task Force 8. I planned to have him return to Pearl 
Harbor to refuel before joining Task Force 3 on the expedition to 
the Marshalls. The carrier Lexington on December 6 was en route to 
Midway. She was in a task force specially constituted for that pur- 
pose and called Task Force 12. In the event of hostilities I planned 
to have the Lexington carry out the Midway expedition and pro- 
ceed to Wake, there to be joined by the commander of Task Force 
3 of which the Lexington was a regular component. Admiral Wilson 
Brown, the commander of Task Force 3, on December 5 was engaged 
in operations in [674-9] the vicinity of Johnston Island. I 
planned to have him leave that area and join the Lexington group, 
thereby bringing together all elements of Task Force 3. Task Force 
3 would then be joined by Admiral Halsey's Task Force 2. When these 
task forces joined, they would proceed with the reconnaissance fea- 
tures of the raiding plan as a preliminary to the actual raids on the 
Marshall Islands. 

This initial expedition was to continue operating as long as we 
could supply it with fuel. We estimated that it would require con- 
tinuous operation of maximum patrol plane strength from 4 to 6 
weeks. Additional expeditions were to be undertaken as rapidly as 
events and forces permitted. 

I shall now describe the nature and extent of distant reconnaissance 
from the Hawaiian area on and after November 27, 1941. 

By dispatch on November 27, the Navy Department had urged me 
to send Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake by aircraft car- 
rier. I replied by dispatch that on November 28 I was sending a 
carrier to Wake with Marine fighter planes, and that I expected there- 
after to send other Marine planes to Midway. 

I considered the Navy Department's suggestion that planes be 
sent to Wake and Midway to be sound. It was [6750] desir- 
able that the defenses of these outlying islands should be as strong as 
possible. The planes which went to Wake were, of course, not enough 
to save that island. Together with its other defenses, they could 
make the capture of that island sufficiently costly to justify sending 
them there. The actual results in the defense of Wake after Decem- 
ber 7 demonstrated that fact. 

The sending of the carrier task forces to Wake and Midway did 
more than reinforce the air defenses of the islands. It permitted a 
broad area to be scouted for signs of enemy movement along the path 
of the advance of these task forces to the islands and their return 
to Oahu. In addition, they were in an excellent position to inter- 
cept any enemy force which might be on the move. 

On November 28, Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor en route to 
Wake in command of Task Force 8, consisting of the carrier Enter- 
prise^ 3 heavy cruisers and 9 destroyers. He carried out morning and 
afternoon searches to 300 miles with his planes for any sign of hostile 
shipping.*^ 

On December 5, 1941, Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor en route 
to Midway in command of Task Force 12, consisting of the carrier 
Lexington^ three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers. Newton, 
like Halsey, conducted scouting flights with his planes to cover his 
advance.*^ 



^1 Hart testimony — Admiral Halsey, p. 299, q. 44. 
<3 Hart testimony — Admiral Newton, p. 318. q. 30. 



2532 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

On December 5, Admiral Wilson Brown left Pearl Harbor en route 
to Johnston Island with Task Force 3 to conduct landing exercises. 

Thus by December 5 there were at sea three task forces of the 
fleet, each deployed in a different area. The Lexington and the 
Enterprise were each conducting air searches. It was a more 
intensive search in the areas covered than could have been made by 
patrol planes based on Oahu. Further, as they approached the out- 
lying islands, these searches were conducted at a much greater dis- 
tance from Oahu than any patrol plane based on Oahu could travel. 

In addition to the operations of these task forces, other distant 
reconnaissance was conducted by the fleet after November 27. 

Upon receipt of the so-called war warning dispatch of November 27, 
I ordered a squadron of patrol planes to proceed from Midway to 
Wake and search the ocean areas en route. While at Wake on Decem- 
ber 2 and 3, they searched to a distance of 525 miles. These orders 
were executed.*^ 

[6752] I also ordered another squadron of patrol planes from 
Pearl Harbor to replace the squadron which went from Midway to 
Wake.*^ This squadron of patrol planes left Pearl Harbor on No- 
vember 30. It proceeded to Johnston Island. On the way to Johns- 
ton, it searched the ocean areas. It then proceeded from Johnston to 
Midway, making another reconnaissance sweep on the way. Upon 
reaching Midway, this squadron of patrol planes conducted distant 
searches of not less than 500 miles of varying sectors from that island 
on December 3, 4, 5, and 6.*^ On December 7, five of these Midway- 
based patrol planes were searching the sector 120° to 170° from Mid- 
way, to a distance of 450 miles. An additional two patrol planes 
of the Midway squadron left at the same time to rendezvous with the 
Lexington at a point 400 miles from Midway. Four of the remaining 
patrol planes at Midway, each loaded with bombs, were on 10-minute 
notice as a ready striking force.'*^ 

When the Enterpiise completed its delivery of planes to Wake, I 
withdrew a squadron of patrol planes from Wake. This squadron 
then proceeded to Midway, searching the ocean areas en route. It 
then moved from Midway to Pearl Harbor, conducting a reconnais- 
sance sweep en route. 

In the week before December 7, these reconnaissance sweeps of the 
patrol plane squadrons moving from Midway to Wake; from Pearl 
Harbor to Johnston and from Johnston to Midway; from Wake to 
Midway and Midway to Pearl Harbor, covered a total distance of 
nearly 5,000 miles. As they proceeded, each squadron would cover 
a 400-mile strand of ocean along its path. They brought under the 
coverage of air search about 2,000,000 square miles of ocean area. 

In addition to these reconnaissance sweeps, submarines of the fleet 
on and after November 27 were on war patrols from Midway and 
Wake Islands continuously. 

At Oahu before the attack, there were 49 patrol planes which were 
in flying condition. Eight other planes were out of commission and 
undergoing repair. In addition, on December 5, a squadron of patrol 

« Dispatch CinCPac to COMPATWING 2, 28 November 1941. 280450. 

«MailKram COMTASKFOR 9 to COMPATRONS 21 and 22. November 20, 1941. 292103. 

« Naval Court of Inquiry testimony, Admiral Bellinger, p. 684, questions 106, 107. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2533 

planes returned to Pearl Harbor after an arduous tour of duty at 
Midway and Wake. This squadron consisted of obsolete PBY-.3 
planes, approaching 18 months' service and overdue for overhaul. It 
was not available for distant searches. 

The 49 fly able patrol planes on Oahu were part of the planes which 
had arrived during the preceding 4 weeks — 18 on October 28, 24 on 
November 23, and 12 on November 28. These planes were of the 
PBY-5 [6754^] type. They w^ere experiencing the shake-down 
difficulties of new planes. There was considerable difficulty due to 
the cracking of new engine sections, which required replacement. A 
program for the installation of leakproof tanks and armor on these 
planes was underway .^^ The leakproof tanks and armor were neces- 
sary to make these planes ready for war. That work had to be 
carried out in Hawaii, Under war plans the planes were to operate 
from advance bases, Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra Islands. 
There, they would operate from aircraft tenders. There were no 
facilities at those advanced bases to complete important material in- 
stallations. The planes had to be in the highest condition of fighting 
efficiency before they left Oahu, 

There was a total absence of spare partb for these planes. 

There were no spare crews. 

To insure an island base against a surprise attack from fast carrier- 
based planes, it is necessary to patrol the evening before to a distance 
of 800 miles on a 3G0° arc. This requires 84 planes on one flight of 16 
hours. Of course, the same planes and the same crews cannot make 
that IG-hotir flight every day. For searches of this character [67551 
over a protracted period, a pool of 250 planes would be required. These 
are fundamental principles. You will find them in the testimony of 
expert aviation officers before the naval court; and in the very com- 
prehensive letter Fleet Admiral Nimitz wrote to the commander in 
chief, United States Fleet, on January 7, 1942, on the subject Air- 
plane Situation in Hawaiian Area. 

It is clear that I did not have a sufficient number of planes to con- 
duct each day a 360° distant search from the island of Oahu. That 
fact is beyond controversy. 

A search of all sectors of approach to an island base is the only type 
of search that deserves the name. The selection of one sector around 
an island for concentration of distant search affords no real protec- 
tion. After a while it may furnish some insurance that the enemy, 
having knowledge of the search plan, will choose some other sector 
within which to make his approach. The search concentrated on the 
so-called "dangerous sector" then ceases to offer much prospect of de- 
tecting the enemy. Admiral Nimitz put the matter clearly in his 
official letter on the subject. He said : *^ 

It cannot be assumed that any direction of approach may safely be left un- 
guarded. The fuel problem is no deterrent, for the approach was made from the 
north on 7 December. Increase in difficulty of the logistic problem would not be 
proportionately great if even an approach from the east were attempted. At 
the same time, as discussed above, neglect of any sector is apt soon to be known. 

Tactical discussions now of what was the most dangerous sector 
around Oahu before December 7 do not reach the heart ot the problem 
which I faced. 



*• Hewitt testimony, Admiral Bellinger, pp. 485, 497. Naval Court of Inquiry testimony. 
Captain Ramsev, p. 590. q. 72. 

« Letter CinCPac to CinCUS, January 7, 1942, serial 059. 



2534 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Secretary of the Navy in his endorsement to the record of the 
Naval Court of Inquiry has stated : 

There were sufficient fleet patrol planes and crews, in fact, available in Oahu 
during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several weeks, a 
daily i*econnaissanee covering 128° to a distance of about 700 miles. 

This statement assumes a 25 -mile visibility for each patrol plane en- 
gaged in the search. It further assumes that I could have used all the 
patrol plane force for this type of search alone without keeping any 
planes in reserve for emergency searches or to cover movements of 
ships in and out of the harbor and in the operating area. 

If I instituted a distant search of any 128° sector around Oahu on 
and after November 27, within the foreseeable future, I would have 
deprived the Pacific Fleet [6707] of any efficient patrol plane 
force for its prescribed war missions. 

In the secret investigation before Admiral Hewitt, from which I 
was excluded, Vice Admiral Bellinger, who commanded my patrol 
plane force, testified : *^ 

Q. Assuming that on December 1, 1941, you had received a directive from 
Admiral Kimmel to conduct the fullest possible partial reconnaissance over an 
indefinite period of time, could you have covered 128 degrees approximately 
on a daily basis and for how long? 

A. It could have been done until the failure of planes and lack of spare parts 
reduced the planes to an extent that it would have made it impossible. Perhaps 
it could have heen carried on for two weeks, perliaps, but this estimate is, of 
course, very vague and it is all based on maintaining planes in readiness for 
flight. (Italic supplied.) 

This testimony reflected the conditions in the patrol plane squad- 
rons as I knew them on November 27 and thereafter. 

Captain Ramsey, the executive officer of the patrol wing, testified 
before the Naval Court of Inquiry as follows : *^ 

[_6758] * * * As nearly as I could estimate the situation and in view 
of our almost total lack of spare parts for the PBY-5 planes, I believe that 
three weeks of intensive daily searches would have been approximately a 75 
percent reduction in material readiness of the entire outfit and we would have 
been placing planes out of commission and robbing them for spare parts to 
keep other planes going. The pilots, I believe, could have kept going approxi- 
mately a six-weeks period, but at the end of that time they would have all 
required a protracted rest period. 

[67S9] The patrol planes in Oahu were not uselessly employed 
prior to the attack. They were not standing idle. There was a def- 
inite program for their operation which was consistent with creating 
and preserving their material readiness for war. In the week preced- 
ing the attack, there was a daily scout by patrol planes on Monday, 
Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, of a sector to the north and north- 
west of Oahu to a distance of 400 miles, after which the planes required 
maintenance and upkeep.^" This was not distant reconnaissance, as 
such, although the distance covered was greater than that searched at 
the time of the 1940 alert. In addition, there was the daily dawn patrol 
out 300 miles to cover the areas where the fleet operated. 

I had been ordered, not once but twice, to be prepared to carry out 
the raids on the Marshalls under WPL-46, which meant the extended 
use of the fleet patrol planes from advanced bases in war operations. 

<' Hewitt testimony — Admiral Bellinger, p. 505. 

*» Naval Court of Inquiry, testimony Captain Ramsey, p. 5R.3, q. 44. 

•« Naval Court of Inquiry, testimony Captain Ramsey, p. 595, question 101. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2535 

I had to decide what was the best use of the patrol planes as a mat- 
ter of policy for the foreseeable future, and with their war task in 
front of me. 

Had I directed their use for intensive distance searches from Oahu, 
I faced the peril of having these planes grounded when the fleet needed 
them and when the war plan was executed. 

[6760] I had no way of knowing that the war was to start on the 
7th of December. I could not decide the matter on the basis of 5 days 
or 10 days of distant searches. 

I did not have the intercepted Japanese dispatches pointing to Pearl 
Harbor as a probable point of attack. 

I knew that any search I could make, straining the planes to the 
breaking point, was in its nature partial and ineffective. 

I took account of my resources. They were slender. 

I took account of my probable future needs and of my orders from 
the Navy Department. 

I decided that I could not risk having no patrol plane force worthy 
of the name for the fleet's expected movement into the Marshalls. 

I considered the nature and extent of the distant reconnaissance 
I was effectuating with my task forces at sea and the patrol plane 
sweeps to and from the outlying islands. 

I considered the necessity of permitting the essential replacement 
and material upkeep program for the new patrol planes in Oahu to be 
continued to get them into war condition. 

I considered the need for patrols of the fleet operating areas against 
the submarine menace and these I carried out. 

I considered the need for some reserve of patrol planes for emer- 
gency distant searches. 

[6761] I considered the need for patrol planes in covering fleet 
movements in and out of the harbor — which might have to be quickly 
and unexpectedly executed. 

I considered the endurance of my patrol-plane manpower — and the 
absence of any spare crews. 

I decided that I could not fritter away my patrol-plane resources by 
pushing them to the limit in daily distant searches of one sector 
around Oahu — which within the predictable future would have to be 
discontinued when the patrol planes and crews gave out. 

The three admirals who composed the Naval Court of Inquiry scruti- 
nized my decision after extensive testimony. Each of the admirals 
could view the matter from the point of view of the commander in the 
field. They summarized the problem : 

The task assigned the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was to prepare his 
Fleet for war. War was known to be imminent — how imminent he did not 
know. The Fleet planes were being constantly employed in patrolling the oper- 
ating areas in which the Fleet's preparations for war were being carried on. 
Diversion of these planes for reconnaissance or other purposes was not justified 
under existing circumstances and in the light of available information. 

If so diverted, the state of readiness of the Fleet [6762] for war would 
be reduced because of the enforced suspension of Fleet operations. 

The value of the Fleet patrol planes to the Fleet would be reduced seriously 
after a few days because of the inability of planes and crews to stand up under 
the demands of daily long-range reconnaissance. 

The court concluded (finding XIII) : 

The omission of this reconnaissance was not due to oversight or neglect. It 
was the result of a military decision, reached after much deliberation and con- 



2536 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

sultation with experienced officers and after weighing the information at hand and 
all the factors involved. 

I shall now discuss the dispositions of the capital ships of the Pacific 
Fleet on and after November 27. On November 28 Admiral Halsey 
left for Wake with a carrier task force and on December 5 Admiral 
Newton left for Midway with another carrier task force. These mis- 
sions were in pursuance of an explicit suggestion from the Navy 
Department. When Admiral Halsey left for Wake on November 28 
the three battleships of his task force accompanied him out of Pearl 
Harbor so as to avoid creating the impression that there was anything 
unusual about the movement of his task force. However, immediately 
on clearing the channel Admiral Halsey diverted his battleships and 
instructed them to carry out exercises in the Hawaiian area. He then 
[6763] headed west with the remainder of his task force. 

It would have been unwise for Admiral Halsey to have taken along 
the battleships. The maximum speed of the battleships was 17 knots. 
The fleet units which he took to Wake could make 30 knots. To take 
his battleships with him would have meant the loss of 13 knots of 
potential speed. He was bound for dangerous waters where cur- 
tailed speed might spell disaster. He needed all the mobility his force 
could attain. Three battleships did not furnish suflicient supporting 
strength to warrant the risks of reduction in speed and mobility which 
their presence in the expedition to Wake would entail. Moreover, it 
was necessary to complete the Wake operation as quickly as possible 
so that the ships engaged might be ready for further eventualities. 

Almost every disposition which I made in the Pacific with the forces 
available to me had its cost. In sending the two carriers to Wake and 
Midway, I took from the immediate vicinity of Pearl Harbor, for the 
time being, the fleet's air strength. We had no carrier left in the 
Hawaiian area. The Saratoga, the third carrier of the Pacific Fleet, 
had been undergoing repair and overhaul on the west coast. The ad- 
visability of using her to transfer a squadron of Marine fighter planes 
from San Diego to Hawaii was suggested by the Chief of Naval 
Operations on November 28.^^ 

[6764] The absence of the carriers from the Hawaiian area 
temporarily limited the mobility of the battleships which were left 
behind. 

While the carriers were absent on the assigned missions to Midway 
and Wake, the battleships force was kept in Pearl Harbor. To send 
them to sea without air cover for any prolonged period would have been 
a dangerous course. The only effective defense at sea from air at- 
tack, whether it be a bombing attack or a torpedo-plane attack, is an 
effective air cover. Surface ships, such as destroyers and cruisers, 
are much less effective against an air attack. That is so today. It 
was the more so prior to 7 December because of the existing in- 
adequacies of antiaircraft guns. 

The carriers furnished air coverage for the battleships at sea. The 
few planes that battleships and cruisers carry for use by catapult are 
not fighters. Their function is only scouting and reconnaissance. 
They are ineffective as a defense against enemy air attack. The bat- 
tleships at sea without carriers had no protection from air bombing at- 
tack. In Pearl Harbor they had the protection of such antiaircraft 



« Dispatch CNO to CinCPac, November 28, 1941, 282054. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2537 

defenses as the Army had. At sea, in deep waters, there were no 
physical barriers to the effectiveness of torpedo-plane attack. In 
Pearl Harbor, where the depth of water was less than 40 feet, a torpedo- 
plane attack was considered a negligible danger. The [6765] 
battleships of the fleet at sea, without carriers, sighted by a force of 
such character as to have a chance of a successful air attack on the 
Hawaiian Islands appeared to be more subject to damage than in port. 

Vice Admiral Pye, commander of the Battle Force, and I discussed 
these considei-ations in a conference after the receipt of the so-called 
war-warning dispatch. 

At the time of our discussion — at that time and later — we did not 
have before us the intercepted Japanese messages indicating that 
the ships in port in Pearl Harbor were marked for attack. We had 
no information that an air attack upon Pearl Harbor was imminent 
or probable. The fact that the Navy Department proposed at this 
time that our carriers be sent to the outlying islands indicated to us 
that the Navy Department felt that no attack on Pearl Harbor could 
be expected in the immediate future. 

All the dispositions of my task forces at sea, as well as the presence 
of the battleships in port, were known to the Navy Department. 
Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, testified before the 
Roberts Commission as follows :^- 

What we expected him (Admiral Kimmel) to do was to get more planes and 
personnel, and so on, out to Wake and Midway, if possible, and to send his task 
forces — some [6766] task forces to sea in readiness to catch any raiders, 
which he did. He did that. We knew it. We kneto these task forces were at 
sea. He informed us that one icas returning from having put the people ashore 
at Wake, that certain planes had heen sent to Midway, and were expected to 
go on the fifth or sixth day doivn to Wake, and ice knew the schedule of the 
ships that were in port, and at that particular time out of the three task forces, 
there loere two scheduled to be in port. Actually there tvas less than one and 
a half in port. He kept the others at sea. He had taken those measures which 
looked absolutely sound. It was a safe assumption that other measures had 
' been taken of a similar nature. (Italics supplied.) 

Upon receipt of the so-called war warning dispatch of November 
27, 1941, I issued orders to the fleet to exercise extreme vigilance 
against submarines in operating areas and to depth bomb ail con- 
tacts expected to be hostile in the fleet operating areas.^^ My dis- 
patch of November 28 to the fleet containing this order was forwarded 
to the Navy Department on that day. On December 2, I wrote to the 
Chief of Naval Operations directing his personal attention to this 
order. The Navy Department, in the 10 days prior to the attack, 
did not approve or disapprove my action. 

For some time there had been reports of submarines in the 
[6767] operating areas around Hawaii. During the first week 
of February 1941, a submerged submarine contact was reported about 
8 miles from the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. A division of de- 
stroyers trailed this contact for approximately 48 hours, after which 
the contact was lost. The destroyers were confident it was a Japa- 
nese submarine. I was not fully convinced, but made a complete 
report to Naval Operations, stating the action taken and adding that 
I would be delighted to bomb every suspected submarine contact 

^ Roberts Commission testimony, pp. 1813 and 1819. 

" Dispatch CiuCPac to Pacific Fleet, info OpNav, November 28, 1941, 280355. 



2538 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

in the operating area around Hawaii.^ I was directed by dispatch 
not to depth bomb submarine contacts except within the 3-mile limit. 

A similar contact at approximately the same position was made 
about the middle of March. Again the destroyers were confident 
that they had trailed a Japanese submarine. Again the evidence 
was not conclusive because the submarine had not actually been 
sighted. 

On September 12, 1941, I wrote to the Chief of Naval Operations 
and asked him "What to do about the submarine contacts off Pearl 
Harbor and the vicinity." I stated, "As you know, our present orders 
are to trail all contacts but not to bomb [6768] unless they are 
in the defensive areas. Should we now bomb contacts without waiting 
to be attacked?" 

On September 23 the Chief of Naval Operations replied to my ques- 
tion in a personal letter. He stated : 

The existing orders, that is not to bomb suspected submarines except in the 
defensive sea areas, are appropriate. If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, 
evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United 
States territory, then a strong warning and threat of hostile action against such 
submarines would appear to be our next step. 

No conclusive evidence was obtained until December 7, 1941. 

The files of the Comander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, contain records 
of at least three suspicious contacts during the 5 weeks preceding 
Pearl Harbor. 

On November 3, 1941, a patrol plane observed an oil slick area in 
latitude 20-10, longitude 157-41. The patrol plane searched a 15- 
mile area. A sound search was made by the U. S. S. Borden, and an 
investigation was made by the U. S. S. Dale, all of them producing 
negative results.^^ On November 28, 1941 the U. S. S. Helena reported 
that a radar operator without knowledge of nry orders directing an 
alert against submarines was positive that a submarine was in a 
restricted area.^° [6769] A search by a task group with three ' 
destroyers of the suspected area produced no contacts. During the 
night of December 2, 1941, the U. S. S. Gainble reported a clear metallic 
echo in latitude 20-30, longitude 158-23. An investigation directed 
by Destroyer Division Four produced no conclusive evidence of the 
presence of a submarine.^^ On the morning of the attack, the U. S. S. 
Ward reported to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District 
that it had attacked, fired upon and dropped depth charges upon a 
submarine operating in the defensive sea area. The Commandant of 
the Fourteenth Naval District directed a verification of this report 
with a view to determining whether the contact with the submarine 
was a sound contact or whether the submarine had actually been seen 
by the Ward. He also directed that the ready-duty destroyer assist the 
Ward in the defensive sea area. Apparently, some short time after 
reporting the submarine contact, the Ward also reported that it had 
intercepted a sampan which it was escorting into Honolulu. This 
message appeared to increase the necessity for a verification of the 
earlier report of the submarine contact. 

Between 7 : 30 and 7 : 40 I received information from the Staff 
Duty Officer of the Ward''s report, the dispatch of the ready-duty 

" Offitial letter CinCPac to CNO, February 11, 1941, serial 0243. 

K^ Ilowitt report, pp. 148-149. 

0" Dispatch U. S. S. Helena to GR 1.5— info CinCPac, November 28, 1941. 280835. 

'■'' Hewitt report, p. 149. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2539 

destroyer to assist the Ward, and the efforts then under way to 
obtain a verification of the Ward^s report. [6770] I was await- 
ing such verification at the time of the attack. In my judgment, 
the effort to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack 
off Pearl Harbor was a proper preliminary to more drastic action 
in view of the number of such contacts which had not been verified 
in the past. 

PART III. — ^INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM THE FLEET AND ITS 
SIGNIFICANCE 

When I took command of the Pacific Fleet I realized that infor- 
mation about our relations with Japan and the plans of that govern- 
ment was of supreme importance to me. I knew in general, from 
my experience in the Navy, of the sources from which the Navy 
Department might derive such intelligence, including the so-called 
"magic" source. The Pacific Fleet was dependent upon the Navy 
Department in Washington for information derived from intercepted 
Japanese diplomatic messages. 

Shortly after I took command, Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, upon 
bis arrival in Hawaii from Washington, informed me of some con- 
fusion in the Navy Department as to whether the responsibility of 
furnishing the Commander in Chief, Pacific, with secret information 
rested wdtli Naval Operations or Naval Intelligence. I immediately 
added a postscript to a letter which I was writing to the Chief of 
Naval Operations, bringing this situation to his attention. I wrote 
Admiral Stark on [6771] February 18, 1941 : 

I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI — 
that is Naval Intelligence — considers it the function of Operations to furnish 
the Commander in Chief with information of a secret nature. I have heard 
also that Operations considers the responsibility for furnishing the same type 
of information to be that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed any- 
thing, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep the 
Commander in Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that 
should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix that responsibility so 
that there will be no misunderstanding. 

He replied in a letter of March 22 : 

With reference to your postscript on the sub.iect of Japanese trade routes 
and the responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to CinCUS, 
Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibilities in keeping 
you adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, 
and disloyal elements within the United States. 

On May 26, 1941 I wrote an official letter to the Chief of Naval 
Operations on the subject of "Survey of Conditions in the Pacific 
Fleet." In a separate paragraph entitled [6772] "Informa- 
tion", again I described my need for information of all important 
developments affecting our foreign relations. 

The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, is in a very difficult position. He is far 
removed from the seat of government. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the 
policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, 
as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He 
is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in 
matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack 
of information is disturbing and tend sto create uncertainty, a condition which 
directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own 
course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations. 



2540 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international 
picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of 
the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely 
information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improve- 
ment. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even 
though necessarily late at times, would enable the commander in chief. Pacific 
Fleet, to modify. [()6'7d] adapt, or even reorient his possible courses of 
action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the 
current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially 
trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption 
of this training by stategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventu- 
alities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department 
itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard 
to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more 
necessary that the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, be guided by broad policy 
and objectives rather than by categorical instructions. 

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander in 
Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important developments as 
they occur and by the quickest secure means available. 

I brought this official letter to Washington with me in June of 1941, 
handed it to the Chief of Naval Operations personally, discussed it 
with him, and received his assurance that I would be informed of all 
important developments as they occurred and by the quickest secure 
means available. 

In the month of July 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations [6774] 
sent me at least seven dispatches which quoted intercepted Japanese 
diplomatic messages from Tokyo to Washington, Tokyo to Berlin, 
Berlin to Tokyo, Tokj'o to Vichy, Canton to Tokj'o. These dispatches 
identified by number the Japanese messages they quoted and gave their 
verbatim text.^ 

I was never informed of any decision to the effect that intelligence 
from intercepted Japanese messages was not to be sent to me. In 
fact, dispatches sent to me by the Navy Department in the week before 
the attack contained intelligence from intercepted messages. On De- 
cember 1, a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations,' sent to me 
for information, quoted a report of November 29 from the Japanese 
Ambassador in Bangkok to Tokj'^o which described a Japanese plan to 
entice the British to invade Thai, thereby permitting Japan to enter 
that country in the role of its defender. On December 3, a dispatch 
to me from the Chief of Naval Operations set forth an order from 
Japan to diplomatic agents and expressly referred to this order as 
"Circular 2444 from Tokyo." ^ Another dispatch from the Chief 
of Naval Operations on December 3 referred to certain "categoric and 
urgent instructions which were sent [6776] yesterday to Japa- 
nese di])lomatic and consular posts." ^ 

The Navy Department thus engaged in a course of conduct cal- 
culated to give me the impression that intelligence from important 
mtercepted Japanese messages was being furnished to me. Under 
these circumstances a failure to send me important information of this 
character was not merely a withholding of intelligence. It partook of 
tlie nature of an affirmative misrepresentation. I had asked for all 
vital information. I had been assured that I would have it. I appeared 
to be receiving it. My current estimate of the situation was formed 



1 Exhibit 37. pp. 6 to 12. 

a Dispatch OpNav to CinCAF info CinCPac, 1 December 1941, 011400. 

» Exhibit S7, p. 41. 

« Exhibit 37, p. 40. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2541 

on tliis basis. Yet, in fact, the most vital information from the inter- 
cepted Japanese messages was not sent to me. This failure not only 
deprived me of essential facts. It misled me. 

I was not supplied with any information of the intercepted mes- 
sages showing that the Japanese Govermnent had divided Pearl 
Harbor into five subareas and was seeking minute information as to 
the berthing of ships of the fleet in those areas. 

On September 24, 1941, the Japanese GoA'ernment instructed its 
consul general in Honolulu as to the type of report it desired from 
him concerning vessels in Pearl Harbor. These instructions divided 
Pearl Harbor into five subareas. Each area was given an alphabetical 
symbol. Area A was the term prescribed to describe the waters be- 
tween Ford Island and the ar [6776] senal. Area B was the 
term prescribed to describe the waters south and west of Ford Island. 
Area C was the tenn prescribed to describe East Loch ; area D, Middle 
Loch; Area E, West Loch and communicating water routes. The 
dispatch stated : ° 

With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you 
report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys, 
and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like 
to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along- 
side the same wharf.) 

This dispatch was decoded and translated on October 9, 1941. This 
information was never supplied to me. 

On September 29, 1941, Kita, the Japanese consul general in Hono- 
lulu, replied to his government's dispatch of September 24. He de- 
scribed an elaborate and detailed system of symbols to be used there- 
after in designating the location of vessels in Pearl Harbor. The 
letters "KS" would describe the repair dock in the navy yard. The 
letters "KT" would describe the navydock in the navy yard. The 
letters "FV" would describe the moorings in the vicinity of Ford 
Island. The letters "FG" would describe vessels alongside Ford Is- 
land, the east and west sides to be designated by A and B, respectively. 
This dispatch of the consul general was decoded and translated on 
October 10, 1941.** This information was never supplied to me. 

[6777] In the critical period before the attack, the Japanese 
Government sent further significant instructions to Honolulu. On 
JS'ovember 15, Togo sent the following disj^atch : ^ 

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make 
your "ships in harbor report" irregular but at the rate of twice a week. Al- 
though you already are no doubt aware, please take exti-a care to maintain 
secrecy. 

This dispatch was decoded and translated by the Navy in Washing- 
ton on December 3, 1941. This information was never supplied 
to me. 

On November 18, 1941, Togo sent the following dispatch to 
Honolulu : ^ 

Please I'eport on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein ; area N, 
Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay (Honolulu), and the Areas Adjacent thereto. (Make 
your investigation with great secrecy.) 



= Exhibit 2, p. 12. 
"Exhibit 2. p. 13. 
7 Exhibit 2, p. 18. 
« Exhibit 2, p. 15. 

7971G — 46— pt. 6- 



2542 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

This dispatch was decoded and translated on December 5, 1941. This 
information was never supplied to me. 

On November 18, lOll the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu 
reported to Tokyo in accordance with the system prescribed in the 
dispatch from Tokyo on September 24. He reported that in Area 
A there was a battleship of the Oklahoma [6778'] class; that 
in Area C there were three heavy cruisers at anchor, as well as the 
carrier Enterprise or some other vessel; that two heavy cruisers of 
the Chicago class were tied up at docks "KS." The symbol "KS" it 
will be recalled was established by the Consul General in his Septem- 
ber dispatch to Tokyo to designate the repair dock in the Pearl Har- 
bor Navy Yard. The Consul General described in great detail the 
course taken by destroyers entering the harbor, their speed and their 
distances apart. He reported that they changed course five times, 
each time roughly 30°, from the entrance of the harbor through Area 
B to the buoys in Area C at which they were moored. This dispatch 
was decoded and translated in Washington on December 6, 1941.^ 
This information was never supplied to me. 

On November 20, Togo in Tokyo dispatched instructions to Hono- 
lulu to investigate comprehensively Fleet bases in the neighborhood 
of the Hawaiian Military Reservation. This dispatch was decoded 
and translated on 4th of December.^° This information was never 
supplied to me. 

Again on November 29, Tokyo sent the following dispatch to 

Honolulu : 

[6'?"/'9] We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but 
in future will you also report even when there are no movements." 

This dispatch was decoded and translated on December 5, 1941. " 

This information was never supplied to me. 

In the volume of intercepted Japanese dispatches eliciting ancLsecur- 
ing information about American military installations and naval 
movements, the dispatches concerning Pearl Harbor, on and after 
September 24, 1941, stand out, apart from the others (exhibit 2). _ No 
other harbor or base in American territory, or possessions was divided 
into subareas by Japan. In no other area was the Japanese Govern- 
ment seeking information as to whether two or more vessels were along- 
side the same wharf. Prior to the dispatch of September 24, the 
information which the Japanese sought and obtained about Pearl 
Harbor, followed the general pattern of their interest in American 
Fleet movements in other localities. One might suspect this type of 
conventional espionage. With the dispatch of September 24, 1941, and 
those which followed, there was a significant and ominous change in 
the character of the information which the Japanese Government 
sought and obtained. The espionage then directed was of an unusual 
character and outside the realm of reasonable suspicion. It was no 
longer merely directed to {6780] ascertaining the general 
whereabouts of ships of the fleet. It was directed to the presence of 
particular ships in particular areas ; to such minute detail as what ships 
were double-docked at the same wharf. In the period immediately 

» Exhibit 2, p. 14. 
'" Exhibit 2, p. 15. 
" Exhibit 2, p. 15. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2543 

preceding the attack, the Jap Consul General in Hawaii was directed 
by Tokyo to report even when there were no movements of ships in 
and out of Pearl Harbor. These Japanese instructions and reports 
pointed to an attack by Japan upon the ships in Pearl Harbor. The 
information sought and obtained, with such painstaking detail, had 
no other conceivable usefulness from a military viewpoint. Its utility 
was in planning and executing an attack upon the ships in port. Its 
effective value was lost completely when the ships left their reported 
berthings in Pearl Harbor. 

No one had a more direct and immediate interest in the security of 
the fleet in Pearl Harbor than its commander in chief. No one had 
a greater right than I to know that Japan had carved up Pearl Harbor 
into subareas and was seeking and receiving reports as to the precise 
berthings in that harbor of the ships of the fleet. I had been sent Mr. 
Grew's report earlier in the year with positive advice from the Navy 
Department that no credence was to be placed in the rumored Japanese 
plans for an attack on Pearl Harbor. I was told then, that no Jap- 
anese move against Pearl Harbor appeared "imminent [6781'\ 
or planned for in the foreseeable future." Certainly I was entitled to 
know when information in the Navy Department completely altered 
the information and advice previously given to me. Surely, I was 
entitled to know of the intercepted dispatches between Tokyo and 
Honolulu on and after September 24, 1941, which indicated that a 
Japanese move against Pearl Harbor was planned in Tokyo. 

lOiowledge of these intercepted Japanese dispatches would have 
radically changed the estimate of the situation made by me and my 
staff. It would have suggested a reorientation of our planned opera- 
tions at the outset of hostilities. The war plans of the Navy Depart- 
ment, and of the Pacific Fleet, as well as our directives and information 
from Washington prior to the attack indicated that the Pacific Fleet 
could be most effectively employed against Japan through diversionary 
raids on the Marshalls, when the Japanese struck at the Malay Barrier. 
Knowledge of a probable Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor afforded 
an opportunity to ambush the Japanese striking force as it ventured 
to Hawaii. It would have suggested the wisdom of concentrating our 
resources to that end, rather than conserving them for the Marshall 
expedition. 

The intercepted dispatches about the berthing of ships in Pearl 
Harbor also clarified the significance of other intercepted Japanese 
dispatches, decoded and translated by the Navy [6782] De- 
partment prior to the attack. I refer particularly to the intercepted 
dispatches which established a deadline date for agreement between 
Japan and the United States. When this date passed without agree- 
ment, these dispatches revealed that a Japanese plan automatically 
took effect. 

The deadline date was first established in a dispatch No. 736 from 
Tokyo to Washington on November 5, 1941. In this dispatch the 
Japanese Govermnent instructed its Ambassador in Washington as 
follows : ^2 

[6783] Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that 
all arrangements for the signing of this agreement, be completed by the 25th of 

"Exhibit 1, p. 100. 



2544 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances 
it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the 
problem of saving the Japanese-United States relations from falling into a chaotic 
condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of 
you. 

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself alone. 

This dispatch was decoded and translated by the Navy on the date 
of its origin, November 5, 1941. This information was never supplied 
to me. 

The deadline was reiterated in a dispatch from Tokyo to Washing- 
ton on November 11, 1941. This dispatch stated : ^^ 

Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications 
that the United States is still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of 
the situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth in my message 
No. 736 is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite deadline 
and therefore it is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time. The 
session of Parliament opens on the 15th (work will start on ( the following day?) ) 
according to the schedule. The government [6784] must have a clear 
picture of things to come in presenting its case at the session. You can see, there- 
fore, that tlie situation i.^ nearing a climax, and that time is indeed becoming 
short * * *" 

This dispatch was decoded and translated by the Navy Department 
on November 12, 1941. This information was never supplied to me. 

The deadline was again emphasized in a dispatch from Tokyo to 
Washington on November 15, 1941. This dispatch stated :^* 

Whatever the case may be, the fact remains that the date set forth in my 
message #736 is an absolutely immovable one. Please, therefore, make the 
United States see the light, so as to make possible the signing of the agreement 
by that date. 

This dispatch was decoded and translated by the Navy Department 
on the date of its origin, November 15, 1941. This information was 
never supplied to me. 

The deadline was again reiterated on November 16 with great em- 
phasis upon its importance. A dispatch from Tokyo to Washington 
of that date was as follows :^^ 

For your Honor's own infoi-mation : 

[6785] 1. I have read your #1090 and you may be sure that you have all 
my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs 
by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did 
before. 

2. * * * In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war 
takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situa- 
tion renders this out of the question. I set the deadline from the solution of 
these negotiations in my #736 and there will be no change. Please try to under- 
stand that. You see how short the time is ; therefore, do not allow the United 
States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for 
a solution on the basis of our proposals and do your best to bring about an 
immediate solution. 

This dispatch was decoded and translated on November 17, 1941. 
This information was never supplied to me. 

The deal line was finally extended on November 22 for a period 
of 4 days. On that date a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington in- 
structed Nomura and Kurusu : ^^ 

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. 
You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our 



'3Exliil)it ], p. 116. 
"Exhibit 1, p. 130. 
"Exhibit 1, p. 138. 
"Exhibit 1, p. 165. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2545 

fixed policy and do [67S6] your very best. Spare no efforts and try 
to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to 
guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but 
if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the 
Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out 
for you — twenty-ninth) ; if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get 
an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short, if 
everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time 
we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things 
are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful con- 
sideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, 
is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone. 

This dispatch was decoded and translated on the date of its origin, 
November 22, 1941. This information was never supplied to me. ^ 

Again on November 24, 1941, Tokyo specifically instructed its 
Ambassadors in Washington that the November 29 deal line was set 
in Tokyo time.^^ This dispatch was decoded and translated 
[6787] on November 24, the date of its origin. This information 
was never supplied to me. 

In at least six separate dispatches, on November 5, 11, 15, 16, 22, 
and 24, Japan specifically established and extended the dead line of 
November 25, later advanced to November 29. The dispatches made 
it plain that after the dead line date of Japanese plan was automatic- 
ally going into operation. The plan was of such importance that as 
the dead line approached, the Government of JajDan declared : "The 
fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days." ^^ 

When the dead line date of November 29 was reached with no 
agreement between the United States and Japan, there was no further 
extension. The intercepted dispatches indicated that the crisis 
deepened in its intensity after that day passed. On the 1st of De- 
cember, Tokyo advised its ambassadors in Washington :^^ 

The date set in my messages #812 has come and gone and the situation con- 
tinues to be increasingly critical. 

This message was translated by the Navy on the 1st of December. 
This information was never supplied to me. 

An intercepted Japanese dispatch from Tokyo to Washington of 
November 28, 1941, made it clear that the American proposal 
[^788] of November 26 was completely unsatisfactory to Japan 
and that an actual rupture of negotiations would c^ccur upon the receipt 
of the Japanese reply. A dispatch on November 28, decoded and trans- 
lated on the same day, stated : ^^ 

Well, you two ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of 
this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. 
This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government 
can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of 
the view of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will 
send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This 
is inevitable. * * *" 

After receipt by Tokyo of the American note of November 26, the 
intercepted Japanese dispatches show that Japan attached great im- 
portance to the continuance of negotiations to conceal from the United 
States whatever plan automatically took effect on November 29. Thus, 

" Exhibit 1, p. 173. 
"Exhibit l.p. 137. 
"Exhibit 1, p. 208. 
» Exhibit 1, p. 195. 



2546 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on November 28, cautions 
the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington : ^^ 

* * * I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are 
broken off. Merely say to them that [6789] you are awaiting instructions 
and that, although the opinions of your government are not yet clear to you, to 
your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims 
and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific * * * 

This information was never supplied to me. 

Again the dispatch from Tokyo to Washington of December 1, 1941, 
advising the Japanese Ambassador that the dead line date had come 
and gone and the situation continues to be critical, contains this further 
information : ^^ 

* * * to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we 
have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide 
differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing, 
(The above is for only your information.) 

This information was never supplied to me. 

Again in the trans-Pacific telephone conversation intercepted on 
November 27, and translated by the Navy Department on November 
28, Yamamoto in Tokyo explicitily instructed Kurusu : "Regarding 
negotiations, don't break them off."^^ 

In another trans-Pacific telephone conversation between Kurusu 
and Yamamoto, intercepted and translated by the Navy [G790] 
on November 30, Kurusu noted the change in the Japanese attitude 
with respect to the duration of the American-Japanese negotiations. 
Before the deadline date Kurusu and Nomura had been urged by 
Tokyo to press for a conclusion of negotiations. Now they were in- 
structed to stretch them out. Kurusu asked, "Are the Japanese- 
American negotiations to continue?'' Yamamoto replied, "Yes." 
Kurusu then stated: "You were very urgent about them before, 
weren't you; but now you want them to stretch out. We will need 
your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign Minister will need 
to change the tone of their speeches! Do you understand? Please 
all use more discretion." ^^ 

The information from these telephone conversations was never 
supplied to me. 

Again on November 29, an intercepted Japanese dispatch from 
Tokyo contains cautious representations to be addressed to the United 
States. The following instructions accompanied them : ^^ 

* * * In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not 
lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations. * * * 

This dispatch was decoded and translated by tlie Navy on Novem- 
ber 30, and never sent to me. 

[6791] The intercepted Japanese diplomatic dispatches show 
that on and after November 29, a Japanese plan of action automa- 
tically went into effect ; that the plan was of such importance that it 
involved the fate of the empire; and tliat Japan urgently wanted the 
United States to believe that negotiations were continuing after the 
deadline date to prevent suspicion as to the nature of the plan. 

« Exhibit 1, p. 195. 
M Exhibit 1, p. 208. 
23 Exhibit, 1, p. 190. 
2» Exhibit 1, p. 207. 
^Exhibit 1, p. 199. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2547 

What was this phin? Why such elaborate instructions to stretch 
out negotiations as a pretext to hide the operation of this plan ? Any- 
one reading the Japanese intercepted messages would face this 
question. 

Certainly the concealed Japanese plans which automatically went 
into effect on November 29 would hardly be the Japanese movement in 
Indo-China. "* * * No effort was made to mask the movements 
(jr presence of the naval forces moving southward, because physical 
observations of that movement were unavoidable and the radio activity 
of these forces would provide a desirable semblance of normalcy." ^^ 
The troop movements to southern Indo-China were the subject of 
formal diplomatic exchanges between the two governments of Japan 
and the United States. 

On December 2, 1941, Mr. Welles handed to Mr. Nomura and 
[67S2] Mr. Kurusu a communication which the President of the 
United States wished to make to them. This communication was as 
follows : ^^ 

I have received reports during the past days of continuing Japanese troop 
movements to southern Indo-Cliina. These reports indicate a very rapid and 
material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by Japan in IndjJ-China. . . 
The stationing of these increased Japanese forces in Indo-China would seem to 
imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for purposes of further aggression, 
since no such number of forces could possibly be required for the policing of that 
region. Such aggression could conceivably be against the Philippine Islands; 
against the many islands of East Indies ; against Burma ; against Malaya or 
either through coercion or through the actual use of force for the purpose of 
undertaking the occupation of Thailand. . . . Please be good enough to request 
the Japanese ambassador and Ambassador Kurusu to inquire at once of the 
Japanese government what the actual reasons may be for the steps already taken 
and what I am to consider is the policy of the Japanese government as demon- 
sti'ated by this recent and rapid concentration of troops in Indo-China. . . 

[679S] Thus, it was apparent to the Japanese Government from 
this formal representation of the United States that our Government 
was aware of the movement in Indochina. The United States ex- 
pressed its concern about potential Japanese action against the Phil- 
ippines, the East Indies, Malaya, or Thailand. There was, therefore, 
very little reason for Japan to keep up a pretext of negotiations for 
the purpose of disguising these objectives. 

Consequently, as time went on after November 29, and as Japan in- 
sisted to her envoj^s upon the continuance of negotiations as a pretext 
to divert the suspicion of the United States, it must have been appar- 
ent to a careful student of the intercepted dispatches that Japan on 
a dead-line date of November 29 had put into effect an operation, 
which was to consume a substantial time interval before its results 
were apparent to this Government, and which appeared susceptible 
of effective concealment in its initial phases. 

The messages as to the berthings of ships in Pearl Harbor would 
then have given the reader of these intercepted dispatches an insight 
as to one of the probable directions of the plan which went into effect 
automatically on November 29, and which Japan was so anxious to 
conceal. All these dispatches taken together would have pointed to 
Pearl Harbor as a probable objective of this plan. Yet, because 
[6794] I was not furnished with these intercepted dispatche.'s, nor 



^ Record, testimonv Admiral Inglis, p. 453. 

« Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan : 1931-41, vol. 2, p. 779. 



2548 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

given in summary form any indication of the dead-line date, the auto- 
matic execution of a plan by Japan on that date, and the continuance 
of negotiations thereafter as a pretext to hide that plan, I was deprived 
of the opportunity to make this deduction, which the dispatches as a 
whole would warrant, if not compel. 

After November 27, there was a rising intensity in the crisis in 
Japanese-United States relations apparent in the intercepted dis- 
patches. I was told on November 27 that negotiations had ceased 
and 2 days later that they appeared to be terminated with the barest 
possibilities of their resumption. Then I was left to read public 
accounts of further conversations between the State Department and 
the Japanese emissaries in Washington which indicated that negotia- 
tions had been resumed. 

[6795] The Navy Department knew immediately of the reactions 
of Nomura and Kurusu to the American note of November 26 — "Our 
failure and humiliation are complete." ^® 

The Navy Department knew imm.ediately of the reactions of the 
Japanese Government to the American note of November 26. Japan 
termed it — -^ 

a humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. 
The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. 
Therefore with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this Ameri- 
can proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be 
de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. 

The Navy Department knew that Nomura and Kurusu suggested to 
Japan on November 26 one way of saving the situation — a wire by the 
President to the Emperor.^° 

The Navy Department knew that the Japanese Government advised 
Nomura and Kurusu on November 28 that the suggested wire from 
the President to the Emperor offered no hope : "What you suggest is 
entirely unsuitable." ^^ 

[6796] The Navy Department knew that on November 30, 
Japan gave Germany a detailed version of the negotiations with the 
United States. Japan stated that "a continuation of negotiations 
would inevitably be detrimental to our cause," and characterized cer- 
tain features of the American proposal of November 26 as "insult- 
ing" — "clearly a trick." Japan concluded that the United States had 
decided to regard her as an enemy .^^ 

The Navy Department knew that Japan had instructed her ambassa- 
dors in Berlin on November 30 to inform Hitler : ^^ 

The conversation begun between Tokyo and Washington last April * * * 
now stand ruptured — broken. Say very secretly to them (Hitler and Ribbentrop) 
that there is extreme danger that way may suddenly break out between the 
Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the 
time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams. 

All this vital information came from intercepted dispatches, decoded 
and translated in Washington, either on the day they were sent or a 
day or two later. None of this information was supplied to me. 

'"Exhibit l.p. ISO. 
sn Exhibit 1, p. 195. 
»» Exhibit 1, p. 180. 
«» Exhibit 1, p. ins. 
« Exhibit 1, p. 205, 206. 
» Exhibit 1, p. 204. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2549 

[6797] On November 19, 1941, the Japanese Government set up 
a system for informing its representatives throughout the world of 
the time when Japan was to sever diplomatic relations ^* or go to war ^^ 
with the United States, Great Britain, or Kussia. This decision was 
to be made known through a false weather broadcast from Japan. 
The words "east wind rain" in the broadcast meant that Japan had 
decided to sever relations or go to war with the United States. The 
words "west wind clear" would denote such action against England. 
The words "north wind cloudy" would denote such action against 
Russia. 

The interception of the false weather broadcast was considered by 
the Navy Department to be of supreme importance. Every facility 
of the Navy was invoked to learn as speedily as possible when the false 
weather broadcast from Japan was heard and which of the significant 
code words were used. Extraordinary measures were established in 
the Navy Department to transmit the words used in this broadcast 
to key officers in Washington as soon as they were known.^" 

[6798] The Naval Court of Inquiry heard substantial evidence 
from various witnesses on the question of whether or not Japan gave 
the signal prescribed by the winds code. The Naval Court of Inquiry 
found the facts on this matter to be as follows : ^^ 

On 4 December an intercepted Japanese broadcast employing this code was 
received in the Navy Department. Although this notification was subject to 
two interpretations, either a breaking off of diplomatic relations between Japan 
and the United States, or war, this information was not transmitted to the 
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, or to other Commanders afloat. 

It was known in the Navy Department that the Commenders-in-Chief, Pacific 
and Asiatic Fleets, were monitoring Japanese broadcasts for this code, and 
apparently there was a mistaken impression in the Navy Department that the 
execute message had also been intercepted at Pearl Harbor, when in truth this 
message was never intercepted at Pearl Harbor. No attempt was made by the 
Navy Department to ascertain whether this information had been obtained by the 
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and by other Commanders afloat. 

Admiral Stark stated that he knew nothing about it, [6799] although 
Admiral Turner stated that he himself was familiar with it and presumed that 
Admiral Kimmel had it. This message cannot now be located in the Navy 
Department. 

[6800] From various intercepted Japanese messages it was ap- 
parent that the high point in the crisis in Japanese-American affairs 
would be reached when the Japanese reply to the American note of 
November 26 was received. As the Naval Court of Inquiry put it : ^^ 

The reply to this note was anxiously awaited by the high officials of the War 
and Navy Departments because of the feeling that Japan would not accept the 
conditions presented, and that diplomatic relations would be severed or that war 
would be declared. 

On the afternoon of December 6, 1941, there was intercepted, de- 
coded, and translated in the Navy Department, a dispatch from Japan 
to her Ambassadors in Washington, known as the "pilot message." 

This stated: 2^ 

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the .A!merican proposal of the 26th 
of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for th(i United 
States contained in my separate message #902 (in English). 

s< Exhibit 1, pp. 154, 155. 

'= Dispatch Ahisna Batavia to OpNav, December 5, 1941, 031030 ; Naval Court of 
Inquiry, exhibit 64, item 3 ; recorrl, testimony General Miles, p. 4100. 

s« Naval Court of Inquiry, testimony Commander Kramer, p. 956, question 32. 
*^ Aflflendum to Naval Court of Inquiry Finding of Fact, p. 4 (not published). 
** Naval Court of Inquiry, finding XVI. 
«• Exhibit 1, p. 238. 



2550 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts 
and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situa- 
tion is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you to please keep it 
secret for the time being. 

[6S01] 3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United 
States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the mean- 
time to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to 
the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions. 

The first 13 parts of the Japanese reply were intercepted and re- 
ceived by the Navy Department at about 3 p. m., December 6, 1941, and 
were translated and made ready for distribution by 9 p. m., Washing- 
ton time, on that date. These 13 parts contained strong language. The 
following expressions are fairly typical of the tenor of those 13 
parts : *° 

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be 
said to be scheming for the extension of the war (Part 9) ... it is exercising 
in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. 
Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations 
should be condemned as it is at times more inhumane than military pressure 
(Part 9) ... It is a fact of history that the countries (of East Asia for the 
past hundred years or more have) been compelled to observe the status quo 
under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice 
[6802] (themselves) to the prosperity of the two nations. (Part 10). 

Mr. Hull described the whole document on December 7 : *^ 

In all my 50 years of public service I have never seen a document that was 
more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions — infamous falsehoods 
and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any 
government of this planet was capable of uttering them. 

The 13 parts and the pilot message instructing the Japanese envoys 
that a specific hour was later to be fixed for its delivery could mean 
only one thing; that war with the United States was imminent. An 
hour had been fixed for the delivery of the Japanese ultimate and 
for the probable outbreak of hostilities. The hour fixed would be 
communicated to the Japanese emissaries in Washington in a separate 
message to be expected shortly. Not a word of these supremely crit- 
ical developments of Saturday, December 6, was sent to me. This 
vital information which was available at 9 p. m., Washington time, 
was distributed to the most important officers of the Government in 
Washington by midnight, Washington time. The President of the 
United States had it. The Secretary of the Navy had it. The Chief 
of Military Intelligence had it. The Director of [6803] Naval 
Intelligence had it. Apparently, the Secretary of War and the Sec- 
retary of State were apprised of these momentous events on that 
same evening. Nine p. m. in AVashington was 3 : 30 in the afternoon 
in Hawaii. At midnight in Washington it was early evening, 6 : 30 
p. m., in Hawaii. 

The dispatch fixing the hour for the delivery of the Japanese ulti- 
matum to the United States as 1 p. m., Washington time,*^ was in- 
tercepted and decoded by the Navy Department by 7 on the morning 
of December 7 — 7 a. m., Washington time, 1 : 30 a. m., Hawaiian 
time — nearly six and a half hours before the attack.*^ The transla- 
tion of this short message from the Japanese was a 2-minute job.** Not 

•"' Exhibit 1, pp. 239-244. 

" Foreign Relations of United States, Japan : 1931-41, vol. 2, p. 787. 

"Exhibit 1, p. 248. 

*^ Hewitt report, p. 86. 

*' Hewitt testimony, C<iptain Kramer, p. 595. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2551 

later than 10 : 30 a. m. the Chief of Naval Operations was informed 
of it. This information was not snpplied to me prior to the attack. 

I cannot tell what the evidence at this investigation will ultimately 
show as to the precise hours on the morning of December 7, when 
various responsible officers of the Navy Department knew that 1 p. m., 
Washington time, was the hour fixed for the delivery of the Japanese 
ultimatum to this Government. This much I know. There was ample 
time, at least an interval of approximately 21/2 hours, [6804] in 
which a message could have been dispatched to me. 

Regardless of what arguments there may be as to the evaluation of 
the dispatches that had been sent to me, I surely was entitled to know 
of the hour fixed by Japan for the probable outbreak of war against 
the United States. I cannot understand now — I have never under- 
stood — I may never understand — why I was deprived of the infor- 
mation available in the Navy Department in Washington on Satur- 
day night and Sunday morning. 

On November 28, 1941, the Navy Department could have informed 
me of the following vital facts : 

(1) Japan had set November 29 as an immovable dead-line date 
for agreement with the United States. 

(2) The United States gave to Japan certain proposals for a solu- 
tion of Japanese-American relations on November 26. I might remark 
parenthetically that an authoritative statement from my Government 
as to the general nature of these proposals would have been most 
enlightening. 

(3) Japan considered the United States proposals of November 26 
as unacceptable and planned to rupture negotiations with the United 
States when he reply to them was delivered to this Government. 

(4) Japan was keeping up a pretext of negotiations after November 
26 to conceal a definite plan which went into effect on November 29. 

[GSOS] This was the type of information which I had stated in 
May I needed so urgently in making the difficult decisions with which 
I was confronted. 

The question will arise in your minds, as it has in mine : Would the 
receipt of this information have made a difference in the events of 
December 7? No man can now state as a fact that he would have taken 
a certain course of action 4 years ago had he known facts which were 
then unknown to him. All he can give is his present conviction on the 
subject, divorcing himself from hindsight as far as humanly possible, 
and re-creating the atmosphere of the past and the factors which then 
influenced him. I give you my views, formed in this manner. 

Had I learned these vital facts and the "ships in harbor" messages 
on November 28, it is my present conviction that I would have rejected 
the Navy Department's suggestion to send carriers to Wake and Mid- 
way. I would have ordered the third carrier, the Saratoga, back from 
the west coast. I would have gone to sea with the fleet and endeavored 
to keep it in an intercepting position at sea. This would have per- 
mitted the disposal of the striking power of the fleet to meet an attack 
in the Hawaiian area. The requirement of keeping the fleet fueled, 
however, would have made necessary the presence in Pearl Harbor 
from time to [6S06] time of detachments of various units of 
the main body of the fleet. 

On December 4, ample time remained for the NaA^ Department to 
forward to me the information which I have outlined, and in addition 



2552 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the following significant facts, which the Navy Department learned 
between November 27 and that date : 

(1) Japan had informed Hitler that war with the Anglo-Saxon 
powers would break out sooner than an3^one dreams ; 

(2) Japan had broadcast her winds code signal using the words 
"east wind rain", meaning war or a rupture of diplomatic relations 
with the United States. 

Assuming that for the first time on December 5 I had all the im- 
portant information then available in the Navy Department, it is my 
present conviction that I would have gone to sea with the fleet, includ- 
ing the carrier Lexington and arranged a rendezvous at sea with 
Halsey's carrier force, and been in a good position to intercept the 
Japanese attack. 

On December 6, 15 hours before the attack, ample time still re- 
mained for the Navy Department to give me all the significant facts 
which I have outlined and which were not available to me in Hawaii. 
In addition, the Navy Department could then have advised me that 
13 parts of the Japanese reply to the American proposals had been 
received, that the tone and temper of this message indicated [6807] 
a break in diplomatic relations or war with the United States, and 
that the Japanese reply was to be formally presented to this Govern- 
ment at a special hour soon to be fixed. Had I received this informa- 
tion on the afternoon of December 6 it is my present conviction that 
I would have ordered all fleet units in Pearl Harbor to sea, arranged 
a rendezvous with Halsey's task force returning from Wake, and been 
ready to intercept the Japanese force by the time fixed for the out- 
break of war. 

Even on the morning of December 7, 4 or 6 hours before the attack, 
had the Navy Department for the first time seen fit to send me all this 
significant information, and the additional fact that 1 p. m., Wash- 
ington time, had been fixed for the delivery of the Japanese ultimatum 
to the United States, my light forces could have moved out of Pearl 
Harbor, all ships in the harbor would have been at general quarters, 
and all resources of the fleet in instant readiness to repel an attack. 

It is my conviction that action by the Navy Department at any one 
of these significant dates in furnishing me the information from the 
intercepted messages would have altered the events of December 7, 
1941. 

The Pacific Fleet deserved a fighting chance. It was entitled to 
receive from the Navy Department the best [6808] informa- 
tion available. Such information had been urgently requested. I had 
been assured that it would be furnished me. We faced our problems 
in the Pacific confident that such assurance would be faithfully car- 
ried out. 

[6809] PART IV PREVIOUS PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 

Voluminous data and documents have accumulated during the 
course of previous Pearl Harbor investigations. The procedure 
adopted at certain of these investigations must be considered in 
placing a value on the results and conclusions which were reached. 

At the proceedings of the Roberts Commission, I was told that I 
was not on trial. ^ I was not permitted to be present at the testimony 



* Roberts Commission testimony, p. 581 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2553 

of other witnesses or to examine or cross-examine tliem. I was not 
permitted to know what evidence had been presented. 

The Roberts Commission held sessions in Washington prior to go- 
ing to Hawaii. At these sessions the highest-ranking officers of the 
War and Navy Departments were heard. Their testimony was not 
recorded. A precis was made of testimony given by responsible offi- 
cers of the Navy Department.^ There is also a memorandum pre- 
pared by Admiral Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence, dated 
December 19, 1941, addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations, which 
gives a contemporaneous account of Admiral Wilkinson's testimony.^ 
These documents contain statements that prior to the attack I was 
[6810] given all the information available to the Navy Depart- 
ment.^ It appears that the so-called magic or intercepted mes- 
sages were freely discussed before the Commission. Consequently, 
it is likely that the Commission received the impression that the in- 
tercepted Japanese diplomatic messages were either forwarded to me 
by Washington or available to me in Pearl Harbor. The Director 
of War Plans, Admiral Turner, testified before the Naval Court of 
Inquiry to the effect that he may have given the Roberts Commission 
the impr^sion that I was familiar with these intercepted dispatches 
because that was his information at the time.^ 

I do not intend to suggest that any of these responsible officers 
deliberately misled the Roberts Commission as to my receipt of the 
"magic messages." It was tragic, however, that the Commission did 
not ask me about this matter. No question was addressed to me on 
the subject of my knowledge of the intercepted Japanese dispatches. 
I had no opportunity to correct any misinformation which the 
Roberts Commission may have received as to my receipt of this in- 
formation. I had no way of knowing what evidence had been 
given the Commission other than my own testimony. It was more 
than 2 years after the Commission concluded its proceedings before I 
[6S11] was permitted to know what evidence had been presented 
to the Commission. 

In June of 1944, the Congress, by statute, directed the Secretary 
of War and the Secretary of the Navy to make investigations. The 
Naval Court of Inquiry was appointed for this purpose. The three 
admirals who sat on the court were selected by the Secretary of 
the Navy. The court proceedings lasted several months. I was pres- 
ent at all hearings, was represented by counsel, introduced evidence, 
examined, and cross-examined witnesses. This proceeding was the 
only one of the secret investigations of Pearl Harbor in which these 
basic American rights were accorded to me. 

The Naval Court of Inquiry found unanimously that there was no 
ground for criticism of my decisions or actions. The findings of the 
naval court were not made public, however, until iVugust 28, 1945. 
When they appeared in the press, I learned for the first time that the 
Naval Court of Inquiry had found that I was not guilty of any 
dereliction of duty or errors of judgment. 

On February 6, 1945, 1 wrote to the Secretary of the Navy requesting 
permission to read the findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations 

2 Record, testimony of Admiral Wilkinson, p. 5021. 

s Record, testimony of Admiral Wilkinson, pp. 4891—4900. 

* Record, testimony of Admiral Wilkinson, pp. 4893-4895, 5022. 

' Naval Court of Inquiry, testimony of Admiral Turner, vol. 4, p. 1018, question 158. 



2554 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of the Naval Court. On February 13, 1945, the Secretary of the Navy 
denied my request. 

In May of 1945, long after the Naval Court of Inquiry [681^] 
had filed its report, the Secretary of the Navy detailed Admiral Hewitt 
to conduct a further secret investigation into Pearl Harbor. I learned 
from the public press that this investigation had begun. On May 8, 
1945, I wrote to the Secretary requesting permission to be present at 
the hearings before Admiral Hewitt, to introduce evidence, to con- 
front and cross-examine witneses. The Secretary of the Navy denied 
my request in a letter of May 14, 1945. 

On May 24, 1945, I wrote again to the Secretary requesting that he 
reconsider his decision to exclude me from the Hewitt investigation. 
The Secretary of the Navy never replied. The Hewitt investigation 
went ahead in secret. 

On the basis of this secret investigation, the Secretary, in effect set 
aside the verdict of the Naval Court of Inquiry. 

With these facts the American people will know how to evaluate 
the various investigations into Pearl Harbor. If this inves*^igation 
succeeds in preserving for the future the pertinent facts about Pearl 
Harbor, I shall be content. History, with the perspective of the long 
tomorrow, will enter the final directive in my case. I am confident of 
that verdict. 

The Chairman. It is now 4 o'clock, and the Chair was advised in 
advance that if Admiral Kimmel did not finish [6813] reading 
his statement until 4, he would rather not proceed now to examine. 

(TVTiereupon, at 4 p. m., the hearing was recessed until tomorrow 
morning, Wednesday, January 16, 1945, at 10 a. m.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2555 



[68m PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 16, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Albeii 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (cluiirman), George, Lucas, Ferguson 
and Brewster and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe. 

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, Associate General Counsel; John E. Hasten, Edward P. 
Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee. 

[6815^ The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in 
order. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman 

The Vice Chairman. The Chairman is detained a few moments and 
we will go ahead. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, in relation to the letter written 
by Mr. Justice Roberts read yesterday, I would like to call attention 
for the record to the minutes of the meeting of the Roberts Commit- 
tee on January 21, 1942. It is just one page and if I might put it into 
the record I would like to do so. 

January 21, 1942. 

The Commission reconvened at 9 : 30 o'clock a. m. at room 2905 Navy Build- 
ing, Washington, D. C. 

All of the members of the Commission were present, and the Recorder, the 
Law Officer, and the Clerk to the Commission were in attendance. 

The Commission went into an Executive Session which continued until 1 : 10 
o'clock p. m., when the Commission took a recess until 2 : 45 p. m. 

At that time the Commission reconvened and resumed the Executive Session 
until 6 : 30 o'clock p. m., when there was an adjournment until Thursday, Jan- 
uary 22, 1942, at 9 : 30 o'clock a. m. 

[68i6] At 3: 00 o'clock p. m., the Secretary of the Navy, having been 

This is the part I had in mind calling to the attention of the com- 
mittee and for the record : 

At 3 : 00 o'clock p. m. the Secretary of the Navy, having been shown certain 
proposed findings of fact, stated that he suggested no changes for safeguarding 
the national interest, in any of the statements, except one in Finding No. 20. 
This was then differently phrased. 

At 4 : 30 o'clock p. m. Brigadier General Gerow, designated by the Chief of 
Staff, after examining the same findings for the same purpose, stated to the 
Recorder that he found no changes to suggest, and the Recorder so informed the 
Commission. 

Signed Owen J. Roberts, Chairman. 



2556 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Signed Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder. 
Signed Albert J. Schneider, Clerk. 

Now, if we examine the Koberts report, tJiat was printed as Docu- 
ment No. 159 of the Seventy-seventh Congress, second session, I find 
only 19 paragraphs. The nineteenth finding is on page 16 and carries 
over on page 17. There is no No. 20 finding. Whereas in the minutes 
of the Commission it says "except one in finding No. 20. This was then 
diiierently phrased." 

I think we should have that as part of the record, indi- [6817'] 
eating that the finding No. 20 does now not appear in the record, as 
indicated by dociunent No. 159 of the. Seventy -seventh Congress, sec- 
ond session. 

The Vice Chairman. Is that all, Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; that is all. It is to clear up that matter of 
yesterday. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, might I, in that connection, ask 
whether it is contemplated that that will be taken up further with 
Justice Roberts to find out what the report was on that'^ 

Mr. Richardson. There was a suggesion yesterday, Mr. Chairman, 
that it was possible that the reading of the Roberts' letter might dis- 
pense with the necessity of calling Justice Roberts as a witness. 

My attention was called later to the idea that he might still be asked 
to appear as a witness. I would like to inquire now whether any mem- 
ber of the committee would like to have me arrange to have Mr. Justice 
Roberts present himself for examination in connection with the point 
brought up by Senator Ferguson, or any other point in connection with 
the report in which the committee is interested. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have Justice 
Roberts called as a witness, particularly with regard to the minutes 
that I read this morning indicating that there [6S18] were 20 
findings and there are only 19 appearing in the official document. Also 
if he had a conversation, which is indicated in the letter, for several 
hours with the President on this particular case and on his findings, 
and so forth, we may obtain information there that would help to 
explain some of the things now before the committee. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson has submitted his request. 
Are there any other requests? 

Mr. Murpht. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say on tlie record that 
I cannot see why we should call Justice Roberts, a former Justice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, when we are not calling any 
members of the Army Board, we are not calling any members of the 
Navy Board. 

Of course, it may be that the gentleman wants to talk to him be- 
cause he talked to President Roosevelt. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas. 

Senator Lucas. May I ask Senator Ferguson this question : I 
haven't examined the report to which the Senator refers. Do I 
understand that each one of those paragraphs presents a separate 
finding within itself? 

Senator Ferguson. That is true. They relate to eacn other but 
they are the findings. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2557 

[6819] Senator Lucas. I was wondering whether the report 
might not include the entire findings even though there are only 19 
paragraphs in it. 

Senator Ferguson. But I can't tell that from the report itself and 
from the minutes. That is the reason I think it is material that we 
find out. Particularly is this true because we haven't been able up 
to now to locate the original of a report from a commission named 
by the President. 

Senator Lucas. The only point I was attempting to make was 
whether or not the report itself sets out definitely one finding after 
another. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. 

Senator Lucas. There are a number of findings in there? 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster. 

Senator Brewster. I think that it is altogether desirable that Jus- 
tice Roberts should appear, as I think there is something that would 
be not clear to any further student of this situation in the letter of 
Justice Roberts that we had read yesterday. He said : 

I replied that the Commission had submitted the fact findings (but not the 
report) to the Secretaries of War and Navy and had been advised by each of 
them that there could [G820] be no objection to the publication of the 
facts as the Commission had stated them in its report. 

I assume the Justice there referred to the final draft after the 
changes had been made, but that was, of course, the object of the 
committee in its original inquiry, as to whether there were changes 
made subsequent to the first determinations of the Commission, and 
I am sure Justice Roberts would be helpful in clarifying that situation. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, so that the record will be complete, I 
would like to say that in the testimony of the Roberts Commission 
itself there was a statement made that all of the testimony would be 
submitted to both the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy 
in order to have them pass on it, to see whether or not there was 
anything there that would affect national security, that would affect 
national interest, or would affect national defense, and as to whether 
or not that in being made public would affect them. 

Senator Brewster. I think that was proper. The clear implica- 
tion of the Roberts letter is that no changes were made as a result of 
that inquiry and it would appear from the record Senator Ferguson 
has read clearly there were certain changes which may well have been 
in the public interest at that time but might affect the record as far as 
subsequent developments were concerned. 

[6821] The Vice Chairman. Is there objection to the request 
that former Associate Justice Roberts of the Supreme Court be re- 
quested to appear as a witness in this hearing. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I have no objection but I prophesy 
now that he won't add anything to this Pearl Harbor inquiry outside 
of taking a little more time. 

The Vice Chairman. Is there objection ? 

(No response.) 

The Chair hears none and the counsel will please arrange for the 
appearance of Justice Roberts. 

79716— 46— pt. 6 6 



2558 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I should like to offer at 
this time a number of exhibits for the record that came to my atten- 
tion in connection wth an examination of the record and of Admiral 
Kimmel's statement in his prior testimony. I do not regard them 
as particularly important and they are not new but in order that the 
historical documents in the case may be complete and since some ques- 
tions may be asked concerning some of these exhibits, I have had 
copies prepared and laid before the members of the committee and I 
should like permission now to have the various documents marked 
as exhibits and offered in evidence at this time. 

The Vice Chairman. You will please proceed and call the atten- 
tion of the committee to the documents and give the number of the 
exhibit. They will be admitted as exhibits for the record. 

[6822] Mr. Masten. As the next exhibit, which I believe is 113, 
we would like to offer the document entitled "Pacific Fleet Employ- 
ment Schedules, Fall and Winter, 1941." This includes a letter dated 
August 13, 1941, signed by i\_dmiral Kimmel, the employment sched- 
ules for Task Forces 1, 2, and 3. 

In addition, we are having duplicated the employment schedule for 
Task Force 9, which will be offered as'soon as it has been duplicated. 

The Vice Chairman. This will be received as Exhibit 113. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 113.") 

Mr. Masten. As Exhibit 114, we would like to offer photostatic copy 
of WPAC-46, which is Admiral Kimmel's implementation of Rain- 
bow 5. 

The Vice Chairman. Is that before members of the committee ? 

Mr. IMasten. We did not have the 10 copies necessary for each mem- 
ber of the committee, but we have distributed as many as we had, and 
we will obtain the other copies, but did not get them this morning. 

The Vice Chairiman. That will be accepted as Exhibit 114. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 114.") 

Mr. Masten. As Exhibit 115, we would like to offer a collection of 
three documents. Tlie first is entitled '"Communi- [68£3] ca- 
tion Intelligence Summaries Concerning Location of Japanese Fleet 
Units, 1 November 1941 to 6 December 1941." 

The Vice Chairman. That is 115 ? 

Mr. Masten. One hundred and fifteen ; yes. The second part of Ex- 
hibit 115 is entitled "Intelligence Reports by Pacific Fleet Intelli- 
gence Officer, 27 October 1941 to 2 December 1941." 

The third part of Exhibit 115 is entitled, "Pacific Fleet Intelligence 
Memorandum of 1 December 1941 — Location of Japanese Fleet 
Units." 

We would like to offer all of those as Exhibit 115. 

The Vice Chairman. They will be so received. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 115.") 

Mr. Masten. As exhibit 116 we would like to offer a compilation of 
all of the correspondence which we have found dealing with the sub- 
ject of antitorpedo nets. Certain of this correspondence has already 
been offered as part of the record included in the present exhibit, but 
this brings together in one compilation all of the correspondence in 
that connection. We offer that as Exhibit 116, 

The Vice Chairman. Let us see a little more clearly just what that 
is. Hold up the document. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2559 

Mr. Masten. This is a compilation of letters the first of which is 
dated February 11, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the 
Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance. 

[68U] The Vice Chairman. That is 116? 

Mr. Masten. 116. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be received. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 116.") 

Mr. Masten. As Exhibit 117, we would like to offer a collection of 
correspondence, the first of which is a letter dated 16 January 1941, 
from the Commander Patrol Wing 2 to the Chief of Naval Operations. 
This correspondence is offered to complete the record on the subject 
of the air defense of the Hawaiian Islands.* There are a number of 
other documents in this connection that are already in exhibits, but 
they do not include the correspondence which we now offer as Exhibit 
117. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit 117. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 117.") 

Mr. M vsten. As Exhibit 118, we would like to offer the daily memo- 
randa dated 30 November 1941 and December 5, 1941, prepared by 
Admiral Kimmel and entitled "Steps To Be Taken in Case of Ameri- 
can-Japanese War Within the Next 24 Hours." It is our understand- 
ing that no memoranda were prepared on the days of December 1, 
2, 3, and 4, that these two are the only ones that exist. We offer them 
as Exhibit 118. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit 118.' 

[6S25] (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 

lis.") 

Mr. Masten. As Exhibit 119, we offer the document entitled, "Eadio 
Log of. Bishop's Point Kadio Station 7 December 1941." This in- 
cludes the communications between the Destroyer Ward and the radio 
station in connection with the dropping of depth charges on the sub- 
marine on the morning of 7 December. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit 119. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 119.") 

Mr. Masten. As the last exhibit this morning, which will be No. 
120, we offer two reports, the first of which is a memorandum for Ad- 
miral Kimmel signed by Admiral Bellinger and dated December 19, 
1941, and the second of which is a memorandum dated 2 January 1942, 
also signed by Admiral Bellinger, to which is attached a report of the 
Army-Navy Board dated 31 October 1941, referred to in the memo- 
randum of 1 January. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit 120. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 120.") 

The Vice Chairman. Does that complete the exhibits ? 

Mr. Masten. That completes all of those that are ready this morn- 
ing. There will be a few others. 

Tlie Vice Chairman. Permit the Chair to inquire as to this docu- 
ment that appears to be before all members. 

[68^6] Mr. Masten. That is the Pacific War Plan 46 which was 
offered as Exhibit 114. 

The Vice Chairman. That is what you referred to as the photostat? 

Mr. Masten. That is right. That is all we have this morning. 



2560 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. Does counsel have anything further at this 
time before the examination of the witness begins? 

Mr. Richardson. No, Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Admiral Kimmel, do you have anything 
further you desire to present to the committee before the exammation 
of counsel begins? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, sir; I have nothing further. 

The Vice Chairman. Counsel will proceed with the examination of 
the witness. 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES 
NAVY, RETIRED (Resumed) 

Mr. Richardson. Admiral Kimmel, you have spent 40 years in the 
Navy, according to your testimony yesterday ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. How much time and what have been your assign- 
ments in the Pacific area during those 40 years, generally ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I will have to think a minute. I was in the 
Pacific area first in 1908 on a cruise around the world, when we went 
around South America up the west coast to Hawaii, Australia, Manila, 
Japan, China, and the rest of the way around the world. 

In 1913 I was in the Pacific. I served on the staff of Admiral 
Thomas B. Howard and later Cameron Winslow, who were succes- 
sively commanders in chief of the Pacific Fleet. I was a fleet gunnery 
officer at that time. 

In 1923 to 1925 I was in the Asiatic Fleet. 

In 1921 1 was in the Pacific Fleet. Oh, I suppose all the time I was 
in command of a battleship or conmiand of a squadron of destroyers 
I was in the Pacific except for brief visits to the Atlantic. As a 
matter of fact, the last duty I did in the Atlantic was about 1911, 
except for a period during the first war. First World War, when I was 
with Admiral Rodman in the American detachment of battleships 
with the British Fleet. 

Mr. Richardson. When did you join the Pacific Fleet prior to your 
appointment as commander in chief of the fleet ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I joined the Pacific Fleet in the summer of 
1938. I took command of the Seventh Heavy Cruiser Division with 
the San Francisco as flagship. I cruised in the Pacific and when we 
came to the Atlantic for the war game I made a trip around South 
America with three cruisers on a good will tour and I visited all the 
principal ports of South [68281^ America. After that I shifted 
my flag to the Honolulu^ which was the flagship of the cruisers for the 
Battle Force, that is, the light cruisers, and from that time until I 
became commander in chief — this was in 1939 — I was in command of 
the cruisers of the Battle Force and I cruised with the fleet. Wlien 
the fleet went to Hawaii in 1940 I went out there with the fleet and 
except for about 2 weeks when I came back to the coast I stayed out 
there until I was relieved as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. 

Mr. Richardson. And your specific command at the time you were 
]>romoted was what? 

Admiral Kimmel. My specific command at the time I was pro- 
moted was three divisions of light cruisers. They included two divi- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2561 

sions of the Boise class, which were probably some of the most ef- 
fective units we had in the fleet. I trained them and I think 'I con- 
tributed somewhat to their efficiency. 

Mr. R.icHAEi:>soN. When did you retire from the Navy, Admiral ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I retired from the Navy on the 1st of March, 
1942. 

Mr. Richardson. Will 3'ou relate the circumstances leading up to 
and in connection with j^our retirement? 

Admiral Kimmel. I have some documents here which I have 
[6829^ prepared on that subject, which gives a factual account. I . 
will review it briefly rather than read it. If I make any mistakes you 
can readily correct it from this record. 

Mr. RiCHAEDSON. I think, Mr. Chairman, that it might be well, in 
view of the nature of the testimony, if this compilation might be offered 
as an exhibit since copies are now being distributed to members of the 
committee. I have not seen this compilation myself up to now. 

The Vice Chairman. W^hat is the number of the exhibit? 

Mr. RiciLVRDSON. 121. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit 121. 

The Vice Chairman. You may proceed, Admiral. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 121.") 

Admiral Kimmel. After I was relieved I was ordered back to the 
west coast. 

Mr. Richardson. And when were you relieved? 

Admiral Kimmel. I was relieved on the 17th day of December 1941. 

1 stayed in Hawaii for several weeks and after I had completed my 
testimony before tlie Roberts Commission I was ordered to the west 
coast and I went to San Francisco. 

I waited in San Francisco for whatever disposition they wished 
to make. The Roberts Commission report was published and about 

2 or 3 days — a few days after the Roberts [68301 Commission 
report was published i^dmiral Greenslade. Rear Admiral Greenslade 
then Commandant of the Thirteenth Naval District, got in touch with 
me, told m.e he had an official communication from the Navy Depart- 
ment for me. He informed me that Admiral Randall Jacobs, Chief 
of the Bureau of Navigation, had telephoned him an official message 
to be delivered to me that the Acting Secretary of the Navy had in- 
formed him that Greneral Short had submitted a request for retirement. 
That was the message. 

Up to that time I had not considered submitting any request for 
retirement; it never entered my -head. I thought the matter over 
and decided if that was the way the Navy Deparment wanted to ar- 
range this affair that I would not stand in their way. I wrote a request 
for retirement and I submitted it. 

A few days later Admii-al Greenslade told me that he had a tele- 
phone message from Admiral Stark in which Stark assured him that 
this information which had been supplied to me was not intended to 
influence me in submitting a request for retirement, that I was free 
to do as I thought best. Of course I was free to do as I thought best. 

In reply to that I submitted a letter to the Navy Department under 
date of January 28. 1942,, in which I stated : 

Reference (A) was submitted after I had been officially informed by the 
Navy Department that General Short [6831] had requested retirement. 



2562 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I was officially informed today by the Navy Department that my notification 
of General Short's request .was not intended to influence my decision to submit 
a similar request. 

I desire my request for retirement to stand, subject only to determination 
by the Department as to what course of action will best serve the interests 
of the country and the good of the service. 

That went along. I had various communications from Admiral 
Stark in the meanwhile which are included here. The. the storm 
of criticism arose because I was running out on them and on Feb- 
ruary 22 I wrote this letter to Admiral Stark. 

[6832] Deae Betty: I started writing this letter a few minutes after 
Pye gave me your letter of 21 February. I thank you for the letter and for 
the information contained therein. I also thank you for your other letters 
which I have not answered. 

I imderstand from your letter that I will not be retired for the present, 
that I will be in a leave status until some further action is taken. 

I submitted my request for retirement because I was notified that Short had 
done so and took that notification as a suggestion for me to do likewise. I 
submitted this request solely to permit the department to take whatever action 
they deemed best for the interests of the country. I did not submit it in order 
to escape censure or punishment. 

When I was notified that the notification in regard to Short was not meant 
to put pressure on me, I submitted my second letter on the subject. 

When the fact that Short and I had submitted requests for retirement was 
published to the country, I was astounded that the department would put 
Short and me in such light before the public. 

On February 19, I received notification by the [6883] Secretary that 
I would be placed on the retired list on March 1, 1942. Paragraph 2 of this 
letter states, "This approval of your request for retirement is without condona- 
tion of any offense or prejudice to future disciplinary action." 

I do not understand this paragraph unless it is to be published to the country 
as a promise that I will be disciplined at some future time. 

I stand ready at any time to accept the consequences of my acts. I do not wish 
to embarrass the government in the conduct of the war. I do feel, however, that 
my crucifixion before the public has about reached the limit. I am in daily receipt 
of letters from irresponsible people over the country taking me to task and even 
threatening to kill me. I am not particularly concerned except as it shows the 
effect on the public of articles published about me. 

I feel that the publication of paragraph two of the Secretary's letter of 
February 16 will further inflame the pul)lic and do me a great injustice. 

I have kept my mouth shut and propose to continue to do so as long as it is 
humanly possible. 

I regret the losses at Pearl Harbor just as keenly, or perhaps more keenly than 
any other American citizen. [6834] I wish that I had been smarter than 
I was and able to foresee what happened on December 7. I devoted all my 
energies to the job and made the dispositions which appeared to me to be called 
for. I cannot now reproach myself for any lack of effort. 

I will not comment on the Report of the Commission, but you probably know 
what I think of it. I will say in passing, that I was not made an interested party 
or a defendant. 

All this I have been willing to accept for the good of the country out of my 
loyalty to the Nation, and to await the judgment of history when all the factors 
can be published. 

But I do think that in all justice the department should do nothing further to 
inflame the public against me. I am entitled to some consideration even though 
you may consider I erred grievously. 

You must appreciate that the beating I have taken leaves very little that can 
be added to my burden. 

I appieciate your efforts on my behalf and will always value your friendship, 
.which is a precious thing to me. 

My kindest regards always. 

/s/ H. E. KIMMEL. 

To : Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations. 
(Written in San Francisco, California.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2563 

[683S] That letter went forward on the 22d of February. 

Admiral Stark apparently did not even know that the papers retir- 
ing me had left the Navy Department, In any event, I was retired 
and the Secretary promised the public to give me a general court 
martial. 

I subsequently learned from Admiral Jacobs that the Acting Secre- 
tary of the Navy who liad directed him to inform me of General 
Short's retirement was Mr. Kjiox. 

In my request for retirement, the original request, I stated that I 
stood ready to perform any duty that the Navy Department would 
assign to me. In order to keep the record straight, on 21 April 1942 
I submitted an official letter to the Bureau of Navigation in which I 
stated : 

Supplementing the statement in my request for retirement dated 26 January 
1942, I wish to again state that I stand ready to perform any duty to which the 
Navy Department may assign me. 

Mr. Richardson. You received no assignment? 

Admiral Kimmel. I received no assignment. 

Mr. Richardson. When Admiral Stark testified, Admiral Kimmel, 
he stated that there never at any time was anything between you and 
him except the closest personal friendship. Do you agree with that 
statement ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes; I agree in that statement. I [6836'] 
had known Admiral Stark since Naval Academy days. I had served 
with him on several occasions; I had the highest regard for him; I 
trusted him, and I felt he was one of my best friends. I had that feel- 
ing, but I cannot forget the fact that — well, events that have occurred 
since then. 

Mr. Richardson. Would you say that your relations during your 
term of duty at Hawaii were friendly and cooperative with the vari- 
ous naval officers connected with Admiral Stark in the Office of Naval 
Operations ? 

Admiral Kjmmel. Yes ; oh, yes. 

Mr. Richardson. You are not conscious at this time that that office, 
or anyone in it, had any personal dislike or hostility to you ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I had not that idea at any time. 

Mr. Richardson. And is that also true with respect to the Secretary 
of the Navy ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. I felt the Secretary of the Navy was a very 
loyal friend of mine, Mr. Knox. I had known the Secretary only 
slightly. I met' him when he came to Hawaii in September, I think it 
was, of 1940. He was sent by Admiral Richardson — I will put it this 
way: Admiral Richardson arranged for a schedule for him to visit 
various types of ships with various flag officers, and Secretary Knox 
spent about 3 days with me in my flag [SSS?] ship while we 
were at sea, and that was when I came to know him, and about the 
only time I knew him. 

Mr. Richardson. You know of no reason, admiral, why there should 
have been the slightest difficulty in a complete liaison between the 
Office of Naval Operations, the Secretary of the Navy in Washington, 
and your command in Hawaiii ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I had not any question in my mind. None. 



2564 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Richardson. Now, admiral, it would be fair to say, would it 
not, that your experience in the Pacific had given you a very intensi- 
fied superior knowledge of naval conditions in the Pacific area? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I had served there a good while. 

Mr. Richardson. Subject to your ability to understand those con- 
ditions, you have had plenty of opportunity to find out what that 
work was ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I had plenty of opportunity ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And those contacts of yours in the Pacific gave 
you an extensive and detailed contact with Japan, and its representa- 
tives ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No; I did not have detailed contact with the 
representatives of Japan. I had some contacts with them. I had 
never lived in Japan. I visited in Japan [6838] on occasions, 
two or three times, but I had no opportunity to obtain any profound 
knowledge of the Japanese people by contacts with them. 

The knowledge I had came principally from reading, and I did that 
extensively. 

Mr. Richardson. The only important power in the Pacific of direct 
interest to the United States was Japan, was it not ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. 

Mr. Richardson. And in all of your war plans from the time you 
first went to the Pacific and up to the 7th of December, Orange in those 
plans meant Japan? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Richardson. And all of those plans were directed at the ex- 
igency of possible war with Japan ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And in connection with those plans there was con- 
stantly in the minds of you and the other officers in charge of our Navy 
in the Pacific what would be clone or could be done, and how it should 
be done in the event hostilities with Japan should ever eventuate ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I will put it this way : 

The only war plan that was called for in the Pacific, and the only 
one of which I had any knowledge, was the [683d] Orange 
war plan, and all of our thoughts, so far as the Pacific war was con- 
cerned, were directed against Japan, yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And it had come to be a fixed feeling among the 
naval officers familiar with Pacific missions that sooner or later it 
was extremely likely there would be a war with Japan ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I think that is a fair statement that a good 
body of opinion in the Navy felt that a war with Japan was coming 
sooner or later. There was, however, a considerable number of offi- 
cers in the Navy who felt that Japan and the United States would have 
no real reason to fight, and principally because if Japan did ever start 
anything, they would be wiped off the map. 

Mr. Richardson. As a matter of fact, Admiral, there was quite a 
divergence of opinion in the Navy as to how long it would take to 
accomplish that result, was there not ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. In a body of tliat kind there is always a 
considerable number of different opinions, but in my thoughts about 
Japan, and my studies at the War College, and other places, every- 
thing I knew and read about, confirmed what President Theodore 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2565 

Eoosevelt is purported to have said back in about 1905 or 1906, and 
[684O] that was that forces necessary to lick Japan in the Pacific 
would take a fleet equal to the then British Fleet, plus an army equal 
to the then German Army, and that anybody who embarked on a 
Pacific war with any other idea was in for a great awakening. 

Mr. Richardson. In 1941, all of this situation with respect to the 
probability of war with Japan immensely increased, did it not? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And may it be fairly said that it was the opinion 
of the high naval command in the Pacific that the peaceful situation 
between Japan and the United States was constantly deteriorating 
day by day? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, that is right. 

Mr. Richardson. And that it seemed quite probable, from a military 
standpoint, that war would result? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

[684.1] Mr. Richardson. Now, in 1911 there was a shooting war 
in the Atlantic ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Beginning in the summer, yes. 

Mr. Richardson. That was known to the high command in the Pa- 
cific ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is true. 

Mr. Richardson. That was the subject of certain conversations and 
correspondence between you and the Office of Naval Operations? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. You understood that it was the settled military 
policy that the war in the Atlantic was to have precedence over the 
situation in the Pacific ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; that is one way of putting it. 

Mr. Richardson. And there was during 1941 a transfer to opera- 
tions in the Atlantic, and operations relating to the Atlantic, of the 
overwhelming majority of all of our munitions of war and ships and 
other equipment in aid of the Atlantic situation ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. and that was something I tried to put a few 
brakes on, and I felt that a strong Pacific Fleet was a real deterrent to 
Japan and, as I think you will find in my correspondence — this is no 
afterthought — I stated then that a weaker one might be an invitation. 

[68If2'] Mr. Richardson. Well, at its top strength the Pacific 
Fleet during 1940 and 1941 was never strong enough to meet in battle 
the main Japanese Fleet, was it, on equal terms ? 

Admiral Kimmel. If you could have gotten the two fleets out and 
lined them up and eliminated all questions of logistics and just gotten 
them into battle with the fleet prior to the time they made the trans- 
fer to the Atlantic — well, it would have been a nice mix-up, and it 
would not have been all one-sided by any means. 

But when you speak of a fleet in the Pacific^ufficient to defeat Japan, 
we are speaking of something entirely different from what you have 
spoken of. We are speaking of a fleet which can go to Japanese waters 
and force them out and defeat them in their own home waters, and 
none of our plans ever stopped short of that, and we never at any time 
until this war started had the Navy to implement that plan.^ 

Mr. Richardson. And until we had this policy of ours in the At- 
lantic you never contemplated that the war against Japan in the 
Pacific would be ijiven seconrlarv consideration? 



2566 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Kimmel. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. By the Government? 

Admiral Kimmel. No. We were forced into that. 

Mr. Richardson. Now early in 1941 this fleet in the Pacific was ma- 
terially weakened by the withdrawal of a [684^] battleship 
and several cruisers, several destroyers, and other naval vessels? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, not the withdrawal of " a" battleship, 
but it was a withdrawal of a division of three battleships which, 
incidentally, were probably the strongest ships we had in the fleet. 

Mr. Richardson. They were removed from the Pacific area to the 
Atlantic area? 

Admiral Kimmel. They were removed, 3 battleships, 1 carrier, 
18 destroyers, and 4 of the most modern and most effective light 
cruisers. 

Mr. Richardson. Who recommended that withdrawal? 

Admiral Kimmel. I do not know. I did not. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there any discussion that you knew of pro 
and con on whether that withdrawal should be made at the time it 
was made? 

Admiral Kimmel. Not with me. I think you will recall I had a 
letter setting forth this plan in which Admiral Stark says, "I am 
telling you, not arguing with you." 

Mr. Richardson. Now, following that, Admiral, there was an- 
other proposed attempt to further weaken the Pacific Fleet by an 
additional assignment of additional fighting ships to the Atlantic 
area, was there not? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

[684-4] Mr. Richardson. Just what part did you plan in con- 
nection with that event? 

Admiral Kimmel. I was in the Navy Department, having come 
here for an official conference, in June of 1941, and Mr. Knox, I think, 
came back from a cabinet meeting and stated that they had decided 
to transfer another division of battleships, another carrier, four 
cruisers, and a number of destroyers to the Atlantic from the Pacific. 
I heard that, and I was very much concerned. 

Mr. Richardson. Why? 

Admiral Kimmel. Because I felt that we should make every effort 
to keep Japan out of the war. I felt that the way to keep Japan out 
of the war was to have a fleet out there which would deter them from 
doing anything. I felt in case we did get into a war with Japan and 
if we had been further reduced by another increment equal to the first, 
leaving us one-half as strong as we had been in 1940, that we would be 
in a bad way. 

Subsequently, when I had an interview with Mr. Roosevelt, I told 
him just that. As I recall his conversation, he said, "Well they told 
me from the Navy Department that that would be all right." "Well," 
I said, "whoever told you was crazy. It just is ridiculous," and 
eventually that transfer was not made. 

[684S] Mr. Richardson. As an experienced naval officer. Ad- 
miral, what is and what was during 1941 the importance of the Pacific 
Fleet in the Pacific to the United States ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, the importance of the Pacific Fleet was to 
keep Japan out of the war, and failing that, to be in a position to stop 
their advance. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2567 

Mr. Richardson. Was there any other defense of importance in the 
entire Pacific Ocean to our western coast than this Pacific Fleet? 

Admiral Kimmel. May I have that question again? 

Mr. Richardson. Will you read it, please? 

(The question was read by the reporter.) 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, there were many important elements out 
there : The bases on the Pacific coast, the productive capacity of the 
Pacific coast, the bases at Hawaii. The fleet was a very important 
part, and perhaps the most important part, of the defense of the coast 
at that time. 

Mr. Richardson. It was the only major naval power we had in the 
Pacific? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. It was all the naval power we had in the 
Pacific except the detachment in the Asiatic known as the Asiatic 
Fleet. 

Mr. Richardson. And how extensive a detachment was that? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, they had a squadron of destroyers, 
[6846] a number of submarines, about two light cruisers, and we 
had — the Navy Department had, I mean, deliberately kept that fleet 
down there for two reasons. One was that unless they could put a 
sufficient fleet in the Asiatic to meet the Japanese Fleet it was not good 
policy to sacrifice ships out there, and the other was we had no means 
of maintaining a fleet in the Asiatic. 

In the weeks immediately preceding the outbreak of war we trans- 
ferred most of our submarines from the Pacific to the Asiatic. 

Mr. Richardson. What was the base of the Asiatic Fleet ? 

Admiral Kimmel. What was the basis of it ? 

Mr. Richardson. The base. What was its base? 

Admiral Kimmel. Manila, I should say. They had other bases out 
there, but Manila was the principal one. 

Mr. Richardson. With the exception of the Manila base the only 
major base we had in the Pacific was at Pearl Harbor, was it not, away 
from the mainland ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I would say Pearl Harbor was the only 
base we had in the Pacific. Manila was by no means a major base at 
that time. All it afforded was ample anchorage space. 

Mr. Richardson. The main base was Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

[684-7] Mr. Richardson. And had been such for years, had it 
not? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Richardson. Pearl Harbor is located on the island of Oahu? 

Admiral Kimiviel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And the island of Oahu is a small island ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. And the base is very largely surrounded by 
mountains? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. The base itself is a shallow harbor, is it not? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir; it is. 

Mr. Richardson. Difficult of entrance? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, it is not a difficult navigational problem, 
but there is only one entrance. 



2568 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Richardson. That is narrow, long, and somewhat winding? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, it is fairly straight. 

Mr. Richardson. There is no place in the base where major ships 
can be hidden or camouflaged ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No. 

Mr. Richardson. And the base is of such a nature and location that 
anyone with a pair of spy glasses who wants to clim.b any one of 100 
mountains can see the entire base and [68/^'] everything in it? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And there is no possible way of avoiding it except 
by keeping human beings away from the mountains with spy glasses? 

Aclmiral Kimmel. That is right. I might add, with cameras also. 

Mr, Richardson. How close is it possible for the casual observer to 
get to the Pearl Harbor base ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, it is my recollection maybe 100 yards, 200 
yards, something of that kind. 

Mr. Richardson. Now our two main military establishments in 
Hawaii are Hickam Field and Shaf ter, are they not ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Hickam Field and what other? 

Mr. Richardson. Shaf ter. Isn't it Shaf ter where the general of 
the Army has his headquarters ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Shaf ter? 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. They are the two military establishments on 
Oahu, are they not? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, the Schofield Barracks. 

Mr. Richardson. Schofield, I mean ; not Shafter. 

Admiral Kimmel. Shafter is another. Then they have a [6849] 
number of small forts scattered around. 

Mr. Richardson. What are two or three of the largest? 

Admiral Kimmel. Schofield Barracks is the largest. Shafter is 
the next. I suggest you get the details from General Short. I may 
be a little mixed up in names. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, in location, Admiral, they are all fairly 
close to Pearl Harbor, are they not ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I do not remember the exact dimensions 
of Oahu, but I think it is something like 40 by 25 miles, something 
like that. Isn't that about right ? 

Mr. Richardson. Well, they are close enough, are they not. Admiral, 
so that it is perfectly practicable for one air attack to attack all of 
those establishments at Pearl Harbor on the same operation? 

Admiral Kimmel. Provided you have enough planes, yes. 

Mr. Richardson. Admiral, if we are to have any defense in the 
Pacific worthy of the name the tiling of the most supreme importance 
in the Pacific is the Pacific Fleet, is it not? 

Admiral Kimmel. Do you mean now ? 

Mr. Richardson. At any time in the last half-dozen years. 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. 

Mr. Richardson. And in order to have a Pacific Fleet functioning 
there must be a base for that fleet ? 

[6850] Admiral Kimmel. Yes, but the experiences o^ this war 
have pretty well demonstrated that the fleet can take its own base 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2569 

with them, and that is something that our Navy had been working 
on for many years, and I think it is in i3retty good shape at tlie present 
time. 

Mr. Richardson. But that was not tlie situation in the summer of 

1941? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And with conditions as they were in the summer 
of 1941 would you not agree with me that the protection of the Pacific 
Fleet was of the highest importance to the interest of the United 
States? 

Admiral KiMMEL. Oh, yes. 

Mr. Richardson. Now what is the significance. Admiral 

Admiral Kimmel. I just want to interject one little thought. You 
cannot spend all your time protecting yourself. If you do you do 
not get anywhere. 

Mr. Richardson. I was just going to come to that. What is the 
significance of a base for a fleet such as you had in Hawaii in 1941? 

Admiral Kijimel. Well, I cannot give any better definition than 
I have alreadv given. It is in the statement taken from the joint 
action of the Army and Navy in a plan known long before it was 
enunciated, and the basic point of that is that [6851] a per- 
manent naval base nuist have within itself the means for its own 
defense and for the defense of all the naval units which are based 
thereon, and that the fleet must have no anxiety as to the security of 
its base. That was laid down many, many years before Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Richardson. Now it is essential, is it not, Admiral, in the 
operation of such a fleet as you had there in the summer of 1941, that 
that fleet make use of the Pearl Harbor base at regular intervals? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Mr; Richardson. Why? 

Admiral Kimmel. There was no alternative. 

Mr. Richardson. What use would the fleet be absolutely required 
to make of the base ? 

Admiral Kimmel. In the first place, the thing that tied the fleet 
to the base more than any other one factor was the question of fuel. 
We had the fuel at Pearl Harbor. During the time I was there, as 
I stated in this statement, I tried to operate more ships at sea and 
found I could not do it because I was depleting the fuel supply at a 
time when it was imperative that we bring this fuel supply up. Every 
move I made I had to get back to that base to get some fuel. 

The facilities for fueling in Pearl Harbor were such that you could 
not fuel more than about one-eighth of the [6852] fleet in any 
12-hour period. And the tankers we had were entirely inadequate 
to support that whole fleet at sea for indefinite periods. 

I had gone to great lengths in order to get the tankers equipped for 
fueling ships at sea, and we were running our tankers betwixt the 
mainland and Hawaii and having them away long enough to have 
these exercises at sea in fueling and to keep up the fuel supply there. 
It was a nice balance that we had to maintain. 

The policy that I did follow out there — and it was forced on me 
more than anything else — and when the time came we did have the 
place full of fuel, and I have been informed that, I think in the first 
6 months after the war started, they used up more than half of that 



2570 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

stored fuel before they could get their supply coming out to keep it 
replenished and to keep the fleet replenished. 

Mr. Richardson. No, Admiral, the fuel supply in Pearl Harbor 
is kept in a lot of metal tanks? 

Admiral Kimmel. Was kept in metal tanks. 

Mr. Richardson. On the edge of the base? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. Perfectly visible? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. Perfectly subject to air attack? 

[68S3] Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Richardson. But fortunately not touched by the attack of 
. December 7 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. If that supply of fuel in the Pearl Harbor base 
had been destroyed by that attack, could you have continued to main- 
tain your Fleet at the Pearl Harbor base in the future? 

Admiral Kimmel. With the facilities I had at that time ? 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. No. 

Mr. Richardson. What would you have had to have done? 

Admiral Kimmel. I would have had to withdraw to the Coast where 
I could get fuel. 

Mr. Richardson. You were familiar, were you not, Admiral, with 
the dispute between Washington and Admiral Richardson with re- 
spect to where the Fleet should be stationed ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Richardson. In that controversy did the question of the safety 
of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor ever become the subject of discussion? 

Admiral Kimmel. I never took part in any of those discussions. I 
think you better get that answer from Admiral Richardson.^ How- 
ever, I think from all my knowledge of it that [^5-5^] his prime 
idea was to put the Fleet in a place where it could train more expedi- 
tiously. All of this that you speak of was well-known to Admiral 
Richardson, the Navy Department, and everybody concerned. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, on the question of fuel alone, there always 
hung over the safety of the Pearl Harbor base the protection of that 
fuel supply? 

Admiral Kimtmel. That is right. 

Mr. Richardson. Now from the very start of your connection with 
the Pacific Fleet as its commander in chief, you knew, did you not, 
Admiral, what that base in Hawaii and what your fleet should have 
in connection with the base by way of equipment in order to properly 
defend the base and defend the Fleet? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think if you will read my letters written during 
that period you can arrive at that conclusion. 

Mr. Richardson. And it is a fact, is it not, Admiral, that constantly 
from the time you took charge of that fleet you bombarded Wash- 
ington for more planes, more •antiaircraft guns, more ammunition and 
more men? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you think that those additional items were 
necessary in order to properly protect the fleet and defend the base? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2571 

[6S-5S] Admiral Kimmel. I adopted the scheme of providing as 
far as I could for all eventualities. I wanted Hawaii to be secure not 
only for the protection of the fleet while it was in there, but for the 
protection of the base, for the facilities, the fuel supply at all times, 
and I wanted the fleet free to move and accomplish something. 

Mr. E-iCHARDSON. What would you have had to have had that you 
did not have to accomplish those results? Let me put it affirmatively. 

You needed more patrol planes, did you not ? 

Admiral Kjmmel. It was a combination 

Mr. Richardson. I am not saying. Admiral, what you had or the 
devices that you used to make what you had go as far as possible, I am 
simply stating now, as a naval expert, when you took charge of the 
Pacific Fleet what did you need to be sent to you as commander in 
chief of the fleet in order to protect the fleet and protect the base? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I should say the protection of the base was 
an Army responsibility. 

Mr. Richardson. I understand that. 

Admiral Kimmel. It was not what I needed. I did not command 
the Army in Hawaii, I had no command over them whatsoever. It was 
wdiat the Army needed for the defense of Hawaii. 

Mr. Richardson. In order to make my question clear, I [68561 
am entirely familiar. Admiral, with your suggestion that it is a mili- 
tary axiom thrit the fleet is not supposed to protect its own base. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. That is the duty of the Army. But there never 
was a time at Hawaii, was there. Admiral, when the protection of the 
base was not part of the duty of the fleet, under your cooperative 
arrangement that you made with the Army in Hawaii? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, if you are talking about what steps I took 
after I came there in command, we had a condition to face and not any 
theory. 

Mr. Richardson. What was the condition? 

Admiral Kimmel. The condition was that the Army had a handful 
of planes, the Army was short of a great many things. Subsequent 
to the effort that we made in the early days of my command out there 
they got a few planes. They got some fighters, they got some B-17 
bombers. At one time the Army was built up to 27 B-17's — I think 
that figure is correct — and we had promises of more. Then the War 
Department ordered the bombers transferred to the Philippines and all 
of those B-17's disappeared to the westward, along with some others, 
except 12, and in the process of outfitting them at Hickam Field they 
stripped 6 of those 12 planes to such an extent [6857] that they 
were not in commission. 

That was the way we found ourselves on December 7th. 

Now the Army had allocated — and I speak from memory — about 
180 B-17's. The Navy had allocated 160 patrol planes to Oahu, and 
w^ith that 160 patrol planes plus the 180 bombers — and we had hopes 
always, you see — this condition would have been quite different. 

The allocations were all right, but what we had was all wrong. 

Mr. Richardson. In order to properly defend the base and the fleet 
in connection with the base, it was necessary, was it not, to have Navy 
patrol planes to carry on that type of reconnaissance which would 
disclose an approaching enemy force in the ocean ? 



2572 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. And furthermore, to have available a 
striking force of bombers and torpedoes, and what not, who would go 
out and destroy the approaching force. It does not profit you much 
to discover the enemy if you cannot hit him with anything. 

Mr. Richardson. And 3^ou had neither the planes with which to dis- 
cover nor the planes with which to hit him after j'ou discovered him? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Richardson. And you so advised Washington? 

[6858] Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, the fact is, Admiral, is it not, that as a mat- 
ter of naval policy you were directed to carry on and maintain a 
defensive position in the Pacific ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. And the only departure that was contemplated in 
WPL-46 was a raiding move toward the mandated islands ? 

Admiral Kimmel. The most important part of any defensive atti- 
tude is the oifensive action you take to carry it out. We speak of 
defensive in the sense of strategic defensive, not a tactical defensive. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, with the size of fleet that you had in Hawaii 
during the summer of 1941 you Avere not in a position to inaugurate 
a grand offensive? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, no. 

Mr. Richardson. Against the Japanese Fleet ? 

Admiral Kimmel. A main offensive involved going into the Japa- 
nese waters. What we had there would permit us to make raids on the 
Marshalls. This was a Navy Department plan, and I was carrying 
out the plan. We hoped to divert the strength of the Japanese away 
from the Malay Barrier, to ease the pressure on the British and Dutch, 
and to do as much damage as we could to the enemy. 

[6859-6959'] Incidentally, we had Wake Island and we planned, 
in the days before Pearl Harbor, that we could use Wake Island as 
more or less of a bait to catch detachments of the Japanese Fleet down 
there. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral, if you had any naval disaster in 
the Hawaiian area, was there any place you could look for immediate 
aid? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, we could look for immediate aid by planes 
from the coast, that they would send out. 

Incidentally, I have been informed, although not in detail, that in 
the days immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor a great many 
planes of good type did appear there. 

Mr. Richardson. Then the only relief they could give to you would 
come from the mainland ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. 

Mr. Richardson. And from the mainland bases ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Richardson. So that, as a matter of fact, Admiral, it can be 
fairly stated, can it not, that your main defense for yourself in the 
Pacific lay in your own hands and that of the Army at Hawaii? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes; we were out there. 

Mr. Richardson. Now you not only found when you went there. 
Admiral, a shortage of planes which could make [6960] recon- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2573 

naissance and planes which could attack upon a reconnaissance, but 
you also found the base deficient in antiaircraft defenses, did you not'? 

Admiral Kimmel. And in fighter planes. 

Mr. Richardson. Leaving the fighter planes, there was also a short- 
age of antiaircraft guns, was there not ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. And part of 3^our requests to Washington asked 
for an assignment of more of those guns? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

[6961] Mr. Richardson. Were they an essential part of the de- 
fense of the base ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes; I think so. 

Mr. Richardson. Those guns would be ordinarily under the control 
of the Army, would they not? 

• Admiral Kimmel. Yes, but we wanted additional antiaircraft guns 
for our outlying island bases. We requested that on many occasions. 

Incidentally, on the 29th of November of 1941, 1 received a dispatch 
from the Navy Department in which the — well, here is the dispatch : 

Ai-rangements described in your 28C627 appear to be best that can be done under 
the circumstances, but suggest advisability of transferring very many of 221. 

That is a Marine fighting squadron. 

— from San Diego to Hawaii via Saratoga. War Department will instruct Com- 
manding General, Hawaiian Department to cooperate with Navy in plans for 
use of Army pursuit planes and Army troops in support of marines. War Depart- 
ment will endeavor to expedite plans for increase of AA defenses, but it is doubtful 
if much improvement is possible soon. 

Marine Corps will shortly receive 16 37-millimeter AA guns and receive am- 
munition in February. You desire these guns for "Midway and Wake. Request 
Airmail report on present defenses of all outlying bases and these increases 
planned in immediate future. 

Wlien I got that dispatch, I sent another dispatch — I don't see it 
here — to the Navy Department, in which I urged that inasmuch as 
they were going to supply us with sixteen 37-mm. AA guns for the 
marines in December, that they give us at least 3,000 rounds of am- 
munition to teach the people at least how to use them when they got 
the ammunition in February. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, was this condition that I have been talking 
about with respect to the need of planes and antiaircraft guns and 
the other equipment which you felt was essential to the protection of 
the base — the fleet's interest in the base — ever furnished you in suffi- 
cient quantities to meet the need ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Not completely, no. And when you say "fur- 
nished me," you mean furnished the Army in Hawaii ? 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. Admiral, I plead guilty to the fact of not 
being able all the while to separate in my mind the Army and the 
Navy in Hawaii, but that is due to the fact, and I am going to ask you, 
whether you didn't enter into a cooperative defense arrangement in 
late 1941 in which you were both for one and one for both? 

[6063] Admiral Kimmel. I entered into that early in February 
of 1941. I issued a letter which is entitled "2 CL^l." The date of 
the first letter was early in February, and about 2 or 3 weeks later we 
replied to that. I wanted to get something out right away and that 
is the reason we hurried with the first one. 

79716 — 46— pt. 6 7 



2574 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Two or three weeks later we revised it, and issued another one in 
the latter part of February, and by that time we felt that we had 
covered the point with the equipment and the forces we had in pretty 
good shape. 

That letter stood until the 14th of October of 1941, when we issued 
another letter. 

Incidentally, I might tell you a little bit about my activities in 
regard to getting an agreement betwixt the air forces out there. Im- 
mediately I got this responsibility, or knew I was going to have it, I 
started to work on the Army, and when General Short arrived I went 
out to call on General Short before he had taken over his command. 
I went out in civilian clothes. I realized the importance of coopera- 
tion betwixt the services. 

I found General Short a very likable gentleman, and subsequently 
a very able Army officer. I broached the subject of some kind of an 
agreement whereby the efforts of the Army air and the Navy air could 
be coordinated on [6964^ the island of Oahu and in the Ha- 
waiian area. 

I found General Short very much of the same mind, and we set in 
motion the studies which eventually resulted in the agreement to use 
what we had jointly. 

That agreement was sent on to Washington. Eventually, we got 
out the estimate of the situation, which Admiral Bellinger and Gen- 
eral Martin had a great deal to do with drawing up, and the coordina- 
tion betwixt the two services was of a higher degree there than any 
other area that I had ever known prior to that time. 

I issued an order that every Navy squadron of planes on wheels 
was to land on each of the Army fields, and to be serviced there and 
to get ammunition and bombs so they would know how to do it, and 
General Short did the same thing for the Army. 

Now, those were the steps that we took in trying to utilize to the 
best advantage the facilities and the forces that we had. 

Mr. EiCHAEDsoN. Those steps were made necessary, Admiral, by 
your shortage in equipment? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, in any event it would have been very desira- 
ble, especially as regard air. I am talking now of the air of the Army 
and the air of the Navy, which was temporarily based on shore at any 
one time. 

[6966] Mr. Eichakdson. Then, as a matter of fact, Admiral, 
for the Navy you did assume a protection to the base which, under 
better conditions j'ou wouldn't have had to assume ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I tried to insure tliat we would have all of our 
forces actively take part in the defense of the Islands. 

Mr. RiCH.^RDSON. You had become quite familiar with Hawaii? 

Admiral Kimmel. I don't know what you mean. 

Mr. Richardson. You knew that 40 percent of the people in Hawaii 
were of Japanese ancestry ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir; I knew that. 

Mr. Richardson. You knew that there was in Hawaii a very numer- 
ous and highly developed Japanese espionage system ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I had an idea that that might be so. 

Mr. Richardson. The conditions were ideal for the building of such 
a system, were they not ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2575 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct, and in the summer of 1941 there 
■was numerous consular agents there. The commandant of the district, 
who handled all of those matters for the fleet and for the Navy 

Mr. Richardson. That was Admiral Bloch ? 

[6966] Admiral Kimmel. Admiral Bloch. Recommended they 
put them all in the jug. That is in effect what he recommended. 
The Army thought that wasn't a good idea, and they recommended 
against it. 

This bounced back and forward and I believe that — I have since 
found out, or since been informed that the Secretary of War was the 
man who finally decided that no action should be taken against these 
people.^ What his reasons were, I don't know. 

Mr. Richardson. And in dealing with such a group, did you find 
any difficulties in your way by reason of the law in connection with 
wire tapping, or the tapping of cables and other means by which 
message could be transmitted from Hawaii to Tokyo ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think I did find some difficulties; yes. I, of 
course, took an interest in all of these matters. I was more concerned 
with the information they obtained than the means they- took to 
obtain it. And, as I have said, that phase of the Pacific Fleet's 
operations, whatever responsibility the Navy had in Hawaii, was 
directly under Admiral Bloch. 

I have every reason to believe that Admiral Bloch did everything 
within his power. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, with that large group of Japanese 
[6967] agents free in Hawaii, you knew, did you not. Admiral, 
that they knew everything with respect to the disposition of the base, 
its defense, and the movement of ships in and out of the base; that 
you knew? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I wouldn't go so far as that. I would say 
that they could know the movements of the ships in and out of the 
base, but I hoped then that we were able to keep a good many things 
from them. When all of the disclosures were made about what they 
knew at Pearl Harbor, I found we hadn't been quite so successful 
as we thought we had been. 

Mr. Richardson. There was no reason, was there, why an intelli- 
gent group of spies, such as these, couldn't keep an active watch on 
what was happening on every airfield in Oahu ? 

Admiral Khmmel. Well, I imagine they did pretty well, because 
they could go up in the hills and look down. 

Mr. Richardson. And if the planes on the various air fields were 
bunched together, it would be very easy for them to find it out? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I don't know about that. 

Mr. Richardson. All they would have to do is use their eyes; 
wouldn't that be so ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I should say so. 

[6968] Mr. Richardson. You had always discovered in your 
talks and conferences concerning the Japanese that they were an 
ardent, competent, intelligent people in connection with such a sub- 
ject as espionage? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. 

Mr. RiciiARDSON. And they were not afraid? 

1 See Exhibit No. 128, introduced on p. 2768, infra. 



2576 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Ki^.imel. They were most industrious. 

Mr. Richardson. They never were afraid ? 

Admiral Kimmel. They were industrious. I don't go with all the 
rest of that. 

Mr. EiciiARDSON. They never were afraid of hard work? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, would you be surprised now to find 
that the Japanese spies were unable to find out the number of avail- 
able planes that the Army and the Navy had in Hawaii during 1941 ? 

Admiral Kisimel. Oh," I think they knew that; they must have 
known it. 

Mr. Richardson. You knew, of course, that whatever they knew, 
they were free to send to Tokyo ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, they were much freer than I knew they 
were. 

Mr. Richardson. Every method of transmission between Hawaii 
and Tokyo was open to them, was it not? 

[6969] Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir; but you must remember 
that I had something else to do besides running around finding out 
what the Japanese knew. I had competent officers there to do every- 
thing within their power. I believe they did do everything within 
their power. 

Mr. Richardson. I understand that. When I say "you" Admiral, 
it is a rather editorial "you." 

Admiral Kimmel. All right, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. I mean that you knew, as the commanding officer, 
the extent and possibility of Japanese espionage in Hawaii? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Richardson. And it was your duty as a commanding officer, 
to fear the worst with respect to the amount of things they could 
find out ? 

Admiral Kimmel. We feared the worst, all right. We feared it 
all the time. 

In connection with this, you mentioned something about the bunch- 
ing of planes. This is something about which my part has never 
been presented to anybody so far as I know. 

I ran across this letter, which I knew I had issued on September 23, 
19-11. and this is a letter which deals with the security of aircraft in 
the Hawaiian area from [6970] air attack at fields or stations. 
I don't know whether it is necessary to read the whole letter, but in 
it I direct the commandant of the district to take steps to insure at all 
times the maximum dispersion of aircraft at the various fields, and 
naval stations there. 

Mr. Richardson. Why? 

Admiral Kimmel. Because it was the sensible thing to do. 

Mr. Richardson. I ask again why was it sensible? What were you 
trying to effectuate by objecting to the bunching of planes on air- 
fields? 

Admiral Kimmel. I was reading at all times, the results of the war 
in Europe. We were trying to put into effect in Hawaii every single 
thing that would help us in the defense of Hawaii in the event of an 
air attack or in the event of any other kind of an attack. 

I tried to overlook nothing, and this was just one of the steps. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2577 

Now, this was a thing that could be done and should be done and 
I presumed was done to the limit of the facilities that we had there 
at that time. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, if the planes were all bunched up close, 
wing tip to wing tip, it would take a considerable amount of time 
to get them in a position where they 16971} could take off 
and go into the air? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, no ; I don't think it would take much more 
time. They could be bunched wing tip to wing tip and you could 
run one out at a time and get them out quickly. 

Mr. Richardson. What did you think, was the primary danger by 
wa}^ of attack to the Pearl Harbor base ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, the Pearl Harbor base, the principal 
danger from attack to the Pearl Harbor base was from the air, of 
course. 

Mr. Richardson. You pointed that out, did you not, over again 
in your correspondence with the Chief of Naval Operations? 

Admiral Kjmmel. Yes ; but there is another form of attack in the 
Hawaiian area, and that was a submarine attack on the base as di- 
vorced from the whole area. The primary form of attack was prob- 
ably by air, if any attack came. 

Mr. Richardson. I think, Mr. Chairman, in view of the Admiral's 
suggestion as to this letter, since we have been furnished with copies, 
it might be well to have it made an exhibit, and circulated with the 
committee. 

The Vice Chairman. Why not just read it into the record? 

[6972] Mr. Murphy. It would be better to spread it in the 
record so it will be tied up with the testimony at this point. 

Mr. Richardson. I have no objection. 

The Vice Chairman. Proceed to read it, Admiral. 

Admiral Kimmel [reading] : 

United States Pacific Fleet 
U. S. S. "Pennsylvania," Flagship 

CinCPAC File No. A16-3/AD/(95) Serial 01504 

Confidential Pe.\rl Harbor, T. H., FieiJloiiJ^er 23, 1941. 

From : Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. 
To : Commandant Fourteenth Naval District. 

Subject : Security of Aircraft, Havraiian Area, from Air Attacks at Fields or 
Stations. 

1. The Commander-in-Chief desires that provision be made for maximum 
security of fleet aircraft in the Havpaiian area from air attack while on the 
ground or water. 

2. As amply demonstrated by current war experience, both dispersal and 
protection where dispersed are fundamental requirements. Movement of air- 
craft units to various available fields or locations and individual dispersal at 
these locations are primarily operational responsi- {6973} bHities. Pro- 
visions for this individual dispersal and for passive protection, however, are 
under the cognizance of the District. 

3. Because of the large size of patrol planes and the need for solid surfaces 
for these planes vrhen on shore, less can be done for their individual dispersal 
and protection than for landplanes. It must be handled primarily by maximum 
intervals between planes on parking platforms and maximum provision of well 
separated moorings of all patrol plane operating points. 

4. Much can and must be done, however, for individual landplane dispersal 
and protection. Ideally, there should be separate "stalls" at each landplane field 



2578 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

or ruuway where, during emergency conditions, all planes that may need to 
operate from a given field can be placed while on the ground. It should be 
possible to taxi planes readily to and from these points without undue delay in 
operating speed. These points should, further, be arranged in other than straight 
lines so as not to provide consecutive targets for attacking planes. Revetments 
for averting and localizing damage should be provided around each stall. 

. For both patrol planes (when on shore) and landplanes, suitable conceal- 
ment camouflage should be developed and provided. The net type is suggested. 

[6974] 0. The Commander-in-Chief understands that action along the above 
lines is already being taken by the Army in this area. He also understands that 
studies are in progress for dispersal construction at Ewa Field. (That is a 
marine field.) He considers that dispersal construction should be undertaken 
at all fields under naval control in the Hawaiian Area and on the outlying 
islands. These on the Island of Oahu are of primary importance and should 
have first priority. It is recognized that what can be accomplished on Ford 
Island will, because of space restrictions, be far from ideal, but the best pos- 
sible solution should be sought. 

7. Because of the close relationship of dispersal construction requirements 
with active operations, it is important that all phases of dispersal be simul- 
taneously considered and coordinated. Accordingly, Commander Aircraft Battle 
Force and Commander Patrol Wing Two are directed to consult with the Com- 
mandant Fourteenth Naval District as to plans and requirements. The objective 
is the earliest possible provision of both the necessary construction and suitable 
operating doctrine. 

H. E. KiMMEX. 

Copy to : 

Combatfor 

Corascofor 

[6975] Comairbatfor 

Comairseofor 

Compatwing TWO. 

Senator Lucas. May I inquire, Mr. Counsel, what is the date of 
that? 

Admiral Kimmel. I beg your pardon ? 

Senator Lucas. What is the date of that again, Admiral ? 

Admiral Kimmel. September 23, 1941. 

And I might add that the Navy at Kanoehe Bay had dispersed their 
patrol planes to the maximum extent possible. Over there they had 
anchored out quite a number of patrol planes. They had done the 
same thing at other naval fields out there. 

On the day of the attack every single one of the patrol planes that 
was anchored out was destroyed because they were sunk at the moor- 
ings, and the__ones that were more or less bunched on the ramps, most 
of them were saved because they could get to them and put out the 
fires. 

Mr. Richardson. Admiral, the United States lost about 3,000 men 
in that attack, did they not ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Something on that order. 

Mr. Richardson. Can you tell me where the great bulk of losses 
came? Was it on board ship, or was it in connec- [69761 tion 
with trying to get the planes off? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think the major part of the losses were on ship- 
board. That is something you can verify very readily. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, throughout 1941 and up to the early fall, 
pretty near every communication you had with the Chief of Naval 
Operations referred to the possibility of air attack? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

No ; that isn't right. It didn't refer to the possibility of air attack. 
Nearly every communication I had from the Navy Department did 
not refer to the possibility of air attack. It referred in greater or 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2579 

less degree to the supply of material which we thought we needed out 
there. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, in every one of your letters where the sub- 
ject of an attack on Hawaii was discussed, the possibility of an air 
attack was presented by you as one of the hazards of the base? 

Admiral Kimmel. There was always that possibility. I wanted 
that base to be secure over an indefinite period and to meet any even- 
tuality that war might bring forward. 

I wanted it to be able to defend itself even though the Pacific Fleet 
were wiped out. 

Mr. KicHARDSON. And so far as ships in Pearl Harbor [6977] 
were concerned, the danger that they would suffer from a submarine 
attack would be less than they might suffer from an air attack? 

Admiral Kimmel. We thought that the danger from submarine 
attacli in Pearl Harbor was nil — nothing. 

Mr. Richardson. That is right. 

Admiral Kimmel. We had at the entrance of the Harbor an anti- 
torpedo net. We didn't have an antisubmarine net. We Imew of no 
submarines which could enter the harbor entirely submerged and this 
two-man submarine that did enter the harbor submerged was an en- 
tirely new type and something of which we had no knowledge. 

Incidentally, I think the two-man submarine never paid for itself. 
The only one that ever got in to that harbor they sank very promptly, 
and its two torpedoes were discharged harmlessly. 

Mr. Richardson. Then your discLission of a submarine attack had 
reference to damages to the fleet in the open sea ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, in the operating areas around — in the sea 
around Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Richardson. With reference to the hazard to the base that lay 
in a possible air attack ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. That appeared to be the only means 
[6978] that they could take to get in to do any damage to the 
fleet at that time. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, with respect to an air attack, you had 
to have a suitable fleet of reconnaissance planes that could carry on 
a distant reconnaissance in an attempt to locate an attacking enemy 
force before their planes could leave 'their carriers for attack? 

Admiral Kimmel. And to have a striking force to go out and sink 
the carriers. 

Mr. Richardson. The second thing that you had to have, passing 
from the question of patrol planes for distant reconnaissance, was a 
suitable fleet of fighters that could do some fighting after you found 
the enemy ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, the fighters — the pursuit planes, which we 
call them in the Navy — fighters are defensive. They are to knock 
down the planes after the attack is launched. And the only real de- 
fense against an airplane attack from carriers, is to discover the car- 
riers and to sink the carriers before they can launch the planes. And 
those are bombing planes, long-range bombing planes. 

Mr. Richardson. And it is a fact, is it not. Admiral, that once the 
planes leave a carrier in quantity for an attack it is a very difficult 
matter to prevent some of those planes from reaching their objective? 

[6979] Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 



2580 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Richardson. And however good your defense may have been 

against the attack on December 7, you, as a Naval man, would be sur- 
prised if some of the attacking planes had not come through and 
reached their targets ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Those were the lessons that we had learned from 
the war in Europe at that time. We had learned those lessons from 
our own maneuvers. 

We had staged many attacks on Pearl Harbor ourselves as a matter 
of training, and those same principles and facts have been demon- 
strated many, many times during the 4 years that have elapsed since 
that time. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, in addition to the subject of planes, patrol 
and fighters, it was essential to a proper defense of an attack on the 
base that you have, that there be available a proper number of anti- 
aircraft guns ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, as an immediate defense. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you have such in Hawaii at that time ? 

Admiral Kimmel. We didn't have such on our ships. The anti- 
aircraft batteries of all our ships, and particularly the battleships, 
were woefully inadequate. It was something that a gi'eat many of 
us had known for many years, and that somehow or other we hadn't 
been able to remedy. [6980] And the thing we were particularly 
deficient in was the short-range antiaircraft guns. That deficiency 
we were in the process of remedying at the time the attack came on 
Pearl Harbor. 

Today battleships, I don't know the number, but they have hundreds 
of antiaircraft guns. On the battleships that we had out there we 
had 12 or 15, maybe 20 altogether of all types. Fifty calibers. And 
no real short-range antiaircraft guns. 

I mean, so few as to be almost negligible. 

Mr. Richardson. The land-based antiaircraft guns were under the 
control of the Army ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you ever make an inspection of the antiair- 
craft batteries of the Army ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you know how many they had ? 

Admiral Kimmel. In general, it has been reported to me. 

Mr. Richardson. Had you made the subject of their guns or their 
number a matter for definite examination by members of your staff? 

Admiral Kimmel. No; the number of antiaircraft guns had been 
reported. I don't know what you mean by definite [6981] 
examination by members of my staff. 

You mean to go out and look at them? 

[6982] Mr. Richardson. That is what I meant. 

Admiral Kimmel. So far as I know, no. 

Now, this question of numbers of guns was treated in correspondence 
and you will recall that that subject was taken up by Admiral Bloch, 
and in December of 1940 he prepared a letter. Richnrdson had had a 
conference with the commanding general, General Herron, out there, 
and this letter was prepared by Bloch and forwarded by Richardson, 
and apparently that started the correspondence betwixt the Secretary 
of War and Secretary of the Navy, and when I saw that correspond- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2581 

ence I had high hopes that we were going to get what everybody 
seemed to admit was required in Hawaii. 

Mr. Richardson. But you knew you had not gotten them ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes; I knew we had not gotten them and in the 
quantities — they got some but they had not gotten them in the quanti- 
ties that they thought were necessary. 

Mr. KiCHARDSON. Did you have any knowledge, or did you direct 
any member of your staff to get specific knowledge as to the status of 
readiness of the Army's antiaircraft batteries immediately prior to 
the attack on December 7th? 

Admiral Kimmel. That was a matter which was covered in my 
fleet security order, and all of that work was delegated to the com- 
mandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, who was the naval base 
defense officer; he was also the commander of the [698S] Ha- 
waiian coastal frontier, and, as I indicated yesterday, with General 
Short was charged with the defense of the Hawaiian coastal fron- 
tier by the Navy Department and as a naval base defense officer to 
coordinate whatever fleet effort could be available with that of the 
Army, and I read from specification "G" of 2 CL-41, dated October 
the 14th, 1941 : 

(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense 
Officer. As such he shall : 

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against 
air attack. 

(b) Arrange with tlie Army to have their anti-aircraft gmis emplaced. 

(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging 
through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort 
between the Army and Navy. 

(d) Coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by: 

(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the 
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain. 

(2) Holding necessary drills. 

(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal. 

[69SJi] (4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and 

the type of attacking aircraft. 

(5) Arranging communication plan. 

(6) Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed." 

Admiral Bloch, I might say, was the commander in chief of tlie 
United States Fleet just prior to Admiral Richardson. Admiral 
Richardson relieved him as commander in chief of the United States 
Fleet. I relieved Richardson, as you recall. 

Admiral Bloch was an accomplished officer, an officer in whom I 
had the highest confidence and still have and I had turned over this 
matter to him, not to a member of my immediate staff, and he did, I 
believe, a gi-eat many things. You will get him here, you will have 
him testify. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, did you understand. Admiral, that it was 
Bloch's duty under your direction to see to it that the Army anti- 
aircraft batteries were in a state of readiness to defend that base? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, insofar as the Navy had any responsibility 
for it, yes, but now I think maybe it would be well for me to go into 
that a little bit in regard to General Short's alert. 

In the late afternoon of November 27, 1941, Captain Earle, Admiral 
Bloch's Chief of Staff, brought to me a copy [6985] of the 
message which General Marshall had sent to General Short. General 
Short had sent a copy to the Naval Base Defense Officer, Admiral 



25S2 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Bloch. I read General Marshall's message. I noted the language 
that Short's measures were not to alarm the civilian population or 
disclose intent. I also noted the order directing General Short to 
report the measures taken by him to General Marshall. The officer 
who brought me the message informed me, "The Army has gone on 
an alert." The next morning my Chief of Staff confirmed this report 
with information about Army troop movements. 

I conferred with General Short on November 28 about the messages 
each of us had received on the 27th. We discussed these dispatches in 
all aspects. We considered, as we did frequently before and did later, 
the probabilities and possibilities of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. 
In this connection there Vvas discussion of the effect of the sugges- 
tion from Washington that 50 Army pursuit planes be sent by air- 
craft carriers to Wake and Midway. I understood the Army was on 
an alert and that the alert was against sabotage among other things, 
although I do not now recall General Short specifically mentioning 
the details of his alert. 

During 1941 1 went to sea with the fleet on maneuvers whenever that 
was possible. I also expected that if war came and the fleet left Pearl 
Harbor on an operation, I would be [6,956'] far from Pearl 
Harbor. Consequently, I knew there was need to have a naval officer 
permanently based in Pearl Harbor to coordinate the use of the naval 
units which might be in Pearl Harbor at that time in the base defense. 
If you refer to my Fleet Security Order, 2CL-41, Exhibit 41, item 12, 
you will find the following provisions : 

(G) (6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base De- 
fense OfBcer. As such he shall : 

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against 
air attack. 

(b) Arrange vpith the Army to have their antiaircraft guns emplaced. 

(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging 
through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort 
between the Army and Navy. 

(d) Coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by: 

(1) Advising the Senior OfBcer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the 
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what conditions of readiness to maintain. 

(2) Holding necessary drills. 

(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal. 

[6'5S7] (4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and 
the type of attacking aircraft. 

(5) Arranging communication plan. 

(G) Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed. 

Admiral Bloch, the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, 
was the naval base defense officer. He was invariably in attendance 
at my conferences with General Short. He has testified at some length 
before the Naval Court as to his activities prior to the attack in carry- 
ing out the duties assigned to him under the provisions of my orders 
which I have just read. He will be a witness here. I do not wish 
to anticipate his testimony. However, I will give you certain high- 
lights of his activities, as testified to before the Naval Court of In- 
quiry, because I was generally familiar with them prior to the attack. 

In February 1941 he had urged upon General Short the necessity 
of emplacing his mobile antiaircraft guns in the field. He personally 
examined the plans for location of all Army antiaircraft weapons that 
were to be emplaced. His subordinates were in constant touch with 
Army representatives. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2583 

In October or November 1941 General Short had explained to him 
the difficulties General Short had emplacing certain of the Army's 
mobile antiaircraft guns. Sites were not on [6988] Govern- 
ment land. Fire-control communications were out in weather and 
subject to deterioration. It was difficult for personnel comprising 
the gun crews to be quartered and subsisted. 

To help obviate this last problem for the Army, the Navy was 
actually making arrangements on December 7 to mess and quarter 
Army gun crews on Navy reservations. 

I considered I had done everything I could prior to the attack to 
strengthen the Army antiaircraft defense of Pearl Harbor. As late as 
December 2, in an official letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, I 
pointed out that "the Army is not only lacking antiaircraft guns for 
outlying bases, but has a serious shortage on Oahu." I had appointed 
a responsible naval officer to exercise with the Army joint supervisory 
control over the defense against air attack and to arrange with the 
Army to have their antiaircraft guns emplaced. From everything I 
knew, he had been active and diligent in following the matter up. Of 
course, the Army had its difficulties, some of which I have mentioned. 
Neither I nor Admiral Bioch could solve tjiem. Moreover, if I had 
constantly intruded into the day-to-day coordination of Admiral Bloch 
and General Short on this matter I might very well have undone all 
my security order, 2 CL-ll, was designed to accomplish, the working 
out of a JDerlnanent Army-Navy local defense coordin- [6989\ 
ation which would have to continue in my absence and that of the 
fleet. 

I knew that General Short had been ordered to report the measures 
he took in response to his message of November 27 from General Mar- 
shall, This meant the joint participation of General Marshall and 
General Short in the character of the alert assumed in Hawaii. I 
thought that General Marshall and General Short knew better than 
I what specific Army measures should be adopted to perform ade- 
quatel}^ the Army mission of defending the naval base at Pearl Harbor 
and at the same time of complying with the restrictions involved of not 
alarming the civilian population nor disclosing intent. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, could I inquire from Avliat the witness 
is reading ? Is it from a previous record or what ? 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy has inquired, Admiral, as to what 
it is you have been reading from ? 

Admiral Kimmel. A memorandum which I prepared, 

Mr. Murphy. Your own memorandum ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. All right. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you know, Admiral, what General Short's first 
alert was ? 

Admiral Kimmel. You mean No. 1 alert, as you call it ? 

Mr. Richardson. That is it. 

[6990] Admiral Kimmel. I did not know he had but one kind of 
an alert. 

Mr. Richardson. What kind of alert did you think he had ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I thought he had an alert where he put his people 
on the alert. 



2584 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Richardson. Did yon know at the time you talked with General 
Short that his No. 1 alert was simply against sabotage? 

Admiral Kimmel. I did not know he had a No. 1 alert. I think I 
have found out since, however, that this No. 1, 2, and 3 alert business 
was put into effect on the 5th of November of 1941. Prior to that 
they had an alert and a nonalert status. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you know from any conversation you had with 
General Short or any reported to you by your staff that Short had re- 
s])onded to the dispatch from Marshall with a notice on his part to 
Marshall that he had put in this first alert against sabotage ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I never saw Short's reply and was never in- 
formed of it. 

Mr. Richardson. You never knew anything about it ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Richardson. In your opinion, under the circumstances that 
there faced you would an alert against sabotage have been in accord- 
ance with what you were contemplating under the order that you have 
just refeiTed to concerning a defense [6991] of Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Kimmel. I had taken the steps to put the ships of the fleet 
on an alert some time before — I mean to put them in shape where they 
could go on an alert very quickly a long time before. I had provided — 
I mean I had made sure that the ammunition for the guns was avail- 
able, that the crews were on board and that a certain proportion of them 
would be mar.ning the guns. At sea we had full security measures in 
effect and in ])()rt we had the security measures in effect which we felt 
that the situation demanded at the time and there was very little more 
that we could have done in port than what we did. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, did you contemplate. Admiral, in con- 
nection with your assignment of duties to Admiral Bloch, that he 
should inform himself of the question of the readiness of the antiair- 
craft batteries of the Army ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That was the Army's responsibility and there 
were two separate commands in Hawaii. There was the Army com- 
mand and there was the Navy command and when the Army said they 
were on an alert I thought they knew their business and I had every 
reason to think so because General Short is a very capable officer. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, if it should be found to be the fact that 
only one battery of antiaircraft guns were in readi- [6992] 
ness, that none of the other guns had ammunition, some not nearer 
than 75 yards and some not nearer than 500 j'ards from the gun place- 
ments, would, in your opinion, that liave l>een a form of alert against 
an attack on the base that you thouglit the Army had in effect at the 
time of your discussion with General Short or at the time of any direc- 
tions you may have given to Admiral Bloch ? 

Admiral Kimmel. My best answer to that is to call your attention 
to the steps that I took. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral, one more subject I want to bring 
up at this point. 

In addition to the question of the use of planes to defend against 
an air attack and in addition to the use of antiaircraft gims to defend 
against an air attack there is one more method, is there not, by which 
you can help and get ready to defend yourself and that is rfcdar? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2585 

Mr. Richardson. Now, as I understood your statement, you sug- 
gested that there had been supplied at long last to the fleet various 
radar equipment? 

Admiral Kjmmel. That is right. 

Mr. RiciiAEDsoN. And that in connection with the use of tliat equip- 
ment and as an aid to the Army you took with you a number of men 
designated by the Army on your ships in order to [6'99J] fa- 
miliarize them with radar? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And it is a fact, is it not, that there was to be 
supplied to the Army in Hawaii a number of so-called mobile radar 
sets and a number of radar sets that were to have fixed land locations ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think that is true. 

Mr. Richardson. And you knew prior to December 7 by a report 
from General Short or under his authority that the mobile radar sets 
were operating and were in shape to operate ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I will put it this way : I could not concern myself 
with whether the Army had mobile radar sets or fixed radar sets. I 
knew they had radar which could give a coverage, I had been so in- 
formed by General Short, and whether they were mobile or fixed I do 
not recall whether I knew that or not. I knew something of the plans 
but just which ones they had in operation, my knowledge of that prior 
to the attack, which ones they had in operation, was sketchy. I knew 
they had sets in operation, that they could give us coverage and I was 
so informed. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral, there was no way within the instru- 
ment itself at that time by which you could tell through radar whether 
approaching planes w^ere enemy planes or friendly planes? 

[€994.] Admiral Kimmel. That is right, and that was something 
that we had urgently requested because we realized from the time that 
radar first came out there that that was going to be one of the great 
difficulties. 

Mr. Richardson. And in order to make a practical use 

Admiral Kimmel. Such a device was in existence, you know. 

Mr. Richardson. But you did not have it ? 

Admiral Kimmel. We did not have it. 

Mr. Richardson. So the only way you could allow for that would 
be to try and orient planes that would be discovered on radar with 
your own information as to where your own planes might be ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Richardson. So that if a radar set operating on Hawaii should 
find on the chart approaching planes, the only way of telling whether 
those planes were friendly planes or enemy planes would be to have 
available the information where the friendly planes that you knew of 
were? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, in order to do that you would have to 
have, would you not, established what is known as an information 
center and to that information center would come the reports 
from the various radar sections of what they discovered and then 
there would be at the radar center appro- ['69d5'] priately 
assigned men who from their knowledge of where our planes were 
could make a deduction as to whether the planes shown were or were 
not friendly planes ? 



2586 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral KnrMEL. Yes ; they had to have that knowledge and the 
only way they eould get that knowledge and keep up to date was to be 
in communication with the operating agencies. All they had to do was 
to get in communication and even then it would be a very difficult 
thing to do. 

Mr. RiciiAKDSON. Yes, I presume so, because you never could be 
exactlj'' sure wliere your own planes were ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, sir, you could never be exactly sure where 
your own planes were and with some of the — well, I will say half- 
trained pilots we had out there at that time, they were fine boys and no 
fault of theirs, but they did not always go and do exactly what they 
were told to do. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, if on the morning of December 7 a 
radar station had located an approaching group of planes, the next 
step would have been to have communicated that information instantly 
to an information center? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Richardson. And tlien at the information conter there 'should be 
representatives familiar with the supposed whereabouts of any friendly 
planes, either Navy or Army? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

[6996] Mr. Richardson. So that would require at the informa- 
tion center Army representatives to do that job and Navy representa- 
tives to do that job and Navy representatives to do that job? 

Admiral Kimmel. Not necessarily. 

Mr. Richardson. Why not ? 

Admiral Kimmel. A Navy man has no God-given faculty for telling 
where Navy planes are. He has to work with the naval operators to 
get it. An Army man properly trained could do it just about as well 
as a Navy man. Any individual put in there and trained and told 
where to get his information could have done it. 

]Mr. Richardson. Then it would be the duty of the representative, 
let us say, of the Navy at the information center to communicate where 
he had been educated to communicate to find out whether there were ' 
Navy planes in the sector from which these approaching planes had 
been seen ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I never operated an information center, 
I have never had anything to do with an information center such as 
this. That 'was purely and entirely an Army function. I presumed 
that the steps necessary to make the information center or the radar 
information, you might say, effective had been taken. I did not go to 
the information center. 

Now, one other thing: There would be in a case like Hawaii 
[6907] not one Navy representative as you call him. one man to 
look out for Navy affairs, but one man perhaps to look out for the 
patrol planes, another man to look out for the planes at Wheeler Field, 
another to look out for the battleship planes, to look out for what not. 
Now, how many men would be required is a question of experience and 
whether that man who sits there and is responsible for a segment or 
detachment of planes is an Army man or a Navy man is immaterial so 
long as he gets the information and knows where to get it. 

Now, suppose — I will anticipate a question a little bit. I had a letter 
from General Short. He asked me on 5 August 1941 in a letter to 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2587 

detail an officer from my headquarters to serve as liaison officer betwixt 
my headquarters and his. 

Senator Lucas. Is that an exhibit, Mr. Counsel? 

Admiral Kimmel. Sir? 

Senator Lucas. Is that in an exhibit? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think not. I have it here, you can have it. 
It has been passed to the committee, I am informed. 

Senator Lucas. Thank you. 

Admiral Kimmel. On August 16 1 replied to that letter and assigned 
my fleet communications officer, Commander Maurice L. E. Curts, to 
act as a liaison officer. 

Now, Commander Curts was to assist him. My understanding 
[699S] and my intention at the time was that Commander Curts 
was to assist him in any way he could in technical matters. I never 
had any request from General Short at any time to detail any watch 
standards in the communications center, the information center, and 
I would not have expected him to request me as commander in chief 
to detail these officers. I would not have expected him to ask Admiral 
Bloch to detail the officers and I tliink you will get from Admiral 
Bloch whatever steps that were taken there. 

Now, I did detail an additional officer to General Short at the request 
of the Army, I think it was General Short's request, a Lieutenant 
Taylor. Lieutenant Taylor had been in Britain and he had some 
knowledge of the operational difficulties of an information center and 
I turned Lieutenant Taylor over to the Army completely for the time 
beino;, to give them whatever assistance he could in advising them as 
to the operation of an information center. 

Now, you must realize that we had had many drills in Hawaii, dur- 
ing which time this information center, to the best of my knowledge 
and belief, was operating and in shape. The commandant of the dis- 
trict reported to me that successful drills were conducted. He had the 
men who conducted drills insofar as the Navy was concerned. I never 
inspected the information center and I never went into the organiza- 
tion of [69991 the information center and I was under the 
conviction, you might say, from the conversations that I had had with 
General Short and also with General Davidson, who was in command 
of the fighter group and the information center. General Davidson 
had told me of some of the results that they had obtained and they 
appeared to be quite satisfactory to me. 

The Vice ChairxMAN. Does that complete your answer, Admiral ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is all I want to say. 

The Vice Chairman. It is now 12 : 30. The committee will recess 
until 2 o'clock. 

(Whereupon, at 12 : 30 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the 
same day.) 

[7000] AFTERNOON SESSION 2 P. M. 

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order. 

Does counsel have anything further before resuming the examina- 
tion ? 

Mr. EicHARDSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. There are two more compi- 
lation of the records which have been referred to by Admiral Kimmel 
which we would like to offer in evidence at this time as exhibits. 



2588 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Masten. The first is a compilation of letters, of eight letters, 
the first of which is dated August 16, 1941, on the top of the compila- 
tion, all having to do with aircraft warning facilities for the Ha- 
waiian Department. We believe these should be offered as exhibit 
122. 

The Vice Chairman. Just a moment. 

Mr. Masten. They were distributed to the committee near the close 
of the morning hearing. 

The Vice Chairman. Give us the date and description again, please. 

Mr. Masten. The top letter is one dated August 16, 1941, from com- 
mander in chief, United States Pacific Fleet, to the commanding gen- 
eral, Hawaiian Department, regarding aircraft warning facilities for 
the Hawaiian Department. 

The Vice Chairman. That is exhibit what? 

Mr. Masten. 122. 

[7001] The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit 122. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 122.") 

Mr. Masten. The second is a group of communications, copies of 
which were distributed to the committee a few minutes ago, having to 
do with the question of the construction of a combined operating cen- 
ter in Hawaii. The top communication is a message from Opnav to 
commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, dated October 15, 1941. 

We offer those as exhibit 123. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit 123. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 123." 

Mr. Masten. That is all we have, Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Does counsel have anything further at this 
point before resuming the examination ? 

Mr. Eichardson. No, Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Admiral Kiminel, do you have anything at 
this point before the examination is resumed ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, sir; I don't. » 

The Vice Chairman. Counsel will proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF EEAE ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES 
NAVY, RETIRED (Resumed) 

Mr. Eichardson. Admiral, are we to understand from your 
[7002] testimony that there was an information center in opera- 
tion in connection with the Army radar ? 

Admiral Ki3Imel. You would understand from my testimony that 
the radar had been operated; that orders had been given to planes in 
drills. I did not know the condition of the operating center, informa- 
tion center, and I did not inquire as to the specific condition in which 
it was at that time. 

Mr. Richardson. Do I understand that it is your recollection that 
you assigned anyone from the Navy to function at that information 
center ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I was never requested to detail anybody to func- 
tion at that information center. I considered it an Army responsi- 
bility. I stood ready to help them in any way I could. I did help 
them. The organization and the whole information center was purely 
an Army function. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2589 

Mr. KicHARDSON. I want to call your attention to your testimony 
before the Roberts Commission to see whether it, in your opinion, is 
a fair statement of what it had reference to. I read from page 663 
of the record. This is your language : 

My recollection is, and I give you this for what it is worth — I have not talked 
to anybody about this since the action — but my impression was that they had, 
I think, three permanent stations, and I think some seven or eight portable sta- 
tions around the island, and their big ones were the ones, [7003] according 
to which I thought that we could have some dependence on. 

The Chairman. Well, vThile I think your information is incorrect as to that, 
the fact is that in the week of December 7 and the days prior to that, and on the 
morning of December 7, you were quite confident that you would get a definite 
warning of distant planes; is that right? 

Admiral Kimmel. I thought we would get some warning of distant planes. 

General McNakney. And as a responsible officer you did not assure yourself 
of that fact? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, except indirectly, but when we had two separate com- 
manders and when you have a responsible officer in charge of the Army and 
responsible commanders in the Navy, it does not sit very well to be constantly 
cheeking up on them. 

General McNarney. Let us examine into that. Under the situation you had 
the system of mutual cooperation? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

General McNakney. And in the method of mutual cooperation, it is necessary 
for one commander to know what the other commander is doing or what his 
plans are? 

Admiral Kimmbx. No. 

That fairly represents what you desire to express with [7004^ 
reference to your attitude toward this radar information center? 

Admiral Kimmel. The "no" business at the end there ? 

Mr. Richardson. That is right. 

Admiral Ivimmel. Let me see that. 

Mr. Murphy. Wliat is that, 667? 

Mr. Richardson. 663. 

Admiral Kimmel. You will have to turn over — in the first place, 
I put in a correction; I find here now, on page 631-A, wherein the 
answer to the last question was changed from "no" to "yes." As a 
matter of fact, I have no recollection of every having said "no," but 
I corrected it. 

[700S] Then on page 672 of the record 

Mr. Richardson. What page is that? 

Admiral Kimmel. 675. [Reading:] 

After the conclusion of the session on Saturday, I thought that a portion of my 
testimony was not clear and also that there might be some misapprehension as to 
my underlying attitude. I think I stated in the discussion which took place at 
the last session that I was convinced that there were at least three fixed stations, 
and by that I mean three stations with communications to the central plotting 
room, and to the central place by wire, and reasonably secure, and I thought 
there were more. 

I find that there were six, and I underestimated. 

Now, I have been informed that each one of these radar stations that was 
manned was the search type and that they are — what do you call them, two 
seventy, wasn't it? Leave that out. 

I don't know what that means now, that last thing. 

Mr. Richardson. Is that all you want to read ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is all I see right here now. I think that is 
all for the present. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, now. Admiral, in order to sort of crystallize 
this, I want to go over those operations which, in your opinion were 

70716 — 46— pt. 6 8 



2590 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

essential to the defense of [7006] Hawaii, so that none may 
be omitted, and the first I desire to suggest would be the availability 
of a suitable number of patrol planes for distant reconnaissance. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Richardson. Second, there should be enough of those patrol 
planes to conduct a proper patrol over a 360-degree protected area 
around Oahu ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. There should be available the best radar facilities. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Richardson. Land defenses of all character should be mobilized 
in radio ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. The fleet should be alerted ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. ^ 

Mr. Richardson. Now, it is true, is it not, Admiral, that the 
extent 

Admiral Kimmel. Just one moment. You left out, I think, an essen- 
tial point of this defense of Oahu, and that is the presence of sufficient 
long-range bombers to destroy the enemy carriers after they are 
discovered. 

Mr. Richardson. Correct. I accept your suggestion. I missed it in 
my notes. 

[7007] Now, Admiral, the extent and detail to which these oper- 
ations are to be carried is dependent upon judgment as to the extreme- 
ness of the danger ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

[7008] Mr. Richardson. You thought on December 7 that the 
danger of air attack on Hawaii was very slight ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Richardson. In fact. Admiral, the danger was exceedingly 
great as the event proved to be ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; I think that is fair. 

Mr. Richardson. Then the disaster at Hawaii was the result of 
an error of judgment? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, not entirely. It was not entirely the result 
of an error of judgment. If we had had available in Oahu at this time 
all of the facilities which you have outlined and we had been able to 
take the precautions which you' have outlined, that would have been 
one thing. 

We had to make a choice. We felt that we had to make a choice. 
We had tp provide for what we knew was coming in all probability 
against what we conceived at that time to be a very small chance of an 
attack on Oahu. 

Now, you can never be absolutely secure, there is no such thing as 
absolute security and with a fleet that is particularly true and this es- 
timate that we made — that I made — was made after mature considera- 
tion of balancing probabilities and when you balance probabilities you 
must take into account the means which you have to meet these various 
possibilities. 

[7009] Mr. Richardson. In reaching such a judgment, Admiral, 
do you have to consider the possible result of a mistake? 

Admiral Kimmel. You should ; yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2591 

Mr. KiCHARDSON. And if the mistake on the one hand might result 
in the destruction of the fleet as against a delay in training what have 
you to say to that? 

Admiral Kimmel. It was not a delay in training that was involved 
in this. The primary thing that we had in mind all the time was to be 
ready for offensive action. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, let me restate my question. In reach- 
ing a judgment as to what you were to do, what weight would you give 
the fact that a mistake with respect to a possible air attack on Hawaii 
which might result in the destruction of your fleet as compared with 
the preparation of your fleet for future offensive action outside of 
Hawaii? 

Admiral Kimmel. In the first place, I never believed that an air 
attack on Hawaii, on Pearl Harbor would result in the destruction of 
the fleet. I was firmly convinced at the time that torpedoes would not 
run in the waters of Pearl Harbor and if it had not been for the de- 
struction accomplished by the torpedoes at that time the damage would 
have been comparatively negligible. 

Mr. Richardson. Weren't you told, Admiral, in the letter of June 
13, which was the second letter in the series with [7010'] re- 
spect to torpedoes launched from planes, that it cannot be determined 
that any preexisting depth of water is too shallow to dispose of the 
possibility of torpedo attack ? 

Admiral Kimmel. You have not stated that exactly correctly. 

What it did state 

Mr. Richardson. Would you mind reading it? 

The Vice Chairman. Permit the Chair to inquire. That is a letter 
from the Chief of Naval Operations to you as Commander in Chief of 
the Pacific Fleet ? Is that correct, Mr. Counsel ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No ; that is not a letter from the Chief of Naval 
Operations to me as commander in chief. It is a letter from the Chief 
of Naval Operations to the commandants of the various naval districts, 
with a copy sent to me for information. 

The Vice Chairman. You received it ? 

Admiral Kjmmel. I received it. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now read it. 

Admiral Kimmel. I might state, since you brought that question 
up 

The Vice Chairman. I just wanted to identify what you are fixing 
to read, that is what I had in mind. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; but you have reminded me of something. 

[7011] The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Admiral Kimmel. That was a letter that was addressed to me as 
commander in chief on February 13, if I remember the date correctly, 
and in it the Chief of Naval Operations told me as commander in chief 
that the minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed and that 
150 feet is what they would most likely need; that is the essence of it. 
At the same time the Chief of Naval Operations wrote a letter to the 
commandants of the districts, in which he included approximately the 
same information. 

Now, when the change came in this letter of June 13 he did not write 
anything to me. He wrote a letter to the commandants of the districts 



2592 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and sent me a copy of the letter. I got the letter, there is no question 
about that. I just want to show you the clijfference. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Read it, please, sir. 

Admiral Ivimmel. Paragraph 2 of this letter of June 13, 1941, from 
the Chief of Naval Operations to the commandants of the various naval 
districts states : 

Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes 
may be dropped from planes at heights of as much at 300 feet, and in some cases 
may initiate dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. 
Hence, it may be stated that it [7012] cannot be assumed that any capital 
ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if 
surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed 
and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo. 

Paragraph 3 : 

While no minimum depth of water in which Naval vessels may be anchored 
can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack, it 
may be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by 
any attack force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms 
or more) is much more likely. 

As a matter of information, the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto, 
were, in general, at thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several 
torpedoes may have been launched at eleven or twelve fathoms. 

Now, there is no information, definite information in there any- 
where that you can launch a torpedo at less than ten fathoms. 

Mr. Richardson. And you concluded 

Admiral Kimmel. Now, I would like to add to that just a little bit. 

[7013] Mr. Richardson. Go ahead. 

Admiral Kimmel. I was not the only man who read this letter. I 
had a very competent staff. Their accomplishments during this war 
have proved that beyond doubt. Admiral Bloch, who was more di- 
rectly concerned with this, any protection that should have been 
afforded in the harbor because he would have been the one to install it, 
all of my staff, Admiral Bloch and I considered the torpedo danger 
negligible after receiving this letter. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral, in connection with the subject of 
information and referring to information from external sources and 
what I may call information from internal sources, is it correct to say 
that the external sources would be, first, intelligence reports to you, 
both local and from other sources ; second, information you might get 
from spies or espionage of j^our own if you had any such; third, a 
formal declaration of war. 

Now, what other sources of information would there be from the 
exterior to the commander of a fleet as to a possible coming attack 
than may fall within those three categories ? 

Admiral Kimmel. The commander in chief and the commandant 
of the naval district had in Hawaii an intelligence unit and this intelli- 
gence unit was primarily concerned with information which they 
could obtain in the Hawaiian Islands. The \701Ii\ only ex- 
ceptions to that were what is known as the traffic analysis method of 
locating ships. That was a radio-direction finder hook-up which per- 
mitted them to make certain traffic analyses. 

Mr. Richardson. These were Hawaii originated activities? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2593 

Admiral Kimmel. No ; they were not Hawaii originated activities. 
They were part — Hawaii was part of a net — I am talking now about 
traiiic analysis — which included Guam and Manila. 

Mr. Richardson. Oh, I see. 

Admiral Kimmel. But I think what you are driving at and what I 
hope to answer is that practically all information that we could hope 
for from spies abroad, from intercepts, from diplomatic exchanges, 
from naval attaches' reports and from the multitudinous means that 
Washington had of obtaining information had to be supplied to me by 
Washington. I had no way to get it. 

Mr. Richardson. If there had been a formal declaration of war 
and you had been advised of that, would that have been information 
which would have changed your Hawaiian dispositions ? 

Admiral Kimmel. If we had had .a formal declaration of war my 
troubles would have been practically ended. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, so far as internal sources of in- [7016'\ 
formation against an attack you would have radar? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. You would have your distance patrol? 

Admiral Kiminiel. Oh, yes. 

Mr. Richardson. And then you would have the military deductions 
that you as the chief might eventually make on the information you 
had? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, let me run over with you the knowledge that 
you had in Hawaii on December 6th. You knew at that time of the 
fundamental importance of the Pacific Fleet? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes ; I had known that for a long time. 

]\Ir. Richardson. And you knew at that time of the vulnerability 
of the Pearl Harbor base ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I did not know that the Pearl Harbor base was 
nesrly as vulnerable as it proved to be, as I have just tried to explain 
in regard to this torpedo business. 

Mr. Richardson. Except for the liability of torpedo attack was 
there any other vulnerability of the base that you diet not appreciate? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, not that I can recall at the present moment. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, you knew at that time that [7016] 
your armament, whether considered as patrol planes or fighter planes 
or bombers or antiaircraft guns was insufficient to permit you to make 
a full, satisfactory defense of Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I will answer that this way : A full satisfactory 
defense of an island base can never be assured no matter what you have 
there. The element of surprise, the element of a fast moving, supe- 
rior air force coming down on you — and although we would have been 
in much better case had we had the additional forces which you have 
outlined here previously, we could not have had absolute security 
there. And we were not entirely helpless out there. I do not want any- 
body to get the idea that I thought we were. 

]\ir. Richardson. Well, insofar as your armament availability was 
lessened your ability to defend also lessened, did it not? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes; of course. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, you had at the time a fleet sufficiently in 
ferior in size so that it had to remain generally in a defensive position ? 



2594 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Richardson. You knew that war was imminent? 

Admiral Kimmel. I knew that the relations were badly strained. 
I knew that war had been predicted time and again [7017] dur- 
ing the past year. Just how imminent was just what I did not know 
and I did not know that a deadline date had been set, I did not know 
that after a certain date things were going to happen automatically ; 
I did not know but that the situation had eased somewhat in the 10 
days since I had received the warning. 

Mr. Richardson. You knew of the Japanese reputation for surprise 
attacks ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. 

Mr. Richardson. You knew how closely they corresponded to a 
declaration of war? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, yes; I had known that they had corre- 
sponded closely to a declaration of war. 

I think there has been a little misconception about the Japanese 
attack on Port Arthur. My recollection of that Japanese attack is 
they had broken off diplomatic relations some 2 or 3 days, I think it 
was 4 days, before they made the attack on Port Arthur. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, was not one of the things. Admiral, con- 
stantly discussed by you and your staff that Japan was just the kind 
of a nation that might attack without warning? 

Admiral Ejmmel. Oh, yes. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, you knew at that time of the ap- [7018] 
propriateness from a military standpoint of an air attack on Oahu? 

Admiral Kimmel. No ; I cannot say that I full}' appreciated the ap- 
propriateness of an air attack on Oahu at that time. In the first 
place, there were very many difficulties that the Japanese had to over- 
come in order to be able to make that attack. I had been warned of 
a surprise attack. I had been told where that surprise attack was 
coming, at least by implication; that it was to be against Thai, the 
Malay Peninsula, Borneo, Philippines. 

[7019] Mr. Richardson. Well, now, did you understand. Ad- 
miral, that the attack on Thai or Borneo or the Philippines, or down 
to the China Sea was a surprise attack ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Why yes. Why not? We did not know which 
place they were going. They could have attacked many places. They 
could have made a surprise attack in many places. 

As a matter of fact, one of the most productive places for them 
to make a surprise attack was in the Philippines. That, I think, was 
mentioned by the Chief of Naval Operations to me as one of the most 
embarrassing things that could happen to us. 

Mr. Richardson. He said it would be embarrassing, but did he 
say it would be a surprise? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, the surprise could very easily be gotten 
from the tenor of all of the dispatches, yes ; a surprise attack in the 
Philippines. 

Mr. Richardson. In view of the fact that pretty near all of the 
dispatches that you had from Washington, and in view of your sug- 
gestion that those dispatches misled you, because they constantly 
talked of the Philippines, Thai Peninsula, Indochina, Malasia, you 
still think that those attacks would be a surprise attack similar to 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2595 

what a surprise [70£0] attack would be on Oahu that had 
never been mentioned ? 

Admiral Kimmel. They could very easily have made a surprise 
attack on any one of the places I mentioned. They could have made 
a surprise attack on the ships of the Asiatic Fleet, as far as that goes. 

Mr. RiCHAEDsoN. Admiral, in your correspondence with the Chief 
of Naval Operations, including your conversation with President 
Roosevelt on your visit to Washington, one form of attack on Hawaii 
that was constantly mentioned was an air attack? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right, and there was just one reason 
that was constantly mentioned, and that reason was because we 
wanted to be sure they could not make a successful air attack, and 
we felt reasonably certain that any other form of attack would not 
have been successful because we had the means to combat it, and we 
were emphasizing our deficiencies. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, Admiral, it would seem from an ex- 
amination of the dispatches that after about October, say the first 
of October, there seems to have been no more mention of air attack 
in the correspondence and the dispatches that passed between you 
and Washington, 

Have you any explanation of why, for a period of 6 months or 
more, there should be such constant reference to [7021] air 
attack and then a sudden cessation of reference to it in the trend of 
dispatches after about the first of October ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I presume that you have been over the 
correspondence, and that what you say is indicated. However, I 
think I read a dispatch here this morning of November 29, and in 
that we were talking about antiaircraft guns, 37-millimeter guns. 

In my correspondence with the Navy Department, and particularly 
with the Chief of Naval Op'erations, I asked for many things. I 
pointed out many deficiencies. 

The one that you have emphasized the most — and as a matter 
of fact it has been emphasized the most since Pearl Harbor — was that 
it had to do with antiaircraft and an air attack. 

I was equally concerned about the lack of bombs in Pearl Harbor. 
We had no bombs. There were not any out there when I took over — 
a handful, perhaps. We had no replacement ammunition for the 
ships. We had no transportation to get that ammunition, and those 
bombs out there and I remember in the early months of my time there 
I issued orders that every ship that came out there was to bring bombs 
and ammunition. 

Of course, that is explosive, and I had to take that [7022'] 
responsibility. 

There were numerous other things I asked for besides antiaircraft 
stuff. I was trying to and did emphasize a great many other things 
besides antiaircraft. I tried to emphasize ever3'^thing that we were 
lacking in. 

Mr. Richardson. I simply wanted to ascertain whether the fact 
that an air attack seems to have not been the subject of comment 
after about the first of October, was due to any change in your belief 
that an air attack, which had been feared for 6 months during 1941, 
was no lojiger to be feared after October ? 



2596 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Kimmell. You have said I feared an air attack. I felt 
always that an air attack was a possibility. I felt that I would have 
been remiss if I had not called the attention of the Navy Department 
and the War Department, with all of the force at my command, to the 
necessity of providing against every contingency in Hawaii. 

At no time did I consider that an air attack was any more than a 
possibility under the conditions that we had out there. What the 
events of a war might bring forth was quite a different thing. 

Mr. EicHARDSON. We might just as well explain it now. Why do 
you suggest that you did not think an air attack was more than a 
possibility? What were the reasons why it not \7023'] only 
could not have been limited to a possibility, but that it was not a 
probability ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I knew the difficulties of an overseas ex- 
pedition such as that. I knew the short range, the steaming range 
of the Japanese aircraft carriers. I very much doubted their ability 
to plan and execute an attack such as they made. We had had various 
reports on the Japanese Air Force, and I think not only I, but all 
the Navy Department were very much surprised at the efficiency of 
their air force and the manner in which they conducted that attack. 

Now, the hazard that they undertook when the came there was some- 
thing that I thought they would never take a chance on. 

Mr. EiCHARDSON. You also knew by December 7 

Admiral Kimmel. And I might add that I gathered this opinion 
after a great deal of thought and a great deal of consultation with 
the best naval minds we had, and I think those naval minds were right 
in Hawaii at the time I was there. 

Mr. Richardson. You knew, Admiral, of the burning of the Jap- 
anese codes by December 7, did you not ? 

Admiral Kimmel. You mean the message of December 3 ? 

Mr. Richardson. That is one of them. There was more \^102Ji-'\ 
than one with reference to the burning of codes, was there not? 

Admiral Kimmel. There was only one that I recall at the moment. 
There was a message of December 3 which said the Japs were burning 
most of their codes and ciphers in London, Hongkong, Batavia, Wash- 
ington, and so forth. 

Mr. Richardson. What would that indicate to you ? 

Admiral Kimmel. At that time it indicated to me, in conjunction 
with the other messages I had that Japan was taking precautionary 
measures preparatory to going into Thai, and because they thought 
that the British or the Americans, or both of them, might jump on 
them and seize their codes and ciphers after they went into Thailand. 

Now, that was the interpretation we gave on it at that time. 

[7025] Now incidentally, I would like to add another thing to 
that. That message came to me. It had nothing in it directing me 
to pass this on to General Short. That was a procedure that the 
Navy Department always used when they had an important message 
that they wanted me to give to General Short. I tried to give every- 
thing that I thought would be of interest to General Short to him 
anyhow. 

I3ut when the Navy Department sent me an important message 
which they thought should be conveyed to General Short they put that 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2597 

in the message. They did not put it in this message, and that in itself 
lent some weight to my construction of it. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you advise General Short about it? 

Admiral Kimmel. I did not personally, no, but you will hear from 
him about whether he heard about it or not. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you instruct any of your staff to advise Gen- 
eral Short? 

Admiral Kimmel. I did not. I did not advise my staff to instruct 
General Short to do a OTeat many things, but they did. 

Mr. Richardson. They did what? 

Admiral Kimmel. I say I did not instruct my staff to instruct 
General Short to do a great many things that they did automatically. 
Most of his information he got from the commandant of the district. 

[70261 As I have tried to tell you, this liaison with the district 
on matters of that kind was more direct than it was with my fleet staff. 

Now the district got everything that I did. 

Mr. Richardson. I was just going to ask you, do you know that 
Admiral Bloch got this information with reference to the burning of 
codes? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. 

Mr. Richardson. Then from your plan of operation that you had 
there you would expect that information to go from Bloch to Short or 
his staff? 

Admiral Kimmel. To exchange the information, yes. 

Mr. Richardson. Now you knew also on December 6 about the 
status which we spoke about this morning of the Jap espionage in 
Hawaii. You had all the knowledge you ever had up to December 7 
about the presence in Hawaii of a flock of Japanese spies that were 
transmitting information into Tokyo as to the situation in Hawaii? 

Admiral Kimmel. We knew about that, yes. 

Mr. Richardson. You knew also on December 6 about these reports 
which had frequently come to you of military movement by Japan on 
the Asiatic Coast? • 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh yes, yes. That was following the pattern that 
was laid down in the messages of the 24:th and [7027'] 27th. 

Mr. Richardson, Now, Admiral, it is also a fact, isn't it, that on 
December 6 it was reported to you by one of your staff, under circum- 
stances showing his nervous interest in the fact, that for 6 days the 
Japanese carriers had been lost? 

Admiral Kimmel. I thought I covered that pretty completely. 

Mr. Richardson. You did. Let me finish. 

And in response to his anxiety about it you made the remark, "Do 
you expect me to believe that the carriers are coming around Diamond 
Head?" 

Now do you recall the incident and will you give us your version 
of it? 

Admiral Kimmel. You are talking about the twinkle in my eye, I 
suppose. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, that is part of it. 

Admiral Kimmel. I do not recall the exact words that I used to 
Captain Layton, but I was very much interested in the location of all 
Japanese ships, not only the carriers but the other types. I felt if I 
could locate the carriers I would be able to determine pretty closely 



2598 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

where the main Japanese effort was going to be. I went over these 
traffic analyses reports with Captain Layton every morning. Cap- 
tain [7028] Layton was a very excellent officer. He was very 
intense, and I have no doubt that I made such remark as that to him, 
not in any way to decry his efforts, or to treat the matter lightly, I 
did not treat the matter lightly, and he would be the last one to ever 
say that I treated the matter lightly. 

Mr. Richardson. But you had a very different reaction to the 
suspected fact than he did ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No; I had no different reaction from what he 
had. If you have gotten that impression I think it is entirely 
erroneous. 

Mr. Richardson. Did he come to you with a twinkle in his eye 
when he told you that he had not heard anything of the carriers for 
6 days? 

Admiral Kjmmel. He came to me because I told him to come. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, that is all right. 

Admiral Kimmel. He came to me every morning. The first thing 
I did when I reached the office in the morning was to go over every- 
thing that had come in during the night. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you get any idea from him when he came 
that he was not serious in this report about the loss of the 6 carriers ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Serious ? 

[7029] Mr. Richardson. Yes. 

Admiral Kjmmel. Of course he was serious. There was never 
any question of being serious. Not about the loss of the carriers. 
As far as we were concerned the carriers were never lost, and when 
people say the carriers were lost they might as well say the whole 
Japanese fleet was lost. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, Admiral 

Admiral Kimmel. Just one second, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. We had during this period a wealth of traffic. 
There was a great deal of traffic. Th> only trouble was we were 
unable to identify it, and we were not only unable to identify the 
Japanese carriers, we were unable to identify pretty nearly all the 
Japanese fleet. It was not that we had lost six carriers, that was 
not the thing. We did not even know we had lost them. We could 
not identify them. 

[7030]^ Mr. Richardson. Did not Layton use the word "lost" 
in reporting to you ? 

Admiral Kimmel. A^ far as I remember, no. All he said he was 
unable to identify them. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral, you also had on December 6, and 
the morning of December 7, various information with respect to 
real, or fancied submarine activities at the Hawaiian base? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right, I did. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, in that connection, without referring to 
those submarines which had been reported at an earlier date and 
referring to what we may call the Ward submarine 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. How many submarines were there discovered in 
the immediate Hawaiian-Pearl Harbor area on the morning of 
December?? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2599 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, on the morning of December 7, there must 
have been a half-dozen altogether. There was one which came into 
the harbor and which was promptly sunk by one of the airplane 
tenders, and destroyer — well, somebody else got into it, I forget now, 
but they hit him all about the same time. 

Mr. iliCHARDSoisr. How far did that one get in ? 

Admiral Kimmel. He got all the way in to Ford Island. [7031'] 
He apparently did no damage at all. They got him right away. 

I have never investigated this myself, because I left out there too 
soon to go into things like that, but my recollection is that he was sup • 
posed to have followed the Altair into the harbor, not the Altair — one 
of the tugs into the harbor earlier in the morning when she came in 
through the gate, through the antitorpedo net. 

Now, mind you, this was a submarine of a type that we did not know 
existed, and we did not believe any submarine could get into the harbor 
without showing its periscope as it came in. That was the reason they 
got in. 

Mr. EiCHARDSON'. When was it sunk? 

Admiral Kimmel. It was sunk inside. 

Mr, Richardson. I know, but when? Do you know the precise 
time ? Could you tell me ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Just about the time the attack started or within 
5 minutes of it, when I think it was sunk. 

Mr. Richardson. All right, go ahead. 

Admiral Kimmel. Then, there was another submarine which ran 
aground up in Bellows Field, the north side of Oahu, and they got 
the skipper out of it. He was the one that the FBI finally decided 
had been around Pearl Harbor and had reported the location of the 
ships in there. 

[7032'] Mr. Richardson. What time did he go ashore, about as 
compared with the attack? 

Admiral Kimmel. I do not remember. 

Mr. Richardson. Was it before the attack or during the attack ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think it was after the attack. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

Admiral Kimmel. The Army found him over there and we sent over 
there and got him. 

Mr. Richardson. Describe those submarines that you refer to that 
were of a new type. 

Admiral IKimmel. I do not know too much about them because T 
had a great many things to do out there at that time. 

The Vice Chairman. Were they both these midget submarines? 

Admiral Kimmel. Sir? 

The Vice Chairman. Were they both these midget submarines? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; they were the midget submarines, the two- 
man submarines^ The submarine is about 10 or 12 feet in diameter 
and about 60 or 70 feet long. It is so small that a white man could 
not get into it. They had to cut the thing apart in order to get a 
white man in [7033] to the seat where they drove it. 

I think it was air-driven and it was capable of about 20 knots under 
water, which was something far in excess of any submarine we knew 
anything about. It was a ship very much like a torpedo and could 
have, I think, about a 100-mile cruising radius, or something of tha< 
kind. 



2600 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Richardson. Now, there were two, Admiral 

Admiral Kimmel. Now, Draemel went out 

Mr. EiCHARDSON. Who is he ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is Rear Admiral Draemel. He was in com- 
mand of the destroyers, of the Battle Force at the time. I forget the 
details, but anyhow, he got a distress call in one of the bays over there. 
He started in and two submarines fired at him torpedoes. They were 
trying to get him in there to shoot at him. 

Mr. Richardson. When was that with respect to the attack? 
Admiral Kimmel. Wliat is that ? 

Mr. Richardson. When was that with respect to the attack? 
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, maybe a couple of hours afterward. I can- 
not recall all these things off the bat, but I should say there were 
conservatively a dozen or more submarines in the Hawaiian area at 
the time the attack took [703^] place that we discovered, and 
maybe more than that. 

Mr. Richardson. When did the Ward episode happen with respect 
to the attack? 

Admiral Kimmel. The Ward episode I have since learned — I think 
she fired depth charges at this submarine around about 6 : 30 or a 
quarter to 7, and she made some kind of a report. 
Mr. Richardson. Whom did they report to ? 

Admiral Kjmmel. The report went to Admiral Bloch. The report 
was, "Have attacked a submarine." It was not as clearly stated at 
that time as it was in a subsequent message about a half-hour or 
three-quarters of an hour later. 

When Admiral Bloch received it, he was waiting for verification, 
because we had had various attacks, or incidents where our people 
had dropped depth charges on suspected submarines, after I had issued 
the order there on the 27th of November. 

I thought his action was quite all right. He did seek verification 
before he did anything else. 

Mr. Richardson. I call the committee's attention to the fact that 
there is a log which is in the record as exhibit 119, giving the radio 
log with respect to some of this submarine activity. 

[7035] Admiral Kimmel. You must realize, in reading this log — 
I have never read it in detail, but I have been told approximately what 
is in it — that we were constantly receiving reports of suspicious objects 
to be investigated, of possible submarines, and this kind of thing was 
going on several times a week. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, should that report that came in on this 
so-called Ward submarine to Admiral Bloch have been immediately 
relayed to you ? 

Admiral Kenimel. It was relayed to me. I do not know how im- 
mediately, because I got it around 7 : 30, between 7 : 30 and 7 : 40, 
something of that kind, or 7: 20 to 7 : 30, something of that kind. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral, you had also on December 6-7, 
information with reference to the change in the call letters of the 
Japanese Fleet ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right, yes. On December 1 that change 
was made. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, the previous change had been made on No- 
vember 1. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2601 

Mr. RiCHARDSOisr. And before that, those call letters had been 
changed about every 6 months, were they not ? 

Admiral Kimmel. At irregular intervals, as I recall it. The first 
one in 1941 was made in May 1941. The second one in November 1941, 
and the third in December, December 1, 1941. 

[7036] Mr. Eichardson. Would the fact that there had been 
such a short period from the change on November 1 arouse any appre- 
hension in your mind that it had any particular significance ? 

Admiral Kimmel. We thought that was a prelude to, their moving 
down the China coast. 

Mr. Richardson. Then you did think that the change in call letters 
liad some call reference to future military operations with Japan ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, in that way; yes. It was entirely con- 
sistent with the advice we had received from the Navy Department. 

Mr. Richardson. Now you also knew on the morning of December 
'7 that you were not conducting any distant patrols other than those 
which attended the operations of your task forces ? 

Admiral Kimmel. On that particular morning ; yes. 

Mr. Richardson. That is right. 

Admiral Kimmel. I think that has been very thoroughly covered 
in the previous testimony that I have given. 

]\Ir. Richardson. Now, Admiral, there is another thing I wanted 
to talk to you about. It was quite generally understood, was it not, 
-during 1941, in discussing the question of air attack upon Hawaii, 
that the dangerous sector, the origin of those attacks was the northern 
sector ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No; I think that that is a misconception, and it 
is a natural misconception which seems to be inevitable after a fact. 
J. know that my predecessor did not consider the northern sector the 
most dangerous, if you take the sector that he covered during his 
patrol, which was to the westward, northwestward, and around to the 
isouthwestward. I know that Admiral Halsey's idea even on the day 
(of the attack was that they would probably come from the Marshalls. 

I testified before the Roberts Commission as to the north being a 
'dangerous sector, and I gave the reasons which appealed to me at that 
time. 

Mr. Murphy. If I can help counsel, pages 605 and 606. 

Mr. Richardson. What is that ? 

Mr. Murphy. Pages 605 and 606. 

Mr. Matson. Is that the typed number ? 

Mr. Murphy. That is the little typed number, on the bottom of page 
605 and the top of page 606. 

Admiral Kimmel, Are you ready for me to go ahead ? 

Mr. Richardson. Just let me clarify j-our recollection. Admiral 
Kimmel, with this testimony. I am reading from typewritten page 605 
and pencil page 622. This is the Kimmel previous testimony before 
the Roberts Commission. 

Senator Brewster. Could we have what Admiral Kimmel 
[7038] was saying at the time he was interrupted? 

Admiral Kimmel. Beg pardon, sir? 

Senator Brewster. You made a statement as to having predicted an 
attack in the north and having given reasons for it. I think you were 
in the process of stating the reasons when you were interrupted by the 
gentleman on the other side. 



2602 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Kimmell. Yes; I started to give an answer but I was 

diverted. , , ^ ^ , , 

Senator Brewster. Will the reporter read the statement to see how 

far you got? 

(The record was read by the reporter.) 

Admiral Kimmel. Then I started out to say I did not wish to make 
an alibi after the fact, and maybe I leaned over a little too far the 
other way. 

In any event, I gave the reasons why an attack from the northward 
might be successful. I did not give it in any detail at all, in fact I 
scarcely touched upon the disadvantages of the northern route, and 
those disadvantages were well known to me at the time. 

The principal disadvantage of the northern route is that it is a 
3,500-mile pull from the homeland ; it is through rough seas at that 
time of the year ; the 3,500-mile pull would require refueling, and an 
expedition of that kind had no better than a 50-50 chance of getting 
through due to weather alone. 

[70S9] You have heard testimony here to the effect that this 
task force was very lucky in being able to get through, I mean in being 
able to refuel and come down there, because they struck some smooth 
weather, which was very unusual at that time of the year. 

In view of all the circmnstances before and since I feel, and I felt 
then, that no arc, no sector could be ruled out as a possible way for them 
to come in. I quoted Admiral Nimitz on that, who relieved me, and he 
agreed in toto with the conception that I had of that. They could 
come in from the east without too much trouble ; they could come from 
the Marshalls, and come in from the southeast. There was no sector 
that they could not come in from. 

If they could come in after a 3,500-mile trip through the northern 
seas, the rough seas up there, there was certainly no deterrent to their 
coming in from any direction. We know that now better than we 
did before Pearl Harbor, as a matter of fact. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, now. Admiral, just to keep the record 
straight, do you think that this answer should be qualified : 

The Chairman. Well, suppose you were expecting a raiding force to come from 
the southward, what would you do V 

Admiral Kimmel. The air raid force on this place would 17040] have a 
better chance, a much better chance to get in from the northward than they did 
from the southward, but no part should be disregarded. 

Admiral Ktmmel. One reason I made that statement — and these 
were not considered statements anyhow, I was called before this com- 
mission and questioned at length, I had no time to prepare myself, I 
had been without sleep for some time, I was, to a considerable extent, 
strained, and all that must be taken into consideration here — but what 
I probably had in mind at the time about coming in from the south- 
ward was that we had been operating from the southward. 

Admiral Brown was down at Johnston Island, which is to the south- 
ward, he had been operating out of there, and I had had some patrol 
planes operating out of there, I liad had some patrol planes sweeping 
betwixt Johnston Island and Midway, and I had patrol planes sweep- 
ing betwixt Oahu and Midwa3\ 

I thought their chances at that particular time for being able 
to get in were better than from the northward, and that probably in- 
fluenced me considerably in what I had to say at that time. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2603 

Now I have attempted to reconstruct in my own mind a little about 
where the Japanese say they went. I am not sure that one of our sweeps 
missed them by so very much out [704-1] there. I have not 
plotted it on the chart. 

Mr. EiCHARDSON. Admiral, let me call your attention also for clari- 
fication to the further testimony of yourself on typewritten page 1547, 
in which the chairman says this : 

Now I think that General McNarney wants a question in order to avoid reading 
all that the order relates and having you repeat it, and his question is to the effect : 
Why, Admiral, did you suggest there was a probability or possibility of a carrier 
to the northward? 

Admiral Kimmel. Because I thought that was the most probable direction of 
an attack coming against this place. 

Admiral Kimmel. Just what I have stated, sir, because we had cov- 
ered a good many areas to the southward recently. And there was 
another thing. I had on that morning what might be termed a hunch 
and I did not know why, but I felt the carriers were to the northward, 
and I put that in a dispatch to Halsey. I did not want to make it much 
more than a hunch. 

Subsequently we got information which seemed to indicate the car- 
riers were to the southward, and I had nothing more than this feeling, 
you might say. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you recall the subject of the northern sector 
being the most likely sector in which an air attack would approach 
in any dispatches or correspondence between [704^1 you and 
Stark's office ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No ; I recall nothing. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you remember any suggestion coming out of 
the Office of Naval Operations affirmatively stating that the northern 
area was the dangerous area ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No ; I remember no such communication at any 
time. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral, I want to ask you another question. 
Do you know a man named Captain Zacharias? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir ; I know him. 

Mr. Richardson. There has been a suggestion made that he had 
conversations with you prior to the attack on December 7 with respect 
to the probability of air attack on the Pearl Harbor base. 

I would like to have you give us, if there were any such conversa- 
tions, what they were, how they occurred, the circumstances, and gen- 
erally tell the committee about it. 

Admiral Kjmmel. I will do so. Captain Zacharias is a Japanese 
language student. He is a very excellent Japanese language student. 
I will give you a little background. 

Mr. Richardson. That is what I want. 

Admiral Kjmmel. He was an intelligence officer down in the San 
Diego district in October of 1940 when Admiral Richardson had a 
detachment of the fleet consisting of two or three [704^1 bat- 
tleships and some smaller craft at anchor at Long Beach, and Captain 
Zacharias sent a message to Admiral Richardson that there was going 
to be an attack by Japanese planes on the fleet in Long Beach that 
night, that the Japs had an airfield down in Mexico, and that they 
were going to get the planes over here some way or another — I believe 
by carrier — and they were coming up there. 



2604 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Richardson had this information. He did not believe it, but he 
had no choice but to get his detachment under way and get out, and 
subsequent investigation proved there was not anything down there 
and there were not any Japanese planes anywhere near the coast. 

Captain Zacharias had an interview with Mr. Nomura, Admiral 
Nomura, when he came over here, and he gave me a valuable resume 
of his conversation with Admiral Nomura by letter. Eventually he, 
in command of a cruiser, the Salt Lake Gity^ I think, came out and 
joined the fleet, and along in March of 1941 I was back in the War 
Plans Section of my headquarters when Admiral W. W. Smith, my 
chief of staff, brought Captain Zacharias back there to talk to me. 

I had a conversation with Captain Zacharias. Most of it was taken 
up with my asking him questions about the Japanese Navy. I have no 
recollection of Captain Zacharias having said anything about an at- 
tack on Pearl Harbor, and [70JiJi.'\ least of all do I recollect 
anything about his having said that the attack was going to come at 
any particular time. 

I might add if he had told me in March that the attack was coming 
on December 7, I would not have been greatly impressed. In any 
event, about 2 weeks prior to Captain Zacharias' conversation with me 
I had received from the Chief of Naval Operations a letter, which has 
been quoted here before this committee, to the effect that no Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor was planned for or projected in the foresee- 
able future. I think you will recall that letter. 

I would have been very much inclined to take the estimate of the 
Chief of Naval Operations forwarding the views of the Chief of Naval 
Intelligence over those of Captain Zacharias. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, don't you think. Admiral, that if he had 
specifically advised 5^ou of the probability of an immediate attack 
on Pearl Harbor that you would now recollect that conservation ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I should think so, sir, but I do not recollect it. 

Mr. Richardson. Now let me move on, Admiral, to ask you some 
questions as to the precise condition in Hawaii at the time of the 
attack. 

Admiral Kimmel. I might add you will have Captain Smith before 
you and you can get his version of tlie same [704^5] conversa- 
tion, because he was prompt throughout the conversation. 

Mr. Richardson. Now at the time of this attack on December 7 you 
had three task forces out : One to Johnston, one to Wake, and one to 
Midway ; is that right ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Richardson. And they were out upon missions, they were not 
connected with fear of a possible attack on Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, yes; that is true; not fear of a possible 
•attack on Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Richardson. Now let me call your attention. Admiral, to this 
map. I place the pointer on Oahu. Now I place the pointer on Mid- 
way. One of these task forces was proceeding from Oahu to Midway 
[indicating]. 

Admiral Kimmel. It was down about 400 miles, a little bit further 
down from where you are indicating. It is to the southward and east- 
ward, along in there [indicating], about 400 to 500 miles. 

Mr. Richardson. What is this [indicating] ? 

Admiral Kimmel. The Newton task iorce, the Xexington. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2605 

Mr. Richardson. I am not referring to any particular name, but 
there was a task force that went to Midway ? 

Admiral Kimmel. It did not go to Midway, it was only going about 
400 miles from Midway, or put it about 700 miles from Oahu. 

[704j6] Mr. Richardson. Well, that task 

Admiral Kimmel. That put it about 700 miles from Oahu, 

Mr. Richardson. To the west ? 

Admiral Kimmel. To the west of Oahu about 700 miles. 

Mr. Richardson. But the course of that task force was to the west ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No ; a little north of west. 

Mr. Richardson. How many degrees north of west? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, looking at it, I would say 20, maybe. 

Mr. Richardson. The other task force was going to Johnston 
Island? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. That is. Brown's task force. 

Mr. Richardson. Then did you have a task force going to Wake ? 

Admiral Kimjiel. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. And that would also be in a weswardly direction ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That was on its return at that time. That was 
about some 300 miles west of Pearl Harbor at that time. 

Mr. Richardson. But that task force at no time would go appre- 
ciably north of a west line from Oahu, would it? 

\70Ji.7'] Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Calling your attention to these red lines on this 
map as very inferentially illustrating the course of the Jap fleet which 
attacked Pearl Harbor 

Admiral Kjmmel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. You had no task force or other patrol that was 
operating in the area covered by those red lines ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Richardson. So that on the morning of December 7, your three 
task forces and the supporting planes which were making reconnais- 
sance with those task forces was very largely confined to a sector which 
might be called the southwest sector from Oahu ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, it was the westerly sector, I should say, 
would be more appropriate. 

Mr. Richardson. And you also on that morning had a plane patrol 
between 4 and 7 a. m., that was covering only local areas for training 
purposes ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. Covering the operation areas to search out 
the submarines. 

Mr. Richardson. And you had on that morning also a radar oper- 
ation schedule between 4 and 7? 

Admiral Kimmel. The Army had. 

Mr. Richardson. That is right. And, so far as you [76^45] 
know, and so far as the Navy is concerned, no method of getting a 
radar report to the Navy from that operation ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Why wasn't there anybody to get a radar report 
from them to the Navy ? 

Mr. Richardson. You didn't have a Navy man assigned? 

Admiral Kimmel. That makes no difference, sir, that I can see. 
Anybody that could talk English could tell me where the planes were. 

Mr. Richardson. There was no Navy man assigned to the Informa- 
tion Center on Sunday morning, was there? 

79716— 46— pt. 6 9 



2606 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Kimmel. The only Navy man that I had assigned to the 
Army at that particular time was Lieutenant Taylor. 

Mr. Richardson. He was a technician? 

Admiral Kimmel. No; he was an operating man. He was not a 
technician. 

Mr. EiCHARDSON. You didn't think, did you, that he was to make 
reports ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I thought he was to be used by the Army in any 
way they saw jQt. I turned him over to them completely, and they 
could give him any order they pleased. 

Now, if they had the information, if the information was in fact 
available, anybody could have telephoned it. 

Mr. Richardson". But nobody did ? 

Admiral Kimmel. So far as I know, they didn't. I [7049] 
never received it. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, on that Sunday morning of the attack, you 
had your ships so arranged in the harbor as to facilitate the use of 
your antiaircraft batteries on the ships? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is a fact. 

Mr. Richardson. That was a matter of definite policy which you 
had worked out to guide your ships when in the harbor? 

Admiral Ki]vime;l. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. So in event of an air attack they could concen- 
trate their fire in the most scientific way ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir; instantly. 

Mr. Richardson. And you testified that your information is that 
your fleet guns, aircraft, antiaircraft guns were firing on this attack 
within 4 to 7 minutes after the attack started ? 

Admiral Kimmel. My understanding and my belief is that in from 
4 to 7 minutes, variously estimated, all the guns of the fleet were firing, 
all the antiaircraft guns of the fleet, but that those that were manned 
before the attack opened fire at once. 

Mr. Richardson. Is that in your opinion as great a state of readi- 
ness as could have been provided for for those [7050] ships 
under those circumstances that morning? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think it was a very reasonable condition to 
maintain. Wlien any gun, or group of guns, one-quarter to one-half 
of them, opened fire at once, and began to shoot at the first planes 
coming in, and when the rest of them chime in to the extent of the 
whole outfit within 4 to 7 minutes, I don't believe you will beat that 
much anywhere. 

Mr. Richardson. Also, it is a fact, is it not that on this Sunday 
morning, under the Short direction, the Army was in its first alert 
against sabotage ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I have heard that stated. I don't know it as 
a fact. 

Mr. Richardson. And you have also heard it stated, have you not, 
Admiral, that upon the Army air fields, the planes of the Army were 
bunched together in order to facilitate guarding themselves against 
sabotage? 

Admiral Kimmel. I read that in some reports, yes. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, passing from the exact condition in Hawaii 
on this morning to find out what was not available then, I bring up 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2607 

again the fact that there was on that morning no distant patrol recon- 
naissance out of Oahu. 

Admiral Kimmel, That has been pretty well established. 

Mr. EiCHARDSON. And there was no continuous radar \7051'\ 
beyond this operation we referred to between 4 and 7? 

Admiral Kimmel. You have the testimony on that. 

Mr. Richardson. And there was no alerting of the antiaircraft guns 
of the Army on that morning ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I learned the details when I read the report of 
the Army Board. 

Mr. Richardson. And those details that you learned indicated that 
they were not alerted? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think those details, as published, speak for 
themselves. 

Mr. Richardson. That is the only comment you care to make ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I have no — I don't think any comment is called 
for by me. I don't know whether the assertions made in the report 
of the Army board are correct or not. I think you should get this 
from General Short. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, you don't know, and your Navy contingent 
had no knowledge, with respect to whether those guns were or were 
not alerted? 

Admiral Kimmel, I do not know now from my own knowledge what 
condition the Army guns were actually in on that morning. 

Mr. Richardson. Was any report made to you by members of your 
staff with reference to that fact? 

[7052] Admiral Kimmel. I don't recall any at the present time. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, now 

Admiral Kimmel. But the members of my staff were not charged 
with that duty. 

Mr. Richardson. That was because it was the duty of the Army ? 

Admiral Kjmmel. No; that was because it was a duty that was, 
insofar as the Navy had anything to do with it, it was a duty of the 
commandant of the district to look out for that. 

Mr. Richardson. He was under you ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, but he is not on my staff. Maybe I spoke in 
a restrictive sense of "staff." 

Mr. Richardson. It was of exceedingly great importance to you 
that those antiaircraft guns of the Army were in a condition of readi- 
ness? 

Admiral Kimmel. I had confidence in General Short. I may say 
I had confidence in General Marshall. I read the report — not the 
report — the dispatch which came to General Short, in which he was 
told to report to General Marshall just exactly what he had done, and 
I had, I remember, this dispatch, you see. I had every reason to 
believe that that business had been looked out for. It [7062 A] 
was doubly sure that if it were reviewed by the Chief of Staff, that 
they would get this condition of alert tJiat he with his additional in- 
formation in Washington knew or believed was required there at that 
time. 

Mr. Richardson. Admiral, at best, that would be an assumption 
on your part, wouldn't it? 



2608 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh 



Mr. Richardson. There certainly was no verification of it by you ? 

Admiral Kimmel. If I made no assumptions, I would have spent 
all my time running around checking up on every detail. 

Mr. Richardson. Was the condition of readiness of your antiaircraft 
guns defending Pearl Harbor, simply a matter of detail? 

Admiral Kimmel. There was in the dispatch which came to General 
Short an admonition not to alarm the civil population, and I presumed 
that he would work that out to the satisfaction of the defense of Pearl 
Harbor and the Chief of Staff, so it wouldn't alarm the civil popula- 
tion, and that they would get a reasonable set-up for it. 

[7053] Mr. Richardson. In other words, neither you nor any 
member of your staff made any attempt to verify or find out what 
the condition of alertness was with respect to the antiaircraft guns 
operated by the Army ? 

Admiral I^mmel. And neither did General Short make any at- 
tempt to find out the details of an alert that the Fleet had in effect 
at that time. 

Mr. Richardson. That, I might suggest, Admiral, is one of the 
troubles in this proceeding. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, there is such a thing as having confidence, 
and if you don't have confidence in the people you work with you 
don't get much result. 

Mr. Richardson. Let me interject this at this point, Admiral : Do 
you think the condition of affairs that existed in Oahu, which culmi- 
nated in the attack on this Sunday morning, has any relevance to the 
question of a single authority directing military operations ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I would say no, and the reason I make that state- 
ment is that we had two chances to receive the vital information 
which was withheld from us. One chance was from the Chief of 
Staff of the Army supplying it to General Short. The other chance 
was from the Chief of Naval Operations supplying it to me. And if 
either one of us had had the vital information, which I have set forth, 
I believe, at great ['^054] lengths, I think that the conditions 
that obtained in Hawaii on that morning would not have obtained. 

Mr. Richardson. The fact is, is it not. Admiral, that as you ap- 
proached December 7 you very definitely gave the Navy program for 
action in event of the declaration of war precedence over the estab- 
lishment of the defense of Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Kimmel. If I had believed in those days preceding Pearl 
Harbor that there was a 50-50 chance or anything approaching that 
of an attack on Pearl Harbor, it would have changed my viewpoint 
entirely. I didn't believe it. And in that I was of the same opinion 
as that of the members of my staff, my advisers, my senior advisers. 

In this connection it might be appropriate to say this. I had con- 
versations with Admiral Pye several times during the week ending on 
November 7. On November 6 we spent most of the forenoon together 
going over the situation. 

Senator Lucas. Do you mean December 6 or November 6 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. December 6, the day before the attack. 

And in the afternoon I spent practically all afternoon, and spoiled 
a couple of golf games, by keeping my operations officers, my war 
plans officer and my Chief of Staff to discuss the situation. I had 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2609 

conversations with Admiral Wilson Brown, who was in command of 
the Scouting Force of the Fleet, and [705S] under whose com- 
mand Admiral Bellinger operated as part of the Fleet. I had several 
conversations with him. He went to sea on the 5th of December and 
was down at Joluiston Island. I had on my staff Captain Smith, 
W. W. Smith, commonly known as "Poko," who has since become a 
vice admiral. And Captain McMorris, who was my war plans 
officer. Captain McMorris stayed there with Admiral Nimitz as 
war plans officer for several months, when he went to sea, and was in 
action up in the Aleutians, successful action, too. And then Admiral 
Nimitz took him back as his Chief of Staff, where he remained as 
Chief of Staff until the end of the war. 

Admiral Delaney, he is a vice admiral now, he was a captain, he 
Avas my operations officer, and he was one of the three that was with 
me most of Saturday afternoon. 

There is Admiral Murphy, Rear Admiral Murphy, then the com- 
mander, who was one of the assistant war plans officers. He has been 
a very successful commander in this war. 

There was Kitts, my gunnery officer, the man who, incidentally, 
advised me about the torpedoes. He is now Assistant Chief of Bureau 
of Ordnance here in the Navy Department and a very able one. 

Those were the type of men I had advising me. Admiral Calhoun, 
vice admiral now, was the commander of the base force. He was 
there. Not to mention Admiral Bloch, whom I [70S6] have 
talked about before. 

Mr. Richardson. You agreed, did you not. Admiral, that if there 
was real danger of an air attack on Hawaii the training program 
shouldn't have stood in the way for a moment ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I didn't let the training program stand in the 
way of the alert that I considered necessary at that time. The fleet 
was on the alert. It was on the alert and any man who says the fleet 
wasn't on the alert, when the whole outfit were firing in the times that 
have been testified to here, well, I don't know what he means by alert. 
I took certain courses of action. I took them after mature consider- 
ation. I did the best I could. And with the same information again 
I am not sure but what I would do the same thing. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, if you had been sufficiently wise to have 
sensed the probability of an air attack, would you have withdrawn all 
of your distant reconnaissance patrols? 

Admiral Kimmel. Would I have done what? 

Mr. Richardson. Withdrawn all of your distant reconnaissance 
patrols, as you did do ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I have tried to indicate in my statement 
what I believe, now believe, I would have done had I considered an 
air attack on Pearl Harbor imminent or probable. 

[7057] Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral, let's consider for just a 
minute the propositions suggested as to mistakes* originating in 
Washington. 

You, as I understand it here, assert that the messages that you re- 
ceived from the Chief of Naval Operations properly bear the interpre- 
tation that you put on them ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And your point, as I understand it, is that if those 
dispatches were intended to alert you against an attack at Pearl Harbor 



2610 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

they should have said something about Pearl Harbor as well as talking 
about Borneo and the Malay States and Thai and the China Sea and 
other places on the Asiatic coast? 

Admiral Kjmmel. If they had convinced me in the dispatches which 
they sent to me of what they now say they meant by those dispatches 
there would never have been any Pearl Harbor such as it was. 

Mr. Richardson. And your contention with reference to what I call 
the harbor plotting message, your contention with reference to them, 
is that had that information come to you it would have definitely 
pointed to Hawaii as a possible point of attack? 

Admiral Kimmel. I can't gather any other conclusion from those 
messages, and I have taken this matter up with [7058] mem- 
bers of my staff, former staff, with Admiral Pye, and they wouldn't 
believe, when I first told them about it, that those messages were in 
existence. They wouldn't believe it. I couldn't believe it myself. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral, the evidence that has been given 
here indicates that those intercepts with reference to those harbor 
plotting messages reached all of the high command here in Washing- 
ton who customarily received such intercepts. 

Admiral Kimimel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And that they passed over the desks of all of those 
members of the High Command.^ 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Richardson. Have you any explanation, as an Admiral in the 
Navy for 40 years, of how a series of messages like those could have 
passed through all those hands without any significance being at- 
tached to them ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I have tried to get an answer to that and I have 
none. I do feel this, that had they given me those dispatches, my 
primary concern out there being the fleet, these people in Washington, 
it is true, had other things to do, but if they had given them to me I 
can say, without any reservation whatsoever, that it would have 
changed my ideas completely and every one of mv staff that I have 
talked to, [7059] and I have talked to Smith, Murphy, Kitts, 
and Pye, all of them feel exactly the same way I do. We were there. 
We were on the ground. 

Mr. Richardson. Admiral, the thing that bothers me is just that, 
you were on the ground. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. You were in the midst of the greatest hotbed 
of Japanese espionage there was in the United States. Shouldn't 
you have had reason to suspect that such an important bit of informa- 
tion as the plotting of the only fleet we had in the Pacific, in Pearl 
Harbor, was being transmitted to Tokyo by that Intelligence without 
receiving information on it from Washington? 

Admiral Kimmel. The significance isn't so much that they were 
transmitting th*s information to Tokyo. The significance is the de- 
mand of Tokyo to get this information to Tokyo, Tokj^^o's anxiety to 
have it, Tokyo's reiteration of what they wanted, and of making the 
reports twice a week, making them even when there was no movement. 
Tokyo's demand was, to me, the significant thing. It wasn't so much 
that the Consul there was transmitting information. But there is no 
reason why they would have wanted that information unless they 
were going to use it on the ships while they were in the harbor. You 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2611 

must remember that this [70601 information was good only 
for a matter of days at best because the ships got out. They had to 
find out over again where they were. This question of getting the 
ships out of Pearl Harbor, of putting them in a position where they 
could get out and head out, and that kind of stuff, we had worked 
that out months before, and when a ship came in she was berthed 
headed out, so that all she had to do was cast off her lines and breast 
herself out a little bit and out she steamed. 

More time was consumed in berthing the ships for that reason. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, let me direct your attention to these dis- 
patches with reference to the so-called cut-off dates of November 25 
and November 29. Those were the dates mentioned in the letters. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, there would be nothing in those letters, 
would there, that would indicate an attack on Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Kimmel. No. 

Mr. Richardson. All you would get from those letters would be 
some appreciation of one of the two elements of doubt, to-wit, when 
war would be declared? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes; yes; and what we would have gotten 
[7061] from those messages is this, that a definite date after which 
things were automatically going to happen had come and passed, the 
automatic operation that was planned was not taking place. It took 
some time to get it into operation and every day it was delayed after 
the 29th made an attack far distant from Japan much more likely 
than it had been before. 

Mr. Richardson. Let me see if I follow you. Your contention is 
that since the 29th passed 

Admiral Kimmel. The 25th first. 

Mr. Richardson. The 25th first, then the 29th passed, and no ac- 
tion ; in view of the language of those dispatches, that they indicated 
a movement from Japan to some distant point that would require 
that expenditure of time to get there ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That seems reasonable. 

[7062] Mr. Richardson. For that reason those cut-off dates 
didn't have reference to a war on the Asiatic coast. Thai, Indo- 
China, Malasia, or the Philippines ? 

Admiral Kimmel. After the elapse of a certain time. 

Mr. Richardson. One thing further : You stated in your testimony 
with reference to the flight of B-17's that came in from San Fran- 
cisco on the morning of the attack, you suggested that the fact that 
those planes had been sent in unarmed, not ready for fighting, indi- 
cated that the high command on the mainland couldn't have contem- 
plated an attack on Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Kimmel. I don't remember my testimony on that line, 
but it is quite probable that is what I thought, whether I testified 
to it or not, that nobody would send unarmed planes to Hawaii if 
they expected an attack on Hawaii any time in the immediate future. 

Mr. Richardson. I only brought it up to suggest to you whether 
it wasn't known that the reason that the planes were not sent armed 
was because of the necessity of increasing their possible gasoline load 
so they could make the trip to Hawaii. 

Admiral Kimmel. The planes, I have been informed — I haven't 
seen the planes — had the guns on board. I am, in talking of arming 



2612 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

planes, I am talking of self-defense [7063] now, not offensive 
measures. They had guns on board and they were what was called 
"kalsomined," put up in heavy grease, and they couldn't operate. 

Now, the only additional thing that would have been required 
would have been the ammunition necessary to serve those guns. 

Mr. Richardson. Admiral, these task operations to Wake and 
Midway were under your control, were they not? 

Admiral Kjmmel. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. If you had disapproved them, you wouldn't have 
had to send those task forces out, would you ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. But you concluded, as you stated in your state- 
ment that the idea of the high command in clirecting those task forces 
to move to Wake and Midway was sound ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; I thought so. 

Mr. Richardson. Had you made that 

Admiral Kimmel. Under my conception at that time. 

Mr. Richardson. And you made that decision knowing that you 
could have held them back if you wanted to ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; I could have held them back ; I could have 
reported to the Navy Department that I was going to do so, and then 
they had the power and the auth- [7064] ority to order me to 
do it, anyhow. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, if they had not gone out, isn't it reason- 
able to expect that the number of ships in Pearl Harbor at the time 
of this attack would have been multiplied ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I don't think so, 

Mr. Richardson. You don't think you would have increased your 
ships in Pearl Harbor out of these task forces if they had not been 
on missions, but had been in Hawaiian waters ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, that is something that is in the realm of 
speculation at the present time. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, the point that I was driving at was whether 
or not the situation wouldn't have been worse in point of danger to 
the fleet if the task forces hadn't been sent than it was in sending them, 
even though you weakened the defense at Hawaii in sending them? 

Admiral Kimmel. If I hadn't sent these task forces to Wake and 
Midway, it would have been because I wanted to get the fleet out and 
to have air cover there for them. 

They wouldn't have been in. 

Mr. Richardson. If you had sent your battleships to sea on the 
morning of the 7th, if you had had sufficient information so that it 
would have been possible to maneuver [7065] them and make 
a sortie with your battleships, wouldn't those battleships have been 
in greater danger from air attack in the open sea without any planes 
of yours that could protect them than they were in the harbor? 

Admiral Klmmel. On the morning of December 7, it was a little 
late to send the battleships to sea, but on the night of December 6 I 
could have arranged a rendezvous with Halsey and gotten out pretty 
much in the same vicinity with him. I could have had the patrol 
planes out, and such planes as we had in the fleet at that time. I 
could have called back Newton with the Lexington., and he would 
have been in supporting distance of the fleet by dajlight the next 
morning. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2613 

Mr. Richardson. How long would it take to sortie the battleships 
out of the harbor into the open sea ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Three hours, perhaps. 

Mr. Richardson. If you had had every possible warning of the 1 
o'clock message which was so delayed on Sunday, the most you could 
have done with your battleships in that time would have been to sortie 
them, wouldn't it? 

Admiral Kijmmel. Yes, but I think now, and again this is hindsight, 
I can't help but believe I wouldn't have sent the battleships to sea. 

Mr. Richardson. That is just the point I was making. 

[7066] Admiral Kimmel, I would have sent all the light forces 
to sea. I would have gotten the destroyers and cruisers out. As a 
matter of fact, one of my problems all the time there, against a fast 
raiding force, if any should come, was the fact that my battleships 
would have been of very little use to me. 

They couldn't go fast enough, and the only ones that were of use 
were the ones that could get out and do something to the enemy, 

Mr. Richardson. Well, the point that was running in my mind was 
that so far as your battleships were concerned, the 2-hour warning that 
you might have had on the 1 o'clock message wouldn't have assisted 
in your defense ? 

[7067] Admiral Kimmel. It would have assisted to this extent. 
I would have had every gun on deck manned. We would have had 
not condition X-ray, as we called it, but condition ZED in the ships, 
which would have made it a little bit more difficult to sink them and this 
2-hour warning would certainly have served to warn the Army. 

The Vice Chairman. It is now 4 o'clock and we will recess until 
10 o'clock in the morning. That will give you a chance to review your 
notes. 

Mr. Richardson. I have just a few minutes left. 

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m.. January 16, 1946, an adjournment was taken 
until 10 a. m., Thursday, January 'l7, 1946. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2615 



[7068^ PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



THURSDAY, JANUARY 17, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington^ D. G. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the caucus room (room 318) , Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. 
Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edvs^ard P. 
Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee. 

\7069\ The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in 
order. Does counsel have anything at this time for the record before 
resuming the examination ? 

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, we have for introduction into the 
record a large number of documents which we think essential in order 
to completely cover the field, which have been prepared; copies have 
been, I think, distributed or are available for distribution by Mr. 
Hannaford, of my staff, and as he will be leaving Washington on 
Saturday, I would like to have about an hour of the committee's time, 
either today or tomorrow, to enable him to offer those documents in 
evidence; and if the chairman will give the matter attention and let 
me know sometime during the day when that may be done, he is pre- 
pared to go ahead with it at that time. It is a matter that does not 
have to be decided now, but sometime during the day. Most of these 
exhibits, if not all of them, are answers to requests that have been made 
by different members of the committee of us. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, do the members of the committee have 
any views on this point? If we will have to take an hour to do this, 
it seems to me we might just as well decide now when to take it. 

Senator Ferguson. I understand that this is to be done in open 
hearing and that he will offer them while we are here [7070] in 
session. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, I noticed the other day that a group of 
exhibits were offered and extended on the record by the reporter 
without the committee being in actual personal session. I do not 
know whether that would be permissible practice with these. It is 
purely a formal introduction into the record of these exhibits. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, that occurred late one afternoon. 

Mr. Richardson. That is right. 



2616 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. We had run over the usual meeting time 
already and then it developed that certain exhibits were ready to be 
presented to the committee and the committee, as I recall, by unani- 
mous consent agreed that counsel might submit those for the record, 
but personally I would think it would be better if theaa could be pre- 
sented when the committee is in session so that we may have a descrip- 
tion of them and know what they are. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, if, for instance, just by way of suggestion, 
the committee could conclude to pause, for instance, at 3 : 30 this 
afternoon, ]Mr. Hannaford would be ready to complete the presenta- 
tion of those exhibits at the close of this afternoon's hearing. 

The Vice Chairman. Is there objection to that suggestion on the 
part of counsel ? 

[7071] (No response.) 

The Vice Chairman. The Chair hears none. It will be so ordered. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

The Vice Chairman. Does counsel have anything further before 
resuming the examination? 

Mr. Richardson. Nothing, Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Admiral Kimmel, do you having anything 
you want to present before counsel resumes his examination ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No. 

The Vice Chairman. Counsel will now proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES 
NAVY, RETIRED (Resumed) 

Mr. Richardson. Admiral, referring to your compilation on re- 
tirement matters, which is noted in the record as exhibit 121, I note 
in the first paragraph the statement that a message came to you that, 
"Admiral Jacobs had been directed by the Acting Secretary of the 
Navy to inform me that General Short had submitted a request for 
retirement." 

I note then in the fourth paragraph of the letter : 

• Subsequently I learned from Admiral Jacobs that the Official directing him to 
inform me that General Short had submitted a request for retirement was not 
the Acting Secretary, but the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox. 

[7072] What do you desire the record to show as to the sig- 
nificance of the reference to the Acting Secretary and the reference 
to the Secretary ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Technically the term "Acting Secretary" as re- 
ferring to Mr. Knox was perhaps correct. I was curious to know the 
individual who had ordered Admiral Jacobs to send this message to 
Admiral Greenslade for me and I inquired of him who it was and he 
told me Mr. Knox. I wanted to know who the individual was. 

[7073] Mr. Richardson. Is there not a common understanding 
dealing with departments of the nature of the Navy Department, 
that the Acting Secretary, so-called, is not usually the Secretary 
himself? 

Admiral Kimmel, Yes, that is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And that was the reason for your further inquiry ? 

Admiral Kimmel. When I made the inquiry, I did not know who 
had given the order. I wanted to know. I found that Mr. Knox 
had given it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2617 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral, referring to your statement which 
you read the other day, and referring to page 35, I want to ask you 
a question or two. 

I asked you yesterday whether you had not conchided, as the com- 
mander of the Pacific Fleet, to subordinate the question of Hawaiian 
defense to the proposition of training. 

I find in your statement this paragraph : 

I was not expected to discontinue training for all-out security measures, 
concentrated on the defense of the Hawaiian Islands, every time an alarming 
dispatch was received from Washington predicting Japanese aggression in 
Far East. Indeed, had I done so, the training program would have been 
curtailed so drastically that the Fleet could not have been prepared for war. 

[7074] Now turning to page 36, I find this paragraph : 

In 1941 we of the Pacific Fleet had a plethora of premonitions, of generalized 
warnings and forebodings that Japan might embark on aggressive action in 
the Far East at any one of the variously predicted dates. After receipt of 
such warnings, we were expected to continue with renewed intensity and zeal 
our own training program and preparations for war, rather than to go on 
an all-out local alert against attack. 

Now, Admiral, you are not complaining, are you, because you re- 
ceived from Washington, what you call a "plethora of premonitions, 
generalized warnings and forebodings"? 

Admiral Kimmel. I was merely stating facts. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, the transmission to you as commander of 
the fleet of just such premonitions, warnings, and forebodings as 
were sent you were precisely what should have been sent you from 
Washington for your information ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I was glad to have all of these warnings and 
forebodings, but the continued submission of these did not mean to 
me at any time that I was to go out on all-out security measures and 
abandon the training program. 

What I was trying to emphasize was that in my correspondence 
with the Navy Department, and in particular in my letter of May 26, 
I set forth my principal problem, and [7075] my principal 
problem was to determine when to stop the training program and 
to go to all-out security measures, and that was what I wanted more 
than anything else, and in a very definite form. 

Mr. Richardson. And with the information that you had at your 
disposal in Hawaii, preceding the attack and the inferences which you 
drew from it, there came your decision to proceed with the training 
program rather than with an all-out alert for defense ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No ; not entirely. I took the steps which I have 
outlined in great detail, which I thought it was possible and advisable 
to take, which I thought the situation demanded. 

Mr. Richardson. Precisely ; but the steps which you did take, and 
which you thought the situation demanded put you on a training 
basis, rather than on an all-out alert defense basis, did they not ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, sir. The steps that I took were all that I 
considered the situation justified at the time, and the fleet was on the 
alert at that time. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, a word, Admiral, with reference to the use 
of torpedoes, aerial torpedoes, by the Japanese in the attack. 

You have referred to the letters of February and June [70761 
as informative to you as to the probability of such an attack on your 
ships in Pearl Harbor with the depth of water there present. 



2618 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Now, all the Japanese did to have the aerial torpedo to make the 
attack was to take some old Whitehead torpedoes built back in 1931, 
and put some fins on them, so located on the torpedo that when it struck 
the water the fins would bring it up to the surface and avoid the ques- 
tion of shallow water, wouldn't it ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That was a device which the Japanese used. It 
was a device which all the brains of our own Navy Department, who 
had been seeking such a solution, had been unable to arrive at. Any 
solution of any problem appears simple when you get the answer, 
and the simpler the better it is. 

Mr. EiCHARDSON". The fins were made of wood, weren't they? 

Admiral Kimmel. I do not know. I think so. I never saw one 
of them. 

Mr. Richardson. And you feel that the use of wood fins on a tor- 
pedo in the water, with those fins so slanted as to bring the torpedo 
up to the surface as soon as possible was a new development in the art 
of warfare comparable to the use of radar ? 

[7077] Admiral Kimmel. Oh, no ; I do not go that far, but this 
was a device which the Japanese discovered, and which our own people 
had been unable to discover. I think it cannot be compared in impor- 
tance with the discovery of radar. 

Mr. Richardson. Admiral, on October 14, 1941, you issued to your 
fleet what is known and referred to as Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 
No. 2CL-41, Revised? 

Admiral Kimmel. I did. That was not the first time that was 
issued. I think that has been stressed here before. 

Mr. Richardson. I understand that, but there was one issued on 
October 14? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And that is included in the compilation known as 
Exhibit 44? 

Admiral Kimmel. I presume so. I* do not know what is in Exhibit 
44. 

Mr. Richardson. Let me read you the second paragraph of that 
letter. 

The security of the Fleet operating and based in the Hawaiian area is predi- 
cated at present on two assumptions : 

(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war under present existing 
conditions, by attacls on [7078] Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and 
misguided nationals of such powers may attempt : 

(1) Sabotage on ships based in Pearl Harbor from small craft; 

(2) To block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the 
channel ; 

(3) To lay magnetic or other mines in the appi-oaches to Pearl Harbor. 

[7079] Now : 

(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by : 

(1) A separate attack on ships in Pearl Harbor. 

(2) A surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area. 

(3) A combination of these two. 

Now in sending that letter to your fleet on October 14, you sent that 
to them as indicating to them what your understanding was as to the 
basis for the security of the fleet in Pearl Harbor and Hawaiian waters 
at that time ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think you will find substantially the same word- 
ing in every issue of this 2CIj^1, the security order. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2619 

Mr. Richardson. And that continued appearance of that informa- 
tion in all of those confidential letters either before or after the one of 
October 14 was because there was present in your mind at that time 
that the matters mentioned in that paragraph threatened the security 
of the fleet? 

Admiral Kimmel. We were covering, as I have stated several times, 
all the possibilities that we could foresee, and we were laying down a 
procedure, insofar as we could see, to meet each one of these condi- 
tions that arose. When you make plans you make plans to foresee 
everything possible, not only the probable things. 

[7080] Mr. Richardson. Admiral, w^ould a copy of these con- 
fidential fleet letters to which we have been referring come to the 
attention of the Chief of Naval Operations in due course ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes ; he is furnished with copies of all these 
letters. You will note at the end of the letter the distribution is 
6GM-41, and a great many letters and indications there, and if nec- 
essary, you can find fro*m the then existing mailing list whether this 
was received in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations. I can 
tell you now that there is not the silghtest doubt but that he did 
receive it. 

Mr. Richardson. You were also transmitting these confidential 
fleet letters to the Army in Hawaii ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I am quite sure they were furnished copies of 
this. I cannot swear to that now, but I am as certain as I can be 
of anything without investigating it. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral, calling your attention to your 
testimony in the Roberts hearings, on page 366, 1 want to read to you 
a short excerpt from that. Commencing with question 376. 

Mr. Masten. That is the Navy court. 

Mr. Richardson. Let me correct that. The record that I am read- 
ing from is Admiral Kimmel's testimony before the naval court, com- 
mencing with question 376 : 

Question. Did you at any time as Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, and as 
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, question the advisability of maintaining 
tlie Pacific Fleet [7081] in Pearl Harbor V 

Answer. When I took command of the Fleet I knew of the disagreement 
between Admiral Richardson, my predecessor, and the authorities in Washing- 
ton on the advisibility of basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. He told me him- 
self. I agreed with Admiral Richardson in general, but when I took command 
of the Fleet we had been for sometime without much gunnery, due to the fact 
that no adequate training target facilities were present in the Hawaiian area, 
and when I took command we had just about succeeded in completing the 
transfer of the material from the Coast. I did not make any protest, any 
formal protest against maintaining the Fleet at Pearl Harbor at any time. 
I did, in conversation with the Chief of Naval Operations in June of 1941, 
point out to him the vulnerability of Pearl Harbor as a Fleet base. The various 
elements that entered into it are well-known. I repeated substantially the 
same thing to the President when I had an interview with him, and the sub- 
stantial point of the conversation was that so far as an air attack on Pearl 
Harbor was concerned, the only real answer to an air attack was not to have 
the Fleet in port if and when the air attack came, that it took from two to 
four hours to sortie, and once an air attack started the attack would be com- 
pleted before we could change in any degree the disposition of the [7082] 
Fleet. I pointed out the chances of blocking the entrance, the single entrance 
that we had, and the danger from the oil storage as it was at that time, and 
I do not recall anything other than that at the present time, although there 
probably was. These were factors which were well-known to the President and 
Ghief of Naval Operations prior to any statement by me. 



2620 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I accepted the conditions at Pearl Harbor. That was one of the reasons why 
repeatedly in correspondence I requested to be kept informed of developments. 

Admiral Kjmmel. That is right. 
Mr. Richardson (reading) : 

Question. In other words, does the Court understand that you concurred with 
your predecessor in that the Fleet should not be kept at Pearl Harbor? 

Answer. In general, yes. 

Question. And you so expressed your opinion in conversations with the Presi- 
dent and Chief of Naval Operations? 

Answer. I did not definitely recommend that the Fleet be withdrawn at the 
time of my conversation, because I wanted to get some training in. I accepted 
the situation but pointed out the dangers that existed so long as the Fleet was in 
Pearl Harbor. 

Question. Did you at any time make any recommendations as to the withdrawal 
of the battleships and carriers or battleships alone from Pearl Harbor? 

[7083] Answer. Not that I recall. 

I just wanted to ask you, Admiral, whether today you regard that 
as an accurate statement of the situation as^thus discussed and re- 
ported ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think so. 

Mr. Richardson. Admiral, I want to call your attention to exhibit 
37, page 1, a dispatch from OPN to "All naval districts." You are 
familiar with that? 

Admiral Kimmel. I am. 

Mr. Richardson. Let me read it : 

Personnel of your naval intelligence service should be advised that because of 
the fact that from past experience shows the Axis Powers often begin activities 
in a particular field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of the 
country concerned, they should take steps on such days to see that proper watches 
and precautions are in effect. 

Do you agree with the statement thus made, that Saturdays and 
Sundays and holidays were days of more probable attack than other 
days of the week by Axis Powers ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I want to say first that I never saw this dispatch 
until after the attack on Pearl Harbor. In fact, I never saw it until 
I came to Washington. The dispatch is addressed to the commandant 
of the naval districts. It was never sent to me. I have no recollection 
of ever having [7084] been warned by any agency that Satur- 
days and Sundays were a time of particular danger for a surprise 
attack. 

However, I was familiar with, in general, with the activities of the 
Axis Powers; but I didn't then consider that Saturday and Sunday 
were particularly a time when the Axis would choose lor such a sur- 
prise attack, and I am not convinced even today that such a time was 
any more than a coincidence. 

Mr. Richardson. Was it discussed at any time between you and the 
members of your staff ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Not to my recollection. I have no recollection 
of ever having discussed that with members of my staff, or anybody 
else. 

Mr. Richardson. Let me call your attention to exhibit 16, which 
purports to be a memorandum for the President, dated November 5, 
1941, from Stark and Marshall, which memorandum came to you by 
letter on November 14, 1941, as shown in the record as exhibit 106. 
You are generally familiar with what I am talking about? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2621 

Mr. Richardson, Let me read an excerpt from page 2 : 

At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the 
Japanese Fleet and cannot undertalse an unlimited strategic offensive in the 
Western Pacific. [1085] In order to be able to do so, it would have to 
be strengthened by withdrawing all naval vessels. * * * 

There is a notation at the bottom of the page that there was in- 
serted after the word "all" the word "practically," so that it should 
read : 

* * * practically all naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned 
to local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would 
require tremendous merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from 
services now considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic 
of naval and merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to 
lose the battle of the Atlantic in the near future. 

The only existing plans. * * * 

Here there is a notation at the foot of the page "two preceding 
words struck out, and handwritten word 'current' substituted," so 
that it would read : 

The current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct 
defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of 
the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. 

You received that communication ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I did. 

Mr. Richardson. You agree with the statement of fact [7086'] 
therein contained ? 

Admiral Kimmel. With the statement of fact? I don't under- 
stand you, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. I will put it differently. Have you any com- 
ment to make upon that language as to whether you agree with it 
or not ? Let me carry it through 

Admiral Kimmel. I don't quite understand the question. 

Mr. Richardson. The statement is made that the U. S. Fleet is 
inferior to the Japanese Fleet. Do you agree with that ? 

Admiral Kjmmell. That was correct. 

Mr. Richardson. The statement is made that to enable you to do 
so you would have to withdraw strength from the Atlantic. 

Admiral Kimmel. That was correct. 

Mr. Richardson. That such an offensive by the Pacific Fleet would 
require tremendous merchant tonnage. Do you agree with that? 

Admiral Kimmel. That was correct. 

Mr. Richardson. That the result of such withdrawal might 
[7087] well cause the United Kingdom to meet with disaster. 
Do you agree with that ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That was a matter of opinion. I think it was 
perhaps accurate. 

Mr. Richardson. And that the current plans for war against Japan 
were to conduct a defensive war in cooperation with the British and 
Dutch for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch 
iiiast Indies. 

Admiral Kimmel, That was correct insofar as I knew it, so far 
as any facts were available to me. 

[7088] Mr. Richardson. Now, we discussed very briefly, yes- 
terday. Admiral, the question of the report to you by Captain Layton 

79716 — 46— pt. 6 10 



2622 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of your staff, with respect to the change in Japanese call signs on 
JNovember 1. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you recall Captain Layton stating to you in 
connection with the communication intelligence summary of Decem- 
ber 1, 1941, that the change in the Japanese call signs "indicated a 
progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale" ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I don't recall the exact language, but I have 
no doubt that language was used in the summary which was sub- 
mitted to me. 

Mr. Richardson. And do you recall that at the time he submitted 
it to you with his communication intelligence summary that you un- 
derlined the sentence I have quoted in red pencil ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I can't recall whether I underlined that myself, 
or whether Captain Layton underlined it. It was a phrase that would 
and should have been called to my attention, and I have no doubt it 
was. 

Mr. Richardson. And it was a practice when particular words 
were called to your attention for you to underline them ? 

[7089] Admiral Kimmel. A practice for me to underline them ? 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. If something struck niy mind as being of par- 
ticular importance, I might underline it. I think it is equally pos- 
sible that Captain Layton himself underlined it. I don't quite get 
the significance or importance of whether I underlined it or whether 
Captain Layton underlined it. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, there wouldn't be. Admiral, aii}^ particular 
distinction if the underlining was done when you two were conferring 
about it. What I am more interested in is what the significance was 
of underlining it. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I would say that the significance of under- 
lining it was that that was probably the most important part of that 
particular communication, and either I underlined it to get the sig- 
nificance when I was rereading it, or Captain Layton underlined it 
before he brought it to me, or he may have underlined it after I had 
completed my conversation. That I can't say now to save my life. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, we discussed yesterday also briefly what I 
clumsily referred to as the lost carrier fleet. 
. Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. One of your staff was Vice Admiral [7090] 
McMorris ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. He was a captain then? 

Admiral Kimmel. He was a captain in charge of the war plans 
section of my staff. He had several very able officers assisting him in 
that section. 

Mr. Richardson. Have you read his testimony in the Hewitt in- 
vestigation ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I don't now recall whether I have read his testi- 
mony in the Hewitt investigation or not. I have read a great deal of 
his testimony. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2623 

Mr. Richardson. Well, I want to call your attention to this lan- 
guage : 

Taking into consideration the general situation and all other information at 
hand, we were extremely disturbed. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct, yes. 

Mr. Richardson. You would agree with that conclusion on his 

part? 

Admiral Kimmel. We were disturbed ; certainly we were disturbed, 
not only on November 27 and succeeding days, but disturbed — I was 
disturbed all the time I was in command of the Pacific Fleet. 

Mr. Richardson. Yes, but. Admiral, this discussion of Admiral 
McMorris had reference to the particular report to [7091] you 
by Layton with respect to the lost fleet around the 1st of December, 
did it not? 

Admiral Kimmel. I am unable to state that unless I read his testi- 
mony. If you say he was referring to that, I presume he was. 

Senator Lucas. Will counsel tell me what he is reading from ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I have tried to the best of my ability to set forth 
just what I knew, and just what significance I attached to these traffic 
analysis reports. 

I have tried to indicate that so far as I was concerned there was 
no lost fleet. There were ships and types of ships which we were 
unable to identify, and we had no reason to suspect that there was a 
lost fleet containing the six carriers any more than we had reason to 
say there was a lost fleet containing, we will say, 75 percent, or 80 
percent of Japanese naval forces. 

Mr. Richardson. If the fleet that we speak of as a lost fleet was 
still in home waters in Japan, or in the China Sea, it would not be as 
important to you as though that fleet was in the neighborhood of 
Hawaiij would it? 

Admiral Kimmel. Certainly not. 

Mr. Richardson. I read now from page 321 of the Hewitt report, 
statement by Vice Admiral McMorris : 

[7092] Mr. Sonnett. Well, I take it. Admiral you recall no specific discus- 
sion of the lack of information concerning carrier divisions 1 and 2 of the Japa- 
nese fleet on or about December 1, 1941, and prior to the attack? 

Vice Admiral MoMoeeis. I do not so recall, but I do recall that during this 
general period the information as to the locations of Japanese fleet units was 
far from as speciflc as desired. But I do not recall that lack of information. 
Taking into consideration the general situation and all other information at hand, 
we were extremely disturbed. 

Admiral Kjmmel. Extremely disturbed? 

Mr. Richardson. Were you extremely disturbed at that time about 
.the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. I wanted to know where the Japanese 
carriers were. 

Mr. Richardson. Were you extremely disturbed about it? 

Admiral Kjmmel. Well, I won't say I was extremely disturbed. 
Had I been extremely disturbed in it, 1 would have — might have de- 
duced that they were headed by Hawaii. Is that what you are trying 
to drive at? I was not disturbed to that extent, and neither was 
Captain McMorris, as shown by his testimony before numerous other 
boards. 



2624 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I am unable to interpret Captain McMorris' testimony [7093] 
as to exactly what he meant. I am quite sure that Captain McMorris 
will be able to speak for himself, and I understand he is on the list 
of witnesses to be called here. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral, let me read you further from page 
363. 

Admiral Kimmel. Does that answer your question ? 

Mr. Richardson. I think so. Let me read this to you further from 
page 363 of the Hewitt report, answers given by Vice Admiral Smith, 
who was also on your staff. 

Admiral Hewitt. That is right. 

Mr. Richardson. Referring now to the whereabouts of the lost car- 
rier fleet, as I put it : 

Mr. SoNNETT. Does 

I guess I will read the preceding question. 
Senator Brewster. Give the page each time. 
Mr. Richardson. I did. 363. 

Vice Admiral Smith. Now, I see nothing very alarming in those dispatches 
up to Pearl Harbor. On one day the traffic will be very light, radio traffic, 
and on the next day it is very heavy, right np to the 6th of December. The 
fact that you don't hear from the second fleet, he doesn't originate any message, 
doesn't necessarily mean he is on the way to Pearl Harbor. Our own forces 
while at sea exercises maintain radio silence. We had a very large force, 
almost [709Jf] half of the Pacific Fleet in May 1941 proceeded to the At- 
lantic, and no traffic was heard from them for a period of some six weeks, 
so the absence of radio traffic from the forces at sea doesn't indicate anything 
to me. 

Mr. SoNNETT. Does it indicate that they are at sea. Admiral? 

Vice Admiral Smith. It indicates the probability that they are at sea. 

Do you agree with that conclusion ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Not entirely. They may have been at sea. 
They may have been in port. The only thing we knew was that we 
were receiving a great deal of traffic. We knew a great deal of traffic 
was being exchanged, and we were unable to identify it. 

Now, Admiral Smith's testimony and Admiral McMorris' testi- 
mony was given without benefit of recent examination of the daily 
summaries which were submitted to me, and which they themselves 
saw at the time, and the best answer to their impressions and their 
testimony here is that during all of this period prior to December 
7, never once did any of them suggest to me that the carriers might 
be on the way to Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you know. Admiral, anything about at the 
time, a conference of destroyer commanders conducted [7095'] 
by Admiral Bloch following the receipt of the warning message of 
November 27 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I don't recall whether I knew of any such con- 
ference prior to December 7. It would have been a natural thing 
for him to do, and when he spoke of his destroyer commanders, he 
spoke of those destroyers which were assigned to him for use in the 
defensive sea area. 

It would have been a perfectly proper thing for him to do, par- 
ticularly in view of my order to exercise extreme diligence in the 
operating areas against submarines and to bomb all suspjected sub- 
marines contacted. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2625 

Mr. Richardson. If he, in his conference, warned his destroyer 
commanders following the warning message of November 27 that 
something- might happen and they should be on the alert that in your 
opinion was precisely what he should have done? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct, yes. I tried to warn them myself, 
and I tried to warn them in positive language. 

Mr. Richardson". Do you recall. Admiral, that he reported to you 
what he had told his destroyer commanders ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I don't recall that he told me anything about it. 
There was no reason why he should. I [7096'] would assume 
that he had done some such thing. I had a right to assume so. 

Mr, Richardson. Did you ever, following the receipt of the warn- 
ing message of November 27, ever advise the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions that you had decided not to operate any lon^-distance recon- 
naissance, but intended to concentrate on your training program ? 

Admira 1 Kimmel. The Chief of Naval Operations was informed in 
correspondence the means available for long-distance air reconnais- 
sance in Pearl Harbor, that we were unable to maintain a reconnais- 
sance for more than a short time, that in order to have a reconnaissance, 
we had to know within narrow time limits, the time of attack, and we 
had no means in Hawaii to make that reconnaissance over mdefinite 
periods. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, you were in effect, through the disposition 
of your task forces, maintaining in effect, such a reconnaissance in the 
west and southwest sectors of Oahu ; were you not ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, w^e were; and we did that incidental — not 
incidental, it was a factor which was considered in this situation, and 
we took advantage of everything we could to make a reconnaissance. 

Mr. Richardson. But you did not detail a single patrol [7097'\ 
plane to make any kind of reconnaissance in the entire north and north- 
west sector from Oahu either on December 6 or December 7 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, that is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Admiral, would it have been practicable for you 
to have detailed either destroyers or submarines for the purpose of 
maintaining a distant patrol in any of those sectors ? 

Admiral Kimmel. The naval court of inquiry went into that ques- 
tion very throroughly. To maintain an effective reconnaissance by 
surface vessels or by submarines — the use of surface vessels for such a 
purpose was, to my mind, highly inadvisable. We had no unimpor- 
tant units out there which we could afford to sacrifice for that purpose. 
You will find in the record that we tried to get a bunch of vessels 
which might have been useful for such things. We were never able to 
get them. 

The only thing we had were surface vessels which, in my mind, were 
far too valuable to put out on a wide arc and had they been put out 
there, they would have been destroyed in detail by the attacking force 
with never a chance. The submarines might have been used if I had 
had submarines available to do it with. 

At the time of Pearl Harbor and immediately preceding [70981 
it, I had a patrol of submarines off Wake and Midway. We had not a 
sufficient number of submarines to maintain more than patrol. I mean 
a sufficient number available for operation at that time. 

In about the early days of November, or it may have been the latter 
part of October, it was decided, with my approval and the approval 



2626 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK. 

of the Navy Department, to send a large number of submarines to 
the west coast ports in order to have installed a distilling apparatus. 
We found that the time the submarine could stay at sea was- dependent 
upon the amount of fresh water they had available, and by putting 
in an improved distilling plant, they were able to increase the time by 
something like 50 to 75 percent. 

And they were balancing then the supply of water against the supply 
of fuel oil and other things which enabled them to remain at sea. 

For that reason a large part of the submarines which were attached 
to the Pacific Fleet proper were in the west coast ports at that time, 
and I recall specifically that Admiral Withers, who was examined 
before the naval court, had told me he was having great difficulty in 
maintaining the patrol of these four submarines off Midway and Wake 
and the reliefs for them. 

You will also be interested to know that in the, oh, [7099] 
within 2 or 3 months preceding Pearl Harbor, we had sent successive 
detachments of submarines to the Asiatic Fleet, where we believed 
they could be of more use because they were closer to the Japanese 
homeland. Therefore we had very few submarines available at this 
time. 

Mr. Richardson. How many did you have ? 

Admiral Kimmel. My recollection of the figures is that there were 
four, on patrol off Midway and we had either four or five in Pearl 
Harbor being held there, who had recently returned from Midway, 
and were having a rest and recreation period and getting ready to 
go out and relieve these fellows at Midway. 

Mr. Richardson. The patrol of submarines at Midway and the 
outlying islands was at your order ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. You removed them from the Hawaiian area and 
sent them on to the Midway area ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. You could have brought them home any time you 
wanted to ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir ; any time I considered it desirable to do 
so, but I did not consider it desirable to do so, and I think they were 
performing very useful service off Midway and Wake. 

[7100] Mr. Richardson. Is it your position, Admiral, here, that 
you were instructed by the Navy Department to continue your training 
programs ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I made no such statement. I made the statement 
that the Navy Department knew throughout the year that I W-as con- 
tinuing the training program and that when in their opinion, with all 
of the information they had here — I thought the least they could do 
was to give me a definite time, either by supplying me with all of the 
information, or by giving me orders. 

Mr. Richardson. Well 

Admiral Kimmel. I repeated and I repeat again, that what we 
needed was information or orders, and what I wanted to determine 
above everything else was when to stop the training program, and when 
to go on all-out security measures. 

Mr. Richardson. And did you ever send a dispatch to the Chief of 
Naval Operations asking that question ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2627 

Admiral Kimmel. I gave it in language which I am unable to im- 
prove upon to this clay m my letter of May 2G and I believe in terms 
which cannot be misunderstood by any human being. 

Mr. KiciiARDSON. Well, let's change our question. 

Did you ever ask Naval Operations in Washington after November 1, 
1941, whether you should continue your training [710J'] pro- 
gram, or whether you should go on an all-out defense of Hawaii ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No ; I didn't ask them that question; but I would 
like to invite your attention to a statement I made at page 35 of the 
paper which I read before the committee the other day. 

Admiral Stark testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he did not intend 
that the Pacific Fleet should discontinue its training program upon receipt of this 
dispatch, two weeks before the attack. 

That is on November. 21 — was the dispatch referred to. 

Mr. Richardson. But, Admiral, you didn't know that before the 
attack, did you ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Didn't know that Admiral Stark felt that way ? 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. I knew it in every way that I could deduce it from 
the dispatches that I had received. 

Mr. Richardson. Was it a serious question that you had to consider 
and decide, whether you would continue the training program or con- 
centrate on Hawaiian defense? 

Admiral Kimmel. It was a serious decision to make to stop all train- 
ing and to go to all-out security measures. I never conceded that the 
Pacific Fleet was placed in [7102'] Hawaii to defend the base 
at Hawaii. I thought the Pacific Fleet was there, I still think the 
Pacific Fleet was there to conduct offensive operations, and by offensive 
operations to afford a measure of security for the fleet — for the base, I 
mean. 

Mr. Richardson. Don't you think it is unusual. Admiral, if you had 
such a serious decision to make in November 1941, that you didn't ask 
the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington, in an appropriate way, 
for his up-to-date conclusions on this very important question ? 

Admiral Kimmel. From his dispatches and from his letters to me 
I felt I would get nothing more than he had already given me, and in 
his letter of November 25, which came to me on December 3, you will 
see the language which was quoted there. 

[7103'] Mr. Richardson. Well now, Admiral, referring again to 
the so-called war warning message of November 27, what did you do 
with respect to the defense of Pearl Harbor and Hawaii after Novem- 
ber 27, in response to that message ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think I have set that forth in the statement 
there. 

Mr. Richardson. In other words, the statement you have made in 
your statement is your answer to that question ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. You refer at one place in your statement to your 
desire to see the actual decoded messages which were being received 
in Washington. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you take the position here that it was the duty 
of the Chief of Naval Operations to send to commanders in the field 



2628 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the precise documents by way of information that came in to the 
office at Washington or their compiled judgment of what those dis- 
patches mean ? 

Admiral Kijimel. I felt that the commander in chief of the United 
States Fleet and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, which 
positions I occupied at the time, were entitled to every scrap of in- 
formation they had in Washington, and how or in what form that 
information was supplied to me, or supplied to the commander in 
chief, I think is unimportant, [7104] it is whether or not the 
information was supplied. 

Mr, EicHARDSON. Do you think. Admiral, that there should have 
been sent to you the specific dispatches themselves ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I didn't care whether they were sent by dis- 
patches, by letter, by courier, or by any other means that they wanted 
to send them. I felt that in order to get — I will say this today that I 
feel that in order to get the meaning out of dispatches, referring 
particularly to Pearl Harbor and to the Pacific situation, it would 
have been very much better to give me the text of the dispatch. That 
I didn't at any time in this statement intend to insist upon. What 
I did intend to insist upon was that I was entitled to all the informa- 
tion, whether in summarized form, all the essential information which 
had to do with the Pacific situation. 

Mr. KicHARDSON. What did you understand. Admiral 

Admiral Kjmmel. And I thought I was getting all that informa- 
tion. 

Mr. Richardson. What did you understand, Admiral, as to the 
scope of the interception of messages that was being conducted by the 
Intelligence stationed at Hawaii? 

Admiral Kimmel. I knew that the Intelligence stationed at Hawaii 
was detailed primarily and almost exclusively on what we have termed 
traffic analysis, that all of their [7105] resources were devoted 
to that end. When they got a message, such as this light message, as- 
I think it has been referred to, where they talked about burning the 
flares, and lights in the windows, and things of that kind, they under- 
took to decode that more as a matter of interest and exercise, with 
entirely inadequate facilities for decoding it. They had no facilities 
for decoding it. 

Mr. Richardson. Then it was your understanding that at no time 
were they in position to intercept and decode these messages that 
were referred to here as magic ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. Incidentally, I think, in regard to this 
light message, I think you will find some testimony before the Hewitt 
Board, Hewitt Board of Investigation, that that light message was 
in fact decoded and translated in an understandable form by 1 o'clock 
on December 6, 1941, and that that was here in the Navy Department 
at that time. That type message that these young fellows out in 
Howaii were doing their best to break and which they were unable to 
break until, I understand, they got some tips from the Japanese 
Consulate. 

Mr. Richardson. Wliat do you consider. Admiral, to have been the 
significance of the so-called Mori message? 

Admiral Kimmel. I don't know. I never heard a thing about that. 
Never knew any such message existed until after [7106] the 



TROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2629 

attack was over. I recently saw in the newspapers, if you want me 
to tell you what I saw in the newspapers 

Mr. Richardson. No ; if you didn't see it before the attack I am not 
interested in it. 

Admiral Kimmel. All right, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, on page 67 of your statement you advanced 
the idea that if you were conducting a partial patrol confined to a 
single sector, that would immediately become known to Japan and 
completely neutralize the advantage of such patrol in that sector. 

Now, if I correctly interpret your position in that regard, then it 
would necessarily follow, would it not. Admiral, that this recon- 
naissance that was being conducted in the west and southwest sector 
would make it pretty certain that no Japanese attack would come 
from that sector under that reconnaissance, wouldn't it? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think that the form of recomiaissance that we 
conducted in the west and southwest sector from the airplane carriers 
and from planes operating from Midway and Johnston and from 
Wake, was much less liable to be known in Japan than any search 
conducted by planes based on Oahu. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, there would be no possible way, would there, 
except through Japanese espionage in Hawaii, of Japan knowing about 
a patrol in the north section? 

[7107] Admiral Kimmel. Well, the Japanese espionage in 
Hawaii would have been able to determine about the north sector. 
What I am talking about is that planes taking off from carriers at 
sea and planes taking off from Midway and Wake and Johnston, the 
knowledge of that would have been much less liable to get into Japanese 
hands than anything which originated on Oahu and, according to 
the northern sector, it would have to come from Oahu. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, I have just a question or two, Admiral. 

Admiral, isn't it fair to state that the information contained in the 
war warning message of November 27 was a fair compilation of the 
general, specific information which had been given to you in the two 
or three preceding messages in late October and November? Isn't 
it in effect a summarized compilation of the information you had in 
the messages which immediately preceded it ? 

Admiral Kimmel. It is a summarized compilation, but it was more 
definite and more restrictive than the previous messages were. 

Mr. Richardson. Now 

Admiral Kimmel. It indicated not an attack in any direction but an 
attack in one of, I think it was, four specified directions. 

[7108] Mr. Richardson. Did you ever in all of your experience 
as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet ever see another dispatch 
from the Chief of Naval Operations which was designated a war 
warning in words? 

Admiral Kimmel. My answer to that — I have prepared a little 
memorandum here because I thought something like this might 
come up. 

On July 3, 1941, I received the dispatch from the Chief of Naval 
Operations in which it was stated that the Japanese Fleet was so 
deployed that it was capable of movement either north or south, that 
a definitive move by the Japanese may be expected during the period 
July 20-August 1. 



2630 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

On July 25 I received another dispatch from the Chief of Naval 
Operations in which the Chief of Staff joined. This told me of the 
economic sanctions that the United States was about to impose and 
continue. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff "do 
not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use 
of military means but you are furnished this information in order 
that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against possi- 
ble eventualities." 

In the letters of the Chief of Naval Operations to me there appear 
the following which I detailed on page 33 of my statement and 
which I repeat : 

What will happen in the Pacific is anyone's guess. 

[7109] (Memorandum of May 14, 1941.) 

An open rupture was described as a possibility on July 24, 1941. 

Obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one 
thing that is factual. 

(July 31, 1941.) 

Also the seriousness of the Pacific situation which continues to deteriorate. 

(August 21, 1941.) 

I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but I wish the 
thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender, 

(August 28, 1941.) 

I have held this letter up pending a talk with Mr. Hull who has asked me 
to hold it very secret. I may sum it up by saying that conversations with the 
Japs have practically reached an impasse. 

(September 23, 1941.) 

My reaction, and the reaction of all of the people, insofar as they 
communicated their feelings to me, was that this term "this is a war 
warning" added little, if anything, to the message of November 27. 
"This is a war warning," merely, "This is to be considered a war 
warning" merely characterized the information which it contained 
and the information which [7110] it contained was the thing 
that we considered most. I had never heard the term used in naval 
parlance before "This is to be considered a war warning." I con- 
sidered all the messages — not all — but a great many of the messages 
that I received during the years as war warnings, and the addition 
of these five letters which are now pointed to as a cure-all for every 
deficiency that might have accrued to Washington in this matter, 
did not have any such effect on me, nor did it have any such effect on 
any of my associates in Pearl Harbor. 

[7111] Mr. Richardson. Well, then, your answer to my ques- 
tion as to whether you ever saw another message from the Chief of 
Naval Operations stating that the message was a war warning in those 
words, your answer would be "No" ? 

Admiral Kim^eel. That is correct. I not only never saw that before 
in any corespondence with the Chief of Naval Operations, I never 
saw it in all m}^ naval experience. 

Mr. Richardson. And did it occur to you, since it was such an ex- 
traordinary term, that you might inquire from the Chief of Naval 
Operations what he meant by using it ? 

Admiral Kimmkl. That is just the trouble. I did not consider it 
an extraordinary term. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2631 

Mr. Richardson. Now, one further question, Admiral. In your 
statement in a number of cases you refer to information from Wash- 
ington. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Can you detail just what you meant by "Wash- 
ington" for us ? Did you mean the Chief of Naval Operations or the 
Secretary of the Navy or State or War or the President or who? 

Admiral Kimmel. So far as I was concerned in my official capacity 
I referred to the Navy Department, I used the term "Washington" 
to include by implication, if you will, the fact that the War Depart- 
ment, in my humble opinion, had just [7112] as much responsi- 
bility for notifying General Short of activities that might affect 
Hawaii in any degree as the Navy Department had in notifying me. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, in fact your reference to Washington 
meant any of the high command at Washington who were in a posi- 
tion to give you information either through your Navy Department or 
through the War Department ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I looked to the Navy Department for my informa- 
tion. I took all the information I could get either from the Navy 
Department or from the War Department and I considered every bit 
of this information, and in that connection I considered the informa- 
tion in General Short's messages from General Marshall and I noted 
on the 29th that the orders that were given to General Short by Gen- 
eral Marshall in Hawaii were also given in almost exactly the same 
terms to the western defense command, which indicated that General 
Marshall must have considered the western defense command in as 
much danger of attack as he considered Hawaii. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, right along that line. Admiral, a question 
occurs to me that I have overlooked. If the message of November 27 
or its equivalent went to all of our naval commands on our west 
coast — Puget Sound, San Pedro, and whatever others there are there, 
should there have been, in your opinion, any different interpretation 
placed upon that [711S] dispatch by those posts than you were 
entitled to place on it in Hawaii ? 

Admiral Kimmel. My recollection of that, the addressees for that 
message 

Mr. Richardson. I am referring to the message of the 27th. Who 
would that message go to, Admiral ? 

Admiral Kimmel. This message went from the Chief of Naval Oper- 
ations to action of commander in chief, Asiatic, and commander in 
chief, Pacific Fleet. It went for information to the commander in 
chief, Atlantic, and to special naval observers. That did not go to all 
the other naval commands. Those were the ones that that message 
of November 27 was confined to, and Admiral Hart in the Asiatic was 
faced with a considerably different situation from the one I had in 
Hawaii and that was meant to cover both. 

The Vice Chairman. If counsel will permit, I think it is shown 
that the parallel War Department message went to these commanders 
to whom you have referred. 

Mr. Richardson. That will be brought out. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct, sir. That is what I was referring 
to a moment ago. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, one final question. Admiral. 



2632 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral KiMjrEL. The message to which I referred a few minutes 
ago was from the Chief of Naval Operations to com- [T'ii^] 
mander, Pacific Northern and Pacific — to the two commandants on the 
west coast as I understand it here. 

Mr. Richardson. That would include Panama ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No. Pacific northern coastal frontier and Pa- 
cific southern coastal frontier, naval coastal frontier. That is where 
this message went to and it was for information of CinCPac and Com- 
mander Pacific naval coastal frontier. 

Now, in the text of the message it says, "Army has sent following 
to Commander, Western Defense Command," and this was the message 
which was sent to me for information. 

Mr. Richardson. Is there any indication that the message went to 
Panama? 

Admiral KiMivrEL. Yes ; information Pacific naval coastal frontier — 
Panama naval coastal frontier, I guess that is what that is. They have 
got these abbreviations which I am a little bit rusty on right now. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, a final question, Admiral. You will agree, 
will you not, with reference to this Pearl Harbor attack question that 
we have been discussing, that if the information which you had and 
those deductions which you as a skilled naval commander should have 
made warned j'ou of the immediate danger of an attack at Pearl Har- 
bor, that no amount of negligence at Washington should have prevented 
you from offering all the defense you could? 

[71151 Admiral Kimmel. Certainly, if I had had anything 
which indicated to me the probability of an attack on Hawaii then 
there would not have been any trouble about what I did out there in 
Hawaii. The messages which came to me, and particularly this mes- 
sage of November 27, were carefully gone over, not only by me but by 
a great many intelligent people and they got the same meaning out 
of it that I did. Now, when a number of people of the intelligence 
of members of my staff and my principal task force commanders who 
saw these messages and this particular message, too, and had seen 
everything else that I had gotten, including my correspondence with 
Admiral Stark, when they did not get the meaning out of it then 
there must have been something the matter with the message and the 
people who originated the message. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, over and above those messages and the 
meaning of those messages it is your contention, is it not. Admiral, 
that you did not have enough information available to you to warrant 
you in doing otherwise than you did? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Before the hearing began the committee adopted 
the procedure by which questions from the committee would alternate 
from the center toward each end. If it is [7116] agreeable to 
the committee, the Chair would like to reverse that procedure during 
the remainder of the examination of Admiral Kimmel and give the 
end man of this group a break by beginning at the end and going 
toward the center. Is there any objection to that ? 

Mr. Murphy. I object to that, Mr. Chairman. I do not think that 
there should be any variance on any particular witness. Having 
adopted a procedure, I do not think there should be any change as to 
one of the most important witnesses that is before us. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2633 

The Chairman. Of course, if there is objection, the Chair will 
not do it. 

The Chair wishes to say that on account of his necessary absence 
yesterday and his inability to hear the testimony given by Admiral 
Kimmel on the examination by counsel, he asks that he may be passed 
until he can look over the testimony so that he will not in his ques- 
tioning duplicate what has already been brought out. Therefore 
Congressman Cooper, of Tennessee, will be recognized. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, it is the plan to continile to 
12:80, is it? 

The Chairman. That is a matter for the committee. We decided 
while the two Houses were not in session that we would go to 12 : 30. 
There will be no legislation today, I suppose, [7117] in the 
Senate. I don't know about the House. There may be some bills 
introduced and speeches, but it will probably be a relief to the com- 
mittee to be in session while they are made. 

Senator Brewster. Well, Mr. Chairman, as the chairman is the 
only gentleman who has had the privilege of making a speech in the 
Senate since we have reconvened, I appreciate his modesty, but I 
think 

The Chairman. If the Senator calls what I said the other day a 
speech, I would like to have a description of one of them that I really 
do make. 

Senator Brewster. From certain questions which were raised on 
the Chairman's side of the Senate the other day about very important 
matters that one of the Senators who is usually regular wished to 
bring up, I would be glad if I could be present there to see just what 
he has in mind. 

The Chairman. The only question brought up the other day was 
whether bills and resolutions should be introduced prior to the Presi- 
dent's message, and I rather indicated that, if the President's message 
was not ready by today, that we would take the halter off and let 
Senators introduce bills and resolutions, but so far as I know, there 
is no legislative business. 

Senator Brewster. I refer more specifically to Senator [7118] 
Green of Rhode Island, who indicated that he had a matter of great 
importance to bring up. I would like to know what it is. 

The Chairman. The matter of great importance was a resolution 
which he proposes to introduce along with Senator Smith, of New 
Jersey, authorizing the appointment of a committee to look into the 
question of a Presidential successor. There will be no action taken 
on it. He just wanted to introduce it. 

Senator Lucas. I think the Senator from Maine is about ready to 
make a speech on the floor of the Senate. I think the chairman ought 
to withdraw the remark. 

The Chairman. Well, whatever the committee wants to do about 
going on after 12 is all right. 

Senator Brewster. Without indicating any agreement with the 
Senator from Illinois, because I do not think I have made many 
speeches and I haven't any in mind today, but I do think that we 
could make an exception on this particular day in view of the discus- 
sion, and I would appreciate it if you would. I felt from what the 
chairman said the other day on the floor about going forward today 
if the Presidential message was not received. I appreciate the supe- 



2634 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

rior knowledge in possession of the chairman as majority leader to 
determine it, but I would personally be glad to have the opportunity 
of going on the floor at 1"2 o'clock today to see what goes on. 

[7 J 19} The Chairman. We might as well then, under the cir- 
cumstances, agree to adjourn today at 12. That is not a precedent that 
we will set, however. 

Senator Brewster. Not at all. 

The Chairman. Congressman Cooper. 

Tlie Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I desire to inquire briefly. 
Admiral Kimmel, you served in the Navy more than 40 years? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. And at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor 
you were one of the senior officers of the Navy? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Very few were senior to you in length of 
service in the Navy at that time, were there ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, yes ; I think that is a fair statement. 

The Vice Chairman. And on December 7, 1941, you held one of 
the most important commands in the Navy ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. You received considerable communications 
from the Navy Department during the period of time that you were 
in command of the Pacific Fleet ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I did. 

\71W] The Vice Chairman. There has been presented to the 
committee a compilation including letters of Admiral Stark and 
Admiral Kimmel to and from each other. The pages of this compila- 
tion are not numbered but according to my count there are 241 pages 
in this exhibit No. 106. 

Admiral Kimmel. I presume that may be correct. 

The Vice Chairman. Which is copies of communications from 
Admiral Stark to you and from you to Admiral Stark. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. That would certainly show that there was a 
considerable volume of correspondence between you two gentlemen ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. There has also been presented as exhibit 37 
in this hearing a document showing basic exhibits of dispatches of 
the Navy Department. Those pages are numbered and show that 
some 46 pages are included here. An examination of that document 
also shows that many of those dispatches went to you as commander of 
the Pacific Fleet. That would also indicate, wouldn't it, that the cor- 
respondence and dispatches from the Navy Department to you and 
from you back to the Navy Department was quite voluminous during 
th§ period of tim^that you were in command of the Pacific Fleet? 

Admiral Kimmel. I might add that that is only a part of - [7121} 
the correspondence, of the total correspondence. It includes substan- 
tially all the so-called personal correspondence, which was really offi- 
cial, but in addition to that there was a great deal of official corre- 
spondence which has not been presented to the committee. 

The Vice Chairman. So that, then, it is true that there was a great 
volume of correspondence and dispatches passing between the Navy 
Department and you? 

Admiral Kimmel. Undoubtedly. Yes, sir ; that is right. 



TROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2635 

The Vice Chairman. You also kept informed from all sources 
available to you as to the situation existing between this country and 
Japan, didn't you ? 

Admiral Kimmel, I did, indeed. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you consider war with Japan as in- 
evitable ? • 

Admiral Kimmel. Beginning when? 

The Vice Chairman. At any time in your life have you considered 
war with Japan inevitable ? 

Admiral Kimmel. In the few months before Pearl Harbor I thought 
was with Japan was highly probable. At no time did I reach the final 
conclusion that war. was inevitable. 

The Vice Chairman. Then your answer is that you never did at 
any time consider war between the United States and Japan as 
inevitable ? 

[7122] Admiral Kimmel. That is right. I thought it highly 
probable. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, when did you reach the conclusion that 
it was highly probable ? 

Admiral I^mmel. Oh, I should say by the time I became com- 
mander in chief. 

The Vice Chairman. And that was in February of 1941 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. From that time on you considered that war 
between the United States and Japan was probable ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. Or did you say highly probable, which? 

Admiral Kimmel. Maybe I said highly probable, yes ; highly prob- 
able. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you ever consider that Japan would 
attack Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Kimmel. I made estimates of the situation from time to 
time. Had I considered that an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent 
at any time my course of action would have been considerably different 
from what it was. I set out from the time I became commander in 
chief to do everything within my power to make Pearl Harbor secure 
against a Japanese attack. I felt it was the part of prudence, it was 
our most important base in the Pacific outside the continental United 
States, but [7123'] I have testified here, I put into my state- 
ment that I did not consider an attack on Hawaii any more than a 
remote possibility at the time that it came and that I had to make a 
choice of how I was going to employ my forces. 

Does that answer your question, sir? 

[7124] The Vice Chairman. I would like you to be a little 
more specific as to whether you at any time considered or were definite 
in your own mind that Japan would attack Pearl Harbor. 

Admiral Ejmmel. I thought it was a possibility. I at no time con- 
sidered that an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent, if that is what 
you mean. 

The Vice Chairman. You never did at an}' time consider that an 
attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor was imminent ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 



2636 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. You considered that an attack on Pearl Har- 
bor might be possible, but you did not at any time think it was 
probable? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. In a campaign, and the ups and downs of 
a campaign my opinion on the probability of an attack on Pearl 
Harbor might very well have changed considerably. I was looking 
forward in all of my efforts to any and all eventualities and under all 
of these eventualities to be able to hold Pearl Harbor, to hold the 
Hawaiian Islands. 

The Vice Chairman. But if I understand you correctly — and I 
want to try to understand you 

Admiral Kimmel. I w^ant you to understand me*, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. That is my whole purpose in asking you these 
questions. My only purpose in serving on this committee is to try to 
find the truth about Pearl Harbor. 

[7125] Admiral IOmmel. Yes, and I hope you get it. 

The Vice Chairman. You were one of the head men there. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, and I will give you everything I know. 

The Vice Chairman. I think you ought to be in a position to tell us 
considerable about it. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. Then I would like to know, if it is appro- 
priate, as to whether you at any time thought Japan was going to 
attack Pearl Harbor. 

Admiral Kimmel. No, I did not. 

The Vice Chairman. You did not? 

Admiral Kimmel. Prior to December 7. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Then of course the attack that did 
come on December 7 came as a great surprise to you ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I was surprised when it came. I did not 
think it was coming. 

The Vice Chairman. Then having reached the conclusion that the 
war was highly probable between the United States and Japan, where 
did you think the first attack would probably come ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think I have stated that in my statement. I 
expected the attack, any attack that eventuated after [7126] 
November 27, to be confined to the Far East. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster. 

Senator Brewster. For the purpose of assisting, I would like to 
have the reporter mark the passage where Admiral Kimmel spoke 
about taking every possible step for the security of Pearl Harbor as 
either the present examiner or others I am sure will want to refer to 
that. Perhaps the reporter can already locate it now, the statement 
he made a few questions back about taking every possible step for 
the security of Pearl Harbor. 

Do you recall the answer? 

The Vice Chairman. I recall the answer. 

Senator Brewster. I would just like to have it marked, that is all. 

The Vice Chairman. I hope the reporter will please note that. I 
did not consider it exactly responsive to the question I was tlien asking 
and that is the reason I did not pursue it further. I might ask some 
other questions about it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2637 

Senator Brewster. It varies, as I understood it, with what pre- 
viously has been said with respect to the respective responsibilities. 
That is why I thought it was significant and it ought, at any rate, to 
be noted in the record, and I shall want to ask about it. I will ask 
the reporter to note [71^7] that. 

The Vice Chairman. Along the line of the question I asked before 
the Senator from Maine intervened, I understood you to say, Admiral, 
that you considered that if war did come between the United States 
and Japan, that Japan would probably first attack in the Far East. Is 
that correct? 

Admiral Kimmel. As nearly as I can recollect my feelings at that 
time, I was not at all sure that Japan was going to attack the United 
States when it did. The information that I had indicated to me, and 
to my associates, that the war would probably — that Japan's next 
move would be to go into Thailand, and that it was by no means cer- 
tain that they were going to attack the United States. I do not mind 
saying that one of the reasons why I felt Japan was not going to attack 
the United States was because it was national suicide for them to do 
so, I never at any time wavered in my belief as to that, not even im- 
mediately after Pearl Harbor ; I had no doubts. 

The Vice Chairman. What do you mean by "immediately after 
Pearl Harbor you had no doubts ?" As to what ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That Japan was going to be wiped off the map 
before the end of the thing. 

The Vice Chairman. I see. 

Admiral Kimmel. Now I did not know of the Japanese [7128] 
"mad dog" attitude, as I have heard some people express it, that they 
were of a state of mind where they were going to strike out regardless 
of how much they got hurt, or how much they hurt anybody else. 

The Vice Chairman. In other words, you thought they would have 
too much common sense to attack the United States? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. "Well, at least in that respect I think you and 
Admiral Stark are in agreement. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. I believe it was Admiral Stark who expressed 
in somewhat those words that he gave them credit for having too much 
common sense. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. To jump on the United States. 

Admiral Kimmel, Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. And that was your view of it ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I never disassociated myself from that view, and 
I could not conceive — well, I never have understood why they were so 
lacking in — well, common sense ; yes. 

The Vice Chairman. But having reached the conclusion in your 
mind that war with Japan was highly probable, if that did occur, 
why — it had to start somewhere — didn't it? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right, it had become highly [7129'] 
probable, I mean that I had reached that conclusion due to the infor- 
mation which I had received as to their actions. But even "highly 

79716 — 46— pt. 6 11 



2638 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

probable" does not mean inevitable, and I thought there would be and 
there should be forces in Japan which would be able to see this thing. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, had not there been more or less a gen- 
eral feeling, admiral, in the Navy for many years that it was probable 
there would sometime be war between Japan and the United States? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, yes; there had been a good many people 
in the service who felt that war with Japan and the United States 
would come. It started back in my earliest recollection of this when 
Mr. Hobson back in about 1904 indicated that, and various writings 
in all the years since then indicated it. 

The Vice Chairman. Are you one of those in the Navy that enter- 
tained the view that war between Japan and the United States was 
sometime probable? 

Admiral Kimmel. Was sometime probable, you say ? 

The Vice Chairman. Probable, yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. I never reached the stage where I thought war 
with Japan was inevitable. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, did you think war was going to occur 
between Japan and the United States ? 

[71S0] Admiral Kimmel. I thought there was a very good 
chance of it, as I told you before here. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Admiral Kimmel. Eventually. What I wanted to know above 
everything else was when it was going to start. 

The Vice Chairman. I am satisfied many people would have liked 
to have known that. They did not send out any message as to when 
it was going to start, did they ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Pretty nearly. 

The Vice Chairman. And based on that, why, the Navy Depart- 
ment issued you an order, did it not ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Sir? 

The Vice Chairman. Based on that information which you say 
was pretty nearly a notice, the Navy Department issued you an order? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes; they issued me certain information and 
certain advice. 

The Vice Chairman. Did not they issue you a direct order, Ad- 
miral ? 

Admiral Kimmel. The only direct order in the message which I 
received was this "execute an appropriate defensive deployment pre- 
paratory to carrying out tasks assigned in WPL-46," and I carried 
out that order to the best of my ability. 

[^ylSl] The Vice Chairman. You have issued and received 
many orders during your service in the Navy, haven't you ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you regard the dispatch you received on 
November 27, 1941, as an order from the Navy Department? 

Admiral Kimmel. The part "execute an appropriate defensive de- 
ployment," certainly. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Admiral Kimmel. And I executed it in a way that I thought would 
best meet the situation. 

The Vice Chairman. I had one more question I wanted to ask back 
along the line of inquiry I was making before going to that message 
that we have just referred tq. 



PROCEEDINGS OP JOINT COMMITTEE 2639 

You stated here yesterday that you considered that the best minds 
of the Navy were at Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; I consider there were no better minds in our 
Navy, or any other navy, than at Pearl Harbor at the time of the 
attack. 

The Vice Chairman. Did any of those best minds expect an attack 
on Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Kimmel. So far as I know, they did not — not at the time 
it came. 

[71321 The Vice Chairman. Well, did they expect an attack on 
Pearl Harbor at any time, as far as you know ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I do not like to speak for a body of men like 
that, but insofar as they expressed their views to me, I think they 
shared my views fairly completely. 

The Vice Chairman. You w-ere in command of all of them ? 

Admiral I^mmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. And none of them ever expressed any view to 
you that indicated they expected an attack on Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. Now you were asked some questions about 

Admiral Kimmel (interposing). At the time it came, I am talking 
about. 

The Vice Chairman. Did anybody expect an attack on Pearl Harbor 
at any time, as far as you know ? 

Admiral I^mmel. Not at any definite time ; no. They shared with 
me the idea we should be prepared for eventualities out there, and the 
situation might change and it might develop into a time when we 
could expect an attack on Pearl Harbor. 

The Vice Chairman. But up until December 7, 1941, you and none 
of the other so-called best minds stationed at Pearl Harbor expected 
an attack on Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Kjmmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now you were asked some ques- 
tions about conversation between you and Captain Zacharias. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. He was an officer under your command at the 
time ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. And you stated that you did have a conversa- 
tion with him in March of 1941, and you did not recall that he said 
anything to you about expecting an air attack on Pearl Harbor, is 
that correct ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. I made such a statement as that. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you have any conversation with him at 
any other time other than March 1941 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Not that I now recall. 

The Vice Chairman. You had no other conversation with him at 
all, that you remember ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I cannot recall every conversation I had 
with every other officer in Pearl Harbor, but so far as I know, Captain 
Zacharias never expressed any idea that an attack on Pearl Harbor 
was imminent at any time to me. He may have expressed such senti- 
anents, I do not know. 



2640 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. Now, then, Admiral, you say that when 
[7J34] you received the message of November 24, 1941 j from tlie 
chief of naval operations you considered that with the senior officers 
of your command. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. And that all of them concurred with you in 
the view that there was not anything in that message to cause you to 
anticipate any trouble at Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Kimmel, To anticipate an attack on Pearl Harbor. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Admiral Kimmel. An air attack on Pearl Harbor. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, any other kind of attack on Pearl 
Harbor? 

Admiral Kimmel. You are talking about the message of November 
24 and not the message of November 27 now ? You said the 24th. 

The Vice Chairman. I said I expect to ask you a few questions 
about both, but I now have before me the message of November 24, 
and to refresh the memory of both of us I will just read it. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, are you going to go on ? We are 
a little past our hour now. 

The Vice Chairman. I beg your pardon. We will suspend at this 
point to 2 o'clock. Admiral. Thank you for calling my attention to 
that. 

( Wliereupon, at 12 : 03 o'clock p. m., the committee recessed until 
2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.) 

[7135] AFTERNOON SESSION 2 P. M. 

TESTIMONY OF EEAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES 
NAVY, EETIRED (Resumed) 

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order. 

Does counsel have anything at this time ? 

Mr. Richardson. Nothing, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Admiral Kimmel, do you have anything you 
want to present before the examination is resumed ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir, I have. 

The Vice Chairman. You may proceed, sir. 

Admiral Kimmel. I think I may have left the wrong impression 

. in regard to these torpedoes by leaving the statements about these 

long vanes and large rudders, that putting these long vanes and large 

rudders was the only thing necessary to make these torpedoes run 

in shallow waters. 

As I told you, I had never seen the torpedoes but during the noon 
recess Admiral Smith informs me that he did examine the torpedoes 
and, incidentally. Admiral Smith is an officer who has had a great 
deal of experience with torpedoes and understands them very well. 

He said in addition to putting long and staunch vanes on and rudders 
on these torpedoes it was necessary to greatly strengthen the after 
bodies. That in our experiments in dropping torpedoes the trouble 
was that the shock of impact would [7136] break the torpedoes 
in two and, therefore, before these old torpedoes were suitable for 
dropping from an airplane they had to have their after bodies very 
greatly strengthened, practically rebuilt. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2641 

Also, the other factor in connection with it and probably the most 
difficult was to get a gyro. The gyro, as you know, was the agency 
by which the torpedo was kept on a straight course and this gyro 
had to be completely rebuilt and strengthened so that when a torpedo 
struck the water the gyro neither upset nor carried away completely, 
in either event making the torpedo entirely inoperative, and in justice 
to our own Navy Bureau of Ordnance I think that I should make that 
statement. 

Mr. RiCHAKDsoN. Well, admiral, in commenting on it what differ- 
ence would the depth of water have to do with the effect on the tor- 
pedo of dropping it to which you have referred ? If it broke in two 
it would break by reason of striking on the surface of the water, 
wouldn't it? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, would it make any difference whether the 
water was 40 feet or 80 feet deep ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, there is something in that, but to make 
these torpedoes effective to drop them from airplanes all these things 
had to be done and these old torpedoes, modernizing them to make 
them suitable for dropping from airplanes, was [71S7] not 
merely a question of putting more vanes on them. That is the point 
that I was trying to make. 

The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your statement on that? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is all I have, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Admiral Kimmel, this morning I asked you 
a few questions about your conversation with Captain Zacharias. At 
that time I did not have before me the photostatic copies of certain 
documents that have been presented here to the committee with re- 
spect to Captain Zacharias, and at the conclusion of the morning ses- 
sion counsel handed me this copy which is the only one before the com- 
mittee. It is headed, "Notes, correspondence and reports relating to 
Pearl Harbor and events leading up to it," and quite a number of items 
are listed on the front page, but I will pass on down to an item ap- 
pearing about the middle of this page, which I will read to you : 

March 1941 : Conversation with Admiral Kimmel, CinCPac — 

that was you — • 

and his Chief of Staff, Captain W. W. Smith, U. S. N. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 
The Vice Chairman (reading) : 

Regarding Nomura, notifying of surprise attack on our fleet by Japanese in 
case hostilities eventuate. De- [7138] tails of this conversation are covered 
in a personal and confidential memo to Chief of Staff, to CinCPac, Rear Admiral 
Milo Draemel, U. S. N., for presentation to CinCPac (Admiral Nimitz) and dated 
March 17, 1942, copy attached. 

Then I turn over to this copy to which he refers in that note. I 
will not take time to read all of it but in the fourth paragraph of this 
headed, "Personal and confidential memorandum for Admiral Drae- 
mel, March 17, 1942," I read you as follows : 

Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral Kimmel and Captain 
Smith during the course of an hour and a half conversation vpith them of the 
exact events to take place on 7 December not only as to vrhat would happen but 
also how and when. My only error was that the Japanese were after four battle- 
ships and they got five. 



2642 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Do you recall any such statement as that, or any information of that 
nature given you by Captain Zacharias? 

Admiral Kjmmel. I think there is very little I can add to my pre- 
vious testimony on that subject. In the past few days I heard of this 
memorandum and I had read that memorandum before I testified 
before this committee and if you want me to clarify any of my pre- 
vious statements I will be pleased to do so, but I am willing to let 
it stand as it is. 

[7139] The Vice Chairman. Well, in questions asked you by 
counsel and those which I asked you you stated that you did not re- 
member 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman (continuing). Any conversation with Captain 
Zacharias along this line. 

Admiral Kimmel. I remembered a conversation with Captain Zach- 
arias. 

[7140] The Vice Chairman. But I have now tried to refresh 
your memory. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. If it is worth anything in that respect. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. By reading you what appears in this memo- 
randum prepared by him, which has been presented to this committee 
for whatever it may be worth. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. And I am now asking you whether he said 
to you what he states there, or anything like that. 

Admiral Kimmel. He did not. And furthermore, I would have paid 
very little attention to any man who told me in March of 1941 that 
an attack was going to occur on the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on 
December 7, 1941. 

The Vice Chairman. I might say, Admiral, that certain members 
of the committee requested that Captain Zacharias' name be added 
to the list of witnesses to appear here. 

Admiral Kimmel. I would be very glad to have you hear him. 

The Vice Chairman. I was not one of those that made the request, 
but the request was made. 

Admiral Kimmel. All right. 

[714J] The Vice Chairman. However, that was a long time 
before this thing even came to our attention. 

Admiral Kimmel. I would like to invite attention to one thing. 
The date of his memorandum was nearly a year after his purported 
conversation with me. 

The Vice Chairman. I think that is correct. I think his memo- 
randum is dated March 17, 1942. But my purpose in asking you and 
inviting your attention to it was I wanted you, if you felt prepared 
to do so, to give a direct answer as to whether that was said to you or 
not. 

Admiral Kimmel. I thank you very much, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Then, Admiral, just before the noon recess 
I was in the act of asking you some questions about the message of 
November 24, 1941, that was addressed to you along with several other 
responsible naval officials. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2643 

The Vice Chairman. And you received the message ? 
Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; I received the message. 
The Vice Chairman. This message states: 

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. 

That is a definite statement, isn't it? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. You had no doubt that that was the fact ? 

[714^] Admiral Kimmel. Very doubtful. 

The Vice Chairman. I say, you have no doubt that I stated the 
fact? 

Admiral Kimmel. I believed it, if that is what you mean. 

The Vice Chairman. You believed that anyhow before you received 
this, did you not? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; I should say that is true. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. And at least that stated a clear 
statement of fact of the Navy Department to you? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman (reading) : 

This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and move- 
ment their naval and military foz'ces indicate in our opinion that a surprise 
aggressive movement in any direction — 

now that states a definite fact ? 

Admiral Kimmel. "In any direction," yes, that is what it says. 

The Vice Chairman (reading) : 

A surprise aggressive movement in any direction. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. That is a very definite statement of fact? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. Then following that : . 

Including [7143] attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief 
of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform 
Senior Army Officers their areas. 

That was a definite statement and request? 

Admiral Kimmel. I would like to invite your attention to the fact 
that the "surprise aggressive movement in any direction" is somewhat 
qualified by the statement "including an attack on Philippines or 
Guam." 

[71441 The Vice Chairman. Of course. Admiral, after all that 
is a question of construction. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. It is a question of j^our construction ; it is a 
question of the construction of the Navy Department ? 

Admiral Kimmel. But nevertheless, it is there. 

The Vice Chairman. And it is a question of construction that I 
or anybody else might give to it ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. But the words are there ? 

Admiral Kjmmel. That is right. The words are there. 

The Vice Chairj^ian. All right 

Admiral Kimmel. "Including an attack on Philippines or Guam" 
is also there. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. If I say I am going to take a trip 
to my home, including a visit to one or two other points, the fact that 



2644 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I include a reference to one or two other points does not change the 
fact that I said I am going home, does it? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I suppose not. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Admiral Kimmel. But in this case, "surprise aggressive movement 
in any direction including an attack on the Philip- [7145^ pines 
or Guam," you are entitled to your own opinion, sir, and I do not want 
to change that, but when you say "including the Philippines or Guam," 
it seems to limit the ideas of the man who is sending it to the vicinity 
of the Far East somewhere. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, anyhow it states "a surprise aggressive 
movement in any direction" ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. It says that ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. Then following that, "including attack on 
Philippines or Guam." 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, it is your interpretation, and you gave 
the construction at the time you received it that those last quoted 
words, "including attack on Philippines or Guam," qualify or limit 
the previous statement? 

Admiral Kimmel. To a degree ; yes. 

The Vice Chairman. I might say to you that I questioned Admiral 
Stark about that. 

Admiral Kjmmel. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And I recall I questioned Admiral Turner, 
who is the man who wrote the message 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

[71^6] The Vice Chairman. And their construction is entirely 
different from yours. 

Admiral Kimmel. I have no doubt of that. 

The Vice Chairman. So after all, it is a difference of opinion on 
that point? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. They stated, as I recall, that that meant just 
what these words said to them. 

Admiral Kimmel. I think so, too. 

The Vice Chairman. "A surprise aggressive movement in any di- 
dection." Now it is your view that the following words qualify or 
limit them ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir, but I would like to call your attention 
again to the fact that this message of November 24 was followed 3 
days later by the message of November 27. 

The Vice Chairman. Yes. If you will indulge me a moment I am 
hoping to get to that. I am just trying to take the cold words that 
appear on the printed page of this message and discuss them with you. 
That is my only purpose of inquiring about this dispatch here. 

Admiral Kimmel. I should be pleased to do just what you want, sir, 
but this message stood undiluted for only 3 days. At the end of 3 
days I had another message. 

[7147] The Vice Chairman. All right. It also states: 

Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation 
or precipitate Japanese action. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2645 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. The words "tense situation" are there, are 
t hey not ? 

Admiral Kimmel. The "tense situation" I cannot say was anything 
new. 

The Vice Chairman. The situation had been tense for some time ? 

Admiral Kevimel. Oh, yes. 

The Vice Chairman. And according to the words of this message 
it was still tense? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Guam will be informed separately. 

That concludes the message. 

Well, now, what did that message mean to you. Admiral? 

Admiral Kimmel. That message meant to me to do whatever I could 
to be prepared for anything that might make 

The Vice Chairman (interposing). If you will pardon me at that 
point, I do not know whether you have quite finished your statement 
or not, but this message does not tell you to do anything except notify 
the Army, doesn't it ? 

[7148] Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. It was not directed to you on any point except 
to notify the Army ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That was information. 

The Vice Chairman. Purely an information message ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. And it referred to aggressive movement in 
any direction, and "tense situation" and so on ? 

Admiral Kimmel. There is one thing that might be considered a 
directive in there. 

The Vice Chairman. What is that? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is the "utmost secrecy necessary." 

The Vice Chairman. It might be. Yes, that is true. It might be. 

So, as I understood you to state in response to the previous question 
I asked you, that message meant to you that you were supposed to 
do whatever you thought was necessary to take care of the situation ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. And you accepted it as a warning to that 
extent, that you understood you were supposed to do whatever was 
necessary to take care of the situation? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, that is right. 

The Vice Chairman. Then, I invite your attention to [714^] 
the message of November 27, 1941, which was addressed to you, the 
commander of the Pacific Fleet, and sent to two other officers for 
information ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. It was sent directly to you and Admiral Hart ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And of course joii received it ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Now, in connection with this message of the 24tli, in a letter to me 
sent by Admiral Stark on November 25, 1941, he said, in a postscript: 

I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I 
have been in constant touch with Mr, Hull, and it was only after a long talk with 



2646 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the 
situation. 

That I take to mean the message of the 24th, which you have just 
been talking about. 

The Vice Chairman. What is the date of the letter that you are 
referring to now ? 

Admiral Kimmel. November 25. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Admiral Kimmel (reading) : 

Will confirm it all in today's meeting, [IISO] as did the President. 
Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles 
an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing tiling tliat could 
happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give 
it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some 
people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese 
to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance 
into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely. 

I won't go into the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I will 
be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may 
do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we 
may do nothing — I think it is more likely to be "anything." 

Certainly, when I received that it qualified to a considerable extent 
the dispatch which I had received before on the 24th. 

The Vice Chairman. Wlien did you receive that ? 

Admiral Kimmel. On the 3d of December. 

The Vice Chairman. The 3d of December ? 

Admiral Kimmel, I did, yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Still even what Admiral Stark stated tliere 
indicated that the situation was still quite tense and serious, did it 
not? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. 

The Vice Chairman. It did not detract any from tJiat ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No ; that is right. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Admiral Kimmel. But it was concerned much more with what we 
should do than what Japan was expected to do to us. 

The Vice Chairman. But it still emphasized tliat the situation was 
tense and serious ? 

Admiral Kim3iel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. And it did not retract anything that had been 
said to you in the message of the 24th ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, he states : 

I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong 
feeling among some people. You know that I have generally held that it was 
not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather 
look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most 
likely. 

The Vice Chairman. As a matter of fact, they did all of them, 
except attack Russia, did they not ? 

Admiral KiM:\rEL. Eventually, yes. 

The Vice Chairinian. They did everything he mentioned there ex- 
cept what he says about Russia ? 

17162] Admiral Kimmel. But that limits the perspective, after 
all, considerably. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2647 

The Vice Chairman. There isn't anything in there that said that 
thev were not going to do anything that he indicated in the message of 
November 24 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. But I think any reasonable man would take that 
as a qualification. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, of course, some men did not. You say 
you did. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairiman. That is the point I am getting at. 

Then inviting your attention to the message of November 27, to the 
words "this dispatch is to be considered a war warning," you say you 
never knew of that language being used in any other message in your 
40 years' experience in the Navy ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chair^ian. Why do you think responsible officials of the 
Navy Department sent that message to you ? 

Admiral Kimmel. You mean now, or when I received it ? 

The Vice Chairman. At the time you received it. Why did you 
think the Chief of Naval Operations, the head of the United States 
Navy, and responsible officials working with him said those words to 
you? 

[7153] Admiral Kimmel. Well, I think I have covered that very 
thoroughly in the statement I made. I do not know how I can add to 
that any, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. I have no doubt, Admiral, you have done that 
to your complete satisfaction, but unfortunately I am sorry it is not 
completely satisfactory to me, and I am hoping that I might be able to 
get some further information from j^ou on it. 

I would still like to know why you thought the head of the United 
States Navy would say those words to you if they did not mean 
anything. 

Admiral &mmel. They did mean something. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. What did they mean ? 

Admiral Kimmel. They meant that they were a characterization of 
the rest of the message which came to me. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you accept it as such ? 

Admiral I^mmel. Oh, yes. 

The Vice Chairman. But you still state, as I understood it, in effect, 
that the inclusion of the words "This dispatch is to be considered a 
war warning," did not mean anything, did not carry much weight with 
you? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think it added very little to the message. 

The Vice Chairman. It added very little to the message? 

[7154.] Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. And you do not know this, I suppose, and that 
is why the head of the United States Navy would put those words into 
such a message? You do not think that they would amount to 
anything? 

Admiral Kimmell. I will put it this way : It did not mean to me, 
nor to my associates, what Admiral Turner and Admiral Stark they 
were intended to mean. I have told in great detail, I think, what those 
messages meant to me. 

Incidentally, sir, before I brought this statement of mine down here, 
I asked various members of my former staff, who happen to be here 



2648 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

in Washington, Admiral Smith, Admiral Delaney, Admiral Murphy, 
Admiral Kitts, Admiral Pye, who was one of my task force com- 
manders — those were all that happened to be available in this area — 
to read this statement, and to indicate to me any place that I had made 
an error, an overstatement or an understatement, and they agree that 
factually the statement of what occurred, what we thought and what 
we did at the time is a correct statement. 

Mr. Murphy. Does the gentleman yield for just one question ? 

The Vice Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Do I understand that all of these admirals ^ [7i55] 
have gone over the statements you have given to the committee and 
agreed with it before you submitted it to the committee ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. I asked them to check it. If 
there was anything wrong I wanted to know about it. 

[7156] The Vice Chairman. In that connection, was that state- 
ment written by you ? 

Admiral Kimmel. This statement is, to my mind, the same story that 
I attempted to tell to the Roberts Commission. 

The Vice Chairman. With all deference to you. Admiral, I asked : 
Did you write this statement ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I will answer your question, sir, if you will give 
me an opportunity. I will try to, at least. 

Senator Brewster. I think he is entitled to that courtesy, Mr. 
Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Admiral Kimmel. I presented the same thing, if not in the same 
words, to the Naval Court of Inquiry. This statement was prepared 
under my direct supervision. I had the assistance of counsel and I had 
the assistance and criticism of various other people in getting it up. 
This is my statement. I had a great deal of assistance in preparing it. 
I am not a literary genius and I couldn't have submitted it in the 
M^ords that it is here. 

But the ideas, the facts and everything that is in it are mine. 

The Vice Chairman. But you did not write the statement? 

Admiral Kimmel. I wrote various parts of it. I will say that the 
words, I was assisted there. The ideas are mine. 

[7157] The Vice Chairman. But you did not write or dictate 
the statement yourself ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Not all of it, no. 

The Vice Chairman. All right ; thank you. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, may I ask, has that question been 
asked of other witnesses who appeared here ? 

The Chairman. The record will show whether it has or not. 

Senator Brewster. I think it is regrettable, and I hesitate to com- 
ment, but I think that as to all the people who have appeared here 
we have recognized that the statements were composite products, and 
I never before heard that criticism. 

The Vice Chairman. The only reason I thought of asking the ques- 
tion was because the admiral himself stated that he conferred with all 
of these other officers that he named in the preparation of this state- 
ment. I think it is a perfectly logical and reasonable question for me 
to ask — how much of this statement then is Admiral Kimmel's state- 
ment. 

Admiral I^mmel. Every bit of it is mine. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2649 

The Vice Chairman. And how much of it was prepared, suggested 
or dictated by someone else. He said it was a composite thought and 
idea of all these officers he conferred with, so I am just trying to find 
the fact. 

[71S8] Admiral Kimmel. I tried to give you the fact. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. I thank you. 

Senator Brewster. I didn't understand his statement to be as you 
stated it. I don't want that implication to appear. He stated that he 
submitted this to a variety of officers on the staff and they indicated 
their concurrence. That was his statement. About his counsel, and 
others, that was assistance. 

The Vice Chairman. I hadn't thought anything about it until the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania asked him the question as to whether 
this was the result of conferences with all these other officers named by 
him, and he said "Yes." 

Now, Admiral, getting back to the message of November 27, that I 
was seeking to secure some information about, I would like to ask you, 
with your permission, once more what you think the words "this dis- 
patch is to be considered a war warning" — what those words mean ? 

Admiral Kimmel. At the time I received it, and in conjunction with 
the rest of the dispatch, the part of that dispatch which appealed to me, 
"and an aggressive move by Japan is expected" 

The Vice Chairman. Pardon me, I dislike to interrupt, but I am 
asking this simple question — what these words I quoted, "this dispatch 
is to be considered a war warning," [7159] what they meant to 
you, Admiral. 

Admiral Kimmel. It meant — I am trying to tell you, sir. I am 
trying to tell you what this dispatch meant to me. It meant to me 
that war was going to eventuate in the Far East. 

The Vice Chairman. That is all it meant to you ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is what I got out of it. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. [Reading:] 

Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific 
have ceased. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. That was a clear statement of fact, wasn't it ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. You knew that from what it says here ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is what it says. 

The Vice Chairman (reading) : 

and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the nest few days. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. That is a clear statement? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. And you accepted that for what it says ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman (reading) : 

* * * The number and equipment of [7160] Japanese troops and the 
organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against 
either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 



2650 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman, That was a clear statement as to what the 
indications appeared to be ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 
The Vice Chairman (reading) : 

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment. 

That is a clear order to you, isn't it ? 
Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 
The Vice Chairman (reading) : 

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you do that? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. Completely? 

Admiral Kimmell. I did. You must read the rest of it. 

The Vice Chairman (reading) : 

Preparatory to 

Admiral Kimmel (reading) : 

Carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46. 

The Vice Chairman. Yes. That is the end of the sentence. 

Admiral Kimmel. I executed an appropriate defensive deployment 
preparatory to executing the tasks assigned in [7161] WPL-46. 
■ The Vice Chairman. So you complied with that order ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I complied with that order and I took every 
precaution in the Hawaiian area that I thought the situation justified 
and the probabilities demanded. The fleet was on the alert. The use 
of the patrol planes I have given in great detail here, my reasons 
for taking the steps I took, and I have also given in great detail my 
reasons for the disposition of the fleet at the time, in the days before 
and at the time of the attack. 

The Vice Chairman. Then it states : 

Inform District and Army authorities. 

You did that? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman (reading) : 

A similar warning is being sent by War Department. SPENAVO inform 
British. Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures 
against sabotage. 

Now, I understood you to state. Admiral, that even if you had 
understood that Japan was going to attack that you would not have 
moved your battleships out of the harbor. 

Admiral Kimmel. Will you please show me that? 

The Vice Chairman. I got the impression from what you stated in 
response to a question asked here. 

[7162] Admiral Kimmel. I don't recall making such a statement 
as that. 

The Vice Chairman. Just a moment. I think I can find my note 
here. 

I will ask you this question : Did you state you would not have taken 
the battleships out of the harbor even if you had expected the attack 
was coming? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2651 

Admiral Kimmel. If I had expected the attack was coming — and 
when did I find ont that the attack was going to come? 

The Vice Chah'.man. Well, I just want to ask you this question: 
Did you state you would not have taken the battleships out of the 
harbor if you had expected the attack ? 

Admiral Kim3iel. I may have made a statement that if I had 
received this information on the morning of December 7, when I 
wouldn't have had time to get them out, that I would not have taken 
them out. Other than that I have no recollection of making such a 
statement. 

The Vice Chairman. I understood you to say you would have sent 
smaller craft out but would have kept battleships in the harbor 
probably for use of their antiaircraft guns. Did you say anything 
like that? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I made that statement, and I made that 
statement because — I predicated that on receiving the knowledge of 
an attack too late to do anything else, and I [716S] predicated 
it on the chances of getting the battleships caught in the channel on 
the way out and blocking the whole channel, and the various other 
considerations. 

That was on the basis of receiving the information so late that, by 
1 o'clock, I couldn't have completed a deployment. 

The Vice Chairman. But if you had 

Admiral Kimmel. I stated in other places that if I had received the 
information a day or two days before then I certainly would have 
taken the ships to sea. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. I believe you stated that you did 
not consider it the duty of the fleet to defend ?earl Plarbor ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, wasn't it your duty to defend yourself 
so far as you could ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes ; and it was my duty to do everything I 
could to destroy any enemy forces. But that is quite a different thing 
from being tied down to have to remain in one vicinity for the defense 
of that particular locality. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, you stated on page 27 of your state- 
ment to this committee, the statement that you have here, "The so- 
called war-warning dispatch," toward the ['7^6-f\ iDottom of 
the page, the next to the last sentence on page 27 — do you find it there, 
"The so-called war-warning dispatch" ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. Six lines from the bottom. 

Admiral Kimmel. I have it. 

The Vice Chairman (reading) : 

The so-called "war warning" dispatch I also discussed with the Senior Task 
Force Commanders, Admiral Pye (Commander of Task Force 1), Admiral Halsey 
(Commander of Task Force 2), Admiral Brown (Commander of Task Force 3), 
Admiral Calhoun (Commander, Base Force), and Admiral Bloch, the Comman- 
dant of the Fourteenth Naval District. I did not personally show that dispatch 
or discuss it with Admiral Newton or Admiral Bellinger. 

That is correct, then, is it? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; that is a correct statement. 
[716-51 The Vice Chairman. Admiral Newton was a commander 
of one of the task forces? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 



2652 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. Admiral Bellinger was the air officer of your 
command, was he? 

Admiral Kimmel. With headquarters at Ford Island, across the 
bay from where I was, and in constant telephone communication with 
me. 

The Vice Chairman. He was your Air Corps officer ? 

Admiral Kimmel. He was. He was the commander of patrol 
planes. Patrol Wing 2. 

The Vice Chairman. He is the same officer who had prepared the 
so-called Bellinger report ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. Which was an air defense of Hawaii, wasn't 
it? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes; but you must remember — I would like to 
just correct what may be a misapprehension. Admiral Halsey, then 
Vice Admiral Halsey, was the senior Naval Air Force commander in 
the Hawaiian area, and as such the rest of them looked to him more 
or less for guidance and assistance. He had command of the carriers, 
the airplanes afloat. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, wasn't it about the day you [7166] 
received the war-warning message, or the following day, that you 
sent Halsey off to Wake ? 

Admiral Ejmmel. Yes ; and in the afternoon Halsey came over, he 
spent the day with me before he went to Wake and his recollection 
and mine, I have talked to him about this, is that he saw thei war 
warning before he sailed, and we discussed it briefly. 

The Vice Chairman. What I am getting at is, Admiral, why didn't 
you show the war-warning message or even discuss it with your air 
officer Bellinger, who had prepared the air defense for Hawaii ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Admiral Bellinger was a subordinate of Ad- 
miral Wilson Brown in. the organization and also a subordinate of 
Admiral Block. I knew what Admiral Bellinger was doing. I didn't 
consider it necessary and I didn't consider it necesary to discuss it 
with a great many other admirals that I had in Pearl Harbor with me. 

The ones that I discussed it with were by no means all the admirals 
that we had out there. 

The Vice Chairman. Admiral Bellinger was the man who had 
prepared the plan for the air defense of Hawaii, wasn't he ? The Bel- 
linger report shows that. 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, Admiral Bellinger did the work under the 
direction of Admiral Bloch. Admiral Bloch was the [7167] 
man who was responsible for that report. 

The Vice Chairman. All I know, Admiral, is what I have heard 
here. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, Admiral 

The Vice Chairman. I know it has been referred here throughout 
the hearings as the Bellinger report for the air defense of Hawaii. 

Admiral Kimmel. That report was prepared by Admiral Bellino;er, 
and General Martin, and they submitted it, whether it was revised or 
not, I don't know, but it had to be approved by the Commandant of 
the District, Admiral Bloch, and by the Commanding General in 
Hawaii before it could have gotten past them, and they were, there- 
fore, resposible for that publication. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2653 

The Vice Chairman. But Admiral Bellinger is the man who pre- 
pared the report ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I presmne he is. He signed it. 

The Vice Chairman. He prepared the plan for the air defense of 
JIawaii ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, he prepared it for Admiral Bloch's ajD- 
proval. 

The Vice Chairman. And he was your air officer there at Pearl 
Harbor at the time of the attack? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

[7168] The Vice Chairman. You didn't show him 

Admiral Kimmel. I didn't tell him because I didn't consider it 
necessary. 

The Vice Chairman. You didn't tell him about the war-warning 
message or didn't show it to him ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right, I did not. 

The Vice Chairman. You didn't consult with him about it at all i 

Admiral Kimmel. No. 

The Vice Charman. All right. 

In that connection, Admiral, I might ask you, did you show the 
war-warning message or discuss it with Admiral Newton ? 

Admiral Ivimmel. No, I did not show it to Admiral Newton. 

The Vice Chairman. He was one of your task force commanders? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, he was not a regular task force commander. 
His task force was organized by Admiral Brown at my direction, and 
Admiral Brown issued Admiral Newton's orders. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, Admiral, wliether you issued the orders, 
or some man you told to issue the orders, did so. Admiral Newton 
was the commander of one of those task [7169] forces? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right, and before he went to sea with his 
task force, according to his testimony, he had an interview with 
Admiral Brown, and I have no doubt that Admiral Brown told him 
everything he needed to know. I don't know whether he told him 
about the war-warning message or not. 

The Vice Chairman. I don't have his testimony before me, but I 
have a recollection that he says he wasn't told. 

Admiral Kimmel. He said he was never told about a war- warning 
message. He also says he was in conference with Admiral Brown, 
who had seen it. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

You never did tell him about it, never did show it to him? 

Admiral Kimmel. I did not, and I did not tell a great many other 
admirals out there, and I didn't show it to them, this war warning. 

The Vice Chairman. All right, sir. I certainly understand you, 
but he was one of your task-force commanders; he was in command 
of one of your task forces? 

Admiral Kimmel. Excuse me, sir. All I am trying to do is to give 
you the facts. 

The Vice Chairman. That is all I am trying to get. 

[7170] Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield ? 

The Vice Chairman. Yes, I will yield. 

Senator Lucas. Just for a question. 

The Vice Chairman. Yes. 

79716— 46— pt. 6 12 



2654 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. I think it is important right here to ascertain 
vrhether or not Admiral Newton had the same orders that Admiral 
Halsey had in his task force. 

The Vice Chairman. Will you answer that question for the Sena- 
tor's benefit, please, sir, and I will be interested in it too. 

Senator Ferguson. May I also, in the same question, put this, 
whether or not it was in writing, whether the orders were in writing. 

Admiral Kimmell. I told Admiral Brown, and the dispatch is in 
the file, showing exactly what I said to Admiral Brown, to send 
]*«Jewton with a certain detachment up to Midway to land these planes, 
and Brown issued his orders. Just what they were, I don't know. 
I haven't seen them. 

The Vice Chairman. Were there any written orders about it ? 

Admiral Kimmell. My orders to Brown I have here, but I have 
never seen the orders Brown gave to Newton. I suppose he gave him 
adequate orders. 

As far as Halsey is concerned, I gave him written [7171^ 
orders, and he was in my office, as I told you, for pretty much all day 
of the 27th, and in the course of the conversation, and having seen 
these warnings he turned to me and he said, "How far do you want 
me to go in this business?" "Well," I said, "all I can tell you is to 
use your common sense." 

Those were the orders that he sailed with, according to conversa- 
tions I have had with him since. I had forgotten some of the details 
myself. And the next I knew about his orders was after he returned 
to Pearl Harbor subsequent to the attack on Pearl Harbor. And 
then Halsey told me he had sailed under war orders, as I testified 
before, I think, one of the other — the Roberts Commission, perhaps — 
that he had sailed under war orders. 

He had armed all of his planes, and he had given orders to sink 
every Japanese ship he came in contact with. Those were the verbal 
orders, as I recall his conversation with me, and that is all I know 
about it. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, getting back — do you want some time 
to look at something there ? 

Admiral Kimmell. They just called my attention to something. 
I have here, if the committee wishes to look at it, the orders issued 
to Admiral Brown, directing him to send Newton to Midway, if you 
would like me to read them. 

[717£] I have no desire to put them in. 

The Vice Chairman. You might just read it for us. 

Admiral Kimmell. On 4 December, 1941 

The Vice Chairman. You issued it, you probably know more about 
it than anybody else; so you go ahead and read it. 

Admiral Kimmell. These are already included in an exhibit on 
page 41. 

[7173] The Vice Chairman. I understand, but you wanted 
specific attention called to this, and I think you might go ahead and 
read it. 

Admiral Kimmel. No, I didn't. 

The Vice Chairman. In response to the question, Admiral, by the 
Senator, maybe it would be well to read it. 

Admiral Kimmel. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2655 

From : CINCPAC 

Action: COMTASKFOR 3 ] 

COMFOURTEEN MAILGRAM 

COMPATWING 2 J 
Info : COMBATFOR 1 

COMBASEFOR UfATT-PRAM 

COMAIRBATFOR ^^AILGRAM 

LEXINGTON I 

040237 

Myser 01825 of 10 Nov Marine Scoron Two Three One will base eighteen planes 
Midway X Lexington provide transportation X On 5 Dec after sortie Pearl form 
Task Force Twelve under Comcruscofor consisting of Lexington Chicago Astoria 
Portland Desron Five less Desdiv Ten X Task Force Twelve proceed by direct 
route to arrive four hundred miles 130 degrees from Midway at 2230 GCT on 
7 Dec X From that vicinity fly off marine planes to Midway X Return operating 
area and resume normal operations after planes have arrived Midway X Com- 
taskfor Nine direct patrol planes from Midway cover Lexington flying 
[71741 off position provide security while that area and guard marine 
plane flight X Communications radio condition 19. 

Et cetera. 

The Chairman. Is there an English translation of that available? 

Admiral Kimmel. I beg your pardon. 

The Chairman. I am just trying to be fimny. Is there any Eng- 
lish translation of all that available? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I don't blame you, sir. 

That means we sent the Lexington., three heavy cruisers, five de- 
stroyers from Honolulu to 400 miles from Midway, where he was 
going to fly off 18 marine planes to form part of the garrison of 
Midway. 

The Vice Chairman. What it finally means is that you ordered an 
admiral to take his force to within 400 miles of Midway ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. I wanted the admiral to form a task force 
from his forces to go to a point 400 miles from Midway. 

The Vice Chairman. And you had to use all those technical and all 
those other words and signs and ciphers to tell him that? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. Then there is some question raised \7175'\ 
about whether people understand naval orders or not. 

Admiral I^mmel. You must understand that that order went not 
only to the people who were in that particular task force but they were 
to go to Admiral Bellinger's outfit who were to cover his advance up 
there and to cover him while he was on the way up there. 

The Vice Chairman. Then, to get back to the point I was seeking 
some information on, admiral, Admiral Newton left with his task 
force without ever seeing the war warning message or having it dis- 
cussed with him ? 

Admiral Kimmel. So far as I know he did. That is what he said. 

The Vice Chairman. That is what he said. 

Admiral Kimmel. I have no reason to doubt it. 

The Vice Chairman. You said in your prepared statement you 
didn't show it to him or discuss it with him. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. You know, in this business about 
Newton going up there, he only got about 700 miles from Pearl Harbor, 
I don't know whether you realize that or not. Midway is only 1,100 
miles from Pearl Harbor and he was going about 400 miles from Pearl 
Harbor. That wasn't so far away to run off. 



2656 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. I understand that. The fact is 



Admiral Kimmel. And Halsey's condition was considerably 
[7176] different. 

The Vice Chairman. He was going to Wake ? 

Admiral Kimmel. 2,000 miles away. 

The Vice Chairman. Which was much further. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. But as events finally transpired Newton was 
much closer to the line of approach of the Japanese attacking forces 
than Halsey was. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct; yes. 

The Vice Chairman. In fact Newton's task force was the one closest 
to the line of approach of the Japanese attack force ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, yes. I wish he had been closer. 

The Vice Chairman. I am sure we all do. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, will the Congressman yield ? 

The Vice Chairman. Yes ; I yield. 

Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman permit me to read something 
ito the record right on this point ? 

The Vice Chairman. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. I am reading from Appendix to Narrative Statement 
of Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations, page 87 : 

It appears from the testimony secured by Admiral Hart in his investigation — — 

[7177] Admiral Kimmel. May I inquire what you are reading 
from, sir? 

Senator Lucas. I am reading from Appendix to Narrative State- 
ment of Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations. 

Admiral Kimmel. That has never been submitted in evidence and it 
has never been reviewed by anybody in authority. 

Mr. Murphy. It was admitted in evidence last week. 

Senator Lucas. It is exhibit 107. 

The Vice Chairman. It is in evidence in this hearing. Admiral. 

Admiral Kimmel. I beg your pardon. 

Senator Lucas. If these facts are not correct. Admiral, why you can 
so state, but I am reading this statement. 

Admiral Kimmel. Thank you, sir. I didn't understand. 

Senator Lucas. It was prepared by the Navy and I thought it was 
information upon this point that might well be developed here. 

Admiral Kimmel. All right, sir. 

Senator Lucas (reading) : 

It appears from the testimony secured by Admiral Hart in his investigation 
that Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor on 5 December 1941 with a powerful force 
consisting of the Lexington, Chicago, Portland, and five destroyers, to deliver a 
squadron of planes to Midway. 

[1118] He testified that on that mission he gave no special orders regarding 
the arming of planes or regarding preparation for war, other than the ordinary 
routine. He said that he never saw, nor was he evei; informed of the contents of 
the October 16 dispatch concerning the i-esignation of the Japanese Cabinet, of 
the November 24th dispatch advising of the possibility of a surprise aggressive 
movement by the Japanese in any direction, including attack on the Philippines 
or Guam, or the November 27th war warning. He said that except for what he 
read in the newspapers, he did not learn anything during the period November 26 
to December 5th which indicated the increased danger of hostilities with Japan. 

Admiral Kimmel. I think, if you want to get— ^this is a version, 
this version was prepared in the Navy Department. The testimony 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2657 

in regard to this, I am sure is available to the committee, and I think 
it would be well to examine that and not to — I have endeavored, in 
the testimony I have given, to tell you what I know about. 

The Vice Chairman. Admiral, is this information here that the 
Senator from Illinois just read, is it in conformity with your knowl- 
edge of the facts? 

Admiral Kimmel. In this account, I think they should have added 
that the testimony before Admiral Ha^t showed [7179] that 
Admiral Bellinger had a conference with Admiral Brown — with Ad- 
miral Newton — wait a minute. 

That Admiral Brown had a conference with Admiral Newton before 
he sailed on this expedition to Midway and I did not attempt to inform 
all of the admirals in the fleet of this. I informed the senior task 
force commanders. And I was enjoined to preserve secrecy and not 
to alarm the people and I restricted the information to the officers that 
I have indicated. 

The Vice Chairman. But that didn't mean you couldn't tell an 
admiral in the United States Navy about it, did it ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Neither did it mean that I was obligated to tell 
every admiral out there. 

The Vice Chairman. But here was an admiral going off on a mis- 
sion under your orders, in command of a task force, with some of the 
most valuable vessels of the United States Navy in that force, and you 
didn't tell him, or you don't know that anybody else ever told him ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I have every reason to believe, and I believe, that 
Admiral Brown gave him the information which he needed to put him 
in proper shape. 

Now, it says in here that he proceeded in the routine way. Well, 
the routine way, as a matter of fact was to take all precautions at sea. 
He also testified that he [7180] zigzagged on the way up there. 
He testified that he put up an airplane patrol, and that he maintained 
an airplane patrol constantly. I don't know myself how many more 
things he could have done. He also had my order, which was issued 
to all the fleet, in regard to exercising extreme vigilance in regard to 
submarines and to depth charge everyone that came in the operating 
area. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether Admiral 
Brown will be a witness ? If he isn't listed, I think he should be. 

The Chairman. Counsel may answer that, whether Admiral Brown 
will be a witness. 

Mr. Richardson. We expect to call everyone of these members of 
Admiral Kimmel's staff, both those in charge and those that were 
subordinates. 

The Vice Chairman. Let me ask you. Admiral, what day was it 
that Admiral Newton left with his task force for Midway ? 

Admiral Kimmel. December 5. 

The Vice Chairman. December 5. What day was it that Admiral 
Halsey left with his task force for Wake ? 

Admiral Kimmel. November 28. 

The Vice Chairman. Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor under 
your orders on November 28 with his task force to [7181] go 
to Wake? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 



2658 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. Aiid- 



Admiral Kimmel. He was going into an area where a contact with 
the Japanese was much more probable than in this 700-mile jaunt of 
Newton's. 

The Vice Chairman. But Admiral Halsey left with his task force 
on November 28 under your orders, with full orders and instructions 
to sink every Japanese ship in sight ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I have just given you the facts in the case, and 
they are not as you have stated it. 

The Vice Chairman. How was it you stated it? 

Admiral Kimmel. I stated that Admiral Halsey, after seeing these 
warnings, turned to me and asked how far he should go, and I said, 
"Use your common sense," and he left with those orders. 

The Vice Chairman. That is all he had from you ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is all he had from me, was to use his com- 
mon sense. He interpreted that as I have told you. 

The Vice Chairman. He interpreted that as full battle orders, 
didn't he, and so issued it to his command? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, that is what lie did. 

[7182] The Vice Chairman. And based on the war warning 
message ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. And Admiral Newton, who left 
on December 5, which was some 7 or 8 daj^s later, left without any 
knowledge of the war warning message, without any information 
about it, or without any war orders ; is that right ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I don't think that is right, no. 

The Vice Chairman. Wliat is right. 

Admiral Kimmel, You will have to ask Admiral Brown, because 
he gave Admiral Newton his orders. 

The Vice Chairman. And you don't know ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No. I have told you that. 

The Vice Chairman. He was under your command, and you don't 
know what orders he went under or what his instructions were? 

Admiral Kimmel. Tlie details, no ; I trusted Admiral Brown and I 
have no reason to regret that trust. 

The Chairman. And you don't know whether Admiral Newton 
had war orders when he left Pearl Harbor or not ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, I don't ; not personally. 

The Vice Chairman, Now, I would like to invite your attention, 
Admiral, to page 47 of your statement presented [71831 here 
to the committee, the second short paragraph there, just three lines, or 
two and a half. 

Perhaps I can read it to you quicker than you can find it. 

Admiral Ivimmel. Pao;e 47? 

The Vice Chairman. Yes. 

[7184] The Vice Chairman (Keading) : 

In these circumstances no reasonable man in my position would consider that 
the war warning was intended to suggest the likelihood of an attack in the 
Hawaiian area. 

That is the way you felt about it at the time ? 

Admiral Kimmel, I cited the circumstances in the preceding pages, 
if I remember correctly. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2659 

The Vice Chairman. Yes, I think that is true; that is your con- 
chision there. 

Admiral Kimmel. That was my conclusion. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Then why didn't you so advise the 
Navy Department? 

Admiral Kimmel. It never occurred to me to notify the Navy De- 
partment of every conclusion that I reached. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, they had sent you a message they called 
a war warning message and made reference to a tense, critical situa- 
tion, and so forth. You did not consider it such ? 

Admiral Kimbiel. Did not construe what as such ? 

The Vice Chairman. As a war warning message? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, if anybody will define for me what a war 
warning message is I would be better able to tell you whether I con- 
strued it as such. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, I have certainly understood [7185] 
from you — and if I am mistaken I want you to correct me — that you 
did not consider it as a message indicating that war was imminent or 
that there would be any probability of any attack on your command. 

Admiral Kimmel. The two are considerably different. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Admiral Kimmel. Now, war was getting closer, we could see that, 
there was no question about that, I have never tried to get away from 
that at any time and I took all steps in Pearl Harbor which I consid- 
ered the probabilities justified and what my forces permitted. 

The Vice Chairman. Then just to get back to the w^ords of your 
own statement here : 

In these circumstances no reasonable man in my position would consider that 
the war warning was intended to suggest the lilcelihood of an attack in the 
Hawaiian area. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. And you said it did not occur to you to ask 
the Navy Department about that ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, I believe you state that 
you did not know about General Short's reply to General Marshall's 
message. 

[7186'\ Admiral Kimmel. I knew that he would make a reply 
because he was ordered to. 

The Vice Chairman. I see. You did not make any reply to the 
message you received ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I did not because none was required. 

The Vice Chairman. That was not customary in the Navy, was it? 

Admiral Kimmel. It has been done. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, was it customary in the Navy to reply 
to messages of that type ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Not unless a reply was asked for. 

The Vice Chairman. I see. I think that is what Admiral Stark 
testified here, that it was not the custom in the Navy, as it was in the 
Army, to ask for acknowledgment or 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I wouldn't say that. When you speak of 
customary, whenever the situation demanded a reply. I have seen 
such merssages where a subordinate was given instructions or informa- 



2660 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tion and directed to report the measures taken, but it was not done in 
this case. If he had wanted a reply he would have asked for one. 

The Vice Chairman. And it never did occur to you to ask for any 
further information or anything further after you received that mes- 
sage of the 27th ? 

Admiral Kimmel.'I thought I understood the situation. 

[71S7] The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Admiral Kimmel. If I had not I would have asked for further 
information. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, testimony has been -given 
the committee here, admiral, by the first witnesses who appeared at 
this hearing, Admiral Inglis for the Navy Department and Colonel 
Thielen, I believe his name was, for the War Department, that no 
searches were made by airplanes on December 6, 1941. Is that cor- 
rect? 

Admiral Kimmel. I have covered that exhaustively in my state- 
ment, the searches that were made prior to December 7, and on De- 
cember 7, and on December 7 Halsey's force did make a search in 
the early morning and were in process of making that search when 
the attack took place. 

The Vice Chairman. I understand that is the 7th, admiral. I am 
asking you if there were any searches made by aircraft from Pearl 
Harbor 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, from Pearl Harbor? 

The Vice Chairman (continuing). On December 6, 1941. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes; there were searches made of the operating 
area. 

The Vice Chairman. On December 6, 1941 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. What searches were made? 

[7188] Admiral Kimmel. Of the operating area. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, just what was that? 

Admiral Kimmel. A distance of about 300 miles out and an area 
to the southward. 

The Vice Chairman. On December 6 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. On December 6 and December 7 too. 

The Vice Admiral. Well, there were not any searches made beyond 
the 300 miles? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. The Navy had the responsibility for long- 
range reconnaissance, didn't it? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir; they did under the agreement. 

The Vice Chairman. And none were made on the 6th beyond the 
300 miles? 

Admiral Kimmel. With the important qualification that it had 
been stated and had been given to the Navy Department, and which 
the Army and all interested parties understood, that you could not 
maintain a search except when we knew that an attack was expected 
within narrow limits, narrow time limits. 

The Vice .Chairman. You did not make any searches or reconnais- 
sance unless you expected an attack within a limited time? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2661 

Admiral Kibemel. That is what we said. That is all we could do. 
We told them that months before and the situation [7189~\ had 
not changed. 

The Vice Chairman. So there were never made at any time then ? 

Admiral Kimmel. On occasions we made some searches, yes. On 
one occasion Admiral Bloch came to me and suggested we scout down 
to the southward. 

The Vice Chairman. When was that ? 

Admiral Kimmel. It w^as probably in September. I do not recall 
exactly. 

The Vice Chairman. About how long a range search did you make ? 

Admiral Kimmel. We sent them about three or four hundred miles 
and we took as a median line a line betwixt Oahu and Jaluit and our 
object was to try to catch on the surface some of these submarines that 
we suspected as operating in the area. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, now, these flights that you refered to, 
Admiral, on December 6 within a distance of 300 miles, that was part 
of the training program, wasn't it ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No. 

The Vice Chairman. It was not ? 

Admiral Kimmel, No. That was 

The Vice Chairman. It was not connected with training? 

Admiral Kimmel. That was an established patrol of the [7190] 
operating area to discover any submarines that might be there. 

The Vice Chairman. You were looking for submarines? 

Admiral Kimmel. Primarily. 

The Vice Chairman. But there were not any searches made looking 
for any surface vessels ? 

Admiral Kimmel. We had forces operating around Hawaii both to 
the northward and to the southward at all times and they made 
searches with their observation planes from the battleships and by the 
planes from the carriers almost constantly. 

The Vice Chairman. There wasn't any made to the north ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Some were made to the northward, yes. In the 
case of people who went up there we had planes operating to the 
northward and they reported everything they saw, not as a regular 
patrol you understand, but it served the same purpose. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, wasn't there something connected with 
the Martin -Bellinger report and the Bloch report and those related to 
the possibility of an air attack 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. 

The Vice Chairman (continuing). on Hawaii? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, yes. 

The Vice Chairman. Yes — that rather emphasized the northern 
direction? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, it never emphasized the northern direc- 
[7 J 91] tion. It emphasized an attack on Hawaii. 

The Vice Chairman. Didn't it call attention to any extent to any 
particular direction? 

Admiral Kimmel. Not to my best recollection at the present time, 
because I think they felt that it was dangerous to predict which sector 
the attack was coming in from. 



2662 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. Well, I am sorry to have detained you as long 
as I have, admiral. I would like to ask you this, though : I under- 
stood you to state this morning that you issued notices on November 
27 to sink all submarines that were sighted. 

Admiral Kimmel. No, I issued no such order as that. 

The Vice Chairman. What was it ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I issued an order to depth bomb every submerged 
contact in the operating area. If a Japanese submarine had appeared 
on the surface, that would have been another story. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, you issued that order on November 27 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I thought it was the 28th. It may have been 
the 27th. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Admiral Kimmel. It was the 28th. 

The Vice Chairman. You issued the order on the 28th ? 

[7192] Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. To sink Japanese craft of any kind that was 
encountered, was that it, or found ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, no. I had better read it to you. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Admiral Kimmel. This is CinCPac to Pacific Fleet. This is to 
everybody ; and, incidentally, I thought it was a pretty good alert in 
itself [reading] : 

Exercise extreme A'igilance against submarines in operating areas vicinity 
Oaliu especially during sortie and entrance X Our submarines will conduct sub- 
merged operations in areas cast 5 and cast 7 only proceeding elsewhere on sur- 
face X Depth bomb all submarine contacts suspected to be hostile in Oahu op- 
erating areas except areas cast 5 and cast 7. 

The Vice Chairman. All right, thank you. Describe what you 
mean by "operating areas". Is that the three hundred mile limit? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, no. 

The Vice Chairman. All right, what do you mean by the operating 
limit there ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Have you got that chart you had this morning ? 

The Vice Chairman. Well, you can tell me, can't you, what 
[719S] it is? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I think if you have that in front of you you 
can see it. Just put it right in front of him. 

We carved up the ocean area in all directions from Pearl Harbor, 
north, south, east, and west, into rectangles or squares in order to be 
able to designate these particular areas and those we had — ^you see 
there "Cast 5 and Cast 7" — that is C-5 and C-7. "Cast" is a naval 
term. 

When I issued this order that said depth bomb them everywhere 
except in those areas which were very definitely laid down on that 
chart and such a chart was in the possession of each ship in the fleet, 
they knew exactly what I meant, the areas in which they were not to 
depth bomb submarines and they were to depth bomb them in all the 
rest of the areas in which they were discovered. 

The Vice Chairman. They were to depth bomb submarines in all 
of the areas except those that were excluded ? 

Admiral Kimmix. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2663 

Admiral Kimmel. And we used that in order to assign a detach- 
ment of the Fleet to some particular locality to carry out certain exer- 
cises and during that time they had t^iat area clear and we put others 
in other areas where they would not interfere with each other. 

[7194] The Vice Chairman. And you issued those orders for 
that on November 28 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. And Admiral Halsey issued orders to shoot 
every Japanese vessel in sight ? 

Admiral Kimmel. So he told me. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. And you issued orders to get into 
action on 24 hours' notice, didn't you ? 

Admiral Kimmel. What is that? I don't know what you mean now 
about 24 hours. 

The Vice Chairman. You referred to something. I think it is on 
page 60. 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, you mean my plans of exactly what orders 
we expected to issue, or at least what things we expected to cover in 
case we had war with Japan in 24 hours? Yes, I did. 

The Vice Chairman. You issued those, prepared those plans? 

Admiral Kimmel. I had those plans. I had that drawn up as_a 
memorandum and kept it in my headquarters for quick reference in 
case anything should happen. 

The Vice Chairman. And I believe you stated, didn't you, that 
Admiral Newton proceeded under complete war conditions? 

Admiral Kimmel. As nearly as I could make out from his descrip- 
tion in his testimony, 

[7195] The Vice Chairman. Well, you say on page 28, line 5 : 

Admiral Newton proceeded under complete war conditions. 

Admiral Kimmel. The information I have of that is Admiral New- 
ton's testimony before Admiral Hart. 

The Vice Chairman. All those things happened after you received 
the war warning message of the 27th ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. ^^Tiat you have referred to here, yes. 

The Vice Chairman. These specific things that I have referred to 
all happened Tinder your orders and instructions after you received 
the war warning message on November 27 ? 

Admiral Kammel. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you at any time after November 27 order 
long-range airplane reconnaissance? 

Admiral Kimmel. I covered that completely and the answer is "no." 

The Vice Chairman. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, will the gentleman yield for just one question ? 

The Chairman. Well, under the order of the committee 3 : 30 having 
arrived the hearing will be suspended in order that the counsel may 
file some documents here that they said will take about an hour. 
Admiral, if you have got another word here put it in. 

[7196] Admiral Kimmel. I just wanted to add, the answer is 
"No" with the qualifiaction that I have set forth completely in my 
statement. 

The Vice Chairman. At this point. Admiral, I think you may be 
excused until 10 o'clock in the morning. 

Admiral Kimmel. Thank you, sir. 



2664 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. The hearing is not suspended. It is simply diverted 
here for the next hour or so in order that certain ofiicial documents may 
be filed. , 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Counsel, you may proceed. 

Mr. Kaufman. Mr. Chairman, in the statement hied by General Short 
he refers to an exhibit which consists of a statement made by him and 
filed with the Roberts Commission and which exhibit also has been 
filed with the Army board as an exhibit. The document is very, very 
long. There are six copies of this document, one in the possession of 
General Short, three in the files of the War Department, and two in 
our files and we were wondering whether this exhibit may be used 
without having duplicated the necessary copies for all of the members 
of the committee. We have five that can be made available to the com- 
mittee and many of the documents referred to in this exhibit are 
already in evidence here and have been copied and copies are in the 
possession of all of the members of the committee. 

[7197] The Vice Chairman. I am sorry, Mr, Kaufman. Due to 
the confusion I did not catch just what the description of this is. 

Mr. Kaufman. General Short in the statement that he has filed, 
which he will read when he takes the stand next week, refers to an 
exhibit,^ which exhibit he tendered to the Roberts Commission in De- 
cember of 1941. That exhibit was also referred to in the hearings 
before the Army board. 

Many of the documents making up this exhibit are already in evi- 
dence and copies of them have been supplied to members of the com- 
mittee. Other parts of it have not been marked in evidence. 

There are in existence six copies of this exhibit, one in the possession 
of General Short, two in the possession of counsel, and three in the 
War Department, and we were wondering whether we could avoid the 
duplicating of this entire exhibit, most of which is already in the 
record in various parts. 

The Vice Chairman. And there are five copies available for mem- 
bers of the committee ? 

Mr. Kaufman. That is correct, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Is there objection to not having this dupli- 
cated ? 

(No response.) 

The Vice Chairman. The Chair hears none. It is so ordered. Pro- 
ceed with the next item. 

[7198] Mr. Hannaford. Mr. Chairman, I have here a number of 
matters which I would like to insert in the record. They are for 
the most part in response to inquiries made by various members of 
the committee. 

The first matter is in response to an inquiry of Congressman 
Murphy at page 1952 of the record where he asked for information 
regarding the establishment of Pearl Harbor as a Navy base. 

The Navy has submitted a two-page memorandum here which I 
would suggest be made a part of the record or I can read it if the 
committee cares to have me read it. It goes back to 1899 and 
brings the history of Pearl Harbor up to date. 

Do you wish to have it spread on the record, or do you wish to 
have it read, Mr. Chairman ? 

' Subsequently introduced as Exhibit No. 133. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMI'TTEE 2665 

The Vice Chairman. It is something that Mr. Murphy called 
for, isn't it, or inquired about ? 

Mr. Hannaford. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. Do you have some preference about this? 

Mr. Murphy. I did not hear what was said. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, do I understand thfvt when 
they are marked as exhibits that we will get copies of them, each 
member will get a copy? If it goes into the transcript, naturally, 
we get the copies and are able to read them. 

Mr. Hannaford. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. But if they are just put in as ex- 
hibits, [7199^ then we must go to the office of counsel 
in order that we may read them or get them from him to read, that 
is the distinction. 

Mr. Hannaford. I would suggest that this be made part of the 
transcript. 

Senator Ferguson. It is not very long, is it ? 

Mr. Hannaford. It is a two-page exhibit. 

The Vice Chairman. Do you suggest that it be spread on the 
transcrijDt ? 

Mr. Hannaford. I suggest that it be spread on the transcript. 

The Vice Chairman. Without objection it will be spread on the 
transcript at this point. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, it might be better to put it in to- 
morrow because I am going to go into it, but it can be spread now 
in order to get it in for reference. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

(The document referred to follows :) 

Department of the Navy, 

Office of the Secretary, 
Washifigton, I4 January 1946. 
1083A 
R#-5 

Memorandum 
To : Mr. William D. Mitchell. 

[7200] 1. In response to the request of Congressman Murphy, noted at page 
1952 of the "Report of Proceedings of the Joint Committee's Investigation," for 
information regarding establishment of the port and base at Pearl Harbor, the 
following information is submitted : 

The Naval Station Hawaii was established in 1899 and in 1902, the Navy 
Yard Halawa was established in Pearl Harbor. The name was changed to Navy 
Yard Pearl Harbor about 1912. In 1909 construction of a dry dock and improve- 
ment of the channel was begun. To improve security Pearl Harbor was declared 
a "closed port" in 1912 and a defensive sea area was established in 1939. 'A 
submarine base was established in 1919 and the Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, 
in 1920. 

Following World War I, reestimates of Naval Base requirements were made by 
Navy and Army-Navy planning agencies culminating in the report of the Rodman 
Board. The Secretary of the Navy approved this report and forwarded it to the 
Chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs House of Representatives, with 
copies to other appropriate committee and subcommittee chairmen of the Senate 
and House. This report recommended "An advanced base to be developed on 
Oahu capable of serving the entire fleet to the 'maximum subject only to the 
natural limitations imposed by the size and character of this island. * * * 
This advanced base should have priority of development over the fleet bases 
named in paragraph 19 (San Francisco, Puget [7201] Sound, New York- 
Narragansett Bay region, Chesapeake Bay, and Canal Zone)." This recommenda- 
tion gave the Hawaiian base first priority. 



2666 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Development of the base facilities was slow until the mid-twenties when the 
surface fuel storage was begun, additional dry docks were constructed, indus- 
trial facilities were expanded, and the channel was improved. During the 
thirties, further dredging and industrial expansion occurred, the radio station 
and ammunition depot were moved out of the Navy Yard, and moorings were 
constructed in Pearl Harbor. The Aiea Hospital was built and the under- 
ground fuel storage was begun. Incident to the latter, an independent water 
supply system for the Navy Yard and the adjacent activities was installed. 
Supply Depot facilities were also progressively developed. Several air fields 
were built on Oahu and one on Mauri. Aviation repair capacity primarily on 
Ford Island was also increased. This base development proceeded in the forties 
at an ever-increasing tempo before and during hostilities until it became apparent 
that the war was nearly over. 

The Naval Base facilities on Oahu and other Hawaiian Islands were before 
the war, and continued to be, the most important in the Pacific. Fleet concen- 
trations for combined training occurred in the Hawaiian area in 1925, 1928, 1932, 
1933, 1935, 1937, 1938, and 1940. In 1939, a large number of ships called [7202] 
the Hawaiian Detachment, were sent to Hawaii and remained until joined by the 
remainder of the fleet in 1940. These fleet visits tested the capacity of the base 
and indicated necessary improvements. Prior to the war, repair and supply 
facilities were especially deficient to maintain the fleet. During the war it was 
necessary to limit repairs to emergency work, largely battle damage, and to return 
ships to West Coast ports whenever time and the ship's condition permitted. 
Pearl Harbor was the port of departure and return for practically all Central 
Pacific and the early South Pacific Task Force Operations prior to our capture 
of the Marshalls. Subsequently, individual ships returned there for permanent 
or temporary repairs and replenishment. The supplies stored there both in the 
Naval Supply Depot and the Aviation Supply Depot were invaluable to support 
the routine and emergency requirements of our forces in more forward areas. 
All Central Pacific Submarine Patrols originated at Pearl Harbor until the sec- 
ondary base at Midway was ready for service in late 1942, after which major 
overhauls continued to be accomplished at Pearl Harbor until the end of the war, 
minor refits being conducted in forward bases. A large part of the Gilberts, the 
Marshalls, the Marianas, the Iwo Jima, and the Okinawa operations were mounted 
in Pearl Harbor. 

In addition to serving the material requirements of the [7203'\ fleet 
during the war, Pearl Harbor, with its extensive communications facilities, was 
the Pacific Fleet operational command center from December 1941, until early 
1945, when CinCPac moved to Guam. Many of the CinCPac staff functions con- 
tinued to be performed in Pearl Harbor as well as those of the various type com- 
manders. CinCPac's operational staff has now returned to Pearl Harbor. 

John Fokd Baechee, 
Lieut. Comdr., USNR. 

The Vice Chairman. All right, go ahead. 

Mr. Hannaford. The next item I have is a letter from Admiral 
Stark in response to a question submitted to him by Representative 
Gearhart, at page 6121 of the transcript. I might read the letter. 
[Reading:] 

In my testimony during the afternoon session of 3 January 1946, at page 6121 
of the transcript, Representative Gearhart asked whether there were any so-called 
"shooting orders" applicable to the Pacific. I stated that there was such an order 
applicable to the Southeast Pacific, and Mr. Gearhart asked that I produce it for 
the record. 

Accordingly, I am enclosing a photostat copy of CNO's secret despatch 282121 
of 28 August 1941, which was sent to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and other 
[7204] addressees. 

I would suggest that this letter and the attachment also be spread 
upon the record at this point, Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered. 
(The attachment referred to follows :) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2667 



Naval Message — Navy Depaetment 



Phone extension number 
From : CNO 



Released by : Adm. Stark 



Addresses 
Cincpac 



Message 

Precedence 

Priority 

PPPPPPPP 

Routine 



Deferred 



Commander Panama 
Naval Coastal 
Frontier 

Cinclant ; Spenavo, Lon : 
Commander Pacific 
Southern Coastal 
Frontier ; 

Commander Caribbean 
Naval Coastal Frontier ; 
Com 11 
Paraphrased by Allensworth 

Indicate by asterisk addresses for which mail delivery is satisfactory 

Note : This despatch sent to SPENAVO London as OPNAV 282128 282121 CR 



Date : 28 August 1941 
Tor: Coderoom 



Encoded by Obannon-Purdy 



Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred 
precedence. 

17205] Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery 

Date Time GOT 

Text 

Certain operations prescribed for the Atlantic by WPL 51 are hereby extended 
to areas of the Pacific Ocean as described herein In view of the destruction by 
raiders of merchant vessels in the Pacific Ocean within the Western Hemisphere 
neutrality zone as defined in the declaration of Panama of Oct. 3, 1939. Formal 
changes in WPL 51 will be issued but meanwhile action addresses will execute 
immediately the following instructions. Cincpac constitute the southeast Pacific 
force consisting of two 7500 ton light cruisers and dispatch it to Balboa. For 
task purposes this force will operate directly under CNO after entering the south- 
east Pacific sub area as defined in WPL 46, PARA 3222 except western limit is 
longitude 100 degrees west, within the Pacific sector of the Panama naval coastal 
frontier and within the southeast Pacific sub area the commander Panama naval 
coastal" frontier and commander southeast Pacific force will in cooperation and 
acting under the strategic direction of the chief of naval operations execute the 
following task colon destroy surface raiders which attack or threaten United 
States flag shipping. Interpret an approach of surface raiders [7206] 
within the Pacific sector of the Panama naval coastal frontier or the Pacific 
southeast sub area as a threat to United States flag shipping.XX For the present 
the forces concerned will base Balboa but CNO will endeavor to make arrange- 
ments for basing on South American ports as may be required XX Action Adees 
and commander Southeast Pacific Force inform CNO when these instructions 
have been placed in effect.XX 
Distribution 

12 . . . Originator CNO File. Show File . . File . . . 

Copies to 16. 2^. S^. . 38. . 38W. . WPD, US Army. . Brit. Nav. Staff in 
Washington 

SECEBTT 



Make original only. 
Return to F-105. 



See Art 76 (4) 
Nav Regs 
Deliver to communication watch officer in person 



Mr. Hannaford. The next item that I have is also a letter from Ad- 
miral Stark in response to a question propounded by Senator Ferguson 
with respect to whether or not the shooting orders issued in the At- 
lantic had been also sent to the Pacific. Admiral Stark has submitted 
a letter here and has attached to it the dispatch which advised the 
Pacific Fleet commander of the issuance of these orders to the Atlantic. 



2668 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[7207] Senator Ferguson. What is the date of notifying the 
Pacific ? 

Mr. Hannaford. The dispatch is dated October 9, 1941. 

I would suggest that this letter and the dispatch also be spread upon 
the daily transcript. 

The Vice Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

(The documents referred to follow :) 

[7208] Navy Department, 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Washington 25, D. C, H January 1946. 
The Honorable Alben W. Barkley, 

Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 
Senate Offlec Building, Washington, D. C. 
Dear Senator Barkley : In my testimony during the afternoon session of 5 
January 1946, at page 6488 of the transcript, there appears the following colloquy 
with Senator Ferguson : 

"Senator Ferguson. Do you recall whether or not you ever notified CINCPAC 
and CINCAF of the orders to the Atlantic Fleet to start shooting German subs? 

"Admiral Stark. I think I covered that in my statement, about telling them 
about the order. 

• "Senator Ferguson. There was no official order? 
"Admiral Staek. No, sir. 

"Senator Ferguson. It would be in that letter that I read to you this morning, 
or that you read to me? 

"Admiral Stark. I do not recall having informed them officially. I believe 
I sent them copies of the order and told them in a personal letter." 

[72091 I have checked up on this matter and I find that the Commander-in- 
Chief, Pacific Fleet was a holder of Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 5 
(WPL-52), which contained the so-called shooting orders with respect to the 
Atlantic. A photostat of the distribution list of Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 5 
is enclosed. 

When WPL-52 was placed in effect, a despatch was sent by the Chief of Naval 
Operations to "ALL US HOLDERS OF WPL FIFTY TWO OUTSIDE OF NAVY 
DEPARTMENT". Therefore, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet was informed 
officially of these so-called "shooting orders" in the Atlantic. A copy of CNO's 
secret despatch 082335 of 9 October 1941 is enclosed. 
Respectfully, 

(S) H. R. Stark, 
Admiral, U. S. Navy. 
cc : The Hon. Homer Ferguson, 

Rear Admiral O. S. Colclough, USN. 

(without enclosures) 



[7210] u. s. NAVY western hemisphere defense plan no. 5 — secret 

Distrihution List 
Official to whom issued Registered Nos. 

Commander in Chief. U. S. Pacific Fleet 1 

Commander, Battle Force 2 

Commander, Battleships, Battle Force 3 

Commander, Cruisers, Battle Force 4 

Commander, Destroyers, Battle Force 5 

Commander, Aircraft, Battle Force 6 

Commander, Scouting Force 7 

Commander, Cruisers, Scouting Force 8 

Commander, Aircraft, Scouting Force 9 

Commander, Submarines, Scouting Force 10 

Commander, Base Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet 11 

Commander, Southeast Pacific Force 12 

Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet 13 

Commander, Battleship Division Three, Atlantic Fleet 14 

Commander, Battleship Division Five, Atlantic Fleet 15 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2669 

Distribution List — Continued 
Official to whom issued Registered Nos. 

Commander, Cruiser Division Eight, Atlantic Fleet 16 

Commander, Cruiser Division Seven, Atlantic Fleet 17 

Commander, Cruiser Division Two, Atlantic Fleet 18 

Commander, Destroyers, Atlantic Fleet 19 

Commander, Aircraft, Atlantic Fleet 20 

Commander, Patrol Wings, Atlantic Fleet 21 

Commander, Submarines, Atlantic Fleet 22 

[7211] Commander, Support Force, Atlantic Fleet 23 

Commander, Train, Atlantic Fleet 24 

Commander, Train Squadron Three, Atlantic Fleet 25 

Commander, South Greenland Patrol 26 

Officer in Charge of U. S. Naval Shore Activities in Iceland 27 

Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet 28 

Commanding General, Atlantic Amphibious Force 29 

Commanding General, First Marine Division 30 

Commanding General, First Marine Brigade (Provisional) 31 

Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in Iceland 32 

Operations — Director, War Plans Division 33 

— Director, Naval Intelligence Division 34 • 

— Director, Naval Communications Division 35 

— Director, Fleet Maintenance Division 36 

— Director, Ship Movements Division 37, 38 

—Director, Naval Districts Division 39 

— Director, Naval Transportation Service (Issued to Director, 

Ship Movements Division) 40 

Chief of the Bureau of Navigation 41 

Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance 42 

Chief of the Bureau of Ships 43 

Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks 44 

[7212] Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics 45 

Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts . 46 

Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery 47 

Judge Advocate General, U. S. Navy 48 

Major General Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps 49 

Director, Shore Establishments Division (Office of Assistant Secretary of 

the Navy) 50 

President, Naval War College 51 

Commandant, U. S. Coast Guard 52 

War Plans Division, General Staff, War Department 53 

Commandant, First Naval District 54 

Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Newfoundland 55 

Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Newport, R. I 56 

Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier 57, 58 

Commandant, Third Naval District 59 

Commandant, Fourth Naval District 60 

Commandant, Fifth Naval District 61 

Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Bermuda 62 

Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier 63 

Commandant, Sixth Naval District 64 

Commandant, Seventh Naval District 65 

Commandant, Eighth Naval District 66 

Commander, Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier 67 

Commandant, Tenth Naval District 68 

[7213] Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo, Cuba 69 

Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Trinidad 70 

Commandant, Eleventh Naval District 71 

Commandant, Twelfth Naval District 72 

Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District 73 

Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District 74 

Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Frontier 75, 76 

Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District 77 

Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District 78 

United States Military Mission in London 79, 80 

United States Naval Attach^, Ottawa, Canada 81 

79716 — 46 — pt. 6 13 



2670 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Distribution List — Continued 
Official to whom issued Registered Nos. 

Registered Publications Section — Worliing Copy 82 

Registered Publications Section — Library Copy 83 

Registered Publications Section — Reserve Copies 84, 

85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96 

Official to whom issued lut hot to ie accounted for to RPS 

British Joint Staff Mission in Washington 97, 98 

The British Admiralty (To be issued through the U. S. Military Mission 

in London) 99 

The Canadian Chief of Naval Staff (To be issued through the U. S. Naval 

Attache, Ottawa, Canada) 100 

The Canadian Chief of Air Staff (To be issued through the 1721^ 

U. S. Naval Attach^, Ottawa, Canada) 101 

The Naval Attache to the Canadian Legation, Washington, D. C. (To be 

issued through the OflSce of Naval Intelligence) 102 



NAVAL MESSAGE NAVY DEPARTMENT 

§ ADDRESSEES MESSAGE PRECEDENCE 

FROM CNO ^ ALL U. S. HOLDERS OF PRIORITY 

RELEASED BY ^ ^'^^ ^^^^^ '^^^ OUTSIDE rqUTINE 

Adm. H. R. Stark g OF NAVY DEPARTMENT 
DATE 9 OCT. 19 il g DEFERRED 

EM 

DECODED BY 

IVANY8HYN 

PARAPHRASED BY 

ALLENSWORTH 

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS 
SATISFACTORY 

082335 CR 07S6 
TEXT 
ON OCTOBER IITH AT 0200 OCT CANCEL WPL 51 AND PLACE WPL 52 IN EFFECT 

DISTRIBUTION: 

12 A ORIG 

CNO FILE G 

13 A 16 A 38 A 20P A RECORD COPIES 20 OP FILE G 
GENERAL FILE 

\7215'] Mr. Hannaford. The next item that I have is at page 
6438 and 6442 of the transcript, various portions of two dispatches 
produced by Admiral Stark which related to the dispatch of De- 
cember 2 on page 39 of Exhibit 37, the so-called order of the President 
to establish a patrol in the Western Pacific, various portions of these 
dispatches were read on those pages that I have just cited and I 
think in the interest of clarity for the transcript we might have the 
two dispatches spread upon the record in full at this point. 

The Vice Chairman. Without objection it is so ordered. 

(The dispatches referred to follow :) 

[72i6] 2 December 1941 

From: CINCAF 

Action: OPNAV 

Info: 

021332 

IIRDIS 12356: My views are as follows: The Jap movement down the Indo- 
Chinese coast is already defined but it remains to be seen whether aimed against 
the Malay Peninsula, Borneo, or both. That the British can meet their com- 
mitment to guard as far as Cape Padaran and we should use what have left 
after guarding against descent on Luzon in watching for one on Borneo. Am 
recalling Isabel from current mission and sending toward Padaran. She is 
too short radius to accomplish much and since we have few fast ships her loss 
would be serious. Therefore have to recommend against carrying out Isabel's 
movement though it is improbable that can start any chartered craft within 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2671 

two days. Am searching for vessels for charter that are suitable but cannot 
yet estimate time required to obtain and equip with radio. Army planes are 
reconnoitering sector northerly from Luzon and eastward from Saubernardino. 
Navy planes northwesterly from Luzon, also covering Balabac Strait and joining 
up with Dutch to cover Mindanao-Halmahera line, effectiveness is problematical 
but as great effort as available forces can sustain continuously. Two cruisers, 
two desdivs are deployed well south, remainder surface forces on local [7217] 
or repairing. 

Have live submarines out now, remainder either placed in readiness for de- 
fensive missions or held here prepared for offensive tasks. When it is con- 
sidered called for will increase air patrols and send out more subs. 



Naval message message precedence : priority 

3 December 1941 

From: OPNAV 

To: CINCAF 

Seci-et 

031540 

Isabel may be replaced by chartered vessel at your discretion as per my 
032356. Ref youi' 021332. 
Redistribution : 
38 . . . Orig 
Record copy . . . 12 . . . Gen file CNO file 20 OP file 

[72J8] Mr. Hannaford. The next, Mr. Chairman, is another 
letter from Admiral Stark in which he asked that certain corrections be 
made in his testimony. I would request that the letter and the cor- 
rections be spread upon the record at this point as we have done in the 
past. 

The Vice Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

( The documents referred to follow : ) 

[7219] Navy Department, 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Room 3028. 

Washington 25, D. C, 11 Januanj lO^S. 
The Honorable Ax.ben W. Barkley, 

Chairman, Joint Committee on the 

Investigations of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Seriate Offlce Building, Washington, D. C. 
Dear Senator Barkley: I am enclosing a list of corrections to my testimony 
before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. 

I understand the record is to be printed, and I trust these changes will be 
approved and made in the transcript before printing. 

There is also enclosed an errata sheet issued by Ward & Paul, correcting the 
time of the attack, which was erroneously stated by me in a colloquy with 
Representative Murphy. I assume this change will be included in any made in 
the transcript before printing. 
Respectfully. 

(S) H. R. Stark, 
H. R. Stark, 
Admiral, U. S. Navy. 

[7220] Corrections in testimony of Admiral E. R. Stark, U. 8. N^ 

VOLUME 31 

Correction 

Insert a period after "time". Begin new sentence with "I". 

Change "to use his eyes" to "for use as eyes". 

Change "For example" to "However". 

Change "extent" to "intent". 

Add "reconnaissance" after "distance". 

^ See Index of Witnesses for testimony of Admiral Stark. 




2672 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Corrections in testimony of Admiral H. R. Stark, V. 8. N. — Continued 

VOLUME 32 



Page 


Line 


Correction 


5722 


14 


After "recollection" add "that it was". 


5723 


22 


Change "Mr. Stark" to "Mr. Mitchell". 


5728 


19 


Change "what" to "which". 


5731 


12 


Change "UPNAV" to "OPNAV". 


5734 


13 


Delete "Yes". 


5745 - 


12 


After "is" insert "a letter". 


5745 


14 


After "Two" add "dated 10 Xovember 1941". 


5750 


25 


Change "6 o'clock" to "1 o'clock". 


5790 


14 


Change "sak" to "say". 


5790 


18 


Change "apetite" to "appetite". 


5814 


25 


Change first "He" to "General Marshall". 


5815 


16 


Insert period after "it". 


5815 


18 


Insert period after "phone". 


5833 


22 


Change ".\dmiral Iveefe" to "Admiral Stark". 


5839 


17 


Delete the period. 


[7S21] 5839 


18 


Change "With" to "with". Insert period after "population" and begin 
new sentence. 


5845 


15 


Place period after "were tense". 


5845 


16 


Before "might also" insert "To have brought it back". 


5845 


20 


Change "reaction" to "recreation". 


5855 


22 


Change "change" to "chance". 


5856 


19 


Insert "in connection" before "with". 


5868 


17 


Change "term" to "time". 


5869.- 


22 


Change "jointed" to "joined". 


5870 -. 


18 


Change "by" to "we weren't". 


5870 


19 


Change comma to period after "more" and begin new sentence. 


5870 


20 


Change to read, "we were playing for time. In the fall of 1941, it". 


5886 


24 


Insert "10:40" after "somewhere around". 


5889 


5 


Change "craft" to "aircraft". 


5894 


7 


Insert "and" after "Admiral Hart". 


5896 


10 


Change "blowed" to "flowed". 


5899 


11 


Change "absent" to "absence". 


5907 


20 


Change "to include" to "I included". 


5911 


21 


Insert "Not" before "separating". 


5913 


15 


Insert "now" after "I have seen it". 



VOLUME 33 



5989 


23 


Correct spelling of "accompanying". 


5990 


2 


Change "158" to "58". 


6008 


8 


Change "Commander-in-Chief" to "Commandant". 


6009 


25 


Change "2613" to "261331". 


6016 


11 


Delete "proper". 


6016 


13 


Insert period after "WPL-46". Change "in foreign" to "Inform". 


6022 


12 


Insert "if" before "I". Insert "had" after "I". Change period at end of 
of line to a dash. 


6035 


22 


Delete "from this type of attack". 


6036 


4 


Change "Commander" to "Commanders" and delete "in Chief". 


6044 


10 


Correct spelling of "Congress". 


6047. 


3 


Delete "in which". 


6051 


19 


Insert "But" before "Once". 


6052 


11 


Change "board" to "Board" and "he" to "we". 


6052 


12 


Insert "overcrowding" after "to". 


6052 


14 


Change "He had that report" to "The President had that report." 


6052 


15 


Insert "for" before "e%'ery". 


6054... 


17 


Change "and" to "because"; insert "that the" after "found" and delete "a" 


6054 


18 


Insert "into commission" after "coming" and delete "in that they". 


6057 


25 


Delete "with". 


6067 


11,12 


Change "2:30" to read "1:25". 




13,14 


Change "1:57" to read "1:25". 




15 


Change "Shortly before 2:00" to "1:25". 




17 


Change "1:57 to 2:00" to "1:25". 




21 


Insert a dash after "Communications". 


6084... 


9 


Change "18" to "A/T". 


6088 • 


15 


Delete "it to": change "that" to "to which", and delete "not". 


6098 


15 


Insert "definite on that" after "anything". 


6117 


25 


Change "Qrear" to "Qreer". 


6118 


23 


Change "Orear" to "Qreer". 


6119. 


5 


Change "Caesar" to "Sessa". 


6121 


19 


Insert "steps" after "similar". 


6129... 


4 


Insert "I wrote" before "that". 


6129 


5 


Insert period after "anywhere" and begin new sentence with "In my 
opinion". 


6131 


13 


Change "southern" to "southward". 


6141 


14 


Change "he" to "Secretary Stimson". 



I 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2673 



Corrections in testimony of Admiral H. R. Stark, U. 8. N. — Continued 

iresj,] VOLUME 34 



Page 


Line 


Correction 


6151 


11 


Change "right or" to "rights of". 


6152 


20 


Change "men-o-war" to "men of war". 


6154 


20 


Change "hunt" to "hung". 


6160 


!4 


Change "as" to "at least". 


6169 


16 


Change "inferring" to "endeavoring." 


6180 


7 


Change "did not" to "indicates I tried to". 


6182 


12 


Change "ascertain-" to "ascertained". 


6183. 


5 


Change "Maxwell, Hamilton and Ballenge.r" to "Maxwell Hamilton and 
Ballentine". 


6185 





Change "on" to "in". 


6186 


13 


Insert "officer" after "executive" and before the comma. 


6201 


10 


Change "ready" to "read". 


6201- 


17 


Change "about it" to "right". 


6203 


6 


Delete "and"; insert comma before "that". 


6204 


3 


Insert "it" after "governments". 


6207_-_ 


17 


Insert quotation marks before "is there etc". 


6207-. __._.. 


19 


Insert quotation marks after "out?". 


6207 


24 


Delete "answered the question and", and insert before "The answer" the 
word "Assuming". 


6207 


25 


Delete quotation marks after "affirmative". Insert a comma after "affirma- 


[72S5] ■ 




tive", and delete "in answering you. but". 


6208 


5 


Add quotation marks after "our effort". 


6209 


4 


Delete "not" and the second "for". 


6214 


22 


Insert "a" before "guess". 


6279 


20 


Change "July ' to "January". 


6281 


8 


Change "short" to "shore". 


6287 


17 


Change "attack" to "attached". 


6290 


3 


Change "Jerry" to "Dudley". 


6293 


S 


Change "briefly" to ".sharply". 


6322 


12 


Change "made" to "implemented". 


6331 _.. 


■n 


Delete comma and insert dash at end of line. 


6331 


23 


Change "understand" to "understanding". 


6333 


20 


Insert "if it is" after "defend". 


6338 


14 


Change "The use" to "They use". 



[72S6] 



VOLUME 35 



6370 


17 


Change "Mr." to "Pa". 


6376 


6 


Change "that" to "them". 


6377 


15 


Changfe "outlay" to "outline". 


6377 


20 


Insert "up" before "to the". 


6379 


7 


Change "in" to "into". 


6379 


9 


Change "tought" to "tough". 


6379 


18 


Change "tried" to "had". 


6379 


19 


Change "to, on" to "to go on". 


6380 


10 


Change "That" to "The". 


6382 


15 


Change "McCollough" to "McCollum" and "Cramer" to "Kramer". 


63S4 


4 


Change "but" to "that". 


6389 


4 


Chanee "bearing" to "bear". 


6389 , 


5 


Delete ", and" and insert dash after "27th". 


6393 


17 


Insert "it" after "that" and "and" after "properly". 


6393 


18 


Change "they" to "by". 


6394-A 


5 


Change "me. Not" to "me — not" and change period at end of line to dash. 


6394-A 


6 


Change "As" to "as", change "Wellborne" to "Wellborn" and "is" to 


6.395 





Change "couldn't get" to "came". 


6395 


25 


Change "busy, we" to "busy. We". 


[7SZ7] 6397 


13 


Insert "the" before "King". 


6421... 


23 


Correct spelling of "seriousness". 


6424 


7 


Delete "that". 


6446 


3 


Change "He" to "We". 


6448 


24 


Change "if available" to "is available". 


6449 .._ 


9-10 


Change "depending on the scale" to "defending ourselves". 


6463 


6 


Delete "about 200,". 


6471 


19 


Insert "it" after "put". 


6474 


21 


Insert "recently" after "not". 


6477 


11-12 


Change "as sizing up under all" to "after sizing up all". 


6477... 


14 


Correct spelling of "heart". 


6483 


21 


Change "I" to "he". 


6502 


12 


Capitalize "Allied Naval Commander in Chief." 


6502 


20 


Change "Transport" to "Task Force". 


6521 


7 


Change "of this" to "indicated an". 


6525 


9 


Change "were they" to "where they". 


6527 


5 


Change "assume" to "assumed". 


6546 


4 


Change last word of line to "as". 


6547 


18 


Delete "Admiral Keefe". 


6567 


15 


Change "conditional" to "additional". 


6587 


19 


Change "premises" to "premise". 


6592. 


8 


Change "say" to "saw". 



2674 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[7238] Mr. Hannaford. At page 4346 of the transcript, Senator 
Ferguson requested all Japanese intercepts in addition to those set 
forth in Exhibit 1, which were transmitted between August 16 and 
August 29, 1941, and which' pertained to Japanese-American nego- 
tiations. 

I would just like to note at this point that these dispatches have 
been sent to Senator Ferguson and they are so bulky that I do not 
think it is worth while making them part of the transcript, but I just 
want the record to show that they have been sent to him and we have 
another copy available for any member of the committee that wishes 
to see them. 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to see them. 

Senator Ferguson. They are going to be made an exhibit now ? 

Mr. Hannaford. They are not an exhibit as yet, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I would certainly like to have them an 
exhibit. 

Mr. Hannaford. We can make them an exhibit at this point. 

The Vice Chairman. The Senator requests that? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I request that. It is very material to 
the issue. 

The Vice Chairman. Without objection it is so ordered. What 
will be the number? 

Mr. Hannaford. I request then that this document be marked 
[7229] "Exhibit 124," Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Without objection it will be so numbered. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 124.") 

INIr. Hannaford. The next item, Mr. Chairman, is an answer to Mr. 
Murphy's request at page 160 of the transcript in which he asked for 
a comparison of the actual damage to the battleships at Pearl Harbor 
as compared with the statement issued by Secretary Knox on Decem- 
ber 15.^ 

A photostatic copy of this comparison has been placed before each 
member of the committee and I would suggest that the actual 
document be made part of the transcript at this point. 

The Vice Chairman. Without objection it is so ordered. 

(The document referred to follows:) 



Comparison of actual damage suffered by the fleet at Pearl Harbor and that 
stated in the report that ivas released by Beeretary Knox on 15 December 19'tl 



Name 


Actual damage 


Reported by Knox 




Sunk .... 


Destroyed. 




do 


Not mentioned by name. 




do .. 


Do. 


[72S0] Oklahoma 


Capsized . . 


Capsized but can be righted and 




Heavily damaged 


repaired. 
Not mentioned by name. 




Damaged 

do _ 


Do. 


Pennsylvania - 


Do. 




.do - 


Do. 




Heavily damaged 


Do. 


Honolulu - 


Damaged 


Do. 




Do. 


Shaw 


do - 


Do. 


Cassin. 


Heavily damaged, burned 

. .do - 


Lost. 
Do. 


Vestal 


Badly damaged 


Do. 


Oglala . - 


Sunk 


Do. 




Damaged 


Nof mentioned by name. 


Utah 


Capsized 


Lost. 









* See Hearings, Part 1, p. 70. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2675 



In addition, Secretary Knox made a general statement of damage 
as follows : 

Navy sustained damage to other vessels. This damage varies from ships vv^hich 
have already been repaired, and are ready for sea, or which have gone to sea, to 
a few ships which will take from a week to several months to repair. In the last 
category is the older BB Oklahoma which has capsized but caa be righted and 
repaired. 

[7231] Mr. Hannaford. The next item that I have is a response 
from the Navy Department in answer to a question of Senator Ferguson 
at page 177 of the transcript, in which he asked for a table showing the 
times at which various points in the Pacific were attacked.^ 

The Navy Department has submitted a chart showing the times in 
local time, Greenwich time and Washington time and a photostatic 
copy of this chart has been placed before each member of the com- 
mittee and I would suggest that it be made part of the transcript at 
this point. 

The Vice Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

(The chart referred to follows:) 



[7232] 



Time of Jap attacks in the Pacific 7 and 8 December 1941 



Place 



Pearl Harbor 

Singapore..- 

Khota Baru-- 

DavaoGuIf, P. I 

Guam 

Hong Kong.- -- 

Wake -- 

Clark Field. P. I 

Midway. - 

Nichols Field (Manila) 



Local time 



7:55 a. m.— 7th... 
3:00 a. m.— 8th... 
3:40 p.m.— 8th.-- 
7:10 a. m.— 8th... 
9:10 a. m.— 8th... 
8:00 a. m.— 8th... 
12:00 noon— 8th-.. 
9:27 a. m.— 8th... 
9:30 p. m.— 7th... 
3:00 a. m.— 9th... 



Greenwich time 



6:25 p. m.— 7th 

8:00 p.m.— 7th 

8:40 p.m.— 7th 

11:10 p.m.— 7th 

11:10 p.m.— 7th - 

Midnight— 7-8th 

1:00 a. m.— 8th 

1:27 a. m.— 8th 

9:30 b. m.— 8th ..- 

7:00 p. m.— 8th 



Washington time 



1:25 p 
3:00 p 
3:40 p 
6:10 p 
6:10 p 
7:00 p 
8:00 p 
8:27 p 
4:30 a, 
2:00 p 



m.— 7th. 
m.— 7th. 
m.— 7th. 
m. — 7th. 
m.— 7th. 
m.— 7th. 
m.— 7th. 
m.— 7 th. 
m.— Sth. 
m.— 8th. 



NOTES 

(1) The above times are compiled from existing records. Minor inaccuracies are 
possible. 

(2) There were other attacks on Army and foreign installations of which the Navy has 
no records. 

Mr. Hannaford. The next item that I have relates to the question 
of watertight integrity of ships at Pearl Harbor and inspections of 
the ships, which have been raised by several members of the committee 
at pages 160, 242, and 2821 of the transcript. 

At page 4437 of the transcript we inserted a partial answer to this 
inquiry, which was supplied to us by the Navy [7233] Depart- 
ment and which show the schedules of inspections of the various vessels 
at Pearl Harbor." 

We have also received one additional memorandum from the Navy 
Department, to which we wrote a subsequent memorandum asking for 
additional information. I would request that these two memoranda 
be spread on the record at this point so that each committee member 
may have it. 

The Vice Chairman. Without objection it is so ordered. 

(The document referred to follows:) 

1 Hearings, Part 1, p. 77. 

^ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5347 et seq., for correspondence on this subject. 



2676 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Dei>aiitment of the Navy 
Office of the Undek Secrei'Ary 

WasliingtoH, 11 December 1945 
R-#16 
Memoratidum 
To : William D. Mitchell. 
Subject : Couclitkm of water-tight integrity of major vessels. 

1. Pursuant to your request concerning the above matter, the following infor- 
mation has been obtained and is submitted : 

(a) An examination of the logs and records of the major vessels at Pearl Harbor 
indicates that only one vessel did not have an equivalent of the condition "all 
water-tight openings below the third deck closed" at the time of the attack. That 
vessel, the USS California, had ten inner and [7234] outboard voids open 
for maintenance work. Its remaining water-tight openings below the third deck 
were closed. 

(b) The logs of the USS Oklahoma and USS Arizona were destroyed. However 
information has been obtained through Commander Fuqua, the Damage Control 
Officer of the Arizona, that on his ship all water-tight doors below the third deck 
were closed. This was also the condition that prevailed in the USS Oklahoma, 
according to information stated by the Commanding Officer of that ship. 

(e) Material conditions of readiness referred to as conditions "Baker" or 
"X-Ray" or '"Yoke" are higher than the minimum. The minimum requirements 
are considered to be those prescribed by Navy Regulations, that is, that all water- 
tight openings below the third deck be closed from 1600 to 0800. 

(d) According to the best available analysis in the Navy Department, the 
USS California is the only ship that might have been saved from sinking by the 
closing of manhole covers that had been left open for maintenance. 

(e) The USS Pennsylvania was in dry dock and is not included within the 
above general statements concerning the conditions of water-tight integrity that 
prevailed at that time. 

2. If more specific and detailed information on these matters is desired, an 
attempt will be made to locate and [7235] have present necessary witnesses. 

John Ford Baecher 

Lt. Comdr., USNR. 



December 11, 1945. 
Memorandum for Admiral Colcough. 

I have just received from Lt. Commander Baecher a memorandum dated Decem- 
ber 11, 1945, entitled "Condition of water-tight integrity of major vessels." 

The inquiry from members of the Conunittee was broader than this. They 
have inquired about the charge that some'or more of the ships in Pearl Harbor 
were undergoing a Sunday "inspection", that some had ammunition on shore, for 
that purpose. The report of December 11th seems too meager on this. 

Water-tight doors are only one feature. An ordered "inspection" might indi- 
cate a general state of mental unalertness to a possible attack. 

Can you not at least answer specifically the "inspection" charge, and name 
witnesses from the ships who could testify about each vessel. 

William D. Mitchell. 



[7236'] Mr. Hannaford. I would like to comment on the final 
answer in response to our final request, which we have received from 
the Navy Department. 

They have compiled a statement of 20 December 1945 from the logs 
of various ships, that show that inspections occurred on December 5th 
and 6th, 1941. I would request that this chart showing the various 
inspections that were held on the battleships to the extent that logs 
are available be spread upon the record at this point. 

The Vice Chairman. Without objection it is so ordered. 

Mr. Hannaford. I would like to make this additional statement, 
that the extracts show that on December 5th or 6th each battleship 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2677 

whose log is available lield some type of inspection ranging from a 
daily inspection, which I take it is a minor type of inspection, to a 
monthly inspection, which I assume is a more important one. 

We have been advised by the Navy Department that the logs for 
December 7, 1941, which are not extracted in this document which will 
be made a part of the record, were not included in the extract because 
the attack occurred earlier than inspections would normally have been 
held if they were to be held on December 7. The Navy is checking 
further to find what the actual logs on December 7 show and additional 
information will be forthcoming. 

Senator Lucas. "VVliat do the inspections show with re- \7'237'] 
spect to water-tight integrity ? 

Mr. Hannaford. The water-tight integrity aspects are covered in 
this memorandum which I have asked to be spread upon the record 
rather than reading it. Senator. I can read it if you wish me to. 

Senator Lucas. No ; I will read it. 

(The document referred to follows:) 

20 December 1945. 
Inspections made on U. S. Battleships which were at Pearl Harbor on 7 Dec 
1941. These inspections occurred on 5 or 6 Dec 1941 as designated. 

U. S. S. Arizona 

No log received for Dec 1941. 

U. S. S. California 

5 Dec 1941 

1149 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; 
conditions normal. 

6 Dec 1941 

1020 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples ; 
conditions normal. 

Made monthly inspection of all indices of smokeless powder on board ; con- 
ditions normal. 

U. S. S. Maryland 

5 Dec 1941 

[1238] 070 Food inspection. 

6 Dec 1941 

0800 Made daily visual examination of all smokeless powder samples, violet 
paper, and test for local heating of magazines on board ship ; conditions normal. 

1330 By order of the Commanding Officer, Lt (jg) Nelson H. Randall, C-V (S) 
USNR, was suspended from duty for a period of 5 days from and including this 
date for improper performance of duty as Communication Watch OfHcer failing 
to deliver a dispatch to the Commander Battleships Battle Foi-ce. The Com- 
manding Officer further ordered that, due to the exigencies of the service Lt (jg) 
Randall is restored to duty for the duration of the Annual Military Inspection 
and Damage Control Practice of this vessel on December 8, 1941 and December 
9, 1941. 

U. S. S. Nevada 

5 Dec 1941 

No inspections. 

6 Dec. 1941 

0705 Food inspection. 

0900 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; 
conditions normal. 

U. S. S. Oklahoma 
No log i-eceived for Dec 1941. 



2678 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[7239] U. S. S. Pennsylvania 

5 Dec 1941 

0800 Food inspection. 

1150 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples ; 
conditions normal. 

6 Dec 1941 

0833 Landing force left tlie ship to be inspected by Commander Battleship 
Division TWO. 1045 Landing force i-eturned. 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania 
6 Dec 1941 

1155 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; 
conditions normal. 

U. S. S. Tennessee 

5 Dec 1941 

1010 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples ; 
conditions normal. 
1445 Secured boiler number 8 after having conducted tests on safety valves. 

6 Dec 1941 

0745 Commenced embarking Landing Force for Annual Mili'tary Inspection. 
1130 Landing Force returned aboard. Made daily inspection of magazines 
and smokeless powder samples ; conditions normal. 

U. S. S. West Virginia 

No log received for Dec 1941. 

[7^40] Mr. Hannafokd. The next item that I have relates to an 
inquiry by Representative Gearhart, at page 879 of the transcript, 
in which he asked for the log of the U. S. S. Wright from November 
27 to December 7, 1941.^ 

The Navy has furnished us with two copies of this log, which I 
think should be marked as an exhibit at this time, Exhibit 125 it 
would be. 

The Vice Chaibman. Without objection it will be received as Ex- 
hibit 125. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 125.") 

Mr. Hannaford. And without objection I would like to read two 
extracts from this log and also a memorandum from the Navy De- 
partment with relation to them. 

On November 27, 1941, the entry at 2024 o'clock reads as follows : 

Steaming as before. 2100 sighted unidentified ship bearing 205 true, distance 
approximately 10 miles on opposite parallel course ; average steam 200 pounds ; 
average RPM 87. 

The second entry is one that appears at 1216 o'clock on December 
7. 1941, and reads as follows : 

Steaming as before. 1200 C-C 2, 109 degrees true and gyro; 098 degrees 
PCC and 098 degrees PSTGC. 1305 secured No. 1 boiler. 1711 sighted plane, 
bearing 170 de- [72//i] gres ti'ue on opposite parallel course, distance 8 
miles. Plane passed abeam to starboard. 1405 plane sighted off starboard beam 
on parallel course, distance 8 miles ; average steaming 200 pounds, average 
liPM 84. 

Now, the Navy has submitted us a memorandum attached to which 
is a chart, a map, at which the location of the Wivght at those two 
points has been charted. 

1 Hearings, Part 1, p. 339. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2679 

With reference to the entry on November 27 where they sighted a 
ship, the Navy's memorandum says : 

As shown by the enclosed chart, the U. S. S. Wright was approximately 1600 
nautical miles distant from the assumed position of the Japanese striking force 
on 27 November 1941. 

With respect to the entry on December 7, where the Wright sighed 
some planes, the Navy's memorandum says as follows : 

As shown by the chart, the U. S. S. Wright was approximately 390 nautical 
miles froni the assumed position of the Japanese striking force on 7 December 
1941. 

I might add that the entry on December 7 does not show whether 
the planes that they sighted was friend or foe. 

Mr. Gearhart. Where was the Wright when it was 300 miles from 
the assumed position of the enemy ? 

Mr. Hannaford. From the chart it appears as though it is pretty 
nearly due west of the Hawaiian Islands. 

[72/^] Mr. Gearhart. How many miles? 

Mr. Hannaford. I cannot read this chart. I would request that the 
chart be made part of the exhibit as well. 

The Vice Chairman. Without objection it is so ordered. 

Mr. Hannaford. The last item I have is at page 6363 of the tran- 
script, where Senator Ferguson asked for the reports of Mr. Curtis 
Munson. I would just like to note that we have handed those to 
Senator Ferguson yesterday, 

Mr. Gearhart. Before we get away from that, will you tell me 
what detachment the Wright belonged to? 

Mr. Hannaford. I am sorry, Congressman, I cannot. It perhaps 
is shown by the exhibit itself, Exhibit 6. Have we got a copy of Ex- 
hibit 6 ? 

Senator Lucas. The Navy men can tell you that. 

Mr. Murphy. The Wright was 22 north, 163 west C. V. as seaplane 
tender 300 miles west of Oahu. That is on the morning of December 
7 at 8 o'clock. 

Mr. Hannaford. I am not sure what it was doing, Congressman. 
The Navy advises me that they believe the Wright was on detached 
duty at that time. 

Mr. MuRPiiT. It was a seaplane tender. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you explain that? 

Mr. Murphy. May I inquire about this Munson business? Is that 
very lengthy? 

Mr. Hannaford. I actually have not seen it. 

\7243'] Mr. Murphy. Is it very lengthy, the Munson report? 
You said you had it yesterday. 

Senator Ferguson. 20 or 25 pages. I will have it here in the morn- 
ing. 

The Vice Chairman. Is there anything further from counsel ? 

Mr. Hannaford. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Senator George has just asked what the Munson 
report is. It is a report that, as I understand it, the State Depart- 
ment — or as an agent of the President they had a special intelligence 
system and Mr. INIunson was one of the intelligence agents to go out 
and get information for the State Department and for the President 
on the Japanese question. 



2680 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. Who has got an extra copy ? 

Mr. Hannaford. That concludes all that I have. 

Mr. Murphy. Who has got an extra copy ? 

Mr. Hannaford. We have only one copy of it, Congressman. 

The Vice Chairman. May I inquire ? The copy furnished Senator 
Ferguson is the only copy we have ? 

Mr. Hannaford. Yes, the copy furnished Senator Ferguson is the 
only copy we have. We can have it spread on the transcript. 

Mr. Murphy, It may not be material. 

[7244] Senator Ferguson. Yes, I think it is material. 

Mr. Hannaford. I haven't read it ; I do not know. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, we can decide that later. 

Senator Ferguson. It shows this, that at least the State Department 
and the President were not satisfied with intelligence of the Army and 
the Navy and the FBI and they sent out their own intelligence agents 
to get certain information in relation to the Japanese both in Hawaii 
and the Japanese on the west coast. 

Mr. Murphy. Wasn't it particularly as to the danger of uprisings 
among the Japanese element ? 

Senator Ferguson. It covered that. It covered the whole question 
of espionage and counterespionage. 

Senator Lucas. I suggest that it be spread on the record. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas, do you request that it be 
spread on the record ? 

Senator Lucas. It is only 25 pages. 

The Vice Chairman. It that your request. Senator? 

Senator Lucas. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

( The document referred to follows :) 



[7245] 



Department of the Navy, 

Office of the Secretary, 
Washington, 11 January 1946. 



Memorandum : 

To : Mr. Seth Richardson. 

1. In compliance with a request from your office, there is enclosed a photo- 
static copy of a "Report on Japanese on the West Coast of the United States" 
by Mr. C. B. Munson, Special Representative of the State Department. 

/S/ John Ford Baecher 
John Ford Baechek 
Lt. Comdr., USNR. 
(Pencil notation:) Received 1/15/46 JMH 



Confidential Confidential 

Subject : Report on Japanese on the West Coast of the United States by Mr. 
C. B. Munson, Special Representative of the State Department. 
Confidential Confidential 



[72Jf6] Secret 

Confidential Confidential 

Subject: Report on Japanese on the West Coast of the United States by Mr. 
C. B. Munson, Special Representative of the State Department. 
Secret Secret 

Confidential Confidential 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2681 

Office of the Chief of Naval Opfjiations, 
OP-16-B-7 November 27, lO^l. 

Memorandum for the Director 
Subject : A Report on Japanese on the West Coast of the United States by Mr. 

C. B. Munson, Special Kopresentative of the State Department. 

A resume of this report by John Franklin Carter (Jay Franklin) is prefixed 
to Mr. Munson's report. 

It is interesting to note that Mr. Munson stated that he spent about a week 
in the Eleventh, Twelftli and Thirteenth Naval Districts with the full coopera- 
tion of Naval Intelligence Representatives. Mr. Munson stated, "Our Navy has 
done by far the most work on this problem, having given it intense consideration 
for the past ten or fifteen years." 

Although Mr. Munson's report is a little lengthy, I think it is worth reading. 

A copy of this report has been routed to Op-16-F, [7247] Op-11, Op-12, 
and Op-30. Copies will be sent to ComEleven, ComTwelve, and ComThirteen. 

Habtwell C. Davis. 
Dictated November 27, 1941 
Dictated by Commander Davis 
Typed by R. Blalock 

1st Endorsement 

Op-13/PS NovEMBEB 25, 1941. 

Serial No. 041813 

(SC)A8-2/EF37 

From : Director Central Division. 

To : Director Naval Intelligence Division. 

Subject: Confidential report on Japanese on the West Coast of the United 

States. 

1. Forwarded for information and file. 

r. e. schuibmann. 

Department of State, 
In reply refer to Washington, November 2Ii, 19A1. 

U-L 
Strictly Confidential 

MEMORANDUM 

To : Director, Central Division, Navy Department. 
From : Liaison Officer. 

Subject: Confidential report on Japanese on the West Coast of the United 
States. 

[72^8] At the direction of the Under Secretary, I enclose for the con- 
fidential information of the Chief of Naval Operations a copy of C. B. Munson's 
report entitled "Japanese on the West Coast", together with a covering memo- 
randum summarizing the report. The report, a secret one, was given the 
Under Secretary personally. 

Orme Wilson, Liaison Officer. 

Enclosure : 

Copy of C. B. Munson's report. 



John Franklin Carter 

(Jay Franklin) 

1210 National Press Building 

Confidential Washington, D. C, November 7, 194I. 

Memorandum on C. B. Munson's Report "Japanese on the West Coast" 

Attached herewith is the report, with supplementary reports on Lower 
California and British Columbia. The report, though lengthy, is worth reading 
in its entirety. Salient passages are: 

1) "There are still Japanese in the United States who will tie dynamite 
around their waists and make a human bomb out of themselves . . . but 
today they are few." 



2682 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2) "There is no Japanese 'problem' on the coast. There will be no armed up- 
rising of Japanese. There will be [72-^9] undoubtedly some sabotage 
financed by Japan and executed largely by imported agents. There will be the 
odd case of fanatical sabotage by some Japanese 'crackpot'." 

3) "The dangerous part of their espionage is that they would be very effective 
as far as movement of supplies, movement of troops and movement of ships 
* * * is concerned." 

4) "For the most part the local Japanese are loyal to the United States or, at 
worst, hope that by remaining quiet they can avoid concentration camps or 
irresponsible mobs." 

5) "Your reporter * * * is horrified to note that dams, bridges, harbors, 
power stations, etc. are wholly unguarded everywhere. The harbor of San Pedro 
could be razed by tire completely by four men with hand grenades and a little 
study in one night. Dams could be blown and half of lower California might 
actually die of thirst. * * * One railway bridge at the exits from the moun- 
tains in some cases could tie up three or four main railroads." 

J. F. C. 



[7250] Japanese on the AVest Coast 

(C. B. Munson) 

GKOUND COVERED 

In reporting on the Japanese "problem" on the West Coast the facts are, on the 
whole, fairly clear and opinion toward the problem exceedingly uniform. In re- 
porting, the main difficulty is to know where to leave oft and what to leave out. 
One could gather data for fifteen years with fifteen men and still be in the position 
of the Walrus and the Cai'penter : 

If seven maids with seven mops 

Swept it for half a year — 

Do you suppose, the Walrus said. 

That they could get it clear? 
Whisking up the grains of sand is the wrong approach, yet when your re- 
porter declares there is a sea and a shore and some sand, and that he has sampled 
the general quality of sand in many varying beaches, do not be too hard in your 
judgment for him if he has stopped far short of sorting out each layer or tint 
or even each beach. You have to feel this problem^ — not figure it out with your 
pencil. We only cite the sand that our reader may never forget the complexities 
of even a shovel full of sand. 

Your reporter spent about a week each in the 11th, 12th, and 13th Navjal 
Districts with the full cooperation of the [72.5/] Naval and Army Intelli- 
gence and the FBI. Some mention should also be made of the assistance rendered 
from time to time by the British Intelligence. Our Navy has done by far the most 
work on this problem, having given it intense consideration for the last ten or 
fifteen years. Your reporter commenced in the 12th Naval District, which covers 
Northern California, from thence to the 13th, covering Washington and Oregon, 
winding up his observations in the 11th Naval District, covering Southern Califor- 
nia, where to his mind the whole "problem" finally focuses. Your reporter also 
turned the corner into British Columbia through a member of the K. C. M. P. 
and the corner into Mexico through a conference with our Consul at Tijuana. 

Opinions of the various services were obtained, also of business, employees, 
universities, fellow white workers, students, fish packers, lettuce packers, farmers, 
religious groups, etc. etc. The opinion expressed with minor differences was 
uniform. Select Japanese in all groups were sampled. To mix indiscriminately 
with the Japanese was not considered advisable chiefly because the opinions of 
many local white Americans who had made this their life work for the last 
fifteen years were available and it was foolish to suppose your reporter could 
add to the sum of knowledge in three weeks by running through the topmost 
twigs of a forest. 

[7252] BACKGEOUND 

Unless familiar with the religious and family background of the Japanese, 
this rough background summary should be skimmed over as it has a bearing on the 
question. If the reader is familiar with the Japanese background, it may be 
omitted. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2683 

An American wit once said, "You cannot tell the trutli about Japan without 
lying." The same witticism might be made with reference to the Japanese 
people, but, like all generalizations, it needs a corrective explanation. A study 
of Japan is a study in the category of social fully as much as of political science 
The study of the Japanese people is one of absorbing interest. 

Who are the Japanese people? From when did they come and what emotional 
concepts did they bring with them? While there might not be unanimity of 
opinion as to the various strains that go to make up the Japanese of today one 
leading anthropologist, Dr. Frederick Star of the University of Chicago, a number 
of years ago said to the writer, "the Japanese are the most mixed race of people 
that I have ever studied." The Malay strain is pronounced in the Japanese 
especially m the Province of Kumamoto. The Mongol is very pronounced in the 
upper middle as well as in the so-called higher brackets of society. Then there is 
the Aryan strain still to be seen in its unmixed form in the 17,000 and more Ainu 
who inhabit portions of Hokkaido and the Kurile Islands. [7253] These 
latter are related to the Aryan group in physiognomy and in language These 
three strains have produced the Japanese of today. 

The Ainu, insofar as we know, was the aboriginal. His social status was 
changed from lime to time as conquering groups drove him farther and farther 
to the north. These conquering groups came from China via Korea. Japanese 
history begins with the conqueror Jimnu Tenno, who arrived on a "Floatin"- 
Bridge of Heaven"— a poetical expression for his coming to Japan by boat He 
found a tribal people with a primitive animistic faith of nature worship He 
had a superior religion and he was shrewd. He told the conquered people that 
their reverence for the tribal chief was a true reverence and that he also revered 
the head of his clan which was the Sun Goddess, whose beneficient rule was seen 
in her health-giving rays. Thus began what is known as "Shinto" ("The Way of 
the Gods"), as we know it today. From the days of Jimnu (the first Japanese 
Emperor) to the present, all Japanese have revered the Emperor as a descendant 
of the Sun Goddess, whose appearance in Japanese mythology is too complicated 
to be discussed here. 

Another cultural element in Japanese life stems from the introduction of 
Buddhism in Japan in the sixth and seventh centuries. BuddhLsm is a foreign 
religion and made little progress in Japan, even though it was fostered by 
[7254] the Emperor Prince Shotoku. Buddhism had a very difficult time 
until some wise propagandist hit upon the idea of incorporating the Shinto 
Gods into the Buddhist Pantheon. All the Shinto deities were recognized as 
avatars of Buddha and we have continuing in Japan until the days of the Resto- 
ration what is known as twofold Buddhism— a union of Shinto and Buddhism— 
a union so intricate that Buddhist God shelves in the home have unmistakable 
Shinto deities and Shinto God shelves have unmistakable Buddhist deities 
Japan can never repay Buddhism for its contribution to the cultural life of the 
people. Its temples were schools wherein those wjio wished might be taught 
It developed the arts and crafts, and was the developer and preserver of much 
that is beautiful in the cultural life of the Nation today. 

While the Shinto and the Buddhist influence, separate and co-mingled were 
moving forward, there developed in Japan a feudal type of society. This society 
was organized under the rule of a tribal person known as "The Great Name" 
(a land baron). He had warriers or knights known as Samurai. They the 
Samurai, preserved order and fought battles to maintain the existance of the 
clan. Besides the Samurai there was the farmer who raised the food, the artisan 
who fashioned and fabricated the tools, not only of the farmer but also of the 
warrior, and there was the merchant ; below them there was the eta, and lower 
still the hinin— whose who [7255] for misconduct or through capture had 
been reduced in status until they were not considered men, as the term "hinin" 
implies. 

For nearly 1,000 years, this state of society existed with internecine wars of 
all too frequent and carnal occurrence until early in the seventeenth century 
when a great man, leyasu, appeared and became the founder of what is known 
as the Tokugawa family. The story of this period is interesting, but time and 
space do not permit the telling of it here, other than to say it was a period of 
about 250 years of great peace. 

During the Tokugawa period, Confucianism had great vogue. The Samurai 
children were privileged to attend the few schools which were maintained and 
where the principles of Confucian ethics were taught, but with one great charac- 
teristic change — the Japanese substituted for the chief virtue, loyalty for filial 
piety. 



2684 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Chugi (loyalty) is loyalty, not to an idea nor an ideal, but to a person. In 
this feudal society personal relationships were supreme, and loyalty was the 
cardinal virtue. 

In the feudal state, as well as throughout all Japanese history, the individual 
as an individual did not exist. He existed as a member of the clan. The family 
could dispose of individuals at will, should occasion merit such action. Even 
life itself could be taken, after the case had been [7256] submitted to 
the family council. In this connection, one should not overlook the tremendous 
influence of the dead. The living succeed or fail, are happy or sad, through the 
influence of the dead who live in the tombs of the village or hover over their 
familiar haunts. It is well to keep this in mind when estimating Japanese 
activity. The Japanese believe that the dead remain in the World and that all 
dead become Gods with supernatural powers, and that happiness of the dead 
depends upon respectful services that are rendered them by the living. 

In a feudal society, the merchant cuts a very poor figure. He was looked down 
upon by the Samurai and he was inferior to the farmer and the artisan. It is 
significant that but a very few families of merchants have maintained a good 
social position. Of these there are the Mitsui, the Iwasaki (this latter being' 
represented by what we know as the Mitsubishi), and also the Sumitomo family. 

With the coming of Commodore Perry in 1853 and 1854, the feudalism began 
to pass away and within 20 years was abolished by Government edict. Although 
the feudal social system was legally abolished, its influence continues even today. 

With the Restoration there appeared a new influence in Japanese life and 
that was the coming of the Christian missionary with his doctrine of individual 
responsibility to deity. This was something new to the Japanese system of 
[7257] society. Heretofore religion centered in the family, and family cul- 
ture and family faith were a collective thing and not individual. The success 
of the missionary movement in Japan is remarkable because it brings this new 
element into the social picture. Wherever Christianity succeeds, it also suc- 
ceeds in breaking the' old family ties and hang-overs of a feudal order. Japan's 
advance in Government, its development educationally and the vast improve- 
ments that we see in society today have been furthered by the application of 
Western methods of teaching, of Government, etc. But, the Christian influence 
must not be underestimated nor should one go too far in overstressing its great 
importance. Christianity is individualistic, and that is one reason why the 
"powers that be" in Japan today are endeavoring to regulate its activities, if 
not to change some of its tenets. The Christian Japanese understand America 
better than any other group because they have been more and more weaned 
away from the influence of feudalism. 

The Japanese are a perplexing people and their study is a very interesting 
and very enlightening one. They follow the leader — they have done this through- 
out all the years of their history. Even today, personal ties are stronger than 
legal ones. 

No estimate of the elements characteristic of the Japanese is complete without 
a word about "giri". There is [7258] no accurate English word for "giri". 
The nearest approach to an understanding of the term is our word "obligation", 
which is very inadequate and altogether too weak. Favors or kindnesses done to 
a Japanese are never forgotten but are stored up in memory and in due time 
an adequate quid pro quo must be rendered in return. The clever and none-too 
scrupulous individual often hangs "giri" upon the unsuspecting, to their hurt 
and harm. "Giri" is the great political tool. To understand "giri" is to under- 
stand the Japanese. 

ASSOCHATIONS 

The Japanese is the grestest joiner in the world. To take care of this passion 
he has furnished himself with ample associations to join. There are around 1563 
of these in the United States. Your reporter has before him a Japanese publi- 
cation entitled "The Japanese-American Directory of 1941" at least two inches 
thick listing the Japanese associations in fine print. Your reporter also has 
before him lists furnished him in the various Naval Districts of some of the 
leading associations considered the most important, with full descrii)tions of 
their activities as far as known. It Is endless to clutter up this report with them. 

FAMILY SET-UP IN UNITED STATES 

In the United States there are four divisions of Japanese to be considered : 
1. The IS8EI — Fii^st generation Japanese. Entire [7259] cultural back- 
ground Japanese. Pi-obably loyal romantically to Japan. They must be con- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2685 

sidered, however, as other races. They have made this their home. They have 
brought up children here, their wealth accumulated by hard labor is here, and 
many would have become American citizens had they been allowed to do so. 
They are for the most part simple people. Their age group is largely 55 to 65, 
fairly old for a hard-working Japanese. 

2. The NISEI — Second generation who have received their whole education in 
the United States and usually, in spite of discrimination against them and a 
certain amount of insults accumulated through the years from irresponsible 
elements, show a pathetic eagerness to be Americans. They are in constant 
conflict with the orthodox, well disciplined family life of their elders. Age 
group — 1 to 30 years. 

3. The KIBEI — This is an important division of the NISEI. This is the term 
used by the Japanese to signify those American born Japanese who received part 
or all of their education in Japan. In any consideration of the KIBEI tliey should 
be again divided into two classes, i. e. those who received their education in 
Japan from childhood to about 17 years of age and those who received their early 
formative education in the United States and returned to Japan for four or five 
years Japanese education. The Kibei arc considered the most dangerous element 
and closer to the [1260] Issei with especial reference to those who received 
their early education in Japan. It must be noted, however, that many of those 
who visited Japan subsequent to their early American education come back with 
added loyalty to the United States. In fact it is a saying that all a Nisei needs 
is a trip to Japan to make a loyal American out of him. The American educated 
Japanese is a boor in Japan and treated as a foreigner and with a certain amount 
of contempt there. His trip is usually a painful experience. 

4. The SANSEI — The Third generation Japanese is a baby and may be disre- 
garded for the purpose of our survey. 

We must now think back to the paragraph entitled BACKGROUND. This 
is tied into the family of which the Issei is the head with more authority and hold 
over his family than an old New England Bible-thundering pioneer. Their family 
life is disciplined and honorable. The children are obedient and the girls virtuous. 
We must think also of the Associations, some sinister, some emanating from 
Imperial Japan, some with Japanese Consular contacts. It all weaves up into a 
sinister pattern on paper. This pattern has been set up in a secret document 
entitled "Japanese Organizations and Activities in the 11th Naval District", and 
may be scrutinized with proper authorization in the Navy Department in 
Washin^on. We only suggest this to our reader in case our words have not 
built up the proper Hallowe'en atmosphere. It is like [7261] looking at 
the "punkin" itself. Thex*e is real fire in it, yet in many ways it is hollow 
and dusty. However, your reporter desires to have you know that all this exists 
before he goes on to the main body of his report on how the Japanese in the 
United States are liable to react in case of war with Japan. 

The Tokio-Sun God-Religious-Family-Association plus oriental mind set-up 
shows signs of the honorable passage of time. 

There are still Japanese in the United States who will tie dynamite around 
their waist and make a human bomb out of themselves. We grant this, but today 
they are few. Many things indicate that very many joints in the Japanese set-up 
show age, and many elements are not what they used to be. The weakest from a 
Japanese standpoint are the Nisei. They are universally estimated from 90 to 
98 percent loyal to the United States if the Japanese educated element of the 
Kibei is excluded. The Nisei are pathetically eager to show this loyalty. They 
are not Japanese in culture. They are foreigners to Japan. Though American 
citizens they are not accepted by Americans, largely because they look differently 
and can be easily recognized. The Japanese American citizens League should be 
encouraged, the while an eye is kept open, to see that Tokio does not get its finger 
in this pie — which it has in a few cases attempted to do. The loyal Nisei 
[7262] hardly knows where to turn. Some gesture of protection or whole- 
hearted acceptance of this group would go a long way to swinging them away 
from any last romantic hankering after old Japan. They are not oriental or 
mysterious, they are very American and are of a proud, self-respecting race suf- 
fering from a little inferiority complex and a lack of contact with the white boys 
they went to school with. They are eager for this contact and to work alongside 
them. 

The Issei or first generation is considerably weakened in their loyalty to Japan 

by the fact that they have chosen to make this their home and have brought up 

their children here. They expect to die here. They are quite fearful of being 

put in a concentration camp. Many would take out American citizenship if 

79716 — 46— ot. 6—14 



2686 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

allowed to do so. The haste of this report does not allow us to go into this more 
fully. The Issei have to break with their religion, their god and Emperor, their 
family, their ancestors and their after-life in order to be loyal to the United 
States. They are also still legally Japanese. Yet they do break, and send their 
boys off to the Army with pride and tears. They are good neighbors. They are 
old men fifty-five to sixty-five, for the most part simple and dignified. Roughly 
they were Japanese lower middle class about analogous to the pilgrim fathers. 
They were largely farmers and fishermen. Today the Japanese is farmer, fisher- 
man and businessman. They get \_7263] very attached to the land they 
work or own (through the second generation). They like their own business, they 
do not work at industrial jobs nor for others except as a stepping stone to becom- 
ing independent. 

The Kibei, educated from childhood to seventeen, are still the element most to 
be watched. 

WHAT WILL THE JAPANESE DO 

Sabotage 

Now that we have roughly given a background and a description of the Japanese 
elements in the United States the question naturally arises — what will these 
people do in case of a war between the United States and Japan? As interview 
after interview piled up, those bringing in results began to call it the same old 
tune. Such it was with only minor differences. These contacts ranged all the 
way from two-day sessions with Intelligence Services, through businessmen, to 
Roman Catholic priests who were frankly not interested in the United States and 
were only interested in making as many Catholics as possible. The story was 
all the same. There is no Japanese "problem" on the Coast. There will be 
no armed uprising of Japanese. There will undoubtedly be some sabotage financed 
by Japan and executed largely by imported agents or agents already imported. 
There will be the odd case of fanatical sabotage by some Japanese "crackpot". 
In each Naval District there are about 250 to 300 suspects [7264] under 
surveillance. It is easy to get on the suspect list, merely a speech in favor of 
Japan at some banquet, being sufficient to land one there. The Intelligence 
Services are generous with the title of suspect and are taking no chances. Pri- 
vately, they believe that only 50 or 60 in each district can be classed as really 
dangerous. The Japanese are hampered as saboteurs because of their easily 
recognized physical appearance. 1* will be hard for them to get near anything 
to blow up if it is guarded. There is far more danger from Communists and 
people of the Bridges type on the Coast than there is from Japanese. The 
Japanese here is almost exclusively a farmer, a fisherman or a small businessman. 
He has no entree to plants or intricate machinery. 

Espionage 

The Japanese, if undisturbed and disloyal, should be well equipped for obvious 
physical espionage. A great part of this work was probably completed and 
forwarded to Tokio years ago, such as soundings and photography of every 
inch of the Coast. They are probably familiar with the location of every building 
and garage including Mike O'Flarety's out-house in the Siskiyous with all trails 
leading thereto. An experienced Captain in Navy Intelligence, who has from 
time to time and over a period of years intercepted information Tokio bound, 
said he would certainly hate to be a Japanese coordinator of information in 
Tokio. He stated that the mass of useless [7265] information was unbe- 
lievable. This would be fine for a fifth column in Belgium or Holland with 
the German army ready to march in over the border, but though the local 
Japanese could spare a man who intimately knew the country for each Japanese 
invasion squad, there would at least have to be a terrific American Naval disaster 
before his brown brothers would need his services. Tlie dangerous part of their 
espionage is that they would be very effective as far as movement of supplies, 
movement of troops and movement of ships out of harbor mouths and over 
railroads is concerned. Tliey occupy only rarely positions where they can get to 
confidential papers or in plants. They are usually, when rarely so placed, a 
subject of perpetual watch and suspicion by their fellow workers. They would 
have to buy most of this type of information from white people. 

Propaganda 

Their direct propaganda is poor and rather ineffective on the whole. Their 
indirect is more successful. By indirect we mean propaganda preaching the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2687 

beauties of Japan and the sweet innocence of the Japanese race to susceptible 
Americans. 

Summary 

Japan will commit some sabotage largely depending on imported Japanese as 
they are afraid of and do not trust the Nisei. There will be no wholehearted 
response from [7266] Japanese in the United States. They may get some 
helpers from certain Kibei. They will be in a position to pick up information on 
troop, supply and ship movements from local Japanese. 

For the most part the local Japanese are loyal to the United States or, at worst, 
hope that by remaining quiet they can avoid concentration camps or irresponsible 
mobs. We do not believe that they would be at the least any more disloyal than 
any other racial group in the United States with whom we went to war. Those 
being here are on a spot and they know it. This is a hurried, preliminary report 
as our boat sails soon for Honolulu. We have not had a moment even to sort out 
our voluminous material since we came west. Your reporter is very satisfied he 
has told you what to expect from the local Japanese, but is horrified to note 
that dams, bridges, harbors, power stations, etc., ai'e wholly unguarded every- 
where. The harbor of San Pedro could be razed by fire completely by four 
men with hand grenades and a little study in one night. Dams could be blown 
and half of lower California might actually die of thirst, not to mention 
the damage to the food supply. One railway bridge at the exit from the 
mountains in some cases could tie up three or four main railroads. The Navy 
has to crawl around San Pedro on its marrow bones from oil company to oil 
company, from lumber yard to harbor board, to city fathers, to politicians in lieu 
[7267] of a centralzed authority, in order to strive albeit only partially to 
protect the conglomeration of oil tanks, lumber, gas tanks and heaven knows 
what else. And this is the second greatest port in the United States ! This is 
the home base of at least the South Pacific Fleet ! Tliis is the greatest collection of 
inflammable material we have ever seen in our lifetime concentrated in a small 
vulnerable area ! We do not suspect the local Japanese above anyone else or as 
much as the Communists or the Nazis, but before or on the outbreak of war in 
the South Pacific someone will set fire to this. If they do not they are fools. 
The Navy or some unified authority should have complete control of the harbor 
of Los Angeles, known as San Pedro and Long Beach, from the water's edge in 
a twenty-five mile radius inland, before the outbreak of war with Japan. That 
time is now. 

We will re-work this report for final submittal later. We have missed a great 
deal through haste. We believe we have given the high points to the best of 
our ability. The Japanese are loyal on the whole, but we are wide open to 
sabotage on this Coast and as far inland as the mountains, and while this one 
fact goes unrectified I cannot unqualifiedly state that there is no danger from the 
Japanese living in the United States which otherwise I would be willing to state. 



[7268] SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON LOWER CALIFORNIA AND NORTHWESTERN MEXICO 

In a conference with the U. S. Consul from Tijuana, he stated that there was 
no Japanese problem in his district as there were very few Japanese left there. 
One Rodriguez, former Governor for many years of Lower California, and very 
partial to the United States, abetted by the American Navy, has set up a shrimp 
fishing monopoly in the Gulf of California thereby eliminating Japanese fishing 
(Japan-controlled) in this area. The Consul states that he has sent full reports 
to the State Department covering the situation there. There is evidently nothing 
in the Japanese problem across the border about which to be exercised. 

SLTPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON BRITISH COLUMBIA 

The following information was furnished by a reliable source but it has not 
been verified and cannot be vouched for. 

The total population of Japanese in Canada is estimated as between 25,000 and 
30,000 of whom 23,000 reside in British Columbia. A few of these Japanese are 
naturalized but the great majority are either native born Canadians or im- 
migrants. 

The Japanese population is suspected of having a predilection for Japan al- 
though the exact feelings of most of them is unknown. They are not believed to 



2688 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

be a serious threat from a standpoint of armed uprisings in ttie event of war al- 
though there are probably a number of individuals in [7269] the group 
who would engage in subversive activity. 

From a strategic point of view these Japanese are dangerously located in event 
of war between Canada and Japan. They are situated at the mouths of important 
rivers and around the entrances of harbors. There are many of them located in 
the vicinities of important air bases in British Columbia. Japanese communities 
exist at most of the strategic points throughout the province. They own a total of 
2,144 vessels in Provincial waters, 211 of these vessels being over ten tons. As a 
race they generally look to the Japanese Consul for their guidance in matters 
pertaining to their welfare and political position in the community. 



KEPORT AND SUGGESTIONS REGARDING HANDLING JAPANESE QUESTION ON THE COAST 

Los Angeles, Calif., 

December 20, 1941. 
(C. B. Munson) 

This report should be read in conjunction with your observer's pre-war report 
on the "Japanese on the West Coast," and his report entitled "Report on Hawaiian 
Islands." Our report on "Hawaiian Islands" should be attached to and become 
part of our report on "Japanese on the West Coast." We did not repeat many 
basic statements originally embodied in the first report ("Japanese on the West 
Coast") in the later [7270] report ("Report on the Hawaiian Islands") as 
these statements had already been made and held good in both cases. 

We desire respectfully to call attention to a statement of the Secretary of the 
Navy evidently made to some reporter on his return to Washington after the 
Pearl Harbor attack as printed in the Los Angeles Times of December 18 and the 
Los Angeles Herald and Express of December 16 (marked in red, clipping en- 
closed). This release was a UP and AP release. 

We quote, "I think the most effective Fifth Column work of the entire war was 
done in Hawaii with the possible exception of Norway," Secretary of the Navy 
Knox said. We suggest that this paragraph creates the wrong impression in that 
it uses the term "Fifth Column." This term is loose and has been widely abused. 
Should not the term "complete physical espionage" have been used tnstead? 
"Physical espionage" is supplied unwittingly by the gabble of Navy wives, by the 
gabble of loyal second generation Japanese, by the gabble of the postman and the 
milkman and classified by definite agents of a foreign government. To this may 
be added years of photographing, sounding and "look seeing" by disloyal and 
paid American people for the last twenty years. Fifth Column activities, such as 
in Norway, impugns the loyalty of a certain large proportion of a population 
Your observer still doubts that this was the case in Honolulu. [7271] He 
doubts, for instance, that outside of sabotage, organized and paid for by the 
Imperial Japanese Government beforehand (i. e. professional work), that there 
was any large disloyal element of the Japanese population which went into action 
as a Fifth Column, running around and intentionally disrupting things on their 
own hook. We draw attention to the remark in the Secretary's report that people 
ot Japanese ancestry employed at Pearl Harbor burnt their hands on machine 
gun barrels firing at Japanese planes. 

What makes this physical espionage so effective and dangerous on the West 
Coast and in Honolulu, as we printed in our first report, is simply that there are 
a lot of Japanese in these districts and have been for years. For instance, we are 
given to understand that the best maps oq the Aleutian Islands were and still 
are Japanese. 

Some reaction of an undesirable nature is already apparent on the West Coast 
due to this statement of the Secretary's. In Honolulu your observer noted that 
the seagoing Navy was inclined to consider everybody with slant eyes bad. 
This thought stems from two sources ; self-interest, largely in the economic field, 
and in the Navy usually from pure lack of knowledge and the good old "eat 'em 
up alive" school. It is not the measured judgment of 98% of the intelligence 
services or the knowing citizenry either on the mainland or in Honolulu. An 
observer can only report [72721 what he observes. Your observer must 
note without fear or favor that 99% of the most intelligent views on the Japanese, 
by military, ofhcial and civil contacts in Honoluhi and the mainland, was best 
crystallzed by two Intelligence men before the outbreak of the war. These two 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2689 

men are Lieutenant Commander K. D. Ringle of the lltli ISiaval District in Los 
Angeles and Mr. Sliivers in Honolulu of the F. B. I. Mr. Shivers in Honolulu, 
since the attack on Pearl Harbor, should know whether he was right or wrong, 
and we believe he is big and loyal enough to be only interested in finding out in 
what regards he was wrong and immediately notifying his superiors. In our 
first report we quoted Alice in Wonderland, 

"If seven maids with seven mops 
Swept it for half a year. 
Do you suppose, the Walrus said. 
That they could get it clear?" 

The best measured judgment on the local Japanese may be wrong. Mr. Shivers 
in Honolulu holds the key. An attack is the proof of the pudding. His hindsight 
should be of inestimable value in shaping policy toward these people on the 
mainland where an attack has not yet occurred. Your observer guesses by 
mental telepathy that Mr. Shivers has not changed his point of view. Your 
observer suspects that Secretary Knox's comparison to the Fifth Column in 
Norways [7273] stems from either of two things: First, a very busy 
man being caught by the coattails by a reporter ; and second, from the unknoioing 
"eat 'em up alive" element amongst whom of necessity he was largely exposed 
in his hurried visit to determine responsibility. 

Your reporter, fully believing that his original reports are still good after 
the attack, makes the following observations about handling the Japanese 
"problem" on the West Coast. 

If Shivers says he was wrong, your observer is wrong too, and this report should 
be thrown in the ashcan and something much tougher substituted. 

\727It] SUGGESTIONS 

A. The loyal Japanese citizens should be encouraged by a statement from high 
government authority and public attitude toward rhem outlined. 

B. Their offers of assistance should be accepted through such agencies as : 

1. Civilian Defense 

2. Red Cross 

3. U. S. O., etc., etc. 

This assistance should not be merely monetary, nor should it even be limited 
to physical voluntary work in segregated Nisei units. The Nisei should work 
with and among white persons, and (b) made to feel he is welcome on a basis 
of equality. 

C. An alien property custodian should be appointed to supervise Issei (first 
generation-alien) businesses, &Ht encouraging Nisei (second generation- American 
citizen) to take over. 

D. Accept investigated Nisei as workers in defense industries such as ship- 
building plants, aircraft plants, etc. 

E. Put responsibility for behavior of Issei and Nisei on the leaders of Nisei 
groups such as the Japanese American Citizens League. 

F. Put the responsibility for production of food (vegetables, fish, etc.) on Nisei 
leaders. 

Enlargeinent of Foregoing Suggestions 

A. "High Government Authority," i. e. President or Vice [7275] Pres- 
ident, or at least almost as high. 

C. Memorandum CoJicerning Farm. Food Production and Distribution Situation 
in the Los Angeles Area folloiving December 7, 19Jfl. — The immediate results at 
the revocation of all licenses authorising Japanese Nationals to engage in business 
was a shai-p curtailment of the movement of vegetable produce into the Los 
Angeles market. This was due to the closing of a number of houses in the local 
produce market owned or controlled by Japanese Nationals and to a fear on the 
part of the Japanese Nationals on the farms that their produce would not be 
received or handled if they brought it in ; also due to the immediate blocking of 
all bank accounts of Japanese Nationals. 

It was at once obvious that some provisions must quickly be made to relieve 
the stoppage of food production and distribution. Under the assumption that 
they would be asked for advice for a plan of reopening the several closed Issei 
produce houses under Federal control, a plan was discussed and tentatively 
drawn up by a group of local produce dealers. 



2690 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

In anticipation of a lessening of these restrictions a press release was issued 
on December 11th calling upon Japanese farmers to bring their products to 
market as evidence of their loj'alty to the United States and assuring [7276] 
them that these products would be received by American firms for marketing. 
Issuance of the General License No. 77 under Executive Order No. 8389, April 
10, 1940 as amended and Regulations issued pursuant thereto relating to trans- 
actions in foreign exchange, etc., issued by the Secretary of the United States 
Treasury under date of December 11, 1941, granted a general license under strict 
banking conti-ol for certain Japanese Nationals to engage in the production, 
marketing and distribution of food products in Continental United States. 

As a result of the press release and the issuance of General License above 
referred to, the local produce market which on December 11th had a total volume 
of only 30 percent of normal, received 75 percent of normal on December 12th and 
was virtually normal on December 13th. In spite of the apparent severity of the 
banking controls set up by this General License, it was generally accepted by all 
concerned as a necessary thing and discussions were immediately undertaken 
as to the most effective means of operating under its terms without severe dis- 
location of the food production program. 

Since the new license No. 77 immediately allowed the Issei px'oduce houses to 
open under their former management in a manner more lenient than had been 
expected, it was still believed that these houses would be promptly taken 
[7277] over directly or indirectly by the Federal Government so as to transfer 
their operations to the control of American citizens. This was particularly ex- 
pected because of the belief that operation of these houses had been strongly 
influenced and directed previously by the J'apanese Government. 

"As discussions were proceeding looking to the setting up of a successful 
program for gradually taking over these essential businesses by American citizens 
and as clarification of a few points in the General License above mentioned were 
being requested, these discussions running over into Monday, December 15th, we 
were suddenly surprised to receive copies of General License No. 68a under 
Executive Order No. 8389, April 10, 1940, as amended and regulations issued pur- 
suant thereto, relating to transactions in foreign exchange, etc., issued by the 
Secretary of the United States Treasury under date of December 15, 1941. We 
assume that this order may have been issued as a result of the wave of query and 
protest that may have arisen immediately following the realization of the total 
freezing situation which occurred immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. 
At any rate, the effect of General License No. 68a which appears to open wide the 
doors so far as Continental transactions are concerned, and puts a great number 
of Japanese nationals back in control, rather than the loyal American citizens of 
Japanese parentage, many of whom we had expected would be [7278] put 
in control of these essential businesses. 

"It has been and is our belief that the objectionable features of the old control 
system have operated by virtue of control over consignments of merchandise and 
credits exercised by the Issei produce houses against the Japanese on the farms. 
Of prime necessity then is the complete elimination of Japanese national control 
of the produce houses. How far into the farms the elimination of Japanese 
National control should extend depends iipon the individual circumstances. In 
some cases on the farm, control has already passed — in some cases perhaps several 
years back — into the hands of the American citizen children of Japanese parents. 
It is believed that in many other cases there are on the farms Nisei children 
capable of assuming complete control and who would have assumed that control 
very promptly if it had not been for the issuance of License No. 68a previously 
referred to. 

"There are unquestionably a number of Japanese National farmers eager to 
demonstrate their loyalty to the United States. Some of these have minor chil- 
dren who are not yet capable of taking over the control of the farm. There are 
also unquestionably instances of Japanese Aliens on farms whose capable sons 
of American birth are in the United States Army and hence not available for 
control or operation of the farm. These are some of the reasons why the matter 
must be approached from the point of view of con- [7279] sideration of 
the individual cases. 

"The statement is made by authoritative sources that Japanese National firms 
have in the past appropriated for their own use funds that were due Japanese 
National farmers in one locality in order to extend credit to Japanese National 
farmers in other localities so that American citizen farmers competing with them 
could be driven out of business and in turn this second group having been estab- 
lished would be used as a source of funds to repeat the operation in another 
locality. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2691 

"Although there are California statutes providing ample redress for any farmer 
who believes he has not received proper returns from the commission house, it is 
reported that Japanese National farmers never make a complaint nor will they 
allow their names to be used to enable the California officials to properly enforce 
these statutes. It is extremely doubtful if this condition would exist in relations 
between Japanese American citizens if they are foimd ready to avail themselves 
of the protection and the machinery set up by American laws for preventing such 
abuses in business transactions. 

"The" fact that some of the Japanese Aliens are operating as commission mer- 
chants without proper license and bond in violation of these California statutes 
are some of the reasons for placing emphasis on the necessity for proceeding as 
[7280] promptly as possible toward elimination of the alien controlled dis- 

tributor houses and in this field there are a great number of loyal American citi- 
zens of Japanese parentage capable of taking over with or without immediate 
control and governmental direction of the operation of these houses." 

D. Fishing Industry. — Fishing and produce are the two major industries of the 
Japanese. Shopkeeping comes third, but is much smaller than the other two. 
There are many little industries such as sign painting. It is our belief, however, 
that if the two major industries are reorganized to function properly in safe 
hands that the other minor industries will either be satisfactorily adjusted to 
the change along the same line or can be taken up later. 

There are distinct differences between produce and fishing. Fishing provides 
an opportunity for direct contact with the enemy and transmission of informa- 
tion, probably to submarines, although transmission of information to surface 
vessels is not an improbability. The general practice is that the Nisei do not 
own or captain fish boats. Japanese and those of Japanese descent own the nets 
and tools for fishing and organize into gangs while the fish boat operators hire 
the gangs with their nets. We consider it very dangerous to send all Japanese 
or all [7281] Nisei crews to sea. The real danger in this lies in the fact 
that all Japanese crews in the intense competition of following the fish might 
get into battles with Scandanavian, Czechoslovakian and Italian crews. The 
fishing people would like to use part Nisei crews — i. e., mixed crews. For this 
purpo.se a clearing house of loyal Nisei should be established (Japanese American 
Citizens League) to giiarantee and give clearance to those who fish. Incidentally, 
the fuel might be limited to the amount necessary for the trip. Of course this 
is equally true of all Italians and other nationalities who are fishing. Unlike 
the produce industry less than 25 percent of the fishing is in Japanese hands. 
There has been issued from Washington an order which keeps all Japanese, 
including American citizens of Japanese ancestry from fishing. This is palpably 
hysteria as they are not any much more of a danger than the Italians who are 
still quite freely fishing. 

E. & F. In case we have not made it apparent, the aim of this report is that 
all Japanese Nationals in the continental United States and property owned and 
operated by them within this country be immediately placed under absolute 
Federal control. 

The aim of this will be to squeeze control from the hands of the Japanese 
Nationals into the hands of the loyal Nisei who are American citizens. As there 
may be a small [7282] percentage of the.se Nisei who are not loyal, it is 
also the intention that those Nisei who are put in positions of trust will be 
passed upon by the unquestionably loyal Nisei who focus in some organization 
such as the Japanese American Citizens League. It is the aim that the Nisei 
should police themselves, and as a result police their parents. Whatever 
organization (Japanese American Citizens League?) wields this influence, it in 
turn must be rigidly approved by and under the thumb of our government or some 
group which fully understands the Japanese on the Coast and is appointed by 
our government. This body should be on the Pacific coast, fully conversant and 
in touch with local problems and preferably of a military or naval intelligence 
texture. 

Likewise there are many technical aliens (legally Japanese citizens who are 
loyal to U. S. but prevented by our laws from becoming naturalized) . The control 
should be sufficiently flexible to encourage these on the basis of performance in 
each individual case. 

To illustrate such a case there are two Japanese ministers in the city of Bakers- 
field. California; one Christian, one Buddhist. The Christian minister is an 
alien. He came to the United States in infancy, grew up here, and is thoroughly 
loyal to the United States. The Buddhist minister is legally a U. S, citizen. He 



2692 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

went to Japan in infancy, grew to manhood there, and returned to the United 
[7283] States within the last two years. He cannot speak good English. 
Which is really the American? 



Report on Hawaiian Islands by Curtis B. Munson 

Your reporter, after a four weeks' survey of the Japanese problem on the Pacific 
Coast, sailed for Honolulu, where he spent nine days. There he received the full 
cooperation of Army and Navy Intelligence Services and the F. B. I. He also 
contacted British Intelligence based on Singapore. In the civilian field he had 
many personal interviews with first and second generation Japanese, police chiefs, 
school teachers, businessmen, conti'actors, rural officials, etc. The F. B. I. seem 
to hold the leading place in Honolulu, due to the fact that they have been set up 
longer on the Japanese question and also due to the personality of Mr. Shivers, 
their Agents in Charge. He has gone far to develop the confidence of the Japanese 
and others in himself and his organization there. The Army got going next, and 
as they have to live with the Japanese on land while the Navy sails the seas, they 
have earnestly thrown themselves into the task under an able Reserve officer 
who brings experience in intelligence service in the last war and decided business 
acument to bear upon his assignment. The Naval Intelligence, though a late 
starter, is silently and ably developing an organization whose real power will not 
reach its i)eak for [728^1 four or five months yet. There is the same 
cooperation between the Services that is evidence on the mainland. 

The consensus of opinion is that there will be no racial uprising of the Japanese 
in Honolulu. The first generation, as on the Coast, are ideologically and cultur- 
ally closest to Japan. Though many of them speak no English, or at best only 
pigeon-English, it is considered that the big bulk of them will be loyal. This is 
especially so, for in Hawaii the first generation is largely on the land and devoted 
to it. It may be well to state here in a general way that everyone in Hawaii, 
especially in the dark-skinned laboring classes, places loyalty to Hawaii first, 
and the United States second. This is not meant to impugn their loyalty — ^but 
they love the Islands. The second generation is estimated as approximately 
ninety-eight percent loyal. However, with the large Japanese population in the 
Hawaiian Islands, giving this the best interpretation possible, it would mean 
that fifteen hundred were disloyal. However, the F. B. I. state that there are 
about four hundred suspects, and the F. B. I's private estimate is that only 
fifty or sixty of these are sinister. (In all figures given on suspects only aliens 
are considered. Should it be possible to pick up citizens, this figure would have 
to be materially increased.) There are also a few Germans and Italians in the 
Islands who should be picked up. We [7285] do not at the moment 
remember the exact number, whether it was seven or seventeen. The Army 
Intelligence showed this reporter a secret map with pins of different colors to 
denote first generation, second generation, and other nationalities who are suspect, 
and their distribution in the Islands. Each one of these men's address is known 
and they showed me that it would be a comparatively easy job to pick them up 
almost in a few hours, should the necessity arise. There is not the same danger 
as in Continental United States that if they escaped the first grab that they 
will completely escape, as of course they have nowhere to go but the Pacific 
Ocean. There will be, undoubtedly, planted Japanese and agents who are there 
for the purpose of sabotage. Though sabotage may be expected, it is a self- 
evident fact that the main things to sabotage in he Islands are the Army and 
Navy installations, and these are under the protection and complete control of 
the two services. However, materials are sometimes lacking to build, say pro- 
tecting guard fences. Outside of the services' installations there are only two 
things open to sabotage; the commercial waterfront (this does not include Pearl 
Harbor), and the power stations and power lines. However, these power lines 
are especially important, for if one transformer is damaged in the Islands there 
are no replacements, and it would be a considerable time before a replacement 
could be secured [7286] from the mainland. Hawaii is particularly fortu- 
nate as regards water supply, possessing a large artesian fiow along with numerous 
reservoirs. Fortunately, in the Islands there would be no "White" sabotage 
which could be purchased by the Japanese, as there is on the Coast, outside of 
the imported white defense workers. There are very few whites who would be 
anything except loyal. 

The danger of espionage is considerable. This is especially the case as many 
Navy wives are over-garrulous with regard to their husbands' departures and 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2693 

where they are going. We believe that the Naval Intelligeuce Service is look- 
ing to put a curb ou this, and we are sure they can be tru,sted to police their 
own family. However, facts can be easily compiled from mail piling up, milk 
and grocery orders cancelled, along with knowledge of what officer is on 
what siiip and other private information, which might indicate the length of 
the ship's visit and where lieaded. This is almost unavoidable in such a com- 
pact and small community, though the services bear this in mind. The bottle- 
neck in the Japanese espionage would not be in the gathering of data but how 
10 transmit it to Japan. This was easy when Japanese vessels were touching 
at the Hawaiian Islands. Now it is very far from easy. It has been suggested 
that lishing boats might drop oilskin packages at sea to be picked up by Jap- 
ajiese Naval vessels. This has [7i?87] more the elements of runior, espe- 
cially as no such parcels have ever been picked up at sea by the numerous 
American vessels. It is suggested that the transmittal may be going East in- 
stead of West, probably to Mexico or some such likely point. From there it 
would be an easier task to forward it to Japan. In this connection there is also 
some suggestion that rumors with sufficient basis in fact to cause the Naval 
Intelligence to look into it, emanate from Mexico City to the Islands. A sample 
of this was the story pointing to Mexico City as a source that the Japanese 
were running submarines oft tlie shore of a certain Island, the crew submerging 
them and going ashore. With them they brought an end of an electric wire on 
shore. Ou M day they would press a button which would set the submarine 
mechanism to work so it would again come to the surface. The grain of truth 
which made the rumor interesting was the fact that the shores of the Hawaiian 
Islands are notoriously deep, rocky, and unsuited for this pui'pose. The one 
spot in all the Islands which the chart showed was suitable was the small spot 
indicated by the rumor. Investigation by the Navy proved there were no sub- 
marines sunk on this one sandy-bottom shoal. However, it wasted a good deal 
of their time, as did some other rumors of this nature. All these rumors had 
one basic local fact which was true and all seemed to start from Mexico City. 

[7288] One important difference between the situation in Hawaii and the 
mainland is that if all the Japanese on the mainland were actively disloyal they 
could be corraled or destroyed within a very short time. In the Hawaiian 
Islands, though there are sufficient American troops and Navy present to over- 
whelm the Japanese population, it would simply mean that the Islands would 
lose their vital labor supply by so doing, and in addition to that we would have to 
feed them, as well as import many thousands of laborers to take their place. Since 
a large party of the vital and essential work of the Islands is ably carried ou by 
the Japanese population, it is essential that they should be kept loyal — at least 
to the extent of staying at their tasks. If Imperial Japan were wise, she would 
devote all her energies in the Hawaiian Islands to trying to induce a spirit of 
mind whicii would cause a universal Japanese sit-down strike. She evidently has 
not thought of this as there is no sign of this type of propaganda. Propaganda, 
by Japan, is practically non-existent on the Islands. 

No report on Honolulu should start anywhere but with the "Big Five." The 
"Houies" or white people at the head of Island affairs centralize in the Big Five. 
The native whites who own the Islands are in a general way descendants of white 
missionaries and traders. Due to these two facts, they bad an interest in their 
labor — Japanese, Philippine, [7289] Hawaiian and Portuguese — and 
treated them well. Though they paid low wages and made money out of the 
Islands, there was hardly ever any absentee management. They sent their sons 
to Yale, Harvard and Princeton, and these sons returned to carry on the work of 
the Islands. There was never the abuse of labor in the Islands by rich, low white 
trash which made Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, or the bull pens of Idaho famous 
and contributed so to the rise of the "isms." You never see today a pair of 
patched pants in any of the Islands, and a short stroll through the streets of 
Honolulu — if one eliminates the defense workers imported from the mainland — 
convinces one that the faces are the fairly contented faces of people who have 
been, on the whole, not badly treated. 

The Islands are really a huge monopoly, centralized under the ownership of 
five families and an independent or two. These five families are called the "Big 
Five." The "Howies" include the sons, the management and less fortunate whites 
of long residence — in a word, all those who go to make up the directing business 
force of the Islands. These whites, especially the "Big Five," are intelligent and 
see the handwriting on the wall. They know that this last oasis of paternalistic 
capitalism is doomed. Naturally they are determined to hold onto it 'til the 



2694 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

last ditch. Due to the fact that the Japanese have always voted either as 
[7290] Democrats or Republicans, the whites control the Islands politically. 
If the Japanese ever voted on racial lines, it is they who would control politically. 
However, it must be said to their credit and the credit of the white owner class 
that they have never done this. The politics are really controlled in a last analy- 
sis by the "Big Five". The people of these Islands have become accustomed to 
being controlled thus, and as a result it must not be overlooked as a factor of 
safety in the control or the Japanese "Problem" in the Islands. The "Big Five" 
see in the ascending power of the Army and the Navy, due to war, a factor which 
is sure to hasten the end of this "last oasis of paternalistic capitalism" previously 
referred to. Thus we have in the Islands the development of three lines of 
thought. One is exemplified in the sea-going branch of the Navy. This leans to 
a slight lack of regard for the civilian life on the Islands, or possibly is the best 
expressed by saying that it regards the Islands as a Naval Base and wants them 
to be a darn good base, regardless. Of course, this point of view is wholly unoffi- 
cial, but it exists in unthinking elements of the Navy. The second thought 
exemplified is the thought of the extreme element of paternalistic capitalism 
which desires to keep control in their own hands to the "nth" hour as far as 
safety of the Navy or the Army forces is concerned. The heads of the F. B. I. 
and, [7291] we believe, the Intelligence Services generally, as well as most 
responsible service people, take the well-balanced middle view. This view is the 
one which we desire to make apparent in our report. The well established and 
really kindly paternalism of the Islands has a definite contribution to make and 
deserves credit as a considerable factor in the safety of the Islands. 

The general background and characteristics of the Japanese are the same in 
the Islands as they are on the mainland. However, certain differences in the 
situation have tended to ameliorate these in some particulars. We believe that 
the best over-all method of expressing this is by the following observation : 
This reporter believes there is this fundamental difference between the Japanese 
"Problem" on the Coast and the Japanese "Problem" in the Hawaiian Islands. 
On the Coast, the .Japanese are discriminated against on a racial basis. In 
Hawaii it is really only on a social and economic basis. This is peculiarly 
American. In our materialistic civilization one fits in socially largely on an 
income basis, provided he is willing to wash his neck and give up eating with 
his knife. In Hawaii, the Japanese fit in thus among the bulk of the inhabitants 
because the bulk are dai'k-sklnned of one kind or another. The whites generally 
are on a higher economic plane than they are on the mainland. The few Jap- 
anese who [7252] reach a position economically where they can mix 
with the whites are not numerous enough to make much impression even if they 
do resent not being asked to tea. The bulk of the whites in Hawaii would not 
mix socially anyway with stevedores or dock laborers, black or white. On the 
mainland there are plenty of "Okies" to call the Japanese a "Yellow-belly," when 
economically and by education the Japanese may not only be their equal but their 
superior. 

The result of this is that the Hawaiian Japanese does not suffer from the same 
inferiority complex or feel the same mistrust of the whites that he does on the 
mainland. "While it is seldom on the mainland that you find even a college- 
educated .Japanese-American citizen who talks to you wholly openly until you 
have gained his confidence, this is far from the case in Hawaii. Many young 
.Japanese there are fully as open and frank and at ease with a white as white 
boys are. In a word. Hawaii is more of a melting pot because there are more 
brown skins to melt — Japanese, Hawaiian, Chinese and Filipino. It is in- 
teresting to note that there has been absolutely no had feeling between the Japa- 
nese and the Chinese in the islands due to the Japanese-Chinese war. Why should 
they be any worse toward us? 

The extreme .Japanese "lover" in Hawaii is probably motivated frequently by 
self-interest. This is because he knows that the economic status quo is built 
largely on the [729S] fine industry of the Japanese labor, and he wishes to 
keep control of this as long as possible and is very loath to suggest to the Army 
or Navy that there is any danger from the Japanese. Any extreme anti-Japanese 
thought in Hawaii is probably due either to an unthinking element of the Navy 
which wants its base to be secure and of good service regardless of other con- 
sequences, or it is extremely anti-"Big Five" thought. 

Imperial Japan has attempted to do the same things in Hawaii that she has 
attempted to do on the mainland. Anyone interested in the Imperial Japanese 
picture visualized on paper should refer to .secret documents in the office of 
the F. B. I. in Washington entitled "Japanese Charts of Hawaiian Office." This 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2695 

will show the same network of Reserve officers, Shinto and Buddhist priests, 
language schools, prefectural clubs and associations, etc., as will be found in the 
Navy Department in Washington in secret charts entitled "Japanese Organiza- 
tions and Activities in the Eleventh Naval District." This reporter did not visit 
any other Island than that of Oahu, in which is found the city of Honolulu. 
The Service theory is that this is the only really good harbor and so all the 
defenses have been concentrated on this Island. In order to attack this Island 
Japan would first have to seize one of the other Islands and then be strong 
enough to seize, from there, Oahu. If she were strong enough to do [7294] 
this she would be strong enough to seize one of the other Islands first anyhow. 
Therefore there has been no spreading of defenses tlain over the whole group. 
There is only one other harbor at Hilo, on the Island of Hawaii, and this is a 
poor one. Of course, surveillance and small garrisons are maintained on the 
other Islands of this group. This reporter was advised that he would be more 
or less wasting time to visit these other islands. There is possibly only one 
that he was negligent in not visiting, though advised that it was unnecessary. 
That was the Island of Kausi. The Japanese Communists are more strongly 
organized on this Island than on any of the others. We believe Japanese 
Communism is purely economic and on this Island it is not considered a really 
serious factor. However, this is the Island that Japan would be most likely to 
seize in the case she felt herself strong enough to have a base for an assault 
on Oahu. 

The best consensus of opinion seemed to agree that martial law should be 
proclaimed now in Hawaii. We believe that under appointment from the Presi- 
dent, the Governor of Hawaii is empowered to declare martial law when he feels 
the need. Many people in Hawaii felt that the Governor was fairly spineless and 
would not do anything soon enough. However, the Army Intelligence Head 
told your reporter confidentially that the Governor would be pretty well guided 
[7295] by what General Short (Commanding General, Army Forces, Hawaii) 
told him to do. In other words, he said the Governor was under General Short's 
thumb. If this is the case, your reporter sees no need to worry on this score, 
and in line with this, read in the newspapers since leaving Hawaii that the 
Governor had made some official move which envisaged the posting of guards at 
all vulnerable points. Your reporter is not in a position to say definitely one 
way or the other whether the Governor is spineless, whether he is a man of de- 
termination or whether (which would be ideal) he is under the thumb of 
General Short. 

There is some danger in Hawaii of race riots. This is largely due to four 
elements. The Filipinos are intensely anti-Japanese and if they were attacked 
on the Philippine Islands they have threatened they would kill every Japanese 
in the Hawaiian Islands. The Intelligence Services, however, have made par- 
ticular note of this and in conjunction with the sugar plantations, by whom 
most of the Filipinos are employed and controlled, have lectured the Filipinos 
kindly but firmly on this point. They have pointed out that if there is to be 
interference with any of the inhabitants of the Islands it must be by the properly 
authorized officials of the American Government. The Filipinos seem to have 
appreciated this and considerably toned down their patriotism. There is a type 
of Japanese who may be termed the "bright [7296] young thing," a bit 
loud, and liable to be openly resentful of insult. He is the prototype of his 
brother on the mainland. He has broken away from the fine character and 
parental control of his Japanese background while becoming too Americanized 
without fully comprehending what Americanization means. Fortunately, he 
represents a small group in the second-generation Japanese and contributes most 
of the juvenile delinquency which is found in this race. He gets drunk and fre- 
quents pool halls. There is danger that drunk sailors may push him off the 
street and call him a "Yellow-belly," especially if they have just returned from 
some Naval battle with the Japanese. Where other Japanese would take this 
in silent anger, this bright young thing might hit back and start some racial 
trouble. However, it must be said that the Army and Navy have this fully 
in mind and are very efficiently policing their own families. The sailors are 
extremely well behaved and it is a matter of common comment and approval. 
The real danger of racial trouble comes from the defense workers who have 
been imported from the mainland. Most of these come from the Pacific Coast 
and contain the dregs of the waterfront element. If they had been able to 
secure a job on the mainland, they would not have gone to Hawaii. They in- 
clude many of the "Okie" class and to them any brown-skin is "Nigger." They 



2696 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

do not like the Islands and are only there because they could not get a job 
17297] on the mainland. They already have insulted many Kanakas by 
calling them "Negroes" and treating them as such. To them every Japanese is a 
"Yellow Peril" and to be treated accordingly. Thei-e is fear in the native vphite 
element in the Islands that these people will create a problem after the emer- 
gency or war is over. The controlling plantation and business class would 
prefer to bring in Filipino labor to take care of the shortage of labor! on the 
plantations caused by the former plantation workers going into defense work. 
In fact, they feel that all labor for the Islands should be imported from the 
Pliilippines. Of course, the reasons are pretty selfish as the Filipinos are more 
docile, and easily handled and create no problem for the future. Besides, the 
construction labor recruited from the Coast is additional handwriting on the 
wall pointing to the final destruction of paternalistic capitalism. Your re- 
porter is not in a position to state, nor is he able to make up his own mind, 
as to what is the best course to pursue. Those who desire Filipino labor will 
say tliere is absolutely no danger from the Japanese, and, in the next breath, 
argue that the importation of Filipino labor would offset the Japanese danger, 
as the Filipinos are so anti-Japanese. In our mind this is not an argument, 
however, as soldiers stationed in the Island of Oahu are more than suflScient 
to take care of the Japanese population if it all were [72981 disloyal, 
without the aid of any Filipinos. Still, we must confess we see the danger of 
the imported coastal riff-raff and do not find ourselves any too partial toward 
them. Besides, a Social Security number entitles a man to work while he may 
change his name twenty times and no information may be secured from Social 
Security. Many men with very bad records are hiding under this. The Intel- 
ligence have tmcovered many men with very bad records among these workers. 
On second thought your reporter casts his vote for the Filipinos. 

Due to the preponderance of Japanese in the population of the Islands, a much 
greater proportion of Japanese have been called to the draft than on the main- 
land. As on the mainland tliey are inclined to enlist before being drafted. The 
Army is extremely high in its praise of them as recruits. The Japanese seems 
to be chiefly afraid that their boys will not be given the same chance at promo- 
tion as the whites. Frankly, at first this discrimination existed. A Japanese 
still had to be better than a white to gain promotion. The Army is gradually 
eliminating even this discrimination. They have been giving them a chance 
at becoming ofiicers. Recently they picked out a few of the very best of these 
and put them in charge of white troops. The Army ofiicers confessed that they 
held their breath. Much to their surprise and relief there was absolutely no 
reaction from the white [,7299] troops and tliey liked these officers very 
well. Of course, these were especially good officers, but the Army is going to 
try more. This has been a great thing in strenghtening the loyalty of the Japanese 
in the Islands. They are beginning to feel that they are going to get a square 
deal and some of them are really almost pathetically exuberant. 

In summarizing, we cannot say how loyal the Japanese in the Hawaiian group 
would be if there were an American Naval disaster and the Japanese fleet ap- 
peared off the Hawaiian Islands. Doubtless great numbers of them would then 
forget their American loyalties and shout "Banzai" from the shore. Under those 
circumstances if this reporter were tliere he is not sure that he might not do it 
also to save his own skin, if not his face. Due to the fact that thei'e are more 
than enough soldiers in the Islands to take care of any Japanese, even if not so 
inclined, the Japanese will doubtless remain quietly at their tasks. However, in 
fairness to them it is only right to say that we believe the big majority anyhow 
would be neutral or even actively loyal. 

[7300] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I have one suggestion. 

We have had some difficulty in getting certain memorandums in 
relation to the Atlantic Conference and the Far East. I want to sug- 
gest to the committee that there is one man who now knows most about 
that subject, Mr. Churchill, and he is in the country and I suggest that 
he be requested to appear. He has appeared on several occasions be- 
fore Congress and given his views and I am sure that he would be glad 
to answer questions in relation to those conferences as it relates to the 
Far East. 

Mr. Murphy. I want to say for the record, Mr. Chairman, that Mr. 
Churchill has been a great figure in this world over a great many 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE * 2697 

years and that he has come to this fcountry as a place of rest, he so stated 
in the papers when he arrived in the country, and I think it ill behooves 
this committee when a great citizen of the world comes to this country 
for rest that we cannot let him have the rest and instead of that we 
are going to ask him about the Atlantic Conference when we have an 
abundance of material on the subject now, with all American offi- 
cials present. 

r don't think it is showing much courtesy to a great citizen of the 
world. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, the other day when I read into 
the record the statement of Mr. Hornbeck in relation to [7301] 
the parallel action, it was suggested even by the chairman of this com- 
mittee that we should get the records from Britain on what that par- 
allel action was and we haven't learned yet from our State Depart- 
ment whether or hot any parallel action was taken. In a democracy 
such as we have here it is up to the people to have all of the facts. 

[7S02] Senator Lucas. Does the Senator think it is fair to sug- 
gest that Churchill be subpenaed here, a citizen of another country 
who happens to be here ? 

Mr. Murphy. It makes good headlines. 

Senator Ferguson. I certainly do or I would not suggest it to the 
committee. 

Mr. IMuRPHY, I think, Mr. Chairman, we ought to be more con- 
cerned with what happened at Pearl Harbor instead of just putting 
out headlines. I think this Churchill business is not fair to a great 
citizen of this world. 

Senator Ferguson. No one is above coming in and telling the facts 
on as great a catastrophe as we have had at Pearl Harbor. This com- 
mittee is laboring to get the facts, and when I say "laboring" I mean 
just that, and if we can get the facts it is up to the committee to get 
all of the facts. 

The Vice Chairman. With two members of the committee having 
temporarily retired, would it be agreeable. Senator, to carry this ques- 
tion to the full committee ? 

Senator F'erguson. I do not care to press it at this moment. 

The Vice Chairman. It would be agreeable then to carry it over 
until the other members are present ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. Just another "fishing expedition," that [7303] 
is all. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I want to say a word on this 
"fishing expedition." I know I have endeavored to obtain some rec- 
ords on occasions and it has been a month or 6 weeks from the time 
certain records were requested until they were obtained. 

Now if that is a "fishing expedition," then, of course, that is what 
it is. 

Senator Lucas. I am talking about tlie Churchill request, that it is 
employed for the benefit of the press and is a "fishing expedition," and 
I repeat it. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I as one member of this com- 
mittee, regret the entirely unparliamentary comment of the Senator 
from Illinois. 

Senator Lucas. I don't care what you think. 



2698 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Brewster. I think if we* were proceeding under any sort 
of parliamentary rules he, of course, would be immediately subject to 
being silenced. Now, the request of the Senator from Michigan is en- 
titled to receive the consideration of this committee without reflec- 
tion upon his motives or his purposes, which, in the first place, have 
been demonstrated by a long record of public service and, in the sec- 
ond place, have been demonstrated, I think, in this committee by cita- 
tions of evidence produced which even [7S04] the Senator 
from Illinois has been pleased to cite with approval after they have 
been produced over very serious objection. 

So, with that in mind, I have a request that I hope will not be sub- 
ject to a similar charge, which I have had pending for 2 months and 
I have not so far had a reply. 

I filed a written request with this committee early in November 
asking the State Department for the records in the Kent case, and I 
have not had a word on it. 

Mr. Murphy. Will not the gentleman admit that a member of this 
committee says tlie Tyler Kent testimony has absolutely nothing to do 
with this inquiry after talking with Tyler Kent for 2 hours? 

Senator Brewster. I shall be very happy to say also that the matters 
with which I am concerned have nothing to do, as far as I understand, 
with what the gentleman discussed. I have never had the privilege 
myself to discuss it with Mr. Kent, and I do not know that I care for it. 
I think that members of this committee, or Members of the Senate, 
are entitled to a reply to a respectful request through the proper chan- 
nels of this committee as to whether or why these records can or cannot 
be produced. The records can then speak for themselves. 

I do not care to take the opinion of anybody else regarding [730S] 
that. I would like to have tlie opportunity to look at them for myself. 

I think even the gentleman on my left has exhibited great diligence 
and might very likely like to look at the records himself. 

Mr. Murphy. I mfght say, Mr. Chairman, that counsel for this com- 
mittee, the eminent counsel who has retired, said there were 1,500 
stolen documents by Tyler Kent and, in his judgment and the judgment 
of the State Department, they have absolutely nothing to do with Pearl 
Harbor. With over a million and a half words in tlie record already, 
as well as thousands upon thousands of other pages, I see no reason 
why we should go into that matter, which is not pertinent, and in 
view particularly also of a public declaration by Tyler Kent that he 
knows absolutely notJiing about Pearl Harbor and can contribute 
nothing. 

[7806] Senator Brewster. I appreciate what the gentleman con- 
tributes. I have not even had the privilege to be told as much as ap- 
parently the gentleman has. But, unfortunately, neither the State 
Department, the eminent counsel who has retired, nor Tyler Kent are 
under the mandate of the Congress of the United States, under which 
we are operating, to form our own independent judgment as to whether 
or not matters of this kind are or are not relevant. 

I have not indicated at any time a desire to introduce them into the 
record. I have simply asked for permission to examine these records 
in order that I might carry out my legislative mandate to determine 
for myself whether they have any relevance, and the more persistently 
the gentleman opposes that examination, the more one suspects that 
perhaps that these may be matters of concern. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2699 

Mr. Murphy. I will say the gentleman is back in the committee and 
we are having trouble all over again. 

Senator Brewster. I would like an answer. I would like someone 
to tell me what tlie answer is. 

The Vice Chairman. Obviously several of these matters mentioned 
will have to be considered in executive session. 

Mr. KJEEFE. Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keef e. 

Mr. Keefe. I do not intend to inject myself into the [7307] 
discussion that has been had, but in view of the fact that counsel has 
offered a number of exhibits that have heretofore been asked for, 
I would like to inquire whether or not the written request which I 
made, which was approved by the committee as a fair request, and 
approved by the counsel of the committee, which purported to request 
correspondence between the late President and Mr. Churchill, be- 
tween certain specific dates, whether or not, after the lapse now 
of a couple of months, that material has been made available, and is 
there any answer that can be given to the request which I made ? 

The Vice Chairman. Let the Chair inquire, does that relate to the 
letter received from Mr. Acheson, of the State Department? 

Mr. Keefe. No ; it is a different matter. The Senator from Illinois 
will recall the request which I made, and the chairman was kind 
enough to state it was a fair request at that time. 

The Vice Chairman. Is counsel prepared to give any reply now to 
Mr. Keefe 's question ? 

Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, we have received a letter from the 
War Department which you have asked for. The Navy advised me 
this noon they will have a similar letter over here tomorrow morning. 
I was on the telephone with the State Department asking them to 
expedite their delivery of [7S08] the information that was 
requested ; to have it here tomorrow or the next day. We have been 
following that up practically every other day.^ 

Mr. Keefe. I realize counsel has been diligent in the matter, and 
I have endeavored not to inject myself into it too frequently, but 
time marches on. It is like a lot of other things we have requested 
here. We just simply do not get them. 

I was going to say, Mr. Chairman, I am going to be insistent on 
having a statement from Mr. Acheson, or whoever is responsible, some- 
time pretty soon to my request for the Salisbury report, so we may 
determine that issue. We have witnesses coming on, and I do not have 
the report, and I cannot decently and intelligently ask questions in 
the absence of having the evidence before us. 

When can we have an executive meeting when Mr. Acheson can come 
down and present this Salisbury report so we may determine whether 
it has anything in it that is relevant and that the committee ought 
to have ? 

The Vice Chairman. I am sure the gentleman remembers the report 
made to him in committee meeting hereby the Chairman of the 
committee. 

Mr. Keefe, At some future time, or at some time agreeable to the 
committee, Mr. Acheson himself can come [7309] down and 
bring those reports and allow us to look at them. 

The Vice Chairman. It is apparent that the committee will have 
to have an executive session sometime very soon. We can convey 

^ See Hearings, Part 8, pp. 3839-3842. 



2700 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

these matters that have been brought up here to the chairman of the 
committee and request an executive session. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one request 
of the counsel which I think is probably material to a proper finding 
of the comittee in the final analysis. 

There has been much information coming from witnesses with re- 
spect to the amount of traffic that was received by the Intelligence 
Department in Hawaii, as well as the Intelligence Department here in 
the Army and Navy. 

I believe if we could have just the number of communications of all 
types and kinds, including Magic, diplomatic exchanges, messages from 
tiie attaches, in various parts of the world that came into the Naval 
Intelligence Department from, say, November 1 to December 7, as 
well as the messages in the Military Intelligence Department, and then 
have the same thing with respect to the Navy and Army Intelligence 
Departments in Hawaii, it would expedite matters. 

In other words, we heard witnesses say, and we know \7310~\ 
the same immense responsibility that devolved upon men here in Wash- 
ington. 

It struck me it might be of some value just to know how many 
messages from November 1 up to the 7th of December they received 
here in Washington, and how many in Hawaii. 

The Vice Chairman. The committee will stand adjourned until 10 
o'clock tomorrow morning. 

(Whereupon, at 4:13 p. m., the committee recessed until 10 a. m., 
Friday, January 18, 1946. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2701 



[7311] PEAKL HARBOE ATTACK 



FRIDAY, JANUARY 18, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington, D. C. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe, 

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, associate general counsel ; John E. Masten, Edward P. Mor- 
gan, and Logan J, Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee. 

[731'2] The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

When the hearing was suspended yesterday, Congressman Cooper 
was examining Admiral Kimmel. 

Do you have further questions, Congressman? 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I just want to state to Admiral 
Kimmel, if you got the impression that I was questioning you rather 
closely about the-se matters yesterday, I just want to say I also ques- 
tioned Admiral Stark and especially Admiral Turner very closely 
about these things, trying to get all the information I could about this 
matter. 

TESTIMONY OF EEAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES 
NAVY (RETIRED)— Resumed 

Admiral Kimmel. I welcome the examination. 

The Vice Chairman. I thank you for the information you gave in 
response to my questions. 

That is all, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Kimmel. I have one thing I would like to present to the 
committee this morning, if this is the time to do it. 

The Chairman. Yes, proceed. 

Admiral Kimmel. In connection with the orders for Admiral 
Halsey, that were issued to him in November of 1941, I would like to 
read the order which I gave him. I think it should be in here to com- 
plete the record. 

I have no comments to make on it except just to read [7313] 
the order. 



79716 — 46— pt. 6 15 



2702 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SECBE?r 

2S0447 Nov. 41 

CINCPAC TO : COMTASKFOR 2 

COM 14 
INFO TO : COMPATWING 2 

COMBATFOR 

COMBASEFOR 
Twelve planes Marine Fightron Two Eleven are to base Wake accordance 
Myser 101825 of 10 November X Enterprise provide transportation X After 
departure Pearl on 28 Nov from Task Force Eight consisting of Entei-prise 
Chester Northampton Salt Lake City and Desron Six and Pass Command Task 
Force Two to Rear Admiral Draemel with orders Task Force Two carry out 
normal operations in Hawaiian area X Proceed to arrive 200 miles 070 degrees 
from Wake at 0700 on 3 Dec X Fly off Marine planes that vicinity and upon 
receiving info that planes have arrived Wake return Pearl X Enroute to and 
from Wake pass through Point Afirm four hundred miles south of Midway X 
Patrol planes from Midway and Wake will cover your route and provide secu- 
rity while at Wake X Communications radio condition nineteen guard NPM 
Primary Fox continuously X Comfourteen inform Wake that planes expected 
arrive there 0830 on 3 Dec and direct Wake report Comfourteen by coded dis- 
patch when planes arrive there X Comfourteen furnish this final arrival infor- 
mation to Comtaskfor Eight X Wake submarine patrol Tambor Triton will be 
advised X Narwhal and Dolphin [731 Jj] are enroute Pearl at 1200 GCT 
on 27 Nov they were about 300 miles east of Wake. 

That is all, sir. 

The Chairman. Does counsel want to ask any further questions ? 

Mr. Richardson. If you would pause before further examination 
to permit us to put into the record at this time a couple of small 
exhibits? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. We would like to do it. 

The Chairman. Proceed. 

Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, we have three short dispatches which 
we would like to read into the record in connection with the last para- 
graph on page 96 of Admiral Kimmel's statement, which is the first 
paragraph on page 6797 of our transcript. 

The dispatches are as follows : 

TOP SECRET 

28 NOVEMBEE 1941 

From: CINCAF 
Action: OPNAV 
Info : COMSIXTEEN CINCPAC COMFOURTEEN 

281430 

Following Tokyo to net intercept translation received from Singapore X If 
diplomatic relations are on verge [7315] of being severed following 
words repeated five times at beginning and end of ordinary Tokyo news broad- 
casts will have significance as follows X Higashi Higashi Japanese Amer- 
ican X Kita Kita Russia X Nishi Nishi England including occupation of Thai 
or invasion of Malaya and N-e-i XX on Japanese language foreign news broad- 
casts the following sentences repeated twice in the middle and twice at the 
end of broadcasts will be used XX America Higashi No Kaze Kumori XX Eng- 
land X Nishi No Kaze Hare X Unquote X British and Comsixteen monitoring 
above broadcasts. 

TOP SECBETT 

1 Decbmbee 1941 
From : COMSIXTEEN 
Action : CINCAF 
Info : CINCPAC, OPNAV, COMFOURTEEN 

011422 

J-V-J press tonight in closing seventeen hundred schedule stated quote "All 
listeners be sure and listen in at zero seven zero zero and zero seven thirty 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2703 

tomorrow morning, since there may be important, news" unquote XX suggest 
frequencies seven tiiree two seven X nine four three zero X and one two two 
seven five X times Toliyo LCT. 

[7S16] The third dispatch is from OPNAV for action of the 
Commandant of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts, and 
for the information of the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and 
Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet. 

It reads as follows : 

New Tokyo broadcast scliedules as follows X J-V-J one two two seven five ke 
six pm and seven pm to Pacific coast six thirty pm to Western Hemisphere X 
J-H-L five one six zero kc eight pm nine pm and ten pm to China coast X J unit 
option nine four three zero kc six thirty pm to Western Hemisphere X J-H-P one 
one nine eight zero kc ten thirty pm to Europe X probably Tokyo time. 

That is all we have. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, these copies furnished us, I 
only see the first one here. 

Mr. Masten. The first two have been furnished you this morning. 
We haven't had time to have the third duplicated. 

Senator Lucas. Can counsel tell us the significance of that last 
message ? 

Mr. Masten. As I understand it, these are instructions to the moni- 
toring stations, the last message. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire from counsel, as 
to the second message, that of December 1, do [7317'] we have 
a memorandum of what was broadcast on the 7th ? 

Mr. Masten. We do not; not to my knowledge. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you tried to find out ? 

Mr. Masten. These only came to my attention last night. 

Senator Ferguson. You just received them last night? 

Mr. Masten. They came to my attention last night. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why they didn't come to your 
attention before? They seem to be in relation to the winds message. 

Mr. Masten. I think they have been down in the office in connec- 
tion with getting together the documentary papers on the winds ex- 
hibit that Mr. Mitchell spoke of some time ago. In view of the state- 
ments made in Admiral Kimmel's statement in this connection, it was 
thought desirable to have them before the committee this morning. 

Senator Brewster. Is this the so-called winds message or is it 
another one ? 

Mr. Masten. I understand this is the same as the intercept that 
appears on page 154 of exhibit 1. 

Senator Brewster. That was the initial winds message. 

Mr. Masten. That is right. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say for the record 
that this second page about which question has been asked is in the 
naval narrative. My recollection is that [7318] there was 
never anything happened on the morning of December 1 when there 
was supposed to be a special broadcast. At least we never got word 
of any. 

The Chairman. Mr. Cooper, are you through? 

The Vice Chairman. Yes. 



2704 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Senator George would be next, but he is tempo- 
rarily absent. 

The Chair recognizes Congressman Clark. 

Mr. Clark. Mr. Chairman, I desire to ask only one or two ques- 
tions to clarify some matters in my own mind. 

In legal or legislative procedure 

Admiral Kimmel. I can't hear you. 

Mr. Clark. I am sorry. 

Admiral Kimmel. I am deaf. 

Mr. Clark. I say, in legal or legislative procedure I would proba- 
bly understand what would be meant by "surprise attack." I am not 
so sure that I do understand its full significance in military parlance. 
Would you help me out a little on that'^ 

Admiral Kimmel. I know of no particular significance in military 
parlance that isn't contained in the words themselves. It is a surprise 
attack. They tried to get in to a point of attack without being dis- 
covered, to, if possible, catch people off balance. A surprise attack is 
just — I [7319] take it the words express what it is. I know 
of no other meaning. 

Mr. Clark. Does it involve almost necessarily the element of the 
unexpected ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Insofar as they are able to make it, yes; yes, I 
would say so. 

Mr. Clark. Now, a surprise attack had long been listed as the chief 
danger to the base at Pearl Harbor, had it not ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I can't hear you, sir. I am sorry. 

Mr. Clark. That is all right. I say a surprise attack had long been 
listed or estimated to be the chief danger to the military establishment 
at the Hawaiian Islands, had it not? 

Admiral Kimmel. Not only to the Hawaiian Islands but any place 
in regard to the Japanese. The Japanese were known to make surprise 
attacks whenever they could. The only difference betwixt the Japa- 
nese and any other nation in that respect was that they were liable to 
do it without a declaration of war. 

Mr. Clark. Well, could the establishment at Pearl Harbor or the 
Hawaiian Islands have been attacked successfully in your opinion 
otherwise than by a surprise attack ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Of course, a surprise attack always gives the at- 
tacking force a great advantage. We have seen [73W] that 
dozens of times. 

Mr. Clark. Well, what I have in mind, sir, is to compare the likely 
success of a surprise attack by air with any other kind of attack that 
was possible at the Hawaiian Islands. 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh I think that other kinds of attack would 
have been possible in the Hawaiian Islands. It depends entirely 
on the forces they have available, and had these carriers been dis- 
covered by patrol planes, had we found them, it is highly probable — 
well, I won t say highly probable, but it is quite possible that they 
could have launched their planes and started the attack before we 
could have done anything about it. 

Even if it hadn't been a complete surprise the attack could have been 
launched. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2705 

Mr. Clark. Well, as between a surprise attack by air and a landing 
attack, what would you say as to the likelihood ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, well, I would say that a surprise attack by 
land was much less possible than a surprise attack by air. The very 
nature of air makes for the ease of a surprise attack, the rapidity with 
which it can be delivered. There is no question about that, sir. 

Mr. Clark. I understand that in former times war games were con- 
ducted there with a surprise attack by air featured in the war games. 
Are you familiar with that? 

[7321] Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes; we had many exercises in 
which we sent planes in to attack the installations on Oahu. 

Mr. Clark. "VVhat time were those planes sent in usually, what time 
of day ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, at various times, but the early morning, 
^he forenoon sometime, was probably the best time, primarily because 
[hat gave the carriers a chance to recover their planes during daylight 
and to have the following night to get away from the range of the land 
based aircraft and from any attacking forces, and have the night to 
dodge and get out. 

[7322'] Mr. Clark. I was just a little interested. Admiral, in the 
background upon which a surprise attack by air had been fixed as 
the No. 1 danger to our set-up at Pearl Harbor, 

Admiral Kimmel. A surprise attack by air was one of the forms of 
attack that could have been made, that is all. We felt, I think, that 
the Japanese didn't have the forces or the logistic support to send 
a very great number of troops and train, and all that kind of thing 
across the ocean at that particular time, and do other things that 
they would have to do, and the air attack was one of the things that 
they could do. 

It was within the realm of possibility, that is what I mean. 

Mr. Clark. In your judgment, is that why a surprise attack by air 
was fixed as the No. 1 danger ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, no, not in order of probability. I thought 
that what they were going to do in case of war in the Pacific at all, 
were against the United States, was to have a mass submarine attack 
in the operating areas around Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Clark. ^Vliy, in your judgment, did the military authorities 
fix a surprise attack by air as the No. 1 danger to Pearl Harbor ? 

[7323] Admiral Kimmel. Well, I couldn't give you exactly why 
they fixed that as the No. 1 danger. As a matter of fact, I never con- 
sidered it the No. 1 danger in the order of probability by any means, 
and I feel tha t the other people scarcely felt that either. 

They felt that they should be in the best case to defend against air 
attack because a hit-and-run attack was always within the realm of 
possibility. 

Mr. Clark. I think in the course of your testimony you may have 
said that an attack on the Philippines, or Thai, or Kra Peninsula might 
be in the nature of a surprise attack. 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes ; I think so. It could be. 

Mr. Clark. You wouldn't say that after the message of November 
27 had designated those points as likely points of attack, would you? 



2706 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Kimmel. There were many points in Thai, in the Philip- 
pines, and the Kra Peninsula that they could have hit, any one of 
which might have been a local surprise. 

Mr. Clark. Yes, a local surprise 

Admiral Kimmel. That is all that a surprise attack can be, is a 
local surprise. 

Mr. Clark. But you wouldn't say that after an attack in those 
directions had been forecast in this message that [7324] then 
an attack in those directions would be a surprise, would you? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, they would endeavor to make it a surprise 
attack; yes, sir. The fact that we had forecast it — well, put it this 
way : If we had been convinced in Pearl Harbor of the probability of 
an air attack in Pearl Harbor it would have still been a surprise attack, 
so far as the Japanese, their best efforts could make it. They didn't 
know what we thought nearly as well as we knew what they thought, 
or at least was known in Washington. 

Mr. Clark. You mean the Japs would have been surprised to know 
that you were prepared for it ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No ; but they would have endeavored to make it 
a surprise attack, no matter how much we were expecting it, and when 
you are expecting an attack over months and months and weeks and 
weeks, no matter how alert you are, it is possible for the enemy to make 
a surprise attack, and we have seen that time without number in this 
war, where they did make surprise attacks, after war had been declared 
and on places where they could have expected an attack. They were 
nevertheless surprises in the sense they hadn't done all the things they 
could have done if they had known the attack was coming at a par- 
ticular time. 

I think that Halsey's attack on the installations in \7325'\ 
Manila and the ships, the vast number of ships that he sank out there, 
was in the nature of a surprise attack. That was after war had been 
going on for a couple of years. 

Mr. Clark. I think you have stated in your testimony that the 
attack at Pearl Harbor on the 7th, was a surprise to you ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir, I thought they weren't coming at that 
time. 

Mr. Clark. Now, will you please state just what disposition you 
would have made of yonv forces, including your ships and planes and 
the use of radar, if at any time between the 27th of November, and the 
6th of December you had been convinced that there was going to be 
an air attack on Pearl Harbor. 

Admiral Kimmel. I think I have set that forth in considerable detail 
in the statement which I have submitted. 

Mr. Clark. Well, I listened rather carefully and it didn't seem to 
me that it was entirely covered. That is why I ask you the question 
now. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well 

Mr. Clark. May I interrupt you just a moment? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. A high naval officer has testified before \7326'] 
this committee as to what dispositions he would have made had he 
been in command at Pearl Harbor as you were, and had received the 
message of November 27. 

Admiral Kimmel. Plus the information he had. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2707 

Mr. Clakk. No, no, the question was submitted to him as to what 
action he would have taken if he had been in command under condi- 
tions then existing and had received the message of November 27. 
He has stated what dispositions he would have made. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Ci^RK. By way of comparison, I would like to have you state 
just what dispositions you would have made of everything at your 
command if you had been reasonably sure at any time between the 
27th of November and the 7th of December, that a surprise air attack 
was going to be made there. 

Admiral Kiminiel, In that event, I would have considered that my 
mission was considerably changed. I would have thought that the 
most important thing that I could do under those circumstances was 
to intercept and destroy this Japanese detachment that was expected 
to come to Hawaii. I would have put to sea with the fleet and I would 
have maintained them in a position where they could be in the best 
intercepting position. I would have used all of the [7327} 
facilities of the patrol planes, by planes afloat. I would have kejDt 
my carriers in the Hawaiian area. I would have abandoned the 
overhaul of the Saratoga^ which was in the nature of — she was not 
entirely out of commission. She was able to get about all right. 

I would have had her brought back to the area and joined up. And 
I would have had the three carriers, the patrol planes covering the 
approaches to the fleet and the approaches to Hawaii, and I would 
have gone ahead and exhausted the patrol planes and thereby cur- 
tailed my chance to carry out the raid on the Marshalls, because I 
would have considered the attack force as a primary objective at that 
time. 

[7328'] Mr. Clark. What use, if any, would you have made of 
your radar? 

Admiral Kimmel. The radar on the ships at sea would have been 
in constant use. I have no doubt that the Army would have — if they 
had felt the same way that I did at the time, and they probably would 
if I felt that way, they would have used their radar to the limits of 
its capacity. 

Mr. Clark. Well, as commander in chief of the fleet you would 
have insisted on that, would you not? 

Admiral Kimmel. I would have advised them. I had no power to 
insist beyond the matter of advice. 

Mr. Clark. Did you consider the situation as between the United 
States and Japan any more serious and any more likely to break 
from and after the 27th of November than it had been prior to that 
time? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I think I did. The situation was becoming 
increasingly serious. I was not convinced from the information I had 
that Japan was going to attack the United States at that time. There 
was that possibility and we guarded against it, to what I considered 
the best way with the information I had and my conviction at the 
time. 

Mr. Clark. You tell the committee now that as this situation be- 
came more tense and serious you now have the feeling that you did 
everything that you reasonably could have [7329] done to have 
anticipated and at least minimized the effect of this attack? 



2708 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Kimmel. If I had known the attack was coming, if I had 
been convinced 

Mr. Clark. Admiral, I beg your pardon, sir. 

Admiral Kimmel. I do not understand, sir. I want to answ^er you. 

Mr. Clark. I want to ask you this: You have said that you con- 
sidered the situation to be becoming more tense from and after the 
27th of November. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Now I am asking you whether you are now telling the 
committee that under those conditions 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, wait a minute. I had better qualify what 
I said slightly. 

Mr. Clark. All right, sir. 

Admiral Kimmel. The message of November 27 — after I received 
that I considered all the previous messages and that the situation in 
the Pacific was becoming more tense. As the days passed after 
November 27 and nothing happened within the next few days I was 
not so certain that something was going to happen. I was watching 
every single thing I could to get any indications, and the indications 
then followed out the line in the message which had come from the 
Navy Depart- [73o0] ment that they were probably going 
down into Thailand to make another advance down there and see what 
could be done, but I was not convinced — as the days passed I was even 
less convinced — that they were going to attack the United States. 

Mr. Clark. Well, then, their going into Thailand had been pro- 
phesied or communicated — the likelihood of that had been communi- 
cated to you ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Sir ? 

Mr. Clark. I say, the likelihood of their going into Thailand had 
been communicated to you by the Chief of Staff? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. There was nothing in the nature of a surprise about 
that? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I thought it could be a surprise even if 
they went there, and then there were several other places that were 
mentioned, any one of which could have been a surprise attack by 
the Japanese. 

Mr. Clark. Well, we have been over that somewhat, so I will get 
back to the other proposition. 

Admiral Kimmel. Put it this way, sir: If they had known that 
an attack definitely was going to come against the Philippines at a 
certain time, the defending forces would have had a great advantage, 
because they would have known it at that particular time, and they 
could have gone out on an all-out [7331] alert to culminate at a 
particular instant, you might say, and so it could be at any other place. 

Mr. Clark. I understand that. I appreciate that fully, sir. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. But you had the record before you that the armed 
services had classified a surprise attack as a number one thing. Now, 
what I want to ask you is, getting back to my question, in the light 
of all the circumstances before you from the 27th on you now tell 
this committee that you think of nothing else that you could or should 
have done as commander of the Pacific Fleet that would have either 
averted or minimized this attack on Hawaii ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2709 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir ; I think that is true. I feel that way ; 
yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Isn't the essence of this whole controversy that every- 
body from the higher oiRcials here in Washington on down through 
the lieutenant who disregarded the radar message, just muffed the 
situation, let the Japs outsmart them? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think you should draw those conclusions, sir, 
rather than me. 

Mr. Clark. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Before the further examination of Admiral 
Kimmel the Chair wishes to make a statement. 

[7332~\ Late yesterday afternoon, in the absence of the chairman, 
who had to leave l)efore the hearing was concluded, the suggestion was 
made that Mr. Winston Churchill, former Prime Minister of Great 
Britain, be asked to appear here as a witness. The Chair does not 
wish at this moment to discuss the propriety of that suggestion, but 
wishes to state that as chairman of this committee he will neither 
issue a subpena for Mr. Churchill nor send him an invitation to appear 
here as a witness unless ordered to do so by the committee. 

Inasmuch as the matter was brought up in a public session, the 
Chair thinks it ought to be settled in a public session ; and if any mem- 
ber of the committee desires now to make a motion instructing the 
Chair either to subpena Mr. Churchill or to invite him, the Chair will 
entertain that motion at this time. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. The Senator from Michigan. 

Senator Ferguson. I now move that the chairman of the committee, 
in behalf of the committee, invite Mr. Winston Churchill to appear 
before this committee at a time that is agreeable to him and also to the 
committee. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. The Senator from Maine. 

Senator Brewster. I am not prepared to pass upon this [7333^ 
myself in quite as expeditious a fashion without consideration and 
discussion. I move to lay that motion on the table. 

The Chairman. One of the reasons, if I may make this observation, 
why the Chair brought this matter up at this time is in view of the 
fact that he thinks that the question of whether Mr. Churchill is to 
be either subpenaed or invited here ought not to be bandied around 
and held in suspense. He thinks it ought to be settled by the com- 
mittee, and it ought to be settled promptly, and that is why the Chair 
brought it up. 

The Senator has moved to lay that motion on the table. As many 
as favor that motion say "Aye." (Chorus of ayes.) 

Those opposed, "No." (Chorus of noes.) 

Senator Brewster. I would like to have a roll on that. 

The Chairman. We will have a roll call on that. The Chair will 
call the roll. 

Senator Brewster. Particularly in view of the fact that one of the 
highly reliable papers in this country misquoted me this morning. 

The Chairman. I am not interested in that. That happens to me 
every day. 

Senator Brewster. That is why I wanted it on record. 



2710 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[7334.1 The Chairman. The Chair will call the roll on the 
motion to lay the Senator's motion on the table. Senator George. 

Senator George. No. 

The Chairman. Senator Lucas. 

Senator Lucas. No. 

The Chairman. Senator Brewster. 

Senator Brewster. Aye. 

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. No. 

The Chapman. Congressman Cooper. 

Mr. Cooper. No. 

The Chairman. Congressman Clark. 

Mr. Clark. No. 

The Chairman. Congressman Murphy. 

Mr. MuRPHT. No. 

The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart. 

Mr. Gearhart. No. 

The Chairman. Congressman Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. No. 

The Chairman. The motion is defeated. 

The Chair will now call the roll on the motion of the Senator 
from Michigan, Mr. Ferguson, to instruct the Chair to invite Mr. 
Churchill to appear as a witness. Senator George. 

Senator George. No. 

[7335] The Chairman. The Chair wishes to vote "No" on that 
previous motion. Senator Lucas. 

Senator Lucas. No. 

The Chairman. Senator Brewster. 

Senator Brewster. Present. 

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. Aye. 

The Chairman. Congressman Cooper. 

Mr. Cooper. No. 

The Chairman. Congressman Clark. 

Mr. Clark. No. 

The Chairman. Congressman Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. No. 

The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart. 

Mr. Gearhart. Aye. 

The Chairman. Congressman Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. Present. 

The Chairman. The Chair votes "No". The motion is lost and 
that settles that. Proceed with the examination. Senator George 
is recognized. The committee will be in order. Senator George. 

Mr. Keefe, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Congressman Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to make this [73361 
statement in view of the fact that I voted "Present" on this resolu- 
tion, that the people of the country have had an opportunity to see 
an expeditious handling and disposition of public business and I 
hope that perhaps we have that reflected on the floor of the Senate as 
well as before this committee in the handling of public business also. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2711 

The Chairman. The Chair appreciates that observation and always 
appreciates the observations of the able member from Wisconsin. 

Senator Lucas. That might apply to the House, too. 

The Chairman. The Chair might suggest in view of that that the 
Congressman from Wisconsin is no doubt interested in the expedition 
of business before both Houses of Congress and he might exercise 
his influence on the Committee on Rules, a body of which he is a 
member, to expedite business in that body. 

Mr. Keefe. I am not a member of the Committee on Rules. 

The Vice Chairman. Exercise your great influence. 

Mr. Keefe. I have tried to exercise my influence on that great 
committee. I see the member of the Rules Committee on our side is 
here and he has taken a back seat in this discussion here. I have 
no influence on the Committee on Rules. 

Senator George. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator George is recognized. 

[7337] Senator George. Mr. Chairman, since I was not here at 
the opening this morning I desire to ask Admiral only a very few 
questions. 

Admiral Kimmel, referring to the message of November 27, to the 
part of it that gave direction in the language beginning "Execute 
an appropriate defensive deployment," may I ask you if "deploy- 
ment" or "defensive deployment" are technical terms within the 
knowledge of naval officers^ 

Admiral Kimmel. No, sir. 

Senator George. Do they have any special significance ? 

Admiral Kimmex,. None that I know of. 

Senator George. What, Admiral, did you understand by "defensive 
deployment," forgetting for the time being the words that follow it, 
which I wish to question you about, because the word "preparatory" 
to doing something else is used there, but what did you understand 
by "defensive deployment"? 

Admiral Kimmel. I never read the "defensive deployment" except 
in connection with the remainder of the sentence, the defensive de- 
ployment in order to accomplish something and that something was 
the attack on the Marshalls. 

Senator George. Now, may I ask — the language is "to execute an 
appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to something else." 

[7338] Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir; that is exactly what I did 
to the best of my knowledge and belief. 

Senator George. And you understand that "appropriate" meant 
something that in your judgment you thought would best accomplish 
the order given you in this directive here ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I did, indeed. The "appropriate" was left en- 
tirely to my discretion. 

Seinator George. Well now, let me ask you with reference to 
WPI^6. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. Wliere was that prepared, Admiral ? 

Admiral Kimmel. WPL-46 was prepared in the Navy Department. 
It was a basic war plan. Navy basic war plan. 

Senator George. Here in Washington ? 



2712 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Kimmel. Here in Washington and based upon that I had 
prepared, as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, what we termed 
'•WPAC-46." WPAC-46 was the implementation of the war plan 
prepared in the Navy Department and that WPAC-46, prepared by 
my staff and approved by me, had been submitted to the Navy De- 
partment and had been approved by them. 

Senator George. So that the requirements of your implementing 
plan were known here in Washington ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. Known to the Navy Department? 

[7339] Admiral Kimmel,. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. Will you say — I believe it is in the record in the 
form of an exhibit but I am not sure — what the main requirements 
of WPL-46 were? I am not asking for detail. I am asking for 
information. 

Admiral Kimmel. I think you will find that set forth beginning 
on page 11 of my statement. That is a copy of the basic war plan 
in WPL-46. 

Senator George. The statement that you made in the beginning of 
your testimony? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. WFLi-AQ. Would you mind saying now what 
your implementing order or plans in the main required ? 

Admiral Kimmel. My implementing plans in the main required 
the fleet to depart immediately after hostilities commenced to con- 
duct reconnaissance and air raids on the Marshalls. They had other 
supporting things to do, but that was the primary mission that we 
had in the Pacific Fleet at that particular time. 

Senator George. You say after hostilities commenced ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. Well, now, this directive was, "Execute an ap- 
propriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks 
assigned in WPL-46." 

[7-34,0] Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir, that is right. That is what 
I did. 

Senator George. And that has been detailed in your statement be- 
fore the committee ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir, in great detail, what I did and why I 
did it. 

Senator George. And that was your interpretation of your own 
order supplementing or implementing WPL— 16 which had been ap- 
proved here in the Naval Department ? • 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. And was understood here by Admiral Stark when 
he formulated or sent to you this message? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. I say "Admiral Stark." Whoever sent the mes- 
sage to you. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. Now, in the message of November 24 there was no 
specific direction to take any particular action, was there, addressed 
to you ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2713 

Admiral Kimmel. I think there was one there. There was one 
direction : 

Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation 
or precipitate Japanese action. 

That, I think, could be termed a "directive." 

[734^] Senator George. Had that appeared in any previous 
messag:e received by you from the Chief of Naval Operations? 

Admiral Kimmel. You mean the injunction as to secrecy? 

Senator George. The injunction as to secrecy. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir, I think so. 

Senator George. You think there had been previous messages? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. That carried the same injunction? 

Admiral Kimmel. In the one on October 16 this sentence occurs : 

In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including such 
preparatory deployment as will not disclose strategic intention, nor constitute 
provocative action against Japan. 

Senator George. Admiral, you probabl,y covered it in your general 
statement but you are more familiar with that statement than any 
member of the committee would be from having heard it or having 
read it. 

Admiral Kimmel, Yes, sir. 

Senator George. Did you have any knowledge prior to December 7 
of the answer made by the State Department on November 26^ 

Admiral Kimmel. No, sir. The only information I had on 
[7342] that subject I got from the newspapers. 

Senator George. You had nothing by way of letter or dispatch ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Not a word. 

Senator George. Did you have any information concerning the 
message from Tokyo to the Japanese to which the November 26 State 
Department document was a reply ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I did not know it existed. I did not know until 
I read the testimony of Mr. Hull before this committee that Mr. Hull 
considered that a Japanese ultimatum. I had no knowledge what- 
soever of that message, of that note. 

Senator George. And you had never seen any text of that message 
or of our State Department reply of November 26 

Admiral Kimmel. I had seen neither one, sir. 

Senator George (continuing). Prior to December 7? 

Admiral Kimmel. Prior to December 7. 

Senator George. Nor no summary of the contents ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No summary whatsoever. 

Senator George. Did you have any letter from Admiral Stark that 
gave you the contents of the November 26 reply of our State Depart- 
ment? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, sir ; I did not. 

Senator George. How long. Admiral, had your implementing plan, 
that is, carrying out WPL-46, how long had it been in the [7343] 
Navy Department and when was it approved ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That was approved on September — I will get 
the exact date. My plan WPAC-46 was approved by the Navy De- 
partment on September 9, 1941. 

Senator George. I believe I have no other questions, Admiral. 



2714 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas, of Illinois, will inquire, 
Admiral, 

Senator Lucas. Admiral Kimmel, you have told the committee that 
your appointment as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet in Jan- 
uary 1941 came as a complete surprise to you. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct, and it did. 

Senator Lucas. You so expressed yourself very forcibly along that 
line in a letter to Admiral Stark? 

Admiral Ivimmel. Immediately after I learned of my prospective 
appointment. 

Senator Lucas. You have told the committee in your statement that 
you first met the President of the United States in 1918. 

Admiral Kimmel. No, sir. If I told you any such thing as that it 
was in error. I did not intend to tell you any such thing as that. 
Would you like me to tell you when I first met him ? 

[7344] Senator Lucas. Yes, indeed, sir. 

Admiral Kimmel. In 1915 I was serving as fleet gunnery officer in 
the Pacific Fleet on the staff of Admiral Thomas B. Howard, who was 
then commander in chief. Mr. Marshall, who at that time was Vice 
President, and Mr. Roosevelt, who was Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy, came to San Francisco to open the San Francisco and San Diego 
expositions which were in celebration of the opening of the Panama 
Canal. 

Wallace Beathoff, a lieutenant from Admiral Howard's staff, was 
detailed as an aide for Mr. Marshall. I was detailed as an aide for 
Mr. Roosevelt. 

Senator Lucas. What was your rank at that time ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I was a lieutenant at that time. 

I traveled with Mr. Roosevelt to the San Francisco Exposition and 
from there I went with him to San Diego. I had a very pleasant time. 

Senator Lucas. How long were you with Mr. Roosevelt ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I was with him about 10 days. At the end of 
that time I went back to my duty as fleet gimnery officer of the Pacific 
Fleet. 

Subsequently, in 1916 I came to Washington on duty in the gunnery 
office of the Navy Department, what is now the Office of Fleet Train- 
ing. I saw Mr. Roosevelt, oh, three or four times during the time I 
was here, and in 1917 I went [734'5'\ over to the British Grand 
Fleet to take some gear that we had developed and subsequently I 
went on Admiral Rodman's staff as his gunnery officer in what became 
known as the Sixth Battle Squadron of the British Grand Fleet. 

In September, I think it was, of 1918 Mr. Roosevelt came over to 
visit this detachment and he was entertained at luncheon by Admiral 
Rodman, and I was present. I saw him then and I had no further con- 
versations with him until June of 1941, 6 months after I had been 
appointed commander in chief. 

To make the record complete, I did pass Mr. Roosevelt at the White 
House in a receiving line once or twice, but that is all. 

Senator Lucas. Well, the last time you saw him before you saw 
him in June 1941 

Admiral Kimmel. I did not understand you, sir. 

Senator Lucas. The last time you saw Mr. Roosevelt before you 
saw him in Juu'i 1041 was in 1918 in England ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2715 

Admiral Kimmel. In the harbor of Kosyth, which is near Edin- 
burgh in Scotland, 

Senator Lucas. Did you ever see him after that meeting in 1918 
until you saw him again in 1941 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Except when I saw him at a White House recep- 
tion ; no. 

Senator Lucas. You had no conversations with him during 
[7S46] all of those years or any communication, as I under- 
stand it ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

Senator Lucas. What State are you from, Admiral ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Kentucky. 

Senator Lucas. And when were you appointed to West Point ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I was appointed to the Naval Academy in 1900. 

Senator Lucas. The reason I made that mistake, I read somewhere 
that you origmally wanted to go to West Point. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

Senator Lucas. And finally landed in the Navy. 

Admiral Kimmel. My father was a West Pointer. He wanted me 
to go there. 

Senator Lucas. As a matter of curiosity, by whom were you ap- 

Admiral Kimmel. By Henry D. Allen. 
Senator Lucas. And was he a Congressman ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Congressman from the Second District of Ken- 
tucky. 

Senator Lucas. Do you know whether he was acquainted with the 
President or not ? 

ny^?in^^^ I^MMEL. I could not answer that question ; I do not know 
Kimme'l— '^^^^' ^^^^^- ^^^^' ^^ ^^^ ^'^^all, Admiral 

Admiral Ejmmel. At that time I was not. 

Senator Lucas. Do you recall, Admiral Kimmel, reading in the 
press or hearing it rumored about that you were such a close and inti- 
mate friend of the President that he jumped over 46 admirals who 
had more seniority and grade in order to give you this job? 

Admiral Kevimel. I read that many times. I thought if it was 
to be answered it should be answered by somebody else besides me 

Senator Lucas. Well, it was rumored around here at that time and 
rumors and gossip are pretty free around Washington and other 
places, that your appointment was purely a political one and only 
because you were a Democrat and because you were the President's 
aide at one time. 

Admiral Kimmel. I know those rumors; I mean I heard those 
rumors. I heard— well, I will pass it. 

Senator Lucas. Go ahead. 

Admiral Kimmel I will say it ; yes. I heard that the reason I was 
appointed commander m chief was because my wife was a niece of 
Senator Barkley, and my wife had never seen Senator Barklev 

Senator Lucas Well you know of the testimony before the com- 
mittee here by Admiral Stark and Admiral Richardson [73m 
who recommended you as one of the men to take charge of the Pacific 



2716 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Fleet in the event anything happened to Admiral Richardson; you 
know of that testimony ? . 

Admiral Kimmel. I have heard something of that kind; yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Well, it is obvious from the testimony of yourself 
and others that these statements and these rumors and this gossip 
that went around immediately following the disaster to Pearl Harbor 
were false and without any foundation in either fact or truth? 

Admiral Kimmel. They were misrepresentations and lies. 

Senator Lucas. Well, of course, I am talking about the general 
proposition that you were appointed solely for political reasons and 
because you were a Kentucky Democrat. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. You are entirely correct. 

Senator Lucas. Well, that lays another one of these false cannards 

on the shelf. ■ , • i 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. I am glad to have it laid. 

Senator Lucas. Admiral, on page, I believe it is 2° or 3, page 3 
probably, of your statement you stated : 

When I ussuuied command the decision to base the Fleet in the Hawaiian area 
was an historical fact. 

I presume you want the committee to understand by that statement 
that you were in no way responsible for having the [734^] 
fleet in Pearl Harbor when you took command ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I hadn't that particular thing in mind but it is 
a fact. I was not responsible. I had nothing to do with basing the 
fleet at Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Lucas. Before I leave the President, I would hke to go 
back and ask you one more question with respect to the conversation 
that you had with him in June 1941 when you returned from Hawaii 
to Washington to discuss the Pacific situation. As I recall, you had 
quite a lengthy conversation with the President. 

Admiral Kimmel. I did, yes, sir ; not very lengthy but, oh, maybe 

an hour. 

Senator Lucas. And one of the chief things that you discussed at 
that time with President Roosevelt was the decision that the Navy 
Department made to take from your fleet a division of battleships and 
cruisers and destroyers? 

Admiral Kimmel. I expressed myself as forcibly as I knew how 
on that subject. . 

Senator Lucas. Will you elaborate for the committee a little more 
as to what the President said in connection with that decision that 
was made by the Navy Department ? 

Admiral Kimmel. My best recollection is that I brought up the 
subject of the transfer of this detachment from the Pacific to the 
Atlantic and protested against it and the [7350] President 
said: 

Well, they told me that that could be done all right and you could defend the 
Pacific with this reduced Fleet. 

As nearly as I can recollect my reply I said, "That is ridiculous and 
nobody in his right mind could" ever make such a statement as that." 
"WelV' he said, "that is what I thought, too," and that ended it. He 
was convinced. I did not press it any further. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2717 

Senator Lucas. Well, after that conversation there was no further 
discussion or any attempt to move this division of battleships and 
cruisers and destroyers? 

Admiral Kimmel. It remained in the Pacific. 

Senator Lucas. Yes, sir. AVho do you mean by "they" ? 

Admiral Kimmel. "It," I said. 

Senator Lucas. Oh, yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. The division of battleships remained in the Pa- 
cific and the rest of the ships they had contemplated taking. My 
recollection is that at that time they contemplated taking three battle- 
ships, an aircraft carrier, another detachment of cruisers and a couple 
squadrons of destroyers. The proposal never became absolutely con- 
crete but that is as nearly as I can recollect what the proposal was. 

Senator Lucas. All right. Now, Admiral, I want to talk with you 
about another statement that you made in your 

[7351] Mr. Keefe. Will the gentleman yield right at that point? 

Senator Lucas. Yes ; I will yield. Congressman. 

Mr. Keefe. You asked what the admiral meant when he used the 
word "they." Now, in his subsequent answer he has used it several 
times, "they wanted to divert certain parts of the Pacific Fleet." 

Senator Lucas. Yes. AVho do you mean by "they" when you are 
speaking "they wanted to divert"? Are you talking about 

Admiral Kimmel. He did not say they wanted to divert. I said 
lie said they had told him. 

Senator Lucas. Who are "they" ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I presume he must have meant some ofR- 
uals of the Navy Department or perhaps some of his Cabinet. He did 
not elaborate. 

Senator Lucas. I see. Now, returning to your statement that you 
made before the committee you said : 

My appointment was in no wise contingent upon any acquiescence upon ray 
part in the decision already made many months before to keep the Fleet in the 
Hawaiian waters. 

Will you elaborate just a little on that for me ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I meant that nobody said to me that, "I will 
appoint you if you keep the fleet in the Hawaiian waters," \7352'\ 
or any such thing; nothing of any description. There were no con- 
ditions attached to my appointment as command in chief. 

Senator Lucas. Admiral, in your testimony before the Roberts 
Commission the question was asked there as to why the fleet was — 
or rather the discussion was had before that committee about the fleet 
being in the Hawaiian waters. There had been some discussion of 
that between Admiral Richardson and the President previous to the 
time that he was relieved of his command. 

Now, on page 565 of the Roberts' testimony, which is in that bound 
volume there — what is the number of that exhibit? 

Mr. Masten. That is not an exhibit, sir. 

Senator Lucas. In that bound book, on page 565, you made this 
statement after discussions off the record : 

Admiral Kimmex. Why the Fleet is in Hawaiian waters? All the senior 
oflacers of the Navy have recognized the increased possibility of a surprise at- 
tack against the Fleet when the Fleet is operating and based in the Hawaiian 
waters. These facts were forcibly brought to the attention of the authorities in 
79716 — 46— pt. 6 16 



2718 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Washington by my predecessor, Admiral Richardson, in answer to a letter from 
the Chief of Naval Operations under date of May 27th reading as follows 

[73S3] and then you proceeded to give the committee what you 
believed to be the essence of that letter. 

Have you ever had an opportunity to examine Richardson's letter 
since that time? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, I think I have; yes. 

Senator Lucas. It is not quite in accord with the statement you 
made there, is it? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is true, it is not. 

Senator Lucas. In other words. Admiral Richardson at that time 
Avanted to move the fleet back to the Pacific coast for a number of 
reasons ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is true ; you are quite right. 

Senator Lucas. But the security of the fleet was not involved in any 
of those reasons? 

Admiral Kimmel. It was not in his written letter. 

Senator Lucas. That is what I am talking about. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

Senator Lucas. In other words, he talked about 

Admiral Kimmel, That is my recollection at least. 

Senator Lucas. Well, that is correct and I wanted to call your 
attention to that statement. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Senator Lucas. Because you were apparently in error there in 
assuming what you did before the committee and I take it [7S54'\ 
because of your lack of the actual knowledge as to what was in that 
letter. 

Admiral Kimmel. At the time I was speaking from memory. 

Senator Lucas. Yes, sir. Now, on the next page of that same docu- 
ment, admiral, you state : 

Now, those same conditions obtained up to the time of the attack here on the 
7th. I knew that the Navy Department and the administration in Washington 
insisted on keeping the Fleet out there. I knew the vulnerability of the 
Fleet here. I thought that was appreciated by the Navy Department as well as 
by me but it was one of the things that I felt it was beyond my power to change. 

You recall, of course, making that statement, I presume, before 
the Roberts Commission? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Senator Lucas. Do you care to make any further explanation of 
that statement at this time, Admiral? 

Admiral Kimmel. In all of my time as commander in chief this 
particular thing was before me and I did all in my power to remedy 
it and the thing that would have helped me most and the thing which 
I time and again tried to impress on the Navy Department was that 
what I needed out there was information ; I needed the information 
upon which to base my actions and if I had had the information 
which was — I recognized the vulner- [7SSo] ability of the fleet 
largely due to the fact that we had only one base and to the limita- 
tions of fuel and other things, which I have gone into here and 
what I hoped and believed that the information would come to us 
in time to at least alleviate the situation. 

Senator Lucas. Well, I presume you did not discuss the question 
of the vulnerability of the fleet in Pearl Harbor when you came back 
here in June 1941? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2719 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes; I discussed that. 

Senator Lucas. With whom did you discuss that ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I discussed it with the Chief of Naval Operations, 
with the Secretary, and I had some conversation with the President 
about it. I just pointed out the situation which he was fully cognizant 
of before I told him about it, and I accepted the risks. You cannot 
be safe; but I did not anticipate what happened by any means. 

Senator Lucas. Well, at least you stated before the Roberts Com- 
mission and you so state now that you knew of the vulnerability of 
the fleet in Pearl Harbor as a result of what was transpiring between 
the United States and Japan at that time ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I knew of the vulnerability of the fleet in Pearl 
Harbor as to the physical location of the fleet, the physical environ- 
ment, and I did everything 1 could to remedy [7356] that 
situation. 

Senator Lucas. Admiral, you have spent considerable time in ex- 
plaining to the committee that the fleet was handicapped through lack 
of trained men. You said you could not spare qualified officers with- 
out assuming an enormous risk. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. I take it you were making that statement based 
upon the fact that if the fleet remained intact you wanted qualified 
trained men to fight either a defensive or an offensive war. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes; I wanted a trained fleet ready to fight. 

Senator Lucas. And you wanted the complements completed on 
every ship ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. Now, in this situation I pointed out, I 
thought, as clearly and as forcefully as I knew how, certainly as 
clearly and as forcefully as I knew how and I think plainly, what the 
situation was in the fleet and when the decisions were made here I 
accepted them and went ahead to do the best I could do, but it was 
my duty to point these things out. That I did. There was one phase 
that I was particularly insistent on and that was that — and I never 
could quite understand why we were unable to — why they were unable 
to keep the numbers in the fleet up, not the trained [7357] men, 
you see, but the numbers and we never had the complements that we 
considered necessary. Now, that is not a question of trained men. 
That is a question of numbers of green, of good material, you see. 

Senator Lucas. You stated that you had a number of men on those 
ships who had never fired a shot in their life; is that right? 

Admiral Kimmell. From time to time, yes ; and that was the com- 
I)elling reason why I had to maintain this training program. 

Senator Lucas. Let me ask you, Admiral, how many men did you 
have on the battleships that were struck at Pearl Harbor on the morn- 
ing of the 7th of December, roughly, if you cannot give the exact 
figures ? 

Admiral Kimmel. The numbers? 

Admiral Kimmel. Anything I can give you would be a 

Senator Lucas. I think it is probably in the record. 

Admiral Kimmel. I think you can find that. I would prefer not to 
because I might be wide of the mark. 



2720 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Sentor Lucas. Well, how near were the battleships and other ships 
that were struck in Pearl Harbor on December the 7th up to the com- 
plement that you desired ; what percentage ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, unless I knew the numbers and the com- 
plement I could not very well tell you that, but if what you [7S581 
are driving at is that we had sufficient men to man the ships under 
the conditions of repelling an attack at anchor in Pearl Harbor, we did 
have a sufficient number. We had a sufficient number to man the guns 
there at that time, but that was not the object of my setting this lack 
of men forth. 

Senator Lucas. I understand. 

Admiral Kimmel. If we had had trained crews, the cost of going 
from a training status to an all-out security status would have been 
much less. Now, once you get a trained fleet you do not have much 
to do to keep them polished up. Do you understand, sir? 

[7359] Senator Lucas. I understand. 

You had a sutHcient number of men on these battleships and other 
ships that were in the harbor to take care of them and repel the attack 
that was made. What you did not have was a sufficient number of 
men for an all-out, over-all training which would have been necessary 
in the event you had to go on the offensive at sea. 

Adimiral Kimmel. That is right. In that connection I would like 
to point out we did not have spare patrol plane crews out there, and 
we had been using our utmost endeavors to get spare patrol plane 
crews. 

At the time, as I pointed out, we were required to supply the main- 
land, for distribution to other places, 12 patrol plane crews per month. 
So we were never able to catch up, to get the screws for the navel 
patrol planes. 

The same thing obtained in the case of submarines. What we en- 
deavored to do was to get the spare crews for submarines, and those 
were the two services that were arduous, and the submarine was a 
very arduous service. 

Senator Lucas. As I recall, you made a request from the Chief of 
Naval Operations for an additional 9,000 or 10,000 men. 

Admiral Ki3imel. No, I did not make the request. I informed him 
that the fleet was 9,000 men short of comple [7M0] ment, and 
we could use an additional 10,000. 

When I used the term "10,000," I had in mind filling up all of the 
training activities on shore, on the island of Oahu, and these patrol 
plane crews, the submarine crews, and what not. 

Senator Lucas. Let me ask you this: If those men had been fur- 
nished to you, is it a reasonable assumption that more men would have 
been lost at Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Kimmel. I do not think so. 

Senator Lucas. Your battleships would have been filled, would they 
not, with a complete complement on the morning of the attack? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, they might have had a few more men there. 
I do not see how you can arrive at the conclusion that more men would 
have been lost. 

Senator Lucas. Well, the more men you had on these battleships 
and other ships that went down, the more men you would probably 
have lost. That is the point I am assuming. It may be an unwar- 
ranted assumption, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2721 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, it is a reasonable assumption if you lose a 
certain percentage of your men, and you increase the number of men 
and still lose the same percentage, why. you would lose more men. 

Senator Lucas. The point I am making is, if you had [7S61^ 
had the 9,000 or 10,000 men that you thought were necessary, it would 
have been no aid to the defense of the harljor on that particular morn- 

Admiral Kimmel. Under those particular circumstances, I told you, 
sir, that they had ample men to man the guns and to use all the offen- 
sive power they could inside of Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Lucas. And any additional men would not have affected the 
case one way or the other? 

Admiral Kimmel. On that particular morning. It might have af- 
fected many other things. 

Senator Lucas. That is the reason we are here, because of that par- 
ticular morning. 

Admiral Kimmel. How is that ? 

Senator Lucas. That is the reason we are here, because of that par- 
ticular morning on December 7. That is what we are talking about. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. Admiral Kimmel, Senator Barkley is not quite clear, 
and perhaps I did not make it clear myself, with respect to the number 
of men that you requested, or that 3^ou said you could use. Was it 
10,000 in addition to the 9,000, or wa's it the total of 10.000?. 

Admiral Kimmel. The total of 19,000. 

[7362] Senator Lucas. Total of 19,000 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. I was not clear on that myself. Thank you, Sena- 
tor Barkley. 

Now, Admiral, in this statement that you made before the commit- 
tee, which is a very powerful statement, j^ou told the committee you 
recognized the Pacific Fleet was inferior to the Japanese Fleet in 
every category of fighting ships. 

Admiral Kimmel. I think that is an accurate statement. 

Senator Lucas. That would be true if you wanted to consider it ship 
by ship and tonnage by tonnage ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Senator Lucas. We demonstrated, after the war started, that we 
were inferior many times in tonnage to the Japanese Fleet, but we 
went on and were successful, and victorious over them. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Senator Lucas. So it is not always a question of tonnage versus 
tonnage. 

Admiral Kimmel. By no means. You are quite right. 

Senator Lucas. Now, you also stated that the ships that you had 
were deficient in antiaircraft weapons. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

[7S63] Senator Lucas. And you have also told us that in April 
1941, when the 3 battleships and 1 aircraft carrier and 4 cruisers and 
18 destroyers were detached from the Pacific Fleet and sent to the 
Atlantic. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

Senator Lucas. Now, let me ask you this question. 



2722 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

You appreciated the vulnerability of the fleet in Pearl Harbor. 
You have told us these three thino:s. and many others. 

Did these facts showing the inadequacy of manpower, the inade- 
quacy of ships, planes, shortage in antiaircraft guns, all of these things 
cause you to use more diligence in providing measures for the fleet's 
protection from submarine or air attack? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I did everything I could to bring the fleet 
up to fighting efficiency. 

Senator Lucas. You were conscious, of course, of these things, as 
you expressed, from time to time? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, of course I was. 

Senator Lucas. And it seemed to me that as a result of your knowl- 
edge of the situation, and your letters to and from the Chief of Naval 
Operations, that it demanded more diligence and more vigilence on 
your part, and I presume you did do that very thing. 

[7S64] Admiral Kimmel. I did. 

Senator Lucas. Let me ask you this question. You have detailed 
to great extent in your statement before the committee these different 
shortages. Do you use the inferiority of the fleet, the shortage in 
planes, ships, tankers and other equipment as a part of your defense 
for what happened at Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, and particularly the mobility of the fleet. 

Senator Lucas. It seems to me that these factors of wealaiess stand- 
ing alone should have made you and your command more sensitive, 
and more wide awake to any kind of attack, including a surprise 
attack at Pearl Harbor. 

Admiral Kimmel. I did everything that I felt I could possibly do. 
You noted the shortages in the fleet. The most critical shortage 
was in planes, long-range reconnaissance planes, and long-range at- 
tack planes. That was the thing that I had stressed over and over 
again. 

Senator Lucas. Do you recall now how many long-range recon- 
naissance planes on the morning of December 7 that were ready to 
make the search ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think we could have mustered, according to 
Admiral Bellinger — I think his figures were 49. They might have 
been supplemented by 6 B-17 Army bombers, and that was all. 

[7365] Senator Lucas. Do you recall now when the last tune 
was that you used any of these planes for search, reconnaissance work 
on any wide-scale basis ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I used them for search in reconnaissance 
work in the week immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, covering 
the advance of the ships which were going to Wake and Midway. 
There were reconnaissances made as part of the training on several 
days of the week of December 6. That is in the statement, I think. 
They were in the north and northwest sector, or in the northwest 
sector. 

Senator Lucas. But you had no regular schedule of reconnaissance 
going out from the Island of Oahu from November 27 to December 6? 

Admiral Kimmel. No ; I did not. 

Senator Lucas. Or December 7 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No. I could not maintain that reconnaissance, 
except for a very short time, and I think that is very well set forth 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2723 

in the statement and in the testimony of the people who knew the 
condition of the planes at the time, and I knew the condition of the 
planes at the time myself. 

Senator Lucas. Under the joint plans that you had agreed to with 
General Short it was your duty to maintain an air patrol against 
enemy forces in the approaches of Oahu ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. And in that same [7366] 
estimate you will find a statement that with the forces available we 
could do that only when an attack was known, within narrow limits, 
known to be probable within narrow limits. 

Senator Lucas. Well, do you recall. Admiral, when you were there 
in 1940, when Admiral Richardson was in command, that he had such 
research planes going under an alert order that was issued by the 
Chief of Naval Operations in Washington? 

Admiral Kimmel. He never had any search under the orders of the 
Chief of Naval Operations, except the search which he conducted in 
response to the alert sent out by General Marshall in June of 1940. 
He had, for training purposes, a search made up to a distance of 180 
miles, in a sketchy kind of search, and that was to carry out the 
maneuver basis under which we were operating at that time. 

He has so testified. 

Senator Lucas. I see. 

Admiral Kimmel. When the alert, the order from General Marshall 
came out to General Herron, they increased that reconnaissance to 300 
miles. At no time did they have, in my opinion, any real reconnais- 
sance flying from Pearl Harbor that would have been successful, ex- 
cept by chance, in discovering an attack in time to be of any real use. 

Senator Lucas. Well, at least they carried out the [7637] 
order and made the attempt to do reconnaissance work in 1940, did 
they not ? Wliether it amounted to anything or not, they did attempt 
that reconnaissance work ? 

Admiral Kimmel. They attempted that reconnaissance work be- 
cause they were told to be alerted, or take an alert against an overseas 
raid, and they continued as long as that order was in effect, and to them 
that meant that an attack was imminent, an overseas raid on Hawaii 
was imminent, and had I received such an order later I would have 
used every means at my command to cover whatever I could cover. 

Even at this time they had a reconnaissance out to a distance of 300 
miles in only a partial sector. 

Senator Lucas. You do not believe that the war warning message 
sent to you on November 27, in which there was the request that you 
use the appropriate necessary defensive deployment, directed you to 
do any reconnaissance work? 

Admiral Kimmel. Not specifically ; no. They told me to take an ap- 
propriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks 
assigned in WPL-46, and that I did. 

Now the Navy Department should have known, and did know beyond 
doubt, that I had no means to conduct a search over a considerable 
period. 

Senator Lucas. I agree with you. 

Admiral Kimmel. Now I might have made a token search [7368] 
and I might have been able to come here and say I made a token search, 
it was not worth anything but I made it, and therefore I am all right. 



2724 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I did not do that. I have never done that kind of thing, and I will 
not do it. 

Senator Lucas. Not even though you were commanded to do it ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I will not do anything that I consider futile and 
expending effort unnecessarily. 

Senator Lucas. Did you consider it futile and expending effort un- 
necessarily in the summer of 1940 when they did carry on that recon- 
naissance work ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I think it was ineffective. They had an 
order to do it and they did the best they could. That was a direct 
order. 

Senator Lucas. Yes, I understand. Did you consider the command 
that was given to General Short by General Marshall, in which he 
definitely requested reconnaissance, a part of your command ? 

Admiral Kimmel. My recollection — I have not seen that dispatch 
for some time — is that was to make such reconnaissance as may be 
practicable. I think that was the term that was used. 

Senator Lucas. I have forgotten the exact wording of it, sir. 

Army has sent following to Commander Western Defense [7869] Com- 
mand quote negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical 
purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might 
come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hos- 
tile action possible at any moment. 

You saw this message, did you not ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes ; I saw that message. 

Senator Lucas. You discussed it with General Short at the time? 

Admiral Kimmel. How's that? 

Senator Lucas. Did you discuss it with General Short at the time ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. 

Senator Lucas (reading) : 

If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States 
desires that Japan commit the first overt act. Tliis policy should not comma 
repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might 
jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to 
undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but 
these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm 
civil population, 

and so forth. 

Now you do not consider that message which came from Marshall, 
which talked about reconnaissance and which under [7370] the 
joint agreement was your duty, you did not consider it was your duty to 
start a lengthy search at sea for any hostile enemy? 

Admiral Kimmel. I did not. I would like to call your attention at 
this time to the fact that on the 29th I received this same dispatch 
from the Chief of Naval Operations, which he sent for action to the 
commander of the Pacific northern naval coastal frontier and Pacific 
southern naval coastal frontier, and in it it says, "Army has sent fol- 
lowing to commander, western defense connnand." Now that meant 
to me that the Puget Sound area and the San Francisco area were 
placed in the same category by General Marshall as the Hawaiian 
area. 

Senator Lucas. I made a slight mistake in reading to you, Admiral, 
the message that went from the Chief of Naval Operations to the 
commanders on the western coast. I would like to have the record 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2725 

corrected so it shows it was the message of the 27th from General 
Marshall to the commanding general, Hawaiian department. The 
language is practically the same, so I will not go over it again. 

Senator Brewster. Does the Senator yield ? 

Senator Lucas. Yes. 

Senator Brewster. Should it not appear in the record at this time 
that on the following day, November 28, Admiral [7371] Kim- 
mel received a copy of this Army wire containing additional instruc- 
tions regarding his activities? I assume that wire or the radio of 
November 28 is in the record, but that does contain the complete Army 
order. 

Senator Lucas. That is right. 

Senator Brewster. Then it contains additional instructions appar- 
ently for the information of Admiral Kimmel. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir ; that is right. I think that was the 29th, 
not the 28th. 

Senator Brewster. The one we have says November 28. 

Senator Ferguson. I think he received it the 29th. 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. 

Senator Brewster. The last part, after the "XX." 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Senator Brewster. It apparently contains additional instructions 
for your command. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir, that is right. 

Senator Lucas. Well, developing the point that has been made 
here by the Senator from Maine, do you recall those additional instruc- 
tions that you received and whether or not they changed in any way 
the instructions you received on November 27 and November 28 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. The additional instructions which I received 
from the Chief of Naval Operations in this message [7372] 
were WPL-52, the end of the quote, you see, just before this, and then 
the Chief of Naval Operations went on on his own : 

WPL-52 is not applicable to Pacific area and will not be placed in effect in that 
area except as now in force in Southeast Pacific sub-area and Panama Naval 
Coastal Frontier. - 

Now that applied to the shooting orders which were in effect in the 
Atlantic and in the Southeast Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier. 
Now in addition it says : 

Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act. Be 
prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL-46 as far as they apply to Japan 
in case hostilities occur. 

Now in the first place, they told me that no shooting orders were 
to be issued in the Pacific, and to undertake no offensive action until 
Japan has committed an overt act. 

Senator Lucas. That is what I was going to say. Li other words, 
in the message of General Marshall to General Short which you dis- 
cussed with General Short, it definitely said that Japan had to com- 
mit the first overt act before you could start in shooting. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

[7373] Senator Lucas. This does not change that phase of it 
very much, does it? 



2726 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Kimmel. It does not change that phase of it very much, 
but those orders were first issued to General Short and I would have 
thought they applied to me without this message. 

Senator Lucas. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Kimmel. But with this message, any doubt I may have 
had was dispelled because the Chief of Naval Operations said, for 
my information, 

Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act — 

and again repeated — 

be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL-46 so far as they apply to 
Japan in case hostilities occur. 

Senator Lucas. Incidentally, those additional messages kept talk- 
ing about the serious danger with Japan, and when they told you not 
to commit the first overt act, it was a pretty fair indication that war 
was prett}^ close at hand, was it not ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Not entirely, because I interpreted their ad- 
monition not to make an overt act as still a desire on the part of my 
Government to avoid hostilities with Japan. 

Senator Lucas. In other words, you construe that message to be, 
notwithstanding all of these messages that you [7374] received 
in the past, that not to commit an overt act meant that we were still 
trying to retain peace with Japan ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Not to upset the applecart. 

Senator Lucas. They upset it for us. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir; very definitely. I think they were 
finally upset, though. 

Senator Lucas. Yes ; they were. Admiral. We all agree on that. 

I want, Mr. Chairman, to read into the record just briefly at this 
point a memorandum or two dealing with reconnaissance that was used 
in 1940 when Admiral Richardson and General Herron were in com- 
mand out there. 

Let me ask you this, Admiral : Do you recall how many planes were 
being used for reconnaissance by the Army in Hawaii in 1940? 

Admiral Kimmel. I have no figures on that. 

Senator Lucas. Now, on July 1, Mr. Chairman, General Herron 
sent to the Chief of Staff in Washington this message : 

Alert on two weeks today. All quiet locally, no ill effect on command except 
cumulative hours on plane engines and impaired overhaul facilities due to move 
from Ford Island. 

On July 8, another message from General Herron : 

[7375] Three weeks of alert completed today with no unfavorable reaction 
on personnel but a good deal of wear on motor transportation. No developments 
in local situation. 

On July 10, General Strong sent this to General Marshall — or Gen- 
eral Strong, on the advice of General Marshall, sent this to Herron : 

The Secretary of War directs that the following radiogi-am in the Chief of 
Staff's secret code be dispatched to the Commanding General Hawaiian 
Department : 

"Your five July 8. Can you not avoid undue wear on motor transportation 
by putting present alert stations on a permanent basis without unfavorable 
reaction on convenience or morale of personnel? If this meets your approval, 
submit an estimate for the necessary construction of temporary type — " 

And so forth. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2727 

On July 15, 1940, another message from General Herron to the 
Chief of Staff: 

Alert entering fifth week. As now conducted, it is without undue strain on 
personnel or materiel including motors. New construction unnecessary. Navy 
continues cooperation by outer aerial patrol. 

Finally, Marshall advises Herron on July 16 : 

You are authorized, at your discretion, to relax [1376] alert provisions 
except that first, precautions against sabotage will be continued on the basis 
of instant readiness, and second aerial patrol measures can be reduced to a 
training status, but so arranged as to be reestablished on an alert liasis on 
short notice. 

Now, General Herron wrote a letter on August 21, 1940, to General 
Marshall, in which he said, on the question of alert, the following : 

Tlie alert has now been on two months. The only present measurable loss 
is in the weathering of the hundreds ol: miles of field wire in place, largely for 
anti-aircraft purposes, but that is probably worthwhile. 

This is all in Exhibit 52, from which I am reading. 
On September 6, General Herron wrote to General Marshall the 
following : 

Dei\r Geobge: Your note of August 2Sth has just reached me here, where I have 
come to collect my wits and obtain a little perspective. Wish you could do 
the same ! 

My absolutely frank and honest opinion is that "the alert" as now carried on 
here, does not dull the keen edge, or exhaust morale. I think that our real 
power accumulates and that the season of individual target practice and instruc- 
tions is about [7377] over, the maneuvers of numerous small units camped 
along the beaches will build up naturally and easily the effectiveness of the alert. 

I would like also, Mr. Chairman, at this point to call attention to 
page 4462 of the record, in which the Navy Department 

The Vice Chairman. The record in this hearing ? 

Senator Lucas. The record in this hearing, in which the Navy De- 
partment furnished the Senator from Illinois the number of planes 
that were attached to the Pacific Fleet in 1940 and 1941, that were 
capable of running a long-distance reconnaissance. 

In that tabulation without going into the number of planes that 
they had, I direct the committee s attention to this one fact : In addition 
to whatever Army planes were doing search work at that time, and 
apparently they were, under the letter that I have read into the record 
here sent by General Herron to General Marshall, Admiral Richardson 
also had out security patrol from Barber's Point as of June 30, 1940, in 
a 300-mile circle, 180° running north and south in a circle that went to 
the northwest and south from that point. 

Now, it is true that he only had six patrol planes that were in 
operation, and each plane each day covered a total [7378'] dis- 
tance of 922 miles, and one as far north from Barber's Point as 226 
miles, and that far west. I merely bring that to the attention of the 
committee because I believe it is pertinent to this inquiry. 

Now, Admiral, I do not suppose you care to make any comment on 
what I have read into the recc»-d ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I presume what you read is perfectly accurate. 

Senator Lucas. Let me ask you whether or not you knew on Decem- 
ber 5 and 6 

Admiral Kimmel (interposing). There is one thing I might say. 
I do not know whether it is of any importance, but Admiral Richard- 
son, prior to the time I took command, discontinued any patrols he had 



2728 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

out except the patrol over the operating area, and that I continued 
in effect. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. I understand that. The order of alert had 
practically ceased. 

Admiral Kjmmel. That is right. 

Senator Lucas. The long-distance search was discontinued after the 
alert was more or less called off ? 

Admiral Kimmel. The 300-mile search was discontinued. 

Senator Lucas. They did carry on that search for a number of 
weeks ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, 

[7379] Senator Lucas. For whatever good it was ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, you can always carry on a search as long 
as you have one plane. 

[7oS0] Senator Lucas. Let me ask you this question : What is a 
dawn patrol ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, we started these searches of the operating 
areas near dawn and that was the dawn patrol. It went out a distance, 
oh, I think, about 300 miles. 

Senator Lucas. What time would they leave in the morning? 

Admiral Kimmel. Just about dawn ; depending upon the season of 
the year. 

Senator Lucas, Did you have such a dawn patrol in operation at any 
time during the first week in December there ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. 

Senator Lucas. Was it operating on the Gth and on the 7th ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. In what direction ? 

Admiral Kimmel. The southern although over the operating areas 
which we considered it necessary to search. 

Senator Lucas. But there were no long distance reconnaissance 
planes, such as have been testified to here two or three times, either on 
the 6th or the 7th ? 

Admiral Kimmel. They went out the 300 miles, and you have fre- 
quently referred to this patrol that Admiral Richardson and General 
Herron established, as a long-distance patrol, and that was to 300 miles 

Senator Lucas. Let me ask you, how many reconnaissance 
[7S81] planes were operating on the search on the morning of the 
6th and the morning of the 7th ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I haven't those exact figures, but I think about 
five or six, and in addition on the morning of the 7th I recall there 
were several patrol planes out operating with the submarines. 

The Chairman. The Chair announces that the hour of 12 has ar- 
rived. In view of pending matters in the Senate some members of 
the committee from the Senate have indicated that they would like 
to be on the floor from 12 on. 

In view of that the committee will recess here until 2 o'clock . 

(Whereupon, at 12: 03 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the 
same day,) 

[7382] afternoon session — 2 p. m. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 
Senator Lucas, will you proceed with the examination of the 
Admiral. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2729 

TESTIMONY OF KEAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES 
NAVY (Retired)— Resumed 

Senator Lucas. Admiral Kimmel, before the recess for lunch we 
were discussing the question of reconnaissance by Army and Navy 
planes in and about Pearl Harbor the week preceding the attack. 

I should like to ask you whether or not you had any conversations 
with General Short following the receipt of the war warning message 
on November 27 with respect to long-range reconnaissance to be car- 
ried on by the Navy ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I presume I discussed that with General Short. 
If you ask me specifically what I said to him and what he said to me, 
I could not answer you. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. You must understand, sir, that we had had an 
agreement over a considerable period of time and that agreement, 
and the limitations of the agreement, were perfectly well-known to 
General Short and to me, and the point in that was that we were 
not going to institute a long-range reconnaissance until such time 
as we knew, within narrow time [?'3S3~\ limits, the time that 
the attack was to be expected. 

Senator Lucas. Was that contained in the agreement, with respect 
to the narrow limit of the time ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, that was stated in the estimate of the situa- 
tion, which might be termed a part of the agreement; yes. It was a 
question of forces that we had available, and until the number of 
planes was, we will say, multiplied by about 4, we would be unable to 
conduct any long-range reconnaissance over a long period of time. 

In connection with all this patrol affair I would like to invite your 
attention to the fact that on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and 
Thursday of the week preceding the attack we did, in fact, send out 
patrol planes in the northwestern sector to a distance of about 400 
miles. After that time these patrol planes required overhaul and up- 
keep, and they were taken in for that purpose. 

I stated in my statement that these were new planes, 54, as I recall 
the number, and all of them had been supplied to us within the month 
preceding the attack. 

These new planes were experiencing shake-down difficulties. They 
had no spare parts. They had some trouble with broken engine sec- 
tions, and there were certain alterations required in the planes before 
they were fully ready for war service. 

Those alterations had not been completed by December 7. [7384] 
When we got these new planes we sent back the planes which we had 
out there, and these planes relieved them. 

Now reverting again to Richardson's patrol, which we touched on 
here this morning. In 1940, June of 1940, General Herron received 
this order from the Chief of Staff to alert his command against an 
overseas raid, or words to that effect. Of course that was a specific 
order and Richardson was asked to cooperate in this. Richardson had 
no other orders except to cooperate against an overseas raid. 

Naturally he used every facility he had to do the best he could with 
it. My orders were very different. My orders were to take a defensive 
deployment preparatory to carrying out the raids in the Marshalls. 



2730 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Richardson's orders at that time, or General Herron's orders, had no 
implications and nothing in his orders beyond conducting a recon- 
naissance. 

I just wanted to ])oint that out, and I think that makes considerable 
difference. 

[7S8S] Senator Lucas. That may be true. Admiral. As I un- 
derstood you to say this morning, on the question of an appropriate 
defensive deployment, it did not necessarily mean, in your opinion at 
that time, that you should use these planes for reconnaissance and 
search ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, sir. I might say that the "appropriate de- 
fensive deployment," and "defensive deployment" used in that letter, 
I mean that "dispatch, Avas a strategic matter, not a tactical matter. 
It was a strategic defensive deployment — I mean our understanding 
was — and that was primarily to make sure that when we deployed 
tlie fleet, or put them in any position that they would not take on an 
offensive character or anything that the Japanese could consider as 
offensive. 

That, coupled, with the other admonitions that I had about doing 
nothing, to commit no overt act or anything that could be construed 
as such, meant, in other words, that I was not to go down to the Mar- 
shalls and sit right on them right away. 

Senator Lucas. Now, when this war-warning message came on 
November 27, did you discuss the question of long-range reconnais- 
sance with the key officers of the fleet ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, I am quite sure I did. We discussed that 
so many times, and our policies were so well [7386] known, 
that very little discussion was required. We had gone up and down 
this scale dozens of times. We knew what we could do. 

Senator Lucas. Did you discuss that with General Short ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I could not say I did, specifically ; no. 

Senator Lucas. In the hearings before the Roberts Commission, the 
chairman of that commission asked General Short this question : 

When you had your discussion, sir, from November 27 to December 7, with 
the Navy commanders, v^ere you informed of what scouting forces they had out? 

General Short. No, sir. I usually knew they had task forces out. They usu- 
ally talked about it. 

The Chairman. There was no discussion about increasing the patrol? 

General Shoet. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Was there any call upon you for additional planes? 

General Short. No. There was no time when we refused planes to them. 
They understood perfectly well they would be made available if necessary, if 
we had them. 

Now, at any time, did you call on General Short for planes to carry 
on any long-range reconnaissance ? 

[7M7~\ Admiral Kimmel. Not during that period. Further- 
more, I reported to the Chief of Naval Operations, in a dispatch of the 
28th of November, I think it was that there were just six Army B-17 
bombers that were in operating condition on the island of Oahu at the 
time, and those were the only planes that General Short had which 
were suitable for long-range reconnaissance, and I knew it. 

Mr. MuKPHY. Will the gentleman yield? 

Admiral Kimmel (continuing). And, furthermore, I might add at 
this time that Admiral Bellinger received a daily report on the avail- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2731 

ability of planes from General Martin, and General Martin received a 
daily report of availability of planes from Admiral Bellinger, and I 
was kept reasonably well informed of the status of the planes. 

I do not mean in detail, but in general. 

[7388] Senator Lucas. Did the Congressman want to say some- 
thing? 

Mr. Murphy. My impression was that you were going to send them 
away from Oahu entirely. 

Admiral Kimmel. What is that, sir? 

Mr. Murphy. Wasn't there a communication that you were going to 
send the 12 B-l7's away from Oahu, but only 6 were in condition to 
run? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, it came up, to be sure, in connection with our 
plans to use the B-17 bombers if and when they became available on 
the island of Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Wake; and we had 
hoped to get those B-17's out there to augment our forces, particularly 
we were hopin,g to be able to get some B-lT's to operate from Wake to 
make the reconnaissance of the Marshall Islands. 

The B-17's were very much faster, had a higher ceiling, and were in 
every way more suitable for reconnaissance than were the patrol 
planes. 

It is quite true that this report was made in connection with that. 
Nevertheless, what I was trying to point out was my knowledge of the 
B-l7's at the time and the fact that the Navy Department had that 
same knowledge available. 

Senator Lucas. Admiral Kimmel, leaving the recon- [7389] 
naissance for a moment, I take it it goes without saying that you knew 
that Pearl Harbor was our most important outpost in the Pacific ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. You also knew that Pearl Harbor and the fleet was 
the hub of our Pacific strategy ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And you knew that the fleet was the most important 
cog in our defensive and offensive war machine in the Pacific ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir ; I think that is true. 

Senator Lucas. And you also knew that it was the greatest single 
factor in the protection of our possessions as well as the United 
States? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir; and I was planning to so use them as 
rapidly as I could. 

Senator Lucas. Now, you went into command of the Pacific Fleet 
in February 1941 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. February 1, 1941. 

Senator Lucas. February 1, 1941, with that thorough knowledge 
and understanding? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. I had had that full knowledge and 
understanding for a long time before I became commander in chief. 

[7300] Senator Lucas. As commander in chief of the Pacific 
Fleet, it was your sole responsibility to take every precautionary meas- 
ure under all circumstances to properly protect that fleet ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That I did. 

Senator Lucas. You were commander of the fleet long enough to 
know and properly evaluate the fleet's strength and its possibilities 
both on the offensive and defensive ? 



2732 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir; and I found that strength leaving much 
to be desired. 

Senator Lucas. With all of these facts, Admiral, admitted, do you 
want the committee to understand that every consideration was given 
the fleet, that the fleet had received every consideration at your hands 
when naval strategy was being discussed, from November 27 to De- 
cember 7, 1941 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. Not only from November 27 to De- 
cember 7, but from the time I became commander in chief and long 
before that. 

Senator Lucas. You want that to include from the time you became 
commander in chief ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. When you became commander in chief of the Pa- 
cific Fleet, there was an operating schedule of ships [7391] 
that had been ordered by Admiral Richardson, whereby one half of 
the fleet was in Pearl Harbor and one half of the fleet would be at sea? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

Senator Lucas. When you took over and became commander of the 
fleet you changed that operation schedule ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, I didn't, I changed that operating schedule 
after I found that even operating one half the fleet out and one half 
in, that 1 was depleting the oil reserves at Pearl Harbor. I couldn't 
keep up the oil reserves with the means I had to transport oil from 
the coast, and do the various other things we had to do with the 
tankers. 

Senator Lucas. Do I understand now that you want the com- 
mittee to know that the reason for the changing of the schedule was 
due to the reserve supply of oil on the island of Oahu ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That was one of the principal factors in the 
decision. 

Senator Lucas. What were the other factors, if I may inquire ? 

Admiral Kimmel. The other factors were the necessity for having 
the fleet in port a little more to make these alterations which were 
rapidly comins: on from our war experience. 

[7S92] Senator Lucas. In other words, due to the stress of the 
deteriorating conditions between Japan and this country, there was a 
continuous cnange in connection with attempting to get the fleet more 
ready for war, and that caused the ships to be in port more than other- 
wise; am I correct in my understanding? 

Admiral Kimmel. I tried to balance everything. I tried to get the 
most out of the time that we had. And the fuel situation alone would 
have demanded that I do what I did. The other factors were to be 
considered, and we took full advantage of the fact that the fuel 
situation demanded we keep them in port. 

Senator Lucas. It so happens that on the morning of December 7, 
two-thirds of the fleet were in Pearl Harbor, 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I am not sure as to the numbers that were 
in Pearl Harbor. I think that is a little high. I think a little over 
half. 

Senator Lucas. Well, all I have is the records that I have examined. 
Admiral, 

Admiral Kimmel, Perhaps you are correct. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2733 

Senator Lucas. I may be in error about that. If I am you can 
correct it upon further investig-ation. But it is my understanding 
from reading the record that two-thirds of the fleet that was based 
at Pearl Harbor was in the [7S.93] harbor on the morning of 
December 7, when the attack came. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I haven't those figures in front of me, but 
I think that is not entirely accurate. 

Senator Lucas. It may not be, sir, and if so, you may correct it. 
I should be glad to have it that way. 

Now, after you received the war warning on November 27, did it 
occur to you to change the operation schedule in any way whereby 
fewer ships might be in the harbor ? 

Admiral Kimmel. We did change the operating schedule to the 
extent of carrying out those tasks which we thought were demanded 
at that time. 

Senator Lucas. With respect to the carrying out of those tasks 
which you say were demanded at that time, as I recall those messages 
that came from the Chief of Naval Operations, they placed the direct 
responsibility upon you to say whether or not those movements were 
feasible and practicable, did they not ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. And with the information I 
had, I thought they were. Otherwise, I would not have done it. 

Senator Lucas. But I rather reached the conclusion from your 
statement that you read to the committee. Admiral, that you assumed 
that that was a direct command from the [7394] Chief of 
Naval Operations here in Washington. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, in naval circles, and I think military 
circles, a suggestion from a senior is little short of a command. I 
realized that I had discretion in the matter. I thought his sugges- 
tion was good, and therefore I carried it out. And I wouldn't have 
hesitated to differ with him had I seen any good reason for doing so. 

Senator Lucas. Those two messages that came directing you to 
take the task forces to Wake and Midway in the event you believed 
it impracticable and not feasible, came after the war message ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Came, I think, on the same day. 

Senator Lucas. I undei*stood you to say in your direct statement 
those two messages were taken into consideration by you, and rather 
qualified the war warning message. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. My recollection is that those messages, one 
of them came in before the war warning, 23 hours, I think I figured 
up, and the other one was the day after the war warning, in connec- 
tion with the transfer of planes. 

However, that is easy enough to check on. It was almost simul- 
taneously. 

Senator Lucas. I w^as under the impression both came after the war 
warning message. I may be in error, and you [7395] may be 
right. I am not sure. 

Admiral Kimmel. I have got time groups on each one of these. 

Senator Lucas. It may not be so important, although I thought 
it was. 

Admiral Kimmel. The only thing I have here is the time of origin. 
I haven't the time I received it, but it would be only a matter of 
hours at the most. 

Just one moment, sir. 

79716— 46— pt. 6 17 



2734 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The two of them, the time of origin of the two messages in regard 
to sending these reinforcements to the islands were just about 23 
hours before the war warning message. 

Senator Lucas. That is the date of them? 

Admiral Kiinimel. All of them are on the 2Tth. The time group on 
the first of the island messages was 0040 and the time group on the 
second one of the island messages was 0038, and the time group on the 
war warning message is 2337. 

Senator Lucas. Would it have made any difference in your plans 
out there for defense or offense if those messages came before the war 
warning, or after? 

Admiral Kimmfx. They came so close together — no, it wouldn't 
have made any difference. The three messages stood. They all origi- 
nated on the same day as it happened. [7396'] Whether one 
came in just ahead or just afterward, I think would have made no 
difference. 

Senator Lucas. When you sent the task forces out on these two mis- 
sions, before you sent them, you had given consideration to the war 
warning message of the 2Tth ? 

Admiral Kimimel. Oh, yes; jqs. And I reported to the Chief of 
Naval Operations on the 28th, after he knew I had received the war 
warning in regard to sending the planes to Wake and also told him 
that I was going to send them later to Midway. 

[7397] ^ Senator Lucas. My thought wasthat the reason perhaps 
that thej used the words "practicable" and "feasible" was due to the 
fact that he had already sent you the war warning message and because 
the war warning message was there it was up to you to determine 
whether or not you thought under those circumstances those task forces 
should go out. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, he must have known that I couldn't very 
well get these movements underway before I would have the war warn- 
ing message anyhow. 

Senator Lucas. Now, Admiral Kimmel, after you received the war 
warning message of November 27, was there any change at all in the 
movement or the operation of these ships in and out of Pearl Harbor, 
outside of the two task forces? 

Admiral Kimmel. You mean any change from the ones we had 
scheduled for? 

Senator Lucas. Yes. You had a regular schedule, as I understand 
it. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. Was that routine of ships entering and leaving 
Pearl Harbor changed any in any way after you received the war 
^Yarning message, other than the two task forces we have been talking 
about ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I couldn't answer that but there was no 
major change. 

[7398] Senator Lucas. In other words, the war warning mes- 
sage that you received did not cause you to change in any way the 
movement of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Kimmel. Except for these task forces. 

Senator Lucas. Except for the task forces. 

Admiral &mmel. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2735 

Senator Lucas. Will you tell the committee where Halsey's task 
force was when Pearl Harbor was struck ? 

Admiral Kimmel. To my recollection he was about 200 miles west 
of Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Lucas. He was on his way home ? 

Admiral Kimmel. On his way to Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Lucas. On his way to Pearl Harbor after having carried 
out the assignment that had been given to him bv you on the 28th— 
was it? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

Senator Lucas. There is a rumor, one of those rumors that you hear 
all the time, there is a rumor that Halsey's task force was delayed in 
coming back because of some engine trouble, or some other trouble, 
out at sea. Do you know anything about that? 

Admiral Kimmel. Never heard of it. 

Senator Lucas. Nothing to it. You would have heard of it^ 

Admiral Kimmel. I think I would. 

[7399] Senator Lucas. Assuming Halsey's task force had ar- 
rived in Pearl Harbor on the night of the 6th, would thev have been 
anchored in there too ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Halsey's task force needed fuel. I would have 
brought him in for fuel if they arrived because they needed fuel. And, 
as a matter of fact, I kept Halsey out and he had to send his destroyers 
m for fuel and I had to send out other destroyers to him to take the 
places of the ones lie had, and after about, oh, not more than 2 or 3 
days of operation, I had to bring Halsey in to fuel his carrier. 

Senator Lucas. Where would Newton's task force have been if you 
had not given him the order to go to Midway on the morning of the 
i th { 

Admiral Kimmel. Well 

Senator Lucas. They left on December 6, they left Pearl Plarbor 
on December 6. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. Do you know what the operational schedule of 
those particular ships was in the regular routine on the afternoon of 
December 6? 

Admiral Kimmel. I can't recall that at the present time, sir. 

Senator Lucas. But it is a near assumption that they [7400] 
might have been in Pearl Harbor on the night of December 6 had they 
not carried this mission out to Midway? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, no ; they would have been at sea. 

Senator Lucas. They would have been at sea ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. Why do you say that ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Because that is my recollection. 

Senator Lucas. I see. There is another question that I want to, 
ask you about the task forces as a result of the colloquy which took 
place on yesterday. 

Halsey's task force, as I understand it, went out fully armed and 
prepared to shoot and sink anything they saw ? 

Admiral Kimmel, He so informed me after he returned. 



2736 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. Did he have the power or authority to do that under 
the order that you gave him and which you read into the record this 
morning ? 

Admiral Kimmel. You better ask Admiral Halsey when he comes, 
sir. 

Senator Lucas. Well, I will ask Admii-al Halsey when he comes, 
but you were the commander in chief of this fleet, in a pretty serious 
time. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. This 

[7401] Admiral Kimmel. And I didn't want Halsey to get 
caught, and I hoped he wouldn't, and I knew Halsey. 

Senator Lucas. You didn't have to give the admiral any orders? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, he knew the situation thoroughly. 

Senator Lucas. I know that, but 1 am just now talking about your 
responsibility out there as commander of the fleet in giving orders to 
men on task forces of this kind. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

[74-02] Senator Lucas. Now, I was wondering whether or not 
under the order that you read in the record this morning and the 
order that you read yesterday to Admiral Brown — whether or not 
under those orders these men would have the right and the authority 
to arm themselves to the teeth for the purpose of sinking or shooting 
down anything that they might run across that they thought was an 
enemy ? 

Admiral Kimmel. When you send a man on an expedition of any 
kind and particularly an admiral, you have got to trust him to do the 
things which the situation demands. I had no authority to give him 
any shooting orders and I had been enjoined not to put shooting orders 
into effect in the Pacific but I did not want them to get caught, either 
one of them. 

Senator Lucas. Well, I can appreciate what you were up against at 
that particular time, Admiral. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. The only thought that I had in mind in asking you 
these questions was to discover, if I could, the reason why Admiral 
Halsey sailed under one set of orders and Admiral Newton sailed ap- 
parently under another set of orders. 

Admiral Kimmel. Admiral Halsey made his own interpretation of 
my suggestion that he use his common sense when he asked me how 
far to go and in view of everything I think he made a pretty good 
selection. 

[74OS] Senator Lucas. Under any circumstances 

Admiral Kimmel. Excuse me. Another point, though, that I have 
tried to indicate was that Halsey was going about 2,000 miles out. 

Senator Lucas. Yes, I know it. 

Admiral Kimmel. That Newton was going only 700 miles and the 
cliances of trouble that Halsey might get into were very much greater 
than anything that Newton had. 

Senator Lucas. Well, under any circumstances and irregardless of 
how they interpreted those orders, Admiral Kimmel was the man who 
had to be held responsible in the final analysis for whatever they did. 

Admiral Kimmel. I think I have been held responsible. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2737 

Senator Lucas. Now, in your statement to the committee on page 63 
you said the following : 

The sending of the carrier task forces to Wake and Midway did more than re- 
inforce the air defenses of the islands. It permitted a broad area to be scouted 
for signs of enemy movement along the path of the advance of these task forces 
to the islands and their return to Oahu. In addition, they were in an excellent 
position to intercept any enemy force which might be on the move. 

Now, do you believe that Newton's task force was in a position, 
assuming his testimony is correct, was in a position [7404.] to 
intercept any enemy force? 

Admiral Kiminiel. Well, regardless of his testimony the location in 
which he was and the track that his course followed put him in a 
position where he was to the westward, a little bit north of west of 
Oahu and any force coming to Oahu or on its way there, having once 
been discovered, Newton could have been directed to take an inter- 
cepting course and that is what we endeavored to do with him on the 
morning of Deceinber 7. The only trouble was that we made a mis- 
take due to the information we received and thought the Japanese 
attack force was down to the southward instead of the northward. 

Senator Lucas. But the point I am making 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? 
Senator Lucas. Yes, I will yield. Congressman. 
Mr. Keefe. Just for clarification. In one of your questions refer- 
ring to the Newton task force I understood you to say that that sailed 
on the 6th of December. My understanding has been up to this time 
that it sailed on the 5th of December, 
Admiral Kimmel. They did sail on the 5th. 

Mr. Keefe. So that the record may be clear on this point in con- 
nection with this cross-examination 

Admiral Kimmel. I did not notice that, 

[740-5] Mr. Keefe (continuing) . The testimony is that it sailed 
on the 5th. Is that correct ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct, sir. I had not noticed that. 
Senator Lucas. I thank you. Congressman. That is correct. 
The point that I was attempting to make, though, Admiral, and 
only usmg your statement to the committee to do so, was whether or 
not Newton, assuming his testimony was correct, if he was just coast- 
ing along on routine duty, as to whether or not he was in a position 
to intercept anybody in the event he had met a hostile enemy ? 

Admiral Kimmel. He was fully fueled, he was fully armed, he was 
zig-zagging against submarines, he had up an air patrol and I presume 
that he could have gone into action in a matter of, oh, a couple of 
minutes at most. 

Senator Lucas. Well, if this statement is correct, and I read it into 
the record yesterday, on that mission he was given no special orders 
regarding the arming of planes or regarding preparation for war 
other than the ordinary routine and the only point I am trying to 
make is whether or not, if that is correct, whether or not his force 
woidd not have been destroyed before he could have gotten into 
action ? 

Admiral Kimmel. We had had orders in effect for a long [7406] 
time about the arming of planes and I presumed. Admiral Newton 
Tva§ carrying those orders out. 



2738 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. Well, if Newton's testimony is correct the task force 
undoubtedly 

Admiral Kimmel. I beg your pardon, sir. May I make an 
observation? 

Senator Lucas. Certainly. 

Admiral Kimmel. I think you are not quoting from Newton's testi- 
mon3^ You are quoting from a 

Senator Lucas. I am quoting from the appendix to the narrative 
statement of evidence at the Navy Pearl Harbor Investigation. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. I think you would get a more 
accurate presentation if j^ou wanted to get Newton's original 
testimony. 

Senator Lucas. Well, that may be true, but is there any doubt in 
your mind now from Newton's testimony that I take it you have read, 
that he testified that on that mission he gave no special orders regard- 
ing the arming of planes or regarding the preparation for war other 
than ordinary routine? Is there any question about that? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, of course, my contention is that the or- 
dinary routine should have been sufficient under the orders under 
which he was operating. 

[7407] Senator Lucas. You think he should have been prepared 
then in every way ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. Then if there is any question of failing to perform 
the duty under the order that you gave him, then it is on Admiral 
Newton ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I should say so. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield at that point? 

Senator Lucas. I will yield for a question. 

Mr. Murphy. I was wondering if the responsibility would lie on 
Admiral Newton under those circumstances, if it was Colonel Bundy's 
dut}^ and General Gerow's duty to check the Short repl}^, why the 
gentleman feels that the responsibility lies on General Marshall? 

Senator Lucas. On General Marshall? Well, I don't want to get 
into that argument right now. 

Now, one other question, Admiral, or two. You spent considerable 
time explaining to the committee how you made a daily memorandum 
from November 30 on as to what should be done within the next 
2,4: hours. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Senator Lucas. And 5'ou were really on a 24-hour war alert after 
November the 27th. were you not ? 

Admiral Ki^mmel. I do not quite understand wdiat you mean 
[74O8] by that. 

Senator Lucas. Well, something in that war message on November 
the 27th caused you from that time on to issue a daily 24-hour memo- 
randum of some kind. 

Admiral Kimmel. I prepared — I had prepared a memorandum on 
the steps which we would take immediately that hostilities commenced. 
I did that as a precautionary measure and I think it was a wise thing. 

Senator Lucas. I agree with you, Admiral, and the only point that 
I am making is that you went on that 24-hour basis immediately follow- 
ing the war-warning message that you received on November the 27tli. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2739 

Senator Lucas. And that was the first time that you had gone on a 
24-hour warning basis of this kind or 

Admiral Kimmel. No, no. We had done it but not quite as syste- 
matically as I insisted on doing it at that time. We always had a 
summary of what we were going to do but I reduced it to — well, to a 
little better system, that is all. 

Senator Lucas. Well, you had not been writing out a message or a 
memorandum up to that time, had you ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No ; I had not been writing out a memorandum, 
but they had been keeping it in the war plans. About the only differ- 
ence here was to be sure that the staff duty [74.09] officer at all 
times had that in his hands. 

Senator Lucas. Well, now, in that memorandum that you prepared 
on the morning of December the 6th there were seven specific items 
referring to the movement of air force in and about Hawaii. 

Admiral IOmmel. That is right. I presume the seven is correct, 
but there were several. 

Senator Lucas. I am now turning again to your testimony before 
the Roberts Commission on page 146 of that rather voluminous docu- 
ment that is before the committee. This question was asked : 

Admiral Reeves. As I have checked it, there are seven specific items referring 
to the movement of air force in this memorandum. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right, sir. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. That was to be put into effect in the case of war? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. That was the action you took on what date? 

Admiral Kimmel. That was approved by me on the morning of 6 December. 

Admiral Reeves. That was tlie direct result of the warning of November 27? 

[7^i0] Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. You took these war preparation measures on that morning 
as a result of that warning? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir ; as the result of that warning and the general situa- 
tion I wanted to know — I was keeping a running record of what 

Admiral Reeves. Well, would you say that these measures that you have 
taken are anti-sabotage protection? Did you have anti-sabotage in your mind 
when you took these measures to despatch forces all along? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Then, you took the warning of November 27 to mean more 
than protect yourself against sabotage? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Did you discuss that with the Army commander? 

Admiral Kimmel. What I was going to do here? I think I didn't show him 
this. I discussed a great many things with the Army commander. 

Admiral Kimmel. I did not hear that, sir. 

Senator Lucas (reading) : 

General McCoy. Did you discuss that with the Army commander? 
[7411] Admiral Kimmel. What I was going to do here? I think I didn't 
show him this. I discussed a great many things with the Army commander. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Senator Lucas. And that is correct. You did not, as I understand 
it, discuss any of these daily messages or memoranda that you prepared 
with General Short. 

Admiral Kimmel. What I meant was that he and the others had 
not seen this memoradum which I had prepared. Some of the things 
would have been of interest to him and all of those I think I did discuss 
with him at various times, but so far as showing him what we had 
drawn up there, it was a crystallization of our ideas, that is all. 



2740 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. And you conveyed the crystallization of those ideas 
on to General Short, I take it. 

Admiral Ejmmel. I should say so, the things that he was interested 
in. 

Senator Lucas. Did you see General Short every day and discuss 
with him the military and naval situation around the island of Oahu 
from the time you received the war- warning message up to the attack? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, sir ; I did not see him every day, but to the 
best of my recollection betwixt November 27 and December 7 I had 
conferences with him on four or five different occasions. 

[74^2] Senator Lucas (reading) : 

General McCoy. Do you remember on what dates immediately prior to the 
attack you had conferences with General Short? 

Admiral Kimmel. It would be difficult for me to say that, sir, but I think I 
can look at some of these dispatches and approximate the 

General MoCoy. Now may I help you? General Short made a statement to us 
that he had conferences with you on certain days. Could you have that looked up, 
the dates? Would that be here or at the hotel? 

Mr. ScHNEiDEB. It is probably at the hotel, General. 

Who was Mr. Schneider ? Was he one of your men ? 
Admiral Kimmel. I don't know who Mr. Schneider was. 
Senator Lucas (reading) : 

Admiral Kimmei.. We had several conferences. 

General McCoy. My remembrance is that he spoke of a prior conference with 
you. 
Admiral Kimmel. That is correct, sir. 

Admiral Kimmel. What kind of conference, sir ? 
Senator Lucas. Prior conference. 
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. 
Senator Lucas (reading) : 

[7^13] Admiral Kimmel. That is correct, sir. 

General McCoy. Immediately prior to the attack. 

Admiral KiMMEii. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

General McCoy. And we asked him to give us some idea of what you talked 
about, 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy, —to see what effect these dispatches had on the two of you. 

Admiral Kimmex,. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Talking it over together. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. And the dispatch that we had particularly in mind, I think, at 
the time, was this one that was the war warning on the 27th. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Apparently General Short didn't remember that at all. He had 
received no copy of it. That is, he had the record looked up. He didn't remember 
it at all, but he said he felt that you must have mentioned it to him, although he 
couldn't remember it. and his records and his file over there do not show that it 
was ever furnished him. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, General, I not only sent that war warning to General 
Short, to the best of my know- [7^^//] ledge and belief, but 

General McCoy. I understand from your records that you had sent him a 
paraphrase. 

Admiral Kimmbx. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Would that paraphrase use the term "war warning," do you 
think? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. 

Admiral Reeves. Yes, sir; we had a paraphrase, or he read it, because they 
were not the same in literal wording, but "war warning" was in both dispatches, 
the paraphrase and the original. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2741 

General McCoy. It made no impression, as I remember, on General Short, 
however. 

Admiral Ktmmel. No, I don't think it did. 

General McCoy. He said, however, that he felt you had shown everything you 
had received. 

Admiral Kimmel. I was going to add. General, that I believe that in my 
own office I showed him these dispatches and discussed them with him. 

Is that still your best memory on that question, x\dmiral? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think you can search your record a little 
further 

Senator Lucas. I am going to. 

Admiral Kimmel. (continuing). And find that I subse- [741S\ 
quently testified that on the afternoon of November 27, when I 
received this war warning, I immediately sent for — well, my Intelli- 
gence officer brought it in. I told him to prepare a paraphrase of it 
and give it to General Short. That he did and the message was de- 
livered to General Short's headquarters, there is no question about 
that, on this afternoon or evening of November 27. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman jaeld? 

Admiral Kimmel, And General Short subsequently, I think, arrived 
at the same conclusion. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ? 

Senator Lucas. He maj' have arrived at the same conclusion there- 
after but at this particular time he apparently was not certain as to 
whether or not the message was ever delivered and you were. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; I was certain. I was certain then and the 
only trouble was that at that particular instant I wanted it checked 
to make sure that my subordinate had carried out the orders I gave 
him. I subsequently found out he had. 

Mr. MuRPiiY. I believe the record will show that the gentleman, the 
admiral, referred to Layton as being an idiot because he did not carry 
out the order which he was given, I believe. He was given it and told 
to deliver it personally ['74-^G] but did not deliver it personally. 
He gave it to a subordinate and the subordinate did not deliver it per- 
sonally. He gave it to some other subordinate of the Army, according 
to the testimony. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct, 

Mr. Murphy. And the record will show the admiral calling Layton 
an idiot before the Board because he did not do what he was told. 

Senator Lucas. Well, is there any question about whether or not 
Short did finally get the message? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think there is no question but what he received 
it. 

Senator Lucas. I now turn briefly to the radar question which has 
been discussed quite a little. 

Admiral Kimmel. What is that, sir? 

Senator Lucas. I am going to talk to you now about radar for just 
a few moments. After November the 27th, Admiral, when you went 
on a 24-hour alert, I call it that, maybe that is not quite correct, did you 
have any conversation with General Short about the condition of the 
Army warning service at that time? 

Admiral Kimmel. My best recollection is that I was informed by 
General Short at about this time that he could give us a coverage of 
150 to 200 miles. Subsequently General Short i'^4^'^] corrected 



2742 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

me to say that he had told me a hundred miles. At any rate, I was 
informed that the Army radar was manned nnd that, as far as I was 
concerned, suited me. 

Subsequently I found that the Army radar had been manned daily 
from 4 o'clock in the morning until 6 p. m. and eventually changed to 
4 in the morning until 4 p. m. This is all second-hand. I did not go 
to the place to see it. That eventually, the day before the attack, one 
of General Short's subordinates told them they need not man it after 
7 o'clock and up to and including Saturday preceding the attack they 
had been manning it from 4 o'clock in the morning until 4 in the after- 
noon. 

I did not inquire of General Short the hours that he was keeping 
in manning his radar, nor did I inquire of him the status of his infor- 
mation center. That was an Army responsibility. I had been in- 
formed that the radar was in operation and I presumed that General 
Short — and I always thought lie was perfectly competent to set the 
hours for manning his radar. 

Senator Lucas. Admiral, in view of the deficiencies and the inade- 
quacies and the vulnerability of the fleet that we have testified to here 
and all agreed on wasn't it almost your duty to find out definitely 
whether or not the radar was working in line with the warning that 
was given in that war message? 

[74I8] Admiral Kimmel. I thought I knew. You must trust 
somebody. I couldn't do everything. 

Senator Lucas. I appreciate that you must trust someone, but under 
the orders that you were operating on at that time and the agreement 
that you entered into for the coastal defense of the island it was the 
duty, as I understand it — if I am wrong you will correct me — for the 
Navy to have a liaison man between the Army and the Navy so that 
they could properly obtain just what those who were experimenting or 
operating radar were doing. Am I correct about that? 

Admiral Kimmei.. The responsibility for the information center 
and the Army radar was entirely an Army function. I received a 
letter from General Short, as I testified to already before this commit- 
tee, on August 5 requesting that I detail a liaison officer to work with 
his forces in the development of radar. I did so detail an officer. Com- 
mander Curts, who was my fleet communication officer at that time, 
and this liaison officer, my understanding of it at the time, which was 
never changed, was that he was to furnish them with technical advice 
and information. He was in nowise to be a w^atch stander in the 
information center. 

Senator Lucas. Wlio was to be a watch stander? 

Admiral Kimmel. That was a function of the Army ; and the Army 
commander, if he wanted a naval officer in there, he could [74J9] 
have requested a naval officer, and one naval officer would not have 
been sufficient. He would have required several. 

And, furthermore, had he requested these several watch standers to 
stand watch in the information center he would undoubtedly have sub- 
mitted that request to Admiral Bloch, who was the commandant of the 
district and the man who was working with him in connection with 
all those affairs.. 

I believe that Admiral Bloch has stated he never received a request. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2743 

Now, I would like to make clear that the man sitting in the opera- 
tions center and the people to whom the Army refers as liaison officers 
were in effect officers detailed to stand watch in the information center. 
An Army officer who had the information in regard to the Navy planes 
could have done that job, in my opinion, quite as well as a naval officer 
could have done it and, likewise, an Army officer detailed — I mean 
a naval officer detailed to follow Army planes. The only advantage 
in having a naval officer to look out for naval planes or an Army officer 
to look out for Army planes was that they probably knew the means 
of getting information. They could not sit in the information center 
and tell which planes were operating. They had to get that informa- 
tion from the people who were ordering the operations and directing 
the o]3erations. 

[7430] Now again I would like to add there was one other thing 
that I did. A few weeks, I forget the exact date, before the attack a 
member of my staff came to me and said the Army had requested the 
services of Lieutenant Taylor. Lieutenant Taylor was a young naval 
officer who had been operating with the British and who had some 
knowledge of the operation of an information center, and I sent Lieu- 
tenant Taylor to report to the Army and they had complete control 
over his movements from that time until December 7 and how much 
longer I have forgotten. At any rate. Lieutenant Taylor did every- 
thing that he could to assist the Army in getting organized and im- 
prove their center. I felt that having done those things I had done 
all that I could to assist the Army in getting their radar business in 
operation. 

Senator Lucas. My inquiries have been directed to radar primarily 
for this reason : Everyone knew about the vulnerability of the fleet out 
there. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Senator Lucas. Everybody knew that there was no long-range 
reconnaissance going on. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Senator Lucas. Everybody knew that there were no surface ships 
that were patrolling wide areas because it was not feasible to do that. 

[74^1] Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Senator Lucas. There were no submarines at that particular time. 

Admiral Kimmel. Because we did not have any. 

Senator Lucas. You did not have any. 

Admiral Kimmel. No. 

Senator Lucas. So the only one thing that you really had on the 
6th and the 7th that would have given you any information at all about 
the approaching planes and a surprise attack was the radar? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right, and, as a matter of fact, we found 
out — I found out on the Tuesday following the attack that they had 
picked up these planes. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. Well, now, you found that out after the attack 
had taken place and that brings me right back to the question that 
seems to me important — it may not seem to you with all the responsi- 
bilities you had — as to why it was when you knew at that particular 
time that radar was the only weapon that you could depend upon to 
discover approaching enemy planes, that you and General Short did 
not have a little better understanding with respect to the transfer of 



2744 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

these messages when they came in on radar? You have gone over 
that and you answered it rather fully. 

Admiral Kimmel. I have answered it and I might answer that 
[74^2] when you know something when you don't really know it, 
you are in a pretty bad way, and I thought I knew. 

Senator Lucas. That is right. You thought you knew and you were 
depending upon someone to give you that information in the event 
that it came in. 

Admiral Kimmel. And you have always got to depend on someone 
if you are going to get anywhere. You cannot do everything. 

Senator Lucas. Now, you stated, I think, on yesterday that you did 
not talk to General Short about a matter of this kind because that was 
an Army matter and 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, not only because it was an Army matter 
but because I had confidence in General Short. 

Senator Lucas. You did not hesitate, Admiral, to talk to General 
Short when the Army proposed the exchange of Army troops for 
marines on the outlying bases? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I did not hesitate to talk to General Short 
at any time on any subject that I considered necessary to talk to him. 

Senator Lucas. Isn't it a fact, now, that on the morning of the 7th 
and on the clay of the 6th that information on that radar was more im- 
portant to the protection of the fleet than any outlying bases outside 
of Oahu ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Again I come back to the fact that I \7Jf23'\ 
thought the radar was manned, that is all I can answer to that and 
when you — I don't know what other answer to make. 

Senator Lucas. All right, x\dmiral. I want to read this bit of 
testimony before the Roberts Commission upon this point. Page 630. 
[Reading:] 

The Chairman. And you probably knew or should have known that the Army 
warning service was not in shape to give you a warning, or to give them a warning, 
of distant airplanes, so there just was not any machinery for warning here ; is 
that right? 

Admiral Kimmel. I thought that the operations of the radar. Army radar, 
which was reported to me in the maneuvers that we had, that they had been able 
to pick up planes taking off from Maui and picking them up this side from 
Hawaii and following them all the way in, in these exercises that we had. They 
told me that they picked up planes from our ships coming in, and we had several 
attacks on Pearl Harbor where we had them carry out and had the carrier run 
in and make the attack and the carrier run the planes in. 

I had been informed that they had picked them up and that they had followed 
them in, and I thought the radar warning was in very good shape. 

I knew that some of the radar warning net was not {142Jf] what they 
wanted it to be, and we were pushing in every way we could to get that radar 
warning net perfected, and within a week before this attack took place I knew 
that my staff had taken a very effective j^art in urging the District and the 
Ai'my to do certain things in connection with it, and particularly the District, 
and young Taylor, I gave, as I told you about today. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmeil. And he had come down and told us also and some other 
people from the District and from the Army, and we were working on the 
perfection of the warning net, and so forth. 

The Chairman. Well, while I think your information is incorrect as to that, 
tlie fact is (liat in the week of December 7th and the days prior to that, and 
on the morning of December 7th, you were quite confident that you would get 
a definite warning of distant planes; is that right? 

Admiral Kim mix. I thought we would get some warning of distant planes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2745 

General McNarnett. And as a responsible officer you did not. assure yourself 
of that fact? 

Admiral Kimmesl. No, except indirectly, but when we had two separate com- 
manders and when you have a respon- [7^25] sible officer in charge of 
the Army and responsible commanders in the Navy, it does not sit very well 
to be constantly checking up on them. 

General McNarney. Let us examine into that. Under the situation you had 
the system of mutual cooperation? 

Admiral Kimmex. Yes. 

General McNarney. And in the method of mutual cooperation, is it neces- 
sary for one commander to know what the other commander is doing or what 
his plans are? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

General McCoy. Was there an officer on your staff detailed to the radar 
warning service room to keep you informed? 

Admiral Kimmeil. No, sir. 

General McCoy. How did you expect to be informed? 

Admiral Kimmel. The radar warning service was the function of the Army 
and the Naval Base Defense Officer. I had a staff who were active and trying 
to do the best. It is a physical impossibility for them to do everything, and I 
thought that they had developed it and handled it. 

If I had it to do again, of course, I would check it a good deal more than I did. 

Does that statement still stand ? 

Admiral Kimmel. If I had it to do again under the condi- 
[7426] tions that I then knew I would have done differently, yes, 
certainly, because that is a perfectly natural thing. 

Senator Lucas, That was hindsight ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Certainly. 

Senator Lucas. Now with respect to this liaison man I want to 
call your attention to section 7 of the joint coastal frontier defense 
plan\nd this is under the "war and defense plans." [Reading:] 

U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five : 

On July 26, 1941, U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five was dis- 
tributed to the Pacific Fleet by Admiral Kimmel. This plan was designed 
to implement the Navy basic war plan (Rainbow Five) in so far as the 
tasks assigned the U. S. Pacific Fleet were concerned. It was approved 9 
September 1941 by the Chief of Naval Operations. The plan provided in part. 

And section 7 of that plan is as follows, a part of it : 

Paragraph III provided for joint communications, and, among other things, 
that all information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore 
from Oahu secured through Navy channels would be transmitted promptly to 
the Command Post of the Army Provisional Anti-Aircraft Brigade and the 
Aircraft Warning Service Infoi'mation Center; that subsequently, when the 
Army air- [7Jf27] craft warning service was established, provision would 
be made for transmission of information on the location or distance of hostile 
and friendly aircraft, and special wire or radio circuits would be made avail- 
able for the use of Navy liaison officers so that they might make their own 
evaluation of the available information and transmit it to their respective 
organizations. 

It seems to me that is rather plain as to what should be done with 
radar on behalf of both the Army and the Navy. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, this question of Navy liaison officers, the 
number that they required in the information center was a thing 
for the Army to determine and for them to request a detail of liaison 
officers when they wanted them. I thought they had what they 
needed and in all of the drills that we had had before, and we had 
had many, the results as reported to me showed that the information 
center was working. It was far from perfect, but it was working 
and they had put the information out. I did not inquire into those 



2746 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

details and the responsibility for fretting information to and from 
the information center was certainly in the hands of the Army be- 
cause it was their function to do so. 

Senator Lucas. Well, let me ask you this, Admiral : Is this the 
kind of an agi*eement that looks good on paper and is fine in theory 
but in practice it just does not work out ? 

[74^8] Admiral Kimmel. No, I would say that the agreement 
was based on getting all the things that we knew we required to 
put everything in bang-up shape and they were in process of get- 
ting in that condition as rapidly as they knew how. 

Senator Lucas. Well, of course, there is always some difficulty, is 
there not, where you have a joint command of this kind in carrying 
out details, where the Army and the Navy are definitely scheduled 
to do certain things? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes, there is always difficulty in carrying 
out any operations where a number of people are involved and we 
had made an agreement and everybody that I know of in Oahu at 
the time was doing their best to efiectuate those agreements. 

Senator Lucas. Well, the radar went into operation immediately 
after the attack? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. It was in operation before the attack. 

Senator Lucas. Yes, it was in there, but the chairman asked this 
question : 

He knew what the conditions were, is that right? 
Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I think he probably did. 

The Chairman. And as the radar sj^stem is now running there is a Naval 
officer sitting there at the board to inform you of anything that goes on there? 
[7229] Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I said this because I presumed that was 
correct, and the naval officer would have been there, I presume and, 
as a matter of fact, I did not know but what he was there already. 

I think it might be well to say at this point once more that the 
information center and the radar had operated in drills and in exer- 
cises and I thought it was on a reasonably efficient basis and all the 
reports I had received led me to believe that. 

Senator Lucas. You did have these air drill exercises? 

Admiral &mmel. Oh, yes; we had the air drill exercises. 

Senator Lucas. Where radar was involved? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. These air drill exercises were based upon the pos- 
sibility of an air raid on the i.sland? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. We had the drills and at the drills the 
information center— to the best of my knowledge and belief, the infor- 
mation center had been manned on all the drills and they had gotten 
very satisfactory results. 

Senator Lucas. For instance, in a statement that was made before 
the Roberts committee 

Admiral Kimmel. I beg your pardon? 

Senator Lucas. In a statement that was made again before 
[74^0] the Roberts committee, on page 602 Justice Roberts said : 

But you did not discuss the possible air attack with him? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, I think, sir, we discussed a possible air attack on many 
occasions. We held these drills. For a long time vye held them weekly, and 
tnen there was some difficulty about getting all elements to take part in the air- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2747 

raid drills, so. we adopted the scheme of setting a date considerably ahead of 
time, so all of us, particularly the Army aircraft, could take part to tlie fullest 
extent, and that had been in effect for — the air-raid drills started, oh, I should 
say in March at the latest. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Senator Lucas. Now, how long did those air-raid drills continue? 

Admiral Kimmel. You mean the duration of each drill ? 

Senator LuCx\s. No. Take the date of December 6 : When was the 
last air raid drill that you had previous to the attack? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, I should say within a couple of weeks of 
the attack. 

Senator Lucas. A couple of weeks of the attack ? 

Admiral Ejmmel. Yes; we had them weekly for some time 
[7431] and then due to difficulties in getting all elements to take 
part we finally decided that once every 2 weeks would give better 
results. 

Senator Lucas. According to a memorandum that was just handed 
to me by counsel it shows that the last air drill you had was on No- 
vember the 12th, 1941. 

Admiral Kimmel. That would be about right, I imagine. 

Mr. Kaufman. That is part of exhibit 120. 

Senator Lucas. That is part of exhibit 120. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. Before that you had a drill on October 27. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. Before that October the 13th. Can you tell the 
committee why the air drills ceased after November the 12th ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I cannot. I did not know they had ceased. 

Senator Lucas. Well, this is a report from P. N. L. Bellinger, 
January the 1st, 1942 [reading] : 

From : The Commander Patrol Wing TWO 

To : Senior Member, Board Investigating Activities of December 7, 1941. 

Subject : Data Requested by Board. 

1. In accordance with your request I am sending [7432] herewith six 
copies of Report of Army-Navy Board of 31 October, 1941. 

2. The dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid Drills were held are as follows : 

The first one beginning on April 24, 1941, and running through No- 
vember 12, 1941. There were some dozen or 15 drills in there. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I did not follow up the schedule of air- 
raid drills exactly when they were conducted, and they were not sus- 
pended to the best of my knowledge and belief. They may have been 
deferred somewhat for some reason beyond my knowledge at the pres- 
ent time. 

Senator Lucas. Well, was that one of your responsibilities. Ad- 
miral ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir; I was responsible for everything out 
there. 

Senator Lucas. Well, I say that with the utmost kindness, sir. 

Admiral Kimmel. I beg pardon ? 

Senator Lucas. I say that in the utmost kindness. I was trying to 
find out whether or not that was one of your responsibilities. 

Admiral Kjmmel. I do not consider that the holding of air-raid 
drills was one of my responsibilities and that I had indi- [7433] 
Gated my approval and desire that the air-raid drills continue. I left 



2748 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

it to General Short and Admiral Bloch as to when they would schedule 
the air-raid drills and I paid very little attention to carrying out the 
schedule, but I did pay considerable attention to the results which they 
obtained from them. 

Senator Lucas. You further stated : 

They were held as often as practicable thereafter, and we held these dress 
rehearsals, you might call them, along about once a week and then once every 
two weeks because we wanted to get the two elements into it without conflicting 
with the training and the various operations. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. They came to me — Admiral 
Bloch, I think it was — came to me and said he would like to change the 
weekly drills to biweekly drills and he gave his reasons for it, wliich 
appealed to me and I thought it was a good idea that one drill every 2 
weeks thoroughly carried out was much more valuable than a drill 
conducted once a week with only a few elements that could take part. 

Incidentally, I might invite your attention to my order of 2CL-il 
and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was charged, 
among other things, with the coordinating of anti-aircraft fire, with 
the base defense by (1) holding necessary drills. Do you remember 
that? 

Senator Lucas. I do, sir. I would like to have you an- ['^4^4-] 
swer this question : As I have followed the testimony and followed 
these hearings I have gained a very distinct impression that it was 
your purpose and your definite purpose to have this fleet trained down 
to the last minute, so to speak, in the event that war came between 
this country and Japan. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. We put on extra steam. Every com- 
mand I ever had while I was in the Navy I endeavored to get it ready to 
fight and w^hen the situation became more and more critical we re- 
doubled our efforts. 

Senator Lucas. I am just wondering whether or not your determina- 
tion and your overzealousness to have this fleet trained to the moment, 
which was certainly commendable, that you probably did not lose sight 
of the vulnerability of the fleet, because of the lack of airplane protec- 
tion, and because of the lack of radar and these things that we did not 
have, apparently. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, of course, you can arrive at your own con- 
clusion. That is your right. 

Senator Lucas. I do not say that that is my conclusion, but I was 
just thinking along that line because I have followed you very closely. 
Admiral, and I know how intense you have been in this hearing and I 
Know how intense you were all through your naval career, and you had 
a fine one, there is no doubt about that, and I was just thinking about 
putting l_74^3S] myself in your shoes at that particular time and 
knowing that war was imminent, whether or not the training of the 
fleet there did not overshadow everything else ? 

Admiral Kimmel. What, sir? 

Senator Lucas. The training of the fleet did not overshadow every- 
thing else. 

[7436] Admiral Kimmel. Well, I do not think so. I think that 
the steps I took at this time, and the reasons which I have given to 
the committee — well, they can speak for themselves. I cannot add 
anything to them. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2749 

Senator Lucas. In this same statement, you said, about the possi- 
bilities of an air raid : 

I confess, and so stated, I considered an air raid on this place as a possibility, 
but by no means a probability. 

Now, it seems that everybody was talking about air raids, you drilled 
for air raids, you drew up in your joint coastal frontier defense plans 
certain surveys indicating exactly what was going to happen. Isn't 
that true? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, we did. One of our objects in that was 
not only to explore the matter thoroughly but to bring it so forcibly 
to the people in Washington and everywhere that action would be 
taken to make that base perfectly secure under all contingencies. 

Now, then, if I had not done that, I would have been properly sub- 
ject to considerable censure. 

Senator Lucas. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Kimmel. The point is every week and every day I had to 
balance one thing against another. I could not do everything, and 
everything I did cost me something. I did not have an unlimited 
number of dollars to buy the [7Ii.37^ things I wanted, if I may 
illustrate it that way. 

I had to buy the things I could with what I had. 

Senator Lucas. Of course, regardless of what you had under the 
circumstances, with the information you had available at that time, 
you would have still been taken by surprise? 

Admiral Kimmel. I do not understand that question. 

Senator Lucas. I say regardless of any deficiencies or inadequacies, 
you might have had in ships and planes and what not, you would 
have still been taken by surprise with the information available that 
you claim you had at that time? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, sir. No, sir. I think that is wrong. If I 
had had an adequate patrol, an adequate supply of patrol planes, if I 
had had an adequate supply of Army B-IT bombers, then the necessity 
for doing what I did would not have existed. It would have been an 
entirely different proposition. 

I had to conserve my meager forces for what I thought was the most 
useful purpose I could put them to. 

Senator Lucas. That is correct, and that was in the training of the 
fleet. 

Admiral Kimmel. What is that? 

Senator Lucas. That was in the training of the fleet [7^55] 
for action ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, no; I think you are mistaken. 

Senator Lucas. That is what you really did. I mean you were 
really training that fleet, eliminating long-range reconnaissance, and 
concentrating primarily upon getting the fleet ready? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, no. In what I have set forth. I have com- 
pletely failed in giving my views if that is all you have gotten out of 
it. I was conserving these patrol planes for uses which I had for 
offensive operations, and had I had available, we will say, 200 patrol 
planes and 120 B-17 bombers, the situation would have been entirely 
different. I could have used the patrol planes then, and still had a 
sufficient number left to conduct the offensive operations. 

79716—46 — pt. 6 18 



2750 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. Well, I want to read into the record at this point, 
just one part of this Martin-Bellinger report. It is found on page 
35 of the appendix to the narrative statement. It is as follows — and 
these were the estimates, the evaluations that they were making with 
respect to the air raid, and this was approved by you in September 
1941, as I remember. 

Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable 
undiscovered surface forces probably [7Jf39] composed of fast ships ac- 
companied by a carrier, and that, in a dawn air attack, there was a high possi- 
bility that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrol 
that we might be using. 

[74.4O] In other words, that was an exact prediction by these 
two men as to what happened ; isn't that true? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, it is always possible, as I have tried to 
point out in my testimony here, that no matter what you do the enemy 
may effect a tactical surprise. 

I might invite attention in that connection to the fact that when 
General MacArthur landed on Leyte that was a tactical surprise, 
and when General MacArthur went to Lingayen Gulf that was a tacti- 
cal surprise. The Japs thought they were going to land to the south- 
ward. All through the war we had many instances of tactical sur- 
prises. 

Senator Lucas. Well, I think that the statement you made yester- 
day, that you did not think there was going to be a surprise attack, 
that with the hazards that the Japs would have to meet they would 
never go through with it, and you were surprised, everybody in Ha- 
waii was surprised, and probably everybody in America was surprised 
when they finally hit us at Pearl Harbor on December 7; isn't that 
correct ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think that is a fair statement. 

Senator Lucas. I want to read just for the record an editorial in 
the Chicago Tribune. 

Did you read any papers out there in Hawaii, Admiral, when you 
were commander of the fleet ? 

[744.1] Admiral Kimmel. Did I read the papers there? 

Senator Lucas. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. I never saw the Chicago Tribune. I wish I had. 

Senator Lucas. I did not ask you about that. I just asked you if 
you read any newspapers from time to time out there. 

Admiral Kimmel. I read the local papers, that is all, and some 
magazines. 

Senator Lucas. I want to show you how one section of the country 
were thinking about Hawaii at this particular time. That coincides 
with all of the evidence that I have heard here practically with respect 
to this surprise attack. 

Everybody out there talked about this surprise attack, everybody 
had air drills for it, they tried to determine when and where it was 
going to happen, and yet when it happened everybody was surprised. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, do I understand the Senator 
from Illinois will say this represents the thinking of this section of the 
country, the Chicago Tribune editorial ? 

Senator Lucas. Well, the Senator from Maine can put his own inter- 
pretation upon this editorial after I read it into the record. It is 
rather interesting, and it is along the lines that we have been talking 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2751 

about here, and shows how [7443] some people were thinkin.^ 
and how a great newspaper was thinking at this particular time, and I 
think it is pertinent to this inquiry to read it into the record. 

It is a part of a long editorial on Monday, October 27, 1941. The 
editorial is entitled, "Mr. Knox Spies a War.*" 

The editorial proceeds : 

And so now Mr. Knox wants the country to believe that we may be at war with 
Japan at any moment. 

Remember that is October 27, 1941, about the time you had your last 
air drill out there. 

War for what? 

Nations, imless they are governed by fools, do not go to war, and particularly 
modern war, except for interests so vital that the life of the nation is threatened 
by tiieir loss. They fight to defend those interests or to take them from their 
opponent. The objective must be worth the treasure and blood expended before 
the dreadful risk is considered. What vital interests of the United States can 
Japan threaten? 

She cannot attack us. That is a military impossibility. Even our base at 
Hawaii is beyond the effective striking power of her Fleet. She may threaten 
the Philippines but the Philippines are of so little viral interest to this country 
that we have already arranged to give them their independence [7U3] 
within five years. 

And what has Japan that we want? Nothing. 

I read that into the record just merely to show what a great news- 
paper Avas telling the people at that particular time with respect to 
Hawaii, that it could not be attacked. Apparently that is what every- 
body thought, that it could not be attacked at that particular time. It 
surprised everybody. 

Now, Mr. Chairman, I have got one or two more questions that I 
want to ask the admiral and then I am tlirough. I regret that I have 
taken so long. 

These are jtist some conclusions. Admiral. Is it a fact that all of 
these deficiencies and inadequacies that you have explained at great 
length placed upon you the highest degree of diligence in the protection 
of the fleet? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct, yes. 

Senator Lucas. Do you believe under all the circumstances that 
between November 24-27 and December 7 you exercised that high de- 
gree of care and caution that was automatically imposed upon you 
when you took over this fleet ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think I did. 

Senator Lucas. From November 24 until the hour of the attack 
did you exercise that superior judgment necessary for one of your 
rank and position when you knew the war was practically imminent? 

[7444] Admiral Kimmel. I did. 

Senator Lucas. Do you believe that on the day of the attack you 
were guilty of any neglect of duty ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I do not. 

Senator Lucas. In other words. Admiral, you are now telling the 
committee under solemn oath that you did not commit any mistakes 
or commit any errors of judgment from November 24 to December 7? 

Admiral Kimmel. I would say that is a reasonable conclusion and 
It IS a conclusion that the Naval Court of Inquiry, composed of three 



2752 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admirals, selected by the Secretary of the Navy, came to when they 
submitted their report to the Secretary of the Navy. 

Senator Lucas. Do you assume any responsibility whatever in the 
loss of ships, property, and lives of our men on that tragic day ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I was commander in chief of the fleet. I cannot 
escape the responsibility which goes with that position, but I have no 
responsibility due to any dereliction on my part. 

Senator Lucas. I presume you will agree with me that Pearl Har- 
bor was the worst naval defeat in all the history of the American 
Navy? 

Admiral Kimmel. I should say maybe that is correct. 

[744^] Senator Lucas. Notwithstanding that humiliating and 
far-reaching sea disaster, you now contend that with the information 
you had available to you you did all that any prudent commander 
could do to prevent or to minimize the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor 
on December 7 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think that is a fair statement. 

Senator Lucas. That is all. 

The Chairman. Congressman Murphy. 

The Chair wishes to say that the counsel have asked that the com- 
mittee hold a brief executive session to consider the matter which 
they wish to bring to its attention immediately after we adjourn this 
afternoon. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral Kimmel, a few moments ago you said that a 
suggestion from a senior in the Navy is a little short of a command. 
I was wondering if you regarded a suggestion from the Secretary of 
the Navy, the constitutional officer in charge of the Navy, as being 
a command ? 

Admiral Kimmel. A suggestion from the Scretary of the Navy 
to whom ? 

Mr. Murphy. To the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, if you 
consider that a command. 

Admiral Kimmel. That would depend somewhat on the circum- 
stances under which it was made. If I received a suggestion from the 
Secretary of the Navy I would do my best [74-4^] to carry it 
out. 

Mr. MuBPHY. I am referring particularly to the letter of the Sec- 
retary of the Navy, which had the approval of the Secretary of War, 
which stated that there was a probability of an air attack on Pearl 
Harbor, in fact that an air attack was the most probable kind of 
attack. Was that a command to you ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I gave great: weight to what the Secretary had to 
say in his letter, and 1 was very much encouraged when I received 
that letter, because 1 hoped and believed at that time that the defici- 
encies which the Secretary himself had pointed out would be remedied 
as rapidly as our resources in this country would permit them to be 
remedied. 

Mr. MuKPHY. Well, you did not consider what he said was true, 
did you, in December of 1941 ? 

Admiral Kiinimel. The Secretary's letter suggested the probability 
of an air attack, and shortly thereafter I received the information 
from the Chief of Naval Operations which told me, in effect, that 
no air attack on Pearl Harbor would be made by the Japanese in 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2753 

the foreseeable future. That came, as I recall, shortly after this 
letter from the Secretary, and I took the letter from the Secretary 
in the way that it was meant. I believe it was meant to put ourselves 
[744'n in a proper condition in Hawaii to repel any and all attacks 
that might be made on it. 

I have here the exact text of the letter from the Chief of Naval 
Operations. He quotes Mr. Grew's warning-^ and says 

Mr. Murphy. That letter. Admiral, I am already familiar with, 
and it is already in the record on several occasions, but I will be glad 
to have you read it again. 

Admiral Kimmel. I just want to make my position clear, that is all. 

Senator Brewster. I think it is most appropriate that that should 
be done. The Congressman is pursuing this line of inquiry and I 
think the record should be complete. I think he should read that. 

Mr. MuRPHT. All right. I am glad to have liim read it. 

Admiral Kimmel (reading) : 

The office of Naval Intelligence places no credence on these rumors. Further- 
more, it has no data regarding the present disposition and deployment of 
Japanese Army and Navy forces. No more against Pearl Harbor appears im- 
minent or planned for in the foreseeable future. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, Admiral, I refer you to another letter, the letter 
from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, and the 
Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox, was the same Secretary of the Navy, 
was he not, in command [744S] of the United States Navy, 
as a member of the Cabinet, on December 7, 1941 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Mr. I^ox ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, the Secretary of the Navy said to the 
Secretary of War : 

, The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are con- 
sidered to be 

(1) air bombing attack. 

(2) air torpedo plane attack. 

Now when did you decide that the Secretary of the Navy and 
Secretary of War were incorrect in their estimate of the situation 
at Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Kimmel, I have given my views on that at great length. 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to have you state them right now, if 
you will, for the record. 

Admiral Kimmel. I beg pardon ; 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to have you state your views on that 
matter right now on the record, at this point, please. 

Admiral Kimmel. When I received the letter from the Chief of 
Naval Operations which I have just quoted I was very much iiti- 
fluenced by it. When I received, further, the letter of February 15. 
I think, m which he told me unqualifiedly that torpedoes could not 
run m the waters of Pearl Harbor, that eliminated the air torpedo 
attack from my consideration. 

[744.9] In the months that followed I had to reestimate the 
situation, and due to my knowledge of the difficulties of overseas raids 
from Japan and the means they had to accomplish it, I arrived at the 
conclusion that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was not probable. That 
was very shortly after I received the Secretary's letter. 

Mr. Murphy. In other words, you had by February decided that 
the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, in their judg- 



2754 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK. 

ment as to what the dangers were at Pearl Harbor, were in error ; is 
that ri^ht? 

Admiral Kjmmel. There was always the possibility of such an at- 
tack. I agreed in toto with the Secretary of War and the Secretary 
of the Navy that we should so arrange our defenses at Pearl Harbor, 
and should have supplied to us the means for this defense so that 
the air attack would be practically impossible. 

Now, in connection with Mr. Knox's opinions, Mr. Knox told me 
when he came to Pearl Harbor^ that he was surprised, very much sur- 
prised when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, and he repeated, I 
think, in public on several occasions that he was surprised. 

Mr. Murphy. I agree. Admiral, that Mr. Knox said that, and a 
great many other people said that. I am now asking, however, when 
you ceased to believe that the Secretary of War [74S0] and 
Secretary of the Navy w^ere in error? I take your answer to be that 
you changed your opinion when you got the letter in February about 
the possibility of an attack by a torpedo plane, as well as when you 
got the letter from Admiral Stark about the unlikeliness of an attack 
subsequent to the so-called Peruvian message. Is that correct? 
Admiral Kimmel. That is correct; yes. 

Mr. Murphy. After that, did not you have an admiral of your fleet, 
and one of the officer airmen in the Navy, the No. 2 man in the Navy, 
under your command, make a survey as to the unlikeliness of an attack 
at Pearl Harbor, and did not he say that an air attack was the most 
probable, subsequent to these two items that you have already given ? 
Admiral Kimmel. Yes; he did. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you disagree with your air expert? 
Admiral Kimmel. I did not disagree with the estimate, because I 
believe in making an estimate of the worst thing that can happen 
and provide against it to the best of your ability. 

Now, then, when it comes to the time to take action you must 
balance probabilities against possibilities. 

Mr. Murphy. It is a fact, Admiral, is it not, that the No. 2 airman 
in the United States Navy says that the most likely attack at Pearl 
Harbor was to be an air attack? [74S1] Isn't that right? 
Admiral Kimmel. That was his opinion. 
Mr. Murphy. And he was in your fleet, wasn't he? 

Admiral Kimmel. And that was his particular 

Mr. Murphy. Domain? 
Admiral Kimmel. Domain. 
Mr. Murphy. That is right. 

Admiral Kimmel. And he was quite right in making such an esti- 
mate. 

Mr. Murphy. Right. And then on December 17, 1941, you asked 
his opinion on the availability and possibility of using planes as of 
and prior to December 7, did you not? 
Mr. Keefe. December 17? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes; on December 17 you asked him to prepare and 
had him prepare an estimate of the situation as it was prior to Decem- 
ber 7 ? I mean exactly that. 

Admiral Kimmel. I wanted a record of his views at that particular 
time, and I asked him to set them forth. I knew all of the essential 
features of that myself before December 7. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2755 

Mr. Murphy. The fact is, however, Admiral, that you did have an 
estimate made, did you not, on December 17 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; I had a letter submitted by him on Decem- 
ber 17, because I wanted it made a matter of record. 

Mr. Murphy. I beg your pardon ; it was December 19, and [74^52] 
I stand corrected. 

Admiral Kimmel. It may have been tlie 10th, but it was about that 
time. 

Mr. Murphy. Right. Now, then, in that particular letter which 
Admiral Bellinger gave to you, on page 2, paragraph 4, or note 4, I 
find the following — first, the first paragraph, paragraph 1, "Avail- 
ability and disposition of patrol planes on morning of 7 December 
1941", and then in paragraph 4 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Murphy. Excuse me. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, may I ask if we have copies of 
these letters ? 

Mr. Murphy. I got mine as a member of this committee at this 
table. I assume you have got what I have got. 

Senator Brewster. Was that furnished to the other members? 

Mr. Murphy. I got it sitting in my chair at the table. 

Mr. Masten. What is the date of it? 

Mr. Murphy. December 19. 

Mr. Masten. That is Exhibit 120. 

Mr. Murphy. Now I have already read, Admiral, paragraph 1, and 
E now read paragraph 4 : 

All planes, except those under repair, were armed with machine guns and a 
full allowance of machine-gun ammunition. 

[74S3] Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. I now go to paragraph (e) , on page 4 : 

Under the circumstances, it seemed advisable to continue intensive expansion 
training operations and improvement of the material military effectiveness, at the 
same time preserving the maximum practicable availability of aircraft for an 
emergency. Under the existing material and spart parts situation, continuous 
and extensive patrol plane operations by the PBY-,5's was certain to result in 
rapid automatic attrition of the already limited number of patrol planes imme- 
diately available by the exhaustion of small but vital spai'e parts for which 
there were no replacement. 

Then again I read paragraph (f ) : 

In this connection it should be noted that there were insufficient patrol planes 
in the Hawaiian area effectively to do the job required. For the Commander of 
a .search group to be able to state with some assurance that no hostile carrier 
could reach a spot 250 miles away and launch an attack without prior detection, 
would require an effective daily search through 360 degrees to a distance of at 
least 800' miles. Assuming a 15-mile radius of visibility this would require a 
daily 16-hour flight of 84 planes. A force of not less than 200 patrol planes, 
adequate spare parts, and ample well-trained personnel would be required for 
such [7-^54] operations. 

Now the fact is, Admiral, that on December 19 you did get the esti- 
mate of Admiral Bellinger as to the appropriateness of having recon- 
naissance subsequent to November 27, did you not? 

Admiral Kimmel. I did not understand that question. 

Mr. Murphy. Will you read it, Mr. Reporter? 

(The question was read by the reporter.) 



2756 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACR 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, I got it. I asked for it. I wanted -it made 
a matter of record. He was the man who knew most about this. I 
had been informed of this condition, I knew of the condition prior to 
December 7, and I wanted it made a matter of record for use on just 
such occasions as this. 

Mr. MuRrriY. He was the air expert at Pearl Harbor, wasn't he ? 

Admiral Kimmel. He was not the only air expert at Pearl Harbor. 
Admiral Halsey had been at Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. MuRPiiT. Was not he the one in charge of the Air Force at 
Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Kimmel. In charge of what? 

Mr. Murphy. The Air Force, the air defense force at Pearl Harbor. 
Was not that his assignment? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, he was in charge of the Patrol Wing 2, which 
was the patrol wing of the fleet. 

[74^5] Mr. Murphy. Was not he the air base defense officer? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh yes, yes, he was the air base defense officer, 
that is right, yes, and as such he was charged with the operation of 
these patrol planes, and such Army patrol planes as were supplied to 
him for the purpose of conducting long-range reconnaissance and 
bombing operations. 

Mr. Murphy. He was the very officer of the Navy who was to make 
any reconnaissance that should be made, and who was to contact the 
Army, to get the Army's planes, to use them in the event a recon- 
naissance was made, is that right? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is true ; yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Notwithstanding that fact, and notwithstanding the 
fact that you discussed the war warning message with ever so many 
of your men. you never consulted your air man, did you ? 

Admiral Kimmel. He was not the only air man we had there. He 
was rear admiral in charge of this patrol wing. If you mean that I 
did not tell him about the war warning, that is correct. I did not tell 
a great many other admirals about the war warning. I did not tell a 
great many other people in Hawaii about the war warning. But Ad- 
miral Bellinger was there directly under my orders, and I felt capable 
of giving him any orders that he required. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, I am not inquiring about orders [74561 
now, I am inquiring about a staff consultation, in view of a war warn- 
ing coming from Washington, to discuss with your airman the neces- 
sity for taking any measures appropriate to the occasion in view of the 
war warning having arrived. 

Admiral Kimmel. He took the measures that I considered neces- 
sary. 

Mr. Murphy. In other words, he took what orders you gave him, 
but there was no consultation with your air defense officer? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. The fact is that there was a plan under way, was 
there not, before December 7, to have a separate air department in the 
Navy and you opposed it, did you not? 

Admiral Kimmel. A separate air department in the Navy? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir. We have some correspondence here to that 
effect. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2757 

Admiral Kimmel. 1 did not know of any movement in the Navy, 
any serious movement to have a separate air department in the Navy. 

Mr. Murphy. Will counsel tell me the number of the exhibit that 
is the correspondence about a separate air force, and the letters from 
Admiral Kimmel? Do you have that? 

Mr. Masten. I haven't that here, Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. I think there is such a letter. I will [74^7] 
produce it in the morning. 

Admiral Kimmel. I am perfectly willing to give my views, if that is 
what you are driving at. 

Mr. Murphy. I am only interested. Admiral 

First of all let me say this : I think it is highly regrettable that cir- 
cumstances are such that a man who rendered honorable service for 40 
years in the United States Navy should have to be answering my ques- 
tions, and I am only asking them because of the occasion of my being 
here, and because of what happened on December 7. I am only in- 
terested in what your views were, what your views as commander in 
chief were up to and including December 7, 1941. 

Admiral Kimmel, I was endeavoring to give you those as honestly 
as I can. 

Mr. Murphy. All right, Admiral. Now, then, did you write a let- 
ter in which you opposed a separate air force in the Navy prior to 
December 7, 1941 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Did I oppose it ? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. Most emphatically, yes. I still oppose it. 

Mr. Murphy. Right. If there had been a separate air arm in the 
Navy on December 7, Admiral Bellinger would have been in the con- 
sultation in order to determine the appropriate- [74^8^ ness 
of the reconnaissance, would he not? 

Admiral Kimmel. No; I think the man I would have consulted 
would have been the senior airman in the fleet, and that was Admiral 
Halsey, and I did so consult him. 

Mr. Murphy. In other words, even if you had a separate air force 
you would not have a consultation, I take it, with the man responsible 
for the air base defense and the man responsible for having a recon- 
naissance started, and the man responsible for calling on the Army 
for reconnaissance planes ? Even under those circumstances he would 
not be consulted ; is that right ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think you are laboring somewhat under a mis- 
apprehension. 

Mr. Murphy. It may be. I am only a layman and you are an 
admiral. 

Admiral Kimmel. As a matter of fact, so far as this activity is con- 
cerned, Admiral Bellinger was the air base defense officer and Admiral 
Bloch was the naval base defense officer, and Admiral Bellinger, for 
ordinary purposes, was directly under the command of Admiral Bloch. 
I just want to get the organization straight in your mind. The man 
who was responsible, insofar as the Navy was responsible for the 
defence of the base, was Admiral Bloch. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, I will check the record with you a [7439] 
little on that, Admiral Kimmel. 

Admiral Kimmel. Sir? 



2758 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. MuRPHT. I say, let me check the record a little bit on that. 
There seems to be a little confusion on that. It may be in the record. 

[^7460] Admiral Kimmel. I gave orders at times directly to 
Admiral Bellinger, that is perfectly true, and I did to a great many 
subordinates, but that doesn't alter the organizational set-up. 

Mr. Murphy. The fact is that as soon as the air raid occurred at 
Pearl Harbor, Admiral Bellinger immediatel}^ assigned two men to 
the interceptor command, didn't he? 

Admiral Kimmel. I presume he did. I don't remember. 

Mr. Murphy. There were no men there before from the Navy, were 
there, before the raid, but two immediately afterward? 

Admiral Kimmel. There were men there. I told you about one 
of them, at least, that I sent over to help. And that assignment of 
these men to the Air Interceptor Command was the duty of Admiral 
Bloch and Admiral Bellinger, to furnish and supply the Army with 
whoever they could to help them in the Air Interceptor Command. 

Mr. Murphy. As I understand, you assigned a man to headquarters 
as a liaison between the Navy and the Army. Taylor was assigned? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, no. 

Mr. Murphy. AndKurts? 

Admiral Kjimmel. No, no. Taylor was not a liaison. 

Mr. Murphy. Taylor was assigned as a technical man. [74^1] 
I am sorry. 

Admiral Kimmel. He was assigned as a technical man. Kurts was 
also a technical man. Kurts was a technical man insofar as materiel 
was concerned. Taylor was a technical man insofar as operations 
were concerned. 

Mr. Murphy. The fact is that Admiral Bellinger, who did not know 
about the war warning up to December 7, immediately assigned two 
men to the interceptor command right after the air raid, didn't he? 

Admiral Kjmmel. I presume he did if you say so. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, I am quoting from the record, Admiral. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, you also said a few minutes ago that when 
you sent a man on a mission you trusted him to do what the situation 
demanded ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Murphy. Wouldn't you expect that the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions would expect the same of you as commander in chief of the 
fleet? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think he did. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, there seems to be quite some confusion in the 
record as to the amount of discussion that occurred between you and 
General Short from the time of the receipt of the war warning mes- 
sage down to and including December 7. 

[74.62] Is it your impression that you discussed those warnings 
with General Short? 

Admiral Kimmel. It is most certainly my impression that I dis- 
cussed the warnings with General Short, and in the discussions which 
had to do with the island bases, the transfer of personnel, and materiel 
out there, the activities of General Short at Canton, and Christmas 
Islands, it was inevitable that we would discuss all phases of the 
situation. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2759 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, on November 27 in the morning you and 
General Short were together for 3 hours. Do you recall that? 

Admiral Kimmel. I don't recall exactly the time, but we were there 
for some time. Where did you get the record ? 

Mr. Murphy. I will read it to you. Admiral. I will give you the 
day and date and the page. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is approximately correct, anyhow. 

Mr. Murphy. It is my understanding that you met for 3 hours on 
November 27, and that the meeting was before the receipt of the war 
warning message. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, the morning of November 27 was before 
the receipt of the war warning message; that is right. 

Mr. Murphy. And the purpose of your meeting then was [7-^<?] 
to discuss the outlying islands? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. MuRPKY. That was the time, before you received the war warn- 
ing message, that you asked McMorris what the possibilities of an air 
raid on Oahu were ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I have testified before, and I will testify again, 
that I don't recall that. It may very well have occurred. 

]\Ir. ]MuRPiiY. I will quote the record for you on that. You met 
again on December 1, and again on December 2, and I believe on 
December 3, and at those meetings your discussions were of the outly- 
ing islands ? 

Admiral Kimmel. And other matters. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, a great deal of your time was taken up 
with a discussion on the outlying islands ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, on December 3 you came in to General 
Short with an eight -page letter; you remember that? 

Admiral Kimmel. I don't remember the date. I did go over there 
one evening. 

Mr. Murphy. That was also with regard to the outlying islands, and 
the possibility of whether the Marines or Army would take over? 

Admiral Ki3imel. Yes. 

[7464-] Mr. Murphy. Now, there has been testimony in the 
record, true or not I don't know, to the effect that one of the men 
present at the meeting testified, and I don't say it is true, but it is in 
the record, to the effect that when it came to who would take over com- 
mand, that you said the Army would "take over your dead body." 

Admiral Kimmel. I made some such statement as that, as a matter of 
emphasis. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, there was still a difference on December 
3, between you and General Short as to who would be in command if 
the Army went in there ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Murphy. You felt that because there was some Navy question, 
that they were islands, you should be in command, and General Short: 
felt that if the Army went in the Navy wouldn't command it. He was 
going to? 

Admiral Kimmel. As I remember. General Short stated about that 
time that he didn't want to send his people out there 

Mr. Murphy. That is right. 



2760 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Kimmel. If they did, he felt he should command it. 

Mr. MuKPHY. Rioht. 

Admiral Kimmel. And in my letters and dispatches to [74&5'\ 
the Navy Department subsequently, I suggested to them that the 
question of command should be settled in Washington. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, you also suggested, didn't you, that it be put 
over for a while, that if there was going to be a settlement, there ought 
to be an express direction from Washington? 

Admiral Kimmel. I suggested that it be put over for a while, not 
on account of the command. 

Mr. Murphy. No. 

Admiral Kimmel. We could have ironed that out, but for other 
technical reasons which I set forth in the letter. 

Mr. Murphy. Construction of air fields ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Supply difficulties? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. It is all in the letters. I wrote two letters 
on December 2, one a personal letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, 
one an official letter to the Chief of Naval Operations. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, I would like to direct to one part of 
your statement in which you say you did not expect an attack on 
Hawaii ? Do you recall that ? I believe it is on page 37. You were 
asked about it by Mr. Cooper yesterday. 

The Chairman. While the gentleman is looking that record up, 
the Chair will announce that in view of an [74-66] important 
engagement of one of the members of the committee, the executive 
session referred to will not be held this afternoon. 

Mr. Murphy. You said at page 37, Admiral : 

In these circumstances, no reasonable man in my position would consider 
that the war warning was intended to suggest the likelihood of an attack in the 
Hawaiian area. 

Isn't it a fact that you have already testified in a previous hearing 
that you expected a mass submarine attack on Pearl Harbor, subse- 
quent to November 27, 1941 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I testified that I thought a mass submarine 
attack was a thing to be guarded against, it was a thing that could 
have been carried out simultaneously with the other operations that I 
believed that Japan might undertake, and, furthermore, it was some- 
thing well within the capacity of the Japanese submarines. 

Mr. Murphy. Wasn't that because of the November 27 message ? 

Admiral Kimmel. What was that? 

Mr. Murphy. Was that because of the war warning, that you felt 
that way ? 

Admiral Kimmel. It was not only because of the war warning, it 
was because I felt that any time we got into war with Japan that 
there would be many submarines in the [7467] operating area. 

Mr. Murphy. Because of your statement. Admiral, I am having 
difficulty. It is my understanding that the war warning was a war 
warning, and it is my understanding that you took very definite and 
positive measures as a result of it. 

But as I remember your statement, you don't now feel that the war 
warning was a war warning. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2761 

Now, did you or did you not think it was a war warning ? I mean 
the message of November 27 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. You ask me did I or did I not believe it was a war 
warning. I never said I didn't believe it was a war warning. I said 
the words "This is to be considered a war warning," did not add any- 
thing to the message. It merely characterized the information which 
that message contained. 

Mr. Murphy. Did it make you believe, if it was a war warning, that 
war was imminent? 

Admiral Kimmel. Did it what? 

Mr. Murphy. Will you read the question ? 

(The question was read by the reporter.) 

Admiral Kimmel. No; I didn't think that war was imminent. I 
thought it was more probable than it had been before. 

[74S8] Mr. Murphy. But you said a bit ago that it was a war 
warning, and if it was a war warning, when you get a warning that 
war is coming, it ordinarily would occur imminently? 

Admiral Kimmel. No ; because I had messages throughout the year 
which I considered war warnings. 

Mr. Murphy. Let me direct your attention. Admiral, to page 645 of 
your testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry, 

Lieutenant, you will find it as page 045 in ink, and 301 typed. 

I am now directing your attention. Admiral Kimmel, to question 91 
on page 301. Do you have it before you? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; I have it before me. 

Mr. Murphy (reading) : 

Question. Did tlie receipt of Exhibit 17, which is the dispatch of November 27, 
1941, in any way change your estimation of the situation in regard to Japanese 
intentions? 

Answer. My estimate of Japanese intentions after the receipt of this dispatch of 
November 27, was as stated in the dispatch that a move would talve place within 
the next few days in the form of an amphibious expedition against either the 
Philippines or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. I estimated from tliis and 
all other information available [77/69] to me that if an aggressive move 
eventuated against a United States possession, it woi;ld be made against the 
Philippines, and if it were made against the Philippines I felt there was a very 
good chance that a mass submarine attack would occur in the Hawaiian area. 

I thought an air attack was still a remote possibility and I did not expect an 
air attack to be made on Pearl Harbor at this time, due to the tenor of the dis- 
patches and other information available to me, the difficulties of making such an 
attack. And the latest information I had from the Navy Department and other 
sources was that the greater portion of the carrier forces were located in home 
waters. 

I considered, of course, that one of the primary causes for the dispatch was as 
stated, that negotiations had ceased. Consequently, when the press indicated 
further conversations were continuing between the Japanese ambassadors and 
the State Department, the warning lost much of its force. I further assumed 
that no ultimatum had been given by the United States Government to Japan, 
because I had been informed that the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval 
Operations had submitted a recommendation to the President that no such ulti- 
matum be delivered. 

I had no knowledge of the contents and tenor of the [77/70] note handed 
by the Secretary of State to the Japanese ambassadors on November 26th until 
long after I returned to the United States. 

Now then. Admiral, I come back to your quote on page 47. [Kead- 
ing:] 

In these circumstances, no reasonable man in my position would consider that 
the war warning was intended to suggest the likelihood of an attack on the 
Hawaiian area. 



2762 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Is that consistent with what you say here : 

I felt there was a very good chance that a mass submarine attack would occur 
in the Hawaiian area. 

Admiral Kimmel. Perhaps I should have said an air attack. I was 
talking in this statement about the type of attack that did occur. 

Mr. Murphy. In that connection, let me come back to your air ex- 
pert. Didn't your air expert say that even the presence of one sub- 
marine would very likely indicate the presence of airplanes and cer- 
tainly the presence of an attack from more than one submarine would 
more likely indicate the presence of an air attack. Isn't that what 
your air expert told you in the Martin -Bellinger report? 

Admiral Kimmel. Not only did the air experts make such a state- 
ment as that, but you find in 2CL-41 some such statement as that 

[7.^7i] Mr. Murphy. Then you disregarded the Bellinger idea 
and 2CL-41 that if you had one you wouldn't have the other in view 
of this consideration ; isn't that so ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No ; I didn't. 

Mr. Murphy. Both of those say if you have submarines you will 
have air. Here you say you are going to have a mass submarine at- 
tack, but no air. 

Admiral Kimmel. I would like to point out to you now that there 
wasn't any submarine attack prior to the airplane attack on Pearl Har- 
bor. There was not. A submarine was discovered, and our people 
attacked the submarine. The submarine didn't attack any ships 
outside. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, that is not the question. I am going to come 
to that submarine and go into it. 

Admiral Kimmel. But that is the question. 

Mr. Murphy. No. My question is this: There is nothing in the 
Martin-Bellinger report, and there is nothing in 2CL-4:1 which says 
that in order to have an air attack you must have submarines, but that 
if the Japs are going to have submarines and make an attack, then 
they would like have an air attack. 

Now, then, if you expected a mass submarine attack, why couldn't 
you also expect airplanes ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I tried to explain that at great [7472] 
length. The mass submarine attack was well within the capacity 
of the Japanese. 

I thought they would probably have it, and at no time did I con- 
sider that a mass submarine attack had to be accompanied by an air 
attack. We were only taking possibilities and you could have one 
without the other. You could have an air attack without a submarine 
attack. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, all I am saying is this, isn't it so that 
in 2CL-41 and in the Martin-Bellinger report it is said that the 
presence of one submarine or more submarines by way of an attack- 
ing force, one or more, that the likelihood is that there will be also 
an air attack ; isn't that in both ? 

Admiral Kimmel, No. It said an air attack may be accompanied 
by — where is it ? 

Mr. Murphy. Will you read what it says, Admiral, please? 

Admiral Kimmel (reading) : 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2763 

A single submarine attack may indicate the presence of considerable surface 
force, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by carriers. 

That is in my own order. 

Mr. MuEPHT. That is right, and it was subsequent to your estimate 
of the situation in the Martin-Bellinger report from your air expert 
in which they pointed that out? 

[7473] Admiral Kimmel. I had much advice besides his. I 
considered his along with the other I had. 

Mr. MuEPHY. Well, I direct your attention. Admiral, to the Martin- 
Bellinger report, Exhibit 44, subsection 8, on page 3, paragraph B. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. It does say there, does it not, it appears that the 
most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air 
attack? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes; that appears there. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, Admiral, I would like to go with you, if 
I may, to the testimony of General Short before the Army Pearl 
Harbor Board. 

By the way, before I go into that, did you ever hear of any dif- 
ficulty which existed between General Herron and Admiral Richard- 
son by way of General Herron never being able to ascertain whether 
or not Admiral Richardson was having reconnaissance, and if he 
was having it, where it was? 

Admiral Kimmel. I never heard anything about it. 

Mr. Murphy. I just asked you the question. I don't know. I have 
never seen anything on it except a question asked of General Short 
in this record by one of the Board, and I will come to that specifically. 
You don't recall [T'i'^] any such difficulty, do you? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, why didn't you tell General Short about 
the message you got that the code machines were being destroyed? 

Admiral Kimmel. I have explained that. That was consistent with 
what I believed would accompany an expedition down the Asiatic 
coast. 

Mr. Murphy. Do you know that General Short said this, at page 
1620 of the record of the Roberts Board : 

The thing tliat would have affected me more — 

speaking about the message from Marshall — 

The thing that would have affected me more than the other matter 

Admiral Kimmel. Wait a minute, please. 

[7p5] Mr. Murphy. Yes. Page 1620. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to direct your attention to page 1620, 
Admiral, at which Justice Roberts, as chairman, said to General 
Short, referring to the Marshall message on December 7 : 

Well, can you tell me what was in that message that would have stirred you 
up, General Short? 

The only thing that would have affected me more than the other matter was 
the fact that they had ordered their code machines destroyed, because to us 
that means just one thing, that they are going into an entirely new phase and 
that they want to be perfectly sure that the code will not be broken for a minimum 
time, say, of three or four days. That would have been extremely significant to 
me, the code machines, much more significant than just the ultimatum. 



2764 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK" 

Then he goes on to talk about another matter which I will go into 
later. 

General Short considered that a highly important matter, the fact 
that the Chief of Naval Operations had seen fit to send yon subsequent 
to the war warning a message that code machines were being de- 
stroyed. You had that information. You said you didn't give it to 
General Short and you didn't tell anybody else to give it to him. 
Who could have given [74'^6] it to him if you didn't order it? 

Admiral Kimmel. I might say that if the Navy Department had 
considered this message of such prime importance ithey might at least 
have told me to deliver it to General Short. 

Mr. Murphy. But, Admiral 

Admiral Kimmel. May I complete ? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. Pardon me. 

Admiral Kimmel. The message which I got on December 3 I think 
was the one he was talking about. 

Mr. Murphy. I don't think you understood, Admiral. I am talk- 
ing about the reaction to the message of December 7 at which time 
Short said if he had had prior dispatch about the codes being burned 
and the machines being destroyed that it would have been of great 
significance to him. 

Admiral Kimmel. You haven't read any such testimony. 

JNIr, Murphy. You don't understand me. Admiral. 

Admiral Kimmel (reading) : 

The thing that would have affected me more than the other matter was the 
fact that they had ordered their code machines destroyed. 

Mr. Murphy. Eight. 

Admiral Kimmel. And that was in the message which General 
Short received after the attack. 

Mr. Murphy. But the fact is, Admiral, that you knew [74-77] 
they were destroying the codes and you had heard it from two or three 
different sources before December 7. 

Admiral Kimmel. No, no. No, no. 

Mr. Murphy. Let me refer you, Admiral 

Admiral Kimmel. What they said in the previous message to me, 
which came on December 3, was they had been ordered to destroy 
most of their codes and ciphers, not all. 

Mr. Murphy. Why didn't you tell General Short that ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Why didn't I? 

Mr, Murphy. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. I didn't consider that of any vital importance 
when I received it and furthermore, if the War Department, or the 
Navy Department, had considered it of such vital importance as they 
now say they do, they should at least have taken the precaution to 
tell me' to give this message to General Short. I tried my best to 
keep General Short informed of all matters but in a matter of this 
kind I used my own judgment about it. I had no objection to his 
knowing. I presumed he had gotten it. I didn't order it given to 
him because it didn't strike me as being highly significant at the time 
I received it. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, you were supposed to play golf with him 
on Sunday morning, weren't you ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2765 

[7478] Mr. Murphy. You were friendly with him. Why 
wouldn't yon tell him? 

Admiral Kimmel. I am talking about this message where "most" 
were destroyed. 

Do we have that message of the 7th? 

There is a difference there, 

]\fr. Murphy. While your assist ajit is looking, you didn't think the 
message of Marshall on the 7th was very clear either, did you ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Was very clear? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

Admiral Kjmmel. I thought it could have been a better message, 
yes, when I saw it. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, while they are looking 

Admiral Kimmel. May I get this first ? 

Mr. Murphy. All right. 

Admiral Kimmel. Now, here is a message of General Marshall. 
This is General Marshall's message : 

Japanese are presenting at one p. m. eastern standard time today what 
amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under ordei's to destroy their code 
machines immediately. Just what significance the hour may have we do not 
know but be on alert accordingly. 

And in this you will notice that he gives a flat statement, [7479'] 
not that they destroyed most of their codes and ciphers, but they are 
to destroy their code machines immediately. 

That is quite a different message from the one I received on De- 
cember 7 and I believe — on December 3, 1 mean — and I believe that is 
the message to which General Short is referring in his testimony on 
page 1620. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, you had word to the effect that you could 
authorize the outlying islands to destroy their secret papers? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Wouldn't that indicate the coming of war ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Not necessarily. One of the reasons that they 
authorized that was because they found my communications set-up 
had given them some very secret codes and they wanted them de- 
stroyed right away because they never should have had them. 

The Chairman. It is now 4 : 30. The Chair supposes that the 
member can't finish ? 

Mr. Murphy. No. It will be quite lengthy. 

The Chairman. We will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. 

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p. m. the committee recessed until 10 a. m. 
Saturday, January 19, 1946.) 



79716— 46— pt. 6 19 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2767 



mso] PEARL HARBOE ATTACK 



SATURDAY, JANUARY 19, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washmgton, D. C. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Ferguson, 
and Brewster, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Hasten, Edward P. 
Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee. 

[74S1] The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Murphy was in the process of examining Admiral Kimmel. 
Proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES 
NAVY (Retired)— Resumed 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman 



The Chairman. I think before you begin counsel have two or three 
documents they want to make a part of the record. 

]\Ir. Masten. Mr. Chairman, I find in checking the transcript on 
the three dispatches that were read into the record yesterday, the 
third of w'hich appears on page 7316, that I neglected to state the date 
of the dispatch. In order that it may be clear on the record I would 
like to state that that dispatch. No. 282301, is dated November 28, 
1941. 

As Exhibit 126, we would like to offer three documents which have 
been distributed to the committee this morning, the first of which is 
dated February 3, 1941, and is entitled "General Order No. 143, 
Organization of the Naval Forces of the United States," signed by 
Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy; the second is a single page con- 
taining excerpts from Navy regulations; the third is a document 
entitled "Pacific Fleet Staff Instructions, 1941." 

All of these have to do with the general duties and responsibilities 
of the commander in chief of the Pacific [74S'3] Fleet and his 
staff. We would like to offer those as Exhibit 126. 

The Chairman. I don't see any paper here that contains only one 
sheet. 



2768 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Masten. It is the third page of the collection of documents 
the first of which is entitled, up in the upper left-hand corner, "Gen- 
eral Order No. 143." 

The Chairman. I am talking about those others. 

Mr. Masten. It is the third page of that collection, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chaieman. Oh, I see. 

Exhibit 126 will be filed. 

(The documents referred to weie marked "Exhibit No. 126.") 

Mr. Masten. As Exhibit 127, we would like to offer a collection of 
several letters and memorandums having to do with the air situation in 
Hawaii after December 7, 1941. At page 77 of Exhibit 113 there is a 
letter dated January 7, 1942, from the commander in chief of the 
Pacific Fleet to the commander in chief of the United States Fleet 
regarding the aircraft situation in Hawaii. We would like to offer 
these as additional information regarding the situation after Decem- 
ber 7, 1941. 

The Chairman. Without objection thej^ will be filed as [7483] 
Exhibit 127. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 127.") 

Mr. Masten. As Exhibit 128, we would like to offer a collection of 
letters and memoranda, six in all, having to do with the prosecution of 
Japanese consular agents in Hawaii. This matter came up at page 
6966 of the transcript, and these letters or memoranda are the only 
documents that we have thus far discovered in this general connec- 
tion. The first is a letter dated June 4, 1941, addressed to the Attorney 
General and signed by the United States attorney for the District of 
Hawaii. We would like to offer these as Exhibit 128. 

The Chairman. It will be so filed. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 128.") 

Mr. Masten. And finally, at the reciuest of Senator Ferguson, we 
would like to offer as Exhibit 74-A a memorandum dated December 
4, 1941, to the Secretary of State signed by Mr. Maxwell Hamilton, 
regarding a conversation between the first seci-etary of the British 
Embassy and an officer of the Far Eastern Division on December 4, 
1941. We would like to offer that as Exhibit 74-A. Exhibit 74 has to 
do with warnings to nationals. 

The Chairman. It will be so filed. 

[74^4.'] (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 

7^A.") 

Mr. Masten. That is all we have. 

The Chairman. All right, Congressman Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr, Chairman, there has been quite a deal said in the 
record about establishing the fleet at Pearl Harbor, and as to whether it 
should have been or should not have been. I think it is pertinent to 
read into the record at this time a report of the United States Congress 
on why Pearl Harbor was established. 

Now, reading from "U. S. Congress, House Committee on Naval 
Affairs, Establishment of a Naval Base at Pearl Harbor in the Ha- 
waiian Islands," dated 1908 : 

The Committee on Naval Affairs, having had under consideration the bill 
(H. R. 18120) to establish a naval station at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, report the 
same with the recommendation that it do pass without amendment. 

The Hawaiian Islands afford the only possible location for a strong naval base 
in the central Pacific Ocean for a distance of over 4,000 miles from our western 
coast. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2769 

Pearl Harbor is beyond question one of the best, if not the best, natural har- 
bor in the world. It has a depth of water of over 60 feet and an area of nearly 
10 square miles, and capable of floating the combined navies of the world. It 
[7//85] is not only landlocked, but, by reason of the topography of the sur- 
rounding ground, ships lying in this harbor are out of view from the open sea. 
It is the only practicable site for a naval base in the Pacific Ocean, and is the 
recognized key to naval supremacy in those waters. Its equipment as an operat- 
ing base is a prerequisite to the most successful operation of our fleets whether 
offensive or defensive. 

For over sixty-five years the United States Government has officially recognized 
the strategetic importance of the Hawaiian Islands and the necessity of prevent- 
ing their occupation by any other nation. 

Beginning in 1842 President Tyler gave notice to all European nations that the 
United States would never consent to their occupying Hawaii or establishing any 
naval base there. 

This "Monroe Doctrine of the Pacific" was reiterated by Daniel Webster, as 
Secretary of State, in 1851, and by William L. Marcy, the great Democratic Secre- 
tary of State, by James G. Blaine, and by William McKinley. 

Captain (now Admiral) A. T. Mahan, writing in 1893, came to the conclusions: 

"To anyone viewing a map that shows the full extent of the Pacific, * * * 
two circumstances will be strikingly and immediately apparent. He will see at a 
glance that [7^86] the Sandwich Islands stand by themselves in a state of 
comparative isolation, amid a vast expanse of sea ; and again, that they form the 
center of a large circle whose radius is approximately the distance from Honolulu 
to San Francisco. * * * 

"This is substantially the same distance as from Honolulu to the Gilbert, 
Mar.shall, Samoa n, and Society Islands, all under European control except Samoa, 
in which we have a part influence. * * * 

"To have a central position such as this, and to be alone, having no rival and 
admitting no rival, * * * ^^.g conditions that at once fix the attention of the 
strategist. * * * b^^. ^q ^jj^g striking combination is to be added the remark- 
able relations borne * * * to the great commercial routes traversing this 
vast expanse. 

"Too much stress cannot be laid upon the immense disadvantage to us of any 
maritime enemy having a coaling station well within 2,500 miles, as this is, of 
every point of our coast line from Puget Sound to Mexico. Were there many 
others available we might find it difficult to exclude from all. There is, however, 
but the one. Shut out from the Sandwich Islands as a coal base, an enemy is 
thrown back for supplies of fuel to distances of 3,500 or 4,000 miles — or between 
7,000 and 8,000 going and coming — an impediment [74S7] to sustained 
maritime operations well nigh prohibitive. * * * It is rarely that so im- 
portant a factor in the attack or defense of a coast line — of a sea frontier — -is con- 
centrated in a single position, and the circumstance renders doubly imperative 
upon us to secure it if we righteously can." 

Twenty-two years ago, by the reciprocity treaty with King Kalakaua, the 
United States acquired the right to establish a naval base on Pearl Harbor. 

Ten years ago this nation, foreseeing the likelihood that they might fall into 
the hands of an Oriental nation, annexed th^ Hawaiian Islands. This momentous 
action was taken primarily because of the strategic value of the Hawaiian 
Islands and for the purpose of establishing a strong naval base on Pearl Harbor. 

Since that time a magnificent site for a naval station, consisting of over 600 
acres of land, has been purchased by the Federal Government, and a 30-foot 
channel has been dredged through the channel bar. 

The War Department has also acquired ample sites for fortifications at the 
channel entrance, and the first battery is now under construction. 

Up to the present time no beginning has been made toward the actual construc- 
tion of a naval base on Pearl Harbor. Year after year the needs of the Naval 
Establishment in other [7.^88] directions have been permitted to crowd 
it out of the naval bills. 

In the judgment of your committee the new developments on the Pacific and 
among the nations that border its shores make it imperative that a strong oper- 
ating base be established for our Navy at Pearl Hai'bor without further delay. 

A naval base at Pearl Harbor is not designed primarily for the protection of 
Hawaii. Its main purpose is to form a buffer of defense for our entire Pacific 
coast and to make possible our naval supremacy upon the Pacific. 



2770 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

An enemy in possession of Hawaii could harass and threaten our entire western 
coast. On the other hand, with our own fleet operating from a well-equipped 
base at Pearl Harbor, no fleet from the Orient would find it practicable to threaten 
our coast, because of the stronghold left in their rear and of the prohibitive 
distance from their coaling base. 

The equipment of Pearl Harbor is therefore a matter of national prudence and 
not of extravagance. It affords the nation's least expensive way of defending 
our Pacific coast. It will constitute one of the strongest factors in the prevention 
of war with any power in the Far East. 

Your committee has received memorials from all of the strongest commercial 
organizations on the entire Pacific [748.9] coast, urging that the develop- 
ment of Pearl Harbor be provided for at this session of Congress. 

The national importance of this measure is emphasized by the fact that com- 
mercial bodies from the Central West and from New York City have also 
memorialized Congress on this subject during this present session. 

The question of a naval base in Hawaii is not comparable with the same problem 
in the Philippines. Hawaii is both a i)ermanent organic part of our nation, and 
is also a source of revenue ; during the past eight years Hawaii has paid more 
than $9,000,000 into the Federal Treasury. 

Every consideration, whether of national honor or policy, demands that Pearl 
Harbor be made impregnable and equipped as a naval base immediately. 

With a naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii would be our great defensive 
outpost; in the hands of an enemy it would double the nation's cost for naval 
defense. 

Mr, Murphy. I will be glad to yield. 

Mr. Keefe. As I understand the procedure, Admiral Kimmel was 
under cross-examination. I am wondering whether the counsel is now 
presenting testimony or whether we are going on with the examination 
of Admiral Kimmel. If he is making out a case for himself of some 
kind here we ought to know about it and all of us can spend the rest 
of the next week introducing excerpts from opinions of this person and 
that person and the other person. I did not think there was any dis- 
pute about the facts that have been set forth here in that naval report 
of 1908 as to Pearl Harbor. I just wonder how far counsel is going 
to go in reading all this material into the record at this time. 

The Chairma^vt. Well, the Chair cannot answer that question. It 
occurred to the Chair that instead of reading the document it might be 
printed as a part of the transcript at this point so that it will be in the 
record. It is not my understanding tliat there is any controversy over 
the fact that Congress established Pearl Harbor as a naval base. 

Mr. Murphy. Are you through, sir? 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, that my rea- 
son for putting this in is not to destroy my voice nor to take the time 
of the committee. If I did not think it was [74^1] pertinent I 
would not have put it in, and the fact is that there has been a great 
deal in this record, as well as throughout the country, about some 
unusual situation that the President of the United States had ordered 
the fleet to Pearl Harbor, and there has been testimony of Admiral 
Richardson as well as Admiral Kimmel as to why the fleet should be at 
Pearl Harbor, and this is the basic document as to why the United 
States Congress established the base at Pearl Harbor, and if it is not 
interesting to the gentleman from Wisconsin it may be to the American 
people. It is to me. 

The Chairman. Well, the only point is whether a document that is 
admitted as an official record of Congress should be read rather than 
printed as a part of the transcript. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2771 

Mr. MuRPiiY. My only reason, Mr. Chairman, in reading it is so that 
the other members of tlie committee will know what I am putting in 
the record — of course, they can read it later — and so that Admiral 
Kimmel will know what I read, and I expect to ask some pertinent 
questions about the matter that I read. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I am inclined to agree, I would 
like to say, with the gentleman in the importance of this thing and 
we have, I think — and I would like to say this as a member of the 
minority — that we have shown considerable latitude to members of 
the majority in introducing [74^i3] what they deem proper and 
pertinent and I should be reluctant to see any restrictions imposed 
upon any individual member as to what they deem to be pertinent. 

The Chairman. There has been no restriction imposed upon any 
member whether he is a member of the majority or minority. The 
only point is whether these official documents should be read or put 
in the record for the sake of the record. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, if the Congressman wants to 
ask questions on this I think he should read it into the record so that 
the witness will be familiar with the text of it and then he will be 
in a position to answer questions. I assume that counsel is going to 
ask some questions. 

The Chairman. Well, it has been read and therefore it is all done 
and he can proceed to ask questions about it if there are any, and 
I presume there are, 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, Mr, Chairman, I would like to direct the 
committee's attention to a report on the inspection of the naval shore 
establishment in 1929 and 1930 by Ernest Lee Jahncke, Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy. I am not going to read the report but there 
were recommendations at that time back in 1930 that the Nation was 
slow in getting Pearl Harbor in the condition it should be in which 
to meet the enemy. I won't read that. Anyone who wants to read 
it can read it. 

[74^3] Now, then, Admiral, I direct your attention to an ex- 
hibit which was placed in the record this morning referring to the 
aircraft scouting force and dated December the 8th, 1941. Will you 
kindly look at that ? 

Mr, Masten, It is Exhibit 127, Mr, Murphy, 

Mr, Murphy, Exhibit No, 127, I direct 3^our attention, Admiral, 
to page 2, on the second page of the exhibit. 

Admiral Kimmel. May I have an opportunity to read this a moment, 
please, sir? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes, surely. I am referring particularly, Admiral, 
to the letter of the 22d, on the second page of the exhibit, dated 
December 22, 1941, and signed "C. L. Tinker." 

Admiral Kimmel. What is that, sir? 

Mr. Murphy. I say I am referring particularly to the letter of the 
22d, on the second page of the exhibit, dated December 22, 1941, and 
signed C, L. Tinker, T-i-n-k-e-r, brigadier general. 

Admiral Kimmel. I see it. 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to go over with you the items in that 
letter and go down first to paragraph 1, section f. On December 
22, 1941, the order directed that all planes be camouflaged. Were the 
planes camouflaged before December 7 ? 



2772 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Kimmel. I think you had better ask General Short about 
that. 

\749Jf\ Mr. Murphy. I am asking about Navy planes. Were 
the Navy planes camouflaged ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I read a letter into the record the other day 
dated in September in which I directed the dispersal of all Navy 
planes in Oahu and to proceed witli the camouflage measures. I am 
not familiar with the steps that were taken. I presume they were 
camouflaged ; I do not know. 

Mr. Murphy. You do not know yourself whether or not the Navy 
planes were camouflaged 

Admiral Kimmel, I do not. 

Mr. Murphy (continuing). Prior to the morning of December 7? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, paragraph 1, specification a : 

Ordered immediate wider dispersal of airplanes, supplies and personnel. 
And that is exactly what you had done with the Navy planes, isn't 
that so? I say that is exactly what you had ordered for the Navy 
planes ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. Paragraph b : 

Directed surveys to be made of additional fields for operation of aircraft 
on the Island of Oahu. 

c. Required the movement of pursuit into Hickam [7^95] Field area 
for more positive protection in the event of adverse weather at the former 
base at Wheeler Field. 

d. Moved 

Admiral Kimmel. Are you asking me about paragraph b? 
Mr. Murphy. No, no, I am reading it into the record. Admiral, 
because it pertains to the Army. 
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, I see. 
Mr. Murphy, Paragraph d : 

Moved obsolescent B-18 and A-20s to Bellows Field to eliminate the air- 
plane congestion at Hickam Field. A-20s were later moved to Wheeler Field. 

e. Moved one squadron B-17s to Wheeler Field to further relieve congestion 
at Hickam Field. 

Paragraph f is about the camouflaging of the planes already re- 
ferred to. 

g. Directed plans be completed for air transport of aircraft ammunition 
to Maui and Molokai, capable of dispatch on two hours notice. 

h. Have issued orders on alerts as follows : 

1. 30 before sunrise to 0800, and one (1) hour before sunset to 30 after 
sunset % Army Pursuit and Navy fighters in air. 

That was not done prior to the 7th? I say that phm was not in 
effect prior to December 7 ? 

[7Ji96'] Admiral Kimmel. No; that plan was not in effect prior 
to December 7, and my information is that they tried this for a few 
days and were forced to abandon it because the planes and crews could 
not stand up. 

Mr. MuRPJiY, We will go into that, I am glad to have j-our infor- 
mation. 

Admiral Kimmel. Isn't that correct, sir? 

Mr, Murpjiy, I don't know, I never saw this before. You say that 
this plan of the 22d was put into effect and abandoned ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2773 

Admiral Kim3iel. I am talking about this particular section which 
you have just read. 

Mr. MuHriiY. Yes. 

Admiral Ki^imel. In regard to having the planes in the air and 
warmed up and ready. My recollection is that in a report submitted 
by the commander in chief, United States Pacific Fleet, he reported 
that they had tried that and that they had to abandon it after a short 
time on account of wear and tear on both crews and planes. 

Mr. MuRPPiY. I ask for a copy of that report. We certainly ought 
to have it. It is pertinent.^ 

Admiral Kiminiel. I have seen it somewhere. I cannot put my 
fingers on it at the moment. 

]\Ir. MuRPiiY. I am going to request the Navy liaison officer to 
[74^7] produce that report so that it can be made an exhibit, and 
until such time, I will proceed reading. Admiral : 

All other Army and Navy planes inclnding pursuit excepting searching planes 
warmed up, manned and ready to take off. 

That was not done prior to December 7, Avas it ? 
Admiral KimMel. I cannot speak for the Army planes. 
Mr. Murphy. The Navy? 
Admiral Kimmel. No. 
Mr. Murphy. Paragraph 2 : 

Between 0800 and one (L) hour before sunset : - 

1/6 Army and Navy Pursuit in air. 

1/6 Army and Navy Pursuit warmed up, manned and ready to take off. 

All other Army and Navy planes including fighters excepting searching planes 
on one hours notice. 

3. One (1) hour after sunset. 30 minutes before sunrise i/4 planes on one (1) 
hours notice, % on four (4) hours notice. 

e. I have visited all operating airdromes, made ground reconnaissance of areas 
where "additional airdromes are to be located, have discussed tactical operations, 
administrative problems, morale and rowards with all major commanders. 

[7498] j. I have conferred with Com. Pat. Wing Two and expect to submit 
to the Department Conuiiander within twenty-four hours revised plans for the 
employment of the Air Force in the Hawaiian area. 

k. I have directed that plans be made and they are well under way for the use 
of certain elements of the Air Force in offensive operations. 

1. Commanding General, 18th Bombardment Wing, directed to have striking 
force of minimum of 18 B-17's available at all times. 

In connection with that. Admiral, it would be difficult to have 18 
prior to December 7 when they only had 6 in commission, isn't that 
right? 

Admiral Kimmel. I did not follow you. 

Mr. Murphy. Will you read it, please? 

(Question read.) 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. It is a fact they only had six in commission on the 7th, 
is that right. Admiral? 

Admiral Kimmel. That was my understanding and my belief at 
the time; yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Paragraph m : 

Directed that a positive system of aircraft and surface ship identification be 
arranged. 

[7499'} Admiral Kimmel. I think this will be all right, sir. 



^ See letter from the Navy Department in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5484. 



2774 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. MuEPHY. All right, Admiral. Now then I read paragraph m: 

Directed that a positive system of aircraft and surface ship identification be 
arranged. 

It is a fact, is it not, Admiral, that you had asked for that equip- 
ment before December 7, but were unable to obtain it? 

Admiral Kimmel. I have lost you, sir. I do not know where you 
are right now. I am trying to keep up. 

Mr. Murphy. I am now referring to paragraph m of the same thing 
I was reading. Admiral. 

Admiral Kimmel. "m"? 

Mr. MuEPHY. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. I see. 

Mr. Murphy (reading) : 

Directed that a positive system of aircraft and surface ship identification be 
arranged. 

The fact is that you did not have the equipment at Pearl Harbor 
but had requested it before December 7, is that right ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Murphy. I ask to have spread on the record at this point, Mr. 
Chairman, from Exhibit 112, a letter dated January 7, 1942, and I refer 
particularly to page 4 thereof, [7500] paragraph 7. 

Admiral Kimmel. Let us catch up, please, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. Page 4, paragraph 7, Admiral, which is page 80 
in the exhibit. 

Admiral Kimmel. I have it now. 

Mr. Murphy. A letter from the commander in chief. United States 
Pacific Fleet, to the commander in chief. United States Fleet. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I have it. 

Mr. Murphy. And I would like to read, Admiral, in connection with 
what you said that there was a change in the plans that were recom- 
mended, in Exhibit 127 the following, paragraph 6 on page 3 : 

With these it is not possible simultaneously and effectively to maintain neces- 
sary long-range search operations, to keep available a useful air striking force, 
and to meet constant requirements for special missions, such as covering sub- 
marine contacts and guarding convoy approach and departure, without having 
on hand for search alone at least three times the number of planes that are 
needed for search on any given day. There is no way of getting around this if 
material and personnel are to maintain the pace. Neither one nor the other can 
do more. 

Then paragraph 7, which describes the search actually [7S01] 
being made and that it had to be reduced to the following basis, which 
is therein outlined. That would be in accordance with what you said 
before, would it not ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. Probably this is what I was talking 
about. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, Admiral, I am referring to volume 35 of the 
testimony in this case and particulary to page 6489. Tlie reason why 
I am referring to this is at page 6489, which was while Admiral Stark 
was on the stand and during the course of the morning hour, the dis- 
tinguished Senator from Michigan had read into the record several 
messages about the bomb plot and about the reports, regularly and 
irregularly, at Pearl Harbor to which you have referred. 

Incidentally, I think you should have gotten that information, but 
in order to show what was before the people at Washington, at page 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2775 

6489 and at 6490 I refer to the general situation, referring to Puget 
Sound, to San Diego, to the Panama Canal and to Alaska and the 
Philippines. 

Did you know. Admiral, or do you Imow now that there were mes- 
sages about those particular areas that were not ship location messages ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I have heard — I have not seen the messages, all 
the messages, but I have been informed, and I believe that in one of 
those localities were there [7502] messages of the same char- 
acter and content as those that were requested by the high officials of 
the Government of Japan, nor did the high officials of the Government 
of Japan show any such anxiety as to the location of sliips in other 
localities. 

Mr. Murphy. I would agree with you, Admiral, that there was no 
other message which talked about the plans as to berthing ships, but 
I ask you to refer to Exhibit 2, at page 34, if you will. 

Admiral Kjmmel. I have it. 

Mr. Murphy. That is a message from Buenos Aires to Tokyo — or to 
Panama, rather 

Mr. Keefe. From Tokyo to Panama ? 

Mr. Murphy. Now, Mr. Chairman, the gentleman on the left has 
made a statement before I started a question and he was going to 
try to cut me off. We are all men. Now let us not have this needling 
going on. I want to conduct a fair examination and I do not propose 
to be cut off. 

The Chairman. The Chairman did not hear the remark. 

Mr. Murphy. I did. 

Mr. Keefe. I did not hear any such remark as that at all, and if he 
did, he does not hear well. That is all I have got to say about it. 

The gentleman has asked a question which I did not [7503] 
understand, and I wanted to understand it, I ask the reporter to 
read the question so that the members may know what the question is. 

The Chairman. Yes; the reporter will read the question. 

Mr. Keefe. Let us see what it is. 

Mr. Murphy. I ask to have it stricken. 

Mr. Keefe, I should like to have it settled, Mr. Chairman, because 
the gentleman has caustically referred to my interruption and I think 
the interruption was thoroughly justified. 

If the gentleman wants to throw the question out and start over 
again, I have no objection to that. 

The Chairman, Let us proceed, gentlemen, 

Mr. Murphy. Now, Admiral, I am referring to exhibit 2, page 34, and 
to the message which is on that page. It is from Buenos Aires to 
Toyko, and dated the 23d of September 1941. It is Circular No. 146. 
Then it says : 

Buenos Aires to Tokyo #416, 

Strictly secret ; C. O. R. 

When Minister Yamagata was in Panama lie was asked by the Italian Minister 
there to deliver some maps and charts of the Panama Canal Zone for him, which 
lie did. Since then, we had Usui go to Chile to take charge of those maps and 
upon their arrival here they were delivered to the Italian Ambassador. At the 
same time, we requested that we be given [750^] copies of them. 

Recently, these copies were delivered to us. (At the time of this delivery. 
Assistant Attache Kameda and Usui were present to ascertain that they were 
exact copies of the originals). And we entrusted them to our Navy's courier 
Tatuma who is returning home on the Buenos Aires Maru. 



2776 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Italian Ambassador here requests that upon the arrival of these papers 
in Tokyo, we notify the Italian Government to that effect through (our Embassy 
in Rome?) 

Minister Yamagata has already advised Chief of Bureau Terasaki regarding 
this matter. The Navy has also sent a report. 

That would be can inquiry which would be rather pertinent — whether 
they wanted maps of the Panama Canal — wouldn't it, Admiral? 

Admiral Ktmmel. I see nothing which indicates that the Govern- 
ment of Japan wanted maps of the Panama Canal. That follows the 
pattern of Japanese espionaoe oAer many years. 

[7605] Mr. Mukphy, You say if you saw the one about Pearl 
Harbor, in the month of September and translated on October 10, 
about the bomb plot, that would have changed your whole plan? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Murphy, This is one in September also, looking for maps of 
the Panama Canal, maps and charts. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Would that indicate a special interest in the Panama 
Canal? 

Admiral Kimmel. The difference, I think, is that in the one case 
this was information which had been gathered by the local espionage 
units in the ordinary course of their duties, and was being sent to 
Tokyo. I can see nothing in this message, and any other messages 
that I have had access to, where the Government in Tokyo was seeking 
and demanding this information at that particular time. 

Now, incidentally, I think this message might well have been sup- 
plied to me as well as the others. I did not mention it at the time. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate. Admiral, as I understand you, the dis- 
tinction you make is : It is significant if Tokyo asked for it. but not 
significant if it is supplied to [7606] Tokyo? 

Admiral Kimmel. Significant that Tokyo asked for it and related 
information on several occasions. 

Mr. Murphy. Let me come again to the Panama Canal. 

At page 36, from Panama to Tokyo. This is a message dated Oc- 
tober 2, 1941 [reading] : 

Since the recent shift in military aviation efforts to the Pacific Area the 
"Panama Air Depot" located at France Field was transferred to Curundu 
Heights (immediately adjacent to Albrook Field). 

Rear Admiral Sandler, Commander of the 1.5th Naval District, since the 
extensive activities on the Pacific end of the Canal, made public on the 1st a 
statement to the effect that because of the increase of naval supplies a four- 
story warehouse built on pier 18 (it will be completed the middle of November), 
the ammunition unloading pier (west of pier IS) consisting of 32 buildings and 
the existing buildings in the neighborhood of the Balboa drydock would all 
be taken over as warehouses. Furthermore, the i)etroleum supply tank at Boca 
on the Pacific side and at Mt. Hope (the railroad junction from which the line 
brandies to Colon and Ft. Randolph) on the Atlantic side (recently it is believed 
that these tanks have been camouflaged) have been taken over. 

[7')07] There are intelligences at hand concerning the construction of a 
food storage deix)t at Corozal which would contain sufficient foodstuffs to 
supply the Canal Zone for a six-month period, even though shipping routes 
between this point and the United States are .severed. 

Would that mean anything to you if you were at Washington and 
you had these series of messages about that particular area? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think this is in the same category as the pre- 
vious message. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2777 

Mr. Murphy. They are talking about camouflaging oil tanks and 
the like, and giving certain vital military information to Tokyo there, 
are they not? 

Admiral Kimmel. They are giving military information to Tokyo. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

Do you think that you should have had that message also? 

Admiral Kimmel. I see no reason why it should not have been 
supplied to me. 

Mr. MuRPiiY. You were awfully busy as it was without reading 
hundreds of additional messages, were you not ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I had a sizable staff out there. 

Mr. MuRPiiY. All right. 

[7S08] Now, 1 refer you, Admiral, to page 122 of the same 
exhibit 2, this being a message from Tokyo to Mexico, from the Tokyo 
Jap Foreign Minister to Mexico, Koshi, dated June 2:3, 1941. No. 106 
[reading] : 

Regarding the plans for procuring maps of the Panama Canal and vicinity, 
please have career attache Kihara make an official trip to Panama. (It might 
be well to have secretary Yoshimizii accompany him). 

Have the maps taken out by plane, and then have Sato, the Naval Attache, 
bring them to Tokyo with him when he returns. 

Furthermore, since tlie Panama Legation, in their #02 from Panama to me, 
mentioned tlie question of a trip get in touch witli tlieni regarding date and 
time of arrival. (American surveillance will unquestionably be vigilant. There 
are also some suspicions that they read some of our codes. Tlierefore, we wish 
to exercise the utmost caution in accomplishing this mission. Also any telegrams 
exchanged between you and Panama should be very simple.) 

Would not that show an luuisual interest on the part of Tokyo in 
the Panama Canal? 

Admiral Kimmel. That shows an interest; yes. 

Mr, Murphy. And would not that have been before the authorities in 
Washington when they were wondering where [7509] the 
Japanese were going to strike, if they were going to strike ? 

Admiral Kimimel. I presume it was before them. 

Mr. Murphy. Don't you think that adds a chapter, at least, to your 
impression about the bomb-plot message, that that directed that the 
attack was going to happen at Hawaii? 

Admiral Kimmel. I see nothing here requesting specific informa- 
tion of shi])s in the harbor, or their location in the harbor, and that 
type of information is good just so long as the ships remain where 
they are. This information is information of more or less permanent 
installations which will be good for a long time. 

Mr. Murphy. The fact is, Admiral, however, that the authorities 
in Washington, on deciding where the Japs were going to strike, did 
have this before them, as well as the bomb-plot message ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. I presume they did. 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to now refer you. Admiral, to page 125 
of the same exhibit. This is a message from Vladivostok to Tokyo, 
dated July 3, 1941 [reading] : 

Report on recent naval activities in this area. 

Since the beginning of the German-Soviet war the naval authorities here have 
tightened up on watch and [7510] are engaged in naval preparations by 
enforcing various exerci-ses to meet any eventuality. However, naval exercises 
are limited to only one section of the force for there are many ships which are 
undergoing repairs. Evidently the preparations ai'e intended for defense against 
Japan. 



2778 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I am wondering, Admiral, if that kind of a message had been sent 
by Japanese espionage from Hawaii to Tokyo, if there would have been 
an attack on Hawaii. They say there the Kussians are prepared to 
meet any eventuality. They could not have said that about Hawaii, 
could they? You were not prepared to meet any eventuality on 
Hawaii, were you? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think you are a better judge of that, or the 
committee is a better judge of that, sir. 

Mr. Murphy, At any rate, you had nothing at all to take care of 
an oncoming air raid by way of reconnaissance, did you, or any radar 
working at the time, or any watchers on the hills, at the observation 
posts, or any pursuit planes in the air, or any ships out scouting to 
the north from which they came, you did not have that, did you? 

Admiral Kimmel. The evidence answers all of those questions very 
conclusively. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, there was a message from [7511] 
Hawaii to Tokyo saying that there was still a good chance as I recall 
it, that there was no reconnaissance being made and still a good chance 
for a raid on Hawaii. That was a message sent to Tokyo, wasn't it, 
before the attack ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Which was translated after the attack. 

Mr. JNIuRPHY. It was, at any rate, sent to them ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think some such message was sent. 

Mr. Murphy. So that as to Hawaii, they had a message that there 
was still a good chance for an attack, but as to Vladivostok they had 
a message that the Eussians were prepared to meet any eventuality, 
did they not ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I did not read that. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, it says — let me read it to you 

Admiral Kimmel. "By enforcing various exercises to meet any 
eventuality." 

Mr. Murphy. Yes; "by enforcing various exercises to meet any 
eventuality." 

Admiral Kimmel. I cannot read there anything except exercises. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, we may differ on that, but at any rate it says 
there, "to meet any eventuality." 

[7S1£] Admiral Kimmel. I only speak of the language here; 
that is all. 

Mr. Murphy. It says — 

in naval preparations by enforcing various exercises to meet any eventuality. 

Of course, that may not mean what I think it does, but it is English, 
and we can both interpret it. 

Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to refer to the fact 

Admiral Kimmel (interposing). Certainly in the Hawaiian area we 
had had exercises designed to meet any eventuality. 

Mr. MuRPiiY. You had exercises right along up to November 20, 
and after November 20 you had no more exercises, did you ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, j^es. 

Mr. Murphy. With the Army. You did not have any exercises 
after November 20, did you, with the Army ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I do not recall those details, but we had exercises 
designed to meet any eventuality, up to and including December 7. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2779 

Mr. Murphy. The fact is that you had no exercises with the Army 
after November 20, did you, of 1941? 

Admiral Kimmel. I do not know. You have some records on that 
which I presume are correct. 

[7olo\ Mr. Murphy. All I know is what was put in the record. 

Admiral Kimmel. You are talking now about an air-raid drill. 
Tliat is by no means the only exercise to meet eventualities. 

Mr. Murphy. It was a very important one, wasn't it. Admiral, recon- 
naissance ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes; it was important, and we held the drills 
regularl}^ and as completely as possible. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, Admiral, I direct your attention to page 
G491 of the record. 

Admiral Kimmel. Page what? 

[7514'] Mr. Murphy. I am just putting this in the record. I am 
referring to paoe ()491 of the printed record at which reference is made 
to page 38 of Exhibit 2. 

Admiral Kimmel. Page 38 ? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. That is another message from Panama to Tokyo, 
dated October G, 1941 : 

The result of my investigations, as I reported in my secret letter No. 142, are 
as follows : 

1. The airplane bases which the United States is constructing are located at 
La Chorrera in Panama province, (please refer to part 4 of my #149) Chitre in 
Herrera province, Monsabo in Los Santos province and at Remidios and Las 
Ra-Hasu in Chiriqui province. 

2. The Panamanian airports already constructed which will be converted into 
military establishments are the ones at David in Chiriqui province and Paidonya 
outside the limits of Panama City. 

3. Airports which have been surveyed but because of the poor condition of the 
terrain have not been constructed, are the airports at Guarare in Los Santos 
province and at eight other projected points. 

Does that also show an additional interest on the part of Tokyo in 
the defenses of Panama ? 

Admiral Kimmel. They are always interested in the \7S16] de- 
fenses of Panama. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, 1 would like also to refer to page 39 of the same 
exhibit, from Panama to Tokyo, dated October 18, 1941, where the 
statement is made : 

In order to find out the plans of the Canal command, I inspected the military 
establishment at the Pacific end on the 10th. 

And again : 

I found that construction is going on at a rapid rate and the whole area is being 
covered with fortifications. 

Admiral Kimjeel. I have lost you, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. I will read the whole thing. I have been reading only 
the high lights. 

Admiral Kimmel. What is that? 

Mv. Murphy. I will read the whole thing : 

Ship movements from the 14th to the 18th : 

Moving toward the Pacific: 4 American, 1 British freighters; 2 American 
tankers. 

Moving toward the Atlantic: 4 American, 2 British, 1 Dutch freighters; 1 
American tanker, 1 American passenger steamer. Recently ships have been going 
through the canal at night. 



2780 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

In order to find out tlie plans of the Canal command, I inspected the military 
establishment at the Pacific end [75^6] on tlie 10th. (Naturally they do 
not allow us to inspect the forts.) I found that construction is going on at a 
rapid rate and the whole area is being covered with fortifications. Specifically, 
at Albrook Field, 3 large hangars, storehouses for airplane parts, underground 
tanks, and 8 barracks to accommodate 200 men each. 

At Corozal, 4 two-hundred-men barracks, 55 two-family officer's quarters and a 
50O-patient hospital are nearing completion. 

That again would show an active interest of Tokyo in the Panama 
Canal area, would it not? 

Admiral Kimmel. It shows an interest, yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I direct your attention to an entry on page 
40, from the Panama Canal, or from Panama to Tokyo, dated October 
18, 1941, and you will find in that particular message, Admiral, without 
my reading it, a reference to gun emplacements at Panama. 

Admiral Kimmel. A reference to what kind of place ? 

Mr. Murphy. Gun emplacements. 

Admiral Kimmel. I presume so. I haven't read it. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, I direct your attention to page 51. That par- 
ticular message, while it is dated November 22, 1941, it is translated 
December 5, 1941. Of course that was before the Japs but not before 
Washington, but I think [7S17] it shows the course of conduct 
of the Japanese. 

You will find the following: 

The United States Government is going on the assumption that the attack on 
the Canal will be made from both air and sea. 

Do you see that, Admiral ? 
Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; I see it. 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to direct your attention to page 52, a 
message from Panama to Tokyo, dated November 22, 1941 : 

The anti-air defenses ( ?) on lock #1, which is now being used, are being im- 
proved. (Of course, there are anti-air defenses (?) at lock #3.) The naval 
defense area patrolled against possible lightning attacks, extends in the north 
from Salina Cruz on the Tehuantepec Isthmus to Monepene (on ?) the Gulf of 
Fonseca. The southern limits extend to the air base on the Galapagos Islands. 

That would seem to divide up Panama a bit, wouldn't it, as to air 
defenses, and as to what they have in each section ? 

Admiral Kimmel. The message speaks for itself there. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, Admiral, they talk about anti-aircraft defenses 
on lock 1, and again on lock 3, and then talk about the naval defense 
area, don't they ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is riglit. 

[7S18] Mr. Murphy. Now, Mr. Chairman, on page 6493 of the 
record, in order that the committee, or whoever desires to read in the 
record the messages which are along the lines to which I have referred 
at the Panama Canal, covering Alaska, covering the Philippines and 
the other areas, are referred to by me by page numbers. 

The stenographer has copied into the record all of the entries re- 
ferred to by the distinguished Senator from Michigan, but he has not 
copied into the record the references which I have given, but only 
shows the page numbers. 

I ask at this point the entries on the pages referred to on page 6493 
be spread in the record. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2781 

The Chairman. Without objection, it will be so ordered. 
(The messages referred to are as follows:) 

[7519] From: Manila 
To: Tokyo 
August 20, 1941 
#532 

Re your Circular #1793.* 

I am reporting to you below information which I haVe been able to get, though 
it may be somewhat incoherent. 

1. There are many tall buildings in the city, to the upper stories of which ad- 
mittance is forbidden. It is thought, therefore, that anti-aircraft guns have been 
placed in them. It is fairly certain that guns have been placed on the Great 
Eastern Hotel (some have actually seen ten disguised machine guns on the top of 
it), the (hitchcock?) Avenue Hotel (this is the former Marco Polo Hotel), and 
on the Insular Life and the Trading Commerce. Besides these, I presume guns 
have been placed on top of the Capitol, the Municipal Building, the post office, 
etc. (I believe that the army and navy both have in their possession a map 
giving the locations of the tall buildings in the city). 

2. A person has seen during the evenings in the latter part of July, 36 anti- 
aircraft guns being transported to Camp Murphy. 

ARMY 21461 Trans. 8/26/41 (6) 



« Not available. 



[7520] From: Manila (Nihro) 
To : Tokyo 
September 22, 1941 
#623 

Re my message #618." 

The Phoenix left port the morning of the 22nd. 
ARMY 22771 Trans. 9/27/41 (6) 



« See SIS #22772. 



From: Davao (Kihara) 
To: Tokyo 
September 26, 1941 
#135 

Upon my arrival to take up my post here, I heard the following report con- 
cerning Zamboanga " : 

Since last August American destroyer tenders, destroyers and submarines 
enter that port from the South Seas every Saturday. After they have lain at 
anchor for one or two days they leave again for the South. In summing up the 
statements of members of the crews of these boats, it appears that these warships 
ply the waters from Jolo " to Tawao " and Tarakan ** on the island of Borneo. 

ARMY 24468 Trans. 11/7/41 (6) 



" A city on the island of Mindanao. 

''Name of the island connecting the main Philippine group [752/] to Borneo 

■= Town in British North Borneo. 

•^ In Netherlands Borneo. 



From : Tokyo 
To : Davao 
October 2, 1941 
#62 

Re your #105 «. 

Please wire me the location and movements of fishermen and since your 

last report. 

ARMY 2597 Trans. 12-4-41 (6) 

" Not available. 

79716 — 4fi— pt. 6 -20 



2782 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

From: Tokyo (Toyoda) 
To : Manila 
October 4, 1941 

#318 

I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along the east, 
west and southern coasts of the Island of Luzon, reporting on their progress, 
strength, etc. Also please investigate anything else which may seem of interest. 

AKMY 23207 Trans. 10/8/41 (6) 



[7522'] From: Manila (Nihro). 
To: Tokyo 
1 November 1941 
(RE your #318) 

Strict guard is being maintained hence the gathering of information is ex- 
tremely difficult. We are making secret investigations but I will wire you the 
following newspaper and foreign office reports for the present. 

1. The incorporation of the Philippine Army into the Far Eastern Army is 
progressing slowly but surely and it is reported that by the end of the year the 
incorporation of 120,000 will be completed. Additions to the barracks at the 
various camps are being rushed to completion. It seems that particular emphasis 
is being placed on the concentration of military strength. 

Localities are as follows : 

Kabanatuan, San Marcelino (several groups missing). 

Furthermore there is to be a great increase in the number of soldiers stationed 
in the vicinity Llngayen during the month of November. Army maneuvei-s are 
to be carried out during the middle of the month. This may be a temporary 
measure. 

[7523] 2. In the vicinity of Mariveles more than 3,000 workmen are being 
used to rush the work on the various projects. However, there are not more 
than 300 infantry and cavalry troops stationed there. 

On the 27th, what I estimated to be between 2,000 and 3,000 infantry troops left 
Manila by bus headed north. Their destination may have been the above place. 
It is being investigated at present. It appears that three airports are being built 
there and the docks are being enlarged. 

In the Bataan area the surveillance is particularly strict and it is said that 
even the entry of Filipinos is prohibited. 

3. Work is being rushed on the road between Dingalan and RAAKU (Laur?) 
and by the middle of October there were less than two kilometers that had not 
been completed and this will be finished in the near future. The road between 
Infanta and Manila is being widened to 5 meters. Work is being carried on day 
and night and the progress is amazing. 

4. In Iba there are 30 or 40 fighter planes, 20 or 30 light bombers and several 
score of altitude planes ( ?) it is said. 

Details by Mail. 

17524] *JD-1 : 5681. "I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new 
defense works along the east, west and southern coasts of the island of Luzon, 
reporting their progress, strength, etc. Also please investigate anything else 
which may seem of interest." 
(SIS #23207) 

JD-1 (H) Navy Trans. 11-4-41 (S-TT) 

24382 



From: Manila (Nihro) 
to : Tokyo 
November 4, 1941 
#727 
Intelligence. 

1. Since about a month ago little by little brown [7525] soldiers have 
been arriving at the Stotsenburg Barracks. The number at present is about two 
or three thousand. In view of the fact that these soldiers speak Spanish, they 
may be "Iko's." I understand that they are not very friendly with American 
soldiers. We are now secretly investigating where they have come from. 

2. Taraiao." Recently the Miguel Air Field has been extended to form a rec- 
tangle about 1,000 meters long. 

■ Tarallo, Camarlnes Province. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2783 

8. All the wooden bridges on the national highway between Taraiao and 
Lingayen" have been replaced with concrete bridges. 

4. At the foot of a hill situated to the north of Teraiao (the hill overlooks the 
Llngayen Gulf) about 200 barracks have been constructed. I understand that 
new barracks are being built at Ste Ignatia. 

5. From what I hear the American soldiers stationed at Stotsenburg main- 
tained an arrogant attitude toward the Filipinos and, since there have been two 
or three cases of assault on Filipinos, the Filipinos are furious. 

ARMY 24626 Trans. 11/12/41 (6) 

" Pangasinan Province, Luzon, Philippine Islands on Llngayen OoU. 



[7526] From : Tokyo 

To : Manila 

5 November 1941 

#355 

For Secretary Yuki 

The Naval General Staff has requested that investigation be made on the fol- 
lowing items. Please arrange as you think best for the same : 

These items in regard to each port of call : 

(1) Conditions at air ports on land. 

(2) Types of planes at each, and number of planes. 

(3) Warships ; also machinery belonging to land forces. 

(4) State of progress being made on all equipment and establishments. 
JD-1: 6424 (F) Navy Trans. 11-13-41 (6-AR) 

24696 



From: Manila (Nihro) 
To : Tokyo 
November 12, 1941 
#754 

According to a report handed on to me by a Japanese [7527] who has 
lived in the Province of Ilocos Norte for some fourteen or fifteen years, the follow- 
ing has been ascertained, 

1. At the present time there are approximately 400 Philippine soldiers and 
seven or. eight officers stationed in Laoag'. It is being rumored, however, that 
the Philippine troops will be increased to approximately 1,700. At the present 
time they are constructing additional barracks. 

2. There seems to be no indication that they plan the expansion of the 
present civil airport in Laoag (length 1,200 metres; width, 850 metres) nor 
are they stationing any military planes at that field. Aside from a reconnais- 
sance flight nightly (one plane) over the coastal area in the vicinity of the 
citv, no extensive activity is in progress. 

3. Though it is said that Claveria *• and Burgos" are being equipped with 
, the details are unknown. (I am continuing my private investi- 
gations in this connection.) 

ARMY 25064 Trans. 11/21/41 (6) 

« Seaport In the Province of Ilocos Norte on the Island of Luzon, P. I. 
» Towns on the northern shore of the Island of Luzon, P. I. 



[7528] From: Manila (Nihro) 
To: Tokyo 
November 12, 1941 

#755 

A report given me by a Japanese who resides in Camarines Norte' is as 
follows : 

1. In that area at the present time there does not seem to be many troops 
stationed. Only about 60 members of the Philippine Patrol organization, with 
headquarters in Daet", are located in that area. Every day five or six of these 
patrolmen are dispatched as a relief unit to Paracale ' and Jose Panganiban ". 

■ Province near southeastern extremity of Luzon. 

" City on southeastern extremity of the Island of Luzon. 

" Seaport In the province of Camarines Norte, 

1 English spelling. Cannot identify. 



2784 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2. The Civil Airport at Paracale is not being used at the present time. Inso- 
far as the military air field at Daet is concerned, though one or two military 
planes landed there during February of this year, from that time to this there 
has not been a single military plane alight on this field. As this field is located 
right on the beach, should it be necessary it is said that naval planes could 
land in the shipping lane just off the beach as well. 

3. On the point of land, San Muricio *, north of Jose Panganiban it is rumored 

that they are equipping with , but this has not been verified. (I 

am continuing my secret investigations.) 

[7529] 4. Twelve or thirteen coastal reconnaissance planes were seen to 
have flown over the area within a period of three days. Toward the latter 
part of last year 13 American freighters are said to have entered the port of 
Panganiban. Since then, almost on the average of once a week, American 
freighters sail from Batganas ' to Hondagua ^. 
ARMY 25162 

« English spelling. Point of land cannot be identified. 

' Seaport in southwestern Luzon. 

s Seaport on Lopez Bay off Lamon Bay. 



From : Toyko 

To: Manila 

15 November 1941 

#368 

Strictly confidential. 

Re your #746* 

Please a.scertain by what route the large bombers went to the Philippines, 
and also please make investigations again as to their niunber. 

(SIS #24850) 
JD-1 : 6753 25236 (H) Navy Trans. 11-24-41 (AK) 

•JD-l : 6545. Reports 32 B-19 bombers in the PhUippines. 



[7550] From: Manila (Nihro) 

To: Tokyo 

15 November 1941 

#767 

1. It has been ascertained that the ship of my #757*, paragraph 2, was a 
British transport, the AWATEA which entered port at the same time under 
convoy, (12000 or 13000 tons, 700 or 800 soldiers on board). Both ships sailed 
again on the evening of the 14th, destination unknown. 

2. On the afternoon of the 14th, 4 destroyers, 11 submarines, 1 minelayer 
entered port. 

3. Ships in port on the 15th : 
A Manila : 



MADDO BBRU** 
Portland HON 
BUKKU WOHOTOSU 
BERU 8 destroyers 






20 submarines 
1 minelayer 


[75311 B. Cavite: 
TON 
PASU 








SIS #24780 

JD-1: 6754 25237 (H) Navy Trans. 


11- 


-25-41 


(AR) 



!^?;;1.U^^^^- .^^ movements of U. S. Naval and British Naval craft in ManUa area. 
•*BERD repeated. 



From: Manila 

To: Tokyo 

15 November 1941 

#767 

We are retransmitting our machine telegram of the 14th with indicator 97720 
because of a mistake on the plug board, as follows : 
The following is from a report of a Japanese resident of Cebu. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2785 

1. At present there are about 300 American and 2500 Filipino soldiers stationed 
there. (There are four barracks each with a capacity of about 500 or 600 
soldiers. 

2. The airport has an area of about 196 acres but is being enlarged (by use of 
convict labor). [7532] About 12 planes (of medium size) used by the 
Philippine Army, have been transported to Java by air, and 12 or 13 American 
Army planes (monoplanes — whether they were scout planes or pursuit planes was 
not clear), are now stationed there. In addition to these there is one large 
bomber in the hangar (double type, capacity 40 planes.) 

3. The headquarters of the former patrol force are being used as the com- 
misariat storehouse and all sorts of provisions are being stored there. 

4. On the 22nd of September, about 20 American warships anchored on the 
northwest coast of the Sulu Archipelago. Around the middle of October two 
destroyers and one cruiser entered Cebu harbor and early this month, one oil 
supply ship of the 20,000 ton class, and a camouflaged cruiser of the 10,000 ton 
class, entered port and anchored for two or three days. It has been recognized 
that occasionally two or three American ships anchor around the south of 
Mactan, Bacol, and Panglao. 

5. There is an open drydock at MAKUGAA (operated by Chinese) capable of 
handling ships up to 10,000 tons. 

JD-1 6587 24933 (H) Navy Trans. 11-18-41 (S-TT) 



[7533] From : Manila (Nihro) 
To : Tokyo 
November 22, 1941 
#785 

1. A camouflaged British cruiser (guessed to be 4 or 5 thousand tons; having 
S guns; name unknown) entered port on the morning of the 21st and anchored 
at Pier #7, sailing at 5 in the afternoon, destination unknown. 

On the 21st an American transport (rumored to be the President Harrison) 
entered port and took on soldiers (number unknown) and material. 

2. Boats anchored in port on the 22nd were : 

Manila — Portland (entered the port on the 21st) ; Marblehead ; Black Hawk; 
Isabel ; Heron ; Wohotosu " ; one mine layer ; 9 destroyers ; 20 submarines. 

Cavite — Houston (?); Canopus. 
AHMY 25471 Trans. 11/29/41 (6) 

■ Kana spelling. 



From : Manila (Nihro) 
To : Tokyo 
November 24, 1941 
#789 

1. Putting together various reports, it appears that a large amount of military 
stores was removed from the "port [753^] area" during the "black-out" of 
the night of the 21st. Forty or fifty civilian buses (carrying the "mark" of the 
Manila Electric Company) were seen in the Rizal Province district. Investiga- 
tions are being made to find out if these were loaded with troops. 

2. At about 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the 22nd, 60 light tanks (carrying 

one gun two ) and 20 ammunition trucks were seen leaving (Quezon Bridge?). 

These light tanks and ammunition trucks were seen on the 21st grouped near 
the headquarters of the "port area" military police. It is conjectured that 
(troops?) arrived on military boats recently entering the harbor. An English 
language "bulletin" of the 24th stated that a large number of light tanks and 
ammunition trucks had left at 4 and 6 o'clock on the afternoon of the 22nd in 
transit for Meycuayan in Bulacan Province and San Fernando in Pampanga 
Province. I believe that these had been landed sometime around the 21st. The 
final destination of these tanks and trucks is now being investigated. 

3. At present it is seen that there are two or three hundred American army 
trucks near the "port area" which have been imported at short intervals, creating 
a hurried atmosphere. Also, troops have newly arrived at (certain places in ?) 
the hills within the -city. They are evidently American reinforcements. Feel- 
ing among the people in general has become tense. 

ARMY 25530 Trans. 12/1/41 (6) 



2786 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[7535] From: Manila (Nihro). 
To: Tokyo 
26 November 1941 

#790 

1. On the 23rd a camouflaged submarine tender, the Holland* (5 or 6 thou- 
sand tons, apparently a camouflaged Dutch vessel), entered port. 

2. On the 24th, 5 submarines left port, destination unknown., 

3. On the 25th, 7 destroyers left port, destination unknown. 

JD-1: 7035 25708 (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (6-AIl) 
•Probably the U. S. S. HOLLAND of 8000 tons. 



From: Manila (Nihro). 

To: Tokyo 

27 November 1941 

#797 

The Portland, BUKKU *, 2 destroyers, 10 submarines, left port on the 
26th {?). Destination unknown. 

JD-1: 7082 25782 (H) Navy. Trans. 12-5-41 (&-AII) 

♦Probably Black Hawk. 



[7536] From: Manila (Nihro) 
To: Tokyo 
November 28, 1941 
#799 

Recently they have utilized a group of nine planes (one flight of six and 
another of three planes) in high-level scouting patrols over the city of Manila 
from four o'clock in the morning. In addition, three other planes fly over the 
city independently. Though in the morning and evening the weather is clear 
and windless, squalls come once a day. 

ARMY 25764 Trans. 12/5/41 (6) 

[7S37] Mr. Murphy. Admiral, was it not your feeling while 
you were commander in chief of the fleet, that you had an attack force 
mission to perform and that you should not be obliged to participate 
in the defense of the Hawaiian Islands as such ; I mean the base itself? 

Admiral Kdvimell. I felt, and I believe all the Navy felt, that the 
real mission of the Pacific Fleet was offensive, and I think that noth- 
ing has ever occurred to change that conviction in the minds of any 
responsible naval officers. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, I would like to refer your attention to 
a letter which you wrote, and in which you objected to having the 
combined houses for the Army and Navy. 

By the way, there was a proposition, was there not, that the Army 
and Navy commanders, the commanding general and commander in 
chief of the fleet at Hawaii be housed together in the same building? 
That was made prior to December 7, was it not? 

Admiral Kimmell. My recollection of that is that that referred to 
an information center. 

Mr. Murphy. No, I think you will find it is beyond that. 

Mr. Masten. Mr. Murphy, that is Exhibit 123. 

[75S8] Mr. Murphy. Will you get that exhibit for the admiral, 
please ? 

(The document was handed to Admiral Kimmel.) 

Mr. Murphy. Do you have Exhibit 123 before you ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2787 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; I have Exhibit 123. 

Mr. MuRPHT. I direct your attention to the second page of that 
exhibit, being a letter from the commandant, Fourteenth Naval Dis- 
trict, for the Chief of Naval Operations. 

Admiral Kimmel. Wait a mmute. Will you say that again ? 

Mr. Murphy. I direct your attention to the second page of the 
exhibit, a letter dated November 3, 1941. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

[7S39] Mr. Murphy. From the commandant. Fourteenth Naval 
District, to the Chief of Naval Operations, by way of the commander 
in chief. United States Pacific Fleet. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Paragraph 1 says : 

It is recommended that no steps be taken at the present time to concentrate 
the Army and Navy in a common building as proposed in reference (a). 

That was a plan to combine how much of the Army and Navy, 
Admiral? 

Admiral Kimmel. My recollection of all this is that that was a 
common information center. Under date of the 15th of October 1941, 
you will see a dispatch. He says : 

Your dispatch 140400 to BUDOCKSX request consideration be given to con- 
struction of combined operating center suflBcient in size and facilities to accommo- 
date in time of emergency staffs of all essential operating activities of both Army 
and Navy in Hawaii such as CINPAC COMFOURTEEN COMTRAIN 
COMSUBFOR COMPATWING and parallel activities of Army. CNO considers 
contemplation of Army and Navy activities in one building of proper construction 
constitutes great advantage for emergency operations. Comment with recom- 
mendations including location and estimate of cost requested. 

Mr. Murphy. Was not that to combine all of you in one [TS^O] 
building? 

Admiral Kimmel. It is a combined operating center. 

Mr. Murphy. It says, "operating activities * * * of CINPAC 
COMFOUKTEEN." Would not that put you and Admiral Bloch 
together in the same building ? 

Admiral Kimmel. If that had been carried out, yes. That is what 
it says. 

Mr. Murphy. I say that is the recommendation, is it not ? 

Admiral Kimmel. It would not necessarily put me and Admiral 
Bloch in the same building. It would put the operating staffs neces- 
sary for the Army and Navy together in one building. 

Mr. Murphy. In the November 3 letter Admiral Bloch says : 

I do not believe that the Commander-in-Chief or the Fleet operations would 
be benefitted by being in a common office building with the Commanding General 
and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 

That was his version of it there, wasn't it, at the bottom of the page, 
in paragraph 5, about the fifth line up from the bottom ? 

Admiral Kimmel. What is that? 

Mr. Murphy. Referring to the letter of November 3, 1941, paragraph 
5, the fifth from the last line. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. Wliat about it? 

[7541] Mr. Murphy. It says there: 

I do not believe that the Commander in Chief or the Fleet operations would 
be benefitted by being in a common office building with the Commanding General 
and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 



2788 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

So that his impression apparently was that they were discussing 
putting all three of you in the same building, isn't that right? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; they were discussing that. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmell. The operating agencies. 

I might shorten up your work here if you want to, however. 

JNIr. MuEPHY. All right. You mean by saying it was adopted after 
December 7 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. It was adopted? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes, wasn't it, after December 7 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Not in that form, no. I do not know what was 
done after December 7 definitely, because I have not been out there 
since, and I haven't talked it over with people, but my general feeling 
at the time, and as I have expressed it in here, I think I have expressed 
it in some of these letters — I have not had a chance to read them re- 
cently — but the fleet commander should not be concerned with the 
immediate operation of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. You had a 
naval admiral and an Army general, and fleet [^5-^] com- 
mander in my opinion should have been free to do other things besides 
concerning himself with the details of the defense of Hawaii. 

Mr. Murphy. That is exactly what I am'coming to. In other words, 
that was your feeling on December 7, and prior thereto, and in your 
letter of November 3, the first endorsement dated November 3 on page 
2 in that exhibit, under paragraph (f), I mean paragraph 3, sub- 
paragraph (f). 

In objecting to a combined operating center for tbe Army and Navy — 

you say- 



Admiral Kjmmel. Wait a minute. 
Mr. Murphy. Excuse me. That is paragraph 3(f). 
Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. You say there, "in objecting," and so forth, paragraph 
3. Then you say : 

On the other hand, there are manifest disadvantages among vphich are the 
building — 

and then I go down to (f) — 

It would have at least a psychological tendency to divert Fleet units to de- 
fensive tasks. 

Admiral Kimihel. That is right. 

Mr. Murphy. In other words, you did not feel that the planes of the 
fleet should be used for the purpose of defending that base, did you? 
You felt that Admiral Bloch should have his own planes and the Army 
should have their planes, that absolutely and primarily it was an 
Army obligation and l'^^-^^] that you should be left to go on 
with your preparation to fight, because that is what you thought you 
were out there for, isn't that right? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, but I made plans to utilize every facility, 
every naval facility that happened to be in Pearl Harbor in the de- 
fense of Pearl Harbor, and I think that the plans that I made show 
that most conclusively. 

Mr. Murphy. You did object to "Washington to the fact that you had 
to do that, did you not? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2789 

Admiral Kimmel. Certainly I objected, and I objected because I 
wanted to have those planes free for other things, and I knew that 
even with all the planes and everything we had that we were forced 
to make a choice as to what we could and should do. 

Mr. MuKPHY. You complained to Admiral Stark; and Admiral 
Stark, in effect, kind of agreed with you but said, "There is no choice. 
We have to do it," did he not? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. MuKPiiY. That was an old problem, because it existed back in 
1940 with Admiral Richardson, did it not? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; it existed always. 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to read into the record from a letter 
dated November 28, lO'iO, a letter to Admiral Stark from Admiral 
Richardson. I would like to refer to the second [7544] para- 
graph, Admiral, which reads as follows : 

With regard to the first of these matters, I will take this up with Bloch on my 
arrival back in Hawaii. This fight on the problem does not give me a great deal 
of concern and I think it can easily be provided for. I think torpedo nets 
within the harbor are neither necessary nor practicable. The area is too restricted 
and ships at present are not moored within torpedo range of the entrance. 

In that connection I would like to direct your attention, Admiral, 
to the discussion of the torpedo nets at Haw^aii. 

Mr. Masten. That is Exhibit 116, Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. MuRPiiY. Exhibit No. 116. Do you have your copy of it? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, there was a letter in February that gave you 
the impression that there was no danger of a torpedo attack at Pearl 
Harbor. Do you recall that ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Gave me definite data, which was conclusive, 
that there was no danger of torpedo attack in Hawaii or in Pearl 
Harbor. 

Mr. Murphy. Right. By the way, there was reference made, when 
counsel was questioning you, to Whitehead torpedoes that were pur- 
chased by the Japs. Is it not a fact that the Japanese had perfected 
those torpedoes in 1931 for the [754^'] specific purpose of being 
used in an attack on Pearl Harbor ? Of course, we did not know about 
that. 

Admiral Kimmel. Of course, I did not know about that, but if that 
be true, this is the first time I ever heard it. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, it is my impression, and only an impression, 
that in the record a statement is made that the Japanese perfected this 
torpedo for use against Pearl Harbor in 1931. Of course, the Navy 
did not know about it, and I am not criticizing the Navy. 

Admiral Kjmmel. No. 

Mr. Murphy. But I am putting it in the record. 

Admiral Kimmel. I think you are a little bit in error. 

Mr. Murphy. All right. 

Admiral Kimmel. My understanding, although I do not Imow, is 
that they took some Whitehead torpedoes that were manufactured in 
1931 and shortly before Pearl Harbor they succeeded in so altering 
them as to make them suitable for use in the waters of Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Murphy. It may be so. 

Admiral Kimmel. I think that is the correct statement. 



2790 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. I am glad to have you say that. My only reason for 
going into it, Admiral, was, I was wondering if the Japs were plotting 
an attack on Pearl Harbor in 1931. Some people in this country would 
have us believe that they started [7546] to prepare on No- 
vember 26, 1941. . . 

I am referring, Admiral, to this group of letters in Exhibit 116, and 
you have already covered the letter written in February that led you 
to believe that there was absolutely no danger from torpedoes. 

This reference has been made to the letter in June. Do you remem- 
ber that? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Murphy. The letter of June 13. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Murphy. Where they discussed Taranto. Now, both the opin- 
ion of Admiral King and a great many opinions are to the effect that 
the idea was then abandoned. 

I now direct your attention to the letter of September 16, 1941. 

Admiral Kimmel. Wait a minute. It appears I haven't got that 
letter. 

Mr. Murphy. You say you do not have the letter? 

Mr. Masten. Is it in the same exhibit ? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

Mr. Masten. What is the date of it? 

Mr. Murphy. September 16, 1941, a letter from Admiral Ingersoll. 

Mr. Masten. I think you will have to read from the copy [7547] 
you have, Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. Under date of September 16, Admiral. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. A letter was written from Admiral Ingersoll, Acting 
Chief of Naval Operations, to the Bureau of Ordnance, and in para- 
graph 1 the following may be found : 

It is suggested that in order that progress may be made in solving some of the 
problems which confront us, that a small group of officers, engineers and drafts- 
men be assigned exclusively to planning improvements in net and boom designs 
and to development and experimental work. 

Then again in paragraph 2 : 

In references (a) and (b) the Chief of Naval Operations indicated the de- 
sirability of undertaking some research and development work. Among other 
suggestions, the need for a lighter anti-torpedo net was stressed, which can be 
laid and which will give good if not perfect protection from torpedoes fired from 
planes. 

At any rate, that indicates that the Chief of Naval Operations in 
September 1941 was trying to get a net that could be used, isn't that 
right? 

Admiral Kimmel. Which could be what? 

Mr. Murphy. Wliich could be used if they had perfected [7548] 
one? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. I knew nothing of this letter. I never 
saw it until recently. 

Mr. Murphy. Do you also find, Admiral, a letter in October fol- 
lowing this? 

Admiral Kimmel. I presume so. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2791 

Mr. MuEPHY. I wonder if you would be kind enough to read the 
October letter? It is lost in my exhibit. It is a short letter. 

(The document was handed to Mr. Murphy.) 

Mf. Murphy. I find a letter dated October 3, 1941, from the Chief 
of Naval Operations to the Chief of Bureau of Ordnance, and para- 
graph 2 reads as follows : 

Attention is invited to paragraph 3 of the enclosure. The Chief of Naval Oper- 
ations considers it urgent to develop an anti-torpedo net vfhich can be made up, 
towed to a desired location, and quickly laid. The use of pontoons, as suggested, 
does not appear to solve this question ; a reduction in the number of moorings, 
at present necessary for the standard net, would seem to be required. 

You did not know about that letter either, Admiral, did you? 

Admiral Kimmel. No; I did not know about it. 

[7S49] Mr. MuEPHY. My reason for putting it in the record is 
to show that the Navy had a very active interest in perfecting a net 
and that the Navy should not be subjected to the criticism which they 
have received from some quarters that they were derelict in not try- 
ing to get a net for Pearl Harbor. 

Admiral Kimmel. They were obtaining nets to be used in all har- 
bors, I presume. Their efforts were not confined to Pearl Harbor 
by any means. 

Mr. Murphy. That is right. 

Admiral Kimmel. And the fact that that letter is in existence shows 
that they were working for a net. It doesn't show where they were 
going to put the net. I presume they would have sent some to Pearl 
Harbor. I don't know. 

Mr. Murphy. It showed they had an active interest in the develop- 
ment of a good torpedo net; isn't that correct? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. 

Mr. Murphy. I would like now to refer to a letter dated December 
30, 1940, from Admiral Bloch to the Chief of Naval Operations, in 
which he says in paragraph 1 : 

In view of the inquiries contained in references (a), (b) and (c), I consider 
It desirable to write this letter to set forth the present ability of the Fourteenth 
Naval District to meet surprise hostile attacks of an enemy with [75501 
the equipment and forces at hand. 

Then I desire to read only a part of paragraph 2, in which it states : 

The Navy component of the local defense forces has no planes for distant 
reconnaissance with which to locate enemy carriers, and the only planes belong- 
ing to the local defense forces to attack carriers when located would be the Armv 
bombers. '' 

Again at the end of the paragraph : 

For distant reconnaissance, requisition would have to be made on the forces 
afloat for such as could be spared by the Fleet. 

I would like also to read from a letter dated January 4, 1941, from 
Admiral Eichardson as commander in chief of the "United States 
Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations, paragraph 2 : 

As neither the increased anti-aircraft batteries nor the augmented pursuit 
squadrons will be available for an extended period, the defense of Fleet units 
within Pearl Harbor will have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet 
which may be in Pearl Harbor in event of an attack by hostile aircraft. 

Now, Admiral, I direct your attention to the basic exhibit of Navy 
dispatches. That would be exhibit No. 37. [7551] 1 direct 



2792 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

your attention, Admiral, if you will, to a dispatch in that exhibit 
Where you were notified that' the Japanese were going to proceed to 
attack sometime prior to November. 

Yesterday we were discussing the significance which you_ attached 
to the messages about the destruction of the codes and you said at that 
time that the reason why you didn't pay particular attention to the 
first message about the codes was that it said that only some, not all, 
but most of the codes were being destroyed ; do you recall that? 

Admiral Kimmel, Yes, I do. 

Mr. MuRrHY. Now, you did have a subsequent message, however, 
which did say that the machines were being destroyed, didn't you? 

The first dispatch of December 3 said that they were told to destroy 
most of their codes and ciphers at once. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. MuEPHY. There was also a dispatch on the 3d which said that 
they were to destroy the machine. 

Admiral Kimmel. There was a qualifying word in there and it 
referred to a particular machine. 

Mr. MuKPHY. Well, I will read it exactly. 

Circular 2444 from Tokyo 1 December orderecl London X Hongkong X Singa- 
pore and Manila to destroy machine XX Batavia machine already sent to 
Tokyo XX December Second Washington also directed destroy X All but one 
copy of other systems X And all secret documents XX British Admiralty Lon- 
don today reports embassy London has complied. 

Wouldn't that be a highly important and significant message in 
view of the developments at that time, to you ? 

Admiral Kjmmel. You will note on your copy that the word "pur- 
ple" was inserted by Mr. Gesell on December 17, 1945, and "there no 
longer being any necessity for maintaining it a secret." Gesell's 
amendment is found in volume 26, page 4559. 

Mr. MuEPHY. I am talking what was before Admiral Kimmel be- 
fore December 7. 

Admiral Kimmel. And I am trying to show exactly what was before 
Admiral Kimmel and what was before Admiral Kimmel was that the 
Japs had orderecl the destruction of one particular machine which 
was by no means all they had. 

Mr. Murphy. I take it then that when you heard about the purple 
code, which was their most precious one, their ultra code, you didn't 
know what "purple" meant, was that it ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, I didn't know what purple meant. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you ask Washington ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No. I asked my intelligence officer. 

Mr. Murphy. Did he know? 

Admiral Kusimel. No. he didn't know. 

[7553] Mr. Murphy. Did you ask Washington then ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, I didn't. My intelligence officer finally 
found one officer on the Island of Oahu who told us it was one of the 
Japanese very secret machines, which one I did not know at the time. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, wouldn't that, in view of the war warning, 
indicate to you that trouble was afoot and that war was coming? 

Admiral Kimmel. It was a step but it was by no means a conclusive 
step. 

Mr. MuRPHT. Admiral, you had other messages too about the de- 
struction of codes, didn't you, from your own intelligence officer? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2793 

Admiral Kimmel. On the afternoon of December 6 my intelligence 
officer came to me and told me that they were burning papers outside 
of the Japanese consulate. Such reports had been made to me three 
or four times in the course of the year. The first time I received such 
a report I was considerably concerned and attempted to find out all 
I could about it and on succeeding reports of that nature I also 
attempted to find out about it. 

When this report was made to me I knew nothing about any infor- 
mation that the FBI may have obtained and I did not see the dispatch 
that was sent by the commandant of the district [7564] until 
after the attack. 

Now, whether or not they were destroying codes, I do not know. 
There was nothing definite that came to me that they were destroying 
codes. The report that came to me was that they were burning papers 
once more. 

Mr. Murphy. Did the FBI man talk to you before you went to the 
hotel that night, the night of the 6th ? There was an FBI man who 
I understand talked to General Short before he went into Schofield 
Barracks. I was wondering if that same FBI man talked to you 
before you went to the hotel ? 

Admiral Kimmel. He did not. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, you did have reports besides the one of the 6th 
about the destruction of codes, from your own intelligence officer, 
didn't you. Admiral? Didn't you have messages showing you that 
they were being destroyed at other posts in the Pacific? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I had some, and I had a message authoriz- 
ing me to destroy codes on the outlying islands. 

Mr. MuRPHT. Did you know. Admiral, that the Navy code was 
much more difficult to break than the Army code ? 

Admiral Kimmel. You mean our own Navy code ? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes, your own Navy code, was a much better code 
and harder to break than the Army code ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, I didn't know it at the time. I [7S5S] 
had an idea that the Navy code might be better. I thought we had a 
better communications system than the Army had. 

Mr. Murphy. The Army says so. 

At any rate, you did have a message from Batavia about them 
destroying codes and machines there ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is the message I just read, I think. 

Mr. Murphy. No, the one of the 6th was the one from Honolulu. 
I am now talking about one of a couple of days before December 1. 
You had a message from Batavia about them destroying codes, in 
your intelligence report ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Where is that ? 

Mr. Murphy. I will get it for you. It is in the fleet intelligence 
report. The one that goes up to December 2, as I recall it. 

Lieutenant Haniey. I have that exhibit, sir. It is Exhibit 115. 

Mr. Murphy. From October 27 to December 2, 1941. 

Lieutenant Hanify. I haven't found the reference yet. 

Admiral Kimmel. In this message that we have just been discussing, 
the one of December 3, 1941, it talks about the destruction of the pur- 
ple machine. "Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo." Is that 
what you are referring to ? 



2794 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. No. There isa separate message in your intelligence 
report. 

[7556] Lieutenant Hantty. The last item in that, sir? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. On December 2 

Lieutenant Hanify. United States Ambassador at Bangkok? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. On December 2, 1941, the intelligence report 
that was placed you show the United States Ambassador at Bangkok 
on the 30th requested permission to destroy all but a limited number 
of codes. That showed that our Ambassador there was quite con- 
cerned about war coming, did it not ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Bangkok is in Thailand. He was concerned that 
they might get his code down there when they attacked Thailand. I 
might say that was the least significant of all of them. 

Mr. Murphy. Didn't it indicate to you that he felt down there 
that war was coming on December 2 ? You said yesterday that when 
nothing happened in several days the importance of these things, 
started to become minimized in 3''our mind. 

Admiral Kimmel. That was a precaution that he might well have^ 
taken. 

Mr. Murphy. You don't see any particular significance to that? 

Admiral Kimmel. You will recall the information I had about the 
conspiracy of the Japs to induce the British to come into Thailand 
and attack them. That was all part of that picture. 

[7557] Mr. Murphy. Yes; that was also in that same group of 
messages, wasn't it ? That was placed before you within 2 or 3 days 
of this other one. Admiral, do you have the intrigue message? 

Admiral Kimmfx,. Yes, I have it here. 

Mr. Murphy. That was just a few days before, wasn't it? 

Admiral Kimmel. The day before. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, you speak in your statement about the 
winds code and the winds code execute. You knew the details of the 
winds code, didn't you? 

Admiral Kimmel. I knew the winds code had been set up. 

Mr. Murphy. You knew that we were looking for it and trying to 
find out if there was an execute message? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Murphy. You had a dispatch on the 28th of November giving 
you that in detail, didn't you? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Telling you exactly what it would mean and showing, 
if there had been an execute, it would mean that there was a rupture 
in diplomatic relations ; Isn't that right ? 

Admiral Kimmel. At least that, yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, it is your opinion, is it not, that there was ajii 
execute message ? You say so in your statement. 

Admiral Kimmel. My opinion, yes. I took my opinion [75^8} 
from the findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry. I quoted them on, 
it. I don't recall that I gave any opinion. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, tiie assertions in your statement whichi 
led you to believe that you had been misled were based in part upon 
the belief by you now and at the time you made your statement that, 
there had been a winds code execute; isn't that right? 

Admiral Kimmel. I based that on the findings of the Naval Court 
of Inquiry who heard all the evidence. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2795 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, if there had not been an execute message 
it would considerably alter your statement to that effect? 

Admiral Kimmel. It would not alter my statement that the Naval 
Court of Inquiry found as a fact that the winds message execute had 
been received. 

Mr. Murphy. If it is a fact, Admiral, that there was no execute 
message, would it alter your statement that you have made to this 
committee that you were misled to that extent ? 

Admiral Kimmel. If I became convinced that the Naval Court of 
Inquiry was in error and they had conclusive evidence that it never 
had been received it would alter my statement to that extent. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, speaking about the Naval Court of Inquiry, 
[7SS9] were you given a fair trial there ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I was, indeed. 

Mr. Murphy. Were you given a fair hearing before the Roberts 
Commission ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I was permitted to testify before the Roberts 
Commission. I didn't have any counsel. 

Mr. Murphy. You had somebody beside you, didn't you? Didn't 
you have Admiral Theobald with you? 

Admiral Kimmel. He was assisting me with the papers. He was 
not counsel. And he said he was not counsel. 

Mr. Murphy. He said he wasn't counsel, but he did volunteer quite 
a little information? 

Admiral Kimmel. And Mr. Roberts said he wasn't counsel. 

Mr. Murphy. But he was at your side, getting papers and making 
statements occasionally to clarify the picture, wasn't he? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, for which he was — all right. 

Mr. Murphy. They asked him to be sworn? 

Admiral Kimmel. They asked him to be sworn so that he would be 
a witness. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes; as long as he was giving information. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. There were some distinguished admirals on that 
Board, on the Roberts Board, were there not ? 

[7560] Admiral Kjmmel. There were two admirals on the 
Board; yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, did you have any reason. Admiral, to feel that 
they weren't able admirals? 

Admiral Kimmel. I beg your pardon? 

Mr. Murphy. Up to the time that you saw their report did you 
have any grievance against them or any criticism to make of their 
capacity to sit? Up to the time you saw their report and differed 
with it, had you any particular criticism of the ability of those two 
gentlemen ? 

Admiral Kimmel. They were able officers. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, were they competent to sit on this board? 

Admiral Kimmel. They were. 

Mr. Murphy. Now the Army Board, you appeared before that, 
didn't you? The Army Pearl Harbor Board, you testified before 
them, didn't you? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr, JMurphy. Were you treated all right there ? 



2796 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Kjmmel. Oh, yes. I was not permitted to hear the testi- 
mony of other witnesses before the Army Board nor to introduce 
evidence, I merely testified before the Army Board. 

Mr. Murphy. The Navy Board ; how were you treated there ? 

[7S61] Admiral Kimmel. The Navy Court of Inquiry? 

Mr. MuKPHY. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. I was permitted to have counsel, I was permit- 
ted to introduce evidence, I was permitted to cross-examine witnesses, 
I was permitted to confront witnesses. 

Mr. Murphy. That was ordered by the Secretary of the Navy and 
you were given every right that you wanted to demand, that you 
required, or that you requested, except that it was not made public? 

Admiral Kimmel. I was given full facilities to present my case to 
the Naval Court of Inquiry. 

Mr. Murphy. Now do you know of any reason why Admiral King 
and Secretary Forrestal would differ as they did, and The Adjutant 
General of the Navy differ as he did, with the findings of the Naval 
Court of Inquiry ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I do not. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, I would like to go with you, if I may, to the 
testimony of General Short before the Koberts Commission. I direct 
your attention — do you have it ? 

Lieutenant Hanify. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Can you make that available, Counsel? 

In the meantime I will read — would you prefer to have a copy 
before you? I am going to ask you some questions. I think in 
fairness to you you ought to have a copy before you. 

[7563] Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I think I ought to have a copy. 
I would like to see what it is you are reading from. 

Mr. Murphy. While they are going downstairs to get a copy I will 
go into some other things, Admiral. 

Admiral, in your statement you complain, apparently, about the 
tenor of the messages that were sent to you from Washington; first, 
the messages about the economic sanctions in July, and then the 
messages in October about the change of Cabinet, and then the other 
messages in November, and you say that each of them were in effect a 
war warning. 

Wouldn't you think the responsibility was more on the Japanese 
than it was on the officials at Washington for that series of messages? 
Wasn't it the conduct of the Japanese that prompted those different 
messages which appeared to be war warnings ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I am unable to say. 

Mr. Murphy. It is a fact that you did expect to be told about the 
change in Cabinet and what might happen in October, October 16? 

Admiral Kimmel. I expected full information, yes. I was glad of 
any information I could get. 

Mr. Murphy. You certainly expected to be told about the economic 
sanctions in July, didn't you? 

Admiral Kimmel. Certainly. 

[7563] Mr. Murphy. And on each of those occasions they would 
have to have a message of pretty serious import to describe that occa- 
sion to you, Avouldn't they? 

Admiral Kjmmel. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2797 

Mr. Murphy. Would Washington be to blame for the series of 
messages or the Japanese? 

Admiral I^mmel. I didn't blame anybody for the series of 
messages. I set forth what I had. 

Mr. Murphy. Except that you see to complain about having had 
some messages prior to the war-warning message. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well 

Mr. Murphy. I was wondering if it wasn't the Japanese that caused 
that instead of somebody in Washington. 

You did have a message from the Chief of Naval Operations about 
code machines or codes being destroyed, before, Admiral, didn't you ? 

I refer to a message in July 17, 1941, reading as follows 

Lieutenant Hanify. Which exhibit, sir? 

Mr. Murphy. 37, page 9 : 

17 July 1941. 
From: OPNAV 
Action: CINCAF 
Info: CINCPAC 

[7564] The time has come blank Tokyo to Vichy twelve July two seven 
four and two seven five list six terms of ultimatum to be answered by twenty 
July X Japan will send necessary Army Navy air forces to southern French 
Indo China X French turnover naval and air bases listed in Jonab or seven 
July X Expeditionary force . to have right to maneuver and move about 
freely X French withdraw forces at landing points to a^^id possible clashes X 
Vichy authorize French Indo China military to arrange details with Japanese 
either before or after landing X Colony to pay Japan twentj'-three million 
piastres annually to meet cost of occupation XX Tokyo to Vichy fourteen July 
two eight one Army now planning advance on or about twenty July XX Tokyo 
to Saigon and Hanoi sixteen July circular one five one eight formal demands 
presented to Vichy on fourteen X Reply asked by twentieth X Japan intends 
carry out plans by force if opposed or if British or United States interferes X 
Kanju Maru being held at Saigon to evacuate all Japanese there sailing early 
dawn twenty-four July X Burn codes X Japanese in northern area evacuate 
or move into Hanoi end of this. 

\7565'\ Would that indicate that since war was coming in that 
direction that the Japanese were ordering the codes be destroyed and 
wouldn't that indicate 

Admiral Kimmel. Let me say, I haven't seen this message for a 
long time. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, the only part I am interested in is the fact 
that they seem to be going to advance. 

Admiral Kimmel. I am trying to find out what he is talking about. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, it is a Navy message. 

Admiral Kimmel. Who is to burn codes, and how ? Can you. make 
out? 

Mr. Murphy. My assumption is that OPNAV is telling what has 
happened between Tokyo and Vichy. They are talking about what 
they are going to do. They are going to make an advance, and be- 
fore they make their advance 

Admiral Kimmel. There must be something missing, because I 
can't see that it makes any sense, so far as the burning codes business 
is concerned. I don't knoAv what that is. 

Mr. Murphy. My only purpose is to ask you, as between an ordi- 
nary layman and an expert, if it wasn't a fact that the advance at 
that time meant war? 

79716 — 4&— pt. 6 ^21 



2798 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Kimmel. Your command of language is better [7566'] 
than mine, I think. 

Mr. Murphy. No. 

Admiral Kimmel. You should be able to understand what the mes- 
sage means. It is plain English. It says "burn codes." I can't make 
out what kind of codes he is talking about. There must be something 
missing. I can't see that it makes sense. 

Mr. Murphy. My trouble is that when I read the one in December 
about burning codes, from everything I have read, I thought that 
meant war, but apparently it didn't mean war at Hawaii, because 
burning codes you said didn't have much significance to you. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, this "burn codes" here in July_ didn't bring 
on war, at least. I don't know what it meant. There is something 
about burning codes. 

Mr. Murphy. You say it didn't bring on war. They did go into 
Indochina. They took over there, didn't they ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, as far as I am concerned, I don't under- 
stand what they are talking about. 

Mr. Murphy. It is a fact that after this message, shortly thereafter, 
they did go into Indochina and take over ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, but w^ho burned the codes ? 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, I am only dealing with [7567] 
what messages ar^ before us, and my only reason in talking about 
burning codes, if you didn't understand it, did you ask Washington 
then, in July, to explain it ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I thought I understood it. 

Mr. Murphy. Will counsel check that and get us the origijial ? ^ 

Mr. Masten. That is the one on page 9 ? 

Senator Lucas. You are going to find out who burned the codes ? 

Mr. Murphy. I am interested in whether or not we are getting accu- 
rate information. It is hard enough to keep up with accurate infor- 
mation. 

Admiral Kjmmel. From memory, I don't remember the message. 
I probably saw it ; if it was addressed to me I certainly saw it. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, do we have the copy of the Short testimony? 

Before the Roberts Commission, Admiral, General Short was being 
questioned about what he would have done if he had had all of the 
material which was asked for. He was also asked what the Navy 
would have done if the Navy had all the material they had asked for. 
The general was reluctant to answer the question, but he did say to 
the Roberts Board that even if the Navy had had all that it [7568] 
wanted and had asked for in his opinion there still would have been 
no reconnaissance on that morning. Would you agree with that? 

Admiral Kimmel. I take the statement that you have made, and I 
presume it is correct, I haven't read it, but I do not agree with his con- 
clusion as you have stated it. 

[7569] ' Mr. Murphy. I refer to page 1637. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. Where is it? 

Mr. Murphy. Excuse me just one minute. I beg your pardon ; page 
1641, Admiral. 

Admiral Kimmel. 1641? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes; 1641, at the bottom of the page. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

^The document was supplied to Representative Murphy. See p. 5134. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2799 

Mr. Murphy (reading) : 

General McCoy. If you had been furnished with all of the things that you felt 
necessary, would that have made any difference in this particular action? 

General Short. I do not believe it would. 

Admiral Standley. Right there: In case the patrol planes that were necessary 
to make the effective off-shore patrol were here in suflQcient numbers, do you still 
think that no change would have been made in the plans? 

General Short. None whatever, because you couldn't tell when some of them 
might have been ordered away. If they had been left they just simply would 
not have called upon us. As a matter of fact, as I said, in most of our exercises 
the assumption was that they had enough to make the patrol, so they made the 
patrols and called up on us to execute the bombing mission, because [7570] 
they considered that our B-17s were more effective as bombers than their own 
planes. 

Admiral Standley. Yes, but in this estimate they stated definitely that there 
were not sufficient forces to make a continuous air patrol as required in war. 

General Short. Yes, sir. Well, there wouldn't be 

Admiral Standley. Now, if you had had that force here do you think under 
the circumstances you would have been making that patrol every morning? Not 
you, I mean, but the Navy. 

General Short. But the Navy. 

Admiral Standley. The combined effort, yes. 

General Short. Well, I think that would be a fair question to ask the Navy. I 
don't hardly think under the conditions that they would ; I think that they would 
have been doing it as an exercise now and then in connection with us. I do not 
believe that they would have been doing it habitually if they had had them, but 
I don't know. It would be a fair question to ask them. 

And then down below : 

Admiral Reeves. Before you go to that. General, let me ask General Short this : 
On the other hand, if you had had material and [7571] fully equipped 

radar stations, would you have been operating them throughout the day or would 

you have operated them as you did on the morning of the 7th? 

General Short. I probably would have operated them just as I did. 

Now, do you agree, first, with General Short that if you had had 
the planes that you wanted that you would have continued the same 
schedule of operations on the morning of the 7th as you did? 

Admiral Kimmel. I do not agree with any of his conclusions here 
about that. I most certainly do not. 

Mr. Murphy. The fact is, Admiral, that General Short testified be- 
fore the Roberts Board that he implicitly believed that you were hav- 
ing reconnaissance on that morning, although he did not know the 
details of it and, as I understand it, you testified that you implicitly 
believed that you were getting radar protection for 200 miles? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, if there had been a conference between 
you and General Short on what to do and into detail after November 
the 27th, would you have been led to believe that you were getting 
a 200-mile coverage at all times on radar and would he have been 
led to believe implicitly that there was a reconnaissance ? 

[7572] Admiral Kimmel. Let us get the beginning of that. That 
is a little bit too long for me. 

Mr. Murphy. It is a long question. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; a little too much there. 

The Vice Chairman. Read the question, please. 

^Question read.) 

Admiral Kimmel. There was a conference, not only one but several 
of them, at which we discussed all phases of the Pacific campaign and 
the defenses of Hawaii and I have covered that very thoroughly in 



2800 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

previous testimony and in the statement which I submitted to the 
committee. 

Mr. Murphy. You have read, have you, General Short's testimony 
before the Eoberts Board ? 

Admiral Kjmmel. Have I what? 

Mr. Murphy. Have you read General Short's testimony before the 
Eoberts Board? 

Admiral Kimmel. I have read some of it. 

Mr. Murphy. AVell, didn't he tell them that you did not discuss 
details, that you spent your time on discussing the outlying islands ; 
that he had never seen the war warning message of the 27th and that 
he thought there was reconnaissance, but he did not know the details ? 

Admiral Kimmel. He changed that testimony considerably later, 
as you will recall. 

17S7S] Mr. Murphy. Before the Board? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think so. 

Mr. Murphy. He changed it in subsequent hearings, but I was won- 
dering if he testified to it before the Board, He did say that it was 
his recollection that he had seen the message, but he did not know 
whether he had or not, as I remember it. 

Let me go into it exactly; I think it is important. I direct your 
attention to page 38 of the record. 

The Vice Chairman. What record ? 

Mr. Murphy. Of the Roberts hearing, General Short's testimony. 
General Short there said that since the beginning of the emergency 
there was only one alert and that was at the time of the freezing of 
assets in July. At that time General Short placed the Army on an 
alert against 

Admiral Kimmel, Where are you reading from ? 

Mr. Murphy. I am not reading yet, I am giving this as preliminary 
to try to save time. 

In July, after the message about the freezing of the assets. General 
Short immediately put out his sabotage alert. As I understand it, at 
that time the Navy did nothing special; is that right? You took no 
special precautions? 

Admiral Kimmel. What date was that, sir ? 

Mr. Murphy. In July, after the message about freezing [7674.] 
the assets. 

Admiral Kjmmel. I do not recall now just what action we took at 
that time, if any. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, as I understand it, you were on a sabotage alert 
for many years; the fleet had done everything they could to stop 
sabotage, and there was no need of getting into any additional pre- 
cautions about it ; isn't that so ? 

Admiral Kimjiel. That is true ; that part of it. 

Mr. Murphy. Whereas the Army did go into a sabotage alert, and 
they put men out to protect the utilities, and as I understand it, they 
never stopped protecting them right down to November 27, whereas 
you did not have any special precautions at that time. 

Admiral Kimmel, I had many precautions, but our problem in re- 
gard to sabotage in the Navy and the Army's problem were entirely 
separate and distinct; very different. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2801 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, in October, when you got the message, you 
did go in and take special precautions and make special assignments, 
did you not ? 

Admiral Kimmel. As I recall, yes, 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

Mr. Murphy. The Army, so far as you knoAv, did not take any steps 
at that time, did they ? 

[7575] Admiral Kimmel. I do not now recall. 

Mr. MuKPHY. Now I direct your attention to page 46. At the bot- 
tom of the page, about 10 lines from the bottom of the page, General 
Short says : 

The question of just how the total reconnaissance was carried out was never 
known by me. 

Do you see that ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I saw that. 
Mr. Murphy (reading) : 

If they called on us for a squadron of planes they would assign it to a certain 
sector, say maybe from zero to 70 degrees, to search out 600 miles, or whatever 
it was. I assumed that the Navy planes were searching all the other critical 
areas, and they probably were. I say, that was a matter that was not under 
my control. 

General Short did so testify, didn't he ? 
Admiral Kimmel. Yes, it is so recorded here. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. I now direct your attention to page 47, about 
one-third of the way down : 
General Shoet. From March 21 

Admiral Kimmel. I have it. 
Mr. Murphy (reading) : 

From March 21 on we had repeatedly carried out exercises along that line. 
We had a minimum of one exer- [7576] cise a week, and sometimes exer- 
cises more frequently than that, but we were working constantly to perfect that 
coordination. This has no direct bearing, but to show what we were trying 
to do, that same agreement provided that when we were using lighters over the 
Island of Oahu then they turned their fighters over to my command. We were 
trying to get a coordinated whole in that. 

Now, I am reading, Admiral, but I do hope that the counsel will 
check on the date of November the 20th as being the last exercise. 

Mr. Eichardson. The 12th. 

Mr. Murphy. November the 12th ? 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. As the last exercise, and I am wondering why if you 
and General Short had plans to have an exercise every week and some- 
times of tener than that throughout the year, there was not at least an 
exercise held to get ready after the war warning of the 27th. 

Admiral Kimmel. I am unable to answer that. I told you that 
that was a matter handled by the commandant of the district and the 
commanding general. 

Mr. Murphy. I now direct your attention. Admiral, to page 54 at 
the bottom of the page, the last paragraph : 

So, while I do not remember exactly asking a speci- [7577] fie question 
as to the location of the Japanese carriers, I had a very decided impression 
that at that time there was nothing in the situation that the location of the 



2802 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARI/ HARBOR ATTACK 

Japanese carriers was worrying us at that time. In fact, the question came 
up very definitely by a question of Admiral Kimmel's. During his conference 
on the 27th with General Martin, his chief of staff, Colonel Mollison, the ques- 
tion was asked, and I would like to read it since his statement is more definite 
than my recollection : 

"I certify that on November 27, 941 I accompanied General Short and General 
Martin to Admiral Kimmel's office for conference relative to sending Arm^y pursuit 
planes to Midway and Wake. As this would unquestionably weaken the defense 
of Oahu, Admiral Kimmel asked a question of Captain McMorris, his War Plans 
Officer, which was substantially as follows : 

"Admiral Kimmel. 'McMorris, what is your idea of the chances of a surprise 
raid on Oahu?' 

"Captain McMorkis. 'I should say none, Admiral.' " 

At that time there was no exception taken to that statement by either Admiral 
Kimmel or Admiral Bloch, and apparently the Navy felt that they had definite 
information of the location of carriers and major ships of the Japanese and that 
there was no question in their minds of the [7578] possibility or proba- 
bility of a surprise attack up Oahu. 

Now, the fact is, Admiral, that at least one person there in the affi- 
davit says that the purpose of that meeting on that morning was about 
Wake and Midway ; isn't that so ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct and that was before the receipt 
of the war warning dispatches you will recall. 

Mr. Murphy. That is right. 

Admiral Kimmel. But we did discuss— in the discussion about the 
sending of planes to Midway and Wake it was inevitable that we should 
discuss the Pacific situation and we did discuss it and this one little 
passage here is an indication of the fact that we did so discuss it. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you ever discuss the question of a raid with 
McMorris in the light of the war warning to see if that would change 
his judgment? He said there was no danger of a raid before he knew 
about the war warning. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. But then came a war warning. Did you ask Mc- 
Morris for his judgment in view of the fact that war is coming? 

Admiral Kimmel. I discussed all phases of the situation with Mc- 
Morris almost daily; not almost daily but daily, and we went over 
the whole situation and at no time did McMorris [7579] recom- 
mend to me that we put out these planes for reconnaissance purposes, 
and he would have done so had he considered it necessary. He is a 
very able, outspoken officer and a man in whom I had the highest 
confidence. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you discuss that subject with General Short and 
was McMorris asked as to whether or not his view would be qualified 
in view of the war warning, before General Short ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Did I discuss it before General Short? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Kimmel. I cannot now recall. 

Mr. Murphy. All right. 

Admiral Kimmel. I cannot recall any specific discussion, but I am 
sure it took place. 

Mr. Murphy. I now direct your attention to the same page : 

General Short. At that time there was no exception taken to that statement 
by either Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch, and apparently the Navy felt that 
they had definite information of the location of carriers and major ships of the 
Japanese and that there was no question in their minds of the possibility or 
probability of a surprise attack upon Oahu. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2803 

In other words, you were not even discussing Oahu at that 
[7S80] time, were 370U, I mean as such? Your problem — well, I 
think General Short is wrong myself on that one, because one con- 
tradicts the other. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, of course it does. 

Mr. Murphy. I am not going to question you on that. 

Now, I direct your attention to page 58. You gave some testimony 
relative to the flight of the B 

Admiral Kimmel. One moment. 

Mr. Murphy. I am not referring to any particular part yet, Ad- 
miral. This is preliminary. 

Admiral Kimmel. All right ; go ahead. Wliat is this ? 

Mr. Murphy. You gave some testimony relative to the fact that 
the Army had sent B-17's from the west coast to Hawaii and you said 
that they did not even have guns ready to shoot and you apparently 
criticized that, or at least said that that would mean that they were not 
worrying about attack. There was a question of ammunition and 
there was also a question of a crew. 

Now, on this page I would like to refer to the testimony of General 
Short relative to where he says the crews would not be enough to man 
the guns 

Admiral Kimmel. Where is this ? 

Mr. Murphy. I will get it for you. At the bottom of the page, in 
the last paragraph, about 10 lines up : 

[7581] The crews- 
Admiral Kimmel. Wait, I think I had better clear up something 
right now. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. I never saw these B-17's that came to Hawaii. 

Mr. Murphy-. That is right. 

Admiral Kimmel. I do not know of my own knowledge anything 
about the condition of their guns. 

Mr. Murphy. I am not going to ask you that question. You have 
already testified that they were cosmolined. 

Admiral Kjmmel. I testified that that was reported to me. 

Mr. JMuRPHY. Eight. 

Admiral Kimmel. And no statements were made and, so far as I 
know, they have never been contradicted. 

Mr. Murphy. That is right, I am not challenging that. My question 
here is that General Short says that the crews would not be enough 
to man the guns even if the guns had been in shape to fire and even 
if they had ammunition and I want to ask you that for this reason : 
There is much ado made in this record, as I recollect, by yourself and 
by others about the fact that the B-l7's had come from the coast to 
Hawaii without being able to protect themselves. 

General Marshall said that the reason why that occurred [7582] 
was that there was a question of the amount of gasoline, we did not 
have planes as good then as now, and that there was a question of how 
much gasoline they could possibly carry and they wanted to have as 
much as possible because they thought they could not cover that 
distance ; they were having winds at the time and the distance basis. 



2804 CONGRESSIONAL IN^^ESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Now, as I understand it you testiJBed that that would lead to the 
inference that they did not fear an attack and you said that they had 
the guns themselves there on the ships but they were cosmolined and 
could not fire. 

Now my question is to you as an expert. General Short said they 
did not have enough crew to fire the guns and they did not have 
enough ammunition — did not have any ammunition. What would 
the relative weight be of a sufficient number of men to fire the guns, 
a complete crew and ammunition and would that interfere substan- 
tially with the amount of gas they could carry? Now, do you under- 
stand my question ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I understand your question, and I do not know 
enough to answer it. I think you can get complete and full answers 
from people who knew the characteristics of the B-lT's at that time. 
However, I certainly was under the impression and the belief that 
they could have taken on a full crew and ammunition and still have 
had ample gasoline to make the trip from San Francisco to Hawaii. 
Now, I am not familiar [75831 with the details, but from all 
the evidence which was presented to me and from all that I believed 
before Pearl Harbor and afterwards, that is what I thought. I do not 
know whetlier that is true or not. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, my only reason in asking you the question. 
Admiral, was that you had discussed the cosmoline question and the 
fact that they were not able to fire and I agree with you that 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I did not discuss cosmolined guns because 
I believed then and I still believe, although I cannot prove it and I am 
not qualified as an expert, but I believed that the B-l7's could have 
made the trip wnth guns and ammunition and a crew. 

Senator Bkewster. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. MuEPHY. Yes, sir ; I will. 

Senator Brewster. I presume that is a thing about which there need 
not be any question or controversy. There must be some competent 
authority to determine it and I am wondering, Does the gentleman 
contemplate having counsel prepare a statement? 

Mr. Murphy. I presume General Arnold can answer it. I think 
General Short will be able to answer it. We are having an airman 
here. General Arnold, but there is a conflict in the record now, I think, 
between the Admiral and General Marshall. 

[7584] Admiral Kimmel. I beg your pardon ? 

Mr. Murphy. I think the record and the testimony conflict, be- 
cause General Marshall said the reason they did not do these other 
things was because of the difficulty with gas and there you think they 
could have had the full crew and the ammunition and the gas at that 
time.^ 

Admiral Kimmel. I want you to understand that I am not able to 
testify accurately on it. I am merely testifying as to my understand- 
ing from conversations I have had. 

Mr. Murphy. Now I direct your attention to page 69 in which Gen- 
eral Short says 

Admiral Kim:mel. It might be interesting to find out what condi- 
tion the B-17's that came out subsequent to December 7, what condi- 
tion they were in when they came out. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, the last ones we have were those that came that 
morning and they were in the same condition. 

' Spe Hparinjrs, Part 10, p. 51.S4 et seq. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2805 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, you will recall, of course, that they quickly 
reinforced places out there with a number of B-l7's and B-25's, and 
so forth. 

Mr. Murphy. That is right. 

Admiral Kimmel. And I would be surprised, although I know 
nothing about it, I would be surprised if they went out there unarmed. 

Mr. MuKPHY. Well, will counsel check that, the condition [7585] 
of the B-17's that went out to Hawaii immediately after the attack, 
as to whether they had a full crew and ammunition and guns not 
cosmolined but ready to fire and a proper bore sight ? 

Now, I direct your attention to page 69, Admiral, a question to Gen- 
eral Short, speaking about the air warning center : 

General McCoy. Could you state whether there was a naval officer there that 
morning? 

General Short. There was not, for some reason, a naval officer there during 
the period four to seven. There had heen on previous days, and as a matter of 
fact the Navy had felt that it would be a good idea to have a little more of that, 
and they had arranged — the interceptor command and the Navy and the whole 
group had worked out, on just a volunteer basis, of continuing that training 
every day until four o'clock in the afternoon, but decided that on Sunday they 
would only work until seven, but the Navy had been instrumental in even 
extending that period, and it had been agreed that they would work right 
through until four o'clock. I had not ordered that, but that was just something 
they were doing on their own. 

Now, you have previously testified, as I understand it, that you do 
not know whether there was a Navy man there on that morning. 

{75861 Admiral Ktmmel. Not of my own knowledge, no. 

Mr. MuKPHY. Well, then we will go into that with another witness, 
but at any rate General Short said that you had a Navy man there, 
as I read his testimony, on other da^^s l3ut not on the morning in 
question. 

Now, immediately after the attack the interceptor command station 
did work 24 hours a day, didn't it, with Navy men present, or would 
you know that, Admiral? 

Admiral Ktmmel. I presume they did, if it is in your reports. 

Mr. MuEPHY. On page 73: 

General McCoy. Yes. Is it in actual operation today? 
General Short. Oh, yes, 24 hours of the day. 

Now, there is one statement on that page that may be a typographical 
error, but it is an important one if it is. I direct your attention to page 
78 in which General Short is testifying and about the middle of the 
second paragraph he says : 

Admiral Halsey had an airplane carrier up to the north. 

This is before December 7. Do you see that, Admiral ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I see it. 

Mr. Mtjrphy. Was there any reason why General Short would 
think that an airplane carrier was up in the north waters? 

[7587] Admiral Kimmel. I am unable to state. He had access 
to all the information on the movements of our own ships that we had 
ourselves. 

Mr. Mukphy. I direct your attention to page 109, on which General 
Short says in the middle of the first paragraph : 

Anybody who has lived here in the last year would know he could hardly ever 
step out of his house without hearing planes. 



2806 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Do you see that ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Was there anything in any of these messages about 
publicity that in any way influenced your judgment as to what the 
Navy should have done alter November 27? 

Admiral Kimmel. I had to take that into consideration in what I 
did. 

Mr. Murphy. I direct your attention to November 30, in which the 
Honolulu Advertiser in a big headline across the top of the page says, 

"THE JAPANESE MAY STRIKE OVER THE WEEK END. " 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Would there be much concern about publicity after 
that headline in the papers in Honolulu ? 

Admiral Kimmel. The Honolulu Advertiser carried a good many 
headlines like that. 

[7S88'] Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate on the 30th of November 
you said that after November 27 you got your information from the 
papers and that they, in effect, made you think that there was less 
danger of an attack, and I am wondering about this particular one, 
"The Japanese may strike over the week end ; Kurusu bluntly warned 
the Nation is ready for battle," if that would make you think less of 
the likelihood of war or more ? 

Admiral Kjmmel. Of course, the Honolulu Advertiser said they 
might strike over the week end. The week end came and passed, and 
they did not strike, and you will read — my recollection of those head- 
lines in the Honolulu papers is that that eased off considerably after 
that. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, you said yesterday you did not know about Mr. 
Hull's attitude and this testimony of the foreign expert about Tokyo's 
mad dog madness. 

Admiral Kevimel. What is that? 

Mr. Murphy. You said yesterday you did not know about the Hull 
attitude to the effect that they were mad dogs, about the madness 
of the war lords in Tokyo. Wouldn't that be along the same line? 

Admiral Kesimel. Not in. the same language, and this was a news- 
paper article. 

Mr. Murphy. That is right. By the way, would you give 
[75891 a newspaper article more importance or greater weight 
than you would to a command of the Chief of Naval Operations? 

Admiral Kimmel. No ; of course not. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, you did let newspaper articles influence your 
judgment, didn't you? 

Admiral Kimmel. Everything that I saw and heard influenced my 
judgment to some degree, and I tried to differentiate betwixt the 
source and the reliability of everything I heard. In the newsp'apers 
in Honolulu and on the radio I heard that Mr. Hull was talking to, 
I forget exactly, but that he was having conversations still with the 
Japanese Ambassador, he called him down to talk to him, Mr. Welles 
talked to him, all in that week, and I think that is contained in the — 
that was in the papers, and it is also contained in the volume called 
Peace and War, I believe it is. 

The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your answer on that ques- 
tion, Admiral ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2807 

Admiral Kjmmel. I think so, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. It is now 12 : 30. The committee will stand 
in recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon. 

(Whereupon, at 12 : 30 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the 
same day.) 

\_7590'] AFTERNOON SESSION 2 P. M. 

The Vice Chairman. The committee will be in order. 

Does counsel have something at this point ? 

Mr. Masten. We have two letters that we would like to add to 
Exhibit 113, which we distributed to the committee. 

The first is dated February 21, 1941, from the commander in chief 
of the United States Pacific Fleet to various commanders of the fleet. 

We would like to offer that as Exhibit 113-A. 

The Vice Chairman. 113-A? 

Mr. Hasten. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit 113-A. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 113-A.") 

Mr. Masten. The second letter is one dated October 31, 1941, 
headed "Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41," having to do with 
the organization and missions of the several task forces. We would 
like to offer that as Exhibit 113-B. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be so received. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 113-B.") 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES 
NAVY (RETIRED) (Resumed) 

The. Vice Chairman. Do you have anything, Admiral, before ex- 
amination is resumed? 

Admiral Kimmel. I have nothing. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania is recognized 
to continue his inquiry. 

Mr. Mtjrphy. Admiral Kimmel, after receipt of the war warning 
message to the Army, which was not so worded, however, but the 
message of the 27th of November, General Short made a reply to 
Washington, and, as I recall it, you referred to that reply in your 
statement to the committee. Are you familiar with the wording of 
that reply? 

Admiral Kimmel. Generally, yes ; I would like to refresh my mem- 
ory on it, if I may. 

Mr. Murphy. Will you refer to exhibit 32, page 16. I beg your 
pardon, page 12; do you have that, admiral? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; I have it now. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, after General Short received the message of 
November 27, he sent a message to Washington reading as follows : 

Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy. 

Now, did you see that dispatch, that you can recollect, [7692] 
subsequent to November 27, the answer of General Short? 

Admiral Kimmel. I never saw that dispatch until after the attack. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, I direct your attention to page 380 of the Army 
Pearl Harbor Board hearings. 

Will you get that for the Admiral, please ? 



2808 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

In my opinion, it is one of the most important entries in any of 
these vohimes. 
General Grunert to General Short : 

In your message of November 27 

Admiral Kimmel. Where is that ? 

Mr. Murphy. The middle of the page, question 134. Do you have 
that? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. General Grunert to General Short : 

In your message of November 27, you say, "liaison with the Navy." Just what 
did you mean by that? How did that cover anything required by that particular 
message? 

General Short. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in touch with the 
Navy, knowing what information they had, and what they were doing. 

General Gkuneet. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to 
carry out its part of that agreement for long distance reconnaissance? 

[75.93] General Short. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent 
that or not, it would have affected it, because they had signed a definite agree- 
ment which was approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of Staff. 

Did you know then that General Short had notified Washington 
and meant to infer by that telegram that he expected you were con- 
ducting the proper reconnaissance after November 27 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. General Short knew that I was going to conduct 
a reconnaissance and that I had the means to conduct a reconnaissance 
only for a very short period, and when an attack on Hawaii was known 
to be probalDle within narrow limits — and I never knew at any time 
that an attack on Hawaii was probable within narrow limits — that 
was also a part of the estimate of the situation and was well Imown 
to everybody that had anything to do with it. 

Mr. ikuEPHY. Do you think if you and General Short had held the 
proper kind of conference 

Admiral KimjMel. We did. 

Mr. Murphy. Let me finish. Do you think he could have made a 
statement such as he makes at page 359 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I can't explain why General Short made his 
statement. 

Mr. Murphy. I now direct your attention to page 1633 [759 fl 
of General Short's testimony. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; I have it. 

That would be in the photostatic section. 

Mr. Murphy. Doesn't General Short say — do you have your copy, 
counsel ? 

Mr. Masten. Admiral Kimmel is using our copy. 

Mr. Murphy. I understand that at page 1633, General Short makes 
the statement that he did not know what the Navy was doing. 

Admiral Kimmel. General Short ? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. I think you had better put in what he said. 

Mr. Murphy. I will get exactly what he said, 

I have myself confused the papers. I thought I wouldn't have to 
refer to that again. Admiral. 

Well, I can't find it. 1 wall pass on that one. 

The Vice Chairman. Perhaps you could use counsel's copy. 

Mr, Masten. Do you want to see this copy ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2809 

Mr. Murphy, Yes ; I would like to see page 1633, if I may. 
Mr. Masten, Very well. 

Admiral Stanley. Well, as a matter of fact, this [7595] shows that 
your search was not being made, and these orders indicate that they were not 
to be made in peacetime, and they were only to be made in case of initiation of 
a hostile attack. 

General Short. Frankly, I do not know how much search the Navy made, 
as the whole business of search was tied in between the ships and the planes, 
and it was their responsibility, and I do not know when their task forces — as I 
say, they have two task forces out at the time. I don't know what instructions 
their task forces had as to search. I assumed that when their task force wtut 
out, if it located Japanese ships, it would report to them. 

Admiral Standley. But his search from Oahu itself, which in wartime was to 
be an all around search, did you know that that was not being carried out? 

General Shokt. I didn't know just what the Navy was doing, frankly. I knew 
they had task forces out and I assumed any searching they did was tied in 
with the task forces. 

Would that indicate to you that General Short knew whether you 
were conducting reconnaissance or not ? 

[7596'\ Admiral Kimmel. Well, that indicates to me the testi- 
mony that General Short made at the time. 

Mr. Murphy. Now I direct your attention to page 1638, General 
Short again testifying : 

General McCoy — 

At the bottom of the page. 
Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 
Mr. Murphy (reading) : 

General McCoy. I would like to ask a few questions : In view of what happened 
and looking back on it are you satisfied with the adequateness of the system in 
operation? 

General Shokt. I think the system is all right. I think we made a very serious 
mistake when we did not go on an alert against an all-out attack. I think our 
system was perfectly all right. Our estimate of the situation was not. 

Do you think you made a mistake in not going on an all-out alert ? 

Admiral Kimmel. In view of what happened, yes ; of course. 

Mr. Murphy. I now direct your attention to page 108, General 
Short's testimony before the Roberts Board. 

Admiral Kimmel. What is the number ? 

Mr. Murphy. 108, Admiral. I am sorry to take you [7697] 
around the lot but this is a big proposition and it is a big record, 
Admiral. This is at the top of the page, the jfirst question : 

General MoNarney. As I remember, you stated in your statement that you 
assumed that the Navy was sending out the proper reconnaissance covering the 
proper areas. Did you know that they were? 

General Shoet. I knew it was their full responsibility, that if they could not 
do it they would call on me for bombers to assist them. That was in the definite 
agreement. I didn't think that I had a right to call on them for a daily report 
of what they were doing. They had task forces out all the time. I don't know 
just where they went, and I don't know just what they did when they went out. 
That was a naval problem. 

• General McNakney. Didn't you feel it was part of your res