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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 

. OF THE PEAEL HAKBOE ATTACK 

CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 



S. Con. Res. 27 />^ 

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress) 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



7 



PART 7 

JANUARY 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 AND 29, 1946 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



I' 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEARL HARBOK ATTACK 



CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEVENTY-NIXTH CONGRESS ^^3)^^^ 

SECOND SESSION - /^ 

PURSUANT TO ^ M ^^ 

S. Con. Res. 27 ^i'fi, 

ft. 7 

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress) * / 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON TEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1041, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 7 

JANUARY 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, AND 29, 1946 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigutiou of the Pearl Harbor Attacli 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
79716 WASHINGTON : 194G 



«. «. SWPERIMTENDPMT OF OOCUM£«» O^ H 

SEP 23 I94S 



JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL 
HARBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California 

gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from 

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin 
North Carolina 



COUNSEL 
(Throiish January 14, 1946) 
William D. ^Mitchell, General Counsel 
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Ansistant Counsel 
JULE M. Hanxaford, Assistant Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 1946) 
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel 
Samuel H. Kaufman. Associate General Counsel 
JOHN E. masten, Assistant Counsel 
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel 
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 



HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 


Pages 


Transcript 




Hearings 


No. 




pages 






1 


1- 399 


1- 1058 


Nov, 


. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 


2 


401- 982 


1059- 2586 


Nov 


. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945, 


3 


983-1583 


2587- 4194 


Dec. 


5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945. 


4 


1585-2063 


4195- 5460 


Dec. 


14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 


5 


2065-2492 


5461- 6646 


Dec. 


31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946. 


6 


2493-2920 


6647- 7888 


Jan. 


15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946. 


7 


2921-3378 


7889- 9107 


Jan. 


22, 23, 24, 25. 26, 28 and 29, 1946., 


8 


3379-3927 


9108-10517 


Jan. 


30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 


9 


3929-4599 


10518-12277 


Feb. 


7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 


10 


4601-5151 


12278-13708 


Feb. 


15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 


11 


5153-5560^ 


13709-14765 


Apr. 


9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 
No. 



12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 through 25 

26 

27 through 31 

32 through 33 

34 

35 

36 through 38 

39 



Exhibits Nos. 

1 through 6. 

7 and 8. 

9 through 43. 

44 through 87. 

88 through 110. 

Ill through 128. 

129 through 156. 

157 through 172. 

173 through 179. 

180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations. 

Roberts Commission Proceedings. 

Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 

Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

Clarke Investigation Proceedings. 

Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



IV 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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VI 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 

5080-5089 
3826-3838 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

163-181 

"'418-423' 
"451-464' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

"87'-'b" 
205 



B223-224" 
B65-66 
B229-231 
49-51 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


^1 1 1 M : 1 Ml 1 1 : ! 1 1 M i I : 1 1 ! 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
495-510 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

4125-4151 

1695-1732 

2745-278.5" 
4186-4196 

3190-3201" 
1928-1965 

3642-3643 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

179-184 
"105-114" 

96-105 

74-85 

""368-378" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 
478-483, 
301-310 

1171-1178" 

1178-1180" 
1659-1663, 
170-198 

"812-843," 
1538-1571 
504-509 

2-32" 

365-368 

1747-1753" 


1 


Craige, Nelvin L., Lt. Col 

Creighton, John M., Capt. (USN) 

Crosley, Paul C, Comdr 

Curley, J. J. (Ch/CM) 

Curts, M. E., Capt., USN 

Daubin, F. A., Capt., USN 

Da'vidson, Howard C, Maj. Gen 

Da-vis, Arthur C, Rear Adm 

Dawson, Harry L 

Deane, John R., Maj. Gen 

DeLany, Walter S., Rear Adm 

Dickens, June D., Sgt 

Dillingham, Walter F 

Dillon, James P 

Dillon, John H., Maj 

Dingeman, Ray E., Col 

Donegan, William Col 

Doud, Harold,' Col 

Dunlop, Robert H., Col 

Dunning, Mary J 

Dusenbury, Carhsle Clyde, Col 

Dyer, Thomas H., Capt., USN 

Earle, Frederick M., W/0___ 

Earle, John Bayliss, Capt., USN 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



VII 



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VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


i ! ii i i i i i i i 1 i i i ! !^§-2 i 'M^^^ 

E 1 i iri : : : 1 i 1 1 1 1 ! : ! icJ:-^? : ij^^^oo 
s, \ \ \?1 1 : ;5S§^ ; ;?^^-orar 

1 1 ITJH II CO 1 "* 1 f "^ 

1 ! 1 ! 1 ! 1 ! 1 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! "^11 ^oJi 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

428-432 
414-417 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

212-213 

166-161 

182 
"'166-161' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


^ 1 i 1 ; i MM 


Joint 
Committee- 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

,'Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 

1070-1076 
461-469 

"763-772" 
816-851 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


1 III 1 1 1 1 III III 

1 — 1 1-^ 1 lOiM 1 1 1 iTtit^ III 1 00 1 1 

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lOOli II 05iliiC<IC5ili 1 II 
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Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
417-436 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 

1571-1574" 

1664-1676 
"469-473" 


i 


Hamilton, Maxwell M., State Dept 

Hannum, Warren T., Brig. Gen 

Harrington, Cyril J 

Hart, Thomas Charles, Senator 

Hayes, Philip, Maj. Gen 

Heard, William A., Capt., USN 

Henderson, H. H., Lt., USA 

Herron, Charles D., Maj. Gen 

HiU, William H., Senator 

Holmes, J. Wilfred., Capt., USN 

Holtwick, J. S., Jr., Comdr 

Hoppough, Clay, Lt. Col 

Hornbeck, Stanley K 

Home, Walter Wilton 

Howard, Jack W., Col 

Hubbell, Monroe H., Lt. Comdr 

Huckins, Thomas A., Capt., USN 

Hull, Cordell 

Humphrey, Richard W. RM 3/c 

Hunt, John A., Col 

IngersoU, Royal E., Adm 

Inglis, R. B., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



IX 



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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


oiiiiiioicoiiiiiiiiii i_r ,-o 1 1 

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lO ^ 1 1 1 1 1 i^^^ ' ' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

541-553 
182-292 

"140^142" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

103 
107-112 

186 
219-222 

102 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarlie 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


1 i-H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Ill II 

"[o ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II 

•^1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I ! 1 1 1 1 1 1 ! 1 ! i 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


icoiiiiicoiiiioiio II 

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giiliiiiCliliiiCOiiiit^iOO II 

.o 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4i 1 1 1 1 i 00 1 1 1 1 4 1 (M II 

ft<illllliOiiiii<NiiliCOiiO II 

IlliliiOiiiliiCOiiiit^iOO II 


Joint 

Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

266.5-2695" 
3028-3067 

1161-1185' 

2787-2802" 
1014-1034 
1678-1694 
3226-3250 

2362-2374" 

2-54" 

T. S. 2-52, 

192-226 

3126-3152 

1816-1913 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


II lO 1 l> 1 1 1 II II 

C^ 1 CO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II 

gi (NiCOiiliiiiiiil II 

„& : 1 1 1 ; ; 14^ ;c4 : ! ! 1 1 1 1 ; ; 1 ! ! i 

Oi 1 1-1 ICO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II 

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Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 2.3, 1942) 


1 ICO ii-H i(N>0 1 1 iiO 1 1 1 iTfi 1 1 lie KM^IOi 

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1 


Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN 

Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen 

Landreth, J. L., Ens 

Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/0 

Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col 

Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC 

Lawton, William S., Col 

Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN 

Leahj', William D., Adm 

Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm 

Lewis, Fulton, Jr -, 

Litell, S. H 

Locey, Frank H 

Lockard, Jo.seph L., Lt., USA 

Lorence, Walter E., Col 

Lumsden, George, Alaj 

Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN 

Lynch, Paul J 

Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr 

Mac Arthur, Douglas, Gen 

Marshall, George C, Gen 

Marston, Morrill W., Col 

Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XI 




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XII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



- Joint 
Congressional 

Committee, 
Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 
1946 


Pages 

5210 
4933-5009 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

""387-388" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

14S 

(Clausen 

Investieation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Oil III 11^ 1 C<lii it-.ll 

Tt<i 00 1 eoii ii>ii 

1^ 1 I 1 1 1 ! 17 1 ^ 1 1 lei ! ! 

^^ I ; 1 1 1 I 1^ : 1 1 1^ ; ! 
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Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


^ 1 1 i \ i 1 M 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


1 lie III III _rr<rrvC<>'"'><^^ 1 lo 1 loo 00 

I lOJ 111 111 '-^f^'i^oon^ 1 iT}< 1 lOO 

1 1 17 111 111 7c^f^2::;: i I7 : \f:^ 
1 1 It^ III 111 '^^cJ.777 1 't^ : 1^7 

n, 1 it^ III III tCK-'-^'O'-* 1 1^ 1 it^^ 

11^ III 11! c^fSg$2S 1 \^ 1 I'^S 

II III III t-ii— I,— (II iii-i 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

1107-1160," 
1240-1252 

3636^3640 
2375-2398, 
3990-3996 
3153-3165 
2923-2933 
3885-3915 

1968^1988' 
1035-1070 

778-789 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
147-169 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


1 i^J-t^-* 1 1 O 1,^,^00 1 1 ICO'* 1 1 1 1 
11^000511 uOiK^lfJc^i, liOOOOiiil 

1 1 1^22 1 1 2 17^^ ! ! I^°? 1 1 1 1 
<S 1 l^^4^ 1 1 <i iS^ ! 1 Icil^ 1 1 1 1 




Pettigrew, Moses W., Col 

Phelan, John, Ens 

Phillips, Walter C, Col 

Pickett, Harry K., Col 

Pierson, Millard, Col . 

Pine, Willard B 

Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov 

Powell, Boiling R., Jr., Maj 

Powell, C. A., Col 

Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr 

Prather, Louise 

Pratt, John S., Col 

Pye, William S., Vice Adm 

Rafter, Case B 

Raley, Edward W., Col 

Ramsey, Logan C, Capt., USN 

Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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XrV CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


IS i i i i !p i is i ig^gp 1 lis 1 i i 
lis iiiiliSiiiiiiisiiliiiiii 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


11 iiOiiiiO llllll III iCOi 

11 1 1 1 1 ll^ 1 III 11-11 

^11 IITJ^IICO llllll III ITtll 

c» 1 1 11 1 1 1 llllll III 11 
„o "C Ill 11-11 

Oiii 11 iico llllll III 11-11 

CO llllll III irf 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

--- 
195-197 

203-204 
185' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarko 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


11 1 1 i(N 1 1 1 1 iC<l 1 1 

^ i 11 11 ill i i i i i j j j 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


lO lillKN i-iliil ^-^-O III III 
i«> t^ 00 1 1 1 >X^^ 1 ' • ' ' ' 

1 17 ! i 1 ! 17 2 1 ! 1 !2?o°? ill ; ! ; 
P \6 ! 1 I i lob 7 rkA4< ! 

Ill i(N 1 1 1 1 i(N t^ 1 1 1 l<=^Sl^ 111 III 

iM 1 1 1 1 iio t^ 1 1 1 1 £ii> III III 
1 lllll O 1 1 1 1 " 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 
3644r-3650 
276-541, 
4411-4445 

3265-3286" 

1539^1575" 
4037-4094 
C 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
32-65" 

323-334 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


lor^ioiiiii ic^iiooo 1 

lO-^iOlilll i'<*<iiOO 

g ii-icO-^ »•- 1 i»-ioO 111 III 

g. 1 1 ^ 1 1-11 IrH^ III III 

o ir^ 1 IN L 1 1 I I 

Ds iCOt^O lllll lOO 1 i«b"b III III 
i.-HTj<illll iCOiiOOO III 111 
l<0 lllll it^llr-lOO 


1 


Short, Arthur T 

Short, Walter C, Maj. Gen 

Shortt, Creed, Pvt 

Sisson, George A 

Smedberg, William R., II, Capt. USN.. 

Smith, Ralph C, Maj. Gen 

Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen 

Smith, William W., Rear Adm 

Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN 

Smoot, Perry M., Col 

Sonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr 

Spalding, Isaac, Brig. Gen 

Staff, W. F, CH/CM . 

Stark, Harold R., Adm 

Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR 

Stilphen, Benjamin L 

Stimson, Henry L 

Stone, John F 

Street, George 

Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XV 



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la 



XVI COXGRECSIONAL R> VESTIGATION PEAHL -HAIiEOR ATfelfceS 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945. 

to May 31, 

1946 


. i i i i i 12 ; ;;;:;; : \\\'Mm 

& 1 1 1 1 1 1 CO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 J. CO 1 

p« CM m'=> ' 

i M 1 i i" i i M i i M ! i i !"" i 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


' Pages 

"389^410' 

376-386 
541-553 
597-602 

442-450 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

187-189 
105-106 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


Vol. 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
1083-1090 


Joint 
Committee 
E.\hibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 
2722-2744 
3120-3124 

1989^2007' 
2456-2478 

1345-1381' 

910-931 
3663-3665 

3677-3683' 

3750-3773 
3357-3586' 

25S0d-2596 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


1 1 1 1 1 100 1 1 1 CM 1 1 1 1 

00 00 1 1 1 1 

giiiiiiCMi iCOiii 1 

a 1 1 1 I 1 !C5 i 1 1 i i i 1 i \6> \ '< \ 1 

^1 1 1 1 i 1 il^ .t-. 1 1 1 1 

C<1 CO 1 1 1 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

toJan.23, 1942) 


Pages 
1311-1329 
496-499 
1830-1842 

1334-1340" 

"247-259' 

1525-1538' 
1683-1705 


a 


Wells, B. IL, Maj. Gen 

West, Melbourne IL, Lt. Col 

Whaling, William J., Lt. Col 

White, William R., Brig. Gen 

Wichiser, Rea B 

Wilke, Weslie T 

Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm 

Willoughby, C. A., Maj. Gen 

Wilson, Durward 8., Maj. Gen 

Wilson, Erie M., Col 

Wimer, Benjamin R., Col 

Vvithers, Thomas, Rear Adm 

Wong, Ahoon H 

Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR 

Woodward, Farnsley C, Lt. (jg), USN. 

Woolley, Ralph E 

Wright, Wesley A., Comdr 

Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col 

York, Yee Kam 

Zacharias, Ellis M., Capt., USN 

Zucca, Emil Lawrence 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2921 



V7889y PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



TUESDAY, JANUARY 22, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF the Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington^ D. C. 
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster 
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, associate general counsel ; John E. Masten, Edward P. Mor- 
gan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee. 
[7890] The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 
General, will you hold up your hand ? 

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES 
ARMY, RETIRED 2 

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. General, the Chair understands that you have 
a statement here which you desire to read, or to have read, due to the 
fact that you have been somewhat indisposed. 

If you would like to have someone else read it, it would be entirely 
agreeable to the committee, or if you wish to read it yourself, why, 
you may proceed. 

General Short. Mr. Chairman, I have been in the hospital with 
pneumonia, and have not entirely recovered my strength, but I shall 
make every effort to go through my testimony before this committee 
without interruption. 

I prefer to read it myself. 

The Chairman. You may proceed. 

General Short. Mr. Chairman; I want to thank you and the mem- 
bers of the committee for giving me, after 4 long years, the oppor- 
tunity to tell my story of Pearl Harbor to the American public. I ap- 
peared before the Roberts commission but was not permitted to hear 
the other witnesses nor given the privilege of cross-examination. I 
was not [7891] given the opportunity to read the evidence 
taken before the Roberts commission until August 1944. I appeared 
before the Army Pearl Harbor board, but again was not permitted 
to hear the other witnesses nor given the privilege of cross-examina- 
tion ; however, I was furnished a copy of the hearings except for the 

1 Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript 
of testimony. 

' Subtitles and consecutively numbered footnotes in General Short's testimony were 
supplied by him ; footnotes indicated by * were supplied by the staff of the committee. 

79716 — 46— pt. 7 2 



2922 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

part considered top secret. The Army board labeled certain evidence 
top secret and I was never permitted to see that until this committee 
was about to meet. Both boards took testimony off the record which 
has not been made available to me. 

Before taking up my statement in detail, there are a few points that 
I would like to mention for emphasis. These will be elaborated upon 
later. 

1. On Pearl Harbor day I was carrying out orders from the War 
Dex)artment as I understood them. 

2. At no time since June 17, 19-10. had the War Department indi- 
cated the probability of an attack on Hawaii. In none of the estimates 
j^repared by G-2 War Department was Hawaii mentioned as a point 
of attack, but the Philippines was mentioned repeatedly. 

o. There was in the War Department an abundance of information 
which was vital to me but which was not furnished to me. This in- 
formation was absolutely essential to a correct estimate of the situation 
and correct decision. [789^] My estimate of the situation and 
my decision were made without the benefit of this vital information. 
Had this information been furnished to me, I am sure tliat I would 
have arrived at the conclusion that Hawaii would be attacked and 
would have gone on an all-out alert. 

4. When I made the decision, based on the information available to 
me, to go on alert to prevent sabotage (No. 1), I reported measures 
taken as follows : 

Reurad 472 27th Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with 
the Navy. 

The War Department had 9 days in which to tell me that my action 
was not what they wanted. I accepted their silence as a full agreement 
with the action taken. I am convinced that all who read the report 
thought that my action was correct or I would have received instruc- 
tions to modify my orders. 

I would like to pass out at this time a chart. Copies of these charts, 
in colors, will be placed on the bulletin board. They are not large 
enough to be very readily seen from there. 

I have had several charts prepared that may be of assistance to this 
committee in the course of my testimony. 

Chart No. 1 is a chronological summary. It shows my appointment 
to Hawaii in December 1940, my conversations in Washington in Jan- 
uary 1941, and the period of my com l7S9o] mand for 10 
months from February 7, 1941, to December 17, 1941. 

It traces my 10 months of effort to strengthen Hawaiian Defense. As 
1 mention these efforts in the course of my testimony, a glance at this 
chart will show how the particular matter fitted into the chronological 
picture. 

At the foot of the chart are listed the various requests and requisi- 
tions I made of the War Department, most of which were disapproved. 
An "X" on the chart indicates the date of disapproval of my request. 
The committee may see at a glance that by December 7, the picture 
clearly showed that the War Department was not favorably consider- 
ing my efforts to strengthen the great Hawaiian outpost. 

The chronological summary also shows the "alert" messages and the 
replies, beginning July 8, 1941. It shows the step-up in traffic from the 
24th to the 28th of November. And it portrays graphically the 9 days 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2923 

of silence which the War Department maintained after 1 sent my second 
sabotage-alert report. 

It shows, also, the December 4 sabotage report, which was sent by 
General Martin from Hawaii on December 4, but for some reason 
never reached the War Department until December 10. 

(The chart referred to is included in "Exhibit No. 134.") 

[7895] General Short, Introduction : 

1. Appointinent to Hawaii 

The Chief of Staff selected me as the commanding general of the 
Hawaiian Department. I was first notified in December 1940. I 
held conferences in Washington, D. C., with General Marshall the 
first week in January 1941. I also conferred with General Gerow in 
the War Plans Division. I talked with some officer about the equip- 
ment of the Hawaiian Department. I talked with Colonel (now Gen- 
eral) Spaatz about the Air Corps problem. 

%. AssiiTnption of com/mand 

At the time I assumed command on February 7, 1941, the Hawiian 
Department was amply prepared for defense against the submarine 
danger and against sabotage and espionage, but was not adequately 
prepared for defense against an air rid, either by bomber or by tor- 
pedo planes or both.^ On February 7, 1941, the Chief of Staff sent 
me a letter, detailing his policies regarding the Army mission in 
Hawaii and stressing his interest in strengthening our air power and 
antiaircraft defense. In that letter he deplored the [7896] 
fact that all defenses would be inadequately equipped because of the 
over-all shortage of aircraft and anti-aircraft equipment.^ 

EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN DEFENSES 

3. 10 months* efforts. 

During the 10 months immediately following my assumption of 
command, in full cooperation with the Navy, I made strenuous efforts 
to improve the defense system of the Hawaiian Islands. 

4. Agreements with Navy 

A joint agreement with reference to the employment of the air 
forces was concluded with the Navy, and has heretofore been called 
to the attention of this committee. Pertinent extracts have been se- 
lected by the counsel for the committee and introduced here as exhibit 
44. Committee exhibit 13, the air study dated August 20, 1941, is also 
before the committee. These agreements specifically placed the respon- 
sibility for distant reconnaissance upon the Navy and provided that the 
Army, when called upon, should furnish to the Navy any available 
aircraft for assisting in this reconnaissance. It specified also that 
when Army planes were detailed to assist in the distant reconnais- 
sance they would act directly under the orders of the Navy and report 
to the Navy [7897] the results obtained in carrying out the 
mission. 



> See letter, Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War, dated January 24, 1941, and reply 
by the Secretary of War, Joint Committee, Daily Record, vol. 5, pp. 720-728. 

^Letter, Marshall to Short, February 7, 1941, committee exhibit No. 53, "correspond- 
ence between General Marshall and General Short," pp. 1 to 3. 



2924 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

6. Statemerut to Roberts commission 

At the time that I was called before the Roberts commission, I pre- 
pared and submitted to them a large document marked as their "Ex- 
hibit No. 7." I am submitting a copy of this long document to this 
joint congressional committee, in order that you may have it available 
in your own records and in order that I may refer to it in this state- 
ment. 

6. Statement to Roberts commission 

At this time I want to call attention to pages 28 to 48, inclusive, of 
exhibit 7 of the Roberts commission and to the exhibits lettered "V" 
through "Z," and "lA" through "IR," as annexed to that exhibit 7. 
On those pages and in those exhibits, I developed at some length and 
in considerable detail, the nature of my effort to improve Hawaiian 
defense. 

The Vice Chairman. General, pardon an interruption. 

Do we have before us this exhibit from the Roberts testimony that 
the General is referring to ? 

Mr. Kaufman. Yes, sir. Reference was made to it the other day, 
Mr. Chairman, and indication was made by Mr. Masten that thefe were 
only five copies available. 

The Vice Chairman. That is the one, is it? 

Mr. Kaufman. That is the one. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

[7898] Go ahead, General. 

General Short (continuing) : 

7. /Statement to Roberts comndssion 

I think it unnecessary at this time to read all the factual data that 
I previously collected for the Roberts commission. Those who wish 
to check the details are referred to the statement which I made to the 
Roberts commission. I believe that it will be sufficient if I summarize 
briefly my efforts to increase the defenses of Hawaii. 

8. Letter to General Marshall 19 February 19Jfl 

My initial study of the problem was incorporated in a letter to Gen- 
eral Marshall on February 19, 1941, and is copied on pages 4 to 9, 
committee exhibit No. 53, "Correspondence between General Marshall 
and General Short." 

9. Airfield bunkers 

On February 19, 1941, a letter was sent to the "War Department rec- 
ommending that $1,565,600 be allotted for the purpose of providing 
protective bunkers and the necessary taxiways and hard standings 
for our aircraft. On September 12, 1941, the War Department prom- 
ised $1,358,000, but these funds were not to become available until 
January 1, 1942, nearly 30 days after the attack. As a result of the 
delay of this project, on December 7, 1941, it was impracticable to 
disperse the planes adequately at Hickam Field or to protect them from 
an air raid. Bunkers at Wheeler Field [7899] had been con- 
structed with soldier labor.^ 



* See exhibit "W" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2925 

10. Military roads and trails 

On February 19, 1941, 1 requested $1,370,000 for construction of mili- 
tary roads and trails. Up to December 7, 1941, only $350,000 had been 
allotted to us.^ 

11. Coast artillery 

On February 18, 1941, I requested two regiments of mobile coast 
artillery. As a result, the War Department, in May 1941, authorized 
certain increases in the coast artillery garrison, to be gradually fur- 
nished us between June 1941 and March 1942. The War Department, 
however, disapproved our request of February 25, 1941, for an increase 
in enlisted men of the 251st Coast Artillery Regiment from 1,181 to 
1,450.^ This was an intiaircraft regiment. 

12. Kaneohe Naval Air Station 

In February 1941, the Army assumed responsibility for the defense 
of the naval air station at Kaneohe Bay. General Marshall concurred 
with this change in the defense plan. On April 14, 1941, a letter was 
sent to the adjutant general recommending procurement of a 12-inch 
gun battery for the Kaneohe Bay area. I requested an increase of 
the war strength [7900] garrison to 71,500 to provide appro- 
priate defenses for Kaneohe Bay and for station complements. This 
request, as well as our subsequent letters, did not receive favorable 
consideration from the War Department.^ 

IS. The Infantry 

As early as April 25, 1941, 1 requested the organization of two trian- 
gular divisions in place of the Hawaiian division (square), the for- 
mation of station complements at Schofield Barracks and Fort 
Shafter, and the activation of an air-defense command. At this time 
the square division was outmoded and no longer in use in the main- 
land units. On May 29, 1941, the War Department reduced our initial 
war garrison to 58,000. I immediately protested and asked that the 
allotment be increased to 71,500 and repeated my request for station 
complements. These requests met with disapproval, except that au- 
thority was granted in July for the organization of the two triangular 
divisions,^ with a reduced over-all strength remaining at 58,000 instead 
of 71,500 as requested by me. 

14- Additional airfields 

Proper air defense and training urgently required the construction 
of additional airfields. Numerous letters were 79011 dis- 

patched between April 5, 1941, and May 14, 1941, with specific recom- 
mendations for 10 airports. Up until the time of the attack, no 
funds had been specifically allotted by the War Department, although 
plans had been approved. By directing that an air field be constructed 
at Kahuku, delay was occasioned by protracted negotiations. In an 
effort to start fields without waiting for the receipt of funds, I directed 
the use of soldier labor at Molokai, Burns, Morse, and Barking 

* Exhibit "lA" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission. 
" Exhibit "IJ" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission. 

« Exhibit "IC" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission ; letter, March 13, 1941, General 
Marshall to General Short, p. 13, committee exhibit No. 53. 
' Exhibit "IL" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission. 



2926 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Sands. I considered the immediate improvement of Bellows Field 
vital for the protection of Oahu and so informed the War Department. 
The War Department approved plans for the project but did not 
immediately allocate funds. However, the district engineer was di- 
rected to take all possible steps until such time as the specific funds 
were made available. By this makeshift means gasoline storage tanks 
were completed and a 5,000-foot runway was half completed on De- 
cember 7, 1941.^ 

15. Landing strips 

On June 21, 1941, the War Department's attention was directed to 
the necessity for landing strips at Wheeler Field. In spite of a pro- 
longed exchange of communications on this subject, no funds were 
allotted or received for this [7902] purpose. Limited im- 
provements were made by soldier labor.^ 

16. Radar 

The aircraft warning service was regarded as probably the most 
important single defense project. The priorities granted to us, how- 
ever, made it impossible to complete the permanent radar stations prior 
to the time of the attack.^" 

17. Prionties 

The priorities situation also rendered it impossible to obtain sup- 
plies except from the mainland, with delivery delayed 6 to 8 weeks 
even under the most favorable conditions. We made repeated efforts 
to correct this situation, but no success had been made up to the time 
of the attack. In this respect, as well as all others, the War Depart- 
ment reserved to itself full control of the determination of the strate- 
gical importance of the various defense projects and in the case of 
aircraft warning material did not favorably consider my request that 
a higher priority be granted to us.^^ 

18. Camouflage of airfields 

On July 15, 1941, we requested funds for camouflage treatment of 
airfields. The War Department, apparently acting upon their estimate 
that air attack was improbable, had furnished us no funds for this 
purpose prior to December 7, 1941. The effectiveness of camouflaging 
which we were able [^7903] to do was limited by our inability 
to buy the necessary materials." 

19. Field fortifhcations 

Along the same line, our request for funds for field fortifications and 
camouflage was also denied by the War Department. No funds were 
given us for this purpose.^^ 

W. Advance 'procurement fimds 

In July 28, 1941, we requested a revolving fund allotment of $1,- 
000,000 to permit advance procurement of essential materials. In 
September the Deputy Chief of Staff allotted $500,000 for this fund, 
but before any materials could be secured the War Department di- 

8 Exhibit "IB" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission. 

» See p. 33 and exhibit "ID" of exhibit 7, Roberts commission. 

^" Exhibit "IE" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission. 

" Exhibit "IF" to exliibit 7. Roberts commission. 

^ Exhibit "Z" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission. 

'3 Exhibit "Y" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2927 

verted the money for housing at Kaneohe Bay. As a result, no reserve 
supplies, except lumber, had been accumulated.^* 

21. Air depot 

Our air depot at Hickam Field was extremely vulnerable to attack. 
Therefore on September 10, 1941, I recommended that bombproof 
faciliies for aircraft repair be constructed, costing $3,480,650. On 
October 27, the War Department informed me that : 

* * * it is a policy that such facilities will not be provided." 

[790Ji-'\ During the attack, this air depot was a main target and 
suffered tremendous damage. Immediately after the attack, funds 
were provided, and underground, bombproof facilities were begun. 

22. May Idlf.! manenAyers 

During our May 1941 maneuvers, it was found that our then existent 
defensive field orders were too cumbersome. On July 14, 1941, a tenta- 
tive Standing Operating Procedure was issued. In letters dated 
October 10 and 28, General Marshall suggested certain changes in this 
defense plan, relative to the Air Corps mission, which suggestions we 
adopted in the final draft of the S. O. P., dated 5 November 1941.^° 
Due to this plan and the familiarization of all units with it, all per- 
sonnel down to the last man were able to act promptly in the execution 
of their missions when the raid took place. This they did in a most 
creditable manner. 

23. Standing operating procedure 

The Standing Operating Procedure of November 5, 1941, was issued 
to comply with paragraph 159, FM 100-5, issued by the War Depart- 
ment on May 22, 1941, which states : 

In every unit, standing operating procedure is prescribed by the commander 
vphenever practicable. 

[7905] This procedure covers those features of operations which lend 
themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. 
The adoption of such procedures will save time in the preparation and issuance 
of orders, minimize the chances for confusion, and errors when under stress 
of combat, and greatly simplify and expedite the execution of operations in the 
field. 

the value of having a standing operating procedure was fully demon- 
strated at the time of the attack. 

I wish to pass out chart No, 2 at this time. 

The Vice Chairman. This [indicating] is the chart you refer to, 
General? 

General Short. That is correct. 

The Vice Chaikmajst. I believe all members of the committee have 
it. 

General Short. This chart will summarize for the committee the 
requests I made of the War Department and the amount I was 
granted. 

It shows that I requested a total of some $22,953,697 for projects 
which the responsible officers in Hawaii considered vital for national 
defense. 



^* Bxlnbit "IG" to exhibit 7. Roberts commission. 
" Exhibit "X" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission. 

^« See pp. 42-45, Committee Exhibit No. 53, Correspondence between General Marshall 
and General Short. 



2928 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

It shows that the War Department granted us only $350,000 — for 
roads and trails. 

The grants totaled about II/2 percent of the requests. 

That situation speaks for itself. 

I want to add that beginning December 7, 1941, right after 
[7906] the attack, I was given a blank check for everything I 
needed. 

(Chart No. 2 appears in "Exhibit No. 134.") 

[7907] General Short. "Preparation of the civilian population 
for defense." 

24. Civilian defense program 

From page 43 through page 48 of the statement which I submitted 
to the Roberts commission, I discussed the civilian defense program 
of the islands. The committee may examine that statement for an 
outline of this phase. The defensive measures to enable the civilian 
population to meet any emergency which might arise where covered 
under the following headings : 

(1) Production and storage of food. 

(2) Organization of doctors and nurses for care of injured 
and wounded. 

(3) An agreement with the Red Cross for it to purchase and 
store in Honolulu $200,000 worth of medicines and surgical sup- 
plies and equipment for use in any possible emergency. 

(4) Organization of an auxiliary to the police force to guard 
utilities and prevent sabotage. 

(5) Preparation of plans and provision for evacuation of 
women and children and preparation of shelters for workers in 
the vicinity of central industries. 

[7908] Governor Poindeoster's letter. I think the best summary 
of my work in preparing the civilian population to meet any emerg- 
ency is found in the letter of Gov. Joseph B. Poindexter, dated Dec- 
ember 23, 1941, which I should like to quote in full : ^^ 

Sejal of the Terkitory of Hawaii 

Executive Chambers, 
Honolulu, 23 Deceniher 19^1. 
Lieutenant General "Walter C. Short, 

Fort Shatter, T. H. 

My Dear General Shoet : Having noted in the public press that an investiga- 
tion is being made as to the military preparedness of the Army and Navy in 
Hawaii on December 7, 1941, I believe it appropriate that I make to you a state- 
ment as to the state of preparedness of the civil communities of these Islands 
for war when they were so insidiously and treacherously attacked -on December 
7, 1941. 

The citizens of the Hawaiian Islands have always appreciated that these 
Islands were important to National De- [7909] fense from a military stand- 
point, but it has only been since your arrival in these Islands on February 5, 
1941 that it has been brought home to the civil population the importance of the 
part it would play in the event of a war in the Pacific. On December 7th, the 
citizens of these Islands met the hour of their test in such a manner as to make 
me proud to be the Chief Executive of these Islands. Your foresight in urging 
the population to prepare to meet the possible vicissitudes of war and the joint 
efforts of the Army and civil population in planning and preparing for this 
emergency was magnificently rewarded. 

" See exhibit 7, Roberts commission, pp. 47a to 47c. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2929 

It may be of interest to point out in detail some of the plans and prepara- 
tions which bore fruit on December 7, 1941 : 

(1) The enactment of the Hawaiian Defense Act by a special session of the 
Legislature called for that purpose. This legislation permits a mobilization of 
the entire civil economy of the Islands in the interest of National Defense or in 
the event of disaster. By virtue of this Act, civilian defense was planned and 
many of its phases were brought to such a i>oint of preparation that they were 
able to go into action immediately and to function effectively on December 7, 
1941. 

2) The production and conservation of food: 

[7910] Householders were persistently urged to stock their shelves in 
canned food. It is estimated that this resulted in increasing the available food 
supply of the Hawaiian Islands by more than twenty percent. Federal appro- 
priation was requested for procurement and storage for food reserve. This ap- 
propriation has, since December 7, 1941, been authorized. By agreement with 
plantation owners, plans were made for the procurement and storage of seed 
and the planting of certain large areas with quick growing food crops. Agree- 
ments were also made for the growing, in normal times, of these crops not 
usually grown in marketable quantities. In furtherance of this plan, the War 
Department was induced to permit the purchase of Island-grown potatoes for 
the use of the Army although the price was above that of mainland potatoes. 
In anticipation of the receipt of reserve supplies of food asked for in the emerg- 
ency, the Army supported a certificate of necessity for building an adequate 
warehouse to meet these needs. This warehouse is now available for the stor- 
age of food supply when it arrives. 

(3) The medical facilities for the care of the injured and wounded during any 
disaster was one of the first things accomplished by the civilians of these 
Islands for an emergency. This resulted in mobilizing the entire medical pro- 
fession of the Islands with all its medical facilities. [7911] Approximately 
three thousand persons were given training' and instruction in First-Aid as 
required by the Red Cross. The persons thus trained assisted in carrying out 
the arduous tasks of evacuation. Twenty First-Aid units were organized, each 
unit consisting of personnel of about one hundred and twenty. An ambulance 
corps of one hundred and forty improvised ambulances were organized. The 
performance of their tasks by these groups was one of the highlights of the 
cilvil defense efforts on December 7, 1941. 

(4) Plans for the evacuation of tvomen and children and the preparation of 
shelters for workers inessential industries had reached a high state of perfec- 
tion on December 7, 1941, and the evacuation of women and children from areas 
attacked was accomplished in a most admirable manner. 

(5) An auxilianj police force to guard utilities and to prevent sabotage was 
organized at an early date in our preparation and it was able to function in- 
stantly when called upon to do so on the morning of December 7th. The work 
of this force was exceptional and excellent. 

(6) Legislation authorizing a home guard was enacted at the special session 
of the Territorial Legislature. It was well planned and so organized that 1400 
of such home guardsmen could be and were placed on duty thereby relieving 
members of the Army for other military duty. 

[7912] (7) There were many other matters too numerous to detail here 
which were planned and accomplished at your instigation. Important among 
these was the bringing home to the public the urgent necessity for cooperation 
and public service in times of emergency. 

All of the foregoing required tremendous effort on the part of the local 
authorities, the citizenry and military authorities. All such efforts have been 
rewarded since December 7, 1941, in that Territorial and City Governments and 
all phases of the public welfare have overcome all obstacles and have operated 
smoothly as a direct result of prior planning and training. 

It is my belief that the public has confidence in the military and civil 
authorities. The fact that the Japanese Government has seen fit to inflict a 
treacherous attack has not in any way diminished the faith of this community in 
your demonstrated abilities. I wish to state that the magnificen way in which 
the Territory of Hawaii met its problem in its crucial hour was in a large 
measure due to your foresight. I am deeply grateful for your efforts on behalf 
of the Territory. 

You are at liberty to use this letter in any way which you see fit. 
Very sincerely yours, 

(S) J. B. POINDEXTEB, 

Oovemor of Hawaii. 



2930 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
[TOIS] PRE-WAR ALERTS 

S6. Marshull-Herron alert 

Prior to the time that I assumed command in Hawaii, General 
Marshall had definitely indicated his intention to direct personally 
any genuine prewar alert. As commanding general and as a matter 
of training I was. of course, fully authorized to conduct drills, ma- 
neuvers, and practice alerts. Numerous maneuvers, general and special 
practice alerts were, in fact, held. However, as a part of my orienta- 
tion, on the day before I assumed command. General Herron, my 
predecessor, acquainted me with the relation which had existed between 
himself and General Marshall during the all-out alert which began 
June 17, 1940.^^ In that alert, General Marshall had directed the 
alert and had closely supervised its continuance, as disclosed in com- 
mittee exhibit No. 52, Communications Between War Department and 
General Herron Concerning 1940 Alert. The following message began 
the alert : 

June 17, 1^0. No. 42S. Immediately alert complete defensive organization 
to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid, to greatest extent possible without creating 
public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents?. 
Suggest maneuver basis. [7914] Maintain alert until further orders. In- 
structions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished 
you shortly. Acknowledge. 

Adams. 

£7. Supervision hy Chief of Staff 

The record is clear that at the time of the 1940 alert the Chief of 
Staff had sufficient time and sense of personal responsibility toward 
the Hawaiian Department to order and to supervise the Hawaiian alert. 
In addition, he had information which caused him to state that — 

* * * In any event it would have been foolhardy not to take special precau- 
tions." 

28. Expected action of Chief of Staff 

In was my expectation that if the Chief of Staff once again had 
information causing him to expect a "trans-Pacific raid'" against Oahu, 
he would follow the course he had previously set as an example. I 
felt that a Chief of Staff who had personally supervised the long- 
continued 1940 alert would certainly have the time and interest not 
only to read and to understand m}' succinct report "Reurad four seven 
two 27th Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison 
with the Xavy", but to send further word in the event that he disagreed 
in any way with the measures I had taken in obedience to his Novem- 
ber ' [7^iJ] 27 directive. At the time that the previous alert 
had been modified, on July 16, 1940, the Chief of Staff had thought 
that the sabotage menace continued, even though the air raid danger 
had subsided. He had said that he wanted the Air Corps training 
resumed in such manner that the "aerial patrol measures" could be 
reestablished on short notice.-" 



^' Affidavit of General Herron, p. 212, Clausen report. 
'* V. 13, committee exhibit No. 52. 
=w P. IS, committee exhibit No. 52. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2931 

THE WAR PLANS 

29. Rairibow Five. 

The basic war plan was callpd Rainbow Five by the Army and 
WPL-46 by the Na^-y. This plan could be put into effect only by 
the War and Navy Departments.^ 

30. Local defense plan. 

The joint coastal frontier defense plan for Hawaii was approved 
by Admiral Bloch and me on 11 April 1941, based, of course, on the 
Rainbow Plan, Under this plan, the Navy undertook responsibility 
for "distant reconnaissance." ^^ No part of this joint plan would take 
effect until the War Department ordered M-day under the Rainbow 
Plan, unless it was ordered in effect from Washington or by mutual 
agreement of the Army and Navy in Hawaii. ^^ Due to my knowledge 
of the attitude of the War Department, I would never have ordered 
any part of the plan into effect [7916] without consulting it, 
as long as communications were open and time permitted. Under the 
circumstances preceding the attack, the War Department, with far 
more intimate knowledge of the nature of the Japanese situation, had 
not ordered M-day, had not put the Rainbow Plan into effect, in whole 
or in part, and had expressed no dissatisfaction with my report of a 
sabotage alert. The only conclusion I could draw was that it did not 
want the war plans implemented because of the possible alarm to the 
public or the danger of provoking the Japanese. Their silence I took 
as concurrence with the degree of alert I had adopted. 

INFORMATIOX FDENISHED HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT 

SJ. Inforination in general. 

1 want to outline for the committee the information which the War 
Department furnished me during the critical 10-day period preceding 
the attack. 

Pass out chart No. 6, please. 

(Chart No. 6 is included in "Exhibit No. 134.") 

\7918'\ General Short. Chart No. 6 is an attempt to show on 
the map the important factors which entered into mv estimate of the 
situation — the things which led me to think that the Japanese were not 
going to attack Hawaii. 

1. The last official prediction of an imminent trans-Pacific raid on 
Oahu was the Marshall-Herron alert of 1940 (shown by a broken 
line on the map from Japan to Honolulu.) 

2. The current information in November 1941 from Washington 
pointed to a Jap attack on Russia, Siam, Kra, the Philippines, or 
Borneo — shown by heavy dark arrows stemming from Japan. 

3. The current information also indicated that the probable danger 
in Hawaii, Guam, and Samoa was "internal attack"; that is, hostile 
action in the form of sabotage and subversive activities. 

" Sec. IX, par. 53, Rainbow Five : sec. VIII, par. 40a. Rainbow Five. 
- Par. 18, i. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, April 18, 1941. 
» Par. 15, c, (2), Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, April 18, 1941. 



2932 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

4. Meantime, Hawaii was a focal point in transporting troops, 
B-l7's and air crews to the Philippines. The planes were always sent 
to Hawaii unarmed, but when sending them out to the more dangerous 
area of the Philippines, we were instructed to arm them. 

6. Discussion was going on about Army troops moving out to Christ- 
mas and Canton to relieves the Marines — shown by a dotted line on 
the map. 

6. The Marshalls were the nearest Jap territory. 

[7919] "With such a picture, the committee can get a better idea 
of the considerations which weighed on my mind. 

S2. Background since 1940 alert 

As a matter of brief background, the committee should recall the 
precedent set by the Marshall-Herron alert of 1940. They should also 
bear in mind the message from The Adjutant General on July 25, 1941 
which is shown in committee exhibit No. 32 (reading) : 

Washington, D. C, 152A July 8, 1941. 
O G Hawn DiaT Fort Shatter TH 

Nine two four seventh AGMC for your information deduction from information 
from numerous sources is that Japanese govt has determined upon its future 
policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups 
period This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probable 
aggressive action against maritime provinces of Russia if and when Siberian 
garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that 
Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia period Opinion is that 
Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and develop- 
ment of naval army and air bases in Indo China although an advance against the 
British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out period Neutrality [1920] 
pact with Russia may be abrogated period They have ordered all Jap vessels 
in US Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first August period Move- 
ment of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant 
vessels are being requisitioned. 

Adams. 

This is the only message sent direct by the War Department to me 
which indicates that "magic" sources w^e being used by the informa- 
tion center. It also is the only message received from the War Depart- 
ment that made a definite estimate as to probable Japanese action. 

I should like also to read the message of July 25. 1941 received 
through Naval Intelligence, shown in committee Exhibit No. 32. This 
is addressed to Admiral Kimmel from Admiral Stark. [Reading] : 

This is a joint dispatch from the CNO and the chief of staff US army x Appro- 
priate adees deliver copies to commanding generals Hawaii Philippines and 
Caribbean defenses command and to General Chaney in London xx You are 
advised that at 1400 GOT July twenty sixth United States will impose economic 
sanctions against Japan x It is expected these sanctions will embargo all trade 
between Japan and the United States subject to modification throiigh a licensing 
system for certain [1921] material x It is anticipated that export licenses 
will be granted for certain grades of petroleum products cotton and possibly some 
other materials and that import licenses may be granted for raw silk x Japanese 
assets and funds in the United States will be frozen except that they may be 
moved if licenses are granted for such movement x It is not repeat not expected 
that Japanese merchant vessels in United States ports will he seized at this 
time X United States flag merchant vessels will not at present be ordered to 
depart from or not to enter ports controlled by Japan x CNO and COS do not 
anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means 
but yon are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate 
precautionary measures against possible eventualities x Action being initiated 
by the United States army to call the Philippine army into active service at an 
early date xx This despatch is to be kept secret except from immediate navy and 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2933 

army subordinates x Spenavo CinCPac CinCLant CinCAF Com Fifteen Spenavo 
London xx. 

The Vice Chairman. General, would you pardon an interruption 
there ? What is the page of that which you just read ? 

General Short. That is on page 2 of Exhibit No. 32. 

The Vice Chairman. And what was the page of the other \7922'\ 
one you read? 

General Short. The other was page 1. 

The Vice Chairman. Page 1 ? 
' General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. May I have the page number which you are 
reading from now? 

General Short. Page 2 of Exhibit 32. 

Mr. Gearhart. No, I mean of your statement. * 

General Short. Page 16 of my statement. 

Also, on October 20, 1941, the Army had informed me that they 
expected "no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy" ^^ in spit© 
of the fact that the Navy Department had predicted possible hos- 
tilities on October 16, lOil.^'^ 

These two messages are so diametrically opposed in their views 
that I should like to read them. 

The Vice Chairman. Will you please give the page every time 
you read one? 

General Short. Yes, sir. On page 3 of Exhibit 32 a message sent 
by IngersoU to Admiral Kimmel dated October 16, 1941. 

[7923] The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situ- 
ation X If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic 
and anti-American X If the Kouoye cabinet remains the effect will be that 
it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement 
with the US X In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a 
strong possibility X Since the US and Britain are held responsible by Japan 
for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may 
attack these two powers X In view of these possibilities you will take due 
precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose stra- 
tegic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X Second and 
third adees inform appropriate Army and Naval district authorities X 
Acknowledge XX. 

That was a quite definite prediction of hostile action on the part 
of Japan. 

Now, the Army message reads as follows ; page No. 4, exhibit 32 : 

Washn, D. C, 1234P Oct. 20, 1941. 
20th Following War Dept. estimate of Japanese situation for your infor- 
mation Stop Tension between United States and Japan remains strained but 
no repeat [79^4 ] no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears 
imminent. 

Adams. 

as. Sabotage versus air danger 

General Marshall's testimony made a strong point of the fact that 
in the correspondence between him and the Hawaiaan Department, 
sabotage was not mentioned but that the letters were confined largely 
to aircraft and antiaircraft defense. He stated that he did not un- 
derstand the reason why sabotage then should later be emphasized. 

25 Radiogram, 20 October 1941, Adjutant General to Short, p. 4, committee exhibit 32. 
=« Radiogram, 16 October 1941, CNO to CINCPAC ; p. 3, committee exhibit 32 ; p. 20-B, 
exhibit 37. 



2934 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The reason that sabotage was never discussed in my letters to General 
Marshall was the fact that we had in Hawaii all of the equipment 
necessary to prevent sabotage. Our letters were written to empha- 
size the need of aircraft and antiaircraft defense. The Secretary of 
the JS avy had stated in his letter to the Secretary of War on January 
24, 1941, that defense against sabotage had been provided for satis- 
factorily. I agreed fully with this statement. There was therefore 
no reason to make requests upon the Chief of Staff with reference to 
equipment or material for antisabotage measures. 

SJf.. Nov. 24. message to Kimmel 

On November 24, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received the following 
message from the Chief of Naval Operations, concurred in by the 
Chief of Staff: 

There are very doubtful chances of a favorable [1925] outcome of nego- 
tiations with Japan. This situation, coupled with statements of Nippon Gov- 
ernment and movements of their naval and military force, indicate, in our 
opinion, that a surprise agrressive movement in any direction. Including an 
attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen 
this dispatch and concurs and requests action. Inform senior Army officers in 
respective areas. Utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate the 
already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action." 

This message indicated possible movement in the direction of the 
Philippines or Guam and called for secrecy. 

S5. Nov. 27 message to KiTinmel 

On November 27th the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the com- 
mander in chief. Pacific Fleet the following message which was made 
known to me : 

Consider this dispatch a vpar warning. The negotiations with Japan in an 
effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to 
make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition 
against either the Philippines, or Kra Peninsula or possibly JJorneo is indicated 
by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of 
[7926 J of their naval forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in 
preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned to WPL 46. Guam, Samoa, and 
Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against 
sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform 
naval district and army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo.-* 

You will notice that whereas the message of the 24th indicated a 
possible attack on Guam, by this time they had decided that the 
movement was entirely to the south and they indicated only sabotage 
arrangements on the island of Oahu. 

While this message is headed "War Warning," it should be noted 
that Navy War Plan 46 was not placed in effect by the Navy Depart- 
ment, but a defensive deployment was ordered in preparation for 
carrying out the tasks assigned under Navy War Plans 46. This 
indicated that later directions would be received if it became neces- 
sary to carry out this plan, Japanese action toward the south was 
indicated. I want to emphasize the following sentence from the 
message : 

You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the 
tasks assigned in WPL 46. 



" Message November 24, Navy to Kimmel, p. 28-B, exhibit 37. 
^ Message November 27, Navy to Kimmel, p. 31-B, exhibit 37. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2935 

[7927] Such defensive deployment would necessarily include 
distant reconnaissance. 

36. Do-DonH message 

On November 27 I received the following radiogram from the Chief 
of Statf which, on account of its conflicting instructions, the Army 
Pearl Harbor Board called the "Do-or-Don't message" : ^^ 

No. 472. Negotiations with tlie Japanese appeal* to be terminated to all prac- 
tical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government 
might come back and offer to continue. Japanese futui'e action unpredictable 
but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, 
be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. 
This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you lo a course of 
action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, 
you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you 
deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as noc, repeat not, 
to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should 
hostilities occur, you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far 
as they \1928\ pertain to Japan. Limit the dissemination of this highly 
secret infoi-mation to minimum essential officers." ^'' 

The impression conveyed to me by this message was that the avoid- 
ance of war was paramount and the greatest fear of the War Depart- 
ment was that some international incident might occur in Hawaii and 
be regarded by Japan as an overt act. That this opinion was in ac- 
cordance with the views of General Marshall is shown by the follow- 
ing quotation from his testimony : 

So far as public opinion was concerned, I think the Japanese were capitalizing 
on the belief that it would be very difficult to bring our people into a willingness 
to enter the war. That, incidentally, was somewhat confirmed by the govern- 
mental policy on our part of making certain that the overt act should not be 
attributed to the United States, because of the state of the public mind at the 
time. Of course, no one anticipated that that overt act would be the crippling of 
the Pacific Fleet.=" 

No mention was made of a probable attack on Hawaii since the alert 
message of June 17, 1940. An examination of the \7929\ var- 
ious Military Intelligence estimates prepared by G-2 WD, shows that 
in no estimate did G-2 ever indicate the probability of an attack on 
Hawaii.^- There was nothing in the message directing me to be pre- 
pared to meet an air raid or an all-out attack. "Hostile action at any 
moment" meant to me that as far as Hawaii was concerned the War 
Department was predicting sabotage. Sabotage is a form of hostile 
action. 

37 . Sabotage emphasis 

The only additional information received from the War Depart- 
ment after the receipt of message No. 472 (November 27) was con- 
tained in three messages on sabotage and subversive measures. The 
first from G-2 War Department to G-2 Hawaiian Department re- 
received November 27 read as follows : 

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate. Hostilities may 
ensue. Subversive activities may be expected. Inform Commanding General 
and Chief of Staff only." 

2» Line 5, p. 123, report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board ; also line 20, p. 1, Top Secret 
Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

30 Messaffe November 27, No. 472, from Marshall ; p. 7, exhibit 32. 

31 V rmv Pearl Harbor Board Transcript, vol. A, p. 41. . 
M Exhibit 33. 

3'Mps""" November 27, No. 473, War Department G-2 to Hawaiian Department G-2; 
p. 10, exhibit 32. 



2936 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

This message was erroneously paraphrased in the Army Pearl Har- 
bor Board report, page 133, to indicate that hostilities were "prob- 
able." 

58. Report hy General Short 

I replied as follows to the radiogram from the Chief of Staff Novem- 
ber 27 : 

[7530] Chief of Staff, Wab Department 
Washington D. C. 
Reurad four seven two 27th Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. 
Liaison with the Navy. 

Short." 

I wish to point out that this message reporting measures taken re- 
ferred by number to the message which I had received from the War 
Department. If the War Department had checked the message care- 
fully, there could have been no possible mistake that it was in reply 
to War Department message No. 472 which directed a report of the 
measures taken. AVar Department message No. 472, November 27, 
was the only message addressed to the commanding general, Hawai- 
ian Department, signed "Marshall." The message of November 27, 
No. 473, signed "Miles," was addressed to G-2, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, and did not call for a report. My message No. 959, November 
27, was addressed to the Chief of Staff, referred by number to No. 472, 
and stated that I was reporting measures taken. It is difficult to see 
how there could have been any possible confusion as to the message 
which was being answered. Failure to check my message No. 959 
to determine to which War Department message it was a reply prob- 
ably came about only because all who read the message believed the 
action [7931] was correct. General Marshall, in his testi- 
mony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, stated : 

We anticipated, beyond a doubt, a Japanese movement in Indochina and the 
Gulf of Siam, and against the Malay Peninsula. We anticipate also an assault 
on the Philippines. We did not, so far as I recall, anticipate an attack on 
Hawaii ; the reason being that we thought, with the addition of more modern 
planes, that the defense there would be suflScient to make it extremely hazardous 
for the Japanese to attempt such on attack.^s 

59. November 2S Sabotage message and report 

On November 28 the following message, relating entirely to sabotage 
and subversive measures, was received from the War Department: 
Hawn Dbst Ft Shafter TH 

482 28th Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately 
against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War 
Department (see paragraph three MID SC 30-45). Also desired that you initiate 
forth all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establish- 
ments, propeBty, and equipment against sabotage, protection of your personnel 
against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage. 
This does not, repeat not, mean that any illegal measures are authorized. Pro- 
tective mesures should be confined to those essential to security, avoiding un- 
necessary publicity and alarm. To insure speed of transniission identical tele- 
grams are being sent to all air stations but this does not, repeat not, affect your 
responsibility under existing instructions. Adams.^" 

When this message was received from the War Department I felt 
that it had been prepared after consideration had been given to my 
message reporting measures taken pursuant to War Department mes- 

3* p. 12. exhibit 32. 

^ Army Pearl Harbor Boarri Transcript, vol. 1, p. 9. 

»* November 28, message No. 482 from The Adjutant General; p. 13, exhibit 32. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2937 

sage No. 472. I sent the following message in reply and was careful 
to refer directly to the War Department number, "482" : 

The Adjutant Genekal, 

War Department, Washington, D. C. 

Re your secret radio 482 28th, full precautions are being taken against sub- 
versive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Depart- 
ment (paragi-aph 3 MID SC 30-45) and military establishments including per- 
sonnel and equipment. As regards protection [1933^ of vital installa- 
tions outside of military reservations such as power plants, telephone exchanges 
and highway bridges, this headquarters by confidential letter dated June 19, 
1941, requested the Governor of tlie Territory to use the broad powers vested 
in him by Section 67 of the Organic Act which provides, in effect, that the Gov- 
ernor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the United 
States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence, in- 
vasion, insurrection, etc. Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June 
20th confidentially made a formal written demand on this headquarters to furnish 
and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent 
sabotage, and lawless violence in connection therewith, being committed against 
vital installations and structures in the Territory. Pursuant to the foregoing 
request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian in- 
stallations. In this connection, at the instigation of this headquarters the City 
and County of Honolulu on June 30th, 1941, enacted an ordinance which permits 
the Commanding General Hawaiian Department to close, or restrict the use of 
and travel upon, any highway within the City and County of Honolulu, whenever 
the Commanding General deems such action neces- U93Ji'\ sary in the 
interest of national defense. The authority thus given has not yet been exercised. 
Relations with FBI and all other Federal and Territorial officials are and have 
been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters. 

Short." 
Ji,0. General Arnold^s radiogram 

On November 28 General Arnold, Chief of the Air Corps, sent to the 
commanding general, Hawaiian Air Forces, a message relating en- 
tirely to sabotage and subversive activities, similar in tone to War De- 
partment message No. 482, signed "Adams." ^^ General Martin, re- 
plying to this message on December 4, gave a detailed report of 
measures taken by him against sabotage and subversive activities and 
added : 

This entire department Is now operating and will continue to operate under an 
alert for prevention of sabotage.^* 

We received no reply disagreeing in any way with the action re- 
ported. 

4-7. November ^8 to Decemher 7, Idlf.! 

From November 28, 1941, until \1935'\ the war began, I 

received only one more message from the War Department,, that of 
November 29, 1941, regarding preparations to move two Army pursuit 
squadrons on short notice, and informing me that the Army would 
take over the defense of advance Pacific bases, except for furnishing 
antiaircraft equipment. This message stated that Cliristmas and 
Canton Islands would be garrisoned from Hawaii, and replacements 
^yould be sent from the United States.*^ This was the last informa- 
tion from the War Department until the final message from the Chief 
of Staff of December 7, which arrived 7 hours after the attack. 

I do not believe that message has been placed in evidence. 

^ p. 17, exhibit 32. 

3' P. 14, exiiihit 37. 

* Message, December 4. No. 1033. General Martin to General Arnold ; p. 19, exhibit 32. 

<» No footnote supplied in official transcript. 

79716—46 — pt. 7 3 



2938 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION, PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[79361 ^^^- Kaufman. Counsel for General Short has suggested 
that we offer in evidence at this point a telegram from the War Depart- 
ment to General Short dated November 29, 1941. The request was 
made by counsel for General Short. 

The Vice Chairman. Do we have copies for the committee ? 

Mr. Kaufman. We have photostats; and I think they have been 
handed around to the members of the committee this morning. 

The Vice Chairman, Does counsel desire that the message be read 
at this time ? 

Mr. Kaufman. Either read into the record, or marked as an exhibit. 
I suggest it be read into the record. 

The Vice Chairman. Suppose you read it into the record. 

Mr. Kaufman (reading) : 

[7937] Standard Form No. 14A [Stamped] Secret From War Department 
Approved by the President Bureau : A. G. O. 

March 10, 1926. AG 3S1( 11-29-41 )MC-E 

Telegr.\m. EHB/cdm-1712 

Official Business — Government Rates November 29 ,1941. 

CaNegram Sent No. 489, 11/29 

Commanding General, 

Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H. 
Consult C in C Pacific Fleet reference his dispatch number two eight Z3ro six 
two seven to Chief of Naval Operations period In view of information contained 
in above dispatch comma the movement of the two Army pursuit squadrons as 
indicated in War Department cable number four six six comma November two 
six comma one nine four one comma will be suspended period These squadrons 
should liowever be prepared to move on short notice period Paragraph War 
Department has offered to take over defense of Pacific advance bases from the 
Navy except for furnishing antiaircraft equipment period Consult C in C Pacific 
Fleet reference requii-ements and areas to be defended period War Department 
has also assumed responsibility for defense of Christmas and Canton period 
It is contemplated that you will form base defense units from the Hawaiian 
garrison 1793S] specially organized as task forces for particular areas 
period If these units are moved from Oahu comma necessary replacements from 
the United States will be furnished period Repoit your cdnclusions and recom- 
mendations to the War Department at the earliest practicable date. 

Adams. 
Based on : WPD 4571-5, 11/29/41. Official : Secret 

Green cy w/d & destroyed by burning. Signature illegible 

12/30/41, CDM— 1705. Adjutant General. 

[Stamped] Secret. 

Senator Ferguson. What is the name of that man at the bottom 
of the telegram? 

Mr. Kaufman. The notation here is "signature illegible." 

General Short. I think it was General Wall. 

The Vice Chairman, It does not look like "Wall" on my copy. It 
looks more like "Williams." 

Mr. Murphy. Does the record now show there is a notation that 
the signature is illegible? 

Mr. Kaufman. There is a notation on the mimeographed copy. 
On the photostatic copy there is a signature, but I cannot make it 
out. 

General Short believes that it is the signature of [79391 
General Wall. 

General Short. I may be wrong, but it looks like "Wall," the last 
four letters. 

Senator Brewster. What are his initials? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2939 

General Short. I do not know. 

Senator Brewstek. Isn't there sombody that can clarify that? I 
think there is somebody in the War Department that can tell whose 
signature it is. 

Mr. Kaufman. Somebody suggested "Sullivan." We will make an 
effort to iind out whose signature it is. 

Mr. Murphy. I was wondering, Mr. Chairman, what difference it 
makes who signed it, as long as it came from the adjutant general. 

The Vice Chairman. That is what I was going to ask. General 
Adams was the man who sent it ? 

General Short. General Adams was the man who sent it. 

The Vice Chairman. Adams' name on it means to you that the 
adjutant general of the Army sent it to you? 

General Short. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. And this other signature did not mean any- 
thing to you at the time, did it ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Senator Brewster. I think in view of the fact that it has appeared 
at some times that the chiefs in the [7940 \ othces aid not 
always know what their subordinates were doing, we certainly ought 
to establish, at any rate, who signed this. It does not seem that 
would be beyond the possibility of determination. 

The Vice Chairman. The counsel has stated he will endeavor to 
secure that information. You may continue. General. 

Senator Ferguson. May 1 make one inquiry of counsel? In the 
lower left-hand corner of the telegram, the "green cy W/D and de- 
stroyed by burning 12/30/41 cdm-1705," what is that? 

Mr. Kaufman. 1 do not know, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is there any character that that refers to? 

Mr. Kaufman. I am told the "green cy" refers to green copy. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you ascertain what that means ? 

Mr. Kaufman. Yes.* 

The Vice Chairman. All right; proceed. General. Give us the 
page where you will resume. 

l'/941j General Short. I am resuming on page 24 of my state- 
ment. The message sent by the Chief of Staff of December 7, which 
arrived 7 hours after the attack, was as follows : 

Hawn Dept Fr Shafter, TH 

52S> 7th Japanese are presenting at 1 :00 P. M. Eastera Standard Time today 
what amounis to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code 
machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do 
not know but be on alert accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this com- 
munication. 

MARSHALL " 

4^. Delay of December 7 Message 

The message was filed at 12:18 p. m., December 7, eastern time 
(6:48 a. m., December 7, Honolulu time). It was received by the 
K.C.A. in Honolulu at 7 : 33 a. m., December 7, and delivered to the 
Signal Ofiice, Fort Shafter, at 11:45 a. m. (Delivery was undoubt- 
edly delayed by the Japanese attack.) The deciphered message was 
delivered to the adjutant general, Hawaiian Department, at 2 : 58 
p. m., December 7. 

" p. 21, exhibit 32. 

♦See memorandum from the War Department in clarification of this document in Hear- 
ings, Part 11, p. 5296. 



2940 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Delay in deciphering due to not being marked "Priority" in Wash- 
ington. Thus, this vital message was received 7 hours after the attack. 

1794^] If this message had been sent by scrambler telephone 
there would have been time to warm up the planes and put them in 
the air, thus, at least, avoiding a large loss of planes in the initial 
attack at 8 a. m. This would not necessarily have lessened the naval 
losses. The fact that the War Department sent this message by radio 
in code instead of telephoning it in the clear and putting it through 
in the minimum amount of time indicates that the War Department, 
even as late as 6 : 48 a. m., December 7th, Honolulu time, did not con- 
sider an attack on Honolulu as likely enough to warrant drastic action 
to prepare the islands for the sneak attack. 

Senator Lucas. Pardon me, General Short. There is one statement 
you made there with respect to the word "Priority" that I do not find 
in my copy. 

General Short. That is not there. Since writing the statement I 
have seen the photostatic copy of the message as it was received in 
Hawaii and there is no indication of any mark of priority or urgency, 
or anj^thing. 

Senator Lucas. Will you kindly refer to page 24 and read that 
statement again, in order that I may correct my copy here? 

General Short. The deciphered message was delivered to the adju- 
tant general, Hawaiian Department, at 2 : 58 p. m., \7943] 
December 7. Delay in deciphering due to not being marked ''Pri- 
ority" in Washington. 

Senator Lucas. Thank you, sir. 

General Short. I might say that General Powell, who is one of the 
witnesses and who was the signal officer in Honolulu, will have a 
photostatic copy of the message as received. I believe also that it is 
shown in the Clausen report in that condition. 

Ii3. jStaf procedure re communications 

It is standard staff procedure and doctrine that all important or 
emergency messages should be sent by all available means of communi- 
cation, which in this case would have included the scrambler tele- 
phones which had been frequently used between the War Department 
and Fort Shafter. Colonel Phillips and General Marshall did confer 
by scrambler phone later in the day on December 7, 1941. If security 
would be violated by sending the information by phone, then the War 
Department should have issued the necessary alert orders which they 
would have known that I would have issued at once if I had the in- 
formation which they possessed. In support of this position, I quote 
from the War Department Field Manual on signal communication: 

* * * Choice of the means employed in each instance depends on the situ- 
ation. Exclusive reliance upon [794^J any one means is unwise because 
special and unforeseen circumstances may render that means inoperative when 
most needed. Plans of all commanders will make advance provision for prompt 
employment of effective and reliable alternate means ; and the simultaneons 
operation of several means will minimize the ill effects of complete interruption 
in any one. * * * 42 

<* Italics supplied ; par. 8b, FM 24-5, p. 4. 



PROCEEDINGS OP JOINT COMMITTEE 2941 

ACTION TAKEN — NOVEMBEK 2 7 TO DECEMBER 7, 1941 

JU' Alert plans 

The standing operating procedure, headquarters, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, 5 Noveniber 1941, provided for the following alerts: 

SEOrlON II ALERTS 

13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as 
indicated below. -Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department 
order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. * * * 

14. Alert No. 1. — a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and up- 
risings within the islands, with no threat from without. * * * 

I want to make clear that under alert No. 1, we had skeleton crews at 
all antiaircraft guns, capable of conducting fire on the enemy, and 
that .30 cal., .50 [75.|5] cal., and pistol ammunition was im- 
mediately at hand for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles, and machine 
guns. Three-inch ammunition was readily accessible to all but four 
batteries. This ammunition was in casemates from 20 to 75 yards 
from the batteries. As part of alert No. 1, the interceptor command 
and the aircraft warning service functioned from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m., 
the most dangerous hours for an air raid. 

15. Alert No. 2. — a. This alert is applicable to a more serious condition than 
Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile subsurface, surface, and 
aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is pro- 
vided. * * * 

16. Alert No. 3. — a. This alert requires the occupation of all field positions by 
all units, prepared for maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installations 
on outlying islands. * * * 

46. Conferences November 27 

When I received the November 27, 1941, message signed "Marshall,'" 
I immediately talked it over with my chief of staff, Colonel Phillips, 
and then made my decision to order alert No. 1. This decision was 
then communicated to G-2 and to the echelon commanders. On that 
same afternoon, I conferred on the matter with General Martin and 
with General Burgin. [75^^] The general contents of the radio- 
gram were also made known to the two division commanders through 
staff officers. In view of the restrictive orders against wide dissemi- 
nation of the information, I withheld it from the other Army per- 
sonnel. At the same time that I ordered alert No. 1 into effect, I di- 
rected that the interceptor command, including the aircraft warning 
service and information center, should operate from 4 a. m. until 
7 a. m. daily. In addition, the six mobile stations operated daily, 
except Sunday, from 7 a. m. to 11 a. m. for routine training and daily, 
except Saturday and Sunday, from 12 noon until 4 p. m. for training 
and maintenance work. 

JS' Alert No. 1: Consideration 

In making the decision for alert No. 1, 1 considered several matters. 

(a) Navy conversation's. — From repeated conversations with the 
Navy, I knew that the Japanese naval vessels were supposed to be 
either in their home ports or proceeding south. I had no informa- 
tion suggesting that some ships might have been detached to proceed 
eastward. Our information also indicated that Japan had no land- 
based bombers capable of proceeding from their nearest island, some 
2,100 miles away. 



2942 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION JPEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(h) TaXk force reconnavificmce. — ^It was known that the Navy 
usually had two or three task forces at sea. The carriers [7,947] 
with the task forces normally scouted 300 miles at each side, a total 
wij^th of 600 miles. Two task forces would thus cover 1,200 miles of 
ocean in the vicinity of Oahu. The Navy also had reconnaissance 
from Midwav, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands. T thus felt 
that- air attack was highly improbable. On the morning of November 
27, I conferred with Admiral Kimmel concerning the messages we 
had each received from Washington with reference to Wake and M'd- 
way. Admiral Kimmel and T discussed reinforcement of the Wake 
and Midway garrisons by Army plnnes. Such reinforcement would 
have weakened thp Oahu defense. The Admiral asked his war-plans 
officer. Captain McMorris, whnt he thought were the chances of a 
surprise attack at Honolnhi. The captain answered, "None." Gen- 
eral Martin and Colonel Mollison were present with me at this con- 
ference. Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch. who were present, 
expressed no difference of opinion with Captain McMorris.'*^ Recon- 
naissance, as directed in message No. 472, November 27, was a function 
of the Navy under the joint agrement approved March 28 by Admiral 
Bloch and me. That the Chief of Staff recognized that this was the 
case is shown by the following quotations from his testimony : 

[79^8] Gpneral Marshall. Distant reconnaissance — was a naval function, 
nnd the Army Commander was liable to furnish them such of the planes suitable 
for that purpose that could be provided." 

General Marshall. * * * As I recall the matter, the only way the Array 
would have been involved in the deep reconnai.ssance would have been in detach- 
injr units to serve und°r the Navy. * * * « 

General Russell. Well, is it your view that both having seen the message of 
November 27, without more ado the Navy should have started their distant 
reconnaissance? 

General Marshall. That is right. That is my view.** 

(c) Traininq mhsion. — The factor of training was also considered. 
Use of Alerts 2 or 3 would have seriously interfered with our training 
mission. The soldiers and officers of my command were in lavrje part 
relatively new to the Army and to their specialized tasks. Hegnlar 
training was essential. The War Department message had not indi- 
cated in any way that our training mission was modified, suspended, 
or abolished, or that nil troops were to go immediately into tactical 
status. [79If9'\ The Hawaiian air force in particular had the 
mission of training combat crews and of ferrying B-l7's to the Philip- 
pine Islands. On September 8, 1941, we sent 9 trained combat teams 
to General MacArthur, Before November 27, we had sent 18 trained 
teams to the mainland and we had 17 more teams ready to go to the 
mainland for ferrying purposes. Twelve more combat crews had to 
be trained for planes expected to arrive at an early date. Only 6 of 
our 12 flying fortresses were in condition and available for this im- 
portant training. It was thus imperative that General Martin be 
allowed to make maximum use of these planes for training. If war 
were momentarily expected in the Hawaiian coastal frontier, these 
considerations would give way. But every indication was that the 
War Department expected the war to break out, if at all, only in the 

■" Compare, Army Pearl Harbor hoard transcript, vol. 4, pp. 284, 285. 
** Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. A, p. 26. 
■" Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. 1, p. 43. 
" Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. 1, p. 47. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2943 

far Pacific and not at Hawaii. In fact, on November 26, 1941, a 
radiogram from the War Department had ordei»jd me to equip two 
B-24 airplanes for a special photographic reconnaissance mission over 
Truk and Jaluit in the Caroline Islands, with particular attention to 
the location of naval vessels, submarines, airfields, airplanes, barracks, 
and camps. If attacked, the crews were directed to use all means in 
their power for self preservation. These planes were to be sent to 
Honolulu unarmed, but I was directed to insure that both were ''fully 
equipped with gun [79S0] ammunition upon departure." *^ 
The first of these two planes did not arrive in Hawaii until December 
5, 1941. Presumably, had the War Department in the meantime de- 
cided that Hawaii was a zone of danger, they would have armed the 
plane before sending it to me. General Martin wired back a request 
that the second B-24 bring necessary equipment other than the guns 
and ammunition which we could supply.^^ 

I would like now to pass out chart No. 4. I want this committee to 
see graphically the picture as I had it in my mind and as all of us in 
Hawaii saw it at the time. 

There was a large number of Japanese aliens and of citizens of 
Japanese extraction. There were thousands of these people all around 
us and near to every military and naval installation. 

Most of these Japanese were loyal. Many were disloyal. Sabotage 
was "first to be expected in point of time", as General Marshall put it. 

Chart 4 shows the major installations. Each black square repre- 
sents an important camp, airfield, or naval yard. Each round black 
dot represents 1,000 persons of Japanese extraction. Each grey dot 
represents 1,000 other residents. 

My figures are taken from a 1943 census study based \7951'\ 
on the population figures of 1940. 

(Chart No. 4 is included in "Exhibit No. 134.") 

General Short, (continuing) : 

{d) Sabotage danger. — The danger of sabotage was paramount in 
my mind and seemed to me to be the chief danger which the War De- 
partment feared. Sabotage had long been considered our primary 
danger in Hawaii, because of the large Japanese population, many of 
whom were under suspicion of disloyalty .^^ Thirty-seven percent of 
the population was of Japanese descent, or probably 161,000. Of these 
about 40,000 were Japanese aliens. Many of the Japanese lived in 
very close proximity to air fields and other defense installations. 
Sabotage might reasonably be expected for several months prior to 
the outbreak of hostilities. Antisabotage defense is best carried out 
where there is little dispersion of the command. Planes must be 
grouped on landing mats and on the apron. The fact that man-proof 
fences and searchlights had not been installed around the air-fields 
made the protection of the planes from sabotage much more difficult 
when the planes were dispersed in bunkers. Funds for fencing air- 
fields had been finally allotted by the War Department but too late 
for installation of fences prior to attack. That the War Department 

"Message, 26 Nov. 1941, No. 465 (RCA No. 831 US Govt), quoted on pages 304-305, 
Vol. 4, Army Pearl Harbor Board Tr. ; page 6, Ex. 32. 

** Message December 5, 1941, to General Arnold. 

^ Compare, Hawaiian Defense Project Revision 1940, committee daily record, vol. 6, 
pp. 966, 967 ; also exhibit 44. 



2944 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

was equally conscious of the danger of \795J^\ sabotage is 
shown by the following quotations : 

In the aide memoire handed to the President by the Chief of Staff 
May 3, 1941, was the statement — 

* * * In point of sequence, sabotage is first to be expected and may, within 
a very limited time, cause great damage. On this account, and in order to 
assure strong control, it would be highly desirable to set up a military control, 
of the islands prior to the likelihood of our involvement in the Far East."" 

General Marshall in his letter to me of February 7, 1941, stated : 

* * * The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air 
and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation * * *." 

(e) Herron alert precedent. — The precedent of the Herron alert 
of 1940, to which I have already alluded, and the general War Depart- 
ment policy of centralization were important factors in my mind. I 
felt and I still feel that if the Chief of Staff wanted an all-out alert 
in Hawaii, he would have ordered it himself and not expected me to 
make the decision, knowing as he did how relatively limited was my 
information as com- [75-55] pared to that available to him. 
Questioned by Mr. Keefe, General Marshall gave the following testi- 
money before this committee : 

Mr. Keefe. Well, when you issued the alert on the 17th of June 1940, you used 
the language, "To deal with possible trans-Pacific raid." 

General Maeshall. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Well, now, then, let us put it this way without splitting 
words : General Marshall, on the morning of the 28th of November you had tre- 
mendously more information as to the possibility of an attack by the Japanese 
than you had in June 1940? 

General Mabshall. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. If you had information in June 1940 as to the possibilities of a 
trans-Pacific raid, you had a mountain of evidence on the 27th of November, did 
you not, to the same effect? 

General Marshall. That is correct." 

Message No. 472, November 27, was referred to so frequently by 
General Marshall as a command directive that I feel there should be a 
comparison of this message with the Herron message and 'with the 
Navy message of November 27. 

[7966'\ I have prepared a chart for comparison of these three 
messages and have attached it as annex A to this prepared statement. 
An inspection of the chart comparing the three alert messages makes it 
readily apparent by the Army Pearl Harbor board designed message 
No. 472 of November 27 as the "Do-Don't Message." 

I would like you to turn to that chart. I would like to make some 
remarks in reference to it. 

Taking up the comparison of the three alerts 

The Vice Chairintan. Will you give us the page. General ? 

General Short. It is the very last thing in the statement, annex A. 

At the time of the Herron alert, there were no negotiations going 
on between Japan and the Ignited States, so no information was given 
on that subject. The Navy message stated, "Negotiations have ceased. 
Aggressive move by Japan expected within next few days." That was 
a very positive and definite statement. The Army message stated: 

Negotiations appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the 
barest possibility will be resumed. 



«• Kxhihit T,^ : daily rpoord, vol. 17, p. 2888. 

»» ■Ryhihit .'i3. np. 1 to 3. 

153 Pailv rpcord, vol. 22. p. 3713. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2945 

Now, the papers indicated that they had been resumed on December 
1, 2, and 5. However, I had no information from the War Depart- 
ment. The War Department knew that [7957] while they 
had outwardly been resumed, they were defacto ruptured, and the 
Japanese emissaries had been told to keep up the illusion that the 
negotiations were going on, so that we would be misguided. That 
information was not in my hands. 

The alert message of June 17 made an estimate of Japanese action 
as a possible trans-Pacific raid. That is what they probably thought 
the danger was. The Navy message of November 27 stated : 

Amphibious expedition against Philippines, Thai, Kra Peninsula or possibly 
Borneo indicated by known Jap task forces. 

This message also made a direct estimate of the probable Japanese 
action. 
The Army message stated : 

Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment. 

Now, this was not in any sense an accurate statement as to the proba- 
ble Japanese action, considering the information that was known in 
Washington. Mr. Hull stated that he considered the document from 
the Japanese of November 20 as an absolute ultimatum, and from then 
on it was just a question of putting it off. They knew that that meant 
war. 

[7958] General Stark stated before this committee that he made 
up his mind in the fall that war was inevitable. The "future action 
unpredictable" in this message did not reflect those two opinions in 
any way. 

Now, I will take up the question of missions and orders as given 
in the three messages. The alert of June 17, 1940, stated : 

Immediately alert complete defensive organization to greatest extent possible 
without creating public hysteria or projecting undue curiosity of newspapers 
and agents. 

Maintain alert until further ordeirs. 

It stated exactly the type of alert that was desired, which were de- 
fensive missions. 
The Navy message stated : 

Consider dispatch a war warning. Execute appropriate defensive deployment 
preparatory to carrying out tasks assigned in WPI/-46. 

Again, a definite directive. 

Take a look at the Army message. It states : 

US desires Japan commit first overt act. This should not be construed as 
restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Take 
such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these meas- 
ures carried out so as not to alarm civil popula- [755.9] tion or disclose 
intent. Should hostilities occur, carry out tasks Rainbow Five. 

Everything is qualified. No definite directive without qualification. 
All messages contain certain miscellaneous instructions. 
The Herron message stated : 

Instructions for secret communications with Chief of Staff will be furnished 
you shortly. Acknowledge. 

The Navy message stated : 

Inform District and Army authorities. Guam, Samoa directed take appropri- 
ate measures against sabotage. 



2946 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Army message of November 27 stated : 

Report measures taken. Limit dissemination to minimum essential oflBcers. 

Those are the only two unqualified statements in the message. The 
"report measures taken," when that report was made, no attention 
was paid to it. 

Now, analyze the last : 

Limit dissemination to minimum essential officers. 

It does not say to limit to minimum essential officers and men. It 
says "to minimum essential officers." 

Now, if you took up alert No. 2 or No. 3, tinder No. 2 you could not 
send a plane in the air to shoot down Japanese planes without telling 
the crew that they were to shoot [7960] down Japanese planes, 
and telling them why. You could not put your antiaircraft in posi- 
tion and tell them to shoot down Japanese planes without giving them 
a definite order, and telling them why. 

Alert No. 3 would have sent every man to his battle position. You 
do not send soldiers into battle without telling them why they are 
there. So that instruction alone literally interpreted would have pre- 
vented-the use of alert No. 2, or alert No. 3. 

We come now to the follow-up of these messages, which is a very im- 
portant factor. The Herron alert of June 17, 1940, states : 

Frequent instructions and request for information from War Department for 
several weeks. 

The committee Exhibit No. 52 shows those in detail. 

The Navy message of November 27 : 

On December 3 two messages with reference to Japanese instruc- 
tions to destroy codes were sent. On December 6 authority was granted 
for outlying islands to destroy all secret and confidential documents. 

Now, as to the Army message of November 27, no checkup was made 
to even find out what my report of measures taken meant. No addi- 
tional instructions were given from the 28th of November under after 
the attack. 

[TOGl] The Vice Chairman. General Short, it has been sug- 
gested that we might recess until 2 o'clock. You might possibly get a 
little tired. 

General Short. Thank you very much. 

The Vice Chairman. We will recess at this point to 2 o'clock this 
afternoon. 

General Short. Thank you very much. 

(Whereupon, at 11 : 55 a. m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 
2 p. m. of the same day.) 

afternoon session — 2 : 00 p. M. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman. 
The Chairman. Congressman Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. Yesterday, at tlie beginning of my examination of Ad- 
miral Kimmel, I made the statement, which I quote from the record :■ 

In your testimony you have acquitted yourself magnificently. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2947 

My attention has been called to the city edition of the New York 
Times which reports that incident as follows : 

The Admiral was applauded by spectators when Representative Keefe, Republi- 
can of Wisconsin, told him, "In your testimony you have acquitted yourself 
insignificantly." 

I want the record to show that I have discussed this matter with 
Mr. White, who wrote the article, and 'I am certain that he sent the 
quote correctly, and either in transmission or in composition some 
error was made which completely changes the statement to such an ex- 
tent that I feel it is necessary to have the matter corrected. I hope 
that in the later editions of the New York Times that very serious error 
will be noted, and that it would not be sent out to their readers as indi- 
cating that I have accused Admiral Kimmel of acquitting himself in- 
significantly, which caused the audience in the [7903] room 
to voice their approval by spontaneous applause. The whole thing 
just does not make sense, and I know the New^ York Times will see 
that it is properly corrected. 

The Chairman. The committee can correct its own mistakes but it 
cannot correct those made outside. However, I am sure that the great 
newspaper. New York Times, will make the necessary correction in 
this case. 

Mr. Mtirphy. Mr. Chairman, at that point, I am wondering what 
the committee is doing about protecting itself, because there are a great 
many misquotations in the record itself. I know there are a great 
many in my own questions. I am w^ondering if we have anybody 
proofreading the record, and what steps we will take to correct the 
misquotes in the record, because there are a lot of misquotes in the 
record. 

Senator Ferguson. I have noted some misquotes in the record. 

The Chairman. It might be advisable for members of the committee 
to read over their own questions in the daily record and call the atten- 
tion of the reporters to any mistakes that may be made. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, in the Ways and Means Com- 
mittee of the House of Representatives each member is furnished a 
copy of the daily record with the pages marked on the back where his 
name appears, or his corrections. He can [7964] turn through 
the pages under his name and very readily take out his own without 
having to read everything that is in the whole record. I do not know 
whether anything like that is practical here or not, but that is the 
practice that is followed there. 

The Chairman. It would not be difficult for each member of the 
committee to find his own interrogation, and if there are any mis- 
takes to call the attention of the reporter to them. 

The Chair is advised that General Short wishes to be excused for the 
remainder of the day after he finishes his written statement, because 
of his recent illness. That is entirely agreeable. 

The Chair wishes also to announce that immediately following that 
there will be an executive session of the committee, at which he hopes 
all members will be present. 

Go ahead, General. 



2948 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES 
ARMY (RETIRED)— Resumed 

General Short. Proceeding on page 33 : 
[7965] 47. C onftrmation of sabotage alert 

After making my decision for the anti-sabotage alert, several other 
things occurred which confirmed my opinion that I was complying 
exactly with the wishes of the War Department. 

{a) Report to and acquiescence hy War Department. — As directed, 
I reported that I had alerted the Department to prevent sabotage 
and had established liaison with the Navy.^^ No reply disagreeing 
with my report was sent to me. If the War Department felt upon 
receipt of my report that my alert against sabotage was not sufficient 
to meet the situation, it should have immediately ordered me to 
provide against an air raid or against an all-out attack. No steps of 
this kind were taken by the War Department, and I had every reason 
to believe that they approved fully of the measures I had taken, in- 
asmuch as they had 9 days before the attack in which to give me 
additional instructions or direct that an all-out alert against an air 
raid or an all-out alert be put into effect. General Marshall, when 
asked by Mr. Keefe, if it wasn't his responsibility to check up on 
the measures taken by General Short as reported in reply to message 
No. 472 of November 27, stated : 

[7966] General Makshaix. Now, in this particular case^ a very tragic thing 
occurred, there is no question about that, there is no question in regard to my 
responsibility as Chief of Staff. I am not attempting to evade that at all, but I 
do not think it is quite characterized in the manner that you have expressed 
yourself." 

When questioned further by Mr. Keefe with regard to General 
Gerow's responsibility in the matter. General Marshall stated : 

He had a direct responsibility and I had the full responsibility."" 

As shown in the following quotation. General Marshall admitted 
that since no objection was being raised by the War Department, I 
had the right to assume that my action was approved : 

Senator Ferguson. Well, would this be true from an Army viewpoint, that 
when an overseas commander is ordered to take measures as he deems neces- 
sary and to report measures taken to you, is he correct in assuming that if 
his report is not the kind of action that you had in mind that you would there- 
after inform him specifically of the difference? 

General Marshall. I would assume so." 

[7967] With reference to my report that the Department was 
alerted to prevent sabotage, General Marshall testified : 

It did not register on Colonel Bundy, it did not register on General Gerow, it 
did not register on me and it carries Mr. Stimson's initials also." 

For 9 days from November 27 to December 7 this reply apparently 
did not register on any of the responsible officers. 

" Message, 27 November, Short to Marshall, exhibit 32, p. 12. 
" Daily record, vol. 22, p. 3726. 
"^ Dailv record, vol. 22, p. 3728. 
»« Daily record, vol. 22, p. 3443. 
" Daily record, vol. 22, p. 3732. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2949 

I want to emphasize also that my report was clear and concise, as 
required by War Department rules : 

General Gebow (reading) : "The merit of a report is not measured by its length. 
A concise presentation of important points usually is all that is required." 

Senator Ferguson. Would General Short's reply comply with that regulation? 
General Geeow. Yes, sir.'* 

In spite of General Gerow's confession that this report of mine was 
in conformity with directives, he still contended that somehow he had 
misunderstood it. When asked how it should have read in order to 
be clear to him and his staff, he answered : 

Well, I think, sir, if the message had read simply, [T96S] "alerted 
against sabotage only," it would have been perfectly clear.'* 

The only little word "only" seems to have been the missing link in 
General Gerow's mind. He was unwilling to read my message and 
admit it meant what it said, no more and no less. 

(b) Further sabotage messages. — The three messages on sabotage 
and subversive activity convinced me that the War Department was 
cognizant of the measures I had taken, approved of the action, and 
wanted to be sure that my measures against sabotage and subversive 
acts were complete but that no illegal acts were committed in carrying 
them out. I believed, and I had good reason to believe, that since the 
War Department specifically mentioned subversive activities as a 
threat to Hawaii, they w^ould also mention a "trans-Pacific raid" if 
they had thought it to be one of our immediate dangers. The fact 
that the War Department sent to the Hawaiian department three sepa- 
rate and distinct messages on November 27 and 28 with reference to 
sabotage is conclusive evidence that the War Department considered 
it as a very serious threat. 

[7969] {c) Ferrying unarmed ylanes. — As late as December 6, 
1941, the War Department was ferrying planes to Hawaii, unarmed 
and unprepared to fight. In fact, 12 B-17 airplanes under orders 
from the War Department left Hamilton Field, Calif., in two squad- 
rons at 9 : 30 p. m., December 6, Pacific time (12 : 30 a. m. December 7, 
eastern time) , and at 10 : 30 p. m., December 6, Pacific time (1 : 30 a. m., 
December 7, eastern time). None of these planes was equipped with 
ammunition or defensive armament. The machine guns were cosmo- 
lined and had not been bore-sighted. Ferry crews were skeletonized, 
consisting of pilot, copilot, navigator, engineer, and radio operator. 
Such crews were incapable of manning the machine guns, even if the 
guns had been properly prepared for combat and supplied with 
ammunition. It cannot be imagined that the War Department wished 
to send these planes to Honolulu unarmed when they already had 
information of a pending Japanese attack. The only inference that 
can be drawn is that while the War Department had information of a 
pending attack, General Arnold, the Chief of Air Corps, who ordered 
these planes to Honolulu, and who, I understand, was present at Ham- 
ilton Field at the time of their departure, did not know of the critical 
situation in the relations between the United States and Japan.^*^ 
[7970] These planes actually arrived at Hickam Field in the 
midst of the first attack. Four of the 12 planes were destroyed or 
damaged without being able to fight. 

■» Daily record, vol. 25, pp. 4.'?56-4357 ; quoting par. 46, FM 101-5, p. 30. 

*» Daily record, vol. 25, pp. 4420-4421. 

•• Compare Marshall's testimony, Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. A, pp. 20-21. 



2950 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

{d) Conferences with Navy. — In my conferences with Admiral 
Kimmel and Admiral Bloch between November 27, 1941, and Decem- 
ber 7, 1941, nothing further developed to indicate that an attack might 
be expected in our coastal frontier sector. The Navy war warning mes- 
sage of November 27, shown to me by Admiral Kimmel, indicated that 
in the continental districts and at Guam and Samoa the Navy Depart- 
ment feared chiefly the sabotage danger.*^^ On December 1, 1941, we 
conferred for a long while regarding the suggestion from Washington 
that Army troops relieve the Wake and Midway Marine garrisons, 
to make them available for landing operations. On December 2, 
Admiral Kimmel came to my quarters with an 8-page letter he had 
prepared on this Wake and Midway problems.®^ On December 3, we 
conferred at Admiral Kimmel's headquarters on a radiogram I was 
sending to the War Department with reference to the relief of Wake 
and Midway.^^ During this period, November 27 to December 7, 
the Navy made no request for Army planes to help conduct long- 
distance reconnaissance. [7971^ At that time I was convinced 
that the Navy either knew the location of tlie Japanese carriers or 
had enough information so that they were not uneasy. I felt that 
they could handle the situation.^* My liaison officer to the Navy, 
Major Fleming, held another conference with Colonel Pfeiffer of the 
Marine Corps on December 4, 1941.^^ 

Will you pass out chart No. 5, please. 

(Chart No. 5 is included in '^Exhibit No. 134.") 

[7973] General Short. This chart collects the time data on a 
24-hour clock. It shows the December 7 "1 p. m." message which was 
received in the War Department about 9 a. m. Washington time, which 
was 3 : 30 a. m. Hawaiian time. 

The events of the submarine sinking, the radar misinterpretation, 
and the action at the time of the attack are charted. 

After the third attack, the "1 p. m." message arrived. It had been 
delayed by the coding, by the commercial transmission, by the attack, 
and by the fact that it was not marked "urgent" or "priority." Other 
priority messages were first decoded by my message center. 

[7974.] This time element was so important that I would like to 
run over this chart in some detail. 

We notice first on the chart the fact that the War Department had 
in its possession at 3 :30 a. m. Honolulu time, the 1 p. m. message stating 
that the other matter was to be delivered at that hour. It was 3 hours 
and 15 minutes from that time before anything happened in Honolulu. 

Then we had the destruction of the two-man submarine. 

About this same time, at 6 : 48 a. m. General Marshall wrote a mes- 
sage which was not delivered until after the attack. 

7 : 20 a. m., planes reported. The Opana radar station picked up the 
planes from the north, and it was misinterpreted by the control 
officer. 

7 : 55 a. m., the first attack in Hickam Field and other installations. 

8 a. m., the first of the unarmed B-17's from Hancock Field, Calif., 
arrived at Hickam Field. 



^ Exhibit 37, p. 31B. 

^ Compare p. 301, vol. 4, Army Pearl Harbor board transcript. 

^ Compare pp. 301-302, 394, vol. 4, Army Pearl Harbor board transcript. 

** Compare p. 303. vol. 4, Army Pearl Harbor board transcript. 

•» Compare pp. 302, 394, vol. 4, Army Pearl Harbor board transcript. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2951 

Incidentally, the first plane to land, the pilot was killed by the 
Japanese. 

At 8 : 03 a. m. my chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips, reported the 
attack. 

At 8 : 05 a. m. the first enemy plane was shot down. 

[797S] At 8 : 10 a. m. the alert by that time had been transmitted 
to all of the major echelons, and Schotield Barracks had been attacked, 
and a plane was shot down there. 

By 8 : 30 a. m. the infantry divisions were proceeding to their battle 
positions. 

At 8 : 50 a. m. the first of the pursuit planes took the air to combat 
the Japanese. 

At 9 a. m. the second attack struck. At the same time the civilian 
surgical teams started reporting at a hospital for work. 

By 10 : 30 a. m. the third attack took place. 

When this was over, at noon, the civilian ambulance teams started 
evacuating women and children from the threatened-attack places, and 
it was not then until 2 : 50 p. m. that Marshall's warning message was 
received, practically lli/^ hours after the War Department had its 
information, the information in its possession when we received this 
vital information. 

4^. Events early on December 7, 19Jfl 

Two events occurred early on the morning of December 7, which, if 
interpreted differently at the time, might have had a very decided effect 
upon the action that followed. 

J/S. Submarine in Pearl Harhor 

About 6 : 45 a. m. a two-man submarine entering Pearl Harbor 
\79'76\ was destroyed by ships on duty. Had the naval authorities 
foreseen this as a possible forerunner of an air attack or notified the 
Army, time would have been available for the dispersion of the planes. 
However, the naval authorities did not connect this submarine attack 
with a possible general attack. The Army was not notified until after 
the attack. 

50. Radar schedule 

After the aircraft warning service information was closed at 7 a. m., 
December 7, the Opana station remained in operation. On Saturday, 
December 6, 1941, Second Lt. Grove C. White, Jr., 0396182, Signal 
Corps, had obtained permission of the control officer to have all sta- 
tions operate from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. only on Sunday, December 7, 1941. 

61. Misinterpretation of radar 

At 7 : 20 a. m., December 7, 1941, the telephone operator at the 
information center received a call from the Opana radar station stating 
that a large number of planes were heading toward Oahu from North 
3 points East. Lt. Kermit A. Tyler then talked on the telephone 
with Private Lockard of the Opana station and said that it was not 
anything of importance. At 0700 all the men at the information 
center except the telephone operator had folded up their equipment 
and left. When the Opana operator phoned [7977] at 0720, 
Lieutenant Tyler thought the flight indicated was either a naval patrol, 
a flight of Hickam bombers, or possibly some B-l7's from the United 
States. 



2952 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

52. Misinterpretation of radar 

If Lieutenant Tyler had realized that the incoming flight was Jap- 
anese, there would have been time to disperse the planes but not to 
warm up the engines and get them into the air. Lieutenant Tyler 
made no report of this matter to me and as far as I know did not 
report the incident to the control officer, Major Tyndall, after the 
information center was manned about 8 : 30 a. m. This matter was 
not brought to my attention until the next day when it was too late 
to be of value. Had this incident been reported to the control officer 
at 8 : 30 a. m. on the 7th, he would have informed the Navy and it 
might have enabled them to locate the carriers. 

[7978] I might say at this point, at that time there was no de- 
vice in existence for determining whether a plane picked up by the 
radar was friend or foe. A few months later such a device was put 
on the planes. 

ACTION AT THE TIME OF ATTACK 

53. Beginning of attack 

At 7 : 55 a. m., December 7, the enemy planes attacked Hickam 
Field, Pearl Harbor, and Wheeler Field. At 9 a. m. a second attack 
was made, and a third about 10 : 30 a. m., each lasting approximately 
15 minutes. At 8 : 03 a. m. the chief of stalf reported the attack, and 
by 8 : 10 a. m. an order had been given to all units (major echelons) 
by telephone to put alert No. 3 into effect. 

5Jf. Antiaircraft artillery 

All antiaircraft batteries had skeleton crews guarding them. These 
crews were able to conduct antiaircraft fire. All units had in their 
possession ammunition for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles, and ma- 
chine guns. Three-inch ammunition had been placed in positions 
accessible to all batteries except four batteries of the 64th C. A. C. 
(AA). 

55. Automatic loeapon batteries 

The automatic weapon batteries at Fort Kamehameha, Pearl Har- 
bor, and Cape Malakole fired on the enemy planes \^7970\ dur- 
ing the 8 o'clock raid. The first enemy plane was shot down at 
8 : 05 a. m. 

66. Hawaiian air forces 

During the first attack men started pulling planes oiit of the fire, 
and at 8 : 50 the serviceable pursuit planes took off. 

57. Twenty-fourth Division 

Troops of the Twenty-fourth Division at Schofield were attacked 
at 8 : 10 a. m. The troops of this division promptly returned the fire 
and with success — one plane being shot down with a rifle. At 8 : 30 
a. m., the division started moving to its battle positions to repel a 
possible landing attack. 

58. Twenty-fifth Division 

The Twenty-fifth Division opened antiaircraft fire almost imme- 
diately. It also moved into battle postions at 8 : 30 a. m. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2953 

69. Value of prior training 

All movement and action of troops was carried out as prescribed 
in the standing operating procedure, with precision and with remark- 
able speed. The value of our prior planning and training, which had 
made everyone familiar with the plans, was brought out very clearly. 

60. Civilian surgical teams 

At 9 a. m., the first civilian surgical teams began reporting at Tripler 
General Hospital. 

\7980^ 61. Civilian relief committee 

At 12 noon the civilian relief committee began the evacuation of 
Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, and Schofield, and continued through- 
out the afternoon and part of the evening. Most of the women and 
children were moved to school buildings, although a few from these 
posts and all of the women and children from Shafter, Tripler, Ord- 
nance Depot, and Signal Depot were sheltered in the incompleted 
underground Interceptor Command Post. 

62. Seizure of foreign agents 

During December 7 the foreign agents previously listed by F. B. I. 
and G-2 were arrested and confined at the immigration and quaran- 
tine stations as follows : 

Japanese 370 

Germans iJS 

Italians , 14 

Total 4S2 

Incidentally, there were only four of the listed agents that were not 
picked up on this first day. 

62. Clearing airfields 

The 804th Engineers began clearing the runways at Hickam Field 
and Wheeler Field just as soon as the first attack diminished. 

6Jt. C reditable action of command 

Every officer and \7981\ man under my command performed 
his duty in a most creditable manner. The deeds of courage on the 
part of both the military and civil population is a matter which I hope 
that history will eventually disclose. 

INFORMATION NOT SENT BY WAR DEPARTMENT 

65. Policy to withhold information 

As this joint committee's investigation has already revealed, there 
was a vast amount of highly significant information available in the 
War Department which no responsible military man could exclude 
from consideration in forming an estimate of the situation. The War 
Department was aware of the fact that I did not have this information 
and had already decided that I should not get this information.^^ It 
was therefore their duty not only to make the estimate of the situation 
but to make the decision as to what military action it required, and 
to give me orders to go on an all-out alert instead of permitting my 
sabotage alert to stand. This was in line with their centralized peace- 
's Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. C, p. 199. 
79716— 46— pt. 7 4 



2954 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

time control system. It is my firm conviction that they did estimate 
the situation, that they expected only sabotage and subversive activi- 
ties in Hawaii, and that on reading my report, "Department alerted 
to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy," they dismissed the 
matter from their minds because I had done exactly what they desired. 

\7982'] 66. No magic to Hawaii 

A definite decision had been made by the War Department that 
neither the Japanese intercepts nor the substance of them should be 
given to the commanding general in Hawaii. The following testimony 
of General Miles makes such decision clear : 

Mr. Gesell. What steps were taken to distribute the intercepted messages to 
the Commanding Officer at Hawaii? 

General Miles. There were no steps taken to distribute these messages to that 
General. 

Mr. Gesell. Do I understand from your answer that these messages as inter- 
cepted and translated were not sent to Hawaii by the Army? 

General Miles. They were not. In some cases the substance, of some messages, 
were sent to Hawaii, and almost always in naval code, I think always in naval 
code, because the naval code was considered to be more secure than the Army 
code. 

Mr. Gesell. "Who made the decision that these messages should not be sent 
to Hawaii as they were intercepted and translated as far as the Army is con- 
cerned? 

General Miles. That followed from the general policy laid down by the Chief 
of Staff that these messages and the fact of the existence of these messages or our 
ability to [7983] decode them should be confined to the least possible num- 
ber of persons; no distribution should be made outside of Washington. 

Mr. Gesell. Was that determination by the Chief of Staff in writing or simply 
an expression of policy? 

General Miles. As far as my recollection goes, it was simply an expression 
of policy. 

Mr. Gesell. Were you consulted in connection with the formulation of that 
policy? 

General Miles. I do not now remember but I imagine that I was." 

67. Hindsight evaluation 

I do not want to attempt to summarize or even to list all the infor- 
mation here which the War Department had but which I did not have. 
I want to refrain from hindsight evaluation of this information. But 
1 also want to call the committee's attention to some very obvious items 
which had they been given to me, would have necessarily changed the 
picture which I then had of the crisis between the United States and 
Japan. 

68. Military coTn/rwitments in Far East 

I did not know that United States Army officers at Singapore had 
made tentative [798Ii,'\ military commitments, not approved by 
the President, that the United States would fight, along with the Neth- 
erlands and the British, to defend the Dutch East Indies and Sing- 
apore.^® 

69. Japanese knowledge of United States policy 

I did not know that the War Department knew that the Japanese 
suspected or had somehow learned of this joint military program. 
Intercept No. 1243, dated 3 December 1941, published in joint com- 

« Daily record, vol. 12, pp. 2091-2092. ,„ v u ^ 

M See Marshall-Stark report to Roosevelt, 27 November 1941 ; Army Pearl Harbor board 

transcript vol. 1, pp. 9-12 ; compare Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. 5, pp. 

449-450. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2955 

mittee Exhibit No, 1, page 227, disclosed to the War and Navy De- 
partments, at least by December 5, that the Japanese did realize that 
such joint military action would occur. As early as Novem^ber 12, 
the people in Washington had in their hands intercept No. 1066, 
printed on page 111 of committee exhibit No. 1, which disclosed that 
Japan had been semiofficially told that — 

If Japan invades again, the United States will fight with Japan — 

[7986] and that the American Government had, and believed, 
reports that — 

* * * Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does 
not believe that your visit on Monday ta the President or the coming of Mr. 
Kurusu will have any effect on the general situation. 

If this information is connected up with the knowledge gained of 
the definite Japanese intention to expand southward, it is clear that the 
War and Navy Departments must have known that war was a cer- 
tainty, and that they, with this exclusive intelligence, wanted to make 
the estimate and decision as to American military defensive action. 
This explains their care in ordering me not to disclose intent, alarm 
the population, or do anything which Japan could use as propaganda 
that the United States had provoked war. 

70. November 20 ultimatum 

I had not been told, but Washington knew, that the Secretary of 
State regarded the November 20, 1941, Japanese proposal as an ulti- 
matum ^'^ and that from then on it was merely a question of trying to 
stall off the final break as long as possible and, quoting Secretary Hull : 

in the hope that somewhere even then something might develop suddenly and out 

of the sky.™ 

71. DeadliTies 

I did not laiow, but the War Department knew [7986] that 
the Japanese had set a deadline after which their armed forces would 
move. On November 26 a translation of intercept No. 188, on page 174 
of Exhibit No. 1, disclosed that — 

* * * our forces shall be able to move within the day — 

in the event that the United States-Japanese negotiations were not 
successfully terminated by 25 November 1941. The first Navy trans- 
lation which told of the November 25 deadline was made as early as 
5 November 1941.^^ 

On 17 November, an intercept was deciphered which included this 
sentence : 

I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736, and there 
will be no change." 

On 22 November, a translation of a 19 November intercept showed 
that Kurusu and Nomura still regarded the 25 November deadline as 
"an absolutely unalterable one." " This message also contained con- 
siderable discussion about evacuation of Government officials and their 



™ Testimony of Mr. Hull, joint committee daily record, November 23, 1945, vol. 7, pp. 
1136, 1181. 

'"> Testimony of Mr. Hull, joint committee daily record, November 23, 1945, vftl. 7, p. 
1195. 

" See No. 736, committee exhibit No. 1. p. 100. 

"Intercept 16 November 1941, pp. 137-138, committee exhibit No. 1. 

" Intercept No. 1140, 19 November, p. 159, committee exhibit No. 1. 



2956 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

wives. The 25 November deadline was then extended to 29 November, 
by an intercept of 22 November, translated the same day. But the 
Tokyo Government [7987] became more emphatic, saying: 

This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After 
that things are automatically going to happen.''* 

On the 28th of November it was learned in Washington that in 2 or 
3 days a report would be sent from Tokyo in answer to the "humiliat- 
ing" American proposal after which — 

* * * the negotiations will be de facto ruptured." 

This same intercept, moreover, showed a design to hide the fact that 
negotiations were broken off. 

72. Code destruction 

Another thingT did not know is the fact that the Japanese were un- 
der orders to destroy their codes and code machines. The War De- 
partment knew of this code destruction as early as 1 December 1941 
and knew specifically of the orders to destroy the codes in the United 
States on 3 December 1941.^*^ I should certainly have been told of this 
intelligence. The following testimony of General Miles makes it plain 
why the Japanese messages ordering the destruction of their codes 
did not reach the commanding general in Hawaii : 

[79S8] Mr. Gesexl. The Army did not send any messages to General Short 
in respect of code destruction, did it? 

General Miles. No, sir. 

Mr. Geselx. What is the explanation of that? 

General Miles. The main reason was that the code experts apparently agreed, 
at least the Navy was particularly strong on the point that their code was much 
more secure than ours. It was obviously, of course, of great importance in se- 
curity that a message be sent in only one code and not two and we had every 
reason to believe, or thought we did, that a Navy message to Hawaii would be 
promptly transmitted to the Army authorities there. 

Mr. Gesell. It is a fact, is it not. General Miles, that none of these messages 
contained any instructions for the Navy authorities to show the information to 
the Army representative at Hawaii? 

General Miles. That is true, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. And that was the practice where joint messages were sent some- 
times as we have seen, was it not? 

General Miles. That happened on one or two occasions, yes, sir. 

Mr. Gesell. Did you give any instructions or directions to the Navy that action 
should be taken to see that these messages were made available to the Army 
authorities [7989] at Pearl Harbor? 

General Miles. Any instruction to the Navy? 

Mr. Gesell. To the Navy here that they should so transmit the messages that 
the Army would be certain to receive them ? 

General Miles. No, sir ; that was not considered necessary." 

7S. Ships in harbor report 

While the War Department G-2 may not have felt bound to let me 
know about the routine operations of the Japanese in keeping track 
of our naval ships, they should certainly have let me know that the 
Japanese were getting reports of the exact location of the ships in Pearl 
Harbor, which might indicate more than just keeping track, because 
such details would be useful only for sabotage, or for air or submarine 
attack in Hawaii. As early as October 9, 1941, G-2 in Washington 

'* Intercept No. 812, 22 November, p. 165, committee exhibit No. 1. 

■'■'' Intercept No. 844. 28 November, p. 195, committee exhibit No. 1. 

'« Intercepts Nos. 24.36, 2444. 2443. 867, pp. 208, 209, 215, committee exhibit No. 1. 

" Dally record, vol. 13, pp. 2220-2222. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2957 

knew of this Japanese espionageJ^ This message, analyzed critically, 
is really a bombing plan for Pearl Harbor.'^ 

[7990] 74. WiTids code 

I was not informed, but the War Department knew, of the so-called 
"winds" code or of the fact that the so-called implementing message 
had been received, definitely confirming the fact that diplomatic rela- 
tions would be severed between Japan and the United States.^" 

75. HuWs '■'-ultimatum'''' to Japan 

I was not informed of Secretary Hull's note of November 26, pro- 
posing a 10-point plan which the Japanese considered an ultimatum.^^ 

76. War considered inevitable 

I did not know that sometime in the fall of 1941 the Chief of Staff 
had come to the conclusion that war with Japan was inevitable.^^ 

77. Jap reply — 13 parts 

Critical information (the first 13 parts of the long Japanese memo- 
randum) finally terminating relations with the United States was re- 
ceived in the War Department by 9 p. m. on December 6. The so-called 
"pilot" message from Tokyo to Washington December 6, 1941, No. 901,^^ 
had been received in the War Department sometime during the 
[7991] afternoon of December 6. This message stated definitely 
that the long Japanese memorandum would be sent as message No. 902 
and would be presented to the Americans as soon as instructions were 
sent. 

78. Part i^, Jap reply 

The fourteenth part of the long memorandum and the short mes- 
sage of the Japanese directing the Ambassador to deliver the long 
memorandum at 1 p. m. on the 7th were in the hands of the War 
Department between 8 : 30 and 9 a. m. December 7.^* This message 
indicated a definite break of relations at 1 p. m., and pointed directly 
to an attack on Hawaii at dawn. Had this vital information been 
communicated to Hawaii by the fastest possible means, we would 
have had more than 4 hours to make preparations to meet the attack 
which was more than enough for completing Army preparations. The 
Navy might have had time to get all ships out of the harbor. 

79. Delay of Decernber 7 vlessage 

Not until 7 hours after the attack was I informed that the Japanese 
Ambassador had been directed to deliver the 14-part memorandum 
to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m., December 7. This message was 
received in the War Department from a naval courier between 
[7992] 8 :30 a. m. and 9 a. m., December 7 (3 a. m. to 3 : 30 a. m. 
Honolulu time). This message definitely pointed to an attack on 
Pearl Harbor at 1 p. m., Washmgton time. If this message had been 

'*Army intercept No. 23260, 24 September 1941, p. 12, committee exhibit No. 2. 

"Daily record, vol. 12, p. 2101. 

*" Intercepts Nos. 2353, 2354, 19 November, committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 154, 155 ; 
testimony of Captain Safford, United States Navy, Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, 
vol. C, po. 126-135. 152-157, 173. 

^ Hull's note, 26 November 1941, joint committee exhibit No. 1, intercept No. 1189, pp. 
181-182. 

*^ See Army Pearl Harbor board, vol. A, p. 40. 

« Exhibit 1, p. 238. 

^ Exhibit 1, No. 902, p. 245, and No. 907, p. 248; Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, 
vol. A, pp. 13-17. 



2958 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

delivered to me by the most rapid possible means of communication 
I would have had 4 hours, more than enough time, to fully alert the 
Army forces against an air raid. 

80. Delay translation Decemher 6 Pearl Harbor message 

A more prompt decoding and translation of one of the December 6 
intercepts would have pointed out clearly to the War and Navy De- 
partments that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was planned. 
After discussing the lack of barrage balloon defense, the consul at 
Honolulu reported as follows to Tokyo : 

* * * However, even though they have actually made preparations, because 
they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in 
the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Eiva, there are limits to the 
balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is 
considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against 
these places.^s 

I would like to set up my conclusions. There will be a certain 
amount of repetition, but I think it is desirable. 

CONCLUSIONS 

SI. Obeyed instructions 

On December 7, 1941, 1 was obeying [7993] my instructions 
from Washington as I understood them, and as the War Department 
had every reason to know that I understood them, and was acting 
in accordance with the information which was available to me at 
that time. Little information was available to me. The little that 
was given to me in the War Department message of November 27 did 
not give an accurate picture of the prospects of war. The War De- 
partment knew definitely by 9 p. m., December 6, that the hour had 
struck and that war was at hand. By 9 a. m., December 7, the War 
Department knew the hour of attack. None of this information was 
given to me. 

82. War Department responsibility 

If for any possible reason the War Department felt that it could 
not give me the information, then it was the responsibility of the 
War Department to direct me to go on an all-out alert particularly 
since it well knew that we were on an antisabotage alert. The 
Hawaiian Department was not provided with agencies for obtaining 
Japanese information outside of Hawaii, and was dependent on the 
War Department for such information. 

S3. War Department estimate 

When the War Department was informed that the Hawaiian De- 
partment was alerted against sabotage, it not only did not indicate 
tliat the command should be alerted against a hostile surface, subsur- 
face, ground or air attack, but replied emphasizing the necessity for 
protec- [7994] tion against sabotage and subversive measures. 
This action on the part of the War Department definitely indicated 
to me that it approved of my alert against sabotage. The War De- 
partment had 9 more days in which to express its disapproval. The 
action of the War Department in sending unarmed B-17's from 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2959 

Hamilton Field, Calif., on the night of December 6, to Honolulu 
confirmed me in my belief that an air raid was not probable. 

6'^. Reasonable reliance on report 

Confirmation of my view that the War Department's silence and 
failure to reply to my report of November 27 constituted reasonable 
grounds for my belief that my action was exactly what the War De- 
partment desired, is contained in General Marshall's testimony before 
this joint committee on December 11, 1945 : 

Senator Ferguson. Well, would this be true from an Army viewpoint, that 
when an overseas commander is ordered to take "such measures as he deems 
necessary and to report measures taken to you", is he correct in assuming that 
if his report is not the kind of action that you had in mind that you would 
thereafter inform him specifically of this difference? 

General Marshall. I would assume so.*" 

[7995] 85. Distant reconnaissance plan 

The joint coastal frontier defense plan, Hawaiian coastal frontier 
places upon the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District the 
responsibility for distant reconnaissance. Annex No. 7 to the joint 
coastal frontier defense plan provides that when naval forces are 
insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and army 
aircraft are made available, these will be under the tactical control 
of the naval command during search operations. That means that 
the Army planes receive their missions and all instructions from the 
naval commander and carry out the search as he deems necessary in 
order to carry out his responsibility for distant reconnaissance. Dur- 
ing the period November 27 to December 6 the Navy made no request 
for Army planes to participate in distant reconnaissance. To me 
this meant that they had definite information of the locations of the 
Japanese carriers or that the number unaccounted for was such that 
naval ships and planes could make the necessary reconnaissance with- 
out the assistance from the Army. It is noted that the Navy Depart- 
ment, both on October 16 and on November 27, directed Admiral 
Kimmel to make preparatory defensive deployments, and that Ad- 
miral Kimmel had several task forces at sea and was conducting con- 
siderable reconnaissance.^^ He did not have [7996'] sufficient 
equipment to conduct complete reconnaissance. General Marshall 
has testified here that even during the war the HaAvaiian Islands had 
never had sufficient equipment for complete perimeter reconnaissance. 

S6. Army-Navy cooperation 

During this period I held frequent conferences with the commander 
in chief of the United States Fleet and the commandant of the Four- 
teenth Naval District, and at no time was anything said to indicate 
that they feared the probability of an air attack by the Japanese. 
In fact, the sentiment was expressed by a naval staff officer that there 
was no probability of such an attack. With a large part of the United 
States Navy in Hawaiian waters and with their sources of informa- 
tion, I was convinced that the Navy would be able either to intercept 
any carrier attempting to approach Oahu or at least to obtain such 
information from task forces or by reconnaissance as to make them 

*" Daily record, vol. 21, p. 3443. 
" Exhibit 37, pp. 20B and 31B. 



2960 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

aware of the presence of carriers in the Hawaiian waters and of the 
probability of an air attack. 

57. Expectations from War Department 

I felt that I had a right to expect the War Department to inform me 
by the most rapid means possible if a real crisis arose in Japanese rela- 
tions. I did not expect that when the crisis arose the message would 
remain in the hands of General Miles and Colonel Bratton without 
action from 9 a. m. till 11 : 25 a. m., and \7997^ that when ac- 
tion was finally taken the desire for secrecy would be considered more 
important than the element of time. Had the message in regard to the 
Japanese ultimatum and the burning of their code machines been given 
me by telephone as an urgent message in the clear without loss of time 
for encoding and decoding, delivery, etc., or if I had been directed by 
telephone to go on an all-out alert for a dawn trans-Pacific raid, with- 
out being told the reason, I would have had approximately 4 hours 
in which to make detailed preparations to meet an immediate attack. 

88. Follow-up of orders 

When any department of the Army has issued an order on any mat- 
ter of importance, it has performed only one-half of its function. 
The follow-up to see that the order has been carried out as desired is 
at least as important as issuing the order. The War Department had 
9 days in which to check up on the alert status in Hawaii and to make 
sure that the measures taken by me were what was desired, which it 
did not do. The check-up would have required no more than a reading 
of my report of measures taken. 

89. Supervision hy Chief of Staff 

Repeatedly, from the time I took command in Hawaii in February 
1941, the Chief of Staff had written me at length advising me on 
policies and details of operation. However, after October 28, 1941, 
with the War Department receiving information almost daily which 
{7998^^ indicated that war was imminent, he communicated to me 
none of those personal messages containing the inside information. 

90. Erroneous estimate of situation 

My decision to put the Hawaiian Department on an alert to prevent 
sabotage was based upon a belief that sabotage was our gravest danger 
and that air attack was not imminent. I realize that my decision was 
wrong, ^^ I had every reason to believe, however, that my estimate of 
the situation coincided with that of the War Department General Staff, 
which had the signal advantage of superior sources of intelligence as 
to enemy intentions. 

91. Hindsight value of information withheld 

I know it is hindsight, but if I had been furnished the information 
which the War Department had, I do not believe that I would have 
made a mistaken estimate of the situation. To make my meaning 
clear, I want to add that I do not believe that my estimate of the situa- 
tion was due to any carelessness on my part or on the part of the 
senior Army and Navy officers with whom I consulted. Nor do I be- 
lieve that my error was a substantial factor in causing the damage 
which our Pacific Fleet suffered during the attack. 

** Compare Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, testimony of General Short, vol. 38, 
p. 4440. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2961 

92. Intelligence complacency 

I have been more than astounded [7999] to learn the com- 
placency of the War Department General Staff with relation to so- 
called magic intelligence. The War Department could have devised 
a method to paraphrase the information obtained and send it by 
courier to me, without, if they chose, disclosing to me that it resulted 
from an ability to decipher Japanese messages. I want to quote for 
the committee the following pertinent paragraph from the Operations 
Manual then current : 

From adequate and timely military intelligence the commander is able to draw 
logical conclusions concerning enemy lines of action. Military intelligence is 
thus an essential factor in the estimate of the situation and in the conduct of 
operations.*" 

General Marshall and Admiral Wilkinson have pointed out that 
the security of our cryptanalytic ability was risked for the slight, tem- 
porary exultation of shooting down Yamamoto's plane. Surely, then, 
supplying the data to me and to Admiral Kimmel would not have 
been inconceivably risky. 

9S. Opinion of Judge Advocate General 

I want to quote for the committee one paragraph from the opinion 
of the Judge Advocate General of the Army concerning this intercept 
intelligence : 

[SOOO] But sin,ce we know in retrospect tliat Short was not, apparently, 
fully alive to an imminent outside threat and since the War Plans Division had 
received substantial information from the Intelligence Section, G-2, the Board 
argues that had this additional information been transmitted to Short it might 
have convinced him not only that war was imminent but that there was a real 
possibility of a surprise air attack on Hawaii. In retrospect it is diflScult to 
perceive any substantial reason for not sending Short this additional informa- 
tion or, in the alternative, checking to see whether Short was suflBciently alive 
to the danger. General Gerow did neither. In my opinion General Gerow showed 
a lack of imagination in failing to realize that had the Top Secret information 
been sent to Short it could not have had any other than a beneficial effect. 
General Gerow also showed lack of imagination in failing to make the proi)er 
deductions from the Japanese intercepts. For instance the message of 24 Sep- 
tember from Tokyo to Honolulu requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor 
and dividing Pearl Harbor into various subdivisions for that purpose coupled 
with the message of 15 November to Honolulu to make "the ships in harbor 
report" irregular and the further message of 29 November to Honolulu asking 
for reports even when there were no ship movements (Top \,%001\ Secret 
Ex. "B") might readily have suggested to an imaginative person a possible Jap 
design on Pearl Harbor. Failure to appreciate the significance of such messages 
shows a lack of the type of skill in anticipating and preparing against even- 
tualities which we have a right to expect in an oflBcer at the head of the War 
Plans Division. If this criticism seems harsh, it only illustrates the advisability 
of General Gerow transmitting the Top Secret information to Short."" 

9Ii.. Adequate sabotage defense 

I had been furnished adequate means to prevent sabotage. I used 
those means with complete success, as the testimony has shown. No 
one can say to what extent sabotage would have occurred if the Army 
had not taken such measures to prevent it. 

95. Inadequate means for air defense 

I had not been furnished adequate means to defend against a sur- 
prise air raid. The War Department was aware of the inadequacy of 

» Italics supplied; par. 194. FM 100-5; dated May 22. 1941. p. 40. 
■^ Opinion of the Judge Advocate General, 25 November 1944, committee exhibit 63, 
p. 45. 



2962 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

our aircraft and antiaircraft defense establishment. The following 
table will show at a glance how inadequate our air defense was at the 
time.»^ 

[800£] I would like to offer at this time a table showing the type 
of equipment that was actually available on December 7, the number 
that we required to complete our plans and the amount of equipment 
that was actually on hand in December 1942. 

The Vice Chairman. General, is that information you are seeking 
to offer now different from the table that is in A'our statement ? 

General Short. It is, in that it has the additional equipment that 
was present at Hawaii in December 1942. 

Tne Vice Chairman. And that table, is that different from the one 
appearing in your statement? 

General Short. Just the third which it adds. 

The Vice Chairman. It adds another column? 

General Short. It adds another column. 

Mr. Murphy. May I ask at this time, Mr. Chairman, if this state- 
ment given here is a correct statement about there being no bombers 
in Hawaii on December 7? 

General Short. No ; no torpedo bombers. 

Mr. Murphy. No torpedo bombers? 

General Short. We had no torpedo bombers. 

[8003] Mr. Murphy. It shows no bombers at all. My impres- 
sion is there were 37. 

General Short. The B-l7's were bombers. 

Mr, Murphy. Are those the only ones then ? 

General Short. Those were the only bombers. We had B-18's that 
were 7 years old, that were distinctly out-of-date, with a maximum 
speed of 150 miles per hour and I did not include those because the air 
people did not feel that those were proper equipment to fight with. 

Mr. Murphy. We will go into that later with you as to what I had 
in mind. 

Senator Lucas. General, you said "December 1942." 

General Short. I am making a comparison of what they had pro- 
vided at the end of another year. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, do j'ou have copies of this new table 
that you want to refer to now ? 

General Short. I have only one. 

The Vice Chairman. Or can you give us this third column ? 

General Short. I will give you the third column. 

The Vice Chairman. If you can give us the third column slowly 
so that we can insert it on here, that might serve the purpose. 

General Short. All right, sir. I would like to call attention to the 
fact also 

[8004] The Vice Chairman. How is the third column to be 
headed ? 

General Short. "On hand December 1942." 

I would like also to call attention to the fact that in December 1942 
the Japanese had several months before been decisively defeated at 
Midway and that the danger of an attack was far less than it had been 
on December 7, 1941. 

•1 The requirerl number of planes is based on the "Study of the Air Situation in 
Hawaii," dated 20 August 1941. committee exhibit 13, daily record, pp. 1013 to 1050; the 
antiaircraft requirements are stated in my letter to the Chief of Staff dated March 15, 
1941, exhibit 58, p. 15 ; also Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. 1, pp. 21, 23. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2963 

The Vice Chairman. Well, now, it would be helpful, I think, if you 
would give us the third column just exactly as it appears here. For 
instance, "B-17D Planes." 

General Short. I will give each one in turn if that will be satis- 
factory. 

The Vice Chair:\ian. All right. 

General Short. B-17 planes : Available on December 7, 6, required 
180 ; in December 1942 there was only one B-17 plane but there were 40 
B-24 planes, which was a very comparable plane. 

The Vice Chairman. One B-17 and 

General Short. 40 B-24's which would accomplish the same pur- 
pose. 

Interceptors and fighters : There were 105 available on December 
7 ; required according to our plans 185 ; and in December 1942 they 
had 200. 

Torpedo bombers: There were none available on December 7, 36 
were required according to our plans and there were [8005] still 
none on hand in December 1942. 

The Vice Chairman. None? 

General Short. None ; yes, sir. 

3-inch antiaircraft guns : There were 82 available on December 7, 
98 required by the plan. In December 1942 there were only 40 3-inch 
antiaircraft guns but there were 44 90-millimeter guns, which was a 
much more powerful gun, able to accomplish much more. 

37-millimeter antiaircraft guns: On December 7 there were 20 
available. There were required under our plans 135. In December 
1942 there were actually 276. 

50-caliber machine guns: Available December 7, 109; required 
according to our plan 345 ; actually available in December 1942, 793. 

I wish to point out that the 50-caliber machine gun was the most 
effective weapon against planes coming in very low over the water, 
and that the number that they had in December 1942 was more than 
seven times the number that we had on December 7. 

I am presenting this table because there has been a statement before 
the committee that we had all that was necessary to defeat the Japanese 
attack. 

The seriousness of this shortage of equipment is best borne out by re- 
calling that our equipment was inadequate to [8006] protect 
the Pacific Fleet, even had w^e been on an all-out alert such as that 
which the Chief of Staff had ordered in June 1940. I want to quote 
General Herron's testimony on this point. 

General Frank. * * * Let iis assume that in 1940, when the Army was in 
that alert, that there was a real menace and that an attack had come similar to 
the one that came on December 7th with the Army on the alert and the Navy not. 
What do yon think would have happened? 

General Hereon. Well, approximately what happened on December 7th. The 
dive bombers would have come in. The Army could not have stopped them with 
its three-inch guns posted up on the hills. They necessarily would bring more 
planes than we had. If we had 50 combat planes they would bring 150, surely. ^ 

96. Army failure — Heroism of troops 

Due to the fact that the War Department did not make available to 
Hawaii the information in its possession, the Army forces in Hawaii 
were unable to prevent the terrific destruction caused by the Japanese 

^ Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. 3, p. 234. 



2964 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

attack. However, the fine action of the Hawaiian troops when struck 
by the surprise attack should not be overlooked. Every officer and man 
did his full duty with promptness, pre- [8007] cision and effi- 
ciency. All organizations moved quickly to their battle positions and 
took up their prescribed duties. Acts of heroism were the rule, not the 
exception. 

97. General JSfaf reorganisation 

I trust that the reorganization of the War Department General 
Staff will lead in the future to prompt evaluation and use of all items 
of intelligence concerning possible aggressive movements by foreign 
military powers. 

98. Unjust War Depofr-tTnevt treatment 

I do not feel that I have been treated fairly or with justice by the 
War Department. I was singled out as an example, as the scapegoat 
for the disaster. My relatively small part in the transaction was not 
explained to the American people until this joint congressional com- 
mittee forced the revelation of the facts, I fully appreciate the desire 
of the War Department to preserve the secrecy of the source of the 
so-called magic, but I am sure that could have been done without any 
attempt to deceive the public by a false pretense that my judgment 
had been the sole factor causing the failure of the Army to fulfill its 
mission of defending the Navy at Pearl Harbor. I am sure that an 
honest confession by the War Department General Staff of their failure 
to anticipate the surprise raid would have been understood by the 
public, in the long run, and even at the time. Instead, they "passed 
the buck" to me, and I have kept [8008] my silence until the 
opportunity of this public forum was presented to me. 

99. War Department'' a Jf-year silence 

The War Department had 4 years to admit that a follow-up should 
have been made on the November 27 message and on my report of the 
same date, but no such admission of responsibility was made public 
until General Gerow and General Marshall testified before this com- 
mittee. 

100. First opportunity to present story 

I want to thank all the members of this committee for the thorough 
manner in which you have tried to bring out the facts and particularly 
for the opportunity to present my story to you and through you to the 
American public. 

The Chairman. The committee will excuse you at this time, General, 
until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. 

General Short. Thank you, sir. 

The Chairman. The committee desires to have an executive session 
and the spectators will depart as rapidly as possible. 

(Whereupon, at 3: 15 p. m., January 22, 1946, an adjournment was 
taken until 10 a. m., Wednesday, January 23, 1946.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2965 



{8009^ PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



WEDNESDAY, JANTJABY 23, 1946 

COXGRESS OF THE UXITED StATES. 

Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF the Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The joint comittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., 
in the Caucus Room (room 318) , Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
"W. Barkley (chairman) pi-esiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present : Seth "W. Richardson, general counsel ; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, associate general counsel: John E. Hasten, Edward P. 
Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee. 

[8010] The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in 
order. General Short, do you have anything to add before counsel 
begins to question you ? 

General Short. Xo, sir. I have not had an opportunity to see if 
there are any clerical errors in the transcript. I would like later on if 
I jBnd any to submit those. 

The Vice Chairman. Then counsel ma}- proceed. 

Mr. Kaufman. Before proceeding with the examination of General 
Short I would like to have certain documents marked in evidence. 

Yesterday General Short in his statement offered as an exhibit the 
batch of papers that he had used before the Roberts examination. It 
was agreed that with respect to this exhibit it need not be duplicated 
but I would like to have it given a number. The next number is 133, 

The Vice Chairman. Counsel desires to offer that as Exhibit 133 ? 

:Mr, Kaufman. As Exhibit 133, 

The Vice Cha^irman. It will be received as Exhibit 133. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 133,") 

Mr, Kaufman. General Short in his examination used five charts 
yesterday and I ask that they be marked as Exliibit No. 134. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered. 

[8011] (The charts referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 134.") 

Mr. Kaufman. I ask that there be marked as "Exliibit 135" a com- 
pilation made by counsel as to the details of the time of sending and 
the receipt of the messages commencing on November 27. Copies of 
this have already been distributed to members of the committee. That 
is Exhibit 135. ^ 

The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit 135. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exliibit No. 135.") 



2966 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Kaufman. I ask that there be marked as Exhibit 136 the report 
of Eugene V. Elder, Lieutenant Colonel, Signal Corps, relating to the 
operation of the radio sets and radar equipment. I ask that that be 
marked Exhibit 136. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit 136. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No, 136.") 

Mr. Kaufman. I ask that there be marked as Exhibit 137 the reports 
from the War Department as to the operation of the radar station in 
Hawaii and the alert of the radar station commencing November 27, 
1941. This has been requested by Con^rressman Gearhart at pages 259 
and 260 of this record.^ Copies of this have already been distributed 
to the members of the committee. 

The Vice Chairman. What is the number ? 

[8012] Mr. Kaufman. Exhibit 137. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit 137. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No, 137.") 

Mr. Kaufman. Now may I proceed with the examination of Gen- 
eral Short ? 

The Vice Chairman. Counsel may proceed with the examination 
of General Short. 

•TESTIMONY OF MAT. GEN. WALTER C. SHOET, UNITED STATES 
ARMY (RETIRED)— Resumed 

Mr. Kaufman. General, will you please state for the record your 
experience in the Army ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

I was commissioned a second lieutenant of Infantry, March 13, 
1902. My appointment was made upon the recommendation of the 
president of the University of Illinois, from which university I had 
graduated in 1901. 

I was assigned to the Twenty -fifth Infantry and to duty in the con- 
tinental United States. I served in the Philippines from August to 
December 1907. I was assigned to the Sixteenth Infantry in Decem- 
ber 1907 and returned to the United States. 

I served in Alaska from 1910 to 1912, I was secretary of the School 
of Musketry from November 1912 to March 1916. I served with the 
Pershing expedition in Mexico from March [SOlS] 1916 to 
February 1917. 

I served in France and Germany from June 1917 to June 1919. I 
went to France as a captain of the Sixteenth Infantry in the First Di- 
vision, I was in the first group of officers sent to the British and 
French fronts and to the British and French schools. 

I participated in the organization of the corps schools and of the 
Army Machine-Gun School in France. I was promoted to major, 
lieutenant colonel, and colonel during my service in France. I served 
on the general staff at GHQ, General Headquarters of the A. E. F., 
having charge of the training and front-line inspections of machine- 
gun units. I was made assistant chief of staff, G-5, Third Army, 
when it was organized and sent into Germany. 

I was an instructor at the Command and General Staff School from 
July 1919 to February 1921 at Fort Leavenworth, Kans. I was placed 
on the initial General Staff eligible list and detailed on the General 

'Part 1, p. 109. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2967 

Staff in February 1921. I served on the General Staff with troops 
from February to June 1921. I served on the War Department Gen- 
eral Staff from July 1921 to August 1924. 

I attended the Army War College from September 1921 to July 
1925. I served in Puerto Rico as a lieutenant colonel, Sixty-fifth In- 
fantry, from July 1925 to July 1928. I was in charge \_80U] 
of the G-3 section, Command and General Staff School, Fort Leaven- 
worth, from August 1928 to September 1930. 1 served in the Bureau 
of Insular Affairs as financial officer and later as executive officer from 
October 1930 to June 1934. I commanded the Sixth Infantry at 
Jefferson Barracks from July 1934 to June 1936. During 2 months 
of this period I acted as executive officer of the national matches 
in 1935. 

I was assistant commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Ben- 
ning from July 1936 to January 1937; promoted to the grade of brig- 
adier general on December 1, 1936. Commanded the First Brigade 
from March to December 1937. Commanded the First Division from 
January 1938 to September 1940, except during periods of maneuvers 
when I was commanding a corps. 

I was promoted to major general March 1, 1940. I organized 
and commanded the Fourth Corps in maneuvers at Fort Benning, Ga., 
marched the corps to Louisiana and participated in maneuvers from 
March 1940 to May 1940. I commanded a provisional corps of Na- 
tional Guard and participated in maneuvers from August 1940 to 
September 1940. I organized and commanded the First Corps at 
Columbia, S. C, from October 1940 to December 1940. I commanded 
the Hawaiian Department from February 7, 1941, to December 17, 
1941 ; was promoted to the grade of lieutenant general February the 
8th [8015] upon taking command of the Department. I re- 
tired as a major general February the 28th, 1942. 

Mr. Kaufman. General, when were you informed that you had been 
selected to command the Hawaiian Department? 

General Short. In December 1940. 

Mr. Kaufman. And who so informed you? 

General Short. I had a personal letter from the Chief of Staff. 

Mr. Kaufman. And after the receipt of that letter did you come to 
Washington to confer with the Chief of Staff. 

General Short. Not immediately. 

Mr. Kaufman. When did you do so? 

General Short. I came to Washington the first week in January to 
confer with the Chief of Staff. 

Mr. Kaufman. And at that time were you told by the Chief of Staff 
as to the probable dangers in the Hawaiian Department ? 

General Short. My conference with the Chief of Staff was rather 
brief and he did not go into my mission to any considerable extent at 
that time but he wrote me a long letter on the day that I assumed com- 
mand detailing his idea of my mission. 

Mr. Kaufman. Were you informed before you took command of the 
Hawaiian Department that there would be a change in [8016] 
the command of the Pacific Fleet ? 

General Short. I was not. 

Mr. Kaufman. When were you informed about that for the first 
time ? 



2968 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. After I reached Honolulu, probably 2 days — I think 
that I knew it 2 days before I took command. 

Mr. Kaufman. The letter that you referred to is the letter by Gen- 
eral Marshall to you dated February 7, 1941, and is part of exhibit 53? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. And it was in that letter that the Chief of Staff 
told you about the probable developments and probable dangers of 
the Hawaiian Department? 

General Short. Yes, sir ; not pointing at any particular time, but as 
I got the idea, if hostilities did eventuate that those were the prob- 
abilities. 

Mr. Kaufman. And the next to the last paragraph of the Chief of 
Staff's letter of February 7 is as follows : 

My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is 
done us during the first six hours of Icnown hostilities, thereafter the existing 
defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk 
of sabotage and the risk involved [80^7] in a surprise raid by air and by 
submarine constitute the real perils of tlie situation. Frankly, I do not see any 
landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority. 

It was in that letter that the Chief of Staff made those statements? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. So that your first instructions, written instruc- 
tions from the Chief of Staff was that the main hazard was a sur- 
prise air attack and a probable submarine attack? 

General Short. He mentioned in order there — he did not say 
what he considered the order of priority, but he mentioned sabotage 
first. 

Mr. Kaufman. Sabotage and the risks involved in a surprise raid 
by air and submarine? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. That is all in the one sentence. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Kaufman. And he winds that sentence up by stating : 

This constitutes the real perils of the situation. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And in addition you knew at that time of the 
deterioration of the relations as between the United States and 
Japan? 

[8018] General Short. I did. 

Mr. Kaufman. And you regarded and the Hawaiian Department 
was regarded as one of the most important outposts of the United 
States ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. You recognized that ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. Then there followed between you and the Chief of 
Staff a series of communications commencing on February 7, 1941, 
and ending on October 28, 1941, all of which correspondence is in- 
cluded in exhibit No. 53. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And the purport of that correspondence was con- 
stant advice and direction to you from the Chief of Staff in connec- 
tion with preparation of the Department for a surprise attack by air ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2969 

General Short. I would say in preparation for any kind of an 
attack by air. 

Mr. Kaufman. And particularly a surprise attack by air ? 

General Short. Yes. He only emphasized that, as I remember, 
once, that it was a question of getting the necessary things to meet 
any air attack. 

Mr. Kaufman. You will not say that the purport of the cor- 
respondence between you and the Chief of Staff laid par- [SOW] 
ticular emphasis on the possibility of a surprise attack by air ? 

General Short. In that one paragraph he did. 

Mr. Kaufman. I am talking about the rest of the correspond- 
ence commencing in February of 1941 and ending in October of 
1941, whether or not the emphasis in all of those communications 
was not with respect to the possibility of an attack, of a surprise 
attack by air? 

General Short. I would say it was with reference to the possi- 
bility of any attack by air, surprise or otherwise. 

Mr. Kaufman. By air^ 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

[SO'^O] Mr. Kaufman. And you recognized, as the result of that 
correspondence, the probability of the attack by air in the event of hos- 
tilities with the Japanese ? 

General Short. At least the possibility. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now what were the conditions in the Hawaiian De- 
partment at the time that you took over the command ? 

General Short. There was still much to be done to prepare the de- 
fenses against an air attack. My letter of February 19 set forth these 
conditions very briefly to General Marshall. 

Now I would like to add, I am not reflecting on any previous com- 
mander that may have made efforts to get all of these things, but the 
fact is those things existed. 

Mr. Kaufman. The fact is after you took command, and in recogni- 
tion of the possibilities of an attack by air, it was part of your problem 
to make the department ready against such possibility of attack ? 

General Short. Very definitely. 

Mr. Kaufman. And you made efforts in that direction ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And you made requests of the War Department for 
additional material and equipment and men for the purpose of 
strengthening that department ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And some of your requests were granted and 
[8021] some were not granted ? 

General Short. Very few were granted ; most were not granted. 

Mr. Kaufman. The requests for pursuit planes were granted, were 
they not? 

General Short. We got a considerable increase in pursuit planes. 

Mr. Kaufman. And your request for radar equipment was granted ? 

General Short. Not completely. I asked for a higher priority, 
which would have advanced the date of receipt, and that was not given 
to me. 

Mr. Kaufman. The fact is, however, you did get three mobile sets ? 

General Short. I got six mobile sets. 

79716— 46— pt. 7 5 



2970 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Kaufman. Six mobile sets and three stationary sets ? 

General Short. I do not believe the stationary sets were complete. 
I think certain parts were still missing. 

Mr. Kaufman. At least one of the stationary sets was in operation 
at one time or another prior to December 7 ? 

General Short. All six of them were in operation at one time or 
another. 

Mr. Kaufman. All six were in operation at one time or another ? 

[802^J] General Short. Of the mobile sets. 

Mr. Kaufman. All six of the mobile sets were in operation and at 
least one of the stationary sets was in operation ? 

General Short. No, sir; no stationary set was in operation, to my 
knowledge. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now on page 3 of your statement, and thereafter, 
you lay particular stress on the efforts that you made for the procure- 
ment of additional material and equipment for the Hawaiian De- 
partment ? 

General Short, That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. And those efforts were the expected efforts of a 
commander in the field to strengthen his Department ? 

General Short. That is right. 

Mr. Kaufman. Against the possibility of air attack ? 

General Short. That is right. 

Mr. Kaufman. You were doing what was expected of you to be 
done ? 

General Short. And what I thought was essential. 

Mr. Kaufman. And most of the material that you made a demand 
for was so as to better protect the Department against a possible air 
attack? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now, as a matter of fact, you know, don't you, that 
the Hawaiian Department got priority in material [8023] and 
men in 1941? 

General Short. Up to a certain point, and then they started send- 
ing all the B-17's to the Philippine Islands, and they even took them 
away from us to send there. I might add also, that as late as about 
December 2 they asked me if I could afford to send 48 75-millimeter 
guns and 120 30-caliber machine guns, and that they would replace 
them. 

Mr. Kaufman. Well, as a practical matter. General, if you had had 
the additional material there on December 7 it would not have made 
any difference, because the material that you did have was not used 
on December 7? 

General Short. It would have made a great deal of difference if I 
had had additional material, and if I also had the information that 
the War Department had. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now will you tell us. General, what was the prin- 
cipal duty of the Army in the Hawaiian Department ? 

General Short. It was to defend the Island of Oahu from surface 
attacks, air attacks, sabotage, internal disorders such as uprisings, 
with particular attention to the defense of Pearl Harbor and of the 
fleet when in the harbor, and always supported by the Navy. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2971 

Mr. Kaufman. One of the principal duties of the Hawaiian De- 
partment was the protection of the fleet when the fleet was in the 
harbor ? 

[80^4] General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. And we might summarize the duties of the Hawai- 
ian Department as follows: To protect the island from invasion of 
any kind, or an attack of any kind ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And to protect the fleet when it was in the harbor? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Kj^ufman. And the installations of the fleet while it was in the 
harbor ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And that particularly including the fuel supply 
around the harbor? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. The fuel supply was in large tanks without any 
protection of any kind? 

General Short. That is right. 

Mr. Kaufman. Which created an additional problem for the com- 
mander of the Hawaiian Department, isn't that correct? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman, Because of the recognition by the commander that 
a destruction of the fuel supply would render the fleet impotent? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

[8025] Mr. Kaufman. Now as commanding general in that field 
you received broad directives from the War Department? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And it was your duty to determine the manner of 
performance ? 

General Short. In the main things the War Department also re- 
quired the opportunity to approve my plans. They were sent to 
Washington for approval. 

Mr. Kaufman. But with respect to a directive, the commander in 
the field had the responsibility of determining the manner of perform- 
ing the directive issued to him ? 

General Short. Yes, sir; and the War Department also had the re- 
sponsibility of furnishing him with the information available. 

Mr. Kaufman. We are talking about different things. General. We 
are talking fundamentally about the duties of a commander in the 
field. He gets liis directives from the War Department? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And the responsibility as to the manner of perform- 
ance is his ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. He reports to Washington as to the method of per- 
formance, and sometimes he gets instructions and some- [8026] 
times he does not? 

General Short. I may also add that the manner of the performance 
of his duties necessarily will be influenced by the essential information 
provided him. It necessarily must be so. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now on pages 14 and 26 of your statement you state, 
in substance, that if any general alert was to be invoked in the 



2972 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Hawaiian Department jou assumed that General Marshall was going 
to supervise such alert; is that right ? 

General Short. He had very definitely done that in the June 17, 
1940, message. 

Mr. Kaufman. The fact is, as you state on pages 14 and 26 of your 
statement, that you expected that if a general alert was going to be 
invoked for the Hawaiian Department Greneral Marshall was going to 
supervise it ? 

General Shl.rt. I expected him to do one of two things : Either to 
order the general alert or to give me sufficient information to justify 
me in ordering it. 

[80^^] Mr. Kaufman. And you assumed that because he or- 
dered the general alert in 1940 ; is that right i 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufalan. And you also assumed it because in 1940 he, to some 
extent, supervised the alert that was invoked there? 

General Short. He followed it up there directly, to know what was 
going on. 

Mr. Kaufmax. Did you make inquiiy from the Chief of Staff as to 
whether or not he would supervise an alert ? 

General Short. I did not. 

Mr. Kaufi^ian. Did you make inquiry from the Chief of Staff as to 
whether or not he would directh- order an alert ? 

General Short. I did not. 

!Mr. Kaufman. You recognized, of course, that conditions had 
changed verv materially from the summer of 1940 to the summer 
of 1941? 

General Short. But I also recognized that a thing that would be 
dangerous in 1940, would be dangerous in 1941. 

Air. Kauf^ian. You did recognize, however, that conditions did ma- 
terially change ? 

General Short. Very materially. 

^Ir. Kaufman. From the summer of 1940 to the summer of 1941 ? 

[80:28] General Short. Very materially. 

Sir. Kaufman. And that the Chief of Staff and the "War Depart- 
ment in "Washington had manv problems in 1941 that thev diet not 
have in 1940 ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. And that that required a greater reliance by them 
on their field commanders in 1941 ? 

General Short. It also required a greater reliance and more exact 
requirement of performance of duty by the general staff. 

All". Kaufman. Xow, coming back to the question of the recogni- 
tion of the possibility or probability of an air attack on the island, 
are you familiar with the correspondence between Secretary Knox 
and Secretary Stimson? 

General Short. I am. 

Mr. Kaufman. "Which is exhibit 10 in this proceeding? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. "When did those communications first come to your 
attention ? 

General Short. Probably within the first few days after my ar- 
rival at Honolulu. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2973 

Mr. Kauksiax. And you recognized the concern of the Secretary 
of the Xavy that everything' be done to protect Pearl Harbor, and 
the fleet against an air attack on the [8029'\ island? 

General Short. I did. 

Mr. Kautzsiax. And you are familiar with the directive made by 
the Secretary of War in his communication of February 7. 1941, 
directing that a study be made, and that all preparations be made 
against such a possible attack? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Kl\ur:MAX. It "was as the result of the communications of the 
Secretary of the Xavy and Secretary of War that the joint coastal 
frontier defense plan was worked out? 

General Short. The modifications of it. 

Mr. KArT]tf AX. The modifications of it ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr, KArFMAX. And the modification of the coastal frontier de- 
fense plan is annex 7 as part of exhibit Irl in this proceeding. Did I 
adequately describe it. General? 

General Short. That is right. 

Mr. Kat:f:max. Will you turn to that plan ? Under item 1. General, 
it says : 

In order to coorflinate joint defensive measurements for the security of the 
Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, for defense against hostile raids 
or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war. and before a general 
mobilization, the following agreement is made. 

[8030] Do you have that language in mind? 

General Short. Yes. sir. 

^Ir. Kat:f3iax. So that one of the first things after you took com- 
mand of the Hawaiian Department was to work out this agreement 
with General Bloch. the Commandant of the Fourteenth Xaval Dis- 
trict ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Kautimax. And it contemplated the preparation of this plan 
of defense before a declaration of war. and before general mobilization. 

General Short. It made provisions for it. 

Mr. Kaufmax. It made provisions for it ? 

General Short. Yes. sir. 

Mr. Kaffmax. And it was something you had in mind in connec- 
tion with the working out of this agreement ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KAFT^rAX. So that the plan was good even though the per- 
formance may not have been good? 

General Short. Yes. sir. 

Mr. Kaufmax. Xot that agreement between yourself and Admiral 
Bloch clearly contemplated specific things to be done 1. by the Army, 
and 2. by the Xavy ? 

General Short. I do not know whether you would say that was the 
order. The order probablv would be reversed. 

[S03J] Mr. Kaufmax. TMiat is that ? 

General Short. The order perhaps would be reversed on account 
of the things that the Xavy was expected to do. 

Mr. Kaufmax. Well, tte fact is. irrespective of the order, that the 
agreement contemplated well-defined activities ? 



2974 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. Very definitely. 

Mr. Kaufman. For the Navy and the Army ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. And those activities vfere to be put into ejffect by 
joint agreement whenever the occasion arose? 

General Short. The first provision would be from Washington, if 
they put the basic war plan into effect, or any part of it. That would 
be the normal procedure. 

Mr. Kaufman. Well, it would not be put into effect by Washington, 
would it? 

General Short. It would be ordered into effect, the basic plan would 
be ordered into effect, which would direct us to put this into effect. 

Mr. Kaufman. Or else that particular part of the agreement could 
be put into effect as a result of joint action by you and Admiral Bloch ? 

General Short. That is true, but when you consider [8032] 
the instructions we had from Washington, indicating that they were 
very anxious not to provoke Japan, I do not believe they wanted us 
to put into effect any part of the war plan that had not been indicated 
from Washington. 

Mr. Kaufman. The plan contemplated activities even before a 
declaration of war, or general mobilization ? 

General Short. Well, at least before a declaration of war. 

Mr. Kaufman. And it also says, "and before general mobilization." 

General Short. They were at liberty to put any part of their plan 
into effect. 

Mr. Kaufman. And you and Admiral Bloch could yourselves have 
put into effect if you determined that it was necessary? 

General Short. But we would have had to keep in mind that desire 
of Washington not to provoke Japan. 

Mr. Kaufman. Well, with respect to this agreement that was made 
between you and Admiral Bloch for joint activities, did you report 
that plan to Washington ? 

General Short. We did, and it was approved. 

Mr. Kaufman. So that Washington knew that so far as the Com- 
mandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and the Commander of 
the Hawaiian Department was concerned, they had worked [S033] 
out a plan for joint activities to be effective before war was declared, 
or before there was a general mobilization ? 

General Short. That is correct; possibly to be effective before it 
could be made effective. 

Mr. Kaufman. To be effective before it could be made effective ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And they knew that your plans with the Navy 
were completed? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And in order to be put into effect, it could be put 
into effect as the result of an agreement between yourself and Ad- 
miral Bloch? 

General Short. Yes, sir; and I believe certain portions were ac- 
tually directed to be effective from Washington. In the Navy mes- 
sage of October 16, and the Navy message of October 27, the Navy 
directed the commander of the fleet to take defensive deployment 
preparatory to carrying out war plans 46, which necessarily would 
have included, and did include very considerable reconnaissance. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2975 

Mr. Kaufman. I think we will come to that, General. What I am 
concerned with is as to whether or not with [8034] respect 

to this agreement, it contemplated that it could be put into effect by 
you and Admiral Bloch, if you determined to do so. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And that would have require agreement between 
yourself and Admiral Bloch to put it into effect? 

General Short. Or a directive from Washington that required it. 

Mr. Kaufman. Or, Washington could direct one of you to put it 
into effect? 

General Short. Or certain parts of it. 

Mr. Kaufman. Or certain parts of it, and if Washington did direct 
you to put it into effect, it would have again contemplated agreement 
between yourself and Admiral Bloch that each of you was doing the 
part provided for in the plan ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr, Kaufman. Now, coming down to the summer of 1941, you read 
in the paper, of course, about the deterioration of relations as between 
the Japanese and the United States ? 

General Short. I did. 

Mr. Kaufman. And you knew of the freezing of Japanese funds 
in the United States ? 

(leiieral Short. Yes, .sir. 

[8035] Mr. Kaufman. And you knew of the oil embargo against 
Japan ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And the embargo against scrap and ammunition? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Kj\.T!rFMAN. Did that create in you a consciousness that trouble 
might come with Japan ? 

General Short. Yes, sir ; but I was also told by the War Department 
that they did not expect a reaction causing the use of military forces 
on account of these acts. In their message of July 25, they stated 
definitely they did not expect a military reaction. 

Mr. Kaufman. They said that in July 1941 ? 

General Short. Yes, sir ; on July 25. 

Mr. Kaufman. And did you get any further advice from Wash- 
ington that they did not expect military action ? 

General Short. No, sir. The only further advice that might be 
construed to that effect was on the 20th of October after the joint 
message had been sent on the 16th predicting certain attacks by the 
Japanese. 

The War Department sent me a message on the 20th stating, while 
the situation continued to be tense, that they did not expect any abrupt 
change in the relations [8036] between the United States and 
Japan. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now, after this message from the War Department 
on the 26th of July — is that correct ? 

General Short. The 25th. 

Mr. Kaufman. The 25th of July 1941, there was nevertheless, great 
concern about the air defenses at Hawaii? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 



2976 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Kattfman. As a result of which, General Martin made a report 
in August of 1941, which is Exhibit 13 in this proceeding. Are you 
familiar with that report ? 

General Short. I am very familiar with it. 

Mr. Kaufman. And in that report he made many suggestions for 
the improvement of the air defenses in Hawaii ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. And you approved that report, did you not? 

General Short. I went over that report very carefully, and per- 
sonally added the 36 torpedo bombers to what we required. 

After talking it over with General Martin, he agreed with my sug- 
gestion. I reviewed that report very carefully before it went to Wash- 
ington. 

Mr. Kaufman. You approved that report, and this is [80S7'\ 

a photostatic copy of your approval of that report [handing document 
to General Short] ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. I will ask that that be marked as an exhibit. A copy 
of it has been handed to the members of the committee. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be so received. What exhibit number 
will that be? 

Mr. Kaufman. Exhibit 138. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 138.") 

Mr. Kaufman. General, on the basis of the report of General Mar- 
tin, another agreement was made between the Army and Navy with 
respect to the use of planes for reconnaissance and other things, and 
that is known as the Martin-Bellinger agreement, is it not ? 

General Short. I do not think that was made as the result of the 
study. That was just a natural folloW-up on the agreement that Ad- 
miral Bloch and I had made. 

Mr. Kaufman. That is correct. 

So that we have it, General, in connection with your appointment, 
you recognized the importance of the Hawaiian Department; you rec- 
ognized the deterioration of relations between Japan and the United 
States throughout the summer [8038] of 1941, you had in mind 
the letter from the War Department of July 25, that they did not 
anticipate any action by Japan, and we come now to the telegram that 
3'ou received from the War Department, the one of November 27. Have 
you got it before you ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. Before you received this telegram, did you see a 
telegram sent to the Navy Department dated November 24? 

General Short. Yes. sir. I was a little uncertain whether I had 
actually received it, or just had it read to me, but a naval officer before 
the Roberts board stated that he definitely gave me a copy, which he 
undoubtedly did. 

Mr. Kaufman. In the hearings before the Roberts Commission your 
recollection was that vou had not seen the telegram of November 24? 

General Short. I believe I stated that I remembered seeing it, but 
I had been unable to find it in mv headquarters, and I thought per- 
hans I had not actually received it. 

But in view of what the naval officer stated, I am sure I must have 
actually received it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2977 

Mr. Kaufman. Captain Layton testified, that he had [SOSP} 

actually given it to you. 

General Short. Actually delivered it to me, and talked to me 
about it. 

Mr. Kaufman. You saw it and you did receive it, according to the 
testimony of Captain Layton, prior to the receipt of the telegram of 
November 27 ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. From the War Department ? 

General Short. That is correct, 

Mr. Kattfman. So that on the 24th you received information from 
the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, as follows : 

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. 

That was a definite statement, was it not ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. It goes on to say : 

This situation, coupled vpith statements of Japanese Government, and movement 
their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive 
move in any direction including attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility. 

Now, I take it from your statement, General, that you said that lan- 
guage excluded Hawaii, because of the mention [804-0] of the 
Philippines or Guam. 

General Short. What I intended to say was that I felt certain that 
if the Navy Department believed an attack on Hawaii was probable, 
they would have mentioned it, the same as they did the Philippines. 
"In any direction " 

Mr. Kaufman. Well, they said 

Senator Brewster. Let him finish. 

Mr. Kaufman. I am sorry. 

General Short. "In any direction" might mean anywhere in the 
world, but they specifically stated that they did expect an attack to- 
ward the Philippines or Guam. I believe if they had been con- 
vinced of the same thing in Hawaii, they would very definitely have 
included Hawaii specifically, and not leave it to be included in the 
"in any direction." 

Mr. Kaufman. Well, do you mean to say. General, that with in- 
formation of that kind, you were justified in not going on an all-out 
alert ? 

General Short. I think very definitely that I was. The fact that 
the War Department did not even inquire or give me any direct in- 
formation to justify it. 

Mr. Kaufman. This was directed to be sent to you for your in- 
formation ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

[SO4I] Mr. Kaufman. A specific direction to you ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. So that when the Navy Department said "aggres- 
sive movement in any direction," did it not mean in the direction in 
which they directed this message to go for information ? 

General Short. I would not say so. If you take it literally, I feel 
absolutely confident, if they had any idea that Hawaii was to be 
directly included, if there was a direct probability that they would 
have said so. There would be no purpose in leaving me to guess. 



2978 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Kaufman. Did you expect the War Department to be able to 
tell you the exact place of an attack ( 

General Short. I believe the War Department actually had the in- 
formation 4 hours before the attack, so they could have told me the 
exact place. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now, we are 2^2 weeks before the 4 hours of the 
attack. We are on the 24th of November, General. 

General Short. The War Department could at least give me their 
best estimate, and I would like, when you get to November 29, to read 
to you what the man who wrote the estimate had to say about it. 

Mr. Kaufman. Coming back again, General, to the 24th, [8042] 
you said that the failure in this dispatch to name Hawaii as the place 
of possible attack, the same as the Philippines of Guam excluded from 
your consideration Hawaii as a probable point of attack. 

General Short. It indicated to me that they did not feel that 
Hawaii was definitely a point of probable attack. It was a possible 
place of attack, of course, but I am 100 percent confident, if they 
had believed it was a probable place of attack, they would have so 
stated it. 

Mr. Kaufman. Did it prompt you to ask for any instructions from 
the War Department ? 

General Short. It did not. 

Mr. Kaufman. We go now to the telegram of November 27. That 
was a direct telegram to you ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. It states. 

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, 
with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come 
back and offer to continue. 

That is a very definite statement, is it not ? 

General Short. It is a very indefinite statement. It says that they 
are to all practical purposes, but there is a possibility that they may 
come back. And they did [8043] come back. I knew it only 
from the papers. I knew that the negotiations were continuing. 

The War Department knew definitely there was a de facto rup- 
ture, and the Japanese were just stalling. They intercepted a mes- 
sage that told them that very positively. 

Mr. Kaufman. You regard that as an indefinite statement? 

General Short. A very indefinite statement. 

Mr. Kaufman. Then it follows, with the statement: "Action un- 
predictable." 

It says : 

Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any 
moment. 

Was that an indefinite or definite statement? 

General Short. Certainly, when you say a thing is unpredictable, it 
is not a definite statement. You say that something is possible, and 
they did not indicate the type of hostile action, they just said "hostile 
action," and I would say again that is a very indefinite statement. 

Mr. Kaufman. You did not believe that that was sufficient to put 
you on notice to go on an all-out alert ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2979 

General Short. I did not. I thought the War Department was 
perfectly capable of writing a positive and definite instruction if they 
wanted to give one. 

[8044] Mr. Kaufman. You did not make any inquiry from the 
War Department ? 

General Short. I did not. 

Mr. Kaufman. Well, you did get a definite instruction in this dis- 
patch, did you not ? 

General Short. I got certain missions assigned, as will appear later 
in the message. 

[SO4S'] Mr. Kaufman. It says : 

If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United 
States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. That is a definite statement ? 

General Short. That is a definite statement if they didn't go ahead 
and modify it by the next sentence. Then you change it into an 
indefinite statement. 

Mr. E^AUFMAN. But that statement, you agree, is definite ? 

General Short. If you stop there I agree that is definite. 

Mr. Kaufman. Then it says: 

This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting 
you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. 

General Short. You immediately have qualified it and it is no 
■ longer a definite statement. It is an indefinite statement. 

Mr. Kaufman. You have one definite statement and one indefinite 
statement ? 

General Short. They are joined together. 

Mr. Kaufman. Did what you claim to be inconsistencies in that 
statement prompt you to make any inquiry from Washington? 

[8046] General Short. It did not. 

Mr. Kaufman. And you didn't do so ? 

General Short. No, sir. I was satisfied of one thing, that their 
prime desire was to avoid war, and to not let any international inci- 
dent happen in Hawaii that might bring on war. 

Mr. Kaufman. It says : 

You are directed to take such reconnaissance and other measures as you 
deem necessary. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. But these measures should be carried out so as not 
to alarm the civil population. 

So that you did have a broad directive ? 

General Short. Always qualified. 

Mr. Kaufman. We will come to that. You did have a broad direc- 
tive to take such action as you deemed necessary ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. But to do it in such a way as would not alarm the 
civilian population? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. That was a complete and concise directive to you, 
was it not? 



2980 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. The first part was a very concise directive. When 
you qualify it, then there was always a (juestion about [8047] 

whether the manner I was going to do it in would alarm the public. 

Mr. Kaufman. The second part referred to the manner? 

General Short. The manner ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. That, again, did not prompt you to make any in- 
quiry from the War Department ? 

General Short. It did not. 

Mr. Kaufman. And you didn't make any ? 

General Short. I did not. 

Mr. Kaufman. The record shows. General, that this dispatch was 
decoded in your signal center at 2 : 22 Hawaiian time. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And that Colonel Phillips took that message to you 
at 2 : 30 on that day. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. On the morning of that day you had had a meeting 
with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And that meeting was before you had received this 
telegram ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. K!aufman. And you received this telegram according to the 
testimony of Colonel Phillips at 2 : 30 and according to the record 
the only person with whom you conferred about [8048] this 
telegram and the order that you gave was with Colonel Phillips, your 
chief of staff? 

General Short. But almost immediately afterwards I conferred 
with my G-2 and with my air force commander and my antiaircraft 
commander, within, I would say, the next hour to an hour and a half, 
all three of them. 

Mr. Kaufman. You put in the alert No. 1 within 30 minutes after 



the receipt- 
General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. Of the dispatch and before conference with any- 
body except Colonel Phillips? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. And you replied to the War Department before you 
had had any conference with anybody other than Colonel Phillips ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. And you replied to that before you had conferred 
with Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch ? 

General Short. I had conferred very fully with Admiral Kimmel 
and Admiral Bloch and at the time we conferred we all knew exactly 
what was in the message of November 24 and there was not one addi- 
tional bit of information of the enemy in this message that was not 
included in the message of November 24. We knew nothing more 
than we had known from the [8049] message of November 24. 

Mr. Kaufman. At any rate, you replied to this telegram to the War 
Department before you had conferred with Admiral Kimmel or Ad- 
miral Bloch or any part of your staff other than Colonel Phillips? 

General Short. I did. 

Mr. Kaufman. And in that telegram your report of action taken 
was — 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2981 

Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. General, having discussed these telegrams and hav- 
ing characterized some of them as being indefinite or unresponsive, 
do you think that the War Department was justified in taking from 
the words "liaison with the Navy" the meaning that you had put into 
effect the joint coastal frontier defense plan ? 

General Short. They very definitely were not. 

Mr. Kaufman. Why not? 

General Short. Because, in the first place, it was primarily their 
function to order it into effect. They knew, I think, that I would have 
consulted them before I would have considered ordering any part of 
it into effect if the communications were open. I am sure they would 
have expected me to phone them and tell them that I contemplated 
doing so. 

[8050] Mr. Kj^ufman. What did you mean by the words "liaison 
with the Navy"? 

General Short. I meant that I was keeping in touch with the Navy. 
I had actually discussed the dangers of the situation over a period of 
about 3 hours that morning with Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel 
and there had been no change since that discussion. 

Mr. Kaufman. Well, keeping in touch with the Navy was part of 
your norma] function, was it not ? 

General Short. Yes, sir ; and I was performing it. 

Mr. Kaufman. It was a part of your normal function that you had 
been undertaking and doing ever since you had taken charge of the 
Hawaiian Department? 

General Short. Also "liaison" is a term that is thoroughly under- 
stood throughout the Army and there was no doubt in my mind it was 
thoroughly understood by the War Department. 

Mr. Kaufman. General, will you state for the record what your 
understanding of the word "liaison" means in military and naval 
circles ? 

General Short. We use "liaison" in two different ways. In the way 
in which I was using it there, where you keep in touch and keep gen- 
erally informed. The other way was where you have a liaison officer 
detailed to a headquarters who has the sole mission of keeping his own 
headquarters informed [8051] as to what is going on. 

Mr. Kaufman. That, you say, is the well-defined meaning? 

General Short. That is right. 

Mr. Kaufman. Of the two uses of the word "liaison" ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. One is to indicate that you were keeping yourself 
informed by the Navy. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. As to what they were doing? 

General Short. The general situation. We were keeping each other 
informed, you might say, as to what we were doing. 

Mr. Kaufman. Well, did you keep yourself informed as to what 
the Navy was doing ? 

General Short, I think at that particular point I was extremely 
well-informed because we had discussed for a period of approximately 
3 hours the whole situation in the Pacific, looking toward Midway and 



2982 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Wake, and the dangers that were involved in sending carriers out there 
for relief. -We discussed every phase of it. 

Mr. Kaufman. The telegram of November 27 says : 

You are directed to take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem 
necessary. 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. Let us go to the first directive. You are [8052] 
directed to undertake such reconnaissance 

General Short. As I deem necessary. 

Mr. Kaufman. As you deem necessary. 

Did you take any reconnaissance at that time ? 

General Short. I did not deem any was necessary because it was 
the Navy's function, definitely agreed upon in the plan, to conduct 
the long-distance reconnaissance. 

Mr. Kaufman. Did you make inquiry from the Navy as to whether 
they were at that time making reconnaissance? 

(jeneral Short. I knew they were sending out three task forces. 1 
discussed it fully with them that morning. They were sending a task 
force to Wake to send out additional Marine planes. They were 
sending out to Midway to send out additional Marine planes. They 
were going to send one to Johnston Island. And I actually got per- 
mission to send a staff officer along because they were going to conduct 
a landing exercise which I wished my G-2 section to understand. I 
knew they were making perimeter reconnaissance from Johnston and 
Wake to Midway. I did not know the details of that reconnaissance 
but I knew it would take place. 

Mr. Kaufman. You knew that the task force to Johnston Island did 
not leave until December 5 ? 

General Short. It was later, but the other two were leaving early. 

[S053] Mr. Kaufman. Admiral Halsey left on the 29th? 

General Short. The 28th or 29th. 

Mr. Kaufman. 28th or 29th. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. Those were the only two task forces that were out? 

General Short. The only two task forces going out right at that 
time. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now, the joint agreement between yourself and 
Admiral Bloch contemplated long-range reconnaissance from the 
islands, did it not? 

General Short. It contemplated it not just from the island. What- 
ever long-range reconnaissance was necessary. And, as I understand 
Admiral Kimmel's attitude, it was that with the perimeter reconnais- 
sance from Johnston, Wake, and Midway, there was a verj' great 
saving in planes, that he could accomplish more than he could with 
the same number of planes from Oahu. And it was a logical thing 
to do, not to send them all out from Oahu. 

Mr. Kaufman. General, let us come back to the 27th of November. 
You were directed to take reconnaissance ? 

General Short. As I deemed necessary. 

Mr. Kaufman. As you deemed necessary? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

[8054] Mr. Kaufman. In other words, in order to have recon- 
naissance, effective reconnaissance, radar stations have to be in oper- 
ation, do they not ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2983 

General Short. The radar did not nial^e distant reconnaissance. 
We thought at that time it was limited to 75 or a hundred miles. We 
discovered that under very exceptional circumstances we actually got 
132 miles. It was not an instrument for distant reconnaissance. 

Mr. Kaufman. That was not put into alert, was it ? 

General Short. That was put into alert during what I considered 
the most dangerous hours of the day for an air attack, from 4 o'clock 
to 7 o'clock a. m. daily. 

Mr. Kaufman. And did you report that to the 

General Short. I did not, 

Mr. Kaufman. Just putting the radar station into operation is 
not effective unless there is the information center that works with it ? 

General Short. The information center was working with it. 

Mr. Kaufman. Was working with it ? 

General Short. Was working with it ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now, General, did you later on that day see the 
dispatch that Admiral Kimmel received from the Navy Department? 

[S0S5] General Short. Yes, sir. I think Lieutenant Burr tes- 
tified that he actually brought it to me personally. 

Mr. Kaufman. That was after you had replied to the War De- 
partment ? 

General Short. Probably sometime in the next hour or two. 

Mr. Kaufman. And when you saw the words "war warning" did 
that create any impression on your mind? 

General Short. No more so than the fact that they had said before 
that the Japs would probably attack. 

Mr. Kaufman. Had you ever in your experience seen a message 
to a field commander using the words "This is a war warning" ? 

General Short. No, sir; but I knew that the Navy messages were 
habitually rather more aggressive than the Army. On October 16 
we had a message in which they said Japan would attack. On October 
20 I had one from the War Department saying they didn't expect 
any. My message said nothing about a war warning and his did. I 
think the Navy messages were inclined to be more positive, possibly 
you might say more alarming, in the context. 

Mr. Kaufman. So that the war warning, you just regarded it as 
aggressiveness of the Navy, and paid no particular attention to it? 

General Short. No particular attention to those words. 

[80S6] Mr. Kaufman. I direct your attention to the telegram 
to the commander in chief of the Pacinc Fleet which says : 

The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval 
task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, 
Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. 

That is for information, is it not? 

General Short. Yes, sir; and indicated definitely to me they were 
attacking toward the Western Pacific. 

Mr. Kaufman. Then it goes on with a directive to the commander 
in chief of the Pacific Fleet. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. To — 

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the 
tasks assigned in WPL-46. 



2984 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. Yes, sir. I thought sure that that inckided dis- 
tant reconnaissance and as I remember Admiral Kimmel told me that 
he had tightened up all along the Ime, as I think he expressed it. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now, 3'ou had occasion to see Admiral Kimmel 
within a few days after the receipt of the dispatches of November 27? 

General Short. I had a conference with Admiral Kimmel on De- 
cember 1. I had another conference with Admiral Kimmel [8057'] 
on December 2. I had another conference with him on December 3. 

]Mr. Kaufman. Did you 

Senator Brewster. Let him finish. 

Mr. Kaufman. Yes. 

General Short. I Avas going to say, one of my staff officers, my staff 
officer used for liaison with the Navy, had a conference with his gun- 
nery officer on the 4th. I think that was the last conference we had 
before the attack. 

jNIr. Kaufman. General, did you at any time tell Admiral Kimmel 
that you had alerted only against sabotage? 

General Short. I don t know that I said that specifically. However, 
there was never an^- doubt in ni}^ mind that he knew exactly the status. 
Lieutenant Burr was detailed as a liaison from the Navy to the G-3 
section. He sat in with our G-o section, which was our operations 
section, which controlled all the alerts, all the war plans, everything 
of that kind. He knew everything that my staff knew. He had just 
one duty and that was to keep his headquarters informed of exactly 
what we were doing. 

Mr. Kaufman. 2s ow, can you account, General, for the testimony 
given by Admiral Kimmel before this committee to the effect that 
he did not know that you had alerted only against sabotage? He 
testified further that he thought you [dOSSj had gone on an 
all-out alert and that he didn't know that you had anything else 
but an all-out alert. 

General Short. The only way I can account for that would be poor 
staff work on the part of the staff of the Fourteenth Naval District. 
As I say, their liaison officer must have known exactly. We had fur- 
nished them with 10 copies of our staff operating procedure, which 
somebody in that naval staff certainly must have dug into and known 
what it meant. Why it did not get to Admiral Kimmel I do not know. 

Senator Lucas. General Short, will you give the committee the name 
of that liaison officer? 

General Short. Lieutenant Burr. I don't know his initials. 
B-u-r-r. 

Senator Lucas. Thank you. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now, General 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest, in the interest of saving 
time, that counsel ask General Short at this time what an all-out 
alert would mean to an observer who knew nothing about it. What 
would they have to do so that someone in Hawaii would know that they 
were on an all-out alert if one was ordered and they went on such an 
alert. 
Mr. Kaufman. What would be an all-out alert, General? 
General Short. An all-out alert would cause every officer and every 
enlisted man in every organization to move to battle [8069] 
positions. Men would be moving all over the islands, in helmets, full 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2985 

field equipment, bj'- motor, and otherwise. There would be men on 
every road. 

Mr. Kaufman. And do you feel that was contrary to the instruc- 
tions of the War Department not to alarm the civilian population? 

General Short. I would saj^ that it would mean to the civilian pop- 
ulation and any Japanese agents that w^e were takin<j; up our definite 
battle positions. There couldn't be any mistake about it. 

Mr. Kaufman. Even though it was done under the name of war 
games, or whatever you wanted to call it ? 

General Short. If we had had time to make a previous announce- 
ment, which we usually did if we were going into maneuvers, and a 
little build-up, we probably could have deceived the average citizen. 
We probably could not have deceived a Japanese agent who had the 
message. 

Mr. Kaufman. So you want the committee to understand that you 
had that problem in mind, so as not to circumvent or go contrary to 
the decision of the War Department? 

General Short. I did. 

Mr. Murphy. Counsel, as long as you are going into that, I suggest 
that we might complete the picture and ask the witness why he didn't 
go into alert No. 2, which provided [8060] protection against 
a submarine and an air attack. Alert No. 2. 

Mr. Kaufman, General, will you first describe what alert No. 2 
was. We have No. 1, against sabotage, and No. 3, an all-out alert. 
What was alert No. 2? 

General Short. Alert No. 2 was a defense against sabotage and 
uprisings and, in addition, a defense against an air attack or against 
an attack by surface and subsurface vessels. 

^Ir. Kaufman. Will you tell us why vou didn't put that into 
effect? 

General Short. All of the coast artillery, all of the antiaircraft 
artillery, and all of the air would have immediately taken up their 
duties as described in that alert. Part of the coast artillery was right 
in the middle of the town. Fort de Russy was within two or three 
blocks of the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, The public couldn't help seeing 
that they were manning their seacoast guns. Placing live ammuni- 
tion. Some of the guns were practically in the middle of the park. 
The bombers would have all gone to outlying islands, except the 
B-l7's which could not, because the landing gear was not along. 
So there would have been a considerable amount of activity. Again 
perhaps the average citizens wouldn't have understood fully but if 
there was a Japanese agent, who knew what he was looking for, he 
would have known perfectly. 

180611 Mr, Kauffman. Congressman Clark has a question. 

Mr. Clark. That answers what was in my mind, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And there were plenty of Jap agents in Hawaii ? 

General Short. We knew there had been a total list of 239 consular 
agents. We had their names very definitely. We hnd the names of 
probably 70 or 80 more that we were confident were Japanese agents. 
I might add in addition to that opportunity of alarming the public 
if we placed men at seacoast guns and at antiaircraft batteries with 
an explanation that they were to be prepared to fire immediately upon 
notice against Japanese, if we told our airplanes to be warmed up to 

79716—46 — pt. 7 6 



2986 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

be ready to go up and attack Japanese planes it is inconceivable that 
in some way the Japanese agents would not have picked up the 
information. 

Mr. Kaufman. You knew that there was certainly no need for 
two-hundred-odd consular agents of the Japanese there, that their 
function was other than what their names indicated ? 

General Short. There function may have been twofold. Some 
of them may not have been espionage agents. The Japanese, as we 
knew, were very much interested in keeping the Japanese-Americans 
as Japanese and I think, to a considerable extent, these agents were 
propaganda agents for Japan; some of [8062] them espio- 
nage ; all of them propaganda. 

Mr. Kaufman. You did not think, General, that it might have been 
very well to indicate that the men were taking battle stations as the 
means of probably heading off an attack, did you ? 

General Short. I did not think it would comply with the War 
Department message. It might have been very desirable but they had 
indicated that they did not want that kind of thing d(me. 

Mr. Kaufman. Well, as commander in the field you certainly had 
the power to inquire from Washington and to make known your plans, 
didn't you, if you wanted to do so ? 

General Short. They had indicated very definitely that they did not 
want to alarm the public and that they did not want to provoke Japan. 

Mr. Kaufman. So that you did not feel that you should have even 
made that suggestion to the War Department? 

General Short. I felt definitely that they did not want it. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now, on the following day 

General Short. May I add something before you leave that mes- 
sage ? 

Mr. Kaufman. By all means, sir. 

General Short. There were two things in that message [806S] 
that you did not mention. One was "report measures taken." Now, 
that told me, said to me that if I reported the measures taken and they 
were not what the War Department thought they should be that I 
would unquestionably get additional instructions. 

The other was, "Limit this highly essential information" or "highly 
secret information to the minimum officers" ; not officers and men but 
officers. You could not possibly go into alert No. 2 or alert No. 3 
without directly violating that. 

Mr. Kaufman. Well, in connection with that. General, in your state- 
ment you state in paragraph 90 that your decision on the 27th of 
November in the light of hindsight was wrong. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And the purport of your argument in your state- 
ment is that although you made an error you complain that Washing- 
ton did not correct your error ; isn't that the purport of your argu- 
ment? 

General Short. Yes, sir ; if you are not furnished information you 
in all probability will make an erroneous estimate. 

Mr. Kaufman. And your argument throughout your statement is 
that although in the first instance the error was yours Washington 
should be partly responsible for not having [SOdi] corrected 
your error ? 



I 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2987 

General Short. I would say wholly responsible. 

Mr. Kaufman. All right. It does not relieve you of the respon- 
sibility, however, does it, General? 

General Short. Yes, sir ; I told them exactly what I was doing. I 
had no reason in the world to believe that they did not approve of it. 
The Chief of Staff has himself stated before this committee that I 
had a right to assume that he would tell me if the action were not what 
he wanted. 

Mr. Kaufman. You say that you made a full report as to the action 
taken by you ? 

General Short. Yes, sir ; I said I made a report. 

Mr. KL\UFMAN. You made a report ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And in that report you intended to make it a com- 
plete report, did you not ? 

General Short. I intended for it to be complete enough for them to 
understand without question. 

Mr. Kaufman. And in that you told them that you had alerted 
against sabotage. Now, the radar warning system had nothing to do 
with sabotage, the sabotage alert, did it? 

General Short. No, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. That is an action that you took that you did not 
report to Washington. 

[S06S] General Short. I did not report that. 

Mr. Kaufman. And you did not report the fact that it was only 
running on a partial time basis ? 

General Short. I did not report it at all. 

Mr. Kaufman. You did not report it at all. You did not think it 
was material for Washington to know that you were only carrying 
your radar station for 3 hours a day? 

General Short. My basic report was of an alert against sabotage, 
which indicated to them that I was not alerted against an air attack or 
against a landing; all-out attack. 

Mr. Kaufman. Then why was the radar alerted on the 27th of 
November ? 

General Short. There were two very good reasons. The first rea- 
son is the Martin study had decided that the 8 hours, 2 hours imme- 
diately preceding dawn and 1 hour after were the dangerous hours. 
The radar was very new, the men were just beginning to be trained. 
If there was any possibility, it was a factor of sabotage, and it also was 
an opportunity to train the men at the most important time and to 
make tliem train a little harder because it was tied in with another 
alert. 

Mr. Kaufman. Have you anything further to say about the Novem- 
ber 27 message before I leave it, sir ? 

General Short. No, sir. There is one thing that I think [8066] 
it would be appropriate to take up at this time to indicate that the 
officers 

S?nator Lucas. What was the question? 

( The question was read by the reporter. ) 

General Short. The question is all tied in with this message as to 
why I did not assume or estimate that Japan was about to attack 
Hawaii. 



2988 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I have here a mimeographed copy from volume 2 of the Clarke 
report. Before I read this I would like to explain that General 
Kroner, who was then Colonel Kroner, was the head of the military 
branch of G-2. He was the officer who was responsible for maintain- 
ing information and for the preparation of estimates as to probable 
action. 

Hawaii was not mentioned as a place of probable attack in the cur- 
rent information and intelligence sent me in November and early 
December 1941. 

In this connection I want to quote for the committee the testimony 
of Gen. Hayes A. Kroner, the chief of the intelligence branch in War 
Department G-2 from July 1941 up to the time of the Japanese attack. 

The testimony I quote was given on September 13, 1944, before Col. 
Carter W. Clarke. It is found in the so-called Clarke investigation. 
I recently borrowed the War Department copy. I am informed that 
the committee has the only other [8067] copy of the Clarke 
report. I quote from page 5 and pages 9 and 10 of General Kroner's 
testimony : 

Col. Clakke. Did you have access to a source of information which we know as 
Top Secret or the British know as Most Secret? 

Gen. Kroner. Meaning communications information? 

Col. Clakke. Signal intelligence. 

Gen. Kkuner. No, none whatever. 

Col. Clakke. You mean you didn't get it or your Branch didn't get it? 

Gen. Kroner. I personally as Chief of the Branch did not get it. I was aware 
that something, which later I found out to be of this nature, existed, but I was 
given to understand, particularly by Col. Bratton and Col. Pettigrew, who some- 
times handled the matter for Col. Bratton, that he received information from 
Col. Minkler, whom I knew to be in the Signal Corps, which perhaps had to do 
with Japanese troop movements, which he by long custom and by General Miles' 
special desire, was to handle himself directly with Gan. Miles. 

Col. Clarke. I would like to ask one more question. In any estimate from 
the time you took over the Intelligence Group up to and including Pearl Harbor, 
was there ever any prediction or forecast made of a possible [806S] attack 
on Pearl Harbor? 

Gen. Kronbir. None to my knowledge. I have in mind the last estimate that 
was made before Pearl Harbor, which was an estimate covering a future period 
from December 1 to sometime in 1942. 

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you consider it a capability of the Japanese to success- 
fully attack Pearl Harbor with bombers? 

Gen. Kroner. No. The matter was discussed 

Col. Clakke. Did you identify this document? 

Gen. Kroner. Yes. I identified it — this is the document to which I reft-rred— 
IB 159, November 29, 1941. 

That is in Exhibit 33 under estimates dated November 29, 1941. 
[Reading :] 

This particular estimate was considered by the whole division, not only the 
Intelligence Group but by General Miles himself, as perhaps the most important 
we had ever gotten out. That importance lay not in so much the danger that 
we saw from Japan, although danger in that field was pretty thoroughly dis- 
cussed, but primarily because Gen. Miles wishes to focus "War Department 
thought on the defeat that could be administered to the Nazi powers. In the 
preparation of the estimate [8069] each geographic section in the In- 
telligence Branch prepared its part. Colonel— now Brigadier General — Thomas 
J. Belts put the several estimates together and did what we called "polish them 
up." He and I discussed the lines of action and capabilities of all the warring 
powers and especially of each potential enemy to the U. S. A., and I took them 
to Gen. Miles where they were finally altered to suit him or approved. This 
particular estimate does not include in the lines of action open to Japan an 
attack on Pearl Harbor, and I remember that so distinctly because wh^n the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2989 

word came through the radio on that fateful Sunday, December 7, that Japan 
had attacked Pearl Harbor, I was sitting in my office in the Munitions Building 
reading from this paper the Japanese capabilities. Therefore from my point 
of view, I feel that Japan's potential capability against Pearl Harbor was left 
from this estimate because neither Col. Betts nor I had any information which 
would lead us to believe that they were capable of or planned to do so. 

Col. Clarke. I would like to ask one final question again just to reiterate the 
fact that you personally had no knowledge of what Col. Bratton did with this 
most secret material or to whom he showed it. 

Gen. Kkonek. That is correct, except to Gen. IMiles. 

[SO/O] I want to call attention to the fact that these two officers 
who were responsible for the preparation of this estimate, General 
Kroner and Colonel Betts, in spite of the fact that General Kroner was 
the head of the Military Intelligence Branch, were denied access to 
the "magic" and for that reason he did not consider Japan capable of 
making an attack and did not believe that they were going to do so. 

I was in the same position with reference to "magic." I had no access 
to "magic." I had access to even less information than General Kroner 
did and General Kroner has made it perfectly plain that the absence 
of access to "magic" had caused him to draw the conclusion and to 
write to the estimate that way and the reason it was left out of the 
estimate was not, as General Miles said before this committee, because 
it was too obvious to be put in, but because they did not believe Japan 
was capable of making the attack considering the information they 
had. 

Mr. MuRPiiT. May I inquire at this point whether oi: not General 
Kroner was a subordinate of General jNIiles ? 

General Short, He was. He was in charge of the intelligence branch 
directly under General Miles and he took this estimate to General 
Miles and General Miles accepted it. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, we distinguish between chief of the in- 
telligence branch and head of the intelligence branch? 

[8071] General Short. No, sir. The G-2 was divided into sev- 
eral branches. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate General Miles was head of Intelligence? 

General Short. He was head of all G-2. 

Mr. Murphy. All Intelligence? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And this man was called Chief of the Intelligence? 

General Short. Of the Military Intelligence Branch. 

Here is another short radiogram that I would like to introduce at 
this time because it shows the attitude of G-2 and what they thought 
between the time of the sending of this message and December 7. This 
message was dated December 5, 1941, No. 512, addressed to G-2 Panama 
Department : 

• U. S.-Japanese relations strained STOP Will inform you if and when sever- 
ance of diplomatic relations imminent. 

Signed "Miles." 

Now, that was only 2 days before the attack and apparently IMiles. 
who was head of G-2 at that time, did not consider that the rupture 
of Japanese relations was imminent. 

Mr. Kauf3ian. I am told that this has never come before the com- 
mittee before. 

Senator Ferguson. Read it. 



2990 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[8072] Mr. Kaufman. It has been read into the record by Gen- 
eral Short and is dated December 6, 1941. 

To Panama Canal Dapartment: 

U. S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS STRAINED STOP WILL INFORM YOU 
IF AND WHEN SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IMMINENT. 

MILES. 

That was not sent to you, was it, General? 

General Short. That was not sent to me but I read it to show that 
at that time Miles did not believe the severance was imminent, 2 days 
before the attack. 

Mr. Kaufman. And is something that you have found that supports 
your contention 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman (continuing). That other people came to the same 
erroneous estimate as you did? 

General Short. And people who had much more information than 
I had even. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, can Mr. Masten, who was here 
earlier with us, can he explain on this record why the War Depart- 
ment, why the Intelligence branch, did not deliver that to the com- 
mittee and why it was not called to the attention of the committee 
before Miles took the witness stand and before General Marshall and 
others were on the witness stand ? 

[8073] Can he explain why we get this information after wit- 
nesses have been here instead of before? I think here is an appro- 
priate place to place their information now in tlie record as to this 
incident. 

Mr. Masten. Senator, I have no personal knowledge to answer the 
question that you asked. I understand from Colonel Duncombe, the 
Army liaison officer, that it is his impression that that was delivered, 
that they had delivered it to us. but we will have to look and see. I 
understand that the exhibit which I think is 

Senator Ferguson. As I understood it we were to have all messages. 

Mr. Masten. Excuse me, Senator. Exhibit 32, which is the only 
exhibit containing Army messages from Washington, states specifi- 
cally that it is restricted to messages between the War Department 
and Hawaii. Now, to my knowledge, there has not been any effort 
made to compile an exhibit of the messages from the War Department 
to Panama or to any of the other places. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand then that we do not have 
all the messages to Panama and we do not have all the messages to the 
Philippines? This is verj'- material as I see it, that this committee 
has all messages sent out in relation to this war or anticipated war. 

[807^] Mr. Masten. Well, as I say, Senator, I have no personal 
knowledge of the precise answer to your question. There are a num- 
ber of other photostats in the office and I will have to check them up. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. Well. then, we will ask you to check it. It is 
now 12 o'clock and the committee will recess until 2 o'clock, General. 

General Short. Thank you. 

The Vice Chairman. And the members of the committee are re- 
quested to meet in the Finance Committee room in executive session at 
1:30. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2991 

(Whereupon at 12 noon a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the 
same day.) 

[8075] ATTERNOON SESSION 2 P. M. 

The Chairman. The committee will be in order. 

Before the examination of General Short is resumed, the Chair 
wishes to announce that in the interest of expedition in the hearings 
that instead of calling personally the members of the staff of General 
Short and of Admiral Kimmel, consisting of some 15 or 20 witnesses 
in all, who have heretofore testified on numerous occasions in regard 
to this inquiry, that a complete record of their testimony heretofore 
taken will be filed as an exhibit as a part of the record of this hearing 
with the right of any member of the committee who wishes to inquire 
of any particular witness who has heretofore testified concerning his 
testimony heretofore given, shall have the right to bring it to the 
attention of the committee and have the right to have the committee 
act favorably upon that request, with the further understanding that 
anv previous witness whose testimony is filed as an exhibit, who is 
called before the committee and orally examined by any member of 
the committee will then be subject to general examination by the 
committee. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, there was a further understanding. 

The Chairman. And, also, the Chair omitted to say that counsel 
for Admiral Kimmel and counsel for Genera] Short were consulted 
by the committee and agreed to that procedure. 

[8076] Mr. Keefe. So that there may be no mistake in the record, 
Mr. Chairman, I think the further qualification should be added, that 
the resolution adopted by the committee does not include the record 
of the Clausen investigation and affidavits. 

The Chairman. Clausen, as the Chair understands it and as the 
committee understand it, was not a member of the staff of either 
Admiral Kimmel or General Short and therefore this resolution would 
not apply to him. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. 

The Chairman. All right. We will now proceed. 

Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, at the conclusion of the morning's 
session a question was asked regarding a telegram dated December 5, 
1941, from General Miles to the G-2 of the Panama Canal Department, 
as to when that telegram had been made available to counsel for the 
committee. 

During the noon hour we have looked into this matter and have 
received this memorandum from the Army liaison officer. It reads 
as follows : 

With reference to the message from G-2, War Department, to G-2, Panama, 
dated 5 December, referred to at the close of this morning's session, the para- 
phrased text of that message is set forth on Page 285 of Volnme D of the top-secret 
transcript of Proceedings Before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. That transcript 
[8077] was delivered to the committee on 9 October 1945. Also, a photostatic 
copy of the ?ame message was delivered by the War Department to the committee 
on or about 1 December and at the same time a copy was delivered to Captain 
Ford, General Short's counsel. 

Harmon Duncomre, 

Lieutenant Colonel. 



2992 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I have checked the files of counsel and find that one of the two sets 
of these volumes has at all times remained in counsel's office available 
to the members of the committee. The other set was delivered on 
October 11 to Senator Brewster and is still in his possession. 

The Chaibman. That is all. You may proceed, Counsel. 

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES 
ARMY (RETIRED)— Resumed 

Mr. Kaui^man. General, coming back- 



General Short. May I add just one thing in regard to that message 
in regard to General Miles? 

Mr. Kaufmax. Yes. 

General Short. I would like to state that I have no information 
as to whether General Miles followed up the December 5 message by 
any warning before December 7, even though he had all the magic 
intelligence. 

I do not know why Miles sent this message to the Panama [S07'8] 
Canal but not to Hawaii, but it shows that his interpretation of the 
alert messages was the same as mine, that relations were only strained 
with no threat of attack on Hawaii. 

My. IL^ufman. General, as I understand it, you have testified that 
after the message of November 27 that you did not invoke the joint 
defense plan. 

General Short. That is correct. I would like to add though, how- 
ever, that I considered that the naval message of October 16 and of 
November 27 did invoke part of it where they told him to take a 
defensive deployment preparatory to WPL-46. 

Mr. Kaufman. But so far as you are concerned j^ou do not want to 
be understood as having taken any action under that war plan ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufmax. Now, I direct your attention to the testimony that 
you gave at page 380 of the Pearl Harbor board hearings. You 
were asked by General Grunert 

General Short. May I see it? 

The Vice Chairman. You are referring to the witness' testimony 
before the Army Pearl Harbor board? 

Mr. Kaufman. That is correct, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. All richt. 

[S079] Mr. Kauf3Ian. Page 380. Have you got page 380? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. I direct your attention to this question by General 
Grunert : 

In your message of November 27tli you say "Liaison with the Navy." Just 
what did you mean by that? How did that cover anything required by that 
particular message? 

To which you are reported to have answered : 

To my mind it meant I was definitely keeping in touch with the Navy, what 
information they had and what they were doing. 

QuKSTiON. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to carry out 
its pat't of that agreement for long-distance reconnaissance? 

An8w?:b. Yes, without any question, whether I had sent that or not, it would 
have effected it because they signed a very definite agreement which was ap- 
proved by the Navy as well as by our Chief of Staff. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2993 

In the light of the testimony that you gave at page 380 do you want 
to change any of the testimony that you gave tnis morning? 

General Short. No, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. You do not. I asked you this morning whether 
the interceptor command had been activated at the [80801 time 
of the activation of the radar station on November 28 and you told 
us this morning that it had been. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. Will you please account, if you can, for the testi- 
mony given by General Davidson at pages 170, 178, 179, and 196 of 
the Roberts Commission and the testimony of Colonel Phillips at 
page 232 

General Short. May I see that testimony? 

Lieutenant Colonel Karr. We do not have copies of it. 

Mr. Kaufman. You do not have a copy of that ? 

Lieutenant Colonel Karr. Of the Roberts Commission? No. 

Senator Lucas. May I suggest to counsel that you take one of those 
pages at a time and shoTV them to General Short? He is asking about 
a number of pages there. It seems to me it may be a little more 
convenient. 

The Vice ChairmxVn. It might be in that same volume there. 

General Short. No, that volume is my testimony only. 

Mr. Kaufman. I can change my question with regard to that. 

General Davidson and General Phillips testified before the Roberts 
Commission that the interceptor command was not activated until 
the I7th of December, 10 days after the attack. Can you explain 
their testimony? 

General Short. Yes. General Davidson and Colonel Pow- 
ell [8081'] and Colonel Meehan had been sent to the mainland 
to learn what was the method of operation in this country. It was 
entirely new. We had just two officers in the Army and one naval 
officer who had any conception of what a communication center and 
an interceptor command consisted of. They were the only two, as 
far as I know, who had ever seen it. That was Major Bergquist 
and Major Tindall of the Army and Commander Taylor of the 
Navy, who had had considerable work with the British and had 
been loaned by the Navy to work with us. 

Wliat we were doing was operating under verbal orders and they 
had full authority to make changes, they were trying to work the 
thing out to what they thought was being done in the States because 
they had been back and seen it a little previously, the two of them, 
with full authority to change it from day to day and we had pur- 
posely waited the return of General Davidson and Colonel Powell 
before putting it in a written order as we did not want to issue 
a written order one day and have to modify it materially the next 
day. 

They came back I think on the 3d or 4th of December, got their 
reports in on — I know General Davidson got his report in on the 
afternoon of the 6th, so that there had been no time to have them 
go over the procedure and put it down in writing. They went ahead 
and operated for the next 10 days on the same verbal orders and 
at the end of that period they [808^] felt positive enough as 
to what they wanted to do that we put it in written form. It was 



2994 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

entirely experimental and we were trying to arrive at what we 
thought was the correct thing with the limited information we had. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, Mr. Chairman, for the sake of accuracy, as I 
understand it the question was directed to page 380 of the Army 
Pearl Harbor Board hearings. Is that right? 

Mr. Kaufman. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. What page? 

Mr. Kaufman. General Davidson's testimony at pages 170 and 178 
cf the Roberts record. 

The question, General, is as to whether or not the interceptor com- 
mand was in operation prior to the 17th of December? 

General Short. It was definitely in operation but it was operating 
on verbal orders in an informal way, but that Major Bergquist and 
Major Tindall had full authority to make changes because they wei-e 
the only two in the Army that really knew anything about it. 

[8083] Mr. Kaufman. Then how do you explain the testimony 
of Colonel Phillips that it was not activated and did not start operat- 
ing until the 17th day of December? 

General Short. I think he must have meant that the formal order 
had not been issued. 

Mr, Kaufman. And the same thing for General Davidson? 

General Short. The same thing. 

I know from talking with General Davidson, there was no doubt 
in his mind that it was operating just the same before as after. 

Mr. Murphy. I think, Mr. Chairman, you will find in the testimony 
of General Short it was being operated on a volunteer basis. 

General Short. I believe not. I would like, if Mr. Murphy has 
any such reference to my testimony, to have it quoted exactly, be- 
cause I do not believe I ever made such a statement. 

Mr. Murphy. When I come to the examination I will do it. 

Mr. Kaufman. Then your answer is now that it was being operated 
on an experimental basis ? 

General Short. Experimental, informal basis, under verbal orders 
to make changes from day to daj'' as it proved necessary. 

[8084] Mr. Kaufman. Can you explain the testimony that Ad- 
miral Kimmel gave here the other day to the effect that he nndei-stood 
the interceptor command was working fully and complete? 

General Short. I will say again, if he understood that, it must have 
been due to poor staff w^ork on the part of the staff of the Fourteenth 
Naval District, because their liaison officer. Lieutenant Burr, sitting in 
G-3, must have known exactly what we were doing. 

Mr. Kaufman. Between November 27, and December 7, did you 
activate your fighter planes ? 

General Short. The fighter planes were ahvaj^s activated. 

Mr. Kaufman. Under whose direction was that, General? 

General Short. The fighter planes were under the command of 
GeneTal Davidson when he was there. I am not sure who was the 
next senior to him, and Avas in command while he was away. It was 
possibly Colonel Flood, but I am not positive. 

Mr. Kaufman. General, were not the fighter planes bunched on 
the field for more easy protection against sabotage? 

General Short. They were grouped for protection against sabotage. 
They were not armed, and warmed up and immediately available to 
take the air. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2995 

[8085] Mr. Kaufman. They were not available at any time be- 
tween the 27th of November and December 7 ? 

General Short. All day long, they were functioning in training. 
Probably most of the time during the training hours some one squadron 
would have been able to take the air immediately, but not fully armed. 

Mr. Kaufman. General, will you explain this, that if your radar 
was alert, what good it would have done if your pursuit planes were 
not ready to take off during the time when the radar was in operation ? 

General Short. If the information had gone to them when it was 
first picked up, they would have had 35 minutes, which would have 
been plenty of time to disperse the planes. 

It would not have been time to get them in the air, but we would 
have had time to disperse the planes and the loss would have been 
much less. 

Mr. Kaufman. General, I am not now talking only about the 7th 
of December ; I am talking about the period between November 27 and 
December 7. 

General Short. I am saying at any time that the radar picked it up, 
and I would have been notified, I would have had 30 minutes and the 
same would have been true. "VVe could have dispersed the planes. 

\8086] Mr. Kaufman. Only 30 minutes? 

General Short. 80 or 35 minutes. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now, j-ou know that the radar equipment is not com- 
plete without the pursuit planes having the ability to take off. 

General Short. That has nothing to do with radar equipment. 

The interceptor command would not be functioning completely 
without that, that is true. 

[8087] Mr. Kaufman. So your interceptor command was not 
working between K'ovember 27 and the 7tli of December ? 

General Short. It was working, but not prepared to take the 
air immediately. 

Mr. Kaufman. Did you do anything between November 27 and 
December 7 to inform yourself precisely as to what Admiral Kimmel 
was doing? 

General Short. I talked with Admiral Kimmel on 3 days when 
we were talking about a more dangerous part of the Pacific, as we 
regarded it, than Honolulu, and I knew where his task forces were 
going out; I knew certain reconnaissances he was making on the 
perimeter, and as I said, he had made the statement to me that he 
had tightened up all along the line. 

Mr. Kaufman. You knew he had to rely on you for long-range 
planes ? 

General Short. No ; I did not. 

Mr. IL4UFMAN. You did not? 

General Short. I had 6 planes and he had approximately 50. I 
knew if he wanted my planes for long-range reconnaissance that he 
would have asked for them, and I would give them to him, but I did 
not know that he relied on that 6 rather than his 50. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now, did anything happen between the 27th 
[8088] of November and the 7tli of December to require you to 
change your estimate? 

General Short. Nothing. In fact, the things thai; happened tended 
to confirm my estimate. 



2996 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Kauf]man. Now, on the 27th of November, after the receipt of 
this message from the chief of staff, you got a message from General 
Miles, did you not ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. Page 10 of Exhibit 32. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. That was a definite statement, was it not, that 
negotiations had come to a practical stalemate? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And it was a definite statement to you that hos- 
tilities may ensue? 

General Short. May ensue ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. After giving vou the information, then, he talks 
about "subversive activities may be expected." 

General Short. Yes, sir. I might add that that apparently was 
the form of hostilities that he expected me to be interested in there. 
That would be the inference. 

Mr. Kaufman. Your inference was that the hostilities that he said 
might ensue pointed onl}' to subversive activities ? 

General Short. Pointed to subversive activities. If [8089] 
he wanted to point out anything else that would have taken place I 
would expect him to say so. 

Mr. Kaufman. Did not he say two things : ''Hostilities may ensue," 
and "Subversive activities may be expected"? 

General Short. Subversive activities are a form of hostilities. It 
is the form of hostilities apparently that he was worried about there. 

Mr. Kaufman. That was your interpretation? 

General Sn ut. That was my interpretation. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now, did you have in mind, on November 27 and 
following that date, the Navy reply that all shipping was to be routed 
through the Torres Straits? 

General Short. I think that ships were turned to the south. I do 
not think that I knew exactly Torres Strait, but I knew they were 
going to the south from Honolulu. 

Mr. Kaufman. And did you have in mind the fact that those ships 
were being escorted by naval ships of Admiral KimmePs fleet? 

General Short. I think I knew that there were some escorts; yes. 

Mr. Kaufman. Did you have in mind that on November 26 you were 
ordered to equip two 13-24 bombers for photographic reconnaissance 
through Truk and the Jaluit Islands ? 

General Short. Yes, sir ; and I remember very definitely [8090] 
that they sent them unarmed to Honolulu and directed me to arm 
them after they got there. 

Mr. Kafman. That was an unusual mission for you ? 

General Short. It was. 

Mr. Kaufman. Although you had that in mind, you did not connect 
it with any of the telegrams you received ? 

General Short. I figured if they would send them to Honolulu 
unarmed and they directed them to be armed from there on, that they 
would not consider that Honolulu was in the same dangerous area as 
the Pacific to the west. 

Mr. Kaufman. When were jou first advised, General, that the 
Japanese consuls in Hawaii were burning their papers? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2997 

General Short. I did not remember the incident until the day after 
the attack, but in view of the testimony of two members of my staff 
I probably did hear that they were burning papers on Saturday morn- 
ing. It seems that at the staff meeting an assistant G-2 did report 
that they had been burning papers. However, my G-2, in his testi- 
mony before the Roberts Commission, stated that he thought nothing 
of it, because we habitually burned papers every day to keep anything 
from being left around about our codes, and he said he reported it 
to me. It probably made the same impression on me that it had made 
on him. There was no question of codes in connection with it — 
simply papers. 

[8091] Mr. Kautman. Did you receive any information from 
the Navy that they had been advised that the Japanese consular posts 
at Hong Kong and Singapore, and other places, were ordered to 
destroy their codes? 

General Short. I did not. 

^Ir. Kaufman. You received no such information from the Navv 
at all? 

(general Short. Xo, sir. 

Mr. KAUTiiAX. Do you recall a telegram directing you on your 
G-2 to communicate with Commander Rochefort respecting the so- 
called winds code? 

General Short. I never saw such a radiogram and never heard 
anything about it until 2 or 3 j'ears afterward. 

Mr. Kaufman*. And your G-2 did not rep(jrt that incident to you? 

General Short. He did not. 

Mr. K.\uF>rAx. Do vou remember on the evening of December 5 
Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell called on you and Colonel Fielder and 
gave you a report on the tapping of the so-called Mori message? 

General Short. It was not on the 5th, it was on the evening of 
December 6, sometime along 6 : 30 or .7 o'clock in the evening. 

Mr. Kattmax. And what did he report to you at that time? 

[800.2] General Short. He brought a message, or, rather, a 
translation of a telephone conversation that had been picked up by 
the FBI. I read the message carefully, and Colonel Fielder read the 
message carefully. I asked Bicknell if he had any idea as to the in- 
terpretation of it, the meaning of it, and he said he had not, but that 
he knew Mori, that he suspected Mori and for that reason he was 
rather positive that it meant something. 

But no one of us could figure out what it possibly meant, and I do 
not believe anybody up to this day has been able to draw any definite 
conclusion. 

^Ir. Kaufman. Did not Colonel Bicknell tell you that he regarded 
that as being very significant ? 

General Short. But he could not tell me what the significance was. 
He thought it was significant only because he did not have any con- 
fidence in this Dr. Mori. 

Mr. Kaufman. Did you tell Colonel Bicknell a few days after the 
attack that he was right about the message and voti were wrong about 
it f 

( ieneral Short. I have seen that statement of his, but I do not re- 
member it. If I said it I would have had only one point, that it had 
to be significant, btit he was never, as far as" I know — and I talked 



2998 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to him about it several times — able to indicate to me, or to anybody 
else, what the significance [8093] of the message was. 

Mr. Kaufman. General, on the morning of December 7, who first 
reported the attack to you ? 

General Short. I heard the first bomb and thought it was perhaps a 
naval exercise that I had forgotten about. Then when the second one 
dropped I ran out on an upstairs porch of my quarters where I could 
see Pearl Harbor and I could see some smoke. About that time my 
chief of staff, who lived next door, ran in to my quarters and called to 
me that it was the real thing, that he just had a phone message from 
Hickam and Weaver Field. That was anywhere from 1 minute to 3 
minutes after 8 o'clock. 

The Chairman. After what? 

General Short. After 8 o'clock. 

Mr. Kaufman. On that morning you had 32 antiaircraft batteries 
stationed around Pearl Harbor? 

General Short. I have forgotten the exact number. 

Mr. Kaufman. Is it a fact that only 4 of the 32 antiaircraft batter- 
ies got into action prior to the time of the third attack? 

General Short. That is not true. 

Mr. Murphy. Section VIII, page 11. 

Mr. Kaufman. General, have you seen Section VII of exhibit 5 of 
this proceeding, being reports made from your [8094-] head- 
quarters, showing that 4 of the 32 anti-aircraft batteries fired at any 
time during the three attacks ? 

General Short. That is not signed. I do not know who made it. 
But I have here an exhibit, exhibit No. 7 signed by C. K. Wing, Colonel, 
Fifty-third Coast Artillery Brigade, who commanded all of the anti- 
aircraft batteries. He gives in detail when the battery was alerted, 
when it was ready to fire, when it opened fire, and when it brought down 
any enemy planes. 

Mr. Kaufman. Have ^^^ou a copy of that? 

General Short. It is in exibit 133. I believe it is 1-s or 1-t, if you 
look into the table of contents. It is in the Wing report. 

Mr. Kaufman. In the record submitted to you in the Roberts com- 
mission ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. It has been marked in evidence here this morning ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. It was made out December 20, and gives 
great detail, and I think Colonel Wing is in a better position to give 
that information than anybody else, because it was his immediate 
command. 

Mr. Kaufman. And you say that the paper that I have just referred 
you to, being section VII of exhibit 5 of this [8095] hearing, is 
not true ? 

General Short. I have not looked it over in detail, but if it states 
that only four batteries fired is not correct. This, I am sure, is the 
most accurate statement that is to be found of what took place, the 
one I have in my hand. It is annex S. 

Mr. Kaufman. General, does that set out your staff as it existed 
between November 27 and December 7 ? 

Senator Lucas. Counsel, before you leave that last point, I wonder 
if we are going to put that into the record and make it a part of the 
transcript ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2999 

Mr. Kaufman. It is in the record as an exhibit, sir. 

General Short. I have a signed copy here, if you wish to put it in 
the transcript, sir. 

Senator Lucas. I would like to have it. 

General, just give me briefly, without reading it, what the document 
says, in view of the question asked by counsel. 

General Short. I will just take up a few batteries. Here is the way 
it gives it : At Fort Weaver, headquarters. Second Battalion, Ninety- 
seventh Coast Artillery, Antiaircraft, alerted 8 : 10, ready to Are 8 : 13, 
engaged enem^'' at 8 : 14. Ammunition fired : .30 caliber ball 407 
rounds; .30 caliber armor piercing, 117; .30 caliber tracer, 53; 
pistol, 12. 

Now it goes through every battery. 

[8096] Senator Lucas. How many batteries were there fired? 

General Short. I am not sure. The 32 is probabh'- correct. I can 
count them here. I am not sure without counting them up. 

Senator Lucas. I think it is important, in view of the previous 
statement that only four were in operation. It seems to me the com- 
mittee at this time ought to know how many actually were fired at 
that time. 

Mr. Kaufman. Well, now, let us take the statement. General, that 
you give us here. 

General Short. All right, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. The Second Battalion, according to your report, was 
alerted at 8 : 10, was ready to fire at 8 : 15. 

General Short. 8 : 13, 1 think it is. 

Mr. Kaufman. That is one battery ? 

General Short. That is four batteries. 

Mr. Kaufman. Four batteries. Battery G of the Ninety-seventh 
was alerted at 8 : 10 ? 

General Short. Keady to fire at 8 : 30, and engaged the enemy at 
8:30. 

Mr. Kaufman. That was one battery? 

General Short. That was one battery. 

Mr. Kaufman. Battery F of the Ninety-seventh was alerted at 7 : 55 
and was ready to fire at 8 : 55, an hour later, is that correct ? 

[8097] General Short. Apparently that is right. 

Mr. Kaufman. And that is one battery. Battery G of the Sixty- 
fourth was alerted at 8 : 15 and was ready to fire at 10 : 30. 

General Short. They had to move, apparently, to some distance. 

Mr. Kaufman. They were ready to fire at 10 : 30, according to this 
report. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And Battery H of the Sixty-fourth was alerted at 
8 : 30 and was ready to fire at 11 : 45. That was after the third attack, 
was it ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. Well, the preceding one was after the third attack? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. The marine detachment 

General Short. You say the marine detachment? 

Mr. Kaufman. Yes. The marine detachment was alerted at 8 
o'clock and ready to fire at 8 : 10. 



3000 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, was that an Ami}' responsibility, the 
marines ? 

General Short. They worked under the Army. 

Mr. Kaufmax. The general says they worked under the Army. 

Mr. Murphy. They are not on this exhibit, then, are they, [8098] 
the Army exhibit? *We have only the Sixty-fourth, the Ninety-sev- 
enth, Ninety-eighth, and Two Hundred and Fifty-first and the AA 
batteries. 

]Mr. Kaufman. That is right. 

Mr. ]Murphy. The marines are under the Navy ordinarily. 

Mr. Kaufman. Probably, according to the general, they were under 
his jurisdiction at that time. 

General Short. The antiaircraft fire was coordinated so that the 
Marine Corps guns on shore operated under our conmiand. 

Mr. Kaufman. Then we have the Ninety-eighth Coast Artillery at 
Schofield that was alerted at 8 o'clock and was ready to fire at 8 : 55. 

Mr. Murphy. What battery would that be ? 

Mr. Kaufman. They were alerted at 8 o'clock and ready to fire with 
their automobile rifles — I assume that means automatic rifles, does it 
not? 

General Short. I haven't got just where you mean. It probably 
does. Where do you mean ? 

]Mr, Kaufman.' The Ninety-eighth Coast Artillery, Schofield Bar- 
racks. 

General Short. Yes. Certain of them were equipped with auto- 
matic rifles. 

Mr. Kaufman. Then the First Battalion of the Ninety-eighth Coast 
Artillery, Battery B, was ready to fire at 9:55. That [8099] 
was after the second attack? 

General Short. Yes. sir. " 

Mr. Kauf:man. And Battery D of the First Battalion, Ninety- 
eighth Coast Artiller}' , was ready to fire at 10 o'clock. 

General Short, That is correct. 

Mr. KLvuF^iAN. And Battery C was not ready to fire until 10 : 30. 

On the next page, Battery M of the Sixty-fourth was alerted at 
8 : 15 and was ready to fire at 11 : 55. That was after the third attack? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And the Second Battalion of the Ninety-eighth 
Coast Artillery, Battery F, was not alerted at all but was in position 
and ready for action at 1315, That is 1 : 15? 

General Short. That is 1 : 15. 

Mr. Kaufman. And Battery G at 1 : 15, and Battery H at 1 : 30. 

And the First Battalion of the Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast 
Artillery, Battery B 

General Short. You are overlooking the fact that from their camp 
there they did open fire at 8 : 04 and brought down a plane. They 
were not at their assigned positions, but they entered into the combat. 
All the units were alerted and they all fired and brought down planes. 

[8100] Mr. Kaufman. That fire was with small arms, rifles? 

General Short. It was with machine guns undoubtedly. 

Mr. Kaufman. We are talking about anti-aircraft batteries. 

General Short. Those are batteries of anti-aircraft guns. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3001 

Mr. Kaufman. That would mean that the First Battalion of the 
Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast Artillery was not ready to fire 
until 11:45? 

General Short. It had fired its guns and then moved on to assigned 
positions. 

Mr. Kaufman. It does not say that here, does it? 

General Short. It says in the first paragraph that all units opened 
fire at 8 : 05 and brought down planes. They were apparently all in 
their positions. 

Mr. Kaufman. All it says is that the units were alerted at 8 : 05 
when fired upon by single enemy planes. 

General Short. Better read the next sentence. 

Mr. KxVUFMAN (reading). 

AH units returned the fire with small arms and the plane was shot down. 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. That makes no reference to the anti-aircraft bat- 
teries. 

General Short. 1 am sure it means with the automatic rifles and 
machine guns. 

Mr. Kauf^ian. With respect, however, to the batteries [SlOl] 
of the First Battalion of the Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast 
Artillery, none of those batteries were ready for firing until 11:45? 

General Short. That is right, after they moved. 

Mr. Kaufman. After the attack was over. What time was the third 
attack over. General ? 

General Short. Oh, there is a variation in estimates. Sometime 
around 11 o'clock. 

Mr. Murfhy. May I suggest that the tank farm was ready at 11 
o'clock ? 

Mr. Kaufman. What is that, sir? 

Mr. JNIurpht. The tank farm at Schofield Barracks. The tank farm 
is the only one before 11 : 45. That is at 11. You notice it is the 
second to the last one. That would be Battery G of the Two Hun- 
dred and Fifty-first. 

Mr. Kaufman. Battery G ? 

Mr. Murphy. It is Battery G of the Two Hundred and Fifty-first 
Coast Artillery on this exhibit. 

Mr. Kaufman. The tank farm ? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes, tank farm, Schofield Barracks, 11a. m. That is 
the only one before 11 : 45. I just wanted that corrected. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now Battery A of the Ninety-seventh Coast Artil- 
lery fired 130 rounds of .30 caliber at one enemy plane at 8 : 35. Was 
that by machine gun or rifle or what ? 

[8102] General Short, What is this you are reading from now? 

Mr. Kaufman. The next paragraph after the second battery of the 
Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast Artillery. 

General Short. 1,500 rounds. 

Mr, Kaufman. 1,500 rounds of ,30 caliber ? 

General Short. Yes. 

Mr, Kaufman. At one enemy plane off-shore at 8 : 35 ? 

General Short. Yes. 

Mr, Kaufman. Was that rifle or machine guns ? 

79716 — 46— pt. 7 7 



3002 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. That was undoubtedly machine guns. They would 
not fire rifles at that distance. 

Mr. Kaufman. Sand Island. The anti-aircraft detachment of Bat- 
tery F, Fifty-fifth Coast Artillery, present at Sand Island when the 
attack started, was ready for action at 8:15. The batterj- fired 89 
rounds of 3-inch antiaircraft and shot down two enemy planes at 8 : 15. 

Let us go back to the first item on this memorandum. Fort Weaver, 
Headquarters Second Battalion, was that one battery or four batteries, 
as you indicated ? Was it not only one ? 

General Short. It may possibly have been only one. I read it the 
Second Battalion, and it apparently was the headquarters of the Second 
Battalion. 

Mr. Kaufman. So that going through this list, as we have just gone 
through the list, would j^ou state that it is [8103] accurate? 

General Short. This, I think, is absolutely accurate. 

Mr. Kaufman. Is it not accurate as stated in section VII of ex- 
hibit 5? 

General Short. I do not believe that it is. 

Mr. Kaufman. That only four of the batteries were ready to fire 
prior to the end of the attack ? 

General Short. I am sure that that is not an accurate statement. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now I counted them through here and I do not find 
any morf; than four or five prior to the time of the completion of the 
attack. General, I will try to check that after the hearing. 

General Short. I think if you will check it carefully you will find 
that there were more than that. More planes were brought down by 
those outfits. 

IMr. Kaufman. More than four out of the 32 batteries ? 

General Short. I think so ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. How manj^ more would you say ? 

General Short. I have not checked it carefully enough to be able 
to tell. 

Mr. INIuRPHY. IMr. Chairman, I request that the exhibit of the Gen- 
eral be spread on the record at this point, and that immediately after- 
ward we have spread section VII of exhibit [8104] 5 on the 
record, that was prepared by the Army as the Army exhibit. 

Mr. Kaufman. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. AVithout objection that will be done. 

(The matter referred to follows:) 

EIeadqxtabtebs 53bd Coast Artillery Bbigade (AA), 

Office of the Brigade Commander, 
Fort Shatter, T. H., 20 December 19^1. 
Subject: Report on action by 53d C. A. Brigade (AA) from 0755 to 2400, 7 

December 1941. 
To : General Short. 

1. At the beginning of the attack on Oahu 7 December 1941, the 53d Coast 
ArtiUery Brigade ( AA) was operating under the conditions of Alert No. 1 S. O. P., 
H. C. A. C, 26 November 1941. The 97th C. A. and the AA Detachments of the 
East Group had anti-sabotage guards at their fixed 3-inch gun batteries. All 
anti-aircraft equipment was being guarded. 

2. a. FORT WEAYER. Headquarters 2nd Battalion 97th C. A. (AA). 
Alerted OSIO 

Ready to tire 0813 
Engaged enemy at 0814 
Amm. fired 

407— .30 Cal. ball. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3003 



[8105] 



117— .30 Cal. A. P. 
58— .30 Cal. Tracer. 
12— Pistol. 
South Group Command Post detail at stations at 0810. NO repeat NO interrup- 
tion in communications in South Group during this period. There was rifle and 
automatic rifle fire on low flying enemy planes by ofii^ers and men. 

BATTERY G 91th, were in camp at Fort Weaver. Its battle position is at 
fixed battery at Fort Weaver. 

Alerted at 0810 

Ready to fire 0830 

Engaged enemy 0S80 

Fired 30 rds— 3" A. A. Shrapnel. Approximately 200 rds of .30 Cal. ball Amm. 
One .50 Cal. Machine Gun was in action at approximately 8:50 A. M. During 
this firing Private YORK gunner was wounded while engaging the enemy, he 
stayed at his post although ordered to take cover. Lieutenant KING states that 
the battery fire broke up and definitely turned back one formation of 15 enemy 
planes. Casualties — One (1) Officer dead — Killed while proceeding through 
Hickam Field to his battle position. Four (4) enlisted men wounded. 

BATTERY F 97th, was camped at Fort Weaver. Its battle position at Fixed 
Battery Closson, Fort Hamehameha, T. H. 

Alerted 0755, and moved to Battery position across [810G] Pearl Harbor 
Entrance. 

Ready to fire 0855 

Engaged Enemy 0900 to 0920 

Amm. fired 

27—3" A. A., H. E., M. K. fuse M3. 
Approximately 400 rds. .30 Cal. ball. 
Approximately 130 rds .30 Cal. A. P. 

BATTERY G 64th, was in barracks at Fort Shaffer, battle position at Ahua 
Point. 

Alerted approximately 0815, and moved to battery position at Fort Kameha- 
meha. 

Ready to fire 1030 

Engaged Enemy with .30 Cal. M. G. at 1030 

Amm. Fired 

Approximately 50 rds. of .30 Cal. ball. 

BATTERY H 6.',th, was in barracks at Fort Shaffer. Its battle position is at 
Fort Weaver. 

Alerted 0830 

Ready to fire 1145 

Engaged Enemy 2100 

Amm. fired 

40 rds .50 Cal. ball. 
40 rds .50 Cal. A. P. 
30 rds .50 Cal. Tracer. 

MARINE DETACHMENT: The Fleet Machine Gun School at Fort Weaver. 
Operations were in cooperation with South [8107] Group although not 
tacticallv assigned. 

Alerted 0800 

Ready to fire 0810 

Engaged Enemy 0810 

Amm. fired 

Approximately 5000 rds. of .50 Cal. A. P. ball and tracer. 
Approximately 450 rds. of 20 mm A. A. 
This Detachment shot down 4 enemy planes and saved a 4-engined bomber by 
causing enemy plane firing on its tail to pull out and cease its attack. Much 
shrapnel and some small arms bullets fell about Fleet M. G. School. There was 
excellent cooperation from Fort Weaver personnel in the liaison, phone, etc. 

&. 9Sth COAST ARTILLERY, SC EOF I ELD BARRACKS. 

Alerted at 0800 

The communications section at the Command Post, Wahiawa, shot down one 
enemy plane flying at less than 100 feet, with their automatic rifles at 0855. 



3004 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

1st Battalion 98th C. A. (AA), was in position and ready for action at the 
fiollowing time : 
B-CS 0955 
D-9S 10(^0 
C-98 1080 
[8108] BATTERY M 6-'fth, stationed at Fort Shafter, was alerted at 0815, 
moved to Wlieelir Field, and was ready for action at 1155. 

2nd Battalion 98th C. A. (AA). — This Battalion has two batteries at Kaneohe 
and one at Waipahu School. They were in position and ready for action at the 
following times: 
F-98 1315 
G-98 1315 
H-9S 1330 

c. CAMP MALAKOLE 251st C. A. (AA).— All units were alerted at 0805 when 
fired upon by a single enemy plane. All units returned the fire with small arms 
and the plane was shot down. 

1st BATTALION 251st C. A. (AA) , was in position and ready for action as 
follows : 

B-251 at West Loch 1145 

C-251 Ewa Beach 1145 

D-251 South of Ewa 1145 
2nd BATTALION 251st C. A. (AA), was in position as follows : 

E-251 Navy Yard 

F-251 Navy Recreation Area 

G-251 Tank Farm 

H-251 Navy Yard 
[8109] At 1120 and again at 1122, E, 251st fired on enemy planes, shooting 
down one plane. 100 rds. of .50 Cal. were fired on the first plane and 200 rds. of 
.50 Cal. were fired on the second plane. 

d. FORT KANEHAMEHA.— Buttery A, 97th C. A. (AA) fired 1500 rds. of .30 
Cal. at one enemv plane offshore at 0835. 

e. SAND ISLAND.— The AA Detachment of Battery F, 55th C. A., present at 
Sand Island when the attack started was ready for action at 0815. This battery 
fired 89 rds of 3" AA and shot down two (2) enemy planes at 0815. 

f. FORT SHAFTER. 

(1) Three (3) enemy dive bombers were fired on by the Headquarters Battery 
and the Intelligence Battery of this Brigade and by Battery E, 64th C. A. (AA). 
Ammunition Expended— 3000— .30 Cal. 

(2) Enemy planes were fired on at 0700 and 1000 by Battery A, 64th C. A. 
(AA). Ammunition Expended lOoO — .30 Cal. 

(3) All 3" gun batteries and Automatic Weapons Batteries of the 64th C. A. 
(AA) were alerted at 0815 and were in position as follows : 

B-64 at Aiea 1000 
C-64 at Aliamanu 1030 
D-64 south of Aliamanu 1100 
[8110] F-64 at Pearl City 1105 
G-64 See Par. 2 a. above 
H-64 See Par. 2 «. above. 
1-64 at Aliamanu 
K-64 at Hickam Field. 
L-64 at Hickam Field 
M-64 See Par. 2 b. above. 
All of these units except M, 64th fired during the second attack from 1000 to 
1145. Ammunition expended as follows : 

3", 23 rds. 

.50 Cal., 2361 rds. 

.30 Cal., 2821 rds. 

g. FORT BARRETTE.— Battery H, 97th C. A. (AA), was stationed at P'ort 
Weaver. The battery was alerted at 0755, moved out of Fort Weaver at 0830, 
and arrived at Fort Barrette at 0910. Enemy planes were engaged by small 
arms fire at Fort Weaver, while enroute, and at Fort Barrette. The detachment 
on guard at Fort Barrette shot down one enemy plane at 0910 by small arms fire. 

3. Three (3) Marine AA Batteries were attached to the Brigade at 2245. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3005 

4. AMMUNITION. 

Status at 0730, 7 December 1941. All units of the [8111] Brigade had 
in their possession, the initial issue of small arms ammunition. This included 
ammunition for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles and machine guns. In addition, 
the 3-inch ammunition was so positioned that it was readily accessible to all 
units of the Brigade except four (4) batteries for which ammunition was at 
Aliamanu Crater. These batteries completed drawing their initial allowance, 
1200 rounds per battery, by 1015. 

(Sgd) C. E. Wing 
C. E. Wing, 
Colonel, 53d C. A. Brigade (AA), 

Commanding. 

18112] AonoN AND DisposmoN of 53bd CA Brigade (Anttaircraft) 

ON 7 Decembeb 1941 
64th CA (AA) Regiment 

All 3-inch gun batteries and automatic weapons batteries of the 64th CA (AA) 
were alerted at Fort Shaf ter at 8 : 15 a. m. and were in position as follows : 

Battery 

"A" (Searchlight) at Honolulu 10:00 a.m. 

"B" (3-inch) at Aiea 10:00 a.m. 

"C" (3-inch) at Aliamanu 10:30 a.m. 

"D" (3-inch) south of Aliamanu 11 : CO a. m. 

"E" (Searchlight) at Ewa-Pearl Harbor Time not known 

"F" (3-inch) at Pearl City 11 : 05 a. m. 

"G" (3-inch) at Ahua Point 10:30 a.m. 

"H" (3-inch) at Ft. Weaver 11 : 45 a. m. 

"I" (37 mm.) at Aliamanu 1 Known only that bat- 

"K" (37 mm.) at Hickam Field --« bX^'lHs 

"L" (37 mm.) at Hickam Field J ^^^^ '^"^^® ^^ • *^ 

"M" (37 mm.) at Wheeler Field 11 : 55 a. m. 

97th CA (AA) Regiment 

Batteries of the 97th CA ( AA) , except Battery "A" at Fort Kamehameha, were 
stationed at Ft. Weaver. They were alerted between 7 : 55 and 8 : 10 a. m. and 
were in position ready to fire as follows : 

[8113] Battery 

"A" (Searchlight) at Ft. Kamehameha 8:34 a. m. (Engaged 

enemy with small 

arms at 8:34 a. m.) 
"F" (3-inch) at Ft. Kamehameha 8:55 a. m. (Engaged 

enemy at 9 : 00 a. m.) 
"G" (3-inch) at Ft. Weaver 8:30 a. m. (Engaged 

enemy at 8: 30 a. m.) 

"H" (3-inch) at Ft. Barrett 10:20 a.m. 

"B", "C", "D", "E" and 3rd Bn not yet organized. 

98th CA (A A) Regiment 

Batteries of the 9Sth CA (AA) Regiment were stationed at Schofield Barracks 
with the exception of Battery "D" which was stationed at Camp Malakole. They 
were in position ready to fire as follows : 

Battery 

"A" (Searchlight) at Schofield Barracks Time not known 

"B" (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks 9: 55 a. m. 

"C" (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks 10:30 a. m. 

"D" (3-inch) at Puuloa Dump, South of Ewa 11 : 45 a. m. 

"E" not yet organized. 

"F" and "G" (3-inch) at Kaneohe Naval Air 

Station 1 : 15 p. m. 

"H" (3-inch) at Waiphu High School 1 : 30 p. m. 

3rd Bq 98th CA (AA) not yet organized. 



3006 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

181141 251 CA (AA) Regiment (less 3rd Bn) 

All units of tlie 251st at Camp Malakole were alerted at 8: 05 a. m. Batteries 
of the 1st Battalion were in position and ready for action as follows : 

Battery 

"A" (Searchlight) at Ewa Time not known 

"B" (3-inch) at West Loch 11 : 45 a. m. 

"C" (3-inch) at Ewa Beach 11:45 a.m. 

"D" (3-inch) at South of Ewa 11:45 a.m. 

"E" (50 cal.) at Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor 12 : 41 p. m. 

"F" (37 mm.) at Navy Recreation Area 12: SO p. m. 

"G" (37 mm.) at Tank Farm, Schofield Barracks 11 : 05 a. m. 

"H" (37 mm.) at Navy Yard 12: 05 p. m. 

AA Bet Battery "F" 55th CA 

This detachment was at Sand Island when the attack started and engaged 
the enemy with 3-inch guns at 8 : 15 a. m., shooting down two enemy planes at 
that time. 

{8115~\ Mr. Kaufman. I have no further questions, Mr. Chair- 
man. 

General Short. You asked a question about this [indicating]. 

Mr. Kaufman. Yes ; I want to finish that. 

With the permission of the chairman, may I suggest that this be 
made an exhibit? I would like to ascertain something about that 
chart. Does that state your staff of officers and is it correct ? 

General Short. I think that chart is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. May we have that marked as an exhibit? 

The Chairman. You want that made an exhibit? 

Mr. Kaufman. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. What number will it be ? 

Mr. Kaufman. IMay we have it spread in the record at this point 
instead of having it marked as an exhibit? 

Tlie Chairman. That will be done. 

(The chart referred to faces this page.) 

[8117'\ Mr. Kaufman. I also offer in evidence at this time two 
reports made to General Short. It has been distributed to the members 
of the committee today. 

The Chairman. Do you want that made a part of the testimony? 

Mr. Kaufman. No, sir. Just as an exhibit. That will be exhibit 
139. 

The Chairiman. That will be done. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 139.") 

The Chairman. Are you through ? 

Mr, Kaufman. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. General Short, I wish to ask you a few questions. 
You were commander of the Army in Hawaii prior to the arrival of 
Admiral Kimmel to take charge of the fleet? 

General Short. No, sir; he took charge of the fleet, I think, a week 
before I arrived. 

The Chairman. You followed him ? 

General Short. By about a week. 

The Chairman. In command of the Army forces? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And you were assigTied there during the whole time 
up to the attack? 

\8118'] General Short. That is correct. 



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79716 O — 46 — pt. 7 (Face p. 3006 1 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3007 

The Chairman. Did your duties require you to remain on the island 
constantly ? 

General Short. I was never out of the Hawaiian group. I made 
visits of inspection on the outlying islands. 

The Chairman. You were going from place to place within the 
territory under your jurisdiction ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

The Chairman. During the entire time ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

The Chairman. What proportion — I am asking you this question 
because I was unavoidably absent when Admiral Kimmel's testimony 
was concluded, and did not get an opportunity to ask him any ques- 
tions at all — what proportion of the time you were at Pearl Harbor — 
Pearl Harbor was your headquarters ? 

General Short. Fort Shafter. 

The Chairman. Fort Shafter ; on the island of Oahu ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. How much of the time during your presence at 
Fort Shafter, or on the island of Oahu, was Admiral Kimmel in the 
harbor at his headquarters? 

General Short. I think he was in almost constantly. He was un- 
doubtedly out at sea for a few days at a time, [81191 but I do 
not remember specifically. I think the greater part of his time he 
was in his headquarters. 

The Chairman. He spent most of his time there on the island, at 
Pearl Harbor? 

General Short. I think so. 

The Chairman. And was only out at sea when his flagship went 
out? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Was there any time during that nearly a year from 
the time you took over in the Army and Admiral Kimmel took over 
in the Navy, when Pearl Harbor was completely empty of naval 
vessels ? 

General Short. I do not know, sir. Naturally you could see the 
vessels in Pearl Harbor every time you drove along the road, but I 
could not say definitely. 

The Chairman. During this year, from February on up until the 
7th of December, you and Admiral Kimmel conversed in a general way 
about the situation ? 

General Short. We talked about the situation, I think from every 
angle, more or less. We talked many, many times about it. 

The Chairman. How many times w^ould you say a week during 
that year ? 

General Short. I probably saw him officially at least [81201 
once a week, and I usually played golf with him every other Sunday, 
and we talked of all kinds of things around the course at that time. 

[81211 The Chairman. You talked over the international situa- 
tion on the fairway ? 

General Spiort. Over everything, in effect ; yes, sir. 

The CiiAiRjNiAN. - Now, as time went on toward the 7th of December, 
did he and yo'u both recognize that the situation was becoming more 
tense ? 



300S CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. I think fiom July 25 on, when the sanctions were 
put into effect, that we both felt it was tense, from then on. 

The Chairman. You didn't have to have any message from Wash- 
ington in order to know that ? 

General Short. No. We read the papers. 

The Chairman. Yes. And you got general information from Wash- 
ington, sizing up the situation as did the admiral? 

General Short. Not very often. The number of messages were very 
limited, but we did get them. 

The Chairman. Did you get letters as well as cablegrams? 

General Short. I didn't get letters on the international situation. I 
got letters from General Marshall, but usually pertaining to measures 
that were being taken to strengthen our defenses. 

The Chairman. There is voluminous correspondence between Ad- 
miral Stark and Admiral Kimmel. It fills a [8122] volume as 
thick as Blackstone's Commentary. Did you have any such corre- 
spondence as that ? 

General Short. The correspondence between General Marshall and 
me, I think, is all in this exliibit here, exhibit No. 53. 

The Chairman. When does that start ? 

General Short. That correspondence started on, the first letter was 
written by General Marshall on the Tth of February, and the last letter 
written by him was on October 28. 

The Chairman. Now, was there any touchiness between Admiral 
Kimmel and you 

General Short. We were extremely friendly. 

The Chairman. Let me finish the question before you answer, please. 

General Short. I am sorry. 

The Chairman. Was there any feeling of touchiness between Ad- 
miral Kimmel and you that might have ])revented either of you from 
making a too detailed inquirj^ into what the other was doing, lest he 
be offended ? 

General Short. I don't think there Avas at all. I think that maybe 
either one of us wouldn't have wanted the other prying into business 
he thought didn't concern him in any way, but our relations were ex- 
tremely friendly. [S12-3] I think I could have asked Admiral 
Kimmel anything that really concerned me and 

The Chairman. Well, of course, the national defense concerned 
both of you, did it not ? 

General Short. Oh, yes; no question about it. 

The Chairman. Concerned you both. 

General Short. Yes. 

The Chairman. And as the situation grew worse, presumably would 
concern both of you more and therefore any inquiry from either as to 
what the other was doing would not necessarily be prpng into his busi- 
ness, would it ? 

General Short. I was thinking, Senator, more in the way of asking 
him as to details, how they performed certain things, that he might 
possibly have figured wasn't my business. 

The Chairman. In his testimony before the Grunert committee, I 
believe it was. Admiral Kimmel made the statement, or testified in 
effect that he hesitated sometimes to ask you in too much, detail for 
fear he might be regarded as trying to pry, although I don't think he 
used that lansruase. 



PEOCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3009 

General Short. I think he probably meant the same thing that I am 
trying to say, that if I would have asked him how often he opened the 
hatches, for instance, of [81£4] his ships and made an inspec- 
tion, he would have thought that it was not any business of mine. 

The Chairman. But as to how many ships he might have in the 
harbor 

General Short. Yes ; I think anything of that kind there would be 
no question about it. 

The Chairman. Why was it necessary to allude to that subject in 
the former investigation ? 

General Short. Well, I don't know. If you will remember, in Gen- 
eral Marshall's first letter to me, he talked considerably about Ad- 
miral Kimmel, the type of man he was. He wanted to be sure, appar- 
ently, that I did get an understanding to begin with, and get off, so to 
speak, on the right foot. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General Short. And I think I took that into consideration. 

The Chairman. He sort of warned you against the Admiral's blunt- 
ness? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And he wanted you to take note of that in making 
the proper approach? 

General Short. Yes, sir ; and I think I tried to carry that out ; and 
I think our terms were excellent. 

[81£o] The Chairman. Did you have any such characteristics as 
might have embarrassed the admiral in approaching you ? 

General Short. Well, I might have, but he wasn't told about it. 

The Chairman. He wasn't warned against you ? 

General Short. I don't believe he was. 

The Chairman. I note in your statement that you have followed the 
pattern rather closely, in a sense, adopted by Admiral Kimmel in his 
statement, that if he had had all of the information that was available 
in Washington, he might have acted differently; you take the same 
position, that if you had had all of the information that was in Wash- 
ington, you might have acted differently? 

General Short. I am sure that we have taken that position abso- 
lutely independently, because, if you will take my statement, the state- 
ment I made before the Roberts commission, the first 50 pages I dic- 
tated, I had never talked with Admiral Kimmel during that period, 
and you will find the same claims that you will find in my statement 
here. 

The Chairman. Did you and Admiral Kimmel consult or confer 
about this hearing? 

General Short. Oh, I have talked to him frequently about this, but 
at the time of the Roberts hearing we " [S12G] were both so 
busy — I think I had 3 days, and spent most of the nights preparing 
that large volume that I have turned in to you, so you can see I had 
very little time to consult with anybody. 

The Chairman. Is it customary, or is it required, or is it military 
or naval practice that the commanders in the field shall be given copies 
of diplomatic messages sent back and forth between their Govern- 
ments and other governments? 

General Short. I wouldn't say that it was, but they at least, if it is 
anything that is going to affect them, it seems to me they would always 



3010 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

be ^iven the substance, even if they ^vere not told where it came from. 

The Chairman. Have you read all of the intercepts that Admiral 
Kimmel recited in his statement that he thinks he should have been 
entitled to see? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Outside of the message carving up Pearl Harbor 
into the five divisions in which ships were located, is there anything 
in any of those messages which pointed to an attack upon Pearl 
Harbor any more than upon any other place? 

General'SnoRT. That was the piost definite thing, and then the fact 
that the delivery of the message was at 1 [81£7] p. m., Wash- 
ington time, which would be shortly after dawn in Honolulu, which I 
think was an indication 

The Chairman. Well, you couldn't have gotten that one any sooner 
than you got it, could you ? 

General Short. Yes ; we could have gotten that, we could have got- 
ten it — they had it all decoded in the War Department between 8 : 30 
and 9 o'clock in the morning. 

The Chairman. That was decoded in the Navy Department? 

General Short. Yes, sir ; but it was received in the War Department 
between 8 : 30 and 9 a. m. 

The Chairman. General Marshall testified as to the time when he 
received it. 

General Short. That is correct, but General Miles and Colonel 
Bratton had it in their possession from at least 9 o'clock to 11 : 25 a. m., 
and did nothing. 

The Chairman. Well, General Miles testified as to what he did, and 
Colonel Bratton will, I suppose. 

At any rate, there were none of these messages that are complained 
of because of their nondelivery in Hawaii, these intercepts, that gave 
any indication of an attack on Pearl Harbor, except the one dividing 
up Pearl Harbor ? 

General Short. No. 

The Chairman. They all indicated, most of them, an [81£S] 
attack somewhere. 

General Short. Yes, sir . 

The Chairman. But I am talking about Pearl Harbor. 

General Short. I think those two things are the really definite 
things that pointed to Pearl Harbor. 

The Chairman. And the other intercepts related to the more tense 
situation as it developed? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. But did not give indication as to where or when 
any attack would be made. 

General Short. Well, I think you could get an indication possibly 
of when. You knew when they set deadlines that somthing was 
going to happen. 

The Chairman. That was a conclusion that might have been drawn, 
that when they set a deadline of the 25th and then moved it up to the 
29th, you could draw the conclusion that something was going to 
happen ? 

General Short. Anybody who was familiar with the weather con- 
ditions in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands and happened to think 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3011 

along that line, I think would have drawn a direct conclusion, because 
about that time of the year the weather gets very bad out in the Aleu- 
tian Islands. I happen to have spent 2 years in Alaska, and know 
that. And to a Navy man that might well mean that the condition 
[8129] was getting to the point where the fueling of ships at sea 
would be hazardous. 

The Chairman. The weather in Alaska wouldn't necessarily in- 
dicate whether the Japanese were going to make an air attack or 
whether they would make it at Hawaii or the Panama Canal or Puget 
Sound. 

General Short. It would only indicate the difficulty of proceeding 
by that northern route. 

The Chairman. In other words, if anybody familiar with the 
weather in Alaska had sat down to speculate on it, he would have 
speculated they wouldn't send the six ships through that route ? 

General Short. Not later than that. It was getting about the limit 
on where it would be bad after that. 

The Chairman. But even that speculation wouldn't have told you 
anything if they were coming to Pearl Harbor? 

General Short. If they went by the northern route, they would be 
probably going to either Seattle or Hawaii. 

The Chairman. Now, this message that the Navy Department sent 
to Admiral Kimmel on the 24th was shown to you ? 

General Short, Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Of course, while it was shown to you for informa- 
tion, it was also shown to you for your guidance ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

[8130] The Chairman. Under the mutual arrangement that you 
were supposed to have out there either one of you who got an important 
message or a directive from Washington was supposed to show it to 
the other ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. To keep one another advised ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairmax. And you got this message of the 24th of November, 
which has been read time and time again into the record, but which 
states : 

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations witli Japan very doubtful. This 
situation coupled with the statements of Japanese Government and movements 
their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive 
movement in any direction including attack on Pliilippines or Guam is possibility. 
Chief of Staff lias seen this dispatch concurs and requests action. Addressees to 
inform senior army officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to 
complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. 

and so forth. 

Now, this is a message saying that an aggressive attack may be ex- 
pected in any direction, including tw^o places ; it doesn't exclude any 
other place, does it ? 

[8131] General Short. No, sir. 

The Chairman. It empliasizes 

General Short. It emphasizes those two places, and when some 
other place is equally important, I feel that if they intended to in- 
clude the other place they would mention it. 



3012 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chaiemax. "Wouldn't a careful interpretation of that message 
mean that the Japanese ^yere calculated to make an agressive move- 
ment in any direction, and that "any direction" means the Philip- 
pines or Guam, as well as every other place, but that they emphasized 
those two places? 

General Short. I would say that it was possible in any direction, 
but probable toward the Philippines and Guam because they were 
singled out. 

The Chairman. Well, that is a matter of interpretation. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. The word "including" means, for instance, if I 
want to sell some stock, I advertise I have a lot of stock for sale, 
including a horse and a mule ; that wouldn't mean that all the rest that 
I had for sale wouldn't be sold? 

General Short, That is true ; but that would definitely emphasize 
the horse and the mule. 

[8132] The Chairman. Yes; I wouldn't want to overlook sell- 
ing them. 

General Short. No, sir. 

The CiiAiRi^tAN. In this message of the 27th — which was shown to 
you also, was it not ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chair^ian. And for the same purpose ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. It was a little stronger : 

This is to be considered as a war warning. 

General Short. There is one very significant thing there, though. 
You notice that Guam was included in the probable attack, or possible 
attack on the 24th, and in that message they talk about Guam only 
in terms of sabotage. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General Short. It would indicate that they were dwelling even 
more on the Southwest Pacific. 

Guam, which was very close to Japan, had been eliminated. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this. Everybody in Washington, 
all the high officers in Washington — Navy, Armj^, Intelligence, War 
Plans, General Staff — all saw these intercepted messages, but as to 
which Admiral Kimmel [8133] complains and you complain 
not having been transmitted to you ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. They all have testified that, notwithstanding those 
messages, they did not really expect an attack at Pearl Harbor and 
were surprised when it came. 

Do you think that if you had gotten all of those, or if the admiral 
had gotten them, or both of you together had gotten them, you would 
have reached any different conclusion from that reached by every- 
body in Washington? 

General Short. I think there was a possibility because Pearl 
Harbor meant a little more to us. We were a little closer to the 
situation, and I believe we would have been inclined to look at that 
Pearl Harbor information a little more closely. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3013 

We might not have made the correct decision, but I believe there 
was more chance that either we or someone on our staffs would have 
had the idea. 

The Chairman. You say that Pearl Harbor meant more to the 
admiral and to you and that therefore you were more concerned 
about it. 

If that is true, why did you rely for the action you took upon 
some definite instruction from Washington instead of exercising 
greater judgment and discretion in doing what [,S134] you 
could do with what you had ? 

General Short. Because they were my only sources of informa- 
tion. I had no source of information outside Hawaii, except the 
War Department. 

The Chairman. In other words, you mean to say that with your 
general information and sizing up the situation during the whole 
year that you would take no action that meant anything in the way 
of preparation until you got meticulous detailed instructions from 
Washington to do it? 

General Short. I mean that I knew that the War Department had 
many sources of information. They had military attaches. They 
got reports from the State Department and the Commerce Depart- 
ment. 

They had a certain number of agents scattered around in the Far 
East, If they were in a position to get information that I had no 
access to at all, I had every reason to believe that their judgment 
Avould be better than my just arriving at a conclusion from reading 
the newspapers. 

The Chairman. Well, we had military attaches and ambassadors 
in Tokyo, but due to the secretiveness of the Japanese Government, 
we didn't get much information. 

General Short. That is true. I didn't know whether they were 
getting much or getting little. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

[813S] Now, let me get down to the message that you got your- 
self from General Marshall, which you call in your statement, the 
**do-don't" message. 

General Short. The Army Pearl Harbor Board was the one that 
designated it that. 

The Chairman. Do you mean by that description to rather ridicule 
the message that Marshall sent to you-, by calling it the "do-don't" 
message ? 

General Short. The Army Pearl Harbor Board gave it that term, 
because of conflicting ideas presented, because of the fact that prac- 
tically everything they gave was qualified, except two things. It 
was not my terminology. I adopted it. I adopted it from the- 
Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

The Chairman. It is not original with you, then? 

General Short. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, this message to you. No. 472 

General Short. Yes, sir. 



3014 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman [reading] : 

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes 
witii only the barest possibilities that the Japanese might come back and offer 
to continue. 

That was the day followincr the delivery of the 10-poiiit note to 
the Japanese Ambassador by Secretary Hull ? 
[81S6] General Short. Yes, sir. 
The Chairman. Which he delivered on the 26th ? 
General Short. Yes, sir. 
The Chairman (reading) : 

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. 
If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit 
the first overt act. 

That was our policy in all departments. All of you understood that 
if war had to come that our own country desired that Japan precipi- 
tate it instead of our country precipitating it; that is correct, isn't it? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You understood that? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And that is what the Secretary of State, the Presi- 
dent, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy, and all of 
the high officers understood that if there had to be hostilities, we 
didn't want to start them ; isn't that true ? 

General Short. I very strongly got that impression from that 
message. 

The Chairman (reading) : 

If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States [8^37] desires that 
Japan commit the first overt act. This policy could not be construed as restrict- 
ing you to a coui'se of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hos- 
tile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other 
measures 

As might be necessary under the circumstances. 

General Short. It made, however, a rather difficult situation. If 
we discovered a carrier 800 or a thousand miles out at sea, it would 
have been a very fine point whether under that we should attack. 

The Chairman. Well, you didn't have to pass on that fine point, 
because you were just in charge of the Army? 

General Short. Yes, I might have had to furnish bombers to do 
the bombing. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General Short. Admiral Kimmel would be the one. 

The Chairman. That was a naval decision. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman (reading) : 

Prior to hostile Japanese action — 

This is not a request. It is not an intimation. It is a direction : 
you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance — 

[81S8] In general broad terms, that doesn't mean to look out 
after sabotage, does it? 

General Short. No, sir; but long distant reconnaissance, by the 
agreement with the Navy, was definitely a Navy problem, and General 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3015 

Marshall agreed that under that construction all I had to do was to 
turn over my planes to the Navy if they were called for. 

The Chaikman. When did he agree to that ? 

General Short. I have the quotation. He was asked, I think, before 
the Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

The Chairman. He hadn't agreed to that before this took place ? 

General Short. No, but he said that was his interpretation, the 
same as it was mine. 

The Chairman (reading) : 

Undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary 
but these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm civil population or 
disclose intent. Report measures taken. 

In reply to that message — then it goes on to say : 

Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five. 

And so forth. 

[81S9] In reply to that message — which I believe was the next 
day, was it? 

General Short. No, sir ; it was the same day. 

The Chairman. The same day ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You cabled him that you had taken steps against 
sabotage and had created liaison with the Navy ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Did you regard that reply as responsive to General 
Marshall's dispatch? 

General Short. I did. There was one very important part of that 
message you didn't read. 

The Chairman. I tried to read it all. What part did I omit? 

General Short (reading) : 

Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential 
oflSeers. 

The Chairman. Oh, jes. That was a direction for you not to spread 
it around in the vicinity. 

General Short. You couldn't possibly take up alert No. 2 or alert 
No. 3 without telling all of the enlisted men what they were out there 
for, who they were to shoot at. 

The Chairman. You had Army practices from time to [Sl^O] 
time that involved these alerts, did you not ? 

General Short. But we didn't give them live ammunition and tell 
them to shoot at a Jap plane, if one came over. 

The Chairman. The population, hearing these guns firing, wouldn't 
know whether they had live ammunition. 

General Short. This limited information wouldn't have allowed 
me to disclose that to an enlisted man — ^merely to "minimum essential 
officers," 

The Chairman. If General Marshall knew, as you say he knew, that 
you had no responsibility as far as reconnaissance was concerned, why 
do you suppose he directed you to institute reconnaissance and take 
every step you thought necessary to protect yourself ? 



3016 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. Because he did not write that message. I would 
like to read what he said in regard to tliat. This is a quotation from 
General Marshall: 

Distant reconnaissance. — was a naval function, and the Army Commander was 
liable to furnisli them such of the planes suitable for that purpose that could be 
provided. 

That is one quotation. There is another quotation from before the 
Arm}' Board. 

[814^] The Chaikman. Well, now, if it is true that you could 
understand this message and j-ou knew what it meant when it said for 
you to institute reconnaissance 

General Short. Yes. 

The Chairman. The words are simple, there is no ambiguity about 
it. If you knew and you knew he knew that all you could do about 
that was to make your planes available to the Navy 

General Short. That was exactly it. 

The Chairman (continuing). Why didn't you in your reply to him 
say either that you had made the planes available to the Navy or you 
had not done so and why you had not done it, instead of just saying 
that you had taken steps against sabotage ? Sabotage can be carried 
on where there are no actual hostilities between two nations. That is 
something that all the spies in Hawaii could indulge in, blowing up an 
installation on the groimd or things of that sort without war being 
actually declared. 

Why in your reply to General Marshall did you limit this to sabotage 
instead of saying something about reconnaissance, which is the only 
specific thing he mentioned in his direction to you ? 

General Short. I was directly obligated by the agreement with the 
Navy to furnish these planes. It had been approved [S14^] by 
the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations and it did not 
seem to me that it was necessary to reiterate that because without 
they told me that — there was also a provision in that agreement that 
if the agreement were to be abrogated it would be in writing. 

The Chairman. Was that a written agreement? 

General Short. That was a written agreement signed by Admiral 
Bloch and me, approved by General Marshall and by Admiral Stark 
and it had a provision that any abrogation must be in writing. 

The Chairman. I cannot understand then why if General Marshall 
knew that you had no duty in regard to reconnaissance that he put 
this in this instruction to you and that if you knew he knew that why 
you did not call his attention to it in your reply to him so that he 
would not be under any misapprehension? 

General Short. Yes, I think I can possibly explain that. In the 
first place, General Marshall was out of town when the message was 
drawn. In the second place, this message was written basically for 
General MacArthur in the Philippines and then adopted to the rest 
of us, and in the Philippines they had no such agreement. The Army 
was responsible for reconnaissance and they got together with the 
Navy and agreed upon what sectors that each would cover. 

187431 Mr. Murphy. Will the chairman yield ? 

The Chairman. Would you regard it as the duty of a high com- 
manding officer in the field — a man of your rank and you obtained that 
rank after long, distinguished service, as the admirals in the Navy 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3017 

do — if there was any possibility of misunderstanding a direct instruc- 
tion given by the Chief of Statf or the Chief of Naval Operations to 
the high-ranking commanding officer in the field, that it is the duty of 
that ranking officer in the field to call that to the attention of the 
originating officer and clarify it instead of just sitting around waiting 
for further instructions? 

It seems to me there ought to be some liaison between the two respec- 
tive offices; if there is any misunderstanding or misapprehension or 
any lack of comprehension that ought to be brought to the attention 
of the other office so as to clarify it immediately. Now, it seems that 
after you received this message on the 27th you made no further effort, 
and so far as the naval end of it is concerned, they made no further 
effort to ascertain just what it was that Washington had in mind when 
they gave these instructions about reconnaissance and defensive de- 
ployments and all that language that has been used here in this 
hearing. 

What have you to say about that ? That bothers me. General. 

General Short. I believe that Admiral Kimmel felt full [8144] 
responsibility for the reconnaissance; I think he realized that it was 
his full duty. 

The Chairman. Well, inasmuch as this message had come to you 
about reconnaissance didn't it ever occur to you that you ouglit to 
advise General Marshall that under the agreement the naval end of it 
had assumed full responsibility for reconnaissance and that it was not 
a part of jour responsibility, so that he would not be expecting you 
to do it? 

General Short. Frankly, I believed General Marshall would have 
known it. 

The Chairman. You believed he would have known it ? 

General Short. I believed he would have known it because he per- 
sonally approved that. 

The Chairman. Well, if that is true this language in here, this 
direct instruction to you to institute reconnaissance, was just idle 
words, it didn't mean anything so far as he was concerned, you think ? 

General Short. You will notice it says : 

Such reconnaissance as you may deem necessary. 

The Chairman. No ; that is not what it says : 

You are to take such reconnaissance and other measures. 

General Short. I think the "deem necessary" applies to all. I don't 
think there is any question of it in reference to any part of it. 

[8143] Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield at that point? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. I think I have something precisely in point. I would 
like to read from page 380 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearing, 
General Grunert to General Short : 

In your message of November 27th you say "liaison with the Navy." Just 
what did you mean by that? How did that cover anything required by that par- 
ticular message? 

Answer. To my mind it meant I was definitely keeping in touch with the 
Navy, what information they had and what they were doing. 

Question. Did it indicate in any way tliat you expected the Navy to carry out 
its part of that agreement for long distance reconnaissance? 

79716 — 46— pt. 7 8 



3018 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Answer. Yes, without any question whetlier I liad sent that or not it would 
have effected it because they signed a very definite agreement which was ap- 
proved by the Navy as well as by our Chief of Staff. 

The Chairman. "WTiat do you say about that answer to that ques- 
tion? 

General Short. Well, I want to finish the quotation that I started 
to read from General Marshall because it was taken before the Army 
Pearl Harbor Board also. 

The Chairman. Yes, go ahead. 

[1846] General Short. This is from the testimony of General 
Marshall. This is the testimony on distance reconnaissance. 

As I recall the matter, the only way the Army would have been involved 
in the deep reconnaissance vv^ould have been in detaching units to serve under 
the Navy. 

General Russell. Well, is it your view that both having seen the message 
of November 27, without more ado the Navy should have started their distant 
reconnaissance? 

General Marshall. That is right. That is my view. 

In other words, I think he had the same view of the responsibility 
that I had there. 

The Chairman. Do you know why, General, and can you tell the 
committee why it was that there was no reconnaissance on the 6th 
of December, the clay before the attack ? 

General Short. I believe, it is my impression that Admiral Kimmel 
was making a considerable reconnaissance. 

The Chairman. He said that there were some Navy planes flying 
to the south. 

Senator Lucas. No ; patrol planes. 

The Chairman. I am not talking about patrol planes. I am talk- 
ing about reconnaissance, long-distance reconnaissance. 

General Short. I think all of his reconnaissance from Johnston 
Island to Wake Island to Midway was very definitely distance-re- 
connaissance. He was doing it on the perimeter in [1S47] 
place of flying them oitt and back from Oahu. • He could accom- 
plish more with the same number of planes. 

The Chairman. He could accomplish more with the same number 
of planes if he had had them at the right place at the right time. 

General Short. Yes. 

The Chairman. But he could not accomplish more with them down 
to the south if the attack was coming down from the north. It 
seems to me there was no reconnaissance from that direction. 

General Short. It is apparent the Navy had not considered that 
because you will recall Admiral Richardson stated before this com- 
mittee that his reconnaissance extended from 10 degrees west of north 
down to the south. He did not think his reconnaissance ever w^ent to 
the east or north. 

Mr. Mtjrphy. Will the Chairman yield ? 

The Chairman. I am through. Congressman Cooper. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I suppose as usual we do not 
want to detain General Short too long and we will quit at 4 o'clock 
as we have been doing ? 

The Chairman. Unless General Short is willing to go on further. 

General Short. Just at the pleasure of the committee. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3019 

The Chairman. Unless there is some reason for the members on 
the House side wanting to quit at 4 there is no reason [SI4S] 
that I know of why the Senators would want to quit in view of the 
situation in the Senate. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, while General Short is on the stand 
we have suspended heretofore at 4 o'clock and I think we ought to 
do that. 

The Chairman. All right. 

The Vice Chairman. Are you through ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. Pardon me. Do you have something further 
you want to look at, General ? 

General Short. That is all right. 

The Vice Chairman. I would like to inquire of you to get some 
additional information, if I may, please. You had served about 40 
years in the Army, hadn't you? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. I believe you stated that you went in the mili- 
tary service from the State of Illinois ? 

General Short. Yes; that is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. You did not attend the Military Academy 
at West Point? 

General Short. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And I understood you to say you were rec- 
ommended by the president of the University of Illinois for a com- 
mission. 

[8I49] General Short. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. And commissioned in 1902 ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, at the time you were in command of 
the Hawaiian Depa,rtment you were one of the senior officers of the 
Army, weren't you ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. You at that time held the rank of Lieutenant 
General ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. At that time there were very few holding 
the rank of lieutenant general, weren't there? 

General Short. I think there were nine, two of whom were air 
officers. I am not sure. 

The Vice Chairman. Certainly there were not near as many as 
later developed during the war ? 

General Short. No ; by no means. 

The Vice Chairman. The rank of lieutenant general back at that 
time was really pretty high in the Army, wasn't it ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, on December 7, 1941, General, you held 
one of the most important commands in the Army, didn't you ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Our fortress at Hawaii was one of the 
[81S0] greatest possessions for national defense that this country 
had? 

General Short. That is correct. 



3020 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. And it was your responsibility to protect 
that? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, you received considerable information 
in the form of correspondence between you and the Chief of Staff, 
as you have indicated in the booklet that you have up there, during 
the period that you were in command at Hawaii ? 

General Short. A great deal of information on the defenses, and 
so forth. 

The Vice Chairman. Yes. 

General Short. A very limited amount on the international situa- 
tion. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, you kept informed on the international 
situation from every source that you could inform yourself, did you 
not? 

(xeneral Short. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. And it was a matter of rather general knowl- 
edge that the situation was growing exceedingly tense between the 
United States and Japan, wasn't it? 

(reneral Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And the situation was growing more 
[8 J 51] critical all the time. You knew that as you very frankly 
stated here. 

Crpnern] Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman, Did you consider that war between the United 
States and Japan was inevitable? 

General Short. I would not go that far. I think I would say that 
1 considered it probable but I thought that Washington, from the 
message I had, was making every possible effort to avoid war and to 
avoid an international incident in Hawaii that they must, therefore, 
still have some hopes of averting it. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, that was your very clear and definite 
impression of the efforts being exerted at Washington? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. But you also knew what Japan was doing, 
too, didn't you. General ? 

General Short. I knew that she was pressing down into China and 
getting on toward the south and that sooner or later might cause a 
conflict. 

The Vice Chairman. And you knew that every indication pointed 
to Japan's further conquests, didn't you? 

Geneial Short. Without we were able through negotiations to arrive 
at something that would stop them. 

[8162] The Vice Chairman. But every move Japan was making 
gave clear indications that she was bent on further conquest, didn't it 1 

General Short, It looked that way. 

The Vice Chairman. It looked that way and you understood that? 

Genei-al Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman, Now, did you ever consider that Japan would 
attack Pearl Harbor? 

General Short. I frankly felt with the fleet — as large a fleet as we 
had in the Hawaiian waters — that they would be able to either keep the 
carriers up there from the vicinity of Hawaii or at least get the infor- 
mation of their approach in time for us to be prepared for the attack. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3021 

The Vice Chairman. I did not understand the last part. 

General Short. I say if they were not able to intercept them that 
they would at least get information in time to give us sufficient time 
to prepare for the attack. 

The Vice CiiAuaiAN. You thought the fleet would be able to do 
that? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, it was true that the fleet had certain 
units out at sea most of the time? 

General Short. Always, I think. 

[8153] The Vice Chairman. And certain task forces were op- 
erating between Hawaii and other islands such as Midway and Wake 
and Johnston and through that area? 

General Short. Yes, sir. They also had forces stationed at those 
islands and they had a certain amount of reconnaissance constantly 
from those islands. 

The Vice Chairman. So then you assumed that the Navy would 
become aware if any hostile act became apparent and you would re- 
ceive the information through the Navy? 

General Short. I expected to ; yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. I believe on page 3 of your statement, General 
and subsequent pages — ^you need not refer to it; I am just going to 
ask a general question. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. On page 3 and subsequent pages of your state- 
ment you referred to certain requests made by you to the War Depart- 
ment for additional equipment, material, and so forth. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. But the fact that you were not furnished 
everything you asked for did not relieve you of the duty and re- 
sponsibility to use what you did have to the best advantage in the 
defense of your department, did it ? 

General Short. In no way. 

[8154] The Vice Chairman. I believe General Marshall made 
one statement here that I think you will agree with at least. He said 
that no commander was ever quite satisfied with what he got. 

General Shcrt. That is unquestionably right. 

The Vice Chairman. They all ask for more than they are able to 
get and he said it only indicates he was a good officer because he was 
asking for more than he could get all the time. 

Now, I believe on page 15 of your statement. General, under the 
heading of "War Plan," among other things in that paragraph there 
you say : 

. That no part of this joint plan would take effect until the War Department 
ordered M-day under the Rainbow plan. 

Well, now, M-day was vrar with Japan, wasn't it ? 

General Short. Not necessarily war with Japan but it would be 
the mobilization toward the preparation for war with Japan. 
_ The Vice Chairman. I see. Well, anyhow, M-day was mobiliza- 
tion for war ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And you say that no part of the joint plan 
had to be put into effect until the War Department ordered that on 
M-day? 



3022 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

[81SS] The Vice Chairman. Well, this did not prevent you from 
using every possible means for a proper defense of your command, did 
it? 

General Short. Not if the situation I would say was just definitely 
so that there was no time to communicate with Washington, but if 
you take their policy I think they expected in all cases to indicate when 
the plan was to go into effect, and also if you couple that with that 
express desire not to create any international incidents, not to provoke 
Japan, I think you naturally would hesitate very seriously as long as 
there was time to communicate with Washington and the communica- 
tions were open, to put anything into effect without first communi- 
cating with them. That was my attitude. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, naturally, that would generally be true, 
but at the same time the responsibility rested upon you to defend your 
Department ? 

General Short. Yes, sir ; but likewise an equal responsibility rested 
upon the War Department to provide me with all the information that 
I needed. 

The Vice Chairman. I am not arguing with you about the respon- 
sibility of the War Department. I am just inquiring briefly about 
your responsibility as a lieutenant general of the United States Army 
in command of the most valuable post for the national defense of this 
country. 

[8156] General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, it was your duty 

General Short. It was mine. 

The Vice Chairman (continuing). To defend it? 

General Short. But my estimate was bound to be made upon the 
information I had. 

The Vice Chairman. Yes ; but it was your duty to defend that post 
that had been assigned to you ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Whether any M-day had arrived or whether 
any instructions had been received from Washington or anywhere else 
if the occasion arose, it was your duty to defend that command ? 

General Short. And when the definite occasion did arise it never 
occurred to me to communicate with Washington then. 

The Vice Chairman. That is right. 

General Short. Because the situation was definitely there. We 
went into action immediately. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, there wasn't any declaration of war at 
the time it happened ? 

General Short. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. There wasn't any M-day put into effect? 

General Short. No, sir. 

[8157] The Vice Chairman. There wasn't any order to that 
effect form the War Department ? 

General Short. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. But when the Japanese attack came you went 
into action? 

Generril Short. Within a minute or two. 

The Vice Chairman. Yes. Now, you have been asked a number 
of questions about these particular messages that were received and 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3023 

the chairman has just inquired some about the message of November 
24 to Admiral Kimmel. You say you saw that and conferred with 
him about it ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And, of course, j^ou saw in that message that 
a surprise aggressive movement in any direction is stated there, isn't 
it? 

General Short. Yes, sir ; but it also points out particular places. 

Tlie Vice Chairman. It also mentions other things but those words 
are in there ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, you say there a little below 
the middle of the page : 

This message indicated possible movements in the direction of the Philippines 
or Guam and called for secrecy. 

I8158'\ but this is not all that it indicated, was it ? 

General Short. I would say that that was what it indicated — prob- 
able. The other was possible. When you say ''attack in any direc- 
tion," that is so indefinite that you cannot point it out as a probable 
thing. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, your statement here is : 

This message indicated possible movements in the direction of the Philippines 
or Guam and called for secrecy. 

General Short. I believe that if the Department had considered 
Hawaii in the same way, classing it with the probable as the Philip- 
pines or Guam, it would have included it. 

The Vice Chairman. But at least the message said also what is 
said about the Philippines and Guam ? 

General Short. But in a very general way. 

The Vice Chairman. At least you did not accept it as meaning any- 
thing but the Philippines and Guam ? 

General Short. That Avas all that it meant to me. 

The Vice Chairman. That was all that it meant to you ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

General Short. I think that is all it meant to Admiral Kimmel. 

The Vice Chairman. It referred to the Philippines and Guam and 
that is all it meant to you and you did not accept it as [8J59] 
meaning anything else ? 

General Short. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Or as being worth anything else to you ? 

General Short. I realized that any time that there was any Japa- 
nese action against the United States that sabotage and subversive 
action might start in Hawaii even ahead of the action to get the 
jump on us. 

The Vice Chairman. But you did not think there was anything in 
this message 

General Short. I did not expect an attack. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, you did not think there was anything 
in this message that should have meant anything to you except the 
Philippines and Guam ? 



3024 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. And possibly internal disorders in Hawaii. 

The Vice Chairman. In Hawaii? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. That is all? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And so far as all these other words that we 
used liere they were just surplusage as far as conveying any meaning 
to you ? 

General Short. They were so general and so indefinite that it was 
pretty hard to say that they conveyed any specific meaning. 

[8100] The Vice Chairman. Well, it did not mean anything 
to you ? 

General Short. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

The Chairman. The Chair thinks we will suspend with you until 
10 o'clock tomorrow morning. 

(Whereupon, at 4:03 p. m., January 23, 1946, an adjournment was 
taken until 10 a. m., Thursday, January 24, 1946.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3025 



{.81611, PEABL HAKBOR ATTACK 



THUBSDAY, JANUARY 24, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington^ D. 0. 
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barldey (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Hasten, Edward P. 
Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee. 
[^8162'] The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 
Congressman Cooper will resume his examination. 
The Vice Chairman. Are you ready, General ? 
General Short. Yes, sir. 

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHOUT, UNITED STATES 
ARMY (RETIRED)— Resumed 

The Vice Chairman. General Short, when we adjourned yester- 
day we had been discussing the Navy message of November 24, with 
which you said you were familiar. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And you had given your explanation of what 
you thought it meant and your ideas about that message. I would 
now like to consider with you for a little while the messages of No- 
vember 27. The Chief of Naval Operations also sent a message of 
November 27 to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. 

General Short. May I correct my very last statement to you before 
we take that up? 

The Vice Chairman. Yes, sir. 

General Short. On page 8159 of the transcript you asked me : 

Well, you did not think there was anything in this message that should have 
meant anything to you except the Philippines and Guam? 
[816S] And possibly internal disorders in Hawaii — 

I added there. 

You said then, "In Hawaii?" 
And I said : 

Yes, sir. And so far as all these other words that we used here they were just 
surplusage as far as conveying any meaning to you? 

General Short. They were so general and so indefinite that it was pretty hard 
to say that they conveyed any specific meaning. 



3026 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Then you said : 

Well, it did not mean anything to you? 

General Short. No, sir. 

I think I should like to correct that that it did mean to me that they 
definitely expected hostilities but that it did not point to Hawaii. I 
don't think my answer "It did not mean anything" was a correct 
answer. 

The Vice Chairman. As full and complete? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. It did mean to you then that hostilities 

General Short. That hostilities, yes, sir, but not an attack at Hawaii. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, then, the Navy message of 
November 27, the so-called war warning message, you are thoroughly 
familiar with that? 

[S16'4] General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And you saw it at the time Admiral Kimmel 
received it ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And you conferred with him about it ? 

General Short. I am sure that I talked pretty thoroughly about that 
on the 1st and the 3cl — well, the 1st, 2d, and 3d of December. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, that was received 

General Short. Oh, no. On the 24th you are talking about? 

The Vice Chairman. No. 

General Short. The one on November 27 ? 

The Vice Chairman. I am talking about the one on November 27. 

General Short. I talked pretty thoroughly with him about that. 
We had talked immediately previously on that morning about the 
situation and the message of the 24th and there was really no additional 
information of an enemy in the message on the 27th that was not in the 
24th. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, it was received in Hawaii on the 27th, 
the day it was sent ? 

General Short, That is correct, the afternoon of the 27th. 

[8166] The Vice Chairman. And you were familiar with it on 
that day ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And the opening words there : 

Consider this dispatch a war warning — 

you say it did not mean anything special to you? 

General Short. It meant no more than saying that Japan was 
going to attack some place. It is the same thing. 

The Vice Chairman. I see. And I believe you stated yesterday 
that you never had seen those words used in any dispatch before? 

General Short. I did not remember that I had; no, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. I recall that Admiral Kimmel stated that he 
had never seen those words used before. 

General ^hort. Yes, sir. 

The Vic^v Chairman. And I was just wondering why it was that 
those words tliat you had never seen in a dispatch before did not mean 
something more to you than you here indicate ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3027 

General Short. Well, if you analyze them they really are not nearly 
as definite, they mean not nearly as much as to say that Japan is going 
to attack the Philippines or Borneo because you are saying there that 
war is imminent and you are saying where it is irmninent. 

[8166] The Vice Chairman. Well, this says : 

Consider this dispatch a war warning. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. That is a pretty definite statement. General. 

General Short. Well, I think if they tell you that the Philippines 
are going to be attacked that is equivalent to a war warning. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, that would be definite, too. 

General Short. I think probably that was the reason that it did not 
have any particular effect on me, because the one on the 24th had stated 
that they expected Japanese action in any direction, including the 
Philippines and Guam. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, you had the impression in your mind 
at the time from the information contained in the Navy message of 
November 24th that hostilities were indicated ? 

General Short. That the Navy definitely believed they were 
indicated. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Then 3 days later on the 27th, you 
saw this mesage, "Consider this dispatch a war warning." 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. With the knowledge in your mind that you 
had already been notified that hostilities were imminent? 

[S167'] General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And then here comes a message : 

Consider this dispatch a war warning. 

You did not give any special meaning to that ? 

General Short. I thought it was just a reiteration of what had been 
said. 

The Vice Chairman. I see. Now, that was with respect to the Navy 
message of the 27th. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, then, on page 18 of your statement you 
enter into a discussion of the Army message of November 27, which 
you quote there on page 18 of your statement. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. This was a message from the Chief of Staff, 
General Marshall, to you. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And you received it on the 27th? 

General Short. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. You had the information contained in this 
message in addition to the information contained in the Navy message 
of the same date with which you were familiar? 

General Short. That is correct. 

[8168] The Vice Chairman. Now, I do not want to go into too 
lengthy a discussion of this message, because it has been covered so 
many times in the hearing, and you set it forth here in your prepared 
statement, but I would like to invite your attention, to get some infor- 



3028 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

mation as to your views about it, to certain words appearing right 
about the middle of the message, and I will quote them to you : 

Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such recon- 
naissance, and other measures as you deem necessary. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. That was a direct order from the Chief of 
Staff to you? 

General Short. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. And then the words "Report measures taken." 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, in your reply to General Marshall, you 
rej^orted only that you had alerted your department against sabotage, 
and liaison with the Navy. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Whether they are the exact words or not, that 
is what you meant and that is what you said ? 

[8169] General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, do you find the word "sabotage" used 
anywhere in this message of November 27 to you ? 

General Short. No, sir ; but I did in the next 3 messages that I got. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, you promptly replied to General Mar- 
shall upon the receipt of this message? 

General Short. That is correct. I also do not find anywhere in 
there that he said there was a probable attack on Hawaii. That is 
what caused me to 

The "Vice Chairman. x\11 right, we will get to that in a moment, but 
right at this point, you say the word "sabotage" is not used anywhere 
in this message of November 27 to you from the Chief of Staff? 

General Short. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. And you say you promptly replied to that 
message without consultation with any members of your staff or any- 
body else, except, I believe, you talked with Colonel Phillips; is that 
riglit ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, with this message before you, and you 
had not at that time received these other messages, you promptly re- 
plied to General Marshall, you alerted your department against sabo- 
tage, and "liaison with the Navy." 

[8170] General Short. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. From this message of General Marshall to 
you, which does not contain the word "sabotage" anywhere in it, where 
did you get the idea that all he wanted to know about was sabotage? 

General Short. The Navy message of November 24 pointed directly 
to an attack on the Philippines or Guam. It did not point to an 
attack on Hawaii. That was in my mind. That was received just 3 
days before. 

There was nothing in this message amending that. The informa- 
tion on the enemy given there "unpredictable but hostile action possi- 
ble at any moment," I felt the information contained in the message 
of November 24 still stood, that the probable action was toward the 
Philipi)ines and Guam. 

[8171] The Vice Chairman. I know, General, but as an ex- 
perienced officer with long and distinguished service of 40 years in 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3029 

the United States Army, you had right in front of you a dispatch 
from the head of the United States Army, the Chief of Staff, and 
you replied to this dispatch. 
General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. You did not reply to the Navy message of 
November 24. 

General Short. Nor, sir ; but I also knew 

The Vice Chair:max. It vras this dispatch that you replied to ? 
General Short. I also knew from 40 years' experience that if the 
Chief of Staff believed there was going to be an air attack or an all-out 
attack on Hawaii he would have said so. 

The Vice Chairman. What I am trying to find, General — and I am 
just trying to get the facts about this thing the best I can, the same as 
I questioned the other witnesses, my only purpose in serving on this 
committee is to tr}'' to find the facts about the question that is pre- 
sented to us here — with this message of the Chief of Staff before youy 
without the word "sabotage" mentioned in it at all, I am just won- 
dering how you got the impression that your reply of "an alert 
against sabotage" was responsive to this message. 

General Short. Because there was no information that [81721 
indicated anything in Hawaii other than internal disorders. And 
the man who wrote the estimate on November 29, the two men, Colonel 
Betts and Colonel Kroner, did not have access to magic, and they 
drew exactly the same conclusion, that there was not a possibility of 
an attack on Hawaii, there was no possibility of an air attack on 
Hawaii, and the only thing of importance was an alert against sabo- 
tage and internal disorder. 

The Vice Chairman. But certainly. General, at the time you re- 
plied to General Marshall's message you did not know what Betts 
and Kroner knew, or whether they knew anything about that. 

General Short. I did not, and I did not have as much informa- 
tion as he had. I am simply saying my conclusion had been abso- 
lutely logical. These two men, the heads of military branches of the 
United States, drew exactly the same conclusions for the same reasons, 
and anybody else would if they were not given the magic informa- 
tion. 

The Vice Chairman. One difficulty with all of us is to separate 
hindsight or present knowledge from what occurred at the time back 
there. I realize your difficulty, and we all have that difficulty, but this 
Kroner and Betts information was not before you then, you knew 
nothing about it. 

General Short. It had nothing to do with my decision. 
[8173] The Vice Chairman. All right. 

General Short. But there was nothing else before me that caused 
me to expect an attack on Hawaii. 

The Vice Chairman. Although the words definitely appeared in 
this message : 

Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such recon- 
naissance and other measures as you deem necessary? 

General Short. And I did. "Hostile action" to me, taking every- 
thing that I had had before and everything in that message into con- 
sideration, meant the form of hostile action in Hawaii would be inter- 
nal disorders, that the War Department thought it would be internal 
disorders. 



3030 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. Did you undertake such reconnaissance as you 
deemed necessary? 

General Short. I did not deem anything necessary in the way of 
long-distance reconnaissance, because it was a Navy job, and I was 
ever ready to give them the planes any time they requested, and that 
was my only function. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. With this directive from the Chief 
of Staff to you to undertake such reconnaissance, and indicating that 
the Navy was supposed to furnish long-distance reconnaissance, did 
you then promptly confer with Admiral Kimmel so you would know 
whether he was doing it ? 

General Short. I knew that morning what reconnaissance 
[8174] ill general he was taking; I talked with him 3 hours that 
morning. 

The Vice Chairman. But not after you received the order from the 
Chief of Staff? 

General Short. No, sir ; but I knew what he was doing. 

The Vice Chairman. Now this same message was sent to certain 
other commanding generals ; was it not ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. The commanding general at Panama, among 
others ; was it not ? 

General Short. I think you will find — I am not positive, but I think 
probably some of the "don'ts" were left out. I know the message to 
the Philippines omitted the don'ts. 

The Vice Chairman. We will get to that in a minute. If you will 
try to stay with me as we go along, it will help me a great deal. 

At the bottom of this message appearing on page 7 of exhibit 32, 
after the name "Marshall," which appeared on the message to you, it 
says here : 

War Department Message Center : Please send same radiogram to : Command- 
ing General, Caribbean Defense Command. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. That was the Panama command ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

[8175] The Vice Chairman. And the General in command there 
replied to the message in quite different form to what you replied ? 

General Short. In all probability he did not have the definite writ- 
ten approved agreement with the Navy that they would be responsible 
for long-distance reconnaissance. I know that was the case in the 
Philippines. I do not know that that was the case in Panama. 

The Vice Chairman. There was quite a difference between that 
general's reply and yours. 

General Short. There would be necessarily a great difference if I 
had been responsible for the long-distance reconnaissance, but I was 
not. 

The Vice Chairman. But the fact remains there was considerable 
difference in the replies. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, then, on the same day a mes- 
sage was sent to General MacArthur in the Philippines. That is not 
identical with the message received by you, but quite similar to it; 
isn't it? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3031 

General Short. Except all the don'ts were left out. 
The Vice Chairman. It is quite similar to it. The same words 
appear in it, General : 

Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to take such reconnaissance 
and other measures [8176] as you deem necessary. 

Those identical words appear in the message to MacArthur and to 
you ; do they not ? 

General Short. Yes, sir ; and I happen to know that there was no 
agreement in the Philippines Islands whereby the Navy assumed the 
responsibility for long-distance reconnaissance. 

The Vice Chairman. But those same words appear in your message 
and in MacArthur's message ? 

General Short. Yes, sir; but the condition in the two places was 
entirely different. 

The Vice Chairman. And MacArthur's reply to General Marshall 
is quite different from yours ? 

General Short. Necessarily so. 

The Vice Chairman. He says : 

Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio six two four air recon- 
naissance has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy stop 
Ground security measures have been taken stop Within the limitations imposed by 
present state of development of this theatre of operations everything is in readi- 
ness for the conduct of a successful defense stop intimate liaison and coopera- 
tion and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy. 

You replied that your department was alerted against sabotage, 
and liaison with the Navy. 

General Short. I think you ought to also take into [8177] 
consideration that he had a great deal — not all, but a large part of 
magic, that he had received a radiogram, that he had held a conference 
with Commissioner Sayre and Admiral Stark, and that this message 
was from the President, that repeated estimates had pointed to the 
probable attack on the Philippine Islands. The situation as painted to 
him was entirely different from that which was painted to me. 

The Vice Chairman. Back again. General, the same words convey- 
ing a definite directive to him, were contained in the message to you? 

General Short. But the action required would be governed by the 
situation that existed, which was entirely different. 

The Vice Chairman. I see. In just reading MacArthur's message it 
would seem that he replied directly to these words contained in both 
messages. 

General Short. I think he replied to meet his situation as it existed. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, General, on page 20 of your 
statement you refer to the message of November 27 from G-2 of the 
War Department to G-2 of your department. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. That was the same day that General Mar- 
shall's message was sent to you? 

General Short. Received probably within an hour or less. 

18178] The Vice Chairman. An hour or less ? 

General Short. Almost the same time. 

The Vice Chairman. But after you had replied to General Mar- 
shall's message ? 

General Short. I think so. 



3032 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now then this message from Gen- 
eral Miles, G-2 of the War Department, to your G-2 relates only to 
sabotage and subversive activities, does it not? 

General Short. That is correct. 

The Vice Chapman. Then why did you think General Miles sent 
you this special message relating only to sabotage if it meant only the 
same thing as the message General Marshall had sent to you? 

General Short. General Miles was responsible for giving us infor- 
mation not only about sabotage but information of any probable 
hostile action. The fact that the information he gave us related only 
to sabotage indicated that he did not expect other hostile action or he 
would have pointed it out the same as they did the subversive action. 

The Vice Chairmax. But the message from General ^Sliles to your 
G-2 meant the same thing to you as General Marshall's message to 

General Short. It predicted to me the same type of hostile action. 

[S170] The Vice Chairman. I see. And you see no difference 
between the Marshall message to vou and the Miles message to 
J our G-2 ? 

General Short. I did. To me the Marshall message indicated that 
there was paramount in the idea of the War Department that they 
must avoid war if possible with Japan and that no international inci- 
dent must take place in Hawaii that would provoke the Japanese or 
give them an excuse. There was nothing of that kind in Miles' 
message. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, if you even had not received General 
Marshall's message, why, you would not have taken an}' such action, 
would you ? 

General Short. If I had not received General Marshall's message 
and only had Miles' message, you mean ? 

The Vice Chairman. If you had not received either one of them 
you would not have done anything to create a Japanese incident, 
would you ? 

General Short. I would have been very careful not to, because 
for months there had been an indication that they were particularly 
anxious not to provoke the Japanese. 

The Vice Chairman. You did not need any message from General 
Marshall or General Miles, or anybody else, for you to take that 
detinite course 3'ourself, did you? 

General Short. I would say that that made it clear; it [8180] 
was necessary to reiterate their position, because they were very 
anxious about it. Uppermost in their minds was that they did not 
want to be responsible for starting a war. 

The Vice Chairman. And j'ou were not going to do anything to 
siart a war even if you had not heard anything from them, were 5'ou? 

General Short. Xot intentionally. 

The Vice Chairman. How is that ? 

General Short. Not intentionally. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, General, I believe you have 
stated that the operation of radar was your responsibility? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And I think you stated, in response to ques- 
tions by counsel, that you had six mobile radar sets and three sta- 
tjonar}' sets. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3033 

General Short. No, sir; there were no stationary sets in operation. 

The Vice Chairman. You had been furnished three, had you not? 

General Short. Not complete. 

The Vice Chairman. But you had six mobile sets ? 

General Short. We had six mobile sets. 

The Vice Chairman. In operation ? 

[8181] General Short. Yes, sir. And I might state also that 
the plans for the erection of the antenna, the towers for the sets were 
not received until — I think they show an endorsement of December 
10, so they were not there. 

At this time, if I may, I would like to read a telegram that I 
received here in the room yesterday from a former signal officer. 
I did not even remember the man 

The Vice Chairman. Just one second before you get to that. I 
just want to try to be clear on one point. I certainly will give you 
an opportunity to read your telegram. There were six mobile radar 
sets in operation at the time ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And although three stationary sets had been 
furnished, they were not complete and not in operation ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. I understood you to state yesterday, in re- 
sponse to a question by counsel, that you did not know whether the 
three stationary sets were in operation at that time or not. 

General Short. I did not mean to convey that. I knew definitely 
they were not ; I knew they were robbing those sets for parts to keep the 
mobile sets working. 

The Vice Chairman. Now if you desire to read the telegram you 
may do so. 

[8182] General Short. As it happens, I do not even remember 
this officer. No inquiry had been made of him. I would just like to 
read the wire that came to me yesterday morning. 

It is dated January 22, at Waterloo, Iowa : 

Lt. Gen. Walter C. Shoht, 

Care Senate Eoune Investigating Committee, Washington, D. C: 
On Dec 10, 1941 I was transferred to Oakland California as assistant signal 
officer SFP of E Stop Lying on the Oakland pier for a long time were three 100 
ft. radar towers No SCR 271 Stop Several weeks later I received a phone inquiry 
from Wash DC and instructions for the Transportation Corps to ship same to 
Honolulu on the next boat Stop It was necessary to use a floating crane to hoist 
these heavy towers Stop Approximately twenty SCR 271 have since been installed 
in the Hawaiian Islands Stop In my opinion if these radar towers had not iwen 
delaved on the Oakland docks you could have used them to good advantage Dec 
7 1941 End 

George D. Leask, 
0-122826 Ex-Major, Signal Corps. 

I want to introduce that just to show that those sets were not com- 
plete, that the towers had not been received. 

[8183] The Vice Chairman. That was three additional sets, 
wasn't it? 

General Short. I don't know from his wire whether it was three 
additional sets. You see, we originally were authorized three sets. 
It was changed to six. I think the situation was that the three towers 
were there but that the plans for the erection of the towers and for the 
footings to be installed by the engineers had not been received and 

79716 — 46 — pt. 7 9 



3034 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

were not forwarded to Hawaii until sometime about December 10 or 12. 
I am not sure of the exact date. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, let's be clear in our understanding. 
You had six mobile sets in operation ? 

General Short. I definitely had six mobile sets. 

The Vice Chairman. You had three stationary sets that had not 
been put in operation? 

General Short. That is correct; and were not complete in all ways. 

The Vice Chairman. But did those three stationary sets have the 
towers there? 

General Short. I don't know. This [referring to wire] raises a 
doubt in my mind. I thou^iht that the towers were there, but the 
plans were not. This wire here that I just got, raises a little doubt in 
my mind as to whether [8J84^] my information was exactly 
correct, but I am sure that the plans for the erection of the towers had 
not been received. 

The Vice Chairman. "Well, you don't know whether the three towers 
for the three stationary sets were there in Hawaii at the time, or not? 

General Short. I am not positive. 

The Vice Chairman. You are not positive ? 

General Short. I had thought that they were. 

The Vice Chair^ian. And you don't know whether that telegram 
just read relates to the towers for the three stationary sets already in 
Hawaii or the three sets that were to be sent there? 

General Short. I do not, because there is no statement made. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Thank you. With all six of the 
mobile sets, radar sets that you did have there — were they in operation 
on the 7th of December ? 

General Short. I am of the opinion they were. I imagine some- 
time during the day certain sets were temporarily out of commission 
because that happened right along. But I don't know. 

The Vice Chairman. You don't know? 

[81SS] General Short. Don't know. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, on page 38 of your statement, General, 
you refer to radar schedule under No. 50. You state : 

Radar schedule. 

After the aii'craft warning service information was closed at 7 a. m. December 
7, the Opana Station remained in operation. On Saturday, December 6, 1941, 
Second Lieutenant Grover C. White. Jr.. Signal Corps, had obtained permission 
of the Control Olhccr to have all stations operate from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. only on 
Sunday, December 7, 1941. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairm.vn. Did you know that permission had been 
granted to Lieutenant Wliite? 

General Short. No, sir; I did not. I had ordered, as part of the 
interceptor command and aircraft warning service, the operation only 
from 4 to 7. The additional hours were part of the training pro- 
gram, and for some time they had been exceeding the prescribed hours. 
They were very keen on making progress, and they had worked well 
beyond the prescribed hours. There was no training as training pre- 
scribed on Sunday, but they had been doing it. 

[8186] I think the control officer was entirely within his province 
in permitting this training to be discontinued. I think that Major 
Berquist, who was the head control officer, felt that the men had been 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3035 

usinff their eyes so many hours, that some of them were having eye 
trouble. 

He testified to that fact before the Army Board. 

I think that perhaps was the reason they agreed to cutting out the 
training on December 7. 

The Vice Chairman. Who was having eye trouble? 

General Short. The men who were operating the oscilloscopes ; the 
radar sets. 

The Vice Chairman. Who was this major, who was the control 
officer ? 

General Short, Major Berquist was the senior man. He and INIajor 
Tindall were the only two officers we had that knew anything about it. 

The Vice Chairman. Did that major have authority to issue orders 
for radar stations not to operate without consulting you, or even 
notifying you ? 

General Short. He did where the hours were over and above the 
hours prescribed by me. There was no training prescribed Sunday. 
They had been doing it on Sunday on their own. I had not issued 
an order that they would have the training and maintenance work on 
Sunday. I considered [8187] that he was within his province 
in calling that off. 

The Vice Chairman. Then it was purely voluntary on their part? 

General Short. On Sunday, not the 4 to 7. That was a definite 
order, but the training on Sunday was voluntary. 

The Vice Chairman. And you didn't know that this. permission 
had been granted by Major Berquist to Second Lieutenant White? 

General Short. 1 did not. 

The Vice Chairman. Now you also tell about the incident there in 
which Lieutenant Tyler was involved. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Where he received this message from the man 
who was voluntarily on duty ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And practicing. That he had observed this 
flight of plajies coming in. 

General Short. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. And Tyler made the decision to do nothing 
about it? 

General Short. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. Was anything done about Tyler's action in 
that respect? 

General Short. No, sir. As soon as I heard it, [SISS] which 
was the next day, I told my chief of staff that I wanted affidavits taken 
to find out the exact status, but at that time there was no device by 
which we could differentiate between friendly planes and enemy 
planes, nobody could have told whether it was an enemy plane or a 
friendly plane. Tyler was inexperienced. I did not feel there was 
anything to justify disciplinary action against Tyler, because he had 
made what he thought was a correct decision. 

The Vice Chairman. You knew Ije was inexperienced ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. There were only two experienced men 
on the island until the return of General Davidson and Colonel 
Meehan. 



3036 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. Whether they were technically experienced 
and trained on that, General, you did have plenty of men with mature 
judgment and discretion? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. That could have been discharging these duties 
that this inexperienced officer was then discharging? 

General Short. Major Berquist selected certain men he was training 
as control officers. I think that he selected these men with instruc- 
tions to call him in case there was any doubt about anything. 

[8180] The Vice Chairman. You think he expected them to do 
that? 

General Short. To call him personally ; yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. What did you know was supposed to be done 
there in the case of receipt of information that might convey vital in- 
formation to you ? 

General Short. If there had been any doubt in the mind of whoever 
was acting as control officer, the pursuit planes at Wheeler Field 
should have been alerted immediately. 

If that lieutenant had phoned to Wheeler Field, General Davidson 
would have turned out the planes without question. It would have 
been looked into later if it were wrong, but there wouldn't have been 
any hesitation on his part. 

The Vice Chairman. Certainly there was a serious error in judg- 
ment there. This inexperienced officer that you referred to- 

General Short, He should have phoned to Major Berquist because 
his experience, I think, was probably insufficient for him to make the 
decision. 

The Vice Chairman. And you knew he was inexperienced ? 

General Short. I did not know, as a matter of fact, that he was on 
the board that morning. 

Tl^e Vice Chairman. You didn't know who was? 

[8190] General Short. I didn't know who was on there. The 
list of officers being trained as control officers was operated by Major 
Berquist. If he found that a man didn't show aptitude, he was at 
liberty to throw him off, and call for another officer. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you personally know that any of the 
radar stations were operating that morning? 

General Short. I didn't visit them that morning, but I had visited 
the radar stations, at least three of them, personally out in the field. 

I had gone through the aircraft warning service several times, the 
information center, and my orders were ordinarily carried out. When 
I gave orders, I fully expected them to be carried out. 

The Vice Chairman, I think that is natural, and I think eveij 
Army officer expects that, but one of your main complaints here is 
that although General Marshall issued you a direct order, he didn't 
do anything to see if you carried it out. 

General Short. When you come to the follow-up it depends on how 
far down you are going. I don't think I could be expected to check 
on every officer detailed there any more than I would see if the cor- 
poral of the guard received his instructions correctly when he went 
on duty. [8190-A] My f(5llow-up was expected to go far 
enough, certainly, for me to talk with the connnander of the Air 
Force, and the chief signal officer, which I did. And to know that 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3037 

"they had the picture, and trying to develop the thing in harmony as 
graphically as possible. 

The Vice Chairman. Wasn't your responsibility such that required 
you to go far enough to see that the job was properly done? 

General Short. I would say to know in general that it was being 
properly done, which I did know that they were conducting this every 
morning. I don't think that my responsibility extended to the point 
of inspecting every man that went on there as a control officer. It 
would have been a physical impossibility for me to take not just this, 
but every other line of activity on the island, and I was responsible 
for all of them, not just this, it would be physically impossible for 
me to inspect levery detail in every one of them every day ; it couldn't 
be done. 

The Vice Chairman. But weren't you required to assume sufficient 
responsibility to get the job done 'i 

General Short. I thought that I \^ as getting it done. 

The Vice Chairman. You thought you had done that? 

General Short. I had the only two men who had ever [8191] 
seen an. installation of this kind supervising it. 

The Vice Chairman. It was your responsibility to see that the 
job was properly done ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And you thought you had taken sufficient 
steps to do that? 

General Short. I thought I had. 

The Vice Chairman. And you found that you had not? 

General Short. I am not sure, in view of the impossibility of de- 
termining the difference between friend and foe that you could have 
logically said that anybody, no matter how experienced could say 
that those were hostile planes. 

The Vice Chairman. But you stated a few moments ago, General, 
that if this inexperienced second lieutenant had repoited to General 
Davidson this information that came to him, General Davidson would 
have had his planes in the air immediately. 

General Short. That is not quite what I stated. 

The Vice Chairman. That is the way I understood it. 

General Short. What I meant was he had the full authority, in spite 
of the fact that he was a lieutenant, as control officer, had full au- 
thority to alert the planes at Wheeler Field. He would just turn 
them out for [8192] hostile planes approaching. If they had 
received that report, no matter whether it had any value or not, they 
would have turned out immediately. 

The Vice Chairman. But that was not done ? 

General Short. That was not done. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ? 

The Vice Chairman. Just one more question on that, if I may. 

If the Navy had had out proper long-distant reconnaissance 
planes 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. They could have been in a position to have 
found whether they were friendly or enemy planes, couldn't they? 

General Short. If the Navy had told me that carriers were in 
Hawaiian waters, then we would have been instantly on the alert 
and we would have been suspecting everybody. 



3038 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. So it was the fault of the Navy in not con- 
ducting proper long-distant reconnaissance so as to be able to supply 
you the information ? - 

General Short. Well, I think, if you are going back to fault, you can 
go back and say, if they had received the message of the delivery of 
the ultimatum, at 1 p. m., I think they would have turned out every- 
thing for the reconnaissance. I don't think you can take one point 
and stop there. 

[819S] The Vice Chairman. But the fact remains that if the 
Navy had been conducting long-range reconnaissance, you thought 
they were, they would have been in position to supply you the infor- 
mation as to whether these were hostile or friendly planes? 

General Short. I would not say that, because I knew that the Navy 
did not have sufficient planes to conduct, for any period of time, a 
360-degree reconnaissance. If they had information pinning down 
probable hostile action to a certain time then they had enough planes 
that they could have searched practically the whole area for a few 
hours. As it was, they were searching what they considered was the 
probable line of approach of the enemy. 

The Vice Chairman, If you had had proper liaison with the Navy, 
you could probably have known whether these were hostile or friendly 
planes ? 

General Short. No, sir ; I do not think I could. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you want to say something ? 

Mr. Murphy. I was wondering how that lieutenant could be held 
responsible for knowing anything when he never heard of these war 
warnings, never had been apprised of any change in the situation, and 
had the information that the man on the street had, even though he 
was the key mnn in the control sfation. 

[8194^ General Short. The information of the war warning 
was given to General Martin. It was talked over thoroughly with 
him. Probably spent 30 minutes. The Interceptor Command was 
under him. Whether or not he read the message he saw the "Dessemi- 
nation to the few essential officers," I don't know whether he gave 
the information to Major Berquist or Major Tindall or whether he 
decided that it was limited in that. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, General, you state on the top of page 38 
of your statement, the very page that I have been asking you some 
questions about : 

At that time I was convinced that the Navy either knew the location of the 
Japanese carriers or had enough information so that they were not uneasy. I felt 
that they could handle the situation. 

General Short. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. That is correct. 

General Short. There was nothing from them of an alarming 
nature. Nothing to show that they were alarmed about the situation. 

The Vice Chairman. So you thought the Navy was taking proper 
care of the long-range reconnaissance matter and when they didn't 
notify you to the contrary you rested on that assumption? 

General Short. I thought they were doing everything they 
[8195] were capable of doing. They found nothing to alarm 
them. They had transmitted nothing to me. And I accepted it on 
that basis. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3039 

The Vice Chairman. You didn't 'check on the matter, did you, 
didn't do anything further ? 

General Short. I knew generally what they were doing but I didn't 
know specifically what hours they were sending out planes and things 
of that kind. 

The Vice Chairman. You don't think it was incumbent upon you 
to find out when they were making reconnaissance and definitely what 
they were doing? 

General Short. It was Admiral Kimmel's definite responsibility. 
I thought he was an officer of sufficient experience. He knew more 
about reconnaissance with surface ships and submarines than I did. 
I felt that he could be counted on to do his job. 

The Vice Chairman. You just assumed that was being done? 

General Short. Yes, sir; as far as he could do it. 

The Vice Chajuman. You state also on page 38 : 

About 6 : 45 a. m. a two-man submarine entering Pearl Harbor was destroyed 
by ships on duty. Had the Naval authorities foreseen this as a possible fore- 
runner of an air attack or notified the Army, time would have been available for 
the [8196] dispersion of the planes. However, the Naval authorities did 
not connect this submarine attack with a possible general attack. The Army 
was not notified until after the attack. 

General Short. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. You received no information from the Navy 
at all about this submarine incident ? 

General Short. Until after the attack. 

The Vice Chairman. Yes. 

General Short. Mr. Congressman, I would like before we leave the 
radar to add one thing, if I may. 

The Vice Chairman. Be glad for you to. 

General Short. The radar system in New York City and in Seattle 
and in San Francisco had bsen completely installed some time before 
we received any equipment and, as I understand it, in New York City 
in order to expedite it they hired experts from the American Tele- 
phone & Telegraph Co. — or RCA, rather — who were familiar with this 
type of equipment, to assist in the installation. 

Now, when it came to Hawaii, it was just a question of the officers 
digging out the thing the best they could from the pamphlets they 
had on the subject and instructing the men the best they could, which 
undoubtedly took more time. It looked like the War Department 
was more interested in developing radar on the mainland than in 
Hawaii. 

[8197] The Vice Chairman. You think that is a proper rea- 
son, then, for you not being more careful about the operation of radar 
in Hawaii ? 

General Short. No, sir. I think that is the reason why our radar 
was still in the experimental stage. If we had been furnished it as 
early as New York and Seattle, we probably would have had it much 
better developed. 

The Vice Chairman. The fact is a man voluntarily practicing 
on the radar that you did have found these planes coming in. 

General Short. That is correct ; but he didn't know what they were. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 



3040 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. As a matter of fact we know that planes were 
■coming in from San Francisco. They came in 5 minutes later. Just 
a difference in direction of 3 degrees. 

The Vice Chairman. What was done about Lieutenant Tyler? 
You said you didn't recommend any disciplinary action. 

General Short. I did not. I believe, I am quite sure that General 
Emmons, who succeeded me, did not, because I think he [Lieutenant 
Tyler] has gone ahead throughout the war and received and been 
promoted. 

The Vice Chairman. What is his present rank ? 

General Short. I believe he is a lieutenant colonel. 

[8198] The Vice Chairman. Been promoted from lieutenant 
to lieutenant colonel ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Now, then, on page 47 of your statement you quote questions and 
answers there between counsel and General Miles while Miles was a 
witness before the committee. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman, One of the quotations there is: 

Mr. Gesell. What is the explanation of that? 

General Miles. The main reason was that the code experts apparently agreed, 
at least the Navy was particularly strong on the point that their code was 
much more secure than ours. It was obviously, of course, of great importance 
in security that a message be sent in only one code and not two and we had 
every reason to believe, or thought we did, that a Navy message to Hawaii would 
be promptly transmitted to the Army authorities there. 

You quote that part of the testimony. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you and Admiral Kimmel keep each 
other thoroughly informed as to all information j^ou received? 

General Short. I will tell you what the practice was. 

[8109] Whenever he received a message that directed the mes- 
sage be transmitted to me or that the Chief of Staff concurred in this 
message he furnished me with a copy. He did not furnish me with 
copies of other messages. He frequently, when we were together, 
told me of some other information but the only thing that I got from 
the Navy were the messages that he was told to deliver to me. 

The Vice Chairman. All you got from Admiral Kimmel were the 
messages that he was told to deliver to you? 

General Short. As far as messages were concerned. As I say, there 
were times when he picked up items of interest that he told me of. 

The Vice Chairman. That was more or less accidental? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. How about the messages received by you, did 
you promptly inform Admiral Kimmel of what they contained? 

General Short. I don't think I received any message that I didn't 
send to him, because I didn't have more than a half-dozen. I think 
every message that I got either showed that it was going to him or 
I sent him a copy. 

The Vice Chairman. You feel sure then that you kept him fully 
informed as to all information received by you through messages but 
he did not do the same thing to you ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3041 

[8£00] General Short. Well, I would say there was this differ- 
ence. I got such a limited number of messages and only the very 
important messages. I got a message on July 8, on July 25, and on 
October 20, and November 27, and then one on the 7th, that came 
after the attack. I think those five were the only messages from July 
on that I received pertaining to the situation, the international situa- 
tion, and I am quite sure that they were all furnished to him, to the 
Navy. They, on the other hand got, I think, much more information 
and lots of it, apparently, that they didn't feel I had any interest in 
or that they assumed I had received. 

The Vice Chairman. How about these code messages, about burning 
the codes, was that conveyed to you ? 

General Short. That was not. 

The Vice Chairman. It was not conveyed to you ? 

General Short. Not conveyed to me. 

The Vice Chairman. The Navy had it? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And did not tell you anything about it? 

General Short. No, sir ; and there was no direction in those messages 
that they should. 

The Vice Chairman. So unless there was a definite direction in the 
Navy message to tell you about it, why, you were not told ? 

[8201] General Short. I think that is absolutely correct. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Now, General, I would just like to ask you this question, with all 
deference and proper respect but if the messages sent, that is, if the 
messages not sent to you from Washington which you think should 
have been sent had made no more impression than the messages that 
were sent to you from Washington, what difference do you think it 
would have made ? 

General Short. I don't think that is a correct statement at all. 
There was never a message received by me that didn't make an im- 
pression. It may not have made the impression on me that ycu get 
from it or you think it should have made, but I never received a 
message from Washington that I didn't analyze carefully and make 
up my mind what the message meant. 

The Vice Chairman. And you think these messages that were not 
sent to you from Washington would have been more important to you 
than those that were sent ? 

General Short. There were two that could hardl}^ fail. The inter- 
cept which was the bombing plan of Pearl Harbor and the message 
stating that the ultimatum would be delivered at 1 p. m., which could 
have been sent to me 4 hours before the attack, and reached me 7 
hours after the attack. Those two messages would definitely have 
meant something to me. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, on page 53 of your statement, [8£02'] 
General, there is this sentence, and I will read it to you : 

During the period November 27 to December 6 the Navy made no requests for 
Army planes to participate in distant reconnaissance. 

That is true, is it ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And that also led you to believe that the 
Navy had sufficient planes and was conducting distant reconnaissance 
as it should have been ? 



3042 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. As they deemed desirable and necessary. 
The Vice Chairman. All right. 

On page 54, you state, under the No. 8G, "Army-Navy Cooperation," 
your last sentence in that paragraph : 

With a large part of the United States Navy in Hawaiian waters and with 
their sources of information, I was convinced that the Navy would be able either 
to intercept any carrier attempting to approach Oahu or at least to obtain such 
information from task forces or by reconnaissance as to make them aware of 
the presence of carriers in the Hawaiian waters and the probability of an air 
attack. 

General Short. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. And you have stated several times that you 
relied upon the Navy entirely in this respect ? 

General Short. Yes, sir ; I had no source of information [8203] 
of my own. 

The Vice Chairman. And they never at any time called on you 
for any assistance so far as reconnaissance was concerned ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, General, I believe you stated here, and 
it also appears rather clearly in your statement, that you did not 
have any conference with Admiral Kimmel from December 3 to 
December?? 

General Short. That is correct ; no personal conference. 

The Vice Chairman. No personal conference. 

General Short. The liaison officer. Major Fleming, who did a great 
deal of my business with the Navy, and Colonel PfeifFer, who was the 
gunnery officer of the fleet, had conferences about the equipment for 
Kanton and Christmas. 

The Vice Chairman. And the last conference between the Army 
and Navy was December 4 ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. There was no conference between the Army 
and Navy in Hawaii between December 4 and December 7 ? 

General Short. Well, that would not be true of the ONI and G-2, 
because the ONI and our contact officer had offices next door to each 
other, had a teletype system, and on subversive measures particularly 
they, I think, were usually in touch several times a day on practically 
all of the subversive activities. 

[S204] The Vice Chairman. But you didn't have any confer- 
ence with Admiral Kimmel after December 3 ? 

General Short. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And no staff officer or responsible officer with 
you conferred with the Navy after December 4, you say ? 

General Short. No, sir. I will say, however, that Lieutenant Burr, 
the liaison officer, was in the G-3 section, and knew everything that was 
taking place, I am sure. 

The Vice Chairman. I mean December 3. December 3 was the last 
conference you had? 

General Short. That is what I understood you said. 

The Vice Chairman. Somebody suggested that I said December 
30. 

General Short. I understood the 3d. 

The Vice Chairman. December 3 was the last conference you had 
with Admiral Kimmel? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3043 

General Short. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. And December 4 was the last conference that 
your Colonel Pfeifer 

General Short, Major Fleming and Colonel Pfeifer. 

The Vice Chairman. Had with the Navy? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

[■8^05] The Vice Chairman. Now, just this question in con- 
clusion, General: 

When Admiral Kimmel tells this committee he did not know you 
had gone on a sabotage alert only, and thought you had gone on full 
alert, and you tell us you thought the Navy was conducting long-range 
reconnaissance when they were not, does that look like proper liaison 
between the Army and Navy? 

General Short. I still believe they were conducting long-range re- 
connaissance. Maybe not all you think they should have, but I am 
sure they were. As to the other, my only answer to that is that they 
had a staff man in our operating section who was familiar with every- 
thing, had no duty, no function, except to keep the staff of the Four- 
teenth Naval District informed of what was going on, and I am sure 
that somebody on that staff was informed. 

The Vice Chairman. The point is. General, do you know about it. 

General Short. Yes, I have Lieutenant Burr's testimony as to 
what 

The Vice Chairman. I mean, did you know then it was being done? 

General Short. I know that he was sitting there with no other duty, 
had no other purpose in being there except [8306] to tell them 
what we were doing, and I knew there was nothing being held out 
from him. 

The Vice Chairman. Who was the Army man to find out for the 
Army? 

General Short. The Army man ? 

The Vice Chairman, Yes. ' 

General Short. With the Navy ? 

The Vice Chairman. Yes. 

General Short. In the Harbor Patrol we had an officer 8 hours a 
day. Lieutenant Dingle. 

The Vice Chairman. Eight hours of the 24 ? 

General Short. Yes. Major Fleming was in constant touch. He 
wasn't sitting in the office, but he was in direct touch with them, and 
got a great deal of information. 

I think that they had a great deal of confidence in him. That was 
one. 

The Vice Chairman. He was the equivalent of Lieutenant Burr ? 

General Short. Mo ; because Lieutenant Burr 

The Vice Chairman. Who was the Army equivalent of Lieutenant 
Burr? 

General Short. We did not have, except at the Harbor Patrol Post, 
any man who sat in 

The Vice Chairman. You did not have any Army man who 
[8£07'\ was the equivalent or opposite of Lieutenant Burr? 

General Short. We did not. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now then, was there anything 
that could have been more important than the very things that you 
and the Navy did not know about with respect to each other? 



3044 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. I think that I knew in regard to their reconnais- 
sance really practically all that I could be expected to know; that they 
were using their combination of ships, submarines, and planes, to re- 
connoiter the waters that they considered most dangerous. They 
were the ones to make the decision. 

Now, as to what they didn't know about my operations, I think it 
must have been faulty staff work, because they should have known. 
At least one Navy man was fully informed. Lieutenant Burr un- 
questionably knew. And, as I say, it was his sole function, sole duty, 
to get it to them. Now, I don't know inside their staff how they 
operated. 

The Vice Chairman. How about inside your staff, General. You 
didn't have any opposite to Lieutenant Burr? 

General Short. I did not have any opposite to Lieutenant Burr 
but I did have, as I say, Major Fleming who operated at irregular 
intervals, and I did too; and I had conferences at that particular 
period, frequent enough that I think anything of importance would 
have been given to me personally. 

[8208} The Vice Chairman. Well, you Imow now that the Navy 
was not conducting long-range reconnaissance in the direction from 
which the Japanese attack came ? 

General Short. I grant you that. 

The Vice Chairman. But you didn't know back at that time it was 
not being done, did you ? 

General Short. No; and I don't know any more than the Navy 
knew that that was the direction they were coming. They had made 
the decision. I don't know whether it was on account of weather 
conditions that that was thought the most dangerous direction. 

The Vice Chairman. You didn't know at that time that that de- 
cision had been made? 

General Short. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Senator George. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, before Senator George proceeds 
I would like to make one request, in the interest, I hope, of expediting. 

I have made a request for the documents from the War and Navy 
Departments with particular reference to the Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral reports on discussions in connection with the Roberts Commis- 
sion.^ I have a very full memorandum from the office of our counsel 
enclosing five items from the War [8209] Department, who, 
apparently, gave a considerably broader construction to my request 
than the Navy did. 

It seems to me that they are documents of very considerable im- 
portance in connection with the historical record dealing with the con- 
templated action of The Adjutant General as recommended to them, 
I don't know whether this has ever come to the attention of General 
Short or not. 

Have you ever seen the possible charges that were contemplated in 
connection with your case? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. How long since you have had those? 

General Short. I think in the last 2 or 3 days. 

Senator Brewster. Well, I would like to request that these, there 
are five items, be made an exhibit in this case, in order that they may 

^ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5495 et seq. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3045 

be formally a part of the record, and then at any appropriate time 
General Short may make any comment that he desires regarding some 
of the comments, some of which are favorable, some of which are un- 
favorable. 

[8£10] The Chairman. Does the CKair understand the Sena- 
tor to want to make as an exhibit here some informal memoranda in 
the War Department upon which charges might have been based but 
were not? 

Senator Brewster. Well, I would not call it informal. It is a for- 
mal report of the Judge Advocate General discussing the whole case 
at length and giving a very compreliensive review of it, analyzing all 
of it, and it seems to me that this will inevitably in the future be a 
thing that will be one of the things that will be considered and it 
seemed to me that it ought properly to be a part of our record. If 
there is some question about it I would be glad to defer it for discussion. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, my only question was your re- 
quest is to put it all in as an exhibit ? 

Senator Brewster. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, I was not clear on that. You said there 
were four or five things. 

Senator Brewster. Four or five items which are submitted here, 
which have been submitted. 

The Vice Chairman. But you are not desiring to pick out part of it ? 

Senator Brewster. Oh, no. 

The Vice Chairman. You want to put it all in ? 

[8211] Senator Brewster. That is right, including the letter 
from the War Department transmitting it. 

The Vice Chairman. As an exhibit? 

Senator Brewster. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. I just wanted to be clear. 

Mr. Murphy. May I ask the Senator how long that material that 
he has there has been available? 

The Chairman. Counsel has a suggestion. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, with reference to the situation as to the 
Navy, I will get the representative of the Navy to make a search to 
see whether the Adjutant General's office participated to any extent 
whatever 

Senator Brewster. The Judge Advocate. 

Mr. Richardson. The Judge Advocate's office participated to any 
extent whatever in relation to the Roberts report or a report on the 
Roberts report and investigation and he says that he will make a 
further investigation and report to me. When I get that I will turn 
it over to Senator Brewster. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire how long this material 
that is now being made an exhibit has been available? 

Senator Brewster. I should say perhaps 50 pages. 

Mr. Murphy. No, I am asking how long it has been available to the 
committee. 

Senator Brewster. I have seen it about 10 minutes. I [821^'] 
received it about 10 minutes ago. 

Mr. Murphy. No other member of the committee has seen it or 
knows what is in it. 



3046 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Well, the Chair suggests that the Senator withhold 
his request until other members have had a chance to look at it. 
I don't know that there will be any objection to it. 

Senator Brewster. That is quite all right. I just brought up the 
point to be sure that General Short had ample opportunity to examine 
it before he was cross-examined on it, because naturally you could 
not give this to him and expect that he would make any comment 
within a short time, that is all I had in mind. Perhaps it can be 
adjusted this afternoon. 

The Chairman. It would be obviously impossible, if no member of 
the committee ever has seen it, to examine it. 

Senator Bkewster. As an exhibit, I assume it will be available to 
everybody, but I have no dq^ire^to press the request, Mr. Chairman, 
immediately. 

The Chairman. All right, we will pass on it later. 

General Short. Mr. Chairman, may I make a statement at this 
point? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

General Short. If that is material, if this material is being put in 
it seems to me appropriate that the letters pre- [8213'] ceding 
this and which caused the Judge Advocate General to prepare the 
opinion he did be put in. 

Senator Brewster. I would tliink so ; I agree with you and that is 
what I expected. I am not certain whether all of the correspondence 
is included here or not but I would certainly say that it should be. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, does the General have that 
correspondence ? 

General Short. I have it, I think. 

Senator Ferguson. Could we see it? 

General Short. I will state that there is one item of the correspond- 
ence that I have not been able to get from the official files. I asked 
Colonel Duncombe for it and it has not yet been located. It was a 
personal letter to the Chief of Staff forwarding an application to the 
Adjutant General, and I have a copy of that letter that I can put in. 

Senator Brewster. What was the date of that? 

General Short. That was January 25. 

Senator Brewster. 26th ? 

General Short. 25th, a personal letter from me to the Chief of 
Staff and I have not been provided with that official letter by the War 
Department but I do have a copy of it. 

The Vice Chairman. The year. General ? 

[821J^] General Short. January 25, 1942. 

Senator Ferguson. Might we see what you have then? 

Senator Brewster. Well, I have here a letter of January 25, 1942, 
from Oklahoma City, Okla. "Subject: Time." Is that the letter? 

General Short, That probably is it. May I see it? 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

General Short. That probably is it. That to which I am referring 
is one that I did not succeed in getting. No, sir ; this is the letter that 
I enclosed with the personal letter. 
Snnator Brewster, All right. 

The Chairman. Well, any additional documents or letters that 
might be well made a part of the exhibit should be passed upon when 
the committee passes on the exhibit later on. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3047' 

General Short. Shall these just be turned in or read? 

The Chairman. Well, I think probably you might turn them in, 
General. It will be acted upon when the other matter is reached. 

The Vice Chairman. Just as a suggestion, Senator, why don't you 
turn the thing over to Mr. Masten and let him get it all together and 
bring it to our attention this afternoon and then we will know what 
you want to offer? 

Senator Brewster. That is precisely what I was going to [8215'\ 
suggest. I think that would be the orderly way to handle it and make 
sure that General Short's counsel can cover the case as completely as 
they wish. 

The Chairman. All right. Senator George. 

Senator George. General Short, I have not heard all of your direct 
testimony and very little, practically none, of the cross examination 
by counsel and at this time, at least, I wish to ask you about only one' 
matter. 

I believe it is agreed, so far as your direct statement goes, that the 
function of the Navy under the joint agreement approved March the^ 
28th by Admiral Bloch and yourself was to provide distant recon- 
naissance. 

General Short. That is correct. 

Senator George. Or deep reconnaissance. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. Was there ever any dispute about the function of 
the Navy ? 

General Short. Never. I am sure that they agreed fully. I think 
Admiral Kimmel's testimony stated specifically that it was his re- 
sponsibility. 

Senator George. That was my recollection but I wish to know if 
there was any dispute or doubt about it. General Marshall also seems 
to have agreed that distant reconnaissance was a naval function and 
the Army commander was liable to [8216] furnish them such, 
planes suitable for that purpose as could be provided. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. In his examination before the Army board Gen- 
eral Marshall made this direct statement also : 

As I recall the matter, the only way the Army would have been involved in the 
deep recpunaissance would have been in detaching units to serve in the Navy. 

General Short. That is correct. 

Senator George. You say you only had actually about six planes 
that were suitable for this type of service or kind of service? 

General Short. That is correct. I had 12 B-l7's but 6 of them had 
been stripped of parts to keep the planes going to the Philippines 
going, so we had only 6 that could operate. 

Senator George. Only six? 

General Short. Yes. 

Senator George. Admiral Kimmel was aware of that condition with, 
respect to these planes ? 

General Short. We had an arrangement whereby every day Gen- 
eral Martin, commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, and Admiral Bel- 
linger exchanged information as to what planes were actually in 
condition to operate that day, and I think they [8217] knew 
every day the exact number. 



3048 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator George. Now, General, I wish to ask you, because I am not 
able to quite interpret it, in view of the fact that it was the function 
of the Navy to provide at least distant reconnaissance, and that fact 
was known to General Marshall, because he has testified to it not only 
in this but in prior hearings, what did he mean precisely by his mes- 
sage of November 27, which probably was not received by you until 
the 28th or maybe later 

The Vice Chairman. No; he said he received it the same day. 

Senator George. Later on the 27th. According to General Mar- 
shall's testimony, as I recollect it, it was reported to have left very 
late on the day of the 27th, but that is immaterial. 

What did he mean by this statement to you, this direct directive: 

You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you 
deem necessary. 

What did he mean by "such reconnaissance" in that message? 

General Short. I think that got into that message due to the fact 
that General Marshall did not write the message. He had approved 
the arrangement with the Navy, and I am sure that if he had personally 
written the message or had seen it [8318] before it went out 
that he would have known that it was the Navy function. I think that 
is the complete answer as to why that expression was used in there. 

Senator George. Well, were you charged with the duty or respon- 
sibility of carrying on any type or kind of reconnaissance ? 

General Short. We were supposed to carry reconnaissance up to 
20 miles from the shore. We actually, on account of the planes that 
we were using, usually sent them not beyond 10 miles, and it depended 
on the visual ability of the pilot for the other 10. The only value that 
that had was in connection with submarines because the time element 
was such that if they had seen an enemy plane it would have been in 
there before they could have made a report. 

Senator George. It would have been of no service so far as it con- 
templated 

General Short. So far as an air attack went ; no, sir. 

Senator George. So far as an air attack went. General, now I 
would like to ask you this direct question: It just troubles me very 
greatly. 

General Marshall, with the knowledge that you were not charged 
with the responsibility of carrying on any distant reconnaissance, 
or deep reconnaissance, nevertheless directed you to undertake "such 
reconnaissance and other measures as [8219] you deem neces- 
sary." Your immediate reply to that message was that you had alerted 
against sabotage as you have described. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. There is nothing in the suggestion "and undertake 
such reconnaissance," is there, that would bring to your mind the 
suggestion, rather, that you should simply alert against sabotage? 
In other words, isn't it inconsistent with the response which you imme- 
diately made that you had alerted against sabotage when his direction 
to you was to take some type of reconnaissance ? 

General Short. Such as I deemed necessary and in view of the fact 
that it was the Navy's responsibility, fully admitted by them, approved 
by the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations and with a defi- 
nite provision in that agreement that that would only be abrogated 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3049 

upon written notice, so it was my best judgment that there was not 
any reconnaissance necessary for me to take. 

Senator George. AVell, I could understand that but what I do not 
imderstand is how you could have consistently interpreted this direc- 
tive here to you to mean an alert against sabotage when the use of 
the word "reconnaissance" here certainly would indicate something 
beyond an alert against sabotage as I understand it. I am a mere 
layman and trying to [8220] understand that situation as it 
actually existed. 

General Short. Since I was not — since the Army was not taking 
any reconnaissance I did not report it because it was a naval function, 
they were the ones that would make a reconnaissance. 

Senator George. I think that seems to be rather clear, yet General 
Marshall did approve this message that went to you and in it he refers 
to "reconnaissance." 

General Short. As I understand it he did not see that message till 
the day after it was sent. His name was signed to it. While his name 
was signed to it it was prepared by General Gerow and the Secretary 
of War. 

Senator George. General, I do not recall the exact testimony of 
General Marshall but my recollection was that he did say that he had 
approved the message although he was absent from Washington until 
late in the day that the message was dated, down in North Carolina 
on some sort of inspection trip. 

The Vice Chairman. He said he went over it on the 26th. 

Senator George. Yes, but I think it is clear that the function of the 
Navy was to provide any distant reconnaissance that might become 
necessary or that might be ordered and I think it is clear that General 
Marshall himself knew of that understanding and that agreement and 
I am just curious to know why he should have directed you to take such 
reconnaissance [8221] as you thought necessary under those 
circumstances ? 

General Short. Well, I believe he read that message; he said that 
he thought he saw the message on the 28th after he returned from 
maneuvers and apparently, if it struck him at all, he did not think 
it was significant enough to send me a message correcting it because 
he did not know it before it was sent. 

Senator George. There is no dispute here in this record that you did 
advise precisely what you had done. 

General Short. Just exactly. 

Senator George. And that that was in response to a request in that 
message. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. And that thereafter you had no advice that your 
alert against sabotage was insufficient or inadequate. 

General Short. That is correct. 

Senator George. You had known of the warning messages — code 
messages about destruction of codes or important paper messages sent 
to you prior to the attack? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Senator George. Mr. Chairman, that is all that I have to ask General 
Short, at least at this time. 

The Chairman. Congressman Clark. 

79716— 46— pT. 7 10 



3050 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[8^22] Mr. Clakk. General, I wish to ask you only a very few 
questions. . '. 

At or about the time you took command at Pearl Harbor it was 
suggested, I think, by General Marshall that the chief danger to our 
establishment at Hawaii was an attack by air. Did you agree with 
that? 

General Short. I think that I took his suggestion that if an attack 
came— he stated that there were three things that were of primary 
importance that would cause the danger and the first thing he men- 
tioned was sabotage; the second was attack by air or submarine. 

Mr. Clark. Well, I have the impression from this record that he 
listed attack by air as the chief danger. 

General Short. May I read exactly what he said in that letter ? In 
the next to the last paragraph he states : 

Risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air or by submarine 
constitute the real perils of the situation. 

Mr. Clark. And he goes on to eliminate much danger from a landing 
attack. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Now, you agreed with that" estimate ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. And subsequent events proved it to be cor- {82'23'] 
rect. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. You did not on or about the 7th of December anticipate 
any surprise attack by air, did you ? 

General Short. I did not. 

Mr. Clark. You had something to say in your statement about re- 
quests made for additional equipment. Do you think that the com- 
bined equipment and manpower of the Army and Navy as it existed 
on the 7th of December was sufficient to have discovered and broken 
up or greatly lessened the damage if it had been fully employed? 

General Short. That is very difficult to say, whether we would 
necessarily have discovered the carriers. If we had been told 4 hours, 
which was possible, before the attack of the time set for the delivery 
of the ultimatum we might have been lucky and picked up the carriers. 

Mr. Clark. Well, I don't think you quite get my question, General, 
if you will pardon me. I am asking you whether from, say, the 27th 
of November until the 7th of December if full use had been made of 
all the equipment and manpower available under the joint agreement 
between the Army and Navy, do you think that the attack might have 
been discovered or broken up or its effect greatly lessened with just 
what you had? 

General Short. I think to have made the maximum use of 
[8£24] that and felt justified in making the maximum use of it we 
would have had to have something pointing to Hawaii. Admiral 
Kimmel had orders to make a deployment preparatory to placing 
War Plan 46 into operation, which was an offensive against the Man- 
date Islands. 

Now, if we had had something that indicated an attack at Pearl 
Harbor he undoubtedly would have discarded that part and would 
have devoted everything he had toward the reconnaissance. He ap- 
parently did not feel that he could use up all of his planes and maybe 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3051 

having nothing at the critical time when he got an order to take an 
offensive action in the Carolines. I think a more positive indication 
as to an attack on Hawaii would have made him use the types of planes 
that he had very definitely for reconnaissance and would have given 
a suitable opportunity of locating the Japanese carriers. 

Mr. Clark. Well, did I understand you to consider the use of the 
ships in the manner that they were used as constituting a deployment? 

General Short. Undoubtedly he was using his ships — I don't know 
just exactly in what way, but he was told to use them as a defensive 
deployment preparatory to going forward. 

Mr. Clark. There were some ships out, that he had sent to these 
islands, one of which was on the way back in. 

[8B25] General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. And if I have your testimony correctly you have pre- 
sented that here as constituting a deployment to that extent in that 
area. 

General Short. No; I presented that as constituting a reconnais- 
sance. 

Mr. Clark. Well. I meant reconnaissance when I said deployment. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Now, with those particular ships aside was there not 
sufficient equipment still on the island to have conducted a considerable 
reconnaissance? 

General Short. A considerable reconnaissance but not 360°, and it 
still would have been a matter of his judgment as to what was the 
dangerous sector of that 360°. 

Mr. Clark. But the fact that you could not cover the entire 360° 
would not constitute any reason, would it, for not employing that 
equipment to the full extent possible? 

General Short. No, sir. I think probably what influenced him in 
that was that he felt his job was going to be to take offensive action, 
that he did not want to get his planes and his crews into such shape 
that they would not be alDle to take that when they got the order. 

Mr. Clark. Now, you think that was the reason, or was it 
[8226'\ the reason, really, that he was not dreaming of a surprise 
attack on Pearl Harbor. 

General Short. He did not expect a surprise attack on Pearl 
Harbor. 

Mr. Clark. And neither did you. 

General Short. Neither did I. 

Mr. Clark. And, consequently, this material and equipment and 
men were not used at the site where there might be a surprise attack, 
isn't that correct ? 

General Short. I believe that Admiral Kimmel is a more logical 
person to ask as to why he did not employ his ships and planes. 

Mr. Clark. Yes. 

General Short. But I feel that unquestionably that the fact that 
we had had nothing pointing to an attack on Hawaii very definitely 
entered into his use of his ships and planes. 

Mr. Clark. Just why did you go into an antisabotage ? 

General Short. Because there never had been at any time anything 
since June 1940 indicating that the War Department believed that 
an attack on Hawaii was probable, so that left it if hostilities oc- 



3052 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

curred and did not include an attack, then it left nothing but sabo- 
tage and internal disorders. 

{5£^/] Mr. Clark. Would you mind stating what difference 
in routine or daily action you invoked upon going on an antisabotage 
alert? 

General Short. When you went into an antisabotage alert, the men 
who were placed OiS guards over all the \'ital installations like 
bridges, telephone exchanges, gasoline tanks, everything of that kind, 
naturally were not continuing in their training, in instruction. 

There were also two battalions that remained on a 24-hour alert, 
with every man required to be present, with the motor transporta- 
tion there so that they could be moved to any part of tlie island to 
put down any possible uprising or disorder. 

All of the rest of the men in the Department continued their 
training. 

Xow. that was sabotage alert Xo. 1. When you went to Xo. 2 
you had this same provision against sabotage, but in addition t-o that 
you had arrangements to meet a surface, or subsurface, or an air 
attack. That meant every plane and every man in the Air Corps 
was devoting his attention to being ready to meet an air attack. 
You would probably have a squadron of pursuit planes in the air 
all the time. You would have certain other squadrons warmed up, 
and they would all be so alerted that they could get in the air 
[S^^'S] in a certain number of minutes. The planes that would 
not be in the air would be in the bimkers. The men belonging to 
the crew would be in the bimkers. would sleep in the bunkers. They 
had their gasoline there, had ammunition there. 

The harbor defense troops would be fully manned, ready to fire 
upon any approaching Japanese ships. The antiaircraft guns would 
be all at the prescribed j :<^sitions and with fidl crews and ammunition 
immediately at hand and ready to fire. 

I would like to explain, if I may at this point, that some may have 
gotten the wrong idea yesterday in presenting that table signed by 
Colonel Wing. A considerable number of those batteries had to move 
maybe 20 miles, so that accounted for tlie length of time from the 
time they were alerted until they were ready to fire. 

That is not part of your question, but I wanted to point that out 
because that naturally came in with alert Xo. 1. 

Xow. you see. in that case the only people who could continue to 
train would be the infantry divisions. Everything else practically 
would be alerted. 

The infantry divisions could go ahead with their training, because 
they are not part of alert Xo. 2. 

[8229] When you come to alert Xo. 3. that is an all-out alert, 
where every man goes to his battle position, every j^ompany and pla- 
toon, battalion, of infantry go to their positions, take up their posi- 
tions, ready to meet an attack, and if their positions have not been 
developed and improved they would start continuing the develop- 
ment, doing more digging, if they need to. putting out barbed wire in 
front of them, doing everything to meet a landing attack. 

Does that answer your question ? 

Mr. Clark. Yes. sir. 

Getting back to the alert you did take, the antisabotage alert, about 
the onlv difference there as against what you were doing before would 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOIXT COMMITTEE 3053 

be to put these particular men on a 24-hour basis rather than regular 
hours? 

General Short. I would like to explain that rather fully. 

Mr. Clark. 1 would like to get clear as to just what ifference it 
made. 

General Short. Between that and ordinary times ? 

Mr. Clark. That is right. 

General J?hort. If there had been no alarming condition we would 
not have had anv of those men out over bridges and ciTilian installa- 
tions and things of that kind. If [82-SOj it was just normal 
peacetimes. I would not have any of that on. 

Xow, as a matter of fact, beginning July S. the situation was such 
that we put considerable number of men out. 

When we got this message of Xovember 27, I had the sentinels 
checked. That was especially true along the water front because we 
had a very serious situation, that all the gasoline that was available 
commercially in Hawaii, which meant a great amount, was open to easy 
sabotage. 

I had General Murray, who commanded the Twentylfifth Division, 
occupy the positions on the south side of the island, and Colonel 
Fielder, who was the G-2. personally go over the whole situation with 
respect to sentinels, to recommend changes, and we made a very de- 
cided overhaul, and put on a great many additional sentinels. We 
did a most thorough job. and particularly around the water front 
where there was danger from fire from gasoline, and so forth. 

Mr. Clark. But that was all precautions against what might take 
place by people located on the island. 

General Short. Yes. sir. 

Mr. Clark. It did not make any great change in that situation? 

Greneral Short. Well, it required a considerable number [SSSlI 
of more men. There were more men who were not able to go on 
with their training. We felt it made a very considerable change in 
that we were much safer as far as any internal action went than 
we were before, because we spent the whole time in going into that 
extremely carefully. 

Mr. Clark. That was the extent of the action that you. as the com- 
manding officer, felt that you could take in response to the message 
you received on the 27th ? 

General Short. With the information I had that was all the enemy 
action I anticip-ated. or expected. 

3>Ir. Clark. Just what was there in this message that caused you to 
feel there might be more danger of injury from people on the island? 

General Short. I thought there was more danger of imminent 
action. 

Mr. Clark. Beg pardon? 

General Short. I thought there was great danger of imminent hos- 
tilities. Since they had never at any time pointed toward Hawaii 
as a place of attack, and the officers who wrote their estimate on 
November 29 said they definitely eliminated it. as I saw the thing, 
our problem was to meet internal disorders. 

Mr. CxuiRK. Could you give the committee an illustration of any 
internal disorder, you had had before [SS32] that ? 

General Short. I had tried to state that we had tightened the ring 
so that there would not be any. We had succeeded ; there never wasl 



3054 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Clark. From the time you got there until the 7th of December, 
there was no internal disorder? 

General Short. No, sir; but there had been for almost 2 years a 
considerable number of sentinels on duty watching. There had hardly 
been a time in 2 years that they had not had considerable guards out 
against sabotage. 

Mr. CixARK. Had there been any sabotage ? 

General Short. No sir ; but that is no indication that there would 
not be. We all knew the possibilities, with the large Japanese popu- 
lation, and I think most of us remembered the sabotage that had 
taken place in the United States in 1917, and we were determined to 
prevent that, if possible. 

Mr. Clark. Now, although there had been no sabotage, the only 
action you took pursuant to this message was to further guard 
against it ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Clark. Now, if you had gone on an all-out alert, according to 
your testimony, as I got it, it would have [8233] attracted a 
great deal of attention on the island ? 

General Short. Unquestionably. We would have troops move un- 
der full field equipment over practically every road on the island. 

Mr. Clark. Practically everybody on the island would have known 
what was taking place? 

General Short. I think they would. I think we had hundreds of 
Japanese-Americans actually in the service at that time, in the Na- 
tional Guard regiments. Some of those may have been Japanese 
agents. We didn't know. 

Mr. Clark. Now, was there anything to keep Admiral Kimmel 
from noticing that you were not on that kind of an alert? 

General Short. I think if he had been ashore, he would have noticed 
it, if we had gone on the all-out alert, because he could not have helped 
seeing the movement of troops. 

Mr. Clark. But he was ashore, wasn't he? 

General Short. From his headquarters at Pearl Harbor, I do not 
know that he could see any traffic. 

Mr. Clark. Well, you mean to tell the committee everybody on the 
island would have known you were on an all-out alert, except Admiral 
Kimmel ? 

General Short. Undoubtedly some of the Navy people [S^SJ^] 
would have known. 

Mr. Clark. He says he did not know that you were not on an all- 
out alert. 

General Short. I still insist it was faulty staff work on the part of 
the Fourteenth Naval District if he did not know. 

Mr. Clark. And you did not know that he was making a long- 
distant reconnaissance? 

General Short. I knew he was making considerable long-distance 
reconnaissance. I did not know the exact time the planes were going 
out, or the exact location of the ships, but I knew he was making con- 
siderable long-distance reconnaissance. He told me he had tightened 
up all along the line. That was the expression he used. 

Mr. Clark. Did vou consider that important. General? 

General Short. I did. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3055 

Mr. Clark. You knew he had not called on you for the use of the 
long-distance reconnaissance planes under your control ? 

General Short. Yes, sir, and there might have been a very good 
reason. In the first place, I had only six, and those six planes were 
the only planes in Honolulu, either Army or Xavy, that could go and 
bomb a carrier that had plane protection, and had any chance to get 
away [8325] with it, that could fight as well as carry bombs. 
The Navy patrol planes were too cumbersome. If the carrier were 
protected with planes in the air in the vicinity they probably would be 
shot down if they tried to bomb. 

The B-17's were the only planes in the whole islands suitable for 
bombing missions. That might have been his reason for not calling 
on them for a patrol mission, because if they located a carrier, and 
he wanted to bomb, they were the only planes that could fight their 
way through and have a reasonable chance of getting home. 

Mr. Clark. At any rate, you knew he did not call on you ? 

General Short. He did not call on me. 

Mr. Clark. You knew he was hard pressed for planes with which 
to make long-distance reconnaissance? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Clark. And even with the Army planes, he did not have enough 
to cover the whole 360°, you say? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Clark. Because of that circumstance, did it occur to you to 
inquire particularly as to whether this reconnaissance could be made? 

General Short. Well, as I say, I knew that a considerable recon- 
naissance was being made. 

[8236] Mr. Clark. I am asking you whether or not the fact 
he did not call for your reconnaissance planes, did not raise the ques- 
tion in your mind as to whether it was being made to the fullest extent 
possible with the equipment available? 

General Short. As I said, I had so few — six — and they were so 
much the best planes for a bombing mission, if such mission became 
necessary, that I think it would have been very sound judgment for 
him not to use those as long as he could avoid it, because they were 
the ones he would want to drive home the bombing attack. 

Mr. Clark. The fact he did not call on those planes did not raise 
that particular question in your mind? 

General Short. No, sir. 

If he had felt the need of them badly probably his air men would 
have asked for every one of my air men, as to whether to send them 
out or hold them for a bombing mission. 

Mr. Clark. I think Mr. Cooper has already touched on what is in 
my mind, therefore I will not take the liberty of repeating the 
question. 

Was there anything more important to the proper protection of 
this establishment in Hawaii than the state of alert the Army was 
on at the time the long distance recon- [8237] naissance would 
be conducted ? 

General Short. Certainly the reconnaissance was perfectly im- 
portant. The state of alertVas undoubtedly limited, if I carried out 
specifically the last sentence in my order, which said : 

Disseminate this vitally secret information to the minimum essential officers. 



3056 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Now, it did not say "officers and men." 

The minute you ordered either alert No. 2 or alert No. 3 you had to 
tell every enlisted man that was put in position why he was there, 
and what he was to shoot at. 

Mr. Clark. Yes; I understand your position about that because 
I listened to your testimony. But may it not be that the information 
not to be given out, that was limited to the officers, was the general 
information? That does not refer exclusively to the alert. It does 
not say "alert." 

General Short. The only information it gave was general infor- 
mation that there was a big chance of hostilities with Japan. 

Mr. Clark. Your position was that you could not have gone on an 
all out-alert without having gone contrary to this message of the 
27th? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Clark. Did it occur to you, if that was your [8£38] 
opinion, that you might ask for a clarification on that ? 

General Short. I thought that the War Department should under- 
stand perfectly. They told me to report measures taken. They knew 
exactly what I was doing. They had 9 days in which to tell me I 
was wrong, that I should do something more or something less, and 
they took no action whatever. 

Mr. Clark. In that 9 days, did it occur to you that you might ask 
them to clarify this apparent contradiction in the message? 

General Short. I did not think so because it struck me the things 
that they were primarily interested in were, first, avoiding war ; sec- 
ond, avoiding any possible international incident that would give 
Japan an excuse for going to war, or for using propaganda that we 
had started the war. 

[8239] Mr. Clark. And notwithstanding the fact that that 
message, I think you said, was not to jeopardize the safety of the 
establishment down there ? 

General Short. That was in regard to the first overt act. They did 
not say that in regard to the dissemination of information. 

Mr. Clark. What I was asking you about was the comparative im- 
portance of the kind of alert you were on and the long-distance recon- 
naissance that was not being made. Was there anything there more 
important than that, in your judgment? 

General Short. The long-distance reconnaissance, if it obtained 
positive information I could have changed my type of alert in a very 
few minutes. I actually had completed the change in 7 minutes when 
the attack took place. Our plans were so drawn that everybody 
understood them to the last man. We had moved into position with 
those plans so the time required, if we got any information from 
Washington or from the Navy that indicated an attack on Hawaii, it 
was simply a question of minutes in going into the correct alert. 

Mr. Clark. In view of the fact that you did not know that the 
Navy was conducting long-distance reconnaissance, or whether it was 
conducting a long-distance reconnaissance, and in view of Admiral 
Kimmel's testimony that he did not know you had not gone on an 
all-out alert, just what did you [8240] mean in the reply to 
the message of the 27th by saying, "Liaison with the Navy"? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3057 

General Short. That I was keeping in touch with the Navy, and I 
thought I knew what they were doing. I still think I knew. Not 
in exact detail, but I knew generally what they were doing. Frankly, 
it had not occurred to me that he did not know the type of alert we 
were on. 

Mr. Clark. But in view of the fact that you did not know precisely 
what the Navy was doing about long-distance reconnaissance, and 
that Admiral Kimmel did not know you had not gone on an all-out 
alert, do you think your statement to the War Department "Liaison 
with the Navy" would have been justified? 

General Short. When I made that statement I had no reason to 
believe he would not loiow exactly what my alert was, because, as I 
say, he had an officer there who knew exactly what we were doing, 
who had no other function except to report it, and I knew from a 
3-hour conference that morning exactly what he was doing in the way 
of reconnaissance. Not in detail, but I mean the general picture. I 
thought he was covering from east of Midway around west and south 
to Palmyra. 

Mr. Clark. General Short, I do not know whether it might be an 
argument for or against unity of command, or anything of that 
sort, but as a member of this committee I am rather [8241^ se- 
riously impressed by the fact that you, as the commander in chief of 
the Army, and Admiral Kimmel, as the commander in chief of the 
Navy, in fact did not Iniow what the other was doing about some very 
vital matters on Pearl Harbor. 

If you can clarify my mind any further in that respect I would 
appreciate it. 

General Short. I would like to answer that rather fully. 

Command by cooperation necessarily depends, to a considerable 
extent, on the personality of the two commanders. I believe if Admiral 
Kimmel and I had full information from Washington that our rela- 
tions were such that we could have made cooperation work. However, 
I will state, on general principles, in the average situation, that I 
believe unity of command is a much stronger, much safer proposition. 

Does that answer your question ? 

Mr. Clark. Yes. sir; except I do not quite see the unity in actual 
operation at Hawaii. 

General Short. Unity of command did not exist in Hawaii until 
after the attack. 

Mr. Clark. Even in view of the contract that was executed between 
the Army and the Navy ? 

General Short. There was only one place where we had provision 
for unity of command and that was when planes were turned over by 
the Army to the Navy or by the Navy to the Army [8^42] 
That was the only unity of command that was provided. There was 
no other unitj^ of command. That was cooperation. 

Mr. Clark. Just one thing further I would like to ask you. Why 
did you not operate the radar for longer hours than from 4 to 7? 

General Short. Well, there were three reasons. In the first place, 
the information I had did not cause me to expect an air attack. I 
really did not expect it, but I decided to operate during the most dan- 
gerous hours anyway. 



3058 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

We had a very limited number of trained men. When you operated 
the information center and the interceptor command you needed your 
best crew on, because there was no use wasting the time of the people 
at the information center by putting men on the radar who did not 
know how to operate it. We needed time during the day for training 
purposes. 

In the third place, we had no spare parts except what we took from 
the permanent sets that were not in use. If we operated 24 hours a 
day there was a very considerable chance that by the end of a few 
days we would not have more than one or two stations that would be 
capable of operating. 

Mr. Clark. I want to say before I desist entirely, sir, that I have 
great respect for you and your honorable record as an officer in the 
Army. I have some sympathy for you for having gotten into a situa- 
tion of the kind you encountered [8243] at Pearl Harbor. It 
has been a hard experience for you, sir, and I appreciate the very clear 
statement you have made to the committee. 

General Short. I thank you very much. I tried to be perfectly 
frank with the committee, and I hope I have succeeded. 

The Vice Chairman. The committee at this point will recess until 
2 o'clock, at which time Senator Lucas, of Illinois, will inquire, General. 

(Whereupon, at 12 : 05 p. m., the committee recessed until 2 p. m. 
of the same day. ) 

[8244] AFTERNOON SESSION 2 100 P. M. 

The Vice Chairman. The committee will be in order. Does counsel 
have anything at this point? 

Mr. Kaufman. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. General, do you have anything before your ex- 
amination is resumed ? 

General Short. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas, of Illinois, will inquire. Gen- 
eral. 

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES 
ARMY (RETIRED)— Resumed 

Senator Lucas. General Short, I have listened with a great deal 
of attention to the memorandum that you furnished the committee in 
which you set forth your views concerning this Pearl Harbor disaster. 
The language that you use in paragraph 98 of your statement expresses 
in rather terse and forceful terms your views, and I just want to ask 
you one question on that. [Reading:] 

Unjust War Department Treatment: I do not feel that I Lave been treated 
fairly or with justice by the War Department. I was singled out as an example, 
as the scapegoat for the disaster. 

Following that statement I should like to ask yoti whether or not 
you bear any ill will against the former President of [8245] the 
United States, Mr. Roosevelt, as a result of your retirement in Decem- 
ber 1941 ? 

General Short. I do not. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3059 

Senator Lucas. General Short, I desire to call your attention to the 
November 27 message and even though there may be some repetition 
there I believe that I should like to ask you a question or two in order 
to satisfy my own mind. 

That message was sent by General Marshall on November the 27th 
and in that message General Marshall states, among other things, that 
you are to "undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you 
deem necessary." 

Now, you have been examined with much care upon that one line 
in the message. I should like to ask you what you undei:stand that 
"deep reconnaissance" means? 

General Short. Exactly the same thing as distant reconnaissance. 
It would be reconnaissance — I would say according to the Martin study 
it should go to the extent of a thousand and fifty miles. That is what 
the Martin study determined should be made to be safe. 

Senator Lucas. Now, did you have any planes at your command at 
that time which would carry out a distance reconnaissance ? 

General Short. I had six planes. 

Senator Lucas. And as I understand it the Navy had 39 [824^] 
planes. 

General Short. I believe it was 49. I am not positive. 

Senator Lucas. I think you are correct. At least the Navy had the 
bulk of the planes to carry out any long distance reconnaissance ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And, of course, as we know, through the joint agree- 
ment it was the duty of the Navy to carry out an}^ reconnaissance under 
any orders that you as commander or Admiral Kimmel as commander 
of the fleet might have received? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Senator Lucas. When you received this message did this statement 
asking you to undertake such reconnaissance signify anything of un- 
usual miportance with respect to our danger from Japan? 

General Short. It would simply indicate to me that while they had 
not pointed in any way toward us that they wanted to be a little surer 
than they would normally be that the Japs were not sending anything 
in there. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I have that answer read? 

General Short. It was maj'be poorly put in. 

Senator Lucas. Will you read the answer, Mr. Reporter, please ? 

[5^47] (The answer was read by the reporter.) 

Senator Lucas. Do you want to clarify that answer in any way, 
General ? 

General Short. Is that clear to you ? 

Senator Lucas. It is clear to me. 

Senator Ferguson. I do not know as I understand what you mean by 
"a little clearer." 

General Short. Did I say "a little clearer" ? 

Senator Ferguson. Or "a little surer." 

General Short. A little surer. 

Senator Ferguson. What do you mean by "a little surer" ? 

General Short. They were just inclined to take a few more pre- 
cautions than they would normally take because they felt that hostili- 
ties were imminent. 



3060 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. Well, isn't it a fact, General, that when General 
Herron was there in 1940 long-range reconnaissance was held for some 
weeks ? 

General Short. It was held, I think, from June 17 through July 16 
and then the sabotage part of the alert was continued on for probably 
another month. 

Senator Lucas. And in that long-range reconnaissance, as I recall, 
the evidence discloses that both the Army and the Navy participated 
in that operation but it was under the jurisdiction of the Navy. 

General Short. At that time there was not a written agreement 
putting the responsibility upon the Navy. Actually, through a per- 
sonal agreement at the time they did it the" same way but it had not 
been laid down in written form and had the approval of the War and 
the Navy Departments. 

Senator Lucas, in the summer of 1940 is the only time that any 
long-range reconnaissance was ever carried on ? 

General Short. I could not be sure of that. It may be that Admiral 
Kimmel, when he got a message like the one of October 16, he carried 
on some. He was carrying on some habitually on the perimeter, which 
was over a thousand miles out from Oahu. He was sending planes 
from Johnston Island to Wake Island to Midway, which was well — 
and part of it well over a thousand miles, so he was conducting habitu- 
ally some long-range reconnaissance. 

Senator Lucas. Is there any difference in wdiat a patrol plane can 
do and what a long-range reconnaissance plane does ? 

General Short. I would say exactly the same thing. 

Senator Lucas. The same thing? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Did you understand that Admiral Kimmel if he 
were carrying out long-range reconnaissance was doing that as a result 
of this message or had he been doing that before ? 

[S^4'^] General Short. Well, he had been doing some before. I 
think from w^hat he told me that he had tightened up all along the 
line and that he was doing more. 

Senator Lucas. Then this word or, rather, this statement, as I 
understand it, given to you by General Marshall in his message of 
November the 27th, did not mean very much to you ? 

General Short. There was one thing that I was responsible for but 
it was not of much value, and that was the in-shore reconnaissance 
that went out only 20 miles and was really of value only against 
submarines. As far as an air attack, it was absolutely valueless. That 
was our responsibility and we did that in two ways : We had one 
reconnaissance squadron that did nothing but train in reconnaissance 
and fly around the perimeter of Oahu and then all of our fighters that 
were training over the island of Oahu normally were taught recon- 
naissance at the same time. 

Senator Lucas. Did you ever at any time before receive a message 
signed by General Marshall while you were in command of Hawaii? 

General Short. I believe that is the only message. I received a good 
many letters but I believe that was the only message. I am not sure 
about that. 

Senator Lucas. Well, this is a command message, is it not? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3061 

[8260] Senator Lucas. And there is a distinct difference in 
Army circles and Navy circles between a command message and one 
that is merely sent for information ? 

General Short. Yes ; but a command message may be sent by the 
adjutant general as well as the chief of staff, either one. 

Senator Lucas. Did the fact that General Marshall was sending 
you, for the first time in your career as commander of the Hawaiian 
'Department, a message, make any unusual impression upon you as to 
the danger that might exist ? 

General Short. I, practically, got from that message that they con- 
sidered hostilities imminent and that they were particularly anxious 
to avoid war, if it was possible to do so, and that they did not want 
any international incident in Hawaii that would either provoke Japan 
or enable her to say that we were starting the war. I think probably 
if I thought about the fact that it was signed by Marshall I might have 
thought that that was his personal angle on the thing, to be sure we 
were careful to not produce a state of war, not producing the effect that 
we had started the war. 

Senator Lucas. The mere fact that General Marshall, who was chief 
of staff of the Army at that time, had his hands in the fire in many 
different places throughout the world, and of course you knew that 
it would take time and effort to [82-51] send you a message 
of this kind, seems to me it should have probably fired your imagina- 
tion immediately on the dangers existing. 

General Short. Well, that indicated at least his specific interest, 
and I thought from the message that his first interest of all was to be 
sure that we were doing nothing to precipitate a war ; that it looked 
like hostilities were imminent and what he was particularly caution- 
ing us against — and I took it it was possibly a very personal desire 
of his — that we do nothing to precipitate a war. 

Senator Lucas. General Short, what time did yon receive this mes- 
sage of November 27 ? 

General Short. I think it was sometime after 2 o'clock. I am not 
sure of the exact time. 

Senator Lucas. In the afternoon ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And where were you at the time when the message 
came ? 

General Short. I was in my office, in mj^ headquarters. 

Senator Lucas. As I understand the record, you replied to General 
Marshall within 30 minutes' time after receiving the message. 

General Short. I made my decision within that time. The message 
I do not think got out of the Signal Office that fast, [82-52] but 
I made my decision in that time. 

Senator Lucas. And before making your decision you conferred 
with no member of your staff as to the meaning or the significance of 
this message ? 

General Short. I conferred with the chief of staff and General 
Fielder, G-2, yes, sir. I conferred with him before the message went, 
but I was rather of the opinion that I made my decision before the 
conference. I am not sure. 

Senator Lucas. Well, if I am in error in that statement of course 1 
apologize to you, sir. 



3062 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. I conferred with the chief of staff definitely, and 
it is possible — the time was so close together that I am not sure that I 
talked with G-2 immediately before or immediately after. 

Senator Lucas. In that reply message of yours you stated "Alerted 
to sabotage ; liaison with the Navy." How did you alert your com- 
mand to sabotage within that short space of time? 

General Short. We had the standing operating procedure that 
laid down definitely what every unit would do, and we issued the 
order as an oral order, and it went out over the telephone in a very 
few minutes; it was not take over 10 minutes at the outset to put it 
into effect, because everybody knew what was required. We had 
that standing operating procedure. You did not have to tell any- 
body what his business [8253] was. 

Senator Lucas. Well, your standing operating procedure at that 
particular time was with respect to sabotage, was it not? 

General Short. No; it was with respect to the three alerts. All 
we had to do, when the phone message went out, was to go into alert 
No. 1. 

Senator Lucas. And what alert were you operating under pre- 
vious to the time you received the message? 

General Short. We were not operating under an alert, but we had 
out a very considerable number of guards over vital installations. 
We were not fully under alert No. 1 ; we were, you might say, half 
way, because there were certain installations that were so important 
that they had been really guarded for months. 

Senator Lucas. Then you took sole responsibility for alerting your 
command to sabotage immediately after receiving this message of 
November 27 ? 

General Short. That is correct. I sent for two officers who would 
be most intimately concerned, General Martin and General Burgin, 
and I conferred with them some time within the next hour or hour 
and a half. 

Senator Lucas. And that is true notwithstanding the fact that 
there is not a single word in that message which talks about sabotage? 

[8254] General Short. That is correct. 

Senator Lucas. It has always been just a little difficult for me to 
understand why your message was not a little more responsive to the 
message that was sent by General Marshall. 

General Short. It is just an interpretation of what the message 
means to you. I think I was influenced almost wholly by the fact 
that no War Department message or estimate since June 17, 1940, 
had ever pointed to the probability of an air attack or a raid. 

Senator Lucas. That is probably true; but the record is rather 
complete here that everybody in Hawaii, both in the Army and Navy, 
were talking about the possibility of an air attack, that is from Feb- 
ruary on at least until October, and they were also having air drills, 
contemplating, I presume, an air attack, were they not ? 

General Short. We had lots of drills. We talked about the possi- 
bility. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. 

General Short. But everything that we got from the War Depart- 
ment in the nature of a probability indicating where the attack would 
come pointed toward the Philippines, Borneo, the Kra Peninsula, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3063 

down in that part of the world, and at Guam in one instance, and 
then in the next wire they took Guam [8£'55] out so as to give 
them sabotage orders. I think we should make a big distinction be- 
tween the "possibility" orders and "probability" on account of the 
information we had from the War Department. 

[8356] Senator Lucas. I think that is a sound conclusion. 

Now, following this message that you pot from General Marshall, 
you also received a message from General Miles ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And that was wholly in regard to sabotage ? 

General Short. Yes, sir, and it was Miles' function if he had any 
information indicating anything beyond sabotage, an all-out attack, 
a landing attack, or air attack, that he should also have mentioned that. 

Senator Lucas. Who was your G-2 in Hawaii at tb at time ? 

General Short. Colonel Fielder, now General Fielder, who is stiU 
G-2 in the Hawaiian Department. 

Senator Lucas. What were his duties in Hawaii under your com- 
mand there in the Hawaiian Department ? 

General Short. His duties were naturally to assemble and evaluate 
all possible enemy information, and the sources of enemy inforination 
were purely local. What he was able to get on his own pertained to 
subversive action. He was dependent on tlie War Department or the 
Navy Department for any other type of information. He had no 
agents outside of Honolulu. 

Senator Lucas. Did he have liaison with the Intelli- [8357] 
gence man in the Navy in Hawaii ? 

General Short. He had very close liaison with the man who had 
charge of the subversive action measures altogether. They had offices 
side by side in town; they had a teletype that connected the FBI and 
ONI and G-2, so they could talk back and forth. 

Senator Lucas. Do I understand you to say to the committee, Gen- 
eral, that all of the information that j^ou received as to the situation 
existing between Japan and this country in the months preceding the 
attack came from Washington, D. C. ? 

General Short. Or some from the Navy Department. None on our 
own. I will amend that slightly. Our contact officer made it a habit 
to meet the boats from the Orient so he could get in touch with the 
people who had been living out in China or Japan who were coming 
through, and pick up anything he could. 

Of course the value of that information varied with the individual 
he talked to. We were never sure how valuable it was, but we carried 
it on all the time, getting what we could out of these passengers going 
through. 

Senator Lucas. Do I understand your only means of obtaining in- 
telligence information was through the Army and Navy Intelligence 
Department here in Washington, D. C. ? 

; [8258] General Short. No, we got some from the Navy in 
Hawaii. 

Senator Lucas. In Hawaii ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. I was going to ask you where Admiral Bloch figured 
in in that picture, as far as obtaining any intelligence was concerned? 

General Short. Admiral Bloch had a service, a radio intercept serv- 



3064 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ice on the location of ships, Japanese ships, and his office kept track 
of them pretty thoroughly, and on a good many occasions I have 
seen the map showing the various locations of the Japanese ships as 
they thought they had been. 

I also talked with both Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel as to 
where the Japanese Fleet was. 

Senator Lucas. There was an interchange then of information with 
respect to the communications that were received ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. I think it was more directly with me than 
it was with G-2. My liaison with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral 
Bloch was a little closer than his liaison with the man who handled 
that type of information. 

Senator Lucas. One of the reasons that I have asked these questions 
is because of what I find in exhibit 33. 

[8259] In exhibit 33, on November 26, 1941, I note a memoran- 
dum for the Chief of Staff : Subject : Japanese Naval Task Force. 

The following information was received from the Commandant 14th Naval 
District through the Office of Naval Intelligence at 12 : 45 a. m. this date. 

In that memorandum they set forth at some length where they be- 
lieve the Japanese Fleet nnght be on that particular day. I was just 
wondering whether you had ever seen that memorandum before it left 
Hawaii for the Naval Intelligence Department here. 

General Short. I did not see the memorandum as such. I might 
have had the information from conversations with Admiral Bloch 
and Admiral Kimmel, or I might have seen the same thing on the 
map in Admiral Bloch's headquarters. 

Senator Lucas. The only reason that I mention that is to me it is 
apparent that Admiral Bloch, or someone out at Hawaii had a consid- 
erable amount of information that they had obtained, and thought 
it valuable enough to send to Washington in order that they might 
have the advantage of making any evaluation of it that they saw fit. 

General Short. Yes, sir, they had a regular intercept service. As 
I understand the thing, Washington took their [8260] esti- 
mates and the estimates of the intercept station at Manila. If there 
was no difference in the information, or if there was no difference of 
opinion, they accepted it, and if there was a difference of opinion they 
gave more credence to Manila, because it was closer and they thought 
it would be more accurate. 

Senator Lucas. Now in that memorandum to the Chief of Staff, 
which came from the Naval Intelligence of the 14th Naval District, 
you conclude by saying : 

The evaluation put upon the above information by the Commandant 14th Naval 
District is that a strong force may be preparing to operate in southeastern Asia, 
while component parts thereof may be expected to operate from Palao and the 
Marshall Islands. 

Is not that a strong indication that those in Hawaii at the time be- 
lived that Japan was going to move toward the Marshall Islands ? 

General Short. That would indicate that they thought some ships 
were going toward the Marshall Islands. Of course Palao is well 
down toward the Philippines. 

Senator Lucas. Yes, I know. 

General Short. The Marshalls would have been of decided interest. 
I don't remember having that piece of information, and I believe I 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3065 

have seen since in docu- [8^61] ments here that Manila dis- 
agreed, and within 12 hours they knew from the War Department that 
Manila had disagreed from that finding, and that ma^^ be one reason 
I never did know about it. 

Senator Lucas. That may be true. I am not certain about whether 
Manila disagreed with this finding. I am only pointing out the Mar- 
shall Islands, because under the Orange war plans, that was where the 
American fleet was going to strike also. 

General Short. That was of very great interest. 

Senator Lucas. So if the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval Dis- 
trict, on November 26, 1941, had any information that he believed that 
the Japanese Fleet, or a part of it might go into the Marshall Islands, 
you were getting pretty close to where America expected to start her 
offensive in the event of a declaration of war ? 

General Short. That is correct. It would have been of interest to 
me, and, as I say, it is possible I did not get it because of the disagTee- 
ment between the two stations. 

Senator Lucas. I do not think that Admiral Kimmel was interro- 
gated upon that message. I overlooked it. It seems to me it would 
be rather important as showing definite information on the 26th of 
November as to what Admiral Bloch [8262] at least, believed 
with respect to the offensive toward the Marshall Islands. 

General Short. I believed, incidentally, that that would turn out to 
be, and it turned out to be false information. 

Senator Lucas. They did not come by way of the Marshalls, but 
they came north of the Marshalls ? 

General Short. They came way north of the Marshalls. 

Senator Lucas. Yes ; that is true. 

General Short. It could not have been the same force. 

Senator Lucas. I am only using it to point to the information which 
they believed at that time, that there was a possibility of some sort of a 
force coming in to the Marshalls which would bring them at least 
closer to Hawaii, and therefore it should have been, it seems to me, of 
tremendous significance to the folks in Hawaii with regard to the 
danger they were facing, whether it was right or wrong. 

General Short. It would have been of very great interest to me, but 
1 did not get it at the time. 

Senator Lucas. I have been just a little puzzled. General, with 
respect to your reply to this message of November 27, and the reply of 
General DeWitt, who was at that time, as I recall, commanding the 
command on the [8263] west coast. 

The message that was sent by General Marshall to you and the mes- 
sage that was sent by General Marshall to General DeWitt on the 
west coast are almost idential are they not ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Senator Lucas. I have been puzzled at your reply when I compare 
it with the reply of General DeWitt, and here is what he says : 

Report following measures taken as per your radio November 27 : Your radio 
paraphrased to Commanding Generals ADC Second Air Force, Fourth Air Force, 
Ninth CAD, Pacific Coastal Frontier Sectors, Ninth Corps Area, and Com- 
mandants Eleventh, Twelfth and Fifteenth Naval Districts. All harbor entrance 
control posts continuously manned. One gun battery each liarbor defense con- 
tinuously alerted. Protection against sabotage and other subversive activities 
intensified. Sixth Infantry battalions and necessary motor transportation 

79716— 46— pt. 7 11 



3066 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

alerted so as to be instantly available to CG NTA to carry out his missions under 
Rainbow Five. Constant contact being maintained with corps area and naval 
district commanders and full cooperation assured. PCF, sector and sub sector 
plans Rainbow Five practically completed and necessary reconnaissance being 
made to carry [82G4\ out defense of critical areas. Two rifle companies 
furnishing CG SF P of E for guard duty and one company furnished to CG NCA 
for internment aliens at Angel Island paren in connection this report see my 
radio to CG GHQ November 25 which recommended that WPL five two be ex- 
tended to include Pacific coast and Japanese vessels and which outlined steps 
talve by me in preparation therefore. As air forces as well as other Army forces 
will be involved in the execution of WPL five two or the preparatory stage of 
Rainbow Five it is strongly urged that I be authorized to direct operation of 
Air forces in defense of the PCF or that instructions be issiied specifying air 
action and that I be furnished copy of such directive. Should hostilities occur 
this command now ready to carry out taslcs assigned in Rainbow Five so far 
as they pertain to Japan except for woeful shortage of ammunition and pursuit 
and bombardment planes which should be made available without delay. 

I presume that there are reasons for the difference in the answers 
that were made by yourself and the one who was in command of the 
west coast. 

Can you tell why General DeWitt would take the position that he 
did in replj'ing to the same kind of a message? 

General Shoet. I can only make a guess at it. My [8265] 
guess would be that he did not having a standing operating procedure, 
and therefore it was necessary for him to go more into detail. 

Our standing operating procedure showed that we had two bat- 
talions with full motor transportation ready to go any place on the 
islands. 

We didn't mention that because that was part of the standing op- 
erating procedure. The reconnaissance apparently had no agreement 
with the Navy so he had to show the reconnaissance. The air force 
that he speaks about wanting placed under his command, I think was 
part of GHQ Air Force that operated directly under Washington, and 
he was asking to have it put under him for operation. 

That is largely an estimate, but I think it is probably a fair one. 

Senator Lucas. His danger was not as much as yours, was it, Gen- 
eral? 

General Short. Well, he had the much longer front, and he had 
some very vital installations, like all of the factories at Los Angeles, 
and so it was difficult to say, because he had less, far less personnel to 
defend with than we had. Our area was a concentrated area where 
we could take up our positions in a relatively short time. His were 
hundreds of miles long, and he had a very limited force. 

[8266] Senator Lucas. Well, the thing that struck me as being 
rather strange was to find a reply of this kind to the same kind of a 
message and the reply of yours from Hawaii which always seemed 
to me to be the most dangerous spot perhaps of our outlying possessions 
or our coastal positions. 

General Short. I believe it would indicate that our preparation for 
occupying our positions and everything of that kind were nmch more 
complete. 

Senator Lucas. It may be, but he went on an all-out alert ; DeWitt 
went on the all-out alert ? 

General Short. No; I don't think so. He alerted certain infantry 
battalions. We had certain infantry battalions alerted. If you 
notice, on his seacoast gims, he alerted, I believe, one gun at the 
entrance of each harbor. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3067 

Senator Lucas (reading) : 

All harbor entrance control posts continuously manned. One gun battery each 
harbor defense continuously alerted. 

General Short. He only had 1 battery alerted. Around San Fran- 
cisco he probably had at least 12 and at Puget Sound he had a very 
considerable number. So you can see his was a partial alert. It was 
not a complete alert at all. 

Senator Lucas. Let me ask you about the civilian population in 
Hawaii. You alerted for sabotage. You were not there in 1940 
when they had the previous alert ? 
[8267] General Short. No, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Well, did you learn about any uprisings or any 
undue sabotage being committed at that time by the people of Hawaii 
was the result of that alert? 

General Short. No; you wouldn't ^ret sabotage as a result of an 
alert. You might get it because you didn't go into an alert. 
Senator Lucas. He went on an all-out alert in 1940 ? 
General Short. That is right, on a direct order from the War 
Department. 

Senator Lucas. I know. 

General Short. Then he cut it back on July 16. 
Senator Lucas. What I am trying to find out is whether as a result 
of the alert the population of Hawaii was in any way disturbed. 

General Short. If you will read the letters between General Mar- 
shall and General Herron there is one letter in there where General 
Herron says that a lot of people were considerably disturbed for the 
fii'st few days and he says that even some of the younger officers sent 
their families to the hills. 

Senator Lucas. Well, the War Department in Washington and 
you fellows out in Hawaii were both wrong on that, too, weren't you, 
on the question of sabotage? 

[826S] General Short. It is very difficult to say. We can't tell 
what would have happened if we hadn't held a tight rein over them. 
I think the feeling was, with everybody who had made a careful 
study, that if there had ever been any real success to the Japanese 
plans, that most anything might have happened. 

Senator Lucas. What do you call a success if December 7, 1941, 
wasn't a pretty fair test of success? 

General Short. A landing on the island of Oahu. They immedi- 
ately would have had perhaps an army of thousands, a fifth column 
of thousands, ready to support them. 

Senator Lucas. Were you alerted against sabotage because you 
feared a landing of the Japanese? 

General Short. No, sir. We were alerted because we felt they might 
try to destroy all the vital installations ; and, as a matter of fact, wi1;h- 
out an alert against sabotage, the way the gasoline and oil was placed 
along the waterfront in Honolulu a very small group of men could 
have destroyed the city of Honolulu ; and the same thing with 4 million 
gallons of oil in Pearl Harbor. They could have done much more 
damage than was done because they could have destroyed all the oil. 
They could have destroyed the repair facilities. And probably the fire 
would have destroyed a good many of the ships in the harbor. 

[8369] Senator Lucas. I don't doubt but that is true. General 
Short, that you had every reason to take every precaution possible 



3088 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

against sabotage, but I come back to my original question, whether or 
not anybody from Japan really used the sabotage methods on Decem- 
ber 7 or immediately thereafter insofar as you Imow? 

General Short. Whether thej^ used it? 

Senator Lucas. Whether they did carry out these acts of sabotage 
that you people in Hawaii and the people in Washington were con- 
stanth' afraid of. 

Greneral Short. There was none, but whether there would have been 
if we had been lax I don't think anybody will ever know. 

Senator Lucas. Perhaps not. That is one of those things that will 
go unsolved. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. I think it is in the record, but do you recall how 
many planes you lost that morning in the air raid that were on 
Hickam Field? 

General Short. I think I have it here. 

Senator Lucas. It may not be material but I am leading up to 
another question. 

General Short. It is in that exhibit No. 7 of the Roberts commis- 
sion. I don't know whether I am going to find it right [8270] 
here or not. I have the statement of planes here as of December 7 and 
then as of December 20. I don't have the statement right here on that. 

Senator Lucas. You don't recall how many planes you lost at that 
];articular time? 

General Short. No, sir; I do not. This shows the different types. 
Some of them may have been repaired, don't you see, between De- 
cember 7 and December 20 and be back in use. 

Senator Lucas. You may have received some more by that time. 

General Short. Beg pardon ? 

Senator Lucas. You may have received some more from the main- 
land. 

General Short. We received 29 more B-l7's and that was all. 

Senator Lucas. How many planes got in the air before the last 
attack was completed? 

General Short. I think there were a total of 14. 

Senator Lucas. Did they shoot down any Jap planes? 

General Short. They shot down 10 enemy planes. 

Senator Lucas. They shot down 10 enemy planes. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. So it is a pretty safe assumption that if the planes 
had been warmed up and ready to go that, consider- [8271] 
ing what you did with the 14 planes, that the damage would have 
been minimized considerably? 

General Short. No question about that. I think our pilots showed 
that they were superior to the Japanese pilots in individual combat 
that day. 

Senator Lucas. Do you recall seeing that two-man submarine ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Do you remember seeing the prisoner that they 
took? 

General Short. I did not. I recall the incident but I didn't ac- 
tuallv see him. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3069 

Senator Lucas. Do you recall now. from the conversations that you 
liad with anyone there, as to just how far out that two-man sub- 
marine was before it started operating at sea? 

General Short. Well, I can give you a rather interesting report 
of just what happened at the time of the capture. It was off a reef 
opposite Bellows Field and the commanding officer or G-2 of Bellows 
Field phoned me that it was there and that the Navy were getting 
ready to bomb it. I said if they wanted to destroy it, I didn't 
think it ought to be destroyed, but if the Navy wanted to destroy 
it we could bring up a piece of field artillery and do it very quickly, 
because it was on the reef. But before that message, apparently, 
could get to the Navy, they dropped a bomb, which fortunately 
[8272] missed it and picked it up and set it on the inside of 
t\K' reef, anrl we sont a man out to put a rope around the conning- 
tower and towed it in. Some fellow from Texas, probably, lassoed it. 

Senator Lucas. Was there ever any conclusive evidence as to how 
and where that submarine took to sea, how far out it was and what 
brought it there? 

General Short. I would hesitate to say. I am afraid my informa- 
tion would not be exact. 

Senator Lucas. Well, was it possible that a surface ship, a war- 
ship of some kind, belonging to the enemy, could have come within 
200 miles and dropped it off, or do you think it came in by sub- 
marine '? 

General Short. I think the feeling was at the time that there was 
a mother ship that had brought them at least a considerable part of 
the way. I don't believe they were capable of going more than 150 to 
200 miles under their own power. 

Senator Lucas. Now, what kind of a ship — that was the point I 
was making — what kind of a ship did you people conclude brought 
this midget submarine to 150 miles of the Hawaiian Islands? 

General Short. Well. I am reallj'' a little uncertain on that. I 
think the Navy would be a much better source. 

[8273] Senator Lucas. Could a Jap submarine carry one of these 
small two-man submarines? 

General Short. I think the largest type probably could but again I 
am not sure. 

Senator Lucas. There is more than a possibility that some large 
surface Japanese ship sailed within 150 or 200 miles of the Hawaiian 
coast that morning and dropped that submarine off? 

General Short. I believe the feeling was that they must have been 
in the vicinity of Hawaiian waters, maybe for several days, and had 
not been picked up. 

By the way, I have the report here. Senator, of the planes damaged. 

Senator Lucas. Please read that. 

General Short. I will take up first what we had. 

We had at the beginning of the attack : Planes in commission, 80. 
That is pursuit planes. Pursuit planes out of commission, 69. A total 
of 149. Of those 80 were damaged. 

We had reconnaissance planes : In commission, 6. Out of commis- 
sion, 7. Out of those 13, 6 were damaged. We had bombers : In com- 
mission, 39. That included the old B-18's. Bombers out of commis- 
sion, 33. And 34 of those bombers were damaged. 



3070 COXGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATIOX PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Now, a considerable number of those planes we were able [82?4.] 
to repair locally. So in the report of December 20 we had almost as 
many planes in commission as we had the morning of the 7th, because 
our repair facilities were working 24 hours a day. 

Senator Lucas. Under the sabotage order these planes were lined 
up wing tip to wing tip? 

General Short. Very close together on the landing mat. 

Senator Lucas. Now, you have given to the committee in your state- 
ment what you consider the term ''appropriate defensive deployment" 
means. 

General Short. Yes. sir. 

Senator Lucas. In that statement you take almost direct issue with 
Admiral Kimmel. 

General Short. I did not intend to give the impression that I was 
making an out and out statement of what a defensive deployment 
meant, but I couldn't conceive of any defense not including recon- 
naissance. I think that that. I said, must necessarily include recon- 
naissance. Isn't that the statement to which you refer? 

Senator Lucas. That is right. 

General Short. I still cannot conceive of any defense that would 
not include reconnaissance. 

Senator Lucas. Admiral Kimmel didn't so interpret the order. 

[8-275] General Short. I don't know what the teclmical term in 
the Navy would include. In the Army any defense in the world wo 
would take up would include reconnaissance. 

Senator Lucas. I want to call your attention to the report of the 
Army board that made an investigation into this Pearl Harbor affair. 
I direct your attention to the last page. The board says : 

Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, Lieutenant General Walter 
C. Short, failed in his duties in the following particulars : 

(a) To place his command in a state of readiness for war in the face of a war 
warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only. 

You have gone into that thoroughly and have made your explana- 
tion. 

General Short. I have. 

Senator Lucas. I presume you did the same thing before the Army 
board? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Notwithstanding its finding? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And I presume your evidence before the Army board 
was practically what is before this committee? 

General Short. That is correct. I know some things [5^7^] 
now. like magic, which I had never heard of at the time I was before 
the Army board. 

Senator Lucas. They further state : 

The information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was suffi- 
cient to warn him of the ;cnse relations betwren our Goveriiment nnd the Japanese 
Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected. 

Do you agree with that ? 

General Short. Yes, sir ; but that wouldn't necessarily mean an at- 
tack. I doubt very much if that board knew of the conclusions of 
General Grunnert and General Betts, which agreed 100 percent with 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3071 

mine, and why they made them. They made them because they didn't 
have access to magic. 

Senator Lucas. Assuming. General Short, that you had never re- 
ceived any message from the War Department, either on November 27 
from Marshall or on the 28th from Miles, or on the 29th from 
Arnold — — 

General Short. Or had any previous information ? 

Senator Lucas. No. From the 27th on you only received three 
messages ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. But you saw some of the Navy messages? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Would your position have been any different 
[8s^77] on December 7 than it was previous to the message on No- 
vember 27 ? 

General Short. I think the three messages that followed up the 27th 
all pointing directly to sabotage did a great deal to confirm me in my 
opinion that I had done what the War Department wanted. 

Senator Lucas. I can well appreciate that. 

General Short. I could have gone into any other alert in a few 
minutes if I had anything to indicate but what I got from the War 
Department pointed, all of it, 100 percent, very definitely to sabotage. 

Senator Lucas. That is, the second and third messages pointed 
definitely to sabotage. 

General Short. Second and third and fourth. 

Senator Lucas. ^Vliich tended to confirm your message to General 
Marshall ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Senator Lucas. That is the way you took it? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. The question I am asking you is this: Assuming 
you received no messages at all from the War Department your posi- 
tion on December 7, 1941, would have been no different than if there 
was an attack on November 24 1 

General Short. I would not have had the message of the 27th. 

[8£78] Senator Lucas. That is right. 

General Short. I hadn't been told to report any measures taken? 

Senator Lucas. That is right. 

General Short. I would have been in the same position I was on 
November 24. 

Senator Lucas. In other words, these messages didn't enlighten you 
whatsoever as far as going on an all-out alert or going on the second 
alert which was near an all-out alert ? 

General Short. There was absolutely no additional enemy informa- 
tion. And there was one thing that cut down the probability. If you 
remember in the Navy message of the 24th they said : "Including 
action toward the Philippines and Guam." In ithe message of the 
27th they told me to be prepared for sabotage at Guam. 

In other words, it looked like they had eliminated even Guam, which 
was right alongside Japan, from possible attack. 

Senator Lucas. Yes ; but the message of the 27th to you didn't ha ve 
anything to do with salDotage. 



3072 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. Xo, That was the naval message. 

Senator Lucas. That is true, but you relied primarily upon Gen- 
eral Marshall's message, more than any Navy message? 

General Short. So far as information pointing to an attack I had 
to rely on the Navy messages because at no time [8£79] after 
July 8 did I ever have an Army message that indicated any probable 
line of action by the Japanese. 

Senator Lucas. You did rely upon both messages, of course? 

General Short. Yes. sir. 

Senator Lucas. But I recall in this testimony that you stated that 
the message of November 24, I think it vras. that was sent to the 
Navy, which was the war warning message of the 2Tth 

General Short. The 27th was the war warning. 

Senator Lucas. In previous testimony you were not sure whether 
or not you ever saw that war warning message. 

General Short. I think I said that I knew the substance of it. I 
was under the impression that Admiral Kimmel had just read it out 
loud at a conference. But in reading over the testimony, Captain 
Layton says that he personally brought it to me, and I have no doubt 
he did, and that he discussed it with me. I was perfectly aware of the 
contents. But I couldn't find in my headquarters, when I assembled 
the material for the Roberts commission, I couldn't find the message 
of either the 2-ith or the naval message of the 2Tth, and so I was 
doubtful whether I had been advised orally or whether I had received 
copies. 

Senator Lucas. Do you believe that in the future, should [8280] 
something of this kind occur, that someone in Hawaii should assume 
all responsibility for the proper interpretation and analyzation of such 
a message as was sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel? 

General Short. I would say, in view of all of the discussion and 
publicity were reference to Pearl Harbor, that anybody in command 
would take no chances whatever. To illustrate what I mean, in March 
of 1942 I visited a good-sized post in the interior of the country and 
found around the parade ground antiaircraft guns manned 2-i hours 
of the day. when 1*}ie possibility of an attack at that paiticular place 
was practically nil. But the commanding officer was taking no 
chances. 

I believe that would be the condition that you will have for some 
years. 

Senator Lucas. You realize that Americans forget pretty fast? 

General Short. Well, in a generation they might forget some. I 
don't believe they would forget much faster. The ones in the Army 
wouldn't forget. 

Now, along that same line, this was hardly over until the War De- 
partment had called on the Command and General Staff School at 
Fort Leavenworth to prepare changes in their manual to provide for 
just that kind of a thing, and I would like to [8281] read what 
they inserted. This was inserted as an entirely new paragraph. It 
was not in the old manual. This is Field Manual 100-15, Field Regu- 
lations, Larger Units, June 29, 1942, paragraph 23 : 

In times of strained relations the "War Department must exhaust every possible 
.source of Information to keep its commanders of field forces advised — 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3073 

Not only keep itself but — 

keep the commanders advised of air, military, and naval dispositions and 
movements of potential enemies and of the trend of diplomatic relations. Com- 
manders of the field forces must keep themselves informed of the possibility of 
a surprise attack being made both from without and within previous to a declara- 
tion of war. During this period commanders must dispose of their forces so that 
a sudden attack will be defeated. 

[82S2] In other words, the "War Department took very decisive 
action and prescribed very definitely for themselves that they would 
keep the commanders completely informed of the information and of 
the relations. 

Senator Lucas. Of course, that comes about through the Pearl Har- 
bor disaster. 

General Short. It comes about definitely through the Pearl Harbor 
disaster. 

Senator Lucas. What I am talking about is : Assuming that in 50 
years a similar situation occurs, where there is no unity of command, 
it is still under a joint control system. You told the committee this 
morning that whether or not they had that complete unity of thought 
and action that was so necessary for the protection of the fleet and 
islands, that personalities were involved. That is. two men might get 
along all right, and two men who followed might not get along all 
right. 

If you had one man in command, where you could place all of the 
responsibility over the Hawaiian Islands and the fleet, would that 
eliminate what I am talking about here, eliminate the possibility of 
any confusion or conflicting interests in the future which might be 
responsible for a similar disaster? 

General Short. I believe it Avould be decidedly helpful. [82S3] 
When you put it at 50 years, it is hard to say whether everybody would 
forget. 

Senator Lucas. Suit your own time on that. Most of us won't be 
around. 

The Chairman. You don't mean that, Senator. 

Senator Lucas. Yes; I do. [Laughter.] 

Senator Lucas. One further question. There can't be any question 
but what under the evidence submitted before this committee they 
were as much confused in Washington in the Intelligence Branch of 
the service as they were in Hawaii with respect to what "^'as going on 
between the two departments. 

Do you agree that if you had one man in Washington responsible 
solely for all of the information, the evaluation of all of the intelli- 
gence, both from the Army and Navy, that that would be conducive 
to better administration, and possibly reduce the danger throughout? 

General Short. I think it would tend to. At the same time, one 
department would have to analyze critically which I don't believe was 
done. 

Senator Lucas. At any rate if you had one man, you wouldn't have 
a general like General Miles coming before the committee and when 
you ask him about the important [8284] message that was sent 
from Tokyo to Honolulu carving the island into five districts, you 
wouldn't have him saying that that was a Navy responsibility, and 
not his, to properly interpret that ? 



3074 COXGRESSIOXAL IN\'ESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. He would know definitely it was his responsibility. 

Senator Lucas. That is where I think we are going to have to lodge 
some of these things, definite responsibility in someone so there can't 
be any buck-passing when a serious thing happens. 

General Shokt. I agi'ee fully that you should have a much more 
competent Intelligence service that is combined. 

[S285] Senator Lucas. Xow this report further says, reading 
again from the Army board report : 

This required that he guard against surprise to the extent possible and make 
ready his command so that it might be employed to the maximum and in time 
againsr the worst form of attack that the enemy might launch. 

I take it you do not agree with that, and you have covered that in 
your testimony. 

General Short. I do not agree. 
Senator Lucas. Further : 

(b> To reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the Admiral commanding 
the Pacific Fleet and the Admiral commanding the Fourteenth Naval District for 
implementing the joint Army and Na%'y plans and agreements then in existence 
which provided for joint action by the two services. One of the methods by 
which they might have become operative was through the joint agreement of 
the responsible commanders. 

You could not agree with that in view of the position that you took 
with respect to the interpretation of these messages ? 

General Short. I believe that the War Department fully expected 
to declare when the situation had arrived to put the war plans into 
effect and that they would have expected us to get their permission 
before we thought of doing it. 

[82S6] Senator Lucas. They further state : 

(c) To inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance 
being conducted by the Navy. 

As I imderstand you took that for granted, that they wei-e doing 
the job? 

General Short. I knew that Admiral Kimmel was doing a great 
deal. I didn't know tlie exact details. But I considered that he was 
more capable of fitting the ships, surface sliips and the submarines and 
the planes, into a complete picture than I was. 

Senator Lucas. Under a unity of conunand no board could have 
made that charge ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Senator Lucas. Do vou know whv the air drills were stopped on 
November 12. 1941 ? * 

General Short. I am of the opinion that they probably were not all 
stopped. The ones that had to do with the B-17's I think were stopped 
because we needed all the time we had for training the crews. 

Senator Lucas. What was the nature of one of those air drills, what 
did you do ? 

General Short. They were of various natures. "We would have a 
report, or the Navy would make an estimate, that possibly some Japa- 
nese ships wer3 in a certain direction. [8-28?"] A squadron or 
group would be given the mission of going out and finding this carrier. 
If they were successful then a bombing squadron would be sent out 
to bomb them. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3075 

Then you mio:ht. by the nexr phase, assume that the carrier got in 
"vdthout being picked up and the fighter planes "vrere coming in. You 
would get that information just in time possibly to send up your o"^vn 
pursuit planes to try to intercept the enemy bomber-s and fighters 
before they reached the islands. 

They varied. 

Senator Lucas. That was an actual drill? 

General Short. Oh. yes. We had one a week on the average from 
t;bout ^March on and 1 think probably about one a month where the 
B-17's were excluded because we didn't think we could spare the time. 

Senator Lucas. Why did you have those drills ? 

General Short. To try to get the Army-Navy Air Corps so they 
could work together. 

.^enat^r Lucas. Pid you have any potential enemy in mind? 

General Short. We always, any time we maneuvered in Hawaii, the 
potential enemy was Japan. There wasn't any doubt in our minds 
about that. We didn't mention it but we thought — we thought of it 
as Orange — ^but it was Japan. 

Senator Lucas. That was the real reason for the air [S-^SSI 
drills, was it not ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Senator Lucas. There was no point in having any air drills over the 
islands unless it was for the defense of those islands and the defense 
of the fleet in case of an attack by the conm^on enemy ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. Those air drills were held, as I recall, 
from sometime in February up to November 12. I think it was prob- 
ably about the first of ^March before we really got them under way. 

Senator Lucas, And all of a sudden they ceased. 

General Short. I don't know definitely but I am inclined to think 
that they had one on the '29ih. of November that did not include the 
B-17's. 

Senator Lucas. Well, it is difficult for me to understand why you 
had all of these air drills all summer long and yet when the tension 
became more strained and everybody in Hawaii knew, as well as here, 
that the conditions with Japan were deteriorating day by day, all of 
a sudden you quit the air drills and went to sabotage. 

General Short. I can tell you why no air drill was scheduled for 
the morning of the 7th. They had a good many of these exercises on 
Sunday morning when the carriers would come in and the planes 
would be sent ashore on Ford Island. [S289] They would 
come in Saturday afternoon and then there would be an air drill 
scheduled for Smiday morning in which the Navy fighter planes would 
participate. On this particular Simdav morning the carriers were all 
out at sea. One was returning from Wake. One was goinir to Mid- 
way. One was on the west coast being overhauled. So there were 
no naval planes to participate. That I know was one reason why 
nothing was scheduled that Sunday morning. 

Senator Lucas. General Short, where were you on the morning of 
December 7 when the attack came ? 

General Short. I was in my quarters. 

Senator Lucas. How far were your quarters from the quarters of 
Admiral Kimmel ? 



3076 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. I would say probably about a mile and a half, maybe 
just a little more than that. 

Senator Lucas. And you immediately, of course, took command and 
gave the orders to your men on the island there as soon as the fir^ 
flight of planes came through ? 

General Short. The chief of staff came into my quarters somewhere 
around 8. 03 and I gave him directions to immediately put No. 3 alert 
into effect. I went over to my headquarters. He was there by the 
time I got there and probably about 8 : 12, and he said that by 8 : 10 he 
had them all alerted. I remained there just long enough to 
[8290] make sure my G-3 section had reached the field command 
posts. I left Colonel Phillips in charge of the regular headquarters 
that had communication with Washington, and I went to the field com- 
mand post where I could be in touch with all of them. 

[8291] Senator Lucas. Admiral Kimmel told the committee 
that he was not only alerted to sabotage but a good many other things, 
as I recall, but was not clear whether he knew that you were alerted to 
sabotage only. 

General Short. I believe that we have some of his testimony before 
this board that states that he did know. 

Senator Lucas. That he did know that you were alerted to sabotage ? 

Mr. Kaufman. He testified both Avays. 

General Short. On page 6985 of the transcript : 

I conferred with General Short on November 28 about the messages each of 
us had received on the 27th. We discussed these dispatches in all aspects. We 
considered, as we did frequentlj' before and did later, the probabilities and pos- 
sibilities of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. In this connection there was discus- 
sion of the effect of the suggestion from Washington that Hfty Army pursuit 
planes be sent by aircraft carriers to Wake and Midway. I understood the Army 
was on an alert and that the alert was against sabotage among other things, al- 
though I do not now recall General Short specifically mentioning the details of 
his alert. 

Senator Lucas. Did you talk to Admiral Kimmel on December the 
6th in the afternoon or the evening ? 

[8292] General Short. I did not. 

Senator Lucas. You did not expect on December the 6th any surprise 
attack on the following day? 

General Short. No, sir ; I did not. 

Senator Lucas. Was there anybody in Hawaii that you knew that 
expected a surprise attack ? 

General Short. If they did they never told me before or after. 
Ordinarily, afterward, there is someone who does expect it. 

Senator Lucas. Well, everybody in Washington and everybody in 
Hawaii sent messages from February on up to almost the day of the 
attack about the possibility of a surprise attack. They had air drills 
for it, they had the Martin-Bellinger report that detailed exactly how 
this thing might happen, which it did, and everybody was surprised 
when the attack came. 

General Short. Yos, sii-. I think you must differentiate between 
possibilities and probabilit3^ 

Senator Lucas. I presume that is correct. 

General Short. We had probabilities pointing to attacks at other 
places and nothing probable pointing to an attack on Hawaii. 

Senator Lucas. Well, the truth of the matter is that everyone 
thought that this war was going to start over around [829S] the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3077 

Malayan States, down the China Sea, and everybody just went to sleep 
on watching Hawaii. 

General Short. I think the universal opinion was that that is where 
the war was going to start. 

Senator Lucas. You stated in your statement before the committee 
that you alerted your command and your troops took the battle posi- 
tions against what you thought was the possibility of a landing attack. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Was that a serious possibility ? 

General Short. Here was the way I felt about it: I felt that if 
that many carriers could elude the Navy and get in there as a com- 
plete surprise that there was an outside possibility that there would 
be a landing force attack here and that I would take no chances. 

Senator Lucas. Then if there was that possibility I would like to 
ask you this hypothetical question : 

Assuming that the fleet had been withdrawn to the western coast 
and conditions at Pearl Harbor were the same other than that, do you 
believe that it would have been possible under those conditions or 
probable that the Japs could have made a landing with the striking 
air forces that they had and brought the planes down as they did? 

General Short. It would have been thoroughly possible. 
[8294.] If they had sent as large a force as they sent against the 
Philippines they could have made the landing. I doubt very much if 
they could have made the landing with a hundred thousand, but I 
believe they sent 224,000 against the Philippines and a force of 
that size, willing to take its losses, could undoubtedly have made the 
landing. 

Senator Lucas. And that would have been a possibility 

General Short. That would have been a possibility. 

Senator Lucas (continuing). If the fleet had not been in Pearl 
Harbor? 

General Short. I would have been much more worried if there 
had been no fleet in Hawaiian waters; I don't mean in Pearl Harbor 
but in the waters of Hawaii. 

Senator Lucas. In the Hawaiian waters. 
■ General Short. I wish to make the distinction. 

Senator Lucas. Yes ; in the Hawaiian waters. If that should have 
happened, that possibility should have happened — and it was a possi- 
bility — and the Japs had taken the island of Oahu, it would have 
taken us a long time to have thrown them out of there, wouldn't it? 

General Short. It would have been very serious. 

Senator Lucas. Very costly. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Referring again to the question of [8290] 
Admiral Kimmel's statement on sabotage I call your attention to page 
6989 of the present transcript where this question was asked by Mr. 
Eichardson, counsel for the committee : 

Mr. Richardson. Did you know, Admiral, what General Short's first alert 
was? 

Admiral Kimmel. You mean No. 1 alert, as you call it? 

Mr. RiCHAKDSON. That is it. 

Admiral Kimmel. I did not know he had but one kind of an alert. 

Mr. Richardson. What kind of alert did you think he had? 

Admiral Kimmel. I thought he had an alert where he put his people on 
the alert. 



3078 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Richardson. Did you know at the time 3'ou talked with General Short 
that his No. 1 alert was simply against sabotage? 

Admiral Kimmel. I did not know he had a No. 1 alert. I think I have 
found out since, however, that this No. 1, 2, and 3 alert business was put 
into effect on the 5th of November of 1941. Prior to that they had an alert 
and a nonalert status. 

So that seems to place his testimony just a little different. 

[8296] General Short. That is a little contradiction from the 
other. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. 

General Short. I would like to say, however, that we had furnished 
Admiral Bloch's headquarters with 10 copies of our alert system, so 
someone in the staff should have known exactly what the different alerts 
meant. 

Senator Lucas. I want to ask one final question, General Short. Not- 
withstanding this far-reaching sea disaster and the damage that was 
done to the property on the island and the loss of life is it your con- 
tention now that with all the information available at that time you 
did all tliat any prudent commander could do to prevent or minimize 
such a surprise attack ? 

General Short. I believe I did all that a prudent commander could 
be expected to do ; yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Do you believe under all the circumstances you ex- 
ercised that high degree of care and caution that was automatically 
imposed u})on you when you took over the command of that base? 

General Short. I believe the people in the — all the people in the 
Army there and the civilians know that I worked very seriously and 
very conscientiously constantly from the time I got there until the date 
of the attack to improve [8£97] conditions to get ready for an 
attack. 

Senator Lucas. And you feel that you exercised that superior judg- 
ment necessary for one of your rank and position when you knew that 
war was on its way ? 

General Short. I believe I did. 

Senator Lucas. That is all, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that I shall be here 
when my tiu*n conies and I only have one question. I do not want it 
answered now. 

I will put the question in connection with this material which the 
counsel has now given me and which he has gone over with General 
Short. I can reoffer it again as an exhibit, although I won't press the 
offer at this time, but before General Short concludes his testimony I 
should like to have him make whatever comment he may think is 
warranted on certain of the items in here which indicate certain con- 
flicts in his prior testimony and I will only read one sentence from the 
exhibit here that bears on it. It is not of a critical character. 

The Chairman. Not of what? 

Senator Brewster, This is not of a critical character but other por- 
tions of the exhibit are. [Reading :] 

General Short's non-feasance or omission were based on an estimate of a situa- 
tion which although proved faulty [S29S] by subsequent events was, inso- 
far as I am able to ascertain from the report of the Roberts Commission, made 
or concurred in by all of those officers in Hawaii best qualified to form an exact 
military opinion. That estimate was that an attack by air was in the highest 
degree improbable. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3079 

Now, whether you want to accept it now or whether you want other 
members of the committee to look it over before it is offered is imma- 
terial to me. 

The Chairman. The CTiair has stated that other members would like 
to see them and look them over before it is made an exhibit and I see 
no delay in that procedure that would be disadvantageous. 

Senator Brewster. That is quite all right. 

The Chairman. And inasmuch as it is obvious that the committee 
will not conclude with General Short's testimony today that might go 
over until tomorrow. 

Senator Brewster. I think he should certainly have a full oppor- 
tunity to prepare any statement he desires on it and that is why I think 
it ought to be gone over. 

The Chairi^ian. Well, the general is familiar with this, with the 
interrogatory of the Senator from Maine. 

General Short. I am not familiar with the particular things he 
is bringing up there. 

[8299] The Chairiman. Would you like to have an opportunity 
to familiarize yourself with it before you answer it? 

Senator Brewster. Well, I am not asking for it now. 

The Chairman. Well, even the suggestion. 

General Short, I think it would be an advantage. 

The Chairman. Yes, all right. Well, we will determine that later. 
Congressman Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. General Short, you were an infantry officer for some 
years, were you not ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Murphy. Did you ever have any training or work with the Air 
Force at all prior to going to Pearl Harbor? 

General Short, les. In nfaneuvers we had Air Corps units at- 
tached. 

Mr. Murphy. Outside of maneuvers you never did deal directly with 
the Air as such, did you ? 

General Short. In the Command Staff School and in the Army War 
College we had a great deal of instruction. 

INIr. Murphy. How many years before Pearl Harbor were you at the 
Staff School and had any instruction about the Air? 

General Short. I graduated from the Army War College in 1925, 

Mr, Murphy, Had you been there between 1925 and 1941 ? 

General Short, No, sir, 

[8300] Mr, Murphy, Admiral Kimmel was a ship man pri- 
marily, wasn't he ? 

General Short. Yes, sir, 

Mr. Murphy, He had not had anything to do particularly with the 
Air either then, so far as you know? 

General Short. I do not know, sir, 

Mr, Murphy, Now, both Admiral Kimmel and yourself, as I recol- 
lect it, say that you were largely influenced by the newspaper at 
Honolulu as to your estimate of the situation subsequent to November 
the 27th, Is that right in your case ? 

General Short, No, sir. I would say the only thing I remember 
getting from the newspaper that had a direct bearing on this mes- 
sage was the fact that the negotiations in Washington with the 
Japanese had been resumed. That is the only thing 



3080 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr, Murphy. Now, I would like to direct your attention to the head- 
lines of the papers in Manila. I am now reading 

The Chairman. In Manila? 

Mr, Murphy. In Honohdii. I beg your pardon. 

I am now reading from page 11 of the United States News which 
contains the Army Pearl Harbor Board report. The newspaper head- 
lines in question, referring to the Honolulu Advertiser and the Hono- 
lulu Star Bulletin — the newspaper headlines in question read as 
follows : 

[8301] U. S. Vi^aits Japan Reply. 

That was the Honolulu Star-Bulletin of November 29, 

Japanese May Strike Over Weekend ; Kurusu Bluntly Warned Nation Ready 
for Battle. 

That was the Honolulu Advertiser of November 30, although it is 
recorded here as the 20th, which is a typographical error because the 
piece is already in the record. That is in the Honolulu Advertiser. 

Hull, Kurusu in Critical Meeting Today. 

That is the 1st of December in the Honolulu Advertiser. 

U. S. Army Alerted in Manila, Singapore Mobilizing as War Tension Grows; 
Japanese Envoys Resume Talks Amid Tension ; War Fears Grow in Philippines. 

That was the 1st of December in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. 

Japan Called Still Hopeful of Making Peace With U. S. ; Japan Gives Two 
Weeks More to Negotiations. 

That was December 2 in the Honolulu Advertiser. 

Huge Pincher Attack on U. S. By Japan, France Predicted. 

That was the 3d of December in the Honolulu Advertiser. 

Japan Spurns U. S. Program. 

That was on the 4th of December in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. 

Pacific Zero Hour Near ; Japan Answers U. S. Today. 

That is the 4th of December 1941 in the Honolulu Advertiser. 

[8302] Singapore on War Footing; New Peace Effort Urged in Tokyo; 
Civilians Urged to Leave Manila. 

That is the 6th of December in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 

America Expected to Reject Japan's Reply on Indo-China ; Japanese Navy 
Moving South ; Detailed Plans Completed for M-Day Setup. 

That is the 6th of December 1941 in the Honolulu Advertiser. 

F. D. R. Will Send Message to Emperor on War Crisis. 

That is the 7th of December 1941 in the Honolulu Advertiser. 

Do you thing there is anything in those headlines that would justify 
you in feeling that there was a lessening of the tension that existed ? 

General Short. Only one thing, the fact that the negotiations were 
expected to continue for 2 weeks. 

Mr. Murphy. In other words, with about 14 you eliminate 13 and 
you stand on that 1 that says they might go 2' weeks ? 

General Short, But practically all of them pointed towards the 
South Pacific, In addition 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3081 

Mr. Murphy. Let us stick to the papers, General. Out of the 14 
the only one that impressed you was the one that they might go on 
for 2 weeks? 

General Short. No. 

Mr. Murphy. Notwithstanding the fact that the subsequent 
[8303'] one says that the zero hour may be on the 4th, or the Pacific 
zero hour is near ; is that right ? 

General Short. I was willing to accept the information in the mes- 
sage of the 27th that hostilities might break out. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, I understand you. You said that the November 
27 message made you feel that war was imminent. 

General Short, Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Do you think then that Admiral Kimmel or yourself 
would be justified, in view of these headlines in December, that the 
newspaper headlines would make you feel there was a lessening in the 
tense situation that existed on the 27th of November? 

General Short. The only thing there would be the statement of De- 
cember 1 on account of the fact that the message had said there was 
a bare possibility that the Japanese Government would come back 
and would resume operations and it shows that they had resumed op- 
erations and then the message indicating that the negotiations would 
probably continue for 2 weeks might well have led us to believe that 
there was less likelihood of hostilities until the expiration of the 2 
weeks. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, that was the only paper that influenced 
you, was it, that one about the 2 weeks ? 

[8304] General Short. That one and the one about the resump- 
tion of the negotiations. 

Mr. Murphy. And the others you dismissed ? 

General Short. No. I thought the others were in line with what 

Mr. Murphy. With the 27th message ? 

General Short. With the information we had been given and also 
the direction of the attack was in line with the information we had 
been given. 

Mr. Murphy. General, you felt and apparently Admiral Kimmel 
felt that there was going to be an attack on the Philippines. You both 
agreed on that, didn't you ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Why, if there were going to be an attack on a United 
States possession and at the Philippines, wouldn't you feel that there 
was grave danger of some kind of an attack on Hawaii ? 

General Short. Frankly, I felt that there would certainly be in- 
ternal disorders but that in all probability if the Japanese were going 
to make a real out and out attack on the Philippines, on the Philippine 
Islands, that they would employ practically all of their equipment and 
available means for that purpose to make it as strong as possible, 

Mr, Murphy. Now, the thing that puzzles the writers and [8305] 
a lot of people in the country is if they were going to go all out on the 
Philippines why wouldn't any military man expect that there was 
danger of an attack from the fleet then on their flank and why wouldn't 
they seek to eliminate that possibility ? 

79716— 46— pt. 7 12 



3082 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. To make that attack they took six out of the eight 
airplane carriers they had. In other words, they took three-fourths of 
their air power that might have been used to support the Philippine 
attack and sent it to Hawaii. It weakened their attack in the Pnilip- 
pines very much and ordinarily when any country is making a very 
serious effort like that they try not to drive their forces. 

Mr. Murphy, Couldn't an attack on the Philippines, General, be 
made and wasn't it made by land-based bombers ? 

General Short. They could by a certain amount. 

Mr, Murphy. Well, didn't they attack it? Isn't that what they 
used ? 

General Short, They did. 

Mr. Murphy, And didn't you know that, that they could ? 

General Short, Yes ; but also we knew that the addition of the car- 
rier planes would make that attack much heavier and much more seri- 
ous. 

Mr, Murphy. Well, they did a pretty thorough job with land-based 
planes, didn't they 2 

[8S06] General Short. They did, yes; but we have used both 
all through the war whenever we have made a serious attack. 

Mr, Murphy, Now I w^ould like to review with you. General, if you 
will, exhibit 53. 

General Short. 53 ? 

Mr. Murphy. I think it is important that somewhere in the record 
there should be a resume of the correspondence between you and Gen- 
eral Marshall. And before I go into that, General, on May 1, 1941, 
you had an all-out alert in Honolulu, did you not, where you had 
fortifications being built, you had everything out you could have in 
the way of equipment, didn't you, for the whole day ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you have some plans for a maneuver on the 10th 
of December ? 

General Short. No, sir ; we had no definite plans for a maneuver. 

Mr, Murphy. Had you discussed it ? 

General Short. We were counting on having a maneuver. There 
were two things that we were waiting for for a complete maneuver. 
We were building an underground interceptor-command post and we 
were completing our own field-command post. We were waiting until 
they were completed and got into comnmnication so that our next 
maneuver would be controlled by the [8S07] communications 
which we expected to have already to follow, 

Mr. Murphy. I will take that up with you later. Let me go to 
Marshall's correspondence with you, I refer first to the letter of Feb- 
ruarj'^ 7, lO^l, At that time G-'ueral Marshall gave you his impres- 
sion and appraisal of Admiral Kimmel; that he was brusque and 
undiplomatic in his approach to problems and that he appeared rather 
rough in his methods of doing business and that he felt that he was 
entirely responsive to plain speaking on the part of the other felloAV 
if there is frankness and logic in the presentation. You remember 
that? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MuRPJiY, And then you answered him, did you not, by saying 
that you had told Kimmel and Bloch that there would be no hair- 
splitting between you, on February 19? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3083 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, to come back to the letter of February 7, 
General Marshall told you that Hawaii was on a far better basis than 
any other command in the Army, did he not ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. He told you at that time that at Cavite and Corregidor 
they had only two antiaircraft guns ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

[8S08] Mr. Murphy. He also told you, and I think this is 
significant : 

Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to 
protect the base and the Naval concentrations at Hawaii. 

That was your mission there ; wasn't it ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

[8J09] Mr. Murphy. Then he also told you about the Army and 
Navy feuds "which still persist in confusing issues of national defense," 
and "we must be completely impersonal in these matters"? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, in your letter of the 19th of February, you 
told him that you were taking up the question of dispersion of pursuit 
aviation upon the island of Oahu in order that you might be able to 
meet an attack from any direction; did you not? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. Then on page 7 of your letter, you make reference, 
Genera], to a letter on maximum readiness of aircraft in the Hawaiian 
area. Do you have a copy of that letter ? I am speaking now of page 
7 of the exhibit, General. 

General Short. What paragraph is that? 

Mr. Murphy. The third paragraph from the bottom of the page : 

Letter HHD to Major Echelon Commanders, 17 February 1941, subject : Maxi- 
mum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area. 

I would like to see a copy of that letter, if I may. 

General Short. I have not a copy here. I will ask Colonel Dun- 
combe if he -can obtain a copy. 

[8310] Mr. Murphy. Will you make a notation of that, counsel, 
please ? That is the third last paragraph on page 7. 

On page 8 you spoke to General Marshall about the necessity of 
bomb-proofing the vital installations; did you not? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy, On March 5, 1941, General Marshall wrote you a letter 
in which he said : 

I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory 
system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first 
priority. 

Do you recall that ? 
General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. On March 6, 1941, you wrote General Marshall : 

One of the first projects which I investigated in this Department was the 
aircraft warning service which I believe is vital to the defense of these islands. 

Then again you said : 

With the present international situation, it seems to me that if this equipmeut 
is to be used at all, the need for it is now here. 



3084 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

That was back in March ; was it not? 

[8311] General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Then you also stated in the next paragraph that the 
equipment would arrive in June and the stations would be operating 
shortly thereafter, did you not? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. You assured General Marshall that the personnel 
would be trained and the stations in operation within 30 days after 
the receipt of the equipment mentioned in your letter? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, on March 13, 1941, General Marshall wrote to 
you and said : 

The progress that you are making in reaching close coordination with local naval 
authorities, and so insuring a maximum degree of readiness in your Department, 
is most gratifying. 

On March 15, 1941, you received a letter from General Bryden, in 
the absence of General Marshall, saying : 

The War Department appreciates fully the necessity for the early establish- 
ment of the aircraft wai'ning service station in the Hawaiian Department 

Then, the third paragraph : 

I have given these matters my personal attention. 

[8312] The last paragraph : 

We are as anxious as you to work out a solution for these problems with the 
least practicable delay, and I know that I can count upon you for fullest coopera- 
tion. 

General Short. May I interrupt you a moment ? 

Mr. Murphy. All right. General. 

General Short. That particular thing he is discussing is the ques- 
tion of getting the permission of the Park Service. 

Mr. Murphy. That is right. 

General Short. That request was started in June 1940. 

Mr. Murphy. That is right. 

General Short. And we did not get the authority until April 1941. 

Mr. Murphy. That is right. You had great difficulty in getting 
permission to have the fixed stations operate. The fixed stations were 
not operating, and therefore they could not help you on December 7 ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. Just put that one on one side, and let us go to the 
next one. 

Now, on March 15, 1941, you stated to General Marshall : 

On all fields the planes have been kept lined up on the field where they would 
suffer terrific loss. 

\8313] So apparently you meant to change that situation, did you 
not? 

General Short. In case of an air attack ; yes, sir, 

Mr. Murphy. But you did not, did you ? 

General Short. We were not alerted against air attack. We were 
alerted against sabotage. 

Mr. Murphy. I see. 



Now, then, on page 16, you said : 

In general, we have no serious shortage in three-inch anti-aircraft artillery, only 
16 guns being required to complete our complement — 

did you not? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. Then in the paragraph on the bottom of the page: 

After the installation of our new detectors, we shall have some 
warning from the different islands and almost continuous service in 
the most dangerous direction for approximately 75 miles. 

What was the most dangerous direction you were speaking of there ? 
It was from the north, wasn't it ? 

General Short. The north is what we ordinarily figured, although 
the Navy felt that there was quite a possibility of an attack coming 
in from the southwest, on account of the Mandated Islands. 

[8314.] Mr. Murphy. As a matter of fact, an expert on Hawaii, 
and Admiral Kimmel on several occasions, and some other witnesses 
in these records, have said the most dangerous area was from the 
north. Are you familiar with that ? 

General Short. I am familiar with that particular thing. Also the 
Navy thought there was considerable danger from the southwest. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, throughout the testimony, for hundreds 
and hundreds of pages, the north was pointed to as the most dangerous 
place. Then, at a subsequent hearing, after the Roberts board had 
completed, there was a statement that the most dangerous place was 
from the north, and in this hearing there is a reference by Admiral 
Richardson to what he thought. The fact is you thought the north was 
the most dangerous section, did you not? 

General Short. Not necessarily directly north, but northwest to 
north. That was the most probable. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you said there : 

The pursuit aviation, however, will have to be prepared to take the air in 
the minimum amount of time. 

That is what you told General Marshall, is it not ? 

General Short. That would be true no matter what direction they 
came from. 

[8315] Mr. Murphy. At any rate, that is what you told General 
Marshall, that pursuit aviation would have to be prepared to take the 
air in the minimum amount of time ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, on the last page, page 17 of that letter, 
the letter of March 15, you told General Marshall : 

I feel that the question of anti-aircraft defense against air attack is the most 
serious problem that we have to face — 

did you not ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, on March 28, 1941, General Marshall wrote you, 
and at that time he said in the second to the last paragraph, he said : 

I am hopeful of arranging for the early augmentation of your anti-aircraft 
garrison so as to provide full strength unit for the armament available within 
your department. 



3086 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Then, again, in the last paragraph : 

I approved your proposal to send General Martin and General Gardner, or their 
execuiives, to the west coast defense exercise. 

That was an air exercise, wasn't it ? 
General Short. Yes, sir. 

[8310] iSlr. Murphy. On April 14, 1941, you wrote General 
Marshall, and in the second to the lust paragraph on page 19, you said: 

Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are making 
in cooperating with the ISavy, I am enclosing the following agreement made with 
them — 

And one of them was the joint coastal frontier defense plan. 
Then in paragraph 3, on page 20, or the one numbered 3, you state : 

putting into effect for the Army the provisions of the Joint Agreement. 

The next paragraph : • 

I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch very cooperative, and 
we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army and the 
Navy Air Forces to act together and with the unity of command as the situation 
requires. 

We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the Air 
Force and the anti-aircraft defense. I hope we shall arrive at something on that 
in the near future. The more I go into the details, the more I am becoming con- 
vinced that it will be necessary for us to set up an air defense command. 

[8317] Then, in the last paragraph, you told General Marshall : 

The Navy has felt very much encouraged by the increase in our air and anti- 
aircraft defense. 

Now, I go over to the letter of May 5, that General Marshall wrote 
to you : 

Thank you for your letter of the 14th enclosing the joint plans and the estimate 
concerning possible air action. It is evident that you liave been on the job, and 
I know that the Navy is delighted to have such generous cooperation. 

And in the last paragraph — and this is significant — 

It is most gratifying to Iiear you say that everything is going along extremely 
well, and do not hesitate to write at any time. 

Do you remember that? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, on May 29, 1941, you wrote General Marshall, 
and you were describing the recent maneuvers. In paragraph 2, you 
said this : 

The maneuver was divided into three phases. The first phase consisted of the 
air action and the actual issue of one day's fire and of engineer supplies for field 
fortifications and of engineer tools. During the air [S3i8J phase, our 
bombers acted under Navy Command in cooperation with the Naval Patrol Squad- 
rons and actually located and bombed airplane carriers 250 miles out at sea. 
The movement of the carrier was entirely free so that the Navy Patrol planes 
had the mission of locating the ship and notifying our bombers and they then 
made the attack. Pui'suit attacked enemy bombers represented by naval planes 
and our own bombers, when they came in to attack ground defenses. 

Upon receipt of the warning for this phase, our bombers were sent to fields on 
outlying islands and pursuit planes were dispersed. Tlie Navy cooperated very 
fully during tliis phase, and I believe we learned more about the coordination 
of Army Air Force, Navy Air Force, and anti-aircraft, than we had during any 
previous exercise. 

Ammunition and engineer supplies had never been actually issued before, and 
we got complete data in regard to the time and the transportation required to 
complete the issue. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3087 

If you had done just that after the war warning, it would have been 
a different result, would it not? 

General Short. Not just that alone, no. 

Mr. MuEPHY. If you had done just what you did on May 29. issued 
live ammunition and had your planes ready, [SSIO} and have 
your pursuits ready ? 

General Short. We had live ammunition at all antiaircraft batteries 
but four, or immediately accessible to them. 

Mr. Murphy. You said you had that ready, and you also said you 
could go into alert 2 from alert 1 in 7 minutes, but the fact is, it took 
5 to 6 hours for them to get to their guns, didn't it ? 

General Short. No, it did not. It took time to move the guns and 
troops to prescribed positions. There were some batteries that had 
to move probably 20 miles. 

Mr. Murphy. You mean to go from alert 1 to alert 2 you would 
make a phone call and say, "Go to alert 2"; is that it? 

General Short. They were prepared for that anyway. 

Mr. Murphy. You would just give the order, but it might take six 
hours to get to where you could shoot? 

General Short. For a few of the batteries that is true. 

Mr. Murphy. It took a few batteries some time to get into their 
positions? 

General Short. They had to move their troops. 

Mr. Murphy. You mean your ammunition was at the crater? 

General Short. The ammunition was at the crater for [8320] 
four batteries. 

Mr. Murphy. In the Sixty-fourth Coast Artillery, Antiaircraft 
B, C, D, and F, just those four batteries? 

General Short. Those four batteries. The others were placed 
close to the prescribed positions, within, I think 20 to 75 yards. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, when you had this maneuver on May 
29, and when you had the alert on May 1 for 12 days — or would 
that be the same one. General? 

General Short. The same one, yes. 

Mr. Murphy. At that time, did the public get hysterical ? 

General Short. I do not think you understood that ammunition 
business. What we were attempting there, was to find out, from a 
logistics point of view, how long it would take to move a day's fire. 
That ammunition was not issued out to the men. That ammuni- 
tion was transported from the various places of storage to the troops. 

The boxes were not opened. It was a question of transportation, 
as to how long it would take to load up the ammunition and to de- 
liver it to the organization concerned. It was a logistics problem 
entirely, and it had never been tried out before in Hawaii. 

Mr. Murphy. The fact is that on May 1, you say now [SS^Q 
that you did not take the ammunition out and did not use live am- 
munition ? 

General Short. We did not use any of it. 

Mr. Murphy. Did not fire any shots at all ? 

General Short. No, we fired none. It was a logistics proposition. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, you also say that the ammunition up in the 
crater only affected four antiaircraft batteries. Is that correct? 



3088 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. That is correct. Now, do not misunderstand me. 
There were lots of other ammunition in the crater. We had am- 
munition immediately accessible to the gun positions of all but those 
four batteries. There were many days of fire in the crater. 

Mr. Murphy. Did not you issue one full day's supply of ammunition 
to each gun in the maneuvers in May? 

General Short. We delivered it to the batteries, yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. You had it right there ready for use ? 

General Short. It was not ready for use. It was a purely trans- 
portation pro'position. 

Mr. Murphy. It was in the boxes and the boxes were not opened? 

General Short. It was testing the time that it took [8S2£] 
to draw the ammunition at the storage, and to move it to the bat- 
tery. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you said in the last paragraph of that 
letter, on page 36 : 

Some time later we expected to have a maneuver without any warning 
whatever to the troops. But will wait until after the organization of our 
air defense command. 

General Spiort. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. Is that the one you were still waiting for in De- 
cember ? 

General Short. That is the one we were waiting for. 

Mr. Murphy. On October 10, you said to Senator Lucas you had 
no word from Washington about the air subsequent to July, as I 
understood you, and here is a letter from General Marshall to you, 
dated October 10, which said : 

The mimeographed standard operating procedure for the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, dated July 14, has just come to my attention, and I am particulary con- 
cerned with missions assigned to air units. 

Then again, in the second paragraph : 

This seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in 
Hawaii. 

General Short. That has no relation whatever to a probable attack. 

[8323] Mr. Murphy. Well, that was a discussion between you 
and General Marshall as to how much the air forces should be trained 
for using guns and the like ; and in your letter you told him, did you 
not, that you had a surplus of some 3,000 men ? 

General Short. Right at that time. 

Mr. Murphy. That you had around 7,000-some-odd-hundred men, 
and if you used around 3,000 of them, that would take care of all of 
your needs for the airplanes, and you had 3,000 left over, and you 
wanted some to take care of themselves in the event there was an 
invasion ; is that right ? 

General Short. That is correct, at that particular day. 

Mr. Murphy. But you were still talking about air, and the im- 
portance of air? 

General Short. Yes, but nobody was pointing to the probability 
of an air attack today or tomorrow, next week or next month. 

Mr. Murphy. I expect you had those airplanes there to stop an air 
attack, did you not? 

General Short. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. You had your air fields, your antiaircraft guns, your 
pursuit planes, and the only reason for them being there was to stop 
an air attack, was it not? 



I PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3089 

[83^4] General Short. Yes, but that did not mean at all that 
! an air attack was going to take place in the immediate future. 
j Mr. Murphy. You were told that war was imminent ? 
! General Spiort. Yes. 

{ Mr. Murphy. You thought they should tell you where the stroke 
-would come? 

General Short. If they had the information, I thought so, and I 
I still think so today, and I think they had it. 

Mr. Murphy. Then, on October 14, you wrote to General Marshall : 

I have your letter of October 10 with reference to the use of men of the air 
force on other than strictly air duties. At the time our tentative standing oper- 
ating Rrocedure was put out the Air Corps had 7,229 men. Full combat details 
and all overhead required only 3,885 men for the planes and organizations 
■ actually on hand. This left a surplus of 3,344 men with no assigned duties 
during maneuvers. One of the main reasons for the assignment was to give 
these men something to do during the maneuvers. Another reason was the 
belief that any serious threat of an enemy ground attack of Oahu could come 
only after destruction of our Air Forces. 

[8325'] So that there would not be any need of an all-out alert 
puiticularly unless the Air Force was destroyed? 

General Short. That was my estimate of the situation. 

Mr. Murphy. You say then near the end of the second to the last 
paragraph : 

As regards their use as military police that was not correct. The plan was to 
use them for guarding certain essential utilities, which did not require team 
training. However, this will be unnecessary as the Legislature has just passed 
the Home Guard Bill, which will go into effect very soon. They will be able 
to take over guarding of all essential utilities, highway bridges, railroad bridges, 
etc. 

So that on October 14, at any rate, you were discussing the air forces 
as such with General Marshall ? 

General Short. We were always discussing air forces. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, General, I would like to ask you this: In the 
alert you put out what did you do about your fire control stations? 
Did you alert them ? 

General Short. The fire control for the coast artillery ? 

Mr. Murphy. All of your fire-control stations under the command 
of the Army. 

General Short. We did not do anj'thing about the fire control sta- 
tions because we were not on that kind of an alert. 

[8326] Mr. Murphy. Right. The fact is that a great amount 
of the damage was done to the hangars. I see here a picture of the 
hangar burning. What hangar would that be, General, do you re- 
member ? 

General Short. I rather suspect it may have been the Hawaiian 
Air Depot. I am not sure. 

Mr. Murphy. I show you another picture of what appears to be 
another hangar, or it may be the same one. Will you examine this, 
if you please ? 

General Short. I would not know which particular hangar it waf 
because they all look alike. 

Mr. Murphy. Will you pass these two to him, please? 

(The photographs were handed to General Short.) 

General Short. I would not be able to say what particular hangars 
those were. 



3090 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. The fact is that a great deal of damage occurred from 
fire there that day, did it not? 

General Short. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. If you had your fire-control stations alerted would 
that have cut down the damage? 

General Short. When you are talking about fire control I assume 
you mean those stations for controlling the fire of the harbor defense 
guns. We had a fire department on every post. 

[8327] Mr. Murphy. I misunderstood you. I do not know any- 
thing about those things. I see Admiral Richardson laughing back 
there. However, I am only a layman and you are an expert. 

What special provisions did you take to stop fire after November 27? 

General Short. We always had provisions to stop fires. 

Mr. Murphy. What special provisions after November 27? 

General Short. Our fire department w^as always fully alerted. We 
did not take any special provisions. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, you say that the Navy had reconnaissance. 
General, and therefore the Navy had reconnaissance because of an ex- 
pected air attack. Why did you have your pursuit planes on 4 hours' 
notice? 

General Short. I did not say that the Navy had reconnaissance be- 
cause of an expected air attack, because I do not think they did ex- 
pect an air attack. They had reconnaissance to make sure that there 
were no Japanese vessels in the coastal zone. 

Mr. Murphy. Is that the understanding you gave to the Roberts 
board that I read yesterday, that the reconnaissance that was had was 
the kind of reconnaissance that was expected in the joint air mission? 
Is that what you referred to, the responsibility of reconnaissance in 
the event of an air [8328] attack? 

General Short. That does not pertain only to air attack. That 
responsibility would be for any kind of reconnaissance. 

Mr. Murphy. You have said. General, you expected the Navy was 
carrying out their full duty in having reconnaissance and the Navy 
expected you to be doing your full duty on radar. Now if the Navy 
was having reconnaissance why did you have your pursuit planes on 
4 hours' notice? 

General Short. You are making statements that I have not made. 
I said I expected them to do their full duty as far as they were able to 
do it with the equipment they had. 

Mr. Murphy. I understood you to say, sir, you expected the Navy to 
do complete reconnaissance. 

General Short. I did not say that. 

Mr. Murphy. Let me find your answer and let me give your exact 
words in the statement you gave before the Army Pearl Harbor board. 

General Short. Will you please quote the page? 

Mr. Murphy. I will, General. I have it here. 

The Chairman. I might say we have reached the hour of 4 o'clock. 

Mr. Murphy. All right. 

[8329] The Chairman. Do you want to recess now or go into 
this? 

Mr. Murphy. No ; I will go into it in the morning. 

The Chairman. The committee will recess until 10 o'clock tomor- 
row morning. 

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., January 24, 1946, the committee recessed 
until 10 a. m., Friday, January 25, 1946.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3091 



[8330] PEAEL HAEBOR ATTACK 



FRIDAY, JANUARY 25, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF the Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington, D. C. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and F'erguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Hasten, Edward P. 
Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee. 

[83r31^ The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in 
order. Does counsel have anything at this point ? 

Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, the other day a request was made for 
any further information that might be available regarding the mes- 
sage of December 7 to General Short signed by General Marshall. 

We have received the following memorandum from Colonel Dun- 
combe that I would like to read into the record. 

The Vice Chairman. Of the War Department ? 

Mr. Masten. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. You may proceed. 

Mr. Masten (reading) : 

War Department, 
Washington, D. C, 24 January 1946. 
Memorandum to Mr. Richardson : 

The following inclosures relate to General Marshall's message to General 
Short, dated 7 December 1941 : 

(1) Copies of papers which show that, at the time of the Army Pearl Harbor 
board hearings, a search was made for General Marshall's handwritten draft of 
the message and that the draft was not found. 

(2) A photostat of a copy of the encoded message sent from the War Depart- 
ment. On the photostat, to avoid dis- 83S2^ closure of U. S. codes, the 
encoded text of the body of the message has been blocked out. 

(3) A copy of Committee Exhibit 61, which is a photostat of General Gerow's 
memorandum to The Adjutant General concerning the message. This memo- 
randum, as indicated by General Gerow's memorandum in Committee Exhibit 39, 
"was typed later during the day (7 December) and formally made of record." 

(4) A photostat of a handwritten memorandum by General Adams, The 
Adjutant General, dated 29 January 1942. 

(5) A photostat of the message as decoded in Hawaii. 

/S/ HAEMON DUNCOMBE, 

,^ , , Lt. Colonel, G8C. 

5 Incls. 



3092 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

We suggest that the memorandum I have just read, together with 
enclosures 1, 2, 4, and 5, be spread on the record at this point. 
The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered. 

Mr. ]\Iasten. I omit enclosure 3 since it is already Exhibit No. 61. 
The Vice Chairman. It may be so ordered. 
(The matter referred to follows:) 

8 September 1944. 



Note for record : 

1. On 8 September, Mr. Schneider, Secretary to Mr. .Justice Roberts and Sec- 
retary to the Roberts Committee, informed General North that 

a. he had no recollection of having seen General Marshall's handwritten 
draft of the 7 December 1941 message, 

b. all documents received by the Committee from the War Department were 
returned to the Secretary of War by Colonel Brown who acted as liaison officer, 

c. Mr. Schneider has no signature indicating receipt by an oilicial of the War 
Department. 

2. On S September 1944 Lt. Col. William M. Connor Jr., reports that General 
Weir of the Judge Advocate General's Office stated that he does not kave the 
handwritten draft in his possession. 

Thomas North. 
Brigadier General, G. S. C, 

Chief, Current Group, OPD. 

Col. Brown, who returned the papers to the War Department, and Col. Bratton, 
who carried the manuscript message in question to the Message Center, have 
both been questioned, and both disclaim any Imowledge of what became of the 
[8334] manuscript draft. 

C. G. J. 



Priority 

18 Sept 44 
Washington, D. C. 

Seci'et 

A War 1S1916Z WTJ 

War 32425 ISth Desire to locate handwritten original of warning message 
dispatched on seven December nineteen forty one period This draft was used 
in testimony before Roberts commission and it would appear that it was sub- 
mitted to that commission paren for Richardson for Colonel Charles W. West 
from North signed Marshall paren Colonel Lee How Brown comma USMC comma 
now believed station with HQ Fifth Marine Division or comma was law officer for 
the commission period Request you contact him to determine what disposition 
was made of this draft and radio your findings. 

[Copy] 



Secret 

20 September 1944. 
Gbitnekt 

President, Army Pearl Harhor Board, 
Bldg #SG, Presidio of San Francisco. 
To : Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department, Washington, 
D. C. 
[8335] Rerad September Eighteenth from General North inquiry Colonel 
Brown Marine Corps reveals he does not recall what disposition was made hand- 
written original mentioned message period He suggested that Albert J. Schnei- 
der now secretary to Justice Roberts then clerk of commission may be able 
furnish information leading to discovery its whereabouts end 

Lt. Gen. Geokge Grunebt, 

TJ. S. Army, 
President, Army Pearl Harbor Board. 
Official : 

R. G. Hurt, 

Major AGD, 

Aide-de-Oamp. 



Signal Coeps, United States Abmy 

Received at DI 56 74/73 US Govt. 

Di Washn, D. C, Dec. 7, IMl, at 1201 PM 
CG 

Hawaiian Dept, Ft Shafter, T. H. 
529 Seventh. 

(*) 

Maeshall. 

1217 PM 

*Reporter's note : Context blocked out. 



[8356] War Department, 

The Adjutant General's Office, 

Washington, D. C. 

Memorandum : ^ , -r x, -rw 

Checked on the history of this radio of Dec. 7, 1941 with Lt. Col. John K. 
Deane, G. S. C, who states that a pencil draft of it was taken directly to the 
Message Center by Col. Bratton for immediate dispatch which was done. 

T. A. G. did not enter the picture at that time in any way except as custodian 

of the record message. -c cs a 

111. o. A. 

1-29-42 

File 



[8357] Signal Corps, United States Army 

4758 

Seciet 

1549WS Washington DC 74/73 RCA Etat 7 1218P 

f C 

Eaion Dept, Ft. Shafter, T. H. 

529 7th Japanese are presenting at one PM eastern standard time today 

what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code 

machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do 

not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this 

communication 

Marshall. 

(Time and date stamp— Received at 3—7 Dec. 1941 Hq. Haw. Dept. AGO SRS) 

(Decoded by Lt. J. H. Babcock, 251P Dec 7 1941 

Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 529 7th <0E. 

[8338'] TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED 
STATES ARMY (RETIRED)— Resumed 

The Vice Chairman. General Short, do you have anything further 
tliat you want to bring to the attention of the committee before your 
examination is resumed ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

First, I would like to have an opportunity for me and my counsel to | 
look over this material that has now been introduced, because we have, 
not seen it. 

The Vice Chairman. You have that right. 

General Short. I have a statement here. I do not know whether Ij 
should read it now. . ' 

Senator Lucas asked me a question that I was unable to answer at tlie 
time. I have the answer out of the testimony of Admiral Inghs. 1. 
can read it now. ■ r^ i o 

The Vice Chairman. Would you permit a suggestion, General ? 



3094 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Since Senator Lucas asked you about that, don't you think it might 
be desirable to wait a little longer until he comes in ? He is detained 
a few moments now. 

General Short. I think it would be. 

The Vice Chairjvian. Since he is the man that wanted to know about 
it, I just offer that suggestion for your consideration. 

General Short. All right, sir ; we will put it to one side. 

[8SS9] The Vice Chairman. With respect to the memorandum 
from Colonel Duncombe and the attached data which has been spread 
upon the record, I assume, General, you are familiar with General Mar- 
shall's testimony ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. That he wrote out in his own handwriting that 
message of December 7, and you know about that ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

The Vice Chaiioian. All right. 

Colonel Kare. We have no objection to the introduction of that 
exhibit. 

The Vice Chairman. Counsel states that he has no objection to that 
being put in the record, which has been done. 

Mr. Murphy, of Penns3^1vania, will continue his inquiry. 

Mr. Murphy. General Short, the reference I made yesterday after- 
noon and was about to read was from page 46 of volume entitled "Pre- 
vious Testimony of General Short." 

Colonel Karr. That is the Roberts Commission hearing? 

Mr. MuRi'HY. The Roberts Commission hearing. And, apparently, 
a quotation from the prepared statement which you presented to the 
Roberts Commission. It reads as follows : 

The question of just how the total reconnaissance was carried out was never 
known by me. 

General Short. About where is that on the page ? 
[8340] Mr. Murphy. Page 46, General, six lines from the bot- 
tom. 

General Short. Yes, sir, I have it. 
Mr. Murphy (reading) : 

The question of just how the total reconnaissance was carried out was never 
known by me. If they called on us for a squadron of planes they would assign 
it to a certain sector, say, maybe from zero to 70 degrees, to search out 600 
miles, or whatever it was. I assumed that the Navy planes were searching all 
the other critical areas, and they probably were. I say, that was a matter that 
was not under my control. 

My only reason for referring to that is that I get the impression 
from that that you thought the Navy were doing a pretty good job 
on reconnaissance. 

General Short. On the critical areas. The best they could do with 
the material they had. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, my other question is. If you thought they 
were having reconnaissance in the critical areas, why did you have 
your pursuit planes on 4 hours' notice? 

General Short. Because, on my information from Washington, 
I had nothing to indicate that we were going to have an air attack. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you think the reconnaissance was being made 
as a result of the message of November 27 ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3095 

[5-5^/] General Short. I thought the reconnaissance was being 
made on account of both that and the message of October 16. They 
were giving exactly the same instructions on October 16 as they were 
in the message of November 27. 

Mr. Murphy. Is it your impression that there was no change in 
the situation from November 27 on than that which existed from 
October 16? 

General Short. As far as the deployment of the Navy, because 
both messages stated that the Navy would take a defensive deploy- 
ment preparatory to carry out 

Mr. Murphy. But you did say, General, many times in the record, 
that you felt after the 27th the Navy tightened up? 

General Short, That is correct. They said they did. 

Mr. Murphy. Right. At any rate, you did not have your pursuit 
planes on other than a 4-hour preparatory state; isn't that right? 

General Short. However, I may state that when the situation 
arose they were actually in the air in 55 minutes. 

Mr. Murphy. Some of them were. 

General Short. All that were in condition to get in the air. 

Mr. Murphy. General, do you have any report made by you to 
"Washington immediately after Pearl Harbor on that situation? 

[834^] General Short. On the planes in the air? 

Mr. MuEPHY. On exactly what happened. We have a report be- 
fore us, a letter, which Admiral Kinimel wrote to Washington, and 
which I am going to discuss with you. Do you have a report that you 
made as to what planes were ready, how your antiaircraft was sit- 
uated, and so forth ? 

General Short. I think we made a written report. I haven't got 
it immediately available. 

Mr. Murphy. I think it is important that we have it. I will ask 
the Army liaison to produce a copy of it if they will.^ 

General Short. May I say one word to Colonel Duncombe if he is 
here. 

I think Colonel Phillips, who is in the audience, can tell you defi- 
nitely whether we did put in a written report. 

The Vice Chairman. The question was about a written report made 
by General Short to the War Department following the attack on 
December 7, 1941. 

General Short (addressing Colonel Duncombe). They want that 
and I think Colonel Phillips can tell you definitely whether it was put 
in and when. 

Mr. Murphy. Don't you know. General, whether you made a report 
to Washington or not? 

General Short. I think I did. I was just referring to my chief 
of staff who would be responsible for assembling [SS^S] the 
details of the report. We made several reports by telephone. I 
think we put in a written report. 

Here is a report put in by radiogram on December 7. 

Mr: Murphy. No, I want a report from the commanding general 
to Washington of the over-all picture. 

General Short. This was a previous report on the over-all picture. 

Mr. Murphy. Signed by whom? 

General Short. Signed by me. 

1 The document was subsequently admitted to the record as "Exhibit No. 164." • p; 



.^^T»T TxrvTrc;TTnATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
3096 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIOAIIUJN rr^ 

Mr MuRPiiY. All right. , 

^^-^^:^^:7Z^i\^l^ site it, if I may. It prob 
ablv is quite lengthy. 

S^r^^r: S,^ferre?dt GSe™,. I thought perhaps , 
was six or seven pa^es. - T)g(,gj^ber and was ad 

aSTo\aiuS^ta;Sritwa%e^~t,Wash^ 

Qitbbcutuu J „«H«v,fpfl number Sixty attacked Hickam Fiek 

Japanese enemy dive b«nibers rshmaltd umbeT six j ^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^ 

Wheeler Field Pearl Harbor a ^>g^'\.^^,f,Sj„ p^eld and to planes caught on th. 
hangars Wheeler Field three hangars H|ckam Ineld ana lo i ^^^ 

ground Stop Details not yet fnown Stop Ra d Jf^t^f ^^^^^^ badly damage< 
h ^Si^rS^wKsc^^'a^^Stop Details later 
Mr. MuRPiiT. It is the details that I am interested m. 

m" MtpnTi JoSicf Uke to have a report, if there is one, by yo. 
givmg your explanation as to what happened and your impression o 

^'^liillTs'^^^^^^^ I think Colonel Duncombe will be able to find that 
Mr MuR^^^^^^^^ bave reference in that regard to a letter dated De 

''Geneil^l~s7iORT. There are other radiograms making additiona 
Ureneiai oiiui ^^ difficult to read. 

"^S MuRpLf l"Lk the Irmy to get d the detailed repor 

whic ; fhe Gei^ral made explainiiig -^fVTW'^'^^^^roTl se 
In that connection I refer to a letter dated December 12 19il, sen 
bf Aclmiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark in which he said tbe Army^^ 
aircraft guns were not manned. Did you know that Admiial Kim 

mel said that ? 

General Short. No, sir. _ 

Mr Murphy. Was that a fair statement i 

imS] General Short. It was not. They were partly mannec 

Mr Murphy. There was only a skeleton antisabotage crew, wasn 

^^^General Short. That is correct; but they were able to fire, an 
broucrht down a considerable number of planes m that first raid. 

M? Murphy. You do not agree with that statemeiit of the Admira 

Geneial Short. Not entii?ly. I don't know how he meant i 
He may have meant that the full crews were not there. It that 
what he meant that is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. He also said: 

Ships in harbor opened fire very promptly b>it the first attack was practical 
unopposed. 

Do you agree? , , , ^ :„ fVo fir 

General Short. We knocked down a number of planes in the nr. 

^ Mr. Murphy. You don't agree then with the admiral's statemei 
tlint the first wave was practically unopposed? . 

Genei-al Short. If he means the dive bombers that came m a ai^ 
tance above the water estimated to have been anywhere f roni iu 
900 feet, the torpedo planes, that is probably correct, because noDOd 
fired on them until they were close enough to identify. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3097 



18S46] Mr. Murphy. Now, General- 



General Short. I have, Mr. Murphy, a radio report here by General 
Martin, commanding the Air Corps, on the 7th, which was a little 
more detailed than the one I read. 

Mr. MuiiPHY. I will ask counsel and the liaison officer if they will 
assemble a report, the reports from Hawaii from the Army on what 
happened on December 7. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

May I interject one other thing? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir. 

General Short. Colonel Phillips, who is in the audience, the chief 
of staff, says that a detailed report was made about the 10th or 11th 
in written form. 

Mr. Murphy. You say that Colonel Phillips made a detailed report f 

General Short. I signed the report but he remembers more of the 
details. 

Mr. Murphy. But did Colonel Phillips know what went on between 
you and Admiral Kimmel ? 

General Short. I think he knew anything of importance. 

Mr. Murphy. He testified that he didn't, didn't he ? 

General Short. No, no ; I wouldn't say that. I would like to have 
you read that testimony. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, let's get down to that exactly. The [8347] 
fact is that one Phil Hayes — was he a general or colonel? 

General Short. He was a colonel. 

Mr. Murphy. Colonel Phil Hayes was your chief of staff up to 
November 1 of 1941 ; isn't that correct ? 

General Spiort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And every time you had a meeting with the Navy you 
took your chief of staff with 3^ou ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. Then on November 6 you got Colonel Phillips as 
your chief of staff and you never brought him to the Navy meetings 
with you ; isn't that correct ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. Do you wish me to make an explanation 
on that? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes, why you wouldn't have your chief of staff in 
your conferences with the other branch. 

General Short. Colonel Hayes had been there for 3 or 4 years. 
He knew all the Navy people and had been present at all these con- 
ferences. I took him because I thought he had considerable back- 
ground of what had gone on before. At the same time that Colonel 
Hayes had been attending conferences with me Major Fleming had 
been carrying on a great deal of the liaison work with the Navy and 
I thought he had more of a background than my new chief of staff'. 

For that reason, the fact that he was an unusually keen [8348] 
able officer, with a remarkable memory, I thought he would know i 
great deal about the things that Colonel Hayes had participated in. 

Mr. Murphy. In other words, Major Fleming, who was in daib 
contact with the District Engineer in Honolulu and in contact witl 
the civilian engineer and in contact with the engineer at San Francisc< 
and was one of your 

General Short. May I add, his contact with the engineer in Sai 
Francisco was through the District Engineer in Honolulu. 

79716 — 46— pt. 7 13 



3098 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, he was one of j'^our engineers, in contact 
daily with the civilian authorities in Honolulu, and with the District 
Engineer, and when you were discussing matters subsequent to 
November 27 instead of having your own chief of staff with you you 
took one of the members of G-4, your engineer, with you ? 

General Short. Because I thought he had more background. He 
had a background over a considerable period. He knew probably 
most everything that Colonel Hayes had known for the last year. 

Mr. Murphy. How was your chief of staff ever to learn or ever to 
know or ever to understand if you were taking the engineer to the 
conferences instead of your chief of staff? 

General Short. I explained to the chief of staff anything of im- 
portance. 

[8349] Mr. Murphy. But the chief of staff never saw these 
messages of the Navy, did he? 

General Short. Yes, I am sure that the important ones were de- 
livered to him ; copies of the important ones he did see. 

Mr. MrRPHY. Did he at any time engage in conversation where 
you had Admiral Kimmel in conversation ? 

General Short. After November 27, in those few conferences, he 
was not present. 

Mr. Murphy. He was not present at any conference after the war 
warning. Was he ever present at any conference between you and 
the Navy from the time he became your chief of staff on November 6? 

General Short. He was not present at formal conferences. He was 
present at a considerable number of informal conferences where 
Admiral Kimmel and I talked. 

Mr. Murphy. And the chief of staff, who was never present at any 
formal conference betAveen you and the Navy, was the only person you 
talked to before you decided on alert No. 1? 

General Short. Yes, sir; because I considered him the best in- 
formed man on the staff. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, you considered him the best informed 
man, but yet you never took him to the conferences. 

General Short. May I put in here, that when you consider [SoSOl 
a chief of staff you must not consider him on only one phase. 
I would like to compare slightly Colonel Hayes and Colonel Phillips. 

Colonel Hayes was an excellent administrative man. He had had 
dealings with the Navy over considerable periods of time. Colonel 
Phillips was a far more competent man on field work and training. 
A far more competent man. 

Mr. Murphy. Isn't it so — excuse me, go ahead. 

General Short. This November 27, if anything was going to come 
of it, it was going to come of it as field work. 

Mr. Murphy. That is the trouble. It was going to come of it as 
field work. 

General Short. If anything came he was the more competent. 

Mr. Murphy. In other words, you Avere field-work conscious, 
weren't you ? 

General Short. I am talking fighting. 

Mr. Murphy. Are you talking about the air, though? I don't 
mean about the infantry. 

General Short. He knew more than any staff officer I had of the 
fighting, the combined army. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3099 

Mr. MuRPHT. How could he when he is presiding as chief of staff 
over a staff confernece of your organization intelligently discuss with 
your staff what was going on if he wasn't in conferences where the 
two services got together ? 

\8351'\ General Short. I think I had better explain how those 
conferences were conducted. 

Mr. Murphy. I wish you would, and will you 

Senator Ferguson. I don't think the witness had completed his 
answer. 

The Vice Chairman. Let him finish his question first. 

Mr. Murphy. I wish you would discuss that. General, I don't want 
to interrupt. But in that connection I wish you would tell us what 
staff conference, if any, was had by the Army between November 27 
and the date of the attack. 

[8S52] General Short. The conferences were habitually held on 
Saturday morning. 

Mr. Murphy. Was there one held on December the 6th? 

General Short. There was. 

Mr. Murphy. All right. Now go ahead. 

General Snoirr. And the chief of staff conducted these conferences 
but he did not do all the talking. Each staff officer, the head of each 
section was called upon in turn. If he had anything of interest or 
importance he discussed it. If the Chief of Staff had anything to add 
to it, or if some other section of the general staff was interested in 
the thing and had some additional information it was brought in. 

Mr. Murphy. You say there was a conference 

The Vice Chairman. Does that complete our answer, General? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, there was a staff conference on December 6, 
1941? 

General Short. There was. 

Mr. Murphy. And who were present at it. General? 

General Short. I think — I was not present at it but I am sure that 
all of the general staff and probably the [8S53'] special staff 
were present at it. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, you were not present, at any rate, to give them 
the benefit of what you knew about what the Navy knew, isn't that 
right? 

General Short. That is correct. 

^ Mr. Murphy. And there was no one else in your organization who 
discussed anything from a staff standpoint with Admiral Kimmel, 
was there? 

General Short. I am sure that Phillips knew anything of impor- 
tance that I knew. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate, you said there was no one 

General Short. He was present. 

Mr. Murphy. You said before he was not. 

General Short. Oh, yes. He conducted the conference. 

Mr. Murphy. Oh, no ; I beg your pardon, we are misunderstanding 
each other. Phillips, your chief of staff, was not at the formal con- 
ferences with the Navy? 

General Short. No, sir; he was not. 



yja, Ai. x/i.»-/i». 



SlOi) CONGRESSIONAL i^ VKSTIGATIUW l-iUAKi. iiAno 

I 

Mr Munpiiy. That is right. Now, then, he is the one presiding over 
the staff conference and yet he had not been present at the conter- 
ences with the other service, isn't that correct? 

General Short. That is correct. 

l835A^ Mr. ;Murphy. Yes. ,,,1^1 i 

General Short. That is correct, but he knew what had taken place., 

Mr. MuRPiTv. He knew only what you told him, isn t that right ? 

General Shout. That is correct. 1, v,„f _.„* 

Mr Murphy. And he never saw the reports as such or what went 
on or'did not have the benefit of looking over these People as they dis- 
cussed things and sizing them up. He took what you told him about 
what went on ; isn't that correct ? 

General Short. That is correct. , , ,, ^ *u 

Mr Murphy. Now, then, do you know whether the man from the 
engineers was requested by the staff conference to give his impressions 
as to what went on at the conference? . • _ 

General Short. I don't know whether he gave his impression 01 
not He was there and if he thought there was anything that needed 
to be added I am sure that he would have added it. 

Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield right on that point toi 
one question ? 

Mr Murphy. Yes; surely. 

Senator Lucas. General Short, did Colonel Philhps know aboul 
the war-warning message that came from the Navy ^ 

General Short. Oh, I am sure he did because that mes- l^-Jod} 
saee— it happens that that particular message was not delivered tc 
me personally, I think, but delivered to the_G-3 section and unques- 
tionably he brought it to me from the G-3 section. 

Senator Lucas. It is your opinion that he saw that message ^ 
General Short. I am confident that he knew exactly what was 11 

Mr mSrphy. I thought, General, that Layton testified— oh, no 
that was the 24th, I beg your pardon— no; I thought it was Laytor 
who testified that he delivered that war-warning message to you per 

'°Ge!4al Short. I may be confused but I think the message of th( 
24th was delivered to me personally but that the message of the 27tt 
was delivered to Colonel or Major Donnegan m charge ot the U-. 
section. It might have been the other way around, but i do no 

Mr Murphy. Now I wish you would turn to page 534 of the Arm] 
Pearl Harbor board hearings. I would like to read question 83«: 

Genpi-al Gkunert. One question, here. Somewhere in "^y Jioles here I hav 
soShing to the efEect that your Chief of Staff, Co onel Phillips state that h 
was not informed as to what took place at your confer- [S3f ] ences wu 
the Admiral. Did you keep him informed, or did you discuss ^Mth him wha 

^''^Genena SHORT. Anything of any importance, I am sure I discussed with hin 
We were on a very friendly personal basis— 

you are meaning there that you were on a very friendly basis wit) 
j'^our own chief of staff ? 

General Short. That is correct. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3101 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. [Beading :] 
—and I am sure that if I picked up any piece of information that I thouglit was 
of any importance— and I know that I talked to him about certam task forces, 
because when it came to sending an officer along, wiiy, he would be the one that 
would get out the order. 

Now, that was a very accurate statement as far as what Phillips 
knew as to what the Navy rras doing? 

General Short. That is a correct statement. , , ^ 4 

Mr. Murphy. Then you told him whatever you thought was ot 
importance ? 

General Short. That is a correct statement. _ 

Mr Murphy. And you then attended meetings with the JNavy on 
!November the 27th and December the 1st and December the 2d and 
[December the 3d, and then a meeting between Major Fleming and 
(Colonel Pfeiffer on December the 4th where there _ L<bJo/J 
•were many Navy men present, at least at some of the meetings and 
motyourownchief of staff; isnt that right? . 

General Short. I don't know who was present between Major 
Fleming and Colonel Pfeiffer. On December 2 there was nobody 
but Admiral Kimmel and me. On December 3 m all probability 
Admiral Bloch was there; I don't remember definitely and 1 do not 
know what additional naval officers were there. I think m all prob- 
ability that Major Fleming was with me, although General Martm 
may have been. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I would like to ask you to turn to page 
522 of the same record, question 790 : 

General Grunert. The notes on the testimony before the Roberts Commission 
indicates that General Wilson, commanding the 24th Division, was never called 
in conference or consulted regarding the warning message of November Zith. 

Was that a correct statement? • i ^i 

General Short. I sent a staff officer the afternoon I received the 
message to General Wilson to explain exactly what was m the mes- 
sage. I did not scatter copies around on account o± limiting the 
strictly secret information as I had been directed. 

General Wilson had the north sector, which was much less popu- 
lated than the south sector and where we feared much _ [bJd^j 
less subversive measures or sabotage. There were practically no 
changes made in the alert, in the sabotage alert as prescribed in our 
standing operating procedure in General Wilson's sector. 

On the other hand, in General Murray's sector, the south sector, 
as a result of inspections by General Murray and by Colone Fielder 
we very largely revamped the guard system in that sector, which was 
the more dangerous of the two sectors. . 

Mr Murphy. At any rate, General, General Wilson said he was 
never consulted about the war warning, and that is a correct state- 

"^ General Short. But he does not say that he did not have the mes- 
sage, intelligence on the message of November 27. A staff oflicer 
was personally sent to him to explain. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, do you know that. 

General Short. I do know it ; yes, sir.^ 

Mr. Murphy. Who did explain it to him? 



3102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. I do not know the name of the staff officer. I 
directed that the staff officers be sent and I know they were sent. 
Mr. Murphy. Well, let me read you a little bit more. 

General Short. Did he say he got It from the Division Officer? 

ISJjyj General Gkunekt. He said he was never consulted. 

General Short. He had the north sector where the antisabotage worli was 
not nearly as serious. While I had repeated conferences with Murray, I may 
not have had any with Wilson. 

General Gkunekt. Wilson thought the Navy had an insliore and offshore patroL 
Why was he not instructed and informed? 

General Short. His job was quite different from that of the other divisions. 
While I had repeated conferences with Murray, and I had Murray personally 
inspect every post and he came back to me with recommendations and made a 
lot of clianges 

General Grunert (interposing). That was in connection with your alert 1? 

General Short. Yes. 

General Gruxert. But in connection with the possibility of his giving advice 
as to any other alert, he, Wilson, did not have any information? 

General Short. I did not have any conference with liim as to whether he 
wanted to advise me as to something different. 

Now, at any rate, General, Wilson was not at that meeting on 
Saturday morning, December 6, was he? 

[SoGO] General Short. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, let us come to Colonel Fielder, at the 
bottom of page 522, question 795. Colonel Fielder, he was your G-2, 
wasn't he ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

General Grunert. Colonel Fielder says he discussed the possibility of an at- 
tack with tlie Commanding General in a purely academic way. I do not quite 
understand how there is anything academic about discussing the possibility of an 
attack. 

General Short. I do not. We discussed the possibility, probably because he 
was G-2 and was supposed to have some information. 

Do you know whether or not G-2 — what he meant by "a purely 
academic wayT' 

General Short. I do not know why he used that terminology, but he 
had more information on sabotage than anybody in the department. 
He had a very thorough understanding of it. 

Mr. Murphy. About sabotage? 

General Short. And any internal disorders and was supposed to 
know more about what the Japanese population in Hawaii were doing 
and thinking than anybody in the department. 

Mr. ISIuRPHY. That was covered very well by everybody, but what 
about the air warning and the messages of the Navy? [S361'\ 
Why didn't he see that or why was he left out of that conference with 
the ^avy ? 

General Short. Because we had no message of an air warning. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, the Navy had McMorris there, didn't they, 
their war plans man? He was their war plans man, wasn't he, Mc- 
Morris ? 

General Short. He was the war plans man. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. Why didn't you have your war plans man there 
if you were going to have a conference? 

General Short. It was entirely up to me whom to bring. McMorris 
I do not think was — I am not sure but I do not think he was in on the 
conference all the time. He was immediately available where Admiral 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3103 

Kimmel could call him in. That was true of all of Admiral Kimmel's 
staff. I took with me to that conference General Martin, who was the 
head of my air force, and Colonel Mollison, who was his chief of staff. 
This was an air conference. They were the two best men, the two best 
informed men in the department on the situation. It was perfectly 
logical to take them. 

Mr. Murphy. General, you say it was an air conference but it had 
nothing to do with the message of November the 27th, did it? 

General Short. Not directly because we had not received [8362'] 
the message. 

Mr. Murphy. That is right ; you did not get that message until some 
time around 2 o'clock in the afternoon and this meeting in the morn- 
ing for about 3 hours was about something else entirely, wasn't it ? 

General Short. But it necessarily covered all the elements of danger 
because the conference was about the reinforcement of Midway and 
Wake by Army planes, but we had discussed the danger connected with 
the reinforcement and the danger connected with lessening the air 
equipment at Oahu. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you ever at any time between November the 27th 
and December the 7th have your staff and the naval staff' together to 
discuss the war warning? 

General Short. There never was any time that I know of, and I 
have not heard of any time in the past, where the complete Army and 
Navy staff were assembled. If any previous commander ever did so I 
never heard of it. 

Mr, Murphy. Now, your key officers, did you assemble them, I mean 
your G-3 and your G-2 ? 

General Short. We did not. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, I direct your attention to page 525, question 
803, Do you have that General, at the bottom of the page ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

[8363'] General Grunert. "Lt. Col. Blcknell, Assistant G-2, informed the 
staff at a meeting on December 6 that the Japs were burning papers on December 
5. Says it meant that war was imminent, to him." Did he so inform his Chief 
of Staff or his Commanding General? If so, what conclusions were reached with 
regard to it? 

General Short. I am sure he didn't inform me. 

Mr. Murphy. As a matter of fact. General, you did not see him 
about that until the next day, did you ? 

General Short. Well, I think that I did not but both my G-2, 
Colonel Fielder, and my chief of staff, Colonel F'hillips, stated in their 
testimony before the Roberts commission that they did inform me that 
they were burning papers. Colonel Fielder also stated to the Roberts 
commission that he attached no importance to it because we did the 
same every day and he thought it was a routine burning of papers. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, the fact is, General, that you did testify here 
and again in these hearings that you did not know about that until 
the next day. 

General Short. All right, will you give me the quotations? 

Mr. Murphy. All right. Now, you say that you did not testify on 
several occasions 

General Short. I am asking you to give me the quota- [8S64] 
tions where I did testify. 



3104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. I will. 

Mr. Keefe. Why not do it now? You said you were going to do 
it half a dozen times and you haven't done it. I would like to get 
it while the General is being interrogated on the subject. 

Mr. Murphy. Be calm; I have the references here and I have a 
thousand pages here. I promise you I will. 

General Short. I would like to have the references so that I can 
judge which one it was. 

Mr. Murphy. I cannot turn to it right now, but I will later. 

Now, your assistant G-2 said he thought that the burning of papers 
meant that war was imminent. You were not at the staff conference. 
Did anybody tell you; did your assistant G-2 tell you on Dacember 
the 6th that he thought war was imminent and about that being dis- 
cussed at the conference ? 

General Short. Not the assistant G-2; he did not tell me that. 
G-2 says he told me that they had been burning papers and he appar- 
ently — he had heard the talk and the report of the assistant G-2. 
He apparently did not consider it a matter of importance, and I wish 
to invite your attention to one thing further. 

Bicknell said he got this information on the 5th. [8365] If 
he had considered it so terrifically important he would not wait till 
the morning of the 6th to report it. 

Mr. Murphy. All I know. General, is that here is one of your staff 
saying under oath that he thought that war was imminent and that 
he discussed it at a staff meeting and you do not go to the staff meeting 
and apparently nobody tells you that in that staff meeting there was 
a feeling that war was imminent on the part of at least one person 
there, isn't that right ? 

General Short. And he also stated that he received the information 
on December 5 and apparently he did not tell Colonel Fielder and he 
did not tell me, which would not indicate that he attached such great 
importance to see that we got it. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate he was right, wasn't he ? 

General Short. He was right in that respect. He was a much less 
experienced man than the G-2. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, may I ask counsel, do you have handy exhibit 
37 ; the basic exhibit ? 

Mr. Masten. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Now I direct your attention to exhibit No._37 — the 
last paper. I think I can make it clear to the general; it is just a 
one-sentence dispatch. 

General, on December 6, 1941, there was sent from [8366] 
COM Fourteen, "ACTION: OpNav," Information for the Navy: 

Believe local Consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably 
not included your eighteen double five of third. 

Did you have any information from the Navy that they had sent 
word to Washington that the Japs at Honolulu were destroying their 
systems ? 

General Short. I did not. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, did you have any information from the Navy 
that on December the 6th a message was sent to Admiral Kimmel : 

In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying 
Pacific Islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and con- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTKE 3105 

fldential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency X Means 
of communication to support our current operations and special Intelligence 
should of course be maintained until the last moment. 

Did the Navy tell you about that? 

General Short. They did not. 

Mr. Murphy. You were not in any conference on any day from the 
third on, were you, with the Navy ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. Right. Did you know from the Navy that [8367] 
they had a dispatch on the 4th of December about destroying con- 
fidential publications and other matters at Guam ? 

General Short. I did not. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you know from the Navy that on the 4th of 
December — I beg your pardon. On the 4th of December — rather, the 
3d of December that there was a message sent to them — and this is 
important in view of your testimony, General : 

Circular Twenty Four Forty Four from Tokyo One December ordered London 
Hong Kong Singapore and Manila to destroy Machine XX Batavia machine 
already sent to Tokyo XX December second Washington also directed destroy X 
All but one copy of other systems X and all secret documents XX British Ad- 
miralty London today reports Embassy London has complied. 

The Navy did not tell you about that either, did they ? 
General Short. They did not. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you know from the Navy that on the 3d of 
December they had a message : 

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instruc- 
tions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, 
Singapore. Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their 
codes and ciphers at once and to [S.36S] burn all other important con- 
fidential and secret documents. 

Did 3^ou get that either. General ? 

General Short. I did not. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, General, as I read your testimony in the other 
hearings you testified that if you had received the one p. m. message 
that there were two matters in the message, one the ultimatum, the 
date, the 1 o'clock hour, and the other about the destruction of the codes 
and you said that that would have much more importance to you than 
the 1 o'clock business, is that right ? 

General Short. Will you restate that, because I do not believe you 
made your meaning clear. 

Mr. Murphy. All right. Will you read the question ? 

(The question was read by the reporter.) 

Mr. Murphy. Do you understand that ? 

General Short. The 1 o'clock business included both; that is the 
reason I did not understand your question. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate did you attach great importance 
to the information about the destruction of the codes or to the fact 
that there was a 1 o'clock hour set ? 

General Short. It would have been a combination of both. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you testify before the Navy — excuse me, I don't 
mean to interrupt. 

[8369] General Short. I think you are misquoting me again. 

Mr. Murphy. Again I am misquoting you ? 

General Short. Yes. 



3106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. Well, then, General, I guess I had better quote you 
exactly so that I won't be accused of that after this hearmg. 

General Short. All right, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. I want to be eminently fair with you, but I want 
the facts. When did I misquote you before. General ? 

General Short. When you have read from the — I cannot say exactly 
when but a number of times you have made a statement that I think 
did not coincide exactly with my testimony. 

Mr. Murphy. You think I misquoted you ? 

General Short. I don't mean intentional at all, but when we quote 
without reading it is pretty hard to state definitely what has been said. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, I will quote you exactly, General. I now refer 
to page 256 of your testimony before the Nav}^ Court of Inquiry. 

General Short. 256? 

Mr. Murphy. 256, General ; question 179. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Question mark. Period. 

General, would you have made a very quick re- [S370] estimate of the 
situation and have ordered such an alert had you had that scrambled telephone 
conversation with General Marshall? 

A. I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there, about 
the destruction of the code machines. Tlie other matter wouldn't have made aa 
impression on me. But when you destroy your codes or code machines, you are 
going into an entirely new phase. I would have had this advantage also: I could 
have asked him the significance to him. But leaving that out, the code machine 
would have been very significant, the destruction of the code machine would have 
been very significant to me. I would have been very much more alarmed about 
that than the other matter. 

General, would that be misquoting you by what I said about that 
message ? 

General Short. You may have drawn the wrong inference from my 
answer. 

Mr. Murphy. What did you mean by that ? 

General Short. I meant by that just the delivery of the ultimatum, 
because at previous times they had stated that the negotiations were 
practicall}'' terminated. I was not talking about the 1 p. m. I was 
talking about the ultimatum. 

Mr. Murphy. General, you say you were not talking about 
[8371] the 1 o'clock message? 

General Short. Not the hour. In my statement there I was com- 
paring the importance in my own mind of the statement that the code 
machines were ordered destroyed and the statement that the ultima- 
tum — that an ultimatum was to be delivered, not the hour of the ulti- 
matum but that an ultimatum was to be delivered ; that is what I had 
in mind. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate. General, you were saying that the code- 
machine business was very significant to you; isn't that right? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. Right. And the fact is that the Navy on the 3d and 
the 6th had several messages about code destruction and then this 
from your own Honolulu to Washington on the 6th sent a message to 
Washington ; isn't that so ? 

General Short. Let me get your last statement. 

Mr. Murphy. On the 6th they sent a message to Washington about 
the destruction of the system ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3107 

General Short. Wlio did? 

Mr. MuRPiiT. The Navy. 

General Short. I believe that that is correct, but I knew nothing 
about any one of them. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, let me quote it correctly so that we won't have 
any charges against me that I am misquoting. [8372] I do not 
want to misquote you. 

General Short. Yes, sir; I have the message that they sent on 
the 6th. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, I will read it exactly : 

Believe local Consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably 
not included your eighteen double five of third. 

Do you see that, General ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And the fact is that you time and again in this hear- 
ing have stated that Admiral Kimmel gave you everything of impor- 
tance; isn't that right? 

General Short. No, sir ; I said he gave — I was pretty sure that he 
gave me everything that he considered of importance to me that I 
should know. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you considered these messages important ? 

General Short. Very important; yes. 

Mr. Murphy. And the fact is that they were very important, as you 
have testified. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And you and Admiral Kimmel had no conference 
about the air messages and you say you had no conference with him 
after the 3d ? 

[8373] General Short. The message on the third came in after 
the conference. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, you had no conference? 

General Short. We had no conference and I did not get the message. 

Mr. Murphy. And it was your understanding that Admiral Kim- 
mel was not to give it to you unless Washington told him to give 
it to you, is that right? 

General Short. I think his practice was definitely to transmit mes- 
sages, as I said, only when he received instructions from Washington 
to do so. He might mention the thing to me informally, but he did 
not transmit the message to me. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you know, General, that Admiral Kimmel was 
getting a lot of information over the months from Manila? 

General Short. I think that I knew that he was getting something 
on location of Japanese intercepts, perhaps, but I did not know of any- 
thing else that I remember. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, did you know that he got a message from Manila 
about the winds code ? 

General Short. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. He did not pass that on to you either, did he ? 

General Short. No, sir; I never heard of the winds [8374] 
code for many months afterward. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, let me quote exactly. Did you know that there 
had been sent on the 28th of November from "CINCAF, ACTION 
OPNAV, info : COM SIXTEEN CINCPAC COM FOURTEEN", 
a message on the winds code which I believe is already in the record ? 



General Short. I did not. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you know that there was a message on the 1st 
of December from "COM SIXTEEN, ACTION : CINCAF, INFO : 
CINCPAC, OPNAV, COM FOURTEEN, 011422", as follows: 

J-V-J press tonight in closing seventeen hundred schedule stated quote "All 
listeners be sure and listen in at zero seven zero zero and zero seven thirty 
tomorrow morning, since there may be important news" unquote XX Suggest 
frequencies seven three two seven X Nine four three zero X And one two two 
seven five X Times Tokyo LCT. 

Did the Navy ever tell you about that message ? 

General Short. They did not. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you know that Admiral Kimmel subsequent to 
the 27th of November instituted a 24-hour war plan ? 

General Short. I don't know what you mean by a "24-hour war 
plan." 

[8375] Mr. Murphy. Well, let me quote exactly. I am referring 
to exhibit 118 in this record : 

Memorandum For the Commander In Chief 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., 1200, 30 Novetnljer, 194I. 
Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese War within the next Twenty- 
four Hours. 

And then subsequently a revision of that on December 5, 1941. Did 
you know that the Navy had taken those steps ? 

General Short. No, sir; I did not. 

Mr. Murphy. Don't you think if you had had conferences with the 
Navy where these problems were discussed from November 27 on 
that you most certainly would have been told about a 24-hour plan 
that the Navy had ? 

General Short. That was a later date, I believe, than any of our 
conferences. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, one was the 30th of November. 

General Short. The 30th of November. 

Mr. Murphy. That is when it was constituted and you had a con- 
ference on the first, on the second, on the third and Major Fleming 
with Colonel Pfeiffer on the fourth. 

General Short. That is correct, but I was not told about that. 

Mr, Murphy. Well, don't you think you should have been ? 

[8376] General Short. I have not read the thing. I could not 
make a statement. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, I ask you to look it over now. if you will, Gen- 
eral, please. It has been an exhibit for some days [handing document 
to the witness] . 

Have you examined it. General ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Had you any word of that plan ? 

General Short. I had not. 

Mr. Murphy. General, a while ago — oh, I don't want to go off this 
subject yet. Don't you think you sliould have been told about the fact" 
that they after the 27th had a 24-hour plan and that on the very 5th 
of December they had a revision of it ? 

General Short. I think if you read it carefully that they had two 
things in there : First, the details of what he was doing to carry out 
his instructions for a defensive deployment and the next the naval de- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3109 

tails of what he expected to do in case that he put war plans — was di- 
rected to put War Plans 46 into effect. 

I do not believe that he would have thought it necessary to tell me 
what he expected to do on details of that kind. He possiblj' would 
have — he probably would have told me if he had ever — when he put 
the thing into effect. You see, among [8377] other thmgs they 
are to include the bringing back from the west coast another carrier 
and he undoubtedly did not think that that was a matter — he had not 
ordered it back, he just contemplated doing it if the war crane on. I 
can see why he did not tell me. 

Mr. Murphy. The fact is that he did have 3 or 4 days ahead — may 
I have it so that I will quote it exactly, please ? 

General Short. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. He did have a plan called, "Steps to be taken in case 
of American- Japanese War within the next 24-hours." 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And do you or do you not think you should have been 
told about the creation of that plan on the 30th of November 1941 and 
the revision on December 5, 1941 ? 

General Short. Looking it over it is practically all details of ship 
movements, and so forth and I can readily understand why he did not 
think it directly concerned me. 

Mr. Murphy. General, war within 24 hours would very much con- 
cern you, wouldn't it, as the General in Hawaii ? 

General Short. Yes, sir; but the location of a particular ship 
might not concern me. 

Mr. Murphy. General Marshall did tell you your mission [8378'] 
was to protect the base and the naval communications and your first 
concern was to protect the fleet, didn't he ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And wouldn't you be concerned then if there were 
going to be war involving the fleet within 24 hours ? 

General Short. If there was going to be ? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

General Short. Definitely; but I would not necessarily be con- 
cerned whether cruiser A was here and B over here, or vice versa. 

Mr. Murphy. Would you be concerned whether the fleet was in or 
out of the harbor ? 

General Short. Very decidedly. 

Mr. Murphy. Wouldn't the 24-hour plan affect that very decidedly? 

General Short. I do not believe as I looked over that paper that 
there is any provision for the fleet coming in from outside the harbor 
except to come in long enough to refuel and go out. That provision 
was there. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, General, I wish you would come back to page 
525 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearings. 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. General Martin was your air officer ; isn't [8379] 
that right? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, will you turn to question 807 ? 

General Gbunert. And General Martin did not seem to know that the Inter- 
ceptor command was not activated until December 17. 



3110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. Well, the fact was it was actually operating, and there was 
such a technical difference there that apparently Bergin and Martin, neither one 
realized it hadn't gone out as an order. It was actually operating daily. 

Was there some confusion in Martin's and Bergin's minds about 
the status of the air warning service ? 

General Short. I think it was more likely confusion in reference 
to terms used because I think they both knew that it was actually in 
operation. The printed order or typed order putting it into oper- 
ation did not go out until the I7th. 

Mr. Murphy. In other words, prior to December the 17th the air 
warning service was under the control of the Signal Corps and had 
not yet been turned over to the Air Corps, isn't that right i 

General Short. That is not correct. 

Mr. Murphy. It is not correct ? 
General Short. No, sir. They were operating on a basis [8380] 
of cooperation. The control officer in every case was an Air officer. 
We had not put the whole thing directly under the Air people. The 
Signal Corps were responsible for the training of the operators and 
for the training of the men at the information center, but whenever 
they operated they had an Air officer in control, the control officer was 
alwaj^s an Air officer, 

Mr. Murphy. Well, the Signal Corps — under the order of the I7th 
it went under the Air Corps, did it not ? 

General Short. Even for training, yes, and they were not under it 
for training previous to that time. 

[8381] Mr. Murphy. But after the I7th it would be under the 
exclusive control of General Davidson ? 

General Short. For training and everything else. 

Mr. Murphy. For training and everything eles ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Then before the l7th, the Signal Corps was doing 
the training? 

General Short. They were responsible for the training when they 
operated as part of an interceptor command. The Air control officer 
actually controlled the whole operation. 

Mr. Murphy. Then on page 1103 

General Short. 1163? 

Mr. Murphy. No, you do not have this. General. I am now refer- 
ring to Transcript of Proceedings Before the Army Pearl Harbor 
Board, pages 9T3 to 1105, in which I find the following — I do not think 
there is another copy of this available, General. Will you come up 
and check me as I am reading it, so I will have it correctly ? 

Lt. Col. Karr. Just go ahead and read it. 

Mr. Murphy (reading) : 

General Russexl. You were not to go into action as a pursuit officer until these 
other people who evaluated the information, had evaluated it, and told you that 
[83S2'] hostile aircraft was enroute to the Island? That is the situation, 
isn't it? 

Colonel Tyi-er. That is right, sir. 

General Russeix. I think it was not your joh to evaluate this information? 

Colonel Tyler. No, sir ; it was not. 

Do you know whether or not that is true? 

General Short. I will tell you how the thing functioned. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3111 

"We had an officer from the pursuit squadron ri^ht there in the in- 
formation center. If he looked on the board when this report came 
in, he should have known exactly where our own planes were, and 
when a plane was reported at a certain place, and he knew that that 
was our own plane, then he would not alert pursuit planes. 

You see, there was no way at that time for the men operating the 
oscilloscope saying "This is an enemy plane," or "This is a friendly 
plane." All he could say is "There is a plane at such and such a place," 
and it was up to the officer representing the pursuit people to try to 
determine whether there was any possibility of a friendly plane there 
before we opened fire, or before we sent someone out to shoot it down. 

Mr. MuRriiY. General, on the floor of Congress, time [8S83] 
after time after time, there have been castigations at this gentleman. 
I do not know who he is, except his name is Tyler. 

As I understand it from reading this record, he was there and his 
duty was to order these pursuit planes where to go, after he had been 
told by somebody else that there was a problem that called for that 
being done. 

Is that your understanding? 

General Short. If the interceptor command had been operating at 
7 : 20, which it was not, before he had the bomber squadron at Wheeler 
Field, there would have been a check-up by the pursuit officer to be 
sure we would not go up and knock down our own ])lanes. 

There was nobody at the station at 7 : 20, as I understand, but a man 
named McDonald, who was a telephone operator, and Lieutenant Tyler, 
because the station as such had been closed about 7 o'clock. 

[S'384] Mr. Murphy. AVell, at an}' rate, wasn't it his job to direct 
the planes from the ground after someone said there was a reason for 
them to leave the ground ? 

General Short. Under the circumstances, I will tell you what I think 
he should have done. He should have called the Pursuit Conmiand at 
Wheeler Field and they would have made the check then whether they 
had planes in that vicinity, before they sent anyone up to fire upon 
them. 

Mr. MiTRPHY. As a matter of fact, would not they then have to call 
you, or somebody else, to reverse alert 1 and put into some other order 
so that they could take them off the ground ? 

General Short. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Who had the authority to alter alert 1 ? 

General Short. There was a provision in the standing operating 
procedure that in case of a surprise attack the alert would go auto- 
matically into effect. They would notify me after they would put it 
into effect. 

Mr. Murphy. What was he then? A lieutenant? Could a lieu- 
tenant do anything about that? 

General Short. I beg pardon ? 

Mr. Murphy. I say he was onlv a lieutenant. It was Lieutenant 
Tyler, wasn't it? 

General Short. Yes. sir, 

[8SS5] Mr. Murphy. He says at page 1101 : 

General Russell and you knew the only thing you had to do was to get in 
touch with the people who could put those planes up, isn't that true? 

Colonel Tyler. That is not exactly true, sir, because we had nothing on the 
alert. We had no planes. 



3112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Would he be in error in that respect ? 

General Short. He would be in error. I have checked that state- 
ment of his with General Davidson, who was the pursuit commander 
at Wheeler Field, and he said there would have been no question, that 
if he had received a message from Tyler to alert the command he 
would have turned out everything. He would have immediately 
checked afterward to find out whether there was justification for it, 
but the first thing he would have done was to alert the command. 

Mr. Murphy. In other words, the second lieutenant would identify 
the planes as being enemy planes ? 

General Short. He would not, because he did not have the informa- 
tion there. The station was closed. In normal times there would be 
a pursuit officer there whose business would be to identify them. 

May I call your attention to paragraph 13 ? I think that will answer 
you. The last two lines, or part of the last three lines. 

[8386] Mr. Murphy (reading) : 

— will be initiated by Department Order except in the case of a surprise hostile 
attack. 

General Short. In case of a surprise hostile attack it went into 
effect automatically; it did not have to be put into effect by the De- 
partment. 

Mr. Murphy. In other words, if this lieutenant knew there were 
any planes ■ 

General Short (interposing). He could put it into effect by simply 
calling the Pursuit Command, and they would start operations and 
then notify me. The first thing they would have done would be to 
start operations. 

Mr. Murphy. Now 1 direct your attention to page 517, General, of 
the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Question 764 : 

General Frank. It strikes me that right within the Army itself you had a 
situation between the Air Force and the Signal Corps where this A. W. S. was 
operating on a cooperative basis ratlier than on a positive command basis. 

General Short. Because it had not reached a state of training where we 
thought it could work to the best advantage. 

General FR.i^KK. But if the vast proportion of the people concerned with its 
operation were Air Force people 

General Short (interposing). Not the technical operation. The operation of 
the communications and the radar [8587] system is definitely for the 
Signal Corps. 

That is a correct statement ? 

General Short. That is absolutely correct. There probably may 
have been 10 times as many men of the Signal Corps working as of 
the Air Corps. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, General, we have a letter placed in the 
record from Admiral Kimmel orderiiig the Navy not to bunch the 
planes but to disperse them, and then, as I remember it, the testimony 
was that the ones that were dispersed and anchored in the bay were 
destroyed and the ones that were together were not destroyed. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, your planes were bunched, based upon 
a survey of General Burwell, isn't that correct ? 

General Short. That is correct. It was a very extensive survey. 

Mr. Murphy. I now direct your attention to page 526 — by the way, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3113 

I will get throngli in 10 minutes — page 526, question 808 : 

General Grunnert. General Kudolph, the Commanding General of the bombers, 
stated that had he had any intimation of preceding trouble his planes would not 
have been bunched or concentrated but would have been ready for the air. Then, 
iu parenthesis, "especially on a Sunday morning" parenthesis. 

[838S] Was he not informed by the Commanding General, or the Com- 
manding General of the Air Forces, of the warnings of the immediate past? 

General Shokt. I went over the tiling very fully with General Mirtin, talked 
over with him at as great length as anybody. I would imagine that he talked 
with his subordinate commanders. 

Would that be a proper subject for discussion at that meeting on 
Saturday morning? 

General Short. No, sir ; I mean General Rudolph ^vas not present at 
that meeting. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, General Martin, if General Rudolph was 
telling tlie truth, should have passed on the message to him, is that 
right ? 

General Short. He should have passed on the message to him. I do 
not know whether he did or not. I would like to read General Martin's 
report, what he sa.ys about that in his report to the War Department. 

Mr. Murphy. I wish you would. 

General Short. I would also say, in view of General Burwell's ex- 
tensive study — in the first place. General Rudolph could not have dis- 
persed those B-17's because you did not dare take them oiT the run- 
vv'ays, the ground was so soft that vou would have never gotten them 
into the air if [83S0] you had. 

I would like to read this : 

8 December 1941. 
Chief of the Army Aie Forces, 

Washington, D. C: 

More specific information on questions asked by General Arnold : Command 
alerted prevention sabotage required concentration rather than dispersion Stop 
All planes now dispei'sed comma pursuit in bunkers Stop Bombers cannot be 
bunkered on account of soft ground off runways Stop Local joint agreement 
places responsibility for search on Navy who may call on Army for help when 
thought necessary Stop Planes in ferry flight all land Oahu two landed small 
fields and were badly damaged comma one destroyed by gunfire and one badly 
damaged Stop Attack so perfectly executed surprise attack in strict accord with 
our prescribed tactics Stop Dive bomber was highly accurate Stop Every effort 
made with the bombers left to locate carriers without success Stop Casualties 
dead six ofiicers two hundred seven enlisted men comma wounded some serioxisly 
three hundred and sixty-seven enlisted men Stop Morale high. 

Marti \. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, General, will you kindlv go to page 524 of the 
Army Pearl Harbor Board hearing, question 800 : 

General Grunnebt. You had a conference once a week. [8390] What 
did you confer on if it were not what the condition of things was and what 
should or should not be done, and so forth? I do not know whether this is tlie 
truth, but that is what is in the record, and we will question about it. 

General Shokt. Undoubtedly that is correct. Burgin was not in on the weekly 
conferences. I did confer with the staff. 

General Grunnert. Then the weekly conference was a staff conference and 
not a conference with subordinate commanders? 

General Short. No. We had a conference with subordinate commanders on 
irregular occasions, whenever there was something we thought we should tak£ 
up with them. 

Do you know whether there was a staff conference with the sub- 
ordinate commanders between November 27 and December 7 ? 

79716— 46— pt. 7 14 



3114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. I had a conference with General ISIartin and Gen- 
eral Burgin within an hour or an hour and a half after the receipt of 
the November 27 message. I had probably at least four or five con- 
ferences with General Murray, who was commanding the division in 
the south sector. I do not believe I had a conference with General 
Wilson in the north sector, because there was nothing in particular 
that I felt I needed to confer with him about. 

Mr. Murphy. General, if you had had all of the radar that you had 
ordered present, would you have had any different [8391'] 
schedule on Sunday morning, December 7, in view of the situation as 
it then confronted you ? 

General Short. In view of the parts situation and in view of the 
fact that we had to train men, I doubt if I would. 

I would like to read you, in that connection, a reference to this spare 
parts. This is a memorandum made out on yesterday. 

Was Department, 
Abmy Service Forces, 
Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 

Washington, 24 January 1946. 
Memorandum : 

I have examined the budget estimate for the FY's 1941 and 1942 and, in addi- 
tion, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the firsi appropirated funds for the 
maintenance and operation of Radar sets SCR 270 were in the Third Supple- 
mental Estimate, Fiscal Year 1942, page 35, submitted 13 November 1941, which 
was approved by the Congress on 17 December 1941. The original planning for 
these funds was made 10 October 1941 (preliminary estimate, F. Y. 1942). 

These appropriated funds were for the operation of this type of set for a 
period of two hours per day, five days a week, and 50 weeks a year to provide 
training of [8392] personnel in the operation of this equipment. 

That was signed by K. C. Lawton, colonel, Signal Corps. 

That shows what the War Department planned their estimate of 
funds on, and that was 2 hours operation a day 5 days a week. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, General, I would like to ask you, if you will 

General Short (interposing). In connection with that, there is a 
statement here from Major Berquist, now Colonel Berquist, who was 
our chief control officer and who was one of the two officers who had 
some training prior to the return of General Davidson and Colonel 
Powell. This is from volume 10, pages 1197 and 1198 of the Army 
Pearl Harbor Board. This is a paraphrase and not a direct quotation : 

The design of the gasoline engines was defective and we had very serious 
trouble. We had very serious trouble with electric power failures. 

He also said in connection with this number of hours, on page 1197, 
and again I paraphrase : 

Colonel Berquist pointed out that some of the enlisted men had been ruining 
their eyes because we had to keep them on the radar work too long. 

Now he was the man who was actively in charge of the operation 
of the radar and interceptor command, the man that [8d93] we 
thought had the most knowledge. 

Mr. ^luRPiiY. Berquist? 

General Short. Berquist. 
. Mr. Murphy. Now in that connection I direct your attention to 
page 1088 of the hearing before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. 
X ou do not have that. 

General Gbunneht. But Lf somebody came down there and said "we have got 
to get this thing going, anything is liable to pop any minute" you might have 
shortened up the time? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3115 

This is General Grunnert questioning Commander Taylor. 
General Short. Yes. 
Mr. Murphy (reading) : 

Commander Taylor. I think both Berquist and Taylor had that attitude, but 
unfortunately we could not get that much information out of the people we 
dealt with. 

General Grunnert. Could not Berquist or Powell, or you, as far as the Navy 
was concerned, have had access to the Chief of Staff and said, "The most im- 
portant thing is lacking. We have got to get it in"? 

Commander Taylor. We saw the Chief of Staff, but we found that somebody 
else was always responsible. 

General Grunneet. So they were not sufficiently impressed to make this their 
business or push it in comparison with all the other things they had to do? 

[8394] Commander Taylor. No, sir ; they lacked the power packs to get it 
going. 

General Gbunnekt. General Short expressed himself as most concerned about 
getting this in. It seems to me if you had approached him he would have been 
able to do something about it. Do you know whether or not permanent radar 
equipment had been on the island awaiting construction projects such as roads, 
cables, and so forth? 

Commander Taylor, It could be, sir; but not according to the Signal Corps. 
My information is from the Signal Corps Officers on the station. 

Do you know whether or not that is a correct statement? 

General Short. Commander Taylor was a naval officer and prob- 
ably did not know as much about the details of what was required 
and what had not been received as Colonel Powell would have known. 
There was one thing that we had definitely not received. I think it was 
sent from the States about December 10 or 12. That was the plans for 
the erection of the radar towers. The engineer could not go ahead 
and erect those towers until he got the plans of the footings that had 
been provided for in the specifications in the Btates, and those were 
not received until after the attack. 

Mr. Murphy. I understand he is talking here, General, about the 
air warning service that was operating. 

[839S] General Short. As far as that is concerned, as I pointed 
out yesterday, on the station at Haleakula, in the park, the negotia- 
tions with the park people lasted from June 1940 to April 1941, and I 
personally had a conference with the head of the park system before 
we got that straightened out. So we were not asleep at the switch. 

Mr. Murphy. I am thoroughly familiar with that. You made every 
effort, and you had your difficulties, but, as I understand it. Com- 
mander Taylor is talking about the mobile sets. He may be talking 
about the permanent sets, but I am not sure. 

General Short. I am talking about the permanent sets. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir. He says this : 

General Grtjnnekt. There was one remark that set me back when I saw it in 
your testimony. You said you never saw Short. Was he not the commanding 
general and was he not around there? 

Commander Taylor. I saw his Chief of Staff. I saw his Operations Officer. 
We were very closely tied in with his staff and the Air Force staff. 

General Short. May I state there that Commander Taylor being a 
naval officer, a junior naval officer, may not have felt that he could 
come to me, but I am sure Colonel Powell, my signal officer, told him he 
could come to me any time, and he was the man who was responsible, 
although Taylor was helping him out. 



3116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[83961 ^^- Murphy. Now I want to conclude, General, by ask- 
ing you to go to the supplemental part of the Army Pearl Harbor 
Board hearing. 

General Short. We have it here. Is it part of the Roberts commis- 
sion ? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. Now, the bottom of page 1619, the fifth para- 
graph up, beginning, "Now, General." 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy (reading) : 

The Chairman. Now, General, have you in mind the contents of General Mar- 
shall's message of the morning of December 7? You have in mind its content, 
have you? 

General Short. You mean the one 

The Chaikman. That never reached you. 

General Shoet. That didn't come until 2 : 58 ; yes, sir. I know exactly what 
it was. 

The Chairman. If that message had reached you, let us say, three hours before 
the attack, would that have changed your dispositions? 

General Shokt. Yes. Oh, yes. I would have gone immediately to either — to 
at least an alert against an air attack, and I probably would have gone against a 
complete attack, because it looked so significant. 

[8397] The Chairman. Well, can you tell me what was in that message 
that would have stirred you up? 

General Short. The thing that would have affected me more than the other 
matter was the fact that they had ordered their code machines destroyed, be- 
cause to us that means just one thing; that they are going into an entirely new 
phase, and that they want to be perfectly sure that the code will not be broken 
lor a minimum time, say of 3 or 4 days. That would have been extremely 
significant to me, the code machine, much more significant than just the ulti- 
matum. 

That was what I was referring to a while ago. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, if the Navy had given you that informa- 
tion on any of those days about the codes, you probably would have 
gone into a more serious alert ; is that right ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. It would have been very significant. I 
"Would like to call your attention to the fact that when I made this 
statement about the ultimatum that I had no conception of what that 
ultimatum consisted of as magic as shown us. Here I found out how 
serious it was. At that time I had no idea what it was. 

Mr. Murphy. But, General, all we are interested in [8398] 
is what you knew on December 7. Not hindsight. 

General Short. Yes, sir. That is the reason for my making the 
statement. I did not know the seriousness of what the War Depart- 
ment had received. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, you will recall that I said I would show you 
in the transcript where you said you hadn't seen the information until 
the next day. 

Will you come to the next question ? 

General McCoy. Didn't you have on the night of the 6th a bit of information 
from j'our intelligence officer that they were burning the consular records? 

General Short. No, sir, I did not know anything about that until probably the 
afternoon of the 7th, that they had. I think that he did get some information 
that they had burned something. 

General McCoy. It was not given to you? 

General Short. It wys not given to me. 

Isn't that what I said before ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3117 

General Short. As I have explained, I may have, in the first part, 
thought that he meant the information given me the following day 
about burning codes, and at that time I did not remember, as I have 
stated, about the burning of papers, but after reading the testimony 
of Colonel Fielder and Colonel Phillips, I am sure the report was made 
to me [8399] of the burning of the papers on Saturday morn- 
ing of the 6th. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you did say at page 1620 : 

As a matter of fact, I didn't know that they had really burned anything until 
the time that the FBI arrested them on the 7th ; they inerrupted the burning. I 
wasn't cognizant of the fact that they had burned tlie previous day. 

You did say that ? 

General Short. I believed that at the time. Wlien I later saw the 
chief of staff, I knew that my memory was at fault. I am j)erfectly 
willing to accept your statement. 

Mr. Murphy. General McCoy did say : 

And you would consider that a serious slip on the part of your intelligence 
officer, then ? 

General Short. Well, that is a little questionable, General, because we burn 
every day. Any secret stuff that we are destroying, we burn to be sure that there 
is no chance of helping somebody break the code, and I wouldn't have been sur- 
prised if the Japanese consul's office was burning every day. It wouldn't have 
surprised me at all to learn that they habitually burned everything in their 
waste-baskets every day. I don't know that I would have gotten terribly excited 
about just the burning [84OO] of the stuff in the waste baskets. I would 
expect it. 

General McCoy. But the fact is that that did not come to you. 

General Short. That did not come to me. no, sir. I learned the nest day that 
when they arrested the consul and the assistant consul, they interrupted the 
burning of a file. 

Now, General, I am asking you this question simply because it was 
passed on to me. Did somebody from tlie FBI call you on the night 
of December 6 and ask to see you before you went to a social affair at 
Schofield Barracks? 

General Short. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you talk to anybody in the FBI that night? 

General Short. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you on the night of the 6th tell anybody that 
they were "too security minded" anybody in the FBI ? 

General Short. No, sir; I talked to no one. I did talk to Colonel 
Bicknell, who had information from the FBI. 

Mr. Murphy. That was to Bicknell and Fielder at your house? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

[8401] Mr. Murphy. You were at a social affair at Schofield 
Barracks, some kind of a relief proposition, on the night of the 6th? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. And the Air Corps had a party that evening but not 
in this building? 

General Short. On an entirely different post. 

Mr. Murphy. At a different post ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now I come to page 1622, the third paragraph : 

General McCoy. And, as I remember it, you had in mind, however, not any 
fear of an attack at that time, and that you were trying to get warning of that, 
but that you were trying to get the personnel accustomed to the worst time, the 
most dangerous time? 



3118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. Frankly, that is more nearly correct, that I was more serious 
about the training, rather than expecting something to happen at that time. 

That would be about the radar? 

General Short. About all material. 

Mr. Murphy. About everything. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Eight. 

[8402] Now, then, General, I come down to page 1G22, the bottom 
of the page. The other day I made some statement about the radar 
being on a volunteer basis, and at that time you felt that wasn't correct. 
I believe you said yesterday that it was on a more or less voluntary 
basis ? 

General Short. It was, as far as Sunday was concerned. 

Mr. Murphy. That is what I meant. 

General Short. And over hours. They were working more than the 
prescribed hours. 

Mr. Murphy. I think this will answer it squarely. I direct your 
attention to the question at the bottom of the page. 

Admiral Standley. In one of the affidavits made by your officers, the affidavit 
of Grover C. White, the Second Lieutenant, Signal Corps, he says, "On Saturday, 
December 6, 1941, I contacted the Control Officer to request authority to have all 
stations operate from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. only, December 7, 1941." 

General Shoet. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. "This was agreed to by the Control Officer." Have you any 
information as to why that request was made that way on that Saturday? 

General Short. I haven't any information except I had ordered these stations 
to work only from four until [8403] seven, and then they were supposed to 
carry on routine training for the rest of the day. In agreement, they had gotten 
together and decided that if they carried on until 11 o'clock in the morning as 
a body, they would get more out of it than they would if they, went on their own 
after 7 o'clock, and they had agreed among themselves that they would carry on 
the training three teams at a time until 11 o'clock and from there on to four 
they would be on their own and making repairs, and things of that kind. So that 
since I had not ordered that, and they were doing it by agreement, they apparently 
thought that they could eliminate it on Sunday, by agreement. That's the only 
way I can account for it. 

The Chairman. In other words, they were not going to do the training after 
7 o'clock on Sunday? 

General Short. On Sunday. They had agreed that just on Sunday alone, in 
place of working right straight through, they would stop at 7 o'clock on Sunday. 

Admiral Standley. We have a gi'eat many coincidences in this incident here 
on the 7th. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standtey. And this is one of them. I was trying to see if there was 
any reason why that request was made on that Saturday, not to work after 7 
o'clock in the [8^04] morning on Sunday. 

General Short. I think it was only because it was Sunday, and they were work- 
ing every day practically from 4 o'clock in the morning until four o'clock in the 
afternoon, making a good long training day, and then they decided that on Sun- 
day they would chop off Sunday hours, the only way I can figure it. They were 
working 12 hours a day the other days. 

Then, the next que.stion : 

Admiral Standley. GTeneral, under the date of 5 November, 1941, you issued 
a Standing Operating Procedure. That was signed by Adjutant General Colonel 
Robert H. Dunlop, and you stated that copies of this were furnished the Navy. 

In that connection. General, the Army have testified that they did 
not get a copy of your standing operating procedure of November 5 
until sometime in early 1942. 

Do you know whether or not that is correct? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3119 

General Short. I have no way of knowing. The Army regulations 
at that time had a prescribed distribution of every order that we is- 
sued, every paper of any kind the Adjutant General was supposed to 
mail to Washington without letter of transmittal, these various things, 
to meet the Army regulations. The only record that was made of the 
[S4OS] mailing of these things was when the document was secret 
and this was not a secret document. I have talked with General Dun- 
lop, who is here in town, and was Adjutant General, and he says the 
fact that it was distributed by the Adjutant General to all of the units 
in the department would make him sure that he must have sent it to 
Washington, but there would be no record of that, because it wasn't 
secret. 

Now I have a copy of the Army regulations in effect at that time, 
and it mentions only corps areas, but the department that worked on 
the same basis as corps areas, applied it to them, and we habitually 
mailed these prescribed copies of whatever we got out. 

Mr. Murphy. I don't think it particularly material anyhow. I was 
just going into it to clear up the record. 

General Short. I would be glad to put this in the record as an ex- 
hibit. 

Mr. Murphy. What I say is this : Alert No. 1 could not be confus- 
ing because you didn't say that ; you said sabotage. 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. The fact is the Army, and I am just trying to clear 
the record, said they didn't get it until 1942, but I don't think it would 
make any difference one [84O6] way or the other, whether they 
had it or not. 

General Short. Hawaii cannot prove whether they did or not, be- 
cause there are no records. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, as to the AWS, I agree the record says it is by 
cooperation, but I refer you to page 1628, and I was only quoting you 
when I made the statement I did : 

General Shoet. I hadn't definitely — we hadn't given it a definite organization. 
It was working, but we waited to bring out the orders until General Davidson 
got back from the mainland, so we would not have to revise that. We were work- 
ing informally. 

Admiral Standley. But is was still working under the Signal Corps at that 
time? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

That is what I had reference to. 

General Short. My answer there was not — as far as aircraft warn- 
ing service, not the interceptor command, but specifically the aircraft 
warning service, that was entirely a Signal function, and I may have 
made the answer on that account. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, I was quoting a pretty good witness. 

General Short. The combined thing was a combination [840T] 
worked by cooperation. 

Mr. Murphy. Then I want to come to page 1633, the third last para- 
graph from the bottom of the page : 

General Short. Frankly, I do not know how much search the Navy made, as 
that whole business of search was tied in between the ships and the planes, and 
it was their responsibility, and I do not know when their task forces — as I say, 
they have two task forces out at the time. I don't know what instructions their 



3120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

task forces had as to search. I assume that whenever their task force went out, 
if it located Japanese ships, it would report them. 

Admiral Standley. Bat as for the search ironi Oahu itself, which in wartime 
was to be an all-around search, did you know that that was not being carried 
out daily? 

General Short. I didn't know just what the Navy were doing, frankly. I knew 
they had task forces out and I assumed any searching they did was tied in with 
the task forces. 

You made that statement ? 

General Short. May I say Admiral Standley's statement \vhere lie 
says that they were supposed to make a complete all-around search 
from Oahu would never be correct, because they would use the perim- 
eter from Wake to Johnston-Wake to [S^O'S] Midway so as to 
get the most economical use of their planes. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, the war plan called for a 3G0-degree 
search, but they couldn't do it ? 

General Short. No, sir. If the Navy had been gone, and the Army 
had had to do this, if we hadn't occupied the outlying islands, we would 
have had to do it from Oahu. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, page 1634: 

Admiral Reeves. It seems to me, General, that the reconnaissance search and 
the radar search are absolutely parallel in locating possible ships at sea. One was 
a longer range affair than the other, but otherwise there was no 'difference what- 
ever. 

General Sho^:t. Oh, there should be — they would be tied in. 

Admiral Reeves. It seems to me that prior to any hostile or air — or declara- 
tion of war, that neither of these procedures was being operated regularly day 
after day. 

General Short. They wei'e being operated as a training matter, Admiral, rather 
than as a real intelligence service just combing the ocean. 

Adnn'ral Reea'es. Yes. 

\S409] General Short. Now, I say I do not know just exactly what the 
Naval instructions were, but I know that was true from our point of view, that 
we were operating as a training proposition. 

Admiral Reeves. Your failuie to operate the radar after 7 a. m., was that in 
any way dependent on the fact that you thought the Navy reconnaissance planes 
were operating? 

General Short. It frankly was that we didn't think — from all the information 
that we had, we did not think the situation demanded it. 

Admiral Ref:ves. Yes, 

General Shout. We would have been working 24 hours a day, if we had had 
anything to indicate that the situation demanded it. 

Now, again at page 1636, at the bottom of the page, referring to the 
carriers, General, five paragraphs up from the bottom: 

General McCoy. Did any information come to you that day from your own 
sources of information or from the Navy that indicated the carriers were to the 
north of Oahu? 

General Short. The only thing that indicated that to me was the fact that they 
picked up this group of planes at 7:20 132 miles 3 degrees east of north. That 
[841O] would indicate one carrier was in there, was in that direction. 

I will ask that that be stricken. That is not the part I wanted. 
Go to the bottom of page 1638, General, the third last paragraph: 

General Short. I think the system is all right. I think that we made a very 
serious mistake when we didn't go to an alert against an all-out attack. I think 
that our system was perfectly all right. Our estimate of the situation was not. 

General McCoy. Do you think there would have been any change in your atti- 
tude, possibly, or a more complete meeting of the situation, if there had been 
unity of command? 

General Shobt. I don't believe it would have had any particular effect without 
the commander in that instance had decided that there was the danger of an air 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3121 

attack. You could have had the same degree of alertness under unity of command 
that you had under cooperation. 

Did you make that statement, General ? 

General Short. I believe that is a perfectly correct statement, that 
we made our estimate of the situation based on the information we had 
from Washington, that one man [S^ll] would have made the 
same estimate if he had been in full command, if he had the same infor- 
mation, because Admiral Kimmel and I absolutely independently ar- 
rived at the same conclusion. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, General, will you go to page 1639, again, at the 
bottom of the page. You are referring there to the conferences you 
had about Wake and Midway. 

* * * —in the whole discussion the fear was submarines, because Wake is 
close to some of the Japanese bases, and not a question of air, although they 
would be close enough that land-based planes could have operated against them 
when they were executing the relief of Wake. I don't think that that was given 
very serious consideration, but there was a lot of discussion at that time, owing 
to, the fact that we were going so far out to make this relief, going practically 
into the Mandate Islands. 

That was a discussion, was it not, about Wake and Midway, 
General ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Is that a fair statement ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. But I think that that statement may not 
be absolutely correct, inasmuch as I remember that the Navy was 
not willing to send the carriers closer than 200 miles to Wake, and 
I think for both reasons [S4J3] and we even went to the 
point where Admiral Halsey took a carrier, we had never flown 
P-40 planes off a carrier, and he toolv his carrier out and two planes 
and made the experiment to determine that afternoon whether we 
could do it, and we succeeded in doing it. That was before the 
decision had been definitely made not to replace them. 

Mr. Murphy. General, it is getting close to the adjourning hour, 
and I want to say that I am sorry that I have to ask j^ou some 
questions here where we talk about radar going 132 miles, when we 
have passed from that time to reaching the moon by radar. 

General Short. I hope I did not give you the idea that I thought 
you were purposely misquoting, but it is hard to quote from memory. 

Mr. Murphy. No. Life is too short for me to misquote anybody. 

The Vice Chairman. You are not quite through? 

Mr. Murphy. I will want about 5 minutes. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas, General Short wants to pre- 
sent some material that you inquired about. 

General Short. On page 82T2 of the record. Senator Lucas asked 
me how the midget submarines got in the vicinity of Hawaiian 
waters, and Admiral Inglis in his [84^3] statement in ex- 
hibit 8, page 16, makes an explanation of why he thought they got 
there, and I would like to read that. 

Senator Lucas. Let me say. General, I had forgotten the testi- 
mony that the Admiral had placed before the committee, but since I 
have to read his testimony. I thank the General for calling my 
attention to it again. 

General Short. It is just eight or ten lines, if you wish me to 
read it. 



3122 coxGRESSioxAL in^t:stigation pearl H-\rbor attack 

The Vice Chaikmax. Do you vrant it read, Senator? 
Senator Lucas. That is perfectly all right. 
General Short [reading] : 

Between 50 and 100 miles off Pearl Harbor, five midget submarines were 
launched from specifically fitted fleet submarines as a "si)ecial attacking 
force to conduct an offensive attack against American ships within the harbor, 
and to prevent the escape of the American Fleet through the harbor entrance 
during the scheduled air strike. Available data indicates that only one of 
the five midget submarines penetrated into the harbor. It inflicted no damage 
on American units, and none of the five rejoined the Japanese force." 

The Vice Chaiemax. Is that all. general ? 

General Short. That is all. 

[84-1^] The Vice Chaikmax. TVe will stand adjourned until 2 
O'clock this afternoon. 

(Wliereupon. at 12 o'clock noon, the committee recessed until 2 
o'clock p. m., of the same day.) 

[84-lo] ATTEEXOOX SESSIOX — 2 P. M. 

'Sir. Clark. The committee \dll be in order. 

TESTIMOITY OP MAJ. GEN. WAITEE C. SHOET, TJNITED STATES 
AEMY (RETIRED)— Eesnmed 

Mr. IMttepht. General Short, I direct your attention to page 1641 
of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearing, the fourth last paragraph 
from the bottom of the page : 

General McCoy. If you had been furnished with all of the things that you felt 
necessary, would that have made any difference in this particular action? 
General Shoet. I do not believe it would. 

Was that a correct answer ? 

General Short. "What I intended to imply by that, that in the ab- 
sence of information from the "War Department we would not have 
been in a proper alert and that we would not have been much more 
effective. 

Mr. MuRPHT. Even though you had all the planes, all the radar, 
and all the things you required? 

General Short. It would have made some difference in the anti- 
aircraft fire ; that is all. 

Mr. MoiPHT. In the antiaircraft fire you still would not have the 
men at the guns ? 

General Short. Only the skeleton crews. 

Mr. Mxtrpht. Just to guard the guns from the islanders? 

\8Ji.l6'\ General Short. And they could fire them. 

Mr. MuPvPHT. Now. continuing : 

Admiral Sta^tdlet. Right there : In case the patrol planes that were necessary 
to make the effective off-shore iwitrol were h'^re in sufficient numbers, do you 
still think that no change would have been made in the plans? 

General Shoet. None whatever, because you cr.uldn't tell when some of them 
might have been ordered away. If they had been left they just simply would 
not have called upon us. As a matter of fact, as I said, in most of our exercises 
the assumption was that they had enough to make the patrol, so they made the 
patrols and called upon us to execute the bombing mission, because they con- 
sidered that our B-17's were more effective as bombers than their own planes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3123 

Admiral Staxdley. Yes, but in tJiis estimate they stated definitely that there 
were not sufficient forces to make a continuous air patrol as required in war. 

General Shokt. Yes, sir. Well, there wouldn't be 

Admiral Staxdlet. Now, if you had had that force here do you think under 
the circumstances you would have been making that patrol every morning? 
Not you. I mean, but the Navy? 

Greneral Shoet. But the Navy. 

[8417} Admiral Staxdlet. The combined effort ; yes. 

General Shoet. WeU, I think that would \je a fair question to ask the Navy. 
I don't hardly think under the conditions that they would ; I think that they 
would have been doing it as an exercise now and then in oDnnection with us. I 
do not believe that they would have been doing it habitually if they had had 
them, but I don't know. It would be a fair question to ask them. 

Were those questions asked you. and did you make those answers 
before the Koberts board ? 

General Short. I think that is perfectly O. K. : yes. sir. 

Mr. ^luRPHT. Now, then. General, one more question near the 
bottom of the page : 

Admiral Reeves. Before vou go to that. General, let me ask General Short 
this: 

On the other hand, if you had had material and ftilly equipped radar stations, 
would you have been operating them throughout the day or would you have 
operated them as you did on the morning of the 7th? 

General Shobt. I probably would have operated them just as I did. 

Is that a correct question and a correct answer, as reported there ? 

General Short. That is assuming that I had just the [S^^SI 
same information from Washington that I did have. 

Mr. MuRTHT. Now I direct your attention to this question by the 
Chairman of the Roberts Board, at page 630 of Admiral Kimmel's 
previous testimony. Do you have that ? 

General Short. Page 630? 

Mr. Murphy. Page 630. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. The very top of the page : 

The Chairman (Justice Roberts). In the picture of it as drawn by Admiral 
Standley's question and your answer, if that is correct as I understand it, the 
Army knew that it was not going to get any warning from your distant recon- 
naissance? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, sir. 

Do you think Admiral Kimmel was justified in making that 
statement ? 

General Short. I do not know that he intended to answer that we 
knew we would not get any. but with all the reconnaissance that I 
know he had out I could not count on getting them, put it that way. 

Mr. Murpht. Xow I direct your attention to page 109 of the Rob- 
erts board hearing of the Army. General, and I will only ask a few 
more questions. 

General Short. Yes. 

[8^9] Mr. Murphy. Page 109. I see. down about 12 lines : 

Anybody who has lived here in the last year would know he could hardly 
ever step out of his house without hearing planes * * * 

Do you see that ? 

General Short. Page 109? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

General Short. Yes, sir : I have it. 



3124 COXGRESSIOXAL INTESTIGATIOX PEAKL HARBOR ATTACK 

ilr. MuRPHT (reading) : 

Anybody who has lived here in the last year would know he could hardly 
ever step oat of his house without hearing planes, » * « 

You made that statement, did you not, before the board? 

General Short. Yes. sir. 

'hlr. MiTRPHT. I go to page 127, Greneral. the middle of the page : 

General Shokt. Tes;. habitually there were planes in the air from 4 o'clock on. 
There were planes in the air almost all the time except from about 11 o'clock at 
night until 4 o'clock in the morning. As I said before, you couldn't step out of 
your house and look in the air without seeing planes. 

Then at the bottom of the page General McCoy said : 

Wen, they were apparently not up on that Sunday morning. 

[S}20] General ;?hobt. Tliat s^unday morniiig they were not up, most un- 
usuaL Each Sunday morning you are likely to 

General McCot. How do you explain that? 

General Short. I wouldn't be able to explain it without asking General David- 
son just why ; bat if they had been ap and training they wouldn't have had ammu- 
nition, for normally in the training they did not carry ammunition. 

In that connection. General. I direct your attention 

Will you give me the number of this exhibit, Kimmel exhibit 5 to 
report of action, dated December 19, 1911. 

;Mr. Mastxx. Exhibit No. 120. 

Mr. MxTRPHT. Exhibit No. 120. Do you have that ? 

Lieutenant Kark. We don't have it. 

Mr. Mi:"BPHT. I will read it to the general There is what is called 
the Kimmel exhibit 5 to report of action, and it is dated December 19, 
1941, and on page 2, under paragraph 4, it says : 

All planes, except those under repair, were armed with machine guns and a fuH 
allowance of machine gun ammunition. 

I was wondering why the Navy planes would have machine gims 
and ammunition and not the Army? 

General Short. Our planes were grouped for sabatoge alert. If 
you put machine-gun ammunition in the planes and a grenade was 
exploded you would probably set off the [S^l] ammunition 
and start a lot more trouble. We deliberately kept out ammunition 
when we grouped them for sabotage. 

Mr. Murphy. Now. then. I ask you, General, if you would outline 
where you were on the 6th of December. That question has been asked 
of each of the important witnesses so far. 

General Short. I was. as I remember, in my office until probably 
sometime around 5 o'clock, or a little after. I then went to my quarters. 
Around about 6 : 30 Colonel Bicknell arrived with the so-called Mori 
message. Colonel BickneU and General Fielder and I discussed that 
for some time. 

Mr. KzEFE. What message was that ? 

General SHOFrr. The Dr. Mori menage. 

Mr. KzzFE. Yes, 

General Short. We discussed that for some time. 

Mr. Keete. The poinsettia message. 

Mr. MuRFHT. The Hibiscus and poinsettia. 

Mr. KxEFE. Yes. 

General Short. Yes, After that discussion we, my wife and I, 
drove with Colonel and ^fe. Fielder to Schofield Barracks where 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3125 

•we attended a dinner for some type of local relief. I left the club 
sometime between 10 and 10 : 15, arrived at home at about 10 : 45, 
and retired. 

!Mr. ^luEPHT. Now, General, you were speaking about 
so [8422] many planes in the air on other mornings. 
There is testimony of Private Elliott that on other mornings Be- 
sides this Sunday morning they would have about 25 different targets 
on the radar station. 

General Short. That confirms my statement, because they would 
pick up everytliing. 

Mr. MuEPHT. Other mornings but not this particular morning. 

General Shcet. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MxntPHY. Xow, Admiral Kimmel received from "Washington 
a several page report of a message or memorandum by General 
Short and Admiral Stark to the President outlining the Pacific 
situation rather in detail. Did he ever give you the benefit of show- 
ing you that ? 

The Vice Chatrmax. You mean General ^larshall and Admiral 
Stark. 

Mr. McRPHT. Strike the question. 

Admiral Kimmel received from Admiral Stark a copy of a mem- 
orandum to the President from Admiral Stark and General Marshall 
outlining the Pacific situation in quite some detail. Did he let you 
see that ( 

General Shckt. No. sir : he did not. 

[84^3] IMr. ^MuEPHT. Did he ever tell you that he received it? 

General Short. I don't think so. 

Mr. MuEPHT. TVhen you talked to Secretary KJiox on his arrival 
at Pearl Harbor, there was some conversation between you in which 
he asked you if you had received a message and. as I recall it. he 
said something about it being sent from Washington at midnight. 
TTill you tell us about that ? 

General Shoet. My feeling is that he must have been confused 
in the time or some way we didn't arrive at an understanding 
because the only message that I got and he could have been referring 
to was the one sent by General Marshall about noon on the 7th. 

Mr. Muepht. Xow. I do find in exhibit 123 on the sixth page, 
something that I think should be shown in the record, and I will 
read it to you. General. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr, MitPwPht. Of course, Admiral Kimmel had before him the 
whole Pacific area. You had before you the defence of Pearl Har- 
bor. So that his problem was a broader problem than yours, 
ordinarily ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

^Mr. Murphy. I read this paragraph : 

[S^^] The conditions likely to exist on Oalitu in the event of war are 
definitely different from those prevailing in Europe, and which dictated the 
esrablishment of the combined headquarters and operating centers in Great 
Britain. Sustained attack of any kind is unlikely. The mission of the Army 
and the Fleet are considerably different — the operation of one being deiensive 
and local, while the operations of the other are offensive and far flung. Stra- 
tegic, rather than tactical cooperation, is indicated, and therefore the necessity 
for rapid receipt and exchange of information and arrival at quick decisions is 
of less importance. 



3126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

That, General, was a statement by Admiral Kimmel to the Chief 
of Naval Operations on November 3, 1941. 

Now, there was a letter written by Admiral Kimmel to Admiral 
Stark on June 4, 1941, General, where he said this : 

The liaison betwixt the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satis- 
factory and weelily drills in air-raid alarms with the two services acting in 
unison are held. 

Then there was the "Memorandmn for General Marshall." 

Enclosed is the arrangement of Kimmel and General Short with regard to 
joint air operations. You will recall [8^25] our talking about it, and it 
looks to me extremely good. 

Signed by "Stark." 

Would there be a possibility that if General Marshall read your 
reply to his telegram that he might have understood liaison with the 
Navy to mean just that? 

General Short. Undoubtedly he would have taken that whole thing 
as referring to that annex No. 7. I don't think there is any question 
but what that would have been the feeling. 

Mr. Murphy. I will ask you this question : As I understand it, there 
was provision at Hawaii for a joint committee of which your chief of 
staff, Colonel Phillips, was head, and that committee never met from 
November 27 until after December 7, and as I understand it, your 
reason for their not meeting was they would only meet in the case 
of an over-all change and there was nothing here to indicate the need 
of any such meeting ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. You also had 100 artillery lookouts that were not 
utilized because you didn't consider the situation called for it ? 

General Short. They would only be used if we expected a surface 
attack. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, you also had sound detectors that [84^3'] 
were not manned and that was to give some indication of something 
coming toward the island? 

General Short. They were good for only about 4 miles. 

Mr. Murphy. They were not manned because of the situation? 

General Short. Because we were not in this type of alert. 

Mr. Murphy. You also had civilian squadrons or lookouts, and 
they were not used because of the situation ? 

General Short. Civilian aircraft squadrons? 

Mr. Murphy. No. 

General Short. I don't believe we had any. 

Mr. Murphy. There was no provision for civilian aircraft squad- 
rons or lock-outs ? 

General Short. There was one poor lone civilian flyer that practi- 
cally flew into the Japanese and got fired at when he didn't know 
anything was on. 

Mr. Murphy. Your harbor-control post was working 8 hours a day 
before December 7, and 24 hours after? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. One other question, General. The martial law, how 
long had you made provision for that? 

General Short. That probably had been in every war plan for the 
last 20 years. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3127 

[84^7] Mr. Murphy. At any rate, when you took over imme- 
diately after the raid, was it your intention at that time that martial 
law would be continued indefinitely, or only for the immediate 
emergency ? 

General Short. I would say as long as it was necessary. Once put 
into etlect it could only be called off upon the order of the President. 

Mr. Murphy. No other questions. 

The Chairjvian. Senator Brewster. 

Senator Brewster. In the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor 
board, at page 49, there is the following colloquy between General 
Grunert and General Marshall to which I invite your attention : 

General Grunert. Just to have it in the record for our future consideration, I 
want to put a query to be answered or not, as you see fit, or whether or not the 
question is sucli as to really demand an answer. That is this : Here, the same 
message, or three messages go to at least i'our prominent commanders, or three 
of them, overseas — Panama, Hawaii, and the Philippines, and one, on a presum- 
ably exposed West Coast. Three of them apparently interpret those messages in 
one way, and the fourth one does not. So the three of them report all ot the 
measures they have taken, or show by their reports that they con- [8^;^S] 
sidered this as quite a critical and dangerous situation ; so they take greater 
measures than the fourth does. 

Now, is there anything in the case of that fourth which happens to be Hawaiian 
Department — are there any peculiar circumstances there that it should be inter- 
preted in a different way for that command than it was in Panama, the Philip- 
pines, or on the West Coast? 

Now, this is w^hat I would like your consideration of : 

General Marshall. All I can say to that is this — and my answer does not 
explain the contrast between the very, very urgent attitude of the Naval and 
Army Commanders in Hawaii in the spring and early summer with relation to 
air and anti-aircraft and radar requirements. All I can say is that Hawaii had 
always 130,000 Japanese in a very congested district there, and no commander 
could ever forget that, and the others did not have them. That did not exist in 
Panama. You had Panamanians over the border, but certainly you had no feeling 
of fears regarding them. In the Philippines you had no Japanese population, 
certainly of any moment. It actually developed later there was a Fifth Column, 
very well organized, out there ; but you had always present in your mind in 
Hawaii the large Japanese population of unpredictable activities. 

Now, I thint that covers the answer to the question [84^9] 
General Grunert asked as to why there was a different interpretation 
on the messages, if that was a fair statement of their purport. 

General Short. Yes, sir; and I would like to add also that the very 
difference in the answers from the various departments should have 
caused the people in the War Plans Division who read my answer to 
look at it critically, and know what it said. It was sufficiently differ- 
ent that it should have called their attention to it, in place of their 
saying they never realized what it said. 

Senator Brewster. It was true in the Philippines they did have 
these intercepts? 

General Short. They had a great deal more information. 

Senator Brewster. So that was another reason. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. But reverting to the point you make, which I 
think is referred to here, reading from page 52 : 

General Frank. Now, General Marshall, a reading of the Roberts commission 
testimony leads one to the conclusion that there was a general feeling in both 
the Army and the Navy and in Hawaii that there would not be an air attack. 
In other words, there was a state of mind of security against an air attack. Do 
you believe such a state of mind [830] existed? 



3128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall. I was unaware of it. The previous communications we 
had had, notably those of the spring and up to June, 1941, related very specifically 
to the urgency of measures protective against an air attack. 

General Short. General Marshall specifically made the statement 
Inmself, and I quoted it in my statement that he did not expect a 
surprise attack in Hawaii. 

Senator Brewster. Where was that? You mean before this com- 
mittee ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. It is in my statement. He made the state- 
ment before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and I quoted it here. It 
is quoted in my statement. I haven't found it yet, but he said he 
expected an attack tovrard Siam, he expected an attack in Indochina, 
he expected an attack in the Philippines, and possibly Borneo, but that 
is as far as he knew, nobody expected an attack in Hawaii. So he was 
ill the same position. 

I have it right here. Dou 3^ou wish me to read it ? 

Senator Brewster. I think it should go in here. 

General Short (reading) : 

We anticipated beyond a doubt a .Japanese movement in Indochina and the 
Gulf of Siam and against the Malay Peninsula. We also anticipated an assault 
on the Philip [SJJi] pines. We did not, so far as I recall, anticipate an 
attack on Hawaii, the reason being that we thought the addition of more modern 
planes at the defenses would be sufficient to make it extremely hazardous for the 
Japanese to attempt such an attack. 

Now, that is Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, volume 1, page 9. 

Senator Brewster. I will see if that is in the one I have here. Yes; 
I have that here before me, and this part which I have been reading 
is subsequent thereto. 

So that it would appear that although I presume there may have 
been intermittent appearances, that before that very board subse- 
quently General Marshall denied his knowledge of the existence of 
a state of mind as to security from air attack, which he apparently 
had earlier testified he understood existed. 

General Short. Definitely. I would like to add, in respect to 
your previous question, if I may, that there was a very considerable 
difference in the message that I received and the message that was 
received in the Philippines, which would account for that, because 
the message in the Philippines didn't have the "don'ts," my message; 

Don't alarm the public, don't do anything to disclose your intent, limit the 
dissemination of [S4S2] this information to the minimum essential 
officers. 

Those words did not appear in the message to the Philippines. 

[84o3] Senator Brewster. Well, I think the point is very 
proper, but recurring to this matter of General Marshall, if my inter- 
pretation of his language is correct then it would indicate that even 
Jupiter occasionally nods. I speak of that because I think they have 
criticized you somewhat because of giving different impressions as 
to the state of mind that existed at various times. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. And this would apparently indicate a some- 
what different impression as to the fear of an air attack in General 
MarshalFs own mind at various times. 

General Short. I think also the aide memoir that he gave to the 
President on May the 3rd, 1941, with reference to Hawaii where he 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3129 

said in points of view or in sequence that the thing that would prob- 
ably occur first would be sabotage and that it might be necessary to 
establish strict military control for several months in Hawaii before 
we had difficulty in the Far East. 

Senator Brewster. Going further, General Frank on page 52 fur- 
ther asked General Marshall : 

Genei-al Feank. At that time, December 1941, what in j'our opinion was the 
general feeling in military and naval circles relative to the effectiveness of the 
air attack with bombs and torpedos? 

[SPi] General Marshall said : 

As I recall, we considered it as very effective, in view of what had occurred 
in the European theater. 

Were you given to understand that that was the military opinion 
at that time ? 

General Short. I believe in general I was. I think, however, that 
the Navy had a slightly different idea in regard to torpedoes ; that they 
thought if the water was shallow enough that the torpedo attack would 
not be effective. 

Senator Brewster. I think that is what Admiral Kimmel has testi- 
fied. 

General Short. I think that was his opinion. I had no decided 
opinion because I did not know enough about the action of torpedoes. 

Senator Brewster. This is the next question : 

General Frank. Was any consideration ever given — 

this is on page 52 and 3 — 

Was any consideration ever given in the War Department to the possibility 
of a feeling of apathy that might ensue as a result of "crying wolf; wolf; too 
often"? 

General Marshall answered : 

Very much so. 

Do I understand that that is your position. General ? 

General Short. I knew that for a year there had been some status of 
alarm and I suppose in the long run that that [84^35] would 
make everybody slightly less alert or less likely to believe in any warn- 
ing that came. 

Senator Brewster. Now, going on with General Frank's question 
on page 53 of this same report : 

With respect to the messages on sabotage sent to General Short from Washing- 
ton, do not the provisions of his war plan and his standing operating procedure 
provide for full defense against sabotage? 

General Marshall said : 

I think it does. 

General Feank. Were not the provisions of these plans known in the War 
Department? 

General Marshaix. They must have been. 

General Feank. Then why was sabotage specifically singled out? 

General Marshall. By whom? 

General Feank. By messages that were sent to him. Between November 16 
and 28 there were six messages sent to him, four of them told him to be careful 
not to disturb the Japanese, and three of them cautioned him about sabotage. 

General Marshall. Two of those on Sc'ibotage that are related to air were 
just coincidences, and those not to disturb the Japanese related to air, and the ex- 
treme anxiety not to have anything happen which would [S^S6] provoke a 
break, which would enable the j'apanese to say that we were taking action, to 

79716 — 46— pt. 7 15 



3130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

give them an excuse for action ; and that was to enable Mr. Hull to stall this thing 
oft" as long as possible. All measures against sabotage are very diflBcult of set-up, 
because they indicate their purpose so plainly wlien you have to deploy your 
people around the key points and have tliem stay there in tents or otherwise, so 
they always provoke a difficult situation, and one that we were fearful would give 
the Japanese some handle to place the accusation against us that we were taking 
action of a hostile character directed towards them. That is as nearly as I can 
recall the reason for the three messages that you refer to, I think, though I have 
to look at the messages to familiarize myself with what they say. I don't recall 
them. 

General Short. In that connection, I would like to say that when I 
arrived there, there were a considerable number of men on guard over 
vital installations to prevent sabotage, there had been for a year or so. 
So far as the guard for sabotage purposes, the community had become 
so accustomed to them that it did not ah\rm them in any way. 

From July the 8th, or July the 25th, when we got the sanction mes- 
sage, we had had about a half alert against sabotage [8j.c^7\ 
constantly because the community was extremely uneasy at that time; 
it affected their pocketbooks, it closed up businesses operated by Japa- 
nese, so that they were at that time accustomed to having our guard 
over vital installations. 

Senator Brewster. Then the next question: 

General Frank. In accordance with that, you feel that it was a responsibility 
for the War Department to caution about sabotage? 

General Marshall. In relation to what I have just said. We were trying to 
be very certain that we did not t.ike measures which the Japanese could put their 
fingers on and say that we were doing something that was hostile; and most of 
your sabotage defense has to be right out in the open, a great portion of it. Now, 
in that respect we were doing something. We had to talk about it, too, because 
that was related to the meetings with Mr. Hull, where we were trying to do any- 
thing possible that could be done to stall off a break in the Pacific. 

That is the whole of the quotation. Was this attitude of General 
Marshall, to which he here refers, as to the very great concern in Wash- 
ington against anything of a provocative character communicated to 
you ? 

General Short. I definitely got that idea that their chief purpose, 
the chief aim was to avoid war if possible [S^SS] and by all 
means to avoid an international incident that might lead to war or 
might give the Japanese the chance to use it as propaganda that we 
provoked war, but at no time did I get the other idea presented that a 
guard over a vital installation was something that the population 
would not understand and would think was provocative. 

Senator Brewster. And the thought was that there must, so far as 
practicable, be nothing done which the Japanese could by any strained 
construction interpret as a hostile act directed against them? 

General Short. Very definitely. 

Senator Brewster. Or an indication that you expected an attack 
from them ? 

General Short. Very definitely. 

Senator Brewster. That seems to run through the thread of Gen- 
eral Marshall's testimony and the thing which I thought was important 
was to know as to whether or not that attitude which he expresses here 
was communicated to you. I gather it was. 

General Short. The November 27 message meant to me beyond 
everything else that what they were interested in was the avoidance 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3131 

of war and the avoidance of giving Japan any excuse to start a war or 
to use propaganda tliat we had provoked a war. 

[84^9] Senator Brewstek. Now, in connection with the material 
which I presented yesterday, as I have examined it — I do not know 
whether other members of the committee have had the opportunity 
as yet — it appears that it consists ahnost exclusively of excerpts from 
the testimony before the Roberts commission and I have come to the 
conclusion that in justice to all concerned, if the testimony before the 
Roberts commission is ultimately to be made a part of our record as an 
exhibit, it would be more fair to handle it in that way. 

Has there been any conclusion reached on that matter of the Roberts 
evidence as yet? 

The Chairman. There has not been any consultation among the 
committee on it at all since you brought it up the other day. 

Mr. Murphy, Mr, Chairman, may I inquire with regard to that? 
I would like to suggest in answer to that, Mr. Chairman, that the 
testimony of General Short before the Roberts commission, to which 
frequent references have been made, be made an exhibit in this pro- 
ceeding the same as we did with the Navy testimony of Admiral 
Kimmel. 

The Chairman. The Chair sees no objection to that. 

Senator Brewster. May we hear from counsel ? 

Mr, Richardson, Well, I suggest this, Mr, Chairman, that until you 
determine the question of all of the testimony [84iO] I see no 
point in picking out a particular bit of testimony and making it an 
exhibit, if all of that testimony is ultimately to be in your record here. 

The Chairman, The Chair would like to inquire of the members of 
the committee if they have had an opportunity to examine the docu- 
ment Senator Brewster referred to, I think, day before yesterday, 
copies of which were supposed to be distributed. 

Mr. Richx\rdson, Well, they are available. We have had it mimeo- 
graphed. 

Mr. Kaufman, Yes; but it has not been distributed. 

Senator Brewster. Well, as 1 have looked it over it does consist 
almost entirely of quotations from the Roberts committee testimony 
and I think rather than taking excerpts it would be fairer all around 
if either the Short testimony or all of it — I would favor having all the 
Roberts testimony as an exhibit in connection with our case in order 
to comprehend the evidence of the whole situation, 

Mr, Murphy, The only trouble, Mr. Chairman, is that what I have 
asked for is a compilation of General Short's testimony on three 
different occasions for the convenience of those who were sufficiently 
interested to read and study it. The suggestion of counsel would have 
people going through three separate records to find what General 
Short said or did [<§^i] not say. 

General Short. You mean this volume here, Mr. Murphy?' 

Mr, Murphy, I mean that very volume. General, which contains 
your testimony on all three occasions and I think in fairness to you 
and to the others who are interested they ought to be able to find it 
as the committee had it and make use of it. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Wasn't that done with Admiral Kimmel? 



3132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. MuBPHY. That was done with Admiral Kimmel. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that if we put this 
testimony in, which I think should be, that it should be sorted by 
counsel so that the testimony of the witness will always appear at 
one place in the record instead of going back days and looking for 
it, just as we would do later with this, but I believe that the time will 
come, and I favor that, that all of the testimony be put in. 

Mr. Kaufman. Mr. Chairman, I assume the Senator means that 
with respect to the several records that a compilation job be done. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. 

Mr. Kaufman. So that the testimony of a witness in all proceed- 
ings be put together with appropriate notations as to which proceed- 
ing the particular testimony comes from. 

[844^] Senator Ferguson. That is right ; and that it be marked 
as an exhibit so that we can have it. 

The Chairman, If that is done, of course, it would comprise all 
the testimony in all the proceedings and it would be marked as an 
appropriate exhibit and, therefore, would include Admiral Kimmel's 
previous testimony as well as General Short's. 

Senator Ferguson. That is correct. 

The Chairman. And, therefore, would obviate the necessity of 
making them separate exhibits now. 

Mr. Kaufman. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. KicHARDSON. That is the point I made a moment ago. 

Tlie Chairman. It seems to the chair that that is a logical way to 
handle it. It all goes in anyway, but it goes in together under an 
exhibit and with the connotation in the record of each one of these 
testimonies as they have come all put together so that the members 
of the committee could refer to them conveniently. That would be 
a better way to handle it. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I concur in Senator Fergu- 
son's views there, I think that would be helpful to us and to others 
who examine the record, but on this question Mr. Murphy raises we 
have accorded Admiral Kimmel the privilege of having his testimony 
in other hearings included as [844^] .^i} exhibit. I think Gen- 
eral Short should be entitled to that same privilege. 

The Chairman. Well, couldn't we do it this way? Of course, we 
will be glad to accord to General Short the same privilege accorded 
to Admiral Kimmel, but if the committee should have it all pub- 
lished, that would obviate the necessity of having these two par- 
ticular testimonies as exhibit something and then put it in again as 
exhibit something else. 

The Vice Chairman. That is correct. 

The Chairman. So that with the understanding that if the com- 
mittee should order it all done and made an exhibit, then it shall not 
be filed as an exhibit separately from that collection of testimony 
which has been put in. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I had in mind, to do it all at the 
same time. 

Mr. Kaufman. And it would result, Mr. Chairman, that the ex- 
hibit of Admiral Kimmel would be stricken out for practical purposes 
and all put in at once. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. 

The Chairman. And the same could apply to General Short. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3133 

Mr. Murphy. I want the record to show that it be stricken out only 
on the condition that it comes in in some other exhibit. 

Senator Brewster. I don't understand that. He refers to 
[84441 a record. Is this to be an exhibit or a record? 

The Chairman. An exhibit. The record you referred to is to 
be an exhibit. 

If there is any reason — let us get it clear — the committee should not 
orders all this testimony presented as an exhibit together, with the 
understanding that counsel will arrange it so that each witness' testi- 
mony will appear consecutively or appear at one place, to which it 
can be referred, in the event we do that then the testimony of Admiral 
Kimmel and also of General Short will not be filed as separate exhibits. 

If we should not do that, then both of them go in as an appropriate 
exhibit now. 

The Vice Chairman. Can't we decide that now? 

The Chairman. Why can't we now act on that ? Without objection, 
then, the Chair will order that all this previous testimony be so ar- 
ranged by counsel as to appear appropriately as we have discussed it 
and that that include the testimony of Admiral Kimmel- referred to 
and made an exhibit the other day, as well as the testimony of General 
Short, and it will all be made an exhibit and include all of that in- 
stead of having it separate. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, Mr. Chairman, with the understanding, 
then, that that includes all witnesses called by the com- [^44'^] 
mittee or not called, who testified in these previous hearings. 

The Chairiman. Yes, I think so. That includes, of course, the testi- 
mony also upon which we agreed the other day. 

Mr. Richardson. And it includes all of the hearings. 

The Chairman. All of the hearings. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right; all except the Clausen because 
that was nothing but affidavits. 

Senator Brewster. That is right. 

The Chairman. That is right. 

Mr. Murphy. I want to say something about the Clausen report 
later. 

Senator Brewster. I think that covers this question that I raised, 
because I think it is better to have the whole thing in than to have just 
the excerpts. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Senator Brewster. So that will dispose of my request, I think. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Senator Brewster. Now, one other matter that I would like to in- 
quire of you about, General, and that is the matter of the circumstances 
of your retirement. 

General Short. I would like, in order to be very exact, to read a 
page that states the circumstances very cuccinctly : 

[8Jf4G] When I read the findings of the Roberts Commission on the morning 
of January 25th, 1942 I was completely dumbfounded. To be accused of derelic- 
tion of duty after almost forty years of loyal and competent service was beyond 
my com^irehension. I immediately called General Marshall on the telcplione. 
He was an old and trusted friend of thirty-nine years standing. He said lie had 
been in New York and had not seen the report until that minute. I asked him 
what I should do, having the country and the war in mind, should I retire? He 
replied, "Stand pat but if it becomes necessary I will use this conversation as 
authority." 



3134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I told him I would place myself entirely in his hands, having faith in his 
judgment and loyalty. After I hung up I decided it wasn't quite fair to him to 
have to use the conversation as authority, so I wrote out a formal application 
which I inclosed in a personal letter to him. I asked the War Department for 
a copy of this letter but they have not been able to locate it. 

I have a copy that I had written of the letter to him and I should 
like to read that. 

Senator Lucas. Do we have a copy of this ? 

Senator Ferguson. It was just handed to you. 

General Short. It is this letter, the mimeograph. 

Senator Brewster. That does not appear to have a date, [5^7] 
General. 

General Short. I beg your pardon? 

Senator Brewster. It does not appear to have a date on it, General. 

General Short. That was dated January 25. That was made from 
a copy that I had made in my own handwriting at that day and 
it was sent from 610 Northwest Fifteenth Street, Oklahoma City, Okla. 
That does not appear on here. 

Senator Lucas, Mr. Chairman, there is one thing I would like 
to inquire about. The preliminary statement. General Short, that 
you read previous to the statement you are about to read, is that 
your own or is that some other statement ? 

General Short. That is mine and was not mimeographed but I 
wrote it in order to be sure and say exactly what I meant. 

Senator Lucas. All right, sir. 

The Chairman. That is not included in this ? 

General Short. That is not included in this. 

The Chairman. All right. 

General Short. This is the letter that I wrote to General Marshall 
on January 25. 

Senator Ferguson. Just one moment that I may understand that 
correctly. Do T understand that what you stated first from that 
statement was a telephone conversation with General Marshall ? 

[544<5] General Short. That is correct, about 1 p. m. on January 
25. 

Senator Brewster. From Oklahoma City? 

General Short. From Oklahoma City. 

The Chairman. Did you call him or did he call you ? 

General Short. I called him. 

Senator Ferguson. Thank you for the explanation. 

General Short (reading) : 

Dear General Marshall : I appreciate very much your advice not to submit 
my request for retirement at the present time. Naturally, under existing condi- 
tions, I very much prefer to remain on the active list and take whatever 
assignment you think it necessary to give me. However, I am inclosing applica- 
tion so that you may use it should you consider it desirable to submit it at 
any time in the future. 

Since you asked me to call your attention to anything I consider important, 
I want to call your attention to the fact that the report of the Board did 
not mention the fact Hiat 12 B-17"s arrived from the niainland in the midst 
of the attack without ammunition, with guns cosmolined, and with skeleton 
crews, resulting in the destruction of four of these planes. You will find this 
set forth fully in my statement accompanying the Board report. From [8^9] 
my point of view this is a strong argument that the War Department agreed 
with me that sabotage was the most dangerous thing to the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment and for that reason did not direct me to take action against an air 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3135 

attack although it had known since November 2Sth of the precautions taken 
by uie. 

In Section IX of the Report of the Board a statement is made that the 
CINCUS received three messages from tlie Navy Department on December 3, 
4, 6 with reference to the destruction of Japanese codes. However, these mes- 
sages were not shown to me. 

I should appreciate very greatly anything you may be able to do in my 
case. 

Sincerely, 

Walter C. Short. 

I considered my dealing with General Marshall a purely personal 
matter between two old friends. 

I did not receive a reply to this letter. I have seen General Mar- 
shall only one time prior to his appearance before tliis committee. 
In June 1942 I went to West Point to witness the graduation of my 
son and attended a garden party given by the superintendent of the 
academy. At this party General Marshall came across the lawn to 
speak to Mrs. Short and me. He spent about 5 minutes with us. He 
did not mention [8450] Pearl Harbor but talked of our early 
service together. 

In this connection there are certain paragraphs in volume 23 of 
the transcript of this committee, page 4049, which I would like to 
read. [Reading:] 

Senator Ferguson. What did the Secretary of War's order that j'ou .=:poke 
about do? 

General MAnsnATX. The Secretary of War's order that I spoke about brouglit 
General Short back from Hawaii, relieved him from all responsibility of command 
in Hawaii, directed him to report to some point in tlie United States, we will 
have to look at the order to see just what it was. Thereafter the question 
was whether he would be given another assignment, or, as actually developed, 
his retirement, which I believe was at his request; I do not recall that. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted on that, as to whether or not he 
would be given another assignment? 

General Marshatx. I do not recall that, sir. 

;Mr. Keefe. Will the gentleman yield, Mr. Chairman? 

General Marshaix. I presume so. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I will yield. 

Mr. Keefe. Yesterday when I examined General Marshall I requested cnun- 
sel to present the order with reference to General Short and I wonder whether 
that is [S'lSi] here today, whether we have received it. 

Mr. Mitchell. It has not been handed to us yet by the War Department. 

General Marshall. The procedure in General Short's case was handled by 
the Secretary of War. 

Now, the enclosure in my personal letter to General Marshall was as 
follows : 

610 N. W. l.^th St., 
Oklahoma City, Okla., Jan. 25, 19ff2. 
Subject : Retirement 
To : Adjutant General, U. S. Army. 

1. I hereby submit my request for retirement after more than thirty-nine 
years service, effective upon a date to be determined by the War Department. 

2. If practicable, I request that the elTective date be such as to permit me to 
take advantage of all accrued leave of absence (approximately four months). 
However, if this request for leave should militate against granting of retire- 
ment, I wish the request for leave to be disregarded. 

(Sgd) Walter C. Short, 

Major General, U. 8. A. 



3136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Now, this letter that I have justTead was enclosed with [8452'] 
my personal letter to General Marshall to be used by him if he con- 
sidered necessary. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, so that the record might be clear, 
has our counsel requested this previous letter and has the War Depart- 
ment reported that it cannot be found, the one in the enclosure that 
includes the one of January 25? I just want to know whether that is 
a missing paper from the files of the War Department, whether we 
have made a sufficient search to ascertain that fact. 

Mr. Richardson. I do not think we have ever requested that letter. 

Senator Ferguson. What are the facts? 

Mr. Kaufman. The fact is, from Colonel Duncombe, that when it 
was ascertained that General Short had a copy of that letter no search 
was made then for the original letter. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, could we now have a search made and 
ascertain the facts as to why that letter was not with the letter that 
was enclosed in the same envelope? As I understand General Short's 
testimony, they were enclosed in the same envelope. 

General Short. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And he made an inquiry and could not locate 
in the War Department this top letter that he has just been reading. 

[84^3] General Short. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct? 

General Short. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. May we have General Short's statement? 

The Chairman. The Chair might ask General Short whether the 
fact, as you stated, that it was a personal letter to General Marshall 
and not an official letter would have any bearing upon whether it 
would be part of the files of the War Department. 

General Short. It was a purely personal letter and he could retain 
it or file it as he saw fit. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I make this inquiry, as to 
whether or not we are not getting, this committee is not getting per- 
sonal letters between our respective officers and are only getting those 
letters that the officers consider are official letters or communications? 

The Chairman. Well, of course, the Chair does not know how many 
personal letters pass between officers in Washington and elsewhere and 
therefore cannot answer that question. I don't know whether any- 
body can or not. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, let me ask General Short. 

Is the letter that you have read here addressed to General Marshall, 
and you supplied the date January 25, 1942, is this a correct copy of 
the letter you sent to General Marshall? 

[84-54] General Short. That is a correct copy. The copy was 
made in my own handwriting. I did not have a typewriter and car- 
bon paper when I wrote it, and I made a copy in my own handwriting 
and this is a correct copy. 

The Vice Chairman. So the committee now has before it, supplied 
by you, the letter that is being discussed here? 

Generad Short. That is correct. 

The Chairman. Did you write that letter to General Marshall in 
your own handwriting ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3137 

General Short. I did. 

The Chairman. Did you mark it "Personal" ? 

General Short. I did. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I should like to make this observa- 
tion on this point. I do not think there has been any question but' 
what every department downtown has furnished us letters from their 
files of a personal nature if the letters were in the files. Obviously 
many personal letters went from one individual to another that never 
found its way into the State, War, or Navy files. Certainly there 
would be no way that counsel or the liaison man of the Navy or the 
Army could find out all of the personal letters that went from one 
individual to another. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, this is what I have in mind : 
When the official letter dated January 25, "Subject : [8455'] 
Retirement" appears before us, it is in a way a conditional, or at 
least there was another condition attached to it, because there was a 
letter and a telephone conversation that preceded it and it does not 
exactly speak the facts alone and, therefore, without the others we 
do not have all of the facts. 

The Chairman. Well, General, I do not suppose that you or any 
other officer who wrote a personal letter to one of your superiors al- 
ways expected that that personal letter should become a part of tlie 
official files of the Department. It was discretionary, I presume, with 
the recipient of the letter. 

General Short. Absolutely. 

The Chairman. As to whether he should regard it as purely per- 
sonal and if you marked it as "Personal" he probably would not put it 
in the files. 

General Short. I regarded it as personal myself and apparently he 
did, too. 

The Chairman. And no implication is to be drawn from the fact 
that General Marshall did not make it a part of the official files of the 
War Department of any sort that would be derogatory to the effort to 
keep the rcord. Your official letter was the one addressed to the Ad- 
jutant General, isn't that true? 

General Short. Yes, sir; and I have a photostat copy of [84561 
it there. 

The Chairman. And that is a part of the files in the War Depart- 
ment. 

General Short. Now, may I explain that this letter and all of the 
following letters were taken from my 201 file in the War Department. 
That was a personal file of the officer concerned. My counsel, Colonel 
Karr, had the copies prepared and compared them and all the re- 
maining letters that I will read came out of my personal file. I did 
not see them till yesterday but 

The Chairman. In other words, all this correspondence except that 
personal letter to General Marshall is part of the file and was taken 
from the file ? 

General Short. That was part of my personal 201 file. 

The Vice Chairman. And the letter to General Marshall was taken 
from your individual file and is here? 

General Short. That is correct. 



3138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, might I make a suggestion? 

The Chairman. Mr. Richardson. 

Mr. Richardson. So far as I know — and I am supported in that by 
my associates — there never has been, so far as we know, any attempt on 
the part of any government agency to pick out what may be called 
official letters from [84.57] personal letters. We have been 
given all the correspondence, so far as we know, that are in the files 
that were examined. 

Exhibit 53 now in the record contains the personal letters between 
Short and Marshall, 106 between Kimmel and Stark, and we know of 
no personal letters that are not there and I would like to inquire from 
General Short whether he knows of any additional personal letters 
that are germane here that are not included in the exhibit 53 ? 

General Short. I believe the exhibit marked "Letters from General 
Marshall to General Short" contains all of our personal correspond- 
ence- 
Senator Ferguson. The other way, from Short to Marshall, does it 
contain all? 

General Short. Both ways, I think, during the period that I was in 
Honolulu. 

Senator Brewster. Well, I very much appreciate this assistance in 
my examination. I hope it does not indicate any inconsiderateness if 
I may now ask a question. 

The Vice Chairman. General Short is not through. 

Senator Brewster. I am all through with it. I said I appreciate 
the help of the committee in the examination. It was a cooperative 
proceeding. 

The Vice Chairman. I thought you were fixing to ask another 
question. 

[84S8'] Senator Brewster. I am when I get a chance. 

The Vice Chairman. He is not through reading yet. 

Senator Brewster. As everybody else has taken the priviledge of in- 
terrupting him I would like to exercise that priviledge likewise. I 
have a question which I think is really germane. 

The Chairman. Proceed. 

Senator Brewster. The point that I wanted to clarifj^, and my ques- 
tion contains no implication as to whether or not this letter should 
have been in the file. I just want to establish the point, which I think 
you said you had asked the War Department, as to whether they had a 
copy of this personal letter and what was the reply that you received 
from them ? 

General Short. I had asked Colonel Duncombe and up to the present 
he has not located it. 

Senator Brewster, And when did you make that request? 

General Short. Do you remember. Captain Ford? 

Senator Brewster, Well, recently I mean? 

General Short, Probably in the last week or 10 days. 

Senator Brewster. Well, that is all right, that clears that up. I 
think now you may resume. 

General Short. All right, sir. The next is a memorandum. 
[Reading :] 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3139 

[8459} War Department, 

Office of the Chief of Staff, 
Washington, January 26, 19^2. 
Memorandum for the Secretary of War. 
Subject: Retirement of General Short. 

As I told you this morning. General Short telephoned me at 1 p. m. yesterday 
(Sunday), to say that he was ready to submit his application for retirement if 
that was desired. I told him to take no action at the present time, that we had 
not yet had an opportunity to read the proceedings, let alone arrive at any 
conclusions. 

I am now of the opinion that we should accept General Short's application for 
retirement today and to do this quietly without any publicity at the moment. 

Admiral Stark has requested me to advise him if we do this, as he proposes to 
communicate this fact to Admiral Kimmel in the hope that Kimmel will likewise 
apply for retirement. 

I have talked briefly with the Judge Advocate General, who sees no objections 
to the foregoing procedure. He is looking over the proceedings of the Roberts' 
Board and preparing to advise us as to the matter [S-iGO] of a Court of 
Inquiry or Court-martial. Quite informally he stated that his idea in the matter, 
without careful consideration, was identical with ours, that the Roberts' Board 
was on a plane above that of a Court of Inquiry and, therefore, rendered the 
latter unnecessary and to be refused if requested, and that a court-martial would 
not be in the public interest at this time. 

(S) G. C. Marshall, 

Chief of Staff. 

This next is a memorandum. [Reading :] 

January 28, 1942. 
Memorandum for The Adjutant General. 

Attached is a written application for retirement from Major General Walter 
C. Short. 

Please hold this without action awaiting instructions from the Secretary of 
War. 

(Sgd.) G. C. MARSHAlfX, 

Chief of Staff. 

Senator Brewster. Now, General, could General Marshall have re- 
ceived your letter on the 26th when he sent this memorandum to the 
Secretary of War? 

General Short. He undoubtedly had received it on the 28th. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

General Short. I don't remember whether I sent the letter 
[8461] airmail. I probably did. It might have been possible for 
him to receive it on the morning of the 26th. 

Senator Brewster. But the memorandum of the 26th does, at any 
rate, indicate a radically different position than he had taken the day 
before ? 

General Short. Yes, sir; and it also by implication indicates that 
he had not received my written application, if you read it carefully. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. But whether or not he had then had an 
opportunity to read the proceedings and to arrive at any conclusion, 
that he was on the 26th of the opinion that the application should be 
accepted. 

General Short. Yes, sir; and the day before he had told me to 
stand pat. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. Now, did he call you at any time again 
regarding this? 

General Short. He did not and he did not answer the letter. Here 
is another memorandum 



3140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Brewster. Well, now, in the 28tli memorandum, evidently- 
then a written application was in and he turned it over to the Adjutant 
General with instructions to await action from the Secretary of War? 

General Short. Yes, sir. [Reading:] 

[Hand-written note:] 

[8462] To G-1 

Check on opinion of JA to Sec War. 

Senator Brewster. Isn't that, "See what must be done"? 
General Short. It should be: "See what must be done. (Sgd. 
GCM." [Reading:] 

Febbuaky 13, 1942. 
Memorandum to the Chief of Staff: 

I took lip with Knox after Cabinet meeting today the retirement of Kimmel and 
Short. He assured me that Kimmel would get no leave with full pay. I told 
Marshall of the opinion of the Attorney General indicating that notice to the 
effect that the time must not be considered a condonation of offenses, if any, on 
the part of the War Department or a bar to a future court martial. The language 
of the President roughly, as given me by Knox, was as follows: "provided it is 
agreed by you that this is no bar to be used legally or otherwise to subsequent 
court martial proceedings". 

Knox told me that the Navy thought that it was only fair that Kimmel and 
Short should have the right to ask for a court martial if they desired it. 

Henry L. Stimson, 

Secretary of War. 



[8^63] Wae Department, 

Washington. 
Memorandum for the President: 

I took up with Secretary Knox, after Cabinet meeting yesterday, the retire- 
ment of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. It is my suggestion that the re- 
quests for retirement of General Short and Admiral Kimmel should be now 
accepted; 

In order that the acceptance of these requests for retirement may not be con- 
sidered as a condonation of the offenses, it is recommended that the following 
language be used in the acceptance of such requests : 

"Is accepted, effective , without prejudice to future action 

in tiie interest of the Government." 

Secretary Knox concurs in this recommendation. 

Secretary of War. 

It does not show "signed Henry L. Stimson." 

[Handwritten notes:] 

Secretary of War's proposed wording 

wirhout condonation of any offense or prejudice 

to future action on behalf of tlie Gov't 

without condonation of any offense or prejudice 

to any future disciplinary action. 
[8-'i6.'i] This approved as safe by Atty. Genl. by telephone Feb. 16. 

It has a notation that — 

Green copy never on file. 

Febbtjaby 14, 1942. 
Memorandum for the Attorney General: 

1. At the Cabinet meeting yesterday, the question of the acceptance of re- 
quests for retirement of Admiral Kimmel and General Short was discussed. 
Several suggestions have been made as to the language that should be used in 
the action on the requests. In order that the acceptance of these requests for 
retirement may not be considered as a condonation of the offenses, the follow- 
ing language has been recommended: 

a. The language of the President, roughly, as given to Secretary Stimson by 
Secretary Knox: 

"Provided it is agreed by you that this is no bar to be used legally or 
otherwise to subsequent court martial proceedings." 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3141 

6, The staff of the War Department, believing that the language suggested 
above might provoke the officers concerned to request court martials at once, 
and believing such action to be inadvisable at this time, submitted the follow- 
ing language, in which The Judge Advocate General concurred : 

[8465] "Is accepted, effective , without prejudice to 

future action in the interest of the Government." 

c. The Secretary of War proposes the following wording : 

'^vithout condonation of any offense or prejudice to future action on 
behalf of the Government." 

The President has requested that you express your judgment as to which of 
the suggestions offered is preferable, and whether or not the preferable wording 
serves the legal purpose for which intended. 

2. The Secretary of War has directed me to request that before reaching a 
final decision with respect to the President's request, that you read the com- 
plete file relating to proposals attached, and also the two opinions of The Judge 
Advocate General of the Army, one to the Secretary of War dated January 31, 
1942, and the other to the Chief of Staff dated January 27, 1942, and the infor- 
mal memorandum from the Secretary of War to The Judge Advocate General 
appended to these opinions. 

3. In view of the fact that the President desires to reach a decision in regard 
to this matter on Monday morning, the Secretai'y of War has directed me to 
request that you [8466] make available to him your decision before the 
end of this week end. In view of the urgency of this matter, Colonel Walsh is 
delivering these papers to you, and is available for what assistance he may be 
to you in this matter. 

For the Secretary of War : 

J. H. HiLLDBTNG, 

Brigadier General, 
Assistant Chief of Staff. 

And a memorandum to the Secretary of War. At the top it says : 

If the Secretary returns to Washington tonight — Sunday — have this at his 
house then. 

G. C. M. 
[Note attached :] Clause agreed upon by Sec. War, Sec. Navy and the Attor- 
ney General : 

"without condonation of any offense or prejudice to any further disciplinary 
action" 
To Seaetary of War: 

For Monday a. m. decision 

Opinion of Attorney General re Short and Kimmel. 

G. M. C. 



[8467] Office of the Attobney General, 

Washington, D. C, February 14, 1942. 
Memorandum for the Secretary of War : 

I have given consideration to the suggestions contained in your memorandum 
of today concerning language to be used in connection with the acceptance of the 
requests for retirement which have been made by Admiral Kimmel and General 
Short. In this connection I have read the opinions and other documents which 
accompanied the memorandum. 

It seems to me that the objection which may be raised as to suggestion a 
(using the words "subsequent court martial proceedings") may be found with re- 
spect to the words in suggestion c "without condonation of any offense". It has 
been felt that the reference to court martial would indicate to the officers con- 
cerned that such action was definitely planned for a future date, and would 
move one or both of them to insist that such proceedings be had immediately. 
Similarly the reference to an offense may suggest to these officers that we felt 
that an offense had been committed, and thus might lead them to an insistence 
that the question of whether or not they were guil.ty of an offense be imme- 
diately determined by appropriate proceedings. 

Suggestion &, while somewhat more remotely susceptible to the same dif- 
ficulty, leaves the matter open for further action on the part of the government 



3142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

without stating tliat a particular course is planned or that any special interpre- 
tation has been placed upon the acts committed. I believe it would be pref- 
erable to use the language contained in recommendation & which, I understand, 
to be that of the Judge Advocate General and the War Department staff. 

(Sgd) Francis Biddle, 

Attorney Oeneral. 

That completes the correspondence. 

Senator Brewster. Well, now, that opinion of the Attorney Gen- 
eral seems to recommend 5, while the notation on the prior page recom- 
mends c. Do you know whether there is any reconciliation of those 
two statements ? 

General Short. You mean General Marshall's memorandum to the 
Secretary ? 

Senator Brewster. Yes. It says: 

The clause agreed upon by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy 
and Attorney General — 

which is clause c, while the opinion of the Attorney General recom- 
mends clause b. 

General Short. Maybe this order directing the retirement would 
explain that fully : 

Febbuaby 17, 1942. 
Subject: Retirement. 

Major General Waxtee C. Shobt (0-1G21), U. S. Army, 
610 N. W. 13th Street, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma: 

By direction of the President, Major General Walter C. Short (0-1621), United 
States Army, upon his own application, is retired from active service to take 
effect February 28, 1JM2, under the provisions of Section 1243, Revised Statutes, 
after more than 39 years' service and without condonation of any offense or 
prejudice to future disciplinary action. He is relieved from his present status 
of awaiting orders at Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and at the proper time will 
proceed to his home. The travel directed is necessary in the military service. 
FD-1401 F 1-06 15-06 A 0410-2 

By order of the Secretary — Major General — ^Adjutant General, 

and the name has not been copied here, so I do not know what particu- 
lar adjutant general signed it. 

Senator Brew^ster. Was the matter taken up by anyone, either the 
Chief of the General Staff, or any other one, before this action ? 

General Short. About the same time that that letter was written 
it was transmitted to me in Oklahoma City by an officer sent by plane 
by the Chief of Staff, who delivered it to me. 

Senator Brewster. There was no further discussion [8Ji.70\ 
regarding any construction to be placed on this language, or the phrase- 
ology which was used ? 

General Short. No, sir; because I would have welcomed a court 
martial in open court, although I did not want any more star-chamber 
proceedings that had everything secret and off the record, as had been 
the case in the Roberts report. 

Senator Brewster. I think that is all that I have. 

Senator Lucas. Will the Senator yield for just a moment? 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. Is the opinion of the Judge Advocate General of 
the Army to the Secretary of War on January 31, 1942, available for 
the committee ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3143 

Mr. Kautman. Yes, sir ; that is available. The entire file has been 
duplicated, sir. 

Senator Lucas. What do you mean by the "entire file," if I may ask? 

Mr. Kaufman. The entire file that leads up to the Advocate Gen- 
eral's opinion. 

Senator Lucas. Do I understand that this is not all of the file, that 
General Short has read, but only a part of it ? Are there more docu- 
ments and correspondence that is involved in this question ? 

[8471] Mr. Kaufman. There are more documents involved in 
this question ; yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. That is in the letter, the reference to the opinion 
of the Judge Advocate General to the Secretary of War, dated January 
31, 1942, and the other to the Chief of Staff "dated January 27, 1942, 
and the informal memorandum of the Secretary of War, they are all 
appended to these opinions. Those are these two documents here 
[indicating] . 

Lieutenant Colonel Karr. We have photostats of them but did not 
have time to reproduce them. We will be very glad to present them 
whh all the documents that have gone in. 

Senator Lucas. My inquiry was whether or not this is all the infor- 
mation we are going to get on this question or whether there is addi- 
tional information that throws more light on this slubject. 

Mr. Kaufman. Senator Brewster or Senator Ferguson has the files. 

Senator Ferguson. Senator Brewster. 

Senator Brewster. This is the file of which I was speaking [indi- 
cating] . These are items 1 and 2. The one to which I have particular 
reference is the one here [indicating]. That is the larger document 
that deals with the brief and resume of the records in the Roberts 
Commission on General [8472] Short's case. That is the one 
to which I had reference and it simply summarizes many points of 
evidence in the Roberts record. 

These others are references to the opinions of the Judge Advocate 
General, of which I quoted two sentences yesterday. 

[8473] Senator Lucas. In view of the fact that General IMar- 
shall's name has been used in these letters that have been read by Gen- 
eral Short, I am wondering whether or not there is any more informa- 
tion in connection with this problem that is now before us, where 
General Marshall is involved anywhere. 

General Short. Senator Lucas, I have two additional ones that we 
got later. We did not have time to duplicate them. I am not sure 
whether General Marshall's name appears on them or not. I will be 
glad to read them. 

Senator Brewster. You referred to the memorandum of January 
27, which was a memorandum for the Chief of Staff. Is that the one 
you refer to ? 

General Short. Yes. sir. 

Senator Brewster. By Maj. Gen. Myron C. Cramer, the Judge Ad- 
vocate General ? 

Senator Lucas. That is the one I referred to in the beginning, yes ; 
because I thought that was important. I should like to see what the 
Judgre Advocate General said on that occasion. Then I followed it 



3144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

with askin<y for any additional information that is in the file that 
deals with General Marshall on this subject. 

Mr. Kauitman. The rest of the file is right in front of Senator 
Brewster. 

[84?4] Senator Lucas. I should like to have counsel, if he will, 
examine that file overnight and see if there is anything pertinent in 
it that ought to go in this record following what the general has 
stated. 

Senator Brewster. They are the ones that presented it to me, and 
they have examined it, so they are familiar with what it contains. 

I had discussed this with them before I took the course I did. 

General Short. May I make a statement to you, Senator Lucas? 

Senator Lucas. Certainly, General. 

General Short. These two documents here [indicating] were fur- 
nished us by the War Department, by Colonel Duncombe. The others 
that I read they did not furnish us, but we went to my 201 file, and 
dug them out, but these were furnished by Colonel Duncombe. 

Senator Lucas. I shall conclude by requesting counsel to make a 
further study of that file with a view of determining whether or not 
they believe this is pertinent and material, to place the additional 
information before the committee. 

General Short. I believe, Senator, that this memorandum, signed 
particularly by the Judge Advocate General [847S] would be 
of interest, and I would like to have the counsel read it, if there is no 
objection. 

Senator Brewster, Would it be possible to have it placed in the 
record ? 

Senator Lucas. I would just as soon have it spread on the record. 

The Chairman. It may be spread on the record without reading. 

(The matter referred to follows :) 

Wab Depabtment 

OFFICE OF THE SECBETABT 

Memorandum 

To THE J. A. G. 

Will you kindly give me your opinion on a further question — in addition to 
those embodied in this opinion — viz: 

If Genl Short's proposed application for voluntary retirement were accepted, 
with the announced understanding that such action would not preclude a future 
court martial for the alleged offenses in re Pearl Harbor, would that be valid — 
could a subsequent court martial be validly brought, should it be found advisable? 

H. L. S. 



[8476] War Depabtment 

office chief of staff 

Washington 
To Secbetaey of Wab: 

Judge Advocate General's recommendations reference Major General Walter C. 
Short. 

G. C. M. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3145 

OOWFTDENTIAL 

Wab DEI'ABTMENT, 

Office of the Judge Advocate General, 

Washington, January 27, 1942. 

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff 

Ssubject : Course of action with respect to General Walter Campbell Short. 

1. Pursuant to your instructions I submit the following comments with respect 
to possible courses of action against the above-named officer on account of the 
derelictions disclosed in the report of the President's Commission to investigate 
the Japanese attack on Hawaii on December 7, 1941. These comments are based 
solely upon the text of the report of the Commission. I have not seen or ex- 
amined the 1887 typewritten pages of testimony taken [S-'/77] by the 
Commission nor the 8000 printed pages of records and documents examined by it. 

2. General Short may be tried by a general court-martial or he may be sum- 
marily discharged from the Army by the President pursuant to the provisions of 
Article of War 118. 

3. With reference to trial by general court-martial, it is assumed that the 
evidence taken by the Commission sustains its findings of fact and conclusions 
and would warrant such procedure should it be deemed advisable. However, 
it is impossible to predict with certainty the result of any trial or the sentence 
which the court might impose. In this case should a court acquit or impose a 
sentence less than dismissal I can see no advantage resulting from such a trial. 
It will be noted that the offenses charged against General Short are oiienses of 
omission or nonfeasance which require a much stronger showing to justify a 
trial than those involving misfeasance or malfeasance. General Siiort's non- 
feasance or omissions were based on an estimate of the situation which, although 
proved faulty by subsequent events, \yas, insofar as I am able to ascertain from 
the report of the Commission, made or concurred in by all those officers in Hawaii 
best qualified to form a sound military opinion. That estimate was that 
[S47S] an attack by air was in the highest degree improbable. 

4. There are, in my opinion, serious questions of policy which should be con- 
sidered in connection with a possible trial of this officer by general court-mar- 
tial. 

a. If a court should find him guilty and sentence him to anything less than dis- 
missal, tlie Army would be accused of white-washing General Short. This ac- 
cusation would be much more strongly made should the trial result in his ac- 
quittal. 

b. Such trial would have to be in open court, otherwise the War Department 
would be subject to criticism of whitewashing General Short if acquitted, or of 
persecuting him if convicted. 

c. The ramifications of this case are such that in a trial by court-martial it 
would be necessary to introduce in evidence numerous secret ijlans, orders and 
other papers which do not appear in the Commission's report. Both the prosecu- 
tion and the defense would need these documents in order proi>erly to present 
their case.?. It certainly would be against the public interest to disclose some, 
at least, of these various war plans and documents. Such being the case, it would 
be impossible to prevent the publication of these plans and documents except by 
closing the court during those sessions in which these secret papers were read 
and [SJfli)] discu.ssed. The result of a trial by a court partly in open 
session and partly in secret session might be that the War Department would be 
subject to the same charges of whitewashing or persecution as referred to in the 
subparagraph b above. 

d. A general court-martial would require the time and energy of a considerable 
period of a large number of generals and other officers of higli rank as members 
of the court-martial, and for personnel of the prosecution and defense. It would 
consume much time and elfort of the numerous officers of the Army and Navy 
whose services would be required in order properly to present the case for 
trial, or whose attendance would be required as witnesses. The ramifications of 
such a trial would be so great and it would require the time of so many officers 
from tlie lowest to the highest rank that it wouUl interfere seriously in the main 
job now before the War Department, namely the prosecution of tlie war. 



79716— 46— pt. 7 16 



3146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

e. The career of General Short as an active Army oflBcer is finished and closed. 
Because of the lack of conlideuce which the public now has in him, which lack 
of contideuce would no doubt be shared by his future subordinates, it is unthink- 
able that any command should again be entrusted to him. General Short knows 
this. That in itself is a very severe punishment. Furthermore, General [8-'f80] 
Short has been relieved of his command which reduces him from a lieutenant 
general to a major general. The addition to that punishment of any punishment 
other th.an dismissal, such as a reprimand, loss of files, forfeiture of pay or 
suspension from a command, would be inappropriate. 

5. For the President to discharge General Short summarily under the provi- 
sions of Article of War 118 would tend even more strongly than a dismissal by a 
sentence of a general court-martial to enable him afterward to claim persecution. 
Revised Statutes, section 1244, provides that when an oflicer is 62 years old he 
may be retired from active service at the discretion of the President. General 
Short will be 62 years old on March 30, 1942. However, it is unnecessary to discuss 
this source of action for the reason that you have informed me that General Short 
has ofi'ered to apply for retirement at any time you may desire to accept it. He 
may lawfully be retired upon such application. 

6. General Short entered the Army as a second lieutenant of Infantry on Feb- 
ruary 2, 1901, and had, up to December 7, 1941, nearly 41 years of honorable and 
most creditable service. He reached the next to the highest rank that an Army 
offi'-er can reach, namely that of a lieutenant general. 

7. I realize that the question of what ought to be [8481] done in this 
matter has been the subject of heated di-scussions in the press and elsewhere and 
whatever may be done will probably subject the War Department to criticism. 
However, in view of all the considerations hereinabove discussed. I respectfully 
suggest the advisability and the desirability of accepting the application of Gen- 
eral Short for retirement. However, in this connection I would further suggest 
that it would be both politic and just to coordinate the action taken by the War 
Department with that taken by the Navy Department in the case of Admiral 
Kimmel. 

/s/ Mybon C. Cramer, 

Major General, 
The Judge Advocate General. 



[8482] confidentiai, 

War Department, 
Office of the Judge Advocate General, 

Washington, January 31, 1942. 
Memorandum for the Secretary of War. 
Subject : Course of action with respect to Major General Walter Campbell Short. 

1. After considering my memorandum for the Chief of Staff of January 27, 1942, 
on the above subject, you have asked me a further question, as follows : 

"If General Short's proposed application for voluntary retirement were ac- 
cepted, with the announced understanding that such action would not preclude a 
future court martial for the alleged offenses in re Pearl Harbor, would that be 
valid — Could a subsequent court martial be validly brought, should it be found 
advisable?" 

2. A retired officer is as a matter of law still an oflBcer of the Army and still 
subject to court-martial as much as though he were still on the active list (A. W. 
2n; Nat'l Defense Act, sec. 2 ; 10 U. S. C. 4). Neither does his retirement amount 
to a break in the continuity of his seiwice which would prevent his trial after 
retirement for [8483] an offense committed before retirement (Dig. Op. 
JAG 1912, p. 992, par. I G 26). The real question involved is whether the retire- 
ment of an oflS 'er on his own application constitutes a condonation of his offense, 
barring trial for it. 

3. Tliere are opinions of this office to the effect that under certain circumstances 
release from arrest or confinement or promotion may constitute such a condona- 
tion. I find no precedent holding either way with respect to retii'ement. Retire- 
ment after thirty years' service upon the officer's own application under section 
1243. Revised Statutes (10 U. S. C. 943; Mil. Laws, sec. 326), is "in the discretion 
of the President." The foregoing is one of the two statutes under which General 
Short may be retired at once on his own application. If he be retired under the 
statutes, there may be some plausibility in a contention that the President's 
exercise of discretion in terminating the officer's active service on his own applica- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3147 

tion constitutes a bargain between him and the officer to the effect that he will not 
further be prosecuted for known oli'enses occurring prior to retirement. There 
is no statutory or judicial authority for such a view, and I regard it as unsound as 
a strict matter of law. Therefore I answer your inquiry by saying that as a 
matter of law [S^SJ/] the retirement of General Short under the above 
statute upon his own application in the discretion of the President does not involve 
the passing of judgment by the President upon the officer's past services or a con- 
donation by him of prior offenses which would prevent subsequent trial by court- 
martial. 

4. Nevertheless, as a matter of fairness rather than law, there is force in the 
supposed contention above stated. General Short has volunteered to submit an 
application for retirement. He may reasonably suppose that a request to him 
from an cffi.'ial source, in answer to his voluntary suggestion, to submit his ap- 
plication for retirement, involves a tacit agreement that the issue of his official 
conduct of the defense of Hawaii prior to and on December 7 will be closed by 
his retirement and that no charges will be preferred against him growing out 
of such conduct. 

5. Another statute under which General Short might be retired immediately 
upon his own application, is the second proviso of section 3 of the act of June 
13, 1040 (54 Stat. 380), reading: 

''Provkled further, That any officer on the active list of the Regular Army or 
Philippine Scouts who serve in any capacity as a member of the military or naval 
forces of the United States prior to [67/85] November 12, 1918, shall upon 
his own application be retired with annual pay equal to 75 per centum of his active- 
duty annual pay at the time of his retirement unless entitled to retired pay of a 
higher grade as hereinafter provided, except that officers with less than twenty 
years" service and officers who are under investigation or who are awaiting trial 
by courts martial or the result of such trial, or who.se cases are pending befoi'e 
courts of inquiry shall be retired only when the appli<ntion for retirement in 
each case has l)een approved by the Secretary (f War : * * *" 

It is manifest that War Department approval of an application of General 
Short for retirement under the above statute, would amount in effect to a finding 
that lie is not under investigation or awaiting trial by court martial and would 
thus tend even more strongly to support a contention that any offenses chargeable 
against him Avere condoned by the action. 

6. If General Short should be retired on his own application under the above 
circumstances and if afterward he should be brought to trial for his conduct 
of the defense of Hawaii, it may be anticipated that charges of bad faith would 
be made against the War Department by him [8'f86] or by others in his 
behalf. I think it is most desirable that no opportunity be afforded for such 
accusations. I assume that General Short's offer of retirement as made was not 
subject to any conditions. Therefore, I suggest that before his offer be accepted 
he be given to understand, prefei-ably in writing for the purpose of the record, 
that such retirement will not constitute a condonation of his offenses, if any, 
on the part of the War Department, or be considered a bar to any future trial by 
general court martial in case such trial should be deemed advisable. 

7. Should General Short refuse to submit his application for voluntary retire- 
ment with such a condition attached, the President may, without any application 
by General Short, retire him upon his reaching the age of 62 years on March 30, 
1942, pursuant to the provisions of Revised Statutes, section 1244 (10 U. S. C. 944 ; 
Mil. Laws, sec. 323), and may make announcement to that effect at the present 
time. 

/s/ Myron C. Ckamee, 

Major General, 
The Judge Advocate General. 
1. Incl. 

Let. to C. of S. 
1/27/42. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Lucas. Yes. 

[8487] Mr. Murphy. General, will yon state now as to whether 
or not you feel it would be in the interest of national defense and 
national security to have had a court martial of either you or Admiral 
Kimmel during the war, and in view of the fact it would show the 



3148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

situation at Hawaii, as well as other things, and require the presence 
of admirals in Admiral Kimmel's case, of admirals who were scattered 
over the seven seas, and in your case, generals and other officers who 
were scattered over the different parts of the world ? 

General Short. I will say that there may have been some justifica- 
tion in that point of view, but I do not think there was any justification 
in concealing the many things that were concealed; that the public 
had a right to know that, and that certainly I had the right to consider 
that the public should know it. 

Mr. Murphy. In other words, you feel that there should have been 
a more fair statement by the War Department, but you do not feel that 
there should have been a complete, [84S8] open court martial 
exposing the matter on the record, is that right? 

General Short. There might possibly have been some question about 
magic. 

The CHAniMAN. General, in that connection, is it not ordinarily the 
practice — whether it is the wisest or best practice, it has nearly always 
been the practice of the War Department and Navy Department, in 
making investigations of any sort under a board of inquiry, to make 
them secret? They do not usually do that out in the open, like we are 
holding this hearing, do they? 

General Short. I will say this: Through the press propaganda, or 
otherwise, the public had been so acqviainted with this case that any 
court of inquiry, or any courts martial was practically a trial before 
the American public, and I do not think there would have been any 
justification for any more secret, top secret, or off-the- record testimony. 

The Chairman. Well, you have not answered my question. I asked 
you whether it was not the practice, over the years, in both the Navy 
and War Department, to hold secret investigations? 

General Short. That has been done frequently. Now I will say 
also usually it is not a matter of the same public interest. 

[8489] The Chairman. No ; and we were not previously engaged 
in an inquiry where the revelation of military secrets might have been 
as universal as in this case. 

General Short. But even granting that, I do not believe there ever 
was any possible justification for off-the-record testimony that nobody 
could examine in the future. 

The Chairman. Do you think that the interest, or the welfare, or 
the result that might follow to any individual officer in the case of 
yourself and Admiral Kimmel could compare to the public interest 
that might be served or affected to a disadvantage by the revelation of 
things that would have come out in a public courts martial in both 
cases? 

General Short. The top secret evidence was kept secret until after 
the war was over, and then has been made available. The off-record 
testimony was not recorded, and I do not know to this day, and the 
public does not know to this day, and I do not think the committee 
knows to this day what that off-tlie-record testimony consisted of, and 
yet there was a final decision arrived at on the basis of that testimony. 

The Chairman. That is a matter about which I think the committee 
need not spend any more time. 
Congressman Gearhart. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3149 

184^01 Senator Brewster. Just a minute. I would like to 
pursue that. 

So it is your impression, General, that the public impressions which 
were formed as the result of releases here in Washington and the 
action taken convicted you before the American public on what you 
term off-the-record testimony? 

General Short. It is. 

Senator Brewster. Without an opportunity for you to have a 
hearing of any proper kind? 

General Short. That is correct. It might be of interest if I could 
read the waiver that I signed to the Secretary of War in regard to 
the courts martial. 

First, I received a letter from the Secretary of War 

The Chairman. General, before you do that, may I ask you this 
question, to clear it up. 

In the newspapers from time to time it has been stated, and else- 
where, maybe on the floor of Congress, that in either the Navy or the 
War Department a demand could be made for a courts martial, and 
it was stated that was not true of both Departments. Is it not true 
that you had the right to demand a courts martial, and Admiral 
Kimmel had a right to demand it in the Navy? 

General Short, I think either one of us could demand it, but whether 
it was granted in either Department depended [8491] on the 
Department. 

Now there was a difference. I think you may possibly be con- 
fusing the court of inquiry in the Nav}^ with the Army board. Under 
the regulations in the Navy, with the court of inquiry, the accused 
officer is permited to hear all of the evidence given, to have an at- 
torney, and is accorded the privilege of cross-examination. 

When Admiral Kimmel appeared before the Navy board he sat in, 
he heard all of the testimony, he had the privilege of cross-examination 
so if things were not brought out he could bring them out. 

Before the Army board I was not permitted to hear the other wit- 
nesses. I was not given the privilege of cross-examination, and 
neither was I permited to be represented by an attorney during that 
period. That was the difference in the two Departments. 

I believe, as far as a courts martial is concerned, that both Depart- 
ments had the legal right to refuse us a courts martial, if they saw 
fit to do so. 

The Chairman. I got the impression that one Department was com- 
pelled by law to grant a courts martial if the person involved requested 
or demanded it. 

General Short. That is true of a court of inquiry. I think the 
point of view expressed by the Judge Advocate [84^2] Gen- 
eral and Chief of Staff was that the action of the Roberts report was 
on a plane above a court of inquiry and therefore denied us the right 
to demand a court of inquiry. That is plainly said in one of these 
memoranda. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. MuRPHT. Do I understand, General, that before the Army 
Pearl Harbor board you were not afforded the right of counsel ? 



3150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. I had the right of counsel only when I was testify- 
ing. My counsel could not sit in when the others were testifying, 
and neither he nor I heard the other witnesses, nor had any privilege 
of cross-examination. 

Mr. Murphy. But you did have Brig. Gen. Thomas Green as coun- 
sel? 

General Short. Yes, sir ; and he was present during the time I was 
testifying only. 

Mr. Murphy. You were furnished a copy of the testimony over the 
protest of the board, weren't you, by the Secretary? 

General Short. I was furnished with a copy of the testimony, except 
for the top secret and off-the-record testimony, so what I got did not 
explain the situation at all. 

The Chairman. The off-the-record testimony was, in the [84931 
main, testimony that might involve some result or effect upon the mili- 
tary operations during the war, was it not? 

General Short. There is no way for me to know what was involved. 

The CHAmMAN, Of course, there was no record made of the off-the- 
record testimony. 

General Short. There was no record made and there was nothing 
to indicate the nature of it. 

The Chairman. All right, go ahead. 

[8494] General Short. This is the letter I received from the 
Secretary of War 

Senator Brewster. General Short, do I understand that before the 
Army board there was off-the-record testimony? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. And there is no record as far as you know of 
that? 

General Short. I am sure there is no record of it. 

Senator Brewster. That appears at various points in the testimony? 

General Short. It just shows the testimony was taken of a certain 
witness off the record. 

The Chairman. Have you been told or have you gotten information 
to the effect that it related largely if not altogether to magic? 

General Short. I have had no word of what it consisted of. It was 
just the blank page. 

The Chairman. Go ahead. 

Mr. Keefe. Will the gentleman yield? 

My recollection is that in the report of the Army board right at the 
beginning of the session there is a notation that General Marshall 
testified off the record, with the time the off-the-record discussion 
started, and [849S'] when his testimony was again placed on 
the record. It is about an hour and 20 minutes, as I recall, that he 
testified off the record. No one knows what that testimony was, of 
course. 

Senator Bewster. Except the men who listened to it. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes ; except the men who listened to it. 

Senator Brewster. And were affected, apparently, by it. 

The Chairman. You couldn't say that without knowing what it 
wast 

General Short. Shall I proceed? 

The Chairman. Go ahead. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3151 

General Short (reading) : 

Wae Department, 
Washington, D. C, 18 September 1943. 
Major General Walter C. Short, 

United States Army, Retired. 
My Deae Geneeal Short: In connection with your possible trial by general 
court-martial, the two-year statute of limitations prescribed by Article of War 
39 will, unless action is taken to prevent it, bar your trial by general court-martial 
7 December 1943. The tolling of the statute of limitations would be stopped by 
either a present waiver by you or [8-'f96] your arraignment before a general 
court martial, which, probably, would adjourn the case until later. 

So long as the war continues it will be impracticable to have a number of 
important witnesses appear before the Board on account of their war duties. 
In this situation it has occurred to me that the practical thing to do is to postpone 
any possible trial until later and that you may desire for this purpose to execute 
a waiver of the statute of limitations. In the event that you see fit to do this, 
I give you my personal assurance that any trial determined upon will be held 
at the earliest practicable date. 

If you should agree with the foregoing your prompt return of the enclosed 
form of waiver, duly executed by you, is requested. 
Sincerely, 

(Signed) Henrt L. Stimson. 
1. Incl. 
Waiver. 

This is the waiver that I signed : 

Waiver 

September 20, 1943. 

I, Walter C. Short, Major General, United States Army, Retired, hereby agree 
on my honor as an officer and [S-'/.97] a gentleman that I will not plead, 
nor permit my attorney or other person on my behalf to plead the statute of 
limitations in bar of my trial by General Court IMartial in open court for any 
alleged offenses with which I may be charged relating to the period on or before 
December 7, 1941, should my trial be held during the present war or within 
six (6) months thereafter. 

I take this action voluntarily, believing it to be in the public interest. 

Walter C. Short, 
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired. 

Senator Fekguson. Will the gentleman yield ? 

Senator Brewster. Yes, 

Senator Ferguson. I would like to inquire, General, whether or not 
you ever saw the Koberts report and when. I mean the testimony 
before the Roberts Commission. 

General Short. I saw it in August 1944, Now, it is possible that my 
attorney had it the last part of July. I made a request for it in July 
and I saw it when I came on to Washington for the Army board. 

Senator Ferguson. July of what year? 

General Short. 1944. 

Senator Ferguson. Wlien these letters were written, which you 
h ave read here today, this report had not been [8498^ furnished 
to you ? 

General Short. It had not. 

Senator Ferguson. I mean, the testimony. 

General Short. No, sir. Here is the letter I wrote requesting the 
Roberts report. July 4, 1944 

Senator Ferguson, That brings up this question : At the time you 
were relieved from command and later retired you didn't have the 
Roberts report and know what the testimony was ? 



3152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. I had no idea what the testimony was. I had 
simply the printed document that appeared in the newspapers. 

Senator Ferguson. Later you demanded it in writing and you are 
going to read us that latter? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. When you called General Marshall and wrote him 
your personal letter enclosing your letter to the Adjutant General, the 
Roberts report hadn't been made at that time ? 

General Short. It was published in the Sunday morning paper of 
January 25. 

The Chairman. And you were not in Washington at that time ? 

General Short. I was in Oklahoma City. 

[8499] The Chairman. You phoned him on seeing the publica- 
tion of the Roberts report? 

General Short. That is correct. 

The Chairman. So the action on your part upon seeing in the 
newspapers an account of that report was purely voluntary ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I was talking about the record upon which that 
report was made. I am talking about the testimony. 

General Short. I understood perfectly. 

The Chairman. I understood it, too. 

Let me ask in that connection, in your letter waiving any right to 
plead the statute of limitations, you said you made that waiver on 
condition that it was a public court martial. Did you mean to in- 
timate that if it was not to be a public court martial that you would 
insist on the statute of limitations ? 

General Short. Very definitely. I would raise the point. If they 
tried to try me in a closed court I would plead the statute of limita- 
tion. If it were in open court I would comply with my waiver. 

The Chairman. That was the implication I got from your letter, 
your waiver was based on the understanding that you had an open 
court martial. 

\8S00^ General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. In order to have an open court hearing you would 
insist, during the war on a public disclosure of the war plans we had 
drawn for the prosecution of the war? 

General Short. If they insisted on court martialing me during the 
war I wanted the public to know exactly what I was being tried upon. 

Mr. Murphy. You wanted a public disclosure of all of our war plans 
for winning the war ? 

General Short. That would have been up to the War Department. 
If they thought the court martial was important enough they would 
have to agree to it. 

Mr. Murphy. In this hearing we have had the war plan in the At- 
lantic, we have had the war plan in the Pacific, we have had the hemi- 
speric defense plan, and according to your theory there should have 
been a complete spreading on the record and in the newspapers and over 
the radio all of our war plans in the war in which we were then 
engaged ? 

General Short. That was a decision for the War Department. If 
the War Department decided my trial was so important that it was 
worth putting that in the papers that was their decision, not mine. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3153 

[85011 The Chairman. Was anybody in the War Department 
insistmg upon a court martial of you? 

General Short. I don't think so. 

The Chairman. Finally, as a result of the board of inquiry, the War 
Department recommended that no action be taken. 

General Short. That is correct. I just wanted to be sure when I 
signed the waiver that I would never be subject to a star chamber 
proceeding. 

Senator Brewster. It should be clear in the record also that your 
waiver gave the War Department 6 months after the conclusion oip the 
war to determine, so that there would be no necessity of the exposure 
of plans even if they did determine you should be court martialed. 

General Short. Not without they deciding it was so important they 
wanted to d6 it this minute and they would gamble eveiything else. 

Senator Brewster. If they decided to wait, the stipulation was that 
it should be after the war, and an open trial ? 

General Short. Yes. 

Senator Brewster. So there was no necessity on the part of the 
War Department to expose their plans in the face of the enemy. 

[8502'] General Short. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You wanted to read something. General? 

General Short. Yes, sir. My letter doesn't appear here but the 
memorandum of the Secretary of War in answer to it does appear, 
which is the important thing. 

This is dated July 4, 1944 : 

Memorandum for the President : 

Major General Walter C. Short has reqiiested that he be furnished a copy of 
the full proceedings of the Roberts Commission. A copy of General Short's letter 
is attached. 

But it is not attached. 

I am informed that the Navy Department, presumably with your approval, has 
furnished Admiral Kimmel with a photostatic copy of the report. I believe that 
General Short is also entitled to a copy, in order to prepare his own defense, and 
request your approval of his reqiiest. 

(Signed) Robert P. Patterson, 

Acting Secretary of War. 
OK FDR 

That is in the President's handwriting. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

[8503] Senator Ferguson. What are you reading from? 

General Short. From a memorandum for the President. 

Senator Ferguson. What file ? 

General Short. In my own 201 file. 

The Chairman. That is the number of your file in the War Depart- 
ment? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. That is what you call the personal file of every 
officer ; it is a 201 file. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. 201 is the personnel number. 

General Short. It is all my file ; yes. 

Mr. Murphy. May I ask one question, Mr. Chairman ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 



3154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. I ask you, General, whether or not on page 541 of the 
Army Pearl Harbor board hearing there will be found the following : 

General Short. I thank the Board for its very courteous treatment. 

General Short. The Army board. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chahiman. Now, the Chair would like to get to a little left of 
center and reach Congressman Gearhart for [8504] interroga- 
tion. 

Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield for just one question? 

Mr. Gearhart. I will gladly yield to the distinguished Senator. 

General Short. May I, Mr. Chairman— may I introduce one more 
letter, that bears on tliis same question of testimony, before we go 
ahead ? 

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the witness. 

General Short (reading) : 

Confidential. 

War Depaktment, 
Washington, Octol}er 20, 1944. 
Dear Geneeal Short: I have your letter of October 18, 1944, requesting that 
your counsel be authorized to inform you of the information he obtains from an 
examination of the recoi'ds made available to him in response to your letter of 
September 29, 1944. 

Much of this information is classified and involves highly important material 
affecting military security. It must not be transmitted in writing, or by a third 
party, or by telephone or telegraph. 

[8505] Should you feel that your interest justifies your personally meeting 
with your counsel, he may orally communicate the information to you upon your 
written undertaking to me that you will not disclose any of this classified infor- 
mation to any person except with the prior approval of the Secretary of War. 
Sincerely yours, 

(S) Henry L. Stimson, 

Secretary of War. 

Naturally, I refused to sign any such written undertaking, because 
it would bar me from using it before this committee or any place with- 
out the personal approval of the Secretary of War. So I had never 
seen any of this material until more recently. 

The Chairman. At that time this committee hadn't been created. 

General Short. It wouldn't have made any difference. He didn't 
limit this. I couldn't use it for any purpose without his personal 
approval. 

Mr. Murphy. Isn't there a letter at page 4450 of the Army Pearl 
Harbor board in which General Ulio said that 3^ou are "to be furnished 
with a copy of the testimony taken to date by the Army Pearl Harbor 
board less exhibits and that hereafter he be furnished with a copy of 
the [8606'] remainder of the testimony from day to day as it 
is taken as approved by order of the Secretary of War"? 

General Short. But that did not approve the top secret and the 
top secret was never furnished me. I had never seen any of the top 
secret until probably a day or two before this board convened on No- 
vember 15, when they had released it for printing. And the first time 
I ever saw the magic was when it was passed out here ; this printed in- 
formation. 

Mr. Murphy. At the time you were demanding the top secret infor- 
mation, the war was in progress, was it not? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3155 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. All right, Congressman Gearhart. 

Senator Lucas. I won't ask my question. I will wait. 

Mr. Gearhart. We will not detain you for long, General. 

General, I understood that when you asked to have an attorney 
appear with you on the Koberts hearings, that you were denied the 
right to have an attorney, but were allowed to have a person in the 
room with you to assist you with your documents; is that correct? 

General Short. That is not correct. I did not make a request for 
an attorney. I took them at their word that this was not a trial in 
any sense. "^ I didn't know they were [85071 going to arrive at 
a finding that practically amounted to a finding of court martial. 
1 felt that I was absolutely not "guilty in any sense, and I could handle 
my own case, and I went before the Roberts commission with no one 
assisting me in even handling documents. 

Mr. Gearhart. Didn't General Green accompany you in the hearing 
room? 

General Short. He did not. 

Mr. Gearhart. You were alone? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. You handled your own papers? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, what was your reference to him a moment 
ago? 

ijreneral Shorj. General Green was my counsel before the Army 
Pearl Harbor board, not before the Roberts Commission. 

Mr. Gearhart, Later on? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did he appear in the room as your attorney at that 
time, or did they object to him appearing as your attorney? 

General Short. He appeared as my attorney, but when he read one 
document and made one slight comment on it, [8508] they did 
object to his comment. He could read the papers for me, to save me 
the trouble of reading them, but he could not comment. 

I haven't that reference immediately at hand, but that actually 
happened. 

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, his function as an attorney 
was limited by the court of inquiry — rather the Army board? 

General Short. Chiefly to advising me. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, I just want to ask one or two questions about 
the radar. 

On the day in question, December 7, 1941, the radar was on from 
4 in the morning until 7 in the morning ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Gearhart. How were those hours fixed ? 

General Short. I issued a general order at the time that we got 
the message of November 27 to my chief of staff and he transmitted 
the verbal order. I am not sure whether he transmitted it orally, 
or whether he put out a written order, but my order was an oral order 
to the chief of staff. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, was the radar on the same time schedule on 
week days as on Sundays? 

General Short. The schedule for routine training was from 7 until 
11 on week-days and from 12 to 4 for [8509] routine training 



3156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and maintenance. They could do in the afternoon all of the main- 
tenance they required, and the man who was responsible for the train- 
ing could vary the thing and do whatever he thought was most needed. 

JS'ow, on Sunday there was no required training. There were a 
good many Sundays they trained voluntarily. Saturday afternoon 
there was no required training, but again because it was new, they 
did voluntarily quite a good deal of maintenance work. 

Mr. Gearhart. Lieutenant Lockhart gave some testimony in Wash- 
ington on the 30th day of October of 1944 at the Pentagon Building 
where he was examined by a Mr. Fraser. He testified, in substance : 

Answer. That is right. There were approximately six men per unit. We 
had six in ours. We operated from 7 to 9 o'clock. 

Question. Nobody operated at nighttime so far as you know? 

Answer. If there was any alert, or if maneuvers were going on, or something 
like that kind, there was a night operation. 

Question. From 7 to H excei.t for lunch periods, you were on daily? 

Answer. Yes, sir, during the week. 

[8510] Question. Sunday was a day off normally? 

Answer. We had to operate Sundays from 4 in the morning until 7 in the 
morning. We took turns. That happened to be my Sunday. 

General Short. This statement might have applied before Novem- 
ber 27. It would not be correct for the period after November 27. 
And you notice he shows specifically that they did operate from 4 to 
7 on Sunday, and that was required for every day. 

Mr. Gearhart. From the 28th of November on? 

General Short. From November 27 on„ 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, that matter was never touched on further, 
so the record is silent except for what I have read to you on that 
point. 

Now, was there any change in your verbal orders to stay on from 
4 to 7 after you gave those orders? 

General Short. No, sir. There was a considerable number of 
changes in the way they actually worked for training and routine, 
because they were interested in doing all they could possibly do, and 
they tried it out, worked until 6 o'clock, from 4 o'clock in the morning 
until 6 in the afternoon. They decided very soon that they couldn't 
work the men that hard, and when they were working beyond the 
hours, that was something they could agree to, and they [8511^ 
made quite a number of changes before it settled down to 7 to 11 and 
12 to 4. 

Mr. Gearhart. How many of those radars did you have? 

General Short. We had six. 

Mr. Gearhart. Where were they placed? One was at the very 
north of the island ? 

General Short, I think I can give you the locations of most of them. 

The Opana station, which was 2 or 3 miles southwest of Kahuku. 
There was one station then almost directly north of Kawailoa. That 
was several miles to the west of the Opana station. There was one 
station at Koko Head, which was a short distance to the south of 
Diamond Head, which I think is familiar to most of j^ou. There was 
one station above Fort Shafter, a very short distance on a high point. 

There was one station near Hawaii Island on the west side of the 
island. I believe that covers them all. 

Mr. Gearhart. The arrangement of those stations was so that you 
could cover the sea in every direction ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3157 

General Short. Yes, sir. They were placed to get the best coverage 
possible with that number. Of course, there probably would have been 
some movement of them as soon as we got our fixed stations into place. 
We probably would [8512] have moved some of them then. 

Mr. Gearhakt. I notice from the testimony that appeared in the 
statement that I have just read from that the range of these portable 
radar stations was 132 miles. 

General Short. We thought the range was 75 to 100 miles. That 
was the normal range. That was what the people on the mainland 
thought. Apparently, our atmospheric conditions were more favor- 
able, and we actually got 132 miles on the morning of December 7. I 
understand that the expert radar people that came out from the main- 
land later were appalled to think we could get any such distance. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, I heard some talk about two of the fixed sta- 
tions already being in place on December 7. That was news to me. Is 
that correct ? 

General Short. That is not correct. I think on one station all of 
the construction work was about 97 percent completed. That was over 
on Haleakala. I am quite sure that the blueprints for the installation 
of the radar antenna hadn't been received so they couldn't complete 
that part of the work. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, the one that was 97 percent complete, was it 
usable at ull^ 

[8513] General Short. No, sir ; because they couldn't set up the 
antenna, because they didn't have the approved plan for putting in the 
foundations and setting up the antenna. 

Mr. Gearhart. What was to be the range of these permanent fixed 
stations ? 

General Short. It was a little uncertain. We thought with these 
greater elevations that we would get between 150 and 200 miles. 

Now, we had one at 10,000 feet. As a matter of fact, I believe that 
they did later get almost the 200 miles from Haleakala, but for some 
reason the expert radar people from Washington recommended that 
it be discontinued on account of dead space. There apparently was 
certain dead space. However, that was after my time, an(J I have no 
personal knowledge of that. 

Mr. Gearhart. When v\'as the material for the construction of the 
fixed radar stations in Hawaii ? 

General Short. Most of the material was in Hawaii previous to 
December 7, and we were actually robbing those units for spare parts 
to keep the others in operation? 

Mr. Gearhart. To keep the portables in operation? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Gearhart. But the original contract for the [8514] 
construction of the fixed radars was for their completion at a time prior 
to December 7, was it not ? 

General Short. I would hardly put it as a contract. I would say 
the estimate of the time that they would be completed was put — we 
were told that we would have the parts by June 30. I mean all of the 
sets. We didn't get them. And we hoped to have all of the construc- 
tion work done before they arrievd. 

However, there were a number of things that held that up, and they 
were not there. 



3158 COXGRESSIOXAL IXVE5TIGATI0X PEARL H.AJ?B0R ATTACK 

[Solol Mr. Gearhart. One of those things was the old question 
of priority ? 

General Short. Priorities and the difficulty of getting permission 
from, taking 10 months to get permission from the Department of 
Interior for the park system. Also the difficulty of getting construc- 
tion materials. There were all kinds of difficulties. 

Mr. Gearhart. Xow. the question of priority was determined in 
Washington, was it not ? 

General Short. Yes. sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. The priorities which determined when you were 
going to get material for the construction of your fixed radars was 
determined in TVashington, you had nothing to do with that ? 

General Short. Xo, sir. I did all I could do. We were working 
under the same priority as military construction in the States, which 
was A-lC. When I heard from the Division Engineer in San Fran- 
cisco, about Jmie 10. that he did not believe we would get our material 
by June 30. 1 sent a wire to the Adjutant General on the 10th of June 
and requested that the priority be attached to A-lA, which was the 
priority the Xavy had for the outlying bases. They came back and 
they said they would advance it to A-lB. and that the chief engineer 
would take care of the [Sold] rest of it. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, did they ? 

General Short. They got there considerably later than June 30. 
They got there, most of them, in August. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then the construction work began? 

General Short. The construction work had been going on where 
it could before they were received. You see, we had to build roads 
up steep moimtams to get up there and that had been going on for 
some time before the sets were received. 

^Ir. Gearhart. If you had been able to get a first priority for the 
material and had been able to get promptly your permit to build this 
fixed station in the national park fi\>m the Department of Interior, 
you wotild have had your 200-mile radius radar on December 7, 
would you not { 

General Short. We probably would have had. Now, there was 
an additional difficulty that I have not mentioned. Procuring first- 
class expert workmen had become a terriffic problem in Hawaii. 
They had taken everybody locally. The Xavy got started about a 
year before the Army on construction. They were constructing bases 
on Johnston Island. Palmyra, and one or two other places. They 
had combed the local market. And apparently the market for labor 
in the States was a good deal in the same sittiation. [8517] 
They put in a request to the engineer in San Francisco for 3C0 work- 
men and when they got there they would not be 300 of the type that 
was expected but probably the best that could be had because good 
labor was scarce all over. It was an added difficulty. 

Mr. Gearhart. But with these interferences and delays incident 
to priorities and permits to occupy the national-park area, you got 
one of those permanent fixed stations 93 percent 

General Short. 97 percent. 

Mr. Gearhart. 97 percent completed? 

General Short. That is my memory, but I think that is correct. 

Mr. Gearhart. Xow, on the 28th day of November you alerted 
against sabotage ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3159 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Geaehaet. How long did you remain alerted against sabotage ? 

General Short. "We remained alerted against sabotage until the 
time the attack struck and by 8 : 10 that morning I had ordered the 
No. 3 alert, which was the alert against an all-out attack. 

Mr. Geaehaet. There was no suspension of the alert against 
sabotage between the day you ordered it and the day [85181 of 
the attack? 

General Short. No, sir. 

Mr. Geaehaet. That is all. 

Mr. ISluRPHY. Mr. Chairman, before you adjourn 

The Chaieman. We will adjourn, but before we do so, inasmuch 
as Mr. Tyler's name has been mentioned here, Lieutenant Tyler, who 
I believe you say is now a colonel ? 

General Shoet. I believe he is a lieutenant colonel. I don't know. 

The Chairman. The newspapers carried several stories to the effect 
of drawing some implication out of the promotion of Lieutenant Tyler 
to a lieutenant colonelcy and keeping of Sergeant Lockhart in the 
ranks where he was at the time, the inference being that Lietttenant 
Tyler, who ignored this warning, that Lieutenant Tyler was pro- 
moted, whereas Lockhart was not. 

Do you know anything about that ? 

[8619] General Short. Lockhart was a private. 

The Chahimax. A private? 

General Short. He was a private and he was promoted from a 
private. I think he became a lieutenant ; so they were both promoted. 

The Chairman. They were both promoted. So there was no justi- 
fication in drawing a comparison as to what happened to the two of 
them? 

General Short. I don't think so. And, incidentally, I will say I 
had nothing to do with the promotion of either one of them. 

Mr. Geaehaet. In addition to that, Mr. Chairman, I think Lock- 
hart was given a decoration at the end for his alertness. 

General Short. I believe he was. 

Senator Ferguson. In March of 1942. 

The Chaie3Ian. That has been bandied about in public publica- 
tions and I am glad to get it straightened out. 

Mr. MuEPHT. Mr. Chairman, before we adjourn, the understanding 
was that everything that was in this file about General Marshall had 
been offered. ^ 

I have here a letter dated June 12, 1942, and then under it a memo- 
randum of July 21, 1943 : 

Took up this matter with General Marshall. 

That is in regard to this court martial. 

[8520] Took up this matter with General Marshall. He told me that he 
would have to wait for Secretary Stimson's return for it was a matter for his 
decision. 

Now, Senator Ferguson was the one who requested this file. 

Senator Feeguson. Senator Brewster. 

Mr. MuRPHT. Senator Brewster, and I do not want to offer some- 
thing that was brought to him as an exhibit, but I do want the record 
to show that if Senator Brewster does not renew his offer of this file 



3160 CONGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

in the morning I will ask unanimous consent to have it go in the record 
because I think it ought to be straightened out on the record. 

The Chairman. Yes. that is the time to take action on it. 

Senator Lucas. Let me ask one question of General Short on this 
point before we suspend. You don't object if I ask another question, 
General Short? 

General Short. No, sir. 

Senator Lucas. I was somewhat intrigued with the condition that 
you placed in the waiver with respect to court martial. I was just 
wondering what the custom is in the Arm}^ with respect to having 
courts martial in o])en before the public. 

General Short. The normal court martial is open but I think there 
are some cases on record where the order for the court martial has 
been — where they have directed sessions in [8S21] closed 
quarters. 

Senator Lucas, If I understand you correctly, then, either in time 
of war or in time of peace the ordinary court martial is open to the 
public ? 

General Short. Wide open. 

Senator Lucas. I was not sure on that. I was under the impression 
it was just the other way. 

General Short. Xo, sir; but I think — my attorney says by act of 
Congress that it must be open. 

Senator Lucas, It must be. Being a member of Congress I should 
know that and I plead guilt}'. One other question. 

The Chairman, Guilty of what ? 

Senator Lucas. Of not knowing or anything that the committee 
wants to find me guilty of, that is all right. 

One other question — well, I will not ask you that. I will just with- 
hold it. Thank you, sir. 

The Chairman. All right, the committee will recess until 10 o'clock 
tomorrow. 

(Whereupon, at 4: 15 p. m., January 25, 1946, an adjournment was 
taken until 10 a. m., Saturday, January 26, 1946.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3161 



[8sm PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



SATURDAY, JANUARY 26, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Ina'estigation 

OF the Pearl Harbor Attack, 

'Washington^ D. C. 
The joint committee met, pursuhnt to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the caucas room (room 318), Senate Ofiice Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson, and Eepresentatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present : Seth W. Richardson, general counsel ; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Hasten, Edward P. Mor- 
gan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee. 

{8623'\ The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in 
order. 

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEIT. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES 
ARMY (Retired)— Resumed 

The Vice Chairman. Does counsel have anything at this time to 
present before examination of the witness is resumed i 

]\Ir. EiciiARDSON. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. General Short, do you have anything you 
want to present to the committee before your examination is resumed? 

General Short. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire. 

Senator Ferguson. General Short, you brought in the other day a 
telegram dated December 5, 191:1, to the Panama Department. Had 
3^ou seen the reply to the message of the 27th by General Andrews — 
it is in exhibit 32. 

General Short. I have it here. It is dated November 29, 1941. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, it would appear that that was mailed air 
mail and there was a telegram sent prior to that indicating he would 
send the report by air mail. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

[<§-5^4] Senator Ferguson. He says : 

Reurad four six one Xovpmber twenty seven signed Marshall report requested 
being forwarded air mail. CDC six eight seven. 

Signed "Andrews." 

Then we have the memorandum showing in detail just exactly what 
he was doing. 

79716— 46— pt. 7 17 



3162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Now, apparently that was received prior to the 5th. And then Gen- 
eral Miles sends this wire : 

U. S.-Japanese relations strained. Will inform you if and when severance of 
diplomatic relations imminent. 

Did you take that wire as a modification of the message of the 27th 
so that they really didn't want Andrews to be alerted to the full extent 
that he had notified them ? 

General Short. No, sir, I took it that he was given to understand 
that he could expect additional and probably last-minute information 
as to exactly what was taking place diplomatically. 

Senator Ferguson. And that Miles' construction of the message of 
the 27th was that diplomatic relations weren't as bad as the message 
of the 27th indicated or that severence of diplomatic relations being 
imminent that they would be notified of that ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

[SS£S] Senator Ferguson. Well, now, I note on this telegram 
this language "send number five twelve" — that is apparently the num- 
ber of the telegram — "twelve seven." In other words, it was drawn 
up on the 5th. Severance of diplomatic relations was not imminent 
at this time and it wasn't sent until the 7th. Sent on the very day — 
even after we had the 14-part message ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So that as far as General Miles was concerned 
he didn't cA^en consider that tlie 1 o'clock and the 14-part message in- 
dicated that a severance of diplomatic relations was imminent. 

General Short. Is it possible that he failed to mark the message 
"urgent" or "priority" and that it was held here in Washington for 
2 days? 

Senator Ferguson. That was going to be my next question. This 
message is not marked "priority," the same as General Marshall's mes- 
sage to you of the 7th, it wasn't marked priority. 

General Short. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. So that it didn't receive the same attention that 
a priority message would receive. Now, was it the understanding as 
far as you were concerned that when messages were not marked "pri- 
ority" that they were not [86^6] considered important mes- 
sages ? 

General Short. If the lines were not loaded, they would be sent 
through, but if the lines were loaded all of the priority or urgent mes- 
sages would be sent ahead of those not so marked. 

Senator Ferguson. And if at the other end there was any trans- 
lating or interpreting of codes the ones that were marked "priority" 
would all go through first and these nonpriority messages would be 
taken up after those? 

General Short. That is correct. 

[8S£7] Senator Ferguson. Is that the system ? 

General Short. Yes, sir; that is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. So that you account for this message to Panama 
that while it was drawn on the 5th, they did not get it until the 7th 
because it was not marked "Priority" and it is not marked "Priority." 
I have gone over it carefully. It is a photostatic copy and I cannot 
find where it was sent "Priority." 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3163 

Do you want to look at it and see whether or not you can find any- 
thing on it indicating "Priority" ? [Handing document to witness.] 

General Short. I see nothing to indicate either "Priority" or 
"Urgent." 

Senator Ferguson. I have before me — and I received it from your 
counsel when going over the papers that were put in yesterday morn- 
ing on the question of priority of the message of General Marshall to 
you. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And that it was not a priority message. I think 
it is clear now from what was put in yesterday that it was not a 
priority message but I think this should be in to make the record com- 
plete. Do you have a copy of it before you ? 

General Short. I think so. 

[SS^S] Senator Ferguson. Would you read it into the record ? 

General Short. You mean the message itself or the 

Senator Ferguson. No. 

General Short. The inquiry ? 

Senator Ferguson. The inquiry. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What was told you or what was told one of your 
officials when they made an inquiry. 

General Short (reading) : 

Paragraph 3 WAR L 54 1 extra urgent 

Washington, D. C, 219 p. m., Decetnier 9, 19^1. 
C G 

Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, T. H. 

Five four nine ninth please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our 
number five two nine. 

Senator Ferguson. That "529" was the Marshall message of the 7tli ? 
General Short. Yes, sir [reading] : 

Repeat five two nine December seven at Honolulu exact time deciphered mes- 
sage transmitted by Signal Corps to staff and by what staff office received. 

CoLTON, Acting. 

Now, there is a pencilled note on that : 

529 delivered to C/s.300 pm 7 Dec — receipted for by Capt. Trueman delivered 
by Mr. Hough. 

[85W] And then out to one side there is a notation that appar- 
ently places it at "2 : 58 p. m.. Colonel Dundoy." 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what that ''2: 58 p. m." is? 

General Short. I beg your pardon ? 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what that "2 : 58 p. m." is ? 

General Short. I beg your pardon ? 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what this "2: 58 p. m." is? 

General Short. I think what that means is that that was delivered 
to Colonel Dunlop, the adjutant general, at 2 : 58 p. m. and he turned 
it over to my aide, Captain Trueman, at 3 o'clock, 2 minutes later, be- 
cause it would take about that length of time to walk from his office 
to mine. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have this memo before you ? 

General Short. Yes. 



3164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson, Did you ask someone there to get this informa- 
tion for you so that you could wire it back to the War Department? 

General Short. I probably did not personally but unquestionably 
a member of my staff did. 

Senator Ferguson. And this is a memorandum ? 

General Short. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you read that into the record ? 

General Short (reading) : 

Radio War Department 529 Received. Filed at Washington, D. C. 12 : 18 PM 
Washington time (or 6: 48 A. Haw. time) (as RCA 1549 WS), 

I think it is. 

[8530] Received by RCA at Honolulu 7:33 A. M. Delivered to Signal 
Office at 11 : 45 A. M. Not marked priority. Other pirority messages handled 
first. Delivered to decoding officer 2 : 40 P. M. Decoded and delivered to Col. 
Dunlop 2 : 50 P. M. Delivered to Capt. Trueman in office of Chief of Staff HHD 
at 3 : 00 P. M. 

And then this was the message, using that information, that was 
sent to the War Department : 

Re your five four nine. Radio five two nine delivered Honolulu via RCA seven 
thirty thi'ee morning of seventh received Signal Office Fort Shafter eleven forty 
five morning (this time approximate but within five minutes) seventh Stop 
Deciphered message received by Adjutant General Hq. Haw Dept two fifty eight 
afternoon seventh (Received by Chief of Staff Hq Haw Dept three o'clock after- 
noon seventh All Hawaiian). 

Short. 

That "All Hawaiian" indicates all Hawaiian time. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, all of the other messages that j^ou read, 
the foundation for the message that you sent, "Not marked priority, 
other priority messages handled first," do you know what they were!^ 

General Short. No, sir ; I do not. There may have been a consider- 
able number. 

[8S31} Senator Ferguson. Would counsel look in and see 
whether they can find out -what messages were sent in there that same 
day 'i 

Mr. Masten. I did not hear that. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. On the same day there is a memorandum here 
on the 7tli that this message was not marked priority, "other priority 
messages handled first." Would you try and ascertain what those 
other priority messages were on the 7tli going into Hawaii that were 
translated first? 

Mr. Masten. Yes.^ 

Senator Ferguson. Then I take these messages to indicate this, that 
on the 9th of December, that is the Tuesday following the disaster, 
the War De})artment here undertook to investigate at least to the 
extent of ascertaining when you had received their message of the 
Tth. Is that correct ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know anything about the General 
Buiidy mission that was coming out to Hawaii to investigate as to 
the disaster ? 

General Short. Not for 2 or 3 years afterward, I think. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, was there any mission that came out for 
the War Department other than the Roberts commission? 

'See Hearings, Part 11 pp. 5296-5297. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE . 3165 

General Short. No, sir. Secretary Knox came out ahead [S53£'\ 
of the Roberts commission. 

Senator Ferguson. I understand that he went more into the details 
of the Navy than he did of the War Department. 

General Short. He went completely through my field headquarters 
and spent, I would say, probably 2 hours, in which we had officers 
detailed from every section to explain everything that had happened. 
He got a very complete picture not only of our headquarters but how 
we were functioning and exactly what happened, and at the end of 
the time he was so impressed with our headquarters that he directed 
the Navy to make arrangements to move over into an underground 
headquarters right alongside of us. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did he indicate in any way that he was 
not satisfied with what you had done ? 

General Short. He did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Now. I may be repeating on this; I do not want 
to repeat but I want to try and find out whether or not you were pres- 
ent when Colonel Knox, Secretary of the Navy, said something to 
Admiral Kimmel about a message being sent on the 6th, the afternoon 
or the evening of the 6th ? 

General Short. I do not remember it. I talked with Colonel Knox 
at Admiral Kimmcl's headquarters soon after he arrived, but I do 
not remember the conversation. It may have taken place. 

[85SS] Senator Ferguson. Well, did he mention in any way to 
you a message being sent on the 6th, a warning message ? 

General Short. I do not remember that. I think that in some way 
that we must have misunderstood each other as to the time, because I 
explained to him about the Chief of Staff's message on the Yth and it 
was the only message I received, and I think that there must have been 
a misunderstanding somewhere between us. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, on the message of the 27th, were you fa- 
miliar with exhibit 45? I wish you would look at exh'bit 45. Does 
counsel have exhibit 45 there ? 

Mr. IVIasten. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Pass it to General Short, please. 

Mr. Masten. All right [handing document to witness]. 

Senator Ferguson. That is an explanation or partial explanation 
as to the message of the 27th [reading] : 

The Secretary of War sent for me about 9 : 30 A. M." — 

This is a memorandum for the Chief of Staff. 

General Bryden was present. The Secretary wanted to know what warning 
messages have been sent to General MacArthur and what were proposed. 

Now, you will note there that there was nothing said about Hawaii. 
It is only what had been sent to General MacArthur and what was 
proposed. 

[8534] I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent No- 
vember 24. I then showed him a copy of the draft message you discussed at the 
Joint Board meeting. He told me he had telephoned both Mr. Hull and the 
President this morning. Mr. Hull stated the conversations had been terminated 
with the barest possibility of resumption. The President wanted a warning mes- 
sage sent to the Philippines. 



5166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

And you will note there that nothmg is said about the President 
wanting a message sent to you. Then going on and reading : 

I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cable- 
gram. 

Now, when did you first learn about that exhibit ? 

General Short. I think that I learned the substance of that exhibit 
when I read the testimony of Secretary Stimson and General Gerow 
before the Army Pearl Harbor Board in 1944. I do not know whether 
I had actually seen the memorandum but I did learn the substance. 

Senator Ferguson. Now I would like to go to several answers in 
the top secret. Admiral Ingersoll on page 423 of the Hart record. 
Now, you were asked and others were asked about that preparatory 
deployment. Here is question No. 38 : 

Admiral, do you recall what the CNO meant by its [8535] directive to 
make a preparatory deployment as contained in this dispatch of October the 
16th? 

That is the first they used that "preparatory deployment", in that 
message also. Now, here is what he answers : 

I think the preparatory deployment that would not constitute provocative 
action or disclose strategic intentions against Japan referred more to the with- 
drawal of certain units of the Asiatic Fleet from the China Sea area toward 
the Southern Philippines rather than any particular deployment of the Pacific 
Fleet, with the possible exception of sending out submarines for observation. 
It will be noted that the dispatch is addressed to both the Commander in Chief 
Pacific Fleet and Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet. I wish to state here in 
connection with this dispatch and others which followed that they were released 
by me. In all cases such dispatches were drafted in the War Plans Division 
and were presented to Admiral Stark for consideration before being sent. In 
many cases I am quite certain that he may have notified both the State Depart- 
ment and the President of his intention to send dispatches of this character. 
The fact that it bears my release simply means that after the original draft 
was presented ai.d corrected by Admiral Stark, in order to save time and not 
to bother him further [8536] I released these dispatches in the form which 
he had approved. 

Now,on page 426, questions Nos. 49 and 50. Let me read both of 
them. 

Question : In drafting the dispatch of the 27th of November was consideration 
given to the thought that mention of western Pacific objectives only might tend 
to reduce the vigilance of the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area? 

Answer: I am sure that the drafting of the dispatch was not meant to give 
such an Impression. The impression it was intended to give was that the events 
were moving in such a fashion in the Far East that the United States would be- 
come involved in war in a few days and consequently that the United States 
forces elsewhere in the Pacific and also in the Atlantic would find themselves at 
war with the Axis when the clash actually took place in the Asiatic waters. 

Question No. 50 : What action on the part of the Commander in Chief, Pacific 
Fleet was expected incident to the directive concerning a deployment as given 
in the dispatch of the 27th of November? 

Again — 

This is his answer — 

Again this dispatch is dispatched both to the Commander in Chief of 
[8537] the Asiatic Fleet and the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. The 
deployment referred more to the movements which were contemplated in the 
Asiatic Fleet regarding withdrawal of forces from the Manila Bay area for 
operations contemplated elsewhere and the movements in the Hawaiian area 
were those regarding observations, the establishment of a patrol and the re- 
inforcement of outlying positions in our own islands. It will be remembered 
that an early dispatch in October had warned both Commanders in Chief 
against taking action which would provoke war. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3167 

Now, did you ever hear of that testimony or that interpretation of 
this word "deployment" in these messages ? 

General Short. I know at the time that it did not strike me that it 
was intended to be only the Asiatic Fleet. I do not believe I have had 
access to the Hart report ; at least I do not remember those particular 
passages. I would like to ask my counsel if we have ever had a copy of 
the Hart report ? 

Captain Ford. No ; we have not. 

General Short. We have never had a copy of the Hart report. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, you have never seen the Hart 
report? 

General Short. That is correct. 

185SS] Senator Ferguson. Even to the time you are testifying 
here? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, is this the kind of difficulty we find in mes- 
sages that are given to two or more outposts where certain words are 
intended for one outpost and not for another ? 

General Short. Unquestionably in this case it was of great difficulty 
because it never occurred to me when I read those two messages that 
they applied just to the Asiatic Fleet. I think they directly applied 
to Admiral Kimmel. 

Senator Ferguson. But the man who drafted the messages or sent 
them out gives this interpretation, that they were intended more for 
the Asiatic Fleet because they had certain missions which were out- 
lined in the war plans. Now, were you familiar with the War Plan 
No. WPL46? 

General Short. I knew in general terms what it provided for. It 
was an offensive into the mandated islands. 

[85391 Senator Ferguson. Well, now. General, in this message 
it said that you were not to commit an overt act against Japan. 

General Short. What is that ? 

Senator Ferguson. You were not to commit the first overt act 
against Japan. 

I want to ask you how, as the head of the Army in Hawaii, it was 
possible for you to commit an overt act of war against Japan? 

General Short. Only by sending out my long-range bombers, which 
would have been acting under the orders of the Navy, not under my 
own orders. 

Senator Ferguson. Then do I understand there was only one way in 
which you could have committed an overt act against Japan, and that 
would have been to send out the long-range bomber and that bomber 
had done something in relation to a ship or submarine, or something 
of Japan ? 

General Short. I might add, something that I might have done to a 
Japanese national that the Japanese might have construed it that way.. 
They were apparently looking for excuses. For instance, if I had 
arrested one of the consular agents that we knew the names of, they 
might have considered that an overt act. It would have been possible 
for me to do that. 

[8S4O] Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, the Navy did not. 
get this message and they were in a position to commit many overt 
acts? 



3168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for that ? 

General Short. I cannot account for it. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think that the arrest by the military 
police of one of the consular agents would have been an overt act in 
war? 

General Short. I do not, but I do not know what the Japs might 
have tried to make it appear, or how they might have tried to make it 
appear. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, how did you read the overt act part of your 
message ? What did it mean to you ? 

General Short. It meant to me simply that the War Department was 
extremely anxious to avoid war, and they did not want any interna- 
tional incident to happen in Hawaii that might provoke war or might 
give the Japanese an opportunity to claim that we had started the war. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, let us look at it this way. We had put the 
fleet in Hawaii in order that we might show Japan our strength, and 
we were backing up our diplomacy by the fleet being out there. 

Now, why would the exhibition of a strong army in [86.^.1] 
Hawaii have a greater tendency to prevent war than by showing we 
were weak and afraid and we were not doing anything? 

General Short. It would look like it would be a similar action that 
they were using to impress Japan. 

Senator Ferguson. With the Navy ? 

General Short. A strong army would have been the same means of 
impressing the Japanese. 

Senator Ferguson. But in one case, we put the Navy in there as a 
symbol of strength, and in the other case, in your case, we tried to 
conceal the fact that you had a strong army and you were ready for 
anything that might happen. 

General Short. That would be true. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, would it have been possible, in your opin- 
ion as an expert — laying aside this question of the firet overt act as far 
as the Army was concerned, that if we had a full mobilization of the 
Army — some 40,000 was it in Hawaii ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. If we had shown a full mobilization of that 
army, if we had shown that we were on the alert for everything that 
might come that we would have never had an attack at Pearl Harbor? 

[864^] General Short. I think it quite probable that if that had 
been reported to the Japanese, they would have turned back the attack- 
ing force. 

Senator Ferguson. That would have meant that we would have had 
no attack at Pearl Harbor? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. These two phrases, one, don't commit the first 
overt act, and the other one, don't do anything — what is the language 
in the message of the 27th ? 

General Short. Alarm the public or disclose intent. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, if you had not had those, and you were 
fully alerted, where the soldiers were wearing regalia, full arms, your 
machine guns were manned, your radar was working 24 hours a day, 
then you would come to the conclusion, would you not that in your 
opinion as an Army General, they would have turned back ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3169 

General Short. There would have been a very excellent chance that 
they would have turned back. That would have been the tendency, 
because they would have felt, or they would be sure that they would 
take heavy losses. Surprise was the only opportunity that they had 
to succeed. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, in your prepared statement, you use this 
language, on page 60, paragraph 98 : 

I do not feel that I have been treated fairly, or [8543] with justice by 
the War Department. I was singled out as an example, as the scapegoat for 
the disaster. 

Now, you are covering very broad ground when you use the word 
"War Department." I wish you would be specific and tell me whom 
you had in mind was the War Department ? 

General Short. I had in mind the General Staff in particular, be- 
cause they were primarily responsible for the policies pursued by the 
War Department. 

Senator Ferguson. And the General Staff was headed by whom? 

General Short. General Marshall. 

Senator Ferguson. And who else would be in there? I would like 
for you to be specific instead of covering the whole ground. 

General Short. General Gerow as head of the War Plans Division 
had the direct responsibility for keeping me informed. General Miles, 
the head of G-2, had a very direct responsibility. 

[8544-] Senator Ferguson, What about the Secretary of War? 
Is he included in the words there "War Department"? 

General Short. As far as technical things went, I would not have 
expected him to be as fully aware of the significance of technical 
things. I would expect him to be fully aware of any policy. 

Senator Ferguson. So as far as the policy was concerned, he 
would be included in that? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now when you use the word "scapegoat", will 
you give us the meaning that you want to convey to us in that 
word ? 

General Short. It seems to me that may be a slang expression, 
but it is a word in very common usage, and I meant just exactly 
what the common usage meant, that it was someone that they saddled 
the blame on to get it off of themselves. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, they were in this position, 
in your opinion, and that is what you wanted to convey, that someone 
had to take some blame for what happened at Pearl Harbor, that 
certain people in AVashington that you had named in your opinion 
were to blame, that they shifted that blame over to you as the 
commanding general at Hawaii and therefore made you, in the 
common language, a [854S'\ scapegoat? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that what you want to convey to this 
committee ? 

General Short. That is exactly what I want to convey. 

Senator Ferguson. Now yesterday you read to us some letters 
about your retirement, and you read part of General Marshall's 
testimony where I had examined him. Wliat is it that you wanted 
to convey by the reading of General Marshall's testimony? Were 



3170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

j'ou of the opinion that it was in conflict with what you were about 
to read from the messages? 

General Short. I thought liis testimony conveyed the idea that 
the matter of my retirement had been handled entirely by the Secre- 
titry of AVar and that he had had notliing to do with it, in fact he 
was not cognizant of what was being done, and the correspondence 
I had did not agree with that. 

Senator Ferguson. Therefore you were of the opinion that his 
testimony was not in line with what the letters showed that you 
vrere about to put in? Is that what you wanted to convey to the 
■connnittee ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you consider, in a way, that your retire- 
ment request was a conditional one, that is that [8^46] you 
would be consulted later by General Marshall before it would be 
turned in? 

General Short. When I sent that to General Marshall I had very 
great confidence in both his judgment and his loyalty to me. I felt 
that he would use it only if his best judgment indicated that he 
should use it, but I did expect — not necessarily before he used it if 
there was not time, but he would communicate with me before he used 
it, or he would communicate with me immediately afterward and 
explain why it was necessary to use it. I had given him full authority 
to use it. 

Senator Ferguson. It would indicate, from the fact that you had 
talked to him at 1 o'clock on the 25th, that is Sunday, when the 
Roberts report came out, and it was used on the 26th, that he would 
not have had time to read all of the testimony in the Roberts report 
to find out the facts, would he? 

General Short. He would have had time, of course, to read all of 
the findings published in the newspaper, but he would not have had 
time to read all of the testimony. 

Senator Ferguson. When you use a report, as a rule, you want to 
know on what facts it is based, do you not? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Wlien those facts are in existence? 

[854'/] General Short. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted b}'^ Justice Roberts as to 
whether or not you had magic? You know what I mean by "magic," 
the intercepted codes, either the codes themselves or the means of 
getting the codes? 

General Short. You mean the intercepts ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Short. I do not think that at any place any inquiry was 
made of me as to whether I had received them. I am rather sure no 
inquiry was made. I think they understood that I had not. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, at least you were not asked the specific 
questions as to whether or not you had or did not have magic? 

General Short. I am sure that is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the Roberts report is 
TDased upon the fact that you and Admiral Kimmel did have magic 
:and had the means of getting the magic? 

General Short. I have seen no testimony from the War Depart- 
anent that indicated that they were told that I did have magic. I 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3171 

believe that there has been testimony here that the Roberts Board 
was informed by someone in the Navy Department 

Senator Fekguson. By Turner and Stark? 

[8S48] General Short. Yes, sir ; that Admiral Kimmel did have 
magic. 

Senator Ferguson. And that would have meant if Kimmel had it 
you would have it? 

General Short. If he had been told to give it to me. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. General, do have a clipping as to what 
appeared in the press about your retirement? 

General Short. I do. I have one here that I do not know whether 
it actually appeared, but I have a statement by the Secretary of War 
that was mimeographed, and it is presumed that it appeared in the 
press. My memory is not definite now to say whether it actually 
appeared. 

Senator Ferguson. By the way, where did you get the copy? 

General Short. Colonel Dumcombe gave it to me this morning. 

Senator Ferguson. At least it was in the War Department? 

General Short. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. You received it when? 

General Short. This morning. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read it? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It was in the War Department file ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. [Reading:] 

18549] Was Depaktment 

bukeau of pubuc relations 

Press Branch 

Tel.— Re 6700 Brs. 3425 and 3438 

February 28, 1942. 

Imediate release 

Retirement of Generai, Short Appro\^d 

The Secretary of War announced today the acceptance, effective February 28, 
1942, of the application for retirement of Major General Walter C. Short "with- 
out condonation of any offense or prejudice to any future disciplinary action." 

The Secretary of War announced at the same time that, based upon the find- 
ings of the report of the Roberts Commission, he had directed the preparation 
of charges for the trial by court-martial of General Short, alleging dei-ellction 
of duty. The Secretary of War made it clear, however, that the trial upon 
these charges would not be held until such time as the public interest and safety 
would permit. 

[End] 
Distribution : A, D, M, N. 
1 ; 00 P. M. 

Senator Ferguson. I understand then from that that [8550] 
the Secretary of War indicated that upon the basis of the Roberts 
report you would be court-martialed at some time ? 

General Short. He at least stated that he had directed this to be 
drawn. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. That would be the same as if you 
would be court-martialed ? 



3172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now did you ever do anything in any way to 
prevent that court-martial, the cliarges being filed? 

General Short. I did not. In fact, I signed a waiver that I would 
agree to a court-martial within 6 months after the termination of 
hostilities. 

[85S1] Senator Ferguson. Now, who came to you about that 
waiver ? 

General Short. General Woodruff, retired, was sent from the War 
Department to Dallas, to see me. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the conversation about the waiver? 
About when was it ? 

General Short. I have forgotten the date. I believe it was some- 
time before December 7, 1943, because they wanted the waiver before 
the time was up. Perhaps along in September or October of 1943. 

He explained to me that Admiral Kimmel had signed such a waiver 
and gave me the letter of the Secretary of War requesting me to sign 
the waiver, and also a copy of the correspondence that Admiral Kim- 
mel had had with the Secretary of the Navy. 

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, they had used your request 
for retirement in getting Admiral KimmeTs request for retirement. 

Now, do I understand that they used what Admiral Kimmel had 
done to waive the statute of limitations when they came to you? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they explain that Admiral Kimmel had 
waived the statute of limitations? 

[8552] General Short. They furnished me with a copy of his 
letter and a copy of the waiver signed by him. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they ask you to sign such a waiver? 

General Shokt. Yes, sir : by the Secretary of War in a written letter 
delivered by General Woodruff. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you happen to have that written letter? 

General Short. I have it. I think we have it here probably. The 
■waiver and letter were both read into the record yesterday, on page 
8495. Do you wish to have it? 

Senator Ferguson. No, no; just let it go. 

General Short. The date of that letter was the 18th of September 
1943. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know whether or not any depart- 
ment of the Government ever made any request of Congress to pass a 
statute extending the statute of limitations? 

General Short. I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. But you were requested by the Secretary of 
War to sign a waiver of the statute of limitations, and you did so ? 

General Short. Yes. sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Nov;, have you ever made any direct [8553'] 
request for a courts martial trial? 

General Short. I have not. 

Senator Ferguson. And you have done nothing, as I understand it, 
to prevent such a trial ? 

General Short. I have not. 

Senator Ferguson. You are prepared, then, to defend any trial that 
the Government may start? Is that the way it stands? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3173 

General Short. That is the way it stands. 

Senator Ferguson. A trial that the Government may start? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you consider that this is a fair hearing for 
you? 

General Short. I consider that this hearing has been extremely fair, 
very thorough, and that I have been accorded very great courtesy 
by the chairman and by every member of the committee. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, 1 want to go to another subject. 

On October IT, 1941, George W. Bicknell, lieutenant colonel, G. S. C, 
assistant A. C. of S.. G-2, contact officer — he was in your department? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

[8664] Senator Ferguson. He was what? 

General Short. He was one of my intelligence officers. He was the 
assistant to the G-2, Colonel Fielder. 

Senator Ferguson. Now were you familiar with what he drew 
up? It is here in evidence as exhibit 139, dated the 17th of October 
1941. Will you look at that and tell us when you first saw that? 

General Short. I probably saw that the day it was prepared, or 
maybe the day after it was prepared. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I will take you to paragraph 3, on page 
3, and ask you to read that. It is headed "Attack on British Pos- 
session in the Far East." 

General Short. You want me to read from there on ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I want you to read from there on to the 
bottom of the page. 

General Short (reading) : 

3. Attack British Possessions in the Far Eiist. 

4. Defend against an American attack in support of the British. 

5. Attack simultaneously — 

Senator Ferguson. No, no, I guess you did not understand my 
question. I mean on page 3, the paragraph numbered 3, "Attack 
on British Possessions in the Far East." Then I would like to have 
you read from there down to the bottom [8o5o} of the page. 

General Short. I was on page 2. lameorry. 

Following the principle of defeating one opponent at a time — famous with 
her Axis partner, Hitler — it is believed that Japan, if faced with certain 
British military resistance to her plans, will unhesitatingly attack the British ; 
and do so without a simultaneous attack on American possessions, because of 
mo known binding agreement between the British and Americans for joint 
military action against Japan, and that the American public is not yet fully 
prepared to support such action. However, it must be evident to the Japanese 
that in case of such an attack on the British, they would most certainly have 
to fight the United States within a relatively short time. 

You vrant me to read on from there? 
Senator Ferguson. Yes. 
General Short (reading) : 

While a simulaneous attack on the ABCD powers would violate the principle 
mentioned above, it cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if 
Japan considers war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of 
her actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to 
strike before our Naval [8556] program is completed. 

An attack on the United States could nut be undertaken without almost 
certain involvement of the entire ABCD block. Hence there remains the pos- 
sibility that Japan may strike at the most opportune time, and at whatever 



3174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

point might gain for her the most strategic, tactical, or economical advantages 
over her opponents. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Now, General, prior to that, what was your information in relation 
to any agreement we may have had, whether legally binding or not, 
with the Brit'sh and Dutch? 

General Suck r. I had no information whatever about an agreement 
between the British and Dutch. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any information about any under- 
standing that we had with them? 

General Short. I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. You notice that your G-2 officer uses this lan- 
guage : 

it is believed that Japan, if faced with certain British military resistance to 
her plans, will unhesitatingly attack the British, and do so without a simul- 
taneous attack on American possessions, because of no known binding agreement 
between the British and Americans for joint military action against Japan, 
and that tlie American public is not [8557] yet fully prepared to support 
such action. 

Now, he uses the language "no known binding agreement." What 
do you understand by "binding agreement" ? Do you mean by treaty ? 

General Short. To be binding, it should be approved by the Con- 
gress, as I understand it. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that what he was talking about there? He 
was telling you that we had no treaty, we had no agreement that was 
approved by Congress? 

General Short. It is difficult to say. He might have meant simply 
any agreement that had been made and approved by the President, 
and not made public, something that the President expected to set 
forth in the Senate. I do not know. 

Senator Ferguson. What was your understanding about that part 
of it that "the American public is not yet fully prepared to support 
such action"? 

General Short. I felt at that time that the American public would 
not have been willing to have an agreement ratified that we would 
go to war to defend the Netlierlands East Indies or Singapore. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, were you familiar at that time with the 
message from Tokyo to Berlin, where we openly intercepted — I will 
not put it that way. We can [8558] only locate, in the War 
Department, two parts of three parts of a message sent from Tokyo 
to Berlin on this question. 

General Short. I was not familiar with it. 

Senator Ferguson. You had no knowledge as to that? 

General Short. None whatever. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that we had met with the British 
and Dutch and had talked over this question? 

General Short. I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. You had no knowlede at all on that? 

General Short. No knowledge whatever. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that this plan, which we now 
have in evidence, this WPL-46, talked about certain agreements? 
Whether or not they were binding agreements is another question; 
but at least talked about it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3175 

General Short, I knew when we received Kainbow 5 at the 
same time that it was drawn up with the idea apparently that when 
it went into effect we would be allied with Britain and the Dutch, but 
I had had no basis for the writing^ of that plan. 

[8S59] Senator Ferguson. Did you know that we had received 
word from the British on the morning of the Cth, sent to the State 
Department, that the Japanese ships were going into the Kra Penin- 
sula ? 

General Short. I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Would that have meant anything to you, what 
you knew about our understanding? 

General Short. It meant certainly war against the British. 

Senator P'^erguson. Have you ever tried to find out personally what 
it would mean if Japa.n and Britain would go to war with no attack 
on America ? 

General Short. No, sir ; I have not asked the War Department. 

Senator Ferguson. You heard Admiral Kimmel testify here, did 
you? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you have read his testimony ? 

General Short. I did not hear him ; I read his testimony. 

Senator Ferguson. You read his testimony ? 

General Short. I read his testimony. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know, prior to the time that you read 
his testimony, that there was certain correspondence by Admiral Kim- 
mel on this question of attack on the British [8560] and Dutch 
alone ? 

General Short. I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. The exhibit that I have just referred to, the 
WPL-46, is exhibit No. 12'9, so that the record will show it. 

Now have you gone over this war plar) ? 

General Short. I think I had gone over it some time ago. Not the 
WPD-46, but the Rainbow 5, which would have the same provisions, 
probably, in regard to fighting with the Allies. 

Senator Ferguson. That is true. This is the "Navy Basic War 
Plan — Rainbow No. 5." 

INTEODUCTION 
CHAPTKB I. ORIGIN, BASIS, AND SCOPE OF THIS PLAN 

This Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5, was prepared under the direction 
of the Chief of Naval Operations. 

It is based upon the report of the United States-British Staff Conversations 
(Short Title ABC-1), the Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan (Short Title 
ABC-22), and the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5. 

The United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC-1) and the Joint Canada- 
United States Defense Plan (ABC-22) will be given only a limited distribution to 
holders of this plan. 

Now, you did not know anything about these negotiations? 

[8561'] ' General Short. I, knew nothing about the negotiations, 
but I think I had a copy of the plan, about what you have read there, 
a short time before the attack. That was a modification of our exist- 
ing war plans, and I think we received that. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know when Singapore was alerted? 



3176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. I do not exactly. I think probably a short time 
before December 7, maybe a week or 10 days before, but it would be 
just guess work. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the Dutch, on December 1, 
sent this dispatch by the Netherlands Minister, Dr. A. Loudon, to 
Mr. Horn beck — 

The Netherlands Minister informed me by telephone this morning that the 
Governor of the Netherlands East Indies had ordered a comprehensive mobiliza- 
tion of his armed forces? 

General Short. I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not know that ? 

General Short. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now under the knowledge that you had would 
that have meant anything to you ? 

General Short. With the information that I had had from the War 
Department always pointing to an attack to the Southwest Pacific, 
and including the Netherlands East Indies, I would have thought that 
was what was going to take place. 

[8S6'2] Senator Ferguson. Would that have meant anything to 
you ? 

General Short. It would have meant that they considered war very 
inmiinent out there naturally. 

Senator Ferguson. Would it have meant that war was imminent on 
the Hawaiian Islands ? 

General SnoitT. Not necessarily, because there had never been an 
estimate since June 17, 1940, of an attack on Hawaii. It would have 
meant possible hostilities on Hawaii, but not necessarily an attack. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the President had delivered 
to Japan, on August 17, a message in relation to the entire Pacific? 

General Short. I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have the copy or copies of information 
from any diplomatic notes between Japan and the United States? 

General Short. I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, if they had brought to your atten- 
tion the alerting of Singapore, the fact that the Singapore troops were 
alerted, what would that have meant to you? 

General Short. With the information I had from the War De- 
partment it was just a confirmation that the Japanese action was going 
to come in that part of the world and not [85631 ii^ Hawaii. 

Senator Ferguson. So it meant just the opposite to you than an 
alert in Hawaii? It indicated to you that there was going to be war 
many thousands of miles way from you with another countr}^? 

General Short, That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that what the information meant to you? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Now I am not clear on the radar. I would like 
to get some information about it. 

There isn't any doubt that the radar machine will catch a plane 
going out as well as coming in ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. And there isn't any doubt that early on that 
morning, about 7 o'clock, our radar machine saw planes 182 miles, I 
believe it was, 130 or 132 miles, coming in from the north, and that 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3177 

those very planes bombed American fortifications and smik our ships? 
Is there any doubt about that ? 

General Short. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And as shown by the map, that same radar ma- 
chine, or other radar machines saw the planes going out in the same 
direction, is there any doubt about that? This [Sod^-] map 
shows them coming in from the north one hundred and thirty-some 
miles, and we had contact with them going out, one hundred and 
thirty-some miles out even further north. At 7 : 02 we catch them first 
going out. 

General Short. Major Berquist, who was the chief control officer, 
stated that there was so much confusion — I suppose he meant because 
they were going in ever}^ direction — that he was not able to draw any 
logical conclusion from what he had. 

Senator Ferguson. There wasn't any confusion about the fact that 
they were coming in at that distance ? 

General Short, Absolutely, because that is a definite direction. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for the fact that the ships 
in these task forces were notified to go south and look for them, when 
our only information was that they came from the north, and they 
even had the degree, or the line on ayIucIi they had come, and we saw 
them coming in at 132 miles and we saw some of them, at least, going 
out the same way, so why did we go to the south to look for them? 

General Short. Lieutenant Tyler states he did not make a report on 
that until some days later, when he reported to General Davidson the 
coming in. I personally did not hear that day that the Opana Station 
had picked them up. [SS6S] It seems when Major Tindall came 
back, when they re-manned the station about 8 : 30, that they took off 
all of the old information on the board in the information center. So 
apparently Lieutenant Tyler was not experienced enough to have this 
mean anything, and it not having been reported to Major Tindall when 
the station opened he did not know it, and the result was that it was 
not reported. 

Senator Ferguson. But, as I understand it, it was brought out defi- 
nitely yesterday that Lieutenant Tyler has been promoted at least 
twice. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

[SS66] Senator Ferguson. There was no disciplinary action 
against him for not reporting this matter? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. And that may have meant the difference be- 
tween bombing and not bombing this Jap Fleet ? 

General Short. I think unquestionably if the Navy had had that 
information, they would have tried to locate the carriers. 

Now, there is one other thing I did not mention. I believe that they 
picked up radio information, an intercept that indicated a Japanese 
ship sending radio messages from the southwest. Now, that may 
have been a small ship that was sent out there purposely by the Jap- 
anese, and I think that that influenced the Navy to send to the south- 
west first. 

Senator Ferguson. That was not as definite information, was it? 

General Short. No, sir. 

Sanator Ferguson. As that the ships had come in from the north 
and had gone out to the north? 

79716—46 — pt. 7 18 



3178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. No, sir; but they did not have that and I did not 
have it. 

Senator Ferguson. I take it from your testimony, you knew noth- 
ing about them coming in from the north on the day [8567] of 
the 7th? 

General Short. Beg pardon? 

Senator Ferguson. On the day of the 7th you had no knowledge of 
these planes coming in from the north ? 

General Short. That is correct. I did know that our flying fort- 
resses from California came in from the north. I knew that definitely. 

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand now that you had no informa- 
tion on the 7th about the radar chart showing planes coming in from 
the north ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson, Anyone could see these planes coming in at 
various times from the north, could they not? 

General Short. They came in from every direction, Senator. They 
had different tasks assigned them. Some came in from the east of the 
island to actually make the attack, and others came in from the west, 
so apparently they had diverted from their original direction so as to 
approach certain targets in certain ways. 

Senator Ferguson. I would assume that after they got near the 
island they would take a position so they could approach a target from 
ascertain direction. 

General Short. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. But prior to that did not everything [8568] 
indicate that they were coming from the north? 

General Short. All we had was what Lif utenant Tyler knew. If 
he had reported, it would have been a definite indication, but we did 
not have it at that time. 

[8569] Senator Ferguson. General, how can you account for tlie 
fact that there was no disciplinary action against an Army officer for 
not reporting a thing like that that was so vital to America's defense? 

General Short. There was no device at that time b}^ which he could 
differentiate between friend and foe. 

Senator Ferguson. But it turned out in a few minutes that everyone 
on tlie island knew that these ships were foe. 

General Short. But coming in about 3° difference in direction, 
and 5 minutes difference in time. He just made a false assumption 
that the ships picked up were the American planes. 

Senator Ferguson. There isn't any evidence in the record that Tyler 
knew that the B-l7's were coming in, other than that the music played 
all night on the Hawaiian radio, and therefore he assumed that our 
planes must be coming in on that beam. 

General Short. You see, they had no beam at that time, and I think 
it was common knowledge with the air people that that music was 
used as a beam to guide our planes in. 

Senator Fergt^son. Were our planes all equipped with radio? 

[8570] General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then why couldn't our radio stations contact 
the planes and ask them whether they were enemy or friend? 

General Short. If the report had been made by Lieutenant Tyler, 
it could have been done. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3179 



Senator Ferguson. I come back- 



General Short. Even if they had gotten the report, they might have 
been misled because they were so close to the same position at the same 
time. 

Senator Ferguson. Couldn't we have asked the B-l7's "Are you 
friend or foe?" Didn't we have any codes at that time? 

General Short. We could have asked them ; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Did we ask them ? 

General Short. We did not. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for that? I realize you 
personally were not in charge of it, but I am trying to find out why 
there wasn't some discipline as far as men down in the ranks were 
concerned in relation to these fatal errors. I consider that you con- 
sidered them fatal. 

General Short. Apparently Lieutenant Tyler felt so sure they were 
friendly planes, that he made no inquiry. 

[857 1] Senator Ferguson. But within a few minutes after he 
gets this message, raining down on the American possessions and our 
men were bombs from an enemy. How could this same man then keep 
the conclusion in his mind that they were friends? 

General Short. I don't think he did. 

Senator Ferguson. Then why couldn't he at that moment, at the 
dropping of the first bomb, even, if nebessary, by foot, give the alarm 
and tell where these planes were coming from so that we could go out 
and get the carriers, so at least they would never do it again ? 

General Short. He did alert the command, but he ^ave nobody the 
information he had as to what direction they were coming. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, he alerted the command, enemy 
planes came in, and he never even told them what direction the planes 
were coming from ? 

General Short. Apparently not. 

Senator Ferguson. And that man was promoted ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did anybody ask him from what direction they 
were coming ? Didn't somebody think to ask him ? I realize you were 
taken away from there about the 16th. 

[8572'] General Short. What I did as soon as I heard it was 
this — it was too late to accomplish anything, but as soon as I heard of 
the incident, I sent an officer to take affidavits of Lieutenant Tyler and 
Lieutenant White, and I believe they got one from the operator. Private 
McDonald. 

Senator Ferguson. General, did you laiow that we even went out 
and bombed one of Admiral Newton's ships, one of the ships of his 
fleet? 

General Short. I didn't know that we ever actually bombed one. I 
knew at one time that we had mistaken information, but fortunately 
our pilots recognized the ship as an American ship and did not bomb it. 
1 never heard that we actually bombed a ship. 

Senator Ferguson. If you will bear with me a moment 

Mr. Murphy. You will find something on it. Senator, in the naval 
narrative. I don't have the page, but it is in the naval narrative. 

Mr. Masten, do you have volume 2 of the navy narrative here? 

Mr. Masi-en. Yes. 



3180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Here it is. It was the Portland. 

None, except we carried on air patrol looking for any enemy forces in our 
area. We fueled cruisers and [S57S] destroyers from a tanker, and we 
had several scares due to erroneous reports of enemy forces which turned out to 
be false. 

The Portland was bombed by one of our own planes from Pearl Harbor, but, 
fortunately, the bombs hit well astern. This plane reported the Portland as an 
enemy carrier and the Porter, who was guarding her while she recovered one of 
her planes was reported as an accompanying cruiser. 

Did you ever hear about that? 

General Short. I don't remember. If I did, I have forgotten 
about it. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, this fleet of ours went south to 
look for this task force instead of north, with a good prospect of find- 
ing it to the north, as I understand the testimony, and that we bombed 
our own ship, the Portland. 

General Short. The search was in control of the Navy. They gave 
our people the information on which they wanted the search. I 
think we made one search that was not directed by the Navy. There 
were persistent reports that there were Japanese planes off Pearl 
Harbor, 25 or 50 miles to the southwest off Barber's Point, and I be- 
lieve that General Martin went out on his own and investigated that 
when he [557^] had no mission from the Navy, and found it 
was false. 

Senator Ferguson. General, I realize that we were at peace for 
something like 25 years, and that we had put our heads in the corner 
and didn't look for any war. That is, some people did, but I won- 
der whether the Army and the Navy were doing the same thing. Here 
it was said that our people weren't ready to enter into an understand- 
ing that in case there was an attack down there we would go to bat. 
But we weren't consulted on the question of the shooting orders in 
the Atlantic, as I recall. Congress didn't say anything about that. 

Now, were the Army and the Navy, and I use this expression be- 
cause it is one that is well-known, were they asleep at the switch up 
to December 7 ? 

General Short. I think we had worked very seriously in Hawaii 
to make preparations against any type of attack, but all of the inf orm- 
tion that we had from Washington indicated to us not an attack on 
Hawaii, but toward the Philippines and South Pacific, and definitely 
gave us the opinion that hostile action in Hawaii would be in the 
nature of sabotage and internal disorder, and that was what we were 
immediately alerted for, that is what Ave immediately expected. 

Senator Ferguson. Did the Army and the Navy ever come 
\8575^ to use "possible" and "probable" as they are commonly un- 
derstood? This word "possible" is so weak that if you tell a man a 
thing is possible you can hardly blame him for not paying attention 
to it. 

General Short. I think the message of July 8, when they were 
pointing out action of the Japanese against Russia, was a rather 
definite prediction, and was the only prediction that the War Depart- 
ment ever made direct to me. 

Some of the naval messages pointed directly toward the Philippines 
and toward the Kra Peninsula. No message of the Army after July 
8 ever pointed anywhere. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3181 

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, I know that you had your own 
forces and your own job out there, but did you know about where 
Newton's course was ? Newton's force was about 300-odd miles from 
Midway when he learned of the attack. You know where Midway is 
as 3^ou see it on that map [indicating] ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. About 300 miles. He said that he thought he 
would receive orders to intercept the enemy, who, he felt must be to 
the northwest, northward of Oahu. Therefore he signaled the Lex- 
ington that the flight to Midway was canceled, because presumably 
Midway had also [^857 6'\ been attacked. 

Now, if he had received the message to go north, wouldn't there 
be good prospects, where you see this reel line, this lower red line 
on tliat chart, to have intercepted that force? 

General Short. He might have intercepted it after they had lost 
their planes and were withdrawing. He would have had to go east, 
I think, to intercept it beforehand. 

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, the Lexington had a full 
deployment of airplanes on her. Notwithstanding those that they 
had taken to Midway or were taking to Midway. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So they would have had the capacity with 
planes at least to attempt to do something to the Jap fleet, which 
it turned out nothing was ever done to, it was never intercepted, 
never seen, and it gave the Japs a great stimulant, I would assume, 
to know that they had made an attack and were not intercepted by 
the American forces. Wouldn't that indicate to the Japanese that we 
were asleep at the switch ? 

General Short. It would indicate that they had succeeded in put- 
ting over a complete surprise on us. 

[5577'] Senator Ferguson. Now, coming back to this "asleep 
at the switch," do you think that we were, as a War Department 
and a Navy Department, our Intelligence, and the whole thing, really 
asleep at the switch as to war coming to America on the 7th? 

General Short. I think that our Intelligence definitely failed to 
draw the conclusions that should have been drawn from the intercepts 
and that they failed to transmit anything to us that would be help- 
ful. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it true in the Army that we treated Intel- 
ligence somewhat, to use the old saying, as a stepchild, that that is 
about the way we treated Intelligence ? 

General Short. I had not been in Washington on duty with the 
General Staff since 1924. It would be hard for me to say what the 
attitude toward Intelligence was in 1941. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the reputation of the Intelligence 
Branch in the Army ? Did good officers try to avoid it ? 

General Short. I don't believe they did. AVhen I was in the War 
Department General Staff from 1921 to 1924, that was soon after the 
First World War, Gen. Stuart Heintzleman, whom the Army con- 
sidered one of the really top-notch men in the Army, was placed 
in charge of the Military Intelligence Division. 

\_8578'\ Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you said yesterday that 
it took almost a year to get permission from the Interior Department 



3182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to put up radar equipment, permanent radar equipment in the Hawai- 
ian Islands. 

General Short. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say that we really had an alert Army 
when it took a year to place radar in position, which was one of the 
new things to protect Hawaii, would you say that if it took a year that 
we were really alert and going as an army ? 

General Short. I don't believe you could place that on G-2 because 
I wrote to the Chief of Staff personally about that and had a reply 
signed by the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Bryden, as to the reasons 
whv they did not feel they could do it. I don't believe it stopped at 
G-2. 

Senator Ferguson. But the Commander in Chief of the United 
States Army, the President of the United States, was at least over both 
those branches ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for it taking almost a 
year to get the right to put up permanent equipment, and we didn't 
even have it up on the 7th of December, when we had a war message, a 
warning in June, on June 17, 1940. How do you account for the fact 
that we, having that [8S79] kind of a warning that we were 
going to have an attack on Hawaii, either ships or planes, and radar 
would catch both, that it took a year after that to get the right to build 
radar equipment on those islands? 

General Short. I would say that the Department of Interior at least 
did not have any proper appreciation of the international situation. 

Senator Ferguson. But who was over the Department of the In- 
terior ? Wasn't the President of the United States ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And he was the Commander in Chief of our 
Army ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand you said yesterday we had 
fine radar equipment in New York City ? 

General Short. That is my understanding. 

Senator Ferguson. Where else — on the west coast ? 

General Short. The west coast, Seattle and San Francisco. I sent 
these officers to attend an exercise meeting conducted at Seattle. When 
they finished there they went to New York City to look over the estab- 
lishment. They reported to me that those establishments were all set 
up 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do a'^ou know whether or not they were 
working 24 hours a day ? 

[SSSO] General Short. I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. On the 6th and the 7th ? 

General Short. I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask counsel if he will ascertain from those 
radar stations what they were doing and whether or not those radar 
station were alerted on the 6th and the 7th.^ 

General, as an Army officer, would you consider that our possessions, 
the Hawaiian Islands, were in more danger than New York City on 
the 7th? 



^ See memorandum dated February 21, 1946, and attachments, from War Department in 
Hearings, Part 11, p. 5302 et seq. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3183 

General Short. Very much so. 

Senator Ferguson. From what you know now ? 

General Short. Very much more. 

Senator Ferguson. From what you know now? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you consider also that it was in more 
danger than Seattle or San Francisco? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. From what you know now? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, coming back, and I know this is a hypo- 
thetical matter because we didn't get those radars established, but if 
those radars had been established under priority — and I understand 
the priority was solely [SSSl] in Washington — is that correct? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It wasn't in your hands? 

General Short. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you try to get high priority, the best 
priority to get the equipment in? 

General Short. On June 10 I radioed the War Department and 
asked that the priority be advanced to A-IA, which was the highest 
priority. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you a believer in radar? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you feel that it was good equipment and 
new equipment such as would help the Army of the United States ? 

General Short. I stated in the telegram that it was probably the 
most important thing that we were trying to do at that time. I think 
I can jfind that and read it if you wish. 

Mr. Murphy. I think you will also find it, once or twice, in your 
correspondence with General Marshall, that very same statement. 

General Short. I was looking for the definite wire. I know I 
covered it in the wire to General Marshall. 

I have the telegram : 

[8582] To the Adjutant General, 

Washington. D. C. 
Division engineer, San Francisco, has informed me that the priority covering 
contract W-foiir one four Engr. seven eight four with Interstate Equipment Cor- 
poration, Elizabeth, N. J., is now dash one dash G Stop This contract is the 
one for furnishing all materials for cableway to Kaala Aircraft Warning Station 
Stop Motors and all electrical equipment and subcontract to General Electric 
Stop Division engineer states that with this priority there is strong, probability 
that delivery this electrical material to contracor will be delayed about fifteen 
weeks Stop This Kaala station is the most important in airci'aft warning sys- 
tem and early completion of this cableway is essential Stop I consider this 
aircraft warning service as the most important single project in this department 
Stop Strongly recommend that the War Department give all possible assistance 
to Chief of Engineers to have priority on this contract changed to dash one 
dash B 

I thought I requested that it be A-lA. This copy states 1-B. 
[8583^ Senator Ferguson. On March 6 you wrote to General 
Marshall : 

Defense of these islands and adequate warning for the United States Fleet is 
so dependent upon the early completion of this Aircraft Warning Service that I 
believe all quibbling over details should be stopped at once. This project was 
very thoroughly studied by a Board of OflScers in this Department who made 



3184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

several personal investigations of each one of the sites. Now that basic decisions 
as to locations, types of stations and general plans have been approved by the 
War Department, I strongly recommend that this project be decentralized, and 
that I be authorized to give final approval to designs, layouts and other details 
to expedite its completion. 

Signed "Walter C. Short." 

What were you talking about there when you said "I believe all 
quibbling over details should be stopped at once." This was back in 
March. 

General Short. Because we had to get the design of the buildings 
going into the national parks approved by the Department of Interior. 

From an architectural standpoint, it had to fit in with their ideas of 
the scenery. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, we were talking [8584-'] 
about beauty rather than efficiency, as far as war was concerned ? 

General Short. It might appear that way. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, how does it appear to you ? 

General Short. It appears to me that the Department of Interior 
considered their routine requirements of more importance than 
preparations for war. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, what was more important to the 
United States w^hen we knew war was coming, to get prepared, or 
to determine upon the beauty of the structure that was to prepare us ? 

General Short. Unquestionably it was important, and I think I 
made my letter to the Chief of Staff about as strong as I could afford 
to make it. 

[8686] Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you say "afford." There 
are certain things yovi do not say 

General Short. To a superior officer. I told him I thought it was 
time to stop quibbling. 

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, there are certain things 
that in the Army you do not say to your superior ; is that it ? 

General Short. You say it in a tactful way. 

Senator Ferguson. I see. You stop just a little short, or you say 
it in a tactful way. That is what you tried to do here ? 

General Short. That is what I tried to do. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the same rule applies to 
Cabinet officers? 

General Short. I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. You haven't been a Cabinet officer ? 

General Short. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I am sure it does not apply to Members of the 
House or the Senate. 

Well, now, General Short, the Intelligence Department of the 
Army was to be used for two purposes if I am right, and if I am 
wrong you correct me : One was to determine when war might come. 
The other one was to determine where war might come. Is that 
correct ? 

[8686] General Short. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. That is really the duty of an Intelligence De- 
partment ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. I might add another thing, and also the 
strength that the prospective enemy might have to pursue this. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And do you consider them of equal im- 
portance ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3185 

General Short. I would say you might say they were of equal im- 
portance because one without the other does not give you the in- 
formation. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, in your opinion did these messages that 
reached you — and you have listed five, I think there were five — tell 
you when war was coming ? 

General Short. They indicated in that message of the 27th that war 
should be coming reasonably soon, although it left a possible chance 
of avoiding it. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did they tell you when war was coming? 

General Short. I mean when, not where. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they tell you where war was coming? 

General Short. At no time after July the 8th did a War Depart- 
ment message directed to me ever point in any [8587] direction. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say that the message of June 17, 
1940, the alert, told General Herron where war was coming? 

General Short. It told him definitely that they were afraid of a 
trans-Pacific raid on the Island of Oahu. 

Senator Ferguson. And that was definite information ? 

General Short. Absolutely. 

Senator Ferguson. Not the date but definite information as to 
where ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any such warning? 

General Short. I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you kept advised as to what we were doing 
as far as our Army was concerned in the proposed attack on the Azores, 
the sending of the Army up to Iceland and whether or not we had con- 
templated a force going into Ireland? 

General Short. General Marshall in one of his personal letters to 
me indicated confidentially that there was a possibility of attack on 
the Azores. That was some months before. 

Senator Ffjrguson. Did you put that letter in here ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

[8588] Senator Ferguson. It is in? 

. Mr. Murphy. It is in the record. 

Senator Ferguson. It is in the record? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. So that we have then before us all the so-called 
personal mail between you and General Marshall ? 

General Short. I believe that you have everything. 

"Senator Ferguson. There has been no determination that the thing 
was personal or departmental. You have put them all in. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? 

General Short. The War Department selected it. I do not have 
any other letters. 

Mr. Murphy. When I say it is in the record I mean it is in the 
exhibit which has been offered. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I understand. 

Well, now, did you know of any investigations, outside of the Rob- 
erts investigation, made by the War Department up until the Army 
board was created under the statute of Congress ? 

General Short. No, sir ; I do not. 



3186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. You did not have information on the Bundy 
investigation, where they were lost in the plane ? 

General Short. I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. And afterward you were not informed 
[8589] of any investigation. Did you know that the President 
had asked or requested that a compilation, at least, of messages, and 
so forth, be prepared and it was sent to General Marshall and that 
he made certain alterations in it? 

General Short. I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know what preparation was made by 
the Army by investigation that they might court martial you? 

General Short. I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. You were never advised of any of those' inves- 
tigations ? 

General Short. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you knew about the statute that was 
passed asking that there be an investigation ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And such action taken as was required? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you ever know about the Clausen in- 
vestigation ? 

General Short. I think there was something in the newspapers 
indicating that it was taking place but I was never advised by the 
War Department that it was being made. 

Senator Ferguson. Did Clausen ever come to you and try to get 
an affidavit? 

[8590] General Short. He did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know now why the Clausen investigation 
was undertaken ? 

General Short. I think that there is an explanation of that. You 
have to read between the lines. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, will you read between the lines for us and 
give us that explanation ? What are you looking for ? • 

General Short. It is Exhibit 63. I am looking for the recommenda- 
tion-. Here it is. 

This is a memorandum from the Judge Advocate General, General 
Cramer, dated November 25, 1944, for the Secretary of War. "Sub- 
ject : Army Pearl Harbor board." 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read what you have in mind? Read 
the lines and read between them. 

General Short. On page 48, the first paragraph. [Reading :] 

Unexplored Leads : 

In the course of my examination of the report and record certain further in- 
quiries have suggested themselves to me which, in my opinion, might advantage- 
ously be pursued. The answers to these inquries would not, in^all probability, 
in my opinion, affect the result ; at the same time in order to complete the picture 
and in fairness to certain personnel these leads should be fur- [8591] ther 
explored. I do not mean to suggest that the Board should be reconvened for this 
purpose ; the work could be done by an individual officer familiar with the matter. 

Now, I would like to state there 

Senator Ferguson. Now you are going to read between the lines? 
General Short. Yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson. All right. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3187 

General Short. General Marshall testified before this committee 
that in all his service he had never heard of a reviewing officer, if he 
were dissatisfied with the findings of a court martial or a board, taking 
such action ; that the normal action was to refer the proceedings back 
to the board and direct that additional evidence be taken if that were 
desired, or direct that a review of their findings be made by the board, 
and they would then be returned to the reviewing officer with a further 
explanation. 

In this case the Judge Advocate General goes out of his way to state 
he does not want it referred back to the board but suggests an officer 
who has been on duty with the board. 

Now, there were only three officers who could have met that qualifi- 
cation. 

Senator Ferguson. Who were they? 

[8592] General Short. They were Colonel Toulmin, who was 
the executive of the board, Colonel West, who was the recorder of the 
board and Lieutenant Colonel Clausen, who was a Major at the time, 
who was assistant recorder of the board. Unquestionably General 
Cramer had in his mind the recommending of Colonel Clausen at the 
time that he made that recommendation, which would have taken the 
further investigation out of the hands of the Army board and placed 
it in the hands of a selected individual. 

Senator Ferguson. He placed it in the hands of a Major, who was 
an assistant? 

General Short. Yes, sir, assistant recorder, who was promoted to 
Lieutenant Colonel since. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, in your experience in the Army did you 
ever know of that ? 

General Short. I have never known of it. I have seen cases repeat- 
edly where the reviewing officer might return the proceedings to the 
board and direct that additional evidence be taken and return it to 
the board, stating that he did not agree with their findings and asking 
them to review their findings, but I have never heard of a case of 
this kind. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand it, before a real review of 
these findings was made they sent Major Clausen out? 

[8593] General Short. I think the review had been made but 
it was not what they wanted. 

Senator Ferguson. Oh. Now, that is what you are reading be- 
tween the lines, that when they read this report they were not satis- 
fied and they used the words "certain personnel" in there? 

General Short. And they apparently did not believe there they 
could get what they wanted out of the Army board, so reading be- 
tween the lines 

Mr. MuEPHY. Will the gentleman yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I will yield. 

Mr. Murphy. I ask at this point in the record that the complete file 
of the Adjutant General, in view of what is now going on here, be 
placed in the record. 

Senator Ferguson. I have no objection. 

Mr. MuRphf. I understand that there is a transcript or mimeo- 
graph, a complete mimeograph of that prepared, which we have. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered. 



3188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have it? 

General Short. I will look at it. 

Mr. Murphy. I understand the file is in Senator Brewster's hands 
and it has been prepared for the committee. 

Senator Ferguson. Oh, that is the one. 

[8594-] Mr. Murphy. I mean the Judge Advocate General's, 
that is the one I am talking about. 

Lieutenant Colonel Kjerr. This is a different one. 

Mr. Murphy. It is the one in which the charges in this case are 
contained. 

Lieutenant Colonel Karr. That may be. I have looked at the file 
tliat you have reference to and this is not the complete file. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, I ask that we have the complete file then of 
everything. And in that connection, Senator, may I also request — 
I understand that the Army has made available all the papers con- 
cerning General Marshall in this transaction and I ask that they be 
made available and spread on the record and I also ask that Secretary 
Stimson's diary insofar as it pertains in any way to the retirement of 
General Short, that that also be brought in here and spread on the 
record. 

I ask that everything the Army has in regard to this question of 
General Short's retirement and the preparation of charges be brought 
in here and placed in the record. 

The Vice Chairman. Spread on the record or as an exhibit? 

Mr. Murphy. As an exhibit.^ 

Senator Ferguson. I not only approve of what the Congressman is 
saying, but I would like to say I have been endeavoring here for weeks 
to get all of the evidence. 

Mr. Murphy. I agree the Senator has and I am not trying [8595] 
to steal a march or anything like that. I want to be cooperative. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I will say this: I not only want Mr. 
Stimson's diary as it relates to this particular question, but I want it 
as it relates to the whole Far East. I think that we will find in that 
diary an explanation of many things that we have been searching for 
here days and days and weeks and that we have hundreds, if not 
thousands, of pages in this record that could have been boiled down to a 
few lines out of the Secretary of War's diary. I think that we ought 
to get it immediately. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield for just 1 minute? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. I also again call the attention of the committee to the 
exhibit which has just been offered, which should be made available 
to all of us. 

Senator Ferguson. May I look at it to see what you are putting in ? 

The Vice Chairman. Without objection Mr. Murphy's request is 
granted, but do you want it as an exhibit or spread on the transcript ? 

Mr. Murphy. I think an exhibit is enough. 

The Vice Chairman. Wliat is the next exhibit number ? 

Mr. Kaufman. 140. 

[8596] The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit 140. 
That is this document here ? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. Will you furnish the reporter a copy of it ? 

^ See Exhibit 170 in Exhibits, Part 19, and Exhibit 140 in Exhibits, Part 18. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3189 

Mr. Katjfman. Yes. 

(Tlie document above referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 140.") 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to call the attention of the conmiittee to 
the fact that yesterday there were certain letters read into the record 
and, as I recall it, it was a series of letters in connection with the 
general's retirement. 

There were present here some photostatic copies and I, at least, 
listening to them intently, thought they did not get into the record but 
I would like everybody to know that they are in the record and there is 
among them a notation in the handwriting of General Marshall, where 
he turns over to the Secretary of War the Judge Advocate General's 
recommendations in reference to — I don't know what these words are — 
"retirement of General Walter C. Short", and the initials of General 
Marshall. 

And then there is a letter dated the 27th of January 1942 from the 
Judge Advocate General to General Marshall explaining the problem 
before him and there is a letter of \S597] January the 31st 
from the Judge Advocate General to the Secretary of War, in which 
he encloses the letter which he had sent to General Marshall, and I 
suggest a reading of those letters in connection with the evidence that 
went in yesterday. 

Mr, Richardson. Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Richardson. 

Mr. Richardson. It probably would be appropriate to say that with 
reference to the Stimson diary, that diary was referred to by the Sec- 
retary of War in a hearing before the Arm}' board. 

An effort was made by Mr. Mitchell before the hearing commenced 
with reference to this diary and he ran into a situation of illness on 
the part of Mr. Stimson under which his doctor refused even to permit 
the question of the diary to be referred to him. 

Our information as to Secretary Stimson's present physical condi- 
tion is not very accurate. I will be very glad to contact him again 
and ascertain, first, whether he can present himself as a witness with 
his diary ; or, second, whether he would be willing to submit his diary 
to the committee. When I get that information I will report it to 
the chairman. 

The Vice Chaieman. Well, we will let it rest on that [8S98] 
for the present. 

Mr. Murphy. I will say, Senator, in connection with this business 
of the Judge Advocate General, in all fairness to General Short, that 
it is in effect a complaint, with General Short not, in fact, being given 
a chance to answer it. I do not want to have any one-sided partisan 
proposition, but in view of his referring to what the Judge Advocate 
General had in mind and why he did certain things I think we ought 
to have everything. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest then 
that — this volume is rather large, I haven't seen a copy of it yet ; it 
has been here among my papers and it is quite large and I assume that 
General Short will want some time to go over it. I would like to ques- 
tion him on it. I wonder whether or not after I am through with 
these other matters that I have and counsel and all the rest of the 
members ask their questions, if we can bring him back and I can quest- 



3190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tion him Monday morning, which will give him plenty of time to go 
over this and also give me plenty of time to go over it. 

General Short. Senator, I would like to make a statement right 
now. I have been over it. 

Senator Ferguson. Oh, you have been over it ? 

General Short. And I have a statement, since Mr. Murphy says I 
should be given an opportunity, that I would like to [8599] 
make. 

Senator Ferguson. I ask you now to make it if you desire to. 

General Short. This relates to Exhibit 140. 

Regarding the memorandum of specifications drawn up against me 
by Colonel Munson, I want to point out that the Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral reviewed all the evidence of the Roberts commission, of the Army 
Pearl Harbor Board, and of the Clausen affidavits, and came to the 
conclusion that he could not prove any offense. 

The Judge Advocate General's letter dated January 27, 1942, reads 
in part as follows : 

General Short's non-feasance or omissions were based on an estimate of the 
situatiyn which although proved faulty by subsequent events was insofar as I am 
able to ascertain from the report of the commission made or concurred in by 
all those officers in Hawaii best qualified to form a sound military opinion. That 
estimate was that an attack by air was in the highest degree improbable. 

In the Judge Advocate General's opinion dated 25 November 1944, 
page 50, the last paragraph. General Cramer said : 

I suggest, therefore, that a public statement be made by you giving a brief 
review of the Board's proceed- [8600] ings and pointing out that General 
Short was guilty of errors of judgment for which he was properly removed from 
command, and that this constitutes a sufficient disposition of the matter at this 
time. In the event further investigation should disclose a different situation the 
matter could later be re-examined in the light of such additional evidence. 

I have looked over the specifications that were drawn up by Colonel 
Munson and shown in this Exhibit and I will say very definitely that if 
these charges had been preferred and I had been arraigned my plea 
in every case would have been "Not guilty." 

The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your statement onn that. 
General ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. It is now 12 o'clock. We will recess until 2 
o'clock this afternoon. 

(Whereupon, at 12 noon a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same 
day.) 

[8601] AFTERNOON SESSION 2 P. M. 

The Chairman. The committee will be in order. Senator Ferguson 
will resume his examination of General Short. 

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES 
ARMY (Retired) — Resumed 

Senator Ferguson. General, there has been offered and received in 

evidence this paper 

The Vice Chairman. Senator, I think it is Exhibit 140. 
Senator Ferguson. Exhibit 140. 
The Vice Chairman. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3191 

Senator Ferguson. In that exhibit there is a memorandum for Mr. 
Bundy, November 27, 1944, subject : "Secretary's Press Release of 28 
February 1942 re General Short." 

Then it says : 

1. Attached hereto are two copies of the Secretary's press release of 28 Feb- 
ruary 1942. 

And then : 

2. Pursuant to his direction the Judge Advocate General's office on 4 March 
undertook preparation of charges against General Short, utilizing all available 
data including the Roberts Report and transcript. This work was completed 
20 April 1942 and resulted in preparation of charges alleging violation of the 
Ofith Article of War, with 11 specifications [8602] as follows : 

Before I go to those specifications, the end of that letter says : 

3. The above charges were merely tentative and possible charges and were 
never approved by The Judge Advocate General or transmitted to the Secretary 
of War. Of course, they were never made public. 

It is signed "William J. Hughes, Jr., Colonel, JAGD." 
Now, I would like to ask you about those specific charges. They 
are in the record and I would like to have your opinion on them. 

1. Failure to provide an adequate inshoi-e aerial patrol. 

You made the statement that you plead not guilty to all of tliem, 
but I think that we should have an explanation on the record of these 
charges and what your answers to them are rather than the conclusion 
of "not guilty." 

General Short. Do you wish me to indicate my answer on each 
one? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Give us what you consider is your com- 
plete answer on it. 

General Short. Not guilty. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, is there anything you want to say more 
than that on number 1? 

[8603] General Short. On the inshore aerial patrol? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Short. I did have an adequate patrol. The air people 
were satisfied and had full control. If the purpose was antisubmarine 
defense and it was not designed for air defense. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you using all the equipment that you had ? 

General Short. We had one observation squadron, six planes, in 
commission, and we were operating them several hours a day. I 
couldn't say exactly what the hours were. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you using them as much as possible? 

General Short. I would say we were using them all we should use 
them. In addition to that there was a lot of observation that accom- 
plished the same thing because our pursuit training was all over 
Oahu, pretty much around the perimeter, and they were all given to 
understand that they should learn to observe for submarines. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, is that all you want to say on number 1? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Number 2. 

Failure to provide adequate anti-aircraft defense. 

[8604^ General Short. Not guilty. We would have had an ade- 
quate antiaircraft defense if the War Department had given us the 



3192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

equipment, and had given us the information which indicated imminent 
attack. Or, if they had replied to my report and indicated any desired 
modification. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you using all the antiaircraft guns and 
facilities that were provided from Washington for you ? 

General Short. We were not alerted for an antiaircraft defense 
because we had not received any information indicating a probable 
air attack. 

Senator Ferguson. The next : 

Failure to set up ati Interceptor Command. 

General Short. Not guilty. We were training personnel as fast as 
we could to operate an effective interceptor command, and it was set 
up and operating as effectively as it could. 

Senator Ferguson. No. 4 : 

Failure to provide a proper aircraft warning service. 

General Short. Not guilty. We were training our personnel as fast 
as we could to set up an effective aircraft-warning service. It was in 
operation. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, No. 5 : 

Failure to provide for the transmission of appropriate [8605] warnings 
to interested agencies. 

General Short. Not guilty. We were restricted b}' direct order from 
Marshall, from transmitting the November 27 warning to any other 
than the minimum essential officers. 

Senator Ferguson. And that would exclude giving it to what was 
called interested agencies ; is that your opinion ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. If I had set up an aircraft-warning service 
and gotten it to everybody we would have had to give it to all the 
enlisted men. 

Senator Ferguson. No. 6 : 

Failure to establish a proper system of defense by cooperation and coordination 
with the Navy. 

General Short, Not guilty. We had full, complete plans for defense 
by cooperation with the Navy, which had been approved by General 
Marshall and Admiral Stark. 

Senator Ferguson. And in your opinion was that being carried out ; 
\vas it being carried out ? 

General Short. It would have been carried out 100 percent if they 
would have given us the information they had. 

Senator Ferguson. No. 7 : 

Failure to issue adequate orders to his subordinates as to their duties in case 
of sudden attack. 

General Short. Not guilty. I could not tell "subordinates" 
[8606] to expect a sudden attack which neither I nor the War 
Department nor anyone else expected. Our information regarding 
impending hostile action was, by direction of the chief of staff, limited 
to the minimum essential officers. Our standard operating procedure 
of 5 November 1941 prescribed fully the duties of all personnel in 
event of any sudden attack. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I understand from some evidence that 
the people in Honolulu were given no information as to what to do 
in case of an air raid. Can you explain M'hy that was true ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3193 

General Short. The civilians? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; the civilian population was not instructed. 

General Short. We had had a number of alerts and blackouts. 
We had had definite training of the surgical teams and of the first- 
aid people and of the ambulance corps. They had turned out and 
set up these several times. And I think that the civilian agencies 
that had to act not only knew but they performed their duties extremely 
well on December 7. 

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that your claim is that you 
had given intimation previously to civilian agencies what to do in 
case of raids ? 

[8607] General Short. The ones who had positive things to do. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, if you had called in the civilian authori- 
ties and explained to them that you anticipated an attack as of after 
November 27, would you have been violating the instructions given to 
you in the message of the 27th ? 

"^ General Short. I certainly would, because in all probability a 
considerable part of the population would have moved to the hills, 
notifying every Jap agent that we expected an attack practically imme- 
diately. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, from what you know now, didn't the 
Japanese agents know all about the defense and all about the various 
activities there ? 

General Short. They knew quite largely, probably most all about 
it, but they would have known definitely then that we were expecting 
an attack. I doubt if they knew that bJecause we didn't know it our- 
selves. 

Senator Ferguson. But if you had been alerted as they were in 
1940 would you then have alerted the civilian population? 

General Short. I think that we would have encouraged them, ex- 
cept the ones in the very congested areas, to remain definitely where 
they were. We had plans completely drawn for the evacuation of 
certain areas where they thought there [8608] was danger of 
bombing or sabotage of the gasoline supply and we had asked for 
money to build those evacuation camps and we had not succeeded in 
getting it. The Delegate, Sam King, and the Governor, had also 
made strenuous ejfforts to get that money. 

Senator Ferguson. Had the responsible authorities in Washington 
been notified of the M-day plan that you had under the legislature 
of Hawaii ? 

General Short. Yes, sir ; they knew that that legislation was being 
passed, I am sure, because we had made requests for these funds and 
when we didn't get it through the War Department then the Governor 
and the Delegate had tried through their channels. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, liad you any notice to put that into effect, 
to declare M-day? 

General Short, We had not. 

Senator Ferguson. Would that have helped the situation ? 

General Short. We had things worked out so that the Governor 
was able to put that in effect in a very few hours. He put it into effect 
sometime before 7 o'clock in the afternoon of December 7 so that it 
turned out the home guard. 

Senator Ferguson. How many civilians were killed in the attack? 

79716—46 — pt. 7 19 



3194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[8609] General Short. I couldn't answer that question. Not a 
great many. There were a few. 

Senator Ferguson, Our casualty lists, I understand, only include 
the Army and Navy, the military casualties. Can you give us an idea ? 

General Short. We lost in the Army 9 officers and 223 men. My 
guess would be that there were perhaps 10 civilians killed, but that 
might be off. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether that has ever been listed 
authoritatively? 

General Short. I think it has. And one rather unusual part of it is 
that I think a very considerable proportion of them were Japanese. 

Senator Ferguson. Number 8 : 

Failure to take adequate measures to protect the Fleet and Naval Base at 
Pearl Harbor. 

General Short. Not guilty. I took every measure I thought neces- 
sary to protect the fleet and naval base against sabotage. I so reported 
to the War Department. Marshall testified that I was reasonable in 
assuming that I was doing exactly what he wanted, because otherwise 
he would have notified me that he wanted more measures taken. 

Senator Ferguson. Number 9 : 

Failure to have his airplanes dispersed in anticipation [8610] of a hostile 
attack, after having been vv^arned of the danger thereof. 

General Short. Not guilty. I was never warned of any imminent 
danger of an air attack. The planes were therefore grouped for more 
adequate protection against hostile action in the form of sabotage. 

[8611] Senator Ferguson. Therefore, when you wrote on the 
-28th, or sent a message back that you were alerted for sabotage, that 
would indicate, would it, that the planes were grouped ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. That was laid down in our standard 
operating procedure. 

Senator Ferguson. No. 10 : 

Failure to have his airplanes in a state of readiness for an attack. 

General Short. Not guilty. My aircraft were not in a state of 
readiness for a surprise attack, but were protected against sabotage 
as directed by the War Department in the sabotage-alert messages of 
27th, of 28th November 1941, and as reported to the War Department 
by me. 

If they had been equipped with ammunition, grouped as they were, 
and a sabotage attack had been made, there would have been much 
more damage by exploding ammunition. 

We never permitted, when alerted for sabotage, we never permitted 
them to be armed or to have ammunition in the planes. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, the sabotage alert was one that 
wouldn't permit ammunition to be in the planes when they were 
grouped for sabotage? 

[8612] General Short. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. No. 11: 

Failure to provide for the protection of military personnel, their families, etc., 
and of civilian employees on various reservations. 

General Short. We made a quite elaborate plan for evacuating 
the families of civilians on the military reservation. We asked the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3195 

War Department for money to establish a camp some 4 miles east of 
Schofield. I wrote a personal letter to the Chief of Staff and told him 
that we were asking for the money to establish these camps on the 
basis of recreation camps and tke different units, different families 
would be assigned to different locations, but our real purpose was to 
get ready for a possible attack and this would give us a chance to 
acquaint everybody with the details without advertising what we 
were doing. 

He answered my letter and stated that guns were needed worse for 
other purposes. 

[8613] Senator Ferguson. I notice that you left out the words 
"not guilty" to this last one. Is there any reason ? 

General Short. No, sir. I plead not guilty. 

Now, I might say when we failed to get our concentration camp 
plans approved, get the money, we then made an alternate plan for 
taking care of the women and children in school buildings that we 
thought would be out of the range of an attack. 

We had blankets placed in those school buildings, we had all ar- 
rangements set up for the establishment of cafeterias and they were 
moved in there on the afternoon of the 7th and everybody was taken 
care of. 

Senator Ferguson. In this evidence that was put in this morning, 
this exhibit, Myron C. Cramer, major general, judge advocate general, 
gives a report. I wish you would look on page 50 of that report; I 
don't know what page it is in the record. 

General Short. I think it is the paragraph I read into the record 
this morning. 

Senator Ferguson. Oh, it is in Exhibit 63 that I had in mind. 

General Short. Exhibit 63, top secret, yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; top secret. 

Now, I notice at the bottom of page 49 this remark by the [ 8614] 
Judge Advocate General : 

As to whether General Short should be tried at any time, a factor to be con- 
sidered is what sentence, in the event of conviction, the court would adjudge. 

Wliy would the Judge Advocate be concerned in advance and before 
he had filed the charges as to what the court would give as a penalty? 

General Short. It would look like that he was thinking of the pos- 
sible effect on public opinion. If I were tried and found not guilty, or 
given a very mild sentence, that the public would tend to feel that 
there had been no justification, that is the only conclusion I can draw. 

Senator Ferguson. And then he goes on : 

As I have already indicated, upon any charge of neglect of duty, or of his 
various duties, General Short would have the formidable defense that he re- 
sponded to the request to report measures he had taken with a message, incom- 
plete and ambiguous it may be, but which should have prompted doubt as to the 
sufficiency of the action taken. 

Now, was he talking about your reply to General Marshall's mes- 
sage ? 

General Short. He undoubtedly was, in spite of his statement 
about it being ambiguous and incomplete. 

[8615] Senator Ferguson. Now, in your opinion was it an am- 
biguous message that you had taken an alert against sabotage ? 



3196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. I don't see how it could have been briefer or more 
concise or clearer. 

Senator Ferguson. The next sentence : 

My experience with courts martial leads me to the belief that a court would 
be reluctant to adjudge a severe sentence in a case of this kind where the general 
picture would be clouded by a claim that others were contributory causes. (Cf., 
Roberts Report, Conclusion 18, p. 21.) 

General Short. I do not have a copy of the Roberts report here. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you see that he gets a copy ? 

Mr. Hasten. Yes. [Handing document to witness.] 

Senator Ferguson. I want to ask you this question in relation to 
that : Couldn't that have been cured by trying all that were guilty of 
contributory causes ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not the War Depart- 
ment has ever considered the question of trying all that were guilty 
of contributory causes or causes of the disaster at Pear Harbor? 

General Short. I am quite sure they have never made a [8616] 
public statement to that effect. I do not know whether any consid- 
eration has been given to it or not. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you have before you the Roberts report, 
do you ? * 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you want to look at those conclusions 18 
on page 21 and see what he was talking about ? 

General Short. I have looked at it. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you Avant to make an}- answer in relation 
to them? 

General Short. I would say in regard to 18 that it was a complete 
surprise, because we had not been furnished the information that was 
definitely available in Washington and that- should have been fur- 
nished to us. 

In regard to 19, the things that he mentioned are largely beyond 
our control : 

Disregard of international law by the Japanese. 

There was nothing that we could do about that. 

The restrictions they prepared on counter-espionage. 
That was a question of our own laws. The Hawaiian Department 
could do nothing about that. 

Emphasis in the warning messages of the probability of aggressive action in 
the Far East and on anti-sabotage measures. 

That was wholly on the shoulders of the War Department. That 
could not apply to the Hawaiian Department. 

[8617] Failure of the War Department to reply to the njessage relating 
to the anti-sabotage measures instituted by the Comiuanding General, 
Hawaiian Department. 

That was entirely a War Department failure. 

Information received by the interested parties prior to the anack of warning 
message of December 7th. 

That was entirely the failure of the War Department. 
Senator Ferguson. The War Department is deiined there as you 
defined it this morning? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3197 

General Short. I beg your pardon ? 

Senator Ferguson. Is it defined as you defined it this morning? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is there anything more that you want to add ? 

General Short. I would like to call attention to the fact that he 
admits in paragraph 20 that when the attack came that the command 
did act efficiently. He said that they were present and that certain 
things had not interfered in any way with their efficiency and that 
subordinate commanders executed their orders without question. 
They were not responsible for the state of readiness. 

I would like to say there that I have never at any time tried to pass 
the buck to any single subordinate. My deci- [861S] sion was 
made on the information that the War Department had furnished me 
and I had no desire and absolutely never took any steps to pass the 
buck to some indivirliial man below me. 

Senator Ferguson. Is there such a thing as a joint trial in courts 
martial, where men can be tried jointly? 

General Short. There is, yes, sir. It is rather unusual but it is 
possible. I think lam correct in that, am I not ? 

Lieutenant Colonel Karr. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Then reading on : 

There is also in cases like this the historic precedent of President Lincoln's 
refusal to rebuke Secretary of "War Simon Cameron for a gross error of judg- 
ment. (Life of Abraham Lincoln by Nicolay & Hay, Vol. 5, p. 125-130.) I am 
therefore foi'ced to conclude that if General Short is tried and if such trial 
should result in his conviction there is considerable likelihood the court would 
adjudge a sentence less than dismissal and might well adjudge nothing beyond 
a reprimand. 

Would that lead us to believe, then, that he was of the opinion that 
he was concerned with the sentence and they were concerned with that 
alone ? 

General Short. I would say they were very greatly concerned with 
the effect on public opinion and that they wanted \8619] to be 
very careful and not try me on something where they would fail 
and the effect would bounce back on them. 

Senator Ferguson. NoWj coming to the Clausen report. When did 
you see the Clausen affidavits ? 

General Short. About 2 or 3 days before this committee convened 
we got a copy of them. 

Senator Ferguson. In the first part of the Clausen report, the 23d 
of November 1944 — have 5^ou got the Clausen report before you ? 

Lieutenant Colonel Karr. No, sir ; we do not have that here. 

Senator Ferguson. It is the letter by the Secretary of War to Major 
Clausen and on the next page is this memorandum : 

Memorandum for Major Henry C. Clausen : Subject : Unexplored Leads in 
Pearl Harbor investigations. 

You had those before you this morning, did you not ? 

General Short. I think so. 

Senator Ferguson. The unexplored leads. 

General Short. I do not believe I did. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to put in evidence 
those two papers, the letter of the 23d creating the Clausen power and 
unexplored leads. 



3198 CONGRESSIONAL'INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. I wonder, Mr, Chairman, why the public are not 
entitled to the whole thing? I move that we put it all in, the whole 
volume. 

[86^0] The Chairman. Make them an exhibit or consider it as 
being spread on the record ? 

Senator Ferguson. I would like to spread those pages at least on the 
record because I have questioned General Short and he gave some an- 
swers in relation to these unexplored leads and that is what I desire 
to have in the record at the present time. 

Mr. Murphy. You mean you object. Senator, to the whole thing 
going in? 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I think we should wait. The only thing 
is I think we should wait until Clausen came to get the other papers 
in, to know how the other papers were obtained before they go in. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, I propose later on to ask that they all go in. 
I would like to have it all go in now. I will ask that again. 

The Chairman. Well, the chair does not want to exclude anything 
that ought to go in here, but if it is all going in when Clausen comes in 
I do not see any need of putting it all in here. 

Mr. Murphy. I have no objection to those two going in but I move 
that they all go in so that we will have everything. 

The Chairman. Let them go in. 

[8621] Senator Ferguson. I will read them in. General, so that 
you will have them before you. 

General Short. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson (reading). "November 23, 1944." Now, that 
date is after the board had rendered its opinion ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. But the board, all the members were living and 
in good health sothat they could have carried on, couldn't they? 

General Short. So far as I know they were. 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 : 
Subject : Pearl Harbor Investigation. 

In connection with the recent report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, a 
number of unexplored leads have suggested themselves which require investiga- 
tion. I have directed that this investigation be undertaken by Major Henry C. 
Clausen, JAGD. 

You are directed to give Major Clausen access to all records, documents, and in- 
formation in your Division, whether of secret or top secret nature and to advise 
all officers of your Division to afford Major Clausen the fullest possible coopera- 
tion. Inquiries made by Major Clausen should be answered fully and the per- 
sons interrogated should volunteer any information of which they [8622] 
may have knowledge concerning the subject of Major Clausen's inquiries. 

In addition, copies of any papers requiretl by Major Clausen, whether secret 
or top secret should be furnished him, any present directives to the contrary 
notwithstanding. 

Henry L. Stimson, 

Secretary of War. 

A true copy. 

* Henby O. Ciausen, 

Lt. Colonel, JAGD. 

Now, the next page is : 

Memorandum for Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD : 
Subject : Unexplored Leads in Pearl Harbor Investigation. 

1. In order to assist you in the investigation you are now making, I am 
suggesting herewith certain unexplored leads which, in my opinion, might 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3199' 

advantageously be followed up in order to complete the general picture in this 
matter. The present memorandum merely contains suggestions and will not 
be construed as a directive or as in any way fixing the scope of your investigation. 

2. In the War and Navy Departments in Washington, [8623] the follow- 
ing matters can be investigated: 

a. Whether Kimniel notified the Navy Department and the Navy Department 
notified the War Department of the order to sink Jap subs, of the reasons 
for the order. 

b. What was the naval condition of readiness at Pearl Harbor. 

c. Whether Short or Kimmel sent any reconnaissance reports to Washington, 

d. Whether Kimmel had any orders from Washington requiring a large part 
of the fleet to remain in harbor. 

e. Whether Kimmel understood the term "defensive deployments" or wired 
back for its meaning. 

f. Whether Kimmel replied to the 24 November. 27 November, and other 
Navy Department mes.sages and if so, was the War Department furnished 
copies thereof. 

g. Whether the June l&iO alert message to Herron was specific and indicative 
of an established War Department i)olicy of being specific when war alerts 
were believed required by the situation. 

h. Whether the War Department manuals and war plans, current in 1941, 
authorized a Commanding General of an overseas Department to revise the 
estimate of the situation, without consulting with or reporting to the War 
Department. 

[8G24] i. Whether Short answered the Secretary of War's letter of Febmary 
1941. 

j. The number of troops in Hawaii in late 1941, the state of their training and 
the possibility of continuing training under Alert 2 or 3. 

k. The terms and origin of the Joint Action Agreement, if any, with Britain 
and the Netherlands, and whether Japan was officially advised of this agree- 
ment or discovered its existence. 

1. Whether Short was sent official notice of the Joint Action Agreement 
or of the Roosevelt-Churchill July 1941 compact for a joint warning to Japan. 
(Rep. 41) 

3. Concerning the "magic" intercepts we should ascertain : 

a. The exact date and time of first translation. 

b. The reason for the apparent delay in translating or deciphering of some 
of the most vital messages. 

c. Who got each message, when and in what form. 

d. The evaluation made of them at the time and the degree of reliance 
placed thereon by the General Staff and by the Navy. 

e. The origin of the "Budapest" intercept. 

4. Significant details regarding the "Winds" intercept might be explored : 
[S625] a. The original of the Navy Department message and translation, 

now probably part of the original Roberts Report i*ecords, or at least, questioning 
of Mr. Justice Roberts would possibly disclose how that Commission disposed of it. 

b. The Navy's alleged delivery of two copies of the translation to the Army 
(Tr., Safford C. 133-135), as to just what procedure there was for delivery, as to 
who was responsible therefor, and who had a duty to check up on whether the 
translation was received. 

c. Whether General Miles, Admiral Noyes, Colonel Bratton, or Captain Safford 
knew about the Anglo-Dutch-U. S. Joint Action Agreement, in which case they 
would have known that a "War with Britain" message would necessarily have 
involved the United States in war. 

Did you ever hear about that one before ? 

General Short. I learned that in respect to the report, as I say, 2 or 
3 days before the committee met. I had never heard about it before 
that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you know whether or not Miles did 
know about that Anglo-Dutch-U. S. joint action agreement, in which 
case they would have known that the War with Britain message would 
necessarily have involved the United States in war ? 



3200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[8626] General Short. I don't remember whether that question 
was specifically asked him or what his answer was. 
Senator Fjsrguson (reading) : 

d. Whether the partial implementation "War with Britain" was brought to 
Admiral Stark's or General Marshall's attention, it being clear that the Chief 
of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff did know of the Joint Action Policy. 

e. Did the Navy in any way notify Admiral Kimmel or Commander Rochefort 
of the implementation intei'cept? 

f. Did the Honolulu intercept stations independently receive the activating 
"Winds" message? 

g. What was the significance of the other Japanese intercepts which the Board 
failed to examine? 

[8627] Did you know that the Army board had failed to examine 
certain intercept messages? 

General Short. I did not know what they had examined. I was 
never permitted to see or know anything about magic. 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

h. Whether General (then Colonel) Fielder actually received the message 
directing him to contact Commander Rochefort, whether he did so, and whether 
there is substance to the hypothesis that he and Short were relying upon the 
warning they would expect to receive when the second or implementing "winds" 
message would be intercepted, thus giving advance notice of hostilities. 

General Short. I never heard of the winds code until I read the 
Roberts report here sometime in August 1944. That was the first 
time I knew there was such a thing. 

Senator Ferguson. You never knew then that Rochefort, admiral 
or commander, whatever he was — it was Commander Rochefort — 
had known that there was intercepted a winds or implementing 
message ? 

General Short. No, sir ; I had never heard of it. 

Senator Ferguson. So then you were not waiting, as a matter of 
fact, on an implementing winds message in order that you may be 
given advance notice of hostilities? 

General Short. I was not. 

[8628] Senator Ferguson. This is signed Myron C. Cramer, 
major general. United States, Judge Advocate General. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; I will yield. 

Mr. Murphy. As you remember, we were first going to put in the 
first 18 pages, and I then stated in the record it was unfair to have 
the 18 in without the explanatory part but to have incorporated in 
the judge advocate general's opinion the report of Major Clausen. 

There is also in the record the cross-examination from the Clausen 
report of General Gerow. I do not see how you can intelligently 
understand a report if you have only three parts of it in and not 
the whole. 

I request, in view of the matters that have been read, that the entire 
report go in as an exhibit. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I am putting in here just what 
the judge advocate general was asking Clausen to look into. I 
haven't time this afternoon to examine him on the whole matter here 
that is contained in this volume. 

I want to ask you. General Short, if you read this paper that I read 
and that I have before me, these affidavits of Clausen, or in the Clausen 
report ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3201 

General Short. I have read the complete report. 

[8620] Senator Ferguson. You have read the complete report? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. The papers have never had the Clausen report. I 
think they are entitled to them. 

The Vice Chairman. Without objection, then 

Mr. Keefe (interposing). Just hold it, Mr. Chairman. I have at 
least on one or two other occasions registered objection to the intro- 
duction of the so-called Clausen statement at this time, until after we 
have had an opportunity to go into that situation in connection with 
the examination of Colonel Bratton and others who expect to be 
witnesses. 

When the full facts with reference to it are developed it can then 
be disclosed as to whether it is material and pertinent to this inquiry. 
I do not care to be a party to consenting to the introduction in evi- 
dence of matter which may or maj^ not be pertinent. 

The Vice Chairman. Does the gentleman of AVisconsin object to the 
request of the gentleman of Pennsylvania? 

Mr. Murphy. May I say on this point, the Navy had a special ex- 
amination after the naval court of inquiry concluded, by Admiral 
Hart, and they had a subsequent examination by Admiral Hewitt, 
and in each of those cases it was conducted by an individual going 
about the world to [8630] take 'testimony. The Clausen ex- 
amination, as I understand it, covered 57,000 miles to the war fronts 
of the world. 

I am simply making my request so that everything about Pearl Har- 
bor shall be known, for whatever it is w^orth. Maybe it will not be 
worth nuich in the view of individual members, but so that all the 
facts wdll be before the papers of the country I think it should be 
made an exhibit. 

Mr. Keefe. In view of that statement, it is perfectly obvious why 
the statement is made ; I do not want any misinterpretation of the pur- 
pose of my objection. 

There is quite a difference between the Hewitt report and the Hart 
report and the manner in which the two were prepared, quite a differ- 
ence between the questions and answers of witnesses recorded under 
oath than the mere statement that is made in the taking of affidavits. 

Now I have some Iniowledge as to the manner and method in which 
affidavits are obtained, and so far as I am concerned, it will all be 
brought out at the proper time. I do not think they should be intro- 
duced in evidence at this time but should await the time when the 
individuals become witnesses on the stand and it gives us an oppor- 
tunity to examine those witnesses in reference to how those affidavits 
were obtained. 

Mr. Murphy. According to the papers the gentleman said 
[8631] he wants to conclude by February 15, and I want to be 
sure the Clausen report is in by then, and I think this is as good a time 
as any. 

The Vice Chairman. Permit me to remind the gentleman from 
Wisconsin, as I recall the only witness who has appeared before the 
committee so far and who had appeared before the Army board of 
inquiry and later gave an affidavit to Major Clausen was General 
Gerow. 

Mr. Keefe. That is correct. 



3202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. General Gerow was questioned by members 
of the committee about his affidavit that he gave to Major Clausen. 

Mr. Keefe. I certainly would not have any objection to having 
General Gerow's affidavit, which he gave to Clausen, introduced in 
evidence. 

Senator Ferguson. It is already in evidence. 

Mr. Keefe. It is already in evidence. Now all I ask is that the 
same situation with respect to the affidavit, perhaps, of Colonel Brat- 
ton and others be indulged in. I have no objection to the public and 
the world knowing just exactly what is in every one of those affidavits, 
but I would like to introduce them at a time when I have the right 
to cross-examine the w^itness who gave those affidavits. 

Mr. Murphy. As I understand it, Mr. Chairman, Major [8632] 
Clausen, I believe, questioned 135 witnesses. I do not believe we are 
going to have them all here. Ordinarily, if you put any part of an 
instrument in you ought to put all of it in, for whatever it is worth. 

The Vice Chairman. The objection has been heard. That settles 
the matter for the present. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, in view of what has been said 
I think it should be made clear that we do not take the affidavits of 
135 witnesses. If Colonel Clausen appears here and we can examine 
him about it, we can review that whole question at that time. In 
the meantime it is a little premature. 

Mr. Murphy. I understand, sir, we have already agreed to take 
the statements of the staffs at Hawaii. 

Senator Brewster. As the gentleman well knows, those who are 
in the category of these witnesses we agreed to let go in evidence. 

Mr. Keefe. That matter has heretofore been determined by this 
committee, as the Chairman will know, when we agreed to p^-ut in 
sworn testimony in the place of calling certain witnesses, and the 
Clausen matter was specifically eliminated by unanimous action of 
the committee at that time. 

[8633] The Vice Chairman. That is true, of course. It was 
determined by the committee in executive session that the Clausen 
material would not be included with this other material, but it does 
not follow that any member of the committee is deprived of the right 
to ask unanimous consent to include it at any time he may desire. 

Mr. Murphy. I ask it particularly in view of the fact that those 
members of the armed forces of the United States were fighting in 
the battlefronts of the world, and swore before God under oath that 
what they said was true, and it was presented to us by an officer of 
the United States Army. 

Senator Brewster. You produce the officer, and we will listen to 
him. 

The Vice Chairman. Proceed. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar. General, with the planes 
that were passing through Hawaii to other fronts for other places 
in the Pacific ? 

General Short. To the Philippines in particular ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3203 

Senator Ferguson. Were these planes up until the Tth [8634-] 
the same as those that came in then? They were not armed? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. No ammunition in them ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. You were to arm them there and then send 
them on ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Had that ever been done before? 

General Short. All the planes that had gone to the Philippines 
came in in that condition up to December 7. 

Senator Ferguson. Came in that condition? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So there was no alteration at that time? 

General Short. You mean the ones coming in on the Tth ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Short. No, sir ; that had been the normal procedure. 

Senator Ferguson. Was your force being reinforced or were these 
planes, from a certain day, all going through to the Philippines? 

General Short. We had actually lost planes. We had 21 B-17's 
at one time, and 9 of those were sent to the [86SS] Philippines 
and we were down to 12, and had to rob 6 of those of parts to keep 
the others going through. 

Senator Ferguson. Did that impress you with the fact that there 
was more thought of an attack in the Philippines than there was in 
your territory ? 

General Short. No question about it. They were ferrying in the 
last few months everything to the Philippines they could. 

Senator Ferguson. Can we get what planes went through Hawaii 
from, say, July, or something like that, Mr. Richar-dson ? 

Mr. Richardson. We will try. 

Senator Ferguson. Try and get that, and what planes stopped and 
how they completed their journey. 

General Short. May I interject there, also, there were other types 
of planes that were not flown through, that were shipped through on 
transports. 

Senator Ferguson. You knew about that? 

General Short. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you been reinforced in such a way by ship- 
ping planes in after, say, September? 

General Short. I think we got most of our planes before July 1. 
I could not state definitely, but I think we did. 

[86S6] Senator Ferguson. After that, had you requested any 
more planes for your defense ? 

General Short. We had in August put in that study showing that 
we should have a total of 180 B-17's. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever received any word of any kind 
that after the 27th of November the Secretary of State had made a 
statement to the Secretary of War that the matter, in effect — I do 
not undertake to quote him in exact words — was then being turned 
over to the Army and Navy ? 

General Short. I had not. 



3204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. You indicated yesterday that yon were of the 
opinion that General Marshall had never seen the message of the 
27th as it was sent, prior to the time it was sent to you. 

General Short. Yes, sir ; I believe that is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. And where do you get that knowledge? 

General Short. Because General Marshall was not in Washington. 
He was, according to his testimonj'', and that of others, in the Carolinas 
for maneuvers. He stated, as I remember in his testimony that when 
he returned to his office on the 28th, he thought he found his message 
on his desk. 

Senator Ferguson. And he saw it afterward? [86S7] He 
saw it after the maneuvers ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you want to add anything to or subtract 
anything from any of your answers that I may have asked you ques- 
tions on? 

General Short. I might bring out the fact that in addition to planes, 
a few days before December 7, 1 had a wire from the War Department 
asking me if I would be willing to ship forty -eight 75-millimeter guns 
and 120 30-caliber machine guns to the Philippines, and that they 
would replace them very soon. I agreed to that. 

The transport was held at the time long enough to get them aboard, 
and they were shipped to the Philippines. That, of course, was an- 
other indication that they considered the situation in the Philippines 
much more critical than in Hawaii. 

Senator Ferguson. And had you had the understanding before that 
that we knew our authorities Imew that in case of a war with Japan, 
we conld not hope to hold the Philippines? 

General Short. I think that for years it had always been considered 
that we probably would lose the Philippines and have to retake them. 
I think in playing our war games at the War College, that had been 
the usual assumption. 

[SOSS] Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the letter 
from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel wherein he quoted the 
President as saying that it would be very embarrassing to us if the 
Philippines were attacked ? 

General Short. I am not. I don't remember. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know, as a military man, how it could 
have been embarrassing, using that word ; is that the word you use in 
military circles, or is that a diplomatic word? 

General Short. I think it would always be embarrassing from a 
military point of view, to lose anything of that kind, but it was some- 
thing we had expected would happen. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. And if an attack came, it would come against 
the Philippines ? 

General Short. It would come against the Philippines and we prob- 
ably would not be able to hold them. We did not have enough out 
there. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment. 

Had you ever asked the question as to what our policy was in case 
of an attack on the Philippines? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3205 

General Short. No, sir. I thought I knew, because I had seen the 
war plans when I was here in Washington. 

[8639] I had played war games, commanded one side of the war 
game in actual maneuvering at the War College. I think I at that 
time knew it very thoroughly. 

Senator Ferguson. What was our policy in case of an attack? 
Would we go into action, into war ? 

General Short. We would hold them as long as we could and then 
expect to take them back. 

Senator Ferguson. Did it mean a general war? Was that our 
policy? 

General Short. I think so. 

Senator Ferguson. So then in your opinion, it meant war if they 
attacked the Philippines, and the British and Dutch? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Just as much as if they attacked Hawaii or the 
Marshalls, or Guam, or any other possessions ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Or even our Coast ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. I just want to say that you made an error when you 
said that was quoting the President about the embarrassing situation. 

[864O] Senator Ferguson. I want to get the exact language. I 
would not under any circumstances leave a quote in here which is not 
a correct quote. Can I get the last letter, counsel, in the Stark-Kimmel 
letters ? 

Mr. Murphy. I think he quotes the President in some matters, but 
f do not think that was the quotation. 

Senator Ferguson. Under no circumstances do I want to allow even 
a thought that I am misquoting. 

Were you here the day that the MacArthur affidavit was read into 
evidence? 

General Short. I am sorry. I did not get the question. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you here on the day that the Clausen- 
MacArthur letter was read in evidence? 

General Short. I think I was. At least I have read it. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, the substance of it, as I recall it, was that 
General MacArthur claimed that he had enough information and was 
not embarrassed by any lack of information. Did you know at that 
time that he had magic? 

General Short. No, sir ; I did not. 

Senator FeI^guson. That would indicate that if he had sufficient 
information then you had sufficient information, would it not ? 

General Short. If you read that alone, you could readily [8641] 
draw that inference, if you did not know anything about the situation. 

Senator Ferguson. But if you know about magic, do you think that 
changes the situation? 

General Short. There were two things that would give him much 
more information. One was magic and the other, which I did not 
know about, the message from the President to Commissioner Sayre, 
that Commissioner Sayre, General MacArthur, and Admiral Hart 



3206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

were to get together at a conference. There was a considerable amount 
of information there. 

Senator Ferguson. And the fact that he had magic and access to 
that? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So that there will be no doubt about my quota- 
tion, I am going to ask to strike my previous question. I will quote 
directly from the letter. 

This is the letter of the 25th of November 1941, in exhibit 106. 

The Vice Chairman. Whom is the letter from ? 

Senator Ferguson. The original letter is signed "Betty." 

The Vice Chairman. From whom to whom? 

Senator Ferguson. From Admiral Stark to Admiral [864^] 
Kimmel. 

Now, I will read the postscript : 

I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have 
been in constant touch with Mr. Hull, and it was only after a long talk with him 
that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situa- 
tion. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would 
be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles, an attack on 
the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. 
There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight 
others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. 
You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed 
against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, 
Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely. 

[8643] 1 won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. 
I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that 
we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for ; 
or we may do nothing — I think it is more likely to be "anything." 

It is initialed "H. R. S." 

Have you seen that? It was written on November 25, and he indi- 
cates that he is holding it up because of a meeting with the President 
and Mr. Hull and then he adds this postscript. 

General Short. I have never seen it. 

Senator Ferguson. Before December 7 ? 

General Short. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When is about the first that you heard of it ? 

General Short. I heard it discussed here. 

Senator Ferguson. In one of our joint committee hearings ? 

General Short. Yes ; the first I ever heard of it. 

Senator Ferguson. So you did not know what they were talking 
about in there, about it being embarrassing if an attack was made on 
the Philippines? 

General Short. I did not know specifically what was intended. 
^ [8644] Senator Ferguson. That is all. • 

The Chairman. Congressman Keefe. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, before Congressman Keefe pro- 
ceeds, there is a matter that I would like to bring to the attention of 
the committee that just came to my attenion in connection with the 
introduction of this record called the brief and resume of records of 
the Roberts commission. I brought this originally to the attention 
of the committee and asked its consideration, and it was deferred. 
Copies were made available for examination. 

Subsequently I stated that an examination of this indicated to me 
clearly it was excerpts from a much longer report of the Robert^? com- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3207 

mission and I asked that a complete record be put in this record and 
be made an exhibit, in justice to all concerned, and that was agreed to. 
Subsequent thereto, there were certain letters that were discussed 
in connection with this, which went into the record yesterday. Last 
night, just before adjournment, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, 
Mr. Murphy, stated : 

I do not want to offer something that was brought to him as an exhibit, but 
I do want the record to show that if Senator Brewster does not renew his offer 
of this file in the morning I will ask unanimous consent to have it go into the 
record because I think it ought to be straightened [86^5] out on the record. 

That being brought to my attention I came here this morning and 
spoke to the chairman, Mr. Cooper, in charge, and I told him I had 
to go to a meeting of conferees on the Ship Sales Act, and if it were 
to be offered I wanted to be heard. He suggested I talk to Mr. Murphy, 
which I did. I asked Mr. Murphy if he wanted to put this in and he 
said no, that he had no intention at this time to put it in. I went 
back to Mr. Cooper and told him the matter was adjusted. I find 
subsequently in the morning Mr, Murphy did offer it. I am ready 
to consider the further factors which led Mr. Murphy to change his 
mind in the course of the morning. 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to speak for myself. 

Senator Brewster. I certainly shall be happj- to hear you. 

The Chairman. Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. I talked to the Senator from Maine this morning 
and told him it was my understanding that exhibits 1 and 2 attached 
to the file he had were not in evidence. I was informed by counsel 
that they were, the counsel for General Short. Thereafter, after the 
Senator from Maine 

Senator Brew^sti;r. Just a moment. You said that was all our con- 
versation ? 

[8640] Mr. Murphy. I told you I did not intend to put the file 
in right then. 

Now, with the understanding that the general was not going to be 
a witness after today, the general then made a statement to the effect, 
as I recollect it, that the Judge Advocate General did not want anyone 
on the Army board, but rather, one individual to go out to make a 
survey of certain additional facts. 

Then there is one other thing. Yesterday the gentleman said, as 
I remember it, that there were certain parts of that record in this 
exhibit. 

Senator Brewster. The Roberts commission. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. In this exhibit there is a letter which states 
that they are referring only to things on the record. ^Vlien the gen- 
tleman saw fit to refer to The Adjutant General of the United States 
Army, and apparently to the Secretary of War, with the inference, as 
I got it, that there was some impropriety in sending out Major Clausen 
to make this survey, I then asked that not only this exhibit but all of 
the files of the War Department, including these and everything else, 
go into the record, so we would have the entire picture. 

I also stated on the record that this, in effect, was a complaint that 
it was a one-sided ex parte proceeding. I [864-7] used that 
word before the noon hour, an ex parte proceeding. I said in fair- 
ness to the general, he ought to be able to give his answer here. 



3208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Whereupon the general said, "I have a paper prepared here. I have 
examined the exhibit." He then read his answer. 

I do think, inasmuch as the gentleman from Maine has brought 
it up, that he should be the one to offer it. Apparently he thought 
it was significant, because he brought it up twice. I certainly do not 
want to offend the general's feelings, but I am interested in the whole 
truth. My only purpose in introducing it is if there was any wrong 
committed by The Adjutant General, or anyone else on the staff, as 
to the procedure, we ought to know it. That is the only reason why 
it should be in this record. 

Senator Brew^ster. I appreciate the gentleman's statement that he 
wants the whole truth, and so do I want the whole truth, but having 
examined this document I have found it does not even purport to 
be anything but a very partial summary of certain portions of the 
evidence. I asked for the entire evidence before the Roberts com- 
mission to be put in as an exhibit, so that we would have the whole 
truth, and that was agreed to. 

I do not think we need to, or want, perhaps, to take the time of 
the committee at this time. In the light of the [8S4S] cir- 
cumstances as stated by Mr. Murphy and myself, I would ask that 
the decision of the committee be reconsidered and that we have an 
opportunity over the week end to consider the situation, with a view 
to whether or not this should be incorporated in the record as an 
exhibit. 

I think there were some serious questions about this which I should 
like to consider and perhaps discuss with Mr. Murphy and the com- 
mittee. 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to say that inasmuch as the good faith 
of The Adjutant General of the United States Army appears to be 
challenged, or the Judge Advocate General, I think this committee 
and everybody should want to know the whole story, and for that 
reason I think it should remain in the record. 

Senator Brewster. I simply ask the matter be reconsidered. 

The Chairman. That matter can be pending and the committee can 
consider it. 

The Vice Chairmax. As the record stands now, it is in the record. 
The Senator is asking to reconsider it and the question of reconsid- 
eration is carried over. 

The Chairman. It is in the record as an exhibit, not as a part of 
the transcript, I understand, so the question of reconsidering that, 
as to whether it should be filed as an exhibit, will be pending. 

[864^] Mr. Murphy. May I just say, Mr. Chairman, that there 
are additional papers, and, as I understand it, counsel have a great 
volume of them, and I hope there will be a study made over the week- 
end. There is particularly one paper that is a memorandum dated 
February 17, 1942, which refers to the original retirement paper, or 
proposed retirement paper of the general, and it refers to a memo- 
randum from General Marshall, and I would like to see that memo- 
randum. 

I have asked to have it here. 

Senator Brewster. I think we should have all the records bearing 
on this which were asked for some days ago by me. It was as the 
result of that that these various records were produced. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMAIITTEE 3209 

Mr. Murphy. I want to give the Senator full credit for it. 

Senator Brewster. I want to say that I cannot conceive that 
similar records to this do not exist in the Kinniiel case in the Navy 
Departmnet, and I should like to have the matter thoroughly explored 
in order that entire justice may be done to all concerned, if it is finally 
decided that particularly documents of this character are to be in- 
cluded in this record as exhibits. 

The Chairman. All those matters can be straightened out by the 
committee. The Chair would like to see if we cannot finish with 
General Short today. We cannot do it [S6o0] if we argue 
back and forth on these matters, which I think can be disposed of in 
the committee itself. 

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment. I do not want the record to 
show that I feel that I was in a position to really examine General 
Short on this because we dropped the subject and I did not cover it as 
caref ulh' as I would want to. I did the best I could. 

The Chairman. You made a pretty good stab at it. 

Congressman Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. Thank 3'ou, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. You are welcome. 

Mr. Keefe. It is always a great pleasure to find myself at the end 
of this whijD cracking and get thrown off into the last minute of the 
last hour of Saturday afternoon with witnesses, so that I am under 
the urge, of necessity, of not consuming any time in trying to com- 
plete with the witnesses. 

I assure you. General Short, that I shall not utilize any of these 
bulky minutes in my examination. I will try to get through by 4 
o'clock. 

Now, General, I sat here during your entire examination and 
listened as attentively as I knew how to this mass of detail that has 
been submitted to this committee. 

The Chairman. Will you permit me to say that counsel [8651] 
wishes to have a brief executive session at the conclusion of today's 
session, so the members who are here will remain. 

I beg your pardon for interrupting. 

]Mr. Keefe. I wonder if I have arrived at a wrong conclusion, or 
whether I am correct when I assume that the evidence up to date, and 
the cross-examination of yourself, has tended to meet the issues 
with respect to your conduct as the commander at Pearl Harbor 
prior to December 7. when in the public's mind for a long time after 
December 7. it was apparent that you and Admiral Kimmel were 
charged with the failure of your responsibilities as commanders at 
Pearl Harbor. 

You specifically had training to alert your command to meet this 
air attack, with all that is involved in that matter of alerting your 
command. 

In other words, the statement has repeatedly been made that had 
Kimmel and Short been on the alert they would have been able to 
meet this Jap attack and either repel it or to have minimized the 
results of that attack, and therefore Pearl Harbor was the result 
of the failure to be on a suitable and proper alert. 

You felt the impact of that sentiment in the last i j'ears, did you 
not? 

79716 — 46 — pt. 7 20 



3210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

[8652] Mr. Keefe. I understand your position to be, General 
Short, that as commander at Pearl Harbor prior to December 7, 1941,. 
and subsequent to your appointment to that important position you 
did everything within your power to provide the physical things- 
necessary to provide for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands. 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Keete. And it is your contention that as to many items of 
physical property, such as guns, installations, radar equipment, air 
strips, buildings, and so on, you did not get but a small part of the 
material that you had requested prior to December 7, 1941. 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Keeee. General Marshall has testified, as I recall, that in his 
opinion the material wliich you did have at Pearl Harbor on Decem- 
ber 7, if alerted and effectively used, would have given a good account 
of itself and perhaps enabled you to repel the attack, or to severely 
minimize the damage that was caused. Do you agree with that ? 

General Short. I could have given a better account of myself, but 
to see how inadequate it was we need to only compare two items. The 
best antiaircraft defense against low-flying planes, which did the 
most damage there, is the .50-caliber machine gun. We had 109. Our 
program at \8653] that time called for 345. but by December 
1, 1942, they had actually increased the number of .50 caliber machine 
guns on Hawaii to 793, showing how much more the AVar Department 
thought was necessary, and keep in mind that that date is after the 
Japanese had been seriously defeated at Midway. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, General, I do not want to indulge in the realm of 
hindsight or speculation. I know how easy it is to judge when you 
have the benefit of hindsight and I do not feel I should call upon you 
to indulge in a matter of speculation. The fact of the matter is, is 
it not, that except for the possibility of getting a few more guns into 
action and possibly minimizing, to a small extent, the damage that 
was done, regardless of what you had out there on December 7, this 
attack would have come in by surprise, isn't that true ? 

[86S4-li General Short. With the information. 

Mr. Keefe. With the information that you had? 

General Short. The information we had from Washington, it was 
bound to be a surprise. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now, then, I think it is quite clear from this evi- 
dence, and anybody can correct me if they think I am in error, but as 
I recall the evidence up to date, every witness that has testified con- 
cluded that there was no probability of an attack by air on Hawaii, 
except, as I recall, the testimony of Admiral Turner. He is the only 
witness that testified to the probability, in his opinion, that an attack 
by air would be made upon Pearl Harbor. 

General Short. Except that General Miles said that the attack was 
so obvious that they couldn't take the trouble to mention it. 

The Chairman. What was that? 

General Short. So obvious that they didn't mention it in any of his 
estimates. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, General Miles said that? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Very well. But it impresses me that everybody that 
had access to the diplomatic changes and all of the information with 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3211 

respect to the Japanese inten- [8655] tions concluded that the 
attack, if it came at all, would be in the far west Pacific. 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. That is what you thought ? 

General Short, Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That is what Stark thought? 

General Short. I think so. 

Mr. Keefe. That is what General Marshall thought. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Everybody that I know of that had access to anything 
thought that is where the attack would come. 

Now, as evidence of that, you have brought before the committee a 
long series of situations. Admiral Kimmel has done likewise. That 
is, that that was the intention. 

You have pointed out the fact that B-17's were sent out there un- 
armed, with their guns cosmolined, that they arrived at the very time 
that the attack was going on, as evidence that the Air Corps or nobody 
else would have sent those B-17's into that fray unarmed had they ex- 
pected an attack. 

You have indicated that they were ordering you to ship your sup- 
plies to the Philippines, material that you had on hand. That is cor- 
rect, is it not ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

[8656] Mr. Keefe. As indicating that that is where the attack, 
would take place? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Some place in the record there is evidence of a plan by 
which the Army was to garrison our outlying islands. Do you re- 
member that? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You would garrison the islands of Samoa, Canton, 
Christmas, Palmyra, and Johnston ; is that right ? 

General Short. I think that Palmyra and Johnston were not spe- 
cifically mentioned. They stated that we would at some future time 
take over the outlying islands and we would garrison Christmas and 
Canton at once. 

Mr. Keefe. And when was that supposed to take place? 

General Short. The message was received, I believe, November 29. 

Mr. Keefe. Then the idea was, after the war warning message of 
the 27th, plans were invoked by which you were to deplete your gar- 
rison at Honolulu and to send Army replacements to garrison Canton,, 
Samoa, Christmas; is that right? 

General Short. I am doubtful whether Samoa was included, but 
Christmas and Canton definitely. 

Mr. Keefe. Canton and Christmas. 

[8657] General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And they proposed to replace the troops thus removed 
from Oahu with fresh troops to be brought from the mainland ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. That is correct? 

General Short. Yes, sir. You took all of those things into consid- 
eration, along with a lot of other facts that I will not burden the. 
record with at this time, that indicated to you that if there was any 



3212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

intent on the part of the Japs to attack Hawaii, that that information 
would be available to Washington, and would be forwarded to you ? 

Mr. Keefe. And you got no information that would indicate a 
specific attack on Hawaii ? 

General Short. No, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, it appears in accordance with the record that is 
before the committee that this November 27 warning message, page 
7 of exhibit 32, was received in the Hawaii signal center at 6 : 46 p. m. 
Washington time, 1 : 16 Hawaiian time, having been dispatched from 
Washington to Hawaii at 6 o'clock p. m., Washington time on the 
27th day of November, and that you replied as shown by your message 
on page 12 of exhibit 32, which was encoded in Hawaii at 11 : 10 p. m. 
Washington time, or 5 : 40 p. m. Hawaii [86SS~\ time, and it 
was received in the War Department code room at Washington at 
5 : 57 a. m. on the 28th of November, or 12 : 27 a. m. the 28 of November, 
Hawaiian time. 

Now, there we had the war warning message to General Short and 
General Short's reply to General Marshall in which you stated that 
you were alterted against sabotage, and had liaison with the Navy. 

Now, after that message of Marshall's you received a message from 
G-2, that has been referred to, sent to you by General Miles, a short 
message, on November 27, which reads : 

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemale stop Hostilities may 
ensue stop Subversive activities may be expected stop Inform Commanding 
General and Chief of StafE only. 

Signed Miles. 

That message went from G-2 in Washington to G-2 Hawaii ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And advises the G-2 in Hawaii to inform you and your 
chief of staff only, and refers to nothing but sabotage? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You saw that message, did you ? 

[86S9] General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Then on the 28th day of November you received a mes- 
sage signed *'Adams." Wlio was Adams ? 

General Short. He was the adjutant general. 

Mr. Keefe. He had authority to send you messages? 

General Short. His message meant that it was authorized by the 
Chief of Staff. 

Mr. Keefe. He would not send you a message unless it was author- 
ized by the Chief of Staff, would he ? 

General Short. I am sure he wouldn't. 

Mr. Keefe. He had the authority to give you a command? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And in this message which he sent you on the 28th day 
of November he states : 

Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against 
subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Depart- 
ment. Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures to pro- 
vide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and equipment 
against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propa- 
ganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop This does not repeat 
not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop Protective measures should 
be confined [S660] to those essential to security comma avoiding unneces- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3213 

sary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams 
are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat nor afEect your possibility 
under existing instructions. 

Now, when you received that telegram on the 28th after Washington 
had receive your message in which you stated that you were alerted 
against sabotage, did that tend to influence you in your thinking that 
the alert which you had was the proper alert, the alert that Washington 
wanted ? 

General Short. It did. I thought it was an answer to my radiogram 
and wanted to emphasize the question of legality. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, there was also sent to the commanding general, 
Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, on the 28th a message signed 
"Carl Kobinson, adjutant general." Did you receive that one? 

General Short. Robinson? 

Mr. Keefe. That is what is looks like to me. 

General Short. What page is that? 

Mr. Keefe. Well, I don't know 

Mr. Murphy. He is reading from different exhibits. 

Mr. Keefe. Here it is. This one here. Wouldn't you [8661'\ 
say that is "Robinson" ? 

Senator Ferguson. I have one by Sullivan. Is this the one you 
want ? 

Senator Lucas. "Williams" isn't it? 

Mr. Murphy. The record shows that somebody thought it was Wall, 
somebody thought it was Sullivan, and now you say it is Robinson. 

Mr. Keefe. Here is the photostatic copy. 

Mr. Murphy. I have seen it. I can't make it out. 

Mr. Keefe. Robinson, R-o-b-i-n-s-o-n, as plain as anything. 

General Short. It is the Arnold message you are reading, from the 
Chief of Air Corps ? 

Mr. Keefe. Yes ; that is the one. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, is it Robinson, Arnold, Williams, or 
Sullivan ? 

Mr. Keefe. This is signed Carl Robinson, adjutant general. My 
eyes aren't too good, but I can certainly see that. 

That came out to you on the 28th of November, did it not ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And that reads : 

[8662] Attention Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force Period That 
Instructions substantially as follows be issued to all establishments and units 
under your control and command is desired Colon Against those subversive activi- 
ties within the field of investigative responsibility of the War Department Parea 
See paragraph three MID SR three zero dash four five Paren 

Wliatever that means. That is what you were worried about, Mr. 
Chariman, the other day. 

The Chairman. I am still worrying about it. 
Mr. Keefe. So am I. 
Then it says : 

The present critical situation demands that all precautions be taken at onoe 
Period It is desired also that all additional measures necessary be initiated by you 
immediately to provide the following Colon Protection of your personnel against 
subversive propaganda Comma Protection of all activities against espionage 
Comma and protection against sabotage of your equipment Comma property and 
establishments Period This does not repeat not authorize any illegal measures 



3214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Period Avoiding unnecessary alarm and publicity protective measures should be 
confined to those essentially to secure Period Para It is also desired \8663] 
that on or before December five this year reports be submitted to the Chief Army 
Air Forces of all steps initiated by you to comply with these instructions Period 

(Signed) Aknold. 

[8664] Now, you got that on the 28th of November? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Another message which refers specifically and only to 
sabotage and espionage; that is true? 

General Short. That is true. 

Mr. K^EEFE. The message speaks for itself. 

Now, you replied to those two messages, the one from the adjutant 
general and the one from the air, the Arnold message, you replied 
separately, did you not ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you replied at considerable length ? 

General Short. Very great detail. 

Mr. Keefe. And those replies, your reply was addressed to the 
Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. And in this reply, which I shall not attempt to read, I 
take it this message is in the record and I won't burden the record 
with reading it again, j^ou give them a full and complete description 
of everything you have done ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, General 

The Chairman. What is the date of that? 

Mr. Keefe. The date is the 29th of November 1941. 

[8665] Perhaps I had better read it into the record right at this 
spot: 

Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth comma full precautions are 
Ijeing taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative respon- 
sibility of War Department paren paragraph three mid sc thirty ddsh forty five 
end paren and military establishments including personnel and equipment stop 
As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such 
as power plants conuna telephone exchanges and highway bridges comma this 
headquarters by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one re- 
quested the governor of the territory to use the broad powers vested in him by 
section sixty seven of the organic act which provides comma in effect comma that 
the governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the 
United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence 
comma invasion comma insurrection etc stop Pursuant to the authority stated 
the governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on 
this headquarters to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as 
may be necessary to prevent sabotage comma and lawless violence in connection 
therewith conuna being committed against vital installations and structures 
[S666] in the territory stop Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate 
military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations stop In 
this connection comma at the instigation of this headquarters the city and county 
of Honolulu on .Tune thirteenth nineteen forty one enacted an ordnance which 
permits the Commanding General Hawaiian Department comma to close comma 
or restrict the use of and travel upon comma any higliway within the city and 
county of Honohilu comma whenever the commanding general deems such action 
necessary in the interest of national defense Stop The authority thus given 
has not yet been exercised Stop Relations with FBI and all other Federal 
and Territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has 
been given on all pertinent matters 

Signed, "Short." 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3215 

Did you consider that there was full and complete and ample notice 
to the War Department at Washington as to what you were doing 
out there in Hawaii ? 

General Short. It seems to me I thought it was very definitely a 
full explanation. 

Mr. Keefe. So if your message of the 27th in response to the 
Marshall message in which you used the language "alerted against 
sabotage — liaison with the Navy," might be contended [56'^7] 
by some people to be too short and too brief and not full enough, this 
message which went to the Adjustant General is full and complete as 
stating everything that you were doing? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Then also on the next day, November 30, 1941, originat- 
ing at Fort Shafter at 12 :57 a. m., the message being dated November 
29, you replied to the message from General Marshall ? 

General Short. That was on December 4. On page 19. I think 
the one you have is a Panama message. 

Mr. Keefe, No. Did you send a reply to the message from Arnold? 

General Short. General Martin sent the reply after my O. K., and 
it is shown on page No. 19, 19 and 20, sent over both General Martin's 
name and mine. 

Mr. Keefe. Oh yes. That is pages 19 and 20 of Exhibit 32. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That gives a full and complete response to the wire 
received by you from General Arnold? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Iveefe. And this was prepared by General Martin of the Air 
Corps in Hawaii but bears your signature? 

[866S] General Short. Yes, sir; and bears his also. 

Mr. Keefe. So that there again was a full and complete statement 
to Washington addressed to the Chief of the Air Corps setting forth 
•completely just what you were doing out there at Hawaii? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, I understand that from the time you sent your 
reply on the 27th of November right down to December 7, the time 
of the attack, you never received a single word from Washington that 
would indicate that these replies which you gave to these messages, 
and which are now in the record, did not indicate that you were carry- 
ing out the instructions from Washington? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, you assumed during all this period, having re- 
plied to the Marshall message, having replied at great length to the 
Adjutant General's message, having replied at great length to the 
message sent you by the Chief of the Air Corps, you felt full assur- 
ance tTiat had any other alert been expected by Washington they cer- 
tainly had all the information as to what you were doing and would 
have given you the order; is that your position? 

General Short. I did ; I felt that. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, as a matter of fact, your war plans, [8669f] 
jou were familiar with Rainbow 5, were you not? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. IvF^FE. And WPL-46? 



3216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. Less familiar with it than Rainbow 5 but familiar 
with it . 

Mr. Keefe. It is a fact, is it not, General Short, that the war plans, 
the joint war plans of the Army and the Navy for war in the Pacific 
with Orange, which was Japan, contemplated an offensive war in the 
event of outbreak of hostilities? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr, Keefe. And that commencement of hostilities was to be an- 
nounced by radiogram to all theaters announcing in plain English just 
what ways to put that plan into effect — M-day ? 

General Short. M-day, that is right. 

Mr. Keefe. Then everybody knew, all over the Pacific, just exactly 
what to do ; isn't that true ? 

General Short. That is true. 

Mr. Keefe. In accordance with the plans already worked out? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That contemplated, so far as the fleet was concerned at 
Pearl Harbor, an offensive action against the [8670] Marshalls 
and the Carolines, did it not ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. So that in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, ac- 
cording to the recorded plan which is here in evidence, that fleet was 
supposed to go on the offensive immediately ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That meant air cover, did it not? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And when Pearl Harbor happened the plans had to be 
completely revised and instead of an offensive war it became a defensive 
war; isn't that true? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. Did any of the war plans, so far as j^ou know, contem- 
plate an attack on Pearl Harbor ? 

General Short. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Keefe. Of course, I assume. General Short, that you were train- 
ing personnel out there at Honolulu all the while you were there in 
various games of one kind or another designed to protect that island? 

General Short. That is correct. 

[8671] Mr. Keefe. You knew that Pearl Harbor and the Island 
of Oahu was a vital thing in our war games and plans as far as the 
Pacific area was concerned ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, radar has been mentioned here repeatedly. You 
were pretty young and pretty new in the radar field at the time of 
the 7th of December, weren't you ? 

General ShorT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. The fact of the matter is you only had about two people 
out there that knew much of anything about it, isn't that true? 

General Short. We had had two and three more arrived and be- 
came available the day before the attack. 

Mr. Keefe. In fact, you had sent a couple of men to the mainland 
to sort of get some instructions a short time before December 7, 
hadn't .you ? 

General Short. That is right. They had just gotten back. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3217 

Mr. Keefe, They had gone there with the full knowledge of Wash- 
ington and practically on instructions from Washington to get some 
knowledge about this radar business ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And what you were trying to do was to train as many 
men as you could in the use of such facilities as you had? 

[S672] General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Isn't that true? 

(xeneral Short. Yes, sir. 

]Mr. Keefe. Well, the utilization of the radar then, as I under- 
stand it, in view of the attitude that no one expected any attack out 
there at Pearl Harbor, was more largely based upon the desire for 
training than it was the expectation that they would intercept Jap 
planes coming into an attack that nobody expected would ever occur 
out there, am I correct in that assumption? 

General Short. You are correct. 

Mr. Keefe. Admiral Kimmel has testified that he was compelled 
to indulge in large-scale training activities because his fleet was being 
depleted constantly of trained personnel for transfers to other theaters. 
Did you know that that was taking place? 

General Short. I think I did. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you transfer any troops from your command in the 
fall of 1941 to other theaters? 

General Short. Trained crews for the B-l7's. 

Mr, Keefe. Yes. Xow, you were training those crews out there, 
were you not ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You couldn't ship B-17's out to the Philip- [867S] 
pines without trained operating and ground crews, could you ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. And you were busy training those crews as fast as the 
B-17's would come in, to take them on and ferry them out to the 
Philippines ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. And that is where the emphasis was being placed, to get 
those bombers out to the Philippines ? 

General Short. Yes, sir, 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now. General Short, how in the world could you 
have put your command on a No. 3 alert without disclosing your 
intent ? 

General Short. It was impossible. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, I agree with you. 

The military installations on Oahu, Avhich is a very small island, 
'some of them are right next door to the biggest hotel there, isn't that 
true ? 

General Short, That is correct, 

Mr, Ejeefe. Right near the public parks? 

General Short, Yes, sir. 

Mr. IvEEFE. Now, if you went on an all-out alert it would mean more 
than just having a few people running around with steel helmets and 
a little field equipment, would it not ? 

General Short. It would. 



3218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[8674] Mr. Keefe. It would mean putting up barbed wire en- 
tanglements, it would mean stretching signal wires around and put- 
ting up emergency signal equipment, would it not ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. It would mean the complete control of the life of that 
island so far as black-outs and all that sort of thing was concerned- 
General Short. I could not have exercised complete control over 
the civil population until martial law was put into effect, but it would 
have been control so far as the Governor could have complied with my 
wishes. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, I am wondering if I am correct in my thinking 
that here is some 135,000 Japanese with a tremendous number of loyal 
Japanese but an unknown number of disloyal Japanese. You had 
that problem before you constantly, did you not ? 

General Short. We did. 

Mr. Keefe. And you could not tell what would happen in the event 
of a rupture of diplomatic relations between this country and Japan 
so far as that overwhelming Japanese population out there was con- 
cerned ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, that was well known to the AVar Department at 
all times here and everybody connected with it, wasn't [8675] 
it? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. So this question of sabotage and espionage became a 
highly important thing so far as Oahu was concerned? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, when they sent you this message that said you 
should take a reconnaissance and such other defensive measures a& 
you deem necessary, you explained the failure of reconnaissance by 
reason of the fact that you had a written contract with the Navy which 
was approved by the War and Navy Departments, and you say that 
General Marshall thoroughly understood that, in your opinion ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And that whoever wrote that message in Ms absence 
apparently had overlooked the fact that that was a Navy responsi- 
bility, is that your answer? 

General Short. That is my answer. 

Mr. Keefe. And that when it says "other defensive measures," 
measures against sabotage and espionage would be those other defen- 
eive measures, would they not? 

General Short. To me they appeared the most important. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, you had a chief of staff. Was it Colonel Phillips? 

[8676] General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Was he a colonel or a major? 

General Short. He was a colonel. 

Mr. Keefe. You requested that he be assigned to you as your chief 
of staff, did you not ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. You made that request of General Marshall when you 
were appointed? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. When did he get out there ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3219 

Greneral Short. About March 1. 

Mr. Keefe. Who was the chief of staff prior to the time that 
Colonel Phillips arrived? 

General Short. Col. Philip Hayes. 

Mr. Keefe. When did Colonel Haj^es retire as chief of staff? 

General Short. I believe it was effective November 5, but I think 
he had been on leave of absence for a few clays before that. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, I do not quite understand that, General. You 
say that Colonel Phillips was sent out there to be your chief of staff 
in March, but Colonel Hayes continued out there until about the 5th 
of November. 

General Short. I was understood that Phillips was to [8677] 
become chief of staff upon the expiration of the tour of Colonel 
Hayes and the time, the interim was used to put Colonel Phillips 
through all the sections of the general staff to familiarize him with 
conditions. 

Mr. Keefe. So that he would have full knowledge when he actually 
assumed the responsibilities of chief of staff? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. So that he actually did not perform as chief of staff 
until some time, you think, in 

General Short. The last part of October, the last few days of 
October. 

Mr. Keefe. When the commission came through ordering Hayes 
back? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. He was an experienced man, was he not? 

General Short. He was an unusually experienced man on. field work 
and training. 

Mr. Keefe. Did he talk Chinese ? 

General Short. I think so. He has been since that time the senior 
liaison officer with the Sixth Chinese Army, with 300 officers under 
him, one down to each battalion and I believe that the rating of that 
Sixth Army, from talking with American officers, was extremely high, 
perhaps the best of the Chinese armies. 

[SsfS] Mr. Keefe. Well, your chief of staff continued on after 
this debacle at Pearl Harbor? 

General Short. Yes, sir; he continued. The War Department had 
ordered Colonel Collins over there to become chief of staff and Gen- 
eral Emmons asked him to stay as deputy chief of staff. He remained 
on for almost a year and at his own request was relieved as he desired 
to get more active service. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, in this line of command you had a staff? 

General Short. Yes. sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Kimmel had a staff? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You each had your chief of staff? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you had your chiefs of various departments of 
your layout out tl^ere? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now in the line of command it was the responsibility 
of the commanding general to issue an order to his chief of staff and 



3220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

it went on from him down through to the various other elements that 
would be affected by that order? 

General Short. Yes, sir, 

Mr. Keefe. Is that correct? 

[8679] General Short, That is the normal way. 

Mr. Keefe. That is a normal method of doing business, is it not ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe, And in connection with your determinations, they were 
your determinations and your orders when issued, but on vital matters 
were they the result of the combined action of your staff? 

General Short, I could go to them for advice but the responsibility 
was definitely mine no matter under what circumstances I made the 
decision, I could not pass the responsibility to them because they 
participated. 

Mr, Keefe. Oh, I understand that thoroughly, but the point is you 
are the president of this corporation out there and you have got a 
board of directors as your staff and you sit in staff meetings and talk 
these things over, isn't that true ? 

General Short, That is correct. 

Mr, Keefe, And you as the president have to make the ultimate 
decision. 

General Short, That is correct. 

Mr, Keefe, Did you ever have a situation where you and your staff 
disagreed on anything of great importance ? 

General Short, I don't think we did, 

[8680] Mr, Keefe, Did you have a telephone out there that you 
could call Washington ? 

General Spiort, I had what we called a scrambler phone and Gen- 
eral Marshall had one in his office, 

Mr, I^efe, Did you ever use it ? 

General Short, I did, 

Mr, Keefe. How long did it take to get a message through normally 
from Honolulu to Washington here using that scrambler telephone 
business ? 

General Short, The times I used it I would say 10 or 15 minutes. 
On the morning of the attack, along about S : 15 I directed Colonel 
Phillips to call General Marshall because I was going to my field 
command post and I believe that he got the connection at 8 : 22. I 
think it took 7 minutes. 

Mr. Keefe, In other words, do I understand that that morning 
right while the attack was going on Colonel Phillips called General 
Marshall on the scrambler telephone and got a connection in about 
7 minutes ? 

General Short, And told him if he would listen he could hear the 
bombs. The attack was still going on, 

Mr, Keefe, I might also say in that connection that I was advised 
by Mr, Hoover when Mr, Gearhart and I talked with him that Mr. 
Shivers, his agent out there, called him when he was up in New York 
and got a direct telephone connection [8681] in just a few 
minutes right while the attack was going on and he heard the bombs 
dropping over the telephone. 

Well, if you could get the telephone message while this attack was 
going on in just a few minutes there wouldn't be any reason why the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3221 

line was not clear so a message could come from the other way, from 
Washington to Honolulu, is there? 

General Short. There wouldn't appear to be. 

Mr. Keefe. Now I would like to get some idea about the use of this 
other means of communication out there. Wasn't there radio com- 
munication ? 

General Short. The Army had a 10-kilowatt station and the Navy 
had a 25-kilowatt station ; the FBI had a station, I think it was quite 
a good deal more powerful than the Army. I am not sure whether it 
was 25 or what. And there was also a commercial radiogram and 
commercial cable. 

Mr. Keefe. These radiograms back and forth, did you use the Army 
set-up frequently ? 

General Short. I think they always used it when it was not over- 
loaded and when the atmospheric conditions were such that the 10- 
watt system would go through. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, do you know whether any investigation has ever 
been made to see what the atmospheric conditions were that morning 
as to whether or not they could use this radio as a means of communi- 
cation ? 

[8G82] General Short. I have heard — I did not know it at the 
time — I have heard since that they did have some trouble getting 
through with that 10-kilowatt system that morning. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, do you know about the Navy or the FBI ? 

General Short. I am sure that they could have gotten through. 

Mr. Keefe. I recall the testimony here that at the time they were 
considering the question of sending this message on the morning of 
December 7 in General Marshall's office, I think I recall that somebody 
suggested that Admiral Stark offered the use of the Navy radio. 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. And it was not used. Well, now, supposing you had 
been called on the telephone, or supposing a telephone call had been 
put in here that morning b}' somebody when the Japanese fourteenth 
part message and the short message of instruction was received, 
decoded and translated and in clean form some time between 7 and 8 
o'clock that morning, would you have been aroused from your slumbers 
that morning or somebody out there to answer a telephone if one had 
come through ? 

General Short. We had an officer on the general staff on duty all 
night along right by the phone and there would have been no difficulty 
in getting anyone. He could have [8683] gotten me within 
a minute or two. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, the story has gone around the country that you 
were all drunk out there that night; that you were drunk and that 
Kimmel was drunk and everybody else was drunk and that everybody 
was asleep out there at Pearl Harbor sleeping off a jag. That is the 
way it has been told out around the country. Now, is there any truth 
in that. General Short? 

General Short. There is absolutely no truth in it. If I may add 
one thing 

Mr. Keefe. Go ahead. 

General Short. To show that the War Department, if they were not 
conscious at that time that more than one means of communication 



3222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

could be used, they became fully conscious at the time they issued the 
order to relieve me. I got that order three diflerent ways within 30 to 
40 minutes. I received a radiogram first. Ten or fifteen minutes 
later General Emmons got off a plane with a printed order. Fifteen 
or twenty minutes later the secretary of the general staff called 
Colonel Philips to ask if I had received the order. 

Mr. Keefe. So 3'ou got it in 

General Short. In three different ways. 

Mr. Keefe (continuing). In three different ways? 

[8684] General Short. Yes. 

Mr. IvEEFE. To make sure that you got it ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now. General Short, to be perfectly frank and 
candid, you have told us where you were that night ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You were not expecting an attack at all? 

General Short. No, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You had your various members of your establishment 
at their respective duties that night the same as they had been? 

General Short. Yes, sir, and my chief of staff at midnight, owing 
to the fact that we were expecting the B-17's in from Hamilton Field, 
went over to headquarters and checked up to find out whether any ad- 
ditional information had been received in regard to them. I know my 
chief of staff was at our headquarters as late as midnight the night 
before. 

Mr. Keefe. »You had no notice whatsoever of this intercept of the 
first thirteen parts of the fourteen pail message and no knowledge 
whatsoever until after the attack of the receipts of the short message 
or anj'^thing else? 

General Short. Seven hours after the attack. 

Mr. Keefe. As evidence of the fact, if I understand your statement 
correctly. General Short, when tlie attack did take [8680] place 
and your all-out alert was ordered the men did do a remarkably splen- 
did job of defense? 

General Short. They did it with great rapidity and precision. 
Every man knew exactly his job and it went into effect extremely 
rapidly. 

Mr. Keefe. It was too late. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. I was a little intrigued by the questions that were asked 
this morning by Senator Ferguson with respect to the difficulties which 
were encountered out there due to not only duplication of or, rather, 
separation of command but also the intervention of a third govern- 
mental unit in the picture, namely, the Interior Department, which 
had to be dealt with in the matter of securing permission to erect mili- 
tary installations out there and I think you testified that it took nearly 
a year to get permission to erect some installations for radar equip- 
ment on Government-owned land, part of the parks system, under the 
supervision of the Interior Department. 

General Short. About 10 months. 

Mr. Keefe. About 10 months. In the face of possibilities of an 
attack in Hawaii? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3223 

Mr. Keefe. Now, General Short, there has been a tremendous 
amount of information given to the American people with [8686'\ 
respect to a Colonel Clausen and a Hans Wilhelm Rohl, who were in 
charge of Army construction out there in Hawaii. Now, I do not want 
to go into that because that would take all next week. 

The Vice Chairman. You mean Colonel AVyman. 

Mr. Keefe. Wyman, that is right. I don't mean Clausen. I mean 
Colonel Wyman. 

And the inference has been that due to certain failures of the Army 
engineers in making installations out there at Pearl Harbor the in- 
stallations were delayed and, thus, as a result Pearl Harbor happened 
and all the damage was done. 

Now I would like to ask you the flat, plain, square question : If 
you had had all the installations that were contemplated and that 
you had asked for and the operators of those installations were not 
alerted to use them, the best that you could have hoped for was to have 
minimized this attack rather than to have stopped it or prevented 
the damage which did actually occur; isn't that right? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. In other words, it doesn't make any difference how many 
guns you have if there is nobody to use them and if there is no ammu- 
nition in them ; isn't that right ? 

General Short. That is true. 

Mr. Keefe. It doesn't nuike any difference how many radar 
[8687] stations you have if there is nobody to use them or know 
how to use them, isn't that right? 

General Short. That is true. 

ISIr. Keefe. So that all this question about the failure of installation 
or failure of installations, while it may be a very important subject 
for some further investigation, so far as its effect upon whether or 
not it contributed to bring about Pearl Harbor do you see any con- 
nection ? 

General Short. If we had had the information, if we had picked 
it up at 200 miles instead of 132 it would not have been time enough 
to do any more than disperse the planes. What we needed was infor- 
mation from Washington giving us time to go into an alert. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, you could have done a pretty good job with the 
stuff you had out there if you had been on the alert and had been 
expecting an attack. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You had some bombers and you had some planes that 
could have been in the air and the few that dicl get into the air did a 
pretty good job, didn't they? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And these slow torpedo planes that came in there and 
did most of the damage to the battleships in the harbor were pretty 
easy targets for your fast fighters, were [8688] they not? 

General Short. If you knew where they were coming from they 
would have been very easy. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, all during this war the element of surprise has 
been a thing that has been involved in almost everything that has been 
done on both sides out there in the Pacific, isn't that true ? 



3224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. All over the world. It is always the most impor- 
tant element. 

Mr. Keefe. It is always the attempt on the part of a commander 
to involve his adversary in surprise, isn't that true ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. And as far as an air attack itself is concerned our experi- 
ence has been that regardless of the fact whether an attack is known 
or not a lot of these planes — some of them, at least, get through and 
cause damage, isn't that true? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. That was true at Okinawa, is it not? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, when we think of the exploits at Midway and the 
magnificent job that our Navy did in sinking the Jap Navy, it was 
possible because of intelligence, was it not and [8960] the fact 
that our Navy was informed and had the facts and knew what to do? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. And w4ien they shot down tliis Admiral Yamamoto that 
was possible because they got an intercept which put them on notice 
and gave them some information ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. I refer to those two incidents because it correctly illus- 
trates the idea that intelligence is necessary and fundamental, is it not ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And when Intelligence fails you are liable to have seri- 
ous results ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, your position in this case is that Intelligence, so 
far as Washington was concerned, failed ? 

General Short. A hundred percent. 

Mr. Keefe. And thus Pearl Harbor occurred. Is tliat your defense ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That is all. 

The Chairman. Does counsel for General Short wish to ask any 
questions ? 

Lieutenant Colonel Karr. No questions, Mr. Chairman. 

[8690] The Chairman. Counsel for the committee? 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. There are several questions I would like to ask. 

Senator Lucas. I would like to ask a couple, too. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, counsel, give me the ship movements ex- 
hibit, the intercepts on the ship movements. It is on page 22. On 
page 22 of that exhibit there is an intercept; I want to ask you about 
that. It is in Exhibit 2. 

Lieutenant Colonel Karr. I am sorry. We do not have that. 

Senator Ferguson. Exhibit 2, page 22. It has been referred to 
at times as the "light in the window" message. Are you familiar with 
that? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It may have been a Paul Revere, it has been sug- 
gested here, but nobody was riding? 

Are you familiar with that? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3225 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, if it appears in the testimony and from 
the evidence that that was translated in the rough by 1 o'clock on 
Saturday, the 6th, and that information had come to you, would that 
have made any difference to you ? It is dated the third, from Hono- 
lulu (Kita) to Tokyo. 

[8591] General Short. Unquestionably that would have given 
us some very definite information if we had had the message and 
knew how to read it. 

Senator Ferguson. What I mean is if you could have had that 
information it would have indicated an attack on Hawaii, would it 
not? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. No doubt about that. 

General Short. It shows a definite desire for detailed information 
of just exactly what our fleet is doing and is preparing to do. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, there is another message on page 27. It 
is dated the 6th, from Honolulu to Tokyo, on page 27. That is the 
one that says : 

No barrage balloons. 

And then it says at the end : 

I imagine that in all probability thei-e is considerable opportunity left to take 
advantage by a surprise attack against these places. 

If that had been decoded and sent to you, or the information from 
it, would that have meant anything to you ? 

General Short. That would practically have meant a surprise at- 
tack was in store for us or was a certainty. 

Senator Ferguson. There isn't any doubt whatever that such 
[8692] a message, while not decoded, as shown by the instrument 
itself at the bottom, because it shows that it was decoded December 8 
but it was sent on the 6th and therefore was intercepted on the 6th — 
if that information had come to you that would have, uncontradicted, 
have indicated a surprise attack on Oahu ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And would that alone have alerted you ? 

General Short. Very decidedly. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, there was one other thing that I wanted 
to inquire about. Did you know about the General Carter Clarke 
report or investigation? 

General Short. I never heard of it till some time after this com- 
mittee met. I have since then read it. I think it probably was a 
month after this committee started meeting before I knew of the 
existence of this report. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for that investigation by 
Carter Clarke after Clausen got through and we find a new investi- 
gation by Carter Clarke, Gen. Carter Clarke? 

General Short. It is pretty difficult to say just what they were at- 
tempting to do. They were apparently wanting to find out exactly 
what every man holding an important position in G-2 would say 
about their so-called top secret material, magic and about their 
estimates, and so forth, and it was a [8693] very difficult report 
to get a hold of. 

79716 — 46 — pt 7 21 



3226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson, And do you know whether or not it indicated 
in any way that there had been an investigation by G-2 for the Presi- 
dent and that there had been some changes made in it bv General Mar- 
shall? 

General Short. Somewhere — I have forgotten whether it was in 
that report or not, but somewhere I have run across something of that 
kind. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Isn't it fair to say that after reading it that there is 
a man named Friedman and several other witnesses and a General 
JSpaulding and others who had some kind of a rumor going ,about 
that Marshall was supposed to have destroyed papers, and that was 
I ni equivocally, absolutely and positively contradicted? 

Senator Ferguson. But there is also more in it. I think at some time 
Carter Clarke or General Clarke should appear and give us the reason 
for it, if there was a reason, but I am just asking you, General, what 
you know about it. 

General ShopvT. I Icnow nothing except what the report states. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

[^694] Mr. Keeee. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask just one ques- 
tion, if I may. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Keefe. Stories have gone about, been bandied about that you 
had your planes lined up on the apron wing-tip to wing-tip without 
any gasoline in them, without any ammunition, making a perfect target 
and a perfect set-up for the Japs to come in to spray with incendiary^ 
bullets that demolished the whole works at one time, and that set-up 
there was likened to the story of the ships in the harbor like a lot of 
sitting ducks for the Japs to come in and shoot up. 

That is the story. 

Now, I would like to know whether or not under your provisions 
against sabotage, there were specific provisions made and orders given 
as to how the airplanes were to be fixed? 

General Short. That is correct. General Burwell — Colonel Bur- 
well then 

Mr. Keefe. Colonel who? 

General Short. Burwell. 

Mr. Keefe. Who is he? 

General Short. He was a: colonel in the Air Corps detached to make 
a study in connection with sabotage. He [S6'95~\ made a very 
extensive study and was absolutely insistent that the way to protect 
them was to place them close together where they could be guarded 
absolutely 'safely leaving the ammunition out of them, so if one was 
hit the ammunition would not explode. 

I am quite sure that the gasoline was not removed. It was an ele- 
ment of danger to have gasoline in them, but the gasoline was in them, 
so the planes could be moved. 

Mr. Keefe. In other words, then, the placing of the planes wing-tip 
to wing-tip on the aprons of the bunkers was in accordance with the 
practice that had been developed by the Air Corps representative out 
there, this Colonel Burwell? 

General Short. That is correct. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3227 

Mr. Keefe. In his report? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. And that was considered after a long investigation and 
study to be the most effective manner of protecting those planes against 
the possibility incident to sabotage? 

General Short. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. And you referred to the fact that son^.e of the Navy 
planes, I believe over at Kaneohe were not so placed, [8696^ and 
that they were the ones that really got damaged. 

General Short. It just happened that the planes that were dispersed 
in the water were sunk, and a considerable number on the apron were 
saved. 

Mr. Keefe. Those that were anchored were all shot and sunk? 

General Short. They were all sunk. 

Mr. Richardson. May I ask a cpestion, Mr. Chairman? 

The CiiAHtMAN. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. Cieneral Short, the only difference there, so far as 
you are concerned, as to guarding the planes against sabotage, would 
have been whether you used a couple of hundred men if they were con- 
centrated or 400 or 500 to guard them, if they were dispersed? 

General Short, That is not correct. The bunkers for the planes at 
Wheeler Field, a very large percentage of them, were right along the 
highway where a man could have driven a truck along the highway 
and simply hurled a grenade into each bunker. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator Lucas. 

Senator Lucas. I desire to ask a question or two. 

Following the thought that has just been discussed, I should like to 
ask you this question. General Short : 

[8697] Your planes were lined up, most of them wing-tip to 
wing-tip under the sabotage-alert order, under which you were oper- 
ating; is that correct? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Now, I do not think the record is clear as to what 
position the Navy planes were in that were on the ground at that time. 

General Short. At Kaneohe Bay the seaplanes were well dispersed, 
but they had on the apron a bunch of planes, or a group of planes that 
were bunched. 

Now, I do not know the exact arrangement of their planes at Ford 
Island. I do happen to know it at Kaneohe Ba}', but I do not know at 
Ford Island. 

Senator Lucas. The record discloses that the Navy lost 102 planes 
and the Army lost 96 planes, and I have been at a loss to understand 
why the Navy lost more planes than the Army unless the Navy was 
also alerted to sabotage. 

General Short. Their planes were dispersed. There is probably 
one reason. A plane that was anchored in the bay at Kaneohe was hit, 
sunk, and was a complete loss. Where they were hit on the runways, 
on the aprons, the men got in and pulled them out, even while the attack 
was going on, and a great many were saved that way. 

Senator Lucas. Do you know whether or not any of [8698] 
the Navy planes were lined up wing-tip to wing-tip similar to the 
planes that you had? 



3228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. I think that was true of Kaneohe Bay, and as to the 
other phices, I do not know. 

Senator Lucas. You made no inquiry about that afterwards? 

General Short. If I had known, I have forgotten it. I do not know 
now. 

Senator Lucas. I do not believe Admiral Kimmel was interrogated 
along that line. It does seem to me in view of his testimony, that that 
is somewhat important. 

One other question. It is not clear in this record whether or not 
Admiral Kimmel knew that you were operating on the sabotage alert, 
AVhat would you say about that ? 

General Short. I believe you will find in his testimony one place 
that he does make the statement that he did understand that I was on 
the sabotage alert, and I think he said some other things. 

Mr. Keefe. That is in the record, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Lucas. I was under the impression that he said in one place 
that he did not know that he was on the sabotage alert, and in another 
part of the testimony that he thought he was on the sabotage alert. 

General Short. I believe he made slight variations in [8699] 
his testimony. I would say that the Navy, the Navy staff, the staff of 
the Fourteenth Naval District definitely should have Iviiown, on account 
of their liaison officer. Lieutenant Burr, who knew exactl}' what was 
going on. 

Senator Lucas. In other words, if Admiral Kimmel didn't know 
3'OU were on the sabotage alert, it was no fault of yours, because j^ou 
gave that information definitely to his liaison man ? 

[6"/^] General Short. Yes, sir; I have the quotation here. 
Page 6985 of the transcript. Witness Kimmel : 

I conferred with General Short on November 28 about the messages each of 
us had received on the 27th. We discussed these dispatches in all aspects. We 
considered, as we did frequently before and did later, the probabilities and 
possibilities of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. In this connection there was 
discussion of the effect of the suggestion from Washington that 50 Army pursuit 
planes be sent by aircraft carriers to Wake and Midway. I understood the 
Army was on an alert and that the alert was against sabotage, among other 
things, although I do not now recall Grcneral Short specifically mentioning the 
details of his alert. 

Senator Lucas. Well, the morning you received the message from 
General Marshall and you alerted your command for sabotage, a short 
while thereafter, as I understand you did not directly tell Admiral 
Kimmel ? 

General Short. I sent a copy of the message to him. 

Senator Lucas. You sent a copy of the message that you had 
alerted for sabotage through your Navy liaison man ? 

General Short. Yes, sir; I sent a copy of my message from the 
Chief of Staff. 

Senator Lucas. One other question. On yesterday [8701] 
there was considerable controversy here between j^ourself and the 
committee with respect to court martials and Army and Navy in- 
quiries and Army and Navy boards. 

In order to clear up a cloud in my mind as to how they operate, I 
want to ask you whether or not there is any difference in the way an 
Army board operates and the way a Navy board operates insofar as 
it being a public affair? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3229 

General Short. The Navy board in this particular case was a court 
of inquiry. Now, I do not know under their regulations whether they 
can have a board that would operate just as the Army board did. 
They were both closed sessions — secret — but in the Navy court of 
inquiry the accused, so to speak, had the right to be present all the way 
through, hear all the witnesses and have counsel with him, and had 
the right of cross-examination. 

Before the Army board I was not permitted to hear the evidence 
given by the other witnesses or to have counsel, except when I was 
personally giving my testimony. 

Senator Lucas. The point I raise is whether or not there is a differ- 
ence between the regulations of the Army and the Navy in an 
investigation of a question of this character. 

General Short. I would rather an officer of the Judge [8702] 
Advocate General's Department answer that. 

Senator Lucas. ]\Iy conclusion upon it is that if the Navy has one 
set of regulations on an important matter of this kind, which permits 
an accused to come before that Board of inquiry with counsel and 
have the right to cross-examine witnesses, and the Army has a differ- 
ent system, which denies that very thing, it certainly is a question 
for consideration by the Congress, because I cannot see why you should 
be denied the right and Admiral Kimmel have the right. That is the 
point I make. 

General Short. Yes, sir. It actually worked out that way. I don't 
know all the details of the law. 

Senator Lucas. Now, General Short, the Congressman from Wis- 
consin and the Senator from Michigan have raised some questions 
about stories that have originated from time to time about what 
happened at Pearl Harbor, about the laxity here and the laxity there. 
I want to state that those are not the only stories that have originated 
about Pearl Harbor from time to time. 

It has been alleged and reported by certain individuals as well as 
a segment of the press that members of this committee have sought 
to suppress certain evidence and in so doing have attempted to white- 
wash the real reason for this investigation. In answer specifically to 
a question [8703] submitted by Senator Ferguson you stated 
that this committee had given you every consideration and, as I under- 
stand it, you are perfectly satisfied with the fair and impartial treat- 
ment that you have received at the hands of this committee ; is that 
correct ? 

General Short. That is correct, absolutely. 

Senator Lucas. Do you know of any evidence that has been covered 
up, that has been suppressed, by any member of this committee, or by 
counsel for the committee, that would have in any wise affected your 
interest, or any other individual who is interested in this hearing? 

General Short. I do not. 

Senator Lucas. There have been a lot of investigations. I suppose 
you hope this is the last one? 

General Sijort. As far as I am concerned. 

The Chairman. Is that all? 

Senator Lucas. Yes. 

The Chairman. The Chair would like to ask this one question, 
General. I am not thoroughly familiar now with what your answer 



3230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

was as to whether between the 3d of December and the 7th of December 
1941 you had any conferences with Admiral Kimmel. 

General Short. I did not. 

The Chairman. That is the way I remembered it. 

\<^704] General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, this has nothing to do with what actually 
happened at Pearl Harbor, but the matter of your retirement and the 
communications between General Marshall and you. I am in doubt 
there, too. 

I want to see if I can clear up something because it may affect your 
personal relations with General Marshall. 

You had been relieved of your command at Pearl Harbor prior 
to the Roberts report? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And you had returned to this country and were in 
Oklahoma City? 

General Short. That is correct. 

The Chairman. You saw in the morning paper accounts of the 
Roberts report and then you called General Marshall over the tele- 
phone ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Did he tell you in that conversation that he had 
read the report? 

General Short. He told me he had not read it. 

The Chairman. You, seeing the report in the newspapers, probably 
thought over in your mind whether your continued active status in 
the Army would be embarrassing to the War Department and there- 
fore you called up to inquire [870S] whether they desired you 
to ask for retirement ; did that happen ? 

General Short. I thought both the country and my personal interest 
required a rather careful consideration, I had great confidence in 
General Marshall's judgment and his loyalty as an old friend, and that 
was the reason I called him and put the thing entirely in his own 
hands. 

The Chairman. You told him in your conversation with him that 
you were going to write him and you would enclose a letter to the 
Adjutant General requesting retirement? 

General Short. I do not believe that I told him in that conversation. 
I think probably after I hung up I decided it was fair to him to send it 
to him. 

The Chairman. Throughout the conversation between General 
Marshall and you then he did not know and was not told that you were 
going to actually send your request for retirement to the Adjutant 
General? 

General Short. He told me that he would take that conversation 
as an application for retirement if they got to the point where it looked 
like it was the thing to do. 

The Chairman. And after you hung up you decided to put it in 
writing and make it formal ? 

General Short. Yes, sir ; and I sent it to him personally. 

The Chairman. Now, is there any other statement not [87061 
brought out by any questions by counsel or members of the committee 
that you wish to make with reference to any further pertinent facts in 
regard to the Pearl Harbor attack? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3231 

General Short. I would like to make a very brief statement. 

The Chairman. All right. 

General Short. As a matter of the interests of the country and as 
a loyal soldier, I maintained a steadfast silence for 4 years and I bore 
the load of public censure during this time and I would have continued 
to bear it so long as I thought the question of national security was 
involved. However, the war is now ended and I have been very 
appreciative of the opportunity that has been given me here to make a 
full and frank statement of my point of view. 

I want to thank all the members of the committee for the attitude 
that they have taken and I want to assure them that I have tried to give 
them fully and frankly all the information that I have on the subject. 

The Chairman. The Chair might state that regardless of any con- 
clusions that may be reached by tlie committee when the evidence is all 
in, in any report that it makes to the Congress, the Chair feels that one 
of the outstanding benefits of this hearing has been that the evidence 
has been brought [<S707] forth in public and everybody has 
been given an opportunity to give to the committee and to the country 
whatever information they had. In all likelihood, regardless of what 
report the committee makes, the country will very probably have made 
up its own mind, and maybe before we do. 

But there has been that benefit that has accrued by reason of this 
public hearing. 

The committee thanks you, General, for your courtesy and patience 
in cooperating with us in attempting to bring out all the evidence. I 
hope you will soon completely recover your health. 

General Short. Thank you very mucli. 

The Chairman. You are excused. 

(Witness excused.) 

The Chairman. The committee will now go into executive session 
and the spectators will retire as promptly as possible. 

(Whereupon, at 4: 30 p. m., the committee recessed and went inta 
executive session.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3233 



[8708] PEARL HAEBOR ATTACK 



* MONDAY, JANUARY 28, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington, D. C. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

President: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Ed^yard P. 
Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee. 

[8709] The Vice Chairman. The committee will please come to 
order. 

I might state that Senator Barkley had to go to the White House 
this morning to attend the usual Monday morning conference. He 
will be in a little later. We will proceed. 

Does counsel have anything before the next witness is called ? 

Mr. Richardson. No. 

The Vice Chairman. The counsel will then call the next witness. 

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I desire to present to you for 
examination, Captain Zacharias. 

The Vice Chairman. Will you please come forward, Captain 
Zacharias. Will you please be sworn. 

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ELLIS M. ZACHARIAS, UNITED STATES 

NAVYi 

(Captain Zacharias was duly sworn by the Vice Chairman.) 

Mr. Richardson. Captain, how old are you ? 

Captain Zacharias. I am 56 years old. 

Mr. Richardson. How long have you been in the Navy ? 

Captain Zacharias. I have completed over 37 years in the naval 
service. 

Mr. Richardson. Were you a graduate of Annapolis ? 

Captain Zacharias. I was. 

[8710] Mr. Richardson. What class? 

Captain Zacharias. Class of 1912. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, will you detail to the committee in a gen- 
eral way, what your Naval experience has been since ? 



1 See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5511 et seq., for corrections in his testimony submitted by 
Capt. Zacharias. 



3234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Zacharias. As I have said, I have completed over 37 years 
in the naval service. I served in or operated with all types of ships. I 
served aboard ship in all departments as head of the department. 

I commanded destroyers, a heavy cruiser, and a battleship. 

All of my shore duty with the exception of 1 year as instructor at 
the Naval Academy, and 1 year taking the senior course at the Naval 
War College, all of my work has been in intelligence on shore duty. 
That included 31/^ years in Japan studying the language and the peo- 
ple; one tour in crypt-analytic work; two tours of about 21/2 years 
each as head of the Far Eastern Division of Naval Intelligence; on^ 
tour of about 21/2 years as District Intelligence Officer of the Eleventh 
Naval District with headquarters at San Diego, Calif.; and between 
my two war cruises, I have served 1 year as Deputy Director of Naval 
Intelligence. That gives a total of about 12 years actually in intelli- 
gence work on shore. 

[8711] At sea, my spare time was devoted to study and matters 
relating to intelligence, and while at sea I actually participated in cer- 
tain counter-espionage activities, and this gave me a direct and indirect 
connection with intelligence over a period of 25 years. 

During the war, I had the good fortune to command two capital 
ships. 

Mr. Richardson. Which war ? 

Captain Zacharias. The recent war. One of those was the heavy 
cruiser jSalt Lake City, and the other was the battleship Neiv> Mexico. 
Both of these ships participated in many of the operations successfully 
in the Pacific and both of them are still afloat. 

My most recent duty was that of conducting a psychological warfare 
campaign against the Japanese high connnand, which had for its 
objective the unconditional surrender of the Japanese without the 
necessity of a forced invasion of the Japanese main islands. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, just before you go into that, did this intel- 
ligence work of yours. Captain, and your life in Japan, give you a 
Japanese acquaintance? 

Captain Zacharias. It gave me an opportunity to make a very wide 
acquaintance in Japan, and I was fortunate in knowing intimately, 
many of the Japanese who in the last [8712] war became the 
Japanese high command. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you learn the language ? 

Captain Zacharias. I did. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you speak it fluently? 

Captain Zacharias. I speak it very fluently. 

Mr. Richardson. And it was that fact, plus your Intelligence 
experience that brought the assignment to you that you were about 
to relate when I interrupted you ? 

Captain Zacharias. That is correct. 

[871-3] Mr. Richardson. Now will you proceed. 

Captain Zacharias. I think that just about concluded my work, 
except I was about to say that this objective, which was the uncon- 
ditional surrender of Japan wnthout the necessity of a forced in- 
vasion of the Japanese main islands, there was an indication of com- 
pletion of that on the 25th of July, 1945, in a broadcast by an official 
spokesman of the Japanese Government direct to me, and, as we know, 
the situation eventuated on the 15th of August 1945. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3235 

Mr. Richardson. Now did your experience with the Navy take you 
into Hawaiian waters? 

Captain Zacharias. It did quite often. 

Mr. Richardson. And were you familiar with Hawaii and the 
general conditions and set-up in Hawaii? 

Captain Zacharias. I was. 

Mr. Richardson, With the character of the people there and the 
-Japanese element involved in the population ? 

Captain Zacharias. I was, both the second generation Japanese, 
that is Americans of Japanese extraction, and also the first generation 
of Japanese who were enemy aliens after the war began. 

Mr. Richardson. During 1941 were you in service in the Pacific? 

Captain Zacharias. I was in command of the heavy cruiser 
[S714] Salt Lake City. 

Mr. Richardson. And was that a part of the Pacific Fleet? 

Captain Zacharias. It was. 

Mr. Richardson. Then you were stationed, a portion of the time at 
least, at Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Zacharias. I was. 

Mr. Richardson. Are you acquainted with Admiral Kimmel? 

Captain Zacharias. I am, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And with his Chief of Staff, Admiral Smith ? 

Captain Zacharias. I am. 

Mr. Richardson. It was brought to the attention of the committee, 
•Captain, that a conversation occurred between you and Admiral 
Kimmel during 1941 in which it is reported reference was made to the 
probability, possibility, likelihood of a Japanese surprise attack* on 
Pearl Harbor. 

Now I would like to ask you whether any such conversation occurred, 
where it occurred, when it occurred, and who was present. 

Captain Zacharias. I think it will add something to the conver- 
sation by indicating the reasons for the conversation. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there such a conversation? 

Captain Zacharias. There was such a conversation. 

\871o\ Mr. Richardson. "Wlien did it take place about? 

Captain Zacharias. It took place between March 26 and March 31, 
1941. 

Mr. Richardson. Where was it? 

Captain Zacharias. In the office of the commander in chief, United 
States Fleet, Admiral Kimmel. 

Mr, Richardson. At Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Zacharias. At Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Richaedson. Who was present at the conversation? 

Captain Zacharias, Admiral Kimmel and his chief of staff, then 
Capt. W. W. Smith, now Vice Admiral Smith. 

Mr, Richardson, They were old acquaintances of yours? 

Captain Zacharias. I had known them both previously. 

Mr. Richardson. Now if you will proceed. 

Captain Zacharias. As I indicated, it will have some bearing to 
tell the reasons why I went over to see Admiral Kimmel on this oc- 
casion. On the 8th of February 1941, I had a long conversation with 
Admiral Nomura in San Francisco. He was then enroute to 
Washington, D. C, as Ambassador. 



'6'2'Sd CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. From Japan ? 

Captain Zacharias. From Japan. 

Mr. Richardson. Was he one of the ambassadors who thereafter 
conducted, in part, the negotiations that took place with Secretary 
Hull? 

[8716] Captain Zacharias. He was. 

Mr. Richardson. Proceed. 

Captain Zacharias. I had indicated previously to Admital 
Richardson that I proposed to have such a conversation with Admiral 
Nomura when he came through San Francisco, and Admiral Richard- 
son expressed a desire to have a copy of the report which he knew I 
would submit after such a conversation, and for that reason, after 
Admiral Richardson was relieved on the first of February 1941 by 
Admiral Kimmel, I sent to Admiral Kimmel on the 11th of February 
1941, in a letter to Admiral Kimmel, a copy of the report on this con- 
ference with Admiral Nomura that I had sent to Admiral Stark. 

Wlien I arrived in Pearl Harbor with my ship after an overhaul 
period on the west coast I took the first opportunity to see Admiral 
Kimmel, and it occurred between the dates that I gave. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, why did you want to see Admiral Kimmel ? 

Captain Zacharias. I wanted to see Admiral Kimmel to find out 
if he had received the report, or whether or not this report of the 
conversation with Admiral Nomura had come to his attention. In 
addition to that I wanted to tell Admiral Kimmel of an incident which 
occurred on the [8717] 16th of October 1940, which had a bear- 
ing on future events as I saw them approaching. 

Incidentally, I think what I am about to relate was referred to as 
having caused Admiral Richardson to take his fleet out on a wild 
goose chase. I would like to clarify that point now by saying that 
this incident had no effect, as far as I could see, on influencing Admiral 
Richardson in any decision that he was to make as a result of it, 
which you will see from the incident itself. 

On October 16, 1940, as district intelligence officer at San Diego, 
I received a report from an intelligence reserve officer at the border, 
Tia Juana, or at San Jacinto opposite Tia Juana in Mexico, that he 
had something of the most vital importance and if I could not come 
down myself he requested that I send one of my best investigators. I 
could not go myself at that time, therefore I did select my most 
competent investigator to go down and find out what this was. 

When he arrived this reserve officer related to him information that 
had just come from an informant in Mexico which stated that a certain 
Japanese — who, incidentally, was on our No. 1 suspect list — had stated 
that on the following day, the iTth of October 1940, the Japanese 
were going to bomb four battleships. He had all the details, that it 
would be done by a force of 12 planes divided into [8718] four 
groups, one of whom in each group was to be a suicide plane and dive 
down the stack of each ship, and the other two would drop their bombs 
and get away, if possible. 

When this report came to me I took it in to the commandant of the 
district, and simultaneously I learned that Admiral Richardson had 
arrived on the west coast, at San Pedro, with three battleships and 
a heavy cruiser, indicating the four ships in this picture. 

Mr. Richardson. Wliere is San Pedro ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3237 

Captain Zachaeias. San Pedro is the seaport of Los Angeles. 
We notified Admiral Richardson that there was something of im- 
portance and requested that he remain on board while I come up by 
plane, which I did. I went aboard, related the story to Admiral Rich- 
ardson, and he said, "Are there any planes in this vicinity which might 
carry out such an attack?" I informed him that we could not assure 
him that there were not planes in Mexico, and further that there had 
been surreptitious activities along the coast by the Japanese vessels that 
we knew of, but we were not certain that there were not planes in 
Mexico with which the Japanese could carry out such an attack. 

Admiral Richardson considered that and then said, "We cannot 
ignore this." And I said, "Admiral, I think you are [8719] 
quite right." He said, "I will alert my antiaircraft batteries, and when 
3^ou return to San Diego you get in touch with Captain McCain," who 
was then the commanding officer at the naval air station at San 
Diego — "and tell him to be on the alert." I did that. I understand 
that the following morning Admiral Richardson sailed from San 
Pedro for San Francisco, where he was going anyhow, and possibly 
left a little before the time of his scheduled departure. 

I told Admiral Kimmel that full situation. 

[8720] Mr. Richardson. Did you see Admiral Kimmel then at 
the place you mentioned earlier in your testimony? 

Captain Zacharias. I did. As indicated, Admiral Kimmel then 
called in Captain Smith, and I proceeded to relate the circumstances 
of my interview with Admiral Nomura. He informed me he had 
received a copy of my report sent to Admiral Stark, and then I pro- 
ceeded to tell him of this incident on the 16th of October 1940. From 
that he went into a discussion of the general Japanese situation, the 
possibilities of what might occur in the future, Japanese attitudes, and 
the prospects of this situation being liquidated. 

Mr. Richardson. What do you mean by that, "liquidated" ? 

Captain Zacharias. The situation which then existed between Ja- 
pan and the United States, for which Admiral Nomura had come over 
to this country to handle if possible. 

Mr. Richardson. By the word "liquidated" you mean settled? 

Captain Zacharias. Settled; right. 

Mr. Richardson. Go ahead. 

Captain Zacharias. In the course of our discussions, Admiral Kim- 
mel asked me if the situation became extreme what I thought would 
occur. And this point is very important, because I think of a misun- 
derstanding that has been created [87:21] by something which 
has been said here about the date December 7 having been the date 
which I predicted. 

First I would like to say that Decemer 7 is a synonym for Pearl 
Harbor particularly in the memorandum which I later submitted to 
Admiral Draemel for Admiral Nimitz. 

This conversation with Admiral Kimmel was 9 months before Pearl 
Harbor, and I don't think there is any profession which would attempt 
to predict 9 months ahead the exact day that something would occur. 
I told Admiral Kimmel in this conversation that if the situation be- 
came such that Japan decided that they must go to war with us, that 
it would begin with an air attack on our fleet on a week-end and prob- 
ably a Sunday morning; that attack would be for the purpose of dis- 
abling four battleships. 



3238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Richardson. Wliy did 3^011 mention four battleships rather than 
three or five or seven ? 

Captain Zacharias. Four battleships was a number that I had de- 
termined in my own mind as the number that the Japanese felt they 
would have to reduce our fleet in order to prevent effective interference 
with any soulliern movement that they might want to make after 
declaring war with us. I will go into more detail on that later. 

Admiral Kinnnel then asked me how I thought they would 
[8722]^ effect such an attack. I said there are two methods, the 
least likely of which would be to bring in seaplanes, surreptitiously 
aboard merchant vessels, and land them in the lea of some of our 
islands that were sparsely populated and then on a selected day, 
weather permitting, they could make such an attack. 

He asked how that could be prevented. I said that could be pre- 
vented effectively by declaring a defensive sea area around the Ha- 
waiian Islands, in which case you notify all nations of the world and 
require all merchant vessels coming into that area to proceed through 
a specified point at which place we could conduct inspections. That 
would preclude any surreptitious entrance and prevent such a con- 
tingency of an attack by that method. 

However, I emphasized that the most probable method of attack 
would be by aircraft carriers supported by appropriate ships; that 
such an attack would come in undoubtedly from the northern because 
tha-t was the prevailing winds in the Hawaiian Islands: they would 
come in and launch their attack downwind, because of their concern 
over the possible loss of a single capital ship and for that reason after 
launching their planes, the ships and the force which brought the 
planes to launch them would retreat as quickly as possible directly 
upwind in order to escape any damage [^8723'] which they felt 
might come. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there discussion as to where this supposed 
expedition would start from ? 

Captain Zacharias. There was not. I would like to indicate at this 
point that although this conversation was 9 months prior to the actual 
attack on Pearl Harbor, it lasted for about an hour and a half, and 
concerned something in which the commander in chief of the Pacific 
Fleet would be vitally interested. However, I realize that Admiral 
Kimmel was a very busy man, that I was only one of hundreds to 
whom he talked, and it was quite possible that he could not remember 
the details of my conversation. 

However, his chief of staff, then Captain Smith, was present 
throughout the entire conversation, and I am sure that he remembers 
the details of that conversation, because he has discussed those details 
subsequent to the event, and for a considerable period after Pearl 
Harbor occurred. 

Mr. Richardson. Why did you think the attack would come on 
Sunday morning ? 

Captain Zacharias. I think it has been clearly indicated that the 
Japanese knew of our every movement in and out of Pearl Harbor, the 
situation existing in Hawaii prior to the attack on December 7. They 
well knew that on Sunday [8724] morning everyone took ad- 
vantage of the lack of drills to be excused from reporting in on Sunday 
morning. We call it being excused from Sunday morning quarters. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3239 

So that they would not have to report on that day. That applies to 
officers and men, and particularly to those who have families in Hawaii, 
in Honolulu. 

Mr. Richardson. Well 

Captain Zacharias, I might add there that Sunday morning is a 
time when eveiyone is enjoying their leisure and it is significant that 
8 o'clock in the morning, which was approximately the time of the 
attack, at 8 o'clock. That is the time when the watches change, when 
men are relieving others who have been on watch, and there is a certain 
amount of confusion existing at that time in the turn-overs which take 
place. 

Mr. Richardson. You spoke of Japanese knowledge in Hawaii. 
Was it a matter. Captain, of common knowledge in the Navy that 
there was present in Hawaii a large number of Japanese agents? 

Captain Zacharias. It was. In my conversations, and I must say 
that I kept in constant touch with not only the fleet intelligence officer, 
but also with the district intelligence officers, because I had a hand in 
setting up that organization beginning with my arrival there No- 
vember [8725] 13, 1940. Therefore, I had a direct interest in 
that organization and what they were accomplishing. It was believed 
that there existed in Hawaii at least a thousand enemy agents. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, do you know of anywhere that you 
have served, where the operations of a military force of either the 
Army or the Navy was subject to as concentrated an espionage as our 
establishment in Hawaii ? 

Captain Zacharias. I do not, and there is no other place comparable 
except in Panama where there was an unusually large group of Jap- 
anese barber shops before Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Richardson, Now, in this conversation, Captain, that you had 
with Admiral Kimmel, were the details of the reasons why you thought 
there would be an attack discussed between you ? 

Captain Zacharias. Only in a general way, but I think the reasons 
why I thought there would be an attack on the fleet if the situation 
became such that war between Japan and the United States was im- 
minent, I think that those reasons have a great bearing on everything 
that is before this committee. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there any discussion on the part of Admiral 
Kimmel in agreement with or opposition to your [8726] views? 

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. After outlining to him the proba- 
bilities and the methods by which the Japanese would make their 
attacks, in the second instance that of an attack by aircraft carriers, 
Admiral Kimmel asked me how I thought it could be prevented, and 
I stated that the only possible way of doing it would be to have a 
daily patrol out to cover the approach of the Japanese, and this patrol 
must go out at least 500 miles. 

To that Admiral Kimmel replied, "Well, we have neither the 
personnel nor the materiel with which to carry out such a patrol," 
and I replied to him, "Well, Admiral, you better get them because 
that is what is coming." 

Mr. Richardson. Do you, as a naval man know of any other way 
in which such an attack could be effectively guarded against than 
through distant patrol and discovery of the attacking planes either 
in carriers, or in the air, and an attack on those planes by fighter planes ? 



3240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Zachaeias. Only by learning of the approach of such a 
force and intercepting it with the fleet. 

Mr. Richardson. Where were you at the time of the attack? 

Captain Zacharias. I was in command of the Salt Lake City which 
was then 200 miles west of Oahu returning to [8727"] Pearl 
Harbor. 

Mr. Richardson. Now — go ahead. 

Captain Zacharias. I was with Admiral Halsey's force which had 
been to Wake Island to deliver the planes to the marines. 

Mr. Richardson. Between the time of this conversation with Ad- 
miral Kiminel, and the attack, were there any other discussions between 
you and any of the staff officers, or task commanders with respect to 
the probability of an attack on Hawaii from the air ? 

Captain Zacharias. There was. 

Mr. Richardson. I want to know whether it was a matter of general 
conversation, or simply a vague possibility? 

Captain Zacharias. There was. As 1 indicated while on sea duty, 
I devoted myself to reading and study of intelligence matters. For 
that reason I frequented the fleet intelligence office. The fleet intelli- 
gence officer, then Commander Layton, I knew well, and I had 
recommended him to Admiral Richardson for that job which he did 
in an excellent manner. 

[8728] In my visits to the fleet intelligence office and the public 
relations office I was enabled to keep track on the situation as it was 
developing and there came a period when I was somewhat concerned 
over the prospects. That is what prompted me to say at one time to a 
group of the staff assembled, I can't recall just who was present at the 
time 

Mr. Richardson. Where was it? 

Captain Zacharias. In the office of the commander in chief Pacific 
Fleet, the flag office. 

I was prompte'd to say, as recorded in this memorandum which has 
been presented to the committee, that "I think it is time to stop these 
surprise inspections and get ready for a surprise attack." These sur- 
prise inspections were methods by which the materiel conditions of 
the ships were ascertained without giving previous notice of visits by 
either division commanders or others. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there any rejoinder to that remark on your 
part from those present? 

Captain Zacharias. There was not. In the course of those con- 
versations I asked the fleet intelligence officer if he had presented 
to the war plans officer of the commander in chief a certain extract 
from a Japanese book which considered the pros and cons of success 
of an attack on Pearl [8729] Harbor. That is included in one 
of the papers that Avere presented to the committee by the Navy De- 
partment and I would like to refer to that later on. It is page 47 of 
the papers. 

Senator Lucas. What is the date of that conversation, sir? 

Captain Zacharias. That was in October 1941. I will bring that in 
when I discuss the reasons for my belief that an attack on Pearl 
Harbor would occur. 

Mr. Richardson. Between the time you had your first talk with 
Admiral Kimmel and the time you had this talk in the fall of 1941 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3241 

was the subject of a possible air attack on Pearl Harbor a matter of 
common or unusual discussion among the Navy people that you met in 
Hawaii ? 

Captain Zacharias. Because of my 

Mr. Richardson. Was it or not ? 

Captain Zacharias. There was general discussion of what would 
occur if we went to war with Japan. 

Mr, Richardson. Was there any general feeling that an attack, 
an air attack, surprise air attack was possible or probable or likely 
or improbable ? 

Captain Zacharias. There was not much expression of opinion. It 
was rather an acceptance of my opinion because of my background 
knowledge and any discussion was for the purpose of ascertaining what 
I thought in the premises, and [8730] I cannot recall any ob- 
jections to them or any attempt to belittle the possibilities. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there any discussion at any time prior to the 
attack between you and the other commanders of the task forces about 
the probability of an attack by air on Hawaii in the case of hostilities? 

Captain Zacharias. There was not. I was a little reluctant to im- 
pose my views here and there. I think most of the officers present knew 
of my background and if the task force commanders wanted any opin- 
ion from me they could ask for it. 

I discussed with Admiral Spruance, who was my division comman- 
der when I was in command of the Salt Lake City, the possibilities of 
the success of Admiral Nomura in preventing hostilities developing 
between Japan and the United States. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you believe he would be successful? 

Senator Brewster. I don't believe he had finished his answer. 

Mr. Richardson. Pardon me. Proceed. 

Captain Zacharias. In these conversations with Admiral Spruance 
there was nothing very definite. There was nothing definite regard- 
ing what would happen if we went to war. It was more with regard 
to the possible success of preventing war. Outside of that I did not 
talk to any task force commanders. 

[8731] I might say that I did at one time, or on several occasions, 
endeavor to engage in conversation the war plans officer of the com- 
mander in chief regarding the situation. On three separate occasions 
I endeavored to do so, but he was always preoccupied and I was never 
able to do so. It seemed rather strange to me at the time that he did 
not want to discuss it, so much so that I went to the fleet intelligence 
officer and questioned him about the attitude of this individual. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I ask at this point : Who was the 
war plans officer, by name ? 

Captain Zacharias. That was then Capt. C. H. McMorris, United 
States Navy, now Vice Admiral McMorris. 

As a result of what .^ took to be in the colloquial a "brush-off," I 
never discussed the situi ion with him although he was the war plans 
officer for the commandei in chief. 

The next time I discussed this with someone whom I considered of 
importance was with Mr. M imson. I had 

Mr. Richardson. Just a minute. He was a civilian? 

Captain Zacharias. He was a civilian, and who had come to Hawaii 
with a letter signed by Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, 

79716 — 46— pt. 7 22 



3242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

which he showed to me, Munson showed to me, statinor that he was 
there to investigate certain matters and everything was to be opened 
lip to him. 

[873^} Munson told me that he had been advised to get in touch 
with me because of my background knowledge of the Japanese. I had 
several conferences with him during the period of October 20 to 26, 
1941, and during those conversations I related to him every aspect of 
a possible attack. He was principally interested in whether or not 
there would be an armed uprising in Hawaii or on the west coast in 
case of a war between Japan and the United States. 

After relating to him everything that I had told to Admiral Kim- 
mel I told him that he could forget about an armed uprising or sabo- 
tage of any kind, that was categorical, because it would begin with an 
air attack on our fleet, and for that reason it would have to be con- 
ducted with the greatest secrecy and therefore no Japanese, regardless 
of their position in the United States or in Hawaii, would be aware of 
the fact that such an attack was coming. 

That being so, and knowing the gieat preparations that you have 
to make in an armed uprising or for (lie commission of sabotage, those 
contingencies were an impossibility, and I told him that I was con- 
vinced that hostilities would begin with an air attack on the fleet. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, during the period immediately be- 
fore the attack, do you know what distant reconnaissance was being 
carried on of your own knowledge ? 

[S733] Captain Zacharias. I do not. 

Mr. Richardson. You were with Halsey's task force ? 

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And your task force was ready for battle from the 
time you started up to the time of the attack, was it not ? 

Captain Zacharias. You mean from the date we left Pearl Harbor 
on the 28th of November 1941 ? 

Mr. Richardson. That is right. 

Captain Zacharias. We received no direct orders from Admiral 
Halsey, but the fleet went out ostensibly on routine training on that 
morning. About noon we changed course to the westward and headed 
for Wake Island. That was not the direction of the operating area 
and we knew that we were going on a different mission. 

As I recall. Admiral Halsey did not send out any specific orders to 
the ships of his course, at least to the cruisers, because there was no 
necessity. He had full knowledge undoubtedly of what might be 
impending and I assume that he was in a position to make any dispo- 
sitions necessary to meet any threat that we might encounter en route 
or returning from Wake Island. I knew that something unusual was 
occurring but was not quite certain. We did learn en route [87S4] 
that, through signal, that we were going to Wake Island to deliver 
planes to the Marines which the Enterprise had on board, that we 
would launch them about 100 miles east of Wake Island and then 
return to Pearl Harbor. We were originally scheduled to arrive back 
in Pearl Harbor on the 5th of December 1941, but we were delayed by 
fueling and weather, and, now I know because of certain orders, which 
did not speed us up, and we felt that was where our luck began because 
we were just 200 miles to the westward instead of being inside on 
December 7. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3243 

Mr. RicHAEDSON. Do you regard that as good luck or bad luck? 

Captain Zachakias. I regard that as good luck because as a com- 
mandmg officer of a ship I prefer to take my chances in the open sea 
rather than in an enclosed harbor. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, can you give us a little more information on 
certain orders that you later discovered had been transmitted, who 
transmitted them and what they were, generally ? 

Captain Zacharias. What orders? 

Mr. Richardson. You just said that you learned afterward of cer- 
tain orders which delayed you. I am wondering what those orders 
were. 

Captain Zacharias. Oh, that is only hearsay and what [8735] 
I have heard of the testimony before this committee. 

Mr. Richardson. I see. When knowledge of the attack came to 
you in fact the direction in which you were directed to search was to 
the south, was it not ? 

Captain Zacharias. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson, Did that surprise you ? 

Captain Zacharias. It did. I might qualify that by saying that in 
the numerous reports that we were receiving subsequent to the attack 
it was indicated that there was a Japanese force down to the south- 
ward, but still I could not reconcile them being there. 

Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Captain Zacharias. If I may, I indicated that I felt it important 
to present the reasons wdiy I thought an attack on Pearl Harbor or 
the fleet would occur. 

Mr. Richardson. Very well. Let me ask you preparatory to that. 
Captain, did you consider that the tension of the situation with the 
probability of war with Japan constantly increased during 1941 ? 

Captain Zacharias. It did. 

Mr. Richardson. And was there any time that it was as tense as 
it was during the week before the attack ? 

Captain Zacharias. I had, the week before the attack, [8736] 
having sailed on the 28th of November, which seems to have been the 
really turning point in the cituation, I received very little news en route 
to Wake Island except through radio press, which indicated that there 
had been some difficulty in the progress of the negotiations taking place 
in Washington. 

However, I had become somewhat concerned over certain events 
which had transpired in the interim or during 1941, such as the em- 
bargo and other things which were matters of policy. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, as the tenseness grew in your mind and with 
your experience did the danger of an air attack become greater and 
greater, as the tenseness continued ? 

Captain Zacharias. No, because I was always convinced that if the 
situation ever became such that hostilities between Japan and the 
United States were imminent that the Japanese would begin their cam- 
paign with an air attack on our fleet wherever it was. 

Mr. Richardson. What I am suggesting is that the condition of af- 
fairs, the information you had, growing tenseness of the situation, con- 
stantly made that danger greater? 

Captain Zacharias. It did not make the danger of an air attack any 
greater. It made the danger of hostilities become more imminent. 



3244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[8737] Mr. Richardson. As hostilities became more imminent 
the danger of an air attack increased? 

Captain Zacharias. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. No further questions. 

Captain Zacharias. Now may I go ahead with the reasons why 
I thought that there would be an air attack ? 

Senator Lucas. Will you move closer to the microphone, please. 

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. 

There were four very good reasons why I felt that in case of hostili- 
ties between the United States and Japan it would begin with an air 
attack on our jfleet. 

First of all, the Japanese could be counted upon not to commit the 
grave strategical blunder of making a movement to the southward with- 
out disabling a part of our fleet and that is in spite of the fact that we 
had in Pearl Harbor at the time a force considerably inferior to the 
Japanese Fleet, namely, about 180 ships in the Japanese Fleet to 102 
of ours. 

That was because the Japanese well knew if they made a movement 
to the southward that before we would be able to assemble an expedi- 
tionary force with which to take the offensive against them we would 
be able to bring around from the Atlantic coast the rest of our fleet 
which would have [8738] then made us superior to the Jap- 
anese, even if that fleet had to go around the Horn. 

[8739] The Japanese are great students. They know everything 
that has been written about the fundamentals of warfare. They know 
all of the lessons of history, and they could be counted upon to utilize 
everything that has been written about it. 

They rtali?pd the value of surprise as one of the fundamental prin- 
ciples of warfare. They used it at Port Arthur with tremendous suc- 
cess. Therefore, it could be certain that they would use it again at 
Pearl Harbor if they could do it with fair safety. 

I have already indicated that the Japanese weighed in their minds 
the probability of success of such an attack on Pearl Harbor. They 
have written several books and those books, I might say, are always 
released under the auspices of the military in Japan, because of the 
complete government control and censorship. 

In those books they have discussed the probability of success in war 
with the United States. In this particular book, which is entitled 
"When Japan Fights," written ostensibly by a civilian named Hirata, 
he discussed the pros and cons, and I think it might be well to read 
that. It is very short, and is included at page 47, 1 think, of the papers 
which were given to the committee. 

He says : 

[87'i0] The American Commander-in-Chief has been occupied by various 
secret plans, but the three points about which he is the most concerned are: 

(1) Will a Japanese fast striking force made up of cruisers and aircraft 
carriers come on a scouting or striking mission? 

(2) Will Japanese submarines hover near the islands to attack or harass the 
Fleet? 

(3) Will a Japanese expeditionary force be sent overseas? 

The first of these is the most fearsome. Suppose Japan were to form a fast 
striking force composed of such speedy battleships (whose speed America 
cannot match) as the Haruna, Kongo, and Kirishimn, the aircraft carriers Akagi 
and Riiujo and the Nachl class of heavy cruisers? This would be a fast-stepping 
force that would be truly matchless and invicible. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3245 

Were they opposed to even the large guns of American battleships, they could 
utilize their superior speeds, thus leaving their slow adversaries behind. If 
opposed to a cruiser force, they could close in with telling blows, crush the 
opposition. Truly this would be a peerless force ; able to close to battle, or open 
out, if outgunned. If this fast striking force should meet misfortune, losing 
one [87-'fl] or two fast battleships or aircraft carriers, they would surely 
be a severe blow to Japan, and we would have to grit our teeth, smothering our 
rage until the day of a decisive main engagement to obtain our revenge. 

Maybe such a bold venture would be too great a risk, who can say? On the 
other hand, warfare is a risk, and he who hesitates, or fears the risks of bold 
venture, cannot wage war. 

Moreover, an attack off Hawaii would be the first battle of the Pacific war, 
and if in the very first engagement one can wrest the courage away from the 
enemy by one's own daring, it would put him in a funk or give him the Jitters. 

[574^] Mr. EiCHARDsoN. Was that book at all widely read among 
naval men? 

Captain Zacharias. It was read by our officers who knew the 
Japanese language. In fact, this translation was made in the fleet 
intelligence office at Hawaii and, as I have indicated, a copy of this 
extract was given to the war plans officer about October 1941. That 
was the third indication. 

The fourth indication that they would attack, open the war by an 
attack on our fleet was somewhat strengthened by this incident which 
occurred in Mexico on October 16, 1940. 

We had always known through discussions of the 5-5-3 ratio that 
Japan was anxious to have the number of capital ships reduced because 
they felt that with a 5-5-3 ratio it was possible for us to arrive in the 
theater of operations in Asia with more than parity. That is what 
crystallized in my mind the fact that they would make an attack on 
our fleet for the purpose of betting 4 battleships. Four battleships 
out of our number, which were then 15, excluding the 2 new ones 
which we had not yet commissioned, would have reduced us to 11. 
One battleship they knew was always in the navy yard under over- 
haul, bringing us down to 10. Under the treaty they were allowed 
9 battleships, but, as expected, they had rearmed the Hiyei, which 
brought them up to 10, or what they considered a parity with us. 

[574-5] As we know, the intensity of their attack was directed 
toward the battleships and I think my impressions were confirmed. 
Those were the four reasons why I felt certain that hostilities with 
Japan would begin with an air attack on our fleet. 

Now, I would like to jump back to my conversation with Admiral 
Kimmel, to say that in the precautions that I felt we should take I 
indicated that there would be earliest indications of hostilities and un- 
mistakable signs of hostilities. 

Among the earliest indications I told him would be the withdrawal 
of their merchant ships to Japan. We had long realized that and had 
kept a complete track of the location of every Japanese merchant vessel 
throughout the world. I started that system myself in 1935 in the 
Office of Naval Intelligen- e. 

The other early indication would be preparations or, rather, de- 
ceptive measures in which they would engage, some of which developed. 
The unmistakable signs, as I pointed out to Admiral Kimmel, would 
be the appearance of submarines in the Hawaiian area, in which case 
he could well realized that the Japanese were then ready to strike. 

In my conversations with Mr. Munson there was one additional 



3246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

indication which I gave to him and that was that we ah'eady had two 
Japanese envoys in Washington, Admiral Nomura and Mr. Knriisu; 
that when the third envoy arrived they could [8744-1 definitely 
look for things to break one way or the other. 

I learned over the radio on the 3d of December that the Japanese 
Ambassador to Peru, Mr. Sakamoto, had arrived in Washington and 
that made me feel that the situation was coming to a head. 

Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions. 

The Chairman. I did not have the privilege of hearing your testi- 
mony up to now because I was unavoidably absent and I may ask a 
question or two that has already been covered. 

You just spoke of the Peruvian Japanese Minister arriving in 
Washington on the 3d of December. 

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Where were you at that time? 

Captain Zacharias. I was in command of the Salt Lake City. We 
were then en route to Pearl Harbor from Wake Island. 

The Chairman. From Wake? 

Saptain Zacharias. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. When did you arrive at Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Zacharias. On the morning of — at noon on the 8th of 
December. 

The Chairman. On the 8th. After the attack? 

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You got this information about the Peruvian 
Minister or Ambassador on the 3d by radio you say? 

[87451 Captain Zacharias. By radio ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You had a radio receiving set on board the ship ? 

Captain Zacharias. We had many sets ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And you got it through a radio ? 

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you know whether the officers in charge of the 
Pearl Harbor installations in the fleet and particularly Admiral Kim- 
mel. Admiral Bloch or General Short, had that information about the 
Peruvian Minister coming here on the third ? 

Captain Zacharias. It is possible they had the information regard- 
ing his arrival but I had not indicated to them that that would have 
any bearing on the subsequent events because I did not know in my 
conversations with Admiral Kimmel that there would be even a second 
ambassador arriving. 

The Chairman. You don't know what his reaction to that would 
have been if he had known it ? 

Captain Zacharias. I do not know, sir. 

The Chairman. Were you stationed at Pearl Harbor or in the 
Hawaiian Islands when you had this conversation in March with 
Admiral Kimmel? 

Captain Zacharias. I was in command of the heavy cruiser Salt 
Lake City and I have already indicated in my testimony [57-^] 
why I sought this conference with Admiral Kimmel and that was to 
discuss, to make certain he had received the report of my conference 
with Admiral Nomura which I had given in detail to Admiral Stark 
in a letter to Admiral Stark. 

The Chairman. Maybe you have already stated it. What was Ad- 
miral Kimmel's reaction to that prediction ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3247 

Captain Zacharias. What he stated ? I did state, sir. 

The Chairman. All right. State it again, please. 

Captain Zacharias. He said to me, "Well, we have neither the per- 
sonnel nor the materiel with which to carry out this patrol." I had 
indicated to him that the only way to prevent this air attack which 
would come down wind from the northward because that was the pre- 
vailing wind in Hawaii, was to have out patrols at least 500 miles then, 
and he stated that he had neither the personnel nor materiel with 
which to carry out such patrols and I said to him, "Well, Admiral, 
you better get them because that is what is coming." 

The Chairman. You formed your conclusion as to what was coming 
from your general knowledge of the situation, together with your ex- 
perience, your long experience in the Intelligence Division ? 

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir. 

The Chairman, You did not have the benefit of any magic or in- 
tercepted messages at the time you formed your conclusion [874^^ 
and at the time you transmitted your conclusion to Admiral Kimmel? 

Captain Zacharias. No, sir ; I did not. I did have some knowledge 
of certain messages which dealt with the Far Eastern situation in 
general but I would not say that I had access to any which really bore 
upon the events which followed. 

The Chairman. Have you read those intercepted messages as they 
have been filed with the committee ? 

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Have you read the messages about which Admiral 
Kimmel and General Short have testified as being messages to which 
thej were entitled and which might have changed their course of 
action if they had had them ? 

Captain Zacharias. Those which were not decoded, I think, until 
after Pearl Harbor. 

The Chairman. No, some of them were decoded. 

Senator Brewster. But not communicated. 

The Chairman. But not communicated. They were decoded but not 
communicated to them. 

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir ; I now recall them. 

The Chairman, As an Intelligence Officer I would like to ask your 
opinion as to whether those messages if transmitted would have given 
any additional information as to the immediate likelihood of an attack 
on Pearl Harbor? 

[8748] Captain Zacharias. I can state the effect that they would 
have had on me but I cannot state what effect they would have had on 
Admiral Kimmel or General Short. 

The Chairman. Well, I realize that but just for my own — not curi- 
osity exactly — but for my own information, I would like to get an 
opinion as to what reaction they would have had on you. 

Captain Zacharias. What opinion I would have had ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Captain Zacharias. Why, I can state positively if I had had access 
to those messages it would have further confirmed my opinion as to 
what took place. 

The Chairman. Those messages, outside of the one carving up the 
Pearl Harbor region or area into five different sections for the ships 
to be parked — that is not the naval word. 



3248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. Docked. 

The Chairman. Docked or berthed pertain to the 

Captain Zacharias. The five different what, sir ? 

The Chairman. One of those messages was an intercept of a mes- 
sage between the Hawaiian Islands and Tokyo indicating the dividing 
up of the harbor into five sections and the berthing of the ships there, 
which might have indicated tliey had some particular interest in that 
in Pearl Harbor, but outside of that, as I recall, the other messages 
were dealing with [8?'4^\ the general situation between Japan 
and the United States and the growing tensity of it. Would those 
messages outside of that one, would those messages have indicated 
anv additional likelihood of an attack upon Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Zacharias. Yes, I think I can say categorically that those 
messages would have had a very distinct effect on my opinion. 

Tlie Chairman. Now, this book from which j'ou have quoted here, 
you say that the part you read was translated and distributed among 
the naval officers ? 

Captain Zacharias. I do not know the distribution but this copy 
was given to me by the fleet intelligence officer because it was trans- 
lated in that office and I picked it up in the course of my conversations 
with them and my interest in the situation. 

The Chairman. That was in October? 

Captain Zacharias. About October. 

The Chairman. 1941? 

Captain Zacharias. 1941, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Well, that is all I will ask at the moment. I am at 
a disadvantage because I did not hear the rest of the testimony. 
Congressman Cooper. 

The Vice Chairman. That fleet intelligence officer you referred 
to. Captain, was the fleet intelligence officer of the [8750'\ 
Pacific Fleet under the command of Admiral Kimmel ? 

Captain Zacharias. He was the first fleet intelligence officer of 
the Pacific Fleet and later, as the name was changed — first he was 
fleet intelligence officer of the United States Fleet and when it was 
changed later to the Pacific Fleet he became fleet intelligence officer 
of the Pacific Fleet. He had been there for quite a considerable time 
before Pearl Harbor. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, at the time you received this copy that 
you have read to the committee he was then Admiral Kimmel's 
intelligence officer? 

Captain Zacharias. That is correct. 

The Chairman. Would you allow me to ask one question that I 
have overlooked? 

The Vice Chairman. Yes. 

The Chairman. What, from your experience, your long experience 
in the Intelligence Division of the Navy, what is the prac tice of naval 
officers in the Navy Department in transmitting diplomatic messages 
to naval officers in the field or in the waters where they are in command ? 

Captain Zacharias. I think the general policy is to give such mes- 
sages only to those who need to know their existence. 

The Chairman. There is a general policy that from such [8751'\ 
messages as are received initially anywhere an estimate of the situation 
is drawn and that is transmitted to the conmianding officers both in 
the Navy and War Departments, is it? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COIMMITTEE 3249 

Captain Zacharias. I did not get tliat. 

The Chairman. Instead of sending each individual diplomatic 
message that is picked up in general for any reason or from any source 
to the commanding officers in the field or in the waters in which the 
Navy may be operating, is it the practice to send them an estimate, a 
general estimate of the situation dra^Yn from those messages that are 
received in the Department as a whole? 

Captain Zacharias. Either or both of those methods are employed. 

The Chairman. Either or both? 

Captain Zacharias. Yes. 

The Chairman. All right. 

The Vice Chairman. Captain, would you give us a little more 
information as to why you considered the arrival of the third Japanese 
envoy so important? 

Captain Zacharias. The reasons as to why I felt that the arrival 
of a third envoy in Washington would precipitate a decision, that 
came through experience in intelligence work and our observation of 
the many Japanese missions which came over to this country on in- 
spection trips or purchasing mis- [87S2] sions. 

We noticed that almost invariably when they went to a certain in- 
dustrial activity they were interested in one particular thing in that 
plant. Depending on its importance, a second mission would come 
and go to that same plant and showed an interest only in that particular 
piece of machinery or whatever it was. They would be followed by 
a third group, who would go through the same procedure and after 
the visit of the third group all interest in that plant and that particular 
item would disappear. 

In my mind I formulated the opinion that the Japanese would not 
accept the view of a single individual; that two individuals usually 
resulted in a controversy. Therefore, it was necessary to have the 
opinion of a third one before they would reach their decision. That 
is typical and in line with everything Japanese. 

The Vice Chairman. It is part of their way of operating, to do 
everything three times before they reach a decision ? 

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir, and that is possibly the 
reason why even in their most important operations they have in the 
past taken away the initiative from the commander in chief and 
required him to get his detailed instructions from Tokyo before 
he would make any move. 

I feel that that every condition was responsible for in [876S^ 
some degree our success at Midway. Ordinarily when a force is 
coming in to make a surprise attack, as they were doing again at 
Midway, a commander in chief would know that he had been dis- 
covered when they spotted a patrol plane of ours 2 days before and 
would then retire to a sector and come in at a later date. The com- 
mander in chief was not empowered to make any such decision and by 
the time, I assume, that he was able to contact Tokyo and get per- 
mission to change his plan it was too late. 

I give that as an indication that decisions by the Japanese are never 
confined to a single individual or even two. 

The Chairman. And you' cite that instance as something that 
actually happened that contributed to our success in the Battle of 
Midway? 



3250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir; that was known ; that information 
had been furnished to Mr. Munson and, as I indicated in the memo- 
randum, I talked with a third party, went over the details of this thin<^ 
completely the ni^jht before I sailed for Wake Island. The night 
before was November 27, 1941 ; and that was with Mr. Lorrin Thurston, 
the head of the Honolulu Advertiser and the head of Station KGU 
in Honolulu, who was a Military Intelligence Reserve officer, a captain. 

The Vice Chairman. He was a captain in the United States 
[87S4] Army? 

Captain Zacharias. Yes, Military Intelligence Reserve and, as I 
indicated in that memorandum, he expressed surprise that he had not 
been informed as to what to send out over his radio when the air attack 
came. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, now, I want to try to understand you a 
little more clearly, Captain, about this — what was his name, Thurs- 
ton? 

Captain Zacharias. L-o-r-r-i-n T-h-u-r-s-t-o-n ; Lorrin Thurston, 

The Vice Chairman. Well, was he at that time a captain in the 
United States Army? 

Captain Zacharias. He was a captain in the Military Intelligence 
Reserve of the United States Army, not on active duty. 

The Vice Chairman. Not on active duty ? 

Captain Z\CHARiAS. Right. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, was that a civilian radio station that he 
had or was it a military radio station ? 

Captain Zacharias. That was one of the two civilian radio stations 
on the Island of Oahu. 

The Vice Chairman. And just what was it you told him? 

Captain Zacharias. I related to him the entire probability of events 
as I have already testified and that is [S'/SS] what caused him 
to say to me with an expression of surprise, "Why, I am here and a 
Reserve intelligence officer in G-2 and I have not been given any indi- 
cation of what I should send out over the radio in the event of an air 
attack." 

I said to him, "Well," I said, "if you say, 'We are having a sporadic 
air attack; there is no reason for alarm. Everyone should keep in- 
doors because if you go on the streets you will interfere with the mili- 
tary going to their posts. Just stay at home and keep calm.' " 

And I might say that on the morning of December 7 when the com- 
munications officer brought me the word around 8 o'clock that Oahu 
had been attacked, I turned on my radio and almost those exact words 
were going out over KGU. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, now, I cannot sav that I understand 
this. I am sure it is my fault but I am sorry. I still do not quite under- 
stand just the status of that officer. You say he was not on active duty? 

Captain Zacharias. He was not on active duty. 

The Vice Chvirman. Then you sav he was working with the Army 
intelligence office. Now, what does that mean ? 

Captain Zvchartar. I did not say he was working with the intelli- 
gence office. I said that he was an intelligence officer in the Military 
Reserve not on active duty but I happened to know that he was con- 
sulted from time to time by the 18756] Army because he was 
a very prominent citizen in Hawaii by reason of those two positions 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3251 

he occupied, but I inject that only to indicate that up to the very last 
moment these ideas that I had were being passed along as freely as 
possible. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, the reason I got the impression that he 
was connected with the Army intelligence office there in Hawaii was 
your statement that you said he was surprised that he had not been 
told about that because he was connected with the Army intelligence 
office. 

Captain Zachaeias. Well, if I conveyed the impression that that 
was being critical of the Army for not advising him 1 ask to correct 
that because it was not. That was only incidental and the surprise 
was on his part. 

[87S7] There were no implications in that. I only brought that 
in to further substantiate the fact that I was carrying all these things 
along in my own mind. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, you told us about your conversation with 
Admiral Kimmel in which you gave him the information that you here 
related, and then you state that you conveyed substantially the same 
opinion, or expressed the same views to Captain Layton. 

Captain Zacharias. No, sir ; I did not say that I had expressed those 
same views to Captain Layton. Undoubtedly in our many conversa- 
tions, possibilities and probabilities were discussed, but I did not say 
that I had given Layton specifically an outline of what I had expected. 
I assume that he would arrive at similar conclusions because of his 
experience in intelligence, and knowledge of the Japanese. He was 
also a Japanese language officer. 

The Vice Chairman. And you had served with him, and it was on 
your recommendation that he was appointed in the positions he was 
then holding? 

Captain Zacharias. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, who else, if anybody, besides Admiral 
Kimmel. did you tell substantially this same thing to? 

Captain Zacharias. I think those were all. As I said [8758'] 
before, I was on duty there in the Hawaiian area. I already expressed 
myself to Admiral Kimmel and his chief of staff. I felt if there was 
anything further that they wanted from me, they knew where I was, 
and they could get it. 

The Vice Chairman. You were not at that time in the intelligence 
service of the Navy ? 

Captain Zacharias, I was not, except indirectly, because I had been 
admonished by a former director of naval intelligence when I com- 
pleted a certain tour of duty in naval intelligence, when he said to me 
"Although you are now leaving this office to go to sea, you must 
consider yourself as continuing your active intelligence work. I hope 
you will feel that way and continue to do so, because of your back- 
ground and the value that it will have to the Navy, and generally 
in the future." 

In other words, he gave me a commission to continue intelligence 
work even while I was afloat, and I proceeded to do so, even to the 
extent of engaging in certain counter-espionage activities, while I was 
aboard ship. 

The Vice Chairman. I believe you stated you had directly, or in 
an indirect way, about 25 years' experience in naval intelligence work? 

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir. 



3252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[8759] The Vice Chairman. Then the greater part of your 37 
years' service in the Navy has been devoted to that line of work? 

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir; although the portions 
afloat, as I have indicated, were during my spare time, because all 
Japanese language officers well realized that in order to have the possi- 
Ibility of promotion by selection in addition to their specialty, they had 
to be good naval officers. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, one other inquiry, if I may, please, 
Captain. 

This information that you say you conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, 
was that based upon your general knowledge of the Japanese, and the 
relations existing between Japan and the United States, or was any 
part of that directly the result of your conversation with Admiral 
Nomura ? 

Captain Zacharias. I think I can say categorically that it was prin- 
cipally my background experience, and not the result of the conver- 
sation with Admiral Nomura. I had hoped that he might be able to 
arrive at a successful solution to the situation between Japan and the 
United States. I might say after my conversation with him, I was 
not too hopeful, but I felt — I knew that — I will stick to my original 
expression, I felt that he was quite anxious [8760] to prevent 
a war between Japan and the United States, because he had always 
said to me that if Japan and the United States went to war, it would 
mean the finish of the Japanese Empire and a great loss to the United 
States. He reiterated that in my conversation with him in San Fran- 
cisco on February 8, 1941 . 

The Vice Chairman. Well, you sought this conference with Admiral 
Nomura in San Francisco, then, did you ? 

Captain Zacharias. I did, and \^hen I had previously notified the 
commander in chief of the United States Fleet, Admiral Richardson, 
that I proposed to do so, he liked the idea and asked me to send him 
a copy of the report of that conversation immediately after it was 
completed. 

The Vice Chairman. And you were then serving as naval intelli- 
gence officer at San Francisco ? 

. Captain Zacharias. No, sir, I was then in command of the heavy 
cruiser. Salt Lake City, which had recently come into Mare Island to 
be overhauled, and an implementation of her armament. 

The Vice Chairman. Had you been ordered, directed, or had a 
suggestion come to you that you have such a conversation with Ad- 
miral Nomura? 

Captain Zacharias. Only through the attitude of Admiral Richard- 
son when I indicated to him that I had known [8761] Admiral 
Nomura intimately in Japan, and on subsequent occasions of his visit 
to the United States, 'that I had found him the one Japanese who was 
willing and never embarrassed hj discussing situations, and I felt if 
anybody could get from him an expression of opinion as to the real 
mission for which he was sent over, that I could do it. I felt there was 
only one other person in the United States with whom he would talk 
as franlcly, and that was Admiral W. V. Pratt, retired. 

The Vice Chairman. You had known Admiral Nomura in Japan ? 

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. How long were you stationed in Japan, Cap- 
tain? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3253 

Captain Zacharias. The first time about 3 years. 

The Vice Chaikman. Were you naval attache at our Embassy there? 

Captain Zacharias. I was an attache at tlie Embassy for the purpose 
of learning the language and studying the people. It was during that 
period that I first met Admiral Nomura. He was then director of 
naval intelligence in Japan. 

The Vice Chairman. All told, how much time have you spent in 
Japan ? 

[8762] Captain Zacharias. About 4 j-ears. I went back to the 
Asiatic Fleet in 1926 for a specific purpose, and on my way back from 
the Asiatic Fleet I was in Japan for a period of something over 6 
months, to refresh my knowledge of both the language, the people, 
and the situation. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, after your conversation with Admiral 
Richardson, in which he indicated at least to you that he thought it 
might be well for you to talk to Admiral Nomura, you then did have 
the conversation with him ? 

Captain Zacharias. I did, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And you reported by way of a memorandum 
on that conversation to Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations ? 

Captain Zacharias. I wrote a personal and very lengthy letter to 
Admiral Stark, a copy of which you have in the papers that were 
furnished by the Navy Department to the committee, and I received 
a reply from Admiral Stark, a copj^ of which also has been furnished 
to you, in which he indicated that my letter to him was very interesting 
and illuminating, and he had sent the original over to the President 
and had made copies for the Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary 
of State. 

[876'S] The Vice Chairman, I believe you state that copies were 
sent to Admiral Kimmel and in your conversation with him he told 
you he had received it. 

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now what was the occasion for your writing 
the memorandum to the other Admiral ; Admiral Draemel ? 

Captain Zacharias. That memorandum, as you recall, was written 
on March IT, 1942. The specific purpose of that memorandum was to 
advise Admiral Nimitz, then commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, 
of the situation existing in Hawaii as I saw it, and to indicate to him 
that if certain steps were not taken to change the situation existing 
there that he could expect something even more disastrous than what 
took place at Pearl Harbor. 

As you know, that situation eventuated less than 3 months later and 
precipitated the battle of Midway. At that time, as you know, the 
Japanese were approaching Hawaii with an overpowering force for 
the purpose of capturing Hawaii after Midway. 

I must say that I felt that we were very fortunate in the conclusion 
of that campaign. I know that Admiral Nimitz felt that way after 
the battle of Midway had finished. 

Now, as I say, this memorandum was prepared for Vice Admiral 
Nimitz of the situation then existing. I was very [8764] much 
concerned in what had not been done regarding Japanese agents in 
Hawaii subsequent to Pearl Harbor, the inspections of various locali- 
ties and everything else as is outlined in this memorandum. 



3254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I was still the commanding officer of a ship and it took a good deal 
of deliberation on my part to decide to go over to the commander in 
chief and present my views to him. However, because of my back- 
ground in intelligence and knowing that I was the senior, the one 
officer in the United States Navy who had such a background of knowl- 
edge regarding the Japanese, and in intelligence work, I felt it my duty 
to advise him of the situation as I saw it, and I proceeded to have a 
conversation with Admiral Draemel, his chief of staff, to see what 
he might suggest. 

After going over all these details with him, which included a com- 
plete analysis of the situation prior to Pearl Harbor, and that was 
given to Admiral Draemel for the sole purpose of letting him know 
my background and to let him know, or, rather, to convince him that I 
knew what I was talking about, that was the sole purpose of giving 
him this pre-Pearl Harbor background. 

After my conversation, and the relation of it was given to him, he 
said, ''Well, now, I agree with you j^ractically 99 percent and I wish 
you would write that out for me in the [8766] form of a mem- 
orandum so I can give it to Admiral Nimitz to read, and then if he 
wants to discuss it with you further he can do so." 

I told him I would be very glad to do that. I returned to my ship 
and wrote out the memorandum as exactly as possible as our conver- 
sation had taken place and gave it to him. 

The Vice Chairman. Then on March 17, 1942, when you wrote this 
memorandum to Admiral Nimitz, you were then in the Pacific Fleet? 

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir. I was a subordinate. 

The Vice Chairman. And in command of the cruiser Salt Lake 
City? 

Captain Zacharias. In command of the cruiser Salt Lake City. 

The Vice Chairman. I believe you stated. Captain, that you were 
graduated from the Naval Academy in 1912. 

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. From what State were you appointed? 

Captain Zacharias. Florida. 

The Vice Chairman. And you have been in the Navy continuously 
since then? 

Captain Zacharias. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. That is all. Thank you. 

\_87GG\ The Chairman. Senator George had to leave to go to 
the floor. Congressman Clark is not here. Senator Lucas. 

Senator Lucas. Captain, you told the committee a few moments 
ago that in October 1941, you attempted, on three different occasions, 
to discuss the Japanese situation from the standpoint of a surprise 
attack with Captain Layton. Is that right? 

Captain Zacharias. No, sir. This was with Captain McMorris — 
and it was not to discuss the possibilities of an air attack, it was to 
discuss the current situation of our relations with Japan. 

Senator Lucas. Well, why did you want to see Captain McMorris 
at that time? 

Captain Zacharias. Because he was the war plans officer and I knew 
that he would be drawing up any procedures for eventualities. 

Senator Lucas. What did you have in mind discussing with Captain 
McMorris ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3255 

Captain Zacharias. I would have discussed with him the 
probabilities. 

Senator Lucas. Of an air attack ? 

Captain Zacharias. Of what might eventuate. I think I would 
have related to him then everything I had told Admiral [5767] 
Kimmel, because it was just at that same period that I had the con- 
versations with Mr. Munson. 

Senator Lucas. Why were you so free with Munson with respect 
to the possibility of an air attack and yet you did not pass it on in 
October 1941 to the proper authorities in Hawaii ? 

Captain Zacharias. I had already passed it along to Admiral 
Kimmel. 

Senator Lucas. Yes ; you had done that back in March 1941. 

Captain Zacharias. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. Did it ever occur to you, as the tense situation 
developed between this country and Japan, to again repeat that to 
Admiral Kimmel? 

Captain Zacharias. I have already indicated that Admiral Kim- 
mel and his chief of staff knew that I was a commanding officer in 
his fleet, and I felt that if he wanted any further information from 
me he knew where he could find me. I did not again go over to bring 
myself to his attention, because I long since learned that when you 
are persistent in these things you arouse certain feelings which nullify 
the effect which you desire to produce. 

Senator Lucas. Did you feel that they considered you a sort of a 
nuisance for interfering with their own decisions [8768] when 
you made suggestions of this kind? 

Captain Zacharias. No, sir; there was no indication of that. 
Why Captain McMorris did not want to discuss it I do not know, 
but it so impressed me after the third attempt that I went in to 
Commander Layton and said, "What is the matter with Captain 
McMorris? I tried to engage him in a conversation about this situa- 
tion but he does not feel like talking about it." And the intelligence 
officer indicated to me he did not know any reason why he should not 
want to discuss it. 

Senator Lucas. You were a very good friend of Captain Layton? 

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. I understand you recommended him. 

Captain Zacharias. I did. 

Senator Lucas. Was it Layton you recommended for the position 
he held in the fleet at that time ? 

Captain Zacharias. That is correct. I might add that I was also a 
good friend of Captain McMorris and he is a classmate of mine. 

Senator Lucas. Now did you discuss with Layton at any time in 
October 1941 the possibilities of an air attack and give to him the 
substance of the conversation that you gave to Munson? 

Captain Zacharias. No; only I think I discussed with him 
[87 Gf^] the fact that Munson had sought me out, and what I had 
gone over with him I cannot recall. 

Senator Lucas. Why did you consider Munson more important 
than Layton? 

Captain Zacharias. Because Munson had come out with a letter 
signed "H. R. Stark," to open up everything to him. That letter 



3256 CONGRESSI