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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
. OF THE PEAEL HAKBOE ATTACK
CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27 />^
(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress)
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
7
PART 7
JANUARY 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 AND 29, 1946
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I'
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOK ATTACK
CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NIXTH CONGRESS ^^3)^^^
SECOND SESSION - /^
PURSUANT TO ^ M ^^
S. Con. Res. 27 ^i'fi,
ft. 7
(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress) * /
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON TEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1041, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 7
JANUARY 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, AND 29, 1946
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigutiou of the Pearl Harbor Attacli
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79716 WASHINGTON : 194G
«. «. SWPERIMTENDPMT OF OOCUM£«» O^ H
SEP 23 I94S
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California
gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin
North Carolina
COUNSEL
(Throiish January 14, 1946)
William D. ^Mitchell, General Counsel
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Ansistant Counsel
JULE M. Hanxaford, Assistant Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
(After January 14, 1946)
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel
Samuel H. Kaufman. Associate General Counsel
JOHN E. masten, Assistant Counsel
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel
HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
Pages
Transcript
Hearings
No.
pages
1
1- 399
1- 1058
Nov,
. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2
401- 982
1059- 2586
Nov
. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945,
3
983-1583
2587- 4194
Dec.
5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4
1585-2063
4195- 5460
Dec.
14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5
2065-2492
5461- 6646
Dec.
31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6
2493-2920
6647- 7888
Jan.
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7
2921-3378
7889- 9107
Jan.
22, 23, 24, 25. 26, 28 and 29, 1946.,
8
3379-3927
9108-10517
Jan.
30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9
3929-4599
10518-12277
Feb.
7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10
4601-5151
12278-13708
Feb.
15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11
5153-5560^
13709-14765
Apr.
9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
No.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22 through 25
26
27 through 31
32 through 33
34
35
36 through 38
39
Exhibits Nos.
1 through 6.
7 and 8.
9 through 43.
44 through 87.
88 through 110.
Ill through 128.
129 through 156.
157 through 172.
173 through 179.
180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
Roberts Commission Proceedings.
Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.
IV
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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VI
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
Pages
5080-5089
3826-3838
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
163-181
"'418-423'
"451-464'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
"87'-'b"
205
B223-224"
B65-66
B229-231
49-51
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
^1 1 1 M : 1 Ml 1 1 : ! 1 1 M i I : 1 1 !
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
495-510
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
4125-4151
1695-1732
2745-278.5"
4186-4196
3190-3201"
1928-1965
3642-3643
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
179-184
"105-114"
96-105
74-85
""368-378"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
Pages
478-483,
301-310
1171-1178"
1178-1180"
1659-1663,
170-198
"812-843,"
1538-1571
504-509
2-32"
365-368
1747-1753"
1
Craige, Nelvin L., Lt. Col
Creighton, John M., Capt. (USN)
Crosley, Paul C, Comdr
Curley, J. J. (Ch/CM)
Curts, M. E., Capt., USN
Daubin, F. A., Capt., USN
Da'vidson, Howard C, Maj. Gen
Da-vis, Arthur C, Rear Adm
Dawson, Harry L
Deane, John R., Maj. Gen
DeLany, Walter S., Rear Adm
Dickens, June D., Sgt
Dillingham, Walter F
Dillon, James P
Dillon, John H., Maj
Dingeman, Ray E., Col
Donegan, William Col
Doud, Harold,' Col
Dunlop, Robert H., Col
Dunning, Mary J
Dusenbury, Carhsle Clyde, Col
Dyer, Thomas H., Capt., USN
Earle, Frederick M., W/0___
Earle, John Bayliss, Capt., USN
INDEX OF WITNESSES
VII
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VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
i ! ii i i i i i i i 1 i i i ! !^§-2 i 'M^^^
E 1 i iri : : : 1 i 1 1 1 1 ! : ! icJ:-^? : ij^^^oo
s, \ \ \?1 1 : ;5S§^ ; ;?^^-orar
1 1 ITJH II CO 1 "* 1 f "^
1 ! 1 ! 1 ! 1 ! 1 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! "^11 ^oJi
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
428-432
414-417
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
212-213
166-161
182
"'166-161'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
^ 1 i 1 ; i MM
Joint
Committee-
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
,'Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
1070-1076
461-469
"763-772"
816-851
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
1 III 1 1 1 1 III III
1 0 — 1 1-^ 1 lOiM 1 1 1 iTtit^ III 1 00 1 1
lOil> It^ 1 l-*Ttl 1 1 1 Ir-^r-H III 1 1^ 1 |
giOOJUMiKNOiilliC^lOiii il>ii
o.i(McOi| ii|(Milli(Nr-iili i| II
-Oil! 1 r-H 1 1 1> 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 III 1 lO 1 1
Oh iCt-- iTt< 1 lO-^ 1 1 1 lOTf III I--H 1 1
iCOiO 1 (M 1 ilNCO 1 1 1 lO^ III it^ 1 1
lOOli II 05iliiC<IC5ili 1 II
1 (M CO 1 1 1 IM 1 1 1 i(N -^ 1 1 1 1 II
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
417-436
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
Pages
1571-1574"
1664-1676
"469-473"
i
Hamilton, Maxwell M., State Dept
Hannum, Warren T., Brig. Gen
Harrington, Cyril J
Hart, Thomas Charles, Senator
Hayes, Philip, Maj. Gen
Heard, William A., Capt., USN
Henderson, H. H., Lt., USA
Herron, Charles D., Maj. Gen
HiU, William H., Senator
Holmes, J. Wilfred., Capt., USN
Holtwick, J. S., Jr., Comdr
Hoppough, Clay, Lt. Col
Hornbeck, Stanley K
Home, Walter Wilton
Howard, Jack W., Col
Hubbell, Monroe H., Lt. Comdr
Huckins, Thomas A., Capt., USN
Hull, Cordell
Humphrey, Richard W. RM 3/c
Hunt, John A., Col
IngersoU, Royal E., Adm
Inglis, R. B., Rear Adm
INDEX OF WITNESSES
IX
I I I I I I 1 I I I rr,
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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
id
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Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
oiiiiiioicoiiiiiiiiii i_r ,-o 1 1
CO ocoii 'iiSlJOii
lo ocoiiiiiiiiiiii2rS<>'i'
lOiiiiiiTt^i III ;H;t2"3ii
§,iO iiiiiiO-^iiiiii lliOil
-eio (MCO ' '2§t^ ' '
lO ^ 1 1 1 1 1 i^^^ ' '
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
541-553
182-292
"140^142"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
103
107-112
186
219-222
102
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarlie
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
1 i-H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Ill II
"[o ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II
•^1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I ! 1 1 1 1 1 1 ! 1 ! i
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
icoiiiiicoiiiioiio II
|llllllr-ll|||ITt<IIIITtllOO II
giiliiiiCliliiiCOiiiit^iOO II
.o 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4i 1 1 1 1 i 00 1 1 1 1 4 1 (M II
ft<illllliOiiiii<NiiliCOiiO II
IlliliiOiiiliiCOiiiit^iOO II
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
266.5-2695"
3028-3067
1161-1185'
2787-2802"
1014-1034
1678-1694
3226-3250
2362-2374"
2-54"
T. S. 2-52,
192-226
3126-3152
1816-1913
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
II lO 1 l> 1 1 1 II II
C^ 1 CO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II
gi (NiCOiiliiiiiiil II
„& : 1 1 1 ; ; 14^ ;c4 : ! ! 1 1 1 1 ; ; 1 ! ! i
Oi 1 1-1 ICO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II
1 (M ICO 1 1 1 1 II
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 2.3, 1942)
1 ICO ii-H i(N>0 1 1 iiO 1 1 1 iTfi 1 1 lie KM^IOi
1 1 »0 1 t^ iCOCTi 1 1 IC30 1 1 1 iO 1 1 1 O iLOOOiO
»ii— (i^ilOiiiCOiiiiiOiiiOO iCOtJhcO
S,l li-Hli-l l^rH 1 1 1— 1 1 1 1 ll 1 1 11-H MCOi-H
« 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i6 1 1 1 1 lO-^
tt, 1 lO ICO 1 00 1 1 i<N 1 1 1 1 O 1 1 1 CO KM
1 1 Tf< 1 lo 1 CO 1 1 1 1>- 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 \ en 1 CO
1 1 ^ 1 rH 1 O 1 1 1 <N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l^ 1
1
Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN
Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen
Landreth, J. L., Ens
Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/0
Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col
Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC
Lawton, William S., Col
Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN
Leahj', William D., Adm
Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm
Lewis, Fulton, Jr -,
Litell, S. H
Locey, Frank H
Lockard, Jo.seph L., Lt., USA
Lorence, Walter E., Col
Lumsden, George, Alaj
Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN
Lynch, Paul J
Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr
Mac Arthur, Douglas, Gen
Marshall, George C, Gen
Marston, Morrill W., Col
Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen
INDEX OF WITNESSES
XI
i
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CD ■-' O CO Q5
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73
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XII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
- Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
Pages
5210
4933-5009
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
""387-388"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
14S
(Clausen
Investieation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Oil III 11^ 1 C<lii it-.ll
Tt<i 00 1 eoii ii>ii
1^ 1 I 1 1 1 ! 17 1 ^ 1 1 lei ! !
^^ I ; 1 1 1 I 1^ : 1 1 1^ ; !
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1—1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
^ 1 1 i \ i 1 M
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
1 lie III III _rr<rrvC<>'"'><^^ 1 lo 1 loo 00
I lOJ 111 111 '-^f^'i^oon^ 1 iT}< 1 lOO
1 1 17 111 111 7c^f^2::;: i I7 : \f:^
1 1 It^ III 111 '^^cJ.777 1 't^ : 1^7
n, 1 it^ III III tCK-'-^'O'-* 1 1^ 1 it^^
11^ III 11! c^fSg$2S 1 \^ 1 I'^S
II III III t-ii— I,— (II iii-i
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
1107-1160,"
1240-1252
3636^3640
2375-2398,
3990-3996
3153-3165
2923-2933
3885-3915
1968^1988'
1035-1070
778-789
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
147-169
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
1 i^J-t^-* 1 1 O 1,^,^00 1 1 ICO'* 1 1 1 1
11^000511 uOiK^lfJc^i, liOOOOiiil
1 1 1^22 1 1 2 17^^ ! ! I^°? 1 1 1 1
<S 1 l^^4^ 1 1 <i iS^ ! 1 Icil^ 1 1 1 1
Pettigrew, Moses W., Col
Phelan, John, Ens
Phillips, Walter C, Col
Pickett, Harry K., Col
Pierson, Millard, Col .
Pine, Willard B
Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov
Powell, Boiling R., Jr., Maj
Powell, C. A., Col
Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr
Prather, Louise
Pratt, John S., Col
Pye, William S., Vice Adm
Rafter, Case B
Raley, Edward W., Col
Ramsey, Logan C, Capt., USN
Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm
INDEX OF WITNESSES
xm
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XrV CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
IS i i i i !p i is i ig^gp 1 lis 1 i i
lis iiiiliSiiiiiiisiiliiiiii
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
11 iiOiiiiO llllll III iCOi
11 1 1 1 1 ll^ 1 III 11-11
^11 IITJ^IICO llllll III ITtll
c» 1 1 11 1 1 1 llllll III 11
„o "C Ill 11-11
Oiii 11 iico llllll III 11-11
CO llllll III irf 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
---
195-197
203-204
185'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarko
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
11 1 1 i(N 1 1 1 1 iC<l 1 1
^ i 11 11 ill i i i i i j j j
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
lO lillKN i-iliil ^-^-O III III
i«> t^ 00 1 1 1 >X^^ 1 ' • ' ' '
1 17 ! i 1 ! 17 2 1 ! 1 !2?o°? ill ; ! ;
P \6 ! 1 I i lob 7 rkA4< !
Ill i(N 1 1 1 1 i(N t^ 1 1 1 l<=^Sl^ 111 III
iM 1 1 1 1 iio t^ 1 1 1 1 £ii> III III
1 lllll O 1 1 1 1 "
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
3644r-3650
276-541,
4411-4445
3265-3286"
1539^1575"
4037-4094
C
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
32-65"
323-334
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
lor^ioiiiii ic^iiooo 1
lO-^iOlilll i'<*<iiOO
g ii-icO-^ »•- 1 i»-ioO 111 III
g. 1 1 ^ 1 1-11 IrH^ III III
o ir^ 1 IN L 1 1 I I
Ds iCOt^O lllll lOO 1 i«b"b III III
i.-HTj<illll iCOiiOOO III 111
l<0 lllll it^llr-lOO
1
Short, Arthur T
Short, Walter C, Maj. Gen
Shortt, Creed, Pvt
Sisson, George A
Smedberg, William R., II, Capt. USN..
Smith, Ralph C, Maj. Gen
Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen
Smith, William W., Rear Adm
Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN
Smoot, Perry M., Col
Sonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr
Spalding, Isaac, Brig. Gen
Staff, W. F, CH/CM .
Stark, Harold R., Adm
Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR
Stilphen, Benjamin L
Stimson, Henry L
Stone, John F
Street, George
Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen
INDEX OF WITNESSES
XV
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la
XVI COXGRECSIONAL R> VESTIGATION PEAHL -HAIiEOR ATfelfceS
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945.
to May 31,
1946
. i i i i i 12 ; ;;;:;; : \\\'Mm
& 1 1 1 1 1 1 CO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 J. CO 1
p« CM m'=> '
i M 1 i i" i i M i i M ! i i !"" i
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
' Pages
"389^410'
376-386
541-553
597-602
442-450
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
187-189
105-106
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
Vol.
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
1083-1090
Joint
Committee
E.\hibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
2722-2744
3120-3124
1989^2007'
2456-2478
1345-1381'
910-931
3663-3665
3677-3683'
3750-3773
3357-3586'
25S0d-2596
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
1 1 1 1 1 100 1 1 1 CM 1 1 1 1
00 00 1 1 1 1
giiiiiiCMi iCOiii 1
a 1 1 1 I 1 !C5 i 1 1 i i i 1 i \6> \ '< \ 1
^1 1 1 1 i 1 il^ .t-. 1 1 1 1
C<1 CO 1 1 1 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
toJan.23, 1942)
Pages
1311-1329
496-499
1830-1842
1334-1340"
"247-259'
1525-1538'
1683-1705
a
Wells, B. IL, Maj. Gen
West, Melbourne IL, Lt. Col
Whaling, William J., Lt. Col
White, William R., Brig. Gen
Wichiser, Rea B
Wilke, Weslie T
Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm
Willoughby, C. A., Maj. Gen
Wilson, Durward 8., Maj. Gen
Wilson, Erie M., Col
Wimer, Benjamin R., Col
Vvithers, Thomas, Rear Adm
Wong, Ahoon H
Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR
Woodward, Farnsley C, Lt. (jg), USN.
Woolley, Ralph E
Wright, Wesley A., Comdr
Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col
York, Yee Kam
Zacharias, Ellis M., Capt., USN
Zucca, Emil Lawrence
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2921
V7889y PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TUESDAY, JANUARY 22, 1946
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
OF the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington^ D. C.
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in
the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark,
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.
Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H.
Kaufman, associate general counsel ; John E. Masten, Edward P. Mor-
gan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.
[7890] The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
General, will you hold up your hand ?
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES
ARMY, RETIRED 2
(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)
The Chairman. General, the Chair understands that you have
a statement here which you desire to read, or to have read, due to the
fact that you have been somewhat indisposed.
If you would like to have someone else read it, it would be entirely
agreeable to the committee, or if you wish to read it yourself, why,
you may proceed.
General Short. Mr. Chairman, I have been in the hospital with
pneumonia, and have not entirely recovered my strength, but I shall
make every effort to go through my testimony before this committee
without interruption.
I prefer to read it myself.
The Chairman. You may proceed.
General Short. Mr. Chairman; I want to thank you and the mem-
bers of the committee for giving me, after 4 long years, the oppor-
tunity to tell my story of Pearl Harbor to the American public. I ap-
peared before the Roberts commission but was not permitted to hear
the other witnesses nor given the privilege of cross-examination. I
was not [7891] given the opportunity to read the evidence
taken before the Roberts commission until August 1944. I appeared
before the Army Pearl Harbor board, but again was not permitted
to hear the other witnesses nor given the privilege of cross-examina-
tion ; however, I was furnished a copy of the hearings except for the
1 Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript
of testimony.
' Subtitles and consecutively numbered footnotes in General Short's testimony were
supplied by him ; footnotes indicated by * were supplied by the staff of the committee.
79716 — 46— pt. 7 2
2922 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
part considered top secret. The Army board labeled certain evidence
top secret and I was never permitted to see that until this committee
was about to meet. Both boards took testimony off the record which
has not been made available to me.
Before taking up my statement in detail, there are a few points that
I would like to mention for emphasis. These will be elaborated upon
later.
1. On Pearl Harbor day I was carrying out orders from the War
Dex)artment as I understood them.
2. At no time since June 17, 19-10. had the War Department indi-
cated the probability of an attack on Hawaii. In none of the estimates
j^repared by G-2 War Department was Hawaii mentioned as a point
of attack, but the Philippines was mentioned repeatedly.
o. There was in the War Department an abundance of information
which was vital to me but which was not furnished to me. This in-
formation was absolutely essential to a correct estimate of the situation
and correct decision. [789^] My estimate of the situation and
my decision were made without the benefit of this vital information.
Had this information been furnished to me, I am sure tliat I would
have arrived at the conclusion that Hawaii would be attacked and
would have gone on an all-out alert.
4. When I made the decision, based on the information available to
me, to go on alert to prevent sabotage (No. 1), I reported measures
taken as follows :
Reurad 472 27th Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with
the Navy.
The War Department had 9 days in which to tell me that my action
was not what they wanted. I accepted their silence as a full agreement
with the action taken. I am convinced that all who read the report
thought that my action was correct or I would have received instruc-
tions to modify my orders.
I would like to pass out at this time a chart. Copies of these charts,
in colors, will be placed on the bulletin board. They are not large
enough to be very readily seen from there.
I have had several charts prepared that may be of assistance to this
committee in the course of my testimony.
Chart No. 1 is a chronological summary. It shows my appointment
to Hawaii in December 1940, my conversations in Washington in Jan-
uary 1941, and the period of my com l7S9o] mand for 10
months from February 7, 1941, to December 17, 1941.
It traces my 10 months of effort to strengthen Hawaiian Defense. As
1 mention these efforts in the course of my testimony, a glance at this
chart will show how the particular matter fitted into the chronological
picture.
At the foot of the chart are listed the various requests and requisi-
tions I made of the War Department, most of which were disapproved.
An "X" on the chart indicates the date of disapproval of my request.
The committee may see at a glance that by December 7, the picture
clearly showed that the War Department was not favorably consider-
ing my efforts to strengthen the great Hawaiian outpost.
The chronological summary also shows the "alert" messages and the
replies, beginning July 8, 1941. It shows the step-up in traffic from the
24th to the 28th of November. And it portrays graphically the 9 days
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2923
of silence which the War Department maintained after 1 sent my second
sabotage-alert report.
It shows, also, the December 4 sabotage report, which was sent by
General Martin from Hawaii on December 4, but for some reason
never reached the War Department until December 10.
(The chart referred to is included in "Exhibit No. 134.")
[7895] General Short, Introduction :
1. Appointinent to Hawaii
The Chief of Staff selected me as the commanding general of the
Hawaiian Department. I was first notified in December 1940. I
held conferences in Washington, D. C., with General Marshall the
first week in January 1941. I also conferred with General Gerow in
the War Plans Division. I talked with some officer about the equip-
ment of the Hawaiian Department. I talked with Colonel (now Gen-
eral) Spaatz about the Air Corps problem.
%. AssiiTnption of com/mand
At the time I assumed command on February 7, 1941, the Hawiian
Department was amply prepared for defense against the submarine
danger and against sabotage and espionage, but was not adequately
prepared for defense against an air rid, either by bomber or by tor-
pedo planes or both.^ On February 7, 1941, the Chief of Staff sent
me a letter, detailing his policies regarding the Army mission in
Hawaii and stressing his interest in strengthening our air power and
antiaircraft defense. In that letter he deplored the [7896]
fact that all defenses would be inadequately equipped because of the
over-all shortage of aircraft and anti-aircraft equipment.^
EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN DEFENSES
3. 10 months* efforts.
During the 10 months immediately following my assumption of
command, in full cooperation with the Navy, I made strenuous efforts
to improve the defense system of the Hawaiian Islands.
4. Agreements with Navy
A joint agreement with reference to the employment of the air
forces was concluded with the Navy, and has heretofore been called
to the attention of this committee. Pertinent extracts have been se-
lected by the counsel for the committee and introduced here as exhibit
44. Committee exhibit 13, the air study dated August 20, 1941, is also
before the committee. These agreements specifically placed the respon-
sibility for distant reconnaissance upon the Navy and provided that the
Army, when called upon, should furnish to the Navy any available
aircraft for assisting in this reconnaissance. It specified also that
when Army planes were detailed to assist in the distant reconnais-
sance they would act directly under the orders of the Navy and report
to the Navy [7897] the results obtained in carrying out the
mission.
> See letter, Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War, dated January 24, 1941, and reply
by the Secretary of War, Joint Committee, Daily Record, vol. 5, pp. 720-728.
^Letter, Marshall to Short, February 7, 1941, committee exhibit No. 53, "correspond-
ence between General Marshall and General Short," pp. 1 to 3.
2924 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
6. Statemerut to Roberts commission
At the time that I was called before the Roberts commission, I pre-
pared and submitted to them a large document marked as their "Ex-
hibit No. 7." I am submitting a copy of this long document to this
joint congressional committee, in order that you may have it available
in your own records and in order that I may refer to it in this state-
ment.
6. Statement to Roberts commission
At this time I want to call attention to pages 28 to 48, inclusive, of
exhibit 7 of the Roberts commission and to the exhibits lettered "V"
through "Z," and "lA" through "IR," as annexed to that exhibit 7.
On those pages and in those exhibits, I developed at some length and
in considerable detail, the nature of my effort to improve Hawaiian
defense.
The Vice Chairman. General, pardon an interruption.
Do we have before us this exhibit from the Roberts testimony that
the General is referring to ?
Mr. Kaufman. Yes, sir. Reference was made to it the other day,
Mr. Chairman, and indication was made by Mr. Masten that thefe were
only five copies available.
The Vice Chairman. That is the one, is it?
Mr. Kaufman. That is the one.
The Vice Chairman. All right.
[7898] Go ahead, General.
General Short (continuing) :
7. /Statement to Roberts comndssion
I think it unnecessary at this time to read all the factual data that
I previously collected for the Roberts commission. Those who wish
to check the details are referred to the statement which I made to the
Roberts commission. I believe that it will be sufficient if I summarize
briefly my efforts to increase the defenses of Hawaii.
8. Letter to General Marshall 19 February 19Jfl
My initial study of the problem was incorporated in a letter to Gen-
eral Marshall on February 19, 1941, and is copied on pages 4 to 9,
committee exhibit No. 53, "Correspondence between General Marshall
and General Short."
9. Airfield bunkers
On February 19, 1941, a letter was sent to the "War Department rec-
ommending that $1,565,600 be allotted for the purpose of providing
protective bunkers and the necessary taxiways and hard standings
for our aircraft. On September 12, 1941, the War Department prom-
ised $1,358,000, but these funds were not to become available until
January 1, 1942, nearly 30 days after the attack. As a result of the
delay of this project, on December 7, 1941, it was impracticable to
disperse the planes adequately at Hickam Field or to protect them from
an air raid. Bunkers at Wheeler Field [7899] had been con-
structed with soldier labor.^
* See exhibit "W" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2925
10. Military roads and trails
On February 19, 1941, 1 requested $1,370,000 for construction of mili-
tary roads and trails. Up to December 7, 1941, only $350,000 had been
allotted to us.^
11. Coast artillery
On February 18, 1941, I requested two regiments of mobile coast
artillery. As a result, the War Department, in May 1941, authorized
certain increases in the coast artillery garrison, to be gradually fur-
nished us between June 1941 and March 1942. The War Department,
however, disapproved our request of February 25, 1941, for an increase
in enlisted men of the 251st Coast Artillery Regiment from 1,181 to
1,450.^ This was an intiaircraft regiment.
12. Kaneohe Naval Air Station
In February 1941, the Army assumed responsibility for the defense
of the naval air station at Kaneohe Bay. General Marshall concurred
with this change in the defense plan. On April 14, 1941, a letter was
sent to the adjutant general recommending procurement of a 12-inch
gun battery for the Kaneohe Bay area. I requested an increase of
the war strength [7900] garrison to 71,500 to provide appro-
priate defenses for Kaneohe Bay and for station complements. This
request, as well as our subsequent letters, did not receive favorable
consideration from the War Department.^
IS. The Infantry
As early as April 25, 1941, 1 requested the organization of two trian-
gular divisions in place of the Hawaiian division (square), the for-
mation of station complements at Schofield Barracks and Fort
Shafter, and the activation of an air-defense command. At this time
the square division was outmoded and no longer in use in the main-
land units. On May 29, 1941, the War Department reduced our initial
war garrison to 58,000. I immediately protested and asked that the
allotment be increased to 71,500 and repeated my request for station
complements. These requests met with disapproval, except that au-
thority was granted in July for the organization of the two triangular
divisions,^ with a reduced over-all strength remaining at 58,000 instead
of 71,500 as requested by me.
14- Additional airfields
Proper air defense and training urgently required the construction
of additional airfields. Numerous letters were 79011 dis-
patched between April 5, 1941, and May 14, 1941, with specific recom-
mendations for 10 airports. Up until the time of the attack, no
funds had been specifically allotted by the War Department, although
plans had been approved. By directing that an air field be constructed
at Kahuku, delay was occasioned by protracted negotiations. In an
effort to start fields without waiting for the receipt of funds, I directed
the use of soldier labor at Molokai, Burns, Morse, and Barking
* Exhibit "lA" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.
" Exhibit "IJ" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.
« Exhibit "IC" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission ; letter, March 13, 1941, General
Marshall to General Short, p. 13, committee exhibit No. 53.
' Exhibit "IL" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.
2926 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Sands. I considered the immediate improvement of Bellows Field
vital for the protection of Oahu and so informed the War Department.
The War Department approved plans for the project but did not
immediately allocate funds. However, the district engineer was di-
rected to take all possible steps until such time as the specific funds
were made available. By this makeshift means gasoline storage tanks
were completed and a 5,000-foot runway was half completed on De-
cember 7, 1941.^
15. Landing strips
On June 21, 1941, the War Department's attention was directed to
the necessity for landing strips at Wheeler Field. In spite of a pro-
longed exchange of communications on this subject, no funds were
allotted or received for this [7902] purpose. Limited im-
provements were made by soldier labor.^
16. Radar
The aircraft warning service was regarded as probably the most
important single defense project. The priorities granted to us, how-
ever, made it impossible to complete the permanent radar stations prior
to the time of the attack.^"
17. Prionties
The priorities situation also rendered it impossible to obtain sup-
plies except from the mainland, with delivery delayed 6 to 8 weeks
even under the most favorable conditions. We made repeated efforts
to correct this situation, but no success had been made up to the time
of the attack. In this respect, as well as all others, the War Depart-
ment reserved to itself full control of the determination of the strate-
gical importance of the various defense projects and in the case of
aircraft warning material did not favorably consider my request that
a higher priority be granted to us.^^
18. Camouflage of airfields
On July 15, 1941, we requested funds for camouflage treatment of
airfields. The War Department, apparently acting upon their estimate
that air attack was improbable, had furnished us no funds for this
purpose prior to December 7, 1941. The effectiveness of camouflaging
which we were able [^7903] to do was limited by our inability
to buy the necessary materials."
19. Field fortifhcations
Along the same line, our request for funds for field fortifications and
camouflage was also denied by the War Department. No funds were
given us for this purpose.^^
W. Advance 'procurement fimds
In July 28, 1941, we requested a revolving fund allotment of $1,-
000,000 to permit advance procurement of essential materials. In
September the Deputy Chief of Staff allotted $500,000 for this fund,
but before any materials could be secured the War Department di-
8 Exhibit "IB" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.
» See p. 33 and exhibit "ID" of exhibit 7, Roberts commission.
^" Exhibit "IE" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.
" Exhibit "IF" to exliibit 7. Roberts commission.
^ Exhibit "Z" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.
'3 Exhibit "Y" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2927
verted the money for housing at Kaneohe Bay. As a result, no reserve
supplies, except lumber, had been accumulated.^*
21. Air depot
Our air depot at Hickam Field was extremely vulnerable to attack.
Therefore on September 10, 1941, I recommended that bombproof
faciliies for aircraft repair be constructed, costing $3,480,650. On
October 27, the War Department informed me that :
* * * it is a policy that such facilities will not be provided."
[790Ji-'\ During the attack, this air depot was a main target and
suffered tremendous damage. Immediately after the attack, funds
were provided, and underground, bombproof facilities were begun.
22. May Idlf.! manenAyers
During our May 1941 maneuvers, it was found that our then existent
defensive field orders were too cumbersome. On July 14, 1941, a tenta-
tive Standing Operating Procedure was issued. In letters dated
October 10 and 28, General Marshall suggested certain changes in this
defense plan, relative to the Air Corps mission, which suggestions we
adopted in the final draft of the S. O. P., dated 5 November 1941.^°
Due to this plan and the familiarization of all units with it, all per-
sonnel down to the last man were able to act promptly in the execution
of their missions when the raid took place. This they did in a most
creditable manner.
23. Standing operating procedure
The Standing Operating Procedure of November 5, 1941, was issued
to comply with paragraph 159, FM 100-5, issued by the War Depart-
ment on May 22, 1941, which states :
In every unit, standing operating procedure is prescribed by the commander
vphenever practicable.
[7905] This procedure covers those features of operations which lend
themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness.
The adoption of such procedures will save time in the preparation and issuance
of orders, minimize the chances for confusion, and errors when under stress
of combat, and greatly simplify and expedite the execution of operations in the
field.
the value of having a standing operating procedure was fully demon-
strated at the time of the attack.
I wish to pass out chart No, 2 at this time.
The Vice Chairman. This [indicating] is the chart you refer to,
General?
General Short. That is correct.
The Vice Chaikmajst. I believe all members of the committee have
it.
General Short. This chart will summarize for the committee the
requests I made of the War Department and the amount I was
granted.
It shows that I requested a total of some $22,953,697 for projects
which the responsible officers in Hawaii considered vital for national
defense.
^* Bxlnbit "IG" to exhibit 7. Roberts commission.
" Exhibit "X" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.
^« See pp. 42-45, Committee Exhibit No. 53, Correspondence between General Marshall
and General Short.
2928 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
It shows that the War Department granted us only $350,000 — for
roads and trails.
The grants totaled about II/2 percent of the requests.
That situation speaks for itself.
I want to add that beginning December 7, 1941, right after
[7906] the attack, I was given a blank check for everything I
needed.
(Chart No. 2 appears in "Exhibit No. 134.")
[7907] General Short. "Preparation of the civilian population
for defense."
24. Civilian defense program
From page 43 through page 48 of the statement which I submitted
to the Roberts commission, I discussed the civilian defense program
of the islands. The committee may examine that statement for an
outline of this phase. The defensive measures to enable the civilian
population to meet any emergency which might arise where covered
under the following headings :
(1) Production and storage of food.
(2) Organization of doctors and nurses for care of injured
and wounded.
(3) An agreement with the Red Cross for it to purchase and
store in Honolulu $200,000 worth of medicines and surgical sup-
plies and equipment for use in any possible emergency.
(4) Organization of an auxiliary to the police force to guard
utilities and prevent sabotage.
(5) Preparation of plans and provision for evacuation of
women and children and preparation of shelters for workers in
the vicinity of central industries.
[7908] Governor Poindeoster's letter. I think the best summary
of my work in preparing the civilian population to meet any emerg-
ency is found in the letter of Gov. Joseph B. Poindexter, dated Dec-
ember 23, 1941, which I should like to quote in full : ^^
Sejal of the Terkitory of Hawaii
Executive Chambers,
Honolulu, 23 Deceniher 19^1.
Lieutenant General "Walter C. Short,
Fort Shatter, T. H.
My Dear General Shoet : Having noted in the public press that an investiga-
tion is being made as to the military preparedness of the Army and Navy in
Hawaii on December 7, 1941, I believe it appropriate that I make to you a state-
ment as to the state of preparedness of the civil communities of these Islands
for war when they were so insidiously and treacherously attacked -on December
7, 1941.
The citizens of the Hawaiian Islands have always appreciated that these
Islands were important to National De- [7909] fense from a military stand-
point, but it has only been since your arrival in these Islands on February 5,
1941 that it has been brought home to the civil population the importance of the
part it would play in the event of a war in the Pacific. On December 7th, the
citizens of these Islands met the hour of their test in such a manner as to make
me proud to be the Chief Executive of these Islands. Your foresight in urging
the population to prepare to meet the possible vicissitudes of war and the joint
efforts of the Army and civil population in planning and preparing for this
emergency was magnificently rewarded.
" See exhibit 7, Roberts commission, pp. 47a to 47c.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2929
It may be of interest to point out in detail some of the plans and prepara-
tions which bore fruit on December 7, 1941 :
(1) The enactment of the Hawaiian Defense Act by a special session of the
Legislature called for that purpose. This legislation permits a mobilization of
the entire civil economy of the Islands in the interest of National Defense or in
the event of disaster. By virtue of this Act, civilian defense was planned and
many of its phases were brought to such a i>oint of preparation that they were
able to go into action immediately and to function effectively on December 7,
1941.
2) The production and conservation of food:
[7910] Householders were persistently urged to stock their shelves in
canned food. It is estimated that this resulted in increasing the available food
supply of the Hawaiian Islands by more than twenty percent. Federal appro-
priation was requested for procurement and storage for food reserve. This ap-
propriation has, since December 7, 1941, been authorized. By agreement with
plantation owners, plans were made for the procurement and storage of seed
and the planting of certain large areas with quick growing food crops. Agree-
ments were also made for the growing, in normal times, of these crops not
usually grown in marketable quantities. In furtherance of this plan, the War
Department was induced to permit the purchase of Island-grown potatoes for
the use of the Army although the price was above that of mainland potatoes.
In anticipation of the receipt of reserve supplies of food asked for in the emerg-
ency, the Army supported a certificate of necessity for building an adequate
warehouse to meet these needs. This warehouse is now available for the stor-
age of food supply when it arrives.
(3) The medical facilities for the care of the injured and wounded during any
disaster was one of the first things accomplished by the civilians of these
Islands for an emergency. This resulted in mobilizing the entire medical pro-
fession of the Islands with all its medical facilities. [7911] Approximately
three thousand persons were given training' and instruction in First-Aid as
required by the Red Cross. The persons thus trained assisted in carrying out
the arduous tasks of evacuation. Twenty First-Aid units were organized, each
unit consisting of personnel of about one hundred and twenty. An ambulance
corps of one hundred and forty improvised ambulances were organized. The
performance of their tasks by these groups was one of the highlights of the
cilvil defense efforts on December 7, 1941.
(4) Plans for the evacuation of tvomen and children and the preparation of
shelters for workers inessential industries had reached a high state of perfec-
tion on December 7, 1941, and the evacuation of women and children from areas
attacked was accomplished in a most admirable manner.
(5) An auxilianj police force to guard utilities and to prevent sabotage was
organized at an early date in our preparation and it was able to function in-
stantly when called upon to do so on the morning of December 7th. The work
of this force was exceptional and excellent.
(6) Legislation authorizing a home guard was enacted at the special session
of the Territorial Legislature. It was well planned and so organized that 1400
of such home guardsmen could be and were placed on duty thereby relieving
members of the Army for other military duty.
[7912] (7) There were many other matters too numerous to detail here
which were planned and accomplished at your instigation. Important among
these was the bringing home to the public the urgent necessity for cooperation
and public service in times of emergency.
All of the foregoing required tremendous effort on the part of the local
authorities, the citizenry and military authorities. All such efforts have been
rewarded since December 7, 1941, in that Territorial and City Governments and
all phases of the public welfare have overcome all obstacles and have operated
smoothly as a direct result of prior planning and training.
It is my belief that the public has confidence in the military and civil
authorities. The fact that the Japanese Government has seen fit to inflict a
treacherous attack has not in any way diminished the faith of this community in
your demonstrated abilities. I wish to state that the magnificen way in which
the Territory of Hawaii met its problem in its crucial hour was in a large
measure due to your foresight. I am deeply grateful for your efforts on behalf
of the Territory.
You are at liberty to use this letter in any way which you see fit.
Very sincerely yours,
(S) J. B. POINDEXTEB,
Oovemor of Hawaii.
2930 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[TOIS] PRE-WAR ALERTS
S6. Marshull-Herron alert
Prior to the time that I assumed command in Hawaii, General
Marshall had definitely indicated his intention to direct personally
any genuine prewar alert. As commanding general and as a matter
of training I was. of course, fully authorized to conduct drills, ma-
neuvers, and practice alerts. Numerous maneuvers, general and special
practice alerts were, in fact, held. However, as a part of my orienta-
tion, on the day before I assumed command. General Herron, my
predecessor, acquainted me with the relation which had existed between
himself and General Marshall during the all-out alert which began
June 17, 1940.^^ In that alert, General Marshall had directed the
alert and had closely supervised its continuance, as disclosed in com-
mittee exhibit No. 52, Communications Between War Department and
General Herron Concerning 1940 Alert. The following message began
the alert :
June 17, 1^0. No. 42S. Immediately alert complete defensive organization
to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid, to greatest extent possible without creating
public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents?.
Suggest maneuver basis. [7914] Maintain alert until further orders. In-
structions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished
you shortly. Acknowledge.
Adams.
£7. Supervision hy Chief of Staff
The record is clear that at the time of the 1940 alert the Chief of
Staff had sufficient time and sense of personal responsibility toward
the Hawaiian Department to order and to supervise the Hawaiian alert.
In addition, he had information which caused him to state that —
* * * In any event it would have been foolhardy not to take special precau-
tions."
28. Expected action of Chief of Staff
In was my expectation that if the Chief of Staff once again had
information causing him to expect a "trans-Pacific raid'" against Oahu,
he would follow the course he had previously set as an example. I
felt that a Chief of Staff who had personally supervised the long-
continued 1940 alert would certainly have the time and interest not
only to read and to understand m}' succinct report "Reurad four seven
two 27th Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison
with the Xavy", but to send further word in the event that he disagreed
in any way with the measures I had taken in obedience to his Novem-
ber ' [7^iJ] 27 directive. At the time that the previous alert
had been modified, on July 16, 1940, the Chief of Staff had thought
that the sabotage menace continued, even though the air raid danger
had subsided. He had said that he wanted the Air Corps training
resumed in such manner that the "aerial patrol measures" could be
reestablished on short notice.-"
^' Affidavit of General Herron, p. 212, Clausen report.
'* V. 13, committee exhibit No. 52.
=w P. IS, committee exhibit No. 52.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2931
THE WAR PLANS
29. Rairibow Five.
The basic war plan was callpd Rainbow Five by the Army and
WPL-46 by the Na^-y. This plan could be put into effect only by
the War and Navy Departments.^
30. Local defense plan.
The joint coastal frontier defense plan for Hawaii was approved
by Admiral Bloch and me on 11 April 1941, based, of course, on the
Rainbow Plan, Under this plan, the Navy undertook responsibility
for "distant reconnaissance." ^^ No part of this joint plan would take
effect until the War Department ordered M-day under the Rainbow
Plan, unless it was ordered in effect from Washington or by mutual
agreement of the Army and Navy in Hawaii. ^^ Due to my knowledge
of the attitude of the War Department, I would never have ordered
any part of the plan into effect [7916] without consulting it,
as long as communications were open and time permitted. Under the
circumstances preceding the attack, the War Department, with far
more intimate knowledge of the nature of the Japanese situation, had
not ordered M-day, had not put the Rainbow Plan into effect, in whole
or in part, and had expressed no dissatisfaction with my report of a
sabotage alert. The only conclusion I could draw was that it did not
want the war plans implemented because of the possible alarm to the
public or the danger of provoking the Japanese. Their silence I took
as concurrence with the degree of alert I had adopted.
INFORMATIOX FDENISHED HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
SJ. Inforination in general.
1 want to outline for the committee the information which the War
Department furnished me during the critical 10-day period preceding
the attack.
Pass out chart No. 6, please.
(Chart No. 6 is included in "Exhibit No. 134.")
\7918'\ General Short. Chart No. 6 is an attempt to show on
the map the important factors which entered into mv estimate of the
situation — the things which led me to think that the Japanese were not
going to attack Hawaii.
1. The last official prediction of an imminent trans-Pacific raid on
Oahu was the Marshall-Herron alert of 1940 (shown by a broken
line on the map from Japan to Honolulu.)
2. The current information in November 1941 from Washington
pointed to a Jap attack on Russia, Siam, Kra, the Philippines, or
Borneo — shown by heavy dark arrows stemming from Japan.
3. The current information also indicated that the probable danger
in Hawaii, Guam, and Samoa was "internal attack"; that is, hostile
action in the form of sabotage and subversive activities.
" Sec. IX, par. 53, Rainbow Five : sec. VIII, par. 40a. Rainbow Five.
- Par. 18, i. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, April 18, 1941.
» Par. 15, c, (2), Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, April 18, 1941.
2932 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4. Meantime, Hawaii was a focal point in transporting troops,
B-l7's and air crews to the Philippines. The planes were always sent
to Hawaii unarmed, but when sending them out to the more dangerous
area of the Philippines, we were instructed to arm them.
6. Discussion was going on about Army troops moving out to Christ-
mas and Canton to relieves the Marines — shown by a dotted line on
the map.
6. The Marshalls were the nearest Jap territory.
[7919] "With such a picture, the committee can get a better idea
of the considerations which weighed on my mind.
S2. Background since 1940 alert
As a matter of brief background, the committee should recall the
precedent set by the Marshall-Herron alert of 1940. They should also
bear in mind the message from The Adjutant General on July 25, 1941
which is shown in committee exhibit No. 32 (reading) :
Washington, D. C, 152A July 8, 1941.
O G Hawn DiaT Fort Shatter TH
Nine two four seventh AGMC for your information deduction from information
from numerous sources is that Japanese govt has determined upon its future
policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups
period This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probable
aggressive action against maritime provinces of Russia if and when Siberian
garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that
Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia period Opinion is that
Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and develop-
ment of naval army and air bases in Indo China although an advance against the
British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out period Neutrality [1920]
pact with Russia may be abrogated period They have ordered all Jap vessels
in US Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first August period Move-
ment of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant
vessels are being requisitioned.
Adams.
This is the only message sent direct by the War Department to me
which indicates that "magic" sources w^e being used by the informa-
tion center. It also is the only message received from the War Depart-
ment that made a definite estimate as to probable Japanese action.
I should like also to read the message of July 25. 1941 received
through Naval Intelligence, shown in committee Exhibit No. 32. This
is addressed to Admiral Kimmel from Admiral Stark. [Reading] :
This is a joint dispatch from the CNO and the chief of staff US army x Appro-
priate adees deliver copies to commanding generals Hawaii Philippines and
Caribbean defenses command and to General Chaney in London xx You are
advised that at 1400 GOT July twenty sixth United States will impose economic
sanctions against Japan x It is expected these sanctions will embargo all trade
between Japan and the United States subject to modification throiigh a licensing
system for certain [1921] material x It is anticipated that export licenses
will be granted for certain grades of petroleum products cotton and possibly some
other materials and that import licenses may be granted for raw silk x Japanese
assets and funds in the United States will be frozen except that they may be
moved if licenses are granted for such movement x It is not repeat not expected
that Japanese merchant vessels in United States ports will he seized at this
time X United States flag merchant vessels will not at present be ordered to
depart from or not to enter ports controlled by Japan x CNO and COS do not
anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means
but yon are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate
precautionary measures against possible eventualities x Action being initiated
by the United States army to call the Philippine army into active service at an
early date xx This despatch is to be kept secret except from immediate navy and
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2933
army subordinates x Spenavo CinCPac CinCLant CinCAF Com Fifteen Spenavo
London xx.
The Vice Chairman. General, would you pardon an interruption
there ? What is the page of that which you just read ?
General Short. That is on page 2 of Exhibit No. 32.
The Vice Chairman. And what was the page of the other \7922'\
one you read?
General Short. The other was page 1.
The Vice Chairman. Page 1 ?
' General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. May I have the page number which you are
reading from now?
General Short. Page 2 of Exhibit 32.
Mr. Gearhart. No, I mean of your statement. *
General Short. Page 16 of my statement.
Also, on October 20, 1941, the Army had informed me that they
expected "no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy" ^^ in spit©
of the fact that the Navy Department had predicted possible hos-
tilities on October 16, lOil.^'^
These two messages are so diametrically opposed in their views
that I should like to read them.
The Vice Chairman. Will you please give the page every time
you read one?
General Short. Yes, sir. On page 3 of Exhibit 32 a message sent
by IngersoU to Admiral Kimmel dated October 16, 1941.
[7923] The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situ-
ation X If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic
and anti-American X If the Kouoye cabinet remains the effect will be that
it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement
with the US X In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a
strong possibility X Since the US and Britain are held responsible by Japan
for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may
attack these two powers X In view of these possibilities you will take due
precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose stra-
tegic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X Second and
third adees inform appropriate Army and Naval district authorities X
Acknowledge XX.
That was a quite definite prediction of hostile action on the part
of Japan.
Now, the Army message reads as follows ; page No. 4, exhibit 32 :
Washn, D. C, 1234P Oct. 20, 1941.
20th Following War Dept. estimate of Japanese situation for your infor-
mation Stop Tension between United States and Japan remains strained but
no repeat [79^4 ] no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears
imminent.
Adams.
as. Sabotage versus air danger
General Marshall's testimony made a strong point of the fact that
in the correspondence between him and the Hawaiaan Department,
sabotage was not mentioned but that the letters were confined largely
to aircraft and antiaircraft defense. He stated that he did not un-
derstand the reason why sabotage then should later be emphasized.
25 Radiogram, 20 October 1941, Adjutant General to Short, p. 4, committee exhibit 32.
=« Radiogram, 16 October 1941, CNO to CINCPAC ; p. 3, committee exhibit 32 ; p. 20-B,
exhibit 37.
2934 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The reason that sabotage was never discussed in my letters to General
Marshall was the fact that we had in Hawaii all of the equipment
necessary to prevent sabotage. Our letters were written to empha-
size the need of aircraft and antiaircraft defense. The Secretary of
the JS avy had stated in his letter to the Secretary of War on January
24, 1941, that defense against sabotage had been provided for satis-
factorily. I agreed fully with this statement. There was therefore
no reason to make requests upon the Chief of Staff with reference to
equipment or material for antisabotage measures.
SJf.. Nov. 24. message to Kimmel
On November 24, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received the following
message from the Chief of Naval Operations, concurred in by the
Chief of Staff:
There are very doubtful chances of a favorable [1925] outcome of nego-
tiations with Japan. This situation, coupled with statements of Nippon Gov-
ernment and movements of their naval and military force, indicate, in our
opinion, that a surprise agrressive movement in any direction. Including an
attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen
this dispatch and concurs and requests action. Inform senior Army officers in
respective areas. Utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate the
already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action."
This message indicated possible movement in the direction of the
Philippines or Guam and called for secrecy.
S5. Nov. 27 message to KiTinmel
On November 27th the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the com-
mander in chief. Pacific Fleet the following message which was made
known to me :
Consider this dispatch a vpar warning. The negotiations with Japan in an
effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to
make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition
against either the Philippines, or Kra Peninsula or possibly JJorneo is indicated
by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of
[7926 J of their naval forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in
preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned to WPL 46. Guam, Samoa, and
Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against
sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform
naval district and army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo.-*
You will notice that whereas the message of the 24th indicated a
possible attack on Guam, by this time they had decided that the
movement was entirely to the south and they indicated only sabotage
arrangements on the island of Oahu.
While this message is headed "War Warning," it should be noted
that Navy War Plan 46 was not placed in effect by the Navy Depart-
ment, but a defensive deployment was ordered in preparation for
carrying out the tasks assigned under Navy War Plans 46. This
indicated that later directions would be received if it became neces-
sary to carry out this plan, Japanese action toward the south was
indicated. I want to emphasize the following sentence from the
message :
You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the
tasks assigned in WPL 46.
" Message November 24, Navy to Kimmel, p. 28-B, exhibit 37.
^ Message November 27, Navy to Kimmel, p. 31-B, exhibit 37.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2935
[7927] Such defensive deployment would necessarily include
distant reconnaissance.
36. Do-DonH message
On November 27 I received the following radiogram from the Chief
of Statf which, on account of its conflicting instructions, the Army
Pearl Harbor Board called the "Do-or-Don't message" : ^^
No. 472. Negotiations with tlie Japanese appeal* to be terminated to all prac-
tical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government
might come back and offer to continue. Japanese futui'e action unpredictable
but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot,
be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.
This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you lo a course of
action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action,
you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you
deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as noc, repeat not,
to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should
hostilities occur, you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far
as they \1928\ pertain to Japan. Limit the dissemination of this highly
secret infoi-mation to minimum essential officers." ^''
The impression conveyed to me by this message was that the avoid-
ance of war was paramount and the greatest fear of the War Depart-
ment was that some international incident might occur in Hawaii and
be regarded by Japan as an overt act. That this opinion was in ac-
cordance with the views of General Marshall is shown by the follow-
ing quotation from his testimony :
So far as public opinion was concerned, I think the Japanese were capitalizing
on the belief that it would be very difficult to bring our people into a willingness
to enter the war. That, incidentally, was somewhat confirmed by the govern-
mental policy on our part of making certain that the overt act should not be
attributed to the United States, because of the state of the public mind at the
time. Of course, no one anticipated that that overt act would be the crippling of
the Pacific Fleet.="
No mention was made of a probable attack on Hawaii since the alert
message of June 17, 1940. An examination of the \7929\ var-
ious Military Intelligence estimates prepared by G-2 WD, shows that
in no estimate did G-2 ever indicate the probability of an attack on
Hawaii.^- There was nothing in the message directing me to be pre-
pared to meet an air raid or an all-out attack. "Hostile action at any
moment" meant to me that as far as Hawaii was concerned the War
Department was predicting sabotage. Sabotage is a form of hostile
action.
37 . Sabotage emphasis
The only additional information received from the War Depart-
ment after the receipt of message No. 472 (November 27) was con-
tained in three messages on sabotage and subversive measures. The
first from G-2 War Department to G-2 Hawaiian Department re-
received November 27 read as follows :
Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate. Hostilities may
ensue. Subversive activities may be expected. Inform Commanding General
and Chief of Staff only."
2» Line 5, p. 123, report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board ; also line 20, p. 1, Top Secret
Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.
30 Messaffe November 27, No. 472, from Marshall ; p. 7, exhibit 32.
31 V rmv Pearl Harbor Board Transcript, vol. A, p. 41. .
M Exhibit 33.
3'Mps""" November 27, No. 473, War Department G-2 to Hawaiian Department G-2;
p. 10, exhibit 32.
2936 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
This message was erroneously paraphrased in the Army Pearl Har-
bor Board report, page 133, to indicate that hostilities were "prob-
able."
58. Report hy General Short
I replied as follows to the radiogram from the Chief of Staff Novem-
ber 27 :
[7530] Chief of Staff, Wab Department
Washington D. C.
Reurad four seven two 27th Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage.
Liaison with the Navy.
Short."
I wish to point out that this message reporting measures taken re-
ferred by number to the message which I had received from the War
Department. If the War Department had checked the message care-
fully, there could have been no possible mistake that it was in reply
to War Department message No. 472 which directed a report of the
measures taken. AVar Department message No. 472, November 27,
was the only message addressed to the commanding general, Hawai-
ian Department, signed "Marshall." The message of November 27,
No. 473, signed "Miles," was addressed to G-2, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, and did not call for a report. My message No. 959, November
27, was addressed to the Chief of Staff, referred by number to No. 472,
and stated that I was reporting measures taken. It is difficult to see
how there could have been any possible confusion as to the message
which was being answered. Failure to check my message No. 959
to determine to which War Department message it was a reply prob-
ably came about only because all who read the message believed the
action [7931] was correct. General Marshall, in his testi-
mony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, stated :
We anticipated, beyond a doubt, a Japanese movement in Indochina and the
Gulf of Siam, and against the Malay Peninsula. We anticipate also an assault
on the Philippines. We did not, so far as I recall, anticipate an attack on
Hawaii ; the reason being that we thought, with the addition of more modern
planes, that the defense there would be suflScient to make it extremely hazardous
for the Japanese to attempt such on attack.^s
59. November 2S Sabotage message and report
On November 28 the following message, relating entirely to sabotage
and subversive measures, was received from the War Department:
Hawn Dbst Ft Shafter TH
482 28th Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately
against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War
Department (see paragraph three MID SC 30-45). Also desired that you initiate
forth all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establish-
ments, propeBty, and equipment against sabotage, protection of your personnel
against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage.
This does not, repeat not, mean that any illegal measures are authorized. Pro-
tective mesures should be confined to those essential to security, avoiding un-
necessary publicity and alarm. To insure speed of transniission identical tele-
grams are being sent to all air stations but this does not, repeat not, affect your
responsibility under existing instructions. Adams.^"
When this message was received from the War Department I felt
that it had been prepared after consideration had been given to my
message reporting measures taken pursuant to War Department mes-
3* p. 12. exhibit 32.
^ Army Pearl Harbor Boarri Transcript, vol. 1, p. 9.
»* November 28, message No. 482 from The Adjutant General; p. 13, exhibit 32.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2937
sage No. 472. I sent the following message in reply and was careful
to refer directly to the War Department number, "482" :
The Adjutant Genekal,
War Department, Washington, D. C.
Re your secret radio 482 28th, full precautions are being taken against sub-
versive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Depart-
ment (paragi-aph 3 MID SC 30-45) and military establishments including per-
sonnel and equipment. As regards protection [1933^ of vital installa-
tions outside of military reservations such as power plants, telephone exchanges
and highway bridges, this headquarters by confidential letter dated June 19,
1941, requested the Governor of tlie Territory to use the broad powers vested
in him by Section 67 of the Organic Act which provides, in effect, that the Gov-
ernor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the United
States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence, in-
vasion, insurrection, etc. Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June
20th confidentially made a formal written demand on this headquarters to furnish
and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent
sabotage, and lawless violence in connection therewith, being committed against
vital installations and structures in the Territory. Pursuant to the foregoing
request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian in-
stallations. In this connection, at the instigation of this headquarters the City
and County of Honolulu on June 30th, 1941, enacted an ordinance which permits
the Commanding General Hawaiian Department to close, or restrict the use of
and travel upon, any highway within the City and County of Honolulu, whenever
the Commanding General deems such action neces- U93Ji'\ sary in the
interest of national defense. The authority thus given has not yet been exercised.
Relations with FBI and all other Federal and Territorial officials are and have
been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters.
Short."
Ji,0. General Arnold^s radiogram
On November 28 General Arnold, Chief of the Air Corps, sent to the
commanding general, Hawaiian Air Forces, a message relating en-
tirely to sabotage and subversive activities, similar in tone to War De-
partment message No. 482, signed "Adams." ^^ General Martin, re-
plying to this message on December 4, gave a detailed report of
measures taken by him against sabotage and subversive activities and
added :
This entire department Is now operating and will continue to operate under an
alert for prevention of sabotage.^*
We received no reply disagreeing in any way with the action re-
ported.
4-7. November ^8 to Decemher 7, Idlf.!
From November 28, 1941, until \1935'\ the war began, I
received only one more message from the War Department,, that of
November 29, 1941, regarding preparations to move two Army pursuit
squadrons on short notice, and informing me that the Army would
take over the defense of advance Pacific bases, except for furnishing
antiaircraft equipment. This message stated that Cliristmas and
Canton Islands would be garrisoned from Hawaii, and replacements
^yould be sent from the United States.*^ This was the last informa-
tion from the War Department until the final message from the Chief
of Staff of December 7, which arrived 7 hours after the attack.
I do not believe that message has been placed in evidence.
^ p. 17, exhibit 32.
3' P. 14, exiiihit 37.
* Message, December 4. No. 1033. General Martin to General Arnold ; p. 19, exhibit 32.
<» No footnote supplied in official transcript.
79716—46 — pt. 7 3
2938 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION, PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[79361 ^^^- Kaufman. Counsel for General Short has suggested
that we offer in evidence at this point a telegram from the War Depart-
ment to General Short dated November 29, 1941. The request was
made by counsel for General Short.
The Vice Chairman. Do we have copies for the committee ?
Mr. Kaufman. We have photostats; and I think they have been
handed around to the members of the committee this morning.
The Vice Chairman, Does counsel desire that the message be read
at this time ?
Mr. Kaufman. Either read into the record, or marked as an exhibit.
I suggest it be read into the record.
The Vice Chairman. Suppose you read it into the record.
Mr. Kaufman (reading) :
[7937] Standard Form No. 14A [Stamped] Secret From War Department
Approved by the President Bureau : A. G. O.
March 10, 1926. AG 3S1( 11-29-41 )MC-E
Telegr.\m. EHB/cdm-1712
Official Business — Government Rates November 29 ,1941.
CaNegram Sent No. 489, 11/29
Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.
Consult C in C Pacific Fleet reference his dispatch number two eight Z3ro six
two seven to Chief of Naval Operations period In view of information contained
in above dispatch comma the movement of the two Army pursuit squadrons as
indicated in War Department cable number four six six comma November two
six comma one nine four one comma will be suspended period These squadrons
should liowever be prepared to move on short notice period Paragraph War
Department has offered to take over defense of Pacific advance bases from the
Navy except for furnishing antiaircraft equipment period Consult C in C Pacific
Fleet reference requii-ements and areas to be defended period War Department
has also assumed responsibility for defense of Christmas and Canton period
It is contemplated that you will form base defense units from the Hawaiian
garrison 1793S] specially organized as task forces for particular areas
period If these units are moved from Oahu comma necessary replacements from
the United States will be furnished period Repoit your cdnclusions and recom-
mendations to the War Department at the earliest practicable date.
Adams.
Based on : WPD 4571-5, 11/29/41. Official : Secret
Green cy w/d & destroyed by burning. Signature illegible
12/30/41, CDM— 1705. Adjutant General.
[Stamped] Secret.
Senator Ferguson. What is the name of that man at the bottom
of the telegram?
Mr. Kaufman. The notation here is "signature illegible."
General Short. I think it was General Wall.
The Vice Chairman, It does not look like "Wall" on my copy. It
looks more like "Williams."
Mr. Murphy. Does the record now show there is a notation that
the signature is illegible?
Mr. Kaufman. There is a notation on the mimeographed copy.
On the photostatic copy there is a signature, but I cannot make it
out.
General Short believes that it is the signature of [79391
General Wall.
General Short. I may be wrong, but it looks like "Wall," the last
four letters.
Senator Brewster. What are his initials?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2939
General Short. I do not know.
Senator Brewstek. Isn't there sombody that can clarify that? I
think there is somebody in the War Department that can tell whose
signature it is.
Mr. Kaufman. Somebody suggested "Sullivan." We will make an
effort to iind out whose signature it is.
Mr. Murphy. I was wondering, Mr. Chairman, what difference it
makes who signed it, as long as it came from the adjutant general.
The Vice Chairman. That is what I was going to ask. General
Adams was the man who sent it ?
General Short. General Adams was the man who sent it.
The Vice Chairman. Adams' name on it means to you that the
adjutant general of the Army sent it to you?
General Short. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. And this other signature did not mean any-
thing to you at the time, did it ?
General Short. That is correct.
Senator Brewster. I think in view of the fact that it has appeared
at some times that the chiefs in the [7940 \ othces aid not
always know what their subordinates were doing, we certainly ought
to establish, at any rate, who signed this. It does not seem that
would be beyond the possibility of determination.
The Vice Chairman. The counsel has stated he will endeavor to
secure that information. You may continue. General.
Senator Ferguson. May 1 make one inquiry of counsel? In the
lower left-hand corner of the telegram, the "green cy W/D and de-
stroyed by burning 12/30/41 cdm-1705," what is that?
Mr. Kaufman. 1 do not know, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Is there any character that that refers to?
Mr. Kaufman. I am told the "green cy" refers to green copy.
Senator Ferguson. Will you ascertain what that means ?
Mr. Kaufman. Yes.*
The Vice Chairman. All right; proceed. General. Give us the
page where you will resume.
l'/941j General Short. I am resuming on page 24 of my state-
ment. The message sent by the Chief of Staff of December 7, which
arrived 7 hours after the attack, was as follows :
Hawn Dept Fr Shafter, TH
52S> 7th Japanese are presenting at 1 :00 P. M. Eastera Standard Time today
what amounis to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code
machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do
not know but be on alert accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this com-
munication.
MARSHALL "
4^. Delay of December 7 Message
The message was filed at 12:18 p. m., December 7, eastern time
(6:48 a. m., December 7, Honolulu time). It was received by the
K.C.A. in Honolulu at 7 : 33 a. m., December 7, and delivered to the
Signal Ofiice, Fort Shafter, at 11:45 a. m. (Delivery was undoubt-
edly delayed by the Japanese attack.) The deciphered message was
delivered to the adjutant general, Hawaiian Department, at 2 : 58
p. m., December 7.
" p. 21, exhibit 32.
♦See memorandum from the War Department in clarification of this document in Hear-
ings, Part 11, p. 5296.
2940 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Delay in deciphering due to not being marked "Priority" in Wash-
ington. Thus, this vital message was received 7 hours after the attack.
1794^] If this message had been sent by scrambler telephone
there would have been time to warm up the planes and put them in
the air, thus, at least, avoiding a large loss of planes in the initial
attack at 8 a. m. This would not necessarily have lessened the naval
losses. The fact that the War Department sent this message by radio
in code instead of telephoning it in the clear and putting it through
in the minimum amount of time indicates that the War Department,
even as late as 6 : 48 a. m., December 7th, Honolulu time, did not con-
sider an attack on Honolulu as likely enough to warrant drastic action
to prepare the islands for the sneak attack.
Senator Lucas. Pardon me, General Short. There is one statement
you made there with respect to the word "Priority" that I do not find
in my copy.
General Short. That is not there. Since writing the statement I
have seen the photostatic copy of the message as it was received in
Hawaii and there is no indication of any mark of priority or urgency,
or anj^thing.
Senator Lucas. Will you kindly refer to page 24 and read that
statement again, in order that I may correct my copy here?
General Short. The deciphered message was delivered to the adju-
tant general, Hawaiian Department, at 2 : 58 p. m., \7943]
December 7. Delay in deciphering due to not being marked ''Pri-
ority" in Washington.
Senator Lucas. Thank you, sir.
General Short. I might say that General Powell, who is one of the
witnesses and who was the signal officer in Honolulu, will have a
photostatic copy of the message as received. I believe also that it is
shown in the Clausen report in that condition.
Ii3. jStaf procedure re communications
It is standard staff procedure and doctrine that all important or
emergency messages should be sent by all available means of communi-
cation, which in this case would have included the scrambler tele-
phones which had been frequently used between the War Department
and Fort Shafter. Colonel Phillips and General Marshall did confer
by scrambler phone later in the day on December 7, 1941. If security
would be violated by sending the information by phone, then the War
Department should have issued the necessary alert orders which they
would have known that I would have issued at once if I had the in-
formation which they possessed. In support of this position, I quote
from the War Department Field Manual on signal communication:
* * * Choice of the means employed in each instance depends on the situ-
ation. Exclusive reliance upon [794^J any one means is unwise because
special and unforeseen circumstances may render that means inoperative when
most needed. Plans of all commanders will make advance provision for prompt
employment of effective and reliable alternate means ; and the simultaneons
operation of several means will minimize the ill effects of complete interruption
in any one. * * * 42
<* Italics supplied ; par. 8b, FM 24-5, p. 4.
PROCEEDINGS OP JOINT COMMITTEE 2941
ACTION TAKEN — NOVEMBEK 2 7 TO DECEMBER 7, 1941
JU' Alert plans
The standing operating procedure, headquarters, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, 5 Noveniber 1941, provided for the following alerts:
SEOrlON II ALERTS
13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as
indicated below. -Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department
order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. * * *
14. Alert No. 1. — a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and up-
risings within the islands, with no threat from without. * * *
I want to make clear that under alert No. 1, we had skeleton crews at
all antiaircraft guns, capable of conducting fire on the enemy, and
that .30 cal., .50 [75.|5] cal., and pistol ammunition was im-
mediately at hand for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles, and machine
guns. Three-inch ammunition was readily accessible to all but four
batteries. This ammunition was in casemates from 20 to 75 yards
from the batteries. As part of alert No. 1, the interceptor command
and the aircraft warning service functioned from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m.,
the most dangerous hours for an air raid.
15. Alert No. 2. — a. This alert is applicable to a more serious condition than
Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile subsurface, surface, and
aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is pro-
vided. * * *
16. Alert No. 3. — a. This alert requires the occupation of all field positions by
all units, prepared for maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installations
on outlying islands. * * *
46. Conferences November 27
When I received the November 27, 1941, message signed "Marshall,'"
I immediately talked it over with my chief of staff, Colonel Phillips,
and then made my decision to order alert No. 1. This decision was
then communicated to G-2 and to the echelon commanders. On that
same afternoon, I conferred on the matter with General Martin and
with General Burgin. [75^^] The general contents of the radio-
gram were also made known to the two division commanders through
staff officers. In view of the restrictive orders against wide dissemi-
nation of the information, I withheld it from the other Army per-
sonnel. At the same time that I ordered alert No. 1 into effect, I di-
rected that the interceptor command, including the aircraft warning
service and information center, should operate from 4 a. m. until
7 a. m. daily. In addition, the six mobile stations operated daily,
except Sunday, from 7 a. m. to 11 a. m. for routine training and daily,
except Saturday and Sunday, from 12 noon until 4 p. m. for training
and maintenance work.
JS' Alert No. 1: Consideration
In making the decision for alert No. 1, 1 considered several matters.
(a) Navy conversation's. — From repeated conversations with the
Navy, I knew that the Japanese naval vessels were supposed to be
either in their home ports or proceeding south. I had no informa-
tion suggesting that some ships might have been detached to proceed
eastward. Our information also indicated that Japan had no land-
based bombers capable of proceeding from their nearest island, some
2,100 miles away.
2942 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION JPEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(h) TaXk force reconnavificmce. — ^It was known that the Navy
usually had two or three task forces at sea. The carriers [7,947]
with the task forces normally scouted 300 miles at each side, a total
wij^th of 600 miles. Two task forces would thus cover 1,200 miles of
ocean in the vicinity of Oahu. The Navy also had reconnaissance
from Midwav, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands. T thus felt
that- air attack was highly improbable. On the morning of November
27, I conferred with Admiral Kimmel concerning the messages we
had each received from Washington with reference to Wake and M'd-
way. Admiral Kimmel and T discussed reinforcement of the Wake
and Midway garrisons by Army plnnes. Such reinforcement would
have weakened thp Oahu defense. The Admiral asked his war-plans
officer. Captain McMorris, whnt he thought were the chances of a
surprise attack at Honolnhi. The captain answered, "None." Gen-
eral Martin and Colonel Mollison were present with me at this con-
ference. Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch. who were present,
expressed no difference of opinion with Captain McMorris.'*^ Recon-
naissance, as directed in message No. 472, November 27, was a function
of the Navy under the joint agrement approved March 28 by Admiral
Bloch and me. That the Chief of Staff recognized that this was the
case is shown by the following quotations from his testimony :
[79^8] Gpneral Marshall. Distant reconnaissance — was a naval function,
nnd the Army Commander was liable to furnish them such of the planes suitable
for that purpose that could be provided."
General Marshall. * * * As I recall the matter, the only way the Array
would have been involved in the deep reconnai.ssance would have been in detach-
injr units to serve und°r the Navy. * * * «
General Russell. Well, is it your view that both having seen the message of
November 27, without more ado the Navy should have started their distant
reconnaissance?
General Marshall. That is right. That is my view.**
(c) Traininq mhsion. — The factor of training was also considered.
Use of Alerts 2 or 3 would have seriously interfered with our training
mission. The soldiers and officers of my command were in lavrje part
relatively new to the Army and to their specialized tasks. Hegnlar
training was essential. The War Department message had not indi-
cated in any way that our training mission was modified, suspended,
or abolished, or that nil troops were to go immediately into tactical
status. [79If9'\ The Hawaiian air force in particular had the
mission of training combat crews and of ferrying B-l7's to the Philip-
pine Islands. On September 8, 1941, we sent 9 trained combat teams
to General MacArthur, Before November 27, we had sent 18 trained
teams to the mainland and we had 17 more teams ready to go to the
mainland for ferrying purposes. Twelve more combat crews had to
be trained for planes expected to arrive at an early date. Only 6 of
our 12 flying fortresses were in condition and available for this im-
portant training. It was thus imperative that General Martin be
allowed to make maximum use of these planes for training. If war
were momentarily expected in the Hawaiian coastal frontier, these
considerations would give way. But every indication was that the
War Department expected the war to break out, if at all, only in the
■" Compare, Army Pearl Harbor hoard transcript, vol. 4, pp. 284, 285.
** Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. A, p. 26.
■" Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. 1, p. 43.
" Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. 1, p. 47.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2943
far Pacific and not at Hawaii. In fact, on November 26, 1941, a
radiogram from the War Department had ordei»jd me to equip two
B-24 airplanes for a special photographic reconnaissance mission over
Truk and Jaluit in the Caroline Islands, with particular attention to
the location of naval vessels, submarines, airfields, airplanes, barracks,
and camps. If attacked, the crews were directed to use all means in
their power for self preservation. These planes were to be sent to
Honolulu unarmed, but I was directed to insure that both were ''fully
equipped with gun [79S0] ammunition upon departure." *^
The first of these two planes did not arrive in Hawaii until December
5, 1941. Presumably, had the War Department in the meantime de-
cided that Hawaii was a zone of danger, they would have armed the
plane before sending it to me. General Martin wired back a request
that the second B-24 bring necessary equipment other than the guns
and ammunition which we could supply.^^
I would like now to pass out chart No. 4. I want this committee to
see graphically the picture as I had it in my mind and as all of us in
Hawaii saw it at the time.
There was a large number of Japanese aliens and of citizens of
Japanese extraction. There were thousands of these people all around
us and near to every military and naval installation.
Most of these Japanese were loyal. Many were disloyal. Sabotage
was "first to be expected in point of time", as General Marshall put it.
Chart 4 shows the major installations. Each black square repre-
sents an important camp, airfield, or naval yard. Each round black
dot represents 1,000 persons of Japanese extraction. Each grey dot
represents 1,000 other residents.
My figures are taken from a 1943 census study based \7951'\
on the population figures of 1940.
(Chart No. 4 is included in "Exhibit No. 134.")
General Short, (continuing) :
{d) Sabotage danger. — The danger of sabotage was paramount in
my mind and seemed to me to be the chief danger which the War De-
partment feared. Sabotage had long been considered our primary
danger in Hawaii, because of the large Japanese population, many of
whom were under suspicion of disloyalty .^^ Thirty-seven percent of
the population was of Japanese descent, or probably 161,000. Of these
about 40,000 were Japanese aliens. Many of the Japanese lived in
very close proximity to air fields and other defense installations.
Sabotage might reasonably be expected for several months prior to
the outbreak of hostilities. Antisabotage defense is best carried out
where there is little dispersion of the command. Planes must be
grouped on landing mats and on the apron. The fact that man-proof
fences and searchlights had not been installed around the air-fields
made the protection of the planes from sabotage much more difficult
when the planes were dispersed in bunkers. Funds for fencing air-
fields had been finally allotted by the War Department but too late
for installation of fences prior to attack. That the War Department
"Message, 26 Nov. 1941, No. 465 (RCA No. 831 US Govt), quoted on pages 304-305,
Vol. 4, Army Pearl Harbor Board Tr. ; page 6, Ex. 32.
** Message December 5, 1941, to General Arnold.
^ Compare, Hawaiian Defense Project Revision 1940, committee daily record, vol. 6,
pp. 966, 967 ; also exhibit 44.
2944 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
was equally conscious of the danger of \795J^\ sabotage is
shown by the following quotations :
In the aide memoire handed to the President by the Chief of Staff
May 3, 1941, was the statement —
* * * In point of sequence, sabotage is first to be expected and may, within
a very limited time, cause great damage. On this account, and in order to
assure strong control, it would be highly desirable to set up a military control,
of the islands prior to the likelihood of our involvement in the Far East.""
General Marshall in his letter to me of February 7, 1941, stated :
* * * The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air
and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation * * *."
(e) Herron alert precedent. — The precedent of the Herron alert
of 1940, to which I have already alluded, and the general War Depart-
ment policy of centralization were important factors in my mind. I
felt and I still feel that if the Chief of Staff wanted an all-out alert
in Hawaii, he would have ordered it himself and not expected me to
make the decision, knowing as he did how relatively limited was my
information as com- [75-55] pared to that available to him.
Questioned by Mr. Keefe, General Marshall gave the following testi-
money before this committee :
Mr. Keefe. Well, when you issued the alert on the 17th of June 1940, you used
the language, "To deal with possible trans-Pacific raid."
General Maeshall. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Yes. Well, now, then, let us put it this way without splitting
words : General Marshall, on the morning of the 28th of November you had tre-
mendously more information as to the possibility of an attack by the Japanese
than you had in June 1940?
General Mabshall. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. If you had information in June 1940 as to the possibilities of a
trans-Pacific raid, you had a mountain of evidence on the 27th of November, did
you not, to the same effect?
General Marshall. That is correct."
Message No. 472, November 27, was referred to so frequently by
General Marshall as a command directive that I feel there should be a
comparison of this message with the Herron message and 'with the
Navy message of November 27.
[7966'\ I have prepared a chart for comparison of these three
messages and have attached it as annex A to this prepared statement.
An inspection of the chart comparing the three alert messages makes it
readily apparent by the Army Pearl Harbor board designed message
No. 472 of November 27 as the "Do-Don't Message."
I would like you to turn to that chart. I would like to make some
remarks in reference to it.
Taking up the comparison of the three alerts
The Vice Chairintan. Will you give us the page. General ?
General Short. It is the very last thing in the statement, annex A.
At the time of the Herron alert, there were no negotiations going
on between Japan and the Ignited States, so no information was given
on that subject. The Navy message stated, "Negotiations have ceased.
Aggressive move by Japan expected within next few days." That was
a very positive and definite statement. The Army message stated:
Negotiations appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the
barest possibility will be resumed.
«• Kxhihit T,^ : daily rpoord, vol. 17, p. 2888.
»» ■Ryhihit .'i3. np. 1 to 3.
153 Pailv rpcord, vol. 22. p. 3713.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2945
Now, the papers indicated that they had been resumed on December
1, 2, and 5. However, I had no information from the War Depart-
ment. The War Department knew that [7957] while they
had outwardly been resumed, they were defacto ruptured, and the
Japanese emissaries had been told to keep up the illusion that the
negotiations were going on, so that we would be misguided. That
information was not in my hands.
The alert message of June 17 made an estimate of Japanese action
as a possible trans-Pacific raid. That is what they probably thought
the danger was. The Navy message of November 27 stated :
Amphibious expedition against Philippines, Thai, Kra Peninsula or possibly
Borneo indicated by known Jap task forces.
This message also made a direct estimate of the probable Japanese
action.
The Army message stated :
Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment.
Now, this was not in any sense an accurate statement as to the proba-
ble Japanese action, considering the information that was known in
Washington. Mr. Hull stated that he considered the document from
the Japanese of November 20 as an absolute ultimatum, and from then
on it was just a question of putting it off. They knew that that meant
war.
[7958] General Stark stated before this committee that he made
up his mind in the fall that war was inevitable. The "future action
unpredictable" in this message did not reflect those two opinions in
any way.
Now, I will take up the question of missions and orders as given
in the three messages. The alert of June 17, 1940, stated :
Immediately alert complete defensive organization to greatest extent possible
without creating public hysteria or projecting undue curiosity of newspapers
and agents.
Maintain alert until further ordeirs.
It stated exactly the type of alert that was desired, which were de-
fensive missions.
The Navy message stated :
Consider dispatch a war warning. Execute appropriate defensive deployment
preparatory to carrying out tasks assigned in WPI/-46.
Again, a definite directive.
Take a look at the Army message. It states :
US desires Japan commit first overt act. This should not be construed as
restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Take
such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these meas-
ures carried out so as not to alarm civil popula- [755.9] tion or disclose
intent. Should hostilities occur, carry out tasks Rainbow Five.
Everything is qualified. No definite directive without qualification.
All messages contain certain miscellaneous instructions.
The Herron message stated :
Instructions for secret communications with Chief of Staff will be furnished
you shortly. Acknowledge.
The Navy message stated :
Inform District and Army authorities. Guam, Samoa directed take appropri-
ate measures against sabotage.
2946 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Army message of November 27 stated :
Report measures taken. Limit dissemination to minimum essential oflBcers.
Those are the only two unqualified statements in the message. The
"report measures taken," when that report was made, no attention
was paid to it.
Now, analyze the last :
Limit dissemination to minimum essential officers.
It does not say to limit to minimum essential officers and men. It
says "to minimum essential officers."
Now, if you took up alert No. 2 or No. 3, tinder No. 2 you could not
send a plane in the air to shoot down Japanese planes without telling
the crew that they were to shoot [7960] down Japanese planes,
and telling them why. You could not put your antiaircraft in posi-
tion and tell them to shoot down Japanese planes without giving them
a definite order, and telling them why.
Alert No. 3 would have sent every man to his battle position. You
do not send soldiers into battle without telling them why they are
there. So that instruction alone literally interpreted would have pre-
vented-the use of alert No. 2, or alert No. 3.
We come now to the follow-up of these messages, which is a very im-
portant factor. The Herron alert of June 17, 1940, states :
Frequent instructions and request for information from War Department for
several weeks.
The committee Exhibit No. 52 shows those in detail.
The Navy message of November 27 :
On December 3 two messages with reference to Japanese instruc-
tions to destroy codes were sent. On December 6 authority was granted
for outlying islands to destroy all secret and confidential documents.
Now, as to the Army message of November 27, no checkup was made
to even find out what my report of measures taken meant. No addi-
tional instructions were given from the 28th of November under after
the attack.
[TOGl] The Vice Chairman. General Short, it has been sug-
gested that we might recess until 2 o'clock. You might possibly get a
little tired.
General Short. Thank you very much.
The Vice Chairman. We will recess at this point to 2 o'clock this
afternoon.
General Short. Thank you very much.
(Whereupon, at 11 : 55 a. m., the committee recessed to reconvene at
2 p. m. of the same day.)
afternoon session — 2 : 00 p. M.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Congressman Keefe.
Mr. Keefe. Yesterday, at tlie beginning of my examination of Ad-
miral Kimmel, I made the statement, which I quote from the record :■
In your testimony you have acquitted yourself magnificently.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2947
My attention has been called to the city edition of the New York
Times which reports that incident as follows :
The Admiral was applauded by spectators when Representative Keefe, Republi-
can of Wisconsin, told him, "In your testimony you have acquitted yourself
insignificantly."
I want the record to show that I have discussed this matter with
Mr. White, who wrote the article, and 'I am certain that he sent the
quote correctly, and either in transmission or in composition some
error was made which completely changes the statement to such an ex-
tent that I feel it is necessary to have the matter corrected. I hope
that in the later editions of the New York Times that very serious error
will be noted, and that it would not be sent out to their readers as indi-
cating that I have accused Admiral Kimmel of acquitting himself in-
significantly, which caused the audience in the [7903] room
to voice their approval by spontaneous applause. The whole thing
just does not make sense, and I know the New^ York Times will see
that it is properly corrected.
The Chairman. The committee can correct its own mistakes but it
cannot correct those made outside. However, I am sure that the great
newspaper. New York Times, will make the necessary correction in
this case.
Mr. Mtirphy. Mr. Chairman, at that point, I am wondering what
the committee is doing about protecting itself, because there are a great
many misquotations in the record itself. I know there are a great
many in my own questions. I am w^ondering if we have anybody
proofreading the record, and what steps we will take to correct the
misquotes in the record, because there are a lot of misquotes in the
record.
Senator Ferguson. I have noted some misquotes in the record.
The Chairman. It might be advisable for members of the committee
to read over their own questions in the daily record and call the atten-
tion of the reporters to any mistakes that may be made.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, in the Ways and Means Com-
mittee of the House of Representatives each member is furnished a
copy of the daily record with the pages marked on the back where his
name appears, or his corrections. He can [7964] turn through
the pages under his name and very readily take out his own without
having to read everything that is in the whole record. I do not know
whether anything like that is practical here or not, but that is the
practice that is followed there.
The Chairman. It would not be difficult for each member of the
committee to find his own interrogation, and if there are any mis-
takes to call the attention of the reporter to them.
The Chair is advised that General Short wishes to be excused for the
remainder of the day after he finishes his written statement, because
of his recent illness. That is entirely agreeable.
The Chair wishes also to announce that immediately following that
there will be an executive session of the committee, at which he hopes
all members will be present.
Go ahead, General.
2948 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES
ARMY (RETIRED)— Resumed
General Short. Proceeding on page 33 :
[7965] 47. C onftrmation of sabotage alert
After making my decision for the anti-sabotage alert, several other
things occurred which confirmed my opinion that I was complying
exactly with the wishes of the War Department.
{a) Report to and acquiescence hy War Department. — As directed,
I reported that I had alerted the Department to prevent sabotage
and had established liaison with the Navy.^^ No reply disagreeing
with my report was sent to me. If the War Department felt upon
receipt of my report that my alert against sabotage was not sufficient
to meet the situation, it should have immediately ordered me to
provide against an air raid or against an all-out attack. No steps of
this kind were taken by the War Department, and I had every reason
to believe that they approved fully of the measures I had taken, in-
asmuch as they had 9 days before the attack in which to give me
additional instructions or direct that an all-out alert against an air
raid or an all-out alert be put into effect. General Marshall, when
asked by Mr. Keefe, if it wasn't his responsibility to check up on
the measures taken by General Short as reported in reply to message
No. 472 of November 27, stated :
[7966] General Makshaix. Now, in this particular case^ a very tragic thing
occurred, there is no question about that, there is no question in regard to my
responsibility as Chief of Staff. I am not attempting to evade that at all, but I
do not think it is quite characterized in the manner that you have expressed
yourself."
When questioned further by Mr. Keefe with regard to General
Gerow's responsibility in the matter. General Marshall stated :
He had a direct responsibility and I had the full responsibility.""
As shown in the following quotation. General Marshall admitted
that since no objection was being raised by the War Department, I
had the right to assume that my action was approved :
Senator Ferguson. Well, would this be true from an Army viewpoint, that
when an overseas commander is ordered to take measures as he deems neces-
sary and to report measures taken to you, is he correct in assuming that if
his report is not the kind of action that you had in mind that you would there-
after inform him specifically of the difference?
General Marshall. I would assume so."
[7967] With reference to my report that the Department was
alerted to prevent sabotage, General Marshall testified :
It did not register on Colonel Bundy, it did not register on General Gerow, it
did not register on me and it carries Mr. Stimson's initials also."
For 9 days from November 27 to December 7 this reply apparently
did not register on any of the responsible officers.
" Message, 27 November, Short to Marshall, exhibit 32, p. 12.
" Daily record, vol. 22, p. 3726.
"^ Dailv record, vol. 22, p. 3728.
»« Daily record, vol. 22, p. 3443.
" Daily record, vol. 22, p. 3732.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2949
I want to emphasize also that my report was clear and concise, as
required by War Department rules :
General Gebow (reading) : "The merit of a report is not measured by its length.
A concise presentation of important points usually is all that is required."
Senator Ferguson. Would General Short's reply comply with that regulation?
General Geeow. Yes, sir.'*
In spite of General Gerow's confession that this report of mine was
in conformity with directives, he still contended that somehow he had
misunderstood it. When asked how it should have read in order to
be clear to him and his staff, he answered :
Well, I think, sir, if the message had read simply, [T96S] "alerted
against sabotage only," it would have been perfectly clear.'*
The only little word "only" seems to have been the missing link in
General Gerow's mind. He was unwilling to read my message and
admit it meant what it said, no more and no less.
(b) Further sabotage messages. — The three messages on sabotage
and subversive activity convinced me that the War Department was
cognizant of the measures I had taken, approved of the action, and
wanted to be sure that my measures against sabotage and subversive
acts were complete but that no illegal acts were committed in carrying
them out. I believed, and I had good reason to believe, that since the
War Department specifically mentioned subversive activities as a
threat to Hawaii, they w^ould also mention a "trans-Pacific raid" if
they had thought it to be one of our immediate dangers. The fact
that the War Department sent to the Hawaiian department three sepa-
rate and distinct messages on November 27 and 28 with reference to
sabotage is conclusive evidence that the War Department considered
it as a very serious threat.
[7969] {c) Ferrying unarmed ylanes. — As late as December 6,
1941, the War Department was ferrying planes to Hawaii, unarmed
and unprepared to fight. In fact, 12 B-17 airplanes under orders
from the War Department left Hamilton Field, Calif., in two squad-
rons at 9 : 30 p. m., December 6, Pacific time (12 : 30 a. m. December 7,
eastern time) , and at 10 : 30 p. m., December 6, Pacific time (1 : 30 a. m.,
December 7, eastern time). None of these planes was equipped with
ammunition or defensive armament. The machine guns were cosmo-
lined and had not been bore-sighted. Ferry crews were skeletonized,
consisting of pilot, copilot, navigator, engineer, and radio operator.
Such crews were incapable of manning the machine guns, even if the
guns had been properly prepared for combat and supplied with
ammunition. It cannot be imagined that the War Department wished
to send these planes to Honolulu unarmed when they already had
information of a pending Japanese attack. The only inference that
can be drawn is that while the War Department had information of a
pending attack, General Arnold, the Chief of Air Corps, who ordered
these planes to Honolulu, and who, I understand, was present at Ham-
ilton Field at the time of their departure, did not know of the critical
situation in the relations between the United States and Japan.^*^
[7970] These planes actually arrived at Hickam Field in the
midst of the first attack. Four of the 12 planes were destroyed or
damaged without being able to fight.
■» Daily record, vol. 25, pp. 4.'?56-4357 ; quoting par. 46, FM 101-5, p. 30.
*» Daily record, vol. 25, pp. 4420-4421.
•• Compare Marshall's testimony, Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. A, pp. 20-21.
2950 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
{d) Conferences with Navy. — In my conferences with Admiral
Kimmel and Admiral Bloch between November 27, 1941, and Decem-
ber 7, 1941, nothing further developed to indicate that an attack might
be expected in our coastal frontier sector. The Navy war warning mes-
sage of November 27, shown to me by Admiral Kimmel, indicated that
in the continental districts and at Guam and Samoa the Navy Depart-
ment feared chiefly the sabotage danger.*^^ On December 1, 1941, we
conferred for a long while regarding the suggestion from Washington
that Army troops relieve the Wake and Midway Marine garrisons,
to make them available for landing operations. On December 2,
Admiral Kimmel came to my quarters with an 8-page letter he had
prepared on this Wake and Midway problems.®^ On December 3, we
conferred at Admiral Kimmel's headquarters on a radiogram I was
sending to the War Department with reference to the relief of Wake
and Midway.^^ During this period, November 27 to December 7,
the Navy made no request for Army planes to help conduct long-
distance reconnaissance. [7971^ At that time I was convinced
that the Navy either knew the location of tlie Japanese carriers or
had enough information so that they were not uneasy. I felt that
they could handle the situation.^* My liaison officer to the Navy,
Major Fleming, held another conference with Colonel Pfeiffer of the
Marine Corps on December 4, 1941.^^
Will you pass out chart No. 5, please.
(Chart No. 5 is included in '^Exhibit No. 134.")
[7973] General Short. This chart collects the time data on a
24-hour clock. It shows the December 7 "1 p. m." message which was
received in the War Department about 9 a. m. Washington time, which
was 3 : 30 a. m. Hawaiian time.
The events of the submarine sinking, the radar misinterpretation,
and the action at the time of the attack are charted.
After the third attack, the "1 p. m." message arrived. It had been
delayed by the coding, by the commercial transmission, by the attack,
and by the fact that it was not marked "urgent" or "priority." Other
priority messages were first decoded by my message center.
[7974.] This time element was so important that I would like to
run over this chart in some detail.
We notice first on the chart the fact that the War Department had
in its possession at 3 :30 a. m. Honolulu time, the 1 p. m. message stating
that the other matter was to be delivered at that hour. It was 3 hours
and 15 minutes from that time before anything happened in Honolulu.
Then we had the destruction of the two-man submarine.
About this same time, at 6 : 48 a. m. General Marshall wrote a mes-
sage which was not delivered until after the attack.
7 : 20 a. m., planes reported. The Opana radar station picked up the
planes from the north, and it was misinterpreted by the control
officer.
7 : 55 a. m., the first attack in Hickam Field and other installations.
8 a. m., the first of the unarmed B-17's from Hancock Field, Calif.,
arrived at Hickam Field.
^ Exhibit 37, p. 31B.
^ Compare p. 301, vol. 4, Army Pearl Harbor board transcript.
^ Compare pp. 301-302, 394, vol. 4, Army Pearl Harbor board transcript.
** Compare p. 303. vol. 4, Army Pearl Harbor board transcript.
•» Compare pp. 302, 394, vol. 4, Army Pearl Harbor board transcript.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2951
Incidentally, the first plane to land, the pilot was killed by the
Japanese.
At 8 : 03 a. m. my chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips, reported the
attack.
At 8 : 05 a. m. the first enemy plane was shot down.
[797S] At 8 : 10 a. m. the alert by that time had been transmitted
to all of the major echelons, and Schotield Barracks had been attacked,
and a plane was shot down there.
By 8 : 30 a. m. the infantry divisions were proceeding to their battle
positions.
At 8 : 50 a. m. the first of the pursuit planes took the air to combat
the Japanese.
At 9 a. m. the second attack struck. At the same time the civilian
surgical teams started reporting at a hospital for work.
By 10 : 30 a. m. the third attack took place.
When this was over, at noon, the civilian ambulance teams started
evacuating women and children from the threatened-attack places, and
it was not then until 2 : 50 p. m. that Marshall's warning message was
received, practically lli/^ hours after the War Department had its
information, the information in its possession when we received this
vital information.
4^. Events early on December 7, 19Jfl
Two events occurred early on the morning of December 7, which, if
interpreted differently at the time, might have had a very decided effect
upon the action that followed.
J/S. Submarine in Pearl Harhor
About 6 : 45 a. m. a two-man submarine entering Pearl Harbor
\79'76\ was destroyed by ships on duty. Had the naval authorities
foreseen this as a possible forerunner of an air attack or notified the
Army, time would have been available for the dispersion of the planes.
However, the naval authorities did not connect this submarine attack
with a possible general attack. The Army was not notified until after
the attack.
50. Radar schedule
After the aircraft warning service information was closed at 7 a. m.,
December 7, the Opana station remained in operation. On Saturday,
December 6, 1941, Second Lt. Grove C. White, Jr., 0396182, Signal
Corps, had obtained permission of the control officer to have all sta-
tions operate from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. only on Sunday, December 7, 1941.
61. Misinterpretation of radar
At 7 : 20 a. m., December 7, 1941, the telephone operator at the
information center received a call from the Opana radar station stating
that a large number of planes were heading toward Oahu from North
3 points East. Lt. Kermit A. Tyler then talked on the telephone
with Private Lockard of the Opana station and said that it was not
anything of importance. At 0700 all the men at the information
center except the telephone operator had folded up their equipment
and left. When the Opana operator phoned [7977] at 0720,
Lieutenant Tyler thought the flight indicated was either a naval patrol,
a flight of Hickam bombers, or possibly some B-l7's from the United
States.
2952 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
52. Misinterpretation of radar
If Lieutenant Tyler had realized that the incoming flight was Jap-
anese, there would have been time to disperse the planes but not to
warm up the engines and get them into the air. Lieutenant Tyler
made no report of this matter to me and as far as I know did not
report the incident to the control officer, Major Tyndall, after the
information center was manned about 8 : 30 a. m. This matter was
not brought to my attention until the next day when it was too late
to be of value. Had this incident been reported to the control officer
at 8 : 30 a. m. on the 7th, he would have informed the Navy and it
might have enabled them to locate the carriers.
[7978] I might say at this point, at that time there was no de-
vice in existence for determining whether a plane picked up by the
radar was friend or foe. A few months later such a device was put
on the planes.
ACTION AT THE TIME OF ATTACK
53. Beginning of attack
At 7 : 55 a. m., December 7, the enemy planes attacked Hickam
Field, Pearl Harbor, and Wheeler Field. At 9 a. m. a second attack
was made, and a third about 10 : 30 a. m., each lasting approximately
15 minutes. At 8 : 03 a. m. the chief of stalf reported the attack, and
by 8 : 10 a. m. an order had been given to all units (major echelons)
by telephone to put alert No. 3 into effect.
5Jf. Antiaircraft artillery
All antiaircraft batteries had skeleton crews guarding them. These
crews were able to conduct antiaircraft fire. All units had in their
possession ammunition for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles, and ma-
chine guns. Three-inch ammunition had been placed in positions
accessible to all batteries except four batteries of the 64th C. A. C.
(AA).
55. Automatic loeapon batteries
The automatic weapon batteries at Fort Kamehameha, Pearl Har-
bor, and Cape Malakole fired on the enemy planes \^7970\ dur-
ing the 8 o'clock raid. The first enemy plane was shot down at
8 : 05 a. m.
66. Hawaiian air forces
During the first attack men started pulling planes oiit of the fire,
and at 8 : 50 the serviceable pursuit planes took off.
57. Twenty-fourth Division
Troops of the Twenty-fourth Division at Schofield were attacked
at 8 : 10 a. m. The troops of this division promptly returned the fire
and with success — one plane being shot down with a rifle. At 8 : 30
a. m., the division started moving to its battle positions to repel a
possible landing attack.
58. Twenty-fifth Division
The Twenty-fifth Division opened antiaircraft fire almost imme-
diately. It also moved into battle postions at 8 : 30 a. m.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2953
69. Value of prior training
All movement and action of troops was carried out as prescribed
in the standing operating procedure, with precision and with remark-
able speed. The value of our prior planning and training, which had
made everyone familiar with the plans, was brought out very clearly.
60. Civilian surgical teams
At 9 a. m., the first civilian surgical teams began reporting at Tripler
General Hospital.
\7980^ 61. Civilian relief committee
At 12 noon the civilian relief committee began the evacuation of
Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, and Schofield, and continued through-
out the afternoon and part of the evening. Most of the women and
children were moved to school buildings, although a few from these
posts and all of the women and children from Shafter, Tripler, Ord-
nance Depot, and Signal Depot were sheltered in the incompleted
underground Interceptor Command Post.
62. Seizure of foreign agents
During December 7 the foreign agents previously listed by F. B. I.
and G-2 were arrested and confined at the immigration and quaran-
tine stations as follows :
Japanese 370
Germans iJS
Italians , 14
Total 4S2
Incidentally, there were only four of the listed agents that were not
picked up on this first day.
62. Clearing airfields
The 804th Engineers began clearing the runways at Hickam Field
and Wheeler Field just as soon as the first attack diminished.
6Jt. C reditable action of command
Every officer and \7981\ man under my command performed
his duty in a most creditable manner. The deeds of courage on the
part of both the military and civil population is a matter which I hope
that history will eventually disclose.
INFORMATION NOT SENT BY WAR DEPARTMENT
65. Policy to withhold information
As this joint committee's investigation has already revealed, there
was a vast amount of highly significant information available in the
War Department which no responsible military man could exclude
from consideration in forming an estimate of the situation. The War
Department was aware of the fact that I did not have this information
and had already decided that I should not get this information.^^ It
was therefore their duty not only to make the estimate of the situation
but to make the decision as to what military action it required, and
to give me orders to go on an all-out alert instead of permitting my
sabotage alert to stand. This was in line with their centralized peace-
's Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. C, p. 199.
79716— 46— pt. 7 4
2954 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
time control system. It is my firm conviction that they did estimate
the situation, that they expected only sabotage and subversive activi-
ties in Hawaii, and that on reading my report, "Department alerted
to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy," they dismissed the
matter from their minds because I had done exactly what they desired.
\7982'] 66. No magic to Hawaii
A definite decision had been made by the War Department that
neither the Japanese intercepts nor the substance of them should be
given to the commanding general in Hawaii. The following testimony
of General Miles makes such decision clear :
Mr. Gesell. What steps were taken to distribute the intercepted messages to
the Commanding Officer at Hawaii?
General Miles. There were no steps taken to distribute these messages to that
General.
Mr. Gesell. Do I understand from your answer that these messages as inter-
cepted and translated were not sent to Hawaii by the Army?
General Miles. They were not. In some cases the substance, of some messages,
were sent to Hawaii, and almost always in naval code, I think always in naval
code, because the naval code was considered to be more secure than the Army
code.
Mr. Gesell. "Who made the decision that these messages should not be sent
to Hawaii as they were intercepted and translated as far as the Army is con-
cerned?
General Miles. That followed from the general policy laid down by the Chief
of Staff that these messages and the fact of the existence of these messages or our
ability to [7983] decode them should be confined to the least possible num-
ber of persons; no distribution should be made outside of Washington.
Mr. Gesell. Was that determination by the Chief of Staff in writing or simply
an expression of policy?
General Miles. As far as my recollection goes, it was simply an expression
of policy.
Mr. Gesell. Were you consulted in connection with the formulation of that
policy?
General Miles. I do not now remember but I imagine that I was."
67. Hindsight evaluation
I do not want to attempt to summarize or even to list all the infor-
mation here which the War Department had but which I did not have.
I want to refrain from hindsight evaluation of this information. But
1 also want to call the committee's attention to some very obvious items
which had they been given to me, would have necessarily changed the
picture which I then had of the crisis between the United States and
Japan.
68. Military coTn/rwitments in Far East
I did not know that United States Army officers at Singapore had
made tentative [798Ii,'\ military commitments, not approved by
the President, that the United States would fight, along with the Neth-
erlands and the British, to defend the Dutch East Indies and Sing-
apore.^®
69. Japanese knowledge of United States policy
I did not know that the War Department knew that the Japanese
suspected or had somehow learned of this joint military program.
Intercept No. 1243, dated 3 December 1941, published in joint com-
« Daily record, vol. 12, pp. 2091-2092. ,„ v u ^
M See Marshall-Stark report to Roosevelt, 27 November 1941 ; Army Pearl Harbor board
transcript vol. 1, pp. 9-12 ; compare Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. 5, pp.
449-450.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2955
mittee Exhibit No, 1, page 227, disclosed to the War and Navy De-
partments, at least by December 5, that the Japanese did realize that
such joint military action would occur. As early as Novem^ber 12,
the people in Washington had in their hands intercept No. 1066,
printed on page 111 of committee exhibit No. 1, which disclosed that
Japan had been semiofficially told that —
If Japan invades again, the United States will fight with Japan —
[7986] and that the American Government had, and believed,
reports that —
* * * Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does
not believe that your visit on Monday ta the President or the coming of Mr.
Kurusu will have any effect on the general situation.
If this information is connected up with the knowledge gained of
the definite Japanese intention to expand southward, it is clear that the
War and Navy Departments must have known that war was a cer-
tainty, and that they, with this exclusive intelligence, wanted to make
the estimate and decision as to American military defensive action.
This explains their care in ordering me not to disclose intent, alarm
the population, or do anything which Japan could use as propaganda
that the United States had provoked war.
70. November 20 ultimatum
I had not been told, but Washington knew, that the Secretary of
State regarded the November 20, 1941, Japanese proposal as an ulti-
matum ^'^ and that from then on it was merely a question of trying to
stall off the final break as long as possible and, quoting Secretary Hull :
in the hope that somewhere even then something might develop suddenly and out
of the sky.™
71. DeadliTies
I did not laiow, but the War Department knew [7986] that
the Japanese had set a deadline after which their armed forces would
move. On November 26 a translation of intercept No. 188, on page 174
of Exhibit No. 1, disclosed that —
* * * our forces shall be able to move within the day —
in the event that the United States-Japanese negotiations were not
successfully terminated by 25 November 1941. The first Navy trans-
lation which told of the November 25 deadline was made as early as
5 November 1941.^^
On 17 November, an intercept was deciphered which included this
sentence :
I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736, and there
will be no change."
On 22 November, a translation of a 19 November intercept showed
that Kurusu and Nomura still regarded the 25 November deadline as
"an absolutely unalterable one." " This message also contained con-
siderable discussion about evacuation of Government officials and their
™ Testimony of Mr. Hull, joint committee daily record, November 23, 1945, vol. 7, pp.
1136, 1181.
'"> Testimony of Mr. Hull, joint committee daily record, November 23, 1945, vftl. 7, p.
1195.
" See No. 736, committee exhibit No. 1. p. 100.
"Intercept 16 November 1941, pp. 137-138, committee exhibit No. 1.
" Intercept No. 1140, 19 November, p. 159, committee exhibit No. 1.
2956 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
wives. The 25 November deadline was then extended to 29 November,
by an intercept of 22 November, translated the same day. But the
Tokyo Government [7987] became more emphatic, saying:
This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After
that things are automatically going to happen.''*
On the 28th of November it was learned in Washington that in 2 or
3 days a report would be sent from Tokyo in answer to the "humiliat-
ing" American proposal after which —
* * * the negotiations will be de facto ruptured."
This same intercept, moreover, showed a design to hide the fact that
negotiations were broken off.
72. Code destruction
Another thingT did not know is the fact that the Japanese were un-
der orders to destroy their codes and code machines. The War De-
partment knew of this code destruction as early as 1 December 1941
and knew specifically of the orders to destroy the codes in the United
States on 3 December 1941.^*^ I should certainly have been told of this
intelligence. The following testimony of General Miles makes it plain
why the Japanese messages ordering the destruction of their codes
did not reach the commanding general in Hawaii :
[79S8] Mr. Gesexl. The Army did not send any messages to General Short
in respect of code destruction, did it?
General Miles. No, sir.
Mr. Geselx. What is the explanation of that?
General Miles. The main reason was that the code experts apparently agreed,
at least the Navy was particularly strong on the point that their code was much
more secure than ours. It was obviously, of course, of great importance in se-
curity that a message be sent in only one code and not two and we had every
reason to believe, or thought we did, that a Navy message to Hawaii would be
promptly transmitted to the Army authorities there.
Mr. Gesell. It is a fact, is it not. General Miles, that none of these messages
contained any instructions for the Navy authorities to show the information to
the Army representative at Hawaii?
General Miles. That is true, sir.
Mr. Gesell. And that was the practice where joint messages were sent some-
times as we have seen, was it not?
General Miles. That happened on one or two occasions, yes, sir.
Mr. Gesell. Did you give any instructions or directions to the Navy that action
should be taken to see that these messages were made available to the Army
authorities [7989] at Pearl Harbor?
General Miles. Any instruction to the Navy?
Mr. Gesell. To the Navy here that they should so transmit the messages that
the Army would be certain to receive them ?
General Miles. No, sir ; that was not considered necessary."
7S. Ships in harbor report
While the War Department G-2 may not have felt bound to let me
know about the routine operations of the Japanese in keeping track
of our naval ships, they should certainly have let me know that the
Japanese were getting reports of the exact location of the ships in Pearl
Harbor, which might indicate more than just keeping track, because
such details would be useful only for sabotage, or for air or submarine
attack in Hawaii. As early as October 9, 1941, G-2 in Washington
'* Intercept No. 812, 22 November, p. 165, committee exhibit No. 1.
■'■'' Intercept No. 844. 28 November, p. 195, committee exhibit No. 1.
'« Intercepts Nos. 24.36, 2444. 2443. 867, pp. 208, 209, 215, committee exhibit No. 1.
" Dally record, vol. 13, pp. 2220-2222.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2957
knew of this Japanese espionageJ^ This message, analyzed critically,
is really a bombing plan for Pearl Harbor.'^
[7990] 74. WiTids code
I was not informed, but the War Department knew, of the so-called
"winds" code or of the fact that the so-called implementing message
had been received, definitely confirming the fact that diplomatic rela-
tions would be severed between Japan and the United States.^"
75. HuWs '■'-ultimatum'''' to Japan
I was not informed of Secretary Hull's note of November 26, pro-
posing a 10-point plan which the Japanese considered an ultimatum.^^
76. War considered inevitable
I did not know that sometime in the fall of 1941 the Chief of Staff
had come to the conclusion that war with Japan was inevitable.^^
77. Jap reply — 13 parts
Critical information (the first 13 parts of the long Japanese memo-
randum) finally terminating relations with the United States was re-
ceived in the War Department by 9 p. m. on December 6. The so-called
"pilot" message from Tokyo to Washington December 6, 1941, No. 901,^^
had been received in the War Department sometime during the
[7991] afternoon of December 6. This message stated definitely
that the long Japanese memorandum would be sent as message No. 902
and would be presented to the Americans as soon as instructions were
sent.
78. Part i^, Jap reply
The fourteenth part of the long memorandum and the short mes-
sage of the Japanese directing the Ambassador to deliver the long
memorandum at 1 p. m. on the 7th were in the hands of the War
Department between 8 : 30 and 9 a. m. December 7.^* This message
indicated a definite break of relations at 1 p. m., and pointed directly
to an attack on Hawaii at dawn. Had this vital information been
communicated to Hawaii by the fastest possible means, we would
have had more than 4 hours to make preparations to meet the attack
which was more than enough for completing Army preparations. The
Navy might have had time to get all ships out of the harbor.
79. Delay of Decernber 7 vlessage
Not until 7 hours after the attack was I informed that the Japanese
Ambassador had been directed to deliver the 14-part memorandum
to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m., December 7. This message was
received in the War Department from a naval courier between
[7992] 8 :30 a. m. and 9 a. m., December 7 (3 a. m. to 3 : 30 a. m.
Honolulu time). This message definitely pointed to an attack on
Pearl Harbor at 1 p. m., Washmgton time. If this message had been
'*Army intercept No. 23260, 24 September 1941, p. 12, committee exhibit No. 2.
"Daily record, vol. 12, p. 2101.
*" Intercepts Nos. 2353, 2354, 19 November, committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 154, 155 ;
testimony of Captain Safford, United States Navy, Army Pearl Harbor board transcript,
vol. C, po. 126-135. 152-157, 173.
^ Hull's note, 26 November 1941, joint committee exhibit No. 1, intercept No. 1189, pp.
181-182.
*^ See Army Pearl Harbor board, vol. A, p. 40.
« Exhibit 1, p. 238.
^ Exhibit 1, No. 902, p. 245, and No. 907, p. 248; Army Pearl Harbor board transcript,
vol. A, pp. 13-17.
2958 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
delivered to me by the most rapid possible means of communication
I would have had 4 hours, more than enough time, to fully alert the
Army forces against an air raid.
80. Delay translation Decemher 6 Pearl Harbor message
A more prompt decoding and translation of one of the December 6
intercepts would have pointed out clearly to the War and Navy De-
partments that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was planned.
After discussing the lack of barrage balloon defense, the consul at
Honolulu reported as follows to Tokyo :
* * * However, even though they have actually made preparations, because
they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in
the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Eiva, there are limits to the
balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is
considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against
these places.^s
I would like to set up my conclusions. There will be a certain
amount of repetition, but I think it is desirable.
CONCLUSIONS
SI. Obeyed instructions
On December 7, 1941, 1 was obeying [7993] my instructions
from Washington as I understood them, and as the War Department
had every reason to know that I understood them, and was acting
in accordance with the information which was available to me at
that time. Little information was available to me. The little that
was given to me in the War Department message of November 27 did
not give an accurate picture of the prospects of war. The War De-
partment knew definitely by 9 p. m., December 6, that the hour had
struck and that war was at hand. By 9 a. m., December 7, the War
Department knew the hour of attack. None of this information was
given to me.
82. War Department responsibility
If for any possible reason the War Department felt that it could
not give me the information, then it was the responsibility of the
War Department to direct me to go on an all-out alert particularly
since it well knew that we were on an antisabotage alert. The
Hawaiian Department was not provided with agencies for obtaining
Japanese information outside of Hawaii, and was dependent on the
War Department for such information.
S3. War Department estimate
When the War Department was informed that the Hawaiian De-
partment was alerted against sabotage, it not only did not indicate
tliat the command should be alerted against a hostile surface, subsur-
face, ground or air attack, but replied emphasizing the necessity for
protec- [7994] tion against sabotage and subversive measures.
This action on the part of the War Department definitely indicated
to me that it approved of my alert against sabotage. The War De-
partment had 9 more days in which to express its disapproval. The
action of the War Department in sending unarmed B-17's from
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2959
Hamilton Field, Calif., on the night of December 6, to Honolulu
confirmed me in my belief that an air raid was not probable.
6'^. Reasonable reliance on report
Confirmation of my view that the War Department's silence and
failure to reply to my report of November 27 constituted reasonable
grounds for my belief that my action was exactly what the War De-
partment desired, is contained in General Marshall's testimony before
this joint committee on December 11, 1945 :
Senator Ferguson. Well, would this be true from an Army viewpoint, that
when an overseas commander is ordered to take "such measures as he deems
necessary and to report measures taken to you", is he correct in assuming that
if his report is not the kind of action that you had in mind that you would
thereafter inform him specifically of this difference?
General Marshall. I would assume so.*"
[7995] 85. Distant reconnaissance plan
The joint coastal frontier defense plan, Hawaiian coastal frontier
places upon the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District the
responsibility for distant reconnaissance. Annex No. 7 to the joint
coastal frontier defense plan provides that when naval forces are
insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and army
aircraft are made available, these will be under the tactical control
of the naval command during search operations. That means that
the Army planes receive their missions and all instructions from the
naval commander and carry out the search as he deems necessary in
order to carry out his responsibility for distant reconnaissance. Dur-
ing the period November 27 to December 6 the Navy made no request
for Army planes to participate in distant reconnaissance. To me
this meant that they had definite information of the locations of the
Japanese carriers or that the number unaccounted for was such that
naval ships and planes could make the necessary reconnaissance with-
out the assistance from the Army. It is noted that the Navy Depart-
ment, both on October 16 and on November 27, directed Admiral
Kimmel to make preparatory defensive deployments, and that Ad-
miral Kimmel had several task forces at sea and was conducting con-
siderable reconnaissance.^^ He did not have [7996'] sufficient
equipment to conduct complete reconnaissance. General Marshall
has testified here that even during the war the HaAvaiian Islands had
never had sufficient equipment for complete perimeter reconnaissance.
S6. Army-Navy cooperation
During this period I held frequent conferences with the commander
in chief of the United States Fleet and the commandant of the Four-
teenth Naval District, and at no time was anything said to indicate
that they feared the probability of an air attack by the Japanese.
In fact, the sentiment was expressed by a naval staff officer that there
was no probability of such an attack. With a large part of the United
States Navy in Hawaiian waters and with their sources of informa-
tion, I was convinced that the Navy would be able either to intercept
any carrier attempting to approach Oahu or at least to obtain such
information from task forces or by reconnaissance as to make them
*" Daily record, vol. 21, p. 3443.
" Exhibit 37, pp. 20B and 31B.
2960 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
aware of the presence of carriers in the Hawaiian waters and of the
probability of an air attack.
57. Expectations from War Department
I felt that I had a right to expect the War Department to inform me
by the most rapid means possible if a real crisis arose in Japanese rela-
tions. I did not expect that when the crisis arose the message would
remain in the hands of General Miles and Colonel Bratton without
action from 9 a. m. till 11 : 25 a. m., and \7997^ that when ac-
tion was finally taken the desire for secrecy would be considered more
important than the element of time. Had the message in regard to the
Japanese ultimatum and the burning of their code machines been given
me by telephone as an urgent message in the clear without loss of time
for encoding and decoding, delivery, etc., or if I had been directed by
telephone to go on an all-out alert for a dawn trans-Pacific raid, with-
out being told the reason, I would have had approximately 4 hours
in which to make detailed preparations to meet an immediate attack.
88. Follow-up of orders
When any department of the Army has issued an order on any mat-
ter of importance, it has performed only one-half of its function.
The follow-up to see that the order has been carried out as desired is
at least as important as issuing the order. The War Department had
9 days in which to check up on the alert status in Hawaii and to make
sure that the measures taken by me were what was desired, which it
did not do. The check-up would have required no more than a reading
of my report of measures taken.
89. Supervision hy Chief of Staff
Repeatedly, from the time I took command in Hawaii in February
1941, the Chief of Staff had written me at length advising me on
policies and details of operation. However, after October 28, 1941,
with the War Department receiving information almost daily which
{7998^^ indicated that war was imminent, he communicated to me
none of those personal messages containing the inside information.
90. Erroneous estimate of situation
My decision to put the Hawaiian Department on an alert to prevent
sabotage was based upon a belief that sabotage was our gravest danger
and that air attack was not imminent. I realize that my decision was
wrong, ^^ I had every reason to believe, however, that my estimate of
the situation coincided with that of the War Department General Staff,
which had the signal advantage of superior sources of intelligence as
to enemy intentions.
91. Hindsight value of information withheld
I know it is hindsight, but if I had been furnished the information
which the War Department had, I do not believe that I would have
made a mistaken estimate of the situation. To make my meaning
clear, I want to add that I do not believe that my estimate of the situa-
tion was due to any carelessness on my part or on the part of the
senior Army and Navy officers with whom I consulted. Nor do I be-
lieve that my error was a substantial factor in causing the damage
which our Pacific Fleet suffered during the attack.
** Compare Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, testimony of General Short, vol. 38,
p. 4440.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2961
92. Intelligence complacency
I have been more than astounded [7999] to learn the com-
placency of the War Department General Staff with relation to so-
called magic intelligence. The War Department could have devised
a method to paraphrase the information obtained and send it by
courier to me, without, if they chose, disclosing to me that it resulted
from an ability to decipher Japanese messages. I want to quote for
the committee the following pertinent paragraph from the Operations
Manual then current :
From adequate and timely military intelligence the commander is able to draw
logical conclusions concerning enemy lines of action. Military intelligence is
thus an essential factor in the estimate of the situation and in the conduct of
operations.*"
General Marshall and Admiral Wilkinson have pointed out that
the security of our cryptanalytic ability was risked for the slight, tem-
porary exultation of shooting down Yamamoto's plane. Surely, then,
supplying the data to me and to Admiral Kimmel would not have
been inconceivably risky.
9S. Opinion of Judge Advocate General
I want to quote for the committee one paragraph from the opinion
of the Judge Advocate General of the Army concerning this intercept
intelligence :
[SOOO] But sin,ce we know in retrospect tliat Short was not, apparently,
fully alive to an imminent outside threat and since the War Plans Division had
received substantial information from the Intelligence Section, G-2, the Board
argues that had this additional information been transmitted to Short it might
have convinced him not only that war was imminent but that there was a real
possibility of a surprise air attack on Hawaii. In retrospect it is diflScult to
perceive any substantial reason for not sending Short this additional informa-
tion or, in the alternative, checking to see whether Short was suflBciently alive
to the danger. General Gerow did neither. In my opinion General Gerow showed
a lack of imagination in failing to realize that had the Top Secret information
been sent to Short it could not have had any other than a beneficial effect.
General Gerow also showed lack of imagination in failing to make the proi)er
deductions from the Japanese intercepts. For instance the message of 24 Sep-
tember from Tokyo to Honolulu requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor
and dividing Pearl Harbor into various subdivisions for that purpose coupled
with the message of 15 November to Honolulu to make "the ships in harbor
report" irregular and the further message of 29 November to Honolulu asking
for reports even when there were no ship movements (Top \,%001\ Secret
Ex. "B") might readily have suggested to an imaginative person a possible Jap
design on Pearl Harbor. Failure to appreciate the significance of such messages
shows a lack of the type of skill in anticipating and preparing against even-
tualities which we have a right to expect in an oflBcer at the head of the War
Plans Division. If this criticism seems harsh, it only illustrates the advisability
of General Gerow transmitting the Top Secret information to Short.""
9Ii.. Adequate sabotage defense
I had been furnished adequate means to prevent sabotage. I used
those means with complete success, as the testimony has shown. No
one can say to what extent sabotage would have occurred if the Army
had not taken such measures to prevent it.
95. Inadequate means for air defense
I had not been furnished adequate means to defend against a sur-
prise air raid. The War Department was aware of the inadequacy of
» Italics supplied; par. 194. FM 100-5; dated May 22. 1941. p. 40.
■^ Opinion of the Judge Advocate General, 25 November 1944, committee exhibit 63,
p. 45.
2962 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
our aircraft and antiaircraft defense establishment. The following
table will show at a glance how inadequate our air defense was at the
time.»^
[800£] I would like to offer at this time a table showing the type
of equipment that was actually available on December 7, the number
that we required to complete our plans and the amount of equipment
that was actually on hand in December 1942.
The Vice Chairman. General, is that information you are seeking
to offer now different from the table that is in A'our statement ?
General Short. It is, in that it has the additional equipment that
was present at Hawaii in December 1942.
Tne Vice Chairman. And that table, is that different from the one
appearing in your statement?
General Short. Just the third which it adds.
The Vice Chairman. It adds another column?
General Short. It adds another column.
Mr. Murphy. May I ask at this time, Mr. Chairman, if this state-
ment given here is a correct statement about there being no bombers
in Hawaii on December 7?
General Short. No ; no torpedo bombers.
Mr. Murphy. No torpedo bombers?
General Short. We had no torpedo bombers.
[8003] Mr. Murphy. It shows no bombers at all. My impres-
sion is there were 37.
General Short. The B-l7's were bombers.
Mr, Murphy. Are those the only ones then ?
General Short. Those were the only bombers. We had B-18's that
were 7 years old, that were distinctly out-of-date, with a maximum
speed of 150 miles per hour and I did not include those because the air
people did not feel that those were proper equipment to fight with.
Mr. Murphy. We will go into that later with you as to what I had
in mind.
Senator Lucas. General, you said "December 1942."
General Short. I am making a comparison of what they had pro-
vided at the end of another year.
The Vice Chairman. Well, do j'ou have copies of this new table
that you want to refer to now ?
General Short. I have only one.
The Vice Chairman. Or can you give us this third column ?
General Short. I will give you the third column.
The Vice Chairman. If you can give us the third column slowly
so that we can insert it on here, that might serve the purpose.
General Short. All right, sir. I would like to call attention to the
fact also
[8004] The Vice Chairman. How is the third column to be
headed ?
General Short. "On hand December 1942."
I would like also to call attention to the fact that in December 1942
the Japanese had several months before been decisively defeated at
Midway and that the danger of an attack was far less than it had been
on December 7, 1941.
•1 The requirerl number of planes is based on the "Study of the Air Situation in
Hawaii," dated 20 August 1941. committee exhibit 13, daily record, pp. 1013 to 1050; the
antiaircraft requirements are stated in my letter to the Chief of Staff dated March 15,
1941, exhibit 58, p. 15 ; also Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. 1, pp. 21, 23.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2963
The Vice Chairman. Well, now, it would be helpful, I think, if you
would give us the third column just exactly as it appears here. For
instance, "B-17D Planes."
General Short. I will give each one in turn if that will be satis-
factory.
The Vice Chair:\ian. All right.
General Short. B-17 planes : Available on December 7, 6, required
180 ; in December 1942 there was only one B-17 plane but there were 40
B-24 planes, which was a very comparable plane.
The Vice Chairman. One B-17 and
General Short. 40 B-24's which would accomplish the same pur-
pose.
Interceptors and fighters : There were 105 available on December
7 ; required according to our plans 185 ; and in December 1942 they
had 200.
Torpedo bombers: There were none available on December 7, 36
were required according to our plans and there were [8005] still
none on hand in December 1942.
The Vice Chairman. None?
General Short. None ; yes, sir.
3-inch antiaircraft guns : There were 82 available on December 7,
98 required by the plan. In December 1942 there were only 40 3-inch
antiaircraft guns but there were 44 90-millimeter guns, which was a
much more powerful gun, able to accomplish much more.
37-millimeter antiaircraft guns: On December 7 there were 20
available. There were required under our plans 135. In December
1942 there were actually 276.
50-caliber machine guns: Available December 7, 109; required
according to our plan 345 ; actually available in December 1942, 793.
I wish to point out that the 50-caliber machine gun was the most
effective weapon against planes coming in very low over the water,
and that the number that they had in December 1942 was more than
seven times the number that we had on December 7.
I am presenting this table because there has been a statement before
the committee that we had all that was necessary to defeat the Japanese
attack.
The seriousness of this shortage of equipment is best borne out by re-
calling that our equipment was inadequate to [8006] protect
the Pacific Fleet, even had w^e been on an all-out alert such as that
which the Chief of Staff had ordered in June 1940. I want to quote
General Herron's testimony on this point.
General Frank. * * * Let iis assume that in 1940, when the Army was in
that alert, that there was a real menace and that an attack had come similar to
the one that came on December 7th with the Army on the alert and the Navy not.
What do yon think would have happened?
General Hereon. Well, approximately what happened on December 7th. The
dive bombers would have come in. The Army could not have stopped them with
its three-inch guns posted up on the hills. They necessarily would bring more
planes than we had. If we had 50 combat planes they would bring 150, surely. ^
96. Army failure — Heroism of troops
Due to the fact that the War Department did not make available to
Hawaii the information in its possession, the Army forces in Hawaii
were unable to prevent the terrific destruction caused by the Japanese
^ Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. 3, p. 234.
2964 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
attack. However, the fine action of the Hawaiian troops when struck
by the surprise attack should not be overlooked. Every officer and man
did his full duty with promptness, pre- [8007] cision and effi-
ciency. All organizations moved quickly to their battle positions and
took up their prescribed duties. Acts of heroism were the rule, not the
exception.
97. General JSfaf reorganisation
I trust that the reorganization of the War Department General
Staff will lead in the future to prompt evaluation and use of all items
of intelligence concerning possible aggressive movements by foreign
military powers.
98. Unjust War Depofr-tTnevt treatment
I do not feel that I have been treated fairly or with justice by the
War Department. I was singled out as an example, as the scapegoat
for the disaster. My relatively small part in the transaction was not
explained to the American people until this joint congressional com-
mittee forced the revelation of the facts, I fully appreciate the desire
of the War Department to preserve the secrecy of the source of the
so-called magic, but I am sure that could have been done without any
attempt to deceive the public by a false pretense that my judgment
had been the sole factor causing the failure of the Army to fulfill its
mission of defending the Navy at Pearl Harbor. I am sure that an
honest confession by the War Department General Staff of their failure
to anticipate the surprise raid would have been understood by the
public, in the long run, and even at the time. Instead, they "passed
the buck" to me, and I have kept [8008] my silence until the
opportunity of this public forum was presented to me.
99. War Department'' a Jf-year silence
The War Department had 4 years to admit that a follow-up should
have been made on the November 27 message and on my report of the
same date, but no such admission of responsibility was made public
until General Gerow and General Marshall testified before this com-
mittee.
100. First opportunity to present story
I want to thank all the members of this committee for the thorough
manner in which you have tried to bring out the facts and particularly
for the opportunity to present my story to you and through you to the
American public.
The Chairman. The committee will excuse you at this time, General,
until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
General Short. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. The committee desires to have an executive session
and the spectators will depart as rapidly as possible.
(Whereupon, at 3: 15 p. m., January 22, 1946, an adjournment was
taken until 10 a. m., Wednesday, January 23, 1946.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2965
{8009^ PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
WEDNESDAY, JANTJABY 23, 1946
COXGRESS OF THE UXITED StATES.
Joint Committee on the Investigation
OF the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington^ D. C.
The joint comittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m.,
in the Caucus Room (room 318) , Senate Office Building, Senator Alben
"W. Barkley (chairman) pi-esiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster,
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark,
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.
Also present : Seth "W. Richardson, general counsel ; Samuel H.
Kaufman, associate general counsel: John E. Hasten, Edward P.
Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.
[8010] The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in
order. General Short, do you have anything to add before counsel
begins to question you ?
General Short. Xo, sir. I have not had an opportunity to see if
there are any clerical errors in the transcript. I would like later on if
I jBnd any to submit those.
The Vice Chairman. Then counsel ma}- proceed.
Mr. Kaufman. Before proceeding with the examination of General
Short I would like to have certain documents marked in evidence.
Yesterday General Short in his statement offered as an exhibit the
batch of papers that he had used before the Roberts examination. It
was agreed that with respect to this exhibit it need not be duplicated
but I would like to have it given a number. The next number is 133,
The Vice Chairman. Counsel desires to offer that as Exhibit 133 ?
:Mr, Kaufman. As Exhibit 133,
The Vice Cha^irman. It will be received as Exhibit 133.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 133,")
Mr, Kaufman. General Short in his examination used five charts
yesterday and I ask that they be marked as Exliibit No. 134.
The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered.
[8011] (The charts referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 134.")
Mr. Kaufman. I ask that there be marked as "Exliibit 135" a com-
pilation made by counsel as to the details of the time of sending and
the receipt of the messages commencing on November 27. Copies of
this have already been distributed to members of the committee. That
is Exhibit 135. ^
The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit 135.
(The document referred to was marked "Exliibit No. 135.")
2966 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Kaufman. I ask that there be marked as Exhibit 136 the report
of Eugene V. Elder, Lieutenant Colonel, Signal Corps, relating to the
operation of the radio sets and radar equipment. I ask that that be
marked Exhibit 136.
The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit 136.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No, 136.")
Mr. Kaufman. I ask that there be marked as Exhibit 137 the reports
from the War Department as to the operation of the radar station in
Hawaii and the alert of the radar station commencing November 27,
1941. This has been requested by Con^rressman Gearhart at pages 259
and 260 of this record.^ Copies of this have already been distributed
to the members of the committee.
The Vice Chairman. What is the number ?
[8012] Mr. Kaufman. Exhibit 137.
The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit 137.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No, 137.")
Mr. Kaufman. Now may I proceed with the examination of Gen-
eral Short ?
The Vice Chairman. Counsel may proceed with the examination
of General Short.
•TESTIMONY OF MAT. GEN. WALTER C. SHOET, UNITED STATES
ARMY (RETIRED)— Resumed
Mr. Kaufman. General, will you please state for the record your
experience in the Army ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
I was commissioned a second lieutenant of Infantry, March 13,
1902. My appointment was made upon the recommendation of the
president of the University of Illinois, from which university I had
graduated in 1901.
I was assigned to the Twenty -fifth Infantry and to duty in the con-
tinental United States. I served in the Philippines from August to
December 1907. I was assigned to the Sixteenth Infantry in Decem-
ber 1907 and returned to the United States.
I served in Alaska from 1910 to 1912, I was secretary of the School
of Musketry from November 1912 to March 1916. I served with the
Pershing expedition in Mexico from March [SOlS] 1916 to
February 1917.
I served in France and Germany from June 1917 to June 1919. I
went to France as a captain of the Sixteenth Infantry in the First Di-
vision, I was in the first group of officers sent to the British and
French fronts and to the British and French schools.
I participated in the organization of the corps schools and of the
Army Machine-Gun School in France. I was promoted to major,
lieutenant colonel, and colonel during my service in France. I served
on the general staff at GHQ, General Headquarters of the A. E. F.,
having charge of the training and front-line inspections of machine-
gun units. I was made assistant chief of staff, G-5, Third Army,
when it was organized and sent into Germany.
I was an instructor at the Command and General Staff School from
July 1919 to February 1921 at Fort Leavenworth, Kans. I was placed
on the initial General Staff eligible list and detailed on the General
'Part 1, p. 109.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2967
Staff in February 1921. I served on the General Staff with troops
from February to June 1921. I served on the War Department Gen-
eral Staff from July 1921 to August 1924.
I attended the Army War College from September 1921 to July
1925. I served in Puerto Rico as a lieutenant colonel, Sixty-fifth In-
fantry, from July 1925 to July 1928. I was in charge \_80U]
of the G-3 section, Command and General Staff School, Fort Leaven-
worth, from August 1928 to September 1930. 1 served in the Bureau
of Insular Affairs as financial officer and later as executive officer from
October 1930 to June 1934. I commanded the Sixth Infantry at
Jefferson Barracks from July 1934 to June 1936. During 2 months
of this period I acted as executive officer of the national matches
in 1935.
I was assistant commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Ben-
ning from July 1936 to January 1937; promoted to the grade of brig-
adier general on December 1, 1936. Commanded the First Brigade
from March to December 1937. Commanded the First Division from
January 1938 to September 1940, except during periods of maneuvers
when I was commanding a corps.
I was promoted to major general March 1, 1940. I organized
and commanded the Fourth Corps in maneuvers at Fort Benning, Ga.,
marched the corps to Louisiana and participated in maneuvers from
March 1940 to May 1940. I commanded a provisional corps of Na-
tional Guard and participated in maneuvers from August 1940 to
September 1940. I organized and commanded the First Corps at
Columbia, S. C, from October 1940 to December 1940. I commanded
the Hawaiian Department from February 7, 1941, to December 17,
1941 ; was promoted to the grade of lieutenant general February the
8th [8015] upon taking command of the Department. I re-
tired as a major general February the 28th, 1942.
Mr. Kaufman. General, when were you informed that you had been
selected to command the Hawaiian Department?
General Short. In December 1940.
Mr. Kaufman. And who so informed you?
General Short. I had a personal letter from the Chief of Staff.
Mr. Kaufman. And after the receipt of that letter did you come to
Washington to confer with the Chief of Staff.
General Short. Not immediately.
Mr. Kaufman. When did you do so?
General Short. I came to Washington the first week in January to
confer with the Chief of Staff.
Mr. Kaufman. And at that time were you told by the Chief of Staff
as to the probable dangers in the Hawaiian Department ?
General Short. My conference with the Chief of Staff was rather
brief and he did not go into my mission to any considerable extent at
that time but he wrote me a long letter on the day that I assumed com-
mand detailing his idea of my mission.
Mr. Kaufman. Were you informed before you took command of the
Hawaiian Department that there would be a change in [8016]
the command of the Pacific Fleet ?
General Short. I was not.
Mr. Kaufman. When were you informed about that for the first
time ?
2968 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. After I reached Honolulu, probably 2 days — I think
that I knew it 2 days before I took command.
Mr. Kaufman. The letter that you referred to is the letter by Gen-
eral Marshall to you dated February 7, 1941, and is part of exhibit 53?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Kaufman. And it was in that letter that the Chief of Staff
told you about the probable developments and probable dangers of
the Hawaiian Department?
General Short. Yes, sir ; not pointing at any particular time, but as
I got the idea, if hostilities did eventuate that those were the prob-
abilities.
Mr. Kaufman. And the next to the last paragraph of the Chief of
Staff's letter of February 7 is as follows :
My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is
done us during the first six hours of Icnown hostilities, thereafter the existing
defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk
of sabotage and the risk involved [80^7] in a surprise raid by air and by
submarine constitute the real perils of tlie situation. Frankly, I do not see any
landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.
It was in that letter that the Chief of Staff made those statements?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. So that your first instructions, written instruc-
tions from the Chief of Staff was that the main hazard was a sur-
prise air attack and a probable submarine attack?
General Short. He mentioned in order there — he did not say
what he considered the order of priority, but he mentioned sabotage
first.
Mr. Kaufman. Sabotage and the risks involved in a surprise raid
by air and submarine?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. That is all in the one sentence.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr, Kaufman. And he winds that sentence up by stating :
This constitutes the real perils of the situation.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. And in addition you knew at that time of the
deterioration of the relations as between the United States and
Japan?
[8018] General Short. I did.
Mr. Kaufman. And you regarded and the Hawaiian Department
was regarded as one of the most important outposts of the United
States ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Kaufman. You recognized that ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. Then there followed between you and the Chief of
Staff a series of communications commencing on February 7, 1941,
and ending on October 28, 1941, all of which correspondence is in-
cluded in exhibit No. 53.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. And the purport of that correspondence was con-
stant advice and direction to you from the Chief of Staff in connec-
tion with preparation of the Department for a surprise attack by air ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2969
General Short. I would say in preparation for any kind of an
attack by air.
Mr. Kaufman. And particularly a surprise attack by air ?
General Short. Yes. He only emphasized that, as I remember,
once, that it was a question of getting the necessary things to meet
any air attack.
Mr. Kaufman. You will not say that the purport of the cor-
respondence between you and the Chief of Staff laid par- [SOW]
ticular emphasis on the possibility of a surprise attack by air ?
General Short. In that one paragraph he did.
Mr. Kaufman. I am talking about the rest of the correspond-
ence commencing in February of 1941 and ending in October of
1941, whether or not the emphasis in all of those communications
was not with respect to the possibility of an attack, of a surprise
attack by air?
General Short. I would say it was with reference to the possi-
bility of any attack by air, surprise or otherwise.
Mr. Kaufman. By air^
General Short. Yes, sir.
[SO'^O] Mr. Kaufman. And you recognized, as the result of that
correspondence, the probability of the attack by air in the event of hos-
tilities with the Japanese ?
General Short. At least the possibility.
Mr. Kaufman. Now what were the conditions in the Hawaiian De-
partment at the time that you took over the command ?
General Short. There was still much to be done to prepare the de-
fenses against an air attack. My letter of February 19 set forth these
conditions very briefly to General Marshall.
Now I would like to add, I am not reflecting on any previous com-
mander that may have made efforts to get all of these things, but the
fact is those things existed.
Mr. Kaufman. The fact is after you took command, and in recogni-
tion of the possibilities of an attack by air, it was part of your problem
to make the department ready against such possibility of attack ?
General Short. Very definitely.
Mr. Kaufman. And you made efforts in that direction ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. And you made requests of the War Department for
additional material and equipment and men for the purpose of
strengthening that department ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. And some of your requests were granted and
[8021] some were not granted ?
General Short. Very few were granted ; most were not granted.
Mr. Kaufman. The requests for pursuit planes were granted, were
they not?
General Short. We got a considerable increase in pursuit planes.
Mr. Kaufman. And your request for radar equipment was granted ?
General Short. Not completely. I asked for a higher priority,
which would have advanced the date of receipt, and that was not given
to me.
Mr. Kaufman. The fact is, however, you did get three mobile sets ?
General Short. I got six mobile sets.
79716— 46— pt. 7 5
2970 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Kaufman. Six mobile sets and three stationary sets ?
General Short. I do not believe the stationary sets were complete.
I think certain parts were still missing.
Mr. Kaufman. At least one of the stationary sets was in operation
at one time or another prior to December 7 ?
General Short. All six of them were in operation at one time or
another.
Mr. Kaufman. All six were in operation at one time or another ?
[802^J] General Short. Of the mobile sets.
Mr. Kaufman. All six of the mobile sets were in operation and at
least one of the stationary sets was in operation ?
General Short. No, sir; no stationary set was in operation, to my
knowledge.
Mr. Kaufman. Now on page 3 of your statement, and thereafter,
you lay particular stress on the efforts that you made for the procure-
ment of additional material and equipment for the Hawaiian De-
partment ?
General Short, That is correct.
Mr. Kaufman. And those efforts were the expected efforts of a
commander in the field to strengthen his Department ?
General Short. That is right.
Mr. Kaufman. Against the possibility of air attack ?
General Short. That is right.
Mr. Kaufman. You were doing what was expected of you to be
done ?
General Short. And what I thought was essential.
Mr. Kaufman. And most of the material that you made a demand
for was so as to better protect the Department against a possible air
attack?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. Now, as a matter of fact, you know, don't you, that
the Hawaiian Department got priority in material [8023] and
men in 1941?
General Short. Up to a certain point, and then they started send-
ing all the B-17's to the Philippine Islands, and they even took them
away from us to send there. I might add also, that as late as about
December 2 they asked me if I could afford to send 48 75-millimeter
guns and 120 30-caliber machine guns, and that they would replace
them.
Mr. Kaufman. Well, as a practical matter. General, if you had had
the additional material there on December 7 it would not have made
any difference, because the material that you did have was not used
on December 7?
General Short. It would have made a great deal of difference if I
had had additional material, and if I also had the information that
the War Department had.
Mr. Kaufman. Now will you tell us. General, what was the prin-
cipal duty of the Army in the Hawaiian Department ?
General Short. It was to defend the Island of Oahu from surface
attacks, air attacks, sabotage, internal disorders such as uprisings,
with particular attention to the defense of Pearl Harbor and of the
fleet when in the harbor, and always supported by the Navy.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2971
Mr. Kaufman. One of the principal duties of the Hawaiian De-
partment was the protection of the fleet when the fleet was in the
harbor ?
[80^4] General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Kaufman. And we might summarize the duties of the Hawai-
ian Department as follows: To protect the island from invasion of
any kind, or an attack of any kind ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. And to protect the fleet when it was in the harbor?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Kj^ufman. And the installations of the fleet while it was in the
harbor ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. And that particularly including the fuel supply
around the harbor?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Kaufman. The fuel supply was in large tanks without any
protection of any kind?
General Short. That is right.
Mr. Kaufman. Which created an additional problem for the com-
mander of the Hawaiian Department, isn't that correct?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Kaufman, Because of the recognition by the commander that
a destruction of the fuel supply would render the fleet impotent?
General Short. Yes, sir.
[8025] Mr. Kaufman. Now as commanding general in that field
you received broad directives from the War Department?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. And it was your duty to determine the manner of
performance ?
General Short. In the main things the War Department also re-
quired the opportunity to approve my plans. They were sent to
Washington for approval.
Mr. Kaufman. But with respect to a directive, the commander in
the field had the responsibility of determining the manner of perform-
ing the directive issued to him ?
General Short. Yes, sir; and the War Department also had the re-
sponsibility of furnishing him with the information available.
Mr. Kaufman. We are talking about different things. General. We
are talking fundamentally about the duties of a commander in the
field. He gets liis directives from the War Department?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. And the responsibility as to the manner of perform-
ance is his ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. He reports to Washington as to the method of per-
formance, and sometimes he gets instructions and some- [8026]
times he does not?
General Short. I may also add that the manner of the performance
of his duties necessarily will be influenced by the essential information
provided him. It necessarily must be so.
Mr. Kaufman. Now on pages 14 and 26 of your statement you state,
in substance, that if any general alert was to be invoked in the
2972 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Hawaiian Department jou assumed that General Marshall was going
to supervise such alert; is that right ?
General Short. He had very definitely done that in the June 17,
1940, message.
Mr. Kaufman. The fact is, as you state on pages 14 and 26 of your
statement, that you expected that if a general alert was going to be
invoked for the Hawaiian Department Greneral Marshall was going to
supervise it ?
General Shl.rt. I expected him to do one of two things : Either to
order the general alert or to give me sufficient information to justify
me in ordering it.
[80^^] Mr. Kaufman. And you assumed that because he or-
dered the general alert in 1940 ; is that right i
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Kaufalan. And you also assumed it because in 1940 he, to some
extent, supervised the alert that was invoked there?
General Short. He followed it up there directly, to know what was
going on.
Mr. Kaufmax. Did you make inquiiy from the Chief of Staff as to
whether or not he would supervise an alert ?
General Short. I did not.
Mr. Kaufi^ian. Did you make inquiry from the Chief of Staff as to
whether or not he would directh- order an alert ?
General Short. I did not.
!Mr. Kaufman. You recognized, of course, that conditions had
changed verv materially from the summer of 1940 to the summer
of 1941?
General Short. But I also recognized that a thing that would be
dangerous in 1940, would be dangerous in 1941.
Air. Kauf^ian. You did recognize, however, that conditions did ma-
terially change ?
General Short. Very materially.
^Ir. Kaufman. From the summer of 1940 to the summer of 1941 ?
[80:28] General Short. Very materially.
Sir. Kaufman. And that the Chief of Staff and the "War Depart-
ment in "Washington had manv problems in 1941 that thev diet not
have in 1940 ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Kaufman. And that that required a greater reliance by them
on their field commanders in 1941 ?
General Short. It also required a greater reliance and more exact
requirement of performance of duty by the general staff.
All". Kaufman. Xow, coming back to the question of the recogni-
tion of the possibility or probability of an air attack on the island,
are you familiar with the correspondence between Secretary Knox
and Secretary Stimson?
General Short. I am.
Mr. Kaufman. "Which is exhibit 10 in this proceeding?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. "When did those communications first come to your
attention ?
General Short. Probably within the first few days after my ar-
rival at Honolulu.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2973
Mr. Kauksiax. And you recognized the concern of the Secretary
of the Xavy that everything' be done to protect Pearl Harbor, and
the fleet against an air attack on the [8029'\ island?
General Short. I did.
Mr. Kautzsiax. And you are familiar with the directive made by
the Secretary of War in his communication of February 7. 1941,
directing that a study be made, and that all preparations be made
against such a possible attack?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Kl\ur:MAX. It "was as the result of the communications of the
Secretary of the Xavy and Secretary of War that the joint coastal
frontier defense plan was worked out?
General Short. The modifications of it.
Mr. KArT]tf AX. The modifications of it ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr, KArFMAX. And the modification of the coastal frontier de-
fense plan is annex 7 as part of exhibit Irl in this proceeding. Did I
adequately describe it. General?
General Short. That is right.
Mr. Kat:f:max. Will you turn to that plan ? Under item 1. General,
it says :
In order to coorflinate joint defensive measurements for the security of the
Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, for defense against hostile raids
or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war. and before a general
mobilization, the following agreement is made.
[8030] Do you have that language in mind?
General Short. Yes. sir.
^Ir. Kat:f3iax. So that one of the first things after you took com-
mand of the Hawaiian Department was to work out this agreement
with General Bloch. the Commandant of the Fourteenth Xaval Dis-
trict ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Kautimax. And it contemplated the preparation of this plan
of defense before a declaration of war. and before general mobilization.
General Short. It made provisions for it.
Mr. Kaufmax. It made provisions for it ?
General Short. Yes. sir.
Mr. Kaffmax. And it was something you had in mind in connec-
tion with the working out of this agreement ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. KAFT^rAX. So that the plan was good even though the per-
formance may not have been good?
General Short. Yes. sir.
Mr. Kaufmax. Xot that agreement between yourself and Admiral
Bloch clearly contemplated specific things to be done 1. by the Army,
and 2. by the Xavy ?
General Short. I do not know whether you would say that was the
order. The order probablv would be reversed.
[S03J] Mr. Kaufmax. TMiat is that ?
General Short. The order perhaps would be reversed on account
of the things that the Xavy was expected to do.
Mr. Kaufmax. Well, tte fact is. irrespective of the order, that the
agreement contemplated well-defined activities ?
2974 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. Very definitely.
Mr. Kaufman. For the Navy and the Army ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Kaufman. And those activities vfere to be put into ejffect by
joint agreement whenever the occasion arose?
General Short. The first provision would be from Washington, if
they put the basic war plan into effect, or any part of it. That would
be the normal procedure.
Mr. Kaufman. Well, it would not be put into effect by Washington,
would it?
General Short. It would be ordered into effect, the basic plan would
be ordered into effect, which would direct us to put this into effect.
Mr. Kaufman. Or else that particular part of the agreement could
be put into effect as a result of joint action by you and Admiral Bloch ?
General Short. That is true, but when you consider [8032]
the instructions we had from Washington, indicating that they were
very anxious not to provoke Japan, I do not believe they wanted us
to put into effect any part of the war plan that had not been indicated
from Washington.
Mr. Kaufman. The plan contemplated activities even before a
declaration of war, or general mobilization ?
General Short. Well, at least before a declaration of war.
Mr. Kaufman. And it also says, "and before general mobilization."
General Short. They were at liberty to put any part of their plan
into effect.
Mr. Kaufman. And you and Admiral Bloch could yourselves have
put into effect if you determined that it was necessary?
General Short. But we would have had to keep in mind that desire
of Washington not to provoke Japan.
Mr. Kaufman. Well, with respect to this agreement that was made
between you and Admiral Bloch for joint activities, did you report
that plan to Washington ?
General Short. We did, and it was approved.
Mr. Kaufman. So that Washington knew that so far as the Com-
mandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and the Commander of
the Hawaiian Department was concerned, they had worked [S033]
out a plan for joint activities to be effective before war was declared,
or before there was a general mobilization ?
General Short. That is correct; possibly to be effective before it
could be made effective.
Mr. Kaufman. To be effective before it could be made effective ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. And they knew that your plans with the Navy
were completed?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. And in order to be put into effect, it could be put
into effect as the result of an agreement between yourself and Ad-
miral Bloch?
General Short. Yes, sir; and I believe certain portions were ac-
tually directed to be effective from Washington. In the Navy mes-
sage of October 16, and the Navy message of October 27, the Navy
directed the commander of the fleet to take defensive deployment
preparatory to carrying out war plans 46, which necessarily would
have included, and did include very considerable reconnaissance.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2975
Mr. Kaufman. I think we will come to that, General. What I am
concerned with is as to whether or not with [8034] respect
to this agreement, it contemplated that it could be put into effect by
you and Admiral Bloch, if you determined to do so.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. And that would have require agreement between
yourself and Admiral Bloch to put it into effect?
General Short. Or a directive from Washington that required it.
Mr. Kaufman. Or, Washington could direct one of you to put it
into effect?
General Short. Or certain parts of it.
Mr. Kaufman. Or certain parts of it, and if Washington did direct
you to put it into effect, it would have again contemplated agreement
between yourself and Admiral Bloch that each of you was doing the
part provided for in the plan ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr, Kaufman. Now, coming down to the summer of 1941, you read
in the paper, of course, about the deterioration of relations as between
the Japanese and the United States ?
General Short. I did.
Mr. Kaufman. And you knew of the freezing of Japanese funds
in the United States ?
(leiieral Short. Yes, .sir.
[8035] Mr. Kaufman. And you knew of the oil embargo against
Japan ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. And the embargo against scrap and ammunition?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr, Kj\.T!rFMAN. Did that create in you a consciousness that trouble
might come with Japan ?
General Short. Yes, sir ; but I was also told by the War Department
that they did not expect a reaction causing the use of military forces
on account of these acts. In their message of July 25, they stated
definitely they did not expect a military reaction.
Mr. Kaufman. They said that in July 1941 ?
General Short. Yes, sir ; on July 25.
Mr. Kaufman. And did you get any further advice from Wash-
ington that they did not expect military action ?
General Short. No, sir. The only further advice that might be
construed to that effect was on the 20th of October after the joint
message had been sent on the 16th predicting certain attacks by the
Japanese.
The War Department sent me a message on the 20th stating, while
the situation continued to be tense, that they did not expect any abrupt
change in the relations [8036] between the United States and
Japan.
Mr. Kaufman. Now, after this message from the War Department
on the 26th of July — is that correct ?
General Short. The 25th.
Mr. Kaufman. The 25th of July 1941, there was nevertheless, great
concern about the air defenses at Hawaii?
General Short. Yes, sir.
2976 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Kattfman. As a result of which, General Martin made a report
in August of 1941, which is Exhibit 13 in this proceeding. Are you
familiar with that report ?
General Short. I am very familiar with it.
Mr. Kaufman. And in that report he made many suggestions for
the improvement of the air defenses in Hawaii ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Kaufman. And you approved that report, did you not?
General Short. I went over that report very carefully, and per-
sonally added the 36 torpedo bombers to what we required.
After talking it over with General Martin, he agreed with my sug-
gestion. I reviewed that report very carefully before it went to Wash-
ington.
Mr. Kaufman. You approved that report, and this is [80S7'\
a photostatic copy of your approval of that report [handing document
to General Short] ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Kaufman. I will ask that that be marked as an exhibit. A copy
of it has been handed to the members of the committee.
The Vice Chairman. It will be so received. What exhibit number
will that be?
Mr. Kaufman. Exhibit 138.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 138.")
Mr. Kaufman. General, on the basis of the report of General Mar-
tin, another agreement was made between the Army and Navy with
respect to the use of planes for reconnaissance and other things, and
that is known as the Martin-Bellinger agreement, is it not ?
General Short. I do not think that was made as the result of the
study. That was just a natural folloW-up on the agreement that Ad-
miral Bloch and I had made.
Mr. Kaufman. That is correct.
So that we have it, General, in connection with your appointment,
you recognized the importance of the Hawaiian Department; you rec-
ognized the deterioration of relations between Japan and the United
States throughout the summer [8038] of 1941, you had in mind
the letter from the War Department of July 25, that they did not
anticipate any action by Japan, and we come now to the telegram that
3'ou received from the War Department, the one of November 27. Have
you got it before you ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. Before you received this telegram, did you see a
telegram sent to the Navy Department dated November 24?
General Short. Yes. sir. I was a little uncertain whether I had
actually received it, or just had it read to me, but a naval officer before
the Roberts board stated that he definitely gave me a copy, which he
undoubtedly did.
Mr. Kaufman. In the hearings before the Roberts Commission your
recollection was that vou had not seen the telegram of November 24?
General Short. I believe I stated that I remembered seeing it, but
I had been unable to find it in mv headquarters, and I thought per-
hans I had not actually received it.
But in view of what the naval officer stated, I am sure I must have
actually received it.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2977
Mr. Kaufman. Captain Layton testified, that he had [SOSP}
actually given it to you.
General Short. Actually delivered it to me, and talked to me
about it.
Mr. Kaufman. You saw it and you did receive it, according to the
testimony of Captain Layton, prior to the receipt of the telegram of
November 27 ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Kaufman. From the War Department ?
General Short. That is correct,
Mr. Kattfman. So that on the 24th you received information from
the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, as follows :
Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful.
That was a definite statement, was it not ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. It goes on to say :
This situation, coupled vpith statements of Japanese Government, and movement
their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive
move in any direction including attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility.
Now, I take it from your statement, General, that you said that lan-
guage excluded Hawaii, because of the mention [804-0] of the
Philippines or Guam.
General Short. What I intended to say was that I felt certain that
if the Navy Department believed an attack on Hawaii was probable,
they would have mentioned it, the same as they did the Philippines.
"In any direction "
Mr. Kaufman. Well, they said
Senator Brewster. Let him finish.
Mr. Kaufman. I am sorry.
General Short. "In any direction" might mean anywhere in the
world, but they specifically stated that they did expect an attack to-
ward the Philippines or Guam. I believe if they had been con-
vinced of the same thing in Hawaii, they would very definitely have
included Hawaii specifically, and not leave it to be included in the
"in any direction."
Mr. Kaufman. Well, do you mean to say. General, that with in-
formation of that kind, you were justified in not going on an all-out
alert ?
General Short. I think very definitely that I was. The fact that
the War Department did not even inquire or give me any direct in-
formation to justify it.
Mr. Kaufman. This was directed to be sent to you for your in-
formation ?
General Short. That is correct.
[SO4I] Mr. Kaufman. A specific direction to you ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. So that when the Navy Department said "aggres-
sive movement in any direction," did it not mean in the direction in
which they directed this message to go for information ?
General Short. I would not say so. If you take it literally, I feel
absolutely confident, if they had any idea that Hawaii was to be
directly included, if there was a direct probability that they would
have said so. There would be no purpose in leaving me to guess.
2978 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Kaufman. Did you expect the War Department to be able to
tell you the exact place of an attack (
General Short. I believe the War Department actually had the in-
formation 4 hours before the attack, so they could have told me the
exact place.
Mr. Kaufman. Now, we are 2^2 weeks before the 4 hours of the
attack. We are on the 24th of November, General.
General Short. The War Department could at least give me their
best estimate, and I would like, when you get to November 29, to read
to you what the man who wrote the estimate had to say about it.
Mr. Kaufman. Coming back again, General, to the 24th, [8042]
you said that the failure in this dispatch to name Hawaii as the place
of possible attack, the same as the Philippines of Guam excluded from
your consideration Hawaii as a probable point of attack.
General Short. It indicated to me that they did not feel that
Hawaii was definitely a point of probable attack. It was a possible
place of attack, of course, but I am 100 percent confident, if they
had believed it was a probable place of attack, they would have so
stated it.
Mr. Kaufman. Did it prompt you to ask for any instructions from
the War Department ?
General Short. It did not.
Mr. Kaufman. We go now to the telegram of November 27. That
was a direct telegram to you ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. It states.
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes,
with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come
back and offer to continue.
That is a very definite statement, is it not ?
General Short. It is a very indefinite statement. It says that they
are to all practical purposes, but there is a possibility that they may
come back. And they did [8043] come back. I knew it only
from the papers. I knew that the negotiations were continuing.
The War Department knew definitely there was a de facto rup-
ture, and the Japanese were just stalling. They intercepted a mes-
sage that told them that very positively.
Mr. Kaufman. You regard that as an indefinite statement?
General Short. A very indefinite statement.
Mr. Kaufman. Then it follows, with the statement: "Action un-
predictable."
It says :
Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any
moment.
Was that an indefinite or definite statement?
General Short. Certainly, when you say a thing is unpredictable, it
is not a definite statement. You say that something is possible, and
they did not indicate the type of hostile action, they just said "hostile
action," and I would say again that is a very indefinite statement.
Mr. Kaufman. You did not believe that that was sufficient to put
you on notice to go on an all-out alert ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2979
General Short. I did not. I thought the War Department was
perfectly capable of writing a positive and definite instruction if they
wanted to give one.
[8044] Mr. Kaufman. You did not make any inquiry from the
War Department ?
General Short. I did not.
Mr. Kaufman. Well, you did get a definite instruction in this dis-
patch, did you not ?
General Short. I got certain missions assigned, as will appear later
in the message.
[SO4S'] Mr. Kaufman. It says :
If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United
States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. That is a definite statement ?
General Short. That is a definite statement if they didn't go ahead
and modify it by the next sentence. Then you change it into an
indefinite statement.
Mr. E^AUFMAN. But that statement, you agree, is definite ?
General Short. If you stop there I agree that is definite.
Mr. Kaufman. Then it says:
This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting
you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.
General Short. You immediately have qualified it and it is no
■ longer a definite statement. It is an indefinite statement.
Mr. Kaufman. You have one definite statement and one indefinite
statement ?
General Short. They are joined together.
Mr. Kaufman. Did what you claim to be inconsistencies in that
statement prompt you to make any inquiry from Washington?
[8046] General Short. It did not.
Mr. Kaufman. And you didn't do so ?
General Short. No, sir. I was satisfied of one thing, that their
prime desire was to avoid war, and to not let any international inci-
dent happen in Hawaii that might bring on war.
Mr. Kaufman. It says :
You are directed to take such reconnaissance and other measures as you
deem necessary.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. But these measures should be carried out so as not
to alarm the civil population.
So that you did have a broad directive ?
General Short. Always qualified.
Mr. Kaufman. We will come to that. You did have a broad direc-
tive to take such action as you deemed necessary ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. But to do it in such a way as would not alarm the
civilian population?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. That was a complete and concise directive to you,
was it not?
2980 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. The first part was a very concise directive. When
you qualify it, then there was always a (juestion about [8047]
whether the manner I was going to do it in would alarm the public.
Mr. Kaufman. The second part referred to the manner?
General Short. The manner ; yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. That, again, did not prompt you to make any in-
quiry from the War Department ?
General Short. It did not.
Mr. Kaufman. And you didn't make any ?
General Short. I did not.
Mr. Kaufman. The record shows. General, that this dispatch was
decoded in your signal center at 2 : 22 Hawaiian time.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. And that Colonel Phillips took that message to you
at 2 : 30 on that day.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. On the morning of that day you had had a meeting
with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. And that meeting was before you had received this
telegram ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. K!aufman. And you received this telegram according to the
testimony of Colonel Phillips at 2 : 30 and according to the record
the only person with whom you conferred about [8048] this
telegram and the order that you gave was with Colonel Phillips, your
chief of staff?
General Short. But almost immediately afterwards I conferred
with my G-2 and with my air force commander and my antiaircraft
commander, within, I would say, the next hour to an hour and a half,
all three of them.
Mr. Kaufman. You put in the alert No. 1 within 30 minutes after
the receipt-
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. Of the dispatch and before conference with any-
body except Colonel Phillips?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Kaufman. And you replied to the War Department before you
had had any conference with anybody other than Colonel Phillips ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Kaufman. And you replied to that before you had conferred
with Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch ?
General Short. I had conferred very fully with Admiral Kimmel
and Admiral Bloch and at the time we conferred we all knew exactly
what was in the message of November 24 and there was not one addi-
tional bit of information of the enemy in this message that was not
included in the message of November 24. We knew nothing more
than we had known from the [8049] message of November 24.
Mr. Kaufman. At any rate, you replied to this telegram to the War
Department before you had conferred with Admiral Kimmel or Ad-
miral Bloch or any part of your staff other than Colonel Phillips?
General Short. I did.
Mr. Kaufman. And in that telegram your report of action taken
was —
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2981
Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. General, having discussed these telegrams and hav-
ing characterized some of them as being indefinite or unresponsive,
do you think that the War Department was justified in taking from
the words "liaison with the Navy" the meaning that you had put into
effect the joint coastal frontier defense plan ?
General Short. They very definitely were not.
Mr. Kaufman. Why not?
General Short. Because, in the first place, it was primarily their
function to order it into effect. They knew, I think, that I would have
consulted them before I would have considered ordering any part of
it into effect if the communications were open. I am sure they would
have expected me to phone them and tell them that I contemplated
doing so.
[8050] Mr. Kj^ufman. What did you mean by the words "liaison
with the Navy"?
General Short. I meant that I was keeping in touch with the Navy.
I had actually discussed the dangers of the situation over a period of
about 3 hours that morning with Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel
and there had been no change since that discussion.
Mr. Kaufman. Well, keeping in touch with the Navy was part of
your norma] function, was it not ?
General Short. Yes, sir ; and I was performing it.
Mr. Kaufman. It was a part of your normal function that you had
been undertaking and doing ever since you had taken charge of the
Hawaiian Department?
General Short. Also "liaison" is a term that is thoroughly under-
stood throughout the Army and there was no doubt in my mind it was
thoroughly understood by the War Department.
Mr. Kaufman. General, will you state for the record what your
understanding of the word "liaison" means in military and naval
circles ?
General Short. We use "liaison" in two different ways. In the way
in which I was using it there, where you keep in touch and keep gen-
erally informed. The other way was where you have a liaison officer
detailed to a headquarters who has the sole mission of keeping his own
headquarters informed [8051] as to what is going on.
Mr. Kaufman. That, you say, is the well-defined meaning?
General Short. That is right.
Mr. Kaufman. Of the two uses of the word "liaison" ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. One is to indicate that you were keeping yourself
informed by the Navy.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. As to what they were doing?
General Short. The general situation. We were keeping each other
informed, you might say, as to what we were doing.
Mr. Kaufman. Well, did you keep yourself informed as to what
the Navy was doing ?
General Short, I think at that particular point I was extremely
well-informed because we had discussed for a period of approximately
3 hours the whole situation in the Pacific, looking toward Midway and
2982 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Wake, and the dangers that were involved in sending carriers out there
for relief. -We discussed every phase of it.
Mr. Kaufman. The telegram of November 27 says :
You are directed to take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem
necessary.
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Kaufman. Let us go to the first directive. You are [8052]
directed to undertake such reconnaissance
General Short. As I deem necessary.
Mr. Kaufman. As you deem necessary.
Did you take any reconnaissance at that time ?
General Short. I did not deem any was necessary because it was
the Navy's function, definitely agreed upon in the plan, to conduct
the long-distance reconnaissance.
Mr. Kaufman. Did you make inquiry from the Navy as to whether
they were at that time making reconnaissance?
(jeneral Short. I knew they were sending out three task forces. 1
discussed it fully with them that morning. They were sending a task
force to Wake to send out additional Marine planes. They were
sending out to Midway to send out additional Marine planes. They
were going to send one to Johnston Island. And I actually got per-
mission to send a staff officer along because they were going to conduct
a landing exercise which I wished my G-2 section to understand. I
knew they were making perimeter reconnaissance from Johnston and
Wake to Midway. I did not know the details of that reconnaissance
but I knew it would take place.
Mr. Kaufman. You knew that the task force to Johnston Island did
not leave until December 5 ?
General Short. It was later, but the other two were leaving early.
[S053] Mr. Kaufman. Admiral Halsey left on the 29th?
General Short. The 28th or 29th.
Mr. Kaufman. 28th or 29th.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. Those were the only two task forces that were out?
General Short. The only two task forces going out right at that
time.
Mr. Kaufman. Now, the joint agreement between yourself and
Admiral Bloch contemplated long-range reconnaissance from the
islands, did it not?
General Short. It contemplated it not just from the island. What-
ever long-range reconnaissance was necessary. And, as I understand
Admiral Kimmel's attitude, it was that with the perimeter reconnais-
sance from Johnston, Wake, and Midway, there was a verj' great
saving in planes, that he could accomplish more than he could with
the same number of planes from Oahu. And it was a logical thing
to do, not to send them all out from Oahu.
Mr. Kaufman. General, let us come back to the 27th of November.
You were directed to take reconnaissance ?
General Short. As I deemed necessary.
Mr. Kaufman. As you deemed necessary?
General Short. Yes, sir.
[8054] Mr. Kaufman. In other words, in order to have recon-
naissance, effective reconnaissance, radar stations have to be in oper-
ation, do they not ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2983
General Short. The radar did not nial^e distant reconnaissance.
We thought at that time it was limited to 75 or a hundred miles. We
discovered that under very exceptional circumstances we actually got
132 miles. It was not an instrument for distant reconnaissance.
Mr. Kaufman. That was not put into alert, was it ?
General Short. That was put into alert during what I considered
the most dangerous hours of the day for an air attack, from 4 o'clock
to 7 o'clock a. m. daily.
Mr. Kaufman. And did you report that to the
General Short. I did not,
Mr. Kaufman. Just putting the radar station into operation is
not effective unless there is the information center that works with it ?
General Short. The information center was working with it.
Mr. Kaufman. Was working with it ?
General Short. Was working with it ; yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. Now, General, did you later on that day see the
dispatch that Admiral Kimmel received from the Navy Department?
[S0S5] General Short. Yes, sir. I think Lieutenant Burr tes-
tified that he actually brought it to me personally.
Mr. Kaufman. That was after you had replied to the War De-
partment ?
General Short. Probably sometime in the next hour or two.
Mr. Kaufman. And when you saw the words "war warning" did
that create any impression on your mind?
General Short. No more so than the fact that they had said before
that the Japs would probably attack.
Mr. Kaufman. Had you ever in your experience seen a message
to a field commander using the words "This is a war warning" ?
General Short. No, sir; but I knew that the Navy messages were
habitually rather more aggressive than the Army. On October 16
we had a message in which they said Japan would attack. On October
20 I had one from the War Department saying they didn't expect
any. My message said nothing about a war warning and his did. I
think the Navy messages were inclined to be more positive, possibly
you might say more alarming, in the context.
Mr. Kaufman. So that the war warning, you just regarded it as
aggressiveness of the Navy, and paid no particular attention to it?
General Short. No particular attention to those words.
[80S6] Mr. Kaufman. I direct your attention to the telegram
to the commander in chief of the Pacinc Fleet which says :
The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval
task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines,
Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo.
That is for information, is it not?
General Short. Yes, sir; and indicated definitely to me they were
attacking toward the Western Pacific.
Mr. Kaufman. Then it goes on with a directive to the commander
in chief of the Pacific Fleet.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. To —
Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the
tasks assigned in WPL-46.
2984 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. Yes, sir. I thought sure that that inckided dis-
tant reconnaissance and as I remember Admiral Kimmel told me that
he had tightened up all along the Ime, as I think he expressed it.
Mr. Kaufman. Now, 3'ou had occasion to see Admiral Kimmel
within a few days after the receipt of the dispatches of November 27?
General Short. I had a conference with Admiral Kimmel on De-
cember 1. I had another conference with Admiral Kimmel [8057']
on December 2. I had another conference with him on December 3.
]Mr. Kaufman. Did you
Senator Brewster. Let him finish.
Mr. Kaufman. Yes.
General Short. I Avas going to say, one of my staff officers, my staff
officer used for liaison with the Navy, had a conference with his gun-
nery officer on the 4th. I think that was the last conference we had
before the attack.
jNIr. Kaufman. General, did you at any time tell Admiral Kimmel
that you had alerted only against sabotage?
General Short. I don t know that I said that specifically. However,
there was never an^- doubt in ni}^ mind that he knew exactly the status.
Lieutenant Burr was detailed as a liaison from the Navy to the G-3
section. He sat in with our G-o section, which was our operations
section, which controlled all the alerts, all the war plans, everything
of that kind. He knew everything that my staff knew. He had just
one duty and that was to keep his headquarters informed of exactly
what we were doing.
Mr. Kaufman. 2s ow, can you account, General, for the testimony
given by Admiral Kimmel before this committee to the effect that
he did not know that you had alerted only against sabotage? He
testified further that he thought you [dOSSj had gone on an
all-out alert and that he didn't know that you had anything else
but an all-out alert.
General Short. The only way I can account for that would be poor
staff work on the part of the staff of the Fourteenth Naval District.
As I say, their liaison officer must have known exactly. We had fur-
nished them with 10 copies of our staff operating procedure, which
somebody in that naval staff certainly must have dug into and known
what it meant. Why it did not get to Admiral Kimmel I do not know.
Senator Lucas. General Short, will you give the committee the name
of that liaison officer?
General Short. Lieutenant Burr. I don't know his initials.
B-u-r-r.
Senator Lucas. Thank you.
Mr. Kaufman. Now, General
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest, in the interest of saving
time, that counsel ask General Short at this time what an all-out
alert would mean to an observer who knew nothing about it. What
would they have to do so that someone in Hawaii would know that they
were on an all-out alert if one was ordered and they went on such an
alert.
Mr. Kaufman. What would be an all-out alert, General?
General Short. An all-out alert would cause every officer and every
enlisted man in every organization to move to battle [8069]
positions. Men would be moving all over the islands, in helmets, full
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2985
field equipment, bj'- motor, and otherwise. There would be men on
every road.
Mr. Kaufman. And do you feel that was contrary to the instruc-
tions of the War Department not to alarm the civilian population?
General Short. I would saj^ that it would mean to the civilian pop-
ulation and any Japanese agents that w^e were takin<j; up our definite
battle positions. There couldn't be any mistake about it.
Mr. Kaufman. Even though it was done under the name of war
games, or whatever you wanted to call it ?
General Short. If we had had time to make a previous announce-
ment, which we usually did if we were going into maneuvers, and a
little build-up, we probably could have deceived the average citizen.
We probably could not have deceived a Japanese agent who had the
message.
Mr. Kaufman. So you want the committee to understand that you
had that problem in mind, so as not to circumvent or go contrary to
the decision of the War Department?
General Short. I did.
Mr. Murphy. Counsel, as long as you are going into that, I suggest
that we might complete the picture and ask the witness why he didn't
go into alert No. 2, which provided [8060] protection against
a submarine and an air attack. Alert No. 2.
Mr. Kaufman, General, will you first describe what alert No. 2
was. We have No. 1, against sabotage, and No. 3, an all-out alert.
What was alert No. 2?
General Short. Alert No. 2 was a defense against sabotage and
uprisings and, in addition, a defense against an air attack or against
an attack by surface and subsurface vessels.
^Ir. Kaufman. Will you tell us why vou didn't put that into
effect?
General Short. All of the coast artillery, all of the antiaircraft
artillery, and all of the air would have immediately taken up their
duties as described in that alert. Part of the coast artillery was right
in the middle of the town. Fort de Russy was within two or three
blocks of the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, The public couldn't help seeing
that they were manning their seacoast guns. Placing live ammuni-
tion. Some of the guns were practically in the middle of the park.
The bombers would have all gone to outlying islands, except the
B-l7's which could not, because the landing gear was not along.
So there would have been a considerable amount of activity. Again
perhaps the average citizens wouldn't have understood fully but if
there was a Japanese agent, who knew what he was looking for, he
would have known perfectly.
180611 Mr, Kauffman. Congressman Clark has a question.
Mr. Clark. That answers what was in my mind, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. And there were plenty of Jap agents in Hawaii ?
General Short. We knew there had been a total list of 239 consular
agents. We had their names very definitely. We hnd the names of
probably 70 or 80 more that we were confident were Japanese agents.
I might add in addition to that opportunity of alarming the public
if we placed men at seacoast guns and at antiaircraft batteries with
an explanation that they were to be prepared to fire immediately upon
notice against Japanese, if we told our airplanes to be warmed up to
79716—46 — pt. 7 6
2986 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
be ready to go up and attack Japanese planes it is inconceivable that
in some way the Japanese agents would not have picked up the
information.
Mr. Kaufman. You knew that there was certainly no need for
two-hundred-odd consular agents of the Japanese there, that their
function was other than what their names indicated ?
General Short. There function may have been twofold. Some
of them may not have been espionage agents. The Japanese, as we
knew, were very much interested in keeping the Japanese-Americans
as Japanese and I think, to a considerable extent, these agents were
propaganda agents for Japan; some of [8062] them espio-
nage ; all of them propaganda.
Mr. Kaufman. You did not think, General, that it might have been
very well to indicate that the men were taking battle stations as the
means of probably heading off an attack, did you ?
General Short. I did not think it would comply with the War
Department message. It might have been very desirable but they had
indicated that they did not want that kind of thing d(me.
Mr. Kaufman. Well, as commander in the field you certainly had
the power to inquire from Washington and to make known your plans,
didn't you, if you wanted to do so ?
General Short. They had indicated very definitely that they did not
want to alarm the public and that they did not want to provoke Japan.
Mr. Kaufman. So that you did not feel that you should have even
made that suggestion to the War Department?
General Short. I felt definitely that they did not want it.
Mr. Kaufman. Now, on the following day
General Short. May I add something before you leave that mes-
sage ?
Mr. Kaufman. By all means, sir.
General Short. There were two things in that message [806S]
that you did not mention. One was "report measures taken." Now,
that told me, said to me that if I reported the measures taken and they
were not what the War Department thought they should be that I
would unquestionably get additional instructions.
The other was, "Limit this highly essential information" or "highly
secret information to the minimum officers" ; not officers and men but
officers. You could not possibly go into alert No. 2 or alert No. 3
without directly violating that.
Mr. Kaufman. Well, in connection with that. General, in your state-
ment you state in paragraph 90 that your decision on the 27th of
November in the light of hindsight was wrong.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. And the purport of your argument in your state-
ment is that although you made an error you complain that Washing-
ton did not correct your error ; isn't that the purport of your argu-
ment?
General Short. Yes, sir ; if you are not furnished information you
in all probability will make an erroneous estimate.
Mr. Kaufman. And your argument throughout your statement is
that although in the first instance the error was yours Washington
should be partly responsible for not having [SOdi] corrected
your error ?
I
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2987
General Short. I would say wholly responsible.
Mr. Kaufman. All right. It does not relieve you of the respon-
sibility, however, does it, General?
General Short. Yes, sir ; I told them exactly what I was doing. I
had no reason in the world to believe that they did not approve of it.
The Chief of Staff has himself stated before this committee that I
had a right to assume that he would tell me if the action were not what
he wanted.
Mr. Kaufman. You say that you made a full report as to the action
taken by you ?
General Short. Yes, sir ; I said I made a report.
Mr. KL\UFMAN. You made a report ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. And in that report you intended to make it a com-
plete report, did you not ?
General Short. I intended for it to be complete enough for them to
understand without question.
Mr. Kaufman. And in that you told them that you had alerted
against sabotage. Now, the radar warning system had nothing to do
with sabotage, the sabotage alert, did it?
General Short. No, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. That is an action that you took that you did not
report to Washington.
[S06S] General Short. I did not report that.
Mr. Kaufman. And you did not report the fact that it was only
running on a partial time basis ?
General Short. I did not report it at all.
Mr. Kaufman. You did not report it at all. You did not think it
was material for Washington to know that you were only carrying
your radar station for 3 hours a day?
General Short. My basic report was of an alert against sabotage,
which indicated to them that I was not alerted against an air attack or
against a landing; all-out attack.
Mr. Kaufman. Then why was the radar alerted on the 27th of
November ?
General Short. There were two very good reasons. The first rea-
son is the Martin study had decided that the 8 hours, 2 hours imme-
diately preceding dawn and 1 hour after were the dangerous hours.
The radar was very new, the men were just beginning to be trained.
If there was any possibility, it was a factor of sabotage, and it also was
an opportunity to train the men at the most important time and to
make tliem train a little harder because it was tied in with another
alert.
Mr. Kaufman. Have you anything further to say about the Novem-
ber 27 message before I leave it, sir ?
General Short. No, sir. There is one thing that I think [8066]
it would be appropriate to take up at this time to indicate that the
officers
S?nator Lucas. What was the question?
( The question was read by the reporter. )
General Short. The question is all tied in with this message as to
why I did not assume or estimate that Japan was about to attack
Hawaii.
2988 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I have here a mimeographed copy from volume 2 of the Clarke
report. Before I read this I would like to explain that General
Kroner, who was then Colonel Kroner, was the head of the military
branch of G-2. He was the officer who was responsible for maintain-
ing information and for the preparation of estimates as to probable
action.
Hawaii was not mentioned as a place of probable attack in the cur-
rent information and intelligence sent me in November and early
December 1941.
In this connection I want to quote for the committee the testimony
of Gen. Hayes A. Kroner, the chief of the intelligence branch in War
Department G-2 from July 1941 up to the time of the Japanese attack.
The testimony I quote was given on September 13, 1944, before Col.
Carter W. Clarke. It is found in the so-called Clarke investigation.
I recently borrowed the War Department copy. I am informed that
the committee has the only other [8067] copy of the Clarke
report. I quote from page 5 and pages 9 and 10 of General Kroner's
testimony :
Col. Clakke. Did you have access to a source of information which we know as
Top Secret or the British know as Most Secret?
Gen. Kroner. Meaning communications information?
Col. Clakke. Signal intelligence.
Gen. Kkuner. No, none whatever.
Col. Clakke. You mean you didn't get it or your Branch didn't get it?
Gen. Kroner. I personally as Chief of the Branch did not get it. I was aware
that something, which later I found out to be of this nature, existed, but I was
given to understand, particularly by Col. Bratton and Col. Pettigrew, who some-
times handled the matter for Col. Bratton, that he received information from
Col. Minkler, whom I knew to be in the Signal Corps, which perhaps had to do
with Japanese troop movements, which he by long custom and by General Miles'
special desire, was to handle himself directly with Gan. Miles.
Col. Clarke. I would like to ask one more question. In any estimate from
the time you took over the Intelligence Group up to and including Pearl Harbor,
was there ever any prediction or forecast made of a possible [806S] attack
on Pearl Harbor?
Gen. Kronbir. None to my knowledge. I have in mind the last estimate that
was made before Pearl Harbor, which was an estimate covering a future period
from December 1 to sometime in 1942.
Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you consider it a capability of the Japanese to success-
fully attack Pearl Harbor with bombers?
Gen. Kroner. No. The matter was discussed
Col. Clakke. Did you identify this document?
Gen. Kroner. Yes. I identified it — this is the document to which I reft-rred—
IB 159, November 29, 1941.
That is in Exhibit 33 under estimates dated November 29, 1941.
[Reading :]
This particular estimate was considered by the whole division, not only the
Intelligence Group but by General Miles himself, as perhaps the most important
we had ever gotten out. That importance lay not in so much the danger that
we saw from Japan, although danger in that field was pretty thoroughly dis-
cussed, but primarily because Gen. Miles wishes to focus "War Department
thought on the defeat that could be administered to the Nazi powers. In the
preparation of the estimate [8069] each geographic section in the In-
telligence Branch prepared its part. Colonel— now Brigadier General — Thomas
J. Belts put the several estimates together and did what we called "polish them
up." He and I discussed the lines of action and capabilities of all the warring
powers and especially of each potential enemy to the U. S. A., and I took them
to Gen. Miles where they were finally altered to suit him or approved. This
particular estimate does not include in the lines of action open to Japan an
attack on Pearl Harbor, and I remember that so distinctly because wh^n the
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2989
word came through the radio on that fateful Sunday, December 7, that Japan
had attacked Pearl Harbor, I was sitting in my office in the Munitions Building
reading from this paper the Japanese capabilities. Therefore from my point
of view, I feel that Japan's potential capability against Pearl Harbor was left
from this estimate because neither Col. Betts nor I had any information which
would lead us to believe that they were capable of or planned to do so.
Col. Clarke. I would like to ask one final question again just to reiterate the
fact that you personally had no knowledge of what Col. Bratton did with this
most secret material or to whom he showed it.
Gen. Kkonek. That is correct, except to Gen. IMiles.
[SO/O] I want to call attention to the fact that these two officers
who were responsible for the preparation of this estimate, General
Kroner and Colonel Betts, in spite of the fact that General Kroner was
the head of the Military Intelligence Branch, were denied access to
the "magic" and for that reason he did not consider Japan capable of
making an attack and did not believe that they were going to do so.
I was in the same position with reference to "magic." I had no access
to "magic." I had access to even less information than General Kroner
did and General Kroner has made it perfectly plain that the absence
of access to "magic" had caused him to draw the conclusion and to
write to the estimate that way and the reason it was left out of the
estimate was not, as General Miles said before this committee, because
it was too obvious to be put in, but because they did not believe Japan
was capable of making the attack considering the information they
had.
Mr. MuRPiiT. May I inquire at this point whether oi: not General
Kroner was a subordinate of General jNIiles ?
General Short, He was. He was in charge of the intelligence branch
directly under General Miles and he took this estimate to General
Miles and General Miles accepted it.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, we distinguish between chief of the in-
telligence branch and head of the intelligence branch?
[8071] General Short. No, sir. The G-2 was divided into sev-
eral branches.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate General Miles was head of Intelligence?
General Short. He was head of all G-2.
Mr. Murphy. All Intelligence?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And this man was called Chief of the Intelligence?
General Short. Of the Military Intelligence Branch.
Here is another short radiogram that I would like to introduce at
this time because it shows the attitude of G-2 and what they thought
between the time of the sending of this message and December 7. This
message was dated December 5, 1941, No. 512, addressed to G-2 Panama
Department :
• U. S.-Japanese relations strained STOP Will inform you if and when sever-
ance of diplomatic relations imminent.
Signed "Miles."
Now, that was only 2 days before the attack and apparently IMiles.
who was head of G-2 at that time, did not consider that the rupture
of Japanese relations was imminent.
Mr. Kauf3ian. I am told that this has never come before the com-
mittee before.
Senator Ferguson. Read it.
2990 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[8072] Mr. Kaufman. It has been read into the record by Gen-
eral Short and is dated December 6, 1941.
To Panama Canal Dapartment:
U. S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS STRAINED STOP WILL INFORM YOU
IF AND WHEN SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IMMINENT.
MILES.
That was not sent to you, was it, General?
General Short. That was not sent to me but I read it to show that
at that time Miles did not believe the severance was imminent, 2 days
before the attack.
Mr. Kaufman. And is something that you have found that supports
your contention
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Kaufman (continuing). That other people came to the same
erroneous estimate as you did?
General Short. And people who had much more information than
I had even.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, can Mr. Masten, who was here
earlier with us, can he explain on this record why the War Depart-
ment, why the Intelligence branch, did not deliver that to the com-
mittee and why it was not called to the attention of the committee
before Miles took the witness stand and before General Marshall and
others were on the witness stand ?
[8073] Can he explain why we get this information after wit-
nesses have been here instead of before? I think here is an appro-
priate place to place their information now in tlie record as to this
incident.
Mr. Masten. Senator, I have no personal knowledge to answer the
question that you asked. I understand from Colonel Duncombe, the
Army liaison officer, that it is his impression that that was delivered,
that they had delivered it to us. but we will have to look and see. I
understand that the exhibit which I think is
Senator Ferguson. As I understood it we were to have all messages.
Mr. Masten. Excuse me, Senator. Exhibit 32, which is the only
exhibit containing Army messages from Washington, states specifi-
cally that it is restricted to messages between the War Department
and Hawaii. Now, to my knowledge, there has not been any effort
made to compile an exhibit of the messages from the War Department
to Panama or to any of the other places.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand then that we do not have
all the messages to Panama and we do not have all the messages to the
Philippines? This is verj'- material as I see it, that this committee
has all messages sent out in relation to this war or anticipated war.
[807^] Mr. Masten. Well, as I say, Senator, I have no personal
knowledge of the precise answer to your question. There are a num-
ber of other photostats in the office and I will have to check them up.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. Well. then, we will ask you to check it. It is
now 12 o'clock and the committee will recess until 2 o'clock, General.
General Short. Thank you.
The Vice Chairman. And the members of the committee are re-
quested to meet in the Finance Committee room in executive session at
1:30.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2991
(Whereupon at 12 noon a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the
same day.)
[8075] ATTERNOON SESSION 2 P. M.
The Chairman. The committee will be in order.
Before the examination of General Short is resumed, the Chair
wishes to announce that in the interest of expedition in the hearings
that instead of calling personally the members of the staff of General
Short and of Admiral Kimmel, consisting of some 15 or 20 witnesses
in all, who have heretofore testified on numerous occasions in regard
to this inquiry, that a complete record of their testimony heretofore
taken will be filed as an exhibit as a part of the record of this hearing
with the right of any member of the committee who wishes to inquire
of any particular witness who has heretofore testified concerning his
testimony heretofore given, shall have the right to bring it to the
attention of the committee and have the right to have the committee
act favorably upon that request, with the further understanding that
anv previous witness whose testimony is filed as an exhibit, who is
called before the committee and orally examined by any member of
the committee will then be subject to general examination by the
committee.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, there was a further understanding.
The Chairman. And, also, the Chair omitted to say that counsel
for Admiral Kimmel and counsel for Genera] Short were consulted
by the committee and agreed to that procedure.
[8076] Mr. Keefe. So that there may be no mistake in the record,
Mr. Chairman, I think the further qualification should be added, that
the resolution adopted by the committee does not include the record
of the Clausen investigation and affidavits.
The Chairman. Clausen, as the Chair understands it and as the
committee understand it, was not a member of the staff of either
Admiral Kimmel or General Short and therefore this resolution would
not apply to him.
Mr. Keefe. All right.
The Chairman. All right. We will now proceed.
Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, at the conclusion of the morning's
session a question was asked regarding a telegram dated December 5,
1941, from General Miles to the G-2 of the Panama Canal Department,
as to when that telegram had been made available to counsel for the
committee.
During the noon hour we have looked into this matter and have
received this memorandum from the Army liaison officer. It reads
as follows :
With reference to the message from G-2, War Department, to G-2, Panama,
dated 5 December, referred to at the close of this morning's session, the para-
phrased text of that message is set forth on Page 285 of Volnme D of the top-secret
transcript of Proceedings Before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. That transcript
[8077] was delivered to the committee on 9 October 1945. Also, a photostatic
copy of the ?ame message was delivered by the War Department to the committee
on or about 1 December and at the same time a copy was delivered to Captain
Ford, General Short's counsel.
Harmon Duncomre,
Lieutenant Colonel.
2992 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I have checked the files of counsel and find that one of the two sets
of these volumes has at all times remained in counsel's office available
to the members of the committee. The other set was delivered on
October 11 to Senator Brewster and is still in his possession.
The Chaibman. That is all. You may proceed, Counsel.
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES
ARMY (RETIRED)— Resumed
Mr. Kaui^man. General, coming back-
General Short. May I add just one thing in regard to that message
in regard to General Miles?
Mr. Kaufmax. Yes.
General Short. I would like to state that I have no information
as to whether General Miles followed up the December 5 message by
any warning before December 7, even though he had all the magic
intelligence.
I do not know why Miles sent this message to the Panama [S07'8]
Canal but not to Hawaii, but it shows that his interpretation of the
alert messages was the same as mine, that relations were only strained
with no threat of attack on Hawaii.
My. IL^ufman. General, as I understand it, you have testified that
after the message of November 27 that you did not invoke the joint
defense plan.
General Short. That is correct. I would like to add though, how-
ever, that I considered that the naval message of October 16 and of
November 27 did invoke part of it where they told him to take a
defensive deployment preparatory to WPL-46.
Mr. Kaufman. But so far as you are concerned j^ou do not want to
be understood as having taken any action under that war plan ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Kaufmax. Now, I direct your attention to the testimony that
you gave at page 380 of the Pearl Harbor board hearings. You
were asked by General Grunert
General Short. May I see it?
The Vice Chairman. You are referring to the witness' testimony
before the Army Pearl Harbor board?
Mr. Kaufman. That is correct, sir.
The Vice Chairman. All richt.
[S079] Mr. Kauf3Ian. Page 380. Have you got page 380?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. I direct your attention to this question by General
Grunert :
In your message of November 27tli you say "Liaison with the Navy." Just
what did you mean by that? How did that cover anything required by that
particular message?
To which you are reported to have answered :
To my mind it meant I was definitely keeping in touch with the Navy, what
information they had and what they were doing.
QuKSTiON. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to carry out
its pat't of that agreement for long-distance reconnaissance?
An8w?:b. Yes, without any question, whether I had sent that or not, it would
have effected it because they signed a very definite agreement which was ap-
proved by the Navy as well as by our Chief of Staff.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2993
In the light of the testimony that you gave at page 380 do you want
to change any of the testimony that you gave tnis morning?
General Short. No, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. You do not. I asked you this morning whether
the interceptor command had been activated at the [80801 time
of the activation of the radar station on November 28 and you told
us this morning that it had been.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. Will you please account, if you can, for the testi-
mony given by General Davidson at pages 170, 178, 179, and 196 of
the Roberts Commission and the testimony of Colonel Phillips at
page 232
General Short. May I see that testimony?
Lieutenant Colonel Karr. We do not have copies of it.
Mr. Kaufman. You do not have a copy of that ?
Lieutenant Colonel Karr. Of the Roberts Commission? No.
Senator Lucas. May I suggest to counsel that you take one of those
pages at a time and shoTV them to General Short? He is asking about
a number of pages there. It seems to me it may be a little more
convenient.
The Vice ChairmxVn. It might be in that same volume there.
General Short. No, that volume is my testimony only.
Mr. Kaufman. I can change my question with regard to that.
General Davidson and General Phillips testified before the Roberts
Commission that the interceptor command was not activated until
the I7th of December, 10 days after the attack. Can you explain
their testimony?
General Short. Yes. General Davidson and Colonel Pow-
ell [8081'] and Colonel Meehan had been sent to the mainland
to learn what was the method of operation in this country. It was
entirely new. We had just two officers in the Army and one naval
officer who had any conception of what a communication center and
an interceptor command consisted of. They were the only two, as
far as I know, who had ever seen it. That was Major Bergquist
and Major Tindall of the Army and Commander Taylor of the
Navy, who had had considerable work with the British and had
been loaned by the Navy to work with us.
Wliat we were doing was operating under verbal orders and they
had full authority to make changes, they were trying to work the
thing out to what they thought was being done in the States because
they had been back and seen it a little previously, the two of them,
with full authority to change it from day to day and we had pur-
posely waited the return of General Davidson and Colonel Powell
before putting it in a written order as we did not want to issue
a written order one day and have to modify it materially the next
day.
They came back I think on the 3d or 4th of December, got their
reports in on — I know General Davidson got his report in on the
afternoon of the 6th, so that there had been no time to have them
go over the procedure and put it down in writing. They went ahead
and operated for the next 10 days on the same verbal orders and
at the end of that period they [808^] felt positive enough as
to what they wanted to do that we put it in written form. It was
2994 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
entirely experimental and we were trying to arrive at what we
thought was the correct thing with the limited information we had.
Mr. Murphy. Now, Mr. Chairman, for the sake of accuracy, as I
understand it the question was directed to page 380 of the Army
Pearl Harbor Board hearings. Is that right?
Mr. Kaufman. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. What page?
Mr. Kaufman. General Davidson's testimony at pages 170 and 178
cf the Roberts record.
The question, General, is as to whether or not the interceptor com-
mand was in operation prior to the 17th of December?
General Short. It was definitely in operation but it was operating
on verbal orders in an informal way, but that Major Bergquist and
Major Tindall had full authority to make changes because they wei-e
the only two in the Army that really knew anything about it.
[8083] Mr. Kaufman. Then how do you explain the testimony
of Colonel Phillips that it was not activated and did not start operat-
ing until the 17th day of December?
General Short. I think he must have meant that the formal order
had not been issued.
Mr, Kaufman. And the same thing for General Davidson?
General Short. The same thing.
I know from talking with General Davidson, there was no doubt
in his mind that it was operating just the same before as after.
Mr. Murphy. I think, Mr. Chairman, you will find in the testimony
of General Short it was being operated on a volunteer basis.
General Short. I believe not. I would like, if Mr. Murphy has
any such reference to my testimony, to have it quoted exactly, be-
cause I do not believe I ever made such a statement.
Mr. Murphy. When I come to the examination I will do it.
Mr. Kaufman. Then your answer is now that it was being operated
on an experimental basis ?
General Short. Experimental, informal basis, under verbal orders
to make changes from day to daj'' as it proved necessary.
[8084] Mr. Kaufman. Can you explain the testimony that Ad-
miral Kimmel gave here the other day to the effect that he nndei-stood
the interceptor command was working fully and complete?
General Short. I will say again, if he understood that, it must have
been due to poor staff w^ork on the part of the staff of the Fourteenth
Naval District, because their liaison officer. Lieutenant Burr, sitting in
G-3, must have known exactly what we were doing.
Mr. Kaufman. Between November 27, and December 7, did you
activate your fighter planes ?
General Short. The fighter planes were ahvaj^s activated.
Mr. Kaufman. Under whose direction was that, General?
General Short. The fighter planes were under the command of
GeneTal Davidson when he was there. I am not sure who was the
next senior to him, and Avas in command while he was away. It was
possibly Colonel Flood, but I am not positive.
Mr. Kaufman. General, were not the fighter planes bunched on
the field for more easy protection against sabotage?
General Short. They were grouped for protection against sabotage.
They were not armed, and warmed up and immediately available to
take the air.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2995
[8085] Mr. Kaufman. They were not available at any time be-
tween the 27th of November and December 7 ?
General Short. All day long, they were functioning in training.
Probably most of the time during the training hours some one squadron
would have been able to take the air immediately, but not fully armed.
Mr. Kaufman. General, will you explain this, that if your radar
was alert, what good it would have done if your pursuit planes were
not ready to take off during the time when the radar was in operation ?
General Short. If the information had gone to them when it was
first picked up, they would have had 35 minutes, which would have
been plenty of time to disperse the planes.
It would not have been time to get them in the air, but we would
have had time to disperse the planes and the loss would have been
much less.
Mr. Kaufman. General, I am not now talking only about the 7th
of December ; I am talking about the period between November 27 and
December 7.
General Short. I am saying at any time that the radar picked it up,
and I would have been notified, I would have had 30 minutes and the
same would have been true. "VVe could have dispersed the planes.
\8086] Mr. Kaufman. Only 30 minutes?
General Short. 80 or 35 minutes.
Mr. Kaufman. Now, j-ou know that the radar equipment is not com-
plete without the pursuit planes having the ability to take off.
General Short. That has nothing to do with radar equipment.
The interceptor command would not be functioning completely
without that, that is true.
[8087] Mr. Kaufman. So your interceptor command was not
working between K'ovember 27 and the 7tli of December ?
General Short. It was working, but not prepared to take the
air immediately.
Mr. Kaufman. Did you do anything between November 27 and
December 7 to inform yourself precisely as to what Admiral Kimmel
was doing?
General Short. I talked with Admiral Kimmel on 3 days when
we were talking about a more dangerous part of the Pacific, as we
regarded it, than Honolulu, and I knew where his task forces were
going out; I knew certain reconnaissances he was making on the
perimeter, and as I said, he had made the statement to me that he
had tightened up all along the line.
Mr. Kaufman. You knew he had to rely on you for long-range
planes ?
General Short. No ; I did not.
Mr. IL4UFMAN. You did not?
General Short. I had 6 planes and he had approximately 50. I
knew if he wanted my planes for long-range reconnaissance that he
would have asked for them, and I would give them to him, but I did
not know that he relied on that 6 rather than his 50.
Mr. Kaufman. Now, did anything happen between the 27th
[8088] of November and the 7tli of December to require you to
change your estimate?
General Short. Nothing. In fact, the things thai; happened tended
to confirm my estimate.
2996 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Kauf]man. Now, on the 27th of November, after the receipt of
this message from the chief of staff, you got a message from General
Miles, did you not ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. Page 10 of Exhibit 32.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. That was a definite statement, was it not, that
negotiations had come to a practical stalemate?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. And it was a definite statement to you that hos-
tilities may ensue?
General Short. May ensue ; yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. After giving vou the information, then, he talks
about "subversive activities may be expected."
General Short. Yes, sir. I might add that that apparently was
the form of hostilities that he expected me to be interested in there.
That would be the inference.
Mr. Kaufman. Your inference was that the hostilities that he said
might ensue pointed onl}' to subversive activities ?
General Short. Pointed to subversive activities. If [8089]
he wanted to point out anything else that would have taken place I
would expect him to say so.
Mr. Kaufman. Did not he say two things : ''Hostilities may ensue,"
and "Subversive activities may be expected"?
General Short. Subversive activities are a form of hostilities. It
is the form of hostilities apparently that he was worried about there.
Mr. Kaufman. That was your interpretation?
General Sn ut. That was my interpretation.
Mr. Kaufman. Now, did you have in mind, on November 27 and
following that date, the Navy reply that all shipping was to be routed
through the Torres Straits?
General Short. I think that ships were turned to the south. I do
not think that I knew exactly Torres Strait, but I knew they were
going to the south from Honolulu.
Mr. Kaufman. And did you have in mind the fact that those ships
were being escorted by naval ships of Admiral KimmePs fleet?
General Short. I think I knew that there were some escorts; yes.
Mr. Kaufman. Did you have in mind that on November 26 you were
ordered to equip two 13-24 bombers for photographic reconnaissance
through Truk and the Jaluit Islands ?
General Short. Yes, sir ; and I remember very definitely [8090]
that they sent them unarmed to Honolulu and directed me to arm
them after they got there.
Mr. Kafman. That was an unusual mission for you ?
General Short. It was.
Mr. Kaufman. Although you had that in mind, you did not connect
it with any of the telegrams you received ?
General Short. I figured if they would send them to Honolulu
unarmed and they directed them to be armed from there on, that they
would not consider that Honolulu was in the same dangerous area as
the Pacific to the west.
Mr. Kaufman. When were jou first advised, General, that the
Japanese consuls in Hawaii were burning their papers?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2997
General Short. I did not remember the incident until the day after
the attack, but in view of the testimony of two members of my staff
I probably did hear that they were burning papers on Saturday morn-
ing. It seems that at the staff meeting an assistant G-2 did report
that they had been burning papers. However, my G-2, in his testi-
mony before the Roberts Commission, stated that he thought nothing
of it, because we habitually burned papers every day to keep anything
from being left around about our codes, and he said he reported it
to me. It probably made the same impression on me that it had made
on him. There was no question of codes in connection with it —
simply papers.
[8091] Mr. Kautman. Did you receive any information from
the Navy that they had been advised that the Japanese consular posts
at Hong Kong and Singapore, and other places, were ordered to
destroy their codes?
General Short. I did not.
^Ir. Kaufman. You received no such information from the Navv
at all?
(general Short. Xo, sir.
Mr. KAUTiiAX. Do you recall a telegram directing you on your
G-2 to communicate with Commander Rochefort respecting the so-
called winds code?
General Short. I never saw such a radiogram and never heard
anything about it until 2 or 3 j'ears afterward.
Mr. Kaufman*. And your G-2 did not rep(jrt that incident to you?
General Short. He did not.
Mr. K.\uF>rAx. Do vou remember on the evening of December 5
Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell called on you and Colonel Fielder and
gave you a report on the tapping of the so-called Mori message?
General Short. It was not on the 5th, it was on the evening of
December 6, sometime along 6 : 30 or .7 o'clock in the evening.
Mr. Kattmax. And what did he report to you at that time?
[800.2] General Short. He brought a message, or, rather, a
translation of a telephone conversation that had been picked up by
the FBI. I read the message carefully, and Colonel Fielder read the
message carefully. I asked Bicknell if he had any idea as to the in-
terpretation of it, the meaning of it, and he said he had not, but that
he knew Mori, that he suspected Mori and for that reason he was
rather positive that it meant something.
But no one of us could figure out what it possibly meant, and I do
not believe anybody up to this day has been able to draw any definite
conclusion.
^Ir. Kaufman. Did not Colonel Bicknell tell you that he regarded
that as being very significant ?
General Short. But he could not tell me what the significance was.
He thought it was significant only because he did not have any con-
fidence in this Dr. Mori.
Mr. Kaufman. Did you tell Colonel Bicknell a few days after the
attack that he was right about the message and voti were wrong about
it f
( ieneral Short. I have seen that statement of his, but I do not re-
member it. If I said it I would have had only one point, that it had
to be significant, btit he was never, as far as" I know — and I talked
2998 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to him about it several times — able to indicate to me, or to anybody
else, what the significance [8093] of the message was.
Mr. Kaufman. General, on the morning of December 7, who first
reported the attack to you ?
General Short. I heard the first bomb and thought it was perhaps a
naval exercise that I had forgotten about. Then when the second one
dropped I ran out on an upstairs porch of my quarters where I could
see Pearl Harbor and I could see some smoke. About that time my
chief of staff, who lived next door, ran in to my quarters and called to
me that it was the real thing, that he just had a phone message from
Hickam and Weaver Field. That was anywhere from 1 minute to 3
minutes after 8 o'clock.
The Chairman. After what?
General Short. After 8 o'clock.
Mr. Kaufman. On that morning you had 32 antiaircraft batteries
stationed around Pearl Harbor?
General Short. I have forgotten the exact number.
Mr. Kaufman. Is it a fact that only 4 of the 32 antiaircraft batter-
ies got into action prior to the time of the third attack?
General Short. That is not true.
Mr. Murphy. Section VIII, page 11.
Mr. Kaufman. General, have you seen Section VII of exhibit 5 of
this proceeding, being reports made from your [8094-] head-
quarters, showing that 4 of the 32 anti-aircraft batteries fired at any
time during the three attacks ?
General Short. That is not signed. I do not know who made it.
But I have here an exhibit, exhibit No. 7 signed by C. K. Wing, Colonel,
Fifty-third Coast Artillery Brigade, who commanded all of the anti-
aircraft batteries. He gives in detail when the battery was alerted,
when it was ready to fire, when it opened fire, and when it brought down
any enemy planes.
Mr. Kaufman. Have ^^^ou a copy of that?
General Short. It is in exibit 133. I believe it is 1-s or 1-t, if you
look into the table of contents. It is in the Wing report.
Mr. Kaufman. In the record submitted to you in the Roberts com-
mission ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. It has been marked in evidence here this morning ?
General Short. Yes, sir. It was made out December 20, and gives
great detail, and I think Colonel Wing is in a better position to give
that information than anybody else, because it was his immediate
command.
Mr. Kaufman. And you say that the paper that I have just referred
you to, being section VII of exhibit 5 of this [8095] hearing, is
not true ?
General Short. I have not looked it over in detail, but if it states
that only four batteries fired is not correct. This, I am sure, is the
most accurate statement that is to be found of what took place, the
one I have in my hand. It is annex S.
Mr. Kaufman. General, does that set out your staff as it existed
between November 27 and December 7 ?
Senator Lucas. Counsel, before you leave that last point, I wonder
if we are going to put that into the record and make it a part of the
transcript ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2999
Mr. Kaufman. It is in the record as an exhibit, sir.
General Short. I have a signed copy here, if you wish to put it in
the transcript, sir.
Senator Lucas. I would like to have it.
General, just give me briefly, without reading it, what the document
says, in view of the question asked by counsel.
General Short. I will just take up a few batteries. Here is the way
it gives it : At Fort Weaver, headquarters. Second Battalion, Ninety-
seventh Coast Artillery, Antiaircraft, alerted 8 : 10, ready to Are 8 : 13,
engaged enem^'' at 8 : 14. Ammunition fired : .30 caliber ball 407
rounds; .30 caliber armor piercing, 117; .30 caliber tracer, 53;
pistol, 12.
Now it goes through every battery.
[8096] Senator Lucas. How many batteries were there fired?
General Short. I am not sure. The 32 is probabh'- correct. I can
count them here. I am not sure without counting them up.
Senator Lucas. I think it is important, in view of the previous
statement that only four were in operation. It seems to me the com-
mittee at this time ought to know how many actually were fired at
that time.
Mr. Kaufman. Well, now, let us take the statement. General, that
you give us here.
General Short. All right, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. The Second Battalion, according to your report, was
alerted at 8 : 10, was ready to fire at 8 : 15.
General Short. 8 : 13, 1 think it is.
Mr. Kaufman. That is one battery ?
General Short. That is four batteries.
Mr. Kaufman. Four batteries. Battery G of the Ninety-seventh
was alerted at 8 : 10 ?
General Short. Keady to fire at 8 : 30, and engaged the enemy at
8:30.
Mr. Kaufman. That was one battery?
General Short. That was one battery.
Mr. Kaufman. Battery F of the Ninety-seventh was alerted at 7 : 55
and was ready to fire at 8 : 55, an hour later, is that correct ?
[8097] General Short. Apparently that is right.
Mr. Kaufman. And that is one battery. Battery G of the Sixty-
fourth was alerted at 8 : 15 and was ready to fire at 10 : 30.
General Short. They had to move, apparently, to some distance.
Mr. Kaufman. They were ready to fire at 10 : 30, according to this
report.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. And Battery H of the Sixty-fourth was alerted at
8 : 30 and was ready to fire at 11 : 45. That was after the third attack,
was it ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. Well, the preceding one was after the third attack?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. The marine detachment
General Short. You say the marine detachment?
Mr. Kaufman. Yes. The marine detachment was alerted at 8
o'clock and ready to fire at 8 : 10.
3000 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, was that an Ami}' responsibility, the
marines ?
General Short. They worked under the Army.
Mr. Kaufmax. The general says they worked under the Army.
Mr. Murphy. They are not on this exhibit, then, are they, [8098]
the Army exhibit? *We have only the Sixty-fourth, the Ninety-sev-
enth, Ninety-eighth, and Two Hundred and Fifty-first and the AA
batteries.
]Mr. Kaufman. That is right.
Mr. ]Murphy. The marines are under the Navy ordinarily.
Mr. Kaufman. Probably, according to the general, they were under
his jurisdiction at that time.
General Short. The antiaircraft fire was coordinated so that the
Marine Corps guns on shore operated under our conmiand.
Mr. Kaufman. Then we have the Ninety-eighth Coast Artillery at
Schofield that was alerted at 8 o'clock and was ready to fire at 8 : 55.
Mr. Murphy. What battery would that be ?
Mr. Kaufman. They were alerted at 8 o'clock and ready to fire with
their automobile rifles — I assume that means automatic rifles, does it
not?
General Short. I haven't got just where you mean. It probably
does. Where do you mean ?
]Mr, Kaufman.' The Ninety-eighth Coast Artillery, Schofield Bar-
racks.
General Short. Yes. Certain of them were equipped with auto-
matic rifles.
Mr. Kaufman. Then the First Battalion of the Ninety-eighth Coast
Artillery, Battery B, was ready to fire at 9:55. That [8099]
was after the second attack?
General Short. Yes. sir. "
Mr. Kauf:man. And Battery D of the First Battalion, Ninety-
eighth Coast Artiller}' , was ready to fire at 10 o'clock.
General Short, That is correct.
Mr. KLvuF^iAN. And Battery C was not ready to fire until 10 : 30.
On the next page, Battery M of the Sixty-fourth was alerted at
8 : 15 and was ready to fire at 11 : 55. That was after the third attack?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. And the Second Battalion of the Ninety-eighth
Coast Artillery, Battery F, was not alerted at all but was in position
and ready for action at 1315, That is 1 : 15?
General Short. That is 1 : 15.
Mr. Kaufman. And Battery G at 1 : 15, and Battery H at 1 : 30.
And the First Battalion of the Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast
Artillery, Battery B
General Short. You are overlooking the fact that from their camp
there they did open fire at 8 : 04 and brought down a plane. They
were not at their assigned positions, but they entered into the combat.
All the units were alerted and they all fired and brought down planes.
[8100] Mr. Kaufman. That fire was with small arms, rifles?
General Short. It was with machine guns undoubtedly.
Mr. Kaufman. We are talking about anti-aircraft batteries.
General Short. Those are batteries of anti-aircraft guns.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3001
Mr. Kaufman. That would mean that the First Battalion of the
Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast Artillery was not ready to fire
until 11:45?
General Short. It had fired its guns and then moved on to assigned
positions.
Mr. Kaufman. It does not say that here, does it?
General Short. It says in the first paragraph that all units opened
fire at 8 : 05 and brought down planes. They were apparently all in
their positions.
Mr. Kaufman. All it says is that the units were alerted at 8 : 05
when fired upon by single enemy planes.
General Short. Better read the next sentence.
Mr. KxVUFMAN (reading).
AH units returned the fire with small arms and the plane was shot down.
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Kaufman. That makes no reference to the anti-aircraft bat-
teries.
General Short. 1 am sure it means with the automatic rifles and
machine guns.
Mr. Kauf^ian. With respect, however, to the batteries [SlOl]
of the First Battalion of the Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast
Artillery, none of those batteries were ready for firing until 11:45?
General Short. That is right, after they moved.
Mr. Kaufman. After the attack was over. What time was the third
attack over. General ?
General Short. Oh, there is a variation in estimates. Sometime
around 11 o'clock.
Mr. Murfhy. May I suggest that the tank farm was ready at 11
o'clock ?
Mr. Kaufman. What is that, sir?
Mr. JNIurpht. The tank farm at Schofield Barracks. The tank farm
is the only one before 11 : 45. That is at 11. You notice it is the
second to the last one. That would be Battery G of the Two Hun-
dred and Fifty-first.
Mr. Kaufman. Battery G ?
Mr. Murphy. It is Battery G of the Two Hundred and Fifty-first
Coast Artillery on this exhibit.
Mr. Kaufman. The tank farm ?
Mr. Murphy. Yes, tank farm, Schofield Barracks, 11a. m. That is
the only one before 11 : 45. I just wanted that corrected.
Mr. Kaufman. Now Battery A of the Ninety-seventh Coast Artil-
lery fired 130 rounds of .30 caliber at one enemy plane at 8 : 35. Was
that by machine gun or rifle or what ?
[8102] General Short, What is this you are reading from now?
Mr. Kaufman. The next paragraph after the second battery of the
Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast Artillery.
General Short. 1,500 rounds.
Mr, Kaufman. 1,500 rounds of ,30 caliber ?
General Short. Yes.
Mr, Kaufman. At one enemy plane off-shore at 8 : 35 ?
General Short. Yes.
Mr, Kaufman. Was that rifle or machine guns ?
79716 — 46— pt. 7 7
3002 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. That was undoubtedly machine guns. They would
not fire rifles at that distance.
Mr. Kaufman. Sand Island. The anti-aircraft detachment of Bat-
tery F, Fifty-fifth Coast Artillery, present at Sand Island when the
attack started, was ready for action at 8:15. The batterj- fired 89
rounds of 3-inch antiaircraft and shot down two enemy planes at 8 : 15.
Let us go back to the first item on this memorandum. Fort Weaver,
Headquarters Second Battalion, was that one battery or four batteries,
as you indicated ? Was it not only one ?
General Short. It may possibly have been only one. I read it the
Second Battalion, and it apparently was the headquarters of the Second
Battalion.
Mr. Kaufman. So that going through this list, as we have just gone
through the list, would j^ou state that it is [8103] accurate?
General Short. This, I think, is absolutely accurate.
Mr. Kaufman. Is it not accurate as stated in section VII of ex-
hibit 5?
General Short. I do not believe that it is.
Mr. Kaufman. That only four of the batteries were ready to fire
prior to the end of the attack ?
General Short. I am sure that that is not an accurate statement.
Mr. Kaufman. Now I counted them through here and I do not find
any morf; than four or five prior to the time of the completion of the
attack. General, I will try to check that after the hearing.
General Short. I think if you will check it carefully you will find
that there were more than that. More planes were brought down by
those outfits.
IMr. Kaufman. More than four out of the 32 batteries ?
General Short. I think so ; yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. How manj^ more would you say ?
General Short. I have not checked it carefully enough to be able
to tell.
Mr. INIuRPHY. IMr. Chairman, I request that the exhibit of the Gen-
eral be spread on the record at this point, and that immediately after-
ward we have spread section VII of exhibit [8104] 5 on the
record, that was prepared by the Army as the Army exhibit.
Mr. Kaufman. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. AVithout objection that will be done.
(The matter referred to follows:)
EIeadqxtabtebs 53bd Coast Artillery Bbigade (AA),
Office of the Brigade Commander,
Fort Shatter, T. H., 20 December 19^1.
Subject: Report on action by 53d C. A. Brigade (AA) from 0755 to 2400, 7
December 1941.
To : General Short.
1. At the beginning of the attack on Oahu 7 December 1941, the 53d Coast
ArtiUery Brigade ( AA) was operating under the conditions of Alert No. 1 S. O. P.,
H. C. A. C, 26 November 1941. The 97th C. A. and the AA Detachments of the
East Group had anti-sabotage guards at their fixed 3-inch gun batteries. All
anti-aircraft equipment was being guarded.
2. a. FORT WEAYER. Headquarters 2nd Battalion 97th C. A. (AA).
Alerted OSIO
Ready to tire 0813
Engaged enemy at 0814
Amm. fired
407— .30 Cal. ball.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3003
[8105]
117— .30 Cal. A. P.
58— .30 Cal. Tracer.
12— Pistol.
South Group Command Post detail at stations at 0810. NO repeat NO interrup-
tion in communications in South Group during this period. There was rifle and
automatic rifle fire on low flying enemy planes by ofii^ers and men.
BATTERY G 91th, were in camp at Fort Weaver. Its battle position is at
fixed battery at Fort Weaver.
Alerted at 0810
Ready to fire 0830
Engaged enemy 0S80
Fired 30 rds— 3" A. A. Shrapnel. Approximately 200 rds of .30 Cal. ball Amm.
One .50 Cal. Machine Gun was in action at approximately 8:50 A. M. During
this firing Private YORK gunner was wounded while engaging the enemy, he
stayed at his post although ordered to take cover. Lieutenant KING states that
the battery fire broke up and definitely turned back one formation of 15 enemy
planes. Casualties — One (1) Officer dead — Killed while proceeding through
Hickam Field to his battle position. Four (4) enlisted men wounded.
BATTERY F 97th, was camped at Fort Weaver. Its battle position at Fixed
Battery Closson, Fort Hamehameha, T. H.
Alerted 0755, and moved to Battery position across [810G] Pearl Harbor
Entrance.
Ready to fire 0855
Engaged Enemy 0900 to 0920
Amm. fired
27—3" A. A., H. E., M. K. fuse M3.
Approximately 400 rds. .30 Cal. ball.
Approximately 130 rds .30 Cal. A. P.
BATTERY G 64th, was in barracks at Fort Shaffer, battle position at Ahua
Point.
Alerted approximately 0815, and moved to battery position at Fort Kameha-
meha.
Ready to fire 1030
Engaged Enemy with .30 Cal. M. G. at 1030
Amm. Fired
Approximately 50 rds. of .30 Cal. ball.
BATTERY H 6.',th, was in barracks at Fort Shaffer. Its battle position is at
Fort Weaver.
Alerted 0830
Ready to fire 1145
Engaged Enemy 2100
Amm. fired
40 rds .50 Cal. ball.
40 rds .50 Cal. A. P.
30 rds .50 Cal. Tracer.
MARINE DETACHMENT: The Fleet Machine Gun School at Fort Weaver.
Operations were in cooperation with South [8107] Group although not
tacticallv assigned.
Alerted 0800
Ready to fire 0810
Engaged Enemy 0810
Amm. fired
Approximately 5000 rds. of .50 Cal. A. P. ball and tracer.
Approximately 450 rds. of 20 mm A. A.
This Detachment shot down 4 enemy planes and saved a 4-engined bomber by
causing enemy plane firing on its tail to pull out and cease its attack. Much
shrapnel and some small arms bullets fell about Fleet M. G. School. There was
excellent cooperation from Fort Weaver personnel in the liaison, phone, etc.
&. 9Sth COAST ARTILLERY, SC EOF I ELD BARRACKS.
Alerted at 0800
The communications section at the Command Post, Wahiawa, shot down one
enemy plane flying at less than 100 feet, with their automatic rifles at 0855.
3004 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1st Battalion 98th C. A. (AA), was in position and ready for action at the
fiollowing time :
B-CS 0955
D-9S 10(^0
C-98 1080
[8108] BATTERY M 6-'fth, stationed at Fort Shafter, was alerted at 0815,
moved to Wlieelir Field, and was ready for action at 1155.
2nd Battalion 98th C. A. (AA). — This Battalion has two batteries at Kaneohe
and one at Waipahu School. They were in position and ready for action at the
following times:
F-98 1315
G-98 1315
H-9S 1330
c. CAMP MALAKOLE 251st C. A. (AA).— All units were alerted at 0805 when
fired upon by a single enemy plane. All units returned the fire with small arms
and the plane was shot down.
1st BATTALION 251st C. A. (AA) , was in position and ready for action as
follows :
B-251 at West Loch 1145
C-251 Ewa Beach 1145
D-251 South of Ewa 1145
2nd BATTALION 251st C. A. (AA), was in position as follows :
E-251 Navy Yard
F-251 Navy Recreation Area
G-251 Tank Farm
H-251 Navy Yard
[8109] At 1120 and again at 1122, E, 251st fired on enemy planes, shooting
down one plane. 100 rds. of .50 Cal. were fired on the first plane and 200 rds. of
.50 Cal. were fired on the second plane.
d. FORT KANEHAMEHA.— Buttery A, 97th C. A. (AA) fired 1500 rds. of .30
Cal. at one enemv plane offshore at 0835.
e. SAND ISLAND.— The AA Detachment of Battery F, 55th C. A., present at
Sand Island when the attack started was ready for action at 0815. This battery
fired 89 rds of 3" AA and shot down two (2) enemy planes at 0815.
f. FORT SHAFTER.
(1) Three (3) enemy dive bombers were fired on by the Headquarters Battery
and the Intelligence Battery of this Brigade and by Battery E, 64th C. A. (AA).
Ammunition Expended— 3000— .30 Cal.
(2) Enemy planes were fired on at 0700 and 1000 by Battery A, 64th C. A.
(AA). Ammunition Expended lOoO — .30 Cal.
(3) All 3" gun batteries and Automatic Weapons Batteries of the 64th C. A.
(AA) were alerted at 0815 and were in position as follows :
B-64 at Aiea 1000
C-64 at Aliamanu 1030
D-64 south of Aliamanu 1100
[8110] F-64 at Pearl City 1105
G-64 See Par. 2 a. above
H-64 See Par. 2 «. above.
1-64 at Aliamanu
K-64 at Hickam Field.
L-64 at Hickam Field
M-64 See Par. 2 b. above.
All of these units except M, 64th fired during the second attack from 1000 to
1145. Ammunition expended as follows :
3", 23 rds.
.50 Cal., 2361 rds.
.30 Cal., 2821 rds.
g. FORT BARRETTE.— Battery H, 97th C. A. (AA), was stationed at P'ort
Weaver. The battery was alerted at 0755, moved out of Fort Weaver at 0830,
and arrived at Fort Barrette at 0910. Enemy planes were engaged by small
arms fire at Fort Weaver, while enroute, and at Fort Barrette. The detachment
on guard at Fort Barrette shot down one enemy plane at 0910 by small arms fire.
3. Three (3) Marine AA Batteries were attached to the Brigade at 2245.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3005
4. AMMUNITION.
Status at 0730, 7 December 1941. All units of the [8111] Brigade had
in their possession, the initial issue of small arms ammunition. This included
ammunition for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles and machine guns. In addition,
the 3-inch ammunition was so positioned that it was readily accessible to all
units of the Brigade except four (4) batteries for which ammunition was at
Aliamanu Crater. These batteries completed drawing their initial allowance,
1200 rounds per battery, by 1015.
(Sgd) C. E. Wing
C. E. Wing,
Colonel, 53d C. A. Brigade (AA),
Commanding.
18112] AonoN AND DisposmoN of 53bd CA Brigade (Anttaircraft)
ON 7 Decembeb 1941
64th CA (AA) Regiment
All 3-inch gun batteries and automatic weapons batteries of the 64th CA (AA)
were alerted at Fort Shaf ter at 8 : 15 a. m. and were in position as follows :
Battery
"A" (Searchlight) at Honolulu 10:00 a.m.
"B" (3-inch) at Aiea 10:00 a.m.
"C" (3-inch) at Aliamanu 10:30 a.m.
"D" (3-inch) south of Aliamanu 11 : CO a. m.
"E" (Searchlight) at Ewa-Pearl Harbor Time not known
"F" (3-inch) at Pearl City 11 : 05 a. m.
"G" (3-inch) at Ahua Point 10:30 a.m.
"H" (3-inch) at Ft. Weaver 11 : 45 a. m.
"I" (37 mm.) at Aliamanu 1 Known only that bat-
"K" (37 mm.) at Hickam Field --« bX^'lHs
"L" (37 mm.) at Hickam Field J ^^^^ '^"^^® ^^ • *^
"M" (37 mm.) at Wheeler Field 11 : 55 a. m.
97th CA (AA) Regiment
Batteries of the 97th CA ( AA) , except Battery "A" at Fort Kamehameha, were
stationed at Ft. Weaver. They were alerted between 7 : 55 and 8 : 10 a. m. and
were in position ready to fire as follows :
[8113] Battery
"A" (Searchlight) at Ft. Kamehameha 8:34 a. m. (Engaged
enemy with small
arms at 8:34 a. m.)
"F" (3-inch) at Ft. Kamehameha 8:55 a. m. (Engaged
enemy at 9 : 00 a. m.)
"G" (3-inch) at Ft. Weaver 8:30 a. m. (Engaged
enemy at 8: 30 a. m.)
"H" (3-inch) at Ft. Barrett 10:20 a.m.
"B", "C", "D", "E" and 3rd Bn not yet organized.
98th CA (A A) Regiment
Batteries of the 9Sth CA (AA) Regiment were stationed at Schofield Barracks
with the exception of Battery "D" which was stationed at Camp Malakole. They
were in position ready to fire as follows :
Battery
"A" (Searchlight) at Schofield Barracks Time not known
"B" (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks 9: 55 a. m.
"C" (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks 10:30 a. m.
"D" (3-inch) at Puuloa Dump, South of Ewa 11 : 45 a. m.
"E" not yet organized.
"F" and "G" (3-inch) at Kaneohe Naval Air
Station 1 : 15 p. m.
"H" (3-inch) at Waiphu High School 1 : 30 p. m.
3rd Bq 98th CA (AA) not yet organized.
3006 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
181141 251 CA (AA) Regiment (less 3rd Bn)
All units of tlie 251st at Camp Malakole were alerted at 8: 05 a. m. Batteries
of the 1st Battalion were in position and ready for action as follows :
Battery
"A" (Searchlight) at Ewa Time not known
"B" (3-inch) at West Loch 11 : 45 a. m.
"C" (3-inch) at Ewa Beach 11:45 a.m.
"D" (3-inch) at South of Ewa 11:45 a.m.
"E" (50 cal.) at Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor 12 : 41 p. m.
"F" (37 mm.) at Navy Recreation Area 12: SO p. m.
"G" (37 mm.) at Tank Farm, Schofield Barracks 11 : 05 a. m.
"H" (37 mm.) at Navy Yard 12: 05 p. m.
AA Bet Battery "F" 55th CA
This detachment was at Sand Island when the attack started and engaged
the enemy with 3-inch guns at 8 : 15 a. m., shooting down two enemy planes at
that time.
{8115~\ Mr. Kaufman. I have no further questions, Mr. Chair-
man.
General Short. You asked a question about this [indicating].
Mr. Kaufman. Yes ; I want to finish that.
With the permission of the chairman, may I suggest that this be
made an exhibit? I would like to ascertain something about that
chart. Does that state your staff of officers and is it correct ?
General Short. I think that chart is correct.
Mr. Kaufman. May we have that marked as an exhibit?
The Chairman. You want that made an exhibit?
Mr. Kaufman. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. What number will it be ?
Mr. Kaufman. IMay we have it spread in the record at this point
instead of having it marked as an exhibit?
Tlie Chairman. That will be done.
(The chart referred to faces this page.)
[8117'\ Mr. Kaufman. I also offer in evidence at this time two
reports made to General Short. It has been distributed to the members
of the committee today.
The Chairman. Do you want that made a part of the testimony?
Mr. Kaufman. No, sir. Just as an exhibit. That will be exhibit
139.
The Chairiman. That will be done.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 139.")
The Chairman. Are you through ?
Mr, Kaufman. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. General Short, I wish to ask you a few questions.
You were commander of the Army in Hawaii prior to the arrival of
Admiral Kimmel to take charge of the fleet?
General Short. No, sir; he took charge of the fleet, I think, a week
before I arrived.
The Chairman. You followed him ?
General Short. By about a week.
The Chairman. In command of the Army forces?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And you were assigTied there during the whole time
up to the attack?
\8118'] General Short. That is correct.
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79716 O — 46 — pt. 7 (Face p. 3006 1
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3007
The Chairman. Did your duties require you to remain on the island
constantly ?
General Short. I was never out of the Hawaiian group. I made
visits of inspection on the outlying islands.
The Chairman. You were going from place to place within the
territory under your jurisdiction ?
General Short. That is correct.
The Chairman. During the entire time ?
General Short. That is correct.
The Chairman. What proportion — I am asking you this question
because I was unavoidably absent when Admiral Kimmel's testimony
was concluded, and did not get an opportunity to ask him any ques-
tions at all — what proportion of the time you were at Pearl Harbor —
Pearl Harbor was your headquarters ?
General Short. Fort Shafter.
The Chairman. Fort Shafter ; on the island of Oahu ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. How much of the time during your presence at
Fort Shafter, or on the island of Oahu, was Admiral Kimmel in the
harbor at his headquarters?
General Short. I think he was in almost constantly. He was un-
doubtedly out at sea for a few days at a time, [81191 but I do
not remember specifically. I think the greater part of his time he
was in his headquarters.
The Chairman. He spent most of his time there on the island, at
Pearl Harbor?
General Short. I think so.
The Chairman. And was only out at sea when his flagship went
out?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Was there any time during that nearly a year from
the time you took over in the Army and Admiral Kimmel took over
in the Navy, when Pearl Harbor was completely empty of naval
vessels ?
General Short. I do not know, sir. Naturally you could see the
vessels in Pearl Harbor every time you drove along the road, but I
could not say definitely.
The Chairman. During this year, from February on up until the
7th of December, you and Admiral Kimmel conversed in a general way
about the situation ?
General Short. We talked about the situation, I think from every
angle, more or less. We talked many, many times about it.
The Chairman. How many times w^ould you say a week during
that year ?
General Short. I probably saw him officially at least [81201
once a week, and I usually played golf with him every other Sunday,
and we talked of all kinds of things around the course at that time.
[81211 The Chairman. You talked over the international situa-
tion on the fairway ?
General Spiort. Over everything, in effect ; yes, sir.
The CiiAiRjNiAN. - Now, as time went on toward the 7th of December,
did he and yo'u both recognize that the situation was becoming more
tense ?
300S CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. I think fiom July 25 on, when the sanctions were
put into effect, that we both felt it was tense, from then on.
The Chairman. You didn't have to have any message from Wash-
ington in order to know that ?
General Short. No. We read the papers.
The Chairman. Yes. And you got general information from Wash-
ington, sizing up the situation as did the admiral?
General Short. Not very often. The number of messages were very
limited, but we did get them.
The Chairman. Did you get letters as well as cablegrams?
General Short. I didn't get letters on the international situation. I
got letters from General Marshall, but usually pertaining to measures
that were being taken to strengthen our defenses.
The Chairman. There is voluminous correspondence between Ad-
miral Stark and Admiral Kimmel. It fills a [8122] volume as
thick as Blackstone's Commentary. Did you have any such corre-
spondence as that ?
General Short. The correspondence between General Marshall and
me, I think, is all in this exliibit here, exhibit No. 53.
The Chairman. When does that start ?
General Short. That correspondence started on, the first letter was
written by General Marshall on the Tth of February, and the last letter
written by him was on October 28.
The Chairman. Now, was there any touchiness between Admiral
Kimmel and you
General Short. We were extremely friendly.
The Chairman. Let me finish the question before you answer, please.
General Short. I am sorry.
The Chairman. Was there any feeling of touchiness between Ad-
miral Kimmel and you that might have ])revented either of you from
making a too detailed inquirj^ into what the other was doing, lest he
be offended ?
General Short. I don't think there Avas at all. I think that maybe
either one of us wouldn't have wanted the other prying into business
he thought didn't concern him in any way, but our relations were ex-
tremely friendly. [S12-3] I think I could have asked Admiral
Kimmel anything that really concerned me and
The Chairman. Well, of course, the national defense concerned
both of you, did it not ?
General Short. Oh, yes; no question about it.
The Chairman. Concerned you both.
General Short. Yes.
The Chairman. And as the situation grew worse, presumably would
concern both of you more and therefore any inquiry from either as to
what the other was doing would not necessarily be prpng into his busi-
ness, would it ?
General Short. I was thinking, Senator, more in the way of asking
him as to details, how they performed certain things, that he might
possibly have figured wasn't my business.
The Chairman. In his testimony before the Grunert committee, I
believe it was. Admiral Kimmel made the statement, or testified in
effect that he hesitated sometimes to ask you in too much, detail for
fear he might be regarded as trying to pry, although I don't think he
used that lansruase.
PEOCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3009
General Short. I think he probably meant the same thing that I am
trying to say, that if I would have asked him how often he opened the
hatches, for instance, of [81£4] his ships and made an inspec-
tion, he would have thought that it was not any business of mine.
The Chairman. But as to how many ships he might have in the
harbor
General Short. Yes ; I think anything of that kind there would be
no question about it.
The Chairman. Why was it necessary to allude to that subject in
the former investigation ?
General Short. Well, I don't know. If you will remember, in Gen-
eral Marshall's first letter to me, he talked considerably about Ad-
miral Kimmel, the type of man he was. He wanted to be sure, appar-
ently, that I did get an understanding to begin with, and get off, so to
speak, on the right foot.
The Chairman. Yes.
General Short. And I think I took that into consideration.
The Chairman. He sort of warned you against the Admiral's blunt-
ness?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And he wanted you to take note of that in making
the proper approach?
General Short. Yes, sir ; and I think I tried to carry that out ; and
I think our terms were excellent.
[81£o] The Chairman. Did you have any such characteristics as
might have embarrassed the admiral in approaching you ?
General Short. Well, I might have, but he wasn't told about it.
The Chairman. He wasn't warned against you ?
General Short. I don't believe he was.
The Chairman. I note in your statement that you have followed the
pattern rather closely, in a sense, adopted by Admiral Kimmel in his
statement, that if he had had all of the information that was available
in Washington, he might have acted differently; you take the same
position, that if you had had all of the information that was in Wash-
ington, you might have acted differently?
General Short. I am sure that we have taken that position abso-
lutely independently, because, if you will take my statement, the state-
ment I made before the Roberts commission, the first 50 pages I dic-
tated, I had never talked with Admiral Kimmel during that period,
and you will find the same claims that you will find in my statement
here.
The Chairman. Did you and Admiral Kimmel consult or confer
about this hearing?
General Short. Oh, I have talked to him frequently about this, but
at the time of the Roberts hearing we " [S12G] were both so
busy — I think I had 3 days, and spent most of the nights preparing
that large volume that I have turned in to you, so you can see I had
very little time to consult with anybody.
The Chairman. Is it customary, or is it required, or is it military
or naval practice that the commanders in the field shall be given copies
of diplomatic messages sent back and forth between their Govern-
ments and other governments?
General Short. I wouldn't say that it was, but they at least, if it is
anything that is going to affect them, it seems to me they would always
3010 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
be ^iven the substance, even if they ^vere not told where it came from.
The Chairman. Have you read all of the intercepts that Admiral
Kimmel recited in his statement that he thinks he should have been
entitled to see?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Outside of the message carving up Pearl Harbor
into the five divisions in which ships were located, is there anything
in any of those messages which pointed to an attack upon Pearl
Harbor any more than upon any other place?
General'SnoRT. That was the piost definite thing, and then the fact
that the delivery of the message was at 1 [81£7] p. m., Wash-
ington time, which would be shortly after dawn in Honolulu, which I
think was an indication
The Chairman. Well, you couldn't have gotten that one any sooner
than you got it, could you ?
General Short. Yes ; we could have gotten that, we could have got-
ten it — they had it all decoded in the War Department between 8 : 30
and 9 o'clock in the morning.
The Chairman. That was decoded in the Navy Department?
General Short. Yes, sir ; but it was received in the War Department
between 8 : 30 and 9 a. m.
The Chairman. General Marshall testified as to the time when he
received it.
General Short. That is correct, but General Miles and Colonel
Bratton had it in their possession from at least 9 o'clock to 11 : 25 a. m.,
and did nothing.
The Chairman. Well, General Miles testified as to what he did, and
Colonel Bratton will, I suppose.
At any rate, there were none of these messages that are complained
of because of their nondelivery in Hawaii, these intercepts, that gave
any indication of an attack on Pearl Harbor, except the one dividing
up Pearl Harbor ?
General Short. No.
The Chairman. They all indicated, most of them, an [81£S]
attack somewhere.
General Short. Yes, sir .
The Chairman. But I am talking about Pearl Harbor.
General Short. I think those two things are the really definite
things that pointed to Pearl Harbor.
The Chairman. And the other intercepts related to the more tense
situation as it developed?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. But did not give indication as to where or when
any attack would be made.
General Short. Well, I think you could get an indication possibly
of when. You knew when they set deadlines that somthing was
going to happen.
The Chairman. That was a conclusion that might have been drawn,
that when they set a deadline of the 25th and then moved it up to the
29th, you could draw the conclusion that something was going to
happen ?
General Short. Anybody who was familiar with the weather con-
ditions in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands and happened to think
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3011
along that line, I think would have drawn a direct conclusion, because
about that time of the year the weather gets very bad out in the Aleu-
tian Islands. I happen to have spent 2 years in Alaska, and know
that. And to a Navy man that might well mean that the condition
[8129] was getting to the point where the fueling of ships at sea
would be hazardous.
The Chairman. The weather in Alaska wouldn't necessarily in-
dicate whether the Japanese were going to make an air attack or
whether they would make it at Hawaii or the Panama Canal or Puget
Sound.
General Short. It would only indicate the difficulty of proceeding
by that northern route.
The Chairman. In other words, if anybody familiar with the
weather in Alaska had sat down to speculate on it, he would have
speculated they wouldn't send the six ships through that route ?
General Short. Not later than that. It was getting about the limit
on where it would be bad after that.
The Chairman. But even that speculation wouldn't have told you
anything if they were coming to Pearl Harbor?
General Short. If they went by the northern route, they would be
probably going to either Seattle or Hawaii.
The Chairman. Now, this message that the Navy Department sent
to Admiral Kimmel on the 24th was shown to you ?
General Short, Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Of course, while it was shown to you for informa-
tion, it was also shown to you for your guidance ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
[8130] The Chairman. Under the mutual arrangement that you
were supposed to have out there either one of you who got an important
message or a directive from Washington was supposed to show it to
the other ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. To keep one another advised ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairmax. And you got this message of the 24th of November,
which has been read time and time again into the record, but which
states :
Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations witli Japan very doubtful. This
situation coupled with the statements of Japanese Government and movements
their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive
movement in any direction including attack on Pliilippines or Guam is possibility.
Chief of Staff lias seen this dispatch concurs and requests action. Addressees to
inform senior army officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to
complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action.
and so forth.
Now, this is a message saying that an aggressive attack may be ex-
pected in any direction, including tw^o places ; it doesn't exclude any
other place, does it ?
[8131] General Short. No, sir.
The Chairman. It empliasizes
General Short. It emphasizes those two places, and when some
other place is equally important, I feel that if they intended to in-
clude the other place they would mention it.
3012 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Chaiemax. "Wouldn't a careful interpretation of that message
mean that the Japanese ^yere calculated to make an agressive move-
ment in any direction, and that "any direction" means the Philip-
pines or Guam, as well as every other place, but that they emphasized
those two places?
General Short. I would say that it was possible in any direction,
but probable toward the Philippines and Guam because they were
singled out.
The Chairman. Well, that is a matter of interpretation.
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. The word "including" means, for instance, if I
want to sell some stock, I advertise I have a lot of stock for sale,
including a horse and a mule ; that wouldn't mean that all the rest that
I had for sale wouldn't be sold?
General Short, That is true ; but that would definitely emphasize
the horse and the mule.
[8132] The Chairman. Yes; I wouldn't want to overlook sell-
ing them.
General Short. No, sir.
The CiiAiRi^tAN. In this message of the 27th — which was shown to
you also, was it not ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chair^ian. And for the same purpose ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. It was a little stronger :
This is to be considered as a war warning.
General Short. There is one very significant thing there, though.
You notice that Guam was included in the probable attack, or possible
attack on the 24th, and in that message they talk about Guam only
in terms of sabotage.
The Chairman. Yes.
General Short. It would indicate that they were dwelling even
more on the Southwest Pacific.
Guam, which was very close to Japan, had been eliminated.
The Chairman. Let me ask you this. Everybody in Washington,
all the high officers in Washington — Navy, Armj^, Intelligence, War
Plans, General Staff — all saw these intercepted messages, but as to
which Admiral Kimmel [8133] complains and you complain
not having been transmitted to you ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. They all have testified that, notwithstanding those
messages, they did not really expect an attack at Pearl Harbor and
were surprised when it came.
Do you think that if you had gotten all of those, or if the admiral
had gotten them, or both of you together had gotten them, you would
have reached any different conclusion from that reached by every-
body in Washington?
General Short. I think there was a possibility because Pearl
Harbor meant a little more to us. We were a little closer to the
situation, and I believe we would have been inclined to look at that
Pearl Harbor information a little more closely.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3013
We might not have made the correct decision, but I believe there
was more chance that either we or someone on our staffs would have
had the idea.
The Chairman. You say that Pearl Harbor meant more to the
admiral and to you and that therefore you were more concerned
about it.
If that is true, why did you rely for the action you took upon
some definite instruction from Washington instead of exercising
greater judgment and discretion in doing what [,S134] you
could do with what you had ?
General Short. Because they were my only sources of informa-
tion. I had no source of information outside Hawaii, except the
War Department.
The Chairman. In other words, you mean to say that with your
general information and sizing up the situation during the whole
year that you would take no action that meant anything in the way
of preparation until you got meticulous detailed instructions from
Washington to do it?
General Short. I mean that I knew that the War Department had
many sources of information. They had military attaches. They
got reports from the State Department and the Commerce Depart-
ment.
They had a certain number of agents scattered around in the Far
East, If they were in a position to get information that I had no
access to at all, I had every reason to believe that their judgment
Avould be better than my just arriving at a conclusion from reading
the newspapers.
The Chairman. Well, we had military attaches and ambassadors
in Tokyo, but due to the secretiveness of the Japanese Government,
we didn't get much information.
General Short. That is true. I didn't know whether they were
getting much or getting little.
The Chairman. Yes.
[813S] Now, let me get down to the message that you got your-
self from General Marshall, which you call in your statement, the
**do-don't" message.
General Short. The Army Pearl Harbor Board was the one that
designated it that.
The Chairman. Do you mean by that description to rather ridicule
the message that Marshall sent to you-, by calling it the "do-don't"
message ?
General Short. The Army Pearl Harbor Board gave it that term,
because of conflicting ideas presented, because of the fact that prac-
tically everything they gave was qualified, except two things. It
was not my terminology. I adopted it. I adopted it from the-
Army Pearl Harbor Board.
The Chairman. It is not original with you, then?
General Short. No, sir.
The Chairman. Now, this message to you. No. 472
General Short. Yes, sir.
3014 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Chairman [reading] :
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes
witii only the barest possibilities that the Japanese might come back and offer
to continue.
That was the day followincr the delivery of the 10-poiiit note to
the Japanese Ambassador by Secretary Hull ?
[81S6] General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Which he delivered on the 26th ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman (reading) :
Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.
If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit
the first overt act.
That was our policy in all departments. All of you understood that
if war had to come that our own country desired that Japan precipi-
tate it instead of our country precipitating it; that is correct, isn't it?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. You understood that?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And that is what the Secretary of State, the Presi-
dent, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy, and all of
the high officers understood that if there had to be hostilities, we
didn't want to start them ; isn't that true ?
General Short. I very strongly got that impression from that
message.
The Chairman (reading) :
If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States [8^37] desires that
Japan commit the first overt act. This policy could not be construed as restrict-
ing you to a coui'se of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hos-
tile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other
measures
As might be necessary under the circumstances.
General Short. It made, however, a rather difficult situation. If
we discovered a carrier 800 or a thousand miles out at sea, it would
have been a very fine point whether under that we should attack.
The Chairman. Well, you didn't have to pass on that fine point,
because you were just in charge of the Army?
General Short. Yes, I might have had to furnish bombers to do
the bombing.
The Chairman. Yes.
General Short. Admiral Kimmel would be the one.
The Chairman. That was a naval decision.
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman (reading) :
Prior to hostile Japanese action —
This is not a request. It is not an intimation. It is a direction :
you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance —
[81S8] In general broad terms, that doesn't mean to look out
after sabotage, does it?
General Short. No, sir; but long distant reconnaissance, by the
agreement with the Navy, was definitely a Navy problem, and General
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3015
Marshall agreed that under that construction all I had to do was to
turn over my planes to the Navy if they were called for.
The Chaikman. When did he agree to that ?
General Short. I have the quotation. He was asked, I think, before
the Army Pearl Harbor Board.
The Chairman. He hadn't agreed to that before this took place ?
General Short. No, but he said that was his interpretation, the
same as it was mine.
The Chairman (reading) :
Undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary
but these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm civil population or
disclose intent. Report measures taken.
In reply to that message — then it goes on to say :
Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five.
And so forth.
[81S9] In reply to that message — which I believe was the next
day, was it?
General Short. No, sir ; it was the same day.
The Chairman. The same day ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. You cabled him that you had taken steps against
sabotage and had created liaison with the Navy ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Did you regard that reply as responsive to General
Marshall's dispatch?
General Short. I did. There was one very important part of that
message you didn't read.
The Chairman. I tried to read it all. What part did I omit?
General Short (reading) :
Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential
oflSeers.
The Chairman. Oh, jes. That was a direction for you not to spread
it around in the vicinity.
General Short. You couldn't possibly take up alert No. 2 or alert
No. 3 without telling all of the enlisted men what they were out there
for, who they were to shoot at.
The Chairman. You had Army practices from time to [Sl^O]
time that involved these alerts, did you not ?
General Short. But we didn't give them live ammunition and tell
them to shoot at a Jap plane, if one came over.
The Chairman. The population, hearing these guns firing, wouldn't
know whether they had live ammunition.
General Short. This limited information wouldn't have allowed
me to disclose that to an enlisted man — ^merely to "minimum essential
officers,"
The Chairman. If General Marshall knew, as you say he knew, that
you had no responsibility as far as reconnaissance was concerned, why
do you suppose he directed you to institute reconnaissance and take
every step you thought necessary to protect yourself ?
3016 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. Because he did not write that message. I would
like to read what he said in regard to tliat. This is a quotation from
General Marshall:
Distant reconnaissance. — was a naval function, and the Army Commander was
liable to furnisli them such of the planes suitable for that purpose that could be
provided.
That is one quotation. There is another quotation from before the
Arm}' Board.
[814^] The Chaikman. Well, now, if it is true that you could
understand this message and j-ou knew what it meant when it said for
you to institute reconnaissance
General Short. Yes.
The Chairman. The words are simple, there is no ambiguity about
it. If you knew and you knew he knew that all you could do about
that was to make your planes available to the Navy
General Short. That was exactly it.
The Chairman (continuing). Why didn't you in your reply to him
say either that you had made the planes available to the Navy or you
had not done so and why you had not done it, instead of just saying
that you had taken steps against sabotage ? Sabotage can be carried
on where there are no actual hostilities between two nations. That is
something that all the spies in Hawaii could indulge in, blowing up an
installation on the groimd or things of that sort without war being
actually declared.
Why in your reply to General Marshall did you limit this to sabotage
instead of saying something about reconnaissance, which is the only
specific thing he mentioned in his direction to you ?
General Short. I was directly obligated by the agreement with the
Navy to furnish these planes. It had been approved [S14^] by
the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations and it did not
seem to me that it was necessary to reiterate that because without
they told me that — there was also a provision in that agreement that
if the agreement were to be abrogated it would be in writing.
The Chairman. Was that a written agreement?
General Short. That was a written agreement signed by Admiral
Bloch and me, approved by General Marshall and by Admiral Stark
and it had a provision that any abrogation must be in writing.
The Chairman. I cannot understand then why if General Marshall
knew that you had no duty in regard to reconnaissance that he put
this in this instruction to you and that if you knew he knew that why
you did not call his attention to it in your reply to him so that he
would not be under any misapprehension?
General Short. Yes, I think I can possibly explain that. In the
first place, General Marshall was out of town when the message was
drawn. In the second place, this message was written basically for
General MacArthur in the Philippines and then adopted to the rest
of us, and in the Philippines they had no such agreement. The Army
was responsible for reconnaissance and they got together with the
Navy and agreed upon what sectors that each would cover.
187431 Mr. Murphy. Will the chairman yield ?
The Chairman. Would you regard it as the duty of a high com-
manding officer in the field — a man of your rank and you obtained that
rank after long, distinguished service, as the admirals in the Navy
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3017
do — if there was any possibility of misunderstanding a direct instruc-
tion given by the Chief of Statf or the Chief of Naval Operations to
the high-ranking commanding officer in the field, that it is the duty of
that ranking officer in the field to call that to the attention of the
originating officer and clarify it instead of just sitting around waiting
for further instructions?
It seems to me there ought to be some liaison between the two respec-
tive offices; if there is any misunderstanding or misapprehension or
any lack of comprehension that ought to be brought to the attention
of the other office so as to clarify it immediately. Now, it seems that
after you received this message on the 27th you made no further effort,
and so far as the naval end of it is concerned, they made no further
effort to ascertain just what it was that Washington had in mind when
they gave these instructions about reconnaissance and defensive de-
ployments and all that language that has been used here in this
hearing.
What have you to say about that ? That bothers me. General.
General Short. I believe that Admiral Kimmel felt full [8144]
responsibility for the reconnaissance; I think he realized that it was
his full duty.
The Chairman. Well, inasmuch as this message had come to you
about reconnaissance didn't it ever occur to you that you ouglit to
advise General Marshall that under the agreement the naval end of it
had assumed full responsibility for reconnaissance and that it was not
a part of jour responsibility, so that he would not be expecting you
to do it?
General Short. Frankly, I believed General Marshall would have
known it.
The Chairman. You believed he would have known it ?
General Short. I believed he would have known it because he per-
sonally approved that.
The Chairman. Well, if that is true this language in here, this
direct instruction to you to institute reconnaissance, was just idle
words, it didn't mean anything so far as he was concerned, you think ?
General Short. You will notice it says :
Such reconnaissance as you may deem necessary.
The Chairman. No ; that is not what it says :
You are to take such reconnaissance and other measures.
General Short. I think the "deem necessary" applies to all. I don't
think there is any question of it in reference to any part of it.
[8143] Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield at that point?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. I think I have something precisely in point. I would
like to read from page 380 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearing,
General Grunert to General Short :
In your message of November 27th you say "liaison with the Navy." Just
what did you mean by that? How did that cover anything required by that par-
ticular message?
Answer. To my mind it meant I was definitely keeping in touch with the
Navy, what information they had and what they were doing.
Question. Did it indicate in any way tliat you expected the Navy to carry out
its part of that agreement for long distance reconnaissance?
79716 — 46— pt. 7 8
3018 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Answer. Yes, without any question whetlier I liad sent that or not it would
have effected it because they signed a very definite agreement which was ap-
proved by the Navy as well as by our Chief of Staff.
The Chairman. "WTiat do you say about that answer to that ques-
tion?
General Short. Well, I want to finish the quotation that I started
to read from General Marshall because it was taken before the Army
Pearl Harbor Board also.
The Chairman. Yes, go ahead.
[1846] General Short. This is from the testimony of General
Marshall. This is the testimony on distance reconnaissance.
As I recall the matter, the only way the Army would have been involved
in the deep reconnaissance vv^ould have been in detaching units to serve under
the Navy.
General Russell. Well, is it your view that both having seen the message
of November 27, without more ado the Navy should have started their distant
reconnaissance?
General Marshall. That is right. That is my view.
In other words, I think he had the same view of the responsibility
that I had there.
The Chairman. Do you know why, General, and can you tell the
committee why it was that there was no reconnaissance on the 6th
of December, the clay before the attack ?
General Short. I believe, it is my impression that Admiral Kimmel
was making a considerable reconnaissance.
The Chairman. He said that there were some Navy planes flying
to the south.
Senator Lucas. No ; patrol planes.
The Chairman. I am not talking about patrol planes. I am talk-
ing about reconnaissance, long-distance reconnaissance.
General Short. I think all of his reconnaissance from Johnston
Island to Wake Island to Midway was very definitely distance-re-
connaissance. He was doing it on the perimeter in [1S47]
place of flying them oitt and back from Oahu. • He could accom-
plish more with the same number of planes.
The Chairman. He could accomplish more with the same number
of planes if he had had them at the right place at the right time.
General Short. Yes.
The Chairman. But he could not accomplish more with them down
to the south if the attack was coming down from the north. It
seems to me there was no reconnaissance from that direction.
General Short. It is apparent the Navy had not considered that
because you will recall Admiral Richardson stated before this com-
mittee that his reconnaissance extended from 10 degrees west of north
down to the south. He did not think his reconnaissance ever w^ent to
the east or north.
Mr. Mtjrphy. Will the Chairman yield ?
The Chairman. I am through. Congressman Cooper.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I suppose as usual we do not
want to detain General Short too long and we will quit at 4 o'clock
as we have been doing ?
The Chairman. Unless General Short is willing to go on further.
General Short. Just at the pleasure of the committee.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3019
The Chairman. Unless there is some reason for the members on
the House side wanting to quit at 4 there is no reason [SI4S]
that I know of why the Senators would want to quit in view of the
situation in the Senate.
The Vice Chairman. Well, while General Short is on the stand
we have suspended heretofore at 4 o'clock and I think we ought to
do that.
The Chairman. All right.
The Vice Chairman. Are you through ?
The Chairman. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. Pardon me. Do you have something further
you want to look at, General ?
General Short. That is all right.
The Vice Chairman. I would like to inquire of you to get some
additional information, if I may, please. You had served about 40
years in the Army, hadn't you?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. I believe you stated that you went in the mili-
tary service from the State of Illinois ?
General Short. Yes; that is correct.
The Vice Chairman. You did not attend the Military Academy
at West Point?
General Short. No, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And I understood you to say you were rec-
ommended by the president of the University of Illinois for a com-
mission.
[8I49] General Short. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. And commissioned in 1902 ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Now, at the time you were in command of
the Hawaiian Depa,rtment you were one of the senior officers of the
Army, weren't you ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. You at that time held the rank of Lieutenant
General ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. At that time there were very few holding
the rank of lieutenant general, weren't there?
General Short. I think there were nine, two of whom were air
officers. I am not sure.
The Vice Chairman. Certainly there were not near as many as
later developed during the war ?
General Short. No ; by no means.
The Vice Chairman. The rank of lieutenant general back at that
time was really pretty high in the Army, wasn't it ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Now, on December 7, 1941, General, you held
one of the most important commands in the Army, didn't you ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Our fortress at Hawaii was one of the
[81S0] greatest possessions for national defense that this country
had?
General Short. That is correct.
3020 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Vice Chairman. And it was your responsibility to protect
that?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Now, you received considerable information
in the form of correspondence between you and the Chief of Staff,
as you have indicated in the booklet that you have up there, during
the period that you were in command at Hawaii ?
General Short. A great deal of information on the defenses, and
so forth.
The Vice Chairman. Yes.
General Short. A very limited amount on the international situa-
tion.
The Vice Chairman. Well, you kept informed on the international
situation from every source that you could inform yourself, did you
not?
(xeneral Short. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. And it was a matter of rather general knowl-
edge that the situation was growing exceedingly tense between the
United States and Japan, wasn't it?
(reneral Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And the situation was growing more
[8 J 51] critical all the time. You knew that as you very frankly
stated here.
Crpnern] Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman, Did you consider that war between the United
States and Japan was inevitable?
General Short. I would not go that far. I think I would say that
1 considered it probable but I thought that Washington, from the
message I had, was making every possible effort to avoid war and to
avoid an international incident in Hawaii that they must, therefore,
still have some hopes of averting it.
The Vice Chairman. Well, that was your very clear and definite
impression of the efforts being exerted at Washington?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. But you also knew what Japan was doing,
too, didn't you. General ?
General Short. I knew that she was pressing down into China and
getting on toward the south and that sooner or later might cause a
conflict.
The Vice Chairman. And you knew that every indication pointed
to Japan's further conquests, didn't you?
Geneial Short. Without we were able through negotiations to arrive
at something that would stop them.
[8162] The Vice Chairman. But every move Japan was making
gave clear indications that she was bent on further conquest, didn't it 1
General Short, It looked that way.
The Vice Chairman. It looked that way and you understood that?
Genei-al Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman, Now, did you ever consider that Japan would
attack Pearl Harbor?
General Short. I frankly felt with the fleet — as large a fleet as we
had in the Hawaiian waters — that they would be able to either keep the
carriers up there from the vicinity of Hawaii or at least get the infor-
mation of their approach in time for us to be prepared for the attack.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3021
The Vice Chairman. I did not understand the last part.
General Short. I say if they were not able to intercept them that
they would at least get information in time to give us sufficient time
to prepare for the attack.
The Vice CiiAuaiAN. You thought the fleet would be able to do
that?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Now, it was true that the fleet had certain
units out at sea most of the time?
General Short. Always, I think.
[8153] The Vice Chairman. And certain task forces were op-
erating between Hawaii and other islands such as Midway and Wake
and Johnston and through that area?
General Short. Yes, sir. They also had forces stationed at those
islands and they had a certain amount of reconnaissance constantly
from those islands.
The Vice Chairman. So then you assumed that the Navy would
become aware if any hostile act became apparent and you would re-
ceive the information through the Navy?
General Short. I expected to ; yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. I believe on page 3 of your statement, General
and subsequent pages — ^you need not refer to it; I am just going to
ask a general question.
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. On page 3 and subsequent pages of your state-
ment you referred to certain requests made by you to the War Depart-
ment for additional equipment, material, and so forth.
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. But the fact that you were not furnished
everything you asked for did not relieve you of the duty and re-
sponsibility to use what you did have to the best advantage in the
defense of your department, did it ?
General Short. In no way.
[8154] The Vice Chairman. I believe General Marshall made
one statement here that I think you will agree with at least. He said
that no commander was ever quite satisfied with what he got.
General Shcrt. That is unquestionably right.
The Vice Chairman. They all ask for more than they are able to
get and he said it only indicates he was a good officer because he was
asking for more than he could get all the time.
Now, I believe on page 15 of your statement. General, under the
heading of "War Plan," among other things in that paragraph there
you say :
. That no part of this joint plan would take effect until the War Department
ordered M-day under the Rainbow plan.
Well, now, M-day was vrar with Japan, wasn't it ?
General Short. Not necessarily war with Japan but it would be
the mobilization toward the preparation for war with Japan.
_ The Vice Chairman. I see. Well, anyhow, M-day was mobiliza-
tion for war ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And you say that no part of the joint plan
had to be put into effect until the War Department ordered that on
M-day?
3022 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. Yes, sir.
[81SS] The Vice Chairman. Well, this did not prevent you from
using every possible means for a proper defense of your command, did
it?
General Short. Not if the situation I would say was just definitely
so that there was no time to communicate with Washington, but if
you take their policy I think they expected in all cases to indicate when
the plan was to go into effect, and also if you couple that with that
express desire not to create any international incidents, not to provoke
Japan, I think you naturally would hesitate very seriously as long as
there was time to communicate with Washington and the communica-
tions were open, to put anything into effect without first communi-
cating with them. That was my attitude.
The Vice Chairman. Well, naturally, that would generally be true,
but at the same time the responsibility rested upon you to defend your
Department ?
General Short. Yes, sir ; but likewise an equal responsibility rested
upon the War Department to provide me with all the information that
I needed.
The Vice Chairman. I am not arguing with you about the respon-
sibility of the War Department. I am just inquiring briefly about
your responsibility as a lieutenant general of the United States Army
in command of the most valuable post for the national defense of this
country.
[8156] General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Now, it was your duty
General Short. It was mine.
The Vice Chairman (continuing). To defend it?
General Short. But my estimate was bound to be made upon the
information I had.
The Vice Chairman. Yes ; but it was your duty to defend that post
that had been assigned to you ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Whether any M-day had arrived or whether
any instructions had been received from Washington or anywhere else
if the occasion arose, it was your duty to defend that command ?
General Short. And when the definite occasion did arise it never
occurred to me to communicate with Washington then.
The Vice Chairman. That is right.
General Short. Because the situation was definitely there. We
went into action immediately.
The Vice Chairman. Well, there wasn't any declaration of war at
the time it happened ?
General Short. No, sir.
The Vice Chairman. There wasn't any M-day put into effect?
General Short. No, sir.
[8157] The Vice Chairman. There wasn't any order to that
effect form the War Department ?
General Short. No, sir.
The Vice Chairman. But when the Japanese attack came you went
into action?
Generril Short. Within a minute or two.
The Vice Chairman. Yes. Now, you have been asked a number
of questions about these particular messages that were received and
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3023
the chairman has just inquired some about the message of November
24 to Admiral Kimmel. You say you saw that and conferred with
him about it ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And, of course, j^ou saw in that message that
a surprise aggressive movement in any direction is stated there, isn't
it?
General Short. Yes, sir ; but it also points out particular places.
Tlie Vice Chairman. It also mentions other things but those words
are in there ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, you say there a little below
the middle of the page :
This message indicated possible movements in the direction of the Philippines
or Guam and called for secrecy.
I8158'\ but this is not all that it indicated, was it ?
General Short. I would say that that was what it indicated — prob-
able. The other was possible. When you say ''attack in any direc-
tion," that is so indefinite that you cannot point it out as a probable
thing.
The Vice Chairman. Well, your statement here is :
This message indicated possible movements in the direction of the Philippines
or Guam and called for secrecy.
General Short. I believe that if the Department had considered
Hawaii in the same way, classing it with the probable as the Philip-
pines or Guam, it would have included it.
The Vice Chairman. But at least the message said also what is
said about the Philippines and Guam ?
General Short. But in a very general way.
The Vice Chairman. At least you did not accept it as meaning any-
thing but the Philippines and Guam ?
General Short. That Avas all that it meant to me.
The Vice Chairman. That was all that it meant to you ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. All right.
General Short. I think that is all it meant to Admiral Kimmel.
The Vice Chairman. It referred to the Philippines and Guam and
that is all it meant to you and you did not accept it as [8J59]
meaning anything else ?
General Short. No, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Or as being worth anything else to you ?
General Short. I realized that any time that there was any Japa-
nese action against the United States that sabotage and subversive
action might start in Hawaii even ahead of the action to get the
jump on us.
The Vice Chairman. But you did not think there was anything in
this message
General Short. I did not expect an attack.
The Vice Chairman. Well, you did not think there was anything
in this message that should have meant anything to you except the
Philippines and Guam ?
3024 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. And possibly internal disorders in Hawaii.
The Vice Chairman. In Hawaii?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. That is all?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And so far as all these other words that we
used liere they were just surplusage as far as conveying any meaning
to you ?
General Short. They were so general and so indefinite that it was
pretty hard to say that they conveyed any specific meaning.
[8100] The Vice Chairman. Well, it did not mean anything
to you ?
General Short. No, sir.
The Vice Chairman. All right.
The Chairman. The Chair thinks we will suspend with you until
10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
(Whereupon, at 4:03 p. m., January 23, 1946, an adjournment was
taken until 10 a. m., Thursday, January 24, 1946.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3025
{.81611, PEABL HAKBOR ATTACK
THUBSDAY, JANUARY 24, 1946
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington^ D. 0.
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in
the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Barldey (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster,
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark,
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.
Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H.
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Hasten, Edward P.
Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.
[^8162'] The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Congressman Cooper will resume his examination.
The Vice Chairman. Are you ready, General ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHOUT, UNITED STATES
ARMY (RETIRED)— Resumed
The Vice Chairman. General Short, when we adjourned yester-
day we had been discussing the Navy message of November 24, with
which you said you were familiar.
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And you had given your explanation of what
you thought it meant and your ideas about that message. I would
now like to consider with you for a little while the messages of No-
vember 27. The Chief of Naval Operations also sent a message of
November 27 to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.
General Short. May I correct my very last statement to you before
we take that up?
The Vice Chairman. Yes, sir.
General Short. On page 8159 of the transcript you asked me :
Well, you did not think there was anything in this message that should have
meant anything to you except the Philippines and Guam?
[816S] And possibly internal disorders in Hawaii —
I added there.
You said then, "In Hawaii?"
And I said :
Yes, sir. And so far as all these other words that we used here they were just
surplusage as far as conveying any meaning to you?
General Short. They were so general and so indefinite that it was pretty hard
to say that they conveyed any specific meaning.
3026 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Then you said :
Well, it did not mean anything to you?
General Short. No, sir.
I think I should like to correct that that it did mean to me that they
definitely expected hostilities but that it did not point to Hawaii. I
don't think my answer "It did not mean anything" was a correct
answer.
The Vice Chairman. As full and complete?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. It did mean to you then that hostilities
General Short. That hostilities, yes, sir, but not an attack at Hawaii.
The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, then, the Navy message of
November 27, the so-called war warning message, you are thoroughly
familiar with that?
[S16'4] General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And you saw it at the time Admiral Kimmel
received it ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And you conferred with him about it ?
General Short. I am sure that I talked pretty thoroughly about that
on the 1st and the 3cl — well, the 1st, 2d, and 3d of December.
The Vice Chairman. Well, that was received
General Short. Oh, no. On the 24th you are talking about?
The Vice Chairman. No.
General Short. The one on November 27 ?
The Vice Chairman. I am talking about the one on November 27.
General Short. I talked pretty thoroughly with him about that.
We had talked immediately previously on that morning about the
situation and the message of the 24th and there was really no additional
information of an enemy in the message on the 27th that was not in the
24th.
The Vice Chairman. Well, it was received in Hawaii on the 27th,
the day it was sent ?
General Short, That is correct, the afternoon of the 27th.
[8166] The Vice Chairman. And you were familiar with it on
that day ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And the opening words there :
Consider this dispatch a war warning —
you say it did not mean anything special to you?
General Short. It meant no more than saying that Japan was
going to attack some place. It is the same thing.
The Vice Chairman. I see. And I believe you stated yesterday
that you never had seen those words used in any dispatch before?
General Short. I did not remember that I had; no, sir.
The Vice Chairman. I recall that Admiral Kimmel stated that he
had never seen those words used before.
General ^hort. Yes, sir.
The Vic^v Chairman. And I was just wondering why it was that
those words tliat you had never seen in a dispatch before did not mean
something more to you than you here indicate ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3027
General Short. Well, if you analyze them they really are not nearly
as definite, they mean not nearly as much as to say that Japan is going
to attack the Philippines or Borneo because you are saying there that
war is imminent and you are saying where it is irmninent.
[8166] The Vice Chairman. Well, this says :
Consider this dispatch a war warning.
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. That is a pretty definite statement. General.
General Short. Well, I think if they tell you that the Philippines
are going to be attacked that is equivalent to a war warning.
The Vice Chairman. Well, that would be definite, too.
General Short. I think probably that was the reason that it did not
have any particular effect on me, because the one on the 24th had stated
that they expected Japanese action in any direction, including the
Philippines and Guam.
The Vice Chairman. Well, you had the impression in your mind
at the time from the information contained in the Navy message of
November 24th that hostilities were indicated ?
General Short. That the Navy definitely believed they were
indicated.
The Vice Chairman. All right. Then 3 days later on the 27th, you
saw this mesage, "Consider this dispatch a war warning."
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. With the knowledge in your mind that you
had already been notified that hostilities were imminent?
[S167'] General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And then here comes a message :
Consider this dispatch a war warning.
You did not give any special meaning to that ?
General Short. I thought it was just a reiteration of what had been
said.
The Vice Chairman. I see. Now, that was with respect to the Navy
message of the 27th.
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Now, then, on page 18 of your statement you
enter into a discussion of the Army message of November 27, which
you quote there on page 18 of your statement.
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. This was a message from the Chief of Staff,
General Marshall, to you.
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And you received it on the 27th?
General Short. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. You had the information contained in this
message in addition to the information contained in the Navy message
of the same date with which you were familiar?
General Short. That is correct.
[8168] The Vice Chairman. Now, I do not want to go into too
lengthy a discussion of this message, because it has been covered so
many times in the hearing, and you set it forth here in your prepared
statement, but I would like to invite your attention, to get some infor-
3028 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
mation as to your views about it, to certain words appearing right
about the middle of the message, and I will quote them to you :
Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such recon-
naissance, and other measures as you deem necessary.
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. That was a direct order from the Chief of
Staff to you?
General Short. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. And then the words "Report measures taken."
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Now, in your reply to General Marshall, you
rej^orted only that you had alerted your department against sabotage,
and liaison with the Navy.
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Whether they are the exact words or not, that
is what you meant and that is what you said ?
[8169] General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Now, do you find the word "sabotage" used
anywhere in this message of November 27 to you ?
General Short. No, sir ; but I did in the next 3 messages that I got.
The Vice Chairman. Well, you promptly replied to General Mar-
shall upon the receipt of this message?
General Short. That is correct. I also do not find anywhere in
there that he said there was a probable attack on Hawaii. That is
what caused me to
The "Vice Chairman. x\11 right, we will get to that in a moment, but
right at this point, you say the word "sabotage" is not used anywhere
in this message of November 27 to you from the Chief of Staff?
General Short. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. And you say you promptly replied to that
message without consultation with any members of your staff or any-
body else, except, I believe, you talked with Colonel Phillips; is that
riglit ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Now, with this message before you, and you
had not at that time received these other messages, you promptly re-
plied to General Marshall, you alerted your department against sabo-
tage, and "liaison with the Navy."
[8170] General Short. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. From this message of General Marshall to
you, which does not contain the word "sabotage" anywhere in it, where
did you get the idea that all he wanted to know about was sabotage?
General Short. The Navy message of November 24 pointed directly
to an attack on the Philippines or Guam. It did not point to an
attack on Hawaii. That was in my mind. That was received just 3
days before.
There was nothing in this message amending that. The informa-
tion on the enemy given there "unpredictable but hostile action possi-
ble at any moment," I felt the information contained in the message
of November 24 still stood, that the probable action was toward the
Philipi)ines and Guam.
[8171] The Vice Chairman. I know, General, but as an ex-
perienced officer with long and distinguished service of 40 years in
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3029
the United States Army, you had right in front of you a dispatch
from the head of the United States Army, the Chief of Staff, and
you replied to this dispatch.
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. You did not reply to the Navy message of
November 24.
General Short. Nor, sir ; but I also knew
The Vice Chair:max. It vras this dispatch that you replied to ?
General Short. I also knew from 40 years' experience that if the
Chief of Staff believed there was going to be an air attack or an all-out
attack on Hawaii he would have said so.
The Vice Chairman. What I am trying to find, General — and I am
just trying to get the facts about this thing the best I can, the same as
I questioned the other witnesses, my only purpose in serving on this
committee is to tr}'' to find the facts about the question that is pre-
sented to us here — with this message of the Chief of Staff before youy
without the word "sabotage" mentioned in it at all, I am just won-
dering how you got the impression that your reply of "an alert
against sabotage" was responsive to this message.
General Short. Because there was no information that [81721
indicated anything in Hawaii other than internal disorders. And
the man who wrote the estimate on November 29, the two men, Colonel
Betts and Colonel Kroner, did not have access to magic, and they
drew exactly the same conclusion, that there was not a possibility of
an attack on Hawaii, there was no possibility of an air attack on
Hawaii, and the only thing of importance was an alert against sabo-
tage and internal disorder.
The Vice Chairman. But certainly. General, at the time you re-
plied to General Marshall's message you did not know what Betts
and Kroner knew, or whether they knew anything about that.
General Short. I did not, and I did not have as much informa-
tion as he had. I am simply saying my conclusion had been abso-
lutely logical. These two men, the heads of military branches of the
United States, drew exactly the same conclusions for the same reasons,
and anybody else would if they were not given the magic informa-
tion.
The Vice Chairman. One difficulty with all of us is to separate
hindsight or present knowledge from what occurred at the time back
there. I realize your difficulty, and we all have that difficulty, but this
Kroner and Betts information was not before you then, you knew
nothing about it.
General Short. It had nothing to do with my decision.
[8173] The Vice Chairman. All right.
General Short. But there was nothing else before me that caused
me to expect an attack on Hawaii.
The Vice Chairman. Although the words definitely appeared in
this message :
Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such recon-
naissance and other measures as you deem necessary?
General Short. And I did. "Hostile action" to me, taking every-
thing that I had had before and everything in that message into con-
sideration, meant the form of hostile action in Hawaii would be inter-
nal disorders, that the War Department thought it would be internal
disorders.
3030 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Vice Chairman. Did you undertake such reconnaissance as you
deemed necessary?
General Short. I did not deem anything necessary in the way of
long-distance reconnaissance, because it was a Navy job, and I was
ever ready to give them the planes any time they requested, and that
was my only function.
The Vice Chairman. All right. With this directive from the Chief
of Staff to you to undertake such reconnaissance, and indicating that
the Navy was supposed to furnish long-distance reconnaissance, did
you then promptly confer with Admiral Kimmel so you would know
whether he was doing it ?
General Short. I knew that morning what reconnaissance
[8174] ill general he was taking; I talked with him 3 hours that
morning.
The Vice Chairman. But not after you received the order from the
Chief of Staff?
General Short. No, sir ; but I knew what he was doing.
The Vice Chairman. Now this same message was sent to certain
other commanding generals ; was it not ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. The commanding general at Panama, among
others ; was it not ?
General Short. I think you will find — I am not positive, but I think
probably some of the "don'ts" were left out. I know the message to
the Philippines omitted the don'ts.
The Vice Chairman. We will get to that in a minute. If you will
try to stay with me as we go along, it will help me a great deal.
At the bottom of this message appearing on page 7 of exhibit 32,
after the name "Marshall," which appeared on the message to you, it
says here :
War Department Message Center : Please send same radiogram to : Command-
ing General, Caribbean Defense Command.
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. That was the Panama command ?
General Short. That is correct.
[8175] The Vice Chairman. And the General in command there
replied to the message in quite different form to what you replied ?
General Short. In all probability he did not have the definite writ-
ten approved agreement with the Navy that they would be responsible
for long-distance reconnaissance. I know that was the case in the
Philippines. I do not know that that was the case in Panama.
The Vice Chairman. There was quite a difference between that
general's reply and yours.
General Short. There would be necessarily a great difference if I
had been responsible for the long-distance reconnaissance, but I was
not.
The Vice Chairman. But the fact remains there was considerable
difference in the replies.
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, then, on the same day a mes-
sage was sent to General MacArthur in the Philippines. That is not
identical with the message received by you, but quite similar to it;
isn't it?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3031
General Short. Except all the don'ts were left out.
The Vice Chairman. It is quite similar to it. The same words
appear in it, General :
Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to take such reconnaissance
and other measures [8176] as you deem necessary.
Those identical words appear in the message to MacArthur and to
you ; do they not ?
General Short. Yes, sir ; and I happen to know that there was no
agreement in the Philippines Islands whereby the Navy assumed the
responsibility for long-distance reconnaissance.
The Vice Chairman. But those same words appear in your message
and in MacArthur's message ?
General Short. Yes, sir; but the condition in the two places was
entirely different.
The Vice Chairman. And MacArthur's reply to General Marshall
is quite different from yours ?
General Short. Necessarily so.
The Vice Chairman. He says :
Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio six two four air recon-
naissance has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy stop
Ground security measures have been taken stop Within the limitations imposed by
present state of development of this theatre of operations everything is in readi-
ness for the conduct of a successful defense stop intimate liaison and coopera-
tion and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy.
You replied that your department was alerted against sabotage,
and liaison with the Navy.
General Short. I think you ought to also take into [8177]
consideration that he had a great deal — not all, but a large part of
magic, that he had received a radiogram, that he had held a conference
with Commissioner Sayre and Admiral Stark, and that this message
was from the President, that repeated estimates had pointed to the
probable attack on the Philippine Islands. The situation as painted to
him was entirely different from that which was painted to me.
The Vice Chairman. Back again. General, the same words convey-
ing a definite directive to him, were contained in the message to you?
General Short. But the action required would be governed by the
situation that existed, which was entirely different.
The Vice Chairman. I see. In just reading MacArthur's message it
would seem that he replied directly to these words contained in both
messages.
General Short. I think he replied to meet his situation as it existed.
The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, General, on page 20 of your
statement you refer to the message of November 27 from G-2 of the
War Department to G-2 of your department.
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. That was the same day that General Mar-
shall's message was sent to you?
General Short. Received probably within an hour or less.
18178] The Vice Chairman. An hour or less ?
General Short. Almost the same time.
The Vice Chairman. But after you had replied to General Mar-
shall's message ?
General Short. I think so.
3032 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Vice Chairman. All right. Now then this message from Gen-
eral Miles, G-2 of the War Department, to your G-2 relates only to
sabotage and subversive activities, does it not?
General Short. That is correct.
The Vice Chapman. Then why did you think General Miles sent
you this special message relating only to sabotage if it meant only the
same thing as the message General Marshall had sent to you?
General Short. General Miles was responsible for giving us infor-
mation not only about sabotage but information of any probable
hostile action. The fact that the information he gave us related only
to sabotage indicated that he did not expect other hostile action or he
would have pointed it out the same as they did the subversive action.
The Vice Chairmax. But the message from General ^Sliles to your
G-2 meant the same thing to you as General Marshall's message to
General Short. It predicted to me the same type of hostile action.
[S170] The Vice Chairman. I see. And you see no difference
between the Marshall message to vou and the Miles message to
J our G-2 ?
General Short. I did. To me the Marshall message indicated that
there was paramount in the idea of the War Department that they
must avoid war if possible with Japan and that no international inci-
dent must take place in Hawaii that would provoke the Japanese or
give them an excuse. There was nothing of that kind in Miles'
message.
The Vice Chairman. Well, if you even had not received General
Marshall's message, why, you would not have taken an}' such action,
would you ?
General Short. If I had not received General Marshall's message
and only had Miles' message, you mean ?
The Vice Chairman. If you had not received either one of them
you would not have done anything to create a Japanese incident,
would you ?
General Short. I would have been very careful not to, because
for months there had been an indication that they were particularly
anxious not to provoke the Japanese.
The Vice Chairman. You did not need any message from General
Marshall or General Miles, or anybody else, for you to take that
detinite course 3'ourself, did you?
General Short. I would say that that made it clear; it [8180]
was necessary to reiterate their position, because they were very
anxious about it. Uppermost in their minds was that they did not
want to be responsible for starting a war.
The Vice Chairman. And j'ou were not going to do anything to
siart a war even if you had not heard anything from them, were 5'ou?
General Short. Xot intentionally.
The Vice Chairman. How is that ?
General Short. Not intentionally.
The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, General, I believe you have
stated that the operation of radar was your responsibility?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And I think you stated, in response to ques-
tions by counsel, that you had six mobile radar sets and three sta-
tjonar}' sets.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3033
General Short. No, sir; there were no stationary sets in operation.
The Vice Chairman. You had been furnished three, had you not?
General Short. Not complete.
The Vice Chairman. But you had six mobile sets ?
General Short. We had six mobile sets.
The Vice Chairman. In operation ?
[8181] General Short. Yes, sir. And I might state also that
the plans for the erection of the antenna, the towers for the sets were
not received until — I think they show an endorsement of December
10, so they were not there.
At this time, if I may, I would like to read a telegram that I
received here in the room yesterday from a former signal officer.
I did not even remember the man
The Vice Chairman. Just one second before you get to that. I
just want to try to be clear on one point. I certainly will give you
an opportunity to read your telegram. There were six mobile radar
sets in operation at the time ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And although three stationary sets had been
furnished, they were not complete and not in operation ?
General Short. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. I understood you to state yesterday, in re-
sponse to a question by counsel, that you did not know whether the
three stationary sets were in operation at that time or not.
General Short. I did not mean to convey that. I knew definitely
they were not ; I knew they were robbing those sets for parts to keep the
mobile sets working.
The Vice Chairman. Now if you desire to read the telegram you
may do so.
[8182] General Short. As it happens, I do not even remember
this officer. No inquiry had been made of him. I would just like to
read the wire that came to me yesterday morning.
It is dated January 22, at Waterloo, Iowa :
Lt. Gen. Walter C. Shoht,
Care Senate Eoune Investigating Committee, Washington, D. C:
On Dec 10, 1941 I was transferred to Oakland California as assistant signal
officer SFP of E Stop Lying on the Oakland pier for a long time were three 100
ft. radar towers No SCR 271 Stop Several weeks later I received a phone inquiry
from Wash DC and instructions for the Transportation Corps to ship same to
Honolulu on the next boat Stop It was necessary to use a floating crane to hoist
these heavy towers Stop Approximately twenty SCR 271 have since been installed
in the Hawaiian Islands Stop In my opinion if these radar towers had not iwen
delaved on the Oakland docks you could have used them to good advantage Dec
7 1941 End
George D. Leask,
0-122826 Ex-Major, Signal Corps.
I want to introduce that just to show that those sets were not com-
plete, that the towers had not been received.
[8183] The Vice Chairman. That was three additional sets,
wasn't it?
General Short. I don't know from his wire whether it was three
additional sets. You see, we originally were authorized three sets.
It was changed to six. I think the situation was that the three towers
were there but that the plans for the erection of the towers and for the
footings to be installed by the engineers had not been received and
79716 — 46 — pt. 7 9
3034 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
were not forwarded to Hawaii until sometime about December 10 or 12.
I am not sure of the exact date.
The Vice Chairman. Well, let's be clear in our understanding.
You had six mobile sets in operation ?
General Short. I definitely had six mobile sets.
The Vice Chairman. You had three stationary sets that had not
been put in operation?
General Short. That is correct; and were not complete in all ways.
The Vice Chairman. But did those three stationary sets have the
towers there?
General Short. I don't know. This [referring to wire] raises a
doubt in my mind. I thou^iht that the towers were there, but the
plans were not. This wire here that I just got, raises a little doubt in
my mind as to whether [8J84^] my information was exactly
correct, but I am sure that the plans for the erection of the towers had
not been received.
The Vice Chairman. "Well, you don't know whether the three towers
for the three stationary sets were there in Hawaii at the time, or not?
General Short. I am not positive.
The Vice Chairman. You are not positive ?
General Short. I had thought that they were.
The Vice Chair^ian. And you don't know whether that telegram
just read relates to the towers for the three stationary sets already in
Hawaii or the three sets that were to be sent there?
General Short. I do not, because there is no statement made.
The Vice Chairman. All right. Thank you. With all six of the
mobile sets, radar sets that you did have there — were they in operation
on the 7th of December ?
General Short. I am of the opinion they were. I imagine some-
time during the day certain sets were temporarily out of commission
because that happened right along. But I don't know.
The Vice Chairman. You don't know?
[81SS] General Short. Don't know.
The Vice Chairman. Now, on page 38 of your statement, General,
you refer to radar schedule under No. 50. You state :
Radar schedule.
After the aii'craft warning service information was closed at 7 a. m. December
7, the Opana Station remained in operation. On Saturday, December 6, 1941,
Second Lieutenant Grover C. White. Jr.. Signal Corps, had obtained permission
of the Control Olhccr to have all stations operate from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. only on
Sunday, December 7, 1941.
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairm.vn. Did you know that permission had been
granted to Lieutenant Wliite?
General Short. No, sir; I did not. I had ordered, as part of the
interceptor command and aircraft warning service, the operation only
from 4 to 7. The additional hours were part of the training pro-
gram, and for some time they had been exceeding the prescribed hours.
They were very keen on making progress, and they had worked well
beyond the prescribed hours. There was no training as training pre-
scribed on Sunday, but they had been doing it.
[8186] I think the control officer was entirely within his province
in permitting this training to be discontinued. I think that Major
Berquist, who was the head control officer, felt that the men had been
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3035
usinff their eyes so many hours, that some of them were having eye
trouble.
He testified to that fact before the Army Board.
I think that perhaps was the reason they agreed to cutting out the
training on December 7.
The Vice Chairman. Who was having eye trouble?
General Short. The men who were operating the oscilloscopes ; the
radar sets.
The Vice Chairman. Who was this major, who was the control
officer ?
General Short, Major Berquist was the senior man. He and INIajor
Tindall were the only two officers we had that knew anything about it.
The Vice Chairman. Did that major have authority to issue orders
for radar stations not to operate without consulting you, or even
notifying you ?
General Short. He did where the hours were over and above the
hours prescribed by me. There was no training prescribed Sunday.
They had been doing it on Sunday on their own. I had not issued
an order that they would have the training and maintenance work on
Sunday. I considered [8187] that he was within his province
in calling that off.
The Vice Chairman. Then it was purely voluntary on their part?
General Short. On Sunday, not the 4 to 7. That was a definite
order, but the training on Sunday was voluntary.
The Vice Chairman. And you didn't know that this. permission
had been granted by Major Berquist to Second Lieutenant White?
General Short. 1 did not.
The Vice Chairman. Now you also tell about the incident there in
which Lieutenant Tyler was involved.
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Where he received this message from the man
who was voluntarily on duty ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And practicing. That he had observed this
flight of plajies coming in.
General Short. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. And Tyler made the decision to do nothing
about it?
General Short. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. Was anything done about Tyler's action in
that respect?
General Short. No, sir. As soon as I heard it, [SISS] which
was the next day, I told my chief of staff that I wanted affidavits taken
to find out the exact status, but at that time there was no device by
which we could differentiate between friendly planes and enemy
planes, nobody could have told whether it was an enemy plane or a
friendly plane. Tyler was inexperienced. I did not feel there was
anything to justify disciplinary action against Tyler, because he had
made what he thought was a correct decision.
The Vice Chairman. You knew Ije was inexperienced ?
General Short. Yes, sir. There were only two experienced men
on the island until the return of General Davidson and Colonel
Meehan.
3036 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Vice Chairman. Whether they were technically experienced
and trained on that, General, you did have plenty of men with mature
judgment and discretion?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. That could have been discharging these duties
that this inexperienced officer was then discharging?
General Short. Major Berquist selected certain men he was training
as control officers. I think that he selected these men with instruc-
tions to call him in case there was any doubt about anything.
[8180] The Vice Chairman. You think he expected them to do
that?
General Short. To call him personally ; yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. What did you know was supposed to be done
there in the case of receipt of information that might convey vital in-
formation to you ?
General Short. If there had been any doubt in the mind of whoever
was acting as control officer, the pursuit planes at Wheeler Field
should have been alerted immediately.
If that lieutenant had phoned to Wheeler Field, General Davidson
would have turned out the planes without question. It would have
been looked into later if it were wrong, but there wouldn't have been
any hesitation on his part.
The Vice Chairman. Certainly there was a serious error in judg-
ment there. This inexperienced officer that you referred to-
General Short, He should have phoned to Major Berquist because
his experience, I think, was probably insufficient for him to make the
decision.
The Vice Chairman. And you knew he was inexperienced ?
General Short. I did not know, as a matter of fact, that he was on
the board that morning.
Tl^e Vice Chairman. You didn't know who was?
[8190] General Short. I didn't know who was on there. The
list of officers being trained as control officers was operated by Major
Berquist. If he found that a man didn't show aptitude, he was at
liberty to throw him off, and call for another officer.
The Vice Chairman. Did you personally know that any of the
radar stations were operating that morning?
General Short. I didn't visit them that morning, but I had visited
the radar stations, at least three of them, personally out in the field.
I had gone through the aircraft warning service several times, the
information center, and my orders were ordinarily carried out. When
I gave orders, I fully expected them to be carried out.
The Vice Chairman, I think that is natural, and I think eveij
Army officer expects that, but one of your main complaints here is
that although General Marshall issued you a direct order, he didn't
do anything to see if you carried it out.
General Short. When you come to the follow-up it depends on how
far down you are going. I don't think I could be expected to check
on every officer detailed there any more than I would see if the cor-
poral of the guard received his instructions correctly when he went
on duty. [8190-A] My f(5llow-up was expected to go far
enough, certainly, for me to talk with the connnander of the Air
Force, and the chief signal officer, which I did. And to know that
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3037
"they had the picture, and trying to develop the thing in harmony as
graphically as possible.
The Vice Chairman. Wasn't your responsibility such that required
you to go far enough to see that the job was properly done?
General Short. I would say to know in general that it was being
properly done, which I did know that they were conducting this every
morning. I don't think that my responsibility extended to the point
of inspecting every man that went on there as a control officer. It
would have been a physical impossibility for me to take not just this,
but every other line of activity on the island, and I was responsible
for all of them, not just this, it would be physically impossible for
me to inspect levery detail in every one of them every day ; it couldn't
be done.
The Vice Chairman. But weren't you required to assume sufficient
responsibility to get the job done 'i
General Short. I thought that I \^ as getting it done.
The Vice Chairman. You thought you had done that?
General Short. I had the only two men who had ever [8191]
seen an. installation of this kind supervising it.
The Vice Chairman. It was your responsibility to see that the
job was properly done ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And you thought you had taken sufficient
steps to do that?
General Short. I thought I had.
The Vice Chairman. And you found that you had not?
General Short. I am not sure, in view of the impossibility of de-
termining the difference between friend and foe that you could have
logically said that anybody, no matter how experienced could say
that those were hostile planes.
The Vice Chairman. But you stated a few moments ago, General,
that if this inexperienced second lieutenant had repoited to General
Davidson this information that came to him, General Davidson would
have had his planes in the air immediately.
General Short. That is not quite what I stated.
The Vice Chairman. That is the way I understood it.
General Short. What I meant was he had the full authority, in spite
of the fact that he was a lieutenant, as control officer, had full au-
thority to alert the planes at Wheeler Field. He would just turn
them out for [8192] hostile planes approaching. If they had
received that report, no matter whether it had any value or not, they
would have turned out immediately.
The Vice Chairman. But that was not done ?
General Short. That was not done.
Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ?
The Vice Chairman. Just one more question on that, if I may.
If the Navy had had out proper long-distant reconnaissance
planes
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. They could have been in a position to have
found whether they were friendly or enemy planes, couldn't they?
General Short. If the Navy had told me that carriers were in
Hawaiian waters, then we would have been instantly on the alert
and we would have been suspecting everybody.
3038 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Vice Chairman. So it was the fault of the Navy in not con-
ducting proper long-distant reconnaissance so as to be able to supply
you the information ? -
General Short. Well, I think, if you are going back to fault, you can
go back and say, if they had received the message of the delivery of
the ultimatum, at 1 p. m., I think they would have turned out every-
thing for the reconnaissance. I don't think you can take one point
and stop there.
[819S] The Vice Chairman. But the fact remains that if the
Navy had been conducting long-range reconnaissance, you thought
they were, they would have been in position to supply you the infor-
mation as to whether these were hostile or friendly planes?
General Short. I would not say that, because I knew that the Navy
did not have sufficient planes to conduct, for any period of time, a
360-degree reconnaissance. If they had information pinning down
probable hostile action to a certain time then they had enough planes
that they could have searched practically the whole area for a few
hours. As it was, they were searching what they considered was the
probable line of approach of the enemy.
The Vice Chairman, If you had had proper liaison with the Navy,
you could probably have known whether these were hostile or friendly
planes ?
General Short. No, sir ; I do not think I could.
The Vice Chairman. Did you want to say something ?
Mr. Murphy. I was wondering how that lieutenant could be held
responsible for knowing anything when he never heard of these war
warnings, never had been apprised of any change in the situation, and
had the information that the man on the street had, even though he
was the key mnn in the control sfation.
[8194^ General Short. The information of the war warning
was given to General Martin. It was talked over thoroughly with
him. Probably spent 30 minutes. The Interceptor Command was
under him. Whether or not he read the message he saw the "Dessemi-
nation to the few essential officers," I don't know whether he gave
the information to Major Berquist or Major Tindall or whether he
decided that it was limited in that.
The Vice Chairman. Now, General, you state on the top of page 38
of your statement, the very page that I have been asking you some
questions about :
At that time I was convinced that the Navy either knew the location of the
Japanese carriers or had enough information so that they were not uneasy. I felt
that they could handle the situation.
General Short. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. That is correct.
General Short. There was nothing from them of an alarming
nature. Nothing to show that they were alarmed about the situation.
The Vice Chairman. So you thought the Navy was taking proper
care of the long-range reconnaissance matter and when they didn't
notify you to the contrary you rested on that assumption?
General Short. I thought they were doing everything they
[8195] were capable of doing. They found nothing to alarm
them. They had transmitted nothing to me. And I accepted it on
that basis.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3039
The Vice Chairman. You didn't 'check on the matter, did you,
didn't do anything further ?
General Short. I knew generally what they were doing but I didn't
know specifically what hours they were sending out planes and things
of that kind.
The Vice Chairman. You don't think it was incumbent upon you
to find out when they were making reconnaissance and definitely what
they were doing?
General Short. It was Admiral Kimmel's definite responsibility.
I thought he was an officer of sufficient experience. He knew more
about reconnaissance with surface ships and submarines than I did.
I felt that he could be counted on to do his job.
The Vice Chairman. You just assumed that was being done?
General Short. Yes, sir; as far as he could do it.
The Vice Chajuman. You state also on page 38 :
About 6 : 45 a. m. a two-man submarine entering Pearl Harbor was destroyed
by ships on duty. Had the Naval authorities foreseen this as a possible fore-
runner of an air attack or notified the Army, time would have been available for
the [8196] dispersion of the planes. However, the Naval authorities did
not connect this submarine attack with a possible general attack. The Army
was not notified until after the attack.
General Short. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. You received no information from the Navy
at all about this submarine incident ?
General Short. Until after the attack.
The Vice Chairman. Yes.
General Short. Mr. Congressman, I would like before we leave the
radar to add one thing, if I may.
The Vice Chairman. Be glad for you to.
General Short. The radar system in New York City and in Seattle
and in San Francisco had bsen completely installed some time before
we received any equipment and, as I understand it, in New York City
in order to expedite it they hired experts from the American Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co. — or RCA, rather — who were familiar with this
type of equipment, to assist in the installation.
Now, when it came to Hawaii, it was just a question of the officers
digging out the thing the best they could from the pamphlets they
had on the subject and instructing the men the best they could, which
undoubtedly took more time. It looked like the War Department
was more interested in developing radar on the mainland than in
Hawaii.
[8197] The Vice Chairman. You think that is a proper rea-
son, then, for you not being more careful about the operation of radar
in Hawaii ?
General Short. No, sir. I think that is the reason why our radar
was still in the experimental stage. If we had been furnished it as
early as New York and Seattle, we probably would have had it much
better developed.
The Vice Chairman. The fact is a man voluntarily practicing
on the radar that you did have found these planes coming in.
General Short. That is correct ; but he didn't know what they were.
The Vice Chairman. All right.
3040 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. As a matter of fact we know that planes were
■coming in from San Francisco. They came in 5 minutes later. Just
a difference in direction of 3 degrees.
The Vice Chairman. What was done about Lieutenant Tyler?
You said you didn't recommend any disciplinary action.
General Short. I did not. I believe, I am quite sure that General
Emmons, who succeeded me, did not, because I think he [Lieutenant
Tyler] has gone ahead throughout the war and received and been
promoted.
The Vice Chairman. What is his present rank ?
General Short. I believe he is a lieutenant colonel.
[8198] The Vice Chairman. Been promoted from lieutenant
to lieutenant colonel ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. All right.
Now, then, on page 47 of your statement you quote questions and
answers there between counsel and General Miles while Miles was a
witness before the committee.
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman, One of the quotations there is:
Mr. Gesell. What is the explanation of that?
General Miles. The main reason was that the code experts apparently agreed,
at least the Navy was particularly strong on the point that their code was
much more secure than ours. It was obviously, of course, of great importance
in security that a message be sent in only one code and not two and we had
every reason to believe, or thought we did, that a Navy message to Hawaii would
be promptly transmitted to the Army authorities there.
You quote that part of the testimony.
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Did you and Admiral Kimmel keep each
other thoroughly informed as to all information j^ou received?
General Short. I will tell you what the practice was.
[8109] Whenever he received a message that directed the mes-
sage be transmitted to me or that the Chief of Staff concurred in this
message he furnished me with a copy. He did not furnish me with
copies of other messages. He frequently, when we were together,
told me of some other information but the only thing that I got from
the Navy were the messages that he was told to deliver to me.
The Vice Chairman. All you got from Admiral Kimmel were the
messages that he was told to deliver to you?
General Short. As far as messages were concerned. As I say, there
were times when he picked up items of interest that he told me of.
The Vice Chairman. That was more or less accidental?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. How about the messages received by you, did
you promptly inform Admiral Kimmel of what they contained?
General Short. I don't think I received any message that I didn't
send to him, because I didn't have more than a half-dozen. I think
every message that I got either showed that it was going to him or
I sent him a copy.
The Vice Chairman. You feel sure then that you kept him fully
informed as to all information received by you through messages but
he did not do the same thing to you ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3041
[8£00] General Short. Well, I would say there was this differ-
ence. I got such a limited number of messages and only the very
important messages. I got a message on July 8, on July 25, and on
October 20, and November 27, and then one on the 7th, that came
after the attack. I think those five were the only messages from July
on that I received pertaining to the situation, the international situa-
tion, and I am quite sure that they were all furnished to him, to the
Navy. They, on the other hand got, I think, much more information
and lots of it, apparently, that they didn't feel I had any interest in
or that they assumed I had received.
The Vice Chairman. How about these code messages, about burning
the codes, was that conveyed to you ?
General Short. That was not.
The Vice Chairman. It was not conveyed to you ?
General Short. Not conveyed to me.
The Vice Chairman. The Navy had it?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And did not tell you anything about it?
General Short. No, sir ; and there was no direction in those messages
that they should.
The Vice Chairman. So unless there was a definite direction in the
Navy message to tell you about it, why, you were not told ?
[8201] General Short. I think that is absolutely correct.
The Vice Chairman. All right.
Now, General, I would just like to ask you this question, with all
deference and proper respect but if the messages sent, that is, if the
messages not sent to you from Washington which you think should
have been sent had made no more impression than the messages that
were sent to you from Washington, what difference do you think it
would have made ?
General Short. I don't think that is a correct statement at all.
There was never a message received by me that didn't make an im-
pression. It may not have made the impression on me that ycu get
from it or you think it should have made, but I never received a
message from Washington that I didn't analyze carefully and make
up my mind what the message meant.
The Vice Chairman. And you think these messages that were not
sent to you from Washington would have been more important to you
than those that were sent ?
General Short. There were two that could hardl}^ fail. The inter-
cept which was the bombing plan of Pearl Harbor and the message
stating that the ultimatum would be delivered at 1 p. m., which could
have been sent to me 4 hours before the attack, and reached me 7
hours after the attack. Those two messages would definitely have
meant something to me.
The Vice Chairman. Now, on page 53 of your statement, [8£02']
General, there is this sentence, and I will read it to you :
During the period November 27 to December 6 the Navy made no requests for
Army planes to participate in distant reconnaissance.
That is true, is it ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And that also led you to believe that the
Navy had sufficient planes and was conducting distant reconnaissance
as it should have been ?
3042 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. As they deemed desirable and necessary.
The Vice Chairman. All right.
On page 54, you state, under the No. 8G, "Army-Navy Cooperation,"
your last sentence in that paragraph :
With a large part of the United States Navy in Hawaiian waters and with
their sources of information, I was convinced that the Navy would be able either
to intercept any carrier attempting to approach Oahu or at least to obtain such
information from task forces or by reconnaissance as to make them aware of
the presence of carriers in the Hawaiian waters and the probability of an air
attack.
General Short. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. And you have stated several times that you
relied upon the Navy entirely in this respect ?
General Short. Yes, sir ; I had no source of information [8203]
of my own.
The Vice Chairman. And they never at any time called on you
for any assistance so far as reconnaissance was concerned ?
General Short. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. Now, General, I believe you stated here, and
it also appears rather clearly in your statement, that you did not
have any conference with Admiral Kimmel from December 3 to
December??
General Short. That is correct ; no personal conference.
The Vice Chairman. No personal conference.
General Short. The liaison officer. Major Fleming, who did a great
deal of my business with the Navy, and Colonel PfeifFer, who was the
gunnery officer of the fleet, had conferences about the equipment for
Kanton and Christmas.
The Vice Chairman. And the last conference between the Army
and Navy was December 4 ?
General Short. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. There was no conference between the Army
and Navy in Hawaii between December 4 and December 7 ?
General Short. Well, that would not be true of the ONI and G-2,
because the ONI and our contact officer had offices next door to each
other, had a teletype system, and on subversive measures particularly
they, I think, were usually in touch several times a day on practically
all of the subversive activities.
[S204] The Vice Chairman. But you didn't have any confer-
ence with Admiral Kimmel after December 3 ?
General Short. No, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And no staff officer or responsible officer with
you conferred with the Navy after December 4, you say ?
General Short. No, sir. I will say, however, that Lieutenant Burr,
the liaison officer, was in the G-3 section, and knew everything that was
taking place, I am sure.
The Vice Chairman. I mean December 3. December 3 was the last
conference you had?
General Short. That is what I understood you said.
The Vice Chairman. Somebody suggested that I said December
30.
General Short. I understood the 3d.
The Vice Chairman. December 3 was the last conference you had
with Admiral Kimmel?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3043
General Short. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. And December 4 was the last conference that
your Colonel Pfeifer
General Short, Major Fleming and Colonel Pfeifer.
The Vice Chairman. Had with the Navy?
General Short. Yes, sir.
[■8^05] The Vice Chairman. Now, just this question in con-
clusion, General:
When Admiral Kimmel tells this committee he did not know you
had gone on a sabotage alert only, and thought you had gone on full
alert, and you tell us you thought the Navy was conducting long-range
reconnaissance when they were not, does that look like proper liaison
between the Army and Navy?
General Short. I still believe they were conducting long-range re-
connaissance. Maybe not all you think they should have, but I am
sure they were. As to the other, my only answer to that is that they
had a staff man in our operating section who was familiar with every-
thing, had no duty, no function, except to keep the staff of the Four-
teenth Naval District informed of what was going on, and I am sure
that somebody on that staff was informed.
The Vice Chairman. The point is. General, do you know about it.
General Short. Yes, I have Lieutenant Burr's testimony as to
what
The Vice Chairman. I mean, did you know then it was being done?
General Short. I know that he was sitting there with no other duty,
had no other purpose in being there except [8306] to tell them
what we were doing, and I knew there was nothing being held out
from him.
The Vice Chairman. Who was the Army man to find out for the
Army?
General Short. The Army man ?
The Vice Chairman, Yes. '
General Short. With the Navy ?
The Vice Chairman. Yes.
General Short. In the Harbor Patrol we had an officer 8 hours a
day. Lieutenant Dingle.
The Vice Chairman. Eight hours of the 24 ?
General Short. Yes. Major Fleming was in constant touch. He
wasn't sitting in the office, but he was in direct touch with them, and
got a great deal of information.
I think that they had a great deal of confidence in him. That was
one.
The Vice Chairman. He was the equivalent of Lieutenant Burr ?
General Short. Mo ; because Lieutenant Burr
The Vice Chairman. Who was the Army equivalent of Lieutenant
Burr?
General Short. We did not have, except at the Harbor Patrol Post,
any man who sat in
The Vice Chairman. You did not have any Army man who
[8£07'\ was the equivalent or opposite of Lieutenant Burr?
General Short. We did not.
The Vice Chairman. All right. Now then, was there anything
that could have been more important than the very things that you
and the Navy did not know about with respect to each other?
3044 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. I think that I knew in regard to their reconnais-
sance really practically all that I could be expected to know; that they
were using their combination of ships, submarines, and planes, to re-
connoiter the waters that they considered most dangerous. They
were the ones to make the decision.
Now, as to what they didn't know about my operations, I think it
must have been faulty staff work, because they should have known.
At least one Navy man was fully informed. Lieutenant Burr un-
questionably knew. And, as I say, it was his sole function, sole duty,
to get it to them. Now, I don't know inside their staff how they
operated.
The Vice Chairman. How about inside your staff, General. You
didn't have any opposite to Lieutenant Burr?
General Short. I did not have any opposite to Lieutenant Burr
but I did have, as I say, Major Fleming who operated at irregular
intervals, and I did too; and I had conferences at that particular
period, frequent enough that I think anything of importance would
have been given to me personally.
[8208} The Vice Chairman. Well, you Imow now that the Navy
was not conducting long-range reconnaissance in the direction from
which the Japanese attack came ?
General Short. I grant you that.
The Vice Chairman. But you didn't know back at that time it was
not being done, did you ?
General Short. No; and I don't know any more than the Navy
knew that that was the direction they were coming. They had made
the decision. I don't know whether it was on account of weather
conditions that that was thought the most dangerous direction.
The Vice Chairman. You didn't know at that time that that de-
cision had been made?
General Short. No, sir.
The Vice Chairman. All right. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator George.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, before Senator George proceeds
I would like to make one request, in the interest, I hope, of expediting.
I have made a request for the documents from the War and Navy
Departments with particular reference to the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral reports on discussions in connection with the Roberts Commis-
sion.^ I have a very full memorandum from the office of our counsel
enclosing five items from the War [8209] Department, who,
apparently, gave a considerably broader construction to my request
than the Navy did.
It seems to me that they are documents of very considerable im-
portance in connection with the historical record dealing with the con-
templated action of The Adjutant General as recommended to them,
I don't know whether this has ever come to the attention of General
Short or not.
Have you ever seen the possible charges that were contemplated in
connection with your case?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. How long since you have had those?
General Short. I think in the last 2 or 3 days.
Senator Brewster. Well, I would like to request that these, there
are five items, be made an exhibit in this case, in order that they may
^ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5495 et seq.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3045
be formally a part of the record, and then at any appropriate time
General Short may make any comment that he desires regarding some
of the comments, some of which are favorable, some of which are un-
favorable.
[8£10] The Chairman. Does the CKair understand the Sena-
tor to want to make as an exhibit here some informal memoranda in
the War Department upon which charges might have been based but
were not?
Senator Brewster. Well, I would not call it informal. It is a for-
mal report of the Judge Advocate General discussing the whole case
at length and giving a very compreliensive review of it, analyzing all
of it, and it seems to me that this will inevitably in the future be a
thing that will be one of the things that will be considered and it
seemed to me that it ought properly to be a part of our record. If
there is some question about it I would be glad to defer it for discussion.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, my only question was your re-
quest is to put it all in as an exhibit ?
Senator Brewster. That is right.
The Vice Chairman. Well, I was not clear on that. You said there
were four or five things.
Senator Brewster. Four or five items which are submitted here,
which have been submitted.
The Vice Chairman. But you are not desiring to pick out part of it ?
Senator Brewster. Oh, no.
The Vice Chairman. You want to put it all in ?
[8211] Senator Brewster. That is right, including the letter
from the War Department transmitting it.
The Vice Chairman. As an exhibit?
Senator Brewster. That is right.
The Vice Chairman. I just wanted to be clear.
Mr. Murphy. May I ask the Senator how long that material that
he has there has been available?
The Chairman. Counsel has a suggestion.
Mr. Richardson. Well, with reference to the situation as to the
Navy, I will get the representative of the Navy to make a search to
see whether the Adjutant General's office participated to any extent
whatever
Senator Brewster. The Judge Advocate.
Mr. Richardson. The Judge Advocate's office participated to any
extent whatever in relation to the Roberts report or a report on the
Roberts report and investigation and he says that he will make a
further investigation and report to me. When I get that I will turn
it over to Senator Brewster.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire how long this material
that is now being made an exhibit has been available?
Senator Brewster. I should say perhaps 50 pages.
Mr. Murphy. No, I am asking how long it has been available to the
committee.
Senator Brewster. I have seen it about 10 minutes. I [821^']
received it about 10 minutes ago.
Mr. Murphy. No other member of the committee has seen it or
knows what is in it.
3046 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Chairman. Well, the Chair suggests that the Senator withhold
his request until other members have had a chance to look at it.
I don't know that there will be any objection to it.
Senator Brewster. That is quite all right. I just brought up the
point to be sure that General Short had ample opportunity to examine
it before he was cross-examined on it, because naturally you could
not give this to him and expect that he would make any comment
within a short time, that is all I had in mind. Perhaps it can be
adjusted this afternoon.
The Chairman. It would be obviously impossible, if no member of
the committee ever has seen it, to examine it.
Senator Bkewster. As an exhibit, I assume it will be available to
everybody, but I have no dq^ire^to press the request, Mr. Chairman,
immediately.
The Chairman. All right, we will pass on it later.
General Short. Mr. Chairman, may I make a statement at this
point?
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
General Short. If that is material, if this material is being put in
it seems to me appropriate that the letters pre- [8213'] ceding
this and which caused the Judge Advocate General to prepare the
opinion he did be put in.
Senator Brewster. I would tliink so ; I agree with you and that is
what I expected. I am not certain whether all of the correspondence
is included here or not but I would certainly say that it should be.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, does the General have that
correspondence ?
General Short. I have it, I think.
Senator Ferguson. Could we see it?
General Short. I will state that there is one item of the correspond-
ence that I have not been able to get from the official files. I asked
Colonel Duncombe for it and it has not yet been located. It was a
personal letter to the Chief of Staff forwarding an application to the
Adjutant General, and I have a copy of that letter that I can put in.
Senator Brewster. What was the date of that?
General Short. That was January 25.
Senator Brewster. 26th ?
General Short. 25th, a personal letter from me to the Chief of
Staff and I have not been provided with that official letter by the War
Department but I do have a copy of it.
The Vice Chairman. The year. General ?
[821J^] General Short. January 25, 1942.
Senator Ferguson. Might we see what you have then?
Senator Brewster. Well, I have here a letter of January 25, 1942,
from Oklahoma City, Okla. "Subject: Time." Is that the letter?
General Short, That probably is it. May I see it?
Senator Brewster. Yes.
General Short. That probably is it. That to which I am referring
is one that I did not succeed in getting. No, sir ; this is the letter that
I enclosed with the personal letter.
Snnator Brewster, All right.
The Chairman. Well, any additional documents or letters that
might be well made a part of the exhibit should be passed upon when
the committee passes on the exhibit later on.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3047'
General Short. Shall these just be turned in or read?
The Chairman. Well, I think probably you might turn them in,
General. It will be acted upon when the other matter is reached.
The Vice Chairman. Just as a suggestion, Senator, why don't you
turn the thing over to Mr. Masten and let him get it all together and
bring it to our attention this afternoon and then we will know what
you want to offer?
Senator Brewster. That is precisely what I was going to [8215'\
suggest. I think that would be the orderly way to handle it and make
sure that General Short's counsel can cover the case as completely as
they wish.
The Chairman. All right. Senator George.
Senator George. General Short, I have not heard all of your direct
testimony and very little, practically none, of the cross examination
by counsel and at this time, at least, I wish to ask you about only one'
matter.
I believe it is agreed, so far as your direct statement goes, that the
function of the Navy under the joint agreement approved March the^
28th by Admiral Bloch and yourself was to provide distant recon-
naissance.
General Short. That is correct.
Senator George. Or deep reconnaissance.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator George. Was there ever any dispute about the function of
the Navy ?
General Short. Never. I am sure that they agreed fully. I think
Admiral Kimmel's testimony stated specifically that it was his re-
sponsibility.
Senator George. That was my recollection but I wish to know if
there was any dispute or doubt about it. General Marshall also seems
to have agreed that distant reconnaissance was a naval function and
the Army commander was liable to [8216] furnish them such,
planes suitable for that purpose as could be provided.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator George. In his examination before the Army board Gen-
eral Marshall made this direct statement also :
As I recall the matter, the only way the Army would have been involved in the
deep recpunaissance would have been in detaching units to serve in the Navy.
General Short. That is correct.
Senator George. You say you only had actually about six planes
that were suitable for this type of service or kind of service?
General Short. That is correct. I had 12 B-l7's but 6 of them had
been stripped of parts to keep the planes going to the Philippines
going, so we had only 6 that could operate.
Senator George. Only six?
General Short. Yes.
Senator George. Admiral Kimmel was aware of that condition with,
respect to these planes ?
General Short. We had an arrangement whereby every day Gen-
eral Martin, commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, and Admiral Bel-
linger exchanged information as to what planes were actually in
condition to operate that day, and I think they [8217] knew
every day the exact number.
3048 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator George. Now, General, I wish to ask you, because I am not
able to quite interpret it, in view of the fact that it was the function
of the Navy to provide at least distant reconnaissance, and that fact
was known to General Marshall, because he has testified to it not only
in this but in prior hearings, what did he mean precisely by his mes-
sage of November 27, which probably was not received by you until
the 28th or maybe later
The Vice Chairman. No; he said he received it the same day.
Senator George. Later on the 27th. According to General Mar-
shall's testimony, as I recollect it, it was reported to have left very
late on the day of the 27th, but that is immaterial.
What did he mean by this statement to you, this direct directive:
You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you
deem necessary.
What did he mean by "such reconnaissance" in that message?
General Short. I think that got into that message due to the fact
that General Marshall did not write the message. He had approved
the arrangement with the Navy, and I am sure that if he had personally
written the message or had seen it [8318] before it went out
that he would have known that it was the Navy function. I think that
is the complete answer as to why that expression was used in there.
Senator George. Well, were you charged with the duty or respon-
sibility of carrying on any type or kind of reconnaissance ?
General Short. We were supposed to carry reconnaissance up to
20 miles from the shore. We actually, on account of the planes that
we were using, usually sent them not beyond 10 miles, and it depended
on the visual ability of the pilot for the other 10. The only value that
that had was in connection with submarines because the time element
was such that if they had seen an enemy plane it would have been in
there before they could have made a report.
Senator George. It would have been of no service so far as it con-
templated
General Short. So far as an air attack went ; no, sir.
Senator George. So far as an air attack went. General, now I
would like to ask you this direct question: It just troubles me very
greatly.
General Marshall, with the knowledge that you were not charged
with the responsibility of carrying on any distant reconnaissance,
or deep reconnaissance, nevertheless directed you to undertake "such
reconnaissance and other measures as [8219] you deem neces-
sary." Your immediate reply to that message was that you had alerted
against sabotage as you have described.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator George. There is nothing in the suggestion "and undertake
such reconnaissance," is there, that would bring to your mind the
suggestion, rather, that you should simply alert against sabotage?
In other words, isn't it inconsistent with the response which you imme-
diately made that you had alerted against sabotage when his direction
to you was to take some type of reconnaissance ?
General Short. Such as I deemed necessary and in view of the fact
that it was the Navy's responsibility, fully admitted by them, approved
by the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations and with a defi-
nite provision in that agreement that that would only be abrogated
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3049
upon written notice, so it was my best judgment that there was not
any reconnaissance necessary for me to take.
Senator George. AVell, I could understand that but what I do not
imderstand is how you could have consistently interpreted this direc-
tive here to you to mean an alert against sabotage when the use of
the word "reconnaissance" here certainly would indicate something
beyond an alert against sabotage as I understand it. I am a mere
layman and trying to [8220] understand that situation as it
actually existed.
General Short. Since I was not — since the Army was not taking
any reconnaissance I did not report it because it was a naval function,
they were the ones that would make a reconnaissance.
Senator George. I think that seems to be rather clear, yet General
Marshall did approve this message that went to you and in it he refers
to "reconnaissance."
General Short. As I understand it he did not see that message till
the day after it was sent. His name was signed to it. While his name
was signed to it it was prepared by General Gerow and the Secretary
of War.
Senator George. General, I do not recall the exact testimony of
General Marshall but my recollection was that he did say that he had
approved the message although he was absent from Washington until
late in the day that the message was dated, down in North Carolina
on some sort of inspection trip.
The Vice Chairman. He said he went over it on the 26th.
Senator George. Yes, but I think it is clear that the function of the
Navy was to provide any distant reconnaissance that might become
necessary or that might be ordered and I think it is clear that General
Marshall himself knew of that understanding and that agreement and
I am just curious to know why he should have directed you to take such
reconnaissance [8221] as you thought necessary under those
circumstances ?
General Short. Well, I believe he read that message; he said that
he thought he saw the message on the 28th after he returned from
maneuvers and apparently, if it struck him at all, he did not think
it was significant enough to send me a message correcting it because
he did not know it before it was sent.
Senator George. There is no dispute here in this record that you did
advise precisely what you had done.
General Short. Just exactly.
Senator George. And that that was in response to a request in that
message.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator George. And that thereafter you had no advice that your
alert against sabotage was insufficient or inadequate.
General Short. That is correct.
Senator George. You had known of the warning messages — code
messages about destruction of codes or important paper messages sent
to you prior to the attack?
General Short. That is correct.
Senator George. Mr. Chairman, that is all that I have to ask General
Short, at least at this time.
The Chairman. Congressman Clark.
79716— 46— pT. 7 10
3050 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[8^22] Mr. Clakk. General, I wish to ask you only a very few
questions. . '.
At or about the time you took command at Pearl Harbor it was
suggested, I think, by General Marshall that the chief danger to our
establishment at Hawaii was an attack by air. Did you agree with
that?
General Short. I think that I took his suggestion that if an attack
came— he stated that there were three things that were of primary
importance that would cause the danger and the first thing he men-
tioned was sabotage; the second was attack by air or submarine.
Mr. Clark. Well, I have the impression from this record that he
listed attack by air as the chief danger.
General Short. May I read exactly what he said in that letter ? In
the next to the last paragraph he states :
Risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air or by submarine
constitute the real perils of the situation.
Mr. Clark. And he goes on to eliminate much danger from a landing
attack.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clark. Now, you agreed with that" estimate ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clark. And subsequent events proved it to be cor- {82'23']
rect.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clark. You did not on or about the 7th of December anticipate
any surprise attack by air, did you ?
General Short. I did not.
Mr. Clark. You had something to say in your statement about re-
quests made for additional equipment. Do you think that the com-
bined equipment and manpower of the Army and Navy as it existed
on the 7th of December was sufficient to have discovered and broken
up or greatly lessened the damage if it had been fully employed?
General Short. That is very difficult to say, whether we would
necessarily have discovered the carriers. If we had been told 4 hours,
which was possible, before the attack of the time set for the delivery
of the ultimatum we might have been lucky and picked up the carriers.
Mr. Clark. Well, I don't think you quite get my question, General,
if you will pardon me. I am asking you whether from, say, the 27th
of November until the 7th of December if full use had been made of
all the equipment and manpower available under the joint agreement
between the Army and Navy, do you think that the attack might have
been discovered or broken up or its effect greatly lessened with just
what you had?
General Short. I think to have made the maximum use of
[8£24] that and felt justified in making the maximum use of it we
would have had to have something pointing to Hawaii. Admiral
Kimmel had orders to make a deployment preparatory to placing
War Plan 46 into operation, which was an offensive against the Man-
date Islands.
Now, if we had had something that indicated an attack at Pearl
Harbor he undoubtedly would have discarded that part and would
have devoted everything he had toward the reconnaissance. He ap-
parently did not feel that he could use up all of his planes and maybe
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3051
having nothing at the critical time when he got an order to take an
offensive action in the Carolines. I think a more positive indication
as to an attack on Hawaii would have made him use the types of planes
that he had very definitely for reconnaissance and would have given
a suitable opportunity of locating the Japanese carriers.
Mr. Clark. Well, did I understand you to consider the use of the
ships in the manner that they were used as constituting a deployment?
General Short. Undoubtedly he was using his ships — I don't know
just exactly in what way, but he was told to use them as a defensive
deployment preparatory to going forward.
Mr. Clark. There were some ships out, that he had sent to these
islands, one of which was on the way back in.
[8B25] General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clark. And if I have your testimony correctly you have pre-
sented that here as constituting a deployment to that extent in that
area.
General Short. No; I presented that as constituting a reconnais-
sance.
Mr. Clark. Well. I meant reconnaissance when I said deployment.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clark. Now, with those particular ships aside was there not
sufficient equipment still on the island to have conducted a considerable
reconnaissance?
General Short. A considerable reconnaissance but not 360°, and it
still would have been a matter of his judgment as to what was the
dangerous sector of that 360°.
Mr. Clark. But the fact that you could not cover the entire 360°
would not constitute any reason, would it, for not employing that
equipment to the full extent possible?
General Short. No, sir. I think probably what influenced him in
that was that he felt his job was going to be to take offensive action,
that he did not want to get his planes and his crews into such shape
that they would not be alDle to take that when they got the order.
Mr. Clark. Now, you think that was the reason, or was it
[8226'\ the reason, really, that he was not dreaming of a surprise
attack on Pearl Harbor.
General Short. He did not expect a surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor.
Mr. Clark. And neither did you.
General Short. Neither did I.
Mr. Clark. And, consequently, this material and equipment and
men were not used at the site where there might be a surprise attack,
isn't that correct ?
General Short. I believe that Admiral Kimmel is a more logical
person to ask as to why he did not employ his ships and planes.
Mr. Clark. Yes.
General Short. But I feel that unquestionably that the fact that
we had had nothing pointing to an attack on Hawaii very definitely
entered into his use of his ships and planes.
Mr. Clark. Just why did you go into an antisabotage ?
General Short. Because there never had been at any time anything
since June 1940 indicating that the War Department believed that
an attack on Hawaii was probable, so that left it if hostilities oc-
3052 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
curred and did not include an attack, then it left nothing but sabo-
tage and internal disorders.
{5£^/] Mr. Clark. Would you mind stating what difference
in routine or daily action you invoked upon going on an antisabotage
alert?
General Short. When you went into an antisabotage alert, the men
who were placed OiS guards over all the \'ital installations like
bridges, telephone exchanges, gasoline tanks, everything of that kind,
naturally were not continuing in their training, in instruction.
There were also two battalions that remained on a 24-hour alert,
with every man required to be present, with the motor transporta-
tion there so that they could be moved to any part of tlie island to
put down any possible uprising or disorder.
All of the rest of the men in the Department continued their
training.
Xow. that was sabotage alert Xo. 1. When you went to Xo. 2
you had this same provision against sabotage, but in addition t-o that
you had arrangements to meet a surface, or subsurface, or an air
attack. That meant every plane and every man in the Air Corps
was devoting his attention to being ready to meet an air attack.
You would probably have a squadron of pursuit planes in the air
all the time. You would have certain other squadrons warmed up,
and they would all be so alerted that they could get in the air
[S^^'S] in a certain number of minutes. The planes that would
not be in the air would be in the bimkers. The men belonging to
the crew would be in the bimkers. would sleep in the bunkers. They
had their gasoline there, had ammunition there.
The harbor defense troops would be fully manned, ready to fire
upon any approaching Japanese ships. The antiaircraft guns would
be all at the prescribed j :<^sitions and with fidl crews and ammunition
immediately at hand and ready to fire.
I would like to explain, if I may at this point, that some may have
gotten the wrong idea yesterday in presenting that table signed by
Colonel Wing. A considerable number of those batteries had to move
maybe 20 miles, so that accounted for tlie length of time from the
time they were alerted until they were ready to fire.
That is not part of your question, but I wanted to point that out
because that naturally came in with alert Xo. 1.
Xow. you see. in that case the only people who could continue to
train would be the infantry divisions. Everything else practically
would be alerted.
The infantry divisions could go ahead with their training, because
they are not part of alert Xo. 2.
[8229] When you come to alert Xo. 3. that is an all-out alert,
where every man goes to his battle position, every j^ompany and pla-
toon, battalion, of infantry go to their positions, take up their posi-
tions, ready to meet an attack, and if their positions have not been
developed and improved they would start continuing the develop-
ment, doing more digging, if they need to. putting out barbed wire in
front of them, doing everything to meet a landing attack.
Does that answer your question ?
Mr. Clark. Yes. sir.
Getting back to the alert you did take, the antisabotage alert, about
the onlv difference there as against what you were doing before would
PROCEEDINGS OF JOIXT COMMITTEE 3053
be to put these particular men on a 24-hour basis rather than regular
hours?
General Short. I would like to explain that rather fully.
Mr. Clark. 1 would like to get clear as to just what ifference it
made.
General Short. Between that and ordinary times ?
Mr. Clark. That is right.
General J?hort. If there had been no alarming condition we would
not have had anv of those men out over bridges and ciTilian installa-
tions and things of that kind. If [82-SOj it was just normal
peacetimes. I would not have any of that on.
Xow, as a matter of fact, beginning July S. the situation was such
that we put considerable number of men out.
When we got this message of Xovember 27, I had the sentinels
checked. That was especially true along the water front because we
had a very serious situation, that all the gasoline that was available
commercially in Hawaii, which meant a great amount, was open to easy
sabotage.
I had General Murray, who commanded the Twentylfifth Division,
occupy the positions on the south side of the island, and Colonel
Fielder, who was the G-2. personally go over the whole situation with
respect to sentinels, to recommend changes, and we made a very de-
cided overhaul, and put on a great many additional sentinels. We
did a most thorough job. and particularly around the water front
where there was danger from fire from gasoline, and so forth.
Mr. Clark. But that was all precautions against what might take
place by people located on the island.
General Short. Yes. sir.
Mr. Clark. It did not make any great change in that situation?
Greneral Short. Well, it required a considerable number [SSSlI
of more men. There were more men who were not able to go on
with their training. We felt it made a very considerable change in
that we were much safer as far as any internal action went than
we were before, because we spent the whole time in going into that
extremely carefully.
Mr. Clark. That was the extent of the action that you. as the com-
manding officer, felt that you could take in response to the message
you received on the 27th ?
General Short. With the information I had that was all the enemy
action I anticip-ated. or expected.
3>Ir. Clark. Just what was there in this message that caused you to
feel there might be more danger of injury from people on the island?
General Short. I thought there was more danger of imminent
action.
Mr. Clark. Beg pardon?
General Short. I thought there was great danger of imminent hos-
tilities. Since they had never at any time pointed toward Hawaii
as a place of attack, and the officers who wrote their estimate on
November 29 said they definitely eliminated it. as I saw the thing,
our problem was to meet internal disorders.
Mr. CxuiRK. Could you give the committee an illustration of any
internal disorder, you had had before [SS32] that ?
General Short. I had tried to state that we had tightened the ring
so that there would not be any. We had succeeded ; there never wasl
3054 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Clark. From the time you got there until the 7th of December,
there was no internal disorder?
General Short. No, sir; but there had been for almost 2 years a
considerable number of sentinels on duty watching. There had hardly
been a time in 2 years that they had not had considerable guards out
against sabotage.
Mr. CixARK. Had there been any sabotage ?
General Short. No sir ; but that is no indication that there would
not be. We all knew the possibilities, with the large Japanese popu-
lation, and I think most of us remembered the sabotage that had
taken place in the United States in 1917, and we were determined to
prevent that, if possible.
Mr. Clark. Now, although there had been no sabotage, the only
action you took pursuant to this message was to further guard
against it ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Clark. Now, if you had gone on an all-out alert, according to
your testimony, as I got it, it would have [8233] attracted a
great deal of attention on the island ?
General Short. Unquestionably. We would have troops move un-
der full field equipment over practically every road on the island.
Mr. Clark. Practically everybody on the island would have known
what was taking place?
General Short. I think they would. I think we had hundreds of
Japanese-Americans actually in the service at that time, in the Na-
tional Guard regiments. Some of those may have been Japanese
agents. We didn't know.
Mr. Clark. Now, was there anything to keep Admiral Kimmel
from noticing that you were not on that kind of an alert?
General Short. I think if he had been ashore, he would have noticed
it, if we had gone on the all-out alert, because he could not have helped
seeing the movement of troops.
Mr. Clark. But he was ashore, wasn't he?
General Short. From his headquarters at Pearl Harbor, I do not
know that he could see any traffic.
Mr. Clark. Well, you mean to tell the committee everybody on the
island would have known you were on an all-out alert, except Admiral
Kimmel ?
General Short. Undoubtedly some of the Navy people [S^SJ^]
would have known.
Mr. Clark. He says he did not know that you were not on an all-
out alert.
General Short. I still insist it was faulty staff work on the part of
the Fourteenth Naval District if he did not know.
Mr. Clark. And you did not know that he was making a long-
distant reconnaissance?
General Short. I knew he was making considerable long-distance
reconnaissance. I did not know the exact time the planes were going
out, or the exact location of the ships, but I knew he was making con-
siderable long-distance reconnaissance. He told me he had tightened
up all along the line. That was the expression he used.
Mr. Clark. Did vou consider that important. General?
General Short. I did.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3055
Mr. Clark. You knew he had not called on you for the use of the
long-distance reconnaissance planes under your control ?
General Short. Yes, sir, and there might have been a very good
reason. In the first place, I had only six, and those six planes were
the only planes in Honolulu, either Army or Xavy, that could go and
bomb a carrier that had plane protection, and had any chance to get
away [8325] with it, that could fight as well as carry bombs.
The Navy patrol planes were too cumbersome. If the carrier were
protected with planes in the air in the vicinity they probably would be
shot down if they tried to bomb.
The B-17's were the only planes in the whole islands suitable for
bombing missions. That might have been his reason for not calling
on them for a patrol mission, because if they located a carrier, and
he wanted to bomb, they were the only planes that could fight their
way through and have a reasonable chance of getting home.
Mr. Clark. At any rate, you knew he did not call on you ?
General Short. He did not call on me.
Mr. Clark. You knew he was hard pressed for planes with which
to make long-distance reconnaissance?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Clark. And even with the Army planes, he did not have enough
to cover the whole 360°, you say?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Clark. Because of that circumstance, did it occur to you to
inquire particularly as to whether this reconnaissance could be made?
General Short. Well, as I say, I knew that a considerable recon-
naissance was being made.
[8236] Mr. Clark. I am asking you whether or not the fact
he did not call for your reconnaissance planes, did not raise the ques-
tion in your mind as to whether it was being made to the fullest extent
possible with the equipment available?
General Short. As I said, I had so few — six — and they were so
much the best planes for a bombing mission, if such mission became
necessary, that I think it would have been very sound judgment for
him not to use those as long as he could avoid it, because they were
the ones he would want to drive home the bombing attack.
Mr. Clark. The fact he did not call on those planes did not raise
that particular question in your mind?
General Short. No, sir.
If he had felt the need of them badly probably his air men would
have asked for every one of my air men, as to whether to send them
out or hold them for a bombing mission.
Mr. Clark. I think Mr. Cooper has already touched on what is in
my mind, therefore I will not take the liberty of repeating the
question.
Was there anything more important to the proper protection of
this establishment in Hawaii than the state of alert the Army was
on at the time the long distance recon- [8237] naissance would
be conducted ?
General Short. Certainly the reconnaissance was perfectly im-
portant. The state of alertVas undoubtedly limited, if I carried out
specifically the last sentence in my order, which said :
Disseminate this vitally secret information to the minimum essential officers.
3056 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Now, it did not say "officers and men."
The minute you ordered either alert No. 2 or alert No. 3 you had to
tell every enlisted man that was put in position why he was there,
and what he was to shoot at.
Mr. Clark. Yes; I understand your position about that because
I listened to your testimony. But may it not be that the information
not to be given out, that was limited to the officers, was the general
information? That does not refer exclusively to the alert. It does
not say "alert."
General Short. The only information it gave was general infor-
mation that there was a big chance of hostilities with Japan.
Mr. Clark. Your position was that you could not have gone on an
all out-alert without having gone contrary to this message of the
27th?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Clark. Did it occur to you, if that was your [8£38]
opinion, that you might ask for a clarification on that ?
General Short. I thought that the War Department should under-
stand perfectly. They told me to report measures taken. They knew
exactly what I was doing. They had 9 days in which to tell me I
was wrong, that I should do something more or something less, and
they took no action whatever.
Mr. Clark. In that 9 days, did it occur to you that you might ask
them to clarify this apparent contradiction in the message?
General Short. I did not think so because it struck me the things
that they were primarily interested in were, first, avoiding war ; sec-
ond, avoiding any possible international incident that would give
Japan an excuse for going to war, or for using propaganda that we
had started the war.
[8239] Mr. Clark. And notwithstanding the fact that that
message, I think you said, was not to jeopardize the safety of the
establishment down there ?
General Short. That was in regard to the first overt act. They did
not say that in regard to the dissemination of information.
Mr. Clark. What I was asking you about was the comparative im-
portance of the kind of alert you were on and the long-distance recon-
naissance that was not being made. Was there anything there more
important than that, in your judgment?
General Short. The long-distance reconnaissance, if it obtained
positive information I could have changed my type of alert in a very
few minutes. I actually had completed the change in 7 minutes when
the attack took place. Our plans were so drawn that everybody
understood them to the last man. We had moved into position with
those plans so the time required, if we got any information from
Washington or from the Navy that indicated an attack on Hawaii, it
was simply a question of minutes in going into the correct alert.
Mr. Clark. In view of the fact that you did not know that the
Navy was conducting long-distance reconnaissance, or whether it was
conducting a long-distance reconnaissance, and in view of Admiral
Kimmel's testimony that he did not know you had not gone on an
all-out alert, just what did you [8240] mean in the reply to
the message of the 27th by saying, "Liaison with the Navy"?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3057
General Short. That I was keeping in touch with the Navy, and I
thought I knew what they were doing. I still think I knew. Not
in exact detail, but I knew generally what they were doing. Frankly,
it had not occurred to me that he did not know the type of alert we
were on.
Mr. Clark. But in view of the fact that you did not know precisely
what the Navy was doing about long-distance reconnaissance, and
that Admiral Kimmel did not know you had not gone on an all-out
alert, do you think your statement to the War Department "Liaison
with the Navy" would have been justified?
General Short. When I made that statement I had no reason to
believe he would not loiow exactly what my alert was, because, as I
say, he had an officer there who knew exactly what we were doing,
who had no other function except to report it, and I knew from a
3-hour conference that morning exactly what he was doing in the way
of reconnaissance. Not in detail, but I mean the general picture. I
thought he was covering from east of Midway around west and south
to Palmyra.
Mr. Clark. General Short, I do not know whether it might be an
argument for or against unity of command, or anything of that
sort, but as a member of this committee I am rather [8241^ se-
riously impressed by the fact that you, as the commander in chief of
the Army, and Admiral Kimmel, as the commander in chief of the
Navy, in fact did not Iniow what the other was doing about some very
vital matters on Pearl Harbor.
If you can clarify my mind any further in that respect I would
appreciate it.
General Short. I would like to answer that rather fully.
Command by cooperation necessarily depends, to a considerable
extent, on the personality of the two commanders. I believe if Admiral
Kimmel and I had full information from Washington that our rela-
tions were such that we could have made cooperation work. However,
I will state, on general principles, in the average situation, that I
believe unity of command is a much stronger, much safer proposition.
Does that answer your question ?
Mr. Clark. Yes. sir; except I do not quite see the unity in actual
operation at Hawaii.
General Short. Unity of command did not exist in Hawaii until
after the attack.
Mr. Clark. Even in view of the contract that was executed between
the Army and the Navy ?
General Short. There was only one place where we had provision
for unity of command and that was when planes were turned over by
the Army to the Navy or by the Navy to the Army [8^42]
That was the only unity of command that was provided. There was
no other unitj^ of command. That was cooperation.
Mr. Clark. Just one thing further I would like to ask you. Why
did you not operate the radar for longer hours than from 4 to 7?
General Short. Well, there were three reasons. In the first place,
the information I had did not cause me to expect an air attack. I
really did not expect it, but I decided to operate during the most dan-
gerous hours anyway.
3058 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
We had a very limited number of trained men. When you operated
the information center and the interceptor command you needed your
best crew on, because there was no use wasting the time of the people
at the information center by putting men on the radar who did not
know how to operate it. We needed time during the day for training
purposes.
In the third place, we had no spare parts except what we took from
the permanent sets that were not in use. If we operated 24 hours a
day there was a very considerable chance that by the end of a few
days we would not have more than one or two stations that would be
capable of operating.
Mr. Clark. I want to say before I desist entirely, sir, that I have
great respect for you and your honorable record as an officer in the
Army. I have some sympathy for you for having gotten into a situa-
tion of the kind you encountered [8243] at Pearl Harbor. It
has been a hard experience for you, sir, and I appreciate the very clear
statement you have made to the committee.
General Short. I thank you very much. I tried to be perfectly
frank with the committee, and I hope I have succeeded.
The Vice Chairman. The committee at this point will recess until
2 o'clock, at which time Senator Lucas, of Illinois, will inquire, General.
(Whereupon, at 12 : 05 p. m., the committee recessed until 2 p. m.
of the same day. )
[8244] AFTERNOON SESSION 2 100 P. M.
The Vice Chairman. The committee will be in order. Does counsel
have anything at this point?
Mr. Kaufman. No, sir.
The Vice Chairman. General, do you have anything before your ex-
amination is resumed ?
General Short. No, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas, of Illinois, will inquire. Gen-
eral.
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES
ARMY (RETIRED)— Resumed
Senator Lucas. General Short, I have listened with a great deal
of attention to the memorandum that you furnished the committee in
which you set forth your views concerning this Pearl Harbor disaster.
The language that you use in paragraph 98 of your statement expresses
in rather terse and forceful terms your views, and I just want to ask
you one question on that. [Reading:]
Unjust War Department Treatment: I do not feel that I Lave been treated
fairly or with justice by the War Department. I was singled out as an example,
as the scapegoat for the disaster.
Following that statement I should like to ask yoti whether or not
you bear any ill will against the former President of [8245] the
United States, Mr. Roosevelt, as a result of your retirement in Decem-
ber 1941 ?
General Short. I do not.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3059
Senator Lucas. General Short, I desire to call your attention to the
November 27 message and even though there may be some repetition
there I believe that I should like to ask you a question or two in order
to satisfy my own mind.
That message was sent by General Marshall on November the 27th
and in that message General Marshall states, among other things, that
you are to "undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you
deem necessary."
Now, you have been examined with much care upon that one line
in the message. I should like to ask you what you undei:stand that
"deep reconnaissance" means?
General Short. Exactly the same thing as distant reconnaissance.
It would be reconnaissance — I would say according to the Martin study
it should go to the extent of a thousand and fifty miles. That is what
the Martin study determined should be made to be safe.
Senator Lucas. Now, did you have any planes at your command at
that time which would carry out a distance reconnaissance ?
General Short. I had six planes.
Senator Lucas. And as I understand it the Navy had 39 [824^]
planes.
General Short. I believe it was 49. I am not positive.
Senator Lucas. I think you are correct. At least the Navy had the
bulk of the planes to carry out any long distance reconnaissance ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. And, of course, as we know, through the joint agree-
ment it was the duty of the Navy to carry out an}^ reconnaissance under
any orders that you as commander or Admiral Kimmel as commander
of the fleet might have received?
General Short. That is correct.
Senator Lucas. When you received this message did this statement
asking you to undertake such reconnaissance signify anything of un-
usual miportance with respect to our danger from Japan?
General Short. It would simply indicate to me that while they had
not pointed in any way toward us that they wanted to be a little surer
than they would normally be that the Japs were not sending anything
in there.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I have that answer read?
General Short. It was maj'be poorly put in.
Senator Lucas. Will you read the answer, Mr. Reporter, please ?
[5^47] (The answer was read by the reporter.)
Senator Lucas. Do you want to clarify that answer in any way,
General ?
General Short. Is that clear to you ?
Senator Lucas. It is clear to me.
Senator Ferguson. I do not know as I understand what you mean by
"a little clearer."
General Short. Did I say "a little clearer" ?
Senator Ferguson. Or "a little surer."
General Short. A little surer.
Senator Ferguson. What do you mean by "a little surer" ?
General Short. They were just inclined to take a few more pre-
cautions than they would normally take because they felt that hostili-
ties were imminent.
3060 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Lucas. Well, isn't it a fact, General, that when General
Herron was there in 1940 long-range reconnaissance was held for some
weeks ?
General Short. It was held, I think, from June 17 through July 16
and then the sabotage part of the alert was continued on for probably
another month.
Senator Lucas. And in that long-range reconnaissance, as I recall,
the evidence discloses that both the Army and the Navy participated
in that operation but it was under the jurisdiction of the Navy.
General Short. At that time there was not a written agreement
putting the responsibility upon the Navy. Actually, through a per-
sonal agreement at the time they did it the" same way but it had not
been laid down in written form and had the approval of the War and
the Navy Departments.
Senator Lucas, in the summer of 1940 is the only time that any
long-range reconnaissance was ever carried on ?
General Short. I could not be sure of that. It may be that Admiral
Kimmel, when he got a message like the one of October 16, he carried
on some. He was carrying on some habitually on the perimeter, which
was over a thousand miles out from Oahu. He was sending planes
from Johnston Island to Wake Island to Midway, which was well —
and part of it well over a thousand miles, so he was conducting habitu-
ally some long-range reconnaissance.
Senator Lucas. Is there any difference in wdiat a patrol plane can
do and what a long-range reconnaissance plane does ?
General Short. I would say exactly the same thing.
Senator Lucas. The same thing?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Did you understand that Admiral Kimmel if he
were carrying out long-range reconnaissance was doing that as a result
of this message or had he been doing that before ?
[S^4'^] General Short. Well, he had been doing some before. I
think from w^hat he told me that he had tightened up all along the
line and that he was doing more.
Senator Lucas. Then this word or, rather, this statement, as I
understand it, given to you by General Marshall in his message of
November the 27th, did not mean very much to you ?
General Short. There was one thing that I was responsible for but
it was not of much value, and that was the in-shore reconnaissance
that went out only 20 miles and was really of value only against
submarines. As far as an air attack, it was absolutely valueless. That
was our responsibility and we did that in two ways : We had one
reconnaissance squadron that did nothing but train in reconnaissance
and fly around the perimeter of Oahu and then all of our fighters that
were training over the island of Oahu normally were taught recon-
naissance at the same time.
Senator Lucas. Did you ever at any time before receive a message
signed by General Marshall while you were in command of Hawaii?
General Short. I believe that is the only message. I received a good
many letters but I believe that was the only message. I am not sure
about that.
Senator Lucas. Well, this is a command message, is it not?
General Short. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3061
[8260] Senator Lucas. And there is a distinct difference in
Army circles and Navy circles between a command message and one
that is merely sent for information ?
General Short. Yes ; but a command message may be sent by the
adjutant general as well as the chief of staff, either one.
Senator Lucas. Did the fact that General Marshall was sending
you, for the first time in your career as commander of the Hawaiian
'Department, a message, make any unusual impression upon you as to
the danger that might exist ?
General Short. I, practically, got from that message that they con-
sidered hostilities imminent and that they were particularly anxious
to avoid war, if it was possible to do so, and that they did not want
any international incident in Hawaii that would either provoke Japan
or enable her to say that we were starting the war. I think probably
if I thought about the fact that it was signed by Marshall I might have
thought that that was his personal angle on the thing, to be sure we
were careful to not produce a state of war, not producing the effect that
we had started the war.
Senator Lucas. The mere fact that General Marshall, who was chief
of staff of the Army at that time, had his hands in the fire in many
different places throughout the world, and of course you knew that
it would take time and effort to [82-51] send you a message
of this kind, seems to me it should have probably fired your imagina-
tion immediately on the dangers existing.
General Short. Well, that indicated at least his specific interest,
and I thought from the message that his first interest of all was to be
sure that we were doing nothing to precipitate a war ; that it looked
like hostilities were imminent and what he was particularly caution-
ing us against — and I took it it was possibly a very personal desire
of his — that we do nothing to precipitate a war.
Senator Lucas. General Short, what time did yon receive this mes-
sage of November 27 ?
General Short. I think it was sometime after 2 o'clock. I am not
sure of the exact time.
Senator Lucas. In the afternoon ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. And where were you at the time when the message
came ?
General Short. I was in my office, in mj^ headquarters.
Senator Lucas. As I understand the record, you replied to General
Marshall within 30 minutes' time after receiving the message.
General Short. I made my decision within that time. The message
I do not think got out of the Signal Office that fast, [82-52] but
I made my decision in that time.
Senator Lucas. And before making your decision you conferred
with no member of your staff as to the meaning or the significance of
this message ?
General Short. I conferred with the chief of staff and General
Fielder, G-2, yes, sir. I conferred with him before the message went,
but I was rather of the opinion that I made my decision before the
conference. I am not sure.
Senator Lucas. Well, if I am in error in that statement of course 1
apologize to you, sir.
3062 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. I conferred with the chief of staff definitely, and
it is possible — the time was so close together that I am not sure that I
talked with G-2 immediately before or immediately after.
Senator Lucas. In that reply message of yours you stated "Alerted
to sabotage ; liaison with the Navy." How did you alert your com-
mand to sabotage within that short space of time?
General Short. We had the standing operating procedure that
laid down definitely what every unit would do, and we issued the
order as an oral order, and it went out over the telephone in a very
few minutes; it was not take over 10 minutes at the outset to put it
into effect, because everybody knew what was required. We had
that standing operating procedure. You did not have to tell any-
body what his business [8253] was.
Senator Lucas. Well, your standing operating procedure at that
particular time was with respect to sabotage, was it not?
General Short. No; it was with respect to the three alerts. All
we had to do, when the phone message went out, was to go into alert
No. 1.
Senator Lucas. And what alert were you operating under pre-
vious to the time you received the message?
General Short. We were not operating under an alert, but we had
out a very considerable number of guards over vital installations.
We were not fully under alert No. 1 ; we were, you might say, half
way, because there were certain installations that were so important
that they had been really guarded for months.
Senator Lucas. Then you took sole responsibility for alerting your
command to sabotage immediately after receiving this message of
November 27 ?
General Short. That is correct. I sent for two officers who would
be most intimately concerned, General Martin and General Burgin,
and I conferred with them some time within the next hour or hour
and a half.
Senator Lucas. And that is true notwithstanding the fact that
there is not a single word in that message which talks about sabotage?
[8254] General Short. That is correct.
Senator Lucas. It has always been just a little difficult for me to
understand why your message was not a little more responsive to the
message that was sent by General Marshall.
General Short. It is just an interpretation of what the message
means to you. I think I was influenced almost wholly by the fact
that no War Department message or estimate since June 17, 1940,
had ever pointed to the probability of an air attack or a raid.
Senator Lucas. That is probably true; but the record is rather
complete here that everybody in Hawaii, both in the Army and Navy,
were talking about the possibility of an air attack, that is from Feb-
ruary on at least until October, and they were also having air drills,
contemplating, I presume, an air attack, were they not ?
General Short. We had lots of drills. We talked about the possi-
bility.
Senator Lucas. Yes.
General Short. But everything that we got from the War Depart-
ment in the nature of a probability indicating where the attack would
come pointed toward the Philippines, Borneo, the Kra Peninsula,
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3063
down in that part of the world, and at Guam in one instance, and
then in the next wire they took Guam [8£'55] out so as to give
them sabotage orders. I think we should make a big distinction be-
tween the "possibility" orders and "probability" on account of the
information we had from the War Department.
[8356] Senator Lucas. I think that is a sound conclusion.
Now, following this message that you pot from General Marshall,
you also received a message from General Miles ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. And that was wholly in regard to sabotage ?
General Short. Yes, sir, and it was Miles' function if he had any
information indicating anything beyond sabotage, an all-out attack,
a landing attack, or air attack, that he should also have mentioned that.
Senator Lucas. Who was your G-2 in Hawaii at tb at time ?
General Short. Colonel Fielder, now General Fielder, who is stiU
G-2 in the Hawaiian Department.
Senator Lucas. What were his duties in Hawaii under your com-
mand there in the Hawaiian Department ?
General Short. His duties were naturally to assemble and evaluate
all possible enemy information, and the sources of enemy inforination
were purely local. What he was able to get on his own pertained to
subversive action. He was dependent on tlie War Department or the
Navy Department for any other type of information. He had no
agents outside of Honolulu.
Senator Lucas. Did he have liaison with the Intelli- [8357]
gence man in the Navy in Hawaii ?
General Short. He had very close liaison with the man who had
charge of the subversive action measures altogether. They had offices
side by side in town; they had a teletype that connected the FBI and
ONI and G-2, so they could talk back and forth.
Senator Lucas. Do I understand you to say to the committee, Gen-
eral, that all of the information that j^ou received as to the situation
existing between Japan and this country in the months preceding the
attack came from Washington, D. C. ?
General Short. Or some from the Navy Department. None on our
own. I will amend that slightly. Our contact officer made it a habit
to meet the boats from the Orient so he could get in touch with the
people who had been living out in China or Japan who were coming
through, and pick up anything he could.
Of course the value of that information varied with the individual
he talked to. We were never sure how valuable it was, but we carried
it on all the time, getting what we could out of these passengers going
through.
Senator Lucas. Do I understand your only means of obtaining in-
telligence information was through the Army and Navy Intelligence
Department here in Washington, D. C. ?
; [8258] General Short. No, we got some from the Navy in
Hawaii.
Senator Lucas. In Hawaii ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. I was going to ask you where Admiral Bloch figured
in in that picture, as far as obtaining any intelligence was concerned?
General Short. Admiral Bloch had a service, a radio intercept serv-
3064 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ice on the location of ships, Japanese ships, and his office kept track
of them pretty thoroughly, and on a good many occasions I have
seen the map showing the various locations of the Japanese ships as
they thought they had been.
I also talked with both Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel as to
where the Japanese Fleet was.
Senator Lucas. There was an interchange then of information with
respect to the communications that were received ?
General Short. Yes, sir. I think it was more directly with me than
it was with G-2. My liaison with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral
Bloch was a little closer than his liaison with the man who handled
that type of information.
Senator Lucas. One of the reasons that I have asked these questions
is because of what I find in exhibit 33.
[8259] In exhibit 33, on November 26, 1941, I note a memoran-
dum for the Chief of Staff : Subject : Japanese Naval Task Force.
The following information was received from the Commandant 14th Naval
District through the Office of Naval Intelligence at 12 : 45 a. m. this date.
In that memorandum they set forth at some length where they be-
lieve the Japanese Fleet nnght be on that particular day. I was just
wondering whether you had ever seen that memorandum before it left
Hawaii for the Naval Intelligence Department here.
General Short. I did not see the memorandum as such. I might
have had the information from conversations with Admiral Bloch
and Admiral Kimmel, or I might have seen the same thing on the
map in Admiral Bloch's headquarters.
Senator Lucas. The only reason that I mention that is to me it is
apparent that Admiral Bloch, or someone out at Hawaii had a consid-
erable amount of information that they had obtained, and thought
it valuable enough to send to Washington in order that they might
have the advantage of making any evaluation of it that they saw fit.
General Short. Yes, sir, they had a regular intercept service. As
I understand the thing, Washington took their [8260] esti-
mates and the estimates of the intercept station at Manila. If there
was no difference in the information, or if there was no difference of
opinion, they accepted it, and if there was a difference of opinion they
gave more credence to Manila, because it was closer and they thought
it would be more accurate.
Senator Lucas. Now in that memorandum to the Chief of Staff,
which came from the Naval Intelligence of the 14th Naval District,
you conclude by saying :
The evaluation put upon the above information by the Commandant 14th Naval
District is that a strong force may be preparing to operate in southeastern Asia,
while component parts thereof may be expected to operate from Palao and the
Marshall Islands.
Is not that a strong indication that those in Hawaii at the time be-
lived that Japan was going to move toward the Marshall Islands ?
General Short. That would indicate that they thought some ships
were going toward the Marshall Islands. Of course Palao is well
down toward the Philippines.
Senator Lucas. Yes, I know.
General Short. The Marshalls would have been of decided interest.
I don't remember having that piece of information, and I believe I
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3065
have seen since in docu- [8^61] ments here that Manila dis-
agreed, and within 12 hours they knew from the War Department that
Manila had disagreed from that finding, and that ma^^ be one reason
I never did know about it.
Senator Lucas. That may be true. I am not certain about whether
Manila disagreed with this finding. I am only pointing out the Mar-
shall Islands, because under the Orange war plans, that was where the
American fleet was going to strike also.
General Short. That was of very great interest.
Senator Lucas. So if the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval Dis-
trict, on November 26, 1941, had any information that he believed that
the Japanese Fleet, or a part of it might go into the Marshall Islands,
you were getting pretty close to where America expected to start her
offensive in the event of a declaration of war ?
General Short. That is correct. It would have been of interest to
me, and, as I say, it is possible I did not get it because of the disagTee-
ment between the two stations.
Senator Lucas. I do not think that Admiral Kimmel was interro-
gated upon that message. I overlooked it. It seems to me it would
be rather important as showing definite information on the 26th of
November as to what Admiral Bloch [8262] at least, believed
with respect to the offensive toward the Marshall Islands.
General Short. I believed, incidentally, that that would turn out to
be, and it turned out to be false information.
Senator Lucas. They did not come by way of the Marshalls, but
they came north of the Marshalls ?
General Short. They came way north of the Marshalls.
Senator Lucas. Yes ; that is true.
General Short. It could not have been the same force.
Senator Lucas. I am only using it to point to the information which
they believed at that time, that there was a possibility of some sort of a
force coming in to the Marshalls which would bring them at least
closer to Hawaii, and therefore it should have been, it seems to me, of
tremendous significance to the folks in Hawaii with regard to the
danger they were facing, whether it was right or wrong.
General Short. It would have been of very great interest to me, but
1 did not get it at the time.
Senator Lucas. I have been just a little puzzled. General, with
respect to your reply to this message of November 27, and the reply of
General DeWitt, who was at that time, as I recall, commanding the
command on the [8263] west coast.
The message that was sent by General Marshall to you and the mes-
sage that was sent by General Marshall to General DeWitt on the
west coast are almost idential are they not ?
General Short. That is correct.
Senator Lucas. I have been puzzled at your reply when I compare
it with the reply of General DeWitt, and here is what he says :
Report following measures taken as per your radio November 27 : Your radio
paraphrased to Commanding Generals ADC Second Air Force, Fourth Air Force,
Ninth CAD, Pacific Coastal Frontier Sectors, Ninth Corps Area, and Com-
mandants Eleventh, Twelfth and Fifteenth Naval Districts. All harbor entrance
control posts continuously manned. One gun battery each liarbor defense con-
tinuously alerted. Protection against sabotage and other subversive activities
intensified. Sixth Infantry battalions and necessary motor transportation
79716— 46— pt. 7 11
3066 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
alerted so as to be instantly available to CG NTA to carry out his missions under
Rainbow Five. Constant contact being maintained with corps area and naval
district commanders and full cooperation assured. PCF, sector and sub sector
plans Rainbow Five practically completed and necessary reconnaissance being
made to carry [82G4\ out defense of critical areas. Two rifle companies
furnishing CG SF P of E for guard duty and one company furnished to CG NCA
for internment aliens at Angel Island paren in connection this report see my
radio to CG GHQ November 25 which recommended that WPL five two be ex-
tended to include Pacific coast and Japanese vessels and which outlined steps
talve by me in preparation therefore. As air forces as well as other Army forces
will be involved in the execution of WPL five two or the preparatory stage of
Rainbow Five it is strongly urged that I be authorized to direct operation of
Air forces in defense of the PCF or that instructions be issiied specifying air
action and that I be furnished copy of such directive. Should hostilities occur
this command now ready to carry out taslcs assigned in Rainbow Five so far
as they pertain to Japan except for woeful shortage of ammunition and pursuit
and bombardment planes which should be made available without delay.
I presume that there are reasons for the difference in the answers
that were made by yourself and the one who was in command of the
west coast.
Can you tell why General DeWitt would take the position that he
did in replj'ing to the same kind of a message?
General Shoet. I can only make a guess at it. My [8265]
guess would be that he did not having a standing operating procedure,
and therefore it was necessary for him to go more into detail.
Our standing operating procedure showed that we had two bat-
talions with full motor transportation ready to go any place on the
islands.
We didn't mention that because that was part of the standing op-
erating procedure. The reconnaissance apparently had no agreement
with the Navy so he had to show the reconnaissance. The air force
that he speaks about wanting placed under his command, I think was
part of GHQ Air Force that operated directly under Washington, and
he was asking to have it put under him for operation.
That is largely an estimate, but I think it is probably a fair one.
Senator Lucas. His danger was not as much as yours, was it, Gen-
eral?
General Short. Well, he had the much longer front, and he had
some very vital installations, like all of the factories at Los Angeles,
and so it was difficult to say, because he had less, far less personnel to
defend with than we had. Our area was a concentrated area where
we could take up our positions in a relatively short time. His were
hundreds of miles long, and he had a very limited force.
[8266] Senator Lucas. Well, the thing that struck me as being
rather strange was to find a reply of this kind to the same kind of a
message and the reply of yours from Hawaii which always seemed
to me to be the most dangerous spot perhaps of our outlying possessions
or our coastal positions.
General Short. I believe it would indicate that our preparation for
occupying our positions and everything of that kind were nmch more
complete.
Senator Lucas. It may be, but he went on an all-out alert ; DeWitt
went on the all-out alert ?
General Short. No; I don't think so. He alerted certain infantry
battalions. We had certain infantry battalions alerted. If you
notice, on his seacoast gims, he alerted, I believe, one gun at the
entrance of each harbor.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3067
Senator Lucas (reading) :
All harbor entrance control posts continuously manned. One gun battery each
harbor defense continuously alerted.
General Short. He only had 1 battery alerted. Around San Fran-
cisco he probably had at least 12 and at Puget Sound he had a very
considerable number. So you can see his was a partial alert. It was
not a complete alert at all.
Senator Lucas. Let me ask you about the civilian population in
Hawaii. You alerted for sabotage. You were not there in 1940
when they had the previous alert ?
[8267] General Short. No, sir.
Senator Lucas. Well, did you learn about any uprisings or any
undue sabotage being committed at that time by the people of Hawaii
was the result of that alert?
General Short. No; you wouldn't ^ret sabotage as a result of an
alert. You might get it because you didn't go into an alert.
Senator Lucas. He went on an all-out alert in 1940 ?
General Short. That is right, on a direct order from the War
Department.
Senator Lucas. I know.
General Short. Then he cut it back on July 16.
Senator Lucas. What I am trying to find out is whether as a result
of the alert the population of Hawaii was in any way disturbed.
General Short. If you will read the letters between General Mar-
shall and General Herron there is one letter in there where General
Herron says that a lot of people were considerably disturbed for the
fii'st few days and he says that even some of the younger officers sent
their families to the hills.
Senator Lucas. Well, the War Department in Washington and
you fellows out in Hawaii were both wrong on that, too, weren't you,
on the question of sabotage?
[826S] General Short. It is very difficult to say. We can't tell
what would have happened if we hadn't held a tight rein over them.
I think the feeling was, with everybody who had made a careful
study, that if there had ever been any real success to the Japanese
plans, that most anything might have happened.
Senator Lucas. What do you call a success if December 7, 1941,
wasn't a pretty fair test of success?
General Short. A landing on the island of Oahu. They immedi-
ately would have had perhaps an army of thousands, a fifth column
of thousands, ready to support them.
Senator Lucas. Were you alerted against sabotage because you
feared a landing of the Japanese?
General Short. No, sir. We were alerted because we felt they might
try to destroy all the vital installations ; and, as a matter of fact, wi1;h-
out an alert against sabotage, the way the gasoline and oil was placed
along the waterfront in Honolulu a very small group of men could
have destroyed the city of Honolulu ; and the same thing with 4 million
gallons of oil in Pearl Harbor. They could have done much more
damage than was done because they could have destroyed all the oil.
They could have destroyed the repair facilities. And probably the fire
would have destroyed a good many of the ships in the harbor.
[8369] Senator Lucas. I don't doubt but that is true. General
Short, that you had every reason to take every precaution possible
3088 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
against sabotage, but I come back to my original question, whether or
not anybody from Japan really used the sabotage methods on Decem-
ber 7 or immediately thereafter insofar as you Imow?
General Short. Whether thej^ used it?
Senator Lucas. Whether they did carry out these acts of sabotage
that you people in Hawaii and the people in Washington were con-
stanth' afraid of.
Greneral Short. There was none, but whether there would have been
if we had been lax I don't think anybody will ever know.
Senator Lucas. Perhaps not. That is one of those things that will
go unsolved.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. I think it is in the record, but do you recall how
many planes you lost that morning in the air raid that were on
Hickam Field?
General Short. I think I have it here.
Senator Lucas. It may not be material but I am leading up to
another question.
General Short. It is in that exhibit No. 7 of the Roberts commis-
sion. I don't know whether I am going to find it right [8270]
here or not. I have the statement of planes here as of December 7 and
then as of December 20. I don't have the statement right here on that.
Senator Lucas. You don't recall how many planes you lost at that
];articular time?
General Short. No, sir; I do not. This shows the different types.
Some of them may have been repaired, don't you see, between De-
cember 7 and December 20 and be back in use.
Senator Lucas. You may have received some more by that time.
General Short. Beg pardon ?
Senator Lucas. You may have received some more from the main-
land.
General Short. We received 29 more B-l7's and that was all.
Senator Lucas. How many planes got in the air before the last
attack was completed?
General Short. I think there were a total of 14.
Senator Lucas. Did they shoot down any Jap planes?
General Short. They shot down 10 enemy planes.
Senator Lucas. They shot down 10 enemy planes.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. So it is a pretty safe assumption that if the planes
had been warmed up and ready to go that, consider- [8271]
ing what you did with the 14 planes, that the damage would have
been minimized considerably?
General Short. No question about that. I think our pilots showed
that they were superior to the Japanese pilots in individual combat
that day.
Senator Lucas. Do you recall seeing that two-man submarine ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Do you remember seeing the prisoner that they
took?
General Short. I did not. I recall the incident but I didn't ac-
tuallv see him.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3069
Senator Lucas. Do you recall now. from the conversations that you
liad with anyone there, as to just how far out that two-man sub-
marine was before it started operating at sea?
General Short. Well, I can give you a rather interesting report
of just what happened at the time of the capture. It was off a reef
opposite Bellows Field and the commanding officer or G-2 of Bellows
Field phoned me that it was there and that the Navy were getting
ready to bomb it. I said if they wanted to destroy it, I didn't
think it ought to be destroyed, but if the Navy wanted to destroy
it we could bring up a piece of field artillery and do it very quickly,
because it was on the reef. But before that message, apparently,
could get to the Navy, they dropped a bomb, which fortunately
[8272] missed it and picked it up and set it on the inside of
t\K' reef, anrl we sont a man out to put a rope around the conning-
tower and towed it in. Some fellow from Texas, probably, lassoed it.
Senator Lucas. Was there ever any conclusive evidence as to how
and where that submarine took to sea, how far out it was and what
brought it there?
General Short. I would hesitate to say. I am afraid my informa-
tion would not be exact.
Senator Lucas. Well, was it possible that a surface ship, a war-
ship of some kind, belonging to the enemy, could have come within
200 miles and dropped it off, or do you think it came in by sub-
marine '?
General Short. I think the feeling was at the time that there was
a mother ship that had brought them at least a considerable part of
the way. I don't believe they were capable of going more than 150 to
200 miles under their own power.
Senator Lucas. Now, what kind of a ship — that was the point I
was making — what kind of a ship did you people conclude brought
this midget submarine to 150 miles of the Hawaiian Islands?
General Short. Well. I am reallj'' a little uncertain on that. I
think the Navy would be a much better source.
[8273] Senator Lucas. Could a Jap submarine carry one of these
small two-man submarines?
General Short. I think the largest type probably could but again I
am not sure.
Senator Lucas. There is more than a possibility that some large
surface Japanese ship sailed within 150 or 200 miles of the Hawaiian
coast that morning and dropped that submarine off?
General Short. I believe the feeling was that they must have been
in the vicinity of Hawaiian waters, maybe for several days, and had
not been picked up.
By the way, I have the report here. Senator, of the planes damaged.
Senator Lucas. Please read that.
General Short. I will take up first what we had.
We had at the beginning of the attack : Planes in commission, 80.
That is pursuit planes. Pursuit planes out of commission, 69. A total
of 149. Of those 80 were damaged.
We had reconnaissance planes : In commission, 6. Out of commis-
sion, 7. Out of those 13, 6 were damaged. We had bombers : In com-
mission, 39. That included the old B-18's. Bombers out of commis-
sion, 33. And 34 of those bombers were damaged.
3070 COXGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATIOX PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Now, a considerable number of those planes we were able [82?4.]
to repair locally. So in the report of December 20 we had almost as
many planes in commission as we had the morning of the 7th, because
our repair facilities were working 24 hours a day.
Senator Lucas. Under the sabotage order these planes were lined
up wing tip to wing tip?
General Short. Very close together on the landing mat.
Senator Lucas. Now, you have given to the committee in your state-
ment what you consider the term ''appropriate defensive deployment"
means.
General Short. Yes. sir.
Senator Lucas. In that statement you take almost direct issue with
Admiral Kimmel.
General Short. I did not intend to give the impression that I was
making an out and out statement of what a defensive deployment
meant, but I couldn't conceive of any defense not including recon-
naissance. I think that that. I said, must necessarily include recon-
naissance. Isn't that the statement to which you refer?
Senator Lucas. That is right.
General Short. I still cannot conceive of any defense that would
not include reconnaissance.
Senator Lucas. Admiral Kimmel didn't so interpret the order.
[8-275] General Short. I don't know what the teclmical term in
the Navy would include. In the Army any defense in the world wo
would take up would include reconnaissance.
Senator Lucas. I want to call your attention to the report of the
Army board that made an investigation into this Pearl Harbor affair.
I direct your attention to the last page. The board says :
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, Lieutenant General Walter
C. Short, failed in his duties in the following particulars :
(a) To place his command in a state of readiness for war in the face of a war
warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only.
You have gone into that thoroughly and have made your explana-
tion.
General Short. I have.
Senator Lucas. I presume you did the same thing before the Army
board?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Notwithstanding its finding?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. And I presume your evidence before the Army board
was practically what is before this committee?
General Short. That is correct. I know some things [5^7^]
now. like magic, which I had never heard of at the time I was before
the Army board.
Senator Lucas. They further state :
The information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was suffi-
cient to warn him of the ;cnse relations betwren our Goveriiment nnd the Japanese
Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected.
Do you agree with that ?
General Short. Yes, sir ; but that wouldn't necessarily mean an at-
tack. I doubt very much if that board knew of the conclusions of
General Grunnert and General Betts, which agreed 100 percent with
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3071
mine, and why they made them. They made them because they didn't
have access to magic.
Senator Lucas. Assuming. General Short, that you had never re-
ceived any message from the War Department, either on November 27
from Marshall or on the 28th from Miles, or on the 29th from
Arnold — —
General Short. Or had any previous information ?
Senator Lucas. No. From the 27th on you only received three
messages ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. But you saw some of the Navy messages?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Would your position have been any different
[8s^77] on December 7 than it was previous to the message on No-
vember 27 ?
General Short. I think the three messages that followed up the 27th
all pointing directly to sabotage did a great deal to confirm me in my
opinion that I had done what the War Department wanted.
Senator Lucas. I can well appreciate that.
General Short. I could have gone into any other alert in a few
minutes if I had anything to indicate but what I got from the War
Department pointed, all of it, 100 percent, very definitely to sabotage.
Senator Lucas. That is, the second and third messages pointed
definitely to sabotage.
General Short. Second and third and fourth.
Senator Lucas. ^Vliich tended to confirm your message to General
Marshall ?
General Short. That is correct.
Senator Lucas. That is the way you took it?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. The question I am asking you is this: Assuming
you received no messages at all from the War Department your posi-
tion on December 7, 1941, would have been no different than if there
was an attack on November 24 1
General Short. I would not have had the message of the 27th.
[8£78] Senator Lucas. That is right.
General Short. I hadn't been told to report any measures taken?
Senator Lucas. That is right.
General Short. I would have been in the same position I was on
November 24.
Senator Lucas. In other words, these messages didn't enlighten you
whatsoever as far as going on an all-out alert or going on the second
alert which was near an all-out alert ?
General Short. There was absolutely no additional enemy informa-
tion. And there was one thing that cut down the probability. If you
remember in the Navy message of the 24th they said : "Including
action toward the Philippines and Guam." In ithe message of the
27th they told me to be prepared for sabotage at Guam.
In other words, it looked like they had eliminated even Guam, which
was right alongside Japan, from possible attack.
Senator Lucas. Yes ; but the message of the 27th to you didn't ha ve
anything to do with salDotage.
3072 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. Xo, That was the naval message.
Senator Lucas. That is true, but you relied primarily upon Gen-
eral Marshall's message, more than any Navy message?
General Short. So far as information pointing to an attack I had
to rely on the Navy messages because at no time [8£79] after
July 8 did I ever have an Army message that indicated any probable
line of action by the Japanese.
Senator Lucas. You did rely upon both messages, of course?
General Short. Yes. sir.
Senator Lucas. But I recall in this testimony that you stated that
the message of November 24, I think it vras. that was sent to the
Navy, which was the war warning message of the 2Tth
General Short. The 27th was the war warning.
Senator Lucas. In previous testimony you were not sure whether
or not you ever saw that war warning message.
General Short. I think I said that I knew the substance of it. I
was under the impression that Admiral Kimmel had just read it out
loud at a conference. But in reading over the testimony, Captain
Layton says that he personally brought it to me, and I have no doubt
he did, and that he discussed it with me. I was perfectly aware of the
contents. But I couldn't find in my headquarters, when I assembled
the material for the Roberts commission, I couldn't find the message
of either the 2-ith or the naval message of the 2Tth, and so I was
doubtful whether I had been advised orally or whether I had received
copies.
Senator Lucas. Do you believe that in the future, should [8280]
something of this kind occur, that someone in Hawaii should assume
all responsibility for the proper interpretation and analyzation of such
a message as was sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel?
General Short. I would say, in view of all of the discussion and
publicity were reference to Pearl Harbor, that anybody in command
would take no chances whatever. To illustrate what I mean, in March
of 1942 I visited a good-sized post in the interior of the country and
found around the parade ground antiaircraft guns manned 2-i hours
of the day. when 1*}ie possibility of an attack at that paiticular place
was practically nil. But the commanding officer was taking no
chances.
I believe that would be the condition that you will have for some
years.
Senator Lucas. You realize that Americans forget pretty fast?
General Short. Well, in a generation they might forget some. I
don't believe they would forget much faster. The ones in the Army
wouldn't forget.
Now, along that same line, this was hardly over until the War De-
partment had called on the Command and General Staff School at
Fort Leavenworth to prepare changes in their manual to provide for
just that kind of a thing, and I would like to [8281] read what
they inserted. This was inserted as an entirely new paragraph. It
was not in the old manual. This is Field Manual 100-15, Field Regu-
lations, Larger Units, June 29, 1942, paragraph 23 :
In times of strained relations the "War Department must exhaust every possible
.source of Information to keep its commanders of field forces advised —
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3073
Not only keep itself but —
keep the commanders advised of air, military, and naval dispositions and
movements of potential enemies and of the trend of diplomatic relations. Com-
manders of the field forces must keep themselves informed of the possibility of
a surprise attack being made both from without and within previous to a declara-
tion of war. During this period commanders must dispose of their forces so that
a sudden attack will be defeated.
[82S2] In other words, the "War Department took very decisive
action and prescribed very definitely for themselves that they would
keep the commanders completely informed of the information and of
the relations.
Senator Lucas. Of course, that comes about through the Pearl Har-
bor disaster.
General Short. It comes about definitely through the Pearl Harbor
disaster.
Senator Lucas. What I am talking about is : Assuming that in 50
years a similar situation occurs, where there is no unity of command,
it is still under a joint control system. You told the committee this
morning that whether or not they had that complete unity of thought
and action that was so necessary for the protection of the fleet and
islands, that personalities were involved. That is. two men might get
along all right, and two men who followed might not get along all
right.
If you had one man in command, where you could place all of the
responsibility over the Hawaiian Islands and the fleet, would that
eliminate what I am talking about here, eliminate the possibility of
any confusion or conflicting interests in the future which might be
responsible for a similar disaster?
General Short. I believe it Avould be decidedly helpful. [82S3]
When you put it at 50 years, it is hard to say whether everybody would
forget.
Senator Lucas. Suit your own time on that. Most of us won't be
around.
The Chairman. You don't mean that, Senator.
Senator Lucas. Yes; I do. [Laughter.]
Senator Lucas. One further question. There can't be any question
but what under the evidence submitted before this committee they
were as much confused in Washington in the Intelligence Branch of
the service as they were in Hawaii with respect to what "^'as going on
between the two departments.
Do you agree that if you had one man in Washington responsible
solely for all of the information, the evaluation of all of the intelli-
gence, both from the Army and Navy, that that would be conducive
to better administration, and possibly reduce the danger throughout?
General Short. I think it would tend to. At the same time, one
department would have to analyze critically which I don't believe was
done.
Senator Lucas. At any rate if you had one man, you wouldn't have
a general like General Miles coming before the committee and when
you ask him about the important [8284] message that was sent
from Tokyo to Honolulu carving the island into five districts, you
wouldn't have him saying that that was a Navy responsibility, and
not his, to properly interpret that ?
3074 COXGRESSIOXAL IN\'ESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. He would know definitely it was his responsibility.
Senator Lucas. That is where I think we are going to have to lodge
some of these things, definite responsibility in someone so there can't
be any buck-passing when a serious thing happens.
General Shokt. I agi'ee fully that you should have a much more
competent Intelligence service that is combined.
[S285] Senator Lucas. Xow this report further says, reading
again from the Army board report :
This required that he guard against surprise to the extent possible and make
ready his command so that it might be employed to the maximum and in time
againsr the worst form of attack that the enemy might launch.
I take it you do not agree with that, and you have covered that in
your testimony.
General Short. I do not agree.
Senator Lucas. Further :
(b> To reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the Admiral commanding
the Pacific Fleet and the Admiral commanding the Fourteenth Naval District for
implementing the joint Army and Na%'y plans and agreements then in existence
which provided for joint action by the two services. One of the methods by
which they might have become operative was through the joint agreement of
the responsible commanders.
You could not agree with that in view of the position that you took
with respect to the interpretation of these messages ?
General Short. I believe that the War Department fully expected
to declare when the situation had arrived to put the war plans into
effect and that they would have expected us to get their permission
before we thought of doing it.
[82S6] Senator Lucas. They further state :
(c) To inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance
being conducted by the Navy.
As I imderstand you took that for granted, that they wei-e doing
the job?
General Short. I knew that Admiral Kimmel was doing a great
deal. I didn't know tlie exact details. But I considered that he was
more capable of fitting the ships, surface sliips and the submarines and
the planes, into a complete picture than I was.
Senator Lucas. Under a unity of conunand no board could have
made that charge ?
General Short. That is correct.
Senator Lucas. Do vou know whv the air drills were stopped on
November 12. 1941 ? *
General Short. I am of the opinion that they probably were not all
stopped. The ones that had to do with the B-17's I think were stopped
because we needed all the time we had for training the crews.
Senator Lucas. What was the nature of one of those air drills, what
did you do ?
General Short. They were of various natures. "We would have a
report, or the Navy would make an estimate, that possibly some Japa-
nese ships wer3 in a certain direction. [8-28?"] A squadron or
group would be given the mission of going out and finding this carrier.
If they were successful then a bombing squadron would be sent out
to bomb them.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3075
Then you mio:ht. by the nexr phase, assume that the carrier got in
"vdthout being picked up and the fighter planes "vrere coming in. You
would get that information just in time possibly to send up your o"^vn
pursuit planes to try to intercept the enemy bomber-s and fighters
before they reached the islands.
They varied.
Senator Lucas. That was an actual drill?
General Short. Oh. yes. We had one a week on the average from
t;bout ^March on and 1 think probably about one a month where the
B-17's were excluded because we didn't think we could spare the time.
Senator Lucas. Why did you have those drills ?
General Short. To try to get the Army-Navy Air Corps so they
could work together.
.^enat^r Lucas. Pid you have any potential enemy in mind?
General Short. We always, any time we maneuvered in Hawaii, the
potential enemy was Japan. There wasn't any doubt in our minds
about that. We didn't mention it but we thought — we thought of it
as Orange — ^but it was Japan.
Senator Lucas. That was the real reason for the air [S-^SSI
drills, was it not ?
General Short. That is correct.
Senator Lucas. There was no point in having any air drills over the
islands unless it was for the defense of those islands and the defense
of the fleet in case of an attack by the conm^on enemy ?
General Short. Yes, sir. Those air drills were held, as I recall,
from sometime in February up to November 12. I think it was prob-
ably about the first of ^March before we really got them under way.
Senator Lucas, And all of a sudden they ceased.
General Short. I don't know definitely but I am inclined to think
that they had one on the '29ih. of November that did not include the
B-17's.
Senator Lucas. Well, it is difficult for me to understand why you
had all of these air drills all summer long and yet when the tension
became more strained and everybody in Hawaii knew, as well as here,
that the conditions with Japan were deteriorating day by day, all of
a sudden you quit the air drills and went to sabotage.
General Short. I can tell you why no air drill was scheduled for
the morning of the 7th. They had a good many of these exercises on
Sunday morning when the carriers would come in and the planes
would be sent ashore on Ford Island. [S289] They would
come in Saturday afternoon and then there would be an air drill
scheduled for Smiday morning in which the Navy fighter planes would
participate. On this particular Simdav morning the carriers were all
out at sea. One was returning from Wake. One was goinir to Mid-
way. One was on the west coast being overhauled. So there were
no naval planes to participate. That I know was one reason why
nothing was scheduled that Sunday morning.
Senator Lucas. General Short, where were you on the morning of
December 7 when the attack came ?
General Short. I was in my quarters.
Senator Lucas. How far were your quarters from the quarters of
Admiral Kimmel ?
3076 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. I would say probably about a mile and a half, maybe
just a little more than that.
Senator Lucas. And you immediately, of course, took command and
gave the orders to your men on the island there as soon as the fir^
flight of planes came through ?
General Short. The chief of staff came into my quarters somewhere
around 8. 03 and I gave him directions to immediately put No. 3 alert
into effect. I went over to my headquarters. He was there by the
time I got there and probably about 8 : 12, and he said that by 8 : 10 he
had them all alerted. I remained there just long enough to
[8290] make sure my G-3 section had reached the field command
posts. I left Colonel Phillips in charge of the regular headquarters
that had communication with Washington, and I went to the field com-
mand post where I could be in touch with all of them.
[8291] Senator Lucas. Admiral Kimmel told the committee
that he was not only alerted to sabotage but a good many other things,
as I recall, but was not clear whether he knew that you were alerted to
sabotage only.
General Short. I believe that we have some of his testimony before
this board that states that he did know.
Senator Lucas. That he did know that you were alerted to sabotage ?
Mr. Kaufman. He testified both Avays.
General Short. On page 6985 of the transcript :
I conferred with General Short on November 28 about the messages each of
us had received on the 27th. We discussed these dispatches in all aspects. We
considered, as we did frequentlj' before and did later, the probabilities and pos-
sibilities of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. In this connection there was discus-
sion of the effect of the suggestion from Washington that Hfty Army pursuit
planes be sent by aircraft carriers to Wake and Midway. I understood the Army
was on an alert and that the alert was against sabotage among other things, al-
though I do not now recall General Short specifically mentioning the details of
his alert.
Senator Lucas. Did you talk to Admiral Kimmel on December the
6th in the afternoon or the evening ?
[8292] General Short. I did not.
Senator Lucas. You did not expect on December the 6th any surprise
attack on the following day?
General Short. No, sir ; I did not.
Senator Lucas. Was there anybody in Hawaii that you knew that
expected a surprise attack ?
General Short. If they did they never told me before or after.
Ordinarily, afterward, there is someone who does expect it.
Senator Lucas. Well, everybody in Washington and everybody in
Hawaii sent messages from February on up to almost the day of the
attack about the possibility of a surprise attack. They had air drills
for it, they had the Martin-Bellinger report that detailed exactly how
this thing might happen, which it did, and everybody was surprised
when the attack came.
General Short. Yos, sii-. I think you must differentiate between
possibilities and probabilit3^
Senator Lucas. I presume that is correct.
General Short. We had probabilities pointing to attacks at other
places and nothing probable pointing to an attack on Hawaii.
Senator Lucas. Well, the truth of the matter is that everyone
thought that this war was going to start over around [829S] the
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3077
Malayan States, down the China Sea, and everybody just went to sleep
on watching Hawaii.
General Short. I think the universal opinion was that that is where
the war was going to start.
Senator Lucas. You stated in your statement before the committee
that you alerted your command and your troops took the battle posi-
tions against what you thought was the possibility of a landing attack.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Was that a serious possibility ?
General Short. Here was the way I felt about it: I felt that if
that many carriers could elude the Navy and get in there as a com-
plete surprise that there was an outside possibility that there would
be a landing force attack here and that I would take no chances.
Senator Lucas. Then if there was that possibility I would like to
ask you this hypothetical question :
Assuming that the fleet had been withdrawn to the western coast
and conditions at Pearl Harbor were the same other than that, do you
believe that it would have been possible under those conditions or
probable that the Japs could have made a landing with the striking
air forces that they had and brought the planes down as they did?
General Short. It would have been thoroughly possible.
[8294.] If they had sent as large a force as they sent against the
Philippines they could have made the landing. I doubt very much if
they could have made the landing with a hundred thousand, but I
believe they sent 224,000 against the Philippines and a force of
that size, willing to take its losses, could undoubtedly have made the
landing.
Senator Lucas. And that would have been a possibility
General Short. That would have been a possibility.
Senator Lucas (continuing). If the fleet had not been in Pearl
Harbor?
General Short. I would have been much more worried if there
had been no fleet in Hawaiian waters; I don't mean in Pearl Harbor
but in the waters of Hawaii.
Senator Lucas. In the Hawaiian waters.
■ General Short. I wish to make the distinction.
Senator Lucas. Yes ; in the Hawaiian waters. If that should have
happened, that possibility should have happened — and it was a possi-
bility— and the Japs had taken the island of Oahu, it would have
taken us a long time to have thrown them out of there, wouldn't it?
General Short. It would have been very serious.
Senator Lucas. Very costly.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Referring again to the question of [8290]
Admiral Kimmel's statement on sabotage I call your attention to page
6989 of the present transcript where this question was asked by Mr.
Eichardson, counsel for the committee :
Mr. Richardson. Did you know, Admiral, what General Short's first alert
was?
Admiral Kimmel. You mean No. 1 alert, as you call it?
Mr. RiCHAKDSON. That is it.
Admiral Kimmel. I did not know he had but one kind of an alert.
Mr. Richardson. What kind of alert did you think he had?
Admiral Kimmel. I thought he had an alert where he put his people on
the alert.
3078 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Richardson. Did you know at the time 3'ou talked with General Short
that his No. 1 alert was simply against sabotage?
Admiral Kimmel. I did not know he had a No. 1 alert. I think I have
found out since, however, that this No. 1, 2, and 3 alert business was put
into effect on the 5th of November of 1941. Prior to that they had an alert
and a nonalert status.
So that seems to place his testimony just a little different.
[8296] General Short. That is a little contradiction from the
other.
Senator Lucas. Yes.
General Short. I would like to say, however, that we had furnished
Admiral Bloch's headquarters with 10 copies of our alert system, so
someone in the staff should have known exactly what the different alerts
meant.
Senator Lucas. I want to ask one final question, General Short. Not-
withstanding this far-reaching sea disaster and the damage that was
done to the property on the island and the loss of life is it your con-
tention now that with all the information available at that time you
did all tliat any prudent commander could do to prevent or minimize
such a surprise attack ?
General Short. I believe I did all that a prudent commander could
be expected to do ; yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Do you believe under all the circumstances you ex-
ercised that high degree of care and caution that was automatically
imposed u})on you when you took over the command of that base?
General Short. I believe the people in the — all the people in the
Army there and the civilians know that I worked very seriously and
very conscientiously constantly from the time I got there until the date
of the attack to improve [8£97] conditions to get ready for an
attack.
Senator Lucas. And you feel that you exercised that superior judg-
ment necessary for one of your rank and position when you knew that
war was on its way ?
General Short. I believe I did.
Senator Lucas. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that I shall be here
when my tiu*n conies and I only have one question. I do not want it
answered now.
I will put the question in connection with this material which the
counsel has now given me and which he has gone over with General
Short. I can reoffer it again as an exhibit, although I won't press the
offer at this time, but before General Short concludes his testimony I
should like to have him make whatever comment he may think is
warranted on certain of the items in here which indicate certain con-
flicts in his prior testimony and I will only read one sentence from the
exhibit here that bears on it. It is not of a critical character.
The Chairman. Not of what?
Senator Brewster, This is not of a critical character but other por-
tions of the exhibit are. [Reading :]
General Short's non-feasance or omission were based on an estimate of a situa-
tion which although proved faulty [S29S] by subsequent events was, inso-
far as I am able to ascertain from the report of the Roberts Commission, made
or concurred in by all of those officers in Hawaii best qualified to form an exact
military opinion. That estimate was that an attack by air was in the highest
degree improbable.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3079
Now, whether you want to accept it now or whether you want other
members of the committee to look it over before it is offered is imma-
terial to me.
The Chairman. The CTiair has stated that other members would like
to see them and look them over before it is made an exhibit and I see
no delay in that procedure that would be disadvantageous.
Senator Brewster. That is quite all right.
The Chairman. And inasmuch as it is obvious that the committee
will not conclude with General Short's testimony today that might go
over until tomorrow.
Senator Brewster. I think he should certainly have a full oppor-
tunity to prepare any statement he desires on it and that is why I think
it ought to be gone over.
The Chairi^ian. Well, the general is familiar with this, with the
interrogatory of the Senator from Maine.
General Short. I am not familiar with the particular things he
is bringing up there.
[8299] The Chairiman. Would you like to have an opportunity
to familiarize yourself with it before you answer it?
Senator Brewster. Well, I am not asking for it now.
The Chairman. Well, even the suggestion.
General Short, I think it would be an advantage.
The Chairman. Yes, all right. Well, we will determine that later.
Congressman Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. General Short, you were an infantry officer for some
years, were you not ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr, Murphy. Did you ever have any training or work with the Air
Force at all prior to going to Pearl Harbor?
General Short, les. In nfaneuvers we had Air Corps units at-
tached.
Mr. Murphy. Outside of maneuvers you never did deal directly with
the Air as such, did you ?
General Short. In the Command Staff School and in the Army War
College we had a great deal of instruction.
INIr. Murphy. How many years before Pearl Harbor were you at the
Staff School and had any instruction about the Air?
General Short. I graduated from the Army War College in 1925,
Mr, Murphy, Had you been there between 1925 and 1941 ?
General Short, No, sir,
[8300] Mr, Murphy, Admiral Kimmel was a ship man pri-
marily, wasn't he ?
General Short. Yes, sir,
Mr. Murphy, He had not had anything to do particularly with the
Air either then, so far as you know?
General Short. I do not know, sir,
Mr, Murphy, Now, both Admiral Kimmel and yourself, as I recol-
lect it, say that you were largely influenced by the newspaper at
Honolulu as to your estimate of the situation subsequent to November
the 27th, Is that right in your case ?
General Short, No, sir. I would say the only thing I remember
getting from the newspaper that had a direct bearing on this mes-
sage was the fact that the negotiations in Washington with the
Japanese had been resumed. That is the only thing
3080 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr, Murphy. Now, I would like to direct your attention to the head-
lines of the papers in Manila. I am now reading
The Chairman. In Manila?
Mr, Murphy. In Honohdii. I beg your pardon.
I am now reading from page 11 of the United States News which
contains the Army Pearl Harbor Board report. The newspaper head-
lines in question, referring to the Honolulu Advertiser and the Hono-
lulu Star Bulletin — the newspaper headlines in question read as
follows :
[8301] U. S. Vi^aits Japan Reply.
That was the Honolulu Star-Bulletin of November 29,
Japanese May Strike Over Weekend ; Kurusu Bluntly Warned Nation Ready
for Battle.
That was the Honolulu Advertiser of November 30, although it is
recorded here as the 20th, which is a typographical error because the
piece is already in the record. That is in the Honolulu Advertiser.
Hull, Kurusu in Critical Meeting Today.
That is the 1st of December in the Honolulu Advertiser.
U. S. Army Alerted in Manila, Singapore Mobilizing as War Tension Grows;
Japanese Envoys Resume Talks Amid Tension ; War Fears Grow in Philippines.
That was the 1st of December in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin.
Japan Called Still Hopeful of Making Peace With U. S. ; Japan Gives Two
Weeks More to Negotiations.
That was December 2 in the Honolulu Advertiser.
Huge Pincher Attack on U. S. By Japan, France Predicted.
That was the 3d of December in the Honolulu Advertiser.
Japan Spurns U. S. Program.
That was on the 4th of December in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin.
Pacific Zero Hour Near ; Japan Answers U. S. Today.
That is the 4th of December 1941 in the Honolulu Advertiser.
[8302] Singapore on War Footing; New Peace Effort Urged in Tokyo;
Civilians Urged to Leave Manila.
That is the 6th of December in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin,
America Expected to Reject Japan's Reply on Indo-China ; Japanese Navy
Moving South ; Detailed Plans Completed for M-Day Setup.
That is the 6th of December 1941 in the Honolulu Advertiser.
F. D. R. Will Send Message to Emperor on War Crisis.
That is the 7th of December 1941 in the Honolulu Advertiser.
Do you thing there is anything in those headlines that would justify
you in feeling that there was a lessening of the tension that existed ?
General Short. Only one thing, the fact that the negotiations were
expected to continue for 2 weeks.
Mr. Murphy. In other words, with about 14 you eliminate 13 and
you stand on that 1 that says they might go 2' weeks ?
General Short, But practically all of them pointed towards the
South Pacific, In addition
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3081
Mr. Murphy. Let us stick to the papers, General. Out of the 14
the only one that impressed you was the one that they might go on
for 2 weeks?
General Short. No.
Mr. Murphy. Notwithstanding the fact that the subsequent
[8303'] one says that the zero hour may be on the 4th, or the Pacific
zero hour is near ; is that right ?
General Short. I was willing to accept the information in the mes-
sage of the 27th that hostilities might break out.
Mr. Murphy. Well, I understand you. You said that the November
27 message made you feel that war was imminent.
General Short, Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Do you think then that Admiral Kimmel or yourself
would be justified, in view of these headlines in December, that the
newspaper headlines would make you feel there was a lessening in the
tense situation that existed on the 27th of November?
General Short. The only thing there would be the statement of De-
cember 1 on account of the fact that the message had said there was
a bare possibility that the Japanese Government would come back
and would resume operations and it shows that they had resumed op-
erations and then the message indicating that the negotiations would
probably continue for 2 weeks might well have led us to believe that
there was less likelihood of hostilities until the expiration of the 2
weeks.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, that was the only paper that influenced
you, was it, that one about the 2 weeks ?
[8304] General Short. That one and the one about the resump-
tion of the negotiations.
Mr. Murphy. And the others you dismissed ?
General Short. No. I thought the others were in line with what
Mr. Murphy. With the 27th message ?
General Short. With the information we had been given and also
the direction of the attack was in line with the information we had
been given.
Mr. Murphy. General, you felt and apparently Admiral Kimmel
felt that there was going to be an attack on the Philippines. You both
agreed on that, didn't you ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Why, if there were going to be an attack on a United
States possession and at the Philippines, wouldn't you feel that there
was grave danger of some kind of an attack on Hawaii ?
General Short. Frankly, I felt that there would certainly be in-
ternal disorders but that in all probability if the Japanese were going
to make a real out and out attack on the Philippines, on the Philippine
Islands, that they would employ practically all of their equipment and
available means for that purpose to make it as strong as possible,
Mr, Murphy. Now, the thing that puzzles the writers and [8305]
a lot of people in the country is if they were going to go all out on the
Philippines why wouldn't any military man expect that there was
danger of an attack from the fleet then on their flank and why wouldn't
they seek to eliminate that possibility ?
79716— 46— pt. 7 12
3082 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. To make that attack they took six out of the eight
airplane carriers they had. In other words, they took three-fourths of
their air power that might have been used to support the Philippine
attack and sent it to Hawaii. It weakened their attack in the Pnilip-
pines very much and ordinarily when any country is making a very
serious effort like that they try not to drive their forces.
Mr. Murphy, Couldn't an attack on the Philippines, General, be
made and wasn't it made by land-based bombers ?
General Short. They could by a certain amount.
Mr, Murphy. Well, didn't they attack it? Isn't that what they
used ?
General Short, They did.
Mr. Murphy, And didn't you know that, that they could ?
General Short, Yes ; but also we knew that the addition of the car-
rier planes would make that attack much heavier and much more seri-
ous.
Mr, Murphy. Well, they did a pretty thorough job with land-based
planes, didn't they 2
[8S06] General Short. They did, yes; but we have used both
all through the war whenever we have made a serious attack.
Mr, Murphy, Now I w^ould like to review with you. General, if you
will, exhibit 53.
General Short. 53 ?
Mr. Murphy. I think it is important that somewhere in the record
there should be a resume of the correspondence between you and Gen-
eral Marshall. And before I go into that, General, on May 1, 1941,
you had an all-out alert in Honolulu, did you not, where you had
fortifications being built, you had everything out you could have in
the way of equipment, didn't you, for the whole day ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Did you have some plans for a maneuver on the 10th
of December ?
General Short. No, sir ; we had no definite plans for a maneuver.
Mr, Murphy. Had you discussed it ?
General Short. We were counting on having a maneuver. There
were two things that we were waiting for for a complete maneuver.
We were building an underground interceptor-command post and we
were completing our own field-command post. We were waiting until
they were completed and got into comnmnication so that our next
maneuver would be controlled by the [8S07] communications
which we expected to have already to follow,
Mr. Murphy. I will take that up with you later. Let me go to
Marshall's correspondence with you, I refer first to the letter of Feb-
ruarj'^ 7, lO^l, At that time G-'ueral Marshall gave you his impres-
sion and appraisal of Admiral Kimmel; that he was brusque and
undiplomatic in his approach to problems and that he appeared rather
rough in his methods of doing business and that he felt that he was
entirely responsive to plain speaking on the part of the other felloAV
if there is frankness and logic in the presentation. You remember
that?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. MuRPJiY, And then you answered him, did you not, by saying
that you had told Kimmel and Bloch that there would be no hair-
splitting between you, on February 19?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3083
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, to come back to the letter of February 7,
General Marshall told you that Hawaii was on a far better basis than
any other command in the Army, did he not ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. He told you at that time that at Cavite and Corregidor
they had only two antiaircraft guns ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
[8S08] Mr. Murphy. He also told you, and I think this is
significant :
Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to
protect the base and the Naval concentrations at Hawaii.
That was your mission there ; wasn't it ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
[8J09] Mr. Murphy. Then he also told you about the Army and
Navy feuds "which still persist in confusing issues of national defense,"
and "we must be completely impersonal in these matters"?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, in your letter of the 19th of February, you
told him that you were taking up the question of dispersion of pursuit
aviation upon the island of Oahu in order that you might be able to
meet an attack from any direction; did you not?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. Then on page 7 of your letter, you make reference,
Genera], to a letter on maximum readiness of aircraft in the Hawaiian
area. Do you have a copy of that letter ? I am speaking now of page
7 of the exhibit, General.
General Short. What paragraph is that?
Mr. Murphy. The third paragraph from the bottom of the page :
Letter HHD to Major Echelon Commanders, 17 February 1941, subject : Maxi-
mum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area.
I would like to see a copy of that letter, if I may.
General Short. I have not a copy here. I will ask Colonel Dun-
combe if he -can obtain a copy.
[8310] Mr. Murphy. Will you make a notation of that, counsel,
please ? That is the third last paragraph on page 7.
On page 8 you spoke to General Marshall about the necessity of
bomb-proofing the vital installations; did you not?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy, On March 5, 1941, General Marshall wrote you a letter
in which he said :
I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Depart-
ment with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory
system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first
priority.
Do you recall that ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. On March 6, 1941, you wrote General Marshall :
One of the first projects which I investigated in this Department was the
aircraft warning service which I believe is vital to the defense of these islands.
Then again you said :
With the present international situation, it seems to me that if this equipmeut
is to be used at all, the need for it is now here.
3084 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
That was back in March ; was it not?
[8311] General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Then you also stated in the next paragraph that the
equipment would arrive in June and the stations would be operating
shortly thereafter, did you not?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. You assured General Marshall that the personnel
would be trained and the stations in operation within 30 days after
the receipt of the equipment mentioned in your letter?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, on March 13, 1941, General Marshall wrote to
you and said :
The progress that you are making in reaching close coordination with local naval
authorities, and so insuring a maximum degree of readiness in your Department,
is most gratifying.
On March 15, 1941, you received a letter from General Bryden, in
the absence of General Marshall, saying :
The War Department appreciates fully the necessity for the early establish-
ment of the aircraft wai'ning service station in the Hawaiian Department
Then, the third paragraph :
I have given these matters my personal attention.
[8312] The last paragraph :
We are as anxious as you to work out a solution for these problems with the
least practicable delay, and I know that I can count upon you for fullest coopera-
tion.
General Short. May I interrupt you a moment ?
Mr. Murphy. All right. General.
General Short. That particular thing he is discussing is the ques-
tion of getting the permission of the Park Service.
Mr. Murphy. That is right.
General Short. That request was started in June 1940.
Mr. Murphy. That is right.
General Short. And we did not get the authority until April 1941.
Mr. Murphy. That is right. You had great difficulty in getting
permission to have the fixed stations operate. The fixed stations were
not operating, and therefore they could not help you on December 7 ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. Just put that one on one side, and let us go to the
next one.
Now, on March 15, 1941, you stated to General Marshall :
On all fields the planes have been kept lined up on the field where they would
suffer terrific loss.
\8313] So apparently you meant to change that situation, did you
not?
General Short. In case of an air attack ; yes, sir,
Mr. Murphy. But you did not, did you ?
General Short. We were not alerted against air attack. We were
alerted against sabotage.
Mr. Murphy. I see.
Now, then, on page 16, you said :
In general, we have no serious shortage in three-inch anti-aircraft artillery, only
16 guns being required to complete our complement —
did you not?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. Then in the paragraph on the bottom of the page:
After the installation of our new detectors, we shall have some
warning from the different islands and almost continuous service in
the most dangerous direction for approximately 75 miles.
What was the most dangerous direction you were speaking of there ?
It was from the north, wasn't it ?
General Short. The north is what we ordinarily figured, although
the Navy felt that there was quite a possibility of an attack coming
in from the southwest, on account of the Mandated Islands.
[8314.] Mr. Murphy. As a matter of fact, an expert on Hawaii,
and Admiral Kimmel on several occasions, and some other witnesses
in these records, have said the most dangerous area was from the
north. Are you familiar with that ?
General Short. I am familiar with that particular thing. Also the
Navy thought there was considerable danger from the southwest.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, throughout the testimony, for hundreds
and hundreds of pages, the north was pointed to as the most dangerous
place. Then, at a subsequent hearing, after the Roberts board had
completed, there was a statement that the most dangerous place was
from the north, and in this hearing there is a reference by Admiral
Richardson to what he thought. The fact is you thought the north was
the most dangerous section, did you not?
General Short. Not necessarily directly north, but northwest to
north. That was the most probable.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you said there :
The pursuit aviation, however, will have to be prepared to take the air in
the minimum amount of time.
That is what you told General Marshall, is it not ?
General Short. That would be true no matter what direction they
came from.
[8315] Mr. Murphy. At any rate, that is what you told General
Marshall, that pursuit aviation would have to be prepared to take the
air in the minimum amount of time ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, on the last page, page 17 of that letter,
the letter of March 15, you told General Marshall :
I feel that the question of anti-aircraft defense against air attack is the most
serious problem that we have to face —
did you not ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, on March 28, 1941, General Marshall wrote you,
and at that time he said in the second to the last paragraph, he said :
I am hopeful of arranging for the early augmentation of your anti-aircraft
garrison so as to provide full strength unit for the armament available within
your department.
3086 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Then, again, in the last paragraph :
I approved your proposal to send General Martin and General Gardner, or their
execuiives, to the west coast defense exercise.
That was an air exercise, wasn't it ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
[8310] iSlr. Murphy. On April 14, 1941, you wrote General
Marshall, and in the second to the lust paragraph on page 19, you said:
Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are making
in cooperating with the ISavy, I am enclosing the following agreement made with
them —
And one of them was the joint coastal frontier defense plan.
Then in paragraph 3, on page 20, or the one numbered 3, you state :
putting into effect for the Army the provisions of the Joint Agreement.
The next paragraph : •
I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch very cooperative, and
we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army and the
Navy Air Forces to act together and with the unity of command as the situation
requires.
We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the Air
Force and the anti-aircraft defense. I hope we shall arrive at something on that
in the near future. The more I go into the details, the more I am becoming con-
vinced that it will be necessary for us to set up an air defense command.
[8317] Then, in the last paragraph, you told General Marshall :
The Navy has felt very much encouraged by the increase in our air and anti-
aircraft defense.
Now, I go over to the letter of May 5, that General Marshall wrote
to you :
Thank you for your letter of the 14th enclosing the joint plans and the estimate
concerning possible air action. It is evident that you liave been on the job, and
I know that the Navy is delighted to have such generous cooperation.
And in the last paragraph — and this is significant —
It is most gratifying to Iiear you say that everything is going along extremely
well, and do not hesitate to write at any time.
Do you remember that?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, on May 29, 1941, you wrote General Marshall,
and you were describing the recent maneuvers. In paragraph 2, you
said this :
The maneuver was divided into three phases. The first phase consisted of the
air action and the actual issue of one day's fire and of engineer supplies for field
fortifications and of engineer tools. During the air [S3i8J phase, our
bombers acted under Navy Command in cooperation with the Naval Patrol Squad-
rons and actually located and bombed airplane carriers 250 miles out at sea.
The movement of the carrier was entirely free so that the Navy Patrol planes
had the mission of locating the ship and notifying our bombers and they then
made the attack. Pui'suit attacked enemy bombers represented by naval planes
and our own bombers, when they came in to attack ground defenses.
Upon receipt of the warning for this phase, our bombers were sent to fields on
outlying islands and pursuit planes were dispersed. Tlie Navy cooperated very
fully during tliis phase, and I believe we learned more about the coordination
of Army Air Force, Navy Air Force, and anti-aircraft, than we had during any
previous exercise.
Ammunition and engineer supplies had never been actually issued before, and
we got complete data in regard to the time and the transportation required to
complete the issue.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3087
If you had done just that after the war warning, it would have been
a different result, would it not?
General Short. Not just that alone, no.
Mr. MuEPHY. If you had done just what you did on May 29. issued
live ammunition and had your planes ready, [SSIO} and have
your pursuits ready ?
General Short. We had live ammunition at all antiaircraft batteries
but four, or immediately accessible to them.
Mr. Murphy. You said you had that ready, and you also said you
could go into alert 2 from alert 1 in 7 minutes, but the fact is, it took
5 to 6 hours for them to get to their guns, didn't it ?
General Short. No, it did not. It took time to move the guns and
troops to prescribed positions. There were some batteries that had
to move probably 20 miles.
Mr. Murphy. You mean to go from alert 1 to alert 2 you would
make a phone call and say, "Go to alert 2"; is that it?
General Short. They were prepared for that anyway.
Mr. Murphy. You would just give the order, but it might take six
hours to get to where you could shoot?
General Short. For a few of the batteries that is true.
Mr. Murphy. It took a few batteries some time to get into their
positions?
General Short. They had to move their troops.
Mr. Murphy. You mean your ammunition was at the crater?
General Short. The ammunition was at the crater for [8320]
four batteries.
Mr. Murphy. In the Sixty-fourth Coast Artillery, Antiaircraft
B, C, D, and F, just those four batteries?
General Short. Those four batteries. The others were placed
close to the prescribed positions, within, I think 20 to 75 yards.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, when you had this maneuver on May
29, and when you had the alert on May 1 for 12 days — or would
that be the same one. General?
General Short. The same one, yes.
Mr. Murphy. At that time, did the public get hysterical ?
General Short. I do not think you understood that ammunition
business. What we were attempting there, was to find out, from a
logistics point of view, how long it would take to move a day's fire.
That ammunition was not issued out to the men. That ammuni-
tion was transported from the various places of storage to the troops.
The boxes were not opened. It was a question of transportation,
as to how long it would take to load up the ammunition and to de-
liver it to the organization concerned. It was a logistics problem
entirely, and it had never been tried out before in Hawaii.
Mr. Murphy. The fact is that on May 1, you say now [SS^Q
that you did not take the ammunition out and did not use live am-
munition ?
General Short. We did not use any of it.
Mr. Murphy. Did not fire any shots at all ?
General Short. No, we fired none. It was a logistics proposition.
Mr. Murphy. Now, you also say that the ammunition up in the
crater only affected four antiaircraft batteries. Is that correct?
3088 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. That is correct. Now, do not misunderstand me.
There were lots of other ammunition in the crater. We had am-
munition immediately accessible to the gun positions of all but those
four batteries. There were many days of fire in the crater.
Mr. Murphy. Did not you issue one full day's supply of ammunition
to each gun in the maneuvers in May?
General Short. We delivered it to the batteries, yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. You had it right there ready for use ?
General Short. It was not ready for use. It was a purely trans-
portation pro'position.
Mr. Murphy. It was in the boxes and the boxes were not opened?
General Short. It was testing the time that it took [8S2£]
to draw the ammunition at the storage, and to move it to the bat-
tery.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you said in the last paragraph of that
letter, on page 36 :
Some time later we expected to have a maneuver without any warning
whatever to the troops. But will wait until after the organization of our
air defense command.
General Spiort. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. Is that the one you were still waiting for in De-
cember ?
General Short. That is the one we were waiting for.
Mr. Murphy. On October 10, you said to Senator Lucas you had
no word from Washington about the air subsequent to July, as I
understood you, and here is a letter from General Marshall to you,
dated October 10, which said :
The mimeographed standard operating procedure for the Hawaiian Depart-
ment, dated July 14, has just come to my attention, and I am particulary con-
cerned with missions assigned to air units.
Then again, in the second paragraph :
This seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in
Hawaii.
General Short. That has no relation whatever to a probable attack.
[8323] Mr. Murphy. Well, that was a discussion between you
and General Marshall as to how much the air forces should be trained
for using guns and the like ; and in your letter you told him, did you
not, that you had a surplus of some 3,000 men ?
General Short. Right at that time.
Mr. Murphy. That you had around 7,000-some-odd-hundred men,
and if you used around 3,000 of them, that would take care of all of
your needs for the airplanes, and you had 3,000 left over, and you
wanted some to take care of themselves in the event there was an
invasion ; is that right ?
General Short. That is correct, at that particular day.
Mr. Murphy. But you were still talking about air, and the im-
portance of air?
General Short. Yes, but nobody was pointing to the probability
of an air attack today or tomorrow, next week or next month.
Mr. Murphy. I expect you had those airplanes there to stop an air
attack, did you not?
General Short. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. You had your air fields, your antiaircraft guns, your
pursuit planes, and the only reason for them being there was to stop
an air attack, was it not?
I PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3089
[83^4] General Short. Yes, but that did not mean at all that
! an air attack was going to take place in the immediate future.
j Mr. Murphy. You were told that war was imminent ?
! General Spiort. Yes.
{ Mr. Murphy. You thought they should tell you where the stroke
-would come?
General Short. If they had the information, I thought so, and I
I still think so today, and I think they had it.
Mr. Murphy. Then, on October 14, you wrote to General Marshall :
I have your letter of October 10 with reference to the use of men of the air
force on other than strictly air duties. At the time our tentative standing oper-
ating Rrocedure was put out the Air Corps had 7,229 men. Full combat details
and all overhead required only 3,885 men for the planes and organizations
■ actually on hand. This left a surplus of 3,344 men with no assigned duties
during maneuvers. One of the main reasons for the assignment was to give
these men something to do during the maneuvers. Another reason was the
belief that any serious threat of an enemy ground attack of Oahu could come
only after destruction of our Air Forces.
[8325'] So that there would not be any need of an all-out alert
puiticularly unless the Air Force was destroyed?
General Short. That was my estimate of the situation.
Mr. Murphy. You say then near the end of the second to the last
paragraph :
As regards their use as military police that was not correct. The plan was to
use them for guarding certain essential utilities, which did not require team
training. However, this will be unnecessary as the Legislature has just passed
the Home Guard Bill, which will go into effect very soon. They will be able
to take over guarding of all essential utilities, highway bridges, railroad bridges,
etc.
So that on October 14, at any rate, you were discussing the air forces
as such with General Marshall ?
General Short. We were always discussing air forces.
Mr. Murphy. Now, General, I would like to ask you this: In the
alert you put out what did you do about your fire control stations?
Did you alert them ?
General Short. The fire control for the coast artillery ?
Mr. Murphy. All of your fire-control stations under the command
of the Army.
General Short. We did not do anj'thing about the fire control sta-
tions because we were not on that kind of an alert.
[8326] Mr. Murphy. Right. The fact is that a great amount
of the damage was done to the hangars. I see here a picture of the
hangar burning. What hangar would that be, General, do you re-
member ?
General Short. I rather suspect it may have been the Hawaiian
Air Depot. I am not sure.
Mr. Murphy. I show you another picture of what appears to be
another hangar, or it may be the same one. Will you examine this,
if you please ?
General Short. I would not know which particular hangar it waf
because they all look alike.
Mr. Murphy. Will you pass these two to him, please?
(The photographs were handed to General Short.)
General Short. I would not be able to say what particular hangars
those were.
3090 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Murphy. The fact is that a great deal of damage occurred from
fire there that day, did it not?
General Short. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. If you had your fire-control stations alerted would
that have cut down the damage?
General Short. When you are talking about fire control I assume
you mean those stations for controlling the fire of the harbor defense
guns. We had a fire department on every post.
[8327] Mr. Murphy. I misunderstood you. I do not know any-
thing about those things. I see Admiral Richardson laughing back
there. However, I am only a layman and you are an expert.
What special provisions did you take to stop fire after November 27?
General Short. We always had provisions to stop fires.
Mr. Murphy. What special provisions after November 27?
General Short. Our fire department w^as always fully alerted. We
did not take any special provisions.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, you say that the Navy had reconnaissance.
General, and therefore the Navy had reconnaissance because of an ex-
pected air attack. Why did you have your pursuit planes on 4 hours'
notice?
General Short. I did not say that the Navy had reconnaissance be-
cause of an expected air attack, because I do not think they did ex-
pect an air attack. They had reconnaissance to make sure that there
were no Japanese vessels in the coastal zone.
Mr. Murphy. Is that the understanding you gave to the Roberts
board that I read yesterday, that the reconnaissance that was had was
the kind of reconnaissance that was expected in the joint air mission?
Is that what you referred to, the responsibility of reconnaissance in
the event of an air [8328] attack?
General Short. That does not pertain only to air attack. That
responsibility would be for any kind of reconnaissance.
Mr. Murphy. You have said. General, you expected the Navy was
carrying out their full duty in having reconnaissance and the Navy
expected you to be doing your full duty on radar. Now if the Navy
was having reconnaissance why did you have your pursuit planes on
4 hours' notice?
General Short. You are making statements that I have not made.
I said I expected them to do their full duty as far as they were able to
do it with the equipment they had.
Mr. Murphy. I understood you to say, sir, you expected the Navy to
do complete reconnaissance.
General Short. I did not say that.
Mr. Murphy. Let me find your answer and let me give your exact
words in the statement you gave before the Army Pearl Harbor board.
General Short. Will you please quote the page?
Mr. Murphy. I will, General. I have it here.
The Chairman. I might say we have reached the hour of 4 o'clock.
Mr. Murphy. All right.
[8329] The Chairman. Do you want to recess now or go into
this?
Mr. Murphy. No ; I will go into it in the morning.
The Chairman. The committee will recess until 10 o'clock tomor-
row morning.
(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., January 24, 1946, the committee recessed
until 10 a. m., Friday, January 25, 1946.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3091
[8330] PEAEL HAEBOR ATTACK
FRIDAY, JANUARY 25, 1946
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
OF the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster,
and F'erguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark,
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.
Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H.
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Hasten, Edward P.
Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.
[83r31^ The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in
order. Does counsel have anything at this point ?
Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, the other day a request was made for
any further information that might be available regarding the mes-
sage of December 7 to General Short signed by General Marshall.
We have received the following memorandum from Colonel Dun-
combe that I would like to read into the record.
The Vice Chairman. Of the War Department ?
Mr. Masten. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. You may proceed.
Mr. Masten (reading) :
War Department,
Washington, D. C, 24 January 1946.
Memorandum to Mr. Richardson :
The following inclosures relate to General Marshall's message to General
Short, dated 7 December 1941 :
(1) Copies of papers which show that, at the time of the Army Pearl Harbor
board hearings, a search was made for General Marshall's handwritten draft of
the message and that the draft was not found.
(2) A photostat of a copy of the encoded message sent from the War Depart-
ment. On the photostat, to avoid dis- 83S2^ closure of U. S. codes, the
encoded text of the body of the message has been blocked out.
(3) A copy of Committee Exhibit 61, which is a photostat of General Gerow's
memorandum to The Adjutant General concerning the message. This memo-
randum, as indicated by General Gerow's memorandum in Committee Exhibit 39,
"was typed later during the day (7 December) and formally made of record."
(4) A photostat of a handwritten memorandum by General Adams, The
Adjutant General, dated 29 January 1942.
(5) A photostat of the message as decoded in Hawaii.
/S/ HAEMON DUNCOMBE,
,^ , , Lt. Colonel, G8C.
5 Incls.
3092 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
We suggest that the memorandum I have just read, together with
enclosures 1, 2, 4, and 5, be spread on the record at this point.
The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered.
Mr. ]\Iasten. I omit enclosure 3 since it is already Exhibit No. 61.
The Vice Chairman. It may be so ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)
8 September 1944.
Note for record :
1. On 8 September, Mr. Schneider, Secretary to Mr. .Justice Roberts and Sec-
retary to the Roberts Committee, informed General North that
a. he had no recollection of having seen General Marshall's handwritten
draft of the 7 December 1941 message,
b. all documents received by the Committee from the War Department were
returned to the Secretary of War by Colonel Brown who acted as liaison officer,
c. Mr. Schneider has no signature indicating receipt by an oilicial of the War
Department.
2. On S September 1944 Lt. Col. William M. Connor Jr., reports that General
Weir of the Judge Advocate General's Office stated that he does not kave the
handwritten draft in his possession.
Thomas North.
Brigadier General, G. S. C,
Chief, Current Group, OPD.
Col. Brown, who returned the papers to the War Department, and Col. Bratton,
who carried the manuscript message in question to the Message Center, have
both been questioned, and both disclaim any Imowledge of what became of the
[8334] manuscript draft.
C. G. J.
Priority
18 Sept 44
Washington, D. C.
Seci'et
A War 1S1916Z WTJ
War 32425 ISth Desire to locate handwritten original of warning message
dispatched on seven December nineteen forty one period This draft was used
in testimony before Roberts commission and it would appear that it was sub-
mitted to that commission paren for Richardson for Colonel Charles W. West
from North signed Marshall paren Colonel Lee How Brown comma USMC comma
now believed station with HQ Fifth Marine Division or comma was law officer for
the commission period Request you contact him to determine what disposition
was made of this draft and radio your findings.
[Copy]
Secret
20 September 1944.
Gbitnekt
President, Army Pearl Harhor Board,
Bldg #SG, Presidio of San Francisco.
To : Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department, Washington,
D. C.
[8335] Rerad September Eighteenth from General North inquiry Colonel
Brown Marine Corps reveals he does not recall what disposition was made hand-
written original mentioned message period He suggested that Albert J. Schnei-
der now secretary to Justice Roberts then clerk of commission may be able
furnish information leading to discovery its whereabouts end
Lt. Gen. Geokge Grunebt,
TJ. S. Army,
President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.
Official :
R. G. Hurt,
Major AGD,
Aide-de-Oamp.
Signal Coeps, United States Abmy
Received at DI 56 74/73 US Govt.
Di Washn, D. C, Dec. 7, IMl, at 1201 PM
CG
Hawaiian Dept, Ft Shafter, T. H.
529 Seventh.
(*)
Maeshall.
1217 PM
*Reporter's note : Context blocked out.
[8356] War Department,
The Adjutant General's Office,
Washington, D. C.
Memorandum : ^ , -r x, -rw
Checked on the history of this radio of Dec. 7, 1941 with Lt. Col. John K.
Deane, G. S. C, who states that a pencil draft of it was taken directly to the
Message Center by Col. Bratton for immediate dispatch which was done.
T. A. G. did not enter the picture at that time in any way except as custodian
of the record message. -c cs a
111. o. A.
1-29-42
File
[8357] Signal Corps, United States Army
4758
Seciet
1549WS Washington DC 74/73 RCA Etat 7 1218P
f C
Eaion Dept, Ft. Shafter, T. H.
529 7th Japanese are presenting at one PM eastern standard time today
what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code
machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do
not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this
communication
Marshall.
(Time and date stamp— Received at 3—7 Dec. 1941 Hq. Haw. Dept. AGO SRS)
(Decoded by Lt. J. H. Babcock, 251P Dec 7 1941
Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 529 7th <0E.
[8338'] TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED
STATES ARMY (RETIRED)— Resumed
The Vice Chairman. General Short, do you have anything further
tliat you want to bring to the attention of the committee before your
examination is resumed ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
First, I would like to have an opportunity for me and my counsel to |
look over this material that has now been introduced, because we have,
not seen it.
The Vice Chairman. You have that right.
General Short. I have a statement here. I do not know whether Ij
should read it now. . '
Senator Lucas asked me a question that I was unable to answer at tlie
time. I have the answer out of the testimony of Admiral Inghs. 1.
can read it now. ■ r^ i o
The Vice Chairman. Would you permit a suggestion, General ?
3094 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Since Senator Lucas asked you about that, don't you think it might
be desirable to wait a little longer until he comes in ? He is detained
a few moments now.
General Short. I think it would be.
The Vice Chairjvian. Since he is the man that wanted to know about
it, I just offer that suggestion for your consideration.
General Short. All right, sir ; we will put it to one side.
[8SS9] The Vice Chairman. With respect to the memorandum
from Colonel Duncombe and the attached data which has been spread
upon the record, I assume, General, you are familiar with General Mar-
shall's testimony ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. That he wrote out in his own handwriting that
message of December 7, and you know about that ?
General Short. That is correct.
The Vice Chaiioian. All right.
Colonel Kare. We have no objection to the introduction of that
exhibit.
The Vice Chairman. Counsel states that he has no objection to that
being put in the record, which has been done.
Mr. Murphy, of Penns3^1vania, will continue his inquiry.
Mr. Murphy. General Short, the reference I made yesterday after-
noon and was about to read was from page 46 of volume entitled "Pre-
vious Testimony of General Short."
Colonel Karr. That is the Roberts Commission hearing?
Mr. MuRi'HY. The Roberts Commission hearing. And, apparently,
a quotation from the prepared statement which you presented to the
Roberts Commission. It reads as follows :
The question of just how the total reconnaissance was carried out was never
known by me.
General Short. About where is that on the page ?
[8340] Mr. Murphy. Page 46, General, six lines from the bot-
tom.
General Short. Yes, sir, I have it.
Mr. Murphy (reading) :
The question of just how the total reconnaissance was carried out was never
known by me. If they called on us for a squadron of planes they would assign
it to a certain sector, say, maybe from zero to 70 degrees, to search out 600
miles, or whatever it was. I assumed that the Navy planes were searching all
the other critical areas, and they probably were. I say, that was a matter that
was not under my control.
My only reason for referring to that is that I get the impression
from that that you thought the Navy were doing a pretty good job
on reconnaissance.
General Short. On the critical areas. The best they could do with
the material they had.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, my other question is. If you thought they
were having reconnaissance in the critical areas, why did you have
your pursuit planes on 4 hours' notice?
General Short. Because, on my information from Washington,
I had nothing to indicate that we were going to have an air attack.
Mr. Murphy. Did you think the reconnaissance was being made
as a result of the message of November 27 ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3095
[5-5^/] General Short. I thought the reconnaissance was being
made on account of both that and the message of October 16. They
were giving exactly the same instructions on October 16 as they were
in the message of November 27.
Mr. Murphy. Is it your impression that there was no change in
the situation from November 27 on than that which existed from
October 16?
General Short. As far as the deployment of the Navy, because
both messages stated that the Navy would take a defensive deploy-
ment preparatory to carry out
Mr. Murphy. But you did say, General, many times in the record,
that you felt after the 27th the Navy tightened up?
General Short, That is correct. They said they did.
Mr. Murphy. Right. At any rate, you did not have your pursuit
planes on other than a 4-hour preparatory state; isn't that right?
General Short. However, I may state that when the situation
arose they were actually in the air in 55 minutes.
Mr. Murphy. Some of them were.
General Short. All that were in condition to get in the air.
Mr. Murphy. General, do you have any report made by you to
"Washington immediately after Pearl Harbor on that situation?
[834^] General Short. On the planes in the air?
Mr. MuEPHY. On exactly what happened. We have a report be-
fore us, a letter, which Admiral Kinimel wrote to Washington, and
which I am going to discuss with you. Do you have a report that you
made as to what planes were ready, how your antiaircraft was sit-
uated, and so forth ?
General Short. I think we made a written report. I haven't got
it immediately available.
Mr. Murphy. I think it is important that we have it. I will ask
the Army liaison to produce a copy of it if they will.^
General Short. May I say one word to Colonel Duncombe if he is
here.
I think Colonel Phillips, who is in the audience, can tell you defi-
nitely whether we did put in a written report.
The Vice Chairman. The question was about a written report made
by General Short to the War Department following the attack on
December 7, 1941.
General Short (addressing Colonel Duncombe). They want that
and I think Colonel Phillips can tell you definitely whether it was put
in and when.
Mr. Murphy. Don't you know. General, whether you made a report
to Washington or not?
General Short. I think I did. I was just referring to my chief
of staff who would be responsible for assembling [SS^S] the
details of the report. We made several reports by telephone. I
think we put in a written report.
Here is a report put in by radiogram on December 7.
Mr: Murphy. No, I want a report from the commanding general
to Washington of the over-all picture.
General Short. This was a previous report on the over-all picture.
Mr. Murphy. Signed by whom?
General Short. Signed by me.
1 The document was subsequently admitted to the record as "Exhibit No. 164." • p;
.^^T»T TxrvTrc;TTnATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3096 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIOAIIUJN rr^
Mr MuRPiiY. All right. ,
^^-^^:^^:7Z^i\^l^ site it, if I may. It prob
ablv is quite lengthy.
S^r^^r: S,^ferre?dt GSe™,. I thought perhaps ,
was six or seven pa^es. - T)g(,gj^ber and was ad
aSTo\aiuS^ta;Sritwa%e^~t,Wash^
Qitbbcutuu J „«H«v,fpfl number Sixty attacked Hickam Fiek
Japanese enemy dive b«nibers rshmaltd umbeT six j ^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^
Wheeler Field Pearl Harbor a ^>g^'\.^^,f,Sj„ p^eld and to planes caught on th.
hangars Wheeler Field three hangars H|ckam Ineld ana lo i ^^^
ground Stop Details not yet fnown Stop Ra d Jf^t^f ^^^^^^ badly damage<
h ^Si^rS^wKsc^^'a^^Stop Details later
Mr. MuRPiiT. It is the details that I am interested m.
m" MtpnTi JoSicf Uke to have a report, if there is one, by yo.
givmg your explanation as to what happened and your impression o
^'^liillTs'^^^^^^^ I think Colonel Duncombe will be able to find that
Mr MuR^^^^^^^^ bave reference in that regard to a letter dated De
''Geneil^l~s7iORT. There are other radiograms making additiona
Ureneiai oiiui ^^ difficult to read.
"^S MuRpLf l"Lk the Irmy to get d the detailed repor
whic ; fhe Gei^ral made explainiiig -^fVTW'^'^^^^roTl se
In that connection I refer to a letter dated December 12 19il, sen
bf Aclmiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark in which he said tbe Army^^
aircraft guns were not manned. Did you know that Admiial Kim
mel said that ?
General Short. No, sir. _
Mr Murphy. Was that a fair statement i
imS] General Short. It was not. They were partly mannec
Mr Murphy. There was only a skeleton antisabotage crew, wasn
^^^General Short. That is correct; but they were able to fire, an
broucrht down a considerable number of planes m that first raid.
M? Murphy. You do not agree with that statemeiit of the Admira
Geneial Short. Not entii?ly. I don't know how he meant i
He may have meant that the full crews were not there. It that
what he meant that is correct.
Mr. Murphy. He also said:
Ships in harbor opened fire very promptly b>it the first attack was practical
unopposed.
Do you agree? , , , ^ :„ fVo fir
General Short. We knocked down a number of planes in the nr.
^ Mr. Murphy. You don't agree then with the admiral's statemei
tlint the first wave was practically unopposed? .
Genei-al Short. If he means the dive bombers that came m a ai^
tance above the water estimated to have been anywhere f roni iu
900 feet, the torpedo planes, that is probably correct, because noDOd
fired on them until they were close enough to identify.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3097
18S46] Mr. Murphy. Now, General-
General Short. I have, Mr. Murphy, a radio report here by General
Martin, commanding the Air Corps, on the 7th, which was a little
more detailed than the one I read.
Mr. MuiiPHY. I will ask counsel and the liaison officer if they will
assemble a report, the reports from Hawaii from the Army on what
happened on December 7.
General Short. Yes, sir.
May I interject one other thing?
Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir.
General Short. Colonel Phillips, who is in the audience, the chief
of staff, says that a detailed report was made about the 10th or 11th
in written form.
Mr. Murphy. You say that Colonel Phillips made a detailed report f
General Short. I signed the report but he remembers more of the
details.
Mr. Murphy. But did Colonel Phillips know what went on between
you and Admiral Kimmel ?
General Short. I think he knew anything of importance.
Mr. Murphy. He testified that he didn't, didn't he ?
General Short. No, no ; I wouldn't say that. I would like to have
you read that testimony.
Mr. Murphy. Well, let's get down to that exactly. The [8347]
fact is that one Phil Hayes — was he a general or colonel?
General Short. He was a colonel.
Mr. Murphy. Colonel Phil Hayes was your chief of staff up to
November 1 of 1941 ; isn't that correct ?
General Spiort. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And every time you had a meeting with the Navy you
took your chief of staff with 3^ou ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. Then on November 6 you got Colonel Phillips as
your chief of staff and you never brought him to the Navy meetings
with you ; isn't that correct ?
General Short. Yes, sir. Do you wish me to make an explanation
on that?
Mr. Murphy. Yes, why you wouldn't have your chief of staff in
your conferences with the other branch.
General Short. Colonel Hayes had been there for 3 or 4 years.
He knew all the Navy people and had been present at all these con-
ferences. I took him because I thought he had considerable back-
ground of what had gone on before. At the same time that Colonel
Hayes had been attending conferences with me Major Fleming had
been carrying on a great deal of the liaison work with the Navy and
I thought he had more of a background than my new chief of staff'.
For that reason, the fact that he was an unusually keen [8348]
able officer, with a remarkable memory, I thought he would know i
great deal about the things that Colonel Hayes had participated in.
Mr. Murphy. In other words, Major Fleming, who was in daib
contact with the District Engineer in Honolulu and in contact witl
the civilian engineer and in contact with the engineer at San Francisc<
and was one of your
General Short. May I add, his contact with the engineer in Sai
Francisco was through the District Engineer in Honolulu.
79716 — 46— pt. 7 13
3098 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, he was one of j'^our engineers, in contact
daily with the civilian authorities in Honolulu, and with the District
Engineer, and when you were discussing matters subsequent to
November 27 instead of having your own chief of staff with you you
took one of the members of G-4, your engineer, with you ?
General Short. Because I thought he had more background. He
had a background over a considerable period. He knew probably
most everything that Colonel Hayes had known for the last year.
Mr. Murphy. How was your chief of staff ever to learn or ever to
know or ever to understand if you were taking the engineer to the
conferences instead of your chief of staff?
General Short. I explained to the chief of staff anything of im-
portance.
[8349] Mr. Murphy. But the chief of staff never saw these
messages of the Navy, did he?
General Short. Yes, I am sure that the important ones were de-
livered to him ; copies of the important ones he did see.
Mr. MrRPHY. Did he at any time engage in conversation where
you had Admiral Kimmel in conversation ?
General Short. After November 27, in those few conferences, he
was not present.
Mr. Murphy. He was not present at any conference after the war
warning. Was he ever present at any conference between you and
the Navy from the time he became your chief of staff on November 6?
General Short. He was not present at formal conferences. He was
present at a considerable number of informal conferences where
Admiral Kimmel and I talked.
Mr. Murphy. And the chief of staff, who was never present at any
formal conference betAveen you and the Navy, was the only person you
talked to before you decided on alert No. 1?
General Short. Yes, sir; because I considered him the best in-
formed man on the staff.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, you considered him the best informed
man, but yet you never took him to the conferences.
General Short. May I put in here, that when you consider [SoSOl
a chief of staff you must not consider him on only one phase.
I would like to compare slightly Colonel Hayes and Colonel Phillips.
Colonel Hayes was an excellent administrative man. He had had
dealings with the Navy over considerable periods of time. Colonel
Phillips was a far more competent man on field work and training.
A far more competent man.
Mr. Murphy. Isn't it so — excuse me, go ahead.
General Short. This November 27, if anything was going to come
of it, it was going to come of it as field work.
Mr. Murphy. That is the trouble. It was going to come of it as
field work.
General Short. If anything came he was the more competent.
Mr. Murphy. In other words, you Avere field-work conscious,
weren't you ?
General Short. I am talking fighting.
Mr. Murphy. Are you talking about the air, though? I don't
mean about the infantry.
General Short. He knew more than any staff officer I had of the
fighting, the combined army.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3099
Mr. MuRPHT. How could he when he is presiding as chief of staff
over a staff confernece of your organization intelligently discuss with
your staff what was going on if he wasn't in conferences where the
two services got together ?
\8351'\ General Short. I think I had better explain how those
conferences were conducted.
Mr. Murphy. I wish you would, and will you
Senator Ferguson. I don't think the witness had completed his
answer.
The Vice Chairman. Let him finish his question first.
Mr. Murphy. I wish you would discuss that. General, I don't want
to interrupt. But in that connection I wish you would tell us what
staff conference, if any, was had by the Army between November 27
and the date of the attack.
[8S52] General Short. The conferences were habitually held on
Saturday morning.
Mr. Murphy. Was there one held on December the 6th?
General Short. There was.
Mr. Murphy. All right. Now go ahead.
General Snoirr. And the chief of staff conducted these conferences
but he did not do all the talking. Each staff officer, the head of each
section was called upon in turn. If he had anything of interest or
importance he discussed it. If the Chief of Staff had anything to add
to it, or if some other section of the general staff was interested in
the thing and had some additional information it was brought in.
Mr. Murphy. You say there was a conference
The Vice Chairman. Does that complete our answer, General?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. All right.
Mr. Murphy. Now, there was a staff conference on December 6,
1941?
General Short. There was.
Mr. Murphy. And who were present at it. General?
General Short. I think — I was not present at it but I am sure that
all of the general staff and probably the [8S53'] special staff
were present at it.
Mr. Murphy. Well, you were not present, at any rate, to give them
the benefit of what you knew about what the Navy knew, isn't that
right?
General Short. That is correct.
^ Mr. Murphy. And there was no one else in your organization who
discussed anything from a staff standpoint with Admiral Kimmel,
was there?
General Short. I am sure that Phillips knew anything of impor-
tance that I knew.
Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate, you said there was no one
General Short. He was present.
Mr. Murphy. You said before he was not.
General Short. Oh, yes. He conducted the conference.
Mr. Murphy. Oh, no ; I beg your pardon, we are misunderstanding
each other. Phillips, your chief of staff, was not at the formal con-
ferences with the Navy?
General Short. No, sir; he was not.
yja, Ai. x/i.»-/i».
SlOi) CONGRESSIONAL i^ VKSTIGATIUW l-iUAKi. iiAno
I
Mr Munpiiy. That is right. Now, then, he is the one presiding over
the staff conference and yet he had not been present at the conter-
ences with the other service, isn't that correct?
General Short. That is correct.
l835A^ Mr. ;Murphy. Yes. ,,,1^1 i
General Short. That is correct, but he knew what had taken place.,
Mr. MuRPiTv. He knew only what you told him, isn t that right ?
General Shout. That is correct. 1, v,„f _.„*
Mr Murphy. And he never saw the reports as such or what went
on or'did not have the benefit of looking over these People as they dis-
cussed things and sizing them up. He took what you told him about
what went on ; isn't that correct ?
General Short. That is correct. , , ,, ^ *u
Mr Murphy. Now, then, do you know whether the man from the
engineers was requested by the staff conference to give his impressions
as to what went on at the conference? . • _
General Short. I don't know whether he gave his impression 01
not He was there and if he thought there was anything that needed
to be added I am sure that he would have added it.
Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield right on that point toi
one question ?
Mr Murphy. Yes; surely.
Senator Lucas. General Short, did Colonel Philhps know aboul
the war-warning message that came from the Navy ^
General Short. Oh, I am sure he did because that mes- l^-Jod}
saee— it happens that that particular message was not delivered tc
me personally, I think, but delivered to the_G-3 section and unques-
tionably he brought it to me from the G-3 section.
Senator Lucas. It is your opinion that he saw that message ^
General Short. I am confident that he knew exactly what was 11
Mr mSrphy. I thought, General, that Layton testified— oh, no
that was the 24th, I beg your pardon— no; I thought it was Laytor
who testified that he delivered that war-warning message to you per
'°Ge!4al Short. I may be confused but I think the message of th(
24th was delivered to me personally but that the message of the 27tt
was delivered to Colonel or Major Donnegan m charge ot the U-.
section. It might have been the other way around, but i do no
Mr Murphy. Now I wish you would turn to page 534 of the Arm]
Pearl Harbor board hearings. I would like to read question 83«:
Genpi-al Gkunert. One question, here. Somewhere in "^y Jioles here I hav
soShing to the efEect that your Chief of Staff, Co onel Phillips state that h
was not informed as to what took place at your confer- [S3f ] ences wu
the Admiral. Did you keep him informed, or did you discuss ^Mth him wha
^''^Genena SHORT. Anything of any importance, I am sure I discussed with hin
We were on a very friendly personal basis—
you are meaning there that you were on a very friendly basis wit)
j'^our own chief of staff ?
General Short. That is correct.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3101
Mr. Murphy. Yes. [Beading :]
—and I am sure that if I picked up any piece of information that I thouglit was
of any importance— and I know that I talked to him about certam task forces,
because when it came to sending an officer along, wiiy, he would be the one that
would get out the order.
Now, that was a very accurate statement as far as what Phillips
knew as to what the Navy rras doing?
General Short. That is a correct statement. , , ^ 4
Mr. Murphy. Then you told him whatever you thought was ot
importance ?
General Short. That is a correct statement. _
Mr Murphy. And you then attended meetings with the JNavy on
!November the 27th and December the 1st and December the 2d and
[December the 3d, and then a meeting between Major Fleming and
(Colonel Pfeiffer on December the 4th where there _ L<bJo/J
•were many Navy men present, at least at some of the meetings and
motyourownchief of staff; isnt that right? .
General Short. I don't know who was present between Major
Fleming and Colonel Pfeiffer. On December 2 there was nobody
but Admiral Kimmel and me. On December 3 m all probability
Admiral Bloch was there; I don't remember definitely and 1 do not
know what additional naval officers were there. I think m all prob-
ability that Major Fleming was with me, although General Martm
may have been.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I would like to ask you to turn to page
522 of the same record, question 790 :
General Grunert. The notes on the testimony before the Roberts Commission
indicates that General Wilson, commanding the 24th Division, was never called
in conference or consulted regarding the warning message of November Zith.
Was that a correct statement? • i ^i
General Short. I sent a staff officer the afternoon I received the
message to General Wilson to explain exactly what was m the mes-
sage. I did not scatter copies around on account o± limiting the
strictly secret information as I had been directed.
General Wilson had the north sector, which was much less popu-
lated than the south sector and where we feared much _ [bJd^j
less subversive measures or sabotage. There were practically no
changes made in the alert, in the sabotage alert as prescribed in our
standing operating procedure in General Wilson's sector.
On the other hand, in General Murray's sector, the south sector,
as a result of inspections by General Murray and by Colone Fielder
we very largely revamped the guard system in that sector, which was
the more dangerous of the two sectors. .
Mr Murphy. At any rate, General, General Wilson said he was
never consulted about the war warning, and that is a correct state-
"^ General Short. But he does not say that he did not have the mes-
sage, intelligence on the message of November 27. A staff oflicer
was personally sent to him to explain.
Mr. Murphy. Well, do you know that.
General Short. I do know it ; yes, sir.^
Mr. Murphy. Who did explain it to him?
3102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. I do not know the name of the staff officer. I
directed that the staff officers be sent and I know they were sent.
Mr. Murphy. Well, let me read you a little bit more.
General Short. Did he say he got It from the Division Officer?
ISJjyj General Gkunekt. He said he was never consulted.
General Short. He had the north sector where the antisabotage worli was
not nearly as serious. While I had repeated conferences with Murray, I may
not have had any with Wilson.
General Gkunekt. Wilson thought the Navy had an insliore and offshore patroL
Why was he not instructed and informed?
General Short. His job was quite different from that of the other divisions.
While I had repeated conferences with Murray, and I had Murray personally
inspect every post and he came back to me with recommendations and made a
lot of clianges
General Grunert (interposing). That was in connection with your alert 1?
General Short. Yes.
General Gruxert. But in connection with the possibility of his giving advice
as to any other alert, he, Wilson, did not have any information?
General Short. I did not have any conference with liim as to whether he
wanted to advise me as to something different.
Now, at any rate, General, Wilson was not at that meeting on
Saturday morning, December 6, was he?
[SoGO] General Short. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, let us come to Colonel Fielder, at the
bottom of page 522, question 795. Colonel Fielder, he was your G-2,
wasn't he ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
General Grunert. Colonel Fielder says he discussed the possibility of an at-
tack with tlie Commanding General in a purely academic way. I do not quite
understand how there is anything academic about discussing the possibility of an
attack.
General Short. I do not. We discussed the possibility, probably because he
was G-2 and was supposed to have some information.
Do you know whether or not G-2 — what he meant by "a purely
academic wayT'
General Short. I do not know why he used that terminology, but he
had more information on sabotage than anybody in the department.
He had a very thorough understanding of it.
Mr. Murphy. About sabotage?
General Short. And any internal disorders and was supposed to
know more about what the Japanese population in Hawaii were doing
and thinking than anybody in the department.
Mr. ISIuRPHY. That was covered very well by everybody, but what
about the air warning and the messages of the Navy? [S361'\
Why didn't he see that or why was he left out of that conference with
the ^avy ?
General Short. Because we had no message of an air warning.
Mr. Murphy. Well, the Navy had McMorris there, didn't they,
their war plans man? He was their war plans man, wasn't he, Mc-
Morris ?
General Short. He was the war plans man.
Mr. Murphy. Yes. Why didn't you have your war plans man there
if you were going to have a conference?
General Short. It was entirely up to me whom to bring. McMorris
I do not think was — I am not sure but I do not think he was in on the
conference all the time. He was immediately available where Admiral
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3103
Kimmel could call him in. That was true of all of Admiral Kimmel's
staff. I took with me to that conference General Martin, who was the
head of my air force, and Colonel Mollison, who was his chief of staff.
This was an air conference. They were the two best men, the two best
informed men in the department on the situation. It was perfectly
logical to take them.
Mr. Murphy. General, you say it was an air conference but it had
nothing to do with the message of November the 27th, did it?
General Short. Not directly because we had not received [8362']
the message.
Mr. Murphy. That is right ; you did not get that message until some
time around 2 o'clock in the afternoon and this meeting in the morn-
ing for about 3 hours was about something else entirely, wasn't it ?
General Short. But it necessarily covered all the elements of danger
because the conference was about the reinforcement of Midway and
Wake by Army planes, but we had discussed the danger connected with
the reinforcement and the danger connected with lessening the air
equipment at Oahu.
Mr. Murphy. Did you ever at any time between November the 27th
and December the 7th have your staff and the naval staff' together to
discuss the war warning?
General Short. There never was any time that I know of, and I
have not heard of any time in the past, where the complete Army and
Navy staff were assembled. If any previous commander ever did so I
never heard of it.
Mr, Murphy. Now, your key officers, did you assemble them, I mean
your G-3 and your G-2 ?
General Short. We did not.
Mr. Murphy. Now, I direct your attention to page 525, question
803, Do you have that General, at the bottom of the page ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
[8363'] General Grunert. "Lt. Col. Blcknell, Assistant G-2, informed the
staff at a meeting on December 6 that the Japs were burning papers on December
5. Says it meant that war was imminent, to him." Did he so inform his Chief
of Staff or his Commanding General? If so, what conclusions were reached with
regard to it?
General Short. I am sure he didn't inform me.
Mr. Murphy. As a matter of fact. General, you did not see him
about that until the next day, did you ?
General Short. Well, I think that I did not but both my G-2,
Colonel Fielder, and my chief of staff, Colonel F'hillips, stated in their
testimony before the Roberts commission that they did inform me that
they were burning papers. Colonel Fielder also stated to the Roberts
commission that he attached no importance to it because we did the
same every day and he thought it was a routine burning of papers.
Mr. Murphy. Well, the fact is, General, that you did testify here
and again in these hearings that you did not know about that until
the next day.
General Short. All right, will you give me the quotations?
Mr. Murphy. All right. Now, you say that you did not testify on
several occasions
General Short. I am asking you to give me the quota- [8S64]
tions where I did testify.
3104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Murphy. I will.
Mr. Keefe. Why not do it now? You said you were going to do
it half a dozen times and you haven't done it. I would like to get
it while the General is being interrogated on the subject.
Mr. Murphy. Be calm; I have the references here and I have a
thousand pages here. I promise you I will.
General Short. I would like to have the references so that I can
judge which one it was.
Mr. Murphy. I cannot turn to it right now, but I will later.
Now, your assistant G-2 said he thought that the burning of papers
meant that war was imminent. You were not at the staff conference.
Did anybody tell you; did your assistant G-2 tell you on Dacember
the 6th that he thought war was imminent and about that being dis-
cussed at the conference ?
General Short. Not the assistant G-2; he did not tell me that.
G-2 says he told me that they had been burning papers and he appar-
ently— he had heard the talk and the report of the assistant G-2.
He apparently did not consider it a matter of importance, and I wish
to invite your attention to one thing further.
Bicknell said he got this information on the 5th. [8365] If
he had considered it so terrifically important he would not wait till
the morning of the 6th to report it.
Mr. Murphy. All I know. General, is that here is one of your staff
saying under oath that he thought that war was imminent and that
he discussed it at a staff meeting and you do not go to the staff meeting
and apparently nobody tells you that in that staff meeting there was
a feeling that war was imminent on the part of at least one person
there, isn't that right ?
General Short. And he also stated that he received the information
on December 5 and apparently he did not tell Colonel Fielder and he
did not tell me, which would not indicate that he attached such great
importance to see that we got it.
Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate he was right, wasn't he ?
General Short. He was right in that respect. He was a much less
experienced man than the G-2.
Mr. Murphy. Now, may I ask counsel, do you have handy exhibit
37 ; the basic exhibit ?
Mr. Masten. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. Now I direct your attention to exhibit No._37 — the
last paper. I think I can make it clear to the general; it is just a
one-sentence dispatch.
General, on December 6, 1941, there was sent from [8366]
COM Fourteen, "ACTION: OpNav," Information for the Navy:
Believe local Consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably
not included your eighteen double five of third.
Did you have any information from the Navy that they had sent
word to Washington that the Japs at Honolulu were destroying their
systems ?
General Short. I did not.
Mr. Murphy. Now, did you have any information from the Navy
that on December the 6th a message was sent to Admiral Kimmel :
In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying
Pacific Islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and con-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTKE 3105
fldential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency X Means
of communication to support our current operations and special Intelligence
should of course be maintained until the last moment.
Did the Navy tell you about that?
General Short. They did not.
Mr. Murphy. You were not in any conference on any day from the
third on, were you, with the Navy ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. Right. Did you know from the Navy that [8367]
they had a dispatch on the 4th of December about destroying con-
fidential publications and other matters at Guam ?
General Short. I did not.
Mr. Murphy. Did you know from the Navy that on the 4th of
December — I beg your pardon. On the 4th of December — rather, the
3d of December that there was a message sent to them — and this is
important in view of your testimony, General :
Circular Twenty Four Forty Four from Tokyo One December ordered London
Hong Kong Singapore and Manila to destroy Machine XX Batavia machine
already sent to Tokyo XX December second Washington also directed destroy X
All but one copy of other systems X and all secret documents XX British Ad-
miralty London today reports Embassy London has complied.
The Navy did not tell you about that either, did they ?
General Short. They did not.
Mr. Murphy. Did you know from the Navy that on the 3d of
December they had a message :
Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instruc-
tions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong,
Singapore. Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their
codes and ciphers at once and to [S.36S] burn all other important con-
fidential and secret documents.
Did 3^ou get that either. General ?
General Short. I did not.
Mr. Murphy. Now, General, as I read your testimony in the other
hearings you testified that if you had received the one p. m. message
that there were two matters in the message, one the ultimatum, the
date, the 1 o'clock hour, and the other about the destruction of the codes
and you said that that would have much more importance to you than
the 1 o'clock business, is that right ?
General Short. Will you restate that, because I do not believe you
made your meaning clear.
Mr. Murphy. All right. Will you read the question ?
(The question was read by the reporter.)
Mr. Murphy. Do you understand that ?
General Short. The 1 o'clock business included both; that is the
reason I did not understand your question.
Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate did you attach great importance
to the information about the destruction of the codes or to the fact
that there was a 1 o'clock hour set ?
General Short. It would have been a combination of both.
Mr. Murphy. Did you testify before the Navy — excuse me, I don't
mean to interrupt.
[8369] General Short. I think you are misquoting me again.
Mr. Murphy. Again I am misquoting you ?
General Short. Yes.
3106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Murphy. Well, then, General, I guess I had better quote you
exactly so that I won't be accused of that after this hearmg.
General Short. All right, sir.
Mr. Murphy. I want to be eminently fair with you, but I want
the facts. When did I misquote you before. General ?
General Short. When you have read from the — I cannot say exactly
when but a number of times you have made a statement that I think
did not coincide exactly with my testimony.
Mr. Murphy. You think I misquoted you ?
General Short. I don't mean intentional at all, but when we quote
without reading it is pretty hard to state definitely what has been said.
Mr. Murphy. Well, I will quote you exactly, General. I now refer
to page 256 of your testimony before the Nav}^ Court of Inquiry.
General Short. 256?
Mr. Murphy. 256, General ; question 179.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Question mark. Period.
General, would you have made a very quick re- [S370] estimate of the
situation and have ordered such an alert had you had that scrambled telephone
conversation with General Marshall?
A. I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there, about
the destruction of the code machines. Tlie other matter wouldn't have made aa
impression on me. But when you destroy your codes or code machines, you are
going into an entirely new phase. I would have had this advantage also: I could
have asked him the significance to him. But leaving that out, the code machine
would have been very significant, the destruction of the code machine would have
been very significant to me. I would have been very much more alarmed about
that than the other matter.
General, would that be misquoting you by what I said about that
message ?
General Short. You may have drawn the wrong inference from my
answer.
Mr. Murphy. What did you mean by that ?
General Short. I meant by that just the delivery of the ultimatum,
because at previous times they had stated that the negotiations were
practicall}'' terminated. I was not talking about the 1 p. m. I was
talking about the ultimatum.
Mr. Murphy. General, you say you were not talking about
[8371] the 1 o'clock message?
General Short. Not the hour. In my statement there I was com-
paring the importance in my own mind of the statement that the code
machines were ordered destroyed and the statement that the ultima-
tum— that an ultimatum was to be delivered, not the hour of the ulti-
matum but that an ultimatum was to be delivered ; that is what I had
in mind.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate. General, you were saying that the code-
machine business was very significant to you; isn't that right?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. Right. And the fact is that the Navy on the 3d and
the 6th had several messages about code destruction and then this
from your own Honolulu to Washington on the 6th sent a message to
Washington ; isn't that so ?
General Short. Let me get your last statement.
Mr. Murphy. On the 6th they sent a message to Washington about
the destruction of the system ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3107
General Short. Wlio did?
Mr. MuRPiiT. The Navy.
General Short. I believe that that is correct, but I knew nothing
about any one of them.
Mr. Murphy. Well, let me quote it correctly so that we won't have
any charges against me that I am misquoting. [8372] I do not
want to misquote you.
General Short. Yes, sir; I have the message that they sent on
the 6th.
Mr. Murphy. Well, I will read it exactly :
Believe local Consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably
not included your eighteen double five of third.
Do you see that, General ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And the fact is that you time and again in this hear-
ing have stated that Admiral Kimmel gave you everything of impor-
tance; isn't that right?
General Short. No, sir ; I said he gave — I was pretty sure that he
gave me everything that he considered of importance to me that I
should know.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you considered these messages important ?
General Short. Very important; yes.
Mr. Murphy. And the fact is that they were very important, as you
have testified.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And you and Admiral Kimmel had no conference
about the air messages and you say you had no conference with him
after the 3d ?
[8373] General Short. The message on the third came in after
the conference.
Mr. Murphy. Well, you had no conference?
General Short. We had no conference and I did not get the message.
Mr. Murphy. And it was your understanding that Admiral Kim-
mel was not to give it to you unless Washington told him to give
it to you, is that right?
General Short. I think his practice was definitely to transmit mes-
sages, as I said, only when he received instructions from Washington
to do so. He might mention the thing to me informally, but he did
not transmit the message to me.
Mr. Murphy. Did you know, General, that Admiral Kimmel was
getting a lot of information over the months from Manila?
General Short. I think that I knew that he was getting something
on location of Japanese intercepts, perhaps, but I did not know of any-
thing else that I remember.
Mr. Murphy. Well, did you know that he got a message from Manila
about the winds code ?
General Short. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. He did not pass that on to you either, did he ?
General Short. No, sir; I never heard of the winds [8374]
code for many months afterward.
Mr. Murphy. Well, let me quote exactly. Did you know that there
had been sent on the 28th of November from "CINCAF, ACTION
OPNAV, info : COM SIXTEEN CINCPAC COM FOURTEEN",
a message on the winds code which I believe is already in the record ?
General Short. I did not.
Mr. Murphy. Did you know that there was a message on the 1st
of December from "COM SIXTEEN, ACTION : CINCAF, INFO :
CINCPAC, OPNAV, COM FOURTEEN, 011422", as follows:
J-V-J press tonight in closing seventeen hundred schedule stated quote "All
listeners be sure and listen in at zero seven zero zero and zero seven thirty
tomorrow morning, since there may be important news" unquote XX Suggest
frequencies seven three two seven X Nine four three zero X And one two two
seven five X Times Tokyo LCT.
Did the Navy ever tell you about that message ?
General Short. They did not.
Mr. Murphy. Did you know that Admiral Kimmel subsequent to
the 27th of November instituted a 24-hour war plan ?
General Short. I don't know what you mean by a "24-hour war
plan."
[8375] Mr. Murphy. Well, let me quote exactly. I am referring
to exhibit 118 in this record :
Memorandum For the Commander In Chief
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 1200, 30 Novetnljer, 194I.
Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese War within the next Twenty-
four Hours.
And then subsequently a revision of that on December 5, 1941. Did
you know that the Navy had taken those steps ?
General Short. No, sir; I did not.
Mr. Murphy. Don't you think if you had had conferences with the
Navy where these problems were discussed from November 27 on
that you most certainly would have been told about a 24-hour plan
that the Navy had ?
General Short. That was a later date, I believe, than any of our
conferences.
Mr. Murphy. Well, one was the 30th of November.
General Short. The 30th of November.
Mr. Murphy. That is when it was constituted and you had a con-
ference on the first, on the second, on the third and Major Fleming
with Colonel Pfeiffer on the fourth.
General Short. That is correct, but I was not told about that.
Mr, Murphy. Well, don't you think you should have been ?
[8376] General Short. I have not read the thing. I could not
make a statement.
Mr. Murphy. Well, I ask you to look it over now. if you will, Gen-
eral, please. It has been an exhibit for some days [handing document
to the witness] .
Have you examined it. General ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Had you any word of that plan ?
General Short. I had not.
Mr. Murphy. General, a while ago — oh, I don't want to go off this
subject yet. Don't you think you sliould have been told about the fact"
that they after the 27th had a 24-hour plan and that on the very 5th
of December they had a revision of it ?
General Short. I think if you read it carefully that they had two
things in there : First, the details of what he was doing to carry out
his instructions for a defensive deployment and the next the naval de-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3109
tails of what he expected to do in case that he put war plans — was di-
rected to put War Plans 46 into effect.
I do not believe that he would have thought it necessary to tell me
what he expected to do on details of that kind. He possiblj' would
have — he probably would have told me if he had ever — when he put
the thing into effect. You see, among [8377] other thmgs they
are to include the bringing back from the west coast another carrier
and he undoubtedly did not think that that was a matter — he had not
ordered it back, he just contemplated doing it if the war crane on. I
can see why he did not tell me.
Mr. Murphy. The fact is that he did have 3 or 4 days ahead — may
I have it so that I will quote it exactly, please ?
General Short. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. He did have a plan called, "Steps to be taken in case
of American- Japanese War within the next 24-hours."
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And do you or do you not think you should have been
told about the creation of that plan on the 30th of November 1941 and
the revision on December 5, 1941 ?
General Short. Looking it over it is practically all details of ship
movements, and so forth and I can readily understand why he did not
think it directly concerned me.
Mr. Murphy. General, war within 24 hours would very much con-
cern you, wouldn't it, as the General in Hawaii ?
General Short. Yes, sir; but the location of a particular ship
might not concern me.
Mr. Murphy. General Marshall did tell you your mission [8378']
was to protect the base and the naval communications and your first
concern was to protect the fleet, didn't he ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And wouldn't you be concerned then if there were
going to be war involving the fleet within 24 hours ?
General Short. If there was going to be ?
Mr. Murphy. Yes.
General Short. Definitely; but I would not necessarily be con-
cerned whether cruiser A was here and B over here, or vice versa.
Mr. Murphy. Would you be concerned whether the fleet was in or
out of the harbor ?
General Short. Very decidedly.
Mr. Murphy. Wouldn't the 24-hour plan affect that very decidedly?
General Short. I do not believe as I looked over that paper that
there is any provision for the fleet coming in from outside the harbor
except to come in long enough to refuel and go out. That provision
was there.
Mr. Murphy. Now, General, I wish you would come back to page
525 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearings.
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. General Martin was your air officer ; isn't [8379]
that right?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. Now, will you turn to question 807 ?
General Gbunert. And General Martin did not seem to know that the Inter-
ceptor command was not activated until December 17.
3110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. Well, the fact was it was actually operating, and there was
such a technical difference there that apparently Bergin and Martin, neither one
realized it hadn't gone out as an order. It was actually operating daily.
Was there some confusion in Martin's and Bergin's minds about
the status of the air warning service ?
General Short. I think it was more likely confusion in reference
to terms used because I think they both knew that it was actually in
operation. The printed order or typed order putting it into oper-
ation did not go out until the I7th.
Mr. Murphy. In other words, prior to December the 17th the air
warning service was under the control of the Signal Corps and had
not yet been turned over to the Air Corps, isn't that right i
General Short. That is not correct.
Mr. Murphy. It is not correct ?
General Short. No, sir. They were operating on a basis [8380]
of cooperation. The control officer in every case was an Air officer.
We had not put the whole thing directly under the Air people. The
Signal Corps were responsible for the training of the operators and
for the training of the men at the information center, but whenever
they operated they had an Air officer in control, the control officer was
alwaj^s an Air officer,
Mr. Murphy. Well, the Signal Corps — under the order of the I7th
it went under the Air Corps, did it not ?
General Short. Even for training, yes, and they were not under it
for training previous to that time.
[8381] Mr. Murphy. But after the I7th it would be under the
exclusive control of General Davidson ?
General Short. For training and everything else.
Mr. Murphy. For training and everything eles ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Then before the l7th, the Signal Corps was doing
the training?
General Short. They were responsible for the training when they
operated as part of an interceptor command. The Air control officer
actually controlled the whole operation.
Mr. Murphy. Then on page 1103
General Short. 1163?
Mr. Murphy. No, you do not have this. General. I am now refer-
ring to Transcript of Proceedings Before the Army Pearl Harbor
Board, pages 9T3 to 1105, in which I find the following — I do not think
there is another copy of this available, General. Will you come up
and check me as I am reading it, so I will have it correctly ?
Lt. Col. Karr. Just go ahead and read it.
Mr. Murphy (reading) :
General Russexl. You were not to go into action as a pursuit officer until these
other people who evaluated the information, had evaluated it, and told you that
[83S2'] hostile aircraft was enroute to the Island? That is the situation,
isn't it?
Colonel Tyi-er. That is right, sir.
General Russeix. I think it was not your joh to evaluate this information?
Colonel Tyler. No, sir ; it was not.
Do you know whether or not that is true?
General Short. I will tell you how the thing functioned.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3111
"We had an officer from the pursuit squadron ri^ht there in the in-
formation center. If he looked on the board when this report came
in, he should have known exactly where our own planes were, and
when a plane was reported at a certain place, and he knew that that
was our own plane, then he would not alert pursuit planes.
You see, there was no way at that time for the men operating the
oscilloscope saying "This is an enemy plane," or "This is a friendly
plane." All he could say is "There is a plane at such and such a place,"
and it was up to the officer representing the pursuit people to try to
determine whether there was any possibility of a friendly plane there
before we opened fire, or before we sent someone out to shoot it down.
Mr. MuRriiY. General, on the floor of Congress, time [8S83]
after time after time, there have been castigations at this gentleman.
I do not know who he is, except his name is Tyler.
As I understand it from reading this record, he was there and his
duty was to order these pursuit planes where to go, after he had been
told by somebody else that there was a problem that called for that
being done.
Is that your understanding?
General Short. If the interceptor command had been operating at
7 : 20, which it was not, before he had the bomber squadron at Wheeler
Field, there would have been a check-up by the pursuit officer to be
sure we would not go up and knock down our own ])lanes.
There was nobody at the station at 7 : 20, as I understand, but a man
named McDonald, who was a telephone operator, and Lieutenant Tyler,
because the station as such had been closed about 7 o'clock.
[S'384] Mr. Murphy. AVell, at an}' rate, wasn't it his job to direct
the planes from the ground after someone said there was a reason for
them to leave the ground ?
General Short. Under the circumstances, I will tell you what I think
he should have done. He should have called the Pursuit Conmiand at
Wheeler Field and they would have made the check then whether they
had planes in that vicinity, before they sent anyone up to fire upon
them.
Mr. MiTRPHY. As a matter of fact, would not they then have to call
you, or somebody else, to reverse alert 1 and put into some other order
so that they could take them off the ground ?
General Short. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Who had the authority to alter alert 1 ?
General Short. There was a provision in the standing operating
procedure that in case of a surprise attack the alert would go auto-
matically into effect. They would notify me after they would put it
into effect.
Mr. Murphy. What was he then? A lieutenant? Could a lieu-
tenant do anything about that?
General Short. I beg pardon ?
Mr. Murphy. I say he was onlv a lieutenant. It was Lieutenant
Tyler, wasn't it?
General Short. Yes. sir,
[8SS5] Mr. Murphy. He says at page 1101 :
General Russell and you knew the only thing you had to do was to get in
touch with the people who could put those planes up, isn't that true?
Colonel Tyler. That is not exactly true, sir, because we had nothing on the
alert. We had no planes.
3112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Would he be in error in that respect ?
General Short. He would be in error. I have checked that state-
ment of his with General Davidson, who was the pursuit commander
at Wheeler Field, and he said there would have been no question, that
if he had received a message from Tyler to alert the command he
would have turned out everything. He would have immediately
checked afterward to find out whether there was justification for it,
but the first thing he would have done was to alert the command.
Mr. Murphy. In other words, the second lieutenant would identify
the planes as being enemy planes ?
General Short. He would not, because he did not have the informa-
tion there. The station was closed. In normal times there would be
a pursuit officer there whose business would be to identify them.
May I call your attention to paragraph 13 ? I think that will answer
you. The last two lines, or part of the last three lines.
[8386] Mr. Murphy (reading) :
— will be initiated by Department Order except in the case of a surprise hostile
attack.
General Short. In case of a surprise hostile attack it went into
effect automatically; it did not have to be put into effect by the De-
partment.
Mr. Murphy. In other words, if this lieutenant knew there were
any planes ■
General Short (interposing). He could put it into effect by simply
calling the Pursuit Command, and they would start operations and
then notify me. The first thing they would have done would be to
start operations.
Mr. Murphy. Now 1 direct your attention to page 517, General, of
the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Question 764 :
General Frank. It strikes me that right within the Army itself you had a
situation between the Air Force and the Signal Corps where this A. W. S. was
operating on a cooperative basis ratlier than on a positive command basis.
General Short. Because it had not reached a state of training where we
thought it could work to the best advantage.
General FR.i^KK. But if the vast proportion of the people concerned with its
operation were Air Force people
General Short (interposing). Not the technical operation. The operation of
the communications and the radar [8587] system is definitely for the
Signal Corps.
That is a correct statement ?
General Short. That is absolutely correct. There probably may
have been 10 times as many men of the Signal Corps working as of
the Air Corps.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, General, we have a letter placed in the
record from Admiral Kimmel orderiiig the Navy not to bunch the
planes but to disperse them, and then, as I remember it, the testimony
was that the ones that were dispersed and anchored in the bay were
destroyed and the ones that were together were not destroyed.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, your planes were bunched, based upon
a survey of General Burwell, isn't that correct ?
General Short. That is correct. It was a very extensive survey.
Mr. Murphy. I now direct your attention to page 526 — by the way,
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3113
I will get throngli in 10 minutes — page 526, question 808 :
General Grunnert. General Kudolph, the Commanding General of the bombers,
stated that had he had any intimation of preceding trouble his planes would not
have been bunched or concentrated but would have been ready for the air. Then,
iu parenthesis, "especially on a Sunday morning" parenthesis.
[838S] Was he not informed by the Commanding General, or the Com-
manding General of the Air Forces, of the warnings of the immediate past?
General Shokt. I went over the tiling very fully with General Mirtin, talked
over with him at as great length as anybody. I would imagine that he talked
with his subordinate commanders.
Would that be a proper subject for discussion at that meeting on
Saturday morning?
General Short. No, sir ; I mean General Rudolph ^vas not present at
that meeting.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, General Martin, if General Rudolph was
telling tlie truth, should have passed on the message to him, is that
right ?
General Short. He should have passed on the message to him. I do
not know whether he did or not. I would like to read General Martin's
report, what he sa.ys about that in his report to the War Department.
Mr. Murphy. I wish you would.
General Short. I would also say, in view of General Burwell's ex-
tensive study — in the first place. General Rudolph could not have dis-
persed those B-17's because you did not dare take them oiT the run-
vv'ays, the ground was so soft that vou would have never gotten them
into the air if [83S0] you had.
I would like to read this :
8 December 1941.
Chief of the Army Aie Forces,
Washington, D. C:
More specific information on questions asked by General Arnold : Command
alerted prevention sabotage required concentration rather than dispersion Stop
All planes now dispei'sed comma pursuit in bunkers Stop Bombers cannot be
bunkered on account of soft ground off runways Stop Local joint agreement
places responsibility for search on Navy who may call on Army for help when
thought necessary Stop Planes in ferry flight all land Oahu two landed small
fields and were badly damaged comma one destroyed by gunfire and one badly
damaged Stop Attack so perfectly executed surprise attack in strict accord with
our prescribed tactics Stop Dive bomber was highly accurate Stop Every effort
made with the bombers left to locate carriers without success Stop Casualties
dead six ofiicers two hundred seven enlisted men comma wounded some serioxisly
three hundred and sixty-seven enlisted men Stop Morale high.
Marti \.
Mr. Murphy. Now, General, will you kindlv go to page 524 of the
Army Pearl Harbor Board hearing, question 800 :
General Grunnebt. You had a conference once a week. [8390] What
did you confer on if it were not what the condition of things was and what
should or should not be done, and so forth? I do not know whether this is tlie
truth, but that is what is in the record, and we will question about it.
General Shokt. Undoubtedly that is correct. Burgin was not in on the weekly
conferences. I did confer with the staff.
General Grunnert. Then the weekly conference was a staff conference and
not a conference with subordinate commanders?
General Short. No. We had a conference with subordinate commanders on
irregular occasions, whenever there was something we thought we should tak£
up with them.
Do you know whether there was a staff conference with the sub-
ordinate commanders between November 27 and December 7 ?
79716— 46— pt. 7 14
3114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. I had a conference with General ISIartin and Gen-
eral Burgin within an hour or an hour and a half after the receipt of
the November 27 message. I had probably at least four or five con-
ferences with General Murray, who was commanding the division in
the south sector. I do not believe I had a conference with General
Wilson in the north sector, because there was nothing in particular
that I felt I needed to confer with him about.
Mr. Murphy. General, if you had had all of the radar that you had
ordered present, would you have had any different [8391']
schedule on Sunday morning, December 7, in view of the situation as
it then confronted you ?
General Short. In view of the parts situation and in view of the
fact that we had to train men, I doubt if I would.
I would like to read you, in that connection, a reference to this spare
parts. This is a memorandum made out on yesterday.
Was Department,
Abmy Service Forces,
Office of the Chief Signal Officer,
Washington, 24 January 1946.
Memorandum :
I have examined the budget estimate for the FY's 1941 and 1942 and, in addi-
tion, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the firsi appropirated funds for the
maintenance and operation of Radar sets SCR 270 were in the Third Supple-
mental Estimate, Fiscal Year 1942, page 35, submitted 13 November 1941, which
was approved by the Congress on 17 December 1941. The original planning for
these funds was made 10 October 1941 (preliminary estimate, F. Y. 1942).
These appropriated funds were for the operation of this type of set for a
period of two hours per day, five days a week, and 50 weeks a year to provide
training of [8392] personnel in the operation of this equipment.
That was signed by K. C. Lawton, colonel, Signal Corps.
That shows what the War Department planned their estimate of
funds on, and that was 2 hours operation a day 5 days a week.
Mr. Murphy. Now, General, I would like to ask you, if you will
General Short (interposing). In connection with that, there is a
statement here from Major Berquist, now Colonel Berquist, who was
our chief control officer and who was one of the two officers who had
some training prior to the return of General Davidson and Colonel
Powell. This is from volume 10, pages 1197 and 1198 of the Army
Pearl Harbor Board. This is a paraphrase and not a direct quotation :
The design of the gasoline engines was defective and we had very serious
trouble. We had very serious trouble with electric power failures.
He also said in connection with this number of hours, on page 1197,
and again I paraphrase :
Colonel Berquist pointed out that some of the enlisted men had been ruining
their eyes because we had to keep them on the radar work too long.
Now he was the man who was actively in charge of the operation
of the radar and interceptor command, the man that [8d93] we
thought had the most knowledge.
Mr. ^luRPiiY. Berquist?
General Short. Berquist.
. Mr. Murphy. Now in that connection I direct your attention to
page 1088 of the hearing before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.
X ou do not have that.
General Gbunneht. But Lf somebody came down there and said "we have got
to get this thing going, anything is liable to pop any minute" you might have
shortened up the time?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3115
This is General Grunnert questioning Commander Taylor.
General Short. Yes.
Mr. Murphy (reading) :
Commander Taylor. I think both Berquist and Taylor had that attitude, but
unfortunately we could not get that much information out of the people we
dealt with.
General Grunnert. Could not Berquist or Powell, or you, as far as the Navy
was concerned, have had access to the Chief of Staff and said, "The most im-
portant thing is lacking. We have got to get it in"?
Commander Taylor. We saw the Chief of Staff, but we found that somebody
else was always responsible.
General Grunneet. So they were not sufficiently impressed to make this their
business or push it in comparison with all the other things they had to do?
[8394] Commander Taylor. No, sir ; they lacked the power packs to get it
going.
General Gbunnekt. General Short expressed himself as most concerned about
getting this in. It seems to me if you had approached him he would have been
able to do something about it. Do you know whether or not permanent radar
equipment had been on the island awaiting construction projects such as roads,
cables, and so forth?
Commander Taylor, It could be, sir; but not according to the Signal Corps.
My information is from the Signal Corps Officers on the station.
Do you know whether or not that is a correct statement?
General Short. Commander Taylor was a naval officer and prob-
ably did not know as much about the details of what was required
and what had not been received as Colonel Powell would have known.
There was one thing that we had definitely not received. I think it was
sent from the States about December 10 or 12. That was the plans for
the erection of the radar towers. The engineer could not go ahead
and erect those towers until he got the plans of the footings that had
been provided for in the specifications in the Btates, and those were
not received until after the attack.
Mr. Murphy. I understand he is talking here, General, about the
air warning service that was operating.
[839S] General Short. As far as that is concerned, as I pointed
out yesterday, on the station at Haleakula, in the park, the negotia-
tions with the park people lasted from June 1940 to April 1941, and I
personally had a conference with the head of the park system before
we got that straightened out. So we were not asleep at the switch.
Mr. Murphy. I am thoroughly familiar with that. You made every
effort, and you had your difficulties, but, as I understand it. Com-
mander Taylor is talking about the mobile sets. He may be talking
about the permanent sets, but I am not sure.
General Short. I am talking about the permanent sets.
Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir. He says this :
General Grtjnnekt. There was one remark that set me back when I saw it in
your testimony. You said you never saw Short. Was he not the commanding
general and was he not around there?
Commander Taylor. I saw his Chief of Staff. I saw his Operations Officer.
We were very closely tied in with his staff and the Air Force staff.
General Short. May I state there that Commander Taylor being a
naval officer, a junior naval officer, may not have felt that he could
come to me, but I am sure Colonel Powell, my signal officer, told him he
could come to me any time, and he was the man who was responsible,
although Taylor was helping him out.
3116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[83961 ^^- Murphy. Now I want to conclude, General, by ask-
ing you to go to the supplemental part of the Army Pearl Harbor
Board hearing.
General Short. We have it here. Is it part of the Roberts commis-
sion ?
Mr. Murphy. Yes. Now, the bottom of page 1619, the fifth para-
graph up, beginning, "Now, General."
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy (reading) :
The Chairman. Now, General, have you in mind the contents of General Mar-
shall's message of the morning of December 7? You have in mind its content,
have you?
General Short. You mean the one
The Chaikman. That never reached you.
General Shoet. That didn't come until 2 : 58 ; yes, sir. I know exactly what
it was.
The Chairman. If that message had reached you, let us say, three hours before
the attack, would that have changed your dispositions?
General Shokt. Yes. Oh, yes. I would have gone immediately to either — to
at least an alert against an air attack, and I probably would have gone against a
complete attack, because it looked so significant.
[8397] The Chairman. Well, can you tell me what was in that message
that would have stirred you up?
General Short. The thing that would have affected me more than the other
matter was the fact that they had ordered their code machines destroyed, be-
cause to us that means just one thing; that they are going into an entirely new
phase, and that they want to be perfectly sure that the code will not be broken
lor a minimum time, say of 3 or 4 days. That would have been extremely
significant to me, the code machine, much more significant than just the ulti-
matum.
That was what I was referring to a while ago.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, if the Navy had given you that informa-
tion on any of those days about the codes, you probably would have
gone into a more serious alert ; is that right ?
General Short. Yes, sir. It would have been very significant. I
"Would like to call your attention to the fact that when I made this
statement about the ultimatum that I had no conception of what that
ultimatum consisted of as magic as shown us. Here I found out how
serious it was. At that time I had no idea what it was.
Mr. Murphy. But, General, all we are interested in [8398]
is what you knew on December 7. Not hindsight.
General Short. Yes, sir. That is the reason for my making the
statement. I did not know the seriousness of what the War Depart-
ment had received.
Mr. Murphy. Now, you will recall that I said I would show you
in the transcript where you said you hadn't seen the information until
the next day.
Will you come to the next question ?
General McCoy. Didn't you have on the night of the 6th a bit of information
from j'our intelligence officer that they were burning the consular records?
General Short. No, sir, I did not know anything about that until probably the
afternoon of the 7th, that they had. I think that he did get some information
that they had burned something.
General McCoy. It was not given to you?
General Short. It wys not given to me.
Isn't that what I said before ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3117
General Short. As I have explained, I may have, in the first part,
thought that he meant the information given me the following day
about burning codes, and at that time I did not remember, as I have
stated, about the burning of papers, but after reading the testimony
of Colonel Fielder and Colonel Phillips, I am sure the report was made
to me [8399] of the burning of the papers on Saturday morn-
ing of the 6th.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you did say at page 1620 :
As a matter of fact, I didn't know that they had really burned anything until
the time that the FBI arrested them on the 7th ; they inerrupted the burning. I
wasn't cognizant of the fact that they had burned tlie previous day.
You did say that ?
General Short. I believed that at the time. Wlien I later saw the
chief of staff, I knew that my memory was at fault. I am j)erfectly
willing to accept your statement.
Mr. Murphy. General McCoy did say :
And you would consider that a serious slip on the part of your intelligence
officer, then ?
General Short. Well, that is a little questionable, General, because we burn
every day. Any secret stuff that we are destroying, we burn to be sure that there
is no chance of helping somebody break the code, and I wouldn't have been sur-
prised if the Japanese consul's office was burning every day. It wouldn't have
surprised me at all to learn that they habitually burned everything in their
waste-baskets every day. I don't know that I would have gotten terribly excited
about just the burning [84OO] of the stuff in the waste baskets. I would
expect it.
General McCoy. But the fact is that that did not come to you.
General Short. That did not come to me. no, sir. I learned the nest day that
when they arrested the consul and the assistant consul, they interrupted the
burning of a file.
Now, General, I am asking you this question simply because it was
passed on to me. Did somebody from tlie FBI call you on the night
of December 6 and ask to see you before you went to a social affair at
Schofield Barracks?
General Short. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Did you talk to anybody in the FBI that night?
General Short. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Did you on the night of the 6th tell anybody that
they were "too security minded" anybody in the FBI ?
General Short. No, sir; I talked to no one. I did talk to Colonel
Bicknell, who had information from the FBI.
Mr. Murphy. That was to Bicknell and Fielder at your house?
General Short. Yes, sir.
[8401] Mr. Murphy. You were at a social affair at Schofield
Barracks, some kind of a relief proposition, on the night of the 6th?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. And the Air Corps had a party that evening but not
in this building?
General Short. On an entirely different post.
Mr. Murphy. At a different post ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now I come to page 1622, the third paragraph :
General McCoy. And, as I remember it, you had in mind, however, not any
fear of an attack at that time, and that you were trying to get warning of that,
but that you were trying to get the personnel accustomed to the worst time, the
most dangerous time?
3118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. Frankly, that is more nearly correct, that I was more serious
about the training, rather than expecting something to happen at that time.
That would be about the radar?
General Short. About all material.
Mr. Murphy. About everything.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Eight.
[8402] Now, then, General, I come down to page 1G22, the bottom
of the page. The other day I made some statement about the radar
being on a volunteer basis, and at that time you felt that wasn't correct.
I believe you said yesterday that it was on a more or less voluntary
basis ?
General Short. It was, as far as Sunday was concerned.
Mr. Murphy. That is what I meant.
General Short. And over hours. They were working more than the
prescribed hours.
Mr. Murphy. I think this will answer it squarely. I direct your
attention to the question at the bottom of the page.
Admiral Standley. In one of the affidavits made by your officers, the affidavit
of Grover C. White, the Second Lieutenant, Signal Corps, he says, "On Saturday,
December 6, 1941, I contacted the Control Officer to request authority to have all
stations operate from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. only, December 7, 1941."
General Shoet. Yes, sir.
Admiral Standley. "This was agreed to by the Control Officer." Have you any
information as to why that request was made that way on that Saturday?
General Short. I haven't any information except I had ordered these stations
to work only from four until [8403] seven, and then they were supposed to
carry on routine training for the rest of the day. In agreement, they had gotten
together and decided that if they carried on until 11 o'clock in the morning as
a body, they would get more out of it than they would if they, went on their own
after 7 o'clock, and they had agreed among themselves that they would carry on
the training three teams at a time until 11 o'clock and from there on to four
they would be on their own and making repairs, and things of that kind. So that
since I had not ordered that, and they were doing it by agreement, they apparently
thought that they could eliminate it on Sunday, by agreement. That's the only
way I can account for it.
The Chairman. In other words, they were not going to do the training after
7 o'clock on Sunday?
General Short. On Sunday. They had agreed that just on Sunday alone, in
place of working right straight through, they would stop at 7 o'clock on Sunday.
Admiral Standley. We have a gi'eat many coincidences in this incident here
on the 7th.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Admiral Standtey. And this is one of them. I was trying to see if there was
any reason why that request was made on that Saturday, not to work after 7
o'clock in the [8^04] morning on Sunday.
General Short. I think it was only because it was Sunday, and they were work-
ing every day practically from 4 o'clock in the morning until four o'clock in the
afternoon, making a good long training day, and then they decided that on Sun-
day they would chop off Sunday hours, the only way I can figure it. They were
working 12 hours a day the other days.
Then, the next que.stion :
Admiral Standley. GTeneral, under the date of 5 November, 1941, you issued
a Standing Operating Procedure. That was signed by Adjutant General Colonel
Robert H. Dunlop, and you stated that copies of this were furnished the Navy.
In that connection. General, the Army have testified that they did
not get a copy of your standing operating procedure of November 5
until sometime in early 1942.
Do you know whether or not that is correct?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3119
General Short. I have no way of knowing. The Army regulations
at that time had a prescribed distribution of every order that we is-
sued, every paper of any kind the Adjutant General was supposed to
mail to Washington without letter of transmittal, these various things,
to meet the Army regulations. The only record that was made of the
[S4OS] mailing of these things was when the document was secret
and this was not a secret document. I have talked with General Dun-
lop, who is here in town, and was Adjutant General, and he says the
fact that it was distributed by the Adjutant General to all of the units
in the department would make him sure that he must have sent it to
Washington, but there would be no record of that, because it wasn't
secret.
Now I have a copy of the Army regulations in effect at that time,
and it mentions only corps areas, but the department that worked on
the same basis as corps areas, applied it to them, and we habitually
mailed these prescribed copies of whatever we got out.
Mr. Murphy. I don't think it particularly material anyhow. I was
just going into it to clear up the record.
General Short. I would be glad to put this in the record as an ex-
hibit.
Mr. Murphy. What I say is this : Alert No. 1 could not be confus-
ing because you didn't say that ; you said sabotage.
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. The fact is the Army, and I am just trying to clear
the record, said they didn't get it until 1942, but I don't think it would
make any difference one [84O6] way or the other, whether they
had it or not.
General Short. Hawaii cannot prove whether they did or not, be-
cause there are no records.
Mr. Murphy. Now, as to the AWS, I agree the record says it is by
cooperation, but I refer you to page 1628, and I was only quoting you
when I made the statement I did :
General Shoet. I hadn't definitely — we hadn't given it a definite organization.
It was working, but we waited to bring out the orders until General Davidson
got back from the mainland, so we would not have to revise that. We were work-
ing informally.
Admiral Standley. But is was still working under the Signal Corps at that
time?
General Short. Yes, sir.
That is what I had reference to.
General Short. My answer there was not — as far as aircraft warn-
ing service, not the interceptor command, but specifically the aircraft
warning service, that was entirely a Signal function, and I may have
made the answer on that account.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, I was quoting a pretty good witness.
General Short. The combined thing was a combination [840T]
worked by cooperation.
Mr. Murphy. Then I want to come to page 1633, the third last para-
graph from the bottom of the page :
General Short. Frankly, I do not know how much search the Navy made, as
that whole business of search was tied in between the ships and the planes, and
it was their responsibility, and I do not know when their task forces — as I say,
they have two task forces out at the time. I don't know what instructions their
3120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
task forces had as to search. I assume that whenever their task force went out,
if it located Japanese ships, it would report them.
Admiral Standley. Bat as for the search ironi Oahu itself, which in wartime
was to be an all-around search, did you know that that was not being carried
out daily?
General Short. I didn't know just what the Navy were doing, frankly. I knew
they had task forces out and I assumed any searching they did was tied in with
the task forces.
You made that statement ?
General Short. May I say Admiral Standley's statement \vhere lie
says that they were supposed to make a complete all-around search
from Oahu would never be correct, because they would use the perim-
eter from Wake to Johnston-Wake to [S^O'S] Midway so as to
get the most economical use of their planes.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, the war plan called for a 3G0-degree
search, but they couldn't do it ?
General Short. No, sir. If the Navy had been gone, and the Army
had had to do this, if we hadn't occupied the outlying islands, we would
have had to do it from Oahu.
Mr. Murphy. Now, page 1634:
Admiral Reeves. It seems to me, General, that the reconnaissance search and
the radar search are absolutely parallel in locating possible ships at sea. One was
a longer range affair than the other, but otherwise there was no 'difference what-
ever.
General Sho^:t. Oh, there should be — they would be tied in.
Admiral Reeves. It seems to me that prior to any hostile or air — or declara-
tion of war, that neither of these procedures was being operated regularly day
after day.
General Short. They wei'e being operated as a training matter, Admiral, rather
than as a real intelligence service just combing the ocean.
Adnn'ral Reea'es. Yes.
\S409] General Short. Now, I say I do not know just exactly what the
Naval instructions were, but I know that was true from our point of view, that
we were operating as a training proposition.
Admiral Reeves. Your failuie to operate the radar after 7 a. m., was that in
any way dependent on the fact that you thought the Navy reconnaissance planes
were operating?
General Short. It frankly was that we didn't think — from all the information
that we had, we did not think the situation demanded it.
Admiral Ref:ves. Yes,
General Shout. We would have been working 24 hours a day, if we had had
anything to indicate that the situation demanded it.
Now, again at page 1636, at the bottom of the page, referring to the
carriers, General, five paragraphs up from the bottom:
General McCoy. Did any information come to you that day from your own
sources of information or from the Navy that indicated the carriers were to the
north of Oahu?
General Short. The only thing that indicated that to me was the fact that they
picked up this group of planes at 7:20 132 miles 3 degrees east of north. That
[841O] would indicate one carrier was in there, was in that direction.
I will ask that that be stricken. That is not the part I wanted.
Go to the bottom of page 1638, General, the third last paragraph:
General Short. I think the system is all right. I think that we made a very
serious mistake when we didn't go to an alert against an all-out attack. I think
that our system was perfectly all right. Our estimate of the situation was not.
General McCoy. Do you think there would have been any change in your atti-
tude, possibly, or a more complete meeting of the situation, if there had been
unity of command?
General Shobt. I don't believe it would have had any particular effect without
the commander in that instance had decided that there was the danger of an air
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3121
attack. You could have had the same degree of alertness under unity of command
that you had under cooperation.
Did you make that statement, General ?
General Short. I believe that is a perfectly correct statement, that
we made our estimate of the situation based on the information we had
from Washington, that one man [S^ll] would have made the
same estimate if he had been in full command, if he had the same infor-
mation, because Admiral Kimmel and I absolutely independently ar-
rived at the same conclusion.
Mr. Murphy. Now, General, will you go to page 1639, again, at the
bottom of the page. You are referring there to the conferences you
had about Wake and Midway.
* * * —in the whole discussion the fear was submarines, because Wake is
close to some of the Japanese bases, and not a question of air, although they
would be close enough that land-based planes could have operated against them
when they were executing the relief of Wake. I don't think that that was given
very serious consideration, but there was a lot of discussion at that time, owing
to, the fact that we were going so far out to make this relief, going practically
into the Mandate Islands.
That was a discussion, was it not, about Wake and Midway,
General ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Is that a fair statement ?
General Short. Yes, sir. But I think that that statement may not
be absolutely correct, inasmuch as I remember that the Navy was
not willing to send the carriers closer than 200 miles to Wake, and
I think for both reasons [S4J3] and we even went to the
point where Admiral Halsey took a carrier, we had never flown
P-40 planes off a carrier, and he toolv his carrier out and two planes
and made the experiment to determine that afternoon whether we
could do it, and we succeeded in doing it. That was before the
decision had been definitely made not to replace them.
Mr. Murphy. General, it is getting close to the adjourning hour,
and I want to say that I am sorry that I have to ask j^ou some
questions here where we talk about radar going 132 miles, when we
have passed from that time to reaching the moon by radar.
General Short. I hope I did not give you the idea that I thought
you were purposely misquoting, but it is hard to quote from memory.
Mr. Murphy. No. Life is too short for me to misquote anybody.
The Vice Chairman. You are not quite through?
Mr. Murphy. I will want about 5 minutes.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas, General Short wants to pre-
sent some material that you inquired about.
General Short. On page 82T2 of the record. Senator Lucas asked
me how the midget submarines got in the vicinity of Hawaiian
waters, and Admiral Inglis in his [84^3] statement in ex-
hibit 8, page 16, makes an explanation of why he thought they got
there, and I would like to read that.
Senator Lucas. Let me say. General, I had forgotten the testi-
mony that the Admiral had placed before the committee, but since I
have to read his testimony. I thank the General for calling my
attention to it again.
General Short. It is just eight or ten lines, if you wish me to
read it.
3122 coxGRESSioxAL in^t:stigation pearl H-\rbor attack
The Vice Chaikmax. Do you vrant it read, Senator?
Senator Lucas. That is perfectly all right.
General Short [reading] :
Between 50 and 100 miles off Pearl Harbor, five midget submarines were
launched from specifically fitted fleet submarines as a "si)ecial attacking
force to conduct an offensive attack against American ships within the harbor,
and to prevent the escape of the American Fleet through the harbor entrance
during the scheduled air strike. Available data indicates that only one of
the five midget submarines penetrated into the harbor. It inflicted no damage
on American units, and none of the five rejoined the Japanese force."
The Vice Chaiemax. Is that all. general ?
General Short. That is all.
[84-1^] The Vice Chaikmax. TVe will stand adjourned until 2
O'clock this afternoon.
(Wliereupon. at 12 o'clock noon, the committee recessed until 2
o'clock p. m., of the same day.)
[84-lo] ATTEEXOOX SESSIOX — 2 P. M.
'Sir. Clark. The committee \dll be in order.
TESTIMOITY OP MAJ. GEN. WAITEE C. SHOET, TJNITED STATES
AEMY (RETIRED)— Eesnmed
Mr. IMttepht. General Short, I direct your attention to page 1641
of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearing, the fourth last paragraph
from the bottom of the page :
General McCoy. If you had been furnished with all of the things that you felt
necessary, would that have made any difference in this particular action?
General Shoet. I do not believe it would.
Was that a correct answer ?
General Short. "What I intended to imply by that, that in the ab-
sence of information from the "War Department we would not have
been in a proper alert and that we would not have been much more
effective.
Mr. MuRPHT. Even though you had all the planes, all the radar,
and all the things you required?
General Short. It would have made some difference in the anti-
aircraft fire ; that is all.
Mr. MoiPHT. In the antiaircraft fire you still would not have the
men at the guns ?
General Short. Only the skeleton crews.
Mr. Mxtrpht. Just to guard the guns from the islanders?
\8Ji.l6'\ General Short. And they could fire them.
Mr. MuPvPHT. Now. continuing :
Admiral Sta^tdlet. Right there : In case the patrol planes that were necessary
to make the effective off-shore iwitrol were h'^re in sufficient numbers, do you
still think that no change would have been made in the plans?
General Shoet. None whatever, because you cr.uldn't tell when some of them
might have been ordered away. If they had been left they just simply would
not have called upon us. As a matter of fact, as I said, in most of our exercises
the assumption was that they had enough to make the patrol, so they made the
patrols and called upon us to execute the bombing mission, because they con-
sidered that our B-17's were more effective as bombers than their own planes.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3123
Admiral Staxdley. Yes, but in tJiis estimate they stated definitely that there
were not sufficient forces to make a continuous air patrol as required in war.
General Shokt. Yes, sir. Well, there wouldn't be
Admiral Staxdlet. Now, if you had had that force here do you think under
the circumstances you would have been making that patrol every morning?
Not you. I mean, but the Navy?
Greneral Shoet. But the Navy.
[8417} Admiral Staxdlet. The combined effort ; yes.
General Shoet. WeU, I think that would \je a fair question to ask the Navy.
I don't hardly think under the conditions that they would ; I think that they
would have been doing it as an exercise now and then in oDnnection with us. I
do not believe that they would have been doing it habitually if they had had
them, but I don't know. It would be a fair question to ask them.
Were those questions asked you. and did you make those answers
before the Koberts board ?
General Short. I think that is perfectly O. K. : yes. sir.
Mr. ^luRPHT. Now, then. General, one more question near the
bottom of the page :
Admiral Reeves. Before vou go to that. General, let me ask General Short
this:
On the other hand, if you had had material and ftilly equipped radar stations,
would you have been operating them throughout the day or would you have
operated them as you did on the morning of the 7th?
General Shobt. I probably would have operated them just as I did.
Is that a correct question and a correct answer, as reported there ?
General Short. That is assuming that I had just the [S^^SI
same information from Washington that I did have.
Mr. MuRTHT. Now I direct your attention to this question by the
Chairman of the Roberts Board, at page 630 of Admiral Kimmel's
previous testimony. Do you have that ?
General Short. Page 630?
Mr. Murphy. Page 630.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. The very top of the page :
The Chairman (Justice Roberts). In the picture of it as drawn by Admiral
Standley's question and your answer, if that is correct as I understand it, the
Army knew that it was not going to get any warning from your distant recon-
naissance?
Admiral Kimmel. No, sir.
Do you think Admiral Kimmel was justified in making that
statement ?
General Short. I do not know that he intended to answer that we
knew we would not get any. but with all the reconnaissance that I
know he had out I could not count on getting them, put it that way.
Mr. Murpht. Xow I direct your attention to page 109 of the Rob-
erts board hearing of the Army. General, and I will only ask a few
more questions.
General Short. Yes.
[8^9] Mr. Murphy. Page 109. I see. down about 12 lines :
Anybody who has lived here in the last year would know he could hardly
ever step out of his house without hearing planes * * *
Do you see that ?
General Short. Page 109?
Mr. Murphy. Yes.
General Short. Yes, sir : I have it.
3124 COXGRESSIOXAL INTESTIGATIOX PEAKL HARBOR ATTACK
ilr. MuRPHT (reading) :
Anybody who has lived here in the last year would know he could hardly
ever step oat of his house without hearing planes, » * «
You made that statement, did you not, before the board?
General Short. Yes. sir.
'hlr. MiTRPHT. I go to page 127, Greneral. the middle of the page :
General Shokt. Tes;. habitually there were planes in the air from 4 o'clock on.
There were planes in the air almost all the time except from about 11 o'clock at
night until 4 o'clock in the morning. As I said before, you couldn't step out of
your house and look in the air without seeing planes.
Then at the bottom of the page General McCoy said :
Wen, they were apparently not up on that Sunday morning.
[S}20] General ;?hobt. Tliat s^unday morniiig they were not up, most un-
usuaL Each Sunday morning you are likely to
General McCot. How do you explain that?
General Short. I wouldn't be able to explain it without asking General David-
son just why ; bat if they had been ap and training they wouldn't have had ammu-
nition, for normally in the training they did not carry ammunition.
In that connection. General. I direct your attention
Will you give me the number of this exhibit, Kimmel exhibit 5 to
report of action, dated December 19, 1911.
;Mr. Mastxx. Exhibit No. 120.
Mr. MxTRPHT. Exhibit No. 120. Do you have that ?
Lieutenant Kark. We don't have it.
Mr. Mi:"BPHT. I will read it to the general There is what is called
the Kimmel exhibit 5 to report of action, and it is dated December 19,
1941, and on page 2, under paragraph 4, it says :
All planes, except those under repair, were armed with machine guns and a fuH
allowance of machine gun ammunition.
I was wondering why the Navy planes would have machine gims
and ammunition and not the Army?
General Short. Our planes were grouped for sabatoge alert. If
you put machine-gun ammunition in the planes and a grenade was
exploded you would probably set off the [S^l] ammunition
and start a lot more trouble. We deliberately kept out ammunition
when we grouped them for sabotage.
Mr. Murphy. Now. then. I ask you, General, if you would outline
where you were on the 6th of December. That question has been asked
of each of the important witnesses so far.
General Short. I was. as I remember, in my office until probably
sometime around 5 o'clock, or a little after. I then went to my quarters.
Around about 6 : 30 Colonel Bicknell arrived with the so-called Mori
message. Colonel BickneU and General Fielder and I discussed that
for some time.
Mr. KzEFE. What message was that ?
General SHOFrr. The Dr. Mori menage.
Mr. KzzFE. Yes,
General Short. We discussed that for some time.
Mr. Keete. The poinsettia message.
Mr. MuRFHT. The Hibiscus and poinsettia.
Mr. KxEFE. Yes.
General Short. Yes, After that discussion we, my wife and I,
drove with Colonel and ^fe. Fielder to Schofield Barracks where
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3125
•we attended a dinner for some type of local relief. I left the club
sometime between 10 and 10 : 15, arrived at home at about 10 : 45,
and retired.
!Mr. ^luEPHT. Now, General, you were speaking about
so [8422] many planes in the air on other mornings.
There is testimony of Private Elliott that on other mornings Be-
sides this Sunday morning they would have about 25 different targets
on the radar station.
General Short. That confirms my statement, because they would
pick up everytliing.
Mr. MuEPHT. Other mornings but not this particular morning.
General Shcet. Yes, sir.
Mr. MxntPHY. Xow, Admiral Kimmel received from "Washington
a several page report of a message or memorandum by General
Short and Admiral Stark to the President outlining the Pacific
situation rather in detail. Did he ever give you the benefit of show-
ing you that ?
The Vice Chatrmax. You mean General ^larshall and Admiral
Stark.
Mr. McRPHT. Strike the question.
Admiral Kimmel received from Admiral Stark a copy of a mem-
orandum to the President from Admiral Stark and General Marshall
outlining the Pacific situation in quite some detail. Did he let you
see that (
General Shckt. No. sir : he did not.
[84^3] IMr. ^MuEPHT. Did he ever tell you that he received it?
General Short. I don't think so.
Mr. MuEPHT. TVhen you talked to Secretary KJiox on his arrival
at Pearl Harbor, there was some conversation between you in which
he asked you if you had received a message and. as I recall it. he
said something about it being sent from Washington at midnight.
TTill you tell us about that ?
General Shoet. My feeling is that he must have been confused
in the time or some way we didn't arrive at an understanding
because the only message that I got and he could have been referring
to was the one sent by General Marshall about noon on the 7th.
Mr. Muepht. Xow. I do find in exhibit 123 on the sixth page,
something that I think should be shown in the record, and I will
read it to you. General.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr, MitPwPht. Of course, Admiral Kimmel had before him the
whole Pacific area. You had before you the defence of Pearl Har-
bor. So that his problem was a broader problem than yours,
ordinarily ?
General Short. That is correct.
^Mr. Murphy. I read this paragraph :
[S^^] The conditions likely to exist on Oalitu in the event of war are
definitely different from those prevailing in Europe, and which dictated the
esrablishment of the combined headquarters and operating centers in Great
Britain. Sustained attack of any kind is unlikely. The mission of the Army
and the Fleet are considerably different — the operation of one being deiensive
and local, while the operations of the other are offensive and far flung. Stra-
tegic, rather than tactical cooperation, is indicated, and therefore the necessity
for rapid receipt and exchange of information and arrival at quick decisions is
of less importance.
3126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
That, General, was a statement by Admiral Kimmel to the Chief
of Naval Operations on November 3, 1941.
Now, there was a letter written by Admiral Kimmel to Admiral
Stark on June 4, 1941, General, where he said this :
The liaison betwixt the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satis-
factory and weelily drills in air-raid alarms with the two services acting in
unison are held.
Then there was the "Memorandmn for General Marshall."
Enclosed is the arrangement of Kimmel and General Short with regard to
joint air operations. You will recall [8^25] our talking about it, and it
looks to me extremely good.
Signed by "Stark."
Would there be a possibility that if General Marshall read your
reply to his telegram that he might have understood liaison with the
Navy to mean just that?
General Short. Undoubtedly he would have taken that whole thing
as referring to that annex No. 7. I don't think there is any question
but what that would have been the feeling.
Mr. Murphy. I will ask you this question : As I understand it, there
was provision at Hawaii for a joint committee of which your chief of
staff, Colonel Phillips, was head, and that committee never met from
November 27 until after December 7, and as I understand it, your
reason for their not meeting was they would only meet in the case
of an over-all change and there was nothing here to indicate the need
of any such meeting ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. You also had 100 artillery lookouts that were not
utilized because you didn't consider the situation called for it ?
General Short. They would only be used if we expected a surface
attack.
Mr. Murphy. Now, you also had sound detectors that [84^3']
were not manned and that was to give some indication of something
coming toward the island?
General Short. They were good for only about 4 miles.
Mr. Murphy. They were not manned because of the situation?
General Short. Because we were not in this type of alert.
Mr. Murphy. You also had civilian squadrons or lookouts, and
they were not used because of the situation ?
General Short. Civilian aircraft squadrons?
Mr. Murphy. No.
General Short. I don't believe we had any.
Mr. Murphy. There was no provision for civilian aircraft squad-
rons or lock-outs ?
General Short. There was one poor lone civilian flyer that practi-
cally flew into the Japanese and got fired at when he didn't know
anything was on.
Mr. Murphy. Your harbor-control post was working 8 hours a day
before December 7, and 24 hours after?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. One other question, General. The martial law, how
long had you made provision for that?
General Short. That probably had been in every war plan for the
last 20 years.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3127
[84^7] Mr. Murphy. At any rate, when you took over imme-
diately after the raid, was it your intention at that time that martial
law would be continued indefinitely, or only for the immediate
emergency ?
General Short. I would say as long as it was necessary. Once put
into etlect it could only be called off upon the order of the President.
Mr. Murphy. No other questions.
The Chairjvian. Senator Brewster.
Senator Brewster. In the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor
board, at page 49, there is the following colloquy between General
Grunert and General Marshall to which I invite your attention :
General Grunert. Just to have it in the record for our future consideration, I
want to put a query to be answered or not, as you see fit, or whether or not the
question is sucli as to really demand an answer. That is this : Here, the same
message, or three messages go to at least i'our prominent commanders, or three
of them, overseas — Panama, Hawaii, and the Philippines, and one, on a presum-
ably exposed West Coast. Three of them apparently interpret those messages in
one way, and the fourth one does not. So the three of them report all ot the
measures they have taken, or show by their reports that they con- [8^;^S]
sidered this as quite a critical and dangerous situation ; so they take greater
measures than the fourth does.
Now, is there anything in the case of that fourth which happens to be Hawaiian
Department — are there any peculiar circumstances there that it should be inter-
preted in a different way for that command than it was in Panama, the Philip-
pines, or on the West Coast?
Now, this is w^hat I would like your consideration of :
General Marshall. All I can say to that is this — and my answer does not
explain the contrast between the very, very urgent attitude of the Naval and
Army Commanders in Hawaii in the spring and early summer with relation to
air and anti-aircraft and radar requirements. All I can say is that Hawaii had
always 130,000 Japanese in a very congested district there, and no commander
could ever forget that, and the others did not have them. That did not exist in
Panama. You had Panamanians over the border, but certainly you had no feeling
of fears regarding them. In the Philippines you had no Japanese population,
certainly of any moment. It actually developed later there was a Fifth Column,
very well organized, out there ; but you had always present in your mind in
Hawaii the large Japanese population of unpredictable activities.
Now, I thint that covers the answer to the question [84^9]
General Grunert asked as to why there was a different interpretation
on the messages, if that was a fair statement of their purport.
General Short. Yes, sir; and I would like to add also that the very
difference in the answers from the various departments should have
caused the people in the War Plans Division who read my answer to
look at it critically, and know what it said. It was sufficiently differ-
ent that it should have called their attention to it, in place of their
saying they never realized what it said.
Senator Brewster. It was true in the Philippines they did have
these intercepts?
General Short. They had a great deal more information.
Senator Brewster. So that was another reason.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. But reverting to the point you make, which I
think is referred to here, reading from page 52 :
General Frank. Now, General Marshall, a reading of the Roberts commission
testimony leads one to the conclusion that there was a general feeling in both
the Army and the Navy and in Hawaii that there would not be an air attack.
In other words, there was a state of mind of security against an air attack. Do
you believe such a state of mind [830] existed?
3128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Marshall. I was unaware of it. The previous communications we
had had, notably those of the spring and up to June, 1941, related very specifically
to the urgency of measures protective against an air attack.
General Short. General Marshall specifically made the statement
Inmself, and I quoted it in my statement that he did not expect a
surprise attack in Hawaii.
Senator Brewster. Where was that? You mean before this com-
mittee ?
General Short. Yes, sir. It is in my statement. He made the state-
ment before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and I quoted it here. It
is quoted in my statement. I haven't found it yet, but he said he
expected an attack tovrard Siam, he expected an attack in Indochina,
he expected an attack in the Philippines, and possibly Borneo, but that
is as far as he knew, nobody expected an attack in Hawaii. So he was
ill the same position.
I have it right here. Dou 3^ou wish me to read it ?
Senator Brewster. I think it should go in here.
General Short (reading) :
We anticipated beyond a doubt a .Japanese movement in Indochina and the
Gulf of Siam and against the Malay Peninsula. We also anticipated an assault
on the Philip [SJJi] pines. We did not, so far as I recall, anticipate an
attack on Hawaii, the reason being that we thought the addition of more modern
planes at the defenses would be sufficient to make it extremely hazardous for the
Japanese to attempt such an attack.
Now, that is Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, volume 1, page 9.
Senator Brewster. I will see if that is in the one I have here. Yes;
I have that here before me, and this part which I have been reading
is subsequent thereto.
So that it would appear that although I presume there may have
been intermittent appearances, that before that very board subse-
quently General Marshall denied his knowledge of the existence of
a state of mind as to security from air attack, which he apparently
had earlier testified he understood existed.
General Short. Definitely. I would like to add, in respect to
your previous question, if I may, that there was a very considerable
difference in the message that I received and the message that was
received in the Philippines, which would account for that, because
the message in the Philippines didn't have the "don'ts," my message;
Don't alarm the public, don't do anything to disclose your intent, limit the
dissemination of [S4S2] this information to the minimum essential
officers.
Those words did not appear in the message to the Philippines.
[84o3] Senator Brewster. Well, I think the point is very
proper, but recurring to this matter of General Marshall, if my inter-
pretation of his language is correct then it would indicate that even
Jupiter occasionally nods. I speak of that because I think they have
criticized you somewhat because of giving different impressions as
to the state of mind that existed at various times.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. And this would apparently indicate a some-
what different impression as to the fear of an air attack in General
MarshalFs own mind at various times.
General Short. I think also the aide memoir that he gave to the
President on May the 3rd, 1941, with reference to Hawaii where he
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3129
said in points of view or in sequence that the thing that would prob-
ably occur first would be sabotage and that it might be necessary to
establish strict military control for several months in Hawaii before
we had difficulty in the Far East.
Senator Brewster. Going further, General Frank on page 52 fur-
ther asked General Marshall :
Genei-al Feank. At that time, December 1941, what in j'our opinion was the
general feeling in military and naval circles relative to the effectiveness of the
air attack with bombs and torpedos?
[SPi] General Marshall said :
As I recall, we considered it as very effective, in view of what had occurred
in the European theater.
Were you given to understand that that was the military opinion
at that time ?
General Short. I believe in general I was. I think, however, that
the Navy had a slightly different idea in regard to torpedoes ; that they
thought if the water was shallow enough that the torpedo attack would
not be effective.
Senator Brewster. I think that is what Admiral Kimmel has testi-
fied.
General Short. I think that was his opinion. I had no decided
opinion because I did not know enough about the action of torpedoes.
Senator Brewster. This is the next question :
General Frank. Was any consideration ever given —
this is on page 52 and 3 —
Was any consideration ever given in the War Department to the possibility
of a feeling of apathy that might ensue as a result of "crying wolf; wolf; too
often"?
General Marshall answered :
Very much so.
Do I understand that that is your position. General ?
General Short. I knew that for a year there had been some status of
alarm and I suppose in the long run that that [84^35] would
make everybody slightly less alert or less likely to believe in any warn-
ing that came.
Senator Brewster. Now, going on with General Frank's question
on page 53 of this same report :
With respect to the messages on sabotage sent to General Short from Washing-
ton, do not the provisions of his war plan and his standing operating procedure
provide for full defense against sabotage?
General Marshall said :
I think it does.
General Feank. Were not the provisions of these plans known in the War
Department?
General Marshaix. They must have been.
General Feank. Then why was sabotage specifically singled out?
General Marshall. By whom?
General Feank. By messages that were sent to him. Between November 16
and 28 there were six messages sent to him, four of them told him to be careful
not to disturb the Japanese, and three of them cautioned him about sabotage.
General Marshall. Two of those on Sc'ibotage that are related to air were
just coincidences, and those not to disturb the Japanese related to air, and the ex-
treme anxiety not to have anything happen which would [S^S6] provoke a
break, which would enable the j'apanese to say that we were taking action, to
79716 — 46— pt. 7 15
3130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
give them an excuse for action ; and that was to enable Mr. Hull to stall this thing
oft" as long as possible. All measures against sabotage are very diflBcult of set-up,
because they indicate their purpose so plainly wlien you have to deploy your
people around the key points and have tliem stay there in tents or otherwise, so
they always provoke a difficult situation, and one that we were fearful would give
the Japanese some handle to place the accusation against us that we were taking
action of a hostile character directed towards them. That is as nearly as I can
recall the reason for the three messages that you refer to, I think, though I have
to look at the messages to familiarize myself with what they say. I don't recall
them.
General Short. In that connection, I would like to say that when I
arrived there, there were a considerable number of men on guard over
vital installations to prevent sabotage, there had been for a year or so.
So far as the guard for sabotage purposes, the community had become
so accustomed to them that it did not ah\rm them in any way.
From July the 8th, or July the 25th, when we got the sanction mes-
sage, we had had about a half alert against sabotage [8j.c^7\
constantly because the community was extremely uneasy at that time;
it affected their pocketbooks, it closed up businesses operated by Japa-
nese, so that they were at that time accustomed to having our guard
over vital installations.
Senator Brewster. Then the next question:
General Frank. In accordance with that, you feel that it was a responsibility
for the War Department to caution about sabotage?
General Marshall. In relation to what I have just said. We were trying to
be very certain that we did not t.ike measures which the Japanese could put their
fingers on and say that we were doing something that was hostile; and most of
your sabotage defense has to be right out in the open, a great portion of it. Now,
in that respect we were doing something. We had to talk about it, too, because
that was related to the meetings with Mr. Hull, where we were trying to do any-
thing possible that could be done to stall off a break in the Pacific.
That is the whole of the quotation. Was this attitude of General
Marshall, to which he here refers, as to the very great concern in Wash-
ington against anything of a provocative character communicated to
you ?
General Short. I definitely got that idea that their chief purpose,
the chief aim was to avoid war if possible [S^SS] and by all
means to avoid an international incident that might lead to war or
might give the Japanese the chance to use it as propaganda that we
provoked war, but at no time did I get the other idea presented that a
guard over a vital installation was something that the population
would not understand and would think was provocative.
Senator Brewster. And the thought was that there must, so far as
practicable, be nothing done which the Japanese could by any strained
construction interpret as a hostile act directed against them?
General Short. Very definitely.
Senator Brewster. Or an indication that you expected an attack
from them ?
General Short. Very definitely.
Senator Brewster. That seems to run through the thread of Gen-
eral Marshall's testimony and the thing which I thought was important
was to know as to whether or not that attitude which he expresses here
was communicated to you. I gather it was.
General Short. The November 27 message meant to me beyond
everything else that what they were interested in was the avoidance
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3131
of war and the avoidance of giving Japan any excuse to start a war or
to use propaganda tliat we had provoked a war.
[84^9] Senator Brewstek. Now, in connection with the material
which I presented yesterday, as I have examined it — I do not know
whether other members of the committee have had the opportunity
as yet — it appears that it consists ahnost exclusively of excerpts from
the testimony before the Roberts commission and I have come to the
conclusion that in justice to all concerned, if the testimony before the
Roberts commission is ultimately to be made a part of our record as an
exhibit, it would be more fair to handle it in that way.
Has there been any conclusion reached on that matter of the Roberts
evidence as yet?
The Chairman. There has not been any consultation among the
committee on it at all since you brought it up the other day.
Mr. Murphy, Mr, Chairman, may I inquire with regard to that?
I would like to suggest in answer to that, Mr. Chairman, that the
testimony of General Short before the Roberts commission, to which
frequent references have been made, be made an exhibit in this pro-
ceeding the same as we did with the Navy testimony of Admiral
Kimmel.
The Chairman. The Chair sees no objection to that.
Senator Brewster. May we hear from counsel ?
Mr, Richardson, Well, I suggest this, Mr, Chairman, that until you
determine the question of all of the testimony [84iO] I see no
point in picking out a particular bit of testimony and making it an
exhibit, if all of that testimony is ultimately to be in your record here.
The Chairman, The Chair would like to inquire of the members of
the committee if they have had an opportunity to examine the docu-
ment Senator Brewster referred to, I think, day before yesterday,
copies of which were supposed to be distributed.
Mr. Richx\rdson, Well, they are available. We have had it mimeo-
graphed.
Mr. Kaufman, Yes; but it has not been distributed.
Senator Brewster. Well, as 1 have looked it over it does consist
almost entirely of quotations from the Roberts committee testimony
and I think rather than taking excerpts it would be fairer all around
if either the Short testimony or all of it — I would favor having all the
Roberts testimony as an exhibit in connection with our case in order
to comprehend the evidence of the whole situation,
Mr, Murphy, The only trouble, Mr. Chairman, is that what I have
asked for is a compilation of General Short's testimony on three
different occasions for the convenience of those who were sufficiently
interested to read and study it. The suggestion of counsel would have
people going through three separate records to find what General
Short said or did [<§^i] not say.
General Short. You mean this volume here, Mr. Murphy?'
Mr, Murphy, I mean that very volume. General, which contains
your testimony on all three occasions and I think in fairness to you
and to the others who are interested they ought to be able to find it
as the committee had it and make use of it.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. Wasn't that done with Admiral Kimmel?
3132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. MuBPHY. That was done with Admiral Kimmel.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that if we put this
testimony in, which I think should be, that it should be sorted by
counsel so that the testimony of the witness will always appear at
one place in the record instead of going back days and looking for
it, just as we would do later with this, but I believe that the time will
come, and I favor that, that all of the testimony be put in.
Mr. Kaufman. Mr. Chairman, I assume the Senator means that
with respect to the several records that a compilation job be done.
Senator Ferguson. That is right.
Mr. Kaufman. So that the testimony of a witness in all proceed-
ings be put together with appropriate notations as to which proceed-
ing the particular testimony comes from.
[844^] Senator Ferguson. That is right ; and that it be marked
as an exhibit so that we can have it.
The Chairman, If that is done, of course, it would comprise all
the testimony in all the proceedings and it would be marked as an
appropriate exhibit and, therefore, would include Admiral Kimmel's
previous testimony as well as General Short's.
Senator Ferguson. That is correct.
The Chairman. And, therefore, would obviate the necessity of
making them separate exhibits now.
Mr. Kaufman. That is correct, sir.
Mr. KicHARDSON. That is the point I made a moment ago.
Tlie Chairman. It seems to the chair that that is a logical way to
handle it. It all goes in anyway, but it goes in together under an
exhibit and with the connotation in the record of each one of these
testimonies as they have come all put together so that the members
of the committee could refer to them conveniently. That would be
a better way to handle it.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I concur in Senator Fergu-
son's views there, I think that would be helpful to us and to others
who examine the record, but on this question Mr. Murphy raises we
have accorded Admiral Kimmel the privilege of having his testimony
in other hearings included as [844^] .^i} exhibit. I think Gen-
eral Short should be entitled to that same privilege.
The Chairman. Well, couldn't we do it this way? Of course, we
will be glad to accord to General Short the same privilege accorded
to Admiral Kimmel, but if the committee should have it all pub-
lished, that would obviate the necessity of having these two par-
ticular testimonies as exhibit something and then put it in again as
exhibit something else.
The Vice Chairman. That is correct.
The Chairman. So that with the understanding that if the com-
mittee should order it all done and made an exhibit, then it shall not
be filed as an exhibit separately from that collection of testimony
which has been put in.
Senator Ferguson. That is what I had in mind, to do it all at the
same time.
Mr. Kaufman. And it would result, Mr. Chairman, that the ex-
hibit of Admiral Kimmel would be stricken out for practical purposes
and all put in at once.
Senator Ferguson. That is right.
The Chairman. And the same could apply to General Short.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3133
Mr. Murphy. I want the record to show that it be stricken out only
on the condition that it comes in in some other exhibit.
Senator Brewster. I don't understand that. He refers to
[84441 a record. Is this to be an exhibit or a record?
The Chairman. An exhibit. The record you referred to is to
be an exhibit.
If there is any reason — let us get it clear — the committee should not
orders all this testimony presented as an exhibit together, with the
understanding that counsel will arrange it so that each witness' testi-
mony will appear consecutively or appear at one place, to which it
can be referred, in the event we do that then the testimony of Admiral
Kimmel and also of General Short will not be filed as separate exhibits.
If we should not do that, then both of them go in as an appropriate
exhibit now.
The Vice Chairman. Can't we decide that now?
The Chairman. Why can't we now act on that ? Without objection,
then, the Chair will order that all this previous testimony be so ar-
ranged by counsel as to appear appropriately as we have discussed it
and that that include the testimony of Admiral Kimmel- referred to
and made an exhibit the other day, as well as the testimony of General
Short, and it will all be made an exhibit and include all of that in-
stead of having it separate.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, Mr. Chairman, with the understanding,
then, that that includes all witnesses called by the com- [^44'^]
mittee or not called, who testified in these previous hearings.
The Chairiman. Yes, I think so. That includes, of course, the testi-
mony also upon which we agreed the other day.
Mr. Richardson. And it includes all of the hearings.
The Chairman. All of the hearings.
Senator Ferguson. That is right; all except the Clausen because
that was nothing but affidavits.
Senator Brewster. That is right.
The Chairman. That is right.
Mr. Murphy. I want to say something about the Clausen report
later.
Senator Brewster. I think that covers this question that I raised,
because I think it is better to have the whole thing in than to have just
the excerpts.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Brewster. So that will dispose of my request, I think.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Brewster. Now, one other matter that I would like to in-
quire of you about, General, and that is the matter of the circumstances
of your retirement.
General Short. I would like, in order to be very exact, to read a
page that states the circumstances very cuccinctly :
[8Jf4G] When I read the findings of the Roberts Commission on the morning
of January 25th, 1942 I was completely dumbfounded. To be accused of derelic-
tion of duty after almost forty years of loyal and competent service was beyond
my com^irehension. I immediately called General Marshall on the telcplione.
He was an old and trusted friend of thirty-nine years standing. He said lie had
been in New York and had not seen the report until that minute. I asked him
what I should do, having the country and the war in mind, should I retire? He
replied, "Stand pat but if it becomes necessary I will use this conversation as
authority."
3134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I told him I would place myself entirely in his hands, having faith in his
judgment and loyalty. After I hung up I decided it wasn't quite fair to him to
have to use the conversation as authority, so I wrote out a formal application
which I inclosed in a personal letter to him. I asked the War Department for
a copy of this letter but they have not been able to locate it.
I have a copy that I had written of the letter to him and I should
like to read that.
Senator Lucas. Do we have a copy of this ?
Senator Ferguson. It was just handed to you.
General Short. It is this letter, the mimeograph.
Senator Brewster. That does not appear to have a date, [5^7]
General.
General Short. I beg your pardon?
Senator Brewster. It does not appear to have a date on it, General.
General Short. That was dated January 25. That was made from
a copy that I had made in my own handwriting at that day and
it was sent from 610 Northwest Fifteenth Street, Oklahoma City, Okla.
That does not appear on here.
Senator Lucas, Mr. Chairman, there is one thing I would like
to inquire about. The preliminary statement. General Short, that
you read previous to the statement you are about to read, is that
your own or is that some other statement ?
General Short. That is mine and was not mimeographed but I
wrote it in order to be sure and say exactly what I meant.
Senator Lucas. All right, sir.
The Chairman. That is not included in this ?
General Short. That is not included in this.
The Chairman. All right.
General Short. This is the letter that I wrote to General Marshall
on January 25.
Senator Ferguson. Just one moment that I may understand that
correctly. Do T understand that what you stated first from that
statement was a telephone conversation with General Marshall ?
[544<5] General Short. That is correct, about 1 p. m. on January
25.
Senator Brewster. From Oklahoma City?
General Short. From Oklahoma City.
The Chairman. Did you call him or did he call you ?
General Short. I called him.
Senator Ferguson. Thank you for the explanation.
General Short (reading) :
Dear General Marshall : I appreciate very much your advice not to submit
my request for retirement at the present time. Naturally, under existing condi-
tions, I very much prefer to remain on the active list and take whatever
assignment you think it necessary to give me. However, I am inclosing applica-
tion so that you may use it should you consider it desirable to submit it at
any time in the future.
Since you asked me to call your attention to anything I consider important,
I want to call your attention to the fact that the report of the Board did
not mention the fact Hiat 12 B-17"s arrived from the niainland in the midst
of the attack without ammunition, with guns cosmolined, and with skeleton
crews, resulting in the destruction of four of these planes. You will find this
set forth fully in my statement accompanying the Board report. From [8^9]
my point of view this is a strong argument that the War Department agreed
with me that sabotage was the most dangerous thing to the Hawaiian Depart-
ment and for that reason did not direct me to take action against an air
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3135
attack although it had known since November 2Sth of the precautions taken
by uie.
In Section IX of the Report of the Board a statement is made that the
CINCUS received three messages from tlie Navy Department on December 3,
4, 6 with reference to the destruction of Japanese codes. However, these mes-
sages were not shown to me.
I should appreciate very greatly anything you may be able to do in my
case.
Sincerely,
Walter C. Short.
I considered my dealing with General Marshall a purely personal
matter between two old friends.
I did not receive a reply to this letter. I have seen General Mar-
shall only one time prior to his appearance before tliis committee.
In June 1942 I went to West Point to witness the graduation of my
son and attended a garden party given by the superintendent of the
academy. At this party General Marshall came across the lawn to
speak to Mrs. Short and me. He spent about 5 minutes with us. He
did not mention [8450] Pearl Harbor but talked of our early
service together.
In this connection there are certain paragraphs in volume 23 of
the transcript of this committee, page 4049, which I would like to
read. [Reading:]
Senator Ferguson. What did the Secretary of War's order that j'ou .=:poke
about do?
General MAnsnATX. The Secretary of War's order that I spoke about brouglit
General Short back from Hawaii, relieved him from all responsibility of command
in Hawaii, directed him to report to some point in tlie United States, we will
have to look at the order to see just what it was. Thereafter the question
was whether he would be given another assignment, or, as actually developed,
his retirement, which I believe was at his request; I do not recall that.
Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted on that, as to whether or not he
would be given another assignment?
General Marshatx. I do not recall that, sir.
;Mr. Keefe. Will the gentleman yield, Mr. Chairman?
General Marshaix. I presume so.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, I will yield.
Mr. Keefe. Yesterday when I examined General Marshall I requested cnun-
sel to present the order with reference to General Short and I wonder whether
that is [S'lSi] here today, whether we have received it.
Mr. Mitchell. It has not been handed to us yet by the War Department.
General Marshall. The procedure in General Short's case was handled by
the Secretary of War.
Now, the enclosure in my personal letter to General Marshall was as
follows :
610 N. W. l.^th St.,
Oklahoma City, Okla., Jan. 25, 19ff2.
Subject : Retirement
To : Adjutant General, U. S. Army.
1. I hereby submit my request for retirement after more than thirty-nine
years service, effective upon a date to be determined by the War Department.
2. If practicable, I request that the elTective date be such as to permit me to
take advantage of all accrued leave of absence (approximately four months).
However, if this request for leave should militate against granting of retire-
ment, I wish the request for leave to be disregarded.
(Sgd) Walter C. Short,
Major General, U. 8. A.
3136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Now, this letter that I have justTead was enclosed with [8452']
my personal letter to General Marshall to be used by him if he con-
sidered necessary.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, so that the record might be clear,
has our counsel requested this previous letter and has the War Depart-
ment reported that it cannot be found, the one in the enclosure that
includes the one of January 25? I just want to know whether that is
a missing paper from the files of the War Department, whether we
have made a sufficient search to ascertain that fact.
Mr. Richardson. I do not think we have ever requested that letter.
Senator Ferguson. What are the facts?
Mr. Kaufman. The fact is, from Colonel Duncombe, that when it
was ascertained that General Short had a copy of that letter no search
was made then for the original letter.
Senator Ferguson. Well, could we now have a search made and
ascertain the facts as to why that letter was not with the letter that
was enclosed in the same envelope? As I understand General Short's
testimony, they were enclosed in the same envelope.
General Short. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. And he made an inquiry and could not locate
in the War Department this top letter that he has just been reading.
[84^3] General Short. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Is that correct?
General Short. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. May we have General Short's statement?
The Chairman. The Chair might ask General Short whether the
fact, as you stated, that it was a personal letter to General Marshall
and not an official letter would have any bearing upon whether it
would be part of the files of the War Department.
General Short. It was a purely personal letter and he could retain
it or file it as he saw fit.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I make this inquiry, as to
whether or not we are not getting, this committee is not getting per-
sonal letters between our respective officers and are only getting those
letters that the officers consider are official letters or communications?
The Chairman. Well, of course, the Chair does not know how many
personal letters pass between officers in Washington and elsewhere and
therefore cannot answer that question. I don't know whether any-
body can or not.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, let me ask General Short.
Is the letter that you have read here addressed to General Marshall,
and you supplied the date January 25, 1942, is this a correct copy of
the letter you sent to General Marshall?
[84-54] General Short. That is a correct copy. The copy was
made in my own handwriting. I did not have a typewriter and car-
bon paper when I wrote it, and I made a copy in my own handwriting
and this is a correct copy.
The Vice Chairman. So the committee now has before it, supplied
by you, the letter that is being discussed here?
Generad Short. That is correct.
The Chairman. Did you write that letter to General Marshall in
your own handwriting ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3137
General Short. I did.
The Chairman. Did you mark it "Personal" ?
General Short. I did.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I should like to make this observa-
tion on this point. I do not think there has been any question but'
what every department downtown has furnished us letters from their
files of a personal nature if the letters were in the files. Obviously
many personal letters went from one individual to another that never
found its way into the State, War, or Navy files. Certainly there
would be no way that counsel or the liaison man of the Navy or the
Army could find out all of the personal letters that went from one
individual to another.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, this is what I have in mind :
When the official letter dated January 25, "Subject : [8455']
Retirement" appears before us, it is in a way a conditional, or at
least there was another condition attached to it, because there was a
letter and a telephone conversation that preceded it and it does not
exactly speak the facts alone and, therefore, without the others we
do not have all of the facts.
The Chairman. Well, General, I do not suppose that you or any
other officer who wrote a personal letter to one of your superiors al-
ways expected that that personal letter should become a part of tlie
official files of the Department. It was discretionary, I presume, with
the recipient of the letter.
General Short. Absolutely.
The Chairman. As to whether he should regard it as purely per-
sonal and if you marked it as "Personal" he probably would not put it
in the files.
General Short. I regarded it as personal myself and apparently he
did, too.
The Chairman. And no implication is to be drawn from the fact
that General Marshall did not make it a part of the official files of the
War Department of any sort that would be derogatory to the effort to
keep the rcord. Your official letter was the one addressed to the Ad-
jutant General, isn't that true?
General Short. Yes, sir; and I have a photostat copy of [84561
it there.
The Chairman. And that is a part of the files in the War Depart-
ment.
General Short. Now, may I explain that this letter and all of the
following letters were taken from my 201 file in the War Department.
That was a personal file of the officer concerned. My counsel, Colonel
Karr, had the copies prepared and compared them and all the re-
maining letters that I will read came out of my personal file. I did
not see them till yesterday but
The Chairman. In other words, all this correspondence except that
personal letter to General Marshall is part of the file and was taken
from the file ?
General Short. That was part of my personal 201 file.
The Vice Chairman. And the letter to General Marshall was taken
from your individual file and is here?
General Short. That is correct.
3138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, might I make a suggestion?
The Chairman. Mr. Richardson.
Mr. Richardson. So far as I know — and I am supported in that by
my associates — there never has been, so far as we know, any attempt on
the part of any government agency to pick out what may be called
official letters from [84.57] personal letters. We have been
given all the correspondence, so far as we know, that are in the files
that were examined.
Exhibit 53 now in the record contains the personal letters between
Short and Marshall, 106 between Kimmel and Stark, and we know of
no personal letters that are not there and I would like to inquire from
General Short whether he knows of any additional personal letters
that are germane here that are not included in the exhibit 53 ?
General Short. I believe the exhibit marked "Letters from General
Marshall to General Short" contains all of our personal correspond-
ence-
Senator Ferguson. The other way, from Short to Marshall, does it
contain all?
General Short. Both ways, I think, during the period that I was in
Honolulu.
Senator Brewster. Well, I very much appreciate this assistance in
my examination. I hope it does not indicate any inconsiderateness if
I may now ask a question.
The Vice Chairman. General Short is not through.
Senator Brewster. I am all through with it. I said I appreciate
the help of the committee in the examination. It was a cooperative
proceeding.
The Vice Chairman. I thought you were fixing to ask another
question.
[84S8'] Senator Brewster. I am when I get a chance.
The Vice Chairman. He is not through reading yet.
Senator Brewster. As everybody else has taken the priviledge of in-
terrupting him I would like to exercise that priviledge likewise. I
have a question which I think is really germane.
The Chairman. Proceed.
Senator Brewster. The point that I wanted to clarifj^, and my ques-
tion contains no implication as to whether or not this letter should
have been in the file. I just want to establish the point, which I think
you said you had asked the War Department, as to whether they had a
copy of this personal letter and what was the reply that you received
from them ?
General Short. I had asked Colonel Duncombe and up to the present
he has not located it.
Senator Brewster, And when did you make that request?
General Short. Do you remember. Captain Ford?
Senator Brewster, Well, recently I mean?
General Short, Probably in the last week or 10 days.
Senator Brewster. Well, that is all right, that clears that up. I
think now you may resume.
General Short. All right, sir. The next is a memorandum.
[Reading :]
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3139
[8459} War Department,
Office of the Chief of Staff,
Washington, January 26, 19^2.
Memorandum for the Secretary of War.
Subject: Retirement of General Short.
As I told you this morning. General Short telephoned me at 1 p. m. yesterday
(Sunday), to say that he was ready to submit his application for retirement if
that was desired. I told him to take no action at the present time, that we had
not yet had an opportunity to read the proceedings, let alone arrive at any
conclusions.
I am now of the opinion that we should accept General Short's application for
retirement today and to do this quietly without any publicity at the moment.
Admiral Stark has requested me to advise him if we do this, as he proposes to
communicate this fact to Admiral Kimmel in the hope that Kimmel will likewise
apply for retirement.
I have talked briefly with the Judge Advocate General, who sees no objections
to the foregoing procedure. He is looking over the proceedings of the Roberts'
Board and preparing to advise us as to the matter [S-iGO] of a Court of
Inquiry or Court-martial. Quite informally he stated that his idea in the matter,
without careful consideration, was identical with ours, that the Roberts' Board
was on a plane above that of a Court of Inquiry and, therefore, rendered the
latter unnecessary and to be refused if requested, and that a court-martial would
not be in the public interest at this time.
(S) G. C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff.
This next is a memorandum. [Reading :]
January 28, 1942.
Memorandum for The Adjutant General.
Attached is a written application for retirement from Major General Walter
C. Short.
Please hold this without action awaiting instructions from the Secretary of
War.
(Sgd.) G. C. MARSHAlfX,
Chief of Staff.
Senator Brewster. Now, General, could General Marshall have re-
ceived your letter on the 26th when he sent this memorandum to the
Secretary of War?
General Short. He undoubtedly had received it on the 28th.
Senator Brewster. Yes.
General Short. I don't remember whether I sent the letter
[8461] airmail. I probably did. It might have been possible for
him to receive it on the morning of the 26th.
Senator Brewster. But the memorandum of the 26th does, at any
rate, indicate a radically different position than he had taken the day
before ?
General Short. Yes, sir; and it also by implication indicates that
he had not received my written application, if you read it carefully.
Senator Brewster. Yes. But whether or not he had then had an
opportunity to read the proceedings and to arrive at any conclusion,
that he was on the 26th of the opinion that the application should be
accepted.
General Short. Yes, sir; and the day before he had told me to
stand pat.
Senator Brewster. Yes. Now, did he call you at any time again
regarding this?
General Short. He did not and he did not answer the letter. Here
is another memorandum
3140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Brewster. Well, now, in the 28tli memorandum, evidently-
then a written application was in and he turned it over to the Adjutant
General with instructions to await action from the Secretary of War?
General Short. Yes, sir. [Reading:]
[Hand-written note:]
[8462] To G-1
Check on opinion of JA to Sec War.
Senator Brewster. Isn't that, "See what must be done"?
General Short. It should be: "See what must be done. (Sgd.
GCM." [Reading:]
Febbuaky 13, 1942.
Memorandum to the Chief of Staff:
I took lip with Knox after Cabinet meeting today the retirement of Kimmel and
Short. He assured me that Kimmel would get no leave with full pay. I told
Marshall of the opinion of the Attorney General indicating that notice to the
effect that the time must not be considered a condonation of offenses, if any, on
the part of the War Department or a bar to a future court martial. The language
of the President roughly, as given me by Knox, was as follows: "provided it is
agreed by you that this is no bar to be used legally or otherwise to subsequent
court martial proceedings".
Knox told me that the Navy thought that it was only fair that Kimmel and
Short should have the right to ask for a court martial if they desired it.
Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of War.
[8^63] Wae Department,
Washington.
Memorandum for the President:
I took up with Secretary Knox, after Cabinet meeting yesterday, the retire-
ment of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. It is my suggestion that the re-
quests for retirement of General Short and Admiral Kimmel should be now
accepted;
In order that the acceptance of these requests for retirement may not be con-
sidered as a condonation of the offenses, it is recommended that the following
language be used in the acceptance of such requests :
"Is accepted, effective , without prejudice to future action
in tiie interest of the Government."
Secretary Knox concurs in this recommendation.
Secretary of War.
It does not show "signed Henry L. Stimson."
[Handwritten notes:]
Secretary of War's proposed wording
wirhout condonation of any offense or prejudice
to future action on behalf of tlie Gov't
without condonation of any offense or prejudice
to any future disciplinary action.
[8-'i6.'i] This approved as safe by Atty. Genl. by telephone Feb. 16.
It has a notation that —
Green copy never on file.
Febbtjaby 14, 1942.
Memorandum for the Attorney General:
1. At the Cabinet meeting yesterday, the question of the acceptance of re-
quests for retirement of Admiral Kimmel and General Short was discussed.
Several suggestions have been made as to the language that should be used in
the action on the requests. In order that the acceptance of these requests for
retirement may not be considered as a condonation of the offenses, the follow-
ing language has been recommended:
a. The language of the President, roughly, as given to Secretary Stimson by
Secretary Knox:
"Provided it is agreed by you that this is no bar to be used legally or
otherwise to subsequent court martial proceedings."
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3141
6, The staff of the War Department, believing that the language suggested
above might provoke the officers concerned to request court martials at once,
and believing such action to be inadvisable at this time, submitted the follow-
ing language, in which The Judge Advocate General concurred :
[8465] "Is accepted, effective , without prejudice to
future action in the interest of the Government."
c. The Secretary of War proposes the following wording :
'^vithout condonation of any offense or prejudice to future action on
behalf of the Government."
The President has requested that you express your judgment as to which of
the suggestions offered is preferable, and whether or not the preferable wording
serves the legal purpose for which intended.
2. The Secretary of War has directed me to request that before reaching a
final decision with respect to the President's request, that you read the com-
plete file relating to proposals attached, and also the two opinions of The Judge
Advocate General of the Army, one to the Secretary of War dated January 31,
1942, and the other to the Chief of Staff dated January 27, 1942, and the infor-
mal memorandum from the Secretary of War to The Judge Advocate General
appended to these opinions.
3. In view of the fact that the President desires to reach a decision in regard
to this matter on Monday morning, the Secretai'y of War has directed me to
request that you [8466] make available to him your decision before the
end of this week end. In view of the urgency of this matter, Colonel Walsh is
delivering these papers to you, and is available for what assistance he may be
to you in this matter.
For the Secretary of War :
J. H. HiLLDBTNG,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.
And a memorandum to the Secretary of War. At the top it says :
If the Secretary returns to Washington tonight — Sunday — have this at his
house then.
G. C. M.
[Note attached :] Clause agreed upon by Sec. War, Sec. Navy and the Attor-
ney General :
"without condonation of any offense or prejudice to any further disciplinary
action"
To Seaetary of War:
For Monday a. m. decision
Opinion of Attorney General re Short and Kimmel.
G. M. C.
[8467] Office of the Attobney General,
Washington, D. C, February 14, 1942.
Memorandum for the Secretary of War :
I have given consideration to the suggestions contained in your memorandum
of today concerning language to be used in connection with the acceptance of the
requests for retirement which have been made by Admiral Kimmel and General
Short. In this connection I have read the opinions and other documents which
accompanied the memorandum.
It seems to me that the objection which may be raised as to suggestion a
(using the words "subsequent court martial proceedings") may be found with re-
spect to the words in suggestion c "without condonation of any offense". It has
been felt that the reference to court martial would indicate to the officers con-
cerned that such action was definitely planned for a future date, and would
move one or both of them to insist that such proceedings be had immediately.
Similarly the reference to an offense may suggest to these officers that we felt
that an offense had been committed, and thus might lead them to an insistence
that the question of whether or not they were guil.ty of an offense be imme-
diately determined by appropriate proceedings.
Suggestion &, while somewhat more remotely susceptible to the same dif-
ficulty, leaves the matter open for further action on the part of the government
3142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
without stating tliat a particular course is planned or that any special interpre-
tation has been placed upon the acts committed. I believe it would be pref-
erable to use the language contained in recommendation & which, I understand,
to be that of the Judge Advocate General and the War Department staff.
(Sgd) Francis Biddle,
Attorney Oeneral.
That completes the correspondence.
Senator Brewster. Well, now, that opinion of the Attorney Gen-
eral seems to recommend 5, while the notation on the prior page recom-
mends c. Do you know whether there is any reconciliation of those
two statements ?
General Short. You mean General Marshall's memorandum to the
Secretary ?
Senator Brewster. Yes. It says:
The clause agreed upon by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy
and Attorney General —
which is clause c, while the opinion of the Attorney General recom-
mends clause b.
General Short. Maybe this order directing the retirement would
explain that fully :
Febbuaby 17, 1942.
Subject: Retirement.
Major General Waxtee C. Shobt (0-1G21), U. S. Army,
610 N. W. 13th Street, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma:
By direction of the President, Major General Walter C. Short (0-1621), United
States Army, upon his own application, is retired from active service to take
effect February 28, 1JM2, under the provisions of Section 1243, Revised Statutes,
after more than 39 years' service and without condonation of any offense or
prejudice to future disciplinary action. He is relieved from his present status
of awaiting orders at Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and at the proper time will
proceed to his home. The travel directed is necessary in the military service.
FD-1401 F 1-06 15-06 A 0410-2
By order of the Secretary — Major General — ^Adjutant General,
and the name has not been copied here, so I do not know what particu-
lar adjutant general signed it.
Senator Brew^ster. Was the matter taken up by anyone, either the
Chief of the General Staff, or any other one, before this action ?
General Short. About the same time that that letter was written
it was transmitted to me in Oklahoma City by an officer sent by plane
by the Chief of Staff, who delivered it to me.
Senator Brewster. There was no further discussion [8Ji.70\
regarding any construction to be placed on this language, or the phrase-
ology which was used ?
General Short. No, sir; because I would have welcomed a court
martial in open court, although I did not want any more star-chamber
proceedings that had everything secret and off the record, as had been
the case in the Roberts report.
Senator Brewster. I think that is all that I have.
Senator Lucas. Will the Senator yield for just a moment?
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Senator Lucas. Is the opinion of the Judge Advocate General of
the Army to the Secretary of War on January 31, 1942, available for
the committee ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3143
Mr. Kautman. Yes, sir ; that is available. The entire file has been
duplicated, sir.
Senator Lucas. What do you mean by the "entire file," if I may ask?
Mr. Kaufman. The entire file that leads up to the Advocate Gen-
eral's opinion.
Senator Lucas. Do I understand that this is not all of the file, that
General Short has read, but only a part of it ? Are there more docu-
ments and correspondence that is involved in this question ?
[8471] Mr. Kaufman. There are more documents involved in
this question ; yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. That is in the letter, the reference to the opinion
of the Judge Advocate General to the Secretary of War, dated January
31, 1942, and the other to the Chief of Staff "dated January 27, 1942,
and the informal memorandum of the Secretary of War, they are all
appended to these opinions. Those are these two documents here
[indicating] .
Lieutenant Colonel Karr. We have photostats of them but did not
have time to reproduce them. We will be very glad to present them
whh all the documents that have gone in.
Senator Lucas. My inquiry was whether or not this is all the infor-
mation we are going to get on this question or whether there is addi-
tional information that throws more light on this slubject.
Mr. Kaufman. Senator Brewster or Senator Ferguson has the files.
Senator Ferguson. Senator Brewster.
Senator Brewster. This is the file of which I was speaking [indi-
cating] . These are items 1 and 2. The one to which I have particular
reference is the one here [indicating]. That is the larger document
that deals with the brief and resume of the records in the Roberts
Commission on General [8472] Short's case. That is the one
to which I had reference and it simply summarizes many points of
evidence in the Roberts record.
These others are references to the opinions of the Judge Advocate
General, of which I quoted two sentences yesterday.
[8473] Senator Lucas. In view of the fact that General IMar-
shall's name has been used in these letters that have been read by Gen-
eral Short, I am wondering whether or not there is any more informa-
tion in connection with this problem that is now before us, where
General Marshall is involved anywhere.
General Short. Senator Lucas, I have two additional ones that we
got later. We did not have time to duplicate them. I am not sure
whether General Marshall's name appears on them or not. I will be
glad to read them.
Senator Brewster. You referred to the memorandum of January
27, which was a memorandum for the Chief of Staff. Is that the one
you refer to ?
General Short. Yes. sir.
Senator Brewster. By Maj. Gen. Myron C. Cramer, the Judge Ad-
vocate General ?
Senator Lucas. That is the one I referred to in the beginning, yes ;
because I thought that was important. I should like to see what the
Judgre Advocate General said on that occasion. Then I followed it
3144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
with askin<y for any additional information that is in the file that
deals with General Marshall on this subject.
Mr. Kauitman. The rest of the file is right in front of Senator
Brewster.
[84?4] Senator Lucas. I should like to have counsel, if he will,
examine that file overnight and see if there is anything pertinent in
it that ought to go in this record following what the general has
stated.
Senator Brewster. They are the ones that presented it to me, and
they have examined it, so they are familiar with what it contains.
I had discussed this with them before I took the course I did.
General Short. May I make a statement to you, Senator Lucas?
Senator Lucas. Certainly, General.
General Short. These two documents here [indicating] were fur-
nished us by the War Department, by Colonel Duncombe. The others
that I read they did not furnish us, but we went to my 201 file, and
dug them out, but these were furnished by Colonel Duncombe.
Senator Lucas. I shall conclude by requesting counsel to make a
further study of that file with a view of determining whether or not
they believe this is pertinent and material, to place the additional
information before the committee.
General Short. I believe, Senator, that this memorandum, signed
particularly by the Judge Advocate General [847S] would be
of interest, and I would like to have the counsel read it, if there is no
objection.
Senator Brewster, Would it be possible to have it placed in the
record ?
Senator Lucas. I would just as soon have it spread on the record.
The Chairman. It may be spread on the record without reading.
(The matter referred to follows :)
Wab Depabtment
OFFICE OF THE SECBETABT
Memorandum
To THE J. A. G.
Will you kindly give me your opinion on a further question — in addition to
those embodied in this opinion — viz:
If Genl Short's proposed application for voluntary retirement were accepted,
with the announced understanding that such action would not preclude a future
court martial for the alleged offenses in re Pearl Harbor, would that be valid —
could a subsequent court martial be validly brought, should it be found advisable?
H. L. S.
[8476] War Depabtment
office chief of staff
Washington
To Secbetaey of Wab:
Judge Advocate General's recommendations reference Major General Walter C.
Short.
G. C. M.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3145
OOWFTDENTIAL
Wab DEI'ABTMENT,
Office of the Judge Advocate General,
Washington, January 27, 1942.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff
Ssubject : Course of action with respect to General Walter Campbell Short.
1. Pursuant to your instructions I submit the following comments with respect
to possible courses of action against the above-named officer on account of the
derelictions disclosed in the report of the President's Commission to investigate
the Japanese attack on Hawaii on December 7, 1941. These comments are based
solely upon the text of the report of the Commission. I have not seen or ex-
amined the 1887 typewritten pages of testimony taken [S-'/77] by the
Commission nor the 8000 printed pages of records and documents examined by it.
2. General Short may be tried by a general court-martial or he may be sum-
marily discharged from the Army by the President pursuant to the provisions of
Article of War 118.
3. With reference to trial by general court-martial, it is assumed that the
evidence taken by the Commission sustains its findings of fact and conclusions
and would warrant such procedure should it be deemed advisable. However,
it is impossible to predict with certainty the result of any trial or the sentence
which the court might impose. In this case should a court acquit or impose a
sentence less than dismissal I can see no advantage resulting from such a trial.
It will be noted that the offenses charged against General Short are oiienses of
omission or nonfeasance which require a much stronger showing to justify a
trial than those involving misfeasance or malfeasance. General Siiort's non-
feasance or omissions were based on an estimate of the situation which, although
proved faulty by subsequent events, \yas, insofar as I am able to ascertain from
the report of the Commission, made or concurred in by all those officers in Hawaii
best qualified to form a sound military opinion. That estimate was that
[S47S] an attack by air was in the highest degree improbable.
4. There are, in my opinion, serious questions of policy which should be con-
sidered in connection with a possible trial of this officer by general court-mar-
tial.
a. If a court should find him guilty and sentence him to anything less than dis-
missal, tlie Army would be accused of white-washing General Short. This ac-
cusation would be much more strongly made should the trial result in his ac-
quittal.
b. Such trial would have to be in open court, otherwise the War Department
would be subject to criticism of whitewashing General Short if acquitted, or of
persecuting him if convicted.
c. The ramifications of this case are such that in a trial by court-martial it
would be necessary to introduce in evidence numerous secret ijlans, orders and
other papers which do not appear in the Commission's report. Both the prosecu-
tion and the defense would need these documents in order proi>erly to present
their case.?. It certainly would be against the public interest to disclose some,
at least, of these various war plans and documents. Such being the case, it would
be impossible to prevent the publication of these plans and documents except by
closing the court during those sessions in which these secret papers were read
and [SJfli)] discu.ssed. The result of a trial by a court partly in open
session and partly in secret session might be that the War Department would be
subject to the same charges of whitewashing or persecution as referred to in the
subparagraph b above.
d. A general court-martial would require the time and energy of a considerable
period of a large number of generals and other officers of higli rank as members
of the court-martial, and for personnel of the prosecution and defense. It would
consume much time and elfort of the numerous officers of the Army and Navy
whose services would be required in order properly to present the case for
trial, or whose attendance would be required as witnesses. The ramifications of
such a trial would be so great and it would require the time of so many officers
from tlie lowest to the highest rank that it wouUl interfere seriously in the main
job now before the War Department, namely the prosecution of tlie war.
79716— 46— pt. 7 16
3146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
e. The career of General Short as an active Army oflBcer is finished and closed.
Because of the lack of conlideuce which the public now has in him, which lack
of contideuce would no doubt be shared by his future subordinates, it is unthink-
able that any command should again be entrusted to him. General Short knows
this. That in itself is a very severe punishment. Furthermore, General [8-'f80]
Short has been relieved of his command which reduces him from a lieutenant
general to a major general. The addition to that punishment of any punishment
other th.an dismissal, such as a reprimand, loss of files, forfeiture of pay or
suspension from a command, would be inappropriate.
5. For the President to discharge General Short summarily under the provi-
sions of Article of War 118 would tend even more strongly than a dismissal by a
sentence of a general court-martial to enable him afterward to claim persecution.
Revised Statutes, section 1244, provides that when an oflicer is 62 years old he
may be retired from active service at the discretion of the President. General
Short will be 62 years old on March 30, 1942. However, it is unnecessary to discuss
this source of action for the reason that you have informed me that General Short
has ofi'ered to apply for retirement at any time you may desire to accept it. He
may lawfully be retired upon such application.
6. General Short entered the Army as a second lieutenant of Infantry on Feb-
ruary 2, 1901, and had, up to December 7, 1941, nearly 41 years of honorable and
most creditable service. He reached the next to the highest rank that an Army
offi'-er can reach, namely that of a lieutenant general.
7. I realize that the question of what ought to be [8481] done in this
matter has been the subject of heated di-scussions in the press and elsewhere and
whatever may be done will probably subject the War Department to criticism.
However, in view of all the considerations hereinabove discussed. I respectfully
suggest the advisability and the desirability of accepting the application of Gen-
eral Short for retirement. However, in this connection I would further suggest
that it would be both politic and just to coordinate the action taken by the War
Department with that taken by the Navy Department in the case of Admiral
Kimmel.
/s/ Mybon C. Cramer,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.
[8482] confidentiai,
War Department,
Office of the Judge Advocate General,
Washington, January 31, 1942.
Memorandum for the Secretary of War.
Subject : Course of action with respect to Major General Walter Campbell Short.
1. After considering my memorandum for the Chief of Staff of January 27, 1942,
on the above subject, you have asked me a further question, as follows :
"If General Short's proposed application for voluntary retirement were ac-
cepted, with the announced understanding that such action would not preclude a
future court martial for the alleged offenses in re Pearl Harbor, would that be
valid — Could a subsequent court martial be validly brought, should it be found
advisable?"
2. A retired officer is as a matter of law still an oflBcer of the Army and still
subject to court-martial as much as though he were still on the active list (A. W.
2n; Nat'l Defense Act, sec. 2 ; 10 U. S. C. 4). Neither does his retirement amount
to a break in the continuity of his seiwice which would prevent his trial after
retirement for [8483] an offense committed before retirement (Dig. Op.
JAG 1912, p. 992, par. I G 26). The real question involved is whether the retire-
ment of an oflS 'er on his own application constitutes a condonation of his offense,
barring trial for it.
3. Tliere are opinions of this office to the effect that under certain circumstances
release from arrest or confinement or promotion may constitute such a condona-
tion. I find no precedent holding either way with respect to retii'ement. Retire-
ment after thirty years' service upon the officer's own application under section
1243. Revised Statutes (10 U. S. C. 943; Mil. Laws, sec. 326), is "in the discretion
of the President." The foregoing is one of the two statutes under which General
Short may be retired at once on his own application. If he be retired under the
statutes, there may be some plausibility in a contention that the President's
exercise of discretion in terminating the officer's active service on his own applica-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3147
tion constitutes a bargain between him and the officer to the effect that he will not
further be prosecuted for known oli'enses occurring prior to retirement. There
is no statutory or judicial authority for such a view, and I regard it as unsound as
a strict matter of law. Therefore I answer your inquiry by saying that as a
matter of law [S^SJ/] the retirement of General Short under the above
statute upon his own application in the discretion of the President does not involve
the passing of judgment by the President upon the officer's past services or a con-
donation by him of prior offenses which would prevent subsequent trial by court-
martial.
4. Nevertheless, as a matter of fairness rather than law, there is force in the
supposed contention above stated. General Short has volunteered to submit an
application for retirement. He may reasonably suppose that a request to him
from an cffi.'ial source, in answer to his voluntary suggestion, to submit his ap-
plication for retirement, involves a tacit agreement that the issue of his official
conduct of the defense of Hawaii prior to and on December 7 will be closed by
his retirement and that no charges will be preferred against him growing out
of such conduct.
5. Another statute under which General Short might be retired immediately
upon his own application, is the second proviso of section 3 of the act of June
13, 1040 (54 Stat. 380), reading:
''Provkled further, That any officer on the active list of the Regular Army or
Philippine Scouts who serve in any capacity as a member of the military or naval
forces of the United States prior to [67/85] November 12, 1918, shall upon
his own application be retired with annual pay equal to 75 per centum of his active-
duty annual pay at the time of his retirement unless entitled to retired pay of a
higher grade as hereinafter provided, except that officers with less than twenty
years" service and officers who are under investigation or who are awaiting trial
by courts martial or the result of such trial, or who.se cases are pending befoi'e
courts of inquiry shall be retired only when the appli<ntion for retirement in
each case has l)een approved by the Secretary (f War : * * *"
It is manifest that War Department approval of an application of General
Short for retirement under the above statute, would amount in effect to a finding
that lie is not under investigation or awaiting trial by court martial and would
thus tend even more strongly to support a contention that any offenses chargeable
against him Avere condoned by the action.
6. If General Short should be retired on his own application under the above
circumstances and if afterward he should be brought to trial for his conduct
of the defense of Hawaii, it may be anticipated that charges of bad faith would
be made against the War Department by him [8'f86] or by others in his
behalf. I think it is most desirable that no opportunity be afforded for such
accusations. I assume that General Short's offer of retirement as made was not
subject to any conditions. Therefore, I suggest that before his offer be accepted
he be given to understand, prefei-ably in writing for the purpose of the record,
that such retirement will not constitute a condonation of his offenses, if any,
on the part of the War Department, or be considered a bar to any future trial by
general court martial in case such trial should be deemed advisable.
7. Should General Short refuse to submit his application for voluntary retire-
ment with such a condition attached, the President may, without any application
by General Short, retire him upon his reaching the age of 62 years on March 30,
1942, pursuant to the provisions of Revised Statutes, section 1244 (10 U. S. C. 944 ;
Mil. Laws, sec. 323), and may make announcement to that effect at the present
time.
/s/ Myron C. Ckamee,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.
1. Incl.
Let. to C. of S.
1/27/42.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ?
Senator Lucas. Yes.
[8487] Mr. Murphy. General, will yon state now as to whether
or not you feel it would be in the interest of national defense and
national security to have had a court martial of either you or Admiral
Kimmel during the war, and in view of the fact it would show the
3148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
situation at Hawaii, as well as other things, and require the presence
of admirals in Admiral Kimmel's case, of admirals who were scattered
over the seven seas, and in your case, generals and other officers who
were scattered over the different parts of the world ?
General Short. I will say that there may have been some justifica-
tion in that point of view, but I do not think there was any justification
in concealing the many things that were concealed; that the public
had a right to know that, and that certainly I had the right to consider
that the public should know it.
Mr. Murphy. In other words, you feel that there should have been
a more fair statement by the War Department, but you do not feel that
there should have been a complete, [84S8] open court martial
exposing the matter on the record, is that right?
General Short. There might possibly have been some question about
magic.
The CHAniMAN. General, in that connection, is it not ordinarily the
practice — whether it is the wisest or best practice, it has nearly always
been the practice of the War Department and Navy Department, in
making investigations of any sort under a board of inquiry, to make
them secret? They do not usually do that out in the open, like we are
holding this hearing, do they?
General Short. I will say this: Through the press propaganda, or
otherwise, the public had been so acqviainted with this case that any
court of inquiry, or any courts martial was practically a trial before
the American public, and I do not think there would have been any
justification for any more secret, top secret, or off-the- record testimony.
The Chairman. Well, you have not answered my question. I asked
you whether it was not the practice, over the years, in both the Navy
and War Department, to hold secret investigations?
General Short. That has been done frequently. Now I will say
also usually it is not a matter of the same public interest.
[8489] The Chairman. No ; and we were not previously engaged
in an inquiry where the revelation of military secrets might have been
as universal as in this case.
General Short. But even granting that, I do not believe there ever
was any possible justification for off-the-record testimony that nobody
could examine in the future.
The Chairman. Do you think that the interest, or the welfare, or
the result that might follow to any individual officer in the case of
yourself and Admiral Kimmel could compare to the public interest
that might be served or affected to a disadvantage by the revelation of
things that would have come out in a public courts martial in both
cases?
General Short. The top secret evidence was kept secret until after
the war was over, and then has been made available. The off-record
testimony was not recorded, and I do not know to this day, and the
public does not know to this day, and I do not think the committee
knows to this day what that off-tlie-record testimony consisted of, and
yet there was a final decision arrived at on the basis of that testimony.
The Chairman. That is a matter about which I think the committee
need not spend any more time.
Congressman Gearhart.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3149
184^01 Senator Brewster. Just a minute. I would like to
pursue that.
So it is your impression, General, that the public impressions which
were formed as the result of releases here in Washington and the
action taken convicted you before the American public on what you
term off-the-record testimony?
General Short. It is.
Senator Brewster. Without an opportunity for you to have a
hearing of any proper kind?
General Short. That is correct. It might be of interest if I could
read the waiver that I signed to the Secretary of War in regard to
the courts martial.
First, I received a letter from the Secretary of War
The Chairman. General, before you do that, may I ask you this
question, to clear it up.
In the newspapers from time to time it has been stated, and else-
where, maybe on the floor of Congress, that in either the Navy or the
War Department a demand could be made for a courts martial, and
it was stated that was not true of both Departments. Is it not true
that you had the right to demand a courts martial, and Admiral
Kimmel had a right to demand it in the Navy?
General Short, I think either one of us could demand it, but whether
it was granted in either Department depended [8491] on the
Department.
Now there was a difference. I think you may possibly be con-
fusing the court of inquiry in the Nav}^ with the Army board. Under
the regulations in the Navy, with the court of inquiry, the accused
officer is permited to hear all of the evidence given, to have an at-
torney, and is accorded the privilege of cross-examination.
When Admiral Kimmel appeared before the Navy board he sat in,
he heard all of the testimony, he had the privilege of cross-examination
so if things were not brought out he could bring them out.
Before the Army board I was not permitted to hear the other wit-
nesses. I was not given the privilege of cross-examination, and
neither was I permited to be represented by an attorney during that
period. That was the difference in the two Departments.
I believe, as far as a courts martial is concerned, that both Depart-
ments had the legal right to refuse us a courts martial, if they saw
fit to do so.
The Chairman. I got the impression that one Department was com-
pelled by law to grant a courts martial if the person involved requested
or demanded it.
General Short. That is true of a court of inquiry. I think the
point of view expressed by the Judge Advocate [84^2] Gen-
eral and Chief of Staff was that the action of the Roberts report was
on a plane above a court of inquiry and therefore denied us the right
to demand a court of inquiry. That is plainly said in one of these
memoranda.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question ?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. MuRPHT. Do I understand, General, that before the Army
Pearl Harbor board you were not afforded the right of counsel ?
3150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. I had the right of counsel only when I was testify-
ing. My counsel could not sit in when the others were testifying,
and neither he nor I heard the other witnesses, nor had any privilege
of cross-examination.
Mr. Murphy. But you did have Brig. Gen. Thomas Green as coun-
sel?
General Short. Yes, sir ; and he was present during the time I was
testifying only.
Mr. Murphy. You were furnished a copy of the testimony over the
protest of the board, weren't you, by the Secretary?
General Short. I was furnished with a copy of the testimony, except
for the top secret and off-the-record testimony, so what I got did not
explain the situation at all.
The Chairman. The off-the-record testimony was, in the [84931
main, testimony that might involve some result or effect upon the mili-
tary operations during the war, was it not?
General Short. There is no way for me to know what was involved.
The CHAmMAN, Of course, there was no record made of the off-the-
record testimony.
General Short. There was no record made and there was nothing
to indicate the nature of it.
The Chairman. All right, go ahead.
[8494] General Short. This is the letter I received from the
Secretary of War
Senator Brewster. General Short, do I understand that before the
Army board there was off-the-record testimony?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. And there is no record as far as you know of
that?
General Short. I am sure there is no record of it.
Senator Brewster. That appears at various points in the testimony?
General Short. It just shows the testimony was taken of a certain
witness off the record.
The Chairman. Have you been told or have you gotten information
to the effect that it related largely if not altogether to magic?
General Short. I have had no word of what it consisted of. It was
just the blank page.
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Mr. Keefe. Will the gentleman yield?
My recollection is that in the report of the Army board right at the
beginning of the session there is a notation that General Marshall
testified off the record, with the time the off-the-record discussion
started, and [849S'] when his testimony was again placed on
the record. It is about an hour and 20 minutes, as I recall, that he
testified off the record. No one knows what that testimony was, of
course.
Senator Bewster. Except the men who listened to it.
Mr. Keefe. Yes ; except the men who listened to it.
Senator Brewster. And were affected, apparently, by it.
The Chairman. You couldn't say that without knowing what it
wast
General Short. Shall I proceed?
The Chairman. Go ahead.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3151
General Short (reading) :
Wae Department,
Washington, D. C, 18 September 1943.
Major General Walter C. Short,
United States Army, Retired.
My Deae Geneeal Short: In connection with your possible trial by general
court-martial, the two-year statute of limitations prescribed by Article of War
39 will, unless action is taken to prevent it, bar your trial by general court-martial
7 December 1943. The tolling of the statute of limitations would be stopped by
either a present waiver by you or [8-'f96] your arraignment before a general
court martial, which, probably, would adjourn the case until later.
So long as the war continues it will be impracticable to have a number of
important witnesses appear before the Board on account of their war duties.
In this situation it has occurred to me that the practical thing to do is to postpone
any possible trial until later and that you may desire for this purpose to execute
a waiver of the statute of limitations. In the event that you see fit to do this,
I give you my personal assurance that any trial determined upon will be held
at the earliest practicable date.
If you should agree with the foregoing your prompt return of the enclosed
form of waiver, duly executed by you, is requested.
Sincerely,
(Signed) Henrt L. Stimson.
1. Incl.
Waiver.
This is the waiver that I signed :
Waiver
September 20, 1943.
I, Walter C. Short, Major General, United States Army, Retired, hereby agree
on my honor as an officer and [S-'/.97] a gentleman that I will not plead,
nor permit my attorney or other person on my behalf to plead the statute of
limitations in bar of my trial by General Court IMartial in open court for any
alleged offenses with which I may be charged relating to the period on or before
December 7, 1941, should my trial be held during the present war or within
six (6) months thereafter.
I take this action voluntarily, believing it to be in the public interest.
Walter C. Short,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.
Senator Fekguson. Will the gentleman yield ?
Senator Brewster. Yes,
Senator Ferguson. I would like to inquire, General, whether or not
you ever saw the Koberts report and when. I mean the testimony
before the Roberts Commission.
General Short. I saw it in August 1944, Now, it is possible that my
attorney had it the last part of July. I made a request for it in July
and I saw it when I came on to Washington for the Army board.
Senator Ferguson. July of what year?
General Short. 1944.
Senator Ferguson. Wlien these letters were written, which you
h ave read here today, this report had not been [8498^ furnished
to you ?
General Short. It had not.
Senator Ferguson. I mean, the testimony.
General Short. No, sir. Here is the letter I wrote requesting the
Roberts report. July 4, 1944
Senator Ferguson, That brings up this question : At the time you
were relieved from command and later retired you didn't have the
Roberts report and know what the testimony was ?
3152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. I had no idea what the testimony was. I had
simply the printed document that appeared in the newspapers.
Senator Ferguson. Later you demanded it in writing and you are
going to read us that latter?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. When you called General Marshall and wrote him
your personal letter enclosing your letter to the Adjutant General, the
Roberts report hadn't been made at that time ?
General Short. It was published in the Sunday morning paper of
January 25.
The Chairman. And you were not in Washington at that time ?
General Short. I was in Oklahoma City.
[8499] The Chairman. You phoned him on seeing the publica-
tion of the Roberts report?
General Short. That is correct.
The Chairman. So the action on your part upon seeing in the
newspapers an account of that report was purely voluntary ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. I was talking about the record upon which that
report was made. I am talking about the testimony.
General Short. I understood perfectly.
The Chairman. I understood it, too.
Let me ask in that connection, in your letter waiving any right to
plead the statute of limitations, you said you made that waiver on
condition that it was a public court martial. Did you mean to in-
timate that if it was not to be a public court martial that you would
insist on the statute of limitations ?
General Short. Very definitely. I would raise the point. If they
tried to try me in a closed court I would plead the statute of limita-
tion. If it were in open court I would comply with my waiver.
The Chairman. That was the implication I got from your letter,
your waiver was based on the understanding that you had an open
court martial.
\8S00^ General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. In order to have an open court hearing you would
insist, during the war on a public disclosure of the war plans we had
drawn for the prosecution of the war?
General Short. If they insisted on court martialing me during the
war I wanted the public to know exactly what I was being tried upon.
Mr. Murphy. You wanted a public disclosure of all of our war plans
for winning the war ?
General Short. That would have been up to the War Department.
If they thought the court martial was important enough they would
have to agree to it.
Mr. Murphy. In this hearing we have had the war plan in the At-
lantic, we have had the war plan in the Pacific, we have had the hemi-
speric defense plan, and according to your theory there should have
been a complete spreading on the record and in the newspapers and over
the radio all of our war plans in the war in which we were then
engaged ?
General Short. That was a decision for the War Department. If
the War Department decided my trial was so important that it was
worth putting that in the papers that was their decision, not mine.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3153
[85011 The Chairman. Was anybody in the War Department
insistmg upon a court martial of you?
General Short. I don't think so.
The Chairman. Finally, as a result of the board of inquiry, the War
Department recommended that no action be taken.
General Short. That is correct. I just wanted to be sure when I
signed the waiver that I would never be subject to a star chamber
proceeding.
Senator Brewster. It should be clear in the record also that your
waiver gave the War Department 6 months after the conclusion oip the
war to determine, so that there would be no necessity of the exposure
of plans even if they did determine you should be court martialed.
General Short. Not without they deciding it was so important they
wanted to d6 it this minute and they would gamble eveiything else.
Senator Brewster. If they decided to wait, the stipulation was that
it should be after the war, and an open trial ?
General Short. Yes.
Senator Brewster. So there was no necessity on the part of the
War Department to expose their plans in the face of the enemy.
[8502'] General Short. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You wanted to read something. General?
General Short. Yes, sir. My letter doesn't appear here but the
memorandum of the Secretary of War in answer to it does appear,
which is the important thing.
This is dated July 4, 1944 :
Memorandum for the President :
Major General Walter C. Short has reqiiested that he be furnished a copy of
the full proceedings of the Roberts Commission. A copy of General Short's letter
is attached.
But it is not attached.
I am informed that the Navy Department, presumably with your approval, has
furnished Admiral Kimmel with a photostatic copy of the report. I believe that
General Short is also entitled to a copy, in order to prepare his own defense, and
request your approval of his reqiiest.
(Signed) Robert P. Patterson,
Acting Secretary of War.
OK FDR
That is in the President's handwriting.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ?
[8503] Senator Ferguson. What are you reading from?
General Short. From a memorandum for the President.
Senator Ferguson. What file ?
General Short. In my own 201 file.
The Chairman. That is the number of your file in the War Depart-
ment?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. That is what you call the personal file of every
officer ; it is a 201 file.
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. 201 is the personnel number.
General Short. It is all my file ; yes.
Mr. Murphy. May I ask one question, Mr. Chairman ?
The Chairman. Yes.
3154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Murphy. I ask you, General, whether or not on page 541 of the
Army Pearl Harbor board hearing there will be found the following :
General Short. I thank the Board for its very courteous treatment.
General Short. The Army board.
Mr. Murphy. Yes.
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chahiman. Now, the Chair would like to get to a little left of
center and reach Congressman Gearhart for [8504] interroga-
tion.
Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield for just one question?
Mr. Gearhart. I will gladly yield to the distinguished Senator.
General Short. May I, Mr. Chairman— may I introduce one more
letter, that bears on tliis same question of testimony, before we go
ahead ?
Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the witness.
General Short (reading) :
Confidential.
War Depaktment,
Washington, Octol}er 20, 1944.
Dear Geneeal Short: I have your letter of October 18, 1944, requesting that
your counsel be authorized to inform you of the information he obtains from an
examination of the recoi'ds made available to him in response to your letter of
September 29, 1944.
Much of this information is classified and involves highly important material
affecting military security. It must not be transmitted in writing, or by a third
party, or by telephone or telegraph.
[8505] Should you feel that your interest justifies your personally meeting
with your counsel, he may orally communicate the information to you upon your
written undertaking to me that you will not disclose any of this classified infor-
mation to any person except with the prior approval of the Secretary of War.
Sincerely yours,
(S) Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of War.
Naturally, I refused to sign any such written undertaking, because
it would bar me from using it before this committee or any place with-
out the personal approval of the Secretary of War. So I had never
seen any of this material until more recently.
The Chairman. At that time this committee hadn't been created.
General Short. It wouldn't have made any difference. He didn't
limit this. I couldn't use it for any purpose without his personal
approval.
Mr. Murphy. Isn't there a letter at page 4450 of the Army Pearl
Harbor board in which General Ulio said that 3^ou are "to be furnished
with a copy of the testimony taken to date by the Army Pearl Harbor
board less exhibits and that hereafter he be furnished with a copy of
the [8606'] remainder of the testimony from day to day as it
is taken as approved by order of the Secretary of War"?
General Short. But that did not approve the top secret and the
top secret was never furnished me. I had never seen any of the top
secret until probably a day or two before this board convened on No-
vember 15, when they had released it for printing. And the first time
I ever saw the magic was when it was passed out here ; this printed in-
formation.
Mr. Murphy. At the time you were demanding the top secret infor-
mation, the war was in progress, was it not?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3155
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. All right, Congressman Gearhart.
Senator Lucas. I won't ask my question. I will wait.
Mr. Gearhart. We will not detain you for long, General.
General, I understood that when you asked to have an attorney
appear with you on the Koberts hearings, that you were denied the
right to have an attorney, but were allowed to have a person in the
room with you to assist you with your documents; is that correct?
General Short. That is not correct. I did not make a request for
an attorney. I took them at their word that this was not a trial in
any sense. "^ I didn't know they were [85071 going to arrive at
a finding that practically amounted to a finding of court martial.
1 felt that I was absolutely not "guilty in any sense, and I could handle
my own case, and I went before the Roberts commission with no one
assisting me in even handling documents.
Mr. Gearhart. Didn't General Green accompany you in the hearing
room?
General Short. He did not.
Mr. Gearhart. You were alone?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. You handled your own papers?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, what was your reference to him a moment
ago?
ijreneral Shorj. General Green was my counsel before the Army
Pearl Harbor board, not before the Roberts Commission.
Mr. Gearhart, Later on?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Did he appear in the room as your attorney at that
time, or did they object to him appearing as your attorney?
General Short. He appeared as my attorney, but when he read one
document and made one slight comment on it, [8508] they did
object to his comment. He could read the papers for me, to save me
the trouble of reading them, but he could not comment.
I haven't that reference immediately at hand, but that actually
happened.
Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, his function as an attorney
was limited by the court of inquiry — rather the Army board?
General Short. Chiefly to advising me.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, I just want to ask one or two questions about
the radar.
On the day in question, December 7, 1941, the radar was on from
4 in the morning until 7 in the morning ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Gearhart. How were those hours fixed ?
General Short. I issued a general order at the time that we got
the message of November 27 to my chief of staff and he transmitted
the verbal order. I am not sure whether he transmitted it orally,
or whether he put out a written order, but my order was an oral order
to the chief of staff.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, was the radar on the same time schedule on
week days as on Sundays?
General Short. The schedule for routine training was from 7 until
11 on week-days and from 12 to 4 for [8509] routine training
3156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and maintenance. They could do in the afternoon all of the main-
tenance they required, and the man who was responsible for the train-
ing could vary the thing and do whatever he thought was most needed.
JS'ow, on Sunday there was no required training. There were a
good many Sundays they trained voluntarily. Saturday afternoon
there was no required training, but again because it was new, they
did voluntarily quite a good deal of maintenance work.
Mr. Gearhart. Lieutenant Lockhart gave some testimony in Wash-
ington on the 30th day of October of 1944 at the Pentagon Building
where he was examined by a Mr. Fraser. He testified, in substance :
Answer. That is right. There were approximately six men per unit. We
had six in ours. We operated from 7 to 9 o'clock.
Question. Nobody operated at nighttime so far as you know?
Answer. If there was any alert, or if maneuvers were going on, or something
like that kind, there was a night operation.
Question. From 7 to H excei.t for lunch periods, you were on daily?
Answer. Yes, sir, during the week.
[8510] Question. Sunday was a day off normally?
Answer. We had to operate Sundays from 4 in the morning until 7 in the
morning. We took turns. That happened to be my Sunday.
General Short. This statement might have applied before Novem-
ber 27. It would not be correct for the period after November 27.
And you notice he shows specifically that they did operate from 4 to
7 on Sunday, and that was required for every day.
Mr. Gearhart. From the 28th of November on?
General Short. From November 27 on„
Mr. Gearhart. Well, that matter was never touched on further,
so the record is silent except for what I have read to you on that
point.
Now, was there any change in your verbal orders to stay on from
4 to 7 after you gave those orders?
General Short. No, sir. There was a considerable number of
changes in the way they actually worked for training and routine,
because they were interested in doing all they could possibly do, and
they tried it out, worked until 6 o'clock, from 4 o'clock in the morning
until 6 in the afternoon. They decided very soon that they couldn't
work the men that hard, and when they were working beyond the
hours, that was something they could agree to, and they [8511^
made quite a number of changes before it settled down to 7 to 11 and
12 to 4.
Mr. Gearhart. How many of those radars did you have?
General Short. We had six.
Mr. Gearhart. Where were they placed? One was at the very
north of the island ?
General Short, I think I can give you the locations of most of them.
The Opana station, which was 2 or 3 miles southwest of Kahuku.
There was one station then almost directly north of Kawailoa. That
was several miles to the west of the Opana station. There was one
station at Koko Head, which was a short distance to the south of
Diamond Head, which I think is familiar to most of j^ou. There was
one station above Fort Shafter, a very short distance on a high point.
There was one station near Hawaii Island on the west side of the
island. I believe that covers them all.
Mr. Gearhart. The arrangement of those stations was so that you
could cover the sea in every direction ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3157
General Short. Yes, sir. They were placed to get the best coverage
possible with that number. Of course, there probably would have been
some movement of them as soon as we got our fixed stations into place.
We probably would [8512] have moved some of them then.
Mr. Gearhakt. I notice from the testimony that appeared in the
statement that I have just read from that the range of these portable
radar stations was 132 miles.
General Short. We thought the range was 75 to 100 miles. That
was the normal range. That was what the people on the mainland
thought. Apparently, our atmospheric conditions were more favor-
able, and we actually got 132 miles on the morning of December 7. I
understand that the expert radar people that came out from the main-
land later were appalled to think we could get any such distance.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, I heard some talk about two of the fixed sta-
tions already being in place on December 7. That was news to me. Is
that correct ?
General Short. That is not correct. I think on one station all of
the construction work was about 97 percent completed. That was over
on Haleakala. I am quite sure that the blueprints for the installation
of the radar antenna hadn't been received so they couldn't complete
that part of the work.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, the one that was 97 percent complete, was it
usable at ull^
[8513] General Short. No, sir ; because they couldn't set up the
antenna, because they didn't have the approved plan for putting in the
foundations and setting up the antenna.
Mr. Gearhart. What was to be the range of these permanent fixed
stations ?
General Short. It was a little uncertain. We thought with these
greater elevations that we would get between 150 and 200 miles.
Now, we had one at 10,000 feet. As a matter of fact, I believe that
they did later get almost the 200 miles from Haleakala, but for some
reason the expert radar people from Washington recommended that
it be discontinued on account of dead space. There apparently was
certain dead space. However, that was after my time, an(J I have no
personal knowledge of that.
Mr. Gearhart. When v\'as the material for the construction of the
fixed radar stations in Hawaii ?
General Short. Most of the material was in Hawaii previous to
December 7, and we were actually robbing those units for spare parts
to keep the others in operation?
Mr. Gearhart. To keep the portables in operation?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Gearhart. But the original contract for the [8514]
construction of the fixed radars was for their completion at a time prior
to December 7, was it not ?
General Short. I would hardly put it as a contract. I would say
the estimate of the time that they would be completed was put — we
were told that we would have the parts by June 30. I mean all of the
sets. We didn't get them. And we hoped to have all of the construc-
tion work done before they arrievd.
However, there were a number of things that held that up, and they
were not there.
3158 COXGRESSIOXAL IXVE5TIGATI0X PEARL H.AJ?B0R ATTACK
[Solol Mr. Gearhart. One of those things was the old question
of priority ?
General Short. Priorities and the difficulty of getting permission
from, taking 10 months to get permission from the Department of
Interior for the park system. Also the difficulty of getting construc-
tion materials. There were all kinds of difficulties.
Mr. Gearhart. Xow. the question of priority was determined in
Washington, was it not ?
General Short. Yes. sir.
Mr. Gearhart. The priorities which determined when you were
going to get material for the construction of your fixed radars was
determined in TVashington, you had nothing to do with that ?
General Short. Xo, sir. I did all I could do. We were working
under the same priority as military construction in the States, which
was A-lC. When I heard from the Division Engineer in San Fran-
cisco, about Jmie 10. that he did not believe we would get our material
by June 30. 1 sent a wire to the Adjutant General on the 10th of June
and requested that the priority be attached to A-lA, which was the
priority the Xavy had for the outlying bases. They came back and
they said they would advance it to A-lB. and that the chief engineer
would take care of the [Sold] rest of it.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, did they ?
General Short. They got there considerably later than June 30.
They got there, most of them, in August.
Mr. Gearhart. Then the construction work began?
General Short. The construction work had been going on where
it could before they were received. You see, we had to build roads
up steep moimtams to get up there and that had been going on for
some time before the sets were received.
^Ir. Gearhart. If you had been able to get a first priority for the
material and had been able to get promptly your permit to build this
fixed station in the national park fi\>m the Department of Interior,
you wotild have had your 200-mile radius radar on December 7,
would you not {
General Short. We probably would have had. Now, there was
an additional difficulty that I have not mentioned. Procuring first-
class expert workmen had become a terriffic problem in Hawaii.
They had taken everybody locally. The Xavy got started about a
year before the Army on construction. They were constructing bases
on Johnston Island. Palmyra, and one or two other places. They
had combed the local market. And apparently the market for labor
in the States was a good deal in the same sittiation. [8517]
They put in a request to the engineer in San Francisco for 3C0 work-
men and when they got there they would not be 300 of the type that
was expected but probably the best that could be had because good
labor was scarce all over. It was an added difficulty.
Mr. Gearhart. But with these interferences and delays incident
to priorities and permits to occupy the national-park area, you got
one of those permanent fixed stations 93 percent
General Short. 97 percent.
Mr. Gearhart. 97 percent completed?
General Short. That is my memory, but I think that is correct.
Mr. Gearhart. Xow, on the 28th day of November you alerted
against sabotage ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3159
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Geaehaet. How long did you remain alerted against sabotage ?
General Short. "We remained alerted against sabotage until the
time the attack struck and by 8 : 10 that morning I had ordered the
No. 3 alert, which was the alert against an all-out attack.
Mr. Geaehaet. There was no suspension of the alert against
sabotage between the day you ordered it and the day [85181 of
the attack?
General Short. No, sir.
Mr. Geaehaet. That is all.
Mr. ISluRPHY. Mr. Chairman, before you adjourn
The Chaieman. We will adjourn, but before we do so, inasmuch
as Mr. Tyler's name has been mentioned here, Lieutenant Tyler, who
I believe you say is now a colonel ?
General Shoet. I believe he is a lieutenant colonel. I don't know.
The Chairman. The newspapers carried several stories to the effect
of drawing some implication out of the promotion of Lieutenant Tyler
to a lieutenant colonelcy and keeping of Sergeant Lockhart in the
ranks where he was at the time, the inference being that Lietttenant
Tyler, who ignored this warning, that Lieutenant Tyler was pro-
moted, whereas Lockhart was not.
Do you know anything about that ?
[8619] General Short. Lockhart was a private.
The Chahimax. A private?
General Short. He was a private and he was promoted from a
private. I think he became a lieutenant ; so they were both promoted.
The Chairman. They were both promoted. So there was no justi-
fication in drawing a comparison as to what happened to the two of
them?
General Short. I don't think so. And, incidentally, I will say I
had nothing to do with the promotion of either one of them.
Mr. Geaehaet. In addition to that, Mr. Chairman, I think Lock-
hart was given a decoration at the end for his alertness.
General Short. I believe he was.
Senator Ferguson. In March of 1942.
The Chaie3Ian. That has been bandied about in public publica-
tions and I am glad to get it straightened out.
Mr. MuEPHT. Mr. Chairman, before we adjourn, the understanding
was that everything that was in this file about General Marshall had
been offered. ^
I have here a letter dated June 12, 1942, and then under it a memo-
randum of July 21, 1943 :
Took up this matter with General Marshall.
That is in regard to this court martial.
[8520] Took up this matter with General Marshall. He told me that he
would have to wait for Secretary Stimson's return for it was a matter for his
decision.
Now, Senator Ferguson was the one who requested this file.
Senator Feeguson. Senator Brewster.
Mr. MuRPHT. Senator Brewster, and I do not want to offer some-
thing that was brought to him as an exhibit, but I do want the record
to show that if Senator Brewster does not renew his offer of this file
3160 CONGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in the morning I will ask unanimous consent to have it go in the record
because I think it ought to be straightened out on the record.
The Chairman. Yes. that is the time to take action on it.
Senator Lucas. Let me ask one question of General Short on this
point before we suspend. You don't object if I ask another question,
General Short?
General Short. No, sir.
Senator Lucas. I was somewhat intrigued with the condition that
you placed in the waiver with respect to court martial. I was just
wondering what the custom is in the Arm}^ with respect to having
courts martial in o])en before the public.
General Short. The normal court martial is open but I think there
are some cases on record where the order for the court martial has
been — where they have directed sessions in [8S21] closed
quarters.
Senator Lucas, If I understand you correctly, then, either in time
of war or in time of peace the ordinary court martial is open to the
public ?
General Short. Wide open.
Senator Lucas. I was not sure on that. I was under the impression
it was just the other way.
General Short. Xo, sir; but I think — my attorney says by act of
Congress that it must be open.
Senator Lucas, It must be. Being a member of Congress I should
know that and I plead guilt}'. One other question.
The Chairman, Guilty of what ?
Senator Lucas. Of not knowing or anything that the committee
wants to find me guilty of, that is all right.
One other question — well, I will not ask you that. I will just with-
hold it. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. All right, the committee will recess until 10 o'clock
tomorrow.
(Whereupon, at 4: 15 p. m., January 25, 1946, an adjournment was
taken until 10 a. m., Saturday, January 26, 1946.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3161
[8sm PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SATURDAY, JANUARY 26, 1946
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Ina'estigation
OF the Pearl Harbor Attack,
'Washington^ D. C.
The joint committee met, pursuhnt to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in
the caucas room (room 318), Senate Ofiice Building, Senator Alben
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster,
and Ferguson, and Eepresentatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark,
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.
Also present : Seth W. Richardson, general counsel ; Samuel H.
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Hasten, Edward P. Mor-
gan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.
{8623'\ The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in
order.
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEIT. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES
ARMY (Retired)— Resumed
The Vice Chairman. Does counsel have anything at this time to
present before examination of the witness is resumed i
]\Ir. EiciiARDSON. No, sir.
The Vice Chairman. General Short, do you have anything you
want to present to the committee before your examination is resumed?
General Short. No, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire.
Senator Ferguson. General Short, you brought in the other day a
telegram dated December 5, 191:1, to the Panama Department. Had
3^ou seen the reply to the message of the 27th by General Andrews —
it is in exhibit 32.
General Short. I have it here. It is dated November 29, 1941.
Senator Ferguson. Now, it would appear that that was mailed air
mail and there was a telegram sent prior to that indicating he would
send the report by air mail.
General Short. Yes, sir.
[<§-5^4] Senator Ferguson. He says :
Reurad four six one Xovpmber twenty seven signed Marshall report requested
being forwarded air mail. CDC six eight seven.
Signed "Andrews."
Then we have the memorandum showing in detail just exactly what
he was doing.
79716— 46— pt. 7 17
3162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Now, apparently that was received prior to the 5th. And then Gen-
eral Miles sends this wire :
U. S.-Japanese relations strained. Will inform you if and when severance of
diplomatic relations imminent.
Did you take that wire as a modification of the message of the 27th
so that they really didn't want Andrews to be alerted to the full extent
that he had notified them ?
General Short. No, sir, I took it that he was given to understand
that he could expect additional and probably last-minute information
as to exactly what was taking place diplomatically.
Senator Ferguson. And that Miles' construction of the message of
the 27th was that diplomatic relations weren't as bad as the message
of the 27th indicated or that severence of diplomatic relations being
imminent that they would be notified of that ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
[SS£S] Senator Ferguson. Well, now, I note on this telegram
this language "send number five twelve" — that is apparently the num-
ber of the telegram — "twelve seven." In other words, it was drawn
up on the 5th. Severance of diplomatic relations was not imminent
at this time and it wasn't sent until the 7th. Sent on the very day —
even after we had the 14-part message ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. So that as far as General Miles was concerned
he didn't cA^en consider that tlie 1 o'clock and the 14-part message in-
dicated that a severance of diplomatic relations was imminent.
General Short. Is it possible that he failed to mark the message
"urgent" or "priority" and that it was held here in Washington for
2 days?
Senator Ferguson. That was going to be my next question. This
message is not marked "priority," the same as General Marshall's mes-
sage to you of the 7th, it wasn't marked priority.
General Short. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. So that it didn't receive the same attention that
a priority message would receive. Now, was it the understanding as
far as you were concerned that when messages were not marked "pri-
ority" that they were not [86^6] considered important mes-
sages ?
General Short. If the lines were not loaded, they would be sent
through, but if the lines were loaded all of the priority or urgent mes-
sages would be sent ahead of those not so marked.
Senator Ferguson. And if at the other end there was any trans-
lating or interpreting of codes the ones that were marked "priority"
would all go through first and these nonpriority messages would be
taken up after those?
General Short. That is correct.
[8S£7] Senator Ferguson. Is that the system ?
General Short. Yes, sir; that is correct.
Senator Ferguson. So that you account for this message to Panama
that while it was drawn on the 5th, they did not get it until the 7th
because it was not marked "Priority" and it is not marked "Priority."
I have gone over it carefully. It is a photostatic copy and I cannot
find where it was sent "Priority."
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3163
Do you want to look at it and see whether or not you can find any-
thing on it indicating "Priority" ? [Handing document to witness.]
General Short. I see nothing to indicate either "Priority" or
"Urgent."
Senator Ferguson. I have before me — and I received it from your
counsel when going over the papers that were put in yesterday morn-
ing on the question of priority of the message of General Marshall to
you.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And that it was not a priority message. I think
it is clear now from what was put in yesterday that it was not a
priority message but I think this should be in to make the record com-
plete. Do you have a copy of it before you ?
General Short. I think so.
[SS^S] Senator Ferguson. Would you read it into the record ?
General Short. You mean the message itself or the
Senator Ferguson. No.
General Short. The inquiry ?
Senator Ferguson. The inquiry.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What was told you or what was told one of your
officials when they made an inquiry.
General Short (reading) :
Paragraph 3 WAR L 54 1 extra urgent
Washington, D. C, 219 p. m., Decetnier 9, 19^1.
C G
Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, T. H.
Five four nine ninth please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our
number five two nine.
Senator Ferguson. That "529" was the Marshall message of the 7tli ?
General Short. Yes, sir [reading] :
Repeat five two nine December seven at Honolulu exact time deciphered mes-
sage transmitted by Signal Corps to staff and by what staff office received.
CoLTON, Acting.
Now, there is a pencilled note on that :
529 delivered to C/s.300 pm 7 Dec — receipted for by Capt. Trueman delivered
by Mr. Hough.
[85W] And then out to one side there is a notation that appar-
ently places it at "2 : 58 p. m.. Colonel Dundoy."
Senator Ferguson. Do you know what that ''2: 58 p. m." is?
General Short. I beg your pardon ?
Senator Ferguson. Do you know what that "2 : 58 p. m." is ?
General Short. I beg your pardon ?
Senator Ferguson. Do you know what this "2: 58 p. m." is?
General Short. I think what that means is that that was delivered
to Colonel Dunlop, the adjutant general, at 2 : 58 p. m. and he turned
it over to my aide, Captain Trueman, at 3 o'clock, 2 minutes later, be-
cause it would take about that length of time to walk from his office
to mine.
Senator Ferguson. Do you have this memo before you ?
General Short. Yes.
3164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson, Did you ask someone there to get this informa-
tion for you so that you could wire it back to the War Department?
General Short. I probably did not personally but unquestionably
a member of my staff did.
Senator Ferguson. And this is a memorandum ?
General Short. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Would you read that into the record ?
General Short (reading) :
Radio War Department 529 Received. Filed at Washington, D. C. 12 : 18 PM
Washington time (or 6: 48 A. Haw. time) (as RCA 1549 WS),
I think it is.
[8530] Received by RCA at Honolulu 7:33 A. M. Delivered to Signal
Office at 11 : 45 A. M. Not marked priority. Other pirority messages handled
first. Delivered to decoding officer 2 : 40 P. M. Decoded and delivered to Col.
Dunlop 2 : 50 P. M. Delivered to Capt. Trueman in office of Chief of Staff HHD
at 3 : 00 P. M.
And then this was the message, using that information, that was
sent to the War Department :
Re your five four nine. Radio five two nine delivered Honolulu via RCA seven
thirty thi'ee morning of seventh received Signal Office Fort Shafter eleven forty
five morning (this time approximate but within five minutes) seventh Stop
Deciphered message received by Adjutant General Hq. Haw Dept two fifty eight
afternoon seventh (Received by Chief of Staff Hq Haw Dept three o'clock after-
noon seventh All Hawaiian).
Short.
That "All Hawaiian" indicates all Hawaiian time.
Senator Ferguson. Now, all of the other messages that j^ou read,
the foundation for the message that you sent, "Not marked priority,
other priority messages handled first," do you know what they were!^
General Short. No, sir ; I do not. There may have been a consider-
able number.
[8S31} Senator Ferguson. Would counsel look in and see
whether they can find out -what messages were sent in there that same
day 'i
Mr. Masten. I did not hear that. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. On the same day there is a memorandum here
on the 7tli that this message was not marked priority, "other priority
messages handled first." Would you try and ascertain what those
other priority messages were on the 7tli going into Hawaii that were
translated first?
Mr. Masten. Yes.^
Senator Ferguson. Then I take these messages to indicate this, that
on the 9th of December, that is the Tuesday following the disaster,
the War De})artment here undertook to investigate at least to the
extent of ascertaining when you had received their message of the
Tth. Is that correct ?
General Short. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know anything about the General
Buiidy mission that was coming out to Hawaii to investigate as to
the disaster ?
General Short. Not for 2 or 3 years afterward, I think.
Senator Ferguson. Well, was there any mission that came out for
the War Department other than the Roberts commission?
'See Hearings, Part 11 pp. 5296-5297.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE . 3165
General Short. No, sir. Secretary Knox came out ahead [S53£'\
of the Roberts commission.
Senator Ferguson. I understand that he went more into the details
of the Navy than he did of the War Department.
General Short. He went completely through my field headquarters
and spent, I would say, probably 2 hours, in which we had officers
detailed from every section to explain everything that had happened.
He got a very complete picture not only of our headquarters but how
we were functioning and exactly what happened, and at the end of
the time he was so impressed with our headquarters that he directed
the Navy to make arrangements to move over into an underground
headquarters right alongside of us.
Senator Ferguson. Well, did he indicate in any way that he was
not satisfied with what you had done ?
General Short. He did not.
Senator Ferguson. Now. I may be repeating on this; I do not want
to repeat but I want to try and find out whether or not you were pres-
ent when Colonel Knox, Secretary of the Navy, said something to
Admiral Kimmel about a message being sent on the 6th, the afternoon
or the evening of the 6th ?
General Short. I do not remember it. I talked with Colonel Knox
at Admiral Kimmcl's headquarters soon after he arrived, but I do
not remember the conversation. It may have taken place.
[85SS] Senator Ferguson. Well, did he mention in any way to
you a message being sent on the 6th, a warning message ?
General Short. I do not remember that. I think that in some way
that we must have misunderstood each other as to the time, because I
explained to him about the Chief of Staff's message on the Yth and it
was the only message I received, and I think that there must have been
a misunderstanding somewhere between us.
Senator Ferguson. Now, on the message of the 27th, were you fa-
miliar with exhibit 45? I wish you would look at exh'bit 45. Does
counsel have exhibit 45 there ?
Mr. IVIasten. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Pass it to General Short, please.
Mr. Masten. All right [handing document to witness].
Senator Ferguson. That is an explanation or partial explanation
as to the message of the 27th [reading] :
The Secretary of War sent for me about 9 : 30 A. M." —
This is a memorandum for the Chief of Staff.
General Bryden was present. The Secretary wanted to know what warning
messages have been sent to General MacArthur and what were proposed.
Now, you will note there that there was nothing said about Hawaii.
It is only what had been sent to General MacArthur and what was
proposed.
[8534] I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent No-
vember 24. I then showed him a copy of the draft message you discussed at the
Joint Board meeting. He told me he had telephoned both Mr. Hull and the
President this morning. Mr. Hull stated the conversations had been terminated
with the barest possibility of resumption. The President wanted a warning mes-
sage sent to the Philippines.
5166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
And you will note there that nothmg is said about the President
wanting a message sent to you. Then going on and reading :
I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cable-
gram.
Now, when did you first learn about that exhibit ?
General Short. I think that I learned the substance of that exhibit
when I read the testimony of Secretary Stimson and General Gerow
before the Army Pearl Harbor Board in 1944. I do not know whether
I had actually seen the memorandum but I did learn the substance.
Senator Ferguson. Now I would like to go to several answers in
the top secret. Admiral Ingersoll on page 423 of the Hart record.
Now, you were asked and others were asked about that preparatory
deployment. Here is question No. 38 :
Admiral, do you recall what the CNO meant by its [8535] directive to
make a preparatory deployment as contained in this dispatch of October the
16th?
That is the first they used that "preparatory deployment", in that
message also. Now, here is what he answers :
I think the preparatory deployment that would not constitute provocative
action or disclose strategic intentions against Japan referred more to the with-
drawal of certain units of the Asiatic Fleet from the China Sea area toward
the Southern Philippines rather than any particular deployment of the Pacific
Fleet, with the possible exception of sending out submarines for observation.
It will be noted that the dispatch is addressed to both the Commander in Chief
Pacific Fleet and Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet. I wish to state here in
connection with this dispatch and others which followed that they were released
by me. In all cases such dispatches were drafted in the War Plans Division
and were presented to Admiral Stark for consideration before being sent. In
many cases I am quite certain that he may have notified both the State Depart-
ment and the President of his intention to send dispatches of this character.
The fact that it bears my release simply means that after the original draft
was presented ai.d corrected by Admiral Stark, in order to save time and not
to bother him further [8536] I released these dispatches in the form which
he had approved.
Now,on page 426, questions Nos. 49 and 50. Let me read both of
them.
Question : In drafting the dispatch of the 27th of November was consideration
given to the thought that mention of western Pacific objectives only might tend
to reduce the vigilance of the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area?
Answer: I am sure that the drafting of the dispatch was not meant to give
such an Impression. The impression it was intended to give was that the events
were moving in such a fashion in the Far East that the United States would be-
come involved in war in a few days and consequently that the United States
forces elsewhere in the Pacific and also in the Atlantic would find themselves at
war with the Axis when the clash actually took place in the Asiatic waters.
Question No. 50 : What action on the part of the Commander in Chief, Pacific
Fleet was expected incident to the directive concerning a deployment as given
in the dispatch of the 27th of November?
Again —
This is his answer —
Again this dispatch is dispatched both to the Commander in Chief of
[8537] the Asiatic Fleet and the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. The
deployment referred more to the movements which were contemplated in the
Asiatic Fleet regarding withdrawal of forces from the Manila Bay area for
operations contemplated elsewhere and the movements in the Hawaiian area
were those regarding observations, the establishment of a patrol and the re-
inforcement of outlying positions in our own islands. It will be remembered
that an early dispatch in October had warned both Commanders in Chief
against taking action which would provoke war.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3167
Now, did you ever hear of that testimony or that interpretation of
this word "deployment" in these messages ?
General Short. I know at the time that it did not strike me that it
was intended to be only the Asiatic Fleet. I do not believe I have had
access to the Hart report ; at least I do not remember those particular
passages. I would like to ask my counsel if we have ever had a copy of
the Hart report ?
Captain Ford. No ; we have not.
General Short. We have never had a copy of the Hart report.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, you have never seen the Hart
report?
General Short. That is correct.
185SS] Senator Ferguson. Even to the time you are testifying
here?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, is this the kind of difficulty we find in mes-
sages that are given to two or more outposts where certain words are
intended for one outpost and not for another ?
General Short. Unquestionably in this case it was of great difficulty
because it never occurred to me when I read those two messages that
they applied just to the Asiatic Fleet. I think they directly applied
to Admiral Kimmel.
Senator Ferguson. But the man who drafted the messages or sent
them out gives this interpretation, that they were intended more for
the Asiatic Fleet because they had certain missions which were out-
lined in the war plans. Now, were you familiar with the War Plan
No. WPL46?
General Short. I knew in general terms what it provided for. It
was an offensive into the mandated islands.
[85391 Senator Ferguson. Well, now. General, in this message
it said that you were not to commit an overt act against Japan.
General Short. What is that ?
Senator Ferguson. You were not to commit the first overt act
against Japan.
I want to ask you how, as the head of the Army in Hawaii, it was
possible for you to commit an overt act of war against Japan?
General Short. Only by sending out my long-range bombers, which
would have been acting under the orders of the Navy, not under my
own orders.
Senator Ferguson. Then do I understand there was only one way in
which you could have committed an overt act against Japan, and that
would have been to send out the long-range bomber and that bomber
had done something in relation to a ship or submarine, or something
of Japan ?
General Short. I might add, something that I might have done to a
Japanese national that the Japanese might have construed it that way..
They were apparently looking for excuses. For instance, if I had
arrested one of the consular agents that we knew the names of, they
might have considered that an overt act. It would have been possible
for me to do that.
[8S4O] Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, the Navy did not.
get this message and they were in a position to commit many overt
acts?
3168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. How do you account for that ?
General Short. I cannot account for it.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think that the arrest by the military
police of one of the consular agents would have been an overt act in
war?
General Short. I do not, but I do not know what the Japs might
have tried to make it appear, or how they might have tried to make it
appear.
Senator Ferguson. Well, how did you read the overt act part of your
message ? What did it mean to you ?
General Short. It meant to me simply that the War Department was
extremely anxious to avoid war, and they did not want any interna-
tional incident to happen in Hawaii that might provoke war or might
give the Japanese an opportunity to claim that we had started the war.
Senator Ferguson. Now, let us look at it this way. We had put the
fleet in Hawaii in order that we might show Japan our strength, and
we were backing up our diplomacy by the fleet being out there.
Now, why would the exhibition of a strong army in [86.^.1]
Hawaii have a greater tendency to prevent war than by showing we
were weak and afraid and we were not doing anything?
General Short. It would look like it would be a similar action that
they were using to impress Japan.
Senator Ferguson. With the Navy ?
General Short. A strong army would have been the same means of
impressing the Japanese.
Senator Ferguson. But in one case, we put the Navy in there as a
symbol of strength, and in the other case, in your case, we tried to
conceal the fact that you had a strong army and you were ready for
anything that might happen.
General Short. That would be true.
Senator Ferguson. Now, would it have been possible, in your opin-
ion as an expert — laying aside this question of the firet overt act as far
as the Army was concerned, that if we had a full mobilization of the
Army — some 40,000 was it in Hawaii ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. If we had shown a full mobilization of that
army, if we had shown that we were on the alert for everything that
might come that we would have never had an attack at Pearl Harbor?
[864^] General Short. I think it quite probable that if that had
been reported to the Japanese, they would have turned back the attack-
ing force.
Senator Ferguson. That would have meant that we would have had
no attack at Pearl Harbor?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. These two phrases, one, don't commit the first
overt act, and the other one, don't do anything — what is the language
in the message of the 27th ?
General Short. Alarm the public or disclose intent.
Senator Ferguson. Now, if you had not had those, and you were
fully alerted, where the soldiers were wearing regalia, full arms, your
machine guns were manned, your radar was working 24 hours a day,
then you would come to the conclusion, would you not that in your
opinion as an Army General, they would have turned back ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3169
General Short. There would have been a very excellent chance that
they would have turned back. That would have been the tendency,
because they would have felt, or they would be sure that they would
take heavy losses. Surprise was the only opportunity that they had
to succeed.
Senator Ferguson. Now, in your prepared statement, you use this
language, on page 60, paragraph 98 :
I do not feel that I have been treated fairly, or [8543] with justice by
the War Department. I was singled out as an example, as the scapegoat for
the disaster.
Now, you are covering very broad ground when you use the word
"War Department." I wish you would be specific and tell me whom
you had in mind was the War Department ?
General Short. I had in mind the General Staff in particular, be-
cause they were primarily responsible for the policies pursued by the
War Department.
Senator Ferguson. And the General Staff was headed by whom?
General Short. General Marshall.
Senator Ferguson. And who else would be in there? I would like
for you to be specific instead of covering the whole ground.
General Short. General Gerow as head of the War Plans Division
had the direct responsibility for keeping me informed. General Miles,
the head of G-2, had a very direct responsibility.
[8544-] Senator Ferguson, What about the Secretary of War?
Is he included in the words there "War Department"?
General Short. As far as technical things went, I would not have
expected him to be as fully aware of the significance of technical
things. I would expect him to be fully aware of any policy.
Senator Ferguson. So as far as the policy was concerned, he
would be included in that?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now when you use the word "scapegoat", will
you give us the meaning that you want to convey to us in that
word ?
General Short. It seems to me that may be a slang expression,
but it is a word in very common usage, and I meant just exactly
what the common usage meant, that it was someone that they saddled
the blame on to get it off of themselves.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, they were in this position,
in your opinion, and that is what you wanted to convey, that someone
had to take some blame for what happened at Pearl Harbor, that
certain people in AVashington that you had named in your opinion
were to blame, that they shifted that blame over to you as the
commanding general at Hawaii and therefore made you, in the
common language, a [854S'\ scapegoat?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Is that what you want to convey to this
committee ?
General Short. That is exactly what I want to convey.
Senator Ferguson. Now yesterday you read to us some letters
about your retirement, and you read part of General Marshall's
testimony where I had examined him. Wliat is it that you wanted
to convey by the reading of General Marshall's testimony? Were
3170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
j'ou of the opinion that it was in conflict with what you were about
to read from the messages?
General Short. I thought liis testimony conveyed the idea that
the matter of my retirement had been handled entirely by the Secre-
titry of AVar and that he had had notliing to do with it, in fact he
was not cognizant of what was being done, and the correspondence
I had did not agree with that.
Senator Ferguson. Therefore you were of the opinion that his
testimony was not in line with what the letters showed that you
vrere about to put in? Is that what you wanted to convey to the
■connnittee ?
General Short. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Did you consider, in a way, that your retire-
ment request was a conditional one, that is that [8^46] you
would be consulted later by General Marshall before it would be
turned in?
General Short. When I sent that to General Marshall I had very
great confidence in both his judgment and his loyalty to me. I felt
that he would use it only if his best judgment indicated that he
should use it, but I did expect — not necessarily before he used it if
there was not time, but he would communicate with me before he used
it, or he would communicate with me immediately afterward and
explain why it was necessary to use it. I had given him full authority
to use it.
Senator Ferguson. It would indicate, from the fact that you had
talked to him at 1 o'clock on the 25th, that is Sunday, when the
Roberts report came out, and it was used on the 26th, that he would
not have had time to read all of the testimony in the Roberts report
to find out the facts, would he?
General Short. He would have had time, of course, to read all of
the findings published in the newspaper, but he would not have had
time to read all of the testimony.
Senator Ferguson. When you use a report, as a rule, you want to
know on what facts it is based, do you not?
General Short. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Wlien those facts are in existence?
[854'/] General Short. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted b}'^ Justice Roberts as to
whether or not you had magic? You know what I mean by "magic,"
the intercepted codes, either the codes themselves or the means of
getting the codes?
General Short. You mean the intercepts ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
General Short. I do not think that at any place any inquiry was
made of me as to whether I had received them. I am rather sure no
inquiry was made. I think they understood that I had not.
Senator Ferguson. Well, at least you were not asked the specific
questions as to whether or not you had or did not have magic?
General Short. I am sure that is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the Roberts report is
TDased upon the fact that you and Admiral Kimmel did have magic
:and had the means of getting the magic?
General Short. I have seen no testimony from the War Depart-
anent that indicated that they were told that I did have magic. I
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3171
believe that there has been testimony here that the Roberts Board
was informed by someone in the Navy Department
Senator Fekguson. By Turner and Stark?
[8S48] General Short. Yes, sir ; that Admiral Kimmel did have
magic.
Senator Ferguson. And that would have meant if Kimmel had it
you would have it?
General Short. If he had been told to give it to me.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. General, do have a clipping as to what
appeared in the press about your retirement?
General Short. I do. I have one here that I do not know whether
it actually appeared, but I have a statement by the Secretary of War
that was mimeographed, and it is presumed that it appeared in the
press. My memory is not definite now to say whether it actually
appeared.
Senator Ferguson. By the way, where did you get the copy?
General Short. Colonel Dumcombe gave it to me this morning.
Senator Ferguson. At least it was in the War Department?
General Short. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. You received it when?
General Short. This morning.
Senator Ferguson. Will you read it?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. It was in the War Department file ?
General Short. Yes, sir. [Reading:]
18549] Was Depaktment
bukeau of pubuc relations
Press Branch
Tel.— Re 6700 Brs. 3425 and 3438
February 28, 1942.
Imediate release
Retirement of Generai, Short Appro\^d
The Secretary of War announced today the acceptance, effective February 28,
1942, of the application for retirement of Major General Walter C. Short "with-
out condonation of any offense or prejudice to any future disciplinary action."
The Secretary of War announced at the same time that, based upon the find-
ings of the report of the Roberts Commission, he had directed the preparation
of charges for the trial by court-martial of General Short, alleging dei-ellction
of duty. The Secretary of War made it clear, however, that the trial upon
these charges would not be held until such time as the public interest and safety
would permit.
[End]
Distribution : A, D, M, N.
1 ; 00 P. M.
Senator Ferguson. I understand then from that that [8550]
the Secretary of War indicated that upon the basis of the Roberts
report you would be court-martialed at some time ?
General Short. He at least stated that he had directed this to be
drawn.
Senator Ferguson. That is right. That would be the same as if you
would be court-martialed ?
3172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now did you ever do anything in any way to
prevent that court-martial, the cliarges being filed?
General Short. I did not. In fact, I signed a waiver that I would
agree to a court-martial within 6 months after the termination of
hostilities.
[85S1] Senator Ferguson. Now, who came to you about that
waiver ?
General Short. General Woodruff, retired, was sent from the War
Department to Dallas, to see me.
Senator Ferguson. What was the conversation about the waiver?
About when was it ?
General Short. I have forgotten the date. I believe it was some-
time before December 7, 1943, because they wanted the waiver before
the time was up. Perhaps along in September or October of 1943.
He explained to me that Admiral Kimmel had signed such a waiver
and gave me the letter of the Secretary of War requesting me to sign
the waiver, and also a copy of the correspondence that Admiral Kim-
mel had had with the Secretary of the Navy.
Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, they had used your request
for retirement in getting Admiral KimmeTs request for retirement.
Now, do I understand that they used what Admiral Kimmel had
done to waive the statute of limitations when they came to you?
General Short. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Did they explain that Admiral Kimmel had
waived the statute of limitations?
[8552] General Short. They furnished me with a copy of his
letter and a copy of the waiver signed by him.
Senator Ferguson. Did they ask you to sign such a waiver?
General Shokt. Yes, sir : by the Secretary of War in a written letter
delivered by General Woodruff.
Senator Ferguson. Do you happen to have that written letter?
General Short. I have it. I think we have it here probably. The
■waiver and letter were both read into the record yesterday, on page
8495. Do you wish to have it?
Senator Ferguson. No, no; just let it go.
General Short. The date of that letter was the 18th of September
1943.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know whether or not any depart-
ment of the Government ever made any request of Congress to pass a
statute extending the statute of limitations?
General Short. I do not.
Senator Ferguson. But you were requested by the Secretary of
War to sign a waiver of the statute of limitations, and you did so ?
General Short. Yes. sir.
Senator Ferguson. Nov;, have you ever made any direct [8553']
request for a courts martial trial?
General Short. I have not.
Senator Ferguson. And you have done nothing, as I understand it,
to prevent such a trial ?
General Short. I have not.
Senator Ferguson. You are prepared, then, to defend any trial that
the Government may start? Is that the way it stands?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3173
General Short. That is the way it stands.
Senator Ferguson. A trial that the Government may start?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you consider that this is a fair hearing for
you?
General Short. I consider that this hearing has been extremely fair,
very thorough, and that I have been accorded very great courtesy
by the chairman and by every member of the committee.
Senator Ferguson. Now, 1 want to go to another subject.
On October IT, 1941, George W. Bicknell, lieutenant colonel, G. S. C,
assistant A. C. of S.. G-2, contact officer — he was in your department?
General Short. Yes, sir.
[8664] Senator Ferguson. He was what?
General Short. He was one of my intelligence officers. He was the
assistant to the G-2, Colonel Fielder.
Senator Ferguson. Now were you familiar with what he drew
up? It is here in evidence as exhibit 139, dated the 17th of October
1941. Will you look at that and tell us when you first saw that?
General Short. I probably saw that the day it was prepared, or
maybe the day after it was prepared.
Senator Ferguson. Now, I will take you to paragraph 3, on page
3, and ask you to read that. It is headed "Attack on British Pos-
session in the Far East."
General Short. You want me to read from there on ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, I want you to read from there on to the
bottom of the page.
General Short (reading) :
3. Attack British Possessions in the Far Eiist.
4. Defend against an American attack in support of the British.
5. Attack simultaneously —
Senator Ferguson. No, no, I guess you did not understand my
question. I mean on page 3, the paragraph numbered 3, "Attack
on British Possessions in the Far East." Then I would like to have
you read from there down to the bottom [8o5o} of the page.
General Short. I was on page 2. lameorry.
Following the principle of defeating one opponent at a time — famous with
her Axis partner, Hitler — it is believed that Japan, if faced with certain
British military resistance to her plans, will unhesitatingly attack the British ;
and do so without a simultaneous attack on American possessions, because of
mo known binding agreement between the British and Americans for joint
military action against Japan, and that the American public is not yet fully
prepared to support such action. However, it must be evident to the Japanese
that in case of such an attack on the British, they would most certainly have
to fight the United States within a relatively short time.
You vrant me to read on from there?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
General Short (reading) :
While a simulaneous attack on the ABCD powers would violate the principle
mentioned above, it cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if
Japan considers war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of
her actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to
strike before our Naval [8556] program is completed.
An attack on the United States could nut be undertaken without almost
certain involvement of the entire ABCD block. Hence there remains the pos-
sibility that Japan may strike at the most opportune time, and at whatever
3174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
point might gain for her the most strategic, tactical, or economical advantages
over her opponents.
Senator Ferguson. All right.
Now, General, prior to that, what was your information in relation
to any agreement we may have had, whether legally binding or not,
with the Brit'sh and Dutch?
General Suck r. I had no information whatever about an agreement
between the British and Dutch.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have any information about any under-
standing that we had with them?
General Short. I did not.
Senator Ferguson. You notice that your G-2 officer uses this lan-
guage :
it is believed that Japan, if faced with certain British military resistance to
her plans, will unhesitatingly attack the British, and do so without a simul-
taneous attack on American possessions, because of no known binding agreement
between the British and Americans for joint military action against Japan,
and that tlie American public is not [8557] yet fully prepared to support
such action.
Now, he uses the language "no known binding agreement." What
do you understand by "binding agreement" ? Do you mean by treaty ?
General Short. To be binding, it should be approved by the Con-
gress, as I understand it.
Senator Ferguson. Is that what he was talking about there? He
was telling you that we had no treaty, we had no agreement that was
approved by Congress?
General Short. It is difficult to say. He might have meant simply
any agreement that had been made and approved by the President,
and not made public, something that the President expected to set
forth in the Senate. I do not know.
Senator Ferguson. What was your understanding about that part
of it that "the American public is not yet fully prepared to support
such action"?
General Short. I felt at that time that the American public would
not have been willing to have an agreement ratified that we would
go to war to defend the Netlierlands East Indies or Singapore.
Senator Ferguson. Now, were you familiar at that time with the
message from Tokyo to Berlin, where we openly intercepted — I will
not put it that way. We can [8558] only locate, in the War
Department, two parts of three parts of a message sent from Tokyo
to Berlin on this question.
General Short. I was not familiar with it.
Senator Ferguson. You had no knowledge as to that?
General Short. None whatever.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that we had met with the British
and Dutch and had talked over this question?
General Short. I did not.
Senator Ferguson. You had no knowlede at all on that?
General Short. No knowledge whatever.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that this plan, which we now
have in evidence, this WPL-46, talked about certain agreements?
Whether or not they were binding agreements is another question;
but at least talked about it.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3175
General Short, I knew when we received Kainbow 5 at the
same time that it was drawn up with the idea apparently that when
it went into effect we would be allied with Britain and the Dutch, but
I had had no basis for the writing^ of that plan.
[8S59] Senator Ferguson. Did you know that we had received
word from the British on the morning of the Cth, sent to the State
Department, that the Japanese ships were going into the Kra Penin-
sula ?
General Short. I did not.
Senator Ferguson. Would that have meant anything to you, what
you knew about our understanding?
General Short. It meant certainly war against the British.
Senator P'^erguson. Have you ever tried to find out personally what
it would mean if Japa.n and Britain would go to war with no attack
on America ?
General Short. No, sir ; I have not asked the War Department.
Senator Ferguson. You heard Admiral Kimmel testify here, did
you?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And you have read his testimony ?
General Short. I did not hear him ; I read his testimony.
Senator Ferguson. You read his testimony ?
General Short. I read his testimony.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know, prior to the time that you read
his testimony, that there was certain correspondence by Admiral Kim-
mel on this question of attack on the British [8560] and Dutch
alone ?
General Short. I did not.
Senator Ferguson. The exhibit that I have just referred to, the
WPL-46, is exhibit No. 12'9, so that the record will show it.
Now have you gone over this war plar) ?
General Short. I think I had gone over it some time ago. Not the
WPD-46, but the Rainbow 5, which would have the same provisions,
probably, in regard to fighting with the Allies.
Senator Ferguson. That is true. This is the "Navy Basic War
Plan — Rainbow No. 5."
INTEODUCTION
CHAPTKB I. ORIGIN, BASIS, AND SCOPE OF THIS PLAN
This Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5, was prepared under the direction
of the Chief of Naval Operations.
It is based upon the report of the United States-British Staff Conversations
(Short Title ABC-1), the Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan (Short Title
ABC-22), and the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5.
The United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC-1) and the Joint Canada-
United States Defense Plan (ABC-22) will be given only a limited distribution to
holders of this plan.
Now, you did not know anything about these negotiations?
[8561'] ' General Short. I, knew nothing about the negotiations,
but I think I had a copy of the plan, about what you have read there,
a short time before the attack. That was a modification of our exist-
ing war plans, and I think we received that.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know when Singapore was alerted?
3176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. I do not exactly. I think probably a short time
before December 7, maybe a week or 10 days before, but it would be
just guess work.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the Dutch, on December 1,
sent this dispatch by the Netherlands Minister, Dr. A. Loudon, to
Mr. Horn beck —
The Netherlands Minister informed me by telephone this morning that the
Governor of the Netherlands East Indies had ordered a comprehensive mobiliza-
tion of his armed forces?
General Short. I did not.
Senator Ferguson. You did not know that ?
General Short. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now under the knowledge that you had would
that have meant anything to you ?
General Short. With the information that I had had from the War
Department always pointing to an attack to the Southwest Pacific,
and including the Netherlands East Indies, I would have thought that
was what was going to take place.
[8S6'2] Senator Ferguson. Would that have meant anything to
you ?
General Short. It would have meant that they considered war very
inmiinent out there naturally.
Senator Ferguson. Would it have meant that war was imminent on
the Hawaiian Islands ?
General SnoitT. Not necessarily, because there had never been an
estimate since June 17, 1940, of an attack on Hawaii. It would have
meant possible hostilities on Hawaii, but not necessarily an attack.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the President had delivered
to Japan, on August 17, a message in relation to the entire Pacific?
General Short. I did not.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have the copy or copies of information
from any diplomatic notes between Japan and the United States?
General Short. I did not.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, if they had brought to your atten-
tion the alerting of Singapore, the fact that the Singapore troops were
alerted, what would that have meant to you?
General Short. With the information I had from the War De-
partment it was just a confirmation that the Japanese action was going
to come in that part of the world and not [85631 ii^ Hawaii.
Senator Ferguson. So it meant just the opposite to you than an
alert in Hawaii? It indicated to you that there was going to be war
many thousands of miles way from you with another countr}^?
General Short, That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Is that what the information meant to you?
General Short. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Now I am not clear on the radar. I would like
to get some information about it.
There isn't any doubt that the radar machine will catch a plane
going out as well as coming in ?
General Short. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. And there isn't any doubt that early on that
morning, about 7 o'clock, our radar machine saw planes 182 miles, I
believe it was, 130 or 132 miles, coming in from the north, and that
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3177
those very planes bombed American fortifications and smik our ships?
Is there any doubt about that ?
General Short. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And as shown by the map, that same radar ma-
chine, or other radar machines saw the planes going out in the same
direction, is there any doubt about that? This [Sod^-] map
shows them coming in from the north one hundred and thirty-some
miles, and we had contact with them going out, one hundred and
thirty-some miles out even further north. At 7 : 02 we catch them first
going out.
General Short. Major Berquist, who was the chief control officer,
stated that there was so much confusion — I suppose he meant because
they were going in ever}^ direction — that he was not able to draw any
logical conclusion from what he had.
Senator Ferguson. There wasn't any confusion about the fact that
they were coming in at that distance ?
General Short, Absolutely, because that is a definite direction.
Senator Ferguson. How do you account for the fact that the ships
in these task forces were notified to go south and look for them, when
our only information was that they came from the north, and they
even had the degree, or the line on ayIucIi they had come, and we saw
them coming in at 132 miles and we saw some of them, at least, going
out the same way, so why did we go to the south to look for them?
General Short. Lieutenant Tyler states he did not make a report on
that until some days later, when he reported to General Davidson the
coming in. I personally did not hear that day that the Opana Station
had picked them up. [SS6S] It seems when Major Tindall came
back, when they re-manned the station about 8 : 30, that they took off
all of the old information on the board in the information center. So
apparently Lieutenant Tyler was not experienced enough to have this
mean anything, and it not having been reported to Major Tindall when
the station opened he did not know it, and the result was that it was
not reported.
Senator Ferguson. But, as I understand it, it was brought out defi-
nitely yesterday that Lieutenant Tyler has been promoted at least
twice.
General Short. Yes, sir.
[SS66] Senator Ferguson. There was no disciplinary action
against him for not reporting this matter?
General Short. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. And that may have meant the difference be-
tween bombing and not bombing this Jap Fleet ?
General Short. I think unquestionably if the Navy had had that
information, they would have tried to locate the carriers.
Now, there is one other thing I did not mention. I believe that they
picked up radio information, an intercept that indicated a Japanese
ship sending radio messages from the southwest. Now, that may
have been a small ship that was sent out there purposely by the Jap-
anese, and I think that that influenced the Navy to send to the south-
west first.
Senator Ferguson. That was not as definite information, was it?
General Short. No, sir.
Sanator Ferguson. As that the ships had come in from the north
and had gone out to the north?
79716—46 — pt. 7 18
3178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. No, sir; but they did not have that and I did not
have it.
Senator Ferguson. I take it from your testimony, you knew noth-
ing about them coming in from the north on the day [8567] of
the 7th?
General Short. Beg pardon?
Senator Ferguson. On the day of the 7th you had no knowledge of
these planes coming in from the north ?
General Short. That is correct. I did know that our flying fort-
resses from California came in from the north. I knew that definitely.
Senator Ferguson. Do I understand now that you had no informa-
tion on the 7th about the radar chart showing planes coming in from
the north ?
General Short. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson, Anyone could see these planes coming in at
various times from the north, could they not?
General Short. They came in from every direction, Senator. They
had different tasks assigned them. Some came in from the east of the
island to actually make the attack, and others came in from the west,
so apparently they had diverted from their original direction so as to
approach certain targets in certain ways.
Senator Ferguson. I would assume that after they got near the
island they would take a position so they could approach a target from
ascertain direction.
General Short. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. But prior to that did not everything [8568]
indicate that they were coming from the north?
General Short. All we had was what Lif utenant Tyler knew. If
he had reported, it would have been a definite indication, but we did
not have it at that time.
[8569] Senator Ferguson. General, how can you account for tlie
fact that there was no disciplinary action against an Army officer for
not reporting a thing like that that was so vital to America's defense?
General Short. There was no device at that time b}^ which he could
differentiate between friend and foe.
Senator Ferguson. But it turned out in a few minutes that everyone
on tlie island knew that these ships were foe.
General Short. But coming in about 3° difference in direction,
and 5 minutes difference in time. He just made a false assumption
that the ships picked up were the American planes.
Senator Ferguson. There isn't any evidence in the record that Tyler
knew that the B-l7's were coming in, other than that the music played
all night on the Hawaiian radio, and therefore he assumed that our
planes must be coming in on that beam.
General Short. You see, they had no beam at that time, and I think
it was common knowledge with the air people that that music was
used as a beam to guide our planes in.
Senator Fergt^son. Were our planes all equipped with radio?
[8570] General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Then why couldn't our radio stations contact
the planes and ask them whether they were enemy or friend?
General Short. If the report had been made by Lieutenant Tyler,
it could have been done.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3179
Senator Ferguson. I come back-
General Short. Even if they had gotten the report, they might have
been misled because they were so close to the same position at the same
time.
Senator Ferguson. Couldn't we have asked the B-l7's "Are you
friend or foe?" Didn't we have any codes at that time?
General Short. We could have asked them ; yes.
Senator Ferguson. Did we ask them ?
General Short. We did not.
Senator Ferguson. How do you account for that? I realize you
personally were not in charge of it, but I am trying to find out why
there wasn't some discipline as far as men down in the ranks were
concerned in relation to these fatal errors. I consider that you con-
sidered them fatal.
General Short. Apparently Lieutenant Tyler felt so sure they were
friendly planes, that he made no inquiry.
[857 1] Senator Ferguson. But within a few minutes after he
gets this message, raining down on the American possessions and our
men were bombs from an enemy. How could this same man then keep
the conclusion in his mind that they were friends?
General Short. I don't think he did.
Senator Ferguson. Then why couldn't he at that moment, at the
dropping of the first bomb, even, if nebessary, by foot, give the alarm
and tell where these planes were coming from so that we could go out
and get the carriers, so at least they would never do it again ?
General Short. He did alert the command, but he ^ave nobody the
information he had as to what direction they were coming.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, he alerted the command, enemy
planes came in, and he never even told them what direction the planes
were coming from ?
General Short. Apparently not.
Senator Ferguson. And that man was promoted ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did anybody ask him from what direction they
were coming ? Didn't somebody think to ask him ? I realize you were
taken away from there about the 16th.
[8572'] General Short. What I did as soon as I heard it was
this — it was too late to accomplish anything, but as soon as I heard of
the incident, I sent an officer to take affidavits of Lieutenant Tyler and
Lieutenant White, and I believe they got one from the operator. Private
McDonald.
Senator Ferguson. General, did you laiow that we even went out
and bombed one of Admiral Newton's ships, one of the ships of his
fleet?
General Short. I didn't know that we ever actually bombed one. I
knew at one time that we had mistaken information, but fortunately
our pilots recognized the ship as an American ship and did not bomb it.
1 never heard that we actually bombed a ship.
Senator Ferguson. If you will bear with me a moment
Mr. Murphy. You will find something on it. Senator, in the naval
narrative. I don't have the page, but it is in the naval narrative.
Mr. Masten, do you have volume 2 of the navy narrative here?
Mr. Masi-en. Yes.
3180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Here it is. It was the Portland.
None, except we carried on air patrol looking for any enemy forces in our
area. We fueled cruisers and [S57S] destroyers from a tanker, and we
had several scares due to erroneous reports of enemy forces which turned out to
be false.
The Portland was bombed by one of our own planes from Pearl Harbor, but,
fortunately, the bombs hit well astern. This plane reported the Portland as an
enemy carrier and the Porter, who was guarding her while she recovered one of
her planes was reported as an accompanying cruiser.
Did you ever hear about that?
General Short. I don't remember. If I did, I have forgotten
about it.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, this fleet of ours went south to
look for this task force instead of north, with a good prospect of find-
ing it to the north, as I understand the testimony, and that we bombed
our own ship, the Portland.
General Short. The search was in control of the Navy. They gave
our people the information on which they wanted the search. I
think we made one search that was not directed by the Navy. There
were persistent reports that there were Japanese planes off Pearl
Harbor, 25 or 50 miles to the southwest off Barber's Point, and I be-
lieve that General Martin went out on his own and investigated that
when he [557^] had no mission from the Navy, and found it
was false.
Senator Ferguson. General, I realize that we were at peace for
something like 25 years, and that we had put our heads in the corner
and didn't look for any war. That is, some people did, but I won-
der whether the Army and the Navy were doing the same thing. Here
it was said that our people weren't ready to enter into an understand-
ing that in case there was an attack down there we would go to bat.
But we weren't consulted on the question of the shooting orders in
the Atlantic, as I recall. Congress didn't say anything about that.
Now, were the Army and the Navy, and I use this expression be-
cause it is one that is well-known, were they asleep at the switch up
to December 7 ?
General Short. I think we had worked very seriously in Hawaii
to make preparations against any type of attack, but all of the inf orm-
tion that we had from Washington indicated to us not an attack on
Hawaii, but toward the Philippines and South Pacific, and definitely
gave us the opinion that hostile action in Hawaii would be in the
nature of sabotage and internal disorder, and that was what we were
immediately alerted for, that is what Ave immediately expected.
Senator Ferguson. Did the Army and the Navy ever come
\8575^ to use "possible" and "probable" as they are commonly un-
derstood? This word "possible" is so weak that if you tell a man a
thing is possible you can hardly blame him for not paying attention
to it.
General Short. I think the message of July 8, when they were
pointing out action of the Japanese against Russia, was a rather
definite prediction, and was the only prediction that the War Depart-
ment ever made direct to me.
Some of the naval messages pointed directly toward the Philippines
and toward the Kra Peninsula. No message of the Army after July
8 ever pointed anywhere.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3181
Senator Ferguson. Now, General, I know that you had your own
forces and your own job out there, but did you know about where
Newton's course was ? Newton's force was about 300-odd miles from
Midway when he learned of the attack. You know where Midway is
as 3^ou see it on that map [indicating] ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. About 300 miles. He said that he thought he
would receive orders to intercept the enemy, who, he felt must be to
the northwest, northward of Oahu. Therefore he signaled the Lex-
ington that the flight to Midway was canceled, because presumably
Midway had also [^857 6'\ been attacked.
Now, if he had received the message to go north, wouldn't there
be good prospects, where you see this reel line, this lower red line
on tliat chart, to have intercepted that force?
General Short. He might have intercepted it after they had lost
their planes and were withdrawing. He would have had to go east,
I think, to intercept it beforehand.
Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, the Lexington had a full
deployment of airplanes on her. Notwithstanding those that they
had taken to Midway or were taking to Midway.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. So they would have had the capacity with
planes at least to attempt to do something to the Jap fleet, which
it turned out nothing was ever done to, it was never intercepted,
never seen, and it gave the Japs a great stimulant, I would assume,
to know that they had made an attack and were not intercepted by
the American forces. Wouldn't that indicate to the Japanese that we
were asleep at the switch ?
General Short. It would indicate that they had succeeded in put-
ting over a complete surprise on us.
[5577'] Senator Ferguson. Now, coming back to this "asleep
at the switch," do you think that we were, as a War Department
and a Navy Department, our Intelligence, and the whole thing, really
asleep at the switch as to war coming to America on the 7th?
General Short. I think that our Intelligence definitely failed to
draw the conclusions that should have been drawn from the intercepts
and that they failed to transmit anything to us that would be help-
ful.
Senator Ferguson. Was it true in the Army that we treated Intel-
ligence somewhat, to use the old saying, as a stepchild, that that is
about the way we treated Intelligence ?
General Short. I had not been in Washington on duty with the
General Staff since 1924. It would be hard for me to say what the
attitude toward Intelligence was in 1941.
Senator Ferguson. What was the reputation of the Intelligence
Branch in the Army ? Did good officers try to avoid it ?
General Short. I don't believe they did. AVhen I was in the War
Department General Staff from 1921 to 1924, that was soon after the
First World War, Gen. Stuart Heintzleman, whom the Army con-
sidered one of the really top-notch men in the Army, was placed
in charge of the Military Intelligence Division.
\_8578'\ Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you said yesterday that
it took almost a year to get permission from the Interior Department
3182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to put up radar equipment, permanent radar equipment in the Hawai-
ian Islands.
General Short. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Would you say that we really had an alert Army
when it took a year to place radar in position, which was one of the
new things to protect Hawaii, would you say that if it took a year that
we were really alert and going as an army ?
General Short. I don't believe you could place that on G-2 because
I wrote to the Chief of Staff personally about that and had a reply
signed by the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Bryden, as to the reasons
whv they did not feel they could do it. I don't believe it stopped at
G-2.
Senator Ferguson. But the Commander in Chief of the United
States Army, the President of the United States, was at least over both
those branches ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. How do you account for it taking almost a
year to get the right to put up permanent equipment, and we didn't
even have it up on the 7th of December, when we had a war message, a
warning in June, on June 17, 1940. How do you account for the fact
that we, having that [8S79] kind of a warning that we were
going to have an attack on Hawaii, either ships or planes, and radar
would catch both, that it took a year after that to get the right to build
radar equipment on those islands?
General Short. I would say that the Department of Interior at least
did not have any proper appreciation of the international situation.
Senator Ferguson. But who was over the Department of the In-
terior ? Wasn't the President of the United States ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And he was the Commander in Chief of our
Army ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand you said yesterday we had
fine radar equipment in New York City ?
General Short. That is my understanding.
Senator Ferguson. Where else — on the west coast ?
General Short. The west coast, Seattle and San Francisco. I sent
these officers to attend an exercise meeting conducted at Seattle. When
they finished there they went to New York City to look over the estab-
lishment. They reported to me that those establishments were all set
up
Senator Ferguson. Now, do a'^ou know whether or not they were
working 24 hours a day ?
[SSSO] General Short. I do not.
Senator Ferguson. On the 6th and the 7th ?
General Short. I do not.
Senator Ferguson. I will ask counsel if he will ascertain from those
radar stations what they were doing and whether or not those radar
station were alerted on the 6th and the 7th.^
General, as an Army officer, would you consider that our possessions,
the Hawaiian Islands, were in more danger than New York City on
the 7th?
^ See memorandum dated February 21, 1946, and attachments, from War Department in
Hearings, Part 11, p. 5302 et seq.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3183
General Short. Very much so.
Senator Ferguson. From what you know now ?
General Short. Very much more.
Senator Ferguson. From what you know now?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Would you consider also that it was in more
danger than Seattle or San Francisco?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. From what you know now?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, coming back, and I know this is a hypo-
thetical matter because we didn't get those radars established, but if
those radars had been established under priority — and I understand
the priority was solely [SSSl] in Washington — is that correct?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. It wasn't in your hands?
General Short. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you try to get high priority, the best
priority to get the equipment in?
General Short. On June 10 I radioed the War Department and
asked that the priority be advanced to A-IA, which was the highest
priority.
Senator Ferguson. Were you a believer in radar?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you feel that it was good equipment and
new equipment such as would help the Army of the United States ?
General Short. I stated in the telegram that it was probably the
most important thing that we were trying to do at that time. I think
I can jfind that and read it if you wish.
Mr. Murphy. I think you will also find it, once or twice, in your
correspondence with General Marshall, that very same statement.
General Short. I was looking for the definite wire. I know I
covered it in the wire to General Marshall.
I have the telegram :
[8582] To the Adjutant General,
Washington. D. C.
Division engineer, San Francisco, has informed me that the priority covering
contract W-foiir one four Engr. seven eight four with Interstate Equipment Cor-
poration, Elizabeth, N. J., is now dash one dash G Stop This contract is the
one for furnishing all materials for cableway to Kaala Aircraft Warning Station
Stop Motors and all electrical equipment and subcontract to General Electric
Stop Division engineer states that with this priority there is strong, probability
that delivery this electrical material to contracor will be delayed about fifteen
weeks Stop This Kaala station is the most important in airci'aft warning sys-
tem and early completion of this cableway is essential Stop I consider this
aircraft warning service as the most important single project in this department
Stop Strongly recommend that the War Department give all possible assistance
to Chief of Engineers to have priority on this contract changed to dash one
dash B
I thought I requested that it be A-lA. This copy states 1-B.
[8583^ Senator Ferguson. On March 6 you wrote to General
Marshall :
Defense of these islands and adequate warning for the United States Fleet is
so dependent upon the early completion of this Aircraft Warning Service that I
believe all quibbling over details should be stopped at once. This project was
very thoroughly studied by a Board of OflScers in this Department who made
3184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
several personal investigations of each one of the sites. Now that basic decisions
as to locations, types of stations and general plans have been approved by the
War Department, I strongly recommend that this project be decentralized, and
that I be authorized to give final approval to designs, layouts and other details
to expedite its completion.
Signed "Walter C. Short."
What were you talking about there when you said "I believe all
quibbling over details should be stopped at once." This was back in
March.
General Short. Because we had to get the design of the buildings
going into the national parks approved by the Department of Interior.
From an architectural standpoint, it had to fit in with their ideas of
the scenery.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, we were talking [8584-']
about beauty rather than efficiency, as far as war was concerned ?
General Short. It might appear that way.
Senator Ferguson. Well, how does it appear to you ?
General Short. It appears to me that the Department of Interior
considered their routine requirements of more importance than
preparations for war.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, what was more important to the
United States w^hen we knew war was coming, to get prepared, or
to determine upon the beauty of the structure that was to prepare us ?
General Short. Unquestionably it was important, and I think I
made my letter to the Chief of Staff about as strong as I could afford
to make it.
[8686] Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you say "afford." There
are certain things yovi do not say
General Short. To a superior officer. I told him I thought it was
time to stop quibbling.
Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, there are certain things
that in the Army you do not say to your superior ; is that it ?
General Short. You say it in a tactful way.
Senator Ferguson. I see. You stop just a little short, or you say
it in a tactful way. That is what you tried to do here ?
General Short. That is what I tried to do.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the same rule applies to
Cabinet officers?
General Short. I do not.
Senator Ferguson. You haven't been a Cabinet officer ?
General Short. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. I am sure it does not apply to Members of the
House or the Senate.
Well, now, General Short, the Intelligence Department of the
Army was to be used for two purposes if I am right, and if I am
wrong you correct me : One was to determine when war might come.
The other one was to determine where war might come. Is that
correct ?
[8686] General Short. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. That is really the duty of an Intelligence De-
partment ?
General Short. Yes, sir. I might add another thing, and also the
strength that the prospective enemy might have to pursue this.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. And do you consider them of equal im-
portance ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3185
General Short. I would say you might say they were of equal im-
portance because one without the other does not give you the in-
formation.
Senator Ferguson. Now, in your opinion did these messages that
reached you — and you have listed five, I think there were five — tell
you when war was coming ?
General Short. They indicated in that message of the 27th that war
should be coming reasonably soon, although it left a possible chance
of avoiding it.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did they tell you when war was coming?
General Short. I mean when, not where.
Senator Ferguson. Did they tell you where war was coming?
General Short. At no time after July the 8th did a War Depart-
ment message directed to me ever point in any [8587] direction.
Senator Ferguson. Would you say that the message of June 17,
1940, the alert, told General Herron where war was coming?
General Short. It told him definitely that they were afraid of a
trans-Pacific raid on the Island of Oahu.
Senator Ferguson. And that was definite information ?
General Short. Absolutely.
Senator Ferguson. Not the date but definite information as to
where ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have any such warning?
General Short. I did not.
Senator Ferguson. Were you kept advised as to what we were doing
as far as our Army was concerned in the proposed attack on the Azores,
the sending of the Army up to Iceland and whether or not we had con-
templated a force going into Ireland?
General Short. General Marshall in one of his personal letters to
me indicated confidentially that there was a possibility of attack on
the Azores. That was some months before.
Senator Ffjrguson. Did you put that letter in here ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
[8588] Senator Ferguson. It is in?
. Mr. Murphy. It is in the record.
Senator Ferguson. It is in the record?
Mr. Murphy. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. So that we have then before us all the so-called
personal mail between you and General Marshall ?
General Short. I believe that you have everything.
"Senator Ferguson. There has been no determination that the thing
was personal or departmental. You have put them all in.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
General Short. The War Department selected it. I do not have
any other letters.
Mr. Murphy. When I say it is in the record I mean it is in the
exhibit which has been offered.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, I understand.
Well, now, did you know of any investigations, outside of the Rob-
erts investigation, made by the War Department up until the Army
board was created under the statute of Congress ?
General Short. No, sir ; I do not.
3186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. You did not have information on the Bundy
investigation, where they were lost in the plane ?
General Short. I did not.
Senator Ferguson. And afterward you were not informed
[8589] of any investigation. Did you know that the President
had asked or requested that a compilation, at least, of messages, and
so forth, be prepared and it was sent to General Marshall and that
he made certain alterations in it?
General Short. I did not.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know what preparation was made by
the Army by investigation that they might court martial you?
General Short. I do not.
Senator Ferguson. You were never advised of any of those' inves-
tigations ?
General Short. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you knew about the statute that was
passed asking that there be an investigation ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And such action taken as was required?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did you ever know about the Clausen in-
vestigation ?
General Short. I think there was something in the newspapers
indicating that it was taking place but I was never advised by the
War Department that it was being made.
Senator Ferguson. Did Clausen ever come to you and try to get
an affidavit?
[8590] General Short. He did not.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know now why the Clausen investigation
was undertaken ?
General Short. I think that there is an explanation of that. You
have to read between the lines.
Senator Ferguson. Well, will you read between the lines for us and
give us that explanation ? What are you looking for ? •
General Short. It is Exhibit 63. I am looking for the recommenda-
tion-. Here it is.
This is a memorandum from the Judge Advocate General, General
Cramer, dated November 25, 1944, for the Secretary of War. "Sub-
ject : Army Pearl Harbor board."
Senator Ferguson. Will you read what you have in mind? Read
the lines and read between them.
General Short. On page 48, the first paragraph. [Reading :]
Unexplored Leads :
In the course of my examination of the report and record certain further in-
quiries have suggested themselves to me which, in my opinion, might advantage-
ously be pursued. The answers to these inquries would not, in^all probability,
in my opinion, affect the result ; at the same time in order to complete the picture
and in fairness to certain personnel these leads should be fur- [8591] ther
explored. I do not mean to suggest that the Board should be reconvened for this
purpose ; the work could be done by an individual officer familiar with the matter.
Now, I would like to state there
Senator Ferguson. Now you are going to read between the lines?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. All right.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3187
General Short. General Marshall testified before this committee
that in all his service he had never heard of a reviewing officer, if he
were dissatisfied with the findings of a court martial or a board, taking
such action ; that the normal action was to refer the proceedings back
to the board and direct that additional evidence be taken if that were
desired, or direct that a review of their findings be made by the board,
and they would then be returned to the reviewing officer with a further
explanation.
In this case the Judge Advocate General goes out of his way to state
he does not want it referred back to the board but suggests an officer
who has been on duty with the board.
Now, there were only three officers who could have met that qualifi-
cation.
Senator Ferguson. Who were they?
[8592] General Short. They were Colonel Toulmin, who was
the executive of the board, Colonel West, who was the recorder of the
board and Lieutenant Colonel Clausen, who was a Major at the time,
who was assistant recorder of the board. Unquestionably General
Cramer had in his mind the recommending of Colonel Clausen at the
time that he made that recommendation, which would have taken the
further investigation out of the hands of the Army board and placed
it in the hands of a selected individual.
Senator Ferguson. He placed it in the hands of a Major, who was
an assistant?
General Short. Yes, sir, assistant recorder, who was promoted to
Lieutenant Colonel since.
Senator Ferguson. Now, in your experience in the Army did you
ever know of that ?
General Short. I have never known of it. I have seen cases repeat-
edly where the reviewing officer might return the proceedings to the
board and direct that additional evidence be taken and return it to
the board, stating that he did not agree with their findings and asking
them to review their findings, but I have never heard of a case of
this kind.
Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand it, before a real review of
these findings was made they sent Major Clausen out?
[8593] General Short. I think the review had been made but
it was not what they wanted.
Senator Ferguson. Oh. Now, that is what you are reading be-
tween the lines, that when they read this report they were not satis-
fied and they used the words "certain personnel" in there?
General Short. And they apparently did not believe there they
could get what they wanted out of the Army board, so reading be-
tween the lines
Mr. MuEPHY. Will the gentleman yield ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, I will yield.
Mr. Murphy. I ask at this point in the record that the complete file
of the Adjutant General, in view of what is now going on here, be
placed in the record.
Senator Ferguson. I have no objection.
Mr. MuRphf. I understand that there is a transcript or mimeo-
graph, a complete mimeograph of that prepared, which we have.
The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered.
3188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Do you have it?
General Short. I will look at it.
Mr. Murphy. I understand the file is in Senator Brewster's hands
and it has been prepared for the committee.
Senator Ferguson. Oh, that is the one.
[8594-] Mr. Murphy. I mean the Judge Advocate General's,
that is the one I am talking about.
Lieutenant Colonel Kjerr. This is a different one.
Mr. Murphy. It is the one in which the charges in this case are
contained.
Lieutenant Colonel Karr. That may be. I have looked at the file
tliat you have reference to and this is not the complete file.
Mr. Murphy. Well, I ask that we have the complete file then of
everything. And in that connection, Senator, may I also request —
I understand that the Army has made available all the papers con-
cerning General Marshall in this transaction and I ask that they be
made available and spread on the record and I also ask that Secretary
Stimson's diary insofar as it pertains in any way to the retirement of
General Short, that that also be brought in here and spread on the
record.
I ask that everything the Army has in regard to this question of
General Short's retirement and the preparation of charges be brought
in here and placed in the record.
The Vice Chairman. Spread on the record or as an exhibit?
Mr. Murphy. As an exhibit.^
Senator Ferguson. I not only approve of what the Congressman is
saying, but I would like to say I have been endeavoring here for weeks
to get all of the evidence.
Mr. Murphy. I agree the Senator has and I am not trying [8595]
to steal a march or anything like that. I want to be cooperative.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. I will say this: I not only want Mr.
Stimson's diary as it relates to this particular question, but I want it
as it relates to the whole Far East. I think that we will find in that
diary an explanation of many things that we have been searching for
here days and days and weeks and that we have hundreds, if not
thousands, of pages in this record that could have been boiled down to a
few lines out of the Secretary of War's diary. I think that we ought
to get it immediately.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield for just 1 minute?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. I also again call the attention of the committee to the
exhibit which has just been offered, which should be made available
to all of us.
Senator Ferguson. May I look at it to see what you are putting in ?
The Vice Chairman. Without objection Mr. Murphy's request is
granted, but do you want it as an exhibit or spread on the transcript ?
Mr. Murphy. I think an exhibit is enough.
The Vice Chairman. Wliat is the next exhibit number ?
Mr. Kaufman. 140.
[8596] The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit 140.
That is this document here ?
Mr. Murphy. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. Will you furnish the reporter a copy of it ?
^ See Exhibit 170 in Exhibits, Part 19, and Exhibit 140 in Exhibits, Part 18.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3189
Mr. Katjfman. Yes.
(Tlie document above referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 140.")
Mr. Murphy. I would like to call the attention of the conmiittee to
the fact that yesterday there were certain letters read into the record
and, as I recall it, it was a series of letters in connection with the
general's retirement.
There were present here some photostatic copies and I, at least,
listening to them intently, thought they did not get into the record but
I would like everybody to know that they are in the record and there is
among them a notation in the handwriting of General Marshall, where
he turns over to the Secretary of War the Judge Advocate General's
recommendations in reference to — I don't know what these words are —
"retirement of General Walter C. Short", and the initials of General
Marshall.
And then there is a letter dated the 27th of January 1942 from the
Judge Advocate General to General Marshall explaining the problem
before him and there is a letter of \S597] January the 31st
from the Judge Advocate General to the Secretary of War, in which
he encloses the letter which he had sent to General Marshall, and I
suggest a reading of those letters in connection with the evidence that
went in yesterday.
Mr, Richardson. Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Richardson.
Mr. Richardson. It probably would be appropriate to say that with
reference to the Stimson diary, that diary was referred to by the Sec-
retary of War in a hearing before the Arm}' board.
An effort was made by Mr. Mitchell before the hearing commenced
with reference to this diary and he ran into a situation of illness on
the part of Mr. Stimson under which his doctor refused even to permit
the question of the diary to be referred to him.
Our information as to Secretary Stimson's present physical condi-
tion is not very accurate. I will be very glad to contact him again
and ascertain, first, whether he can present himself as a witness with
his diary ; or, second, whether he would be willing to submit his diary
to the committee. When I get that information I will report it to
the chairman.
The Vice Chaieman. Well, we will let it rest on that [8S98]
for the present.
Mr. Murphy. I will say, Senator, in connection with this business
of the Judge Advocate General, in all fairness to General Short, that
it is in effect a complaint, with General Short not, in fact, being given
a chance to answer it. I do not want to have any one-sided partisan
proposition, but in view of his referring to what the Judge Advocate
General had in mind and why he did certain things I think we ought
to have everything.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest then
that — this volume is rather large, I haven't seen a copy of it yet ; it
has been here among my papers and it is quite large and I assume that
General Short will want some time to go over it. I would like to ques-
tion him on it. I wonder whether or not after I am through with
these other matters that I have and counsel and all the rest of the
members ask their questions, if we can bring him back and I can quest-
3190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tion him Monday morning, which will give him plenty of time to go
over this and also give me plenty of time to go over it.
General Short. Senator, I would like to make a statement right
now. I have been over it.
Senator Ferguson. Oh, you have been over it ?
General Short. And I have a statement, since Mr. Murphy says I
should be given an opportunity, that I would like to [8599]
make.
Senator Ferguson. I ask you now to make it if you desire to.
General Short. This relates to Exhibit 140.
Regarding the memorandum of specifications drawn up against me
by Colonel Munson, I want to point out that the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral reviewed all the evidence of the Roberts commission, of the Army
Pearl Harbor Board, and of the Clausen affidavits, and came to the
conclusion that he could not prove any offense.
The Judge Advocate General's letter dated January 27, 1942, reads
in part as follows :
General Short's non-feasance or omissions were based on an estimate of the
situatiyn which although proved faulty by subsequent events was insofar as I am
able to ascertain from the report of the commission made or concurred in by
all those officers in Hawaii best qualified to form a sound military opinion. That
estimate was that an attack by air was in the highest degree improbable.
In the Judge Advocate General's opinion dated 25 November 1944,
page 50, the last paragraph. General Cramer said :
I suggest, therefore, that a public statement be made by you giving a brief
review of the Board's proceed- [8600] ings and pointing out that General
Short was guilty of errors of judgment for which he was properly removed from
command, and that this constitutes a sufficient disposition of the matter at this
time. In the event further investigation should disclose a different situation the
matter could later be re-examined in the light of such additional evidence.
I have looked over the specifications that were drawn up by Colonel
Munson and shown in this Exhibit and I will say very definitely that if
these charges had been preferred and I had been arraigned my plea
in every case would have been "Not guilty."
The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your statement onn that.
General ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. It is now 12 o'clock. We will recess until 2
o'clock this afternoon.
(Whereupon, at 12 noon a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same
day.)
[8601] AFTERNOON SESSION 2 P. M.
The Chairman. The committee will be in order. Senator Ferguson
will resume his examination of General Short.
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES
ARMY (Retired) — Resumed
Senator Ferguson. General, there has been offered and received in
evidence this paper
The Vice Chairman. Senator, I think it is Exhibit 140.
Senator Ferguson. Exhibit 140.
The Vice Chairman. Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3191
Senator Ferguson. In that exhibit there is a memorandum for Mr.
Bundy, November 27, 1944, subject : "Secretary's Press Release of 28
February 1942 re General Short."
Then it says :
1. Attached hereto are two copies of the Secretary's press release of 28 Feb-
ruary 1942.
And then :
2. Pursuant to his direction the Judge Advocate General's office on 4 March
undertook preparation of charges against General Short, utilizing all available
data including the Roberts Report and transcript. This work was completed
20 April 1942 and resulted in preparation of charges alleging violation of the
Ofith Article of War, with 11 specifications [8602] as follows :
Before I go to those specifications, the end of that letter says :
3. The above charges were merely tentative and possible charges and were
never approved by The Judge Advocate General or transmitted to the Secretary
of War. Of course, they were never made public.
It is signed "William J. Hughes, Jr., Colonel, JAGD."
Now, I would like to ask you about those specific charges. They
are in the record and I would like to have your opinion on them.
1. Failure to provide an adequate inshoi-e aerial patrol.
You made the statement that you plead not guilty to all of tliem,
but I think that we should have an explanation on the record of these
charges and what your answers to them are rather than the conclusion
of "not guilty."
General Short. Do you wish me to indicate my answer on each
one?
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Give us what you consider is your com-
plete answer on it.
General Short. Not guilty.
Senator Ferguson. Now, is there anything you want to say more
than that on number 1?
[8603] General Short. On the inshore aerial patrol?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
General Short. I did have an adequate patrol. The air people
were satisfied and had full control. If the purpose was antisubmarine
defense and it was not designed for air defense.
Senator Ferguson. Were you using all the equipment that you had ?
General Short. We had one observation squadron, six planes, in
commission, and we were operating them several hours a day. I
couldn't say exactly what the hours were.
Senator Ferguson. Were you using them as much as possible?
General Short. I would say we were using them all we should use
them. In addition to that there was a lot of observation that accom-
plished the same thing because our pursuit training was all over
Oahu, pretty much around the perimeter, and they were all given to
understand that they should learn to observe for submarines.
Senator Ferguson. Now, is that all you want to say on number 1?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Number 2.
Failure to provide adequate anti-aircraft defense.
[8604^ General Short. Not guilty. We would have had an ade-
quate antiaircraft defense if the War Department had given us the
3192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
equipment, and had given us the information which indicated imminent
attack. Or, if they had replied to my report and indicated any desired
modification.
Senator Ferguson. Were you using all the antiaircraft guns and
facilities that were provided from Washington for you ?
General Short. We were not alerted for an antiaircraft defense
because we had not received any information indicating a probable
air attack.
Senator Ferguson. The next :
Failure to set up ati Interceptor Command.
General Short. Not guilty. We were training personnel as fast as
we could to operate an effective interceptor command, and it was set
up and operating as effectively as it could.
Senator Ferguson. No. 4 :
Failure to provide a proper aircraft warning service.
General Short. Not guilty. We were training our personnel as fast
as we could to set up an effective aircraft-warning service. It was in
operation.
Senator Ferguson. Now, No. 5 :
Failure to provide for the transmission of appropriate [8605] warnings
to interested agencies.
General Short. Not guilty. We were restricted b}' direct order from
Marshall, from transmitting the November 27 warning to any other
than the minimum essential officers.
Senator Ferguson. And that would exclude giving it to what was
called interested agencies ; is that your opinion ?
General Short. Yes, sir. If I had set up an aircraft-warning service
and gotten it to everybody we would have had to give it to all the
enlisted men.
Senator Ferguson. No. 6 :
Failure to establish a proper system of defense by cooperation and coordination
with the Navy.
General Short, Not guilty. We had full, complete plans for defense
by cooperation with the Navy, which had been approved by General
Marshall and Admiral Stark.
Senator Ferguson. And in your opinion was that being carried out ;
\vas it being carried out ?
General Short. It would have been carried out 100 percent if they
would have given us the information they had.
Senator Ferguson. No. 7 :
Failure to issue adequate orders to his subordinates as to their duties in case
of sudden attack.
General Short. Not guilty. I could not tell "subordinates"
[8606] to expect a sudden attack which neither I nor the War
Department nor anyone else expected. Our information regarding
impending hostile action was, by direction of the chief of staff, limited
to the minimum essential officers. Our standard operating procedure
of 5 November 1941 prescribed fully the duties of all personnel in
event of any sudden attack.
Senator Ferguson. Now, I understand from some evidence that
the people in Honolulu were given no information as to what to do
in case of an air raid. Can you explain M'hy that was true ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3193
General Short. The civilians?
Senator Ferguson. Yes; the civilian population was not instructed.
General Short. We had had a number of alerts and blackouts.
We had had definite training of the surgical teams and of the first-
aid people and of the ambulance corps. They had turned out and
set up these several times. And I think that the civilian agencies
that had to act not only knew but they performed their duties extremely
well on December 7.
Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that your claim is that you
had given intimation previously to civilian agencies what to do in
case of raids ?
[8607] General Short. The ones who had positive things to do.
Senator Ferguson. Now, if you had called in the civilian authori-
ties and explained to them that you anticipated an attack as of after
November 27, would you have been violating the instructions given to
you in the message of the 27th ?
"^ General Short. I certainly would, because in all probability a
considerable part of the population would have moved to the hills,
notifying every Jap agent that we expected an attack practically imme-
diately.
Senator Ferguson. Well, from what you know now, didn't the
Japanese agents know all about the defense and all about the various
activities there ?
General Short. They knew quite largely, probably most all about
it, but they would have known definitely then that we were expecting
an attack. I doubt if they knew that bJecause we didn't know it our-
selves.
Senator Ferguson. But if you had been alerted as they were in
1940 would you then have alerted the civilian population?
General Short. I think that we would have encouraged them, ex-
cept the ones in the very congested areas, to remain definitely where
they were. We had plans completely drawn for the evacuation of
certain areas where they thought there [8608] was danger of
bombing or sabotage of the gasoline supply and we had asked for
money to build those evacuation camps and we had not succeeded in
getting it. The Delegate, Sam King, and the Governor, had also
made strenuous ejfforts to get that money.
Senator Ferguson. Had the responsible authorities in Washington
been notified of the M-day plan that you had under the legislature
of Hawaii ?
General Short. Yes, sir ; they knew that that legislation was being
passed, I am sure, because we had made requests for these funds and
when we didn't get it through the War Department then the Governor
and the Delegate had tried through their channels.
Senator Ferguson. Now, liad you any notice to put that into effect,
to declare M-day?
General Short, We had not.
Senator Ferguson. Would that have helped the situation ?
General Short. We had things worked out so that the Governor
was able to put that in effect in a very few hours. He put it into effect
sometime before 7 o'clock in the afternoon of December 7 so that it
turned out the home guard.
Senator Ferguson. How many civilians were killed in the attack?
79716—46 — pt. 7 19
3194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[8609] General Short. I couldn't answer that question. Not a
great many. There were a few.
Senator Ferguson, Our casualty lists, I understand, only include
the Army and Navy, the military casualties. Can you give us an idea ?
General Short. We lost in the Army 9 officers and 223 men. My
guess would be that there were perhaps 10 civilians killed, but that
might be off.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether that has ever been listed
authoritatively?
General Short. I think it has. And one rather unusual part of it is
that I think a very considerable proportion of them were Japanese.
Senator Ferguson. Number 8 :
Failure to take adequate measures to protect the Fleet and Naval Base at
Pearl Harbor.
General Short. Not guilty. I took every measure I thought neces-
sary to protect the fleet and naval base against sabotage. I so reported
to the War Department. Marshall testified that I was reasonable in
assuming that I was doing exactly what he wanted, because otherwise
he would have notified me that he wanted more measures taken.
Senator Ferguson. Number 9 :
Failure to have his airplanes dispersed in anticipation [8610] of a hostile
attack, after having been vv^arned of the danger thereof.
General Short. Not guilty. I was never warned of any imminent
danger of an air attack. The planes were therefore grouped for more
adequate protection against hostile action in the form of sabotage.
[8611] Senator Ferguson. Therefore, when you wrote on the
-28th, or sent a message back that you were alerted for sabotage, that
would indicate, would it, that the planes were grouped ?
General Short. Yes, sir. That was laid down in our standard
operating procedure.
Senator Ferguson. No. 10 :
Failure to have his airplanes in a state of readiness for an attack.
General Short. Not guilty. My aircraft were not in a state of
readiness for a surprise attack, but were protected against sabotage
as directed by the War Department in the sabotage-alert messages of
27th, of 28th November 1941, and as reported to the War Department
by me.
If they had been equipped with ammunition, grouped as they were,
and a sabotage attack had been made, there would have been much
more damage by exploding ammunition.
We never permitted, when alerted for sabotage, we never permitted
them to be armed or to have ammunition in the planes.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, the sabotage alert was one that
wouldn't permit ammunition to be in the planes when they were
grouped for sabotage?
[8612] General Short. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. No. 11:
Failure to provide for the protection of military personnel, their families, etc.,
and of civilian employees on various reservations.
General Short. We made a quite elaborate plan for evacuating
the families of civilians on the military reservation. We asked the
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3195
War Department for money to establish a camp some 4 miles east of
Schofield. I wrote a personal letter to the Chief of Staff and told him
that we were asking for the money to establish these camps on the
basis of recreation camps and tke different units, different families
would be assigned to different locations, but our real purpose was to
get ready for a possible attack and this would give us a chance to
acquaint everybody with the details without advertising what we
were doing.
He answered my letter and stated that guns were needed worse for
other purposes.
[8613] Senator Ferguson. I notice that you left out the words
"not guilty" to this last one. Is there any reason ?
General Short. No, sir. I plead not guilty.
Now, I might say when we failed to get our concentration camp
plans approved, get the money, we then made an alternate plan for
taking care of the women and children in school buildings that we
thought would be out of the range of an attack.
We had blankets placed in those school buildings, we had all ar-
rangements set up for the establishment of cafeterias and they were
moved in there on the afternoon of the 7th and everybody was taken
care of.
Senator Ferguson. In this evidence that was put in this morning,
this exhibit, Myron C. Cramer, major general, judge advocate general,
gives a report. I wish you would look on page 50 of that report; I
don't know what page it is in the record.
General Short. I think it is the paragraph I read into the record
this morning.
Senator Ferguson. Oh, it is in Exhibit 63 that I had in mind.
General Short. Exhibit 63, top secret, yes.
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; top secret.
Now, I notice at the bottom of page 49 this remark by the [ 8614]
Judge Advocate General :
As to whether General Short should be tried at any time, a factor to be con-
sidered is what sentence, in the event of conviction, the court would adjudge.
Wliy would the Judge Advocate be concerned in advance and before
he had filed the charges as to what the court would give as a penalty?
General Short. It would look like that he was thinking of the pos-
sible effect on public opinion. If I were tried and found not guilty, or
given a very mild sentence, that the public would tend to feel that
there had been no justification, that is the only conclusion I can draw.
Senator Ferguson. And then he goes on :
As I have already indicated, upon any charge of neglect of duty, or of his
various duties, General Short would have the formidable defense that he re-
sponded to the request to report measures he had taken with a message, incom-
plete and ambiguous it may be, but which should have prompted doubt as to the
sufficiency of the action taken.
Now, was he talking about your reply to General Marshall's mes-
sage ?
General Short. He undoubtedly was, in spite of his statement
about it being ambiguous and incomplete.
[8615] Senator Ferguson. Now, in your opinion was it an am-
biguous message that you had taken an alert against sabotage ?
3196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. I don't see how it could have been briefer or more
concise or clearer.
Senator Ferguson. The next sentence :
My experience with courts martial leads me to the belief that a court would
be reluctant to adjudge a severe sentence in a case of this kind where the general
picture would be clouded by a claim that others were contributory causes. (Cf.,
Roberts Report, Conclusion 18, p. 21.)
General Short. I do not have a copy of the Roberts report here.
Senator Ferguson. Would you see that he gets a copy ?
Mr. Hasten. Yes. [Handing document to witness.]
Senator Ferguson. I want to ask you this question in relation to
that : Couldn't that have been cured by trying all that were guilty of
contributory causes ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not the War Depart-
ment has ever considered the question of trying all that were guilty
of contributory causes or causes of the disaster at Pear Harbor?
General Short. I am quite sure they have never made a [8616]
public statement to that effect. I do not know whether any consid-
eration has been given to it or not.
Senator Ferguson. Now, you have before you the Roberts report,
do you ? *
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you want to look at those conclusions 18
on page 21 and see what he was talking about ?
General Short. I have looked at it.
Senator Ferguson. Do you Avant to make an}- answer in relation
to them?
General Short. I would say in regard to 18 that it was a complete
surprise, because we had not been furnished the information that was
definitely available in Washington and that- should have been fur-
nished to us.
In regard to 19, the things that he mentioned are largely beyond
our control :
Disregard of international law by the Japanese.
There was nothing that we could do about that.
The restrictions they prepared on counter-espionage.
That was a question of our own laws. The Hawaiian Department
could do nothing about that.
Emphasis in the warning messages of the probability of aggressive action in
the Far East and on anti-sabotage measures.
That was wholly on the shoulders of the War Department. That
could not apply to the Hawaiian Department.
[8617] Failure of the War Department to reply to the njessage relating
to the anti-sabotage measures instituted by the Comiuanding General,
Hawaiian Department.
That was entirely a War Department failure.
Information received by the interested parties prior to the anack of warning
message of December 7th.
That was entirely the failure of the War Department.
Senator Ferguson. The War Department is deiined there as you
defined it this morning?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3197
General Short. I beg your pardon ?
Senator Ferguson. Is it defined as you defined it this morning?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Is there anything more that you want to add ?
General Short. I would like to call attention to the fact that he
admits in paragraph 20 that when the attack came that the command
did act efficiently. He said that they were present and that certain
things had not interfered in any way with their efficiency and that
subordinate commanders executed their orders without question.
They were not responsible for the state of readiness.
I would like to say there that I have never at any time tried to pass
the buck to any single subordinate. My deci- [861S] sion was
made on the information that the War Department had furnished me
and I had no desire and absolutely never took any steps to pass the
buck to some indivirliial man below me.
Senator Ferguson. Is there such a thing as a joint trial in courts
martial, where men can be tried jointly?
General Short. There is, yes, sir. It is rather unusual but it is
possible. I think lam correct in that, am I not ?
Lieutenant Colonel Karr. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Then reading on :
There is also in cases like this the historic precedent of President Lincoln's
refusal to rebuke Secretary of "War Simon Cameron for a gross error of judg-
ment. (Life of Abraham Lincoln by Nicolay & Hay, Vol. 5, p. 125-130.) I am
therefore foi'ced to conclude that if General Short is tried and if such trial
should result in his conviction there is considerable likelihood the court would
adjudge a sentence less than dismissal and might well adjudge nothing beyond
a reprimand.
Would that lead us to believe, then, that he was of the opinion that
he was concerned with the sentence and they were concerned with that
alone ?
General Short. I would say they were very greatly concerned with
the effect on public opinion and that they wanted \8619] to be
very careful and not try me on something where they would fail
and the effect would bounce back on them.
Senator Ferguson. NoWj coming to the Clausen report. When did
you see the Clausen affidavits ?
General Short. About 2 or 3 days before this committee convened
we got a copy of them.
Senator Ferguson. In the first part of the Clausen report, the 23d
of November 1944 — have 5^ou got the Clausen report before you ?
Lieutenant Colonel Karr. No, sir ; we do not have that here.
Senator Ferguson. It is the letter by the Secretary of War to Major
Clausen and on the next page is this memorandum :
Memorandum for Major Henry C. Clausen : Subject : Unexplored Leads in
Pearl Harbor investigations.
You had those before you this morning, did you not ?
General Short. I think so.
Senator Ferguson. The unexplored leads.
General Short. I do not believe I did.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to put in evidence
those two papers, the letter of the 23d creating the Clausen power and
unexplored leads.
3198 CONGRESSIONAL'INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Murphy. I wonder, Mr, Chairman, why the public are not
entitled to the whole thing? I move that we put it all in, the whole
volume.
[86^0] The Chairman. Make them an exhibit or consider it as
being spread on the record ?
Senator Ferguson. I would like to spread those pages at least on the
record because I have questioned General Short and he gave some an-
swers in relation to these unexplored leads and that is what I desire
to have in the record at the present time.
Mr. Murphy. You mean you object. Senator, to the whole thing
going in?
Senator Ferguson. Well, I think we should wait. The only thing
is I think we should wait until Clausen came to get the other papers
in, to know how the other papers were obtained before they go in.
Mr. Murphy. Well, I propose later on to ask that they all go in.
I would like to have it all go in now. I will ask that again.
The Chairman. Well, the chair does not want to exclude anything
that ought to go in here, but if it is all going in when Clausen comes in
I do not see any need of putting it all in here.
Mr. Murphy. I have no objection to those two going in but I move
that they all go in so that we will have everything.
The Chairman. Let them go in.
[8621] Senator Ferguson. I will read them in. General, so that
you will have them before you.
General Short. Yes.
Senator Ferguson (reading). "November 23, 1944." Now, that
date is after the board had rendered its opinion ?
General Short. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. But the board, all the members were living and
in good health sothat they could have carried on, couldn't they?
General Short. So far as I know they were.
Senator Ferguson (reading) :
Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 :
Subject : Pearl Harbor Investigation.
In connection with the recent report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, a
number of unexplored leads have suggested themselves which require investiga-
tion. I have directed that this investigation be undertaken by Major Henry C.
Clausen, JAGD.
You are directed to give Major Clausen access to all records, documents, and in-
formation in your Division, whether of secret or top secret nature and to advise
all officers of your Division to afford Major Clausen the fullest possible coopera-
tion. Inquiries made by Major Clausen should be answered fully and the per-
sons interrogated should volunteer any information of which they [8622]
may have knowledge concerning the subject of Major Clausen's inquiries.
In addition, copies of any papers requiretl by Major Clausen, whether secret
or top secret should be furnished him, any present directives to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of War.
A true copy.
* Henby O. Ciausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
Now, the next page is :
Memorandum for Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD :
Subject : Unexplored Leads in Pearl Harbor Investigation.
1. In order to assist you in the investigation you are now making, I am
suggesting herewith certain unexplored leads which, in my opinion, might
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3199'
advantageously be followed up in order to complete the general picture in this
matter. The present memorandum merely contains suggestions and will not
be construed as a directive or as in any way fixing the scope of your investigation.
2. In the War and Navy Departments in Washington, [8623] the follow-
ing matters can be investigated:
a. Whether Kimniel notified the Navy Department and the Navy Department
notified the War Department of the order to sink Jap subs, of the reasons
for the order.
b. What was the naval condition of readiness at Pearl Harbor.
c. Whether Short or Kimmel sent any reconnaissance reports to Washington,
d. Whether Kimmel had any orders from Washington requiring a large part
of the fleet to remain in harbor.
e. Whether Kimmel understood the term "defensive deployments" or wired
back for its meaning.
f. Whether Kimmel replied to the 24 November. 27 November, and other
Navy Department mes.sages and if so, was the War Department furnished
copies thereof.
g. Whether the June l&iO alert message to Herron was specific and indicative
of an established War Department i)olicy of being specific when war alerts
were believed required by the situation.
h. Whether the War Department manuals and war plans, current in 1941,
authorized a Commanding General of an overseas Department to revise the
estimate of the situation, without consulting with or reporting to the War
Department.
[8G24] i. Whether Short answered the Secretary of War's letter of Febmary
1941.
j. The number of troops in Hawaii in late 1941, the state of their training and
the possibility of continuing training under Alert 2 or 3.
k. The terms and origin of the Joint Action Agreement, if any, with Britain
and the Netherlands, and whether Japan was officially advised of this agree-
ment or discovered its existence.
1. Whether Short was sent official notice of the Joint Action Agreement
or of the Roosevelt-Churchill July 1941 compact for a joint warning to Japan.
(Rep. 41)
3. Concerning the "magic" intercepts we should ascertain :
a. The exact date and time of first translation.
b. The reason for the apparent delay in translating or deciphering of some
of the most vital messages.
c. Who got each message, when and in what form.
d. The evaluation made of them at the time and the degree of reliance
placed thereon by the General Staff and by the Navy.
e. The origin of the "Budapest" intercept.
4. Significant details regarding the "Winds" intercept might be explored :
[S625] a. The original of the Navy Department message and translation,
now probably part of the original Roberts Report i*ecords, or at least, questioning
of Mr. Justice Roberts would possibly disclose how that Commission disposed of it.
b. The Navy's alleged delivery of two copies of the translation to the Army
(Tr., Safford C. 133-135), as to just what procedure there was for delivery, as to
who was responsible therefor, and who had a duty to check up on whether the
translation was received.
c. Whether General Miles, Admiral Noyes, Colonel Bratton, or Captain Safford
knew about the Anglo-Dutch-U. S. Joint Action Agreement, in which case they
would have known that a "War with Britain" message would necessarily have
involved the United States in war.
Did you ever hear about that one before ?
General Short. I learned that in respect to the report, as I say, 2 or
3 days before the committee met. I had never heard about it before
that time.
Senator Ferguson. Well, do you know whether or not Miles did
know about that Anglo-Dutch-U. S. joint action agreement, in which
case they would have known that the War with Britain message would
necessarily have involved the United States in war ?
3200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[8626] General Short. I don't remember whether that question
was specifically asked him or what his answer was.
Senator Fjsrguson (reading) :
d. Whether the partial implementation "War with Britain" was brought to
Admiral Stark's or General Marshall's attention, it being clear that the Chief
of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff did know of the Joint Action Policy.
e. Did the Navy in any way notify Admiral Kimmel or Commander Rochefort
of the implementation intei'cept?
f. Did the Honolulu intercept stations independently receive the activating
"Winds" message?
g. What was the significance of the other Japanese intercepts which the Board
failed to examine?
[8627] Did you know that the Army board had failed to examine
certain intercept messages?
General Short. I did not know what they had examined. I was
never permitted to see or know anything about magic.
Senator Ferguson (reading) :
h. Whether General (then Colonel) Fielder actually received the message
directing him to contact Commander Rochefort, whether he did so, and whether
there is substance to the hypothesis that he and Short were relying upon the
warning they would expect to receive when the second or implementing "winds"
message would be intercepted, thus giving advance notice of hostilities.
General Short. I never heard of the winds code until I read the
Roberts report here sometime in August 1944. That was the first
time I knew there was such a thing.
Senator Ferguson. You never knew then that Rochefort, admiral
or commander, whatever he was — it was Commander Rochefort —
had known that there was intercepted a winds or implementing
message ?
General Short. No, sir ; I had never heard of it.
Senator Ferguson. So then you were not waiting, as a matter of
fact, on an implementing winds message in order that you may be
given advance notice of hostilities?
General Short. I was not.
[8628] Senator Ferguson. This is signed Myron C. Cramer,
major general. United States, Judge Advocate General.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; I will yield.
Mr. Murphy. As you remember, we were first going to put in the
first 18 pages, and I then stated in the record it was unfair to have
the 18 in without the explanatory part but to have incorporated in
the judge advocate general's opinion the report of Major Clausen.
There is also in the record the cross-examination from the Clausen
report of General Gerow. I do not see how you can intelligently
understand a report if you have only three parts of it in and not
the whole.
I request, in view of the matters that have been read, that the entire
report go in as an exhibit.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I am putting in here just what
the judge advocate general was asking Clausen to look into. I
haven't time this afternoon to examine him on the whole matter here
that is contained in this volume.
I want to ask you. General Short, if you read this paper that I read
and that I have before me, these affidavits of Clausen, or in the Clausen
report ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3201
General Short. I have read the complete report.
[8620] Senator Ferguson. You have read the complete report?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. The papers have never had the Clausen report. I
think they are entitled to them.
The Vice Chairman. Without objection, then
Mr. Keefe (interposing). Just hold it, Mr. Chairman. I have at
least on one or two other occasions registered objection to the intro-
duction of the so-called Clausen statement at this time, until after we
have had an opportunity to go into that situation in connection with
the examination of Colonel Bratton and others who expect to be
witnesses.
When the full facts with reference to it are developed it can then
be disclosed as to whether it is material and pertinent to this inquiry.
I do not care to be a party to consenting to the introduction in evi-
dence of matter which may or maj^ not be pertinent.
The Vice Chairman. Does the gentleman of AVisconsin object to the
request of the gentleman of Pennsylvania?
Mr. Murphy. May I say on this point, the Navy had a special ex-
amination after the naval court of inquiry concluded, by Admiral
Hart, and they had a subsequent examination by Admiral Hewitt,
and in each of those cases it was conducted by an individual going
about the world to [8630] take 'testimony. The Clausen ex-
amination, as I understand it, covered 57,000 miles to the war fronts
of the world.
I am simply making my request so that everything about Pearl Har-
bor shall be known, for whatever it is w^orth. Maybe it will not be
worth nuich in the view of individual members, but so that all the
facts wdll be before the papers of the country I think it should be
made an exhibit.
Mr. Keefe. In view of that statement, it is perfectly obvious why
the statement is made ; I do not want any misinterpretation of the pur-
pose of my objection.
There is quite a difference between the Hewitt report and the Hart
report and the manner in which the two were prepared, quite a differ-
ence between the questions and answers of witnesses recorded under
oath than the mere statement that is made in the taking of affidavits.
Now I have some Iniowledge as to the manner and method in which
affidavits are obtained, and so far as I am concerned, it will all be
brought out at the proper time. I do not think they should be intro-
duced in evidence at this time but should await the time when the
individuals become witnesses on the stand and it gives us an oppor-
tunity to examine those witnesses in reference to how those affidavits
were obtained.
Mr. Murphy. According to the papers the gentleman said
[8631] he wants to conclude by February 15, and I want to be
sure the Clausen report is in by then, and I think this is as good a time
as any.
The Vice Chairman. Permit me to remind the gentleman from
Wisconsin, as I recall the only witness who has appeared before the
committee so far and who had appeared before the Army board of
inquiry and later gave an affidavit to Major Clausen was General
Gerow.
Mr. Keefe. That is correct.
3202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Vice Chairman. General Gerow was questioned by members
of the committee about his affidavit that he gave to Major Clausen.
Mr. Keefe. I certainly would not have any objection to having
General Gerow's affidavit, which he gave to Clausen, introduced in
evidence.
Senator Ferguson. It is already in evidence.
Mr. Keefe. It is already in evidence. Now all I ask is that the
same situation with respect to the affidavit, perhaps, of Colonel Brat-
ton and others be indulged in. I have no objection to the public and
the world knowing just exactly what is in every one of those affidavits,
but I would like to introduce them at a time when I have the right
to cross-examine the w^itness who gave those affidavits.
Mr. Murphy. As I understand it, Mr. Chairman, Major [8632]
Clausen, I believe, questioned 135 witnesses. I do not believe we are
going to have them all here. Ordinarily, if you put any part of an
instrument in you ought to put all of it in, for whatever it is worth.
The Vice Chairman. The objection has been heard. That settles
the matter for the present.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, in view of what has been said
I think it should be made clear that we do not take the affidavits of
135 witnesses. If Colonel Clausen appears here and we can examine
him about it, we can review that whole question at that time. In
the meantime it is a little premature.
Mr. Murphy. I understand, sir, we have already agreed to take
the statements of the staffs at Hawaii.
Senator Brewster. As the gentleman well knows, those who are
in the category of these witnesses we agreed to let go in evidence.
Mr. Keefe. That matter has heretofore been determined by this
committee, as the Chairman will know, when we agreed to p^-ut in
sworn testimony in the place of calling certain witnesses, and the
Clausen matter was specifically eliminated by unanimous action of
the committee at that time.
[8633] The Vice Chairman. That is true, of course. It was
determined by the committee in executive session that the Clausen
material would not be included with this other material, but it does
not follow that any member of the committee is deprived of the right
to ask unanimous consent to include it at any time he may desire.
Mr. Murphy. I ask it particularly in view of the fact that those
members of the armed forces of the United States were fighting in
the battlefronts of the world, and swore before God under oath that
what they said was true, and it was presented to us by an officer of
the United States Army.
Senator Brewster. You produce the officer, and we will listen to
him.
The Vice Chairman. Proceed.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar. General, with the planes
that were passing through Hawaii to other fronts for other places
in the Pacific ?
General Short. To the Philippines in particular ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
General Short. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3203
Senator Ferguson. Were these planes up until the Tth [8634-]
the same as those that came in then? They were not armed?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. No ammunition in them ?
General Short. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. You were to arm them there and then send
them on ?
General Short. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Had that ever been done before?
General Short. All the planes that had gone to the Philippines
came in in that condition up to December 7.
Senator Ferguson. Came in that condition?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. So there was no alteration at that time?
General Short. You mean the ones coming in on the Tth ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
General Short. No, sir ; that had been the normal procedure.
Senator Ferguson. Was your force being reinforced or were these
planes, from a certain day, all going through to the Philippines?
General Short. We had actually lost planes. We had 21 B-17's
at one time, and 9 of those were sent to the [86SS] Philippines
and we were down to 12, and had to rob 6 of those of parts to keep
the others going through.
Senator Ferguson. Did that impress you with the fact that there
was more thought of an attack in the Philippines than there was in
your territory ?
General Short. No question about it. They were ferrying in the
last few months everything to the Philippines they could.
Senator Ferguson. Can we get what planes went through Hawaii
from, say, July, or something like that, Mr. Richar-dson ?
Mr. Richardson. We will try.
Senator Ferguson. Try and get that, and what planes stopped and
how they completed their journey.
General Short. May I interject there, also, there were other types
of planes that were not flown through, that were shipped through on
transports.
Senator Ferguson. You knew about that?
General Short. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Had you been reinforced in such a way by ship-
ping planes in after, say, September?
General Short. I think we got most of our planes before July 1.
I could not state definitely, but I think we did.
[86S6] Senator Ferguson. After that, had you requested any
more planes for your defense ?
General Short. We had in August put in that study showing that
we should have a total of 180 B-17's.
Senator Ferguson. Had you ever received any word of any kind
that after the 27th of November the Secretary of State had made a
statement to the Secretary of War that the matter, in effect — I do
not undertake to quote him in exact words — was then being turned
over to the Army and Navy ?
General Short. I had not.
3204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. You indicated yesterday that yon were of the
opinion that General Marshall had never seen the message of the
27th as it was sent, prior to the time it was sent to you.
General Short. Yes, sir ; I believe that is correct.
Senator Ferguson. And where do you get that knowledge?
General Short. Because General Marshall was not in Washington.
He was, according to his testimonj'', and that of others, in the Carolinas
for maneuvers. He stated, as I remember in his testimony that when
he returned to his office on the 28th, he thought he found his message
on his desk.
Senator Ferguson. And he saw it afterward? [86S7] He
saw it after the maneuvers ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you want to add anything to or subtract
anything from any of your answers that I may have asked you ques-
tions on?
General Short. I might bring out the fact that in addition to planes,
a few days before December 7, 1 had a wire from the War Department
asking me if I would be willing to ship forty -eight 75-millimeter guns
and 120 30-caliber machine guns to the Philippines, and that they
would replace them very soon. I agreed to that.
The transport was held at the time long enough to get them aboard,
and they were shipped to the Philippines. That, of course, was an-
other indication that they considered the situation in the Philippines
much more critical than in Hawaii.
Senator Ferguson. And had you had the understanding before that
that we knew our authorities Imew that in case of a war with Japan,
we conld not hope to hold the Philippines?
General Short. I think that for years it had always been considered
that we probably would lose the Philippines and have to retake them.
I think in playing our war games at the War College, that had been
the usual assumption.
[SOSS] Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the letter
from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel wherein he quoted the
President as saying that it would be very embarrassing to us if the
Philippines were attacked ?
General Short. I am not. I don't remember.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know, as a military man, how it could
have been embarrassing, using that word ; is that the word you use in
military circles, or is that a diplomatic word?
General Short. I think it would always be embarrassing from a
military point of view, to lose anything of that kind, but it was some-
thing we had expected would happen.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. And if an attack came, it would come against
the Philippines ?
General Short. It would come against the Philippines and we prob-
ably would not be able to hold them. We did not have enough out
there.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ?
Senator Ferguson. Just a moment.
Had you ever asked the question as to what our policy was in case
of an attack on the Philippines?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3205
General Short. No, sir. I thought I knew, because I had seen the
war plans when I was here in Washington.
[8639] I had played war games, commanded one side of the war
game in actual maneuvering at the War College. I think I at that
time knew it very thoroughly.
Senator Ferguson. What was our policy in case of an attack?
Would we go into action, into war ?
General Short. We would hold them as long as we could and then
expect to take them back.
Senator Ferguson. Did it mean a general war? Was that our
policy?
General Short. I think so.
Senator Ferguson. So then in your opinion, it meant war if they
attacked the Philippines, and the British and Dutch?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Just as much as if they attacked Hawaii or the
Marshalls, or Guam, or any other possessions ?
General Short. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Or even our Coast ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. I just want to say that you made an error when you
said that was quoting the President about the embarrassing situation.
[864O] Senator Ferguson. I want to get the exact language. I
would not under any circumstances leave a quote in here which is not
a correct quote. Can I get the last letter, counsel, in the Stark-Kimmel
letters ?
Mr. Murphy. I think he quotes the President in some matters, but
f do not think that was the quotation.
Senator Ferguson. Under no circumstances do I want to allow even
a thought that I am misquoting.
Were you here the day that the MacArthur affidavit was read into
evidence?
General Short. I am sorry. I did not get the question.
Senator Ferguson. Were you here on the day that the Clausen-
MacArthur letter was read in evidence?
General Short. I think I was. At least I have read it.
Senator Ferguson. Well, the substance of it, as I recall it, was that
General MacArthur claimed that he had enough information and was
not embarrassed by any lack of information. Did you know at that
time that he had magic?
General Short. No, sir ; I did not.
Senator FeI^guson. That would indicate that if he had sufficient
information then you had sufficient information, would it not ?
General Short. If you read that alone, you could readily [8641]
draw that inference, if you did not know anything about the situation.
Senator Ferguson. But if you know about magic, do you think that
changes the situation?
General Short. There were two things that would give him much
more information. One was magic and the other, which I did not
know about, the message from the President to Commissioner Sayre,
that Commissioner Sayre, General MacArthur, and Admiral Hart
3206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
were to get together at a conference. There was a considerable amount
of information there.
Senator Ferguson. And the fact that he had magic and access to
that?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. So that there will be no doubt about my quota-
tion, I am going to ask to strike my previous question. I will quote
directly from the letter.
This is the letter of the 25th of November 1941, in exhibit 106.
The Vice Chairman. Whom is the letter from ?
Senator Ferguson. The original letter is signed "Betty."
The Vice Chairman. From whom to whom?
Senator Ferguson. From Admiral Stark to Admiral [864^]
Kimmel.
Now, I will read the postscript :
I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have
been in constant touch with Mr. Hull, and it was only after a long talk with him
that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situa-
tion. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would
be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles, an attack on
the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us.
There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight
others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people.
You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed
against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand,
Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely.
[8643] 1 won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do.
I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that
we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for ;
or we may do nothing — I think it is more likely to be "anything."
It is initialed "H. R. S."
Have you seen that? It was written on November 25, and he indi-
cates that he is holding it up because of a meeting with the President
and Mr. Hull and then he adds this postscript.
General Short. I have never seen it.
Senator Ferguson. Before December 7 ?
General Short. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. When is about the first that you heard of it ?
General Short. I heard it discussed here.
Senator Ferguson. In one of our joint committee hearings ?
General Short. Yes ; the first I ever heard of it.
Senator Ferguson. So you did not know what they were talking
about in there, about it being embarrassing if an attack was made on
the Philippines?
General Short. I did not know specifically what was intended.
^ [8644] Senator Ferguson. That is all. •
The Chairman. Congressman Keefe.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, before Congressman Keefe pro-
ceeds, there is a matter that I would like to bring to the attention of
the committee that just came to my attenion in connection with the
introduction of this record called the brief and resume of records of
the Roberts commission. I brought this originally to the attention
of the committee and asked its consideration, and it was deferred.
Copies were made available for examination.
Subsequently I stated that an examination of this indicated to me
clearly it was excerpts from a much longer report of the Robert^? com-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3207
mission and I asked that a complete record be put in this record and
be made an exhibit, in justice to all concerned, and that was agreed to.
Subsequent thereto, there were certain letters that were discussed
in connection with this, which went into the record yesterday. Last
night, just before adjournment, the gentleman from Pennsylvania,
Mr. Murphy, stated :
I do not want to offer something that was brought to him as an exhibit, but
I do want the record to show that if Senator Brewster does not renew his offer
of this file in the morning I will ask unanimous consent to have it go into the
record because I think it ought to be straightened [86^5] out on the record.
That being brought to my attention I came here this morning and
spoke to the chairman, Mr. Cooper, in charge, and I told him I had
to go to a meeting of conferees on the Ship Sales Act, and if it were
to be offered I wanted to be heard. He suggested I talk to Mr. Murphy,
which I did. I asked Mr. Murphy if he wanted to put this in and he
said no, that he had no intention at this time to put it in. I went
back to Mr. Cooper and told him the matter was adjusted. I find
subsequently in the morning Mr, Murphy did offer it. I am ready
to consider the further factors which led Mr. Murphy to change his
mind in the course of the morning.
Mr. Murphy. I would like to speak for myself.
Senator Brewster. I certainly shall be happj- to hear you.
The Chairman. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. I talked to the Senator from Maine this morning
and told him it was my understanding that exhibits 1 and 2 attached
to the file he had were not in evidence. I was informed by counsel
that they were, the counsel for General Short. Thereafter, after the
Senator from Maine
Senator Brew^sti;r. Just a moment. You said that was all our con-
versation ?
[8640] Mr. Murphy. I told you I did not intend to put the file
in right then.
Now, with the understanding that the general was not going to be
a witness after today, the general then made a statement to the effect,
as I recollect it, that the Judge Advocate General did not want anyone
on the Army board, but rather, one individual to go out to make a
survey of certain additional facts.
Then there is one other thing. Yesterday the gentleman said, as
I remember it, that there were certain parts of that record in this
exhibit.
Senator Brewster. The Roberts commission.
Mr. Murphy. Yes. In this exhibit there is a letter which states
that they are referring only to things on the record. ^Vlien the gen-
tleman saw fit to refer to The Adjutant General of the United States
Army, and apparently to the Secretary of War, with the inference, as
I got it, that there was some impropriety in sending out Major Clausen
to make this survey, I then asked that not only this exhibit but all of
the files of the War Department, including these and everything else,
go into the record, so we would have the entire picture.
I also stated on the record that this, in effect, was a complaint that
it was a one-sided ex parte proceeding. I [864-7] used that
word before the noon hour, an ex parte proceeding. I said in fair-
ness to the general, he ought to be able to give his answer here.
3208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Whereupon the general said, "I have a paper prepared here. I have
examined the exhibit." He then read his answer.
I do think, inasmuch as the gentleman from Maine has brought
it up, that he should be the one to offer it. Apparently he thought
it was significant, because he brought it up twice. I certainly do not
want to offend the general's feelings, but I am interested in the whole
truth. My only purpose in introducing it is if there was any wrong
committed by The Adjutant General, or anyone else on the staff, as
to the procedure, we ought to know it. That is the only reason why
it should be in this record.
Senator Brew^ster. I appreciate the gentleman's statement that he
wants the whole truth, and so do I want the whole truth, but having
examined this document I have found it does not even purport to
be anything but a very partial summary of certain portions of the
evidence. I asked for the entire evidence before the Roberts com-
mission to be put in as an exhibit, so that we would have the whole
truth, and that was agreed to.
I do not think we need to, or want, perhaps, to take the time of
the committee at this time. In the light of the [8S4S] cir-
cumstances as stated by Mr. Murphy and myself, I would ask that
the decision of the committee be reconsidered and that we have an
opportunity over the week end to consider the situation, with a view
to whether or not this should be incorporated in the record as an
exhibit.
I think there were some serious questions about this which I should
like to consider and perhaps discuss with Mr. Murphy and the com-
mittee.
Mr. Murphy. I would like to say that inasmuch as the good faith
of The Adjutant General of the United States Army appears to be
challenged, or the Judge Advocate General, I think this committee
and everybody should want to know the whole story, and for that
reason I think it should remain in the record.
Senator Brewster. I simply ask the matter be reconsidered.
The Chairman. That matter can be pending and the committee can
consider it.
The Vice Chairmax. As the record stands now, it is in the record.
The Senator is asking to reconsider it and the question of reconsid-
eration is carried over.
The Chairman. It is in the record as an exhibit, not as a part of
the transcript, I understand, so the question of reconsidering that,
as to whether it should be filed as an exhibit, will be pending.
[864^] Mr. Murphy. May I just say, Mr. Chairman, that there
are additional papers, and, as I understand it, counsel have a great
volume of them, and I hope there will be a study made over the week-
end. There is particularly one paper that is a memorandum dated
February 17, 1942, which refers to the original retirement paper, or
proposed retirement paper of the general, and it refers to a memo-
randum from General Marshall, and I would like to see that memo-
randum.
I have asked to have it here.
Senator Brewster. I think we should have all the records bearing
on this which were asked for some days ago by me. It was as the
result of that that these various records were produced.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMAIITTEE 3209
Mr. Murphy. I want to give the Senator full credit for it.
Senator Brewster. I want to say that I cannot conceive that
similar records to this do not exist in the Kinniiel case in the Navy
Departmnet, and I should like to have the matter thoroughly explored
in order that entire justice may be done to all concerned, if it is finally
decided that particularly documents of this character are to be in-
cluded in this record as exhibits.
The Chairman. All those matters can be straightened out by the
committee. The Chair would like to see if we cannot finish with
General Short today. We cannot do it [S6o0] if we argue
back and forth on these matters, which I think can be disposed of in
the committee itself.
Senator Ferguson. Just a moment. I do not want the record to
show that I feel that I was in a position to really examine General
Short on this because we dropped the subject and I did not cover it as
caref ulh' as I would want to. I did the best I could.
The Chairman. You made a pretty good stab at it.
Congressman Keefe.
Mr. Keefe. Thank 3'ou, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. You are welcome.
Mr. Keefe. It is always a great pleasure to find myself at the end
of this whijD cracking and get thrown off into the last minute of the
last hour of Saturday afternoon with witnesses, so that I am under
the urge, of necessity, of not consuming any time in trying to com-
plete with the witnesses.
I assure you. General Short, that I shall not utilize any of these
bulky minutes in my examination. I will try to get through by 4
o'clock.
Now, General, I sat here during your entire examination and
listened as attentively as I knew how to this mass of detail that has
been submitted to this committee.
The Chairman. Will you permit me to say that counsel [8651]
wishes to have a brief executive session at the conclusion of today's
session, so the members who are here will remain.
I beg your pardon for interrupting.
]Mr. Keefe. I wonder if I have arrived at a wrong conclusion, or
whether I am correct when I assume that the evidence up to date, and
the cross-examination of yourself, has tended to meet the issues
with respect to your conduct as the commander at Pearl Harbor
prior to December 7. when in the public's mind for a long time after
December 7. it was apparent that you and Admiral Kimmel were
charged with the failure of your responsibilities as commanders at
Pearl Harbor.
You specifically had training to alert your command to meet this
air attack, with all that is involved in that matter of alerting your
command.
In other words, the statement has repeatedly been made that had
Kimmel and Short been on the alert they would have been able to
meet this Jap attack and either repel it or to have minimized the
results of that attack, and therefore Pearl Harbor was the result
of the failure to be on a suitable and proper alert.
You felt the impact of that sentiment in the last i j'ears, did you
not?
79716 — 46 — pt. 7 20
3210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. Yes, sir.
[8652] Mr. Keefe. I understand your position to be, General
Short, that as commander at Pearl Harbor prior to December 7, 1941,.
and subsequent to your appointment to that important position you
did everything within your power to provide the physical things-
necessary to provide for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands.
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Keete. And it is your contention that as to many items of
physical property, such as guns, installations, radar equipment, air
strips, buildings, and so on, you did not get but a small part of the
material that you had requested prior to December 7, 1941.
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Keeee. General Marshall has testified, as I recall, that in his
opinion the material wliich you did have at Pearl Harbor on Decem-
ber 7, if alerted and effectively used, would have given a good account
of itself and perhaps enabled you to repel the attack, or to severely
minimize the damage that was caused. Do you agree with that ?
General Short. I could have given a better account of myself, but
to see how inadequate it was we need to only compare two items. The
best antiaircraft defense against low-flying planes, which did the
most damage there, is the .50-caliber machine gun. We had 109. Our
program at \8653] that time called for 345. but by December
1, 1942, they had actually increased the number of .50 caliber machine
guns on Hawaii to 793, showing how much more the AVar Department
thought was necessary, and keep in mind that that date is after the
Japanese had been seriously defeated at Midway.
Mr. Keefe. Now, General, I do not want to indulge in the realm of
hindsight or speculation. I know how easy it is to judge when you
have the benefit of hindsight and I do not feel I should call upon you
to indulge in a matter of speculation. The fact of the matter is, is
it not, that except for the possibility of getting a few more guns into
action and possibly minimizing, to a small extent, the damage that
was done, regardless of what you had out there on December 7, this
attack would have come in by surprise, isn't that true ?
[86S4-li General Short. With the information.
Mr. Keefe. With the information that you had?
General Short. The information we had from Washington, it was
bound to be a surprise.
Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now, then, I think it is quite clear from this evi-
dence, and anybody can correct me if they think I am in error, but as
I recall the evidence up to date, every witness that has testified con-
cluded that there was no probability of an attack by air on Hawaii,
except, as I recall, the testimony of Admiral Turner. He is the only
witness that testified to the probability, in his opinion, that an attack
by air would be made upon Pearl Harbor.
General Short. Except that General Miles said that the attack was
so obvious that they couldn't take the trouble to mention it.
The Chairman. What was that?
General Short. So obvious that they didn't mention it in any of his
estimates.
Mr. Keefe. Well, General Miles said that?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Very well. But it impresses me that everybody that
had access to the diplomatic changes and all of the information with
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3211
respect to the Japanese inten- [8655] tions concluded that the
attack, if it came at all, would be in the far west Pacific.
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. That is what you thought ?
General Short, Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. That is what Stark thought?
General Short. I think so.
Mr. Keefe. That is what General Marshall thought.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Everybody that I know of that had access to anything
thought that is where the attack would come.
Now, as evidence of that, you have brought before the committee a
long series of situations. Admiral Kimmel has done likewise. That
is, that that was the intention.
You have pointed out the fact that B-17's were sent out there un-
armed, with their guns cosmolined, that they arrived at the very time
that the attack was going on, as evidence that the Air Corps or nobody
else would have sent those B-17's into that fray unarmed had they ex-
pected an attack.
You have indicated that they were ordering you to ship your sup-
plies to the Philippines, material that you had on hand. That is cor-
rect, is it not ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
[8656] Mr. Keefe. As indicating that that is where the attack,
would take place?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Some place in the record there is evidence of a plan by
which the Army was to garrison our outlying islands. Do you re-
member that?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. You would garrison the islands of Samoa, Canton,
Christmas, Palmyra, and Johnston ; is that right ?
General Short. I think that Palmyra and Johnston were not spe-
cifically mentioned. They stated that we would at some future time
take over the outlying islands and we would garrison Christmas and
Canton at once.
Mr. Keefe. And when was that supposed to take place?
General Short. The message was received, I believe, November 29.
Mr. Keefe. Then the idea was, after the war warning message of
the 27th, plans were invoked by which you were to deplete your gar-
rison at Honolulu and to send Army replacements to garrison Canton,,
Samoa, Christmas; is that right?
General Short. I am doubtful whether Samoa was included, but
Christmas and Canton definitely.
Mr. Keefe. Canton and Christmas.
[8657] General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And they proposed to replace the troops thus removed
from Oahu with fresh troops to be brought from the mainland ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. That is correct?
General Short. Yes, sir. You took all of those things into consid-
eration, along with a lot of other facts that I will not burden the.
record with at this time, that indicated to you that if there was any
3212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
intent on the part of the Japs to attack Hawaii, that that information
would be available to Washington, and would be forwarded to you ?
Mr. Keefe. And you got no information that would indicate a
specific attack on Hawaii ?
General Short. No, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now, it appears in accordance with the record that is
before the committee that this November 27 warning message, page
7 of exhibit 32, was received in the Hawaii signal center at 6 : 46 p. m.
Washington time, 1 : 16 Hawaiian time, having been dispatched from
Washington to Hawaii at 6 o'clock p. m., Washington time on the
27th day of November, and that you replied as shown by your message
on page 12 of exhibit 32, which was encoded in Hawaii at 11 : 10 p. m.
Washington time, or 5 : 40 p. m. Hawaii [86SS~\ time, and it
was received in the War Department code room at Washington at
5 : 57 a. m. on the 28th of November, or 12 : 27 a. m. the 28 of November,
Hawaiian time.
Now, there we had the war warning message to General Short and
General Short's reply to General Marshall in which you stated that
you were alterted against sabotage, and had liaison with the Navy.
Now, after that message of Marshall's you received a message from
G-2, that has been referred to, sent to you by General Miles, a short
message, on November 27, which reads :
Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemale stop Hostilities may
ensue stop Subversive activities may be expected stop Inform Commanding
General and Chief of StafE only.
Signed Miles.
That message went from G-2 in Washington to G-2 Hawaii ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And advises the G-2 in Hawaii to inform you and your
chief of staff only, and refers to nothing but sabotage?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. You saw that message, did you ?
[86S9] General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Then on the 28th day of November you received a mes-
sage signed *'Adams." Wlio was Adams ?
General Short. He was the adjutant general.
Mr. Keefe. He had authority to send you messages?
General Short. His message meant that it was authorized by the
Chief of Staff.
Mr. Keefe. He would not send you a message unless it was author-
ized by the Chief of Staff, would he ?
General Short. I am sure he wouldn't.
Mr. Keefe. He had the authority to give you a command?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And in this message which he sent you on the 28th day
of November he states :
Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against
subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Depart-
ment. Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures to pro-
vide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and equipment
against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propa-
ganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop This does not repeat
not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop Protective measures should
be confined [S660] to those essential to security comma avoiding unneces-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3213
sary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams
are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat nor afEect your possibility
under existing instructions.
Now, when you received that telegram on the 28th after Washington
had receive your message in which you stated that you were alerted
against sabotage, did that tend to influence you in your thinking that
the alert which you had was the proper alert, the alert that Washington
wanted ?
General Short. It did. I thought it was an answer to my radiogram
and wanted to emphasize the question of legality.
Mr. Keefe. Now, there was also sent to the commanding general,
Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, on the 28th a message signed
"Carl Kobinson, adjutant general." Did you receive that one?
General Short. Robinson?
Mr. Keefe. That is what is looks like to me.
General Short. What page is that?
Mr. Keefe. Well, I don't know
Mr. Murphy. He is reading from different exhibits.
Mr. Keefe. Here it is. This one here. Wouldn't you [8661'\
say that is "Robinson" ?
Senator Ferguson. I have one by Sullivan. Is this the one you
want ?
Senator Lucas. "Williams" isn't it?
Mr. Murphy. The record shows that somebody thought it was Wall,
somebody thought it was Sullivan, and now you say it is Robinson.
Mr. Keefe. Here is the photostatic copy.
Mr. Murphy. I have seen it. I can't make it out.
Mr. Keefe. Robinson, R-o-b-i-n-s-o-n, as plain as anything.
General Short. It is the Arnold message you are reading, from the
Chief of Air Corps ?
Mr. Keefe. Yes ; that is the one.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, is it Robinson, Arnold, Williams, or
Sullivan ?
Mr. Keefe. This is signed Carl Robinson, adjutant general. My
eyes aren't too good, but I can certainly see that.
That came out to you on the 28th of November, did it not ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And that reads :
[8662] Attention Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force Period That
Instructions substantially as follows be issued to all establishments and units
under your control and command is desired Colon Against those subversive activi-
ties within the field of investigative responsibility of the War Department Parea
See paragraph three MID SR three zero dash four five Paren
Wliatever that means. That is what you were worried about, Mr.
Chariman, the other day.
The Chairman. I am still worrying about it.
Mr. Keefe. So am I.
Then it says :
The present critical situation demands that all precautions be taken at onoe
Period It is desired also that all additional measures necessary be initiated by you
immediately to provide the following Colon Protection of your personnel against
subversive propaganda Comma Protection of all activities against espionage
Comma and protection against sabotage of your equipment Comma property and
establishments Period This does not repeat not authorize any illegal measures
3214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Period Avoiding unnecessary alarm and publicity protective measures should be
confined to those essentially to secure Period Para It is also desired \8663]
that on or before December five this year reports be submitted to the Chief Army
Air Forces of all steps initiated by you to comply with these instructions Period
(Signed) Aknold.
[8664] Now, you got that on the 28th of November?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Another message which refers specifically and only to
sabotage and espionage; that is true?
General Short. That is true.
Mr. K^EEFE. The message speaks for itself.
Now, you replied to those two messages, the one from the adjutant
general and the one from the air, the Arnold message, you replied
separately, did you not ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And you replied at considerable length ?
General Short. Very great detail.
Mr. Keefe. And those replies, your reply was addressed to the
Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. And in this reply, which I shall not attempt to read, I
take it this message is in the record and I won't burden the record
with reading it again, j^ou give them a full and complete description
of everything you have done ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now, General
The Chairman. What is the date of that?
Mr. Keefe. The date is the 29th of November 1941.
[8665] Perhaps I had better read it into the record right at this
spot:
Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth comma full precautions are
Ijeing taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative respon-
sibility of War Department paren paragraph three mid sc thirty ddsh forty five
end paren and military establishments including personnel and equipment stop
As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such
as power plants conuna telephone exchanges and highway bridges comma this
headquarters by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one re-
quested the governor of the territory to use the broad powers vested in him by
section sixty seven of the organic act which provides comma in effect comma that
the governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the
United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence
comma invasion comma insurrection etc stop Pursuant to the authority stated
the governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on
this headquarters to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as
may be necessary to prevent sabotage comma and lawless violence in connection
therewith conuna being committed against vital installations and structures
[S666] in the territory stop Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate
military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations stop In
this connection comma at the instigation of this headquarters the city and county
of Honolulu on .Tune thirteenth nineteen forty one enacted an ordnance which
permits the Commanding General Hawaiian Department comma to close comma
or restrict the use of and travel upon comma any higliway within the city and
county of Honohilu comma whenever the commanding general deems such action
necessary in the interest of national defense Stop The authority thus given
has not yet been exercised Stop Relations with FBI and all other Federal
and Territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has
been given on all pertinent matters
Signed, "Short."
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3215
Did you consider that there was full and complete and ample notice
to the War Department at Washington as to what you were doing
out there in Hawaii ?
General Short. It seems to me I thought it was very definitely a
full explanation.
Mr. Keefe. So if your message of the 27th in response to the
Marshall message in which you used the language "alerted against
sabotage — liaison with the Navy," might be contended [56'^7]
by some people to be too short and too brief and not full enough, this
message which went to the Adjustant General is full and complete as
stating everything that you were doing?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Then also on the next day, November 30, 1941, originat-
ing at Fort Shafter at 12 :57 a. m., the message being dated November
29, you replied to the message from General Marshall ?
General Short. That was on December 4. On page 19. I think
the one you have is a Panama message.
Mr. Keefe, No. Did you send a reply to the message from Arnold?
General Short. General Martin sent the reply after my O. K., and
it is shown on page No. 19, 19 and 20, sent over both General Martin's
name and mine.
Mr. Keefe. Oh yes. That is pages 19 and 20 of Exhibit 32.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. That gives a full and complete response to the wire
received by you from General Arnold?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Iveefe. And this was prepared by General Martin of the Air
Corps in Hawaii but bears your signature?
[866S] General Short. Yes, sir; and bears his also.
Mr. Keefe. So that there again was a full and complete statement
to Washington addressed to the Chief of the Air Corps setting forth
•completely just what you were doing out there at Hawaii?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now, I understand that from the time you sent your
reply on the 27th of November right down to December 7, the time
of the attack, you never received a single word from Washington that
would indicate that these replies which you gave to these messages,
and which are now in the record, did not indicate that you were carry-
ing out the instructions from Washington?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. Now, you assumed during all this period, having re-
plied to the Marshall message, having replied at great length to the
Adjutant General's message, having replied at great length to the
message sent you by the Chief of the Air Corps, you felt full assur-
ance tTiat had any other alert been expected by Washington they cer-
tainly had all the information as to what you were doing and would
have given you the order; is that your position?
General Short. I did ; I felt that.
Mr. Keefe. Now, as a matter of fact, your war plans, [8669f]
jou were familiar with Rainbow 5, were you not?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. IvF^FE. And WPL-46?
3216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. Less familiar with it than Rainbow 5 but familiar
with it .
Mr. Keefe. It is a fact, is it not, General Short, that the war plans,
the joint war plans of the Army and the Navy for war in the Pacific
with Orange, which was Japan, contemplated an offensive war in the
event of outbreak of hostilities?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr, Keefe. And that commencement of hostilities was to be an-
nounced by radiogram to all theaters announcing in plain English just
what ways to put that plan into effect — M-day ?
General Short. M-day, that is right.
Mr. Keefe. Then everybody knew, all over the Pacific, just exactly
what to do ; isn't that true ?
General Short. That is true.
Mr. Keefe. In accordance with the plans already worked out?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. That contemplated, so far as the fleet was concerned at
Pearl Harbor, an offensive action against the [8670] Marshalls
and the Carolines, did it not ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. So that in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, ac-
cording to the recorded plan which is here in evidence, that fleet was
supposed to go on the offensive immediately ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. That meant air cover, did it not?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And when Pearl Harbor happened the plans had to be
completely revised and instead of an offensive war it became a defensive
war; isn't that true?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. Did any of the war plans, so far as j^ou know, contem-
plate an attack on Pearl Harbor ?
General Short. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Keefe. Of course, I assume. General Short, that you were train-
ing personnel out there at Honolulu all the while you were there in
various games of one kind or another designed to protect that island?
General Short. That is correct.
[8671] Mr. Keefe. You knew that Pearl Harbor and the Island
of Oahu was a vital thing in our war games and plans as far as the
Pacific area was concerned ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. Now, radar has been mentioned here repeatedly. You
were pretty young and pretty new in the radar field at the time of
the 7th of December, weren't you ?
General ShorT. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. The fact of the matter is you only had about two people
out there that knew much of anything about it, isn't that true?
General Short. We had had two and three more arrived and be-
came available the day before the attack.
Mr. Keefe. In fact, you had sent a couple of men to the mainland
to sort of get some instructions a short time before December 7,
hadn't .you ?
General Short. That is right. They had just gotten back.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3217
Mr. Keefe, They had gone there with the full knowledge of Wash-
ington and practically on instructions from Washington to get some
knowledge about this radar business ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And what you were trying to do was to train as many
men as you could in the use of such facilities as you had?
[S672] General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Isn't that true?
(xeneral Short. Yes, sir.
]Mr. Keefe. Well, the utilization of the radar then, as I under-
stand it, in view of the attitude that no one expected any attack out
there at Pearl Harbor, was more largely based upon the desire for
training than it was the expectation that they would intercept Jap
planes coming into an attack that nobody expected would ever occur
out there, am I correct in that assumption?
General Short. You are correct.
Mr. Keefe. Admiral Kimmel has testified that he was compelled
to indulge in large-scale training activities because his fleet was being
depleted constantly of trained personnel for transfers to other theaters.
Did you know that that was taking place?
General Short. I think I did.
Mr. Keefe. Did you transfer any troops from your command in the
fall of 1941 to other theaters?
General Short. Trained crews for the B-l7's.
Mr, Keefe. Yes. Xow, you were training those crews out there,
were you not ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. You couldn't ship B-17's out to the Philip- [867S]
pines without trained operating and ground crews, could you ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. And you were busy training those crews as fast as the
B-17's would come in, to take them on and ferry them out to the
Philippines ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. And that is where the emphasis was being placed, to get
those bombers out to the Philippines ?
General Short. Yes, sir,
Mr. Keefe. Well, now. General Short, how in the world could you
have put your command on a No. 3 alert without disclosing your
intent ?
General Short. It was impossible.
Mr. Keefe. Well, I agree with you.
The military installations on Oahu, Avhich is a very small island,
'some of them are right next door to the biggest hotel there, isn't that
true ?
General Short, That is correct,
Mr, Ejeefe. Right near the public parks?
General Short, Yes, sir.
Mr. IvEEFE. Now, if you went on an all-out alert it would mean more
than just having a few people running around with steel helmets and
a little field equipment, would it not ?
General Short. It would.
3218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[8674] Mr. Keefe. It would mean putting up barbed wire en-
tanglements, it would mean stretching signal wires around and put-
ting up emergency signal equipment, would it not ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. It would mean the complete control of the life of that
island so far as black-outs and all that sort of thing was concerned-
General Short. I could not have exercised complete control over
the civil population until martial law was put into effect, but it would
have been control so far as the Governor could have complied with my
wishes.
Mr. Keefe. Now, I am wondering if I am correct in my thinking
that here is some 135,000 Japanese with a tremendous number of loyal
Japanese but an unknown number of disloyal Japanese. You had
that problem before you constantly, did you not ?
General Short. We did.
Mr. Keefe. And you could not tell what would happen in the event
of a rupture of diplomatic relations between this country and Japan
so far as that overwhelming Japanese population out there was con-
cerned ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. Now, that was well known to the AVar Department at
all times here and everybody connected with it, wasn't [8675]
it?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. So this question of sabotage and espionage became a
highly important thing so far as Oahu was concerned?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now, when they sent you this message that said you
should take a reconnaissance and such other defensive measures a&
you deem necessary, you explained the failure of reconnaissance by
reason of the fact that you had a written contract with the Navy which
was approved by the War and Navy Departments, and you say that
General Marshall thoroughly understood that, in your opinion ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And that whoever wrote that message in Ms absence
apparently had overlooked the fact that that was a Navy responsi-
bility, is that your answer?
General Short. That is my answer.
Mr. Keefe. And that when it says "other defensive measures,"
measures against sabotage and espionage would be those other defen-
eive measures, would they not?
General Short. To me they appeared the most important.
Mr. Keefe. Now, you had a chief of staff. Was it Colonel Phillips?
[8676] General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Was he a colonel or a major?
General Short. He was a colonel.
Mr. Keefe. You requested that he be assigned to you as your chief
of staff, did you not ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. You made that request of General Marshall when you
were appointed?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. When did he get out there ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3219
Greneral Short. About March 1.
Mr. Keefe. Who was the chief of staff prior to the time that
Colonel Phillips arrived?
General Short. Col. Philip Hayes.
Mr. Keefe. When did Colonel Haj^es retire as chief of staff?
General Short. I believe it was effective November 5, but I think
he had been on leave of absence for a few clays before that.
Mr. Keefe. Well, I do not quite understand that, General. You
say that Colonel Phillips was sent out there to be your chief of staff
in March, but Colonel Hayes continued out there until about the 5th
of November.
General Short. I was understood that Phillips was to [8677]
become chief of staff upon the expiration of the tour of Colonel
Hayes and the time, the interim was used to put Colonel Phillips
through all the sections of the general staff to familiarize him with
conditions.
Mr. Keefe. So that he would have full knowledge when he actually
assumed the responsibilities of chief of staff?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. So that he actually did not perform as chief of staff
until some time, you think, in
General Short. The last part of October, the last few days of
October.
Mr. Keefe. When the commission came through ordering Hayes
back?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. He was an experienced man, was he not?
General Short. He was an unusually experienced man on. field work
and training.
Mr. Keefe. Did he talk Chinese ?
General Short. I think so. He has been since that time the senior
liaison officer with the Sixth Chinese Army, with 300 officers under
him, one down to each battalion and I believe that the rating of that
Sixth Army, from talking with American officers, was extremely high,
perhaps the best of the Chinese armies.
[SsfS] Mr. Keefe. Well, your chief of staff continued on after
this debacle at Pearl Harbor?
General Short. Yes, sir; he continued. The War Department had
ordered Colonel Collins over there to become chief of staff and Gen-
eral Emmons asked him to stay as deputy chief of staff. He remained
on for almost a year and at his own request was relieved as he desired
to get more active service.
Mr. Keefe. Now, in this line of command you had a staff?
General Short. Yes. sir.
Mr. Keefe. Kimmel had a staff?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. You each had your chief of staff?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And you had your chiefs of various departments of
your layout out tl^ere?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now in the line of command it was the responsibility
of the commanding general to issue an order to his chief of staff and
3220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
it went on from him down through to the various other elements that
would be affected by that order?
General Short. Yes, sir,
Mr. Keefe. Is that correct?
[8679] General Short, That is the normal way.
Mr. Keefe. That is a normal method of doing business, is it not ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe, And in connection with your determinations, they were
your determinations and your orders when issued, but on vital matters
were they the result of the combined action of your staff?
General Short, I could go to them for advice but the responsibility
was definitely mine no matter under what circumstances I made the
decision, I could not pass the responsibility to them because they
participated.
Mr, Keefe. Oh, I understand that thoroughly, but the point is you
are the president of this corporation out there and you have got a
board of directors as your staff and you sit in staff meetings and talk
these things over, isn't that true ?
General Short, That is correct.
Mr, Keefe, And you as the president have to make the ultimate
decision.
General Short, That is correct.
Mr, Keefe, Did you ever have a situation where you and your staff
disagreed on anything of great importance ?
General Short, I don't think we did,
[8680] Mr, Keefe, Did you have a telephone out there that you
could call Washington ?
General Spiort, I had what we called a scrambler phone and Gen-
eral Marshall had one in his office,
Mr, I^efe, Did you ever use it ?
General Short, I did,
Mr, Keefe. How long did it take to get a message through normally
from Honolulu to Washington here using that scrambler telephone
business ?
General Short, The times I used it I would say 10 or 15 minutes.
On the morning of the attack, along about S : 15 I directed Colonel
Phillips to call General Marshall because I was going to my field
command post and I believe that he got the connection at 8 : 22. I
think it took 7 minutes.
Mr. Keefe, In other words, do I understand that that morning
right while the attack was going on Colonel Phillips called General
Marshall on the scrambler telephone and got a connection in about
7 minutes ?
General Short, And told him if he would listen he could hear the
bombs. The attack was still going on,
Mr, Keefe, I might also say in that connection that I was advised
by Mr, Hoover when Mr, Gearhart and I talked with him that Mr.
Shivers, his agent out there, called him when he was up in New York
and got a direct telephone connection [8681] in just a few
minutes right while the attack was going on and he heard the bombs
dropping over the telephone.
Well, if you could get the telephone message while this attack was
going on in just a few minutes there wouldn't be any reason why the
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3221
line was not clear so a message could come from the other way, from
Washington to Honolulu, is there?
General Short. There wouldn't appear to be.
Mr. Keefe. Now I would like to get some idea about the use of this
other means of communication out there. Wasn't there radio com-
munication ?
General Short. The Army had a 10-kilowatt station and the Navy
had a 25-kilowatt station ; the FBI had a station, I think it was quite
a good deal more powerful than the Army. I am not sure whether it
was 25 or what. And there was also a commercial radiogram and
commercial cable.
Mr. Keefe. These radiograms back and forth, did you use the Army
set-up frequently ?
General Short. I think they always used it when it was not over-
loaded and when the atmospheric conditions were such that the 10-
watt system would go through.
Mr. Keefe. Well, do you know whether any investigation has ever
been made to see what the atmospheric conditions were that morning
as to whether or not they could use this radio as a means of communi-
cation ?
[8G82] General Short. I have heard — I did not know it at the
time — I have heard since that they did have some trouble getting
through with that 10-kilowatt system that morning.
Mr. Keefe. Well, do you know about the Navy or the FBI ?
General Short. I am sure that they could have gotten through.
Mr. Keefe. I recall the testimony here that at the time they were
considering the question of sending this message on the morning of
December 7 in General Marshall's office, I think I recall that somebody
suggested that Admiral Stark offered the use of the Navy radio.
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. And it was not used. Well, now, supposing you had
been called on the telephone, or supposing a telephone call had been
put in here that morning b}' somebody when the Japanese fourteenth
part message and the short message of instruction was received,
decoded and translated and in clean form some time between 7 and 8
o'clock that morning, would you have been aroused from your slumbers
that morning or somebody out there to answer a telephone if one had
come through ?
General Short. We had an officer on the general staff on duty all
night along right by the phone and there would have been no difficulty
in getting anyone. He could have [8683] gotten me within
a minute or two.
Mr. Keefe. Well, the story has gone around the country that you
were all drunk out there that night; that you were drunk and that
Kimmel was drunk and everybody else was drunk and that everybody
was asleep out there at Pearl Harbor sleeping off a jag. That is the
way it has been told out around the country. Now, is there any truth
in that. General Short?
General Short. There is absolutely no truth in it. If I may add
one thing
Mr. Keefe. Go ahead.
General Short. To show that the War Department, if they were not
conscious at that time that more than one means of communication
3222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
could be used, they became fully conscious at the time they issued the
order to relieve me. I got that order three diflerent ways within 30 to
40 minutes. I received a radiogram first. Ten or fifteen minutes
later General Emmons got off a plane with a printed order. Fifteen
or twenty minutes later the secretary of the general staff called
Colonel Philips to ask if I had received the order.
Mr. Keefe. So 3'ou got it in
General Short. In three different ways.
Mr. Keefe (continuing). In three different ways?
[8684] General Short. Yes.
Mr. IvEEFE. To make sure that you got it ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Well, now. General Short, to be perfectly frank and
candid, you have told us where you were that night ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. You were not expecting an attack at all?
General Short. No, sir.
Mr. Keefe. You had your various members of your establishment
at their respective duties that night the same as they had been?
General Short. Yes, sir, and my chief of staff at midnight, owing
to the fact that we were expecting the B-17's in from Hamilton Field,
went over to headquarters and checked up to find out whether any ad-
ditional information had been received in regard to them. I know my
chief of staff was at our headquarters as late as midnight the night
before.
Mr. Keefe. »You had no notice whatsoever of this intercept of the
first thirteen parts of the fourteen pail message and no knowledge
whatsoever until after the attack of the receipts of the short message
or anj'^thing else?
General Short. Seven hours after the attack.
Mr. Keefe. As evidence of the fact, if I understand your statement
correctly. General Short, when tlie attack did take [8680] place
and your all-out alert was ordered the men did do a remarkably splen-
did job of defense?
General Short. They did it with great rapidity and precision.
Every man knew exactly his job and it went into effect extremely
rapidly.
Mr. Keefe. It was too late.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. I was a little intrigued by the questions that were asked
this morning by Senator Ferguson with respect to the difficulties which
were encountered out there due to not only duplication of or, rather,
separation of command but also the intervention of a third govern-
mental unit in the picture, namely, the Interior Department, which
had to be dealt with in the matter of securing permission to erect mili-
tary installations out there and I think you testified that it took nearly
a year to get permission to erect some installations for radar equip-
ment on Government-owned land, part of the parks system, under the
supervision of the Interior Department.
General Short. About 10 months.
Mr. Keefe. About 10 months. In the face of possibilities of an
attack in Hawaii?
General Short. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3223
Mr. Keefe. Now, General Short, there has been a tremendous
amount of information given to the American people with [8686'\
respect to a Colonel Clausen and a Hans Wilhelm Rohl, who were in
charge of Army construction out there in Hawaii. Now, I do not want
to go into that because that would take all next week.
The Vice Chairman. You mean Colonel AVyman.
Mr. Keefe. Wyman, that is right. I don't mean Clausen. I mean
Colonel Wyman.
And the inference has been that due to certain failures of the Army
engineers in making installations out there at Pearl Harbor the in-
stallations were delayed and, thus, as a result Pearl Harbor happened
and all the damage was done.
Now I would like to ask you the flat, plain, square question : If
you had had all the installations that were contemplated and that
you had asked for and the operators of those installations were not
alerted to use them, the best that you could have hoped for was to have
minimized this attack rather than to have stopped it or prevented
the damage which did actually occur; isn't that right?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. In other words, it doesn't make any difference how many
guns you have if there is nobody to use them and if there is no ammu-
nition in them ; isn't that right ?
General Short. That is true.
Mr. Keefe. It doesn't nuike any difference how many radar
[8687] stations you have if there is nobody to use them or know
how to use them, isn't that right?
General Short. That is true.
ISIr. Keefe. So that all this question about the failure of installation
or failure of installations, while it may be a very important subject
for some further investigation, so far as its effect upon whether or
not it contributed to bring about Pearl Harbor do you see any con-
nection ?
General Short. If we had had the information, if we had picked
it up at 200 miles instead of 132 it would not have been time enough
to do any more than disperse the planes. What we needed was infor-
mation from Washington giving us time to go into an alert.
Mr. Keefe. Well, you could have done a pretty good job with the
stuff you had out there if you had been on the alert and had been
expecting an attack.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. You had some bombers and you had some planes that
could have been in the air and the few that dicl get into the air did a
pretty good job, didn't they?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And these slow torpedo planes that came in there and
did most of the damage to the battleships in the harbor were pretty
easy targets for your fast fighters, were [8688] they not?
General Short. If you knew where they were coming from they
would have been very easy.
Mr. Keefe. Now, all during this war the element of surprise has
been a thing that has been involved in almost everything that has been
done on both sides out there in the Pacific, isn't that true ?
3224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. All over the world. It is always the most impor-
tant element.
Mr. Keefe. It is always the attempt on the part of a commander
to involve his adversary in surprise, isn't that true ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. And as far as an air attack itself is concerned our experi-
ence has been that regardless of the fact whether an attack is known
or not a lot of these planes — some of them, at least, get through and
cause damage, isn't that true?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. That was true at Okinawa, is it not?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now, when we think of the exploits at Midway and the
magnificent job that our Navy did in sinking the Jap Navy, it was
possible because of intelligence, was it not and [8960] the fact
that our Navy was informed and had the facts and knew what to do?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. And w4ien they shot down tliis Admiral Yamamoto that
was possible because they got an intercept which put them on notice
and gave them some information ?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. I refer to those two incidents because it correctly illus-
trates the idea that intelligence is necessary and fundamental, is it not ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And when Intelligence fails you are liable to have seri-
ous results ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now, your position in this case is that Intelligence, so
far as Washington was concerned, failed ?
General Short. A hundred percent.
Mr. Keefe. And thus Pearl Harbor occurred. Is tliat your defense ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. That is all.
The Chairman. Does counsel for General Short wish to ask any
questions ?
Lieutenant Colonel Karr. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
[8690] The Chairman. Counsel for the committee?
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. There are several questions I would like to ask.
Senator Lucas. I would like to ask a couple, too.
Senator Ferguson. Now, counsel, give me the ship movements ex-
hibit, the intercepts on the ship movements. It is on page 22. On
page 22 of that exhibit there is an intercept; I want to ask you about
that. It is in Exhibit 2.
Lieutenant Colonel Karr. I am sorry. We do not have that.
Senator Ferguson. Exhibit 2, page 22. It has been referred to
at times as the "light in the window" message. Are you familiar with
that?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. It may have been a Paul Revere, it has been sug-
gested here, but nobody was riding?
Are you familiar with that?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3225
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, if it appears in the testimony and from
the evidence that that was translated in the rough by 1 o'clock on
Saturday, the 6th, and that information had come to you, would that
have made any difference to you ? It is dated the third, from Hono-
lulu (Kita) to Tokyo.
[8591] General Short. Unquestionably that would have given
us some very definite information if we had had the message and
knew how to read it.
Senator Ferguson. What I mean is if you could have had that
information it would have indicated an attack on Hawaii, would it
not?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. No doubt about that.
General Short. It shows a definite desire for detailed information
of just exactly what our fleet is doing and is preparing to do.
Senator Ferguson. Now, there is another message on page 27. It
is dated the 6th, from Honolulu to Tokyo, on page 27. That is the
one that says :
No barrage balloons.
And then it says at the end :
I imagine that in all probability thei-e is considerable opportunity left to take
advantage by a surprise attack against these places.
If that had been decoded and sent to you, or the information from
it, would that have meant anything to you ?
General Short. That would practically have meant a surprise at-
tack was in store for us or was a certainty.
Senator Ferguson. There isn't any doubt whatever that such
[8692] a message, while not decoded, as shown by the instrument
itself at the bottom, because it shows that it was decoded December 8
but it was sent on the 6th and therefore was intercepted on the 6th —
if that information had come to you that would have, uncontradicted,
have indicated a surprise attack on Oahu ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And would that alone have alerted you ?
General Short. Very decidedly.
Senator Ferguson. Now, there was one other thing that I wanted
to inquire about. Did you know about the General Carter Clarke
report or investigation?
General Short. I never heard of it till some time after this com-
mittee met. I have since then read it. I think it probably was a
month after this committee started meeting before I knew of the
existence of this report.
Senator Ferguson. How do you account for that investigation by
Carter Clarke after Clausen got through and we find a new investi-
gation by Carter Clarke, Gen. Carter Clarke?
General Short. It is pretty difficult to say just what they were at-
tempting to do. They were apparently wanting to find out exactly
what every man holding an important position in G-2 would say
about their so-called top secret material, magic and about their
estimates, and so forth, and it was a [8693] very difficult report
to get a hold of.
79716 — 46 — pt 7 21
3226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson, And do you know whether or not it indicated
in any way that there had been an investigation by G-2 for the Presi-
dent and that there had been some changes made in it bv General Mar-
shall?
General Short. Somewhere — I have forgotten whether it was in
that report or not, but somewhere I have run across something of that
kind.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Isn't it fair to say that after reading it that there is
a man named Friedman and several other witnesses and a General
JSpaulding and others who had some kind of a rumor going ,about
that Marshall was supposed to have destroyed papers, and that was
I ni equivocally, absolutely and positively contradicted?
Senator Ferguson. But there is also more in it. I think at some time
Carter Clarke or General Clarke should appear and give us the reason
for it, if there was a reason, but I am just asking you, General, what
you know about it.
General ShopvT. I Icnow nothing except what the report states.
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
[^694] Mr. Keeee. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask just one ques-
tion, if I may.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Keefe. Stories have gone about, been bandied about that you
had your planes lined up on the apron wing-tip to wing-tip without
any gasoline in them, without any ammunition, making a perfect target
and a perfect set-up for the Japs to come in to spray with incendiary^
bullets that demolished the whole works at one time, and that set-up
there was likened to the story of the ships in the harbor like a lot of
sitting ducks for the Japs to come in and shoot up.
That is the story.
Now, I would like to know whether or not under your provisions
against sabotage, there were specific provisions made and orders given
as to how the airplanes were to be fixed?
General Short. That is correct. General Burwell — Colonel Bur-
well then
Mr. Keefe. Colonel who?
General Short. Burwell.
Mr. Keefe. Who is he?
General Short. He was a: colonel in the Air Corps detached to make
a study in connection with sabotage. He [S6'95~\ made a very
extensive study and was absolutely insistent that the way to protect
them was to place them close together where they could be guarded
absolutely 'safely leaving the ammunition out of them, so if one was
hit the ammunition would not explode.
I am quite sure that the gasoline was not removed. It was an ele-
ment of danger to have gasoline in them, but the gasoline was in them,
so the planes could be moved.
Mr. Keefe. In other words, then, the placing of the planes wing-tip
to wing-tip on the aprons of the bunkers was in accordance with the
practice that had been developed by the Air Corps representative out
there, this Colonel Burwell?
General Short. That is correct.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3227
Mr. Keefe. In his report?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. And that was considered after a long investigation and
study to be the most effective manner of protecting those planes against
the possibility incident to sabotage?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. And you referred to the fact that son^.e of the Navy
planes, I believe over at Kaneohe were not so placed, [8696^ and
that they were the ones that really got damaged.
General Short. It just happened that the planes that were dispersed
in the water were sunk, and a considerable number on the apron were
saved.
Mr. Keefe. Those that were anchored were all shot and sunk?
General Short. They were all sunk.
Mr. Richardson. May I ask a cpestion, Mr. Chairman?
The CiiAHtMAN. Yes.
Mr. Richardson. Cieneral Short, the only difference there, so far as
you are concerned, as to guarding the planes against sabotage, would
have been whether you used a couple of hundred men if they were con-
centrated or 400 or 500 to guard them, if they were dispersed?
General Short, That is not correct. The bunkers for the planes at
Wheeler Field, a very large percentage of them, were right along the
highway where a man could have driven a truck along the highway
and simply hurled a grenade into each bunker.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Lucas.
Senator Lucas. I desire to ask a question or two.
Following the thought that has just been discussed, I should like to
ask you this question. General Short :
[8697] Your planes were lined up, most of them wing-tip to
wing-tip under the sabotage-alert order, under which you were oper-
ating; is that correct?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Now, I do not think the record is clear as to what
position the Navy planes were in that were on the ground at that time.
General Short. At Kaneohe Bay the seaplanes were well dispersed,
but they had on the apron a bunch of planes, or a group of planes that
were bunched.
Now, I do not know the exact arrangement of their planes at Ford
Island. I do happen to know it at Kaneohe Ba}', but I do not know at
Ford Island.
Senator Lucas. The record discloses that the Navy lost 102 planes
and the Army lost 96 planes, and I have been at a loss to understand
why the Navy lost more planes than the Army unless the Navy was
also alerted to sabotage.
General Short. Their planes were dispersed. There is probably
one reason. A plane that was anchored in the bay at Kaneohe was hit,
sunk, and was a complete loss. Where they were hit on the runways,
on the aprons, the men got in and pulled them out, even while the attack
was going on, and a great many were saved that way.
Senator Lucas. Do you know whether or not any of [8698]
the Navy planes were lined up wing-tip to wing-tip similar to the
planes that you had?
3228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. I think that was true of Kaneohe Bay, and as to the
other phices, I do not know.
Senator Lucas. You made no inquiry about that afterwards?
General Short. If I had known, I have forgotten it. I do not know
now.
Senator Lucas. I do not believe Admiral Kimmel was interrogated
along that line. It does seem to me in view of his testimony, that that
is somewhat important.
One other question. It is not clear in this record whether or not
Admiral Kimmel knew that you were operating on the sabotage alert,
AVhat would you say about that ?
General Short. I believe you will find in his testimony one place
that he does make the statement that he did understand that I was on
the sabotage alert, and I think he said some other things.
Mr. Keefe. That is in the record, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lucas. I was under the impression that he said in one place
that he did not know that he was on the sabotage alert, and in another
part of the testimony that he thought he was on the sabotage alert.
General Short. I believe he made slight variations in [8699]
his testimony. I would say that the Navy, the Navy staff, the staff of
the Fourteenth Naval District definitely should have Iviiown, on account
of their liaison officer. Lieutenant Burr, who knew exactl}' what was
going on.
Senator Lucas. In other words, if Admiral Kimmel didn't know
3'OU were on the sabotage alert, it was no fault of yours, because j^ou
gave that information definitely to his liaison man ?
[6"/^] General Short. Yes, sir; I have the quotation here.
Page 6985 of the transcript. Witness Kimmel :
I conferred with General Short on November 28 about the messages each of
us had received on the 27th. We discussed these dispatches in all aspects. We
considered, as we did frequently before and did later, the probabilities and
possibilities of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. In this connection there was
discussion of the effect of the suggestion from Washington that 50 Army pursuit
planes be sent by aircraft carriers to Wake and Midway. I understood the
Army was on an alert and that the alert was against sabotage, among other
things, although I do not now recall Grcneral Short specifically mentioning the
details of his alert.
Senator Lucas. Well, the morning you received the message from
General Marshall and you alerted your command for sabotage, a short
while thereafter, as I understand you did not directly tell Admiral
Kimmel ?
General Short. I sent a copy of the message to him.
Senator Lucas. You sent a copy of the message that you had
alerted for sabotage through your Navy liaison man ?
General Short. Yes, sir; I sent a copy of my message from the
Chief of Staff.
Senator Lucas. One other question. On yesterday [8701]
there was considerable controversy here between j^ourself and the
committee with respect to court martials and Army and Navy in-
quiries and Army and Navy boards.
In order to clear up a cloud in my mind as to how they operate, I
want to ask you whether or not there is any difference in the way an
Army board operates and the way a Navy board operates insofar as
it being a public affair?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3229
General Short. The Navy board in this particular case was a court
of inquiry. Now, I do not know under their regulations whether they
can have a board that would operate just as the Army board did.
They were both closed sessions — secret — but in the Navy court of
inquiry the accused, so to speak, had the right to be present all the way
through, hear all the witnesses and have counsel with him, and had
the right of cross-examination.
Before the Army board I was not permitted to hear the evidence
given by the other witnesses or to have counsel, except when I was
personally giving my testimony.
Senator Lucas. The point I raise is whether or not there is a differ-
ence between the regulations of the Army and the Navy in an
investigation of a question of this character.
General Short. I would rather an officer of the Judge [8702]
Advocate General's Department answer that.
Senator Lucas. ]\Iy conclusion upon it is that if the Navy has one
set of regulations on an important matter of this kind, which permits
an accused to come before that Board of inquiry with counsel and
have the right to cross-examine witnesses, and the Army has a differ-
ent system, which denies that very thing, it certainly is a question
for consideration by the Congress, because I cannot see why you should
be denied the right and Admiral Kimmel have the right. That is the
point I make.
General Short. Yes, sir. It actually worked out that way. I don't
know all the details of the law.
Senator Lucas. Now, General Short, the Congressman from Wis-
consin and the Senator from Michigan have raised some questions
about stories that have originated from time to time about what
happened at Pearl Harbor, about the laxity here and the laxity there.
I want to state that those are not the only stories that have originated
about Pearl Harbor from time to time.
It has been alleged and reported by certain individuals as well as
a segment of the press that members of this committee have sought
to suppress certain evidence and in so doing have attempted to white-
wash the real reason for this investigation. In answer specifically to
a question [8703] submitted by Senator Ferguson you stated
that this committee had given you every consideration and, as I under-
stand it, you are perfectly satisfied with the fair and impartial treat-
ment that you have received at the hands of this committee ; is that
correct ?
General Short. That is correct, absolutely.
Senator Lucas. Do you know of any evidence that has been covered
up, that has been suppressed, by any member of this committee, or by
counsel for the committee, that would have in any wise affected your
interest, or any other individual who is interested in this hearing?
General Short. I do not.
Senator Lucas. There have been a lot of investigations. I suppose
you hope this is the last one?
General Sijort. As far as I am concerned.
The Chairman. Is that all?
Senator Lucas. Yes.
The Chairman. The Chair would like to ask this one question,
General. I am not thoroughly familiar now with what your answer
3230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
was as to whether between the 3d of December and the 7th of December
1941 you had any conferences with Admiral Kimmel.
General Short. I did not.
The Chairman. That is the way I remembered it.
\<^704] General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Now, this has nothing to do with what actually
happened at Pearl Harbor, but the matter of your retirement and the
communications between General Marshall and you. I am in doubt
there, too.
I want to see if I can clear up something because it may affect your
personal relations with General Marshall.
You had been relieved of your command at Pearl Harbor prior
to the Roberts report?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And you had returned to this country and were in
Oklahoma City?
General Short. That is correct.
The Chairman. You saw in the morning paper accounts of the
Roberts report and then you called General Marshall over the tele-
phone ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Did he tell you in that conversation that he had
read the report?
General Short. He told me he had not read it.
The Chairman. You, seeing the report in the newspapers, probably
thought over in your mind whether your continued active status in
the Army would be embarrassing to the War Department and there-
fore you called up to inquire [870S] whether they desired you
to ask for retirement ; did that happen ?
General Short. I thought both the country and my personal interest
required a rather careful consideration, I had great confidence in
General Marshall's judgment and his loyalty as an old friend, and that
was the reason I called him and put the thing entirely in his own
hands.
The Chairman. You told him in your conversation with him that
you were going to write him and you would enclose a letter to the
Adjutant General requesting retirement?
General Short. I do not believe that I told him in that conversation.
I think probably after I hung up I decided it was fair to him to send it
to him.
The Chairman. Throughout the conversation between General
Marshall and you then he did not know and was not told that you were
going to actually send your request for retirement to the Adjutant
General?
General Short. He told me that he would take that conversation
as an application for retirement if they got to the point where it looked
like it was the thing to do.
The Chairman. And after you hung up you decided to put it in
writing and make it formal ?
General Short. Yes, sir ; and I sent it to him personally.
The Chairman. Now, is there any other statement not [87061
brought out by any questions by counsel or members of the committee
that you wish to make with reference to any further pertinent facts in
regard to the Pearl Harbor attack?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3231
General Short. I would like to make a very brief statement.
The Chairman. All right.
General Short. As a matter of the interests of the country and as
a loyal soldier, I maintained a steadfast silence for 4 years and I bore
the load of public censure during this time and I would have continued
to bear it so long as I thought the question of national security was
involved. However, the war is now ended and I have been very
appreciative of the opportunity that has been given me here to make a
full and frank statement of my point of view.
I want to thank all the members of the committee for the attitude
that they have taken and I want to assure them that I have tried to give
them fully and frankly all the information that I have on the subject.
The Chairman. The Chair might state that regardless of any con-
clusions that may be reached by tlie committee when the evidence is all
in, in any report that it makes to the Congress, the Chair feels that one
of the outstanding benefits of this hearing has been that the evidence
has been brought [<S707] forth in public and everybody has
been given an opportunity to give to the committee and to the country
whatever information they had. In all likelihood, regardless of what
report the committee makes, the country will very probably have made
up its own mind, and maybe before we do.
But there has been that benefit that has accrued by reason of this
public hearing.
The committee thanks you, General, for your courtesy and patience
in cooperating with us in attempting to bring out all the evidence. I
hope you will soon completely recover your health.
General Short. Thank you very mucli.
The Chairman. You are excused.
(Witness excused.)
The Chairman. The committee will now go into executive session
and the spectators will retire as promptly as possible.
(Whereupon, at 4: 30 p. m., the committee recessed and went inta
executive session.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3233
[8708] PEARL HAEBOR ATTACK
* MONDAY, JANUARY 28, 1946
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.
President: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster,
and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark,
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.
Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H.
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Ed^yard P.
Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.
[8709] The Vice Chairman. The committee will please come to
order.
I might state that Senator Barkley had to go to the White House
this morning to attend the usual Monday morning conference. He
will be in a little later. We will proceed.
Does counsel have anything before the next witness is called ?
Mr. Richardson. No.
The Vice Chairman. The counsel will then call the next witness.
Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I desire to present to you for
examination, Captain Zacharias.
The Vice Chairman. Will you please come forward, Captain
Zacharias. Will you please be sworn.
TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ELLIS M. ZACHARIAS, UNITED STATES
NAVYi
(Captain Zacharias was duly sworn by the Vice Chairman.)
Mr. Richardson. Captain, how old are you ?
Captain Zacharias. I am 56 years old.
Mr. Richardson. How long have you been in the Navy ?
Captain Zacharias. I have completed over 37 years in the naval
service.
Mr. Richardson. Were you a graduate of Annapolis ?
Captain Zacharias. I was.
[8710] Mr. Richardson. What class?
Captain Zacharias. Class of 1912.
Mr. Richardson. Now, will you detail to the committee in a gen-
eral way, what your Naval experience has been since ?
1 See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5511 et seq., for corrections in his testimony submitted by
Capt. Zacharias.
3234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Zacharias. As I have said, I have completed over 37 years
in the naval service. I served in or operated with all types of ships. I
served aboard ship in all departments as head of the department.
I commanded destroyers, a heavy cruiser, and a battleship.
All of my shore duty with the exception of 1 year as instructor at
the Naval Academy, and 1 year taking the senior course at the Naval
War College, all of my work has been in intelligence on shore duty.
That included 31/^ years in Japan studying the language and the peo-
ple; one tour in crypt-analytic work; two tours of about 21/2 years
each as head of the Far Eastern Division of Naval Intelligence; on^
tour of about 21/2 years as District Intelligence Officer of the Eleventh
Naval District with headquarters at San Diego, Calif.; and between
my two war cruises, I have served 1 year as Deputy Director of Naval
Intelligence. That gives a total of about 12 years actually in intelli-
gence work on shore.
[8711] At sea, my spare time was devoted to study and matters
relating to intelligence, and while at sea I actually participated in cer-
tain counter-espionage activities, and this gave me a direct and indirect
connection with intelligence over a period of 25 years.
During the war, I had the good fortune to command two capital
ships.
Mr. Richardson. Which war ?
Captain Zacharias. The recent war. One of those was the heavy
cruiser jSalt Lake City, and the other was the battleship Neiv> Mexico.
Both of these ships participated in many of the operations successfully
in the Pacific and both of them are still afloat.
My most recent duty was that of conducting a psychological warfare
campaign against the Japanese high connnand, which had for its
objective the unconditional surrender of the Japanese without the
necessity of a forced invasion of the Japanese main islands.
Mr. Richardson. Now, just before you go into that, did this intel-
ligence work of yours. Captain, and your life in Japan, give you a
Japanese acquaintance?
Captain Zacharias. It gave me an opportunity to make a very wide
acquaintance in Japan, and I was fortunate in knowing intimately,
many of the Japanese who in the last [8712] war became the
Japanese high command.
Mr. Richardson. Did you learn the language ?
Captain Zacharias. I did.
Mr. Richardson. Do you speak it fluently?
Captain Zacharias. I speak it very fluently.
Mr. Richardson. And it was that fact, plus your Intelligence
experience that brought the assignment to you that you were about
to relate when I interrupted you ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct.
[871-3] Mr. Richardson. Now will you proceed.
Captain Zacharias. I think that just about concluded my work,
except I was about to say that this objective, which was the uncon-
ditional surrender of Japan wnthout the necessity of a forced in-
vasion of the Japanese main islands, there was an indication of com-
pletion of that on the 25th of July, 1945, in a broadcast by an official
spokesman of the Japanese Government direct to me, and, as we know,
the situation eventuated on the 15th of August 1945.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3235
Mr. Richardson. Now did your experience with the Navy take you
into Hawaiian waters?
Captain Zacharias. It did quite often.
Mr. Richardson. And were you familiar with Hawaii and the
general conditions and set-up in Hawaii?
Captain Zacharias. I was.
Mr. Richardson, With the character of the people there and the
-Japanese element involved in the population ?
Captain Zacharias. I was, both the second generation Japanese,
that is Americans of Japanese extraction, and also the first generation
of Japanese who were enemy aliens after the war began.
Mr. Richardson. During 1941 were you in service in the Pacific?
Captain Zacharias. I was in command of the heavy cruiser
[S714] Salt Lake City.
Mr. Richardson. And was that a part of the Pacific Fleet?
Captain Zacharias. It was.
Mr. Richardson. Then you were stationed, a portion of the time at
least, at Pearl Harbor?
Captain Zacharias. I was.
Mr. Richardson. Are you acquainted with Admiral Kimmel?
Captain Zacharias. I am, sir.
Mr. Richardson. And with his Chief of Staff, Admiral Smith ?
Captain Zacharias. I am.
Mr. Richardson. It was brought to the attention of the committee,
•Captain, that a conversation occurred between you and Admiral
Kimmel during 1941 in which it is reported reference was made to the
probability, possibility, likelihood of a Japanese surprise attack* on
Pearl Harbor.
Now I would like to ask you whether any such conversation occurred,
where it occurred, when it occurred, and who was present.
Captain Zacharias. I think it will add something to the conver-
sation by indicating the reasons for the conversation.
Mr. Richardson. Was there such a conversation?
Captain Zacharias. There was such a conversation.
\871o\ Mr. Richardson. "Wlien did it take place about?
Captain Zacharias. It took place between March 26 and March 31,
1941.
Mr. Richardson. Where was it?
Captain Zacharias. In the office of the commander in chief, United
States Fleet, Admiral Kimmel.
Mr, Richardson. At Pearl Harbor?
Captain Zacharias. At Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Richaedson. Who was present at the conversation?
Captain Zacharias, Admiral Kimmel and his chief of staff, then
Capt. W. W. Smith, now Vice Admiral Smith.
Mr, Richardson, They were old acquaintances of yours?
Captain Zacharias. I had known them both previously.
Mr. Richardson. Now if you will proceed.
Captain Zacharias. As I indicated, it will have some bearing to
tell the reasons why I went over to see Admiral Kimmel on this oc-
casion. On the 8th of February 1941, I had a long conversation with
Admiral Nomura in San Francisco. He was then enroute to
Washington, D. C, as Ambassador.
'6'2'Sd CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Vice Chairman. From Japan ?
Captain Zacharias. From Japan.
Mr. Richardson. Was he one of the ambassadors who thereafter
conducted, in part, the negotiations that took place with Secretary
Hull?
[8716] Captain Zacharias. He was.
Mr. Richardson. Proceed.
Captain Zacharias. I had indicated previously to Admital
Richardson that I proposed to have such a conversation with Admiral
Nomura when he came through San Francisco, and Admiral Richard-
son expressed a desire to have a copy of the report which he knew I
would submit after such a conversation, and for that reason, after
Admiral Richardson was relieved on the first of February 1941 by
Admiral Kimmel, I sent to Admiral Kimmel on the 11th of February
1941, in a letter to Admiral Kimmel, a copy of the report on this con-
ference with Admiral Nomura that I had sent to Admiral Stark.
Wlien I arrived in Pearl Harbor with my ship after an overhaul
period on the west coast I took the first opportunity to see Admiral
Kimmel, and it occurred between the dates that I gave.
Mr. Richardson. Now, why did you want to see Admiral Kimmel ?
Captain Zacharias. I wanted to see Admiral Kimmel to find out
if he had received the report, or whether or not this report of the
conversation with Admiral Nomura had come to his attention. In
addition to that I wanted to tell Admiral Kimmel of an incident which
occurred on the [8717] 16th of October 1940, which had a bear-
ing on future events as I saw them approaching.
Incidentally, I think what I am about to relate was referred to as
having caused Admiral Richardson to take his fleet out on a wild
goose chase. I would like to clarify that point now by saying that
this incident had no effect, as far as I could see, on influencing Admiral
Richardson in any decision that he was to make as a result of it,
which you will see from the incident itself.
On October 16, 1940, as district intelligence officer at San Diego,
I received a report from an intelligence reserve officer at the border,
Tia Juana, or at San Jacinto opposite Tia Juana in Mexico, that he
had something of the most vital importance and if I could not come
down myself he requested that I send one of my best investigators. I
could not go myself at that time, therefore I did select my most
competent investigator to go down and find out what this was.
When he arrived this reserve officer related to him information that
had just come from an informant in Mexico which stated that a certain
Japanese — who, incidentally, was on our No. 1 suspect list — had stated
that on the following day, the iTth of October 1940, the Japanese
were going to bomb four battleships. He had all the details, that it
would be done by a force of 12 planes divided into [8718] four
groups, one of whom in each group was to be a suicide plane and dive
down the stack of each ship, and the other two would drop their bombs
and get away, if possible.
When this report came to me I took it in to the commandant of the
district, and simultaneously I learned that Admiral Richardson had
arrived on the west coast, at San Pedro, with three battleships and
a heavy cruiser, indicating the four ships in this picture.
Mr. Richardson. Wliere is San Pedro ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3237
Captain Zachaeias. San Pedro is the seaport of Los Angeles.
We notified Admiral Richardson that there was something of im-
portance and requested that he remain on board while I come up by
plane, which I did. I went aboard, related the story to Admiral Rich-
ardson, and he said, "Are there any planes in this vicinity which might
carry out such an attack?" I informed him that we could not assure
him that there were not planes in Mexico, and further that there had
been surreptitious activities along the coast by the Japanese vessels that
we knew of, but we were not certain that there were not planes in
Mexico with which the Japanese could carry out such an attack.
Admiral Richardson considered that and then said, "We cannot
ignore this." And I said, "Admiral, I think you are [8719]
quite right." He said, "I will alert my antiaircraft batteries, and when
3^ou return to San Diego you get in touch with Captain McCain," who
was then the commanding officer at the naval air station at San
Diego — "and tell him to be on the alert." I did that. I understand
that the following morning Admiral Richardson sailed from San
Pedro for San Francisco, where he was going anyhow, and possibly
left a little before the time of his scheduled departure.
I told Admiral Kimmel that full situation.
[8720] Mr. Richardson. Did you see Admiral Kimmel then at
the place you mentioned earlier in your testimony?
Captain Zacharias. I did. As indicated, Admiral Kimmel then
called in Captain Smith, and I proceeded to relate the circumstances
of my interview with Admiral Nomura. He informed me he had
received a copy of my report sent to Admiral Stark, and then I pro-
ceeded to tell him of this incident on the 16th of October 1940. From
that he went into a discussion of the general Japanese situation, the
possibilities of what might occur in the future, Japanese attitudes, and
the prospects of this situation being liquidated.
Mr. Richardson. What do you mean by that, "liquidated" ?
Captain Zacharias. The situation which then existed between Ja-
pan and the United States, for which Admiral Nomura had come over
to this country to handle if possible.
Mr. Richardson. By the word "liquidated" you mean settled?
Captain Zacharias. Settled; right.
Mr. Richardson. Go ahead.
Captain Zacharias. In the course of our discussions, Admiral Kim-
mel asked me if the situation became extreme what I thought would
occur. And this point is very important, because I think of a misun-
derstanding that has been created [87:21] by something which
has been said here about the date December 7 having been the date
which I predicted.
First I would like to say that Decemer 7 is a synonym for Pearl
Harbor particularly in the memorandum which I later submitted to
Admiral Draemel for Admiral Nimitz.
This conversation with Admiral Kimmel was 9 months before Pearl
Harbor, and I don't think there is any profession which would attempt
to predict 9 months ahead the exact day that something would occur.
I told Admiral Kimmel in this conversation that if the situation be-
came such that Japan decided that they must go to war with us, that
it would begin with an air attack on our fleet on a week-end and prob-
ably a Sunday morning; that attack would be for the purpose of dis-
abling four battleships.
3238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Richardson. Wliy did 3^011 mention four battleships rather than
three or five or seven ?
Captain Zacharias. Four battleships was a number that I had de-
termined in my own mind as the number that the Japanese felt they
would have to reduce our fleet in order to prevent effective interference
with any soulliern movement that they might want to make after
declaring war with us. I will go into more detail on that later.
Admiral Kinnnel then asked me how I thought they would
[8722]^ effect such an attack. I said there are two methods, the
least likely of which would be to bring in seaplanes, surreptitiously
aboard merchant vessels, and land them in the lea of some of our
islands that were sparsely populated and then on a selected day,
weather permitting, they could make such an attack.
He asked how that could be prevented. I said that could be pre-
vented effectively by declaring a defensive sea area around the Ha-
waiian Islands, in which case you notify all nations of the world and
require all merchant vessels coming into that area to proceed through
a specified point at which place we could conduct inspections. That
would preclude any surreptitious entrance and prevent such a con-
tingency of an attack by that method.
However, I emphasized that the most probable method of attack
would be by aircraft carriers supported by appropriate ships; that
such an attack would come in undoubtedly from the northern because
tha-t was the prevailing winds in the Hawaiian Islands: they would
come in and launch their attack downwind, because of their concern
over the possible loss of a single capital ship and for that reason after
launching their planes, the ships and the force which brought the
planes to launch them would retreat as quickly as possible directly
upwind in order to escape any damage [^8723'] which they felt
might come.
Mr. Richardson. Was there discussion as to where this supposed
expedition would start from ?
Captain Zacharias. There was not. I would like to indicate at this
point that although this conversation was 9 months prior to the actual
attack on Pearl Harbor, it lasted for about an hour and a half, and
concerned something in which the commander in chief of the Pacific
Fleet would be vitally interested. However, I realize that Admiral
Kimmel was a very busy man, that I was only one of hundreds to
whom he talked, and it was quite possible that he could not remember
the details of my conversation.
However, his chief of staff, then Captain Smith, was present
throughout the entire conversation, and I am sure that he remembers
the details of that conversation, because he has discussed those details
subsequent to the event, and for a considerable period after Pearl
Harbor occurred.
Mr. Richardson. Why did you think the attack would come on
Sunday morning ?
Captain Zacharias. I think it has been clearly indicated that the
Japanese knew of our every movement in and out of Pearl Harbor, the
situation existing in Hawaii prior to the attack on December 7. They
well knew that on Sunday [8724] morning everyone took ad-
vantage of the lack of drills to be excused from reporting in on Sunday
morning. We call it being excused from Sunday morning quarters.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3239
So that they would not have to report on that day. That applies to
officers and men, and particularly to those who have families in Hawaii,
in Honolulu.
Mr. Richardson. Well
Captain Zacharias, I might add there that Sunday morning is a
time when eveiyone is enjoying their leisure and it is significant that
8 o'clock in the morning, which was approximately the time of the
attack, at 8 o'clock. That is the time when the watches change, when
men are relieving others who have been on watch, and there is a certain
amount of confusion existing at that time in the turn-overs which take
place.
Mr. Richardson. You spoke of Japanese knowledge in Hawaii.
Was it a matter. Captain, of common knowledge in the Navy that
there was present in Hawaii a large number of Japanese agents?
Captain Zacharias. It was. In my conversations, and I must say
that I kept in constant touch with not only the fleet intelligence officer,
but also with the district intelligence officers, because I had a hand in
setting up that organization beginning with my arrival there No-
vember [8725] 13, 1940. Therefore, I had a direct interest in
that organization and what they were accomplishing. It was believed
that there existed in Hawaii at least a thousand enemy agents.
Mr. Richardson. Well, now, do you know of anywhere that you
have served, where the operations of a military force of either the
Army or the Navy was subject to as concentrated an espionage as our
establishment in Hawaii ?
Captain Zacharias. I do not, and there is no other place comparable
except in Panama where there was an unusually large group of Jap-
anese barber shops before Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Richardson, Now, in this conversation, Captain, that you had
with Admiral Kimmel, were the details of the reasons why you thought
there would be an attack discussed between you ?
Captain Zacharias. Only in a general way, but I think the reasons
why I thought there would be an attack on the fleet if the situation
became such that war between Japan and the United States was im-
minent, I think that those reasons have a great bearing on everything
that is before this committee.
Mr. Richardson. Was there any discussion on the part of Admiral
Kimmel in agreement with or opposition to your [8726] views?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. After outlining to him the proba-
bilities and the methods by which the Japanese would make their
attacks, in the second instance that of an attack by aircraft carriers,
Admiral Kimmel asked me how I thought it could be prevented, and
I stated that the only possible way of doing it would be to have a
daily patrol out to cover the approach of the Japanese, and this patrol
must go out at least 500 miles.
To that Admiral Kimmel replied, "Well, we have neither the
personnel nor the materiel with which to carry out such a patrol,"
and I replied to him, "Well, Admiral, you better get them because
that is what is coming."
Mr. Richardson. Do you, as a naval man know of any other way
in which such an attack could be effectively guarded against than
through distant patrol and discovery of the attacking planes either
in carriers, or in the air, and an attack on those planes by fighter planes ?
3240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Zachaeias. Only by learning of the approach of such a
force and intercepting it with the fleet.
Mr. Richardson. Where were you at the time of the attack?
Captain Zacharias. I was in command of the Salt Lake City which
was then 200 miles west of Oahu returning to [8727"] Pearl
Harbor.
Mr. Richardson. Now — go ahead.
Captain Zacharias. I was with Admiral Halsey's force which had
been to Wake Island to deliver the planes to the marines.
Mr. Richardson. Between the time of this conversation with Ad-
miral Kiminel, and the attack, were there any other discussions between
you and any of the staff officers, or task commanders with respect to
the probability of an attack on Hawaii from the air ?
Captain Zacharias. There was.
Mr. Richardson. I want to know whether it was a matter of general
conversation, or simply a vague possibility?
Captain Zacharias. There was. As 1 indicated while on sea duty,
I devoted myself to reading and study of intelligence matters. For
that reason I frequented the fleet intelligence office. The fleet intelli-
gence officer, then Commander Layton, I knew well, and I had
recommended him to Admiral Richardson for that job which he did
in an excellent manner.
[8728] In my visits to the fleet intelligence office and the public
relations office I was enabled to keep track on the situation as it was
developing and there came a period when I was somewhat concerned
over the prospects. That is what prompted me to say at one time to a
group of the staff assembled, I can't recall just who was present at the
time
Mr. Richardson. Where was it?
Captain Zacharias. In the office of the commander in chief Pacific
Fleet, the flag office.
I was prompte'd to say, as recorded in this memorandum which has
been presented to the committee, that "I think it is time to stop these
surprise inspections and get ready for a surprise attack." These sur-
prise inspections were methods by which the materiel conditions of
the ships were ascertained without giving previous notice of visits by
either division commanders or others.
Mr. Richardson. Was there any rejoinder to that remark on your
part from those present?
Captain Zacharias. There was not. In the course of those con-
versations I asked the fleet intelligence officer if he had presented
to the war plans officer of the commander in chief a certain extract
from a Japanese book which considered the pros and cons of success
of an attack on Pearl [8729] Harbor. That is included in one
of the papers that Avere presented to the committee by the Navy De-
partment and I would like to refer to that later on. It is page 47 of
the papers.
Senator Lucas. What is the date of that conversation, sir?
Captain Zacharias. That was in October 1941. I will bring that in
when I discuss the reasons for my belief that an attack on Pearl
Harbor would occur.
Mr. Richardson. Between the time you had your first talk with
Admiral Kimmel and the time you had this talk in the fall of 1941
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3241
was the subject of a possible air attack on Pearl Harbor a matter of
common or unusual discussion among the Navy people that you met in
Hawaii ?
Captain Zacharias. Because of my
Mr. Richardson. Was it or not ?
Captain Zacharias. There was general discussion of what would
occur if we went to war with Japan.
Mr, Richardson. Was there any general feeling that an attack,
an air attack, surprise air attack was possible or probable or likely
or improbable ?
Captain Zacharias. There was not much expression of opinion. It
was rather an acceptance of my opinion because of my background
knowledge and any discussion was for the purpose of ascertaining what
I thought in the premises, and [8730] I cannot recall any ob-
jections to them or any attempt to belittle the possibilities.
Mr. Richardson. Was there any discussion at any time prior to the
attack between you and the other commanders of the task forces about
the probability of an attack by air on Hawaii in the case of hostilities?
Captain Zacharias. There was not. I was a little reluctant to im-
pose my views here and there. I think most of the officers present knew
of my background and if the task force commanders wanted any opin-
ion from me they could ask for it.
I discussed with Admiral Spruance, who was my division comman-
der when I was in command of the Salt Lake City, the possibilities of
the success of Admiral Nomura in preventing hostilities developing
between Japan and the United States.
Mr. Richardson. Did you believe he would be successful?
Senator Brewster. I don't believe he had finished his answer.
Mr. Richardson. Pardon me. Proceed.
Captain Zacharias. In these conversations with Admiral Spruance
there was nothing very definite. There was nothing definite regard-
ing what would happen if we went to war. It was more with regard
to the possible success of preventing war. Outside of that I did not
talk to any task force commanders.
[8731] I might say that I did at one time, or on several occasions,
endeavor to engage in conversation the war plans officer of the com-
mander in chief regarding the situation. On three separate occasions
I endeavored to do so, but he was always preoccupied and I was never
able to do so. It seemed rather strange to me at the time that he did
not want to discuss it, so much so that I went to the fleet intelligence
officer and questioned him about the attitude of this individual.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I ask at this point : Who was the
war plans officer, by name ?
Captain Zacharias. That was then Capt. C. H. McMorris, United
States Navy, now Vice Admiral McMorris.
As a result of what .^ took to be in the colloquial a "brush-off," I
never discussed the situi ion with him although he was the war plans
officer for the commandei in chief.
The next time I discussed this with someone whom I considered of
importance was with Mr. M imson. I had
Mr. Richardson. Just a minute. He was a civilian?
Captain Zacharias. He was a civilian, and who had come to Hawaii
with a letter signed by Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations,
79716 — 46— pt. 7 22
3242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
which he showed to me, Munson showed to me, statinor that he was
there to investigate certain matters and everything was to be opened
lip to him.
[873^} Munson told me that he had been advised to get in touch
with me because of my background knowledge of the Japanese. I had
several conferences with him during the period of October 20 to 26,
1941, and during those conversations I related to him every aspect of
a possible attack. He was principally interested in whether or not
there would be an armed uprising in Hawaii or on the west coast in
case of a war between Japan and the United States.
After relating to him everything that I had told to Admiral Kim-
mel I told him that he could forget about an armed uprising or sabo-
tage of any kind, that was categorical, because it would begin with an
air attack on our fleet, and for that reason it would have to be con-
ducted with the greatest secrecy and therefore no Japanese, regardless
of their position in the United States or in Hawaii, would be aware of
the fact that such an attack was coming.
That being so, and knowing the gieat preparations that you have
to make in an armed uprising or for (lie commission of sabotage, those
contingencies were an impossibility, and I told him that I was con-
vinced that hostilities would begin with an air attack on the fleet.
Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, during the period immediately be-
fore the attack, do you know what distant reconnaissance was being
carried on of your own knowledge ?
[S733] Captain Zacharias. I do not.
Mr. Richardson. You were with Halsey's task force ?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. And your task force was ready for battle from the
time you started up to the time of the attack, was it not ?
Captain Zacharias. You mean from the date we left Pearl Harbor
on the 28th of November 1941 ?
Mr. Richardson. That is right.
Captain Zacharias. We received no direct orders from Admiral
Halsey, but the fleet went out ostensibly on routine training on that
morning. About noon we changed course to the westward and headed
for Wake Island. That was not the direction of the operating area
and we knew that we were going on a different mission.
As I recall. Admiral Halsey did not send out any specific orders to
the ships of his course, at least to the cruisers, because there was no
necessity. He had full knowledge undoubtedly of what might be
impending and I assume that he was in a position to make any dispo-
sitions necessary to meet any threat that we might encounter en route
or returning from Wake Island. I knew that something unusual was
occurring but was not quite certain. We did learn en route [87S4]
that, through signal, that we were going to Wake Island to deliver
planes to the Marines which the Enterprise had on board, that we
would launch them about 100 miles east of Wake Island and then
return to Pearl Harbor. We were originally scheduled to arrive back
in Pearl Harbor on the 5th of December 1941, but we were delayed by
fueling and weather, and, now I know because of certain orders, which
did not speed us up, and we felt that was where our luck began because
we were just 200 miles to the westward instead of being inside on
December 7.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3243
Mr. RicHAEDSON. Do you regard that as good luck or bad luck?
Captain Zachakias. I regard that as good luck because as a com-
mandmg officer of a ship I prefer to take my chances in the open sea
rather than in an enclosed harbor.
Mr. Richardson. Now, can you give us a little more information on
certain orders that you later discovered had been transmitted, who
transmitted them and what they were, generally ?
Captain Zacharias. What orders?
Mr. Richardson. You just said that you learned afterward of cer-
tain orders which delayed you. I am wondering what those orders
were.
Captain Zacharias. Oh, that is only hearsay and what [8735]
I have heard of the testimony before this committee.
Mr. Richardson. I see. When knowledge of the attack came to
you in fact the direction in which you were directed to search was to
the south, was it not ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct.
Mr. Richardson, Did that surprise you ?
Captain Zacharias. It did. I might qualify that by saying that in
the numerous reports that we were receiving subsequent to the attack
it was indicated that there was a Japanese force down to the south-
ward, but still I could not reconcile them being there.
Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Captain Zacharias. If I may, I indicated that I felt it important
to present the reasons wdiy I thought an attack on Pearl Harbor or
the fleet would occur.
Mr. Richardson. Very well. Let me ask you preparatory to that.
Captain, did you consider that the tension of the situation with the
probability of war with Japan constantly increased during 1941 ?
Captain Zacharias. It did.
Mr. Richardson. And was there any time that it was as tense as
it was during the week before the attack ?
Captain Zacharias. I had, the week before the attack, [8736]
having sailed on the 28th of November, which seems to have been the
really turning point in the cituation, I received very little news en route
to Wake Island except through radio press, which indicated that there
had been some difficulty in the progress of the negotiations taking place
in Washington.
However, I had become somewhat concerned over certain events
which had transpired in the interim or during 1941, such as the em-
bargo and other things which were matters of policy.
Mr. Richardson. Now, as the tenseness grew in your mind and with
your experience did the danger of an air attack become greater and
greater, as the tenseness continued ?
Captain Zacharias. No, because I was always convinced that if the
situation ever became such that hostilities between Japan and the
United States were imminent that the Japanese would begin their cam-
paign with an air attack on our fleet wherever it was.
Mr. Richardson. What I am suggesting is that the condition of af-
fairs, the information you had, growing tenseness of the situation, con-
stantly made that danger greater?
Captain Zacharias. It did not make the danger of an air attack any
greater. It made the danger of hostilities become more imminent.
3244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[8737] Mr. Richardson. As hostilities became more imminent
the danger of an air attack increased?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct.
Mr. Richardson. No further questions.
Captain Zacharias. Now may I go ahead with the reasons why
I thought that there would be an air attack ?
Senator Lucas. Will you move closer to the microphone, please.
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
There were four very good reasons why I felt that in case of hostili-
ties between the United States and Japan it would begin with an air
attack on our jfleet.
First of all, the Japanese could be counted upon not to commit the
grave strategical blunder of making a movement to the southward with-
out disabling a part of our fleet and that is in spite of the fact that we
had in Pearl Harbor at the time a force considerably inferior to the
Japanese Fleet, namely, about 180 ships in the Japanese Fleet to 102
of ours.
That was because the Japanese well knew if they made a movement
to the southward that before we would be able to assemble an expedi-
tionary force with which to take the offensive against them we would
be able to bring around from the Atlantic coast the rest of our fleet
which would have [8738] then made us superior to the Jap-
anese, even if that fleet had to go around the Horn.
[8739] The Japanese are great students. They know everything
that has been written about the fundamentals of warfare. They know
all of the lessons of history, and they could be counted upon to utilize
everything that has been written about it.
They rtali?pd the value of surprise as one of the fundamental prin-
ciples of warfare. They used it at Port Arthur with tremendous suc-
cess. Therefore, it could be certain that they would use it again at
Pearl Harbor if they could do it with fair safety.
I have already indicated that the Japanese weighed in their minds
the probability of success of such an attack on Pearl Harbor. They
have written several books and those books, I might say, are always
released under the auspices of the military in Japan, because of the
complete government control and censorship.
In those books they have discussed the probability of success in war
with the United States. In this particular book, which is entitled
"When Japan Fights," written ostensibly by a civilian named Hirata,
he discussed the pros and cons, and I think it might be well to read
that. It is very short, and is included at page 47, 1 think, of the papers
which were given to the committee.
He says :
[87'i0] The American Commander-in-Chief has been occupied by various
secret plans, but the three points about which he is the most concerned are:
(1) Will a Japanese fast striking force made up of cruisers and aircraft
carriers come on a scouting or striking mission?
(2) Will Japanese submarines hover near the islands to attack or harass the
Fleet?
(3) Will a Japanese expeditionary force be sent overseas?
The first of these is the most fearsome. Suppose Japan were to form a fast
striking force composed of such speedy battleships (whose speed America
cannot match) as the Haruna, Kongo, and Kirishimn, the aircraft carriers Akagi
and Riiujo and the Nachl class of heavy cruisers? This would be a fast-stepping
force that would be truly matchless and invicible.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3245
Were they opposed to even the large guns of American battleships, they could
utilize their superior speeds, thus leaving their slow adversaries behind. If
opposed to a cruiser force, they could close in with telling blows, crush the
opposition. Truly this would be a peerless force ; able to close to battle, or open
out, if outgunned. If this fast striking force should meet misfortune, losing
one [87-'fl] or two fast battleships or aircraft carriers, they would surely
be a severe blow to Japan, and we would have to grit our teeth, smothering our
rage until the day of a decisive main engagement to obtain our revenge.
Maybe such a bold venture would be too great a risk, who can say? On the
other hand, warfare is a risk, and he who hesitates, or fears the risks of bold
venture, cannot wage war.
Moreover, an attack off Hawaii would be the first battle of the Pacific war,
and if in the very first engagement one can wrest the courage away from the
enemy by one's own daring, it would put him in a funk or give him the Jitters.
[574^] Mr. EiCHARDsoN. Was that book at all widely read among
naval men?
Captain Zacharias. It was read by our officers who knew the
Japanese language. In fact, this translation was made in the fleet
intelligence office at Hawaii and, as I have indicated, a copy of this
extract was given to the war plans officer about October 1941. That
was the third indication.
The fourth indication that they would attack, open the war by an
attack on our fleet was somewhat strengthened by this incident which
occurred in Mexico on October 16, 1940.
We had always known through discussions of the 5-5-3 ratio that
Japan was anxious to have the number of capital ships reduced because
they felt that with a 5-5-3 ratio it was possible for us to arrive in the
theater of operations in Asia with more than parity. That is what
crystallized in my mind the fact that they would make an attack on
our fleet for the purpose of betting 4 battleships. Four battleships
out of our number, which were then 15, excluding the 2 new ones
which we had not yet commissioned, would have reduced us to 11.
One battleship they knew was always in the navy yard under over-
haul, bringing us down to 10. Under the treaty they were allowed
9 battleships, but, as expected, they had rearmed the Hiyei, which
brought them up to 10, or what they considered a parity with us.
[574-5] As we know, the intensity of their attack was directed
toward the battleships and I think my impressions were confirmed.
Those were the four reasons why I felt certain that hostilities with
Japan would begin with an air attack on our fleet.
Now, I would like to jump back to my conversation with Admiral
Kimmel, to say that in the precautions that I felt we should take I
indicated that there would be earliest indications of hostilities and un-
mistakable signs of hostilities.
Among the earliest indications I told him would be the withdrawal
of their merchant ships to Japan. We had long realized that and had
kept a complete track of the location of every Japanese merchant vessel
throughout the world. I started that system myself in 1935 in the
Office of Naval Intelligen- e.
The other early indication would be preparations or, rather, de-
ceptive measures in which they would engage, some of which developed.
The unmistakable signs, as I pointed out to Admiral Kimmel, would
be the appearance of submarines in the Hawaiian area, in which case
he could well realized that the Japanese were then ready to strike.
In my conversations with Mr. Munson there was one additional
3246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
indication which I gave to him and that was that we ah'eady had two
Japanese envoys in Washington, Admiral Nomura and Mr. Knriisu;
that when the third envoy arrived they could [8744-1 definitely
look for things to break one way or the other.
I learned over the radio on the 3d of December that the Japanese
Ambassador to Peru, Mr. Sakamoto, had arrived in Washington and
that made me feel that the situation was coming to a head.
Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions.
The Chairman. I did not have the privilege of hearing your testi-
mony up to now because I was unavoidably absent and I may ask a
question or two that has already been covered.
You just spoke of the Peruvian Japanese Minister arriving in
Washington on the 3d of December.
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Where were you at that time?
Captain Zacharias. I was in command of the Salt Lake City. We
were then en route to Pearl Harbor from Wake Island.
The Chairman. From Wake?
Saptain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. When did you arrive at Pearl Harbor?
Captain Zacharias. On the morning of — at noon on the 8th of
December.
The Chairman. On the 8th. After the attack?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. You got this information about the Peruvian
Minister or Ambassador on the 3d by radio you say?
[87451 Captain Zacharias. By radio ; yes, sir.
The Chairman. You had a radio receiving set on board the ship ?
Captain Zacharias. We had many sets ; yes, sir.
The Chairman. And you got it through a radio ?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Do you know whether the officers in charge of the
Pearl Harbor installations in the fleet and particularly Admiral Kim-
mel. Admiral Bloch or General Short, had that information about the
Peruvian Minister coming here on the third ?
Captain Zacharias. It is possible they had the information regard-
ing his arrival but I had not indicated to them that that would have
any bearing on the subsequent events because I did not know in my
conversations with Admiral Kimmel that there would be even a second
ambassador arriving.
The Chairman. You don't know what his reaction to that would
have been if he had known it ?
Captain Zacharias. I do not know, sir.
The Chairman. Were you stationed at Pearl Harbor or in the
Hawaiian Islands when you had this conversation in March with
Admiral Kimmel?
Captain Zacharias. I was in command of the heavy cruiser Salt
Lake City and I have already indicated in my testimony [57-^]
why I sought this conference with Admiral Kimmel and that was to
discuss, to make certain he had received the report of my conference
with Admiral Nomura which I had given in detail to Admiral Stark
in a letter to Admiral Stark.
The Chairman. Maybe you have already stated it. What was Ad-
miral Kimmel's reaction to that prediction ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3247
Captain Zacharias. What he stated ? I did state, sir.
The Chairman. All right. State it again, please.
Captain Zacharias. He said to me, "Well, we have neither the per-
sonnel nor the materiel with which to carry out this patrol." I had
indicated to him that the only way to prevent this air attack which
would come down wind from the northward because that was the pre-
vailing wind in Hawaii, was to have out patrols at least 500 miles then,
and he stated that he had neither the personnel nor materiel with
which to carry out such patrols and I said to him, "Well, Admiral,
you better get them because that is what is coming."
The Chairman. You formed your conclusion as to what was coming
from your general knowledge of the situation, together with your ex-
perience, your long experience in the Intelligence Division ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
The Chairman, You did not have the benefit of any magic or in-
tercepted messages at the time you formed your conclusion [874^^
and at the time you transmitted your conclusion to Admiral Kimmel?
Captain Zacharias. No, sir ; I did not. I did have some knowledge
of certain messages which dealt with the Far Eastern situation in
general but I would not say that I had access to any which really bore
upon the events which followed.
The Chairman. Have you read those intercepted messages as they
have been filed with the committee ?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Have you read the messages about which Admiral
Kimmel and General Short have testified as being messages to which
thej were entitled and which might have changed their course of
action if they had had them ?
Captain Zacharias. Those which were not decoded, I think, until
after Pearl Harbor.
The Chairman. No, some of them were decoded.
Senator Brewster. But not communicated.
The Chairman. But not communicated. They were decoded but not
communicated to them.
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir ; I now recall them.
The Chairman, As an Intelligence Officer I would like to ask your
opinion as to whether those messages if transmitted would have given
any additional information as to the immediate likelihood of an attack
on Pearl Harbor?
[8748] Captain Zacharias. I can state the effect that they would
have had on me but I cannot state what effect they would have had on
Admiral Kimmel or General Short.
The Chairman. Well, I realize that but just for my own — not curi-
osity exactly — but for my own information, I would like to get an
opinion as to what reaction they would have had on you.
Captain Zacharias. What opinion I would have had ?
The Chairman. Yes.
Captain Zacharias. Why, I can state positively if I had had access
to those messages it would have further confirmed my opinion as to
what took place.
The Chairman. Those messages, outside of the one carving up the
Pearl Harbor region or area into five different sections for the ships
to be parked — that is not the naval word.
3248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Murphy. Docked.
The Chairman. Docked or berthed pertain to the
Captain Zacharias. The five different what, sir ?
The Chairman. One of those messages was an intercept of a mes-
sage between the Hawaiian Islands and Tokyo indicating the dividing
up of the harbor into five sections and the berthing of the ships there,
which might have indicated tliey had some particular interest in that
in Pearl Harbor, but outside of that, as I recall, the other messages
were dealing with [8?'4^\ the general situation between Japan
and the United States and the growing tensity of it. Would those
messages outside of that one, would those messages have indicated
anv additional likelihood of an attack upon Pearl Harbor?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, I think I can say categorically that those
messages would have had a very distinct effect on my opinion.
Tlie Chairman. Now, this book from which j'ou have quoted here,
you say that the part you read was translated and distributed among
the naval officers ?
Captain Zacharias. I do not know the distribution but this copy
was given to me by the fleet intelligence officer because it was trans-
lated in that office and I picked it up in the course of my conversations
with them and my interest in the situation.
The Chairman. That was in October?
Captain Zacharias. About October.
The Chairman. 1941?
Captain Zacharias. 1941, yes, sir.
The Chairman. Well, that is all I will ask at the moment. I am at
a disadvantage because I did not hear the rest of the testimony.
Congressman Cooper.
The Vice Chairman. That fleet intelligence officer you referred
to. Captain, was the fleet intelligence officer of the [8750'\
Pacific Fleet under the command of Admiral Kimmel ?
Captain Zacharias. He was the first fleet intelligence officer of
the Pacific Fleet and later, as the name was changed — first he was
fleet intelligence officer of the United States Fleet and when it was
changed later to the Pacific Fleet he became fleet intelligence officer
of the Pacific Fleet. He had been there for quite a considerable time
before Pearl Harbor.
The Vice Chairman. Well, at the time you received this copy that
you have read to the committee he was then Admiral Kimmel's
intelligence officer?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct.
The Chairman. Would you allow me to ask one question that I
have overlooked?
The Vice Chairman. Yes.
The Chairman. What, from your experience, your long experience
in the Intelligence Division of the Navy, what is the prac tice of naval
officers in the Navy Department in transmitting diplomatic messages
to naval officers in the field or in the waters where they are in command ?
Captain Zacharias. I think the general policy is to give such mes-
sages only to those who need to know their existence.
The Chairman. There is a general policy that from such [8751'\
messages as are received initially anywhere an estimate of the situation
is drawn and that is transmitted to the conmianding officers both in
the Navy and War Departments, is it?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COIMMITTEE 3249
Captain Zacharias. I did not get tliat.
The Chairman. Instead of sending each individual diplomatic
message that is picked up in general for any reason or from any source
to the commanding officers in the field or in the waters in which the
Navy may be operating, is it the practice to send them an estimate, a
general estimate of the situation dra^Yn from those messages that are
received in the Department as a whole?
Captain Zacharias. Either or both of those methods are employed.
The Chairman. Either or both?
Captain Zacharias. Yes.
The Chairman. All right.
The Vice Chairman. Captain, would you give us a little more
information as to why you considered the arrival of the third Japanese
envoy so important?
Captain Zacharias. The reasons as to why I felt that the arrival
of a third envoy in Washington would precipitate a decision, that
came through experience in intelligence work and our observation of
the many Japanese missions which came over to this country on in-
spection trips or purchasing mis- [87S2] sions.
We noticed that almost invariably when they went to a certain in-
dustrial activity they were interested in one particular thing in that
plant. Depending on its importance, a second mission would come
and go to that same plant and showed an interest only in that particular
piece of machinery or whatever it was. They would be followed by
a third group, who would go through the same procedure and after
the visit of the third group all interest in that plant and that particular
item would disappear.
In my mind I formulated the opinion that the Japanese would not
accept the view of a single individual; that two individuals usually
resulted in a controversy. Therefore, it was necessary to have the
opinion of a third one before they would reach their decision. That
is typical and in line with everything Japanese.
The Vice Chairman. It is part of their way of operating, to do
everything three times before they reach a decision ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir, and that is possibly the
reason why even in their most important operations they have in the
past taken away the initiative from the commander in chief and
required him to get his detailed instructions from Tokyo before
he would make any move.
I feel that that every condition was responsible for in [876S^
some degree our success at Midway. Ordinarily when a force is
coming in to make a surprise attack, as they were doing again at
Midway, a commander in chief would know that he had been dis-
covered when they spotted a patrol plane of ours 2 days before and
would then retire to a sector and come in at a later date. The com-
mander in chief was not empowered to make any such decision and by
the time, I assume, that he was able to contact Tokyo and get per-
mission to change his plan it was too late.
I give that as an indication that decisions by the Japanese are never
confined to a single individual or even two.
The Chairman. And you' cite that instance as something that
actually happened that contributed to our success in the Battle of
Midway?
3250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir; that was known ; that information
had been furnished to Mr. Munson and, as I indicated in the memo-
randum, I talked with a third party, went over the details of this thin<^
completely the ni^jht before I sailed for Wake Island. The night
before was November 27, 1941 ; and that was with Mr. Lorrin Thurston,
the head of the Honolulu Advertiser and the head of Station KGU
in Honolulu, who was a Military Intelligence Reserve officer, a captain.
The Vice Chairman. He was a captain in the United States
[87S4] Army?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, Military Intelligence Reserve and, as I
indicated in that memorandum, he expressed surprise that he had not
been informed as to what to send out over his radio when the air attack
came.
The Vice Chairman. Well, now, I want to try to understand you a
little more clearly, Captain, about this — what was his name, Thurs-
ton?
Captain Zacharias. L-o-r-r-i-n T-h-u-r-s-t-o-n ; Lorrin Thurston,
The Vice Chairman. Well, was he at that time a captain in the
United States Army?
Captain Zacharias. He was a captain in the Military Intelligence
Reserve of the United States Army, not on active duty.
The Vice Chairman. Not on active duty ?
Captain Z\CHARiAS. Right.
The Vice Chairman. Well, was that a civilian radio station that he
had or was it a military radio station ?
Captain Zacharias. That was one of the two civilian radio stations
on the Island of Oahu.
The Vice Chairman. And just what was it you told him?
Captain Zacharias. I related to him the entire probability of events
as I have already testified and that is [S'/SS] what caused him
to say to me with an expression of surprise, "Why, I am here and a
Reserve intelligence officer in G-2 and I have not been given any indi-
cation of what I should send out over the radio in the event of an air
attack."
I said to him, "Well," I said, "if you say, 'We are having a sporadic
air attack; there is no reason for alarm. Everyone should keep in-
doors because if you go on the streets you will interfere with the mili-
tary going to their posts. Just stay at home and keep calm.' "
And I might say that on the morning of December 7 when the com-
munications officer brought me the word around 8 o'clock that Oahu
had been attacked, I turned on my radio and almost those exact words
were going out over KGU.
The Vice Chairman. Well, now, I cannot sav that I understand
this. I am sure it is my fault but I am sorry. I still do not quite under-
stand just the status of that officer. You say he was not on active duty?
Captain Zacharias. He was not on active duty.
The Vice Chvirman. Then you sav he was working with the Army
intelligence office. Now, what does that mean ?
Captain Zvchartar. I did not say he was working with the intelli-
gence office. I said that he was an intelligence officer in the Military
Reserve not on active duty but I happened to know that he was con-
sulted from time to time by the 18756] Army because he was
a very prominent citizen in Hawaii by reason of those two positions
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3251
he occupied, but I inject that only to indicate that up to the very last
moment these ideas that I had were being passed along as freely as
possible.
The Vice Chairman. Well, the reason I got the impression that he
was connected with the Army intelligence office there in Hawaii was
your statement that you said he was surprised that he had not been
told about that because he was connected with the Army intelligence
office.
Captain Zachaeias. Well, if I conveyed the impression that that
was being critical of the Army for not advising him 1 ask to correct
that because it was not. That was only incidental and the surprise
was on his part.
[87S7] There were no implications in that. I only brought that
in to further substantiate the fact that I was carrying all these things
along in my own mind.
The Vice Chairman. Well, you told us about your conversation with
Admiral Kimmel in which you gave him the information that you here
related, and then you state that you conveyed substantially the same
opinion, or expressed the same views to Captain Layton.
Captain Zacharias. No, sir ; I did not say that I had expressed those
same views to Captain Layton. Undoubtedly in our many conversa-
tions, possibilities and probabilities were discussed, but I did not say
that I had given Layton specifically an outline of what I had expected.
I assume that he would arrive at similar conclusions because of his
experience in intelligence, and knowledge of the Japanese. He was
also a Japanese language officer.
The Vice Chairman. And you had served with him, and it was on
your recommendation that he was appointed in the positions he was
then holding?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. Now, who else, if anybody, besides Admiral
Kimmel. did you tell substantially this same thing to?
Captain Zacharias. I think those were all. As I said [8758']
before, I was on duty there in the Hawaiian area. I already expressed
myself to Admiral Kimmel and his chief of staff. I felt if there was
anything further that they wanted from me, they knew where I was,
and they could get it.
The Vice Chairman. You were not at that time in the intelligence
service of the Navy ?
Captain Zacharias, I was not, except indirectly, because I had been
admonished by a former director of naval intelligence when I com-
pleted a certain tour of duty in naval intelligence, when he said to me
"Although you are now leaving this office to go to sea, you must
consider yourself as continuing your active intelligence work. I hope
you will feel that way and continue to do so, because of your back-
ground and the value that it will have to the Navy, and generally
in the future."
In other words, he gave me a commission to continue intelligence
work even while I was afloat, and I proceeded to do so, even to the
extent of engaging in certain counter-espionage activities, while I was
aboard ship.
The Vice Chairman. I believe you stated you had directly, or in
an indirect way, about 25 years' experience in naval intelligence work?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
3252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[8759] The Vice Chairman. Then the greater part of your 37
years' service in the Navy has been devoted to that line of work?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir; although the portions
afloat, as I have indicated, were during my spare time, because all
Japanese language officers well realized that in order to have the possi-
Ibility of promotion by selection in addition to their specialty, they had
to be good naval officers.
The Vice Chairman. Now, one other inquiry, if I may, please,
Captain.
This information that you say you conveyed to Admiral Kimmel,
was that based upon your general knowledge of the Japanese, and the
relations existing between Japan and the United States, or was any
part of that directly the result of your conversation with Admiral
Nomura ?
Captain Zacharias. I think I can say categorically that it was prin-
cipally my background experience, and not the result of the conver-
sation with Admiral Nomura. I had hoped that he might be able to
arrive at a successful solution to the situation between Japan and the
United States. I might say after my conversation with him, I was
not too hopeful, but I felt — I knew that — I will stick to my original
expression, I felt that he was quite anxious [8760] to prevent
a war between Japan and the United States, because he had always
said to me that if Japan and the United States went to war, it would
mean the finish of the Japanese Empire and a great loss to the United
States. He reiterated that in my conversation with him in San Fran-
cisco on February 8, 1941 .
The Vice Chairman. Well, you sought this conference with Admiral
Nomura in San Francisco, then, did you ?
Captain Zacharias. I did, and \^hen I had previously notified the
commander in chief of the United States Fleet, Admiral Richardson,
that I proposed to do so, he liked the idea and asked me to send him
a copy of the report of that conversation immediately after it was
completed.
The Vice Chairman. And you were then serving as naval intelli-
gence officer at San Francisco ?
. Captain Zacharias. No, sir, I was then in command of the heavy
cruiser. Salt Lake City, which had recently come into Mare Island to
be overhauled, and an implementation of her armament.
The Vice Chairman. Had you been ordered, directed, or had a
suggestion come to you that you have such a conversation with Ad-
miral Nomura?
Captain Zacharias. Only through the attitude of Admiral Richard-
son when I indicated to him that I had known [8761] Admiral
Nomura intimately in Japan, and on subsequent occasions of his visit
to the United States, 'that I had found him the one Japanese who was
willing and never embarrassed hj discussing situations, and I felt if
anybody could get from him an expression of opinion as to the real
mission for which he was sent over, that I could do it. I felt there was
only one other person in the United States with whom he would talk
as franlcly, and that was Admiral W. V. Pratt, retired.
The Vice Chairman. You had known Admiral Nomura in Japan ?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. How long were you stationed in Japan, Cap-
tain?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3253
Captain Zacharias. The first time about 3 years.
The Vice Chaikman. Were you naval attache at our Embassy there?
Captain Zacharias. I was an attache at tlie Embassy for the purpose
of learning the language and studying the people. It was during that
period that I first met Admiral Nomura. He was then director of
naval intelligence in Japan.
The Vice Chairman. All told, how much time have you spent in
Japan ?
[8762] Captain Zacharias. About 4 j-ears. I went back to the
Asiatic Fleet in 1926 for a specific purpose, and on my way back from
the Asiatic Fleet I was in Japan for a period of something over 6
months, to refresh my knowledge of both the language, the people,
and the situation.
The Vice Chairman. Well, after your conversation with Admiral
Richardson, in which he indicated at least to you that he thought it
might be well for you to talk to Admiral Nomura, you then did have
the conversation with him ?
Captain Zacharias. I did, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And you reported by way of a memorandum
on that conversation to Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations ?
Captain Zacharias. I wrote a personal and very lengthy letter to
Admiral Stark, a copy of which you have in the papers that were
furnished by the Navy Department to the committee, and I received
a reply from Admiral Stark, a copj^ of which also has been furnished
to you, in which he indicated that my letter to him was very interesting
and illuminating, and he had sent the original over to the President
and had made copies for the Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary
of State.
[876'S] The Vice Chairman, I believe you state that copies were
sent to Admiral Kimmel and in your conversation with him he told
you he had received it.
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Now what was the occasion for your writing
the memorandum to the other Admiral ; Admiral Draemel ?
Captain Zacharias. That memorandum, as you recall, was written
on March IT, 1942. The specific purpose of that memorandum was to
advise Admiral Nimitz, then commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet,
of the situation existing in Hawaii as I saw it, and to indicate to him
that if certain steps were not taken to change the situation existing
there that he could expect something even more disastrous than what
took place at Pearl Harbor.
As you know, that situation eventuated less than 3 months later and
precipitated the battle of Midway. At that time, as you know, the
Japanese were approaching Hawaii with an overpowering force for
the purpose of capturing Hawaii after Midway.
I must say that I felt that we were very fortunate in the conclusion
of that campaign. I know that Admiral Nimitz felt that way after
the battle of Midway had finished.
Now, as I say, this memorandum was prepared for Vice Admiral
Nimitz of the situation then existing. I was very [8764] much
concerned in what had not been done regarding Japanese agents in
Hawaii subsequent to Pearl Harbor, the inspections of various locali-
ties and everything else as is outlined in this memorandum.
3254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I was still the commanding officer of a ship and it took a good deal
of deliberation on my part to decide to go over to the commander in
chief and present my views to him. However, because of my back-
ground in intelligence and knowing that I was the senior, the one
officer in the United States Navy who had such a background of knowl-
edge regarding the Japanese, and in intelligence work, I felt it my duty
to advise him of the situation as I saw it, and I proceeded to have a
conversation with Admiral Draemel, his chief of staff, to see what
he might suggest.
After going over all these details with him, which included a com-
plete analysis of the situation prior to Pearl Harbor, and that was
given to Admiral Draemel for the sole purpose of letting him know
my background and to let him know, or, rather, to convince him that I
knew what I was talking about, that was the sole purpose of giving
him this pre-Pearl Harbor background.
After my conversation, and the relation of it was given to him, he
said, ''Well, now, I agree with you j^ractically 99 percent and I wish
you would write that out for me in the [8766] form of a mem-
orandum so I can give it to Admiral Nimitz to read, and then if he
wants to discuss it with you further he can do so."
I told him I would be very glad to do that. I returned to my ship
and wrote out the memorandum as exactly as possible as our conver-
sation had taken place and gave it to him.
The Vice Chairman. Then on March 17, 1942, when you wrote this
memorandum to Admiral Nimitz, you were then in the Pacific Fleet?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir. I was a subordinate.
The Vice Chairman. And in command of the cruiser Salt Lake
City?
Captain Zacharias. In command of the cruiser Salt Lake City.
The Vice Chairman. I believe you stated. Captain, that you were
graduated from the Naval Academy in 1912.
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
The Vice Chairman. From what State were you appointed?
Captain Zacharias. Florida.
The Vice Chairman. And you have been in the Navy continuously
since then?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. That is all. Thank you.
\_87GG\ The Chairman. Senator George had to leave to go to
the floor. Congressman Clark is not here. Senator Lucas.
Senator Lucas. Captain, you told the committee a few moments
ago that in October 1941, you attempted, on three different occasions,
to discuss the Japanese situation from the standpoint of a surprise
attack with Captain Layton. Is that right?
Captain Zacharias. No, sir. This was with Captain McMorris —
and it was not to discuss the possibilities of an air attack, it was to
discuss the current situation of our relations with Japan.
Senator Lucas. Well, why did you want to see Captain McMorris
at that time?
Captain Zacharias. Because he was the war plans officer and I knew
that he would be drawing up any procedures for eventualities.
Senator Lucas. What did you have in mind discussing with Captain
McMorris ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3255
Captain Zacharias. I would have discussed with him the
probabilities.
Senator Lucas. Of an air attack ?
Captain Zacharias. Of what might eventuate. I think I would
have related to him then everything I had told Admiral [5767]
Kimmel, because it was just at that same period that I had the con-
versations with Mr. Munson.
Senator Lucas. Why were you so free with Munson with respect
to the possibility of an air attack and yet you did not pass it on in
October 1941 to the proper authorities in Hawaii ?
Captain Zacharias. I had already passed it along to Admiral
Kimmel.
Senator Lucas. Yes ; you had done that back in March 1941.
Captain Zacharias. Yes.
Senator Lucas. Did it ever occur to you, as the tense situation
developed between this country and Japan, to again repeat that to
Admiral Kimmel?
Captain Zacharias. I have already indicated that Admiral Kim-
mel and his chief of staff knew that I was a commanding officer in
his fleet, and I felt that if he wanted any further information from
me he knew where he could find me. I did not again go over to bring
myself to his attention, because I long since learned that when you
are persistent in these things you arouse certain feelings which nullify
the effect which you desire to produce.
Senator Lucas. Did you feel that they considered you a sort of a
nuisance for interfering with their own decisions [8768] when
you made suggestions of this kind?
Captain Zacharias. No, sir; there was no indication of that.
Why Captain McMorris did not want to discuss it I do not know,
but it so impressed me after the third attempt that I went in to
Commander Layton and said, "What is the matter with Captain
McMorris? I tried to engage him in a conversation about this situa-
tion but he does not feel like talking about it." And the intelligence
officer indicated to me he did not know any reason why he should not
want to discuss it.
Senator Lucas. You were a very good friend of Captain Layton?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. I understand you recommended him.
Captain Zacharias. I did.
Senator Lucas. Was it Layton you recommended for the position
he held in the fleet at that time ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct. I might add that I was also a
good friend of Captain McMorris and he is a classmate of mine.
Senator Lucas. Now did you discuss with Layton at any time in
October 1941 the possibilities of an air attack and give to him the
substance of the conversation that you gave to Munson?
Captain Zacharias. No; only I think I discussed with him
[87 Gf^] the fact that Munson had sought me out, and what I had
gone over with him I cannot recall.
Senator Lucas. Why did you consider Munson more important
than Layton?
Captain Zacharias. Because Munson had come out with a letter
signed "H. R. Stark," to open up everything to him. That letter
3256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
was to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. So I tried to
get from Munson some indication as to whom he was representing,
but he consistently declined to tell me, in a very friendly manner, so
I did not pursue it further, but I reached my own conclusions.
Senator Lucas. Did Munson talk to Captain Lay ton while he was
there ?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Did you confer with Layton after Munson left
and discuss with him the conversation that you might have had?
Captain Zacharias. Now, only incidentally, possibly. In one of
my visits to the fleet intelligence officer I said I had some conversa-
tions with Munson and had given him my idea of what would occur.
Senator Lucas. As I recall, Admiral Kimmel does not remember
the conversation you had with him in JNIarch 1941.
Captain Zacharias. I have indicated that I was possibly one
[8770] of hundreds with whom he talked, and although the subject
of our conversation was one which I felt, and still feel, was most vital
to his position as commander in chief of the fleet, I have said that I
can realize that he might not remember the details of that conversation.
Senator Lucas. Have you talked to Captain Smith, the other officer
who was present at the time you engaged Admiral Kimmel in a con-
versation about this important matter?
Captain Zacharias. Not about the matters I discussed there. I
probably have spoken to him in greetings.
The Vice Chairman. Will the Senator yield ?
Senator Lucas. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. I understood the Senator to state Admiral
Kimmel testified he did not have the conversation with him.
Senator Lucas. If I said that I am wrong. Admiral Kimmel did
not recall the substance of the conversation that he had with you,
Captain ?
The Vice Chairman. If the Senator will permit, I interrogated
Admiral Kimmel about that. He stated that he did have a conversa-
tion with Captain Zacharias in March of 1941. Then I read to him
this statement from your memorandum and asked him whether Cap-
tain Zacharias told him there would be an air attack on Pearl Harbor,
and he answered that he [8771] did not believe that.
Senator Lucas. Yes ; I think that is right.
Captain Zacharias. I think I can clarif}^ that.
Senator Lucas. Clarify it, if you will, sir.
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. The question asked of Admiral Kim-
mel was whether this was going to take place, or whether I had told
him that this would take place on December 7, and he said I did not.
The Vice Chairman. I will read the quotation, if the Senator will
indulge me a moment.
Senator Lucas. I yield for that purpose.
[8772] The Vice Chairman. I first asked Admiral Kimmel:
Now, you were asked some questions about some conversations between you and
Captain Zacharias.
Senator Brewster. What page is that?
The Vice Chairman. Page 7133 of our transcript.
Admiral Kimmel answered : "Yes, sir."
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3257
Then I asked :
He was an officer under your command at the time?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes.
Then I asked :
And you stated that you did have a conversation with him in March of 1941,.
and you did not recall that he said anything to you about expecting an air at-
tack on Pearl Harbor, is that correct?
Admiral Kimmel. That is right. I made such a statement as that.
Then I asked :
Did you have any conversation with him at any other time other than Marcli.
1941?
Admiral Kimmel. Not that I now recall.
Then I asked :
You had no other conversation with him at all, that you remember?
[8773] Admiral Kjmmel. Well, I cannot recall every conversation I had
with every officer in Pearl Harboi*, but so far as I know, Captain Zacharias never
expressed any idea that an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent at any time
to me. He may have expressed such sentiments, I do not know.
Then I said:
Now, then, Admiral, you say that when you received the message of Novembi^r
24, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations-
then I inquired about the message of November 24.
Then shortly after that we recessed for noon.
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. In tlie meantime I had looked at these papers
that had been filed before we resumed the afternoon session, or that
you had filed with the Navy Department. There was only one copy^
and I had not read it up to that time, but during the noon recess I
looked through it. Then, when we resumed the hearing after noon,
I questioned Admiral Kimmel further on that point, as appears on
page 7140 of our transcript.
Senator Brewster. Would not you take page 7137, where you
started your question on that ? That is where you began in the after-
noon about the conversation.
[8774] The Vice Chairman. That was during the mornings
I had not thought that was important, but this should precede what
I read.
Senator Brewster. That was the afternoon session, page 7137,.
when we resumed the inquiry, and introduced the exhibit.
The Vice Chairman. Oh, yes ; I see now. Page 7137.
Captain Zacharias. I think I know the point.
The Vice Chairman. Anyhow, on page 7137 I asked Admiral
Kimmel this question :
Admiral Kimmel, this morning I asked you a few questions about your conver-
sation with Captain Zacharias. At that time I did not have before me the-
photostatic copies of certain documents that have been presented here to the
committee with respect to Captain Zacharias, and at the conclusion of tlie
morning's session, counsel handed me this copy which is the only one before the
committee. It is headed "Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to Pearl
Harbor and Events Leading Up To It." And quite a number of items are listed!
on the front page, but I will pass on down to an item appearing about the middle-
of this page, which I will read to you :
"March, 1941 : Conversation with Admiral Kimmel CINCPAG —
79716 — 46— pt. 7 23
3258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that was you —
"and his Chief of Staff, Captain," it [8775] looks like "W. W. Smith,
tJ. S. N."
Admiral Kimmel. That is right.
Then I continued reading :
"Regarding Nomura, notifying of surprise attack on our Fleet by Japanese in
case hostilities eventuate. Details of this conversation are covered in a personal
and confidential memo to Chief of Staff, to CINCPAC, Rear Admiral Milo
Draemel, U. S. N., for presentation to CINCPAC (Admiral Nimitz) and dated
March 17, 1942, copy attached."
Then I turn over to this copy to which he refers in that note. I will not take
time to read all of it, but in the fourth paragraph of this headed "Personal and
Confidential Memorandum for Admiral Draemel, March 17, 1942" I read you as
follows :
'Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral Kimmel and Captain
Smith during the course of an hour and a half conversation with them of the
exact event to take place on 7 December, not only as to what would happen,
but also how and when. My only error was that the Japanese were after four
battleships, and they got five." ,
Do you recall any such statement as that, or any Information of that nature
given you by Captain Zacharias?
Admiral Kimmel. I think there is very little I can add to my previous testi-
mony on that subject. In the past [8776] few days I heard of this memo-
randum, and I had read that memorandum before I testified before this com-
mittee and if you want me to clarify any of my previous statements, I will be
pleased to do so, but I am willing to let it stand as it is.
Then I asked :
Well, in questions asked you by counsel and those which I asked you, you
stated that you did not remember
Admiral Kimmex. That is correct.
Then I asked :
Any conversation with Captain Zacharias along this line.
Admiral Kimmel. I remembered a conversation with Captain Zacharias.
Then I asked :
But I have now tried to refresh your memory.
Admiral Kimmel. That is right.
Then I state :
If it is worth anything in that respect.
Admiral Kimmel. Yes.
Then I state :
By reading you what appears in this memorandum prepared by him, which
has been presented to this committee for whatever it may be worth.
[8777] Admiral Kimmel. That is right.
Then I asked :
And I am now asking you whether he said to you what he states there, or
anything like that.
Admiral Kimmel. He did not, and furthermore, I would have paid very little
attention to any man who told me in March of 1941 that an attack was going to
occur on the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.
I think that covers the pertinent point. I assume you are familiar
with it.
The Chairman. I think it is time to adjourn.
Captain Zacharias. I can reply very quickly to that.
The Chairman. Yes, if you will. "We will have to recess in a
moment.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3259
Captain Zacharias. Included in that memorandum was the date
December 7. I have already indicated that December 7 is synonymous
with Pearl Harbor. When you realize that this memorandum was
prepared after Pearl Harbor, it was referring back to an event for the
benefit of Admiral Draemel and Admiral Nimitz, and Admiral
Kimmel is quite correct in saying that in March 1941, I did not
predict something was going to happen on December 7. xVnd he
is also correct in saying that I did not indicate that there was any
imminence of Japanese hostilities. Everything I said to him
[8778] was contingent upon the development of a situation which
made hostilities between Japan and the United States imminent. I
did not predict when that would occur, but I indicated to him clearly
as to what would happen if that situation evolved.
The Chairman. The committee will recess until 2 : 00 o'clock, and
the Chair understands that Justice Roberts will be here.
You may come back here also. Captain.
Captain Zacharias. I will be here, sir.^
(Whereupon, at 12 : 10 p. m., the committee recessed to 2 p. m., of the
same day.)
[8779'} AFTERNOON SESSION — 2 P. M.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Justice Roberts, will you be sworn ?
( Justrce Roberts was sworn by the chairman.)
Mr. Richardson. I have before me, Mr. Chairman, some corre-
spondence which it might be well to have extended in the record in
connection with the testimony of the Justice.
The first is a letter of December 16, 1941, to the President from the
Secretary of War in connection with the individuals who were selected
to form the Commission of which the Justice was the chairman.
That is followed by a letter of January 27, 1942, being a letter to
Justice Roberts from the Secretary of War with reference to the
report which had been prior thereto filed.
The third is a letter under date of January 31, 1942, from the Justice
to the Secretary of War in acknowledgment of the letters.
I think probably it would be sufficient if the letters were extended in
the record by the stenographer without reading them.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I have had the privilege of
counsel showing them to me and I think that they are of sufficient con-
sequence to have them read.
The Chairman. Oh, well, they ought to be spread on the [8780}
record at this point before Justice Roberts testifies.
Senator Brewster. I think they should be read so the committee
will be familiar with them.
The Chairman. If there is no objection, counsel may read them.
Mr. Murphy. I have a suggestion to make. They were read about
two weeks ago at the time Senator Ferguson asked a question about
them. I think these were among those read.
Senator Brewster. These were not read.
The Chairman. The Chair does not understand that they were read.
Mr. Murphy. Oh, I see, these letters were not read.
* Captain Zacharias' testimony is resumed on p. 3303, infra.
3260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PliARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Chairman. Without objection the counsel will read the letters
into the record, at this point in sequence.
Mr. Richardson, (reading) :
Personal and Confidential
December i6, 194 1.
Deab Mr. Prksident : Knox tells me that you would like our suggestions as to
the investigating board this morning
The CiiAiRaiAN. Let me ask counsel this question: Prior to that
letter is there any official document appointing the Commission by
the President which might well go in ahead of these letters ?
[8781] Mr. Richardson. This would come ahead of that, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Brewster. Yes.
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Mr. Richardson (reading) :
Knox tells me that you would like our suggestions as to the investigating board
this morning.
1. My suggestion for the civilian head is Justice Roberts. No less a man in
my opinion should be asked and Roberts, by his action in investigating and prose-
cuting the Teapot Dome scandal and in deciding the Black Tom case more
recently, has an outstanding reputation among our people for getting down to
the bottom of a factual situation. I think his appointment would command the
confidence of the whole country. I believe Knox agrees with me.
2. For the AVar Department representatives I suggest Major General Frank
R. McCoy, Retired, and Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney of the Air Corps.
a. McCoy you know personally. He has the most outstanding record of any
man in the Army for such an appointment, requiring as it does breadth of view,
superlative character, and wide similar experience. As a member of the Lytton
Commission which investigated the [8782] Japanese in Manchuria, he
won a very high reputation among all nations involved for his balance and tact.
It was due to him more than any other member that the report of that Com-
mission was unanimous.
b. McNarney I recommend as the best air man we have for that purpose. I
think there must be an air man on the board because the duties and alleged
derelictions were in air protection. The fight was an air fight. We have no
retired oflicers of the Air Corps fit for this assignment, but McNarney has a
reputation which commands the respect of everybody. As you know, he was
Chief of Staff for Chaney in London, was on the recent Staff conferences with
the British, went to Moscow, and is familiar with British technique in respect
to air defense. Marsliall and I think he is the most competent man we have at
the present time on air and ground joint requirements.
Marshall and I united on all the foregoing suggestions after very careful
consideration by each of us.
Most confidentially we are sending to Hawaii two men to relieve Short and
Martin, the present Army Commander and Air Commander. Lieutenant General
Emmons, our present Air Combat Commander, will relieve Short. Brigadier
General Tinker will relieve Martin. They are starting at once and I think
nothing should be said about [8785] it until they arrive to take command.
As you know, we have had a sad and serious blow in this matter. Major General
Dargue and Colonel Bundy, who have been missing since the storm of last Fri-
day night, were on their way out to Hawaii. They were two of the best men
we had and we had expected to use Dargue to relieve one of the men out there.
Faithfully yours,
Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of War.
This is addressed to:
The President,
The White House.
My opinion is that the housecleaning which I describe in the last paragraph
should be synchronized with a similar housecleaning in the Navy Command,
and all announced at the same time.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3261
This was followed by a letter of January 27, 1942, from the Secre-
tary of War to Justice Roberts. [Reading:]
My dear Justice Roberts :
This is just a hasty line to tell you what an admirable job I think that you
and your collegues have done in your diflScult task of drawing the report on
the disaster at Pearl Harbor.
[8784] I think it is a masterpiece of candid and accurate statement based
upon most careful study and analysis of a difficult factual situation. One of the
best features of it has been your treatment of certain underlying elements which,
could not be fully embodied in the report without giving assistance to the enemy.
Your full opinion on some of these latter points seems to me so important
that I hope it will be given to the President and others of us who are concerned
in the defense of the country, in a manner which can be used without going to
the enemy. These are the type of things that I intended to suggest to you
in my preliminary talk with you before you left for Pearl Harbor.
Faithfully yours,
Henby L. Stimson,
And addressed to : "Honorable Owen J. Roberts, United States
Supreme Court, Washington, D. C."
That is followed by a letter of January 31, 1942, from Justice
Roberts to the Secretary of War. [Reading :]
My Dear Mr. Secrettary: I am greatly indebted to you for your letter of
January 27 with respect to the Pearl Harbor report. It was good of you to take
the time from your manifold [8785] duties to write me about it.
Yours sincerely,
Owen .T. Egberts.
Addressed to "Hon. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, Muni-
tions Building, Washington, D. C."
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, does the record show the date of the
first two letters?
Mr. Richardson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. It does ? All right.
The Chairman. Proceed with the examination of Justice Roberts.
[8786] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I wish those would
remain or be gotten back.
The Reporter. They will be back in a half-hour.
The Cpiairman. Proceed, Mr. Richardson.
TESTIMONY OF HON. OWEN J. ROBERTS, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE,
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (RETIRED)
Mr. Richardson. Mr. Justice, you were the Chairman of what is
known as the Roberts Commission in connection with the investigation,
of Pearl Harbor?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. AVhen was that Commission sworn in ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. I should think the 18th or 19th of December.
1 can give you the exact date from the minutes. We swore the recorder
and then he swore the members of the Commission.
Mr. Richardson. How soon after that before the Commission began
to function ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Immediately. The very morning that it was
organized.
Mr. Richardson. Will 5^ou give us a running resume of the time the
Commission did function here and then later upon your arrival at
Hawaii ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. We called in the higher command of the Army
and Navy and ask them to produce the war plans, maps, orders, and
3262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
every document that could have a bearing on the situation at Pearl
Harbor. We examined those and had [8787] the officers ex-
plain them and their bearing to us.
I might say at that time we had not decided how we would take
testimony, and we had no stenographer. "We had a secretary who was
a stenographer who made notes on the topics on which these people
spoke, and we each made notes for ourselves of things which we
thought important and that we desired to investigate.
General Marshall and Admiral Stark were present and gave us an
outline of the whole transaction from their points of view. We asked
whether we should retain certain code telegrams, and what not, and
they told us that copies of them would be found at Pearl Harbor, and
we decided not to take those into our possession at that time but to
get them when we had stenographic service at Pearl Harbor.
As the result of the conference and testimony of these gentlemen,
who were not under oath but were upon honor to give us all they had,
we then formed a plan of going to Pearl Harbor where copies of prac-
tically every document they produced would be found and we could
proceed more formally with the stenographer.
We made arrangements immediately for stenographic service by
stenographers known in Washington, and known to me personally to
be reputable, because we did not know what kind of stenographic serv-
ice we could depend on in Pearl [8788] Harbor, and we took
those gentlemen with us. I think they arrived on Oahu on the 22d —
I may be wrong about the date — about 6 o'clock in the morning, and
we started our session at 9 : 30 on that morning at Fort Shafter with
a stenographer present, and we called for our first witness, after we
called for the production of a lot of documents, General Short.
Mr. Richardson. From that time on, when the Commission func-
tioned, it was by question and answer to witnesses who had first been
duly sworn ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes. I might say that Congress passed an act
giving us the right to subpena witnesses and swear them, and that was
at our request.
Mr. Richardson. Was any witness proposed who was not given
an opportunity to be heard ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Certainly not.
Mr. Richardson. How were your proceedings conducted with re-
spect to their being open or otherwise ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. They were closed. Every witness was asked
to observe secrecy, that is to say, not to disclose what went on in the
room.
Of course the reason for that was what this committee now knows,
that there w^ere questions of broken codes. We were informed that
the Army and Navy were getting invaluable [8789] informa-
tion every day ; that the Japanese did not realize that their codes were
broken, and indeed the Navy was rather chary aboiit even telling us
about the thing for fear there might be some leak from our commission.
Of course if we held open hearings there was a chance we might do
a great damage to our forces, our military program.
Mr. Richardson. When did you complete your duties there, ap-
proximately ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. I have got it all in the minutes, and you have
the minutes, I think, so when I speak I do not speak against the min-
utes. It was around the 18th of January, I suppose.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3263
Mr. KiCHARDSON. Then you returned to Washington ?
Mr. Justice Egberts. Yes ; we came to San Francisco, and in order
not to lose any time we came back by Pulhnan from San Francisco,
and we had a drawing room in which we could discuss the facts, and
as to facts which were of record and as to which there was no doubt
we could start to prepare findings, which we did on the train.
Mr. Richardson. Approximately how long after you returned
were your findings completed ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Again I do not speak by the record. It is all
here. You can get it day by day. But I should [8790] think
something over a week.
The Chairman. The report shows that they held meetings on the
16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22d, and 23d.
Mr. Justice Roberts. That is right.
The Chairman. And the report is dated the 23d of January.
Mr. Justice Roberts. That is right.
Mr. Richardson. Then upon your return to Washington you took
no more testimony?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes; we did. We took some testimony on
some matters that were still doubtful in our minds, and we did not
attempt to make findings on those particular points until we had
taken testimony from General Marshall, Admiral Stark, and several
others.
Mr. Richardson. I note, Mr. Justice, in the report that your com-
mission eventually made, there are 19 in number of what are referred
to as the findings of fact.
I also note in the minutes of your commission, under date of Janu-
ary 21, 1942, the following language :
At 3 : 00 o'clock p. m. the Secretary of the Navy, having been shown certain pro-
posed findings of fact, stated that he suggested no changes for the safeguarding
of the national interest in any of the statements except one, in Finding No. 20.
This was then differently phrased. At [8791] 4 : 30 p. m. Brigadier Gen-
eral Gerow, designated by the Chief of Staff, after examining the same findings
for the same purpose stated to the recorder that he found no changes to suggest,
and the recorder so informed the Commission.
I would be obliged if you would give us some explanation with
respect to the elimination of what must have been originally finding
No. 20 in connection with your report.
Mr. Justice Roberts. There wasn't any elimination. When we
started to make findings, every member of the commission was draw-
ing findings to represent his view of certain facts. Then we took the
different drafts of the members and compared them, and corrected
them, and agreed on a statement.
In order to have that done accurately, I asked the Commissioners in
making findings, to make a short finding for each specific fact. When
we had finally agreed on the findings there were over 70 of them, num-
bered from 1 to 70. They were agreed upon. Those were the ones
that were shown to the Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War.
[87921 When we came to draft our report for submission to the
President, every one of the Commission but myself said that it was a
disjointed sort of thing, because it had 70 short paragraphs in it, cut
apart, and they said it would be a great deal better to put the findings
in longer paragraphs together.
3264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
We did that, and we finally condensed those 70 paragraphs into 19,
without changing a word in them. If you will look at the findings,
you will see that No. 1 consists of two paragraphs. Those were orig-
inally numbered separately.
The next one consists of two paragraphs which were originally
numbered separately. The third one does not. The fourth consists of
three paragraphs that had separate numbers, and so on.
We took the findings that dealt with a particular situation and put
them under one caption with paragraphs instead of having them
numbered straight through.
As to finding No. 20, 1 think I know what it was. It is at the bottom
of page 6 of the printed report. That finding is now in a paragraph
starting "November 24, 1941." It dealt with a message from the Navy.
In making up a statement on these messages we garbled them. W^
were told if we had translated them accurately, that either the Ger-
mans or the Japanese, who had taken off the code messages, might
[8793] take the translation and break our code, and we should par-
aphrase them, and Secretary Knox thought our paraphrase perhaps
was not plain enough to deceive the Japanese, and he suggested a slight
change in verbiage, and we made it.
Mr. Richardson. Then, as a matter of fact, Mr. Justice, nothing
in your findings was deleted, or eliminated because of the objection
of anyone outside of the Commission?
Mr. Justice Egberts. Certainly not, except, as I say, Secretary
Knox called attention to one finding, and said that might give some
information, that we ought to phrase it somewhat differently, and
we did.
Mr. Richardson. But the factual result of the rephrasing was the
same as the original phrasing?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Absolutely.
Mr. Richardson. Now was your commission unanimous in ap^
proving each of the findings which you reported ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Certainly.
Mr. Richardson. And was your commission unanimous in the
report which you filed on those findings ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. It was.
Mr. Richardson. Now, when that report was made, how was it
signed ?
Mr. Justicce Roberts. Signed by all the commission [8794]
in duplicate.
Mr. Richardson. And each commissioner had a signed copy of
the report?
Mr. Justice Roberts. No, sir. When we decided to make this
change in the findings of fact, to put them in long paragraphs, that
was pretty late. I think it might have been Thursday afternoon or.
Friday morning, and our secretary told us that he could get the
report finished quicker, if he did not have to make seven copies, with
six carbons, so he made the first and two carbons; that made it less
difficult to put into the machine for each page, and we signed two
duplicates. This is one, the ribbon copy, and one carbon.
I kept this one copy [indicating] as my copy, the third carbon.
If you will look at the minutes, you will see the commissioner in-
structing the secretary to make one copy from this for each of the
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3265
other commissioners, that is to make four from this. So far as I
know, the four were made, and so far as I Imow, each commissioner
has a copy. I do not believe there was any shuffling around. I think
that is the copy that the minutes said I was to have.
Mr. Richardson. And that copy was an exact copy of the report
as signed ?
[8795] Mr. Justice Roberts. Absolutely. It is a carbon copy
of the ribbon copy.
Mr. Richardson. Now, following the signing of your report, did
you have some conference with the President with reference to that
report ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes. I covered that in my letter.
Mr. Richardson. Would you mind going over it again, so your testi-
mony can be complete here on that point?
Mr. Justice Roberts. I do not know whether I can state what is in
the letter with accuracy or not. I think I can.
That report was finished around 2 : 30 on Friday afternoon, Decem-
ber 23. In the presence of the commissioners, I called the White
House, got INliss Tully on the phone, told her the report would be
ready late that afternoon, was practically ready, and would be ready
within an hour or so, and I should like to know whether the President
wished it sent by the recorder under cover or whether he wished the
commission to wait on him in a body and present it, or whether he
wanted myself, as the chairman, to present it.
Miss Tully told me that the President was in a Cabinet meeting
and could not reach him, but when he came out she would com-
municate with me.
The commission waited until Miss Tully came back and [8796']
said the President had come out of the Cabinet meeting, that he was
very tired, and he did not want the report presented that afternoon ;
that he wanted it presented by me as chairman of the commission in
person, and he would see me for that purpose at 11 o'clock the next
morning.
Mr. Richardson. What date or what month was the 24th ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. January 24, Saturday.
Mr. Richardson. Your earlier remark was December 23. That
should have been January ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Should have been January ; certainly.
So I called at the White House on the morning of January 24 at 11
o'clock, saw the President in his study on the second floor. He was
at his desk. I handed him an envelope containing these two duplicate
reports. He opened it, and then started to read it.
I sat there and he read it line by line, and so far as I could make
out he read every word of it, carried his finger on the pages.
I was there over 2 hours.
When he concluded reading it, he turned to me and said, "Is there
anything in this report that might give our enemies information
they ought not to have?" Or words to that effect. I said "No, sir;
I cleared that with the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy,
[8797] because we didn't want to put anything in here that might
endanger the national defense."
Then he said, "I do not see why I should not give this report to
tlie public in full."
'3266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I said, "It would be a jjreat satisfaction to the commission if you
did that, sir," or "it would please the commission if you did that,"
or words to that effect.
He rang the bell, and Mr. Mclntyre came in. He threw this whole
thing across the table, as I remember it, both copies, and envelope,
and said, "Mac, give that to the Sunday papers in full," and Mr.
Mclntyre said, "Well I will have to put it in the mimeographing
room, in the press room."
You see, it was then 1 o'clock and he took it and started to go
away, and then he turned around and saidj "Don't you want to say
something about the work of the commission, Mr. President?"
The President said, "Oh, yes," and then he said something about
he was greatly indebted to the commission for their prompt report,
something of that kind, and Mr. Mclntyre turned and went away.
I have never seen the report from that day to this.
Mr. Richardson. You have had a copy, this carbon copy ?
Mr. Justice Egberts. That has been in my files.
[8798] Mr. Richardson. That has also been compared, has it,
with this Senate Document No. 159 ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes.
Mr. Richardson. And that also is a correct copy of the report ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, I found one typographical error in the
Senate Report, in finding 15, where it should read "distant air raid
reconnaissance," it reads "distinct air raid reconnaissance." There
can be no mistake as to what is meant, because the word "distant"
appears twice again in the same paragraph. That is at the top of
page 12. That is evidently a printer's error. That is the only thing
I can find.
Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I do not care to inquire of the Justice.
Congressman Cooper.
Mr. Justice Roberts. I would like to say this: When we made
these findings into larger paragraphs, we made two or three changes.
You will note up at the top of page 8, at the end of the paragraph,
there, "Referred to in the next succeeeding paragraph."
Well, as that paragraph had been put into a finding we had to
change the words "next succeeding finding" to [87991 "para-
graph," because they were all separate.
The same thing occurs in one or two other places wherever we speak
of the "next succeeding paragraph." That originally read "finding",
but when we put them in one finding, we changed it.
The Chairman. I will ask just one question.
I gather from your statement there was never any finding 20 that
was in any way eliminated, but you consolidated some seventy-odd
findings into 19 findings; is that correct?
Mr. Justice Roberts. That is correct.
The Chairman. At no time during your consideration was there any
finding No. 20 that was subsequently eliminated?
Mr. Justice Roberts. No, sir. There is one other thing.
At the very last moment, and after we had heard from the Secre-
taries of War and Navy, we made a slight change in finding 16, what
is now the fourth paragraph of that finding.
In reading over the thing when it was finally in tj'^pe, there was a
word or two in there which I thought indicated that the Navy might
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3267
have broken the Japanese Navy code after December 7, and I elimi-
nated, with the consent of the other two commissioners, two or three
words, that I thought might indicate that the Navy had broken the
Japanese code. [8800] That was the Japanese naval code, and
not this other code that has been talked about.
The Chairman. That elimination was made with the approval of
all of the commissioners?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes.
The Chairman. As a matter of fact, the whole report was a ten-
tative draft which was subsequently reduced in form to the 19 find-
ings which appear here in this official document ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. That is correct.
[8801] The Chairman. Congressman Cooper.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Justice, there never was any intention of
conducting any kind of court proceeding or trial, or anything of that
kind ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. No, sir.
The Vice Chairman. You were just making an investigation, were
you?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes, sir. This seemed to me a preliminary in-
vestigation, like a grand jury investigation, and I did not think, for
our report, that was to be taken as precluding evei-y one of the men
mentioned in it from a defense before his peei-s.
In other words, you could not conduct a proceeding without "cross-
examination and without publicity and call it a trial. It was not a
trial.
[880£] The Vice Chairman. It was just an investigation ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. It was an investigation and it was the forma-
tion of a judgment to be handed to the President. We didn't know
whether the President would publish it or what he would do with it.
The Vice Chairman. That is all.
The Chairman. Senator George.
Senator George. No questions.
The Chairman. Congressman Clark is not here. Senator Lucas.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Justice, after the President gave the two copies
to Secretary Mclntyre with instructions to give it to the press, do you
recall seeing that report in the press the following Sunday ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. At that time I was on the Supreme Court and
the following Monday mimeographed copies of this press release were
sent up to the press room of the Supreme Court and Mr. Potter brought
me up one. I didn't compare it line for line with our report but I had
the report fully in mind. I read it through and it was obviously
complete.
Senator Lucas. After you read the report through you saw no
changes or there was nothing in the report that called to your atten-
tion any changes from what you had [8803] presented to the
President on the Saturday before ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. That is correct, sir. I also saw the full re-
port published in the New York Times on Sunday and read it with
some care to see if it was complete and to my eye it was complete.
There again I did not compare it line for line with my typewritten
copy. Of course, with this [indicating printed copy] I took the
trouble to compare it paragraph by paragraph — not line by line —
and it was complete.
3268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Lucas. That is all.
The Chairman. Congressman Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Justice, when Admiral Kimmel was testifying
before us he made some reference to the type of stenographic work
done at Pearl Harbor. As I read the record that has been given to
us there was first several pages reporting the questions and answers as
between the Commission and the witness. Thereafter there were
corrections suggested and as we have been given it they are interlined
following each particular page that would be corrected.
Then after that was done, as I understand it. Admiral Kimmel pre-
sented his version of the testimony. I mean, something that Avas
prepared by him and which he wanted the commission to substitute
for that which the stenographer had actually reported. As I under-
stand it, then the commission [8SO4] said "No, but w^e will
take it as reported to us and the corrections as supplied by you, we
will also take what you consider the correct version, and include both
in our record, and we will have before us what we actually got from
the stenographer, the corrections that were suggested, plus the com-
pleted copy."
At any time was there ever any intention on the part of the com-
mission to be unfair to Admiral Kimmel and not reflect entirely what
occurred during the course of the entire investigation ?
Mr. Justice Koberts. No, Mr. Murphy.
Let'me say that Admiral Kimmel was in a state, to my mind, of
shock after this situation. He was dreadfully down, at which I was
not at all surprised. These stenographers that I have spoken of
served first to my knowledge in the Teapot Dome case. They are offi-
cial court stenographers in Washington of the highest type. There
was no criticism of their work in any respect.
Now, the transcript of Admiral Kimmel's testimony to our knowl-
edge was a correct transcript of what he said. Then he came back
and said that wasn't what he said and he wanted to substitute various
things — and you have got his proposed substitutions. The commis-
sion considered that matter and they said "The stenographic trans-
cript to our mind [SSOol is correct as to what you said, Ad-
miral, and we can't let you interlard things that you did not say."
So we didn't allow him to do that. Then he went off with one of his
assistants and prepared a draft of what he said he really meant by
his testimony or had really intended to say and we said — he wanted
what he had said deleted from the record and this thing substituted —
and \ye said "We can't do that. Admiral Kimmel, but in fairness to you
we will include in the transcript this new paper that you have drawn
up which you say is really what you want to say on tlie subject."
So we put them all in the record so there would be no question of
unfairness to him.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Justice, do you have any recollection of any paper
ever having been given to your commission which was in effect an in-
tercept of the so-called winds code?
Mr. Justice Egberts. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. I believe the Army Pearl Harbor Board makes refer-
ence to the fact that such a paper was presented to your commission
and lost.
Mr. Justice Roberts. Was not.
Mr. Murphy. Did you ever have any such paper ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3269
Mr. Justice Roberts. It was not. When Senator Ferguson wrote
me some time ago and asked me what I knew about the [8806]
winds message I sent him a letter about a winds message that I did
know about and when I read the testimony before this Commission
I found that I was talking about something entirely different. There
was a commercial message over the radio from Tokyo on the 5th or 6th
of December by a merchant in Honolulu to a merchant in Tokyo.
Mr. Murphy. Would that be the Mori message ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. I think so. It talked about the poinsettias
being in bloom and the winds blowing from the east, and so forth. I
thought that was the thing referred to. But I know of no other.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate that was the only so-called winds mess-
age that you had any knowledge of during the course of your entire
proceeding ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. That is true.
Mr. Murphy. I have no other questions.
The Chairman. Senator Brewster.
Senator Brewster. On page 9 of the report, the Senate document,
there is a statement:
Every effort was made to have the message reach Hawaii in the briefest
possible time, but due to conditions beyond the control of anyone concerned the
delivery of this urgent message was delayed until after the attack.
That relates to the warning message of the morning of [SSOT}
December 7.
That would require some qualification under the evidence we have
received. How fully was that explored by you ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. As fully as we knew how, and that was our
judgment after hearing all the story. You may have evidence that we
didn't have.
Senator Brewster. Wliat was your understanding as to how that
message was sent?
Mr. Justice Roberts. I haven't seen the testimony, since it was
sealed, but I will give you my recollection of it after 4 years.
General Marshall told us before we went to Pearl Harbor the cir-
cumstances of that. When he had gotten to his office on the morning
of December 7 and learned of this decode of the Japanese message he
thought he ought to send one more urgent message to Pearl Harbor,
and he told Admiral Stark he would like him to join it, and Admiral
Stark in effect said, "Well, I have sent so many warning messages to
them that I think it will only confuse them to send another; I think
they have all the warning they need, and I won't join."
Marshall sat down and, to hurry, he scribbled off the message in
lead pencil. Then Stark reconsidered, phoned him, and said, "You
may join me in that message," which Marshall [8808] did. He
then sent for his communications officer. It may have been Colonel
French. He said, "How quickly can you get that to Pearl Harbor?"
The man said, "In about a half an hour." I think he had warned
French beforehand that he wanted to get a message through, and
French had tried to open communications on the Army radio to Pearl
Harbor but they couldn't get them. This communications officer ex-
plained to us in his testimony their practice in that case, where they
couldn't raise the station on the radio, was to open the Western Union
wire. He said the Army had a standing arrangement that when they
wanted a wire open they could get it opened immediately and have it
3270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
held open. He called the Western Union and asked them to open a
wire to San Francisco. That was done. The message was coded and
Sent. That then required the Western Union in San Francisco to
carry the message across the street to the cable office to be resent.
Mr. Richardson. RCA, I think.
Mr. Justice Roberts. RCA, whatever it was. The cable office. I
guess there is no cable to Hawaii. But to a communications company
that would send it to Hawaii.
Now, we asked General Marshall whether he couldn't have used
the telephone. He had, as we understood it, what might be called a
private telephone from his office to [8809] General Short's
office. General Marshall said that first of all the man having told
him that he could get the message there in about a half an hour it
didn't occur to him to use it but in any event he would have been
hesitant to use that telephone while it had a scrambler on it. He knew
that our enemy, and I don't know whether it was Germany or Japan,
had been able to take off some messages from those scrambler tele-
phones. They weren't very safe.
I think that is the whole of it.
Senator Brewster. Well, I think my question had reference to
the
Mr. Justice Roberts. Oh, let me add one thing more.
If the teletype in Pearl Harbor had been working Sunda}' morning
that message would have been delivered within 2 or 3 minutes of its
receipt. It was not the practice to run the teletype Sunday morning
iind the teletype was not running this Sunday morning. When the
RCA operator found he couldn't get to General Short on the teletype
he gave a little boy the message to take on a bicycle. The boy started
out and went some distance when the first bomb dropped and then he
went into the bushes and stayed there until about 2 o'clock when he
delivered the message.
The Chairman. Can't blame him for that.
Senator Brewster. The qualification which I had in mind,
[8810] which I gather is now indicated by your testimony, is that
every effort was macle to have the message reach Hawaii in the briefest
possible time consistent with security. That qualification I take it
is implied in connection with the scrambler telephone.
Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. As we have had testimony that within the next
hour after the attack they reached Washington on the phone in 7 min-
utes; so that apparently there was very ready communication by the
scrambler telephone between Washington and — between Hawaii and
the east coast of the United States. There was the question of
security raised which, of course, was a factor to be taken into account.
Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes. Those are all the facts I know on
which we formed our judgment. It may have been quite a wrong
one.
Senator Brewster. So you would agree that that qualification
would be necessary to make your statement in the report strictly
accurate ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. No ; I don't think so. The way I got it was
that General Marshall thought that it would go through in code in
about a half hour.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3271
Senator Brewster. Did lie tell you how long it took on tlie scram-
bler telephone ?
[8811] Mr. Justice Roberts. No, but I supposed only a minute
or two.
Senator Brewster. So that the statement:
Every effort was made to have the message reach Hawaii in the briefest,
possible time, * * *
without a qualification would not be correct?
Mr. Justice Roberts. That is probably true.
Senator Brewster. Now, another statement, on page 18 :
Both commanders were handicapped by lack of information as to Japanese
dispositions and intent. The lack of such knowledge rendered more urgent the
initiation of a state of readiness for defense.
On this question of lack of information, were you informed in your
hearings in Washington that Admiral Kimmel and General Short
had the same information which was available in the War and Navy
Departments here in Washington?
Mr. Justice Roberts. I don't think so.
Senator Brewster. In particular relation to the magic messages?
Mr. Justice Roberts. I don't think so. I think we set forth in our
report what information we thought they were given by these warn-
ing messages. They were in doubt about the disposition of the Japa-
nese fleet. The monitoring, the Navy monitoring system in Pearl
Harbor, had been keeping [881£] very careful tabs on radio,
messages from the Japanese fleet. They had gotten a lot of indica-
tion that there was a tremendous fleet going down the Kra Peninsula.
They had also noted that there was complete silence by the carriers.
Now, they assumed that the carriers being silent they were in
port, bcause when they were in port they used a low frequency radio,
that couldn't be heard over the ocean. Of course, the carriers were^
coming across under silence from the northeast but the Navy De-
partment seemed to think the carriers were in port. I presume Ad-
miral Kimmel was told that from time to time by the monitors.
The reason for our statement there was that after the warnings that
any lack of information ought to have made the commanders even,
more alert because they had warnings that war was liable to break
out and go in any direction any moment.
Senator Brewster. That, of course, would be a matter of opinion.
Mr. Justice Roberts. That is a matter of our conclusion and our
findings and I do not assume you are examining the Roberts Com-
mission to find its faults.
Senator Brewster. Not at all. I was examining the Roberts com-
mission to find out what
Mr. Justice Roberts. What it had before it.
[8813] Senator Brewster. That is right.
I call attention again to :
Both commanders were handicapped by lack of information as to Japanese
dispositions and intent.
It is my understanding that you were given more or less informa-
tion about the magic, but all reference to that was very properly
eliminated from both your investigation and your report?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Certainly.
:3272 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Brewster. This is now all a matter of public knowledge.
The point which I think is of importance to determine is whether or
not when you were given the information regarding the magic you
were given any information as to whether or not Kimmel and Short
had been given any report regarding that or its contents.
Mr. Justice Roberts. The commission's information was, I think,
quite to the contrary. In other words, that no commander anywhere
was told anything about that. Perhaps a half a dozen people in
Washington were all the people that knew anything about it.
Senator Brewster. That was explained, so far as you recall now, to
you fully at that time ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. We knew the commanders weren't given what
was taken off the breaking of the code ; yes, indeed.
[881^] Senator Brewster. Was there evidence before you as
to the responsibility of General Marshall and General Gerow in check-
ing on General Short's report, which you quote :
Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy.
Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes.
Senator Brewster. And you understood that that was their respon-
sibility, to check on that?
Mr. Justice Roberts. I understood, yes, and you will notice that in
our report we say one of the subsidiary causes of the disaster was the
failure of the War Department to reply to the message relating to the
anti-sabotage messages instituted by the commanding general, Ha-
waiian Department.
Senator Brewster. Did the matter of the winds message come be-
fore you ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. I don't know anything about this winds mes-
sage except the winds message that I wrote Senator Ferguson about,
that commercial message a day or two before the attack.
Senator Brewster. So, so far as you now recall, there was no men-
tion about either the original or implementing winds message, as it is
called?
Mr. Justice Roberts. I have no recollection of any such thing. And
I think you will search the testimony in 18815] vain for any
reference to it.
Senator Brewster. Well, we understood there were important gaps
in that as the result of representations as to security.
Mr. Justice Roberts. Oh, No. The stenographic testimony is com-
plete. There is nothing eliminated from the stenographic testimony.
Oh, now and again General McNarney would want to know where
General X or General Y was, and would say off the record "By the
way, where is General X or Y." There were questions of that type,
but there was nothing suppressed from the testimony whatever. All
that about the magic, and all that, was given us in confidence at the
War Department when we were taking the statements and not put on
the typewritten record, not having a stenographer present.
Senator Brewster. That is what I am addressing myself to. I
supposed that was material which was not a formal part of the
record? •
Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. For reasons which you have indicated.
Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3273
Senator Brewster. That is all.
The Chairman, Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. I have already questioned the Justice.
The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart. Pardon me.
[8816] Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Justice, how much time intervened
after the attack before the Roberts commission had its first meeting?
Mr. Justice Roberts, The attack was on December 7, We had our —
I Avas called to the "VVliite House and told that the President desired
me to act as chairman of the commission on the 16th or 17th, 16th, I
think. Admiral Standley was on his way to Washington. General
McNarney had come in by air that morning. There was an informal
meeting of four of us with the Secretary of War and Secretary of
Navy on the morning I would say of the l7th and we formally organ-
ized on the morning of the 18th. That would have been 11 clays
after the attack.
Mr. Gearhart. Then on the 16th day, were Admiral Stark and
General Marshall present?
jNIr. Justice Roberts. The White House sent me a request to call there
in the afternoon by 5 o'clock. I called at the White House and went
to the President's Executive Office. Secretary of War Stimson, Secre-
tary of Navy Knox, Admiral Leahy, Admiral King, Admiral Stark
and General Marshall, at least, were there when the President asked
me to assume this duty. I think there were no others present. I told
him I could not assume the duty without the consent of the Chief
Justice and he asked me to get that consent and phone [8817]
liim and I did that evening.
Mr. Gearhart. Did you take any testimony in the United States,
that is, in the States here?
Mr. Justice Roberts. I would say so, Mr. Gearhart. T \vould say
that all these statements and all this documentary proof that v>-as pro-
duced from the Navy and the Army — I imagine you have had it all
before you, war plans, subwar plans, copies of messages, orders, let-
ters, all of that was in a sense testimony, and General Marshall told
us what its bearing was and which hitched to which.
Admiral Turner was there to explain the war plans. General Gerow
was there to explain the war plans. I would call that all testimon)^
It was not taken formally.
Mr. Gearhart. It was not stenographically reported ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Not at that time. We had no stenographers
at that time and we had been warned that nobody outside of the Com-
mission was to be there because the Army and Navy were so wor-
ried about anybody getting this story about the broken code, which,
of course, they had to tell us, to tell us why they got frightened on
December 7.
Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Stark and General Marshall both told you
about the 1 o'clock directive message ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Which do you mean, the 1 o'clock ? The one
that was sent off at noon on December 7 ?
[8818] Mr. Gearhart. That contained a reference to it. I am
referring to the Japanese intercepted message directing that the reply
to Secretary Hull's message be delivered at 1 o'clock on Sunday, the
7th of December 1941.
Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes, they told us about that. That was the
secret thing that they didn't want disclosed anywhere.
79716—46 — pt. 7 24
3274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gearhart. Yes.
Mr. Justice Roberts. You see, we had to cover that up in our report.
I saw where we said something about it was "believed", "that it was
believed that relations would be broken off", or something of that
kind. "Believed", by Secretary Hull.
The Chairman. You said in effect that information was received
"from various sources" ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Something of that kind.
The Chairman. Without identifying it.
Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Did General Marshall and Admiral Stark tell you
when they first received that information?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes. It was on the morning of December 7.
General Marshall was out horseback riding. I think he got it about,
I won't be certain, 10 : 30. Something like that— 10 or 10 : 30. He
came right to the War [8819] Department. I don't remember
when Admiral Stark said he got it but it was that morning, maybe
9 o'clock or 9 : 30. I won't be certain.
Mr. Gearhart. Did either of them tell when it was received and
when it was decoded?
Mr. Justice Roberts. No, sir. I got the impression that it was
received on the morning of December 7 sometime. Now, they weren't
definite about when the State Department or the Navy Department
got it and they were very chary about telling us which agency was
taking this stuff off. I never got it clear whether it was the Navy
that broke that thing or the Army or the Department of State or
whose agency was doing it. I know that they got the final word
sometime on the morning of December 7 and from whom they got it
I don't know.
Mr. Gearhart. Did they, or either one of them, tell you about the
14-part message which the 1 o'clock directive referred to ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Not in that way. They said they didn't know
the final news until that morning. They didn't tell us that the 14
parts came one day and one part the next dsij or overnight, but that
the final directive, whatever it was, came that morning. And I be-
lieve that is right. I don't know.
[88^0] Mr. Gearhart. I think that is right. Was anything
said by either of them about the 13 parts that came the afternoon
before ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. No. It was spoken of as their getting the
knowledge that the thing was going to break that morning.
Mr. Gearhart. Did they or either one of them tell you where they
were on Saturday night preceding?
Mr. Justice Roberts. No, sir, I don't think we asked them.
Mr. Gearhart. You didn't ask them that question ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. I don't think so.
Mr. Gearhart. Did they volunteer any information as to where
they might have been?
Mr. Justice Roberts. No, sir, I think not.
Mr. Gearhart. Did they tell you where they were the previous
Saturday during the daytime ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. No, I think not. I don't think we asked them.
Mr. Gearhart. That is all.
The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3275
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Justice, were you interviewed by Colonel
Clausen? The reason I ask is that someone advised him, as shown
in the record at page 8625 :
[8821] The original of the Navy Department message and translation, now
probably part of the original Roberts Report records, or at least, questioning of
Mr. Justice Roberts would possibly disclose how that Commission disposed of it.
Mr. Justice Roberts. I am sure I don't know what he is talking
about.
Senator Ferguson. This was sometime in 1944. He is talking about
the winds message.
Mr. Justice Roberts. No ; I never heard of it.
Senator Ferguson. At another place in the record, page 134 of Saf-
ford's testimony before the Pearl Harbor Board
Mr. Justice Roberts. Whose testimony?
Senator Ferguson. Safford, Captain Safford. Do you recall him?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes.
Senator Ferguson (reading) :
The last time I saw that message after the attack on Pearl Harbor about the
15th of December, Admiral Noyes called for the assembling of all important
messages into one file, to show as evidence to the Roberts Commission ; and
Kramer assembled them, and I checked them over for completeness and to see
that we strained out the unimportant ones ; and that "winds" translation, the
"winds execute," was included [8822] in those. I do not recall whether
that ever came back or not. So far as I know, it may even be with the original
papers of the Roberts Commission. It never came back that I know of, and we
have never seen it since, and that is the last I have seen of it.
Mr. Justice Roberts. It couldn't be with the original papers of the
Roberts Commission. We did not take any of these original messages.
Not one. They were looked at. The Navy and the Army said they
would rather keep them in their secret files. They were available.
We made memorandums of them. When we got to Pearl Harbor we
took the same course. If there was any message that was shown to
us we made a memorandum as to what it was and gave it back to the
custodian. We did not have the original, the file originals of any-
thing of this kind in our custody at any time.
Senator Ferguson. When you made a copy of a message, at the
end, when you got through, what happened to your papers ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. It was returned to the man who produced it
for us.
Senator Ferguson. I mean the copies. When you finally completed
and had your testimony and your notes.
Mr. Justice Roberts. We destroyed them. AVhen we took [8823]
a copy of a message, if the message said, "This is a war warning," we
would make a copy, in conjunction with the Navy or the Army, "This
is to be considered a war warning," so as to stick in a couple of words
so that if we ever published it the Japs couldn't translate from the
English back to the code. We would make our transcript of the pur-
port of the message and return the message to the man who pro-
duced it.
That is true of the messages that were produced for us in Pearl
Harbor. We didn't take them out of the Army Pearl Harbor files.
They ought to be there toda5^
Senator Ferguson. In volume 3 of the testimony before your com-
mission, referring to page 290, this is a photostatic copy, you are exam-
ining Colonel Fielder. He was
3276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Justice Roberts. He Avas on General Short's staff.
Senator Ferguson. As an intelligence oflicer ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. You were the chairman and this is your lan-
guage :
The Chairman. It has been reported to nie that about 10 clays before the attack
a code was intercepted which could not be broken, but it was forwarded to Wash-
ington to the War Department to be broken, and the War Department found out
it could be broken and did break it, and found it contained [8S2Ji] three
important signal words which would direct the attack on Pearl Harbor, and that
the War Department subsequently intercepted over the radio those three signal
words and forwarded them to the military authorities here as an indication that
the code had been followed and that the attack was planned.
I \rish you would look at that.
Mr. Justice Roberts. You don't need to show it to me.
Senator Ferguson. What were you talking about?
Mr. Justice Roberts. I was talking about some information that had
been given to me somewhere around Pearl Harbor. People were com-
ing to me all the time telling me that there was such and such a rumor.
You see I say "It has been reported to me."
Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't this describe the winds code message?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Very likely it would ; very likely so.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do you know of anyone in Hawaii
that knew about this code coming in here and that we translated and
got it ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. I couldn't know. I got numerous letters and
telephone messages from people who thought they had information and
I gathered reports from all around. And \ 882-5] you will see
that I say in this report that the commission has had all sorts of rumors
and tried to run them down. And that is no doubt some report that
came to me out in Pearl Harbor.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Justice, this last part —
and that the War Department subsequently intercepted over the radio those three
signal words and forwarded them to the military authorities here —
you were in Hawaii then ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. As an indication that the code had been followed
and that the attack was planned.
Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes ; that is what I say.
Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't that indicate that the winds execute
message had been received and that you had some information on that
point ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Surely. Somebody had told me that or I
wouldn't have asked the question.
Senator Ferguson. Now^, on page 319
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator jdeld?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. Don't you think we ought to have the answer of
Colonel Fielder ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Colonel Fielder said :
I have no knowledge of that whatever.
[S826] The Chairman. You know nothing about it?
Colonel FiEXOEE. No.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3277
The Chaibman. You had no communication from the War Department as of
December 5th forwarding to you the meaning of the three code words which
would be the signal for the attack?
I was coming back to that.
Now, that would indicate that there were three code words showing
there was going to be an attack as far as the United States was con-
cerned, at least someone told you about it ?
Mr. Justice Egberts. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. And then Colonel Fielder says :
No, sir, it never came to my attention.
The Chairman. After the Japanese Consul had burned his papers, the code
message here was discovered?
Colonel FiE3U)ER. Yes, the code book was.
They are talking about a different thing.
Now, I refer to exhibit 32 and on December 5, 1941, there was a
message sent by General Miles :
Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters, G-2,
Hawaiian Department, Honolulu Territory, Hawaii.
Contact Commander Rochefort immediately through Commandant Fourteenth
Naval District regarding broadcast from Tokyo with reference weather.
[8827] signed "Miles".
Did you have that message before you, do you recall?
Mr. Justice Roberts. I think so.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that they were talking there
about the original code message ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. I mean the original winds message.
Mr. Justice Roberts. No, sir ; I don't know it now.
Senator F'erguson. Now, going on :
The Chairman. I refer to something else which you may or may not know
anything about. I refer to the fact that some ten days before December it is
supposed that a Japanese code message was intercepted and was broken down
by the Department in Washington, one of the military departments, which gave
certain key words which would be flashed over the radio directing the attack
on Pearl Harbor.
Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes.
The Chairman. And that, having broken that down, one of the military es-
tablishment in Washington caught over the radio the three key words and relayed
them here to you. When I say "you", to the Islands.
Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes.
The Chairman. Do you know of any such story?
Colonel BicKNEix. I never heard of such a thing, no, sir.
[882S] The Chairman. Never heard of it?
Colonel BiCKNEix. No, sir.
The Chairman. I have no other questions. Are tliere any other questions?
Mr, Justice Roberts. I was talking about the same rumors that
had come to me from somewhere.
Senator Ferguson. As you were there with Bicknell ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you follow that up? I have looked over
the testimony and I haven't been able to find it but I want to know
now, from your recollection, do you know whether you ever tried to
follow that up here in Washington after vou failed on Bicknell and
Fieldei-?
3278 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Justice Roiierts. Yes, sir. We asked for all the niessaf>es there
Avere about any broken codes and we were told we had had all they
had except this magic thing.
Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that you did not get the magic I
Mr. Justice Roberts. No : we Avere never shown one of the magic
messages.
Senator Ferguson. Not one?
iNir. Justice Rodekts. Not one.
Senator Ferguson. Were you ever shown the substance of the magic
messages ?
\8829'\ Mr. Justice Roberts. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. So that when you made this report you never
had any information out of the magic messages?-
Mr. Justice Roberts. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you knoAv there were such messages ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, I knew that the Army or Navy or State
Department had been cracking a super code of the Japanese for weeks
or months and that they had been taking off all kinds of informa-
tion. We asked the War Department and the Navy Department to
tell us what they got from that and they told us. They did not show
us the messages, any of them, and I didn't ask them to.
Senator Ferguson. That being true how was this finding possible,
on page 19 :
The Secretary of State
Mr. Justice Roberts. Now, Senator, is this an investigation of the
Roberts commission or an investigation of what happened at Pearl
Harbor?
Senator Ferguson. I aui trying to get the facts.
Mr. Justice Roberts. When you ask "How is this finding possible?"
I don't find you criticizing me a bit.
Senator Ferguson. I am not criticizing. I w^ant to know on the
facts you had before you
\^88S0'\ Mr. Justice Roberts. How we could make a certain find-
ing.
Senator Ferguson, Yes.
Mr. Justice Roberts. I think that is criticism.
Senator Ferguson. You think that is criticism ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Go ahead. I will be glad to answer your
question.
Senator Ferguson (reading) :
The Secretary of State fulfilled his obligations by keeping the War anrl Navy
Departments in close touch with the international situation and fully advising
them respecting the course and probable termination of negotiations with Japan.
Now, I merely mean if you didn't have any of these messages, for
instance, the message setting the dead line as the 25th, which he had,
another dead line of the 29th, the pilot message, the 1 o'clock message,
the 13-part message up until midnight or 9 o clock, and the 14th part
and 1 o'clock message on Sunday morning, how could the commission
make a finding, if they didn't have the facts?
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
The Chairman. Let him answer the question first.
Mr, Justice Roberts. I spent an entire day in Secretary Hull's
offi(;e. Secretary Hull showed me, as a Commissioner sent over by the
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3279"
commission, because we wanted [8831] to do him the cour-
tesy of sending someone there to take his evidence instead of dragging
him over to the Navy Department, Secretary Hull showed me his per-
sonal memorandum where he had noted that on a certain day he had
told the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy this, that and
the other thing, and where he got that information I. didn't ask him,
but I was perfectly convinced, and our commission was convinced from
my report to them of the testimony he brought to me, that Secretary
Hull had been warning the War and Navy Departments day by day
and day by day tliat something might happen this da}' or that day,
that the situation was degenerating, and so on.
[88S2] Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, Justice, that part of
the testimony is not in the testimony furnished to us, is it ?
Mr. Justice Egberts. Certainly not. They had a stack of memo-
randa of the State Department that high, or Secretary Hull's personal
memoranda and in order to recap it I asked him to write the letter
which is in our record.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever have the message of the 16th and
the 17th — no, it was in Exhibits 16 and 17 here and I will describe it
because you wouldn't know those exhibit numbers, about the two dead-
lines. Did you ever know there was a dead line set?
Mr. Justice Egberts. I won't say that I knew there was a dead line
set in so many words. What our commission was interested in was
this, if General Marshall and Admiral Stark had not been given
sufficient warnings the Secretary of State would have been at fault.
We did not want to pass on the policy that the Secretary of State had
or was pursuing, it was not within our function at all. We were to
look into any military defaults.
Now, all we had to satisfy ourselves was that General Marshall and
Admiral Stark had had ample warning and they told us so them-
selves. They said that they had had ample warning.
[88S3] Mr. Murphy. That is all the report says, by the way, the
Army and Navy Departments
Senator Ferguson. Just a moment.
The Chairman. The Senator does not yield.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand you did not go into any
question of policy of the Secretary of State or the President of the
United States?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Certainly not. It was not within our com-
mission. Here is the commission.
Senator Ferguson. Your commission was limited solely to the
Army ?
Mr. Justice Egberts. And the Navy.
Senator Ferguson. And the Navy?
Mr. Justice Egberts. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Then Ave come to the next finding in
your conclusions :
The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy fulfilled their obligations
by conferring frequently with the Secretary of State and with each other and by
keeping the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations informed of the
course of the negotiations with Japan and the significant implications thereof.
Now, without having the intercepted magic messages, did you make
this finding ? I will put it that way.
3280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[SSrU] ^Ii'. Justice Roberts. Wliy, cirtainly. The Chief of
Staff and Admiral Stark told us and the Secretary of War and the
Secretary of the Na\'y told us that every time Hull gave them a warning
the}' would go and repeat it to the Chief of Staff and to the Admiral.
I did not need to look at any messages to find out whether Marshall and
Stark had been sufficiently warned. That is all I was interested in.
Senator Ferguson. Now, Justice, the Secretary of the Navy and the
Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, the Chief of
Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, the President, and the Secretary of
State were each being furnished this magic. Did you not know that
they were all being furnished the magic ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. I did not know it and I would not have been
interested in it.
Senator Ferguson. AVell, then, as to whether or not
Mr. Justice Roberts. Now, let's go ahead.
Senator Ferguson. Do j^ou have something to say?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Let's investigate the Roberts commission. I
would not have been interested in it. Senator. I wanted to know
whether the military men were put on full warning and put on their
toes by the men who did have the information. I got a unanimous
statement that they were.
Senator Ferguson. Well, then, Justice, if your commission
[883-5] was not furnished all the data that we had here in Wash-
ington how could 3'ou make a finding on whether or not they were
on their toes out in Hawaii and knew all the facts I
Mr. Justice Roberts. We had the messages that were sent to them.
Senator Ferguson. Well, did you know that there was more in-
formation that could have been sent to them ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. I suppose there never was a situation where
there was not more information that could be sent to somebody.
Senator Ferguson. Well, I show you Exhibit 2 and show you a
message on page
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. Not at this moment.
(Continuing.) Page 14 and ask you whether or not that message
was ever furnished to you? [Handing document to witness.]
Mr. Justice Roberts. I think we saw that message ; I think so.
Senator Ferguson. Now. on page 18 of your report you say this:
[Reading:]
Both commanders were handicapped by lack of information as to Japanese
dispositions and intent. The lack of such knowledge rendered more urgent the
initiation of [SS36] a state of I'eadiness for defense.
Now, have j^ou ever gone over all of the intercepted messages,
diplomatic and otherwise, like the one I just showed you, to determine
whether or not that was a fact or not, or did you find this upon what
you had before you and that did not include the magic ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. It certainly did not include the magic. The
magic was not shown to us. I would not have bothered to read it if
it had been shown to us. All I wanted to know was whether the
commanders had been advised of the criticalness of this situation. I
found from the messages sent them — I say "I found'" — the commis-
sion found that they had had ample warning and that they had orders
from headquarters. Now, they could have been sent more, of course.
They could have been sent a message every 2 hours.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3281
Senator Fi:rguson. Well, now, wait. If there was a message com-
ing in every 2 hours and that information would have given them
more warning wouldn't there then have been neglect on those here
who did not send it?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Now, do you want me to make your report?
Senator Ferguson. No.
Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, I have made my conclusions. My com-
missioners joined me in making the conclusions. If you [8837]
reach a different conclusion, certainly that is your privilege but don't
ask me to check your conclusions.
Senator Ferguson. On page 2 1 see this :
The oral evidence received amounts to 1,887 typewritten pages, and the records
and documents examined exceed 3,000 printed pages in number.
Now, the photostatic copy of the transcript has only 1862 pages, 25
less, and there is — would you look at the page?
Mr. Justice Roberts. I do not need to, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Can vou answer it if you do not need to look at
it?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes ; I can answer it. I do not know why the
discrepancy.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether there is any evidence that
we do not have ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. I know there is none you do not have.
Senator Ferguson. Well, do you know what evidence we have as
far as the Roberts report is concerned ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, I thought yoti meant whether there was
any evidence before us that you do not have. We turned over every-
thing that was before us that was in the shape of evidence.
[8838] Senator Ferguson. And to whom did you turn it over?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, our minutes show it; you have the min-
utes before you. Documents received from the Army were returned
to the Army. Documents received from the Navy w^ere returned to
the Navy. Documents received neither from the Army nor the Navy
were sealed in a Navy bundle, the testimony was sealed in a bundle, a
copy of our minutes were sealed in a bundle and one bundle delivered
to the Army and one bundle delivered to the Navy and in each one
of them we had a list of the documents delivered to the Army and to
the Navy.
Senator Ferguson. No copy of the findings and the exhibits was
furnished to the White House?
Mr. Justice Roberts. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. On the day that you spent some 2 hours with
the President the day you made your report did you have a discus-
sion of the facts ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. There was no discussion of the facts?
Mr. Justice Robp:rts. Well, it depends on what you mean by a "dis-
cussion of the facts."
Senator Ferguson. Well, will you try and give us what took place
there and that will answer the question.
Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, I think it a highly improper thin^ but
if you ask it I suppose I am bound to answer it.
[883d] The President, as I said, read this report with his fin-
gers on the lines, and I remember when he came to a statement
3282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Justice, I only want in relation to Pearl Har-
bor. I do not want anything else.
Mr. Justice Roberts. Certainly. I think it is improper; the report
speaks for itself.
The President, I remember, when he saw our report said that tlie
attack had done great damage and caused a great loss of life. He
said, "Did you report on the nature of the damage?" I said, "No, Mr.
President, I thought the administration would give that out when it
thought the country was prepared for it. It is not really our prov-
ince."' He said, "I think you are right." And I remember when he
got to something about what happened at Pearl Harbor he said,
"Frank Knox told me that." Knox had been over there before us and
had come back. And several times he would say "Frank Knox re-
ported on that." Two or three times he would shake his head and sav,
"Tsk, Tsk," something of that sort.
I remember when he got to the finding about the FBI establishing
an office in Pearl Harbor he said, "I ordered the FBI to establish an
office there." He said, "I thought they could do the civilian espionage
better than the Army or the Navy."
And then he turned to me and he said, "Was there any [8840]
evidence that the Army and the Navy and the FBI did not cooperate
fully?" I said, "We could find none, Mr. President." And I think
there was some report went to Washington on it and he said something
about, "I understand tlie airways there are going to be usable very
soon in there," and I said, "I heard the Army and Navy men discussing
it with some of the witnesses but it didn't interest me, it had nothing to
do with our inquiry."
I remember that — of course, it has been 4 years ago and it was
a sort of a running commentary. I think he asked me what reason
these officers out there seemed to have for thinking that there never
would be an air attack on Oahu? And I told him that as nearly as I
could gather it was because they thought that fhe Japanese would
never risk three or four carriers in such an attack, it was too big a
risk. And he said something about our lack of carriers, that our
carrier force, he hoped, would be very much augmented and very fast
and I think he said that he was thinking about converting other t3'pes
of vessels into carriers, merchant vessels into small carriers.
Well, there was that sort of comment; it was a comment and a
question here and there.
Senator Ferguson. Was there anything said about the [8841]
safety of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, whether that question had been
raised before ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. No. Our report referred to that and he did
not say anything about that.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now. Justice, what was wrong with the
question I asked you, to tell me what the President had said ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, now Senator, I am not going to indicate
whether Senator Ferguson is wrong. We have been inquiring about
how wrong Roberts is. Don't let us get clear off that line.
Senator Ferguson. I was wondering why we shouldn't have the facts
as a committee.
Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, I am not going to argue it with you,
Senator. I said I was going to trj' to answer your questions.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3283
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, there is in your letter — rather, in the
letter from Mr. Stimson I read this language :
Your full opinion on some of these latter points seem to me so important that I
hope it will be given to the President and others, possibly, who are concerned with
the defense of the country in a manner which we can use without getting to
the enemy.
Wliat did he have in mind, do you know ?
[884^] Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, I think I know. I told you
that on the morning after I w^as notified of my appointment and the
others were we met informally in the Secretary of War's office at his
request. Secretary Knox was there and jNlr. Stimson very character-
istically said that the Army and Navy wanted to cooperate fully
with us and furnish us every facility they could and he added that he
felt really that it was not a question of Army versus the Navy or
Navy versus the Army and he turned to Knox and said, "How about
that, Frank?" And Secretar}^ Knox said, "That is absolutely right;
it is not a question of Army against the Navy or the Navy against the
Army. Let them find the full facts."
And Stimson said, "I have asked you to stop in here because there
is another thing in my mind." He said, "While I understand it has
nothing to do with j^our functions as an investigative body, some of
these men are competent military and naval men. It has just oc-
curred to me that as a result of your investigation you may think of
something that is for the betterment of the service, some lines that we
can take in the future and make some recommendations," and we lis-
tened to him and M'e went out.
You see, he wrote in that sense to me afterward. I thought it was
not my province to make recommendations to the [8843] Army
and Navy and you will see by my reply I acknowledge his letter and
say nothing about making any recommendations.
Whether Admiral Standley or Admiral Reeves saw something
about a better type of airplane and mentioned it to the Secretary
afterward or better antiaircraft or better organization, I do not know,
but I did not think I would volunteer any military advice to the Secre-
tary of War and I did not.
Senator Ferguson. So you had not given him any opinion, so that
he wanted you to elaborate on the report?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Certainly not. I gave him what is in our
report and I have never given him anything else.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have information in Hawaii that there
had been wire tapping?
Mr. Justice Roberts. It depends on when you mean.
Senator Ferguson. Well, at any time.
Mr. Justice Roberts. We were so informed and the testimony was
that the military services, intelligence services, including the FBI,
had been histructed by the Attorney General that it was unlawful to
tap commercial messages, private messages. We were informed that
that view was changed just before Pearl Harbor, I cannot say how
many days, and that arrangements had been made with one or
two of the commercial radio companies for taps. As a result of those
taps they got this poinsettia called message that I told you about, where
a [8844] Honolulu merchant talked to a Tokyo merchant for
something like $50 about winds and poinsettias and so on.
3284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
They took that tap to General Short and he said, "Well, what does it
mean ?" They said, "We don't know." He said "I don't know what I
can do about it." They took it to Admiral Kimmel and the same
think took place.
I think they also — that is the only commercial message that I re-
member that they got as a result of those 2 or 3 days of taps. They
did take off a message that I am not sure whether it was a commercial
message or not, in code which contained signals that if a fire was
burning on a mountain on Maui on a certain night that would mean
something and if a light was shown in a certain house on a certain
night — on the night of December 6, that would mean something.
Now
Senator Ferguson. Just on that, if I may.
Mr. Justice Egberts. And in addition — let me finish.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Justice Roberts. The Navy Intelligence Service could not make
that message out. They never got it broken until, I think, December
8 or 9 ; they finally broke it.
Senator Ferguson. You mean at Hawaii they had not broken it?
Mr. Justice Roberts. That is right.
[884^] Senator Ferguson. We have some testimony here be-
fore us that it was broken in the rough and on Commander Kramer's
desk by 1 or 2 o'clock on Saturday. Did you go into the question of
the attack on the Kra Peninsula; what it meant?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, we went into the fact that the navy
intelligence was indicating a tremendous fleet going down the Kra
Peninsula and that the likelihood was that an attack would come there
very likely.
Senator Ferguson. Did you go into the question as to whether or
not we had any obligations if there was an attack upon the Kra Penin-
sula and not upon America, as to what our obligations would be ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Certainly not.
Senator Ferguson. You would have considered that part of the
policy which you were not to go into?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Why, certainly.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. So that was not covered.
Mr. Justice Roberts. Certainly not. /
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
The Chairman. Congressman Keefe.
Mr. Keefe. I just want to ask one or two questions to see if I can
understand the testimony of Justice Roberts.
The scope of your inquiry or, rather, the inquiry made by [8S4'S']
the Roberts Commission, was limited to the Army and Navy and spe-
cifically limited to the facts surrounding Pearl Harbor?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Quite so, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now, do I correctly understand your testimony that in
connection with the determination of what you conceived to be the
issue submitted to the commission you were not shown by either the
Army or the Navy the magic messages ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. That is correct; we were not shown one of
them.
Mr. Keefe. You were shown the messages that were sent from
Washington to Kimmel and Short?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3285
Mr. Justice Egberts. That is right.
Mr, Keefe. And the reply that Short and Kimmel gave to Wash-
ington ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. That is right.
Mr. Keefe. So that the determination of the Roberts Commission
was based upon that type of message and that type of intelligence and
in no way considered the magic which was in the possession of the
officers here in Washington.
Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, we considered it in this sense, that
evidently the magic had given information to all in the high command
here that something was going to break very soon. Now they had a
duty as soon as they got that information. That duty was that they
sufficiently advise the commanders at [8847] the front that that
was the situation and put them on warning.
Mr. Keefe. So that as far as you and your commission were con-
cerned you had general knowledge that they must have received infor-
mation from some source
]Mr. Justice Roberts. Oh, certainly.
Mr. Keefe (continuing). Which prompted them to send the
messages.
Mr. Justice Roberts. They told us they had this magic that gave
that distinct information.
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
Mr. Justice RoBER-rs. Yes.
Mr. Keefe. That is all.
Senator Brew^ster. Mr. Chairman, before
Mr. Justice Roberts. ISIr. Chairman, is it desired that my copy of
(he report go in'^ There still seems to be some suspicion that the Pres-
ident did not get all we had, or expressions of that sort.
The Chairman. Well, regardless of any suspicion or lack of sus-
picion, in order that the record may be complete the Chair thinks that
such copy should be printed at this time as a part of your testimony.
Mr. Justice Roberts. And that it may be returned to me, if the
stenographer will mark it as my property. This is the only copy I
have.
188^8] The Chairman. We will undertake to do that.
Mr. Justice Roberts. Thank you, sir.
(The report referred to follows:)
INS^.9] January 23, 1942.
The President,
The White House.
SiK : Tlie undeiisigned were appointed by Executive Order of December 18, 1941,
which defined our duties as a commission thus:
"to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese
armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941. "The
purposes of the required inquiry and report are to provide bases for sound
decisions whether any derelictions of duty or errors of judgment on the part
of United States Army or Navy personnel contributed to such successes as
were achieved by the enemy on the occasion mentioned, and if so, what
these derelictions or errors were, and who were responsible therefor."
The Congress speedily supplemented the Executive Order by granting the
Commission power to summon witnesses and examine them under oath.
The Commission held three meetings in Washington December 18, 19 and 20,
and on the latter day proceeded to Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, where the
Commission arrived [8850] December 22 and held meetings December
22, 23, 24, and 26 at the Headquarters of the Hawaiian Department, Fort
3286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Shafter, and December 27, 29, 30, and 31, 1941, and January 2, and 3, 1942 at
the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, and January 5, 6, 7, S, and 9 at the Royal
Hawaiian Hotel, Honolulu. January 10 the Commission left Honolulu for Wash-
ington, D. C, held meetings January 12, 13, and 14, arrived at Washington Janu-
ary 15th, and h«ld further meetings January 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23.
The Commission examined 127 witnesses and received a large number of
documents. All members of the military and naval establishments, and civil
offic rs and citizens who were thought to have knowledge of facts pertinent to
the inquiry were summoned and examined under oath. All persons in the
Island of Oahu, who believed they had knowledge of such facts, were publicly
requested to appear, and a number responded to the invitation, and gave evidence.
Various rumors and hearsay statements have been communicated to the Com-
mission. The Commission has sought to find and examine witnesses who might
be expected to have knowledge respecting them. We believe that our findings
of fact sufBciently dispose of most of them.
The evidence touches subjects which in the national interest should remain
secret. We have, therefore, refrained [8So/] from quotation of testimony
or documentary proof. Our findings, however, have been made with the purpose
fully and accurately to reflect the testimony, which as respects matters of fact
is substantially without contradiction.
It is true, as we have found, that due to the enormous demand on the nation's
capacity to produce munitions and war supplies, there was a deficiency in the
provision of materiel for the Hawaiian area. This was but natural, in the
circumstances, and was well known to the government departments and local
commanders. We have made no detailed findings on the subject, since as will
appear from our report, we find that this deficiency did not affect the critical
fact of failure to the take appropriate measures with the means available.
At our hearings reference was made to what lias long been a matter of com-
mon knowledge — that there are, and have been, diverse views of national policy
respecting the basing of the entire United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor,
T. H. We feel that the national policy in this matter is one that has been,
settled by those responsible for such decisions and that it is not within our
province — that of finding the facts respecting the attack of December 7, and
the responsibility for the resulting damage to the United States, — to discuss
any such topic.
Regrettable loss of life and extensive damage [8852] resulted from the
air raid. The nature of that damage and the details of the measures taken to
repair it have no direct bearing on the execution of the mandate appointing
this Commission, and the subject is dealt with in our report only to the extent
that it bears on questions of responsibility for the disaster.
The evidence taken covered a wide scope. The Commission intentionally
invited such latitude of testimony and inquiry in the belief that thereby inci-
dental light might be thrown upon the main issues involved. As an example, the
Commission heard evidence to show what had been done at Pearl Harbor and
on the Island of Oahu by naval and military commands subsequent to December
7, 1941, in the view that this might throw some light upon the matters submitted
for our consideration. Again, the Commission heard much testimony as to
the population of Hawaii, its composition, and the attitude and disposition of
the persons composing it, in the belief that the facts disclosed might aid in
appraising the results of investigative, counter-espionage, and anti-sabotage
work done antecedent to the attack of December 7, 1941.
The Commission visited the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor and air fields of
the military and naval establishments, as well as the Army posts and forts and
certain of the coast fortifications on the Island of Oahu.
[8853] The minutes of each meeting of the Commission are of record. The
statements of witnesses i-eceived in the meetings previous to that of December 22
have been recorded in summaries. All testimony received at the meeting of
December 22 and the subsequent meetings was stenographically reported and
transcribed.
The oral evidence received amounts to 1887 typewritten pages, and the records
and documents examined exceed 3000 printed pages in number.
Appended hereto is a map of the Island of Oahu showing the location of the
principal naval and military establishments.
All the testimony and evidence received have been considered, and as the
result of its deliberations, the Commission .'submits the following
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3287
FINDINGS OF FACT
About 7 : 55 A. M. Honolulu time (1.25 P. M. E. S. T.) ou Sunday, December 7,
1941, Japanese forces attacked Army and Navy installations and sbips of the
Pacific Fleet in Oahu, Territory of Hawaii.
Although the United States and Japan were at peace on that morning, Japan
planned to aflnounce to the Secretary of State of the United States at 1.00 P. M.
of that day E. S. T. (7.30 A. M. Honolulu time) the severance of diplomatic
relations and simultaneously to attack the [8854] Island of Oahu and Pearl
Harbor. The military preparations for this breach of international faith and
honor were put in train and the forces for its consummation had been dispatched
weeks prior to any intimation of the planned severance of relations.
n
The Territory of Hawaii comprises the group of islands known as "The
Hawaiian Islands." This group consists of the larger islands — Hawaii, Maui,
Molokai, Oahu, and Kauai — a number of smaller islands. They extend from
Hawaii in the south some three hundred miles in a northwesterly direction,
including Kauai in the north. For purposes of certain developments and protec-
tion, the Islands of Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra. Christmas, and Canton,
had been placed under the resi>onsible naval and military heads in the Hawaiian
area.
The importance of the Territory of Hawaii from a national defense standpoint
is the fact that Pearl Harbor, the main outlying naval base in the Pacific, is
located in the Island of Oahu, one of the Hawaiian group. For this reason all
measures for the protection and defense of the Territory have centered in and
around Oahu, the other islands being garrisoned by minor forces only. A main
outlying naval base, such as Pearl Harbor, is intended for the use of the fleet
for taking on fuel and supplies, [8855] for recreation and rest of the fleet
personnel, and for the repair and refitting of ships.
Ill
It has been well known that the policy of the United States as to alYairs in the
Pacific was in conflict with the policies of other Governments. It was realized
by the State, War and Navy Departments of the United States that unless these
policies were reconciled war in the Pacific was inevitable.
IV
Plans and preparations against the contingency of war was the joint respon-
sibility of the military and naval authorities, and within the limits of funds
and authorizations provided by the Congress were being ceaselessly carried out.
Under these plans the general function of the Army is to conduct military
operations in direct defense of United States territory. The general function of
the Navy is to conduct naval operations to gain and maintain control of vital
sea areas, thereby contributing to the defense of the coastal frontiers.
Specific plans for the protection of the Hawaiian area against every con-
tingency had been prepared. There included Joint Army and Navy War Plans
and War Department and Navy Department plans subsidiary thereto which
[8856] establish the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, assign tasks and forces to
both Army and Navy for its joint defense, and prescribe that the system of co-
ordination between the responsible Army and Navy commanders shall be by
mutual cooperation.
v
Thfe responsibility for the joint defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier
rested upon the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Com-
mandant 14th Naval District, the latter acting as a subordinate of the Com-
mander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. The Commander in Chief of the Fleet,
in addition, was assigned the task of protecting the territory within the Ha-
waiian Naval Coastal Frontier by destroying hostile expeditions and by sup-
porting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions
within that frontier, and the further task of covering the operations of the
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier forces. The Commanding General, Hawaiian De-
3288 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
partment, could properly deal respecting defense measures and dispositions with
eitlier tlie commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet or the Commandant of the
14th Naval District.
The Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet from February 1, 1941 to De-
cember 17, 1941, was Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. The Commandant, 14th
Naval District from April 11, 1940 to date is Rear Admiral Claude E. Bloch.
The [8857] Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, from February
7, 1941 to December 17, 1941, was Lieutenant General Walter C. Short.
A local joint defense plan entitled "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawai-
ian Coastal Frontier", was prepared by General Short and Rear Admiral Bloch,
the latter acting under the direction of Admiral Kimmel. Each commander
adopted a standing operating procedure, or standing orders, to carry out his
obligation under the joint agreement. This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan was intended to become operative under order of the War and Navy De-
partments or as agreed upon by the local commanders in the case of an emer-
gency, a threat of hostile action, or the occurrence of war.
VI
The means available to the Army, for the fulfillment of this mission, consist
of coast defense and antiaircraft artillery, mobile ground forces, the Hawaiian
Air Force, and an aircraft warning service. The supporting elements of the
Navy consist of local naval defense forces comprising light surface craft and
shore-based aircraft not assigned to the fleet. The fleet as such was not charged
with. the defense of Pearl Harbor, except that certain aircraft attached to the
fleet, when present, and the antiaircraft weapons of such units of the fleet as
were in [8858] port, were available.
It was recognized that, prior to furnishing the full war strength garrison.
insuflScient forces were available to maintain all the defenses on a war. footing
for extended periods of time. The responsible commanders made numerous
recommendations to the War and Navy Departments for additional forces, equip-
ment, and funds which they deemed necessary to insure the defense of the
Hawaiian Coastal^ Frontier under any eventuality. The national situation per-
mitted only a partial filling of these requirements. However, presupposing
timely dispositions by the Army and Navy Commands in Hawaii, the forces
available to them were adequate to frustrate a surprise air attack or greatly to
mitigate its effectiveness.
VII
In a letter of January 24, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy advised the Secretary
of War that the increased gravity of the Japanese situation had prompted a
restudy of the problem of the security of the Pacific fleet while in Pearl Harbor.
The writer stated : "If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible
that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval
Base at Pearl Harbor." The writer stated that the "inherent possibilities of a
major disaster" warranted further speedy action to "increase the joint readiness
of [SS59] the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character
mentioned.
The letter proceeded : "The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and
probability are considered to be: (1) air bombing attack (2) air torpedo plane
attack (3) sabotage (4) submarine attack (5) mining (6) bombardment by gun
fire." It stated the defenses against all but the first two were then satisfactory,
described the probable character of an air attack and urged consideration by the
Army of dispositions to discover and meet such attack and provision of addi-
tional equipment therefor. It concluded with recommendations for the revision
of joint defense plans with special emphasis on the coordination of Army and
Navy operations against surprise aircraft raids. It also urged the conduct of
joint exercises to train the forces to meet such raids.
The Secretary of War replied February 7, 1941, giving the present and pro-
spective status of the Hawaiian Department in respect to airplanes and anti-
aircraft artillery, and stating with respect to the other proposals of the Secretary
of the Navy that a copy of the letter was being forwarded to the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, with direction to him to cooperate with the local
naval authorities in making the suggested measures effective.
[8860] Admiral Kimmel and General Short received copies of these letters
at about the time they assumed the commands which they held December 7, 1941.
Rear Admiral Bloch also received copies.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3289
The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and plans subsidiary thereto envisaged
the possibility of an air attack and estimated that, if made, it would most likely
occur at dawn. An agreement between the Hawaiian Air Force and the Com-
mander, Navy Patrol Wing Two, established the responsibilities for the joint use
and operation of the available air forces of the Army and Navy. The Standing
Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, and standing orders of the U. S.
Pacific Fleet and the 14th Naval District also prescribed measures for protection
against air attack. Frequent joint drills and exercises were conducted during
the vear 1941 to insure such measures would be effective.
For months prior to December 7, 1941, the Secretary of State was repeatedly
in contact with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, not only
in Cabinet meetings, but in meetings of the War Council; and on the occasions
of those contacts and in conference with the Secretary of War and the Sec-
retary of the Navy discussed negotiations with Japan and the growing tensity
of the relations of the United States with Japan. At meetings [8861] of
the War Council the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations were also
present. The Secretary of State constantly kept the Secretary of War and the
Secretary of the Navy informed of the progress of the negotiations, and all
three of these officials were cognizant of the growing threat of hostilities and
of the military and naval needs and measures consequent thereupon. The
Secretaries of War and Navy were in constant touch with the Chief of Staff
and tlie Chief of Naval Operations, and imparted to them the information re-
ceived from the Secretary of State and the results of their conferences with
him. The latter officers in turn advised the responsible commanders in the
field of the progress of events and of the growing threat of hostilities. The
responsible commanders in the Hawaiian area were aware that previous Japa-
nese actions and demonstrated Axis methods indicated that hostile action might
be expected prior to a declaration of war.
October 16, 1941, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the
Commander in Chief of the Fleet, were advised by the War and Navy Depart-
ments of tlie changes in the Japanese cabinet, of the probability of hostilities
between Japan and Russia, and of the possibility of an attack by Japan on
Great Britain and the United States. [8862] Both commanders were
warned to take precautions and to make preparatory dispositions which would
not disclose their strategic intentions or constitute provocation as against
Japan. Admiral Kimmel made certain dispositions of units of the fleet, and
placed additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside
Pearl Harbor. At that time various ta.sk forces of the Navy were engaged in
training operations and maneuvers which were deemed highly important to the
training of the fleet personnel, and the Army was also conducting intensive
training, particularly of its air arm. The responsible commanders testified that
to undertake increased defense measures respecting Pearl Harbor and the
Hawaiian area would necessitate curtailment of training, if not its virtual
suspension, and they thought the situation was not such as to require that.
November 24, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to Admiral
Kimmel in which he stated that in the opinion of the Navy Department a sur-
prise aggressive movement in any direction by the Japanese, including an at-
tack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility ; that the doubt as to favorable
outcome of pending negotiations, the statements of the Japanese government, and
tlie movements of its army and naval forces, support this opinion. The com-
munication enjoined secrecy to prevent complication of the tense existing situ-
ation. The message advised that the [8863] Chief of Staff of the Army
requested that the local senior Army officers be advised that he concurred in the
despatch. This message was seen by both the Commander in Chief of the Fleet
and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.
The responsible commanders in Hawaii knew that negotiations had been con-
tinued through October and November, and were awaiting further developments.
November 27, 1941, the Chief of Staff of the Army informed the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, that the negotiations with Japan seemed to be
ended, with little likelihood of their resumption ; that Japanese action was un-
predictable; that hostilities on the part of Japan were momentarily possible; that
79716 — 46— pt. 7 25
3290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in the event of hostilities could not be avoided the United States desired that
this nation should not commit the first overt act ; that the Department Com-
mander was not to be restricted to any course which would jeopardize his defense.
The message directed him, even prior to hostile action, to undertake such recon-
naissance and otlier measures as he deemed necessary, but to carry them out in
such a way as not to alarm the civil population or disclose his intent. He was
directed to restrict the information contained in the message to the minimum of
essential oflScers, and to report to the Chief of Staff the measures taken. The
purport of this message was communicated by the Department Commander to
the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.
[886Ji] On the same day (November 27, 1941) The Chief of Military Intelli-
gence sent a message to the Intelligence OflScer on the Staff of the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, directing him to inform the Commanding Gen-
eral and his Chief of Staff that negotiations with Japan had practically ceased ;
that hostilities might ensue ; and that subversive activity might be expected.
On the same day ( November 27, 1941 ) the Chief of Naval Operations- sent a
message to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Eleet, which stated in sub-
stance that the dispatch was to be considered a war wai-ning; that the negotia-
tions with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific had ended ;
that Japan was expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days ;
that an amphibious expedition against the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula,
or possibly Borneo, was indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese
troops and the organization of their naval task forces. It directed the execution
of a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out war tasks. It stated
that Guam, Samoa and Continental Districts had been directed to take appro-
priate measures against sabotage, and that a similar warning was being sent by
the War Department. It ordered that the addressee inform naval district and
army authorities. The Commander in Chief of the Fleet communicated the
purpose of this message to the General commanding [8865] the Hawaiian
Department of the Army.
At the time of our hearing General Short had no independent recollection of the
last mentioned message, although he felt that it must have been shown to him.
November 27. 1941. the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, in re-
sponse to the direction of the Chief of Staff that he report measures taken,
informed the Chief of Staff that he had alerted his command against sabotage
and that he was maintaining liaison with the Navy. No I'eply referring to this
message was sent by the War Department ; but General Short testified that he
considered the Adjutant General's message referred to in the next succeeding
paragraph a reply.
November 28, 1941, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, received
from the Adjutant General of the Army a message stating that the critical situa-
tion required every precaution to be taken at once against subversive activities,
within the scope of the Army's responsibility ; that all necessary measures to be
taken to protect military establishments, property and equipment against sabot-
age, against propaganda affecting Army personnel, and against all espionage.
The message disclaimed ordering any illegal measures, and warned that protec-
tive measures should be confined to those essential to security, so as to avoid
unnecessary publicity and alarm. The message stated that [8S66] identic
communications were being sent to all air stations, and on November 28 the Chief
of the Army Air Forces sent such an identic message to the Commanding General,
Hawaiian Air Force.
November 29, 1941, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, replied to
the last mentioned message outlining at length and in detail the measures taken
to prevent sabotage of military establishments and property and essential indus-
trial and public utility installations. No reply was sent by the War Department
to this message. General Short testified that he considered tliis series of messages
a tacit agreement that the measures taken were all that were intended by the
Department.
November 29, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to the Com-
mander in Chief of the Fleet, which was in substance a quotation of the Chief of
Staff's despatch of November 27 to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart-
ment ; and in addition directed the addressee to take no offensive action until
Japan had committed an overt act, and ordered certain action in case hostilities
should occur.
November 30, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a despatch to the Com-
mander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, and also forwarded the message to the
Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet for his information, in which it was
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3291
stated the indications were that Japan was about to [SS67] launch an
attaclv on the Kra Isthmus, directing the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic
Fleet to do certain scouting, but to avoid the appearance of attacking. Admiral
Kimmel testified that he had, viewed this message as indicating that the Navy
Department was not expecting a Japanese attack on Hawaii.
The Navy Department sent three messages to the Commander in Chief of the
Pacific Fleet ; the first of December 3, 1941, stated that it was believed certain
Japanese consulates were destroying their codes and burning secret documents ;
rhe second of December 4, liMl. instructed the addressee to destroy confidential
documents and means of confidential communication, retaining only such as were
necessary, the latter to be destroyed in event of emergency (this was sent to the
Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet for information only) : and the third
of December 6, 1941, directing that in view of the tense situation the naval
commands on the outlying Pacific Islands might be authorized to destroy con-
fidential papers then or later, under conditions of greater emergency, and that
those essential to continued operations should be retained until the last moment.
The foregoing messages did not create in the minds of the responsible officers
in the Hawaiian area apprehension as to probable imminence of aid raids.
On the [8868] contrary they only served to emphasize in their minds the
danger from sabotage and surprise submarine attack. The ne<essity for taking a
state of war readiness which would have been retpiired to avert or meet an
air raid attack was not considered.
[8869] X
December 1, 1941, the Director of Naval Intelligence issued a bulletin which,
under the caption "Japanese Naval Situation", stated:
"Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that exten-
sive preparations are under way for hostilities. At the same time troop trans-
ports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern
China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and For-
mosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small
individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely
indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date this
task force, under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears
to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the
Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong
striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the combined air force, de-
stroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also
may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home [8870]
waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers."
The naval intelligence service in Hawaii, due to lack of information indicating
that the bulk of Japanese carriers were at sea, concluded they were in home
I)orts.
XI
At about noon E. S. T. (6:3(1 A. M. Honolulu timet December 7, an addi-
tional warning message indicating an almost immediate break in relations be-
tween the United States and Japan, was despatched by the Chief of Staft' after
conference with the Chief of Naval Operations, for the information of resitonsible
Army and Navy commanders. Every effort was made to have the message reach
Hawaii in the briefest possible time, but due to conditions beyond the control
of anyone concerned the delivery of this urgent message was delayed until after
the attack.
xn
The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, the Commander in Chief
of the Fleet, and the Commandant 14th Naval District, their senior subordinates,
of their principal staff oflHcers, considered the possibility of air raids. Without
exception they believed that the chances of such a raid while the Pacific Fleet
was based upon Pearl Harbor were practically nil. The attack of Sunday,
December 7. 1941, was therefore a complete surprise to each of them.
[8871] While General Short and Admiral Kimmel conferred frequently
with respect to joint Army-Navy plans and procedures, they did not, on or
s\ibsequent to November 27, 1941, hold any conference specifically directed to
the meaning of the messages received from the War and Navy Departments or
concerning action required to be taken pursuant to those messages.
3292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
For some time prior to November 27, 1941, the War Department and the Navy
Department had under consideration the possibility of sending Army airphmes
to Wake and Midway and withdrawing marine planes then on those islands :
of relieving marines stationed there by the substitution of units of the Army.
General Short, Admiral Kimmel, and Hear Admiral Bloch had been in confer-
ence concerning this proposal.
At the time of the receipt of the messages of November 27 by Admiral Kimmel
and General Short, respectively, this proposal was a subject of discussion. Gen-
eral Short held discussions with Admiral Kimmel on November 27, December 1.
2, and 3, concerning this matter in an effort to compose certain differences of
view. At one of these conferences Admiral Kimmel inquired of his War Plans
Officer, Captain McMori-is, who was present, concerning the probability of a
surprise air attack on Oahu. According to General Short, Captain McMorris re-
plied there was no probability of such an attack ; and, according to Captain
McMorris. his reply was that the Japanese would never so [887^] attack.
According to the testimony Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not discuss
means or measures for Hawaiian defense to be adopted in the light of the
messages.
On and after November 27, 1941, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, and the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, independently took such
action as each deemed appropriate to the existing situation. Neither informed
the other specifically of the action he was taking, and neither inquired of the
other whether or not any action had been taken, nor did they consult as to the
appropriateness of the actions taken by them respectively.
After receipt of the messages of November 27 the following action was taken :
The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, ordered Alert No. 1 (see
next succeeding paragraph) into effect on November 27, and it was maintained
in (ff ct until December 7. At the same time he ordered that the aircraft
warning system operate daily from 4 :00 A. M. to 7 :00 A. M. The Commandant
of the 14th Naval District, in liis capacity as base defense officer, called a con-
ference of all the destroyer commanders of the inshore patrol, advised them that
something might happen, and that they should be on the alert. The Commander
in Chief of the Fleet made certain dispositions of units of the Fleet for the
purpose of strengthening his outposts to the south and west of the [8875]
Hawaiian Islands, and also issued an order that any Japanese submarines found
in the operating areas around the Island of Oahu should be attacked. This
order went beyond the authority given him by the Navy Department.
In the Hawaiian Department's standing operating procedure governing the
defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, three states of readiness were pre
scribed, known as Alert No. 1, Alert No. 2, and Alert No. 3. Alert No. 1 was
thus defined :
"This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the
Islands, with no threat from without."
Alert No. 2 was thus defined :
"This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert No. 1. Security
against attacks from hostile subsurface, surface, and air craft, in addition to
defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided."
Alert No. 3 was thus defined :
"This alert requires occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for
maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installations on outlying islands."
[887^] XIII
The responsibilities of the Army included the installation and operation of an
aircraft warning system for the detection of water-borne and air-borne craft
at a distance from the coast. Throughout the late spring and summer of 1941
the Army was engaged in the installation of permanent facilities for this purpose
on the Hawaiian Islands. Permanent installations had not, on December 7.
1941, been completed. By November 27, 1941, certain mobile equipment had been
installed at temporary locations, and was being operated intermittently through-
out the day for the purpose of training personnel in its operation. On 'November
27, 1941, in connection with the order for Alert No. 1, the Commanding General.
Hawaiian Department, ordered that this system be operated each day during
the period from 4.00 A. M. until 7.00 A. M. It was intended that in the near
future the Navy should have officer personnel in the information center, but up
to December 7 such officers had not been designated. In accordance with the
order in effect, the system closed at 7.00 A. M. Sunday, December 7. A non-
commissioned officer who had been receiving training requested that he be allowed
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3293
to remain tit one of the stations, and was granted leave so to do. At about 7.02
A. M. he discovered what he thought was a large flight of planes slightly east of
north of Oahu, at a dis- [8875] tance of about 130 miles. He reported
this fact at 7.20 A. M. to a lieutenant of the Army who was at the central infor-
mation center, having been detailed there to familiarize himself with the opera-
tion of the system. This inexperienced lieutenant, having information that
certain United States planes might be in the vicinity at the time, assumed that
the planes in question were friendly planes, and took no action with respect to
them. The recording of the observation made indicated that these airplanes
were tracked towards the Island and then lost.
On November 27, 1941, there was sufficient partially trained personnel avail-
able to operate the aircraft warning system throughout twenty-four hours of
the day, as installed in its temporary locations. An arc of nearly 360 degrees
around Oahu could have been covered.
Admiral Kimmel, on and prior to December 7, 1941, assumed that the aircraft
warning system was being fully operated by the Army, but made no inquiry
after reading any of the messages of October and November from the War and
Navy Departments as to what the fact was with respect to its operation.
The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided that, when it became effec-
tive, the Army should conduct an inshore airplane patrol, covering the circum-
ference of the Island of [8876] Oahu to a distance of about twenty miles.
Prior to December 7, 1941, no inshore patrol was conducted, except during drills
and maneuvers. Pilots were being trained on weekdays, and the training in-
volved flying around the confines of Oahu from about eight o'clock in the morning
throughout the day. On Sunday morning no inshore airplane patrol was con-
ducted.
Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, when the Plan became effective
the Navy was to conduct distant air reconnaiss-ance, radiating from Oahu to a
distance of from seven to eight hundred miles. Prior to December 7, 1941, no
distant reconnaissances were conducted, except during drills and maneuvers.
The Fleet from time to time had task forces operating in various areas off the
Island of Oahu, and in connection with such operations carrier and patrol planes
conducted reconnaissances of the operating areas. The sectox's searched, how-
ever, constituted but small arcs of the total arc of 860 degrees, and rarely
extended to a radius of seven hundred miles.
Means were available for distance reconnaissance which would have afforded
a measure of security against a surprise air attack.
General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance,
but after seeing the warning messages of October and November from the War
and Navy Departments [SS77] he made no inquiry with respect to the dis-
tant reconnaissance, if any, being conducted by tlie Navy.
xvi
There were, prior to December 7, 1941, Japanese spies on the Island of Oahu.
Some were Japanese consular agents and others were persons having no open
relations with the Japanese foreign service. These spies collected, and through
various channels transmitted, information to the Japanese Empire respecting
the military and naval establishments and dispositions on the Island.
In Hawaii the local Army Intelligence Service has always devoted itself to
matters pertaining to Army personnel and property ; and the local Naval Intelli-
gence Service to matters pertaining to Navy personnel and property. In addi-
tion, prior to the establishment of an office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
in Hawaii, Naval Intelligence investigated enemy activities amongst the civil
population. When the Bureau's office was establislied it was agreed by the three
governmental agencies that the Bureau should take over and become primarily
responsible for investigation of matters connected with the civil population, and
that the three services should cooperate with each other. Efforts were made by
the Bureau to uncover espionage activities in Hawaii. The United States being
at peace with Japan, i-estrictions imposed prevented resort to certain methods of
obtaining [SS78] the content of messages transmitted by telephone or
3294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
radio telegraph over the commercial lines operating between Oahu and Japan.
The Bureau and the local intelligence staffs were unable, prior to December 7,
to obtain and make available significant information respecting Japanese plans
and fleet movements in the direction of Hawaii.
In the summer of 1941 there were more than 200 consular agents acting under
the Japanese Consul who was stationed in Honolulu, T*erritory of Hawaii. The
Naval District Intelligence Oflace raised a question with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, and with the Intelligence Officer of the Hawaiian Department of
the Army, whether these agents should not be arrested for failing to register as
agents of a foreign principal as required by statutes of the United States. In
conferences respecting this question the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, objected to the arrest of any such persons at least until they had been given
notice and an opportunity to register, asserting that their arrest would tend to
thwart the efforts which the Army had made to create friendly sentiment towards
the United States on the part of Japanese aliens resident in Hawaii and Amer-
ican citizens of Japanese descent resident in Hawaii and create unnecessary
bad feeling. No action was taken against the agents.
It was believed that the center of Japanese espionage [SS75J in Hawaii
was the Japanese consulate at Honolulu. It has been discovered that the Jap-
anese consul sent to and received from Tokyo in his own and other names many
messages on commercial radio circuits. This activity greatly increased toward
December 7, 1941. Tlie contents of these messages, if it could have been learned^
might have furnished valuable information. In view of the peaceful relations
with Japan and the consequent restrictions on the activities of the investigating
agencies they were unable prior to December 7th to obtain and examine messages
transmitted through commercial channels by the Japanese consul, or by persons
acting for him.
It is now apparent that through their intelligence service the Japanese had
complete information. They •evidently knew that no task force of the United
States Navy was anywhere in the sector northeast, north, and northwest of the
Hawaiian Islands. They evidently knew that no distant airplane reconaissance
was maintained in any sector. They evidently knew that up to December 6 no
inshore airplane patrol was being maintained around the periphery of Oahu.
They knew from maps which they had obtained, the exact location of vital air
fields, hangars, and other structures. They also knew accurately where certain
important naval vessels would be berthed. Their fliers had the most detailed
maps, courses, and bearings, so that each could attack a given vessel or field.
Each fSSSOl seems to have been given a specified mission.
xvn
The passes and liberty granted the personnel of the Army and Navy in Hawaii
on Saturday, December 6th, were normal for a period when the forces were not
upon a war footing, with the following exceptions : the normal Army guard had
been inci'eas6d by approximately 100 per cent ; two battalions of infantry were
held in reserve for anti-sabotage defense; anti-aircraft gun crews were main-
tained on ships in harbor for instant defense; all Navy personnel, with the ex-
ception of those authorized to be absent, were required to be in their quarters
at midnight ; all places of amusement in Honolulu and all entertainments at the
Army posts were closed at midnight ; all saloons and drinking places in Honolulu
were closed at midnight.
On the night of December 6 numerous officers of the Army and Navy attended
social functions at various points on the island of Oahu. principally the usual Sat-
urday functions at the various posts and naval establishments. The Command-
ing General. Hawaiian Department, and the Commander in Chief of the Pacific
Fleet, were both guests at dinners away from their posts of command on that
evening, but returned to their quarters at an early hour. [S8S1] The per-
centages of strength in the Army present for duty on the Island of Oahu at 8.00
A. M. December 7, 1941, reported by all major echelons and posts, were: 24th
Infantry Division, 90% ; 2r)th Infantry Division, 85.6% ; Coast Artillery Corps,
87.5% ; Air Force, 88.9% ; miscellaneous, including Department Headquarters,
Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Medical, 92%. Estimated general percentage
88.8%. Reports from large ships and destroyers that were in Pearl Harbor during
the attack, show 60% of officers on board, and 96% of the men. Of seventy-five
vessels of the Fleet, of all kinds, 49 commanding officers were aboard during the
attack, and 22 were enroute to their ships, one was on another ship, and one
was on authorized leave, which leaves two for whom we are unable to account.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3295
Intoxicating liquor is sold on tlie Island of Oahu, and men on pass or on liberty
have the opportunity to buy and consume it. Following the established pro-
cedure, at home and abroad, the Army exercises disciplinary control of men on
pass through its military police, and the Navy of men on liberty by the use of
shore patrols. These organizations take into custody any person showing evi-
dence of intoxication. On the night of December 6-7, 1941, from 6.00 P. M. to
6.00 A. M., arrests of soldiers by the military police, for intoxication, were 38, and
arrests of sailors by the Navy shore patrol, for intoxication, were 4. By [8882'\
comparison the arrests of civilians for drunkenness on that night were 39. Thor-
ough inquiry disclosed there is no evidence of excessive drinking by any officer of
either service on that night. The evidence shows that as respects the use of
intoxicating liquor and intoxication, the conditions amongst the men of the
Army and of the Navy on the night of December 6 compare closely with similar
conditions for the several preceding months. On Saturday, December 6, 1941,
the usual percentage of enlisted strength entitled to passes or liberty took ad-
vantage of such privilege to spend the afternoon or evening in the city of
Honolulu. Application of this ratio to totnl numbers of all the services then
on the Island of Oahu and in Pearl Harbor, amounting to about seventy-five
thousand men, indicates that no less than eleven thousand soldiers, sailors and
marines visited Honolulu that afternoon and evening.
In normal times more enlisted men of both services are absent from duty by
permission on Saturday nights than on other nights ; and on Saturday nights
more offlcers are customarily absent than on week-day nights.
On the morning of Sunday, December 7, Army posts and Naval vessels and
stations were adequately manned, for the readiness and alert then in effect, by
men fit for duty.
The attack on the morning of December 7, 1941, was a combined air raid
and submarine attack on the Island of Oahu, a bombardment of Midway and a
continuous air attack and bom- [S8S5] bardment on Wake Island.
Available information indicates that the force attacking Oahu consisted of
either three or four Japanese carriers, with supporting surface craft and a few
small submarines, and that this force had maintained radio silence during its
approach, which, except for the submarines, was from the northward of Oahu.
In the attack on Oahu a suspicious object was sighted in the prohibited area off
Pearl Harbor at 6.30 A. M., by the U. S. S. Antares. Between 6.33 and 6.45 this
object, which was a small submarine, was attacked and sunk by the concerted
action of a naval patrol plane and the U. S. S. Watd. A report of this action
by the Ward reached the Naval Base watch officer at 7.12 A. M., who notified
his Chief of Staff. The ready destroyer was despatched to investigate, but no
alert warnings were issued based upon this report. Another small submarine
was fired upon, depth charged, rammed and sunk inside the harbor between 8.35
and 8.43 A. M. A third small submarine grounded in Kaneohe Bay and was cap-
tured. There is no evidence of any damage by torpedoes fired by these sub-
marines.
Pearl Harbor was provided with an anti-torpedo net which would have pre-
vented the entrance of torpedoes into the harbor, and would have revealed the
entrance of a submarine. The procedure prior to December 7, 1941, was to keep
the net closed during the hours of darkness, opening [888't] it only when
necessary for a vessel to pass through. It was kept open during daylight hours,
on the theory that, during daylight, the channel entrance destroyer, the net vessel,
and other vessels in the vicinity, would detect a submerged or partially submerged
submarine. December 7 the net was opened at 458 A. M. for the entrance of two
mine sweepers. It was kept open until 8.40 A. M., when it was closed by orders.
The net was not damaged. The submarine was first sighted in the harbor at
7.45 A. M. The time of its entrance is not known, but probablv it passed in about
7.00 A. M.
An estimated force of from 150 to 200 fighting, bombing and torpedo planes
simultaneously attacked Pearl Harbor and all air bases on Oahu at about 7.55
A. M. All attacking planes had withdrawn before ll.CO A. M. As a result of
the attack serious loss of life was caused and serious damage was inflicted on
ships in the harbor, and planes, hangars, and other facilities at Hickam Field, Ewa
Field, Fort Island, Wheeler Field, Bellows Field, and Kaneohe.
The major part of the damage to ships in Pearl Harbor resulted from torpedoes
launched from planes. The torpedoes were of an obsolete type, altered to increa.se
3296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
their explosive load, to decrease their radius, and fitted with side vaues to insure
functioning in shallow water [8885] a weapon peculiarly adapted to an
attack such as the one delivered upon ships in Pearl Harbor. Many of the bombs
had extra heavy cases, and appeared to be modified armor-piercing shell.
December 7, 1941, at 9.30 P. M. Midway time (11.30 P. M. Honolulu time), a
force believed to consist of two cruisers and two destroyers, approaching from
the southward, opened fire and shelled Midway Island for about thirty minutes.
About noon December 8, 1941 (2.50 P. M. December 7. Honolulu time), some twen-
ty-seven land planes made a strafing and bombing attack on Wake Island. Some
loss of life and damage to material resulted on each island. Attacks on Wake
continued until its capture on December 22, 1941 (December 21, Honolulu time).
Immediately upon realizing that the Japanese wei"e attacking, the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, ordered Alert No. 3. Tlie alert was executed
with reasonable promptness. At the same time the Commander in Chief placed
the Fleet on a full war basis and issued a series of orders in an effort to intercept
and destroy the attacking force.
Officers and enlisted men, in defending against the attack, demonstrated excel-
lent training and high morale. Anti-aircraft weapons aboard ship, which were
not already manned, and anti-aircraft weapons ashore, which were in [8886]
position, were promptly manned. Junior oflBcers and enlisted men on their own
initiative procured from storage every possible automatic weapon. These weapons
continued in action during and in spite of low level strafing and dive bombing
which had been known to demoralize even seasoned troops. At least three
fighter pilots, in total disregard of their own safety, attempted to take off in
the face of greatly superior forces then attacking their airdrome, but lost their
lives in the attempt. A few fighter planes parked on an outlying gunnery
training field, which was not attacked, took the air. This combined anti-aircraft
and fighter action resulted in the destruction of approximately thirty enemy
aircraft ; and a number of others were lost at sea because they were unable to
rejoin their carriers.
The state of readiness prescribed for Army aircraft prior to the attack
required them to be ready for flight only after four hours' notice. The type of
alert in effect required all Army aircraft to be concentrated in order more effec-
tively to guard against possible sabotage, instead of being dispersed in order to
afford greater security against air attack, and greater facility in taking the air.
This state of readiness, this concentration of airplanes, and the element of
surprise, all [8887] contributed to the effectiveness of the Japanese attack.
and resulted in such permanent or temporary disablement of airplanes that
very few fighter planes were able to take the air during the course of the action.
For the same reasons it was impossible to get airplanes into the air in time to trail
the Japanese airplanes back to their carriers.
The aircraft warning system, which was remanned by about 8.30 A. M.
December 7, 1941, failed during the balance of that day to furnish any reliable
information of enemy aircraft returning to their carriers. Such information as
it afforded indicated enemy forces to the southward and sousthwestward of
Oahu. A report of an actual contact with an enemy carrier, which later proved
to be erroneous, gave credence to numerous reports from other sources indicating
enemy carriers might be to the southward and* southwestward thus causing
futile searches in those areas.
On December 7, naval Task Force 8 was about 200 miles west of Oahu proceed-
ing towards Oahu. Another was about 700 miles west of Oahu. A third Task
Force 11 w\as in the vicinity of Johnston Island, about 700 miles southwest of
Oahu. These task forces were engaged in operations connected with strengthen-
ing the defenses of the outlying islands.
On the morning of December 7, 1941, prior to the attack, the following searches
of sea areas were being made. [SS88] Six patrol planes were searching
south and southeastwardly from Midway. Three patrol planes were in the
air engaged in a joint exercise with submarines south of Oahu. Eighteen scout-
ing planes from Task Force 8 had been despatched to scout in advance of the
force which was on its way to Oahu. These scouted to the southwestward of
Oahu. After the attack tlie following searches were made; The three planes
in the air south of Oahu, according to their standing orders, searched to the
northwest of Oahu a distance of about 37;") miles. Nine planes were despatched
by Task Force 8 and searched to the south and southwest of Oahu. Carrier
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3297
ylaues of Task Force 11 searched in an area about 500 miles southwestward of
Oahii. About 11. 27 A. M. two heavy Army bombers and four liglit bombers took
off to attack a carrier reported about 25 miles off Barber's Point. After failure
to make contact the two heavy bombers searched first to the southwestward and
then in areas to the northwest of Oahu. The other four searched to the south-
westward. At 11.50 A. M. six Navy VS planes searched southward of Oahu.
Thereafter nine planes searched the sector southwest to northwest of Oahu.
Two utility planes searched northward of Oahu to a distance of 300 miles; and
nine planes which had arrived from carriers and refueled searched some two
hundred miles to the northward. No contacts were made with the enemy air-
craft or carriers, except that one Navy airplane was at- [S8S9] tacked by
a Japanese airplane some 300 miles north of Oahu. This incident was not i"e-
ported until the next day.
SUMMARY OF THE MORE IMPORTANT FACTS
Pearl Harbor is an important outlying naval base, and its security is vital to
both offensive and defensive operations. It is the Army's function to insure
the security of Pearl Harbor against hostile attack, and the Navy's function to
support the Army indirectly by operations at sea and directly by making avail-
able therefor such instrumentalities of the Navy as are on the vessels of the
fleet when in harbor and are located or based on shore either temporarily or
permanently.
Effective utilization of the military power of the nation is essential to suc-
cess in war and requires that the operations of the Army and the Navy be coor.
dinated. Under the then existing plans the joint defense of the Hawaiian Fron-
tier was to be coordinated by mutual cooperation between the commanders con-
cerned. Plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier were prepared
by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant of
the 14th Naval District, the latter acting as a subordinate of the Commander in
Chief of the Pacific Fleet. Adherence to such a plan prepared in advance of
hostilities does not sufiice to relieve commanders of their responsibility to
[8890] apply and adapt the plan to the situation as it develops.
Where as here the defense of an area is the joint responsibility of two com-
manders who are to coordinate their activities by mutual cooperation, the first
duty of such commanders in the case of an emergency is conference and con-
sultation with respect to the measures to be taken under the existing plans and
the adaption of those plans in whole or in part to the situation.
At about the time that Admiral Kinimel and General Short assumed their re-
spective commands, the War and Navy Departments were in correspondence with
respect to adequate defense against air raids on Oahu and the naval base. The
correspondence between the Departments exhibits a deep concern respecting the
probability of this form of attack. These commanders were acquainted with this
correspondence. Nevertheless, there has been amongst the responsible command-
ers and their subordinates, without exception, a conviction, which persisted up to
December 7, 1941, that Japan had no intention of making any such raid. Conse-
quently this form of attack was a complete surprise to all of the superior officers
of Array and Navy stationed in the Hawaiian area. This conviction persisted
notwithstanding messages containing warnings and orders, brought to the at-
tention of both commanders over a period of weeks prior to the attack. As early
as October 16 the commanders were warned of the [8S5i] possibility of an
attack by Japan on the United States and were directed to take precautions and
make preparatory dispositions in the light of this information. A significant
warning message was communicated to both the local commanders on November
24th. On November 27 each responsible commander was warned that hostilities
were momentarily possible. The warnings indicated war, and war only.
Both of these messages contained orders. The Commanding General was
ordered to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as he deemed
necessary. The Commander in Chief of the Fleet was ordered to execute a
defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out war tasks. Other sig-
nificant messages followed on succeeding days. These emphasized tlie impend-
ing danger and the need for war readiness.
In this situation, during a period of ten days preceding the Japanese attack,
the responsible commanders held no conference directed to a discussion of the
meaning of the warnings and orders sent them, and failed to collaborate and to
3298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
coordinate defensive measures which should be taken pursuant to the orders
received. Dispositions as a result of the messages were independently made by
each commander. Neither of them Informed himself of the measures and dispo-
sitions taken by the other.
The dispositions so made were inadequate to meet a [8892] surprise air
attack.
Both commanders were handicapped by lack of information as to Japanese
dispositions and intent. The lack of such knowledge rendered more urgent
the initiation of a state of readiness for defense.
The personnel, materiel, and equipment were insufficient to place the forces
on a war footing and maintain them on that footing for an extended period.
These deficiencies did not preclude measures which would have to a great extent
frustrated the attack or mitigated its severity.
A considerable number of the Army and Navy personnel were on pass or liberty
December 6th, for the reason that the state of alert or of readiness demanded
by the emergency had not been put into effect. With immaterial exceptions Army
and Navy personnel had returned from leave and liberty hours before the attack
ensued, fit for duty.
[8893] Both officers and men responded immediately in the emergency
and exhibited initiative, efficiency and bravery in meeting the raid.
Based upon its findings of fact, the Commission reaches the following
CONCLUSIONS
1. Effective utilization of the military power of the nation is essential to
success in war and requires: first, the coordination of the foreign and military
policies of the nation ; and, second, the coordination of the operations of the
Army and Navy.
2. The Secretary of State fulfilled his obligations by keeping the War and
Navy Departments in close touch with the international situation and fully
advising them respecting the course and probable termination of negotiations
with Japan.
3. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy fulfilled their obliga-
tions by conferring frequently with the Secretary of State and with each other
and by keeping the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations informed
of the course of the negotiations with Japan and the significant implications
thereof.
4. The Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled their obliga-
tions by consulting and cooper- [8894] ating with each other, and with
their superiors, respecting the joint defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Fi'ontier;
and each knew of and concurred in the warnings and orders sent by the other
to the responsible commanders with respect to such defense.
5. The Chief of Staff of the Army fulfilled his command responsibility by issu-
ing a direct order in connection with his warning of probable hostilities, in the
following words : "Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake
such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary."
6. The Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled his conuuand responsibility by
issuing a warning and by giving a direct order to the Connnander in Chief,
Pacific Fleet, in the following words : "This despatch is to be considered a war
warning" ; and "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to
carrying out the tasks assigned."
7. The responsible commanders in the Hawaiian Area, in fulfillment of their
obligation so to do. prepared plans which, if adapted to and used for the existing
emergency would have been adequate.
8. In the circumstances the responsibility of these commanders was to confer
upon the question of putting into effect and adapting their joint defense plans.
9. These commanders failed to confer with respect [8895] to the waim-
ings and orders issued on and after November 27, and to adapt and use existing
plans to meet the emergency.
10. The order for Alert No. 1 of the Army conunand in Hawaii was not ade-
quate to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning messages.
11. The state of readiness of the naval forces on the morning of December 7
was not such as was reqiiired to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning
message.
12. Had orders issued by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations
November 27, 1941, been complied with, the aircraft warning system of the Army
should have been operating; the distant reconnaissance of the Nav.v, and the
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3299
inshore air patrol of tlie Army, should have been maintained; the anti-airL-raft
batteries of the Army and similar shore batteries of the Navy, as well as addi-
tional anti-aircraft artillery located on vessels of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor,
should have been manned and supplied with ammunition ; and a high state of
readiness of aircraft should have been in effect. None of these conditions was
in fact inaugurated or maintained for the reason that the responsible commanders
failed to consult and cooperate as to necessary action based upon the warnings
and to adopt measures enjoined by the orders given them by the chiefs of the
Army and Navy commands in "Washington.
13. There was deficiencies in personnel, weapons, [8896] equipment and
facilities to maintain all the defenses on a war footing for extended periods of
time, but these defi.^'iencies should not have affected the decision of the respon-
sible commanders as to the state of readiness to be prescribed.
14. The warning message of December 7, intended to reach both commanders
in the field at about 7:00 A. M. Hawaiian time, December 7, 1941, was but an
added precaution, in view of the warnings and orders previously issued. If the
message had reached its destination at the time intended, it would still have
been too late to be of substantial use, in view of the fact that the commanders
had failed to take measures and make dispositions prior to the time of its antici-
pated receipt which would have been effective to warn of the attack or to meet it.
15. The failure of the cflicers in the War Department to observe that General
Short, neither in his reply of November 27 to the Chief of Staff's message of
that date, nor otherwise, had reported the measures taken by him, and the trans-
mission of two messages concerned chiefly with sabotage which warned him not
to resort to illegal methods against sabotage or espionage, and not to take meas-
ures which would alarm the civil population, and the failure to reply to his
message of November 29 outlining in full all the actions he had taken against
sabotage only, and referring to nothing [88.07 J else, tended to lead
General Short to believe that what he had done met the requirements of the
warnings and orders received by him.
16. The failure of the Commanding General, Hawaiian D;'partment, and the
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to confer and cooperate with respect to the
meaning of the 'warnings received and the measures neces.sary to comply with
the orders given them tuider date of November 27, 1941, restilted largely from a
sense of sectirity due to the opinion prevalent in diplomatic, military and naval
circles, and in the public press, that any immediate attack by Japan would be in
the far East. The existence of such a view, however prevalent, did not relieve
the commanders of the responsibility for the security of the Pacific Fleet and our
most important outpost.
17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate action,
transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December 7, and the
obligation under the system of coordination then in effect for joint cooperative
action on their part, it was a dereliction of dttty on the part of each of them not
to consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the
warnings, and the appropriate measures of defense reqtiired by the imminence
of hostilities. The attitude of each, that he was not required to inform him.self
of, and his lack of interest in, the meastires undertaken by the other to carry
[8898] out the responsibility assigned to such other under the provisions
of the plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of appre-
ciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent in their positions as
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Commanding G'^neral, Hawaiian Deixirt-
ment.
18. The Japanese attack was a complete surprise to the commanders, and they
failed to make suitable dispositions to meet such an attack. Each failed properly
to evaluate the seriousness of the situation. These errors of judgment were the
effective causes for the success of the Japanese attack :
19. Causes contributory to the success of the Japanese attack were:
Disregard of international law and custom relating to declaration of war by
the Japanese and the adherence by the United States to such laws and customs.
Restrictions which prevented effective counter-espionage.
Emphasis in the warning messages on the probability of aggressive Japanese
action in the Far East, and on anti-sabotage measures.
Failure of the War Department to reply to the message relating to the anti-
sabotage measures instituted by the Commanding General. Hawaiian Depart-
ment.
3300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[8899] Non-receipt by the interested parties, prior to tlie attack, of the
.warning message of December 7, 1941.
20. When the attack developed on the morning of December 7, 1941, the officers
and enlisted men of both services vpere present in sufficient number and were in
fit condition to perform any duty. Except for a negligible number, the use of
intoxicating liquor on the preceding evening did not affect their efficiency.
21. Subordinate commanders executed their superiors' orders without question.
They were not responsible for the state of readiness prescribed.
Respectfully submitted.
[8900] The Chairmak. I have a recollection that Admiral Kim-
mel was asked here by one of the members of the committee whether
there were a couple of distinguished admirals who were members of the
Commission of which you were chairman and his Ye\)\y was "There
were a couple of admirals."
I would like to ask if you are acquainted with the records of
Admiral Standley and Admiral Reeves, as to what positions they had
held in the Navy ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, Admiral Reeves was originally the
assistant engineer on the Oregon. When Captain Clark was ordered
to bring the Oregon around to fio:ht in Cuba in the Spanish- American
war Admiral Reeves was responsible largely for the physical condition
of her machinery and so on. She came around, as you know, to Cuba
and fought.
Admiral Reeves after the Spanish-American War determined that
air was the great, coming thing in the Navy. He asked to be trans-
ferred from the engineering to the line. He was transferred to the
line. He went to Florida and went into one of the Navy's flying
schools and handled the sticks, although he was a middle-aged man.
He is the outstanding original airman in the Navy. He was pro-
moted finally to Admiral of the Pacific Fleet and he was Admiral
of the United States Fleet more years than any other man in your
life or mine. He has been in command of the " [8901] United
States Fleet.
When the war broke out he was called back to take care of the Navy's
end of the lend-lease with Britain and has held that responsible
position up to recently at any rate ; I do not know how long. He was
an officer who wherever he appeared in Honolulu or anywhere else
Navy men just flocked to him, as if to a father, and with respect to
many of the witnesses who were admirals who came before us. Reeves
would turn to me and say, "He is one of my boys."
Admiral Standley has had almost a parallel career. Admiral
Standley has had very high commands in the Navy and was Chief
of Naval Operations, as you know, sir, for a long time and a very
outstanding Chief of Naval Operations, one of the keenest and ablest
men I have ever known and one of the fairest.
18899-A]
79718 O— 46— pt. 7 (Face p. 3300)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3301
The Chairman. I think it is valuable to have that testimony as
to their record in view of the question asked by a member of the
committee.
Mr. Justice Roberts. You are correct, sir.
The Chairman. The Senator from Maine would like to inquire.
Senator Brewster. I would like to take up one further matter,
Justice, and I think you will understand that it is very rare for us
to have an opportunity to examine a former Justice of the Supreme
Court.
[890£] Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, I hope they are having as
much fun as I am.
Senator Brewster. It is rarely we can suggest that a witness may
be unduly sensitive, although without positive
Mr. Justice Roberts. Oh, no ; I am just plain Mr. John Citizen now ;
you know that. I haven't the high exalted position that you hold now.
The Chairman. Well, you can be recalled to the service, but if we
are retired, we cannot be.
Mr. Justice Roberts. No, I cannot be. I have resigned. Senator.
I am a pensioner, sir, on your good will only.
Senator Brewster. Well, I am sure you will appreciate somewhat
the difficulty of our situation and I do think that this should be
clarified in the record, in justice to everyone concerned. I think prob-
ably it is susceptible of clarification, but on page 3173 of our record
General Marshall, answering Senator Ferguson — Senator Ferguson,
referring to the Roberts report, said :
Before that report was issued, there were certain things taken out of it?
General Mabshall. Before that report was made public there were certain
things withdrawn. * * *
Senator Ferguson. We are clear on that, that certain parts were taken out
before it was made public?
[8903] General Marshall. That is correct. I am quite certain, sir.
Then on page 3175 the question appears there, with the Chairman
also participating as to clarification of this statement, and Senator
Ferguson says :
May we have from the witness what his understanding was?
General INIaeshall. My understanding was, and I am speaking on hearsay
because I had no control over the matter, that tiie complete report went to the
President but that the portions that referred to magic were withdrawn from
the portion of the report which was released to the public.
Senator Ferguson. Have I misquoted you, General?
General Marshall. There has been so much conversation I am a little con-
fused, but the complete report, as I understand it, and I am not an authority
on that, went to the President, and the portions that were considered top secret,
which were magic, were pulled out of that before a general release to the public.
That is my understanding, but I am not the best authority on that. That is my
understanding and it was on that that this part of the letter was based.
I quote all of this, Mr. Justice, in justice to Senator [S904]
Ferguson who, I think, had reason to feel that the situation invited
clarification and I assume that it is susceptible of clarification and I
gather from what you have said that General Marshall was wrong
in his understanding, but I do think we ought to have that as a matter
of record.
[890S] Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, I have testified to the facts.
Now if you want me to say, which I think is a very improper thing,
that General Marshall was wrong, I will say General Marshall was
3302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
teetotally wrong. I have given you facts. The facts are all typed,
they are not my word against General Marshall's word.
Sometime ago the President of the United States was asked why
portions of the Roberts report were suppressed and he said, "For
military reasons."
Senator Brewster. What President?
Mr. Justice Roberts. President Truman. The papers from time to
time said that portions of it were suppressed. I was not accused of
suppressing it, so I did not jump to conclusions.
Senator Brewster. You made your first reputation as an investi-
gator and prosecutor, Mr. Justice, and I cannot beheve that in your
broad experience you failed to call the attention of witnesses to con-
tradictions of testimony in order to give them an opportunity to
clarify it, if it was possible.
I do not think it is questioning the integrity of General Marshall
or criticizing you when your attention is called to the testimony of
General Marshall before this committee, and it was called to your
attention for any [S906] comment you desired to make, and I
do feel very confident, in examining your distinguished record both
as investigator and justice of the highest court in this country for
many years, that you have found that this could be duplicated many
times.
Mr. Justice Roberts. Thank you for those kind words.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to interrupt and raise the
point of order, but Justice Roberts has taken care of it.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one remark.
The Chairman. Senator Lucas wishes to ask another question.
Senator Lucas. I want to make one observation with respect to
the winds message, the so-called pilot message and so-called execute
message.
There has probably been more misinterpretation about that mes-
sage than any other message in this hearing.
Mr. Justice Roberts. I haven't any information about it.
Senator Lucas. On the question that the Senator from Michigan
asked you, and also calling attention to a question that you asked a
witness while you were in Hawaii, in order to make the record com-
plete at this point I want to direct your attention and call the atten-
tion of the committee to [89071 the fact that on November 28
Admiral Hart sent to Admiral Kimmel for his information a copy
of the pilot message that is known as the original winds message,
the pilot message, and Admiral Kimmel had that message when you
gentlemen were in Hawaii making this investigation.
Mr. Justice Roberts. I did not know it.
Senator Lucas. So it is vei-y reasonable to suppose that, as the
result of those high in command in Hawaii having this original
message, that some information leaked out and got to you along that
line.
The Chairman. Mr. Justice, just this one question :
Regardless of General Marshall's answer to any questions based
upon the assumption that something in the Roberts Report was sup-
pressed or withheld and that it was clone for military reasons, and
regardless of the impression of the present President of the United
States, who was not at that time familiar with your report or the
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3303
existence of it, that if anything was withheld it was for military-
reasons, the fact is that nothing was suppressed or withheld for mili-
tary or other reasons, is it not ?
Mr. Justice Roberts. That is correct, sir. We tried not to dis-
close any military secrets in what we wrote, but what we wrote was
published line for line.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I want the record also to [8908]
show that General Marshall said he could only give hearsay. There
had been a protest by certain members of this committee theretofore
about hearsay evidence, but he was asked to pursue a line which neces-
sarily would' be hearsay. So it is not a question of contradiction
necessarily, it is a question of one knowing the fact and the other
giving hearsay evidence.
The Chairman. Any further questions by the committee?
(No response.)
The Chairman. By counsel ?
(No response.)
The Chairman. Mr. Justice, the committee thanks you for your
cooperation. It regrets the necessity of bringing you from what
Horace in his "Odes" said is a Sabine farm.
Mr. Justice Roberts. I cannot get back in time to milk, Mr. Chair-
man.
The Chairman. I would like to have a photograph of you in that
operation.
Mr. Justice Roberts. I think that is the most irrelevant of anything
that the committee has asked me for [Laughter].
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
(Justice Roberts was excused.)
Captain Zacharias, will you resume the witness stand.
[8909] TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN ELLIS M. ZACHARIAS, UNITED
STATES NAVY— (Resumed)
The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order.
Senator George was unavoidably detained when he was reached this
morning and he will inquire at this time, Captain.
Senator George. I think my very brief questioning should follow
Senator Lucas since he had already commenced.
The Vice Chairman. Without objection, the questions of Senator
George and answers of Captain Zacharias will appear in the record
following the conclusion of Senator Lucas' inquiry.
Senator Lucas. Developing the thought that was just placed before
you by the distinguished Senator from Georgia, I again call your
attention to page 7137 which carries a copy of the statement that you
had given to the committee which you prepared sometime, as I recall,,
after the Pearl Harbor disaster.
At page 7138 you make this statement :
Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral Kimmel and Captain
Smith during the course of the hour and a half conversation with them of the
exact events to take place on 7 December, not only as to what would happen
but also how and when.
3304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Now reading that without any clarification, would not I be justified
in concluding that you had predicted to Admiral Kinimel that this
would happen on December 7 ?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir; without knowing that I had given
him this 9 months before, and I doubt that anyone would assume that
I would make a prediction as to an [8912] exact date 9 months
hence. I explained at the conclusion of this morning's testimony that
the two words "7 December" were synonymous with Pearl Harbor
and were injected in that sentence for the purpose of conveying to
Admiral Draemel and Admiral Nimitz what I was talking about prior
to a certain period.
Senator Ltjcas. I accept your interpretation and clarification, but
what I am asking you is, without any clarification and verification,
would I have the right to reach the conclusion that you had given
Admiral Kimmel definite information that this attack would happen
on the date of December 7 ?
Captain Zacharias. You would have to assume that I had some
very occult powers.
Senator Lucas. I am not assuming anything, whether you have
occult powers or just ordinary powers; I am asking you whether that
would not be a fair interpretation and whether that is the way he in-
terpreted it on the following page, on page 7140, where he said :
The Vice Chairman. And I am now asking you whethei* he said to you what
he states there, or anything like that.
Admiral Kimmel. He did not. And furtliermore, I would have paid very little
attention to any man who told me in March of 1941 that an attack was going to
occur on [8913] the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir; I would agree with him that such a
statement was made.
Senator Lucas. In other words, Admiral Kimmel, after reading
your statement, took the position that you had told him that this
would happen on December 7, 1941, and answered accordingly. You
have clarified that and qualified it by your statement to the commit-
tee this morning.
Captain Zacharias. Well, it is hard for me to say, with a careful
reading of that sentence and having in mind that this was a statement
prepared for Admiral Draemel subsequent to Pearl Harbor, that he
could read any other meaning into it.
Senator Lucas. I will read it again.
Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral Kimmel and Captain
Smitli during the course of an hour and a half conversation with them of the
exact events to take place on 7 December not only as to what would happen
but also how and when.
If I understood the construction of the English language — and I
have been practicing law for a good many years — it seems to me — —
Captain Zacharias (interposing). The reference to December 7
was made over 3 months after the date, and as I [89J4] said,
it was synonymous with the words "Pparl Harbor.'' So I suppose it
it possible that Admiral Kimmel would read something else into it.
1 will grant him that.
Senator Lucas. I read something else into it too. ,
Captain Zacharias. That is all right, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3305
[8915'] Senator Lucas. I am just wondering if I am not fair
in making that kind of interpretation by the way you have it stated
here.
Captain Zacharias. I do not think that would be a fair inter-
pretation.
Senator Lucas. I caution you if you have a case in court at any
time you better not use that type of language. It may get you
into trouble. Especially with a man like Justice Roberts.
The Chairman. Or Lawyer Lucas. [Laughter.]
Senator Lucas. Now, one other question or two, sir : When you were
out with Admiral Halsey, with his task force on the mission to Wake
Island, which, I understand you to tell the committee went on a regular
routine trip without being armed, or without knowing that war might
be imminent at any time
Captain Zacharias (interposing). We were to leave that morning
on a routine training schedule. Our task force was due to go out
that day, which we did, but after we were outside the harbor,
Admiral Halsey changed the course to the westward, and we pro-
ceeded toward Wake.
Subsequent to that time we were advised by signal that we were
heading for Wake to deliver planes to the [8916] Marines at
that place.
Senator Lucas. What orders did you get from Admiral Halsey
with respect to having your ship ready for anything that might
happen?
Captain Zacharias. No additional orders. We were in condition
of readiness 3, which is half of the antiaircraft battery manned.
Senator Lucas. Is that the way you sailed ?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. To Wake and also upon your return ?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir ; that is correct.
Senator Lucas. When did you finally change over to an all-out
alert on that ship ?
Captain Zacharias. About 11 o'clock in the morning of December
7 a report was received that an enemy plane was sighted to the
southward, and we went into condition 2, in which half of the main
battery are inanned in addition to the antiaircraft battery being
manned.
Senator Lucas. When did you first learn of the attack ?
Captain Zacharias. About 8 o'clock when my communications
officer came into my cabin and informed me that a message had been
received that —
Oahu is being attacked. This is no drill.
[8917] Senator Lucas. Then you went on the all-out alert?
Captain Zacharias. No, sir. We immediately received a signal
from Admiral Halsey to change our disposition a slight degree. We
reduced the distance of the cruisers from the carrier, which we were
escorting, by one-half.
We closed into 1,000 yards from the carrier, whereas we were out
a mile from the carrier before.
The destroyers which were screening us closed in proportionately.
79716 — 46— pt. 7 26
3306 rONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Lucas. And you were due back in Pearl Harbor on the
evening of December 5 ?
Captain Zacharias. As far as the schedule provided.
Senator Lucas. Why was it again that you did not get there then ?
Captain Zacharias. We were delayed by the fueling of the ships,
the destroyers particularly, and also some little rough weather that
we had coming back.
Senator Lucas. Did you ever have a conversation with Admiral
Halsey with respect to the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor?
Captain Zacharias. Not during that trip, sir. There was nothing
to justify me in doing that.
Senator Lucas. At any time, did you ever talk to him about it ?
[8918] Captain Zacharias. During the trip ?
Senator Lucas. At any time previous to Pearl Harbor did you ever
discuss with Admiral Halsey what you discussed with Captain Lay-
ton — or do you know about that?
Captain Zacharias. Only my conversation. No exact details.
Senator Lucas. I think that is all.
Senator George. Captain, this forenoon you detailed a statement
that you made to Admiral Kimmel and the discussion that you had
with Admiral Kimmel. I should like to ask whether or not your
statements made to Admiral Kimmel regarding the air attack on
Oahu, or the Hawaiian Islands, was based on any specific information
that you had received or was it based upon your general knowledge
and your general estimate of the situation ?
Captain Zacharias. It was based upon my general knowledge and
general estimate of the situation.
Senator George. You received no specific information that there
was to be at any particular time an overseas air attack on the Fleet
at Oahu?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Senator George. You never gave any information to General Short ?
Captain Zacharias. I did not, sir.
Senator George. That, of course, was not your responsibility. But
you did have this conversation with Admiral Kimmel.
Captain Zacharias. Yes.
Senator George. I also understood from your testimony that you did
not indicate that an air attack would be made on any particular
Sunday or week-end.
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Senator Georcje. And whether it would be on December 1, Decem-
ber 7, December 21, or any other i)articular day?
Ca])tain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Senator George. Your statement was general, not based upon any
specific information whatever but upon your general evaluation and
general knowledge of the Japanese and their methods of warfare,
and so forth ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir ; and it was contingent upon
a situation which might result in hostilities between the United States
and Japan.
Senator George. Yes, I understand that. That is, if hostilities
actually did become imminent, that is, immediate, why, this was your
conchision of what would happen, is that correct?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3307
Captain Zacharias. That it- correct, sir.
Senator Geohge. That is all the (juestions I have.
The Chairman. Congressman Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Captain, as I understand it, your conversation with
Admiral Kimmel was sometime toward the end of March of 1941, in
which you outlined your idea as to the possible attack on Pearl
Harbor, that is right, isn't it?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Had you, prior to your conversation with Admiral
Kimmel, been familiar with the message which had been sent to
Hawaii from Washington about the possible attack on Pearl Harbor,
the origin of that being from the Ambassador to Japan, Mr. Grew ?
Captain Zacharias. No, sir; I did not.
Mr. Murphy. Well, you now know, do you not, that there was such
a message in the month of Februar5^ i
Captain Zacharias. I have heard that there was something.
[89W] Mr. Murphy. Had you known at the time you talked to
Aclmiral Kimmel about the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to
the Secretary of War and the Secretary of War's answer, the Secre-
tary of the Nav}' outlining pretty much in detail the dangers and
Pearl Harbor 'i
Captain Zacharias. No, sir ; I did not.
Mr. Murphy. Had you known that just about at the very same time
as you were talking to Admiral Kimmel, that there was prepared, I
believe on March 21, 1941, a plan which in effect, outlined the steps
that you outlined to the Admiral ?
Captain Zacharias. I did not know that, sir.
Mr. Murphy. There has been a great deal of talk here about a bomb
plot from the Japanese in the month of September and decoded in
the month of October, but the Martin-Bellinger plan was practically
a bomb' plot of what would happen at Pearl Harbor: did you know
about that ?
Captain Zacharias. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Did j'ou know that the Secretary of War had given
a direction to the general at Pearl Harbor to be prepared to meet a
situation such as a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, an air raid
attack?
Captain Zacharias. I did not, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, Mr. Chairman, so that there will be [8920]
a complete account of the message sent by Captain Zacharias to Ad-
miral Draemel, I ask that the letter of March 17, 1942, be spread on the
record at this point in its entirety.
The Chairman. Without objection, it will be so ordered.
(The memorandum referred to follows :)
Personul and confidential
Memoianduiu for Admiral Draemel
March 17, 194li.
In accordance with your request after our conversation this morning, the
following memo is submitted —
My conversation with you is impelled from a sense of duty because of what I
consider a serious situation existing in Hawaii. Once before, in such a situation,
I gave concrete opinions and advice which apparently could not break through
preconceived ideas. History was about to repeat itself and no one would believe
it. I have no personal ambitions or desires regarding the subject matter other
than assuring that we have a safe and well protected base for our fleet, which
3308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
is the sole reason for the existence of Hawaii. It has been my attitude that it
makes no difference who does a job as long as it is done efficiently and thoroughly.
Any criticism direct or implied is offered solely from a constructive viewpoint
and is for the purpose of preventing in the future a recurrence of a disaster
such as that of 7 December.
[8921] Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral Kimmel and
Captain Smith, during the course of an hour and a half conversation with them,
of the exact events to take place on 7 December, not only as to what would happen,
but also how and when. My only eiTor was that the Japanese were after four
battleships and they got five. I also gave them the reasons for my conclusion
and advised them of the steps necessary to prevent such an attack. From time
to time, in contact with the Staff, I would voice possibilities and only two months
before the attack amazed at unrealistic attitude I said, "When are we going to
stop these surprise inspections and prepare for surprise attack." About that
same time Mr. Munson, a representative from Washington (believed to be a
Presidential agent) carrying a letter from Opnav to "open everything to him."
sought me for an expression of views on probabilities and my opinion as to what
action should be taken with the Japanese here and on the West Coast. After out-
lining to him my firm conviction that if Japan decided to go to war with us it would
open by an air attack on Pearl Harbor, on a weekend and probably Sunday
morning, with all the reasons therefor, and I then stated, "You now have two
envoys in Washington. When the third one arrives you can look for it to break
immediately, one way or the other." This envoy arrived [8922] in Wash-
ington about 2 December 1941.
On the night of 27 November, after dinner with Lorrin Thurston, Head of the
Honolulu Advertiser and KGU, I I'elated the impending possibilities as above
and he said, "Here I am a G-2 Officer and I haven't even been advised what to
send out over the radio in case of an attack." I advised him precisely to say,
"We are having a sporadic air attack, everyone should keep calm and remain
indoors. Do not go on the streets, as it will prevent the military from getting
to their stations. There is nothing to worry about." On 28 November I sailed
with Task Force 8 for Wake Island. Upon receipt of CincPac's despatch on
7 December, "The Islands are being attacked this is no drill," I turned on my
radio and KGU was sending out my exact words. At least someone believed it.
This was probably made certain by the press announcement about 3 December
that the Ambassador to Peru had arrived in Washington as a third envoy. See-
ing this, Mrs. Thurston reminded her husband ; and they were alerted.
On Friday, 5 December, having received a report of a submarine off Oahu —
one of the things I gave Admiral Kimmel as a positive indication of intention
to attack — I listened all evening on short wave for Japanese conversation.
All was garbled conversation but the intensity of the [8923J acknowl-
edgments (typically Japanese) indicated to me that something was imminent.
I tried to obtain a single word which would justify me in requesting ComTask-
For 8 to advise CincPac, but nothing could be made out. I knew what the re-
action would be to a recommendation from thin air and I assumed that proper
warnings would be coming from Washington.
I have made it a point when afloat to give my advice to Intelligence activities
both ashore and afloat and when necessary even to the point of "butting in".
I had tried for years to have detailed a Fleet Intelligence Officer who was not
tied up as Flag Secretary or on other jobs. Finally two years ago Commander
Dyer advised me that Cincus was going to have a Fleet Intelligence Officer. I
recommended Lieutenant Commander Layton, who has consistently done a
splendid job in an office where there should have been 20 officers instead of two.
Early in November I was about to see Captain Smith and advise that he get
some help for Layton and Hudson as they were both worn down and appeared
ready to creek up. But I hesitate, wondering why should I have to advise
Cincus on the adequacy of his force. It should have been obvious to any
Commander that Intelligence at such a time was his most vital issue. I decided
not to approach Smith, because I found that Intelligence was not receiving its
proper recognition.
[892-^j] One of the contributing factors to 7 December was the reluctance
of Admiral Kimmel to assume his prerogatives and tell the Commandant to
carry out directives or someone else would be obtained to do the job. The
possibilities of an unpleasant situation should have been readily apparent to
the Department when a former Commander-in-Chief is put under a younger
man. Petty jealousies are bound to be present and these grow into opposition.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3309
A typical indication was one incident which I observed closely. When I ari'ived
in Honolulu in November 1940 to take command of the Salt Lake City I was
asked to assist in a survey of tlie District Intelligence Office which was initiated
by the Commander-in-Chief. It was learned then that recommendations had
been blocked and tliat the office was of little value.
This survey included immediate and extensive recommendations, including
trained personnel to be taken from my old 11th District to build up the 14th
as quickly as possible.
The next day, after telling Admiral Bloch the security we enjoyed in the 11th
and indicating the complete lack here he approved all steps to remedy the
situation. Accordingly, the personnel arrived and expansion, planning, and
training were rapid. During the course of a subsequent survey to outline faults
in the District, the report or digest was brought , to the attention of Admiral
Bloch. This survey was made by an officer who was working for the Com-
mander-in-Chief and also helping the [8925] District. At the sight of
this critical survey coming from the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Bloch gave
vent to his wrath and Intelligence activities suffered for quite a time.
The skepticism of the Commandant regarding necessity for security was also
typical from a remark once made during security efforts, "Bring me a Japanese
spy. I've never seen one and would like to see one". His yard was full of
them.
On 16 September, 1941, in a letter to Admiral Stark, I stated, "It is gratify-
ing to see that there is a possibility of resolving the Japanese situation, but we
must not relax until they have given concrete demonstrations of sincerity".
All of the foregoing is simply to indicate the possibility of qualified personnel
accurately estimating the situation, and the distressing fact that nothing was
done about it.
I am now concerned because of another situation which is growing in serious-
ness and proportions. Rumors are increasing and I find not only the morale of
civilians falling lower and lower but also that of Naval Officers. This is a
typical fifth column technique and it must be stopped. It not only softens
up our own people but it is throwing the second generation Japanese into the
laps of enemy agents, many of whom are still not in custody. I used to be most
optimistic about the Japanese never returning here for another raid, but that
persistence of the present situation, which they will learn about soon enough,
will be an invitation to them to return. [8926] This situation can be
corrected somewhat by strong "offensive" pronouncements but not by "defen-
sive" ones, and by punitive action against rumor mongers. I found one woman
frantically engaging passage because an Army man told her how terrible the
gas attack would be when it came. Someone is spreading a rumor that there
is to be a Japanese Fleet attack on April 14th. I am now trying to trace the
source of some rumors. Rumors are sometimes started to enhance the position
of an individual or organization.
Apparently, on the West Coast they are undecided how to handle the Japanese
situation. Here, where it is much more difficult, I find that little or nothing is
being done. Make no mistake about it, the proper handling of this situation
requires two qualifications : first, highly professional Intelligence activities, and
second, a thoi-ough knowledge of the Japanese people. The Army in Hawaii has
no one qualified to handle either. I know what they have and what they are
capable of doing. It makes no difference who does the job as long as it is done
efficiently and thoroughly. But I venture to make the flat statement that little or
no results have been received on cases turned over to them by the 14th Naval
District. I find that the numerous Japanese amateur operators have only been
admonished by letter only not to operate. Adequate searches have not been made.
Known suspects have not been taken into custody. Strategic locations are still
endangered by the [8927] presence of enemy aliens. The problem can be
solved in forty-five days by qualified personnel and Intelligent Action.
In my long interview with General Emmons, I was impressed with his incom-
petence. He appeared to have no thoughts of his own. He gave as the reason for
continuing the Japanese newspapers that they were necessary for the morale of
the enemy aliens. At the same time, the Army has assembled all the second gen-
eration Japanese into one battalion of the Territorial Guard and have disbanded
it. The selectees have been disarmed and put into labor battalions. This action
will have the effect of sending these boys slinking home and into the laps of
enemy agents. It is most serious. There are sensible solutions to all these prob-
lems which certain of us have worked out, but it is inadvisable to let incompetent
hands take on pre-prpjudiced solutions.
3310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
After my interview with General Emmons, I searched for the reasons for what
seemed like an undue influence upon him. Yesterday I tliink I discovered the
answer. I was told that one of his principal advisors on Island and Japanese
matters is General Wells, a highly paid official, of one of the large local industries
whose objectives are still "maintenance of the status quo".
At the present time the Army is endeavoring to take over control of the Intel-
ligence Organization in Hawaii. Under those conditions the Commander-in-Chief
would be tying his oivn hands [S92S] voluntarily. Their past and present
training and performances in no way qualifies thera for the work. I know their
capabilities and what they have because it was I who for many years, tried to
have them implemented on the West Coast, but the War Department invariably
replied, "No action will be taken until M day". As a result they "had not a single
trained Intelligence man with which to start an organization". The quotations
are from General Miles, the head of G-2.
The Naval Intelligence Organization of the 14th District has been built up and
trained through the intensive effort of two excellent officers with years of experi-
ence behind them. Through their knowledge, excellent personnel have been en-
rolled and trained and I am safe in saying that in spite of obstruftions which
should have been help, this organization is so far superior to tlie Army and F. B. I.
for Intelligence work that there is no comparison.
CONCLUSION
Hawaii, as a defense outpost of the United States, is of value solely as a safe
base for the Fleet. The protection of it provides the only excuse for the ex-
istence of the Army. An offensive attitude is a requisite to that defense. This
offensive attitude does not exist. Under the present state of administration, the
influences at work, and the degenerating morale, I cannot escape the feeling that
unless firm action is taken we are approaching a situation which might result in
some- [S929] thing worse than that of 7 December. (It has always been
my considered opinion for a long time that because of the racial situation the
Hawaiian Islands will evenutually require a military government. Its pur-
poses dictate that it should be a Naval military government, therefore now is the
time to start it.)
BECOMMENDATION
That the Commander-in-Chief, as Military Commander, exercise his function
as Military Governor and take command of all activities that the administration
of martial law be delegated to a Deputy, as at px-esent, if such administration has
been satisfactory, and that the Intelligence Organization be centered under the
Commander-in-Chief, in order to insure the security of the Fleet and the Fleet
Base.
That power of arrest be extended to special agents of the Naval Intelligence
Organization. (The most vitally interested agency but the only government
agency not having the power. )
That the security of the Naval District and the Navy Yard be incorporated
under a competent head (The present security officer, Victor Houston, was re-
cently removed from the Police Commission and it is inconceivable that he should
be in a position to hamper Naval security).
E. M. Zacharias.
[8930] Mr. Murphy. Now, Captain, I would like to take you to
the memorandum which you sent to Admiral Stark on February 9,
1941, in which you outlined your conversation with Ambassador
Nomura.
Did you at any place in that letter to Admiral Stark, a copy of which
was apparently sent to Admiral Kimmel, refer to the details which you
have outlined as to Pearl Harbor?
Captain Zacharias. I did not, sir.
Mr. Murphy. That letter which you sent to Admiral Stark, and
which Admiral Kimmel got a copy of, was, in ejffect your appraisal of
the situation, of the relations between Japan and the United States,
as the result of the Nomura talk ; isn't that right?
Captain Zacharias. I would say it was more in relation to the
details of the conversation than the reactions of Admiral Nomura.
Senator Brewster. Will the Congressman yield ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3311
Mr. Murphy. Yes, surely.
Senator Brewster. Do you contemplate putting this entire matter
in? It seems to me it might be a valuable thing as an exhibit in the
ease, and I was going to suggest that at the proper time.
Mr. Murphy. I ask that the letter of February 9, 189-31]
1941, be spread in the record at this point, and that all of the letters
be marked as an exhibit.
Senator Brewster. Do you have what I have here, labeled "Notes,
Correspondence, and Reports Relating to Pearl Harbor and Events
Leading Up to It"? I think that should be in as an exhibit.
Mr. Masten. That will be Exhibit 141,
The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit 141, and the re-
quest of Mr. Murphy to spread the letter he described on the record
will be granted without objection.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 141.")
(The letter referred to follows:)
U. S. S. Salt Lake City,
i[ote Inland, California, February 9, 1941.
My Deae Admiral : I think that you will be interested in a conversation that
I had with Admiral Nomura yesterday. It lasted for more than an liour and we
were alone the entire time in his room at the hotel. Having known him inti-
mately and favorable over a long period we were in a position to speak frankly.
I decided to arrange for such a conversation in order to determine if possible
the purpose for which he was [S932] sent over here and to explore, if
possible, the latitude which might be in his hands. As a result of the conversa-
tion I have formed the following impressions :
(1) That Japan regrets her partnership in the Axis and is greatly concerned
over the China venture, therefore Admiral Nomura was sent here to <letermine
the best bargain to be obtained. (A previous thought that he might be coming
to "Rock us to sleep" while Japan proceeded to the Southward, has been eliminated
definitely).
(2) He will try to prevent an embargo on oil and other essentials now being
obtained here, and will request reconsideration on those now under embargo.
(3) Japan definitely has decided that they cannot "conquer" China or exert
sufficient control while Chiang Kai-Shek maintains his present position and
strength. They realize that their best way out is a peace. This will be attempted
first by trying to dissuade us from further aid to China, thereby allowing the
Wang Chin-wei group to gain control iinder Japanese direction. If this is im-
possible he will then explore the other possible means of bringing about peace iv
China.
(4) That hostilities between Japan and the U. S. can be avoided if he is given
sufficient basis for an approach to the Leaders in Japan. (I indicated to him
that an [8933] immediate definite indication of sincerity by Jai);in would
have to be forthcoming if our Government opened such an approach. When he
asked "What for example," I replied, "If I were asked, I would say 'Immediate
cessation of all Japanese activities in Siam and French Indo-China' ". He made
no comment on this.
In the course of the conversation he made the following positive statements :
(1) That his mission was to prevent a resort to force between Japan and the
U. S. in settling present disagreements.
(2) That Japan has completely changed her views with regard to China, and
that peace is essential to both countries.
(3) That if the U. S. is patient until Europe is settled then the Far Eastern
situation will take care of itself. (This statement I took to be a feeler, therefore
I resisted an impulse to ask him if impatience meant probability of force by us in
the Far East.) My reply was optimism over British prospects which prompted
the question from him "Do you think it will be a long war?" My answer was
negative and reason given was the effect upon the German people when they
finally hear of U. S. aid to Britain.
(4) That the signing of the Axis pact was done only after a sharp division of
opinion and with only a slight [89341 balance of influence in its favor.
3312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Now, the mistake is. realized but as it is a "Fait accompli" nothing can be done
towards cancelling it. It must die a natural death. (The previous day a leading
Japanese business representative in San Francisco referred to the signing of the
pact by Japan as a grave mistake. When asked what could have brought this
about he stated without hesitation and authoritatively that it was accomplished
by bribery of officials with tremendous sums of money from Germany.)
DETAILS OF C0NVEB8ATI0N
After the usual exchange of pleasantries I opened the conversation by indi-
cating to the Admiral that I thought he had been given a most difficult task and
asked him how he expected to handle it.
He said "My hope is to prevent a resort to force in settling the difficulties
existing between our two countries. I replied, "Of course you know that at
least 65 percent of the American people are reconciled to any action as far as the
Far East is concerned, and you yourself have often said that such a conflict would
be disastrous for Japan and entail great loss for the U. S.
"We have no desire to see Japan defeated and destroyed. We saved her in 1904,
you will agree?" He answered in the affirmative, and I continued, "Well, we
would like to [S935] save her again because the very same reasons exist
today. The American people have long since learned that a strong Russia or a
strong China means the end of Japan, in which case problems for us will come
from other sources. I have always told the Japanese that we would go to war
if our commerce was blocked off, because that has been the cause of every war in
which we have engaged. Now see what has happened to all Foreign trade in
Manchuria. What would happen in the rest of Asia?" At this he apologized for
their extremists and I reminded him that they are the ones who bring on wars.
I then said, "Admiral, one thing which the American people can't reconcile is why
Japan, a country which has called continually for 'Equal Opportunity' could sign
a pact with Germany which has done away with all opportunity and has the
utmost contempt for all other nations?" He replied that there was a sharp
division of opinion in Japan as to the advisability of signing the pact and that
only a very slight balance of influence made it possible. Now, they realize the
mistake but it is a "fait accompli" and it is practically impossible to cancel it.
Therefore it will have to die a natural death.
[8936] "Admiral, I would like to know why you think you can pick a man
like Wang Chin-wei, set him up and count upon him working for Japan?"
He replied that Wang was for peace in China and that this was very necessary
now to combat the growing menace of Communism which has spread Russian
influence as far South as Peping. "In this case", I said, "it seems to me that
you want a man like Chiang Kai-shek to combat it, as he has done so successfully
for over ten years. That is where you ought to make your agreement if you
really want the peace of Asia, and here is where the U. S. might act as Mediator
and again save Japan. With communications as now exist in China you will
never be able to conquer or control it. Peace in China will bring prosperity to all
three of our countries. Your objective of markets and raw materials will be
realized. Our complementary trade will thrive again and there remains only the
problem of taking care of Japan's expanding population. Let's explore the
I'ealms of possibility. Do you think that if Chiang Kai-shek should be willing to
cede Manchuria to Japan in return for the protection it would afford Asia from
the inroads of Communism, would you then be able to go to the Japanese people
and say 'Japan has at last reached her original objective, we can now stop this
war in China and settle down to prosperity', do you think it would be accepted?"
This question was evidently unexpected for after much hesitation the Admiral
laughing and then seriously said, "It Avould have to be handled [S937]
very carefully, you know how excited the extremists become in such matters
and the steps they take." I replied that I remember well the affair of resump-
tion of normal affairs under the careful direction of Chiang Kai-shek and the long
desired development would eventuate, China would disappear." The Admiral
again indicated the difficulty of approach to such problems in Japan at this time,
but I said that the more difficult they were the more important they became. And
I added, "Of course, you imderstand that if Japan really wants the U. S. to
assist in solving this serious situation without resort to force, which you say is
your mission, then there would have to be an immediate definite indication of
sincerity by Japan." I would say Immediate cessation of all Japanese activities
in Siam and French Indo-Cliiiia. He made no comment on this and remained
thoughtful for an iipprociable ii\terval.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMIITEE 3313
[S938] During this couversatiou I made two references to my watch and
the fact that he must have many callers, in order to give him the opportunity to
indicate a desire to break off, but each time he stressed that he had no engage-
ments and wanted to continue talking.
Other parts of the conversation were devoted to the general cause of ill feeling
between the two countries which I indicated has been due solely to the villifica-
tion of the U. S. by the controlled press of Japan. Starting with the unjustified
raging over the Portsmouth Treaty after the U. S. had saved Japan from defeat,
it continued with every incident. Typical was that after the immigration bill,
a purely economic expedient occasioned by the failure of immigrant farmers to
adhere to the existing standards thereby endangering the California farmers.
Japan does not admit farmers.
I indicated that the Public is now well aware of the vast difference between
the Monroe Doctrine and the Asiatic Monroe Doctrine. Also that the public
does understand Japans needs and the diflScult situations with which she has been
confronted in the past, however they do not understand and will not tolerate
either in Europe or Asia any impositions on our commerce whicli restricts their
freedom to go where and when they will.
In conclusion I told the Admiral that he had been [8939} tjuoted in
the Press as having accepted this mission on the conditions that while he was
here the Japanese Government would not take any steps in the Far East which
might embarrass him. He neither confirmed nor denied this. I then said that
I hoped that it was true because it had put him in a very favorable light with
the American public and they would wish him every success as I do.
Admiral Nomura is accompanied by Mr. Wakasugi, as advisor. Wakasugl
was formerly Consul-General at San Francisco, and was not looked upon as a good
mixer. Having had some occasion to observe him in 1931 I was not impressed
with his ability. For a diplomat he was unusually unapproachable, which gave
the impression of assumed reticence to hide inferior qualities. It is believed
that he will be only a general guide for Admiral Nomura, whose activities or
conclusions will not be influenced by Mr. Wakasugi.
Admiral Nomura was very appreciative of the attentions which he received
from Admiral Richardson while in Honolulu, and I am sure these will have a
profound effect in Japan, in raising his prestige.
Admiral Richardson, who knew of my proposed conversation with Admiral
Nomura, had expressed a desire to have any details I could give him on it. I am
therefore sending a copy of this letter to Admiral Kimmel.
[8940] With kindest regards and best wishes, I am
Sincerely,
E. M. Zachabias.
Admiral H. R. Staek, U. S. N.,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
Mr. Murphy. Captain, my understanding of the reason for you hav-
ing been listed as a witness was that early in the executive session one
of the members of the committee said you had given two talks at
Annapolis relative to the Pearl Harbor situation.
Did you give talks at Annapolis to the student body?
Captain Zachx\rias. I had given talks at Annapolis to the student
body, but I do not recall that they referred specifically to the Pearl
Harbor situation.
[8941] Mr. Murphy. You do not recall any such talks there?
Captain Zacharias. I always talked about Japan and the possibili-
ties of war, but I do not believe I referred to what might occur spe-
cifically at Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Murphy. Now you gave testimony this morning to the effect
that, in your judgment, the north of the island was the most dan-
gerous. "Were atmospheric conditions any different on the north of
the island usually than they were on the other parts of the island of
Oahu? Was it clearer there ordinarily?
Captain Zacharias. There is quite frequently a difference in the
atmospheric conditions to the northward from those to the southward
because of the configuration of the land areas.
3314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Murphy. You also said something about the north being a
more dangerous area for an attack because of the wind conditions.
What degree of the arc would you say, or what degree of area, would
be covered by that particular wind condition?
Captain Zaciiarias. The prevailing winds in the Hawaiian area
are from the northward, because of the trade winds. The trade winds
are from the northeastward, but in the Hawaiian area they are — I do
not know just what the prevalence is, but they are from the northern
sector,
[894^] Mr. Murphy. Now is it your judgment — while I agree
that this was marked as an exhibit — is it your judgment that all of
this material is pertinent to this inquiry? They are your notes, are
they not?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. Of course there are letters there
which bring out what I felt were organizational deficiencies regard-
ing the improper indoctrination in the Navy and the naval officers
regarding security.
Mr. MuRPiiY. You have seen fit to criticize the conduct of officers
even after Pearl Harbor. Was that part of your function? You
remember that, don't you? You made some very caustic remarks
and uncomplimentary remarks about General Emmons.
Captain Zacharias. Well, you will note these reports were marked
'"personal and confidential," made up for a superior officer of the Navy,
for his use, on which to base an estimate of the situation. As an In-
telligence officer and as an officer of 37 years in the Navy I felt that
I had reached the stage where I could present facts to a superior
officer without mincing any words.
Mr. Murphy. Did you think it was part of the Navy function to
be criticizing Army generals? That is what I am wondering about.
Captain Zacharias. That report was not for the purpose [89^3]
of criticizing Army generals but was for the purpose of emphasizing
to the commander in chief what I considered the danger in allow-
ing Japanese newspapers, under the control of alien enemies, to be
republished in Hawaii after Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, the report was written for the admiral
in charge after tliere was unity of command and after the Army, in
effect, was under the command of the Navy; is that right?
Captain Zachaiuas. Well, I understood by the joint agreement of
the Army and Navy that the senior officer present in an outlying sta-
tion, such as Pearl Harbor, the senior officer was, in fact, in a position
to exercise unity of command.
Mr. Murphy, I think there is considerable disagreement about that.
The fact is, however, after December 7 there was unity of command
and it was in charge of a Navy man and your letter was written while
the Navy was, in effect, in command and the Army under the Navy
command ; is that right ? Do you understand me ?
Captain Zacharias. I would like to have that again,
Mr, Murphy. Read it please, Mr. Reporter.
(The question was read by the reporter.)
[8944] Captain Zacharias. That is correct. I would like to
add that the report that I made up after my conference with Gen-
eral Emmons regarding allowing these Japanese newspapers to re-
sume publication, I went to see him upon the direction of Admiral
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3315
Nimitz and the report was made out in an official manner for Admiral
Nimitz. I took along with me, now that you have mentioned the criti-
cism, I took along with me the district Intelligence officer, Capt. I. H.
Mayfield, now Eear Adm. I. H. Mayfield, who upon the termination
of our conference with General Emmons, or my interconversation
with General Emmons, as we left he turned to me and he said, "Now
you see what we are up against."
A year later I was advised by an Army officer who was then the
head of the Joint Intelligence activity that he had read this report
that I had submitted to Admiral Nimitz and he wanted to say that he
and Admiral Kichardson agreed with everything I had to say in it
and steps would be taken to remedy the situation immediately.
Mr. Murphy. I have just one more question.
Captain, you have been asked about the particular alert condition
of the ship you were on after it departed from Pearl Harbor imme-
diately prior to December 7, lO-tl. There is an article — and I do not
like to go to the Saturday Evening Post for my authority, but it has
been mentioned here [894'5] at different times — there is an
article by Lt. J. Bryan 3d, USNR, of January 1, 1944, in which he
said that on November 28, 1 day out at sea, battle order No. 1 was put
into effect and that that provided the following :
1. The Enterprise is now operating under war conditions.
2. At any time day or night we must be ready for instant action.
3. Hostile submarines may be encountered.
The writer says further:
Further he ordered all planes armed with torpedoes, bombs and ammunitien
and told the pilots "sink anything you sight."
Do you know of anything like that ever having existed?
Captain Zacharias. No order of that nature was transmitted to us
but it is quite possible that it was in effect on the Enterprise because
of their duties of scouting and other matters.
Mr. Murphy. I have no other questions.
The Chairman. Senator Brewster.
The Chair might say, in view of the fact the members of the House
have some duties at the other end, we have decided not to go later
than 4 : 15.
Senator BRp:ws'i'ER. I don't think I will take more than \89Ji6^
3 minutes.
The Chairman. All right.
Senator Brewster. I have asked that this entire record be placed
in evidence as an exhibit because I think there is some very valuable
material in there on Intelligence and it is to the broader questions that
I shall address myself.
With regard to the December 7 date concerning which you were
examined by Mr. Lucas, I think it may be pertinent to call attention
to what appears in the subsequent portion of the same paragraph
where the statement is made :
About that same time Mr. Munson, a representative from Washington (be-
lieved to be a Presidential agent) carrying a letter from OPNAV to "open every-
thing to him", sought me for an expression of views on probabilities and my
opinion as to what action should be talien with the Japanese here and on the
West Coast. After outlining to him my firm conviction that if Japan decided
to go to war with us it would open by an air attack on Pearl Harbor, on a
3316 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
weekend, and probably Sunday morning, with all reasons therefor, and I then
stated, "you now have two envoys in Washington. "When the third one arrives
you can look for it to l)reak immediately, one way or the other."
So that ill tlie same paragraph to which Admiral Kimmel's attention
had been called in reference to the letter it did appear that Avhile
1894-7] on March 17 you apparently had predicted December 7,
if it is read very literally in October when Mr. Munson arrived you
did not defend the date but indicated you were referring to the attack
and the time ?
Captain Zaciiariab. That is correct.
Senator Brewster. So it lends some confirmation to the interpre-
tation which you placed on the communication, you gather?
Captain Zacharias. It does, sir.
Senator Brewster. Now, on the broader question of the intelligence,
Admiral Stark in his testimony, on page 6280 said, in response to a
question about intelligence, and, as I understand, there were three
officers in charge of intelligence in the year preceding Pearl Harbor;
is that correct ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct.
Senator Brewster. Admiral Kirk, Admiral Anderson, and Admiral
Wilkinson, three in the year preceding?
Captain Zacharias. Yes.
Senator Brewster. Admiral Stark in response to a question about
the officer desiring to go to sea and be taken out of Intelligence said;
Generally speaking that is true in the Navy. An officer in wartime, or if the
occasion demanded, I think at [80841 any time might sacrifice his
career, * * *
Now, in a letter which you have written I find that same language,
that you indicated in one of your exhibits your readiness to sacrifice
your career for Intelligence. What does that mean ?
Captain Zacharias. I was asked one day by Admiral Anderson,
when he was Director of Naval Intelligence, whether I would sacri-
fice my career for Intelligence. I was rather puzzled at the question
and I said to him:
Admiral, I think that the situation is such that if some of us don't think about
sacrificing our careers there aren't going to be any to sacrifice.
I later in my letter to Admiral Stark reiterated to him that, some-
thing along that same line that I had told to Admiral Anderson. That
was for the purpose of emphasizing that regardless of the prejudice
against ourselves which we wrought by engaging in too much intelli-
gence work, because we thought it was vitally necessary for the security
of the Nation, I was ready to accept that if necessary.
Senator Brewster. As it w^ould mean that your promotion might be
seriously affected by failure to have the well-rounded activities of the
Navy?
Captain Zacharias. That would he correct; but I felt that I did
have a well-rounded activity throughout the Navy \8949] as
my record at sea will show.
Senator Brewster. One other thing and I am through.
In your letter of November 16, 1941, you emphasize this in your
communication to Admiral Stark :
Of course I look forward to the day when I will be in the position to continue
to work out the many ideas which I know to he vital to our intelligence organi-
zation. As you know, the r'ommnnd(>r in Chief has expressed himself as to
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3317
the lack of suflScient and thoroughly effective Intelligence organization. In the
past it has been a diflScult "selling" job, but I hope eventually to make our people,
particularly the higher ranks, realize the important elements. Last June, while
in Washington, Admiral Anderson asked me one day if I would be willing to
sacrifice my career for Intelligence —
Was he then in charge of intelligence ?
Captain Zacharias. Yes ; I am quite sure.
Senator Brewster (reading) :
"asked me one day if I would be willing to sacrifice my career for Inteligence."
I replied, "Admiral, the time has come when if we don't think about sacrificing
our careers, there won't be any to sacrifice." Of course, I am deliglited with my
ship and will soon have in half of my two years in grade, but if and when
the situation demands my [8950] statement above still stands.
In other words, is it your impression that the important of com-
petently directed intelligence had not been sufficiently appreciated in
what you term the higher ranks of the Navy prior to Pearl Harbor 't
Captain Zacharias. If I may say so, I think that is one of the great-
est contributing factors for Pearl Harbor.
Senator Brewster. That is all.
The Chairman. If I may interject there, what you mean is that the
average naval officer making a choice between gluing himself to a
desk or a station for intelligence work or going to sea in command of
a vessel would choose the sea and that in order to have a properly
directed intelligence service men must give up the chances of promo-
tion that would be involved in command at sea and remain, if neces-
sary, glued to their desks in the intelligence service ?
Captain Zacharias. That is one phase of it, sir, but what I was
driving at in the two letters which I wrote on January 27, 1942, which
are included in there, one regarding the lack of security indoctrination
in the Navy and the other the faulty selection of officers for intelligence
duty, those were based upon a belief on my part that the officers of
the Navy were not sufficiently cognizant of the [8051] scope
and importance of intelligence as such and I urged that training fa-
cilities be installed to remedy that situation.
I felt that once a general knowledge on the part of all officers of the
Navy became a fact, a general knowledge regarding the scope and
importance of intelligence, that the future would be safeguarded
against such a thing as occurred at Pearl Harbor.
I would like to invite attention to one page in one of those letters,
I think it is page 40 in the documents listed, which outlines my opinion
of what constituted a good intelligence officer.
[8952] Among the things which are given there in addition to
the qualifications, I say that an officer must not only be able to receive
the information and evaluate it properly, he must have the courage to
present it to his superior officer, and that is where in the past that has
been one of the greatest drawbacks and that is the reason I said that
this situation was one of the greatest contributing factors to Pearl
Harbor.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question ?
The Chairman. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. I understood Admiral Stark to say — and I
won't say that I am correct about it and I hope you can tell me — I un-
derstood Admiral Stark to say that as a matter of law by act of Con-
gress nayal officers had to have a certain amount of sea duty.
3318 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Zacharias. I think it is custom rather than law.
The Vice Chairman. Well, the custom is then that they have to
have a certain amount of sea duty.
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir; in order to be eligible to have a good
chance of selection and be promoted.
The Vice Chairivian. And that does have some bearing on promo-
tions ?
Captain Zacharias. It does; yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And that, he thought, affects an officer's career.
[8£/63] Captain Zacharias. It affects those who might other-
wise choose intelligence as a field.
The Vice Chairman. Well, are there any intelligence officers at sea ?
Captain Zacharias. Each ship has an intelligence officer designated
as such but
The Vice Chairman. That is what I thought.
Captain Zacharias (continuing). Very few have any intelligence
background or experience.
The Vice Chairman. Well, I thought they had intelligence officers
at sea.
Captain Zacharias. They now have people with experience because
during the 1 year which I had as Deputy Director of Navy" Intelli-
gence between my two war cruises I installed an entirely new system
of training which gave basic and advanced intelligence training and
provided for the fleet the officers which they now have to interpret
what we call operational intelligence.
The Vice Chairman. Well, these officers who have intelligence
duties at sea, does that count in their favor the same as if they were
serving intelligence work on shore ?
Captain Zacharias. In the past that duty at sea has been a collateral
duty. They had regular ship's duties in addition to having intelli-
gence duties.
[Sr9S4'} The Vice Chairman. Well, does the fact that they do
intelligence work at sea militate against their interest?
Captain Zacharias. No, sir ; it does not.
The Vice Chairman. All right.
The Chairman. Senator Lucas.
Senator Lucas. As I recall. Captain, there are some special duty
stations in the Navy where the officers are never changed ; am I correct
about that?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct; yes sir. They all have the
status of engineering duty only, although they might not be in
engineering.
Senator Lucas. Their promotion is not affected as a result of being
placed in that special-duty work ?
Captain Zacharias. The general feeling has been that an officer
in specialist duty is prejudiced to some extent.
Senator Lucas. But there are some spots where they make no change.
Once they get a good man in that place they keep him there.
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lucas. There were a few instances of that kind, as I recall,
testified to before the Naval Affairs Committaee some time ago and I
would like to ask you whether or not in view of what has happened
here in the development of a lack of proper intelligence, perhaps, or
PROCEEDINGS OF .lOlM" COMMITTEE 3319
lack of proper evalu- [8955] ation, whether or not if you found
the right type of a man tliat really could do the job it wouldn't be more
advantageous to the national defense to keep that man in Intelligence
rather than move him out every year and a half or two years all ovel
the globe ?
Captain Zacharias. I think that goes without saying, sir.
Senator Lucas. You would advocate that, wouldn't you
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas (continuing). As one who has had a lot of experi-
ence in that kind of work ?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir, that is quite true. Of course, then
Senator Lucas. In other words, take a fellow like Edgar Hoover
here, who is the head of crime detection in this country and of intelli-
gence. We don't take him out every so often and put a new man in be-
cause he has done and is doing a whale of a job, and it seems to me that
in Army and Navy as a result of this Pearl Harbor investigation
we must have something on the same order and it does seem to me
that that has to come about.
Captain Zacharias. I am now convinced that we will have to come
to something of that nature, and this lack of the knowledge and scope
of the work of intelligence ordinarily has tended to create another
organization unit. I think it [8956] has brought out in these
hearings that the war plans officers have taken over the functions of
evaluation, which are primarily the functions of the Chiefs of In-
telligence, and I feel certain that if the Chiefs of Intelligence had been
allowed to retain that function and had the responsibility, that a great
many things which did occur would not occur and I certainly ad-
vocate that for the future.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to just say that I did
not go into detail in this exhibit just introduced, which gives Captain
Zacharias' views at considerable length, on account of the time ele-
ment. I think they are highly important. I do want to read this
additional sentence that I found there in the letter of the 27th of
January :
The orthodox and conservative type of naval officer is designed by training
and indoctrination not to be an intelligence officer.
Captain Zacharias. I think that is correct.
Senator Brewster. I think that is a considered conclusion. I might
say in conclusion, Captain, that in November 1940 when you were
going to Pearl Harbor, if you need additional corroboration as to your
concern, you stated it very fully to me in the course of a trip out
there, as to your very great anxiety over the Pearl Harbor situation,
to which you then pointed.
\89o7] Were you then a captain ?
Captain Zacharias. I was then a captain. I was en route to take
command of the Salt Lake City.
Senator Brewster. And 3^011 have not been promoted since that
time ?
Captain Zacharias. No. sir.
The Chairmax. Well, the committee will suspend until 10 o'clock
tomorrow, when the captain will resume.
(Whereupon, at 4:80 p. m., January 28, 1946, an adjournment
was taken until 10 a. m., Tuesday, January 29. 1946.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3321
[8958^ PEARL HAEBOR ATTACK
TUESDAY, JANUARY 29, 1946
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation,
or THE Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington^ D. C.
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the
caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W.
Barkley (chairman), presiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster
and Ferguson, and Kepresentatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark,
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.
Also present: Seth AV. Richardson, General Counsel; Samuel H.
Kaufman, Associate General Counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P.
Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.
[8959] The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Captain Zacharias.
TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ELLIS M. ZACHARIAS, UNITED STATES
NAVY (Resumed)
Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, we have one item that we would like
to take up first.
The Chairman. The counsel has something to take up before you
resume, Mr. Gearhart.
Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, some time ago we compiled a
group of documents which relate to certain transfers of information
and inquiry between the United States and other Governments. The
file I hold in my hand contains the photostats of those documents.
There has been suggestion from individual members of the com-
mittee that they would like to have us advise the State Department
that these various documents should be called to the attention of the
foreign governments, and their permission obtained, as is required,
for the publication of these documents.
We brought the matter, you recall, to the attention of the commit-
tee at one time, suggesting that we felt we should have the direction
of the committee before we formally advise the State Department to
formally request the foreign governments to release the documents.
[^8960^ Now, I say just for what it may be worth, which is
probably nothing, as we go through these documents there are only
one or two that we can, by any particular stretch of the imagination,
feel are germane.
I have this suggestion :
If the committee is amenable to a direction to us to secure the con-
sent of the foreign governments to the publication of all of these
documents, that then some method be devised whereby any indi-
79716 — 46— pt. 7 27
3322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
vidual committee members who are interested might examine this
group and delete from the number of documents those that are not
relevant to this proceeding, so that the number that we have to ask
the foreign governments to O. K. and free, can be reduced as much
as possible.
But I would like now to have the committee give us some direction
as to what is to be done with reference to communicating with the
State Department to get the release of these documents.
The Vice Ciiairmax. Let me inquire there, Mr. Richardson. You
have examined all of these documents?
Mr. Richardson. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And it is your opinion that only a few of
them could, by any stretch of the imagination, be relevant or mate-
rial to this inquiry?
[8d61] Mr. Richardson. That was my feeling, as I read them.
The Vice Chairman. It would look to me like the committee would
want very carefully to consider that before we go to all the trouble
of having the State Department get the clearances of the foreign gov-
ernments on something that may not be even material or relevant to
this inquiry.
I would think that the members who have indicated an interest in
this material, would assist the committee to the extent of examining
these things carefully, and conferring with you and seeing if they can
reach a decision to comply with the suggestion that you here made.
Mr. Richardson. Well. Mr. Chairman, there is no need of any fur-
ther conference with us. 1 am perfectly willing to turn this tile over
to any committeeman who wants to examine it. and then it is up to
the committee to tell us which ones ought to be taken out.
The Vice Chairman. My point in that suggestion is that a mem-
ber interested may take this whole file and examine it carefully him-
self, and then confer with you as to your opinion as to which of those
documents might be material, and you can point out to the member
your reason for thinking that others are not. In other words, try to
get together with the committee member and if the committee mem-
ber feels that he still wants to urge that all of it be brought in here,
why, then the matter can be submitted to the committee again for
action on it.
\8962] Senator Lucas. May I inquire just that this is?
Mr. Richardson. Senator, it is a series of d(K'uments that have to
do with the troubled relations existing between the United States and
Japan and England and China.
The Vice Chairman. I might say personally what I am afraid
of is that we are getting such a mass of material in here, much of
it that is so remotely, if at all, related to the subject under consideration,
we are going to get our record so terribly large that it Avill be difficult
for people interested in the matter to find the things that are really
material and important.
Mr. Richardson. Suppose, Mr. Chairman, that I turn tliis over to
Senator Ferguson, who I think is more familiar with them than
anyone else.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I will say that I have gone over
this and I have marked certain ones that I think are material. I
wanted them released prior to a witness we had last week leaving the
stand, but I will go over them again.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3323
The Vice Chairmax. I am sure we will all appreciate that.
Senator Ferguson. There were, I think, three places that I marked
for counsel that I was greatly interested in, but the witness has gone
from the stand and I couldn't use [8963] it for cross-
examination.
Mr. Richardson, Then we may depend upon having further infor-
mation from Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. All right.
Mr. Richardson. Now I think Mr. Masten has a document he wants
to offer in evidence.
Mr. Masten. Yes.
The Vice Chairman, Mr. Masten may proceed.
Mr. Masten, Mr, Chairman, we have distributed to the committee
this morning a folder of documents, mimeographed copies of docu-
ments, which is entitled "Material Relating to 'Winds' Code.''
The Vice Chairman. That is this document here ?
Mr. Masten. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. All right.
Mr, Masten. If you will look at the first two pages you will find a
table of contents of the documents that are included in this compilation.
Many of the documents included have been previously introduced,
either in the transcript or as exhibits, but it was thought for the
convenience of the connnittee it would be well to bring them all together
in one place.
If I may take a minute I would like to run down the [8964-]
index to show you just how it was compiled.
The Vice Chairman. Go right ahead.
Mr. Masten. Section No. 1, entitled "Data received concerning
establishment and nature of winds code," lists dispatches, all of which,
except item d, have been previously placed in the record or made an
exhibit.
Under Section 2, "Dispatches and data relating to monitoring for
Winds 'Execute,' " there are listed three dispatches, all of which are
either exhibits or have been read into the record previously.
Section 3, entitled "Certification of Secretary FCC, dated 8/18/44,
with attachments as follows," is not now in the record and is new
material.
The Vice Chairman, All four of those messages I
Mr. Masten. All four of those items under No, 3,
The same is true of all of the items of Section 4 entitled "Material
relating to weather Winds 'Execute' message sent or received." Items
a and b under that number include all of the communications which
have been received from General MacArthur in this connection.
Items c, d, and e include communications from the State Depart-
ment to the British, the Australians, and the Dutch regarding the
monitoring for the Winds "Execute" message that was carried on by
those respective governments.
[8965] Items c, d, and e may have to be supplemented by further
reports from the State Department, but we have given you here every-
thing that we have received to date in that connection.
Section 5, entitled "List of messages appearing in Committee Ex-
hibit 1 dealing with instructions to Japanese representatives to de-
3324 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sti'oy codes, sent through ordinary channels of communications," is
simply a list that was compiled on the basis of the material in
Exhibit 1, and I. think is self-explanatory.
Section 6 consists of new material which has to do with the ques-
tion of file number JD-1 7001 in the Navy Department, and I think
will be found self-explanatory upon examination.
In this latter connection, I would like to read into the record a
memorandum dated January 26, 1946, from Lt. Col. Harmon Dun-
combe, the Army liaison officer, which is as follows :
Memorandum for Mr. Richardson :
Pursuant to the request of former counsel to the committee, a comparison
was made of the intercepted messages in the Army Signal Intelligence Service
file which had been translated on 2, 3, and 4 December 1941 and those in the
Navy file translated on the same dates. The purpose of the comparison was to
ascertain whether the Army file contained [8966] a message not in the
Navy file. The comparison, which was jointly made by the Army and the Navy,
showed that each message in the Army file was also in the Navy file.
The results of the comparison were reported orally to the former counsel to
the committee at the time the comparison was completed.
As you will see that memorandum also has to do with the question
of file number 7001.
Now, there may be additional material later in connection with the-
winds matter, in fact, there are some dispatches referred to in the
statement by Captain Safford which has been circulated to the com-
mittee \\ liich the Navy Department is now endeavoring to find and
deliver to us, and we will make them available to you just as soon as
they are received.
We would like to offer this compilation as Exhibit No. 142.
The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit No. 142,
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 142.")
Mr. Masten. We would also like to offer two additional documents
from the Federal Communications Commission file, the first of which
is the page dated at the top December 5, 1941, and is a memorandum
to Mr. Sterling. We [8967] would like to offer that as Ex-
hibit 142-A.
The Vice Chairman. Exhibit 142-A?
Mr. Masten. Yes; in other words, we would like to have Exhibit
142 as the basic exhibit for all this new material.
The Vice Chairman. It will be so received.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 142-A.")
The Vice Chairman. What is next?
Mr. Masten. That is all we have.
The Vice Chairman. All this is one exhibit, then ?
Mr. Masten. Yes ; Mr. Kichardson suggests that we mention at this
time that the material included in Exhibit 142, item 3, and this addi-
tional material which we have now marked as Exhibit 142-A, is only
a part of the total material we have received from the FCC but is the
part that we felt was most relevant, and if any of the other material
becomes relevant we will add it to the exhibit.
The Vice Chairman. All of this material in Exhibit 142-A relates
to the FCC?
Mr. Masten. That is correct.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3325
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire from counsel, have
you got in this new data you gave us this {8968] Tokyo to
Washington serial 8430, November 27, 1941 ?
Mr. Masten. If that is one of the dispatches referi-ed to in Captain
SafFord's statement as not being in the record, it is not yet included in
this as we have not yet received it from the Navy Department.
Senator Ferguson. You have not yet got that from the Navy De-
partment.
Mr. Masten. They are working on it, but it has not yet been re-
ceived.
Senator Ferguson. xVnother one is OPNAV 282301. That is not in
either?
Mr. Masten. That is not in this compilation.
Senator Ferguson. Then on page 16 of the Safford statement, 1, 2,
3, 4 OPNAV messages are marked priority, two of them referred to
priority, you don't have those in the memorandum ?
Mr. Masten. If those are dispatches referred to as not having been
introduced, then they are not in this compilation but all of them are
being sought by the Navy and we will let you have them as soon as we
get them.
Senator Ferguson. But you haven't them now?
Mr. Masten. No, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Is there anything further?
Mr. Richardson. No.
[8969] The Vice Chairman. Captain Zacharias, do you have
anything 5^ou want to present to the committee before your examina-
tion is resumed ?
[8970] Captain Zacharias. I think I would like to clarify one
of my statements yesterday regarding the word "when" about which
I was questioned by Senator Lucas.
I couldn't quite make his point and since thinking it over, I feel
that he wanted an explanation of what I meant by "when."
If so, the word "when" applied to two things ; one a Sunday morn-
ing, and the other a time when submarines were discovered in the
Hawaiian area. That would cover the meaning of the word "when"
in my statement that I advised Admiral Kimmel as to where, how, and
when sucli an attack would take place.
Senator Lucas. That still does not satisfy the Senator from Illinois.
The Vice Chairman. Is there anything further. Captain?
Captain Zacharias, Nothing further.
The Vice Chairman. I believe it is Mr. Gearhart's time to inquire.
Mr. Gearhart of California will inquire, Captain.
Mr. Gearhart. Captain, as I understand your testimony, the sub-
stance of your conversation with Admiral Kimmel and the purpose of
your going to his office or headquarters to discuss anything with him,
was to point out that in your opinion, as an experienced Intelligence
officer, and also [8971] as an experienced line officer in the
Navy, that the Japanese, if they chose to attack us, would commence
hostilities by an attack upon our fleet ; is that not correct ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir. Of course, that discussion
evolved from my discussions with Admiral Kimmel regarding the
report that I had sent in to Admiral Stark regarding my conversa-
tions with Admiral Nomura and then the discussion of the incident
of October 16, 1940, which I described in detail vesterdav.
3326 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From there we went into a discussion of the general situation
which might arise, and the things that would be inherent in it.
Mr. Gearhart. After you pointed out to him that in your opin-
ion, they would commence hostilities by an attack upon our fleet,
the next topic of conversation naturally was, "Well, assuming that
to be true, what should we do about it," and you suggested that we
install or inaugurate patrols ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct,
Mr. Gearhart. Which caused the admiral to say that he didn't
have the equipment or the men to maintain extended patrols for any
length of time ?
Captain Zacharias. He didn't qualify it. He said :
[8972] Well, we have neither the personnel nor the materiel with which to
make such a patrol.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, the maintenance of a patrol which is ade-
quate as a defense against surprise attack, 3^ou could expect a tre-
mendous attrition upon the planes that are used, could you not ?
Captain Zacharias. The patrol planes ?
Mr. Gearhart. Yes.
Captain Zacharias. Yes, you could. However, it is to be expected
that an alert patrol would be able to get in a report by radio before
it is shot down.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, I don't mean attrition by warfare especially,
but attrition from the mechanical standpoint.
Captain Zacharias. That is correct.
Mr. Gearhart. A certain number of planes will always have to be
under repair, a certain amount of parts will become worn, and have
to be replaced, so unless you have a large number of planes, as a
reservoir, any patrol undertaken with 50 or 60 planes available would
necessarily be a limited operation, limited as to time, would it not ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir, but although limited in
forces available for that work, they nevertheless coud be used and
restricted to the most probable area [8973] or sector.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, was there a most probable area ?
Captain Zacharias. In my opinion, as I stated, I expected, fully
expected, that an air attack would be launched doMii-wind, and as
the prevailing wind in Hawaii is from the northward sector, it
would come from that direction.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, you knew that if any Japanese fleet should
sail into that area, that it would have to travel several thousand
miles, didn't you ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. You also knew that the Japanese were already in-
stalled in the Marshall Islands, and in other Pacific islands, from
which they could make a quicker movement toward the Hawaiian
Islands ?
Captain Zacharias. But they would suspect that that would be thf
locality in which we would be most interested.
Mr. Gearhart. In other words, it being more probable that they
would come from the Marshalls or from some other islands in that
area, therefore they would reduce, by coming froin that area, the
element of surprise?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3327
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And if they came from the north, the element of
surprise would be emphasized rather than detracted from ?
[89'/4] Captain Zacharias. Well, it wasn't the unexpected
area in my mind.
Mr. Gearhart. In other words, you selected that point as a probable
initiation of attack because it was the improbable one?
Captain Zacharias. From the standpoint of what the Japanese
would estimate us to do.
Mr. Gearhart. In other words, you were trying to think as a Jap
would think.
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, Admiral Kimmel explained to you that he only
had a limited number of planes available for this purpose of reconnais-
sance, and you urged him to do everything he could to get the Washing-
ton authorities to supply him with more planes, didn't you ?
Captain Zacharias. He didn't explain that he had a limited number.
He said "We have neither the material nor the personnel with which
to carry out such a patrol," and as I indicated, I replied, "Well, Ad-
miral, I feel you better get them because that is what is coming."
Mr. Gearhart. You knew that both Admiral Kimmel and General
Short were asking for more and more planes at all times ?
Captain Zacharias. I did not, sir.
[897S] Mr. Gearhart. You didn't know that Harry Hopkins
was sending them across the Atlantic rather than sending them to the
Pacific?
Captain Zacharias. No, sir.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I object to that statement.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, the Senator from Illinois has a perfect right to
object, but I would like to know.
Senator Lucas. Wliat is the basis for the assumption, and why bring
Harry Hopkins into this program at this late date ?
[8976] Mr. Gearhart. Why, certainly the Senator from Illinois
is not so uninformed as not to know that Harry Hopkins was doing the
allocating of those materials at that time.
Senator Lucas. Well, is there anv proof in this record to that
effect? \
Mr. Gearhart. Yes; there is in this record as well as in the record
of the American people.
Senator Lucas. Well, I challenge the statement.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Gearhart will proceed in order.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, do I understand then that the
ruling of the Chair was that the Congressman was not in order?
The Vice Chairman. I ruled that the gentleman from California
may proceed in order, whicli is a proper parliamentary expression to
use.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. And is used all the time in the Senate and in
the House.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes; that was a very adroit one because nobody
knows when they hear that ruling whether the objection is sustained
or is not sustained. However, we will proceed in order.
3328 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Vice Chairman. The gentleman from California will proceed
in order.
[8977] Mr. Gearhart. You were informed that there was a
munitions assignment board, weren't you?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir ; I was aware of that.
Mr. Geariiart. And you were also aware of the fact that Harry
Hopkins was a member of that board, weren't you?
Captain Zacharias. I do not recall that I did, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, he was, and if there is any doubt in the mind
of the Senator from Illinois now, it is now in evidence by my asser-
tion.
Senator Lucas. Of course, that makes it so.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, I am giving the Senator from Illinois an
opportunity now to say it is not true if it is not true, and I will accept
his word for it.
Senator Lucas. I am not going to argue with the Congressman. He
has testified all the way through in these hearings.
Mr. Gearhart. You knew that under lend-lease we were supplying
the British and other people who were fighting Hitlerism with planes?
Captain Zacharias. I knew we were furnishing a great many sup-
plies and including planes, too.
Mr. Gearhart. And you naturally knew as an American citizen
that which the Senator from Illinois pretends is not in evidence, that
some agency of the Government had to alio- [8978] cate to
the different theaters of operations and to the different countries that
were involved all the munitions that we produced of various kinds,
including airplanes, didn't you?
Captain Zacharias, That was a matter of policy to which I gave no
question at all.
Mr. Gearhart. Then as a naval expert, one who has had a great deal
of experience in intelligence work, which involves a further study of
the question of what is an appropriate supply, do you think that the
number of planes that Admiral Kimmel had and General Short had
was a sufficient amount to defend that island in the likelihood of an
attack from the Japanese?
Captain Zacharias. Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short have
stated that the number of planes was insufficient. I prefer to take
their opinion on that point.
Mr, Gearhart. Because they were closer to the problem.
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, when did you first reduce to writing the sub-
stance of your conversation with Admiral Kimmel ?
Captain Zacharias. The first time was when I presented the mem-
orandum to Admiral Draemel on March the 17, 1942, just about a year
after I had the conversation with Admiral Kimmel.
[8979] Mr. GEARiiArtT. Was there anything in that conversation
that you had with Admiral Kimmel which marked it in your memory
so that you can say now that your memorandum prepared a year later
was accurate in every detail ?
Captain Zacharias. I would like to say that this whole question was
something that was uppermost in my mind. There were no important
duties to becloud it in any way. It was something that had been of
interest to me for the past 20 years. Therefore, there is every reason
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3329
why I should have remembered every detail of that conversation with
Admiral Kimmel and I mi^ht say, on the other hand, that he had many
other matters Avhich were his concern, and I grant the possibility for
that reason for his not having remembered the details of that conversa-
tion.
However, I do want to emphasize that this whole question was one
to which I was giving full attention all my spare time in contacts with
the fleet intelligence office at Pearl Harbor and the district intelligence
office in the city of Honolulu.
Mr. Gearhart. To whom did you say you prepared that memoran-
dum ? For whom did you prepare it ?
Captain Zacharias. It was prepared as a result of a conversation
which I had with Admiral Draeniel, then the chief of staff to Admiral
Nimitz, and it was made up upon his recommendation when he said :
I agree with ninety-nine per cent of [S9S0] what you have said and I
wish you would write this up for me as a memorandum so I can present it to
Admiral Nimitz and let him go over it at his leisure.
That was the sole purpose of the preparation of that memorandum,
and I would like to emphasize at this time that there was no inclination
on my part to air my views regarding this previous conversation that
I had had with Admiral Kimmel in March of 1941.
Mr. Gearhart. Did you take any steps after your conversation with
Admiral Kimmel, when he told you he did not have sufficient equip-
ment to undertake a patrol of the type that you recommended, did
you take any steps to communicate your views to Washington
authorities ?
Captain Zacharias. Not regarding the lack of planes. I think I
furnished a copy of that memorandum to Admiral King.
Mr. Gearhart. After the conversation, a year after the conversation
with Admiral Kimmel.
Captain Zacharias. -That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, at the time you talked with Admiral Kimmel
and at the time he told you he could not undertake such a reconnais-
sance, you did not carry your ideas to any other source, but remained
silent on the subject for a year?
Captain Zacharias. In replying to that, sir, I would like to em-
phasize that I was a commanding officer of a ship of the [8981^
Pacific Fleet, which were my primary duties and having once given
Admiral Kimmel my views as a student of 'Japan I knew that — I felt
that — he knew that I was in the vicinity, available at any time should
he desire any further advice on the subject.
Mr. Gearhart. But if Admiral Kimmel told you he did not have
sufficient equipment to undertake such a reconnaissance, you knew
that equipment could be secured from higher authority. Did you
thereafter take the matter up with any authority
Captain Zacharias. No, sir.
Mr. Gearhart (continuing). By letter or by conversation?
Captain Zacharias. No, sir; I did not. That was not a part of
my function.
Mr. Gearhart. Was your original conversation with Admiral Kim-
mel a part of your function?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. As I stated yesterday, I was the
senior officer on active duty who had studied the Japanese language
3330 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and Japan. I was the one who had interviewed Admiral Nomura and
had made a semiofficial report to Admiral Stark, in which I knew
Admiral Kimmel would be interested. I was the one who partici-
pated in that event of October 16, 1940, which I knew would be of
interest to Admiral Kimmel. i898"d] Therefore, it was from
a sense of duty that I took it upon myself to <io over and have a talk
with him.
Mr. Gearhaht. At that time you were the commander, were you not,
of the U. S. S. Salt Lake Citu} '
Captain Zaciiarias. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Geariiart. As such you were not detailed to intelligence work
at that time, were you?
Captain Zacharias. Only insofar as I had been previously impor-
tuned by a former Director of Naval Intelligence that because of my
past experience and interest, although I Avas going to sea duty, it
was hoped and desired that I would continue active as an Intelligence
officer no matter where I was or what duty I was performing. I
merely followed that recommendation.
Mr. Geariiart. At the time that you held this conversation with
Admiral Nomura were you an Intelligence officer or were you just
a naval officer, a friend of his?
Captain Zacharias. I was commanding officer of the Salt Lake City
at that time in the San Francisco area. I had previously discussed
the proposed visit of Admiral Nomura with Admiral Richardson and
told him that I expected to talk to him because of my intimate ac-
quaintance with Admiral Nomura, and Admiral Richardson expressed
a desire for a copy of the report which I told him I would make out
after the conversa [89SS] tion and send in to the Chief of Naval
Operations.
Mr. Geariiart. Now, as an expert in naval strategy, and as an Intel-
ligence officer and informed with respect to such things, you knew what
the Japanese problem was in the event they undertook hostilities
against the United States ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. That problem was to immobilize our fleet until
they could consolidate their conquests and install themselves into posi-
tion, is that not correct?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir, and specifically, too, I felt
that they had as their objective seriously disabling at least four battle-
ships.
Mr. Geariiart. It would have been a rather dangerous operation
for the Japanese to attempt conquests in the soutlnvestern Pacific
if the American fleet was on its flank and in fighting trim ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir. As I explained yesterday,
that although we had in the Pacific 102 ships as against the Japanese
180, they would certainly feel that by the time we had assembled an
expeditionary force with which to make an offensive movement across
the Pacific we could have the rest of our fleet around in the Pacific
even if it had to go around the Horn.
Mr. Gearhart. And even though the Japanese did have far
[3984] more ships, numerically speaking, in the Pacific than we
had, they had their responsibilities, other responsibilities than facing
an American fleet alone, and would have further responsibilities in
PROCEEDINGS OK JOINT COMMITTEE 3331
the event they were to move through finally in the Pacific, is that not
correct ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir; and I might add that in all
our fleet problems at War College and the general consideration, it
was taken for granted that in the event of hostilities between the
United States and Japan they would most certainly capture Guam
and attempt to capture the Philippines regardless of whatever else
they did.
Mr. Geariiaet. And whatever they did do, each operation required
ships ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Therefore, they did not have 160 vessels of different
kinds to direct against our approximately a hundred vessels of dif-
ferent kinds at Hawaii ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And assuming that we would immediately reinforce
our fleet by transfers from the Atlantic — and they had to assume the
worst, of course — it became apparent from their standpoint, did it
not, that they had to immobilize a considerable number of our ships
before they undertook any operations in the southwestern Pacific?
[8985] Captain Zacharias. That is correct, and as I have indi-
cated previously.
Mr. Gearhart. And when they undertook this attack upon Hawaii
they undertook a very risky operation, did they not? As it turned
out, it worked all right for them, but I mean as thej'^ contemplated it
and looked forward to the operation.
Captain Zacharias. All things being equal it may be considered a
very dangerous operation, as was indicated by the extract that I read
into the record yesterday, Avhich is page 47 of the papers furnished to
the committee, but we felt that they knew the exact situation existing
in Hawaii and could to some extent discount the danger that they
might encounter.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, as a matter of fact whether it was very, very
dangerous, or whether it was less dangerous, or not dangerous at all, it
was absolutely necessary for Japan to commence this war that way, as
you pointed out.
Captain Zachabias. In order to have a chance of victory, that is
correct.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, the Hawaiian Islands are very small, and the
harbors are very limited, and the fleet based on Hawaii was necessarily
concentrated, with the ships very close together under all circum-
stances, is that not correct ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And the fleet at Hawaii proper would be a
[8986] far better opportunity for immobilization by a successful
attack than they would have been if the fleet had been scattered be-
tween San Francisco, Monterey Bay, Los Angeles Harbor, Long Beach
and San Diego ?
Captain Zacharias. I think the important point in their was that
that gave the Japanese a better opportunity to destroy the aircraft
which would be a menace to the force that was bringing the planes over
and thereby reduce the danger to the Japanese force, than would have
existed if they would have had to attack another area. As it turned
out they did immobilize practically every aircraft in Hawaii.
3332 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gearhart. And by knocking out our battleships they immobil-
ized our fleet and compelled it to immediately drop its offensive plans
as set forth in WPL-46 and the Rainbow, and go on a defensive opera-
tion, didn't they ?
Captain Zacharias. Of course, I felt immediately after Pearl Har-
bor that the Japanese had not destroyed any vessels which we would
use in the operations that would be needed in the immediate future,
such as the raids which we began. Those battleships, of course, would
be vitally necessary at a later date, when we began the expeditionary
forces.
Mr. Gearhart. That being true how do you account for the fact
that the Japanese pilots went right after the battleships and their
damage to the cruisers was slight in comparison ?
[8987] Captain Zacharias. Because the Japanese had in mind
disabling all the battleships because they would represent the ultimate
force that would be brought to bear against the Japanese in the
Western Pacific.
Mr. Gearhart. But they were not considering about ultimate forces
as much as they were considering the immediate result, were they not?
Is that not true ?
Captain Zacharias. The immediate result was to disable the battle-
ships; yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. The immediate result they were after was to immo-
bilize the American fleet for a considerable length of time.
Captain Zacharias. That is correct.
Mr. Gearhart. To give them time sufficiently long for them to con-
solidate their conquests in the Southwest Pacific.
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, they immobilized our fleet, as they set out to,
by immobilizing our battleships, didn't they ?
Captain Zacharias. I was differentiating between the offensive and
defensive actions on our part, but I agree to what you say, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. In other words, if their attack had been unsuc-
cessful against Hawaii, the very temper of the American people, I
think, would have been such as to require an immed- [8988]
iate attempt by the American fleet to go to the relief of the Philip-
pines ; is that not correct ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And if we went to the relief of the Philippines it
would have to be by an American armada undertaking the task,
wouldn't it ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. That would have to include battleships, would it
not?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And therefore, by immobilizing our battleships,
they immobilized the American fleet right then, not eventually; is
that not correct?
Captain Zacharias. As far as early movements were concerned,
that is correct, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Now, by concentrating our fleet in this limited
area around the Hawaiian Islands and in that one harbor that they
have over there that is at all important, did we not offer the Japs a
temptation to come there and with one fell swoop to immobilize our
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3333
whole fleet and accomplish something which would have been difficult
to accomplish if the fleet had been scattered along the Pacific coast
as advocated by others and naval strategists ?
Captain Zacharias. Well, that is a matter of policy, [89891
undo-ubtedly, based on information which was not at my disposal. I
prefer not to comment on that.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, I don't want you to take sides between one set
of officers and another set of strategists, but, in passing on it, the Japs
could not have hit the Pacific coast and knocked out and immobilized
our full fleet if our fleet was scattered, with only four carriers, could
they?
Captain Zacharias. I think the important consideration is this:
If the fleet had been at some point on the west coast, the Japanese would
not have been in a position to immobilize the aircraft at our disposal,
which would have resulted in a very sizable aircraft force being sent
out against the forces which had to come in to make this attack, and
would have created a very dangerous situation for the Japanese fleet
which had come over. In addition to that they would have had to
travel 2,500 miles further than Hawaii, which would put them in a
position strategically vulnerable because of the location of the air
forces at Hawaii and Dutch Harbor to the northward.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, now, we have defined the problem that the
Japanese had with our fleet based at Hawaii. Can you define the
problem that would have been theirs if they were contemplating hostil-
ities against the United States if our fleet were scattered between San
Francisco and San Diego?
[8990] Captain Zacharias. We did contemplate that in our fleet
problem No. 14 in 1932, in which I participated as commanding officer
of a destroyer and was required to make up an estimate of the situation
and a decision. At that time I arrived at the conclusion that the Jap-
anese would begin hostilities with an air attack on our fleet wherever
it was and also disable by an air attack, if possible, the facilities at
Hawaii on their way home.
At that time, 1932, we did not have dispersed along the west coast
or in close proximitj^ the air bases which we had in 1941 and which I
have indicated would have created a much more dangerous situation
for the Japanese at that time than it would have in 1932. However, I
give you that to indicate that we have thought in terms of this air at-
tack for a long time.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, if our fleet was scattered along the Pacific
coast the air defense problem would be reduced to one-half, in that they
would only have to patrol 180°, whereas around the islands they have
to patrol 360°, is that not correct?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir, provided we did not take
into consideration a favorable sector from which they might approach.
Mr. Gearhart. And in the event that they set upon the [S991]
idea of immobilizing our fleet scattered as I described along the
Pacific coast, they would have to send at least four naval contingents
to cover each one of the ports where the American fleet might be at
that moment in harbor?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And, furthermore, is it not a fact that we had
permanent installations of radar along the Pacific coast?
3334 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Zachakias. I do not recall the state of the radar installa-
tions at that time.
Mr. Gearhaet. Well, there is one other thing that I would like
to conclude by asking you about : In the course of your remarks you
used the phrase "surprise inspections."
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. I think you were discussing some operation that
was being used frequently in the Hawaiian area, were you not?
- Captain Zacharias. Those surprise inspections were inspections
made by division commanders of ships, or higher authority, by sud-
den visits to the ships they wished to inspect, with an announcement
only late the night before that they were coming the following morn-
ing. This, of course, was for the purpose of keeping up materiel
conditions of the ships. What prompted my remark this afternoon
when I was visiting [8992] with some of the staff at fleet
headquarters, was the changing situation which made me feel that
a little more attention should be directed toward the surprise attacks
rather than these materiel conditions at that time.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, you were coming into Hawaii on December
7. weren't you, as commander of the U. S. S. Salt Lake City?
Captain Zacharias. We were originally scheduled to return on
the 5th of December, but that was on the regular training schedule
w^hich we were to take up when we left port, but which was changed
when we found that we were going to Wake Island, so our delay
was due principally to the necessities of refueling on that trip, a little
bad weather that we encountered, and the duty that we were per-
forming, so that we did not arrive until the morning of the 8th of
December.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, naturally as a naval officer you were tre-
mendousl}^ interested in what had transpired at Pearl Harbor on
the7? /
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Ever3'body was talking about that and nothing
else. Did you make a visit to Pearl Harbor on the 8th ?
Captain Zacharias. I did, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. You saw the results of their attack?
Captain Zacharias. I did, sir.
[8993] Mr. Gearhart. I wonder if you heard discussed at that
time anything about inspections having been ordered or having been
in process on any of the ships that we^-e in the harbor at the time of
the attack ?
Captain Zacharias. I did, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. What did you learn as to what was the fact with
respect to inspections of various kinds that were being engaged in at
the time of the attack ?
Cai^tain Zacharias. Well, this is only hearsay and I have no basis
for expressing it other than that there was much discussion about one
or more ships being opened for a surprise inspection on Monday
morning.
Mr. Gearhart. Monday morning? You mean after the attack they
were still opened ?
Captain Zacharias. They were opened on Saturday or Sunday —
jm: Saturday, or before the attack on Sunday morning, so that they
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3335
«vould be ready for the inspecting party when they arrived on Monday
morning. As I say, I have no knowledge of the facts regarding this.
Mr. Gearhart. When you use the phrase, "opened for inspection"
are you referring to the voids of the larger ships ?
Captain Zaciiarias. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Battleships have voids?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
[S994.] Mr. Gearhart. Cruisers have voids?
Captain Zacharias. Some; yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. But destroyers do not, is that correct?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct.
Mr. Gearhart. And when the voids are opened the battle efficiency
of a battleship and a cruiser is reduced somewhat, is it not?
Captain Zacharias. Those voids are for the purpose of giving ad-
ditional stability to the ship. Therefore, when water is allowed to
enter them the stability of the ship is greatly reduced and enhances the
chances of capsizing.
Mr. Gearhart. But if w^ater enters into any one void and is properly
sealed, the water is confined to that particular void, is that not true?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And the ship therefore will not sink as a result
of having been pierced by a torpedo in a single or one or two voids?
Captain Zacharias. That is true, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, did you hear in the discussion that the voids
on some of the battleships were opened for inspection at the time
the torpedo attack occurred?
Captain Zacharias. Those w^ere the rumors.
Mr.- Gearhart. Yes. Well, wasn't it a well-substantiated [SODS']
rumor in view of what happened to the Oklahoma?
Captain Zacharias. So it would appear, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. In fact, it capsized because of the torpedoes and the
letting of water in unequally in the ship, is that correct?
Captain Zacharias. I don't know about the Oklahoma^ but I think
it has been brought out that the Bureau of Ships made a study of
the situation pertaining to those ships and found that only one ship
was affected by that condition. I cannot remark on the correctness
of that statement.
Mr. Gearhart. The report was a little bit unsatisfactory to me
when it said that the fighting efficiency of one ship was reduced because
of the condition of the inspection. I do not know how to interpret that,
and the ship they referred to was the California.
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. But the fighting efficiency of one ship can be im-
proved by having its voids open when a battle is on ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, I had a letter from one of the Annapolis
students who heard you speak down in Annapolis and ever since you
said something about that yesterday I have been trying to find that
letter and I haven't been able to find it, but it compels me to ask you
were your addresses that you delivered [8996] down there at
that time written? Were they prepared addresses in writing?
Captain Zacharias. They were delivered from notes, and after the
question yesterday I found my notes last night and discovered that
the statement was with regard to the importance of Intelligence, if
3336 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I may refer to the notes, which I have. This was a lecture delivered
to the midshipmen on the 20th of November 1942 in which I stated,
in the com*se of emphasizing the importance of Intelligence, that —
Full appreciation of Intelligence would have prevented the surprise at Pearl
Harbor. Intelligence knew what would happen, where and when, and more will
be heard later about the failure to grasp the basic psychology of the Japanese
which was largely responsible for the success of the Japanese attack.
I think that is the substance of the point in question.
Mr. Gearhart. I believe that is all. Thank you very much, Captain.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson, of Michigan, will inquire,
Captain.
Captain Zacharias. Sir ?
The Vice Chairman. I said Senator Ferguson of Michigan will
inquire now.
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
[8997] Senator Ferguson. Captain Zacharias, were you famil-
iar with our policy as far as our diplomatic relations with Japan were
concerned ?
Captain Zacharias. I think so, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Were you one of the men who saw the inter-
cepts of the Japanese code as far as it related to our international or
our relations with Japan ?
Captain Zacharias. I had seen many of them at times previously
but none at the time near the Pearl Harbor attack.
Senator Ferguson. When did you leave the Intelligence Branch
here in Washington ?
Captain Zacharias. I left Washington the last time in 1936, when
I went to 2 years sea duty. My next Intelligence duty was as dis-
trict Intelligence officer in San Diego from June 1938 until November
1940. During that period I made one trip back to Washington on
duty for a period of about 3 or 4 weeks to discuss the situation and
details with Admiral Anderson, then the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence.
Senator Ferguson. Now, if I understood you correctl}^ then, you
knew that we were intercepting Jap diplomatic messages ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And you knew that how early, what year?
Captain Zacharias. Well, of course, I indicated that I [8998]
was engaged in cryptanalytic work, particularly of the Japanese, as
far back as 1924.
Senator Ferguson. Now, were you familiar with the actual mes-
sages at any time? Did you know that we had received a dead-line
message on the 29th ?
Captain Zacharias. No, sir; I did not have knowledge of those.
Senator Ferguson. You did not have any knowledge of that?
Captain Zacharias. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have the so-called ship movements
knowledge that is in Exhibit 2 ? I want to show you several messages.
Captain Zacharias. Well, they had continually been interested in
movements of ships, all of our ships.
Senator Ferguson. But if you Avill look on page 12, the one I think
that was referred to yesterday. Now, that is dated September 24,
1941, and according to our information on the bottom of it it was
PROCFEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3337
translated on October the 9th. Are you familiar with that message?
Captain Zaciiarias. I had not seen it before ; no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Would that indicate that Japan was plotting
our harbor for an air attack?
Captain Zacharias. I think that would have reinforced my views
regarding the preparation.
[S999] Senator Ferguson. Isn't that the thing that such a mes-
sage would indicate? Isn't that the only thing that such a message
could indicate?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. How do you account for the fact that it would
not be translated from September 24 to October the 9th when our
diplomatic intercepts were being decoded the da}', many times, that
they were received? In fact, I know of no case when they were not
translated the same day.
Captain Zacpiarias. I think that is one — I look upon that as one
of the organizational deficiencies.
Senator Ferguson. I want to ask you about the organizational de-
ficiencies. Will you explain that to us?
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. What you mean by the "organizational de-
ficiencies" ?
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield on one thing that is in the
record? You said the diplomatic messages were translated on the
same day. That is not quite so. In fact, the winds code was not
translated for a period of about 2 weeks after, the original winds code
itself.
Senator Ferguson. I want to ask the witness whether or not the
winds code was considered diplomatic. It was not in purple code, as
I understand it.
[9000] Mr. MinjPHY. It is in the intercepts, in the diplomatic
intercepts. It is in Exhibit 1, it is in that book there on page 15-1.
You will find a period of 10 days.
Senator Ferguson. It tells exactly when they were received here
and many of them were translated on the same day. It was one known
as the code J-19, not the purple code.
Were you familiar with the difTerence between J-19 and purple?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. I tliink that at this time there was
a limited number of personnel available to do such work as you have
here, and the alocation of it was a result of an agreement between
the Army and the Navy, and the delay which is indicated here is un-
doubtedly due to one or two things: Either insufhcient personnel with
which to cover all of the traffic or improper selectivity.
[9001] Senator Ferguson. Now, in that same Exhibit will vou
look at page 22?
Capatain Zacharias (after reading document). Yes.
Senator Ferguson. If that had been decoded and on the desk of
one of the naval officers by noon, or by 2 o'clock Saturday, the 6th,
would that message have been significant as to an attack on Pearl
Harbor ? Particularly page 23 ?
Captain Zacharias. Only as something leading up to it. It does
indicate a little further concentration of espionage activities, but there
is nothing there beyond what we already knew, that they were trying
to keep in the closest possible touch with our ship movements.
79716 — 46— pt. 7 28
3338 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Did not that also indicate that they were follow-
ing up the message that you saw on page 12 ?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. It is an intensification of the
espionage activities which would have had a significance.
Senator Ferguson. Now, that was reecived by our communications
on the 8d of December 1941.
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, look at page 27, the one on the 6th from
Honolulu to Tokyo, where they talk about, in [9002] the first
sentence :
Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of bal-
loons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage
balloon equipment.
Then the last sentence :
I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take
advantage for a surprise attack against these places.
What does that indicate ?
Captain Zacharias. That would have been extremely significant
that an attack was in preparation.
Senator I^'ergusgn. Well, that was in our possession, as shown by the
message itself on the 6th.
Now, I want to ask you, how the selectivity of these messages could
have been exercised, so we could have pulled out a message like that,,
and have seen that they intended to attack Pearl Harbor, and even
do it by a surprise attack. What method is there in the Department
for selecting such a message to get a translation of it quickly, particu-
larly since on the morning of the 6th we had a pilot message that we
were going to get an answer to our declaration of the 26th, and it would
be in 14 parts, and there would be a time of delivery i Are you famil-
iar with those messages 'i
Captain Zacharias. Not the contents of the messages, but in general.
[9uO^] Senator Ferguson. Now, that being true, and expecting
on Saturday that there was, as they had expressed before, "some-
thing automatically would take place," wouldn't it be significant that
on the day we were anticipating an answer that we were not decoding
immediately all messages sent on that day, because that could be a
fatal day ? Do you see what I have in mind ?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir ; that is correct, but it is possible that
there were personnel limitations there. That point, I think, can be
better covered by the officers actually engaged at the time in thii
work.
Senator Ferguson. Well, would there be anything unusual on that
kind of a day to work all personnel around the clock ?
Captain Zacharias. Considering the situation existing at the time,
I would say that that is correct, sir.
[9004] Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not we were
alerted here in Washington on that day?
Captain Zacharias. I do not know, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You say that the message on page 27 is a very
significant message that they would attack Pearl Harbor. I wish
you would look at the whole message.
Captain Zacharias. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Give us your opinion on it.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3339
Captain Zacharias. That would lead to the conclusion that there
hade been previous discussions by the Japanese of the feasibility
of an air attack and that this did presage something.
Senator Fergusox. Now were you familiar with the fact that Japan
was about to attack the Kra Peninsula on Sunday or Saturday ^
Captain Zacharias. I was not aware of that.
Senator Ferguson. You were not aware of that ?
Captain Zacharias. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Would that fact have been significant, that on
Saturday we had received the message from the British Admiralty,
through Winant who was our Ambassador there, to the Secretary of
State, which went to our Navy, and to others, that some sixty-odd
ships were moving on the Kra Peninsula about 14 hours away ?
[900S] Captain Zacharias. That would depend upon other in-
formation available at the time. The Kra Peninsula, while being a
direct menace to Singapore, I cannot say at this time and would not
have been able to say whether or not that in itself would involve Japan
in a war with the United States.
Senator Ferguson. Did you liave any knowledge as to what was the
arrangement between the United States and Britain and the Nether-
lands in relation to an attack on one being considered an attack on all?
Captain Zacharias. No, sir; I did not.
Senator Ferguson. You had no such knowledge ?
Captain Zacharias. None whatever.
Senator Ferguson. It would have depended upon that situation,
would it, as to what appraisal or evaluation you would have given the
movement on the British possessions ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you anticipate that if they attacked one
that they would attack both, or did you have no facts upon which you
could base that?
Captain Zacharias. I had no facts, but I always felt that the
Japanese, being the opportunists that they were, and the fact that
they had always made their advance prepared to retreat a little to
placate anyone who might dislike it. [9006] I could only specu-
late as to the probable effect that that would have on my opmion at
that time.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the Japanese maps showed
that there were supj^osed to be carriers where some of our battleships
were, and that that may have made a difference on the concentration
on the battleships ? You indicated before that you thought they were
equally alert to getting our aircraft as they were to getting the battle-
ships.
Captain Zacharias. The aircraft on shore, I meant. I did not mean
the naval aircraft.
Senator Ferguson. You did not mean the naval aircraft?
Captain Zacharias. No, sir. That was the aircraft on shore, because
they would be the only one available to go out against the Japanese
forces, or to intercept the attacking planes. It would be impossible
to launch the aircraft from the carriers in the harbor.
Senator Ferguson. That is true.
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What about the carriers themselves?
3340 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Zacharias. Well, they would look upon the carriers as
probably just as important as the battleships. But knowing that they
were cognizant of the movements of our ships I think they well knew
that no carriers were in [9007] there on the morning of De-
cember 7.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know anything in relation to a down-
wind sector ? Does that mean anything to you ?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Where was that sector ?
Captain Zacharias. I do not know about a message
Senator Ferguson (interposing). Not a message but a certain terri-
tory around Hawaii.
Captain Zacharias. Well, the down-wind sector, of course, is a
small sector on either side of the direction of the wind. That is the
sector within which we might expect an attack to come, because of the
necessity of the attacking forces to have the best chance of getting
away.
It was felt that they would launch their planes from up-wind in
that comparatively small sector in order to let them come in with a
greater speed, and when the forces retreated up-wind, that is away
from Hawaii, it would slow down any planes, it would slow down to
the greatest extent any planes that might come out to attack those
forces.
Therefore it could be expected that an attack would be launched
from this down- wind sector, so-called, in order to get the best results
in the shortest possible time, and to give the greatest protection to the
attacking forces.
Senator Ferguson. You said you had a conversation with
[9008] Admiral Nomura before he came over here, in fact before
he arrived here in Washington.
Captain Zacharias. I did, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Was there anything in that conversation that
indicated to you that war was imminent ?
Captain Zacharias. There was not, sir. I was convinced that he
would do his utmost to prevent it.
Senator Ferguson. At that time you trusted him ?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir; because of his statement in 1921, and
which he reiterated at that time on February 8, 1941, that he felt that
if Japan and the United States went to war it would mean the finish
of the Japanese Empire and a great loss to the United States.
Senator Ferguson. Did he say anything on the day that you talked
to him in 1941 about that?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir; he did. I asked him if he still felt
that way and he said he did.
Senator Ferguson. Then there was nothing in that conversation
that was significant, as far as Pearl Harbor was concerned, or an at-
tack on Pearl Harbor?
Captain Zacharias. No, sir ; there was not.
Senator Ferguson. In fact I take it, from your statement there,
that it would be all negative, that it would inclicate that war would
not be imminent?
[9009] Captain Zacharias. That he would do his best to pre-
vent it.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3341
Senator Ferguson. And in yoiir^ opinion was he a strong man in
government in Japan, that his views would mean a lot on the question
of war ?
Captain Zacharias. He was. He was a very unusual Japanese in
many ways, and I might say that he was the only Japanese extant
who had expressed himself regarding the potential power of the
United States, because that was something they never wanted to hear,
or disliked to hear.
It so happens that when other Japanese, who had been over here in
official capacities, ventured the opinion that the war potential of the
United States might make it impossible for them to win a war against
the United States, it always brought them into disfavor.
Admiral Nomura was the only one who seemed to be able to keep
his position even after stating such things.
Senator Ferguson. Would that bring you to the conclusion that it
would have been a good thing for us to be bold with our forces on
Hawaii, that we should have indicated that we anticipated an attack,
that we were alerted to full strength both in Washington and in
Hawaii, rather than to say that we were to do* nothing that would
arouse the population ?
[9010] Captain Zacharias. Well, that was a matter of policy
which was probably based on more information that I had available.
Senator Ferguson. But with what you Imew, what would your
answer be ?
Captain Zacharias. My knowledge of the Japanese makes me feel
that they respond better to certain things than they do to others,
and one of them would be a situation that would not invite an attack
by them. That was why I was concerned about the situation in March
1942 which caused me to prepare, or to initiate the conversation with
Admiral Draemel and prepare the memorandum for Admiral Ximitz,
because of the local situation and the defensive attitude that we were
taking at that time which, to my mind, invited the Japanese to come
back. That, of course, eventuated in less than 3 months when the
battle of Midway took place.
The attitude to which I refer was expressed in the press in such
terms as "We can defend the Islands." Anyone knowing the Japa-
nese would realize that that would immediately create in their minds
a doubt on our part as to whether or not we could defend them. I
would have preferred to say "We wish the Japanese would come back.
We will hit them with everything we have." That would have had
an entirely different effect upon them than a pronouncement that
[9011] we can defend the Hawaiian Islands.
Senator Ferguson. Was your ship, the Salt Lake City, alerted fully
to war on the 6th, your particular ship? In other words, you were
the captain of that ship.
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Were you alerted to war ?
Captain Zacharias. I was alert myself on December 5, when I re-
ceived a report that a submarine had been sighted in the Hawaiian
area. As you recall, that was one of the contingencies, the unmis-
takable signs that I indicated to Admiral Kimmel, that the Japanese
would be ready to strike. Therefore
3342 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson (interposing) . As I understand it, you were alert
because you knew there was a sub around, not that somebody alerted
you?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Go ahead. You started to say "therefore."
Captain Zacharias. That evening, from 6 o'clock to midnight — this
was the 5th of December, Friday night — I sat at my radio listening to
the short wave transmissions from Japan, hoping to pick up some-
thing which would give me further indications of what they intended,
but all I could hear was scrambled conversation. We were then en
route to [9012] Pearl Harbor. I did nothing, other than the
condition of readiness 3 in which we were placed at the time, to alert
the ship any further.
Of course, under way the captain is in his emergency cabin all the
time, which is really a part of the navigating bridge, where the officer
on deck can have him on the bridge within 2 seconds.
Senator Ferguson. But there was no specific alert given to your
ship?
Captain Zacharias. There was not, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now we have evidence before us that Gen. Hayes
A. Kroner, the Chief of the Intelligence Branch, War Department,
G-r2, from July 1941 up to the time of the Japanese attack, had not
personally received the intercepts of the Jap codes either in Exhibit 2
or Exhibit 1, or the others. Could you explain what the set-up would
be that would keep him from having that information? You were
familiar with the set-up here, were you not ?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. I did not know about that specific
instance, but it might be an indication of one of the organizational
deficiencies which I had in mind and which had been considered over
a great number of years and on which effort had been made to bring
about a change. That is the allocation of the cryptographic work to
a [9013] purelv technical bureau such as the Office of Naval
Communications and Signal Intelligence Service of the Army. Those
are purely technical organizations which have the facilities and per-
sonnel for picking messages out of the air. After that their function
would seem to cease, and therefore, the decrypting, translating, evalu-
ating, and dissemination, of information in such dispatches is a purely
Intelligence function.
For that reason I had made consistent efforts over many years to
have that function placed directly under the Office of Naval Intel-
ligence, but without results.
Senator Ferguson. Well, why would they place evaluation under
Communications rather than under Intelligence?
Captain Zacharias. That is one of the things that I could never
understand, because Intelligence is the receptacle of all information
and would be the only organization in either the Army or Navy where
all information was available, and particularly background informa-
tion such as on the Japanese. That appears to have contributed
largely to some of the things that took place, because the evaluations
were made by certain war-plans officers without a background knowl-
edge of Japan and the Japanese, and thev could not possibly have at
their dis]:)Osal all the information available.
Senator Ferguson. Do vou know how often they would [9014]
change the heads of Intelligence in the Navy?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3343
Captain Zacharias. That is another organizational deficiency that
I would like to defer. I might say that in the past 5 years we have
had seven Directors of Naval Intelligence.
Senator Ferguson. If you knew that, how is it possible for the
Director to get the background information and really intelligently
operate as an Intelligence officer ?
Captain Zacharias. It is not possible.
Senator Ferguson. Before December 7, 1941, we had a change, as
I remember here in the evidence, in March, and one on October 15,
which was the day before the change in the Jap Cabinet.
Captain Zacharias. That was when Admiral Kirk was relieved by
Admiral Wilkinson.
Senator Ferguson. Kirk took the place of Anderson and Anderson
had been relieved by an acting man, so we really had three in that
year.
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. How would it be possible, from your experience
in Intelligence, for an officer as Director of Naval Intelligence to get
the background and to be able to intelligently evaluate intelligence
under those circumstances and under those changes ?
[WIS] Captain Zacharias. As I said before, it is not possible.
That is one of the points that I would like to emphasize, regarding the
training of officers for Intelligence work. There has been a general
misconception that because an officer is intelligent he is a good In-
telligence officer. That is not correct. As indicated by Senator Brew-
ster yesterday in reading from one of the papers, I wish to em-
phasize that naval officers are trained fundamentally not to be In-
telligence officers, because of the qualifications that are attached
thereto. That does not detract one bit from the capabilities of these
officers as naval officers, but it is a misconception to believe that be-
cause an officer is intelligent he will make a good Intelligence officer.
[9016] Senator Ferguson. Why shouldn't a man, if he makes a
good Intelligence officer, receive his promotions and receive high rank?
Why do we treat Intelligence, which is, as I understand, to tell you
the strength of the enemy, when you may go to war, or when you may
not, and where you may go to war — aren't those all very, very impor-
tant questions?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir. It is actually a specialty
of the same comparable importance as the Chief of the Bureau of
Medicine and Surgery.
Senator Ferguson. But what have been the conditions in our Navy ?
Captain Zacharias. I might say that there has been entire disre-
gard of the fundamental requiremenit for Intelligence, but that is not
a reflection on those who made the decisions, because they were not in
a position to judge properly.
If you will examine that letter of mine written on January 27, 194:2,.
which is a part of the exhibit which I sent into the Cliief of Naval
Operations, via the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet at that
time, I have indicated clearly why we must have better selectivity and
training for officers doing Intelligence work, and unless we do that
I think we will never change the situation with [9017] which
we have been confronted in the past.
3344 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. You mentioned yesterday, in relation to, let's
call it the boldness of an officer, or the capacity of an officer to evaluate
something for a superior officer, that some men just do not have the
capacity to evaluate and actually tell the superior officer the meaning
of what he has.
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir, and that is what I tried to
do for Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Nimitz.
Senator Ferguson. Could that^ prior to the 7th, have been one of the
cases that we didn't really get out of what we intercepted and what
we had the real significance, and permitted an attack without our
knowledge that it was coming ?
Captain Zacharias. That is quite true, sir. The improper selection
of officers for Intelligence duty is one, I look upon it as one, organiza-
tion deficiency. The allocation of evaluation functions to the com-
munications officer and Signal Intelligence Service is the other, and a
third one — well, I won't bring that in at this time.
Senator Ferguson. Does it have anything to do with this?
Captain Zacharias. We have mentioned it already. The War Plans
officers undertaking the functions of evaluation [OOlSli and dis-
semination instead of the Chiefs of Intelligence taking over.
Senator Ferguson. Now, that brings me to this point, that some-
time during 1941, it was decided that certain people would get the
information, that is, it would be given to the War Plans, it would be
given to the Chief of Naval Operations, it would be given to the
Secretary of the Navy, it would be given to the President of the
United States, it would be given to the Secretary of State, in the raw,
you might call it, so that evaluations would not go to them from tlie
men who had been trained and who had the history of the situation.
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
. Senator Ferguson. Did not that fact alone place the responsibility
for the evaluation of our intelligence in those who got it in the raw,
and who did not take the evaluation of those who had the history and
who were trained to give evaluation?
Captain Zacharias. I would say that it would tend to take away
the functions of the Chiefs of Intelligence who should have been the
sole, should have had the sole, responsibility for the evaluation and
presentation to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff,
and at Pearl Harbor, the fleet Intelligence officer instead of [9019]
the War Plans officer.
I would like to point specifically to that because, as has been re-
ported, it was the War Plans officer on the staff of the commander in
chief who stated in a conference between General Short and Admiral
Kimmel, when asked whether there was any probability of an air at-
tack on Pearl Harbor, he stated there was none.
Now, he was an officer, an excellent officer, but he did not have any
background knowledge of Japan or the Japanese, or their psychology.
In other words, he did not have full information at his disposal on
which to make such a decision, and unconsciously that would be bound
to effect the decision of the commander in chief, and I feel that he is
entitled to better information and advice than he received there, all of
which was inadvertent and due solely to the organizational deficiency,
and I feel confident that if the fleet intelligence officer had had the sole
responsibility for stating his evaluation to the commander in thief
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3345
and had been allowed to do so, we would have had an entirely dif-
ferent picture.
Senator Ferguson. Now, you stated this morning that the attack of
the Japanese on Pearl Harbor was a hazardous attack. Of course, all
attacks in war are hazardous, isn't that true?
[9020] Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir ; and they discuss that fully
in this extract from the book that I read yesterday.
Senator Ferguson. Now if the Japanese knew that we were fully
alerted — and as I understand it their intelligence was rather superior
on Hawaii, they had intelligence officers all over the island?
Captain Zacpiarias. They knew everything that was going on.
Senator Ferguson. They knew everything that was going on.
Therefore we should have assumed that they knew everything that
was going on, isn't that correct?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Now, if they knew everything that was going
on, the next thing they would have to find out would be whether we
knew that they knew what was going on; isn't that correct?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. If we did know what was going on and were
fully alerted, it would be an extraordinarily hazardous thing, would
it not?
Captain Zacharias. That is true.
Senator Ferguson. If they knew that we just passed it over and
didn't do anything, for instance, stopped our radar at 7 in the morning,
and had our ships coming in [9021] from the coast unarmed,
at the same time that we were not alerted, they had these messages, as
I have shown you, what hazard were they taking?
Captain Zacharias. I would say they were confident that they
were taking none, and that they knew every detail of information as
to the operation of the radars, the times at which they were under
operation, and other things that were if importance to them.
Senator Ferguson. In your opinion, how could the fact that on the
morning of the 7th we fully alerted Hawaii, Pearl Harbor, to a full
alert for an attack, how could that have in any way been a detriment
to the United States? That would be 4 or 5 hours before they left
their ships.
Suppose they found out we were then fully alerted, wouldn't that
be a great benefit to the United States, that they would get that
knowledge ?
Captain Zacharias. It would have, sir. It might have served the
purpose of preventing — of calling off the attack.
Senator Ferguson. If they knew we were fully alerted?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, I showed you the ad in a newspaper this
morning.
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
[9022] Senator Ferguson. You obtained from your file another
ad in a newspaper. I want to show you these ads.
First, I want to show you the cloud above, with the white spot on
it, and the bottom part of the "J" in "Jashion," and some of the words.
Have you got an extra copy of that ?
Captain Zacharias. I have a small one.
3346 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. What does the botton of that "J" indicate in the
Japanese or Chinese characters?
Captain Zacharias. The bottom part would be the numeral 1.
Senator Ferguson. Not 7 ?
Captain Zacharias. No, sir. The botton part is simply that straight
line.
Senator Ferguson. I don't mean the bottom; I mean the entire —
will you take this interpretation. This is an advertisement published
by tiie Honolulu Star Bulletin, December 3, 1941. That is before
the Pearl Harbor attack.
Take the other sheet that I hand you. The reason I ask you is
that you are familiar with the language, and we have indications here
from some of these messages that they were using the want ads and
other ads to get certain signals or certain information.
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir; but I don't think I [.902r3]
would attach much importance to it.
Senator Ferguson. You don't?
Captain Zacharias. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, look down over the sheet that has been
interpreted there, and see whether or not there is any truth — or
whether they are false — those interpretations.
Captain Zacharias. 1 checked on — ■ —
Senator Ferguson. You must have checked on that ad.
Captain Zacharias. I did, sir. In Hawaii, this was brought to
my attention, and we checked first to see if these were the names of
silks, and I was told that there was a silk for each one of these names.
That led to the
Senator Ferguson. Take the "Yippee."
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. In consideration of those
Senator Ferguson. What kind of silk is that ?
Captain Zacharias. In consideration of those various unusual silks,
it led to the investigation of who had inserted the ad in the paper, par-
ticularly because in another paper, in the Honolulu Star Bulletin on
six different days, November 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, and 26, there appeared
in the personal column, a phrase, "Yippee," which also appears in
this silk ad, "Please call me on phone, urgent."
[9024] On checking with the newspaper office, it was found that
this ad was registered in the name of a man named Tmayer, giving a
cerfain address.
Further investigation disclosed that no such person was at the
address given, or in any directory in Hawaii. But the Intelligence
officer was unable to run down anything further regarding these
advertisements, but it did leave the impression that it was very sus-
picious, particularly because the ad was made up in Hawaiian Import-
ing Co., which was a Japanese house, and turned over to the newspaper
for publication.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether there was a silk known
as Tip-Hi ? That is the second one.
Captain Zacharias. Only through inquiries that there was such a
silk. I don't know now whether that is true.
Senator Ferguson. What does the word "Juno" mean ; what is the
interpretation of that? What is the interpretation given on the ad I
gave you ? Will you look and see on the one I gave you ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3347
Captain Zacharias. Juno means Sunday in Japanese. That is
not correct.
Senator Ferguson. That is not correct?
Captain Zacharias. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What is the word for Sunday ?
[90£S] Captain Zacharias. Nichiyobi.
Senator Lucas. Wliat is Monday in Japanese ?
Captain Zacharias. Monday ?
Senator Lucas. Yes.
Captain Zacharias. Getsuyobi.
Senator Ferguson. The reason I am asking you about these ads,
you thought they were significant and had looked them up and our
Intelligence officers had looked them up ; isn't that true ?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you find that their intelligence was such
that they were using certain ads to convey certain messages?
Captain Zacharias. It was my impression that they were, particu-
larly in Japanese newspapers. The reason for insertion in the
English-language newspapers was in order to reach agents who were
not Japanese and who we knew were operating in Hawaii at the
time. That is, Germans and Italians.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, they were reaching them by ads
in American newspapers, and this could have been one of those ads ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. You tliought at one time that it was [9026]
such an ad?
Captain Zacharias. I did, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you get anything from it?
Captain Zacharias. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Would the interpretations put on the one which
I gave you, give you any more knowledge on it?
Captain Zacharias. No, sir. These have been analyzed very thor-
oughly, and the conclusion was that there was nothing we could under-
stand from them. That still did not remove the possibility of their
being an instrument for conveying information.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, unless you had the code words,
you couldn't determine that they were significant ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Now, in order that there might not be any doubt about this transla-
tion "Juno" meaning Sunday, the word "Nichiyobi" is composed of
two characters, "Nichi," meaning Sunday, and "yobi" — "day." Like-
wise Monday is composed of "Getsu," which is Monday, and "yobi,"
which is "day."
Mr. Murphy. May I suggest that somebody reading this record is
going to have to read all this to get down to [9027] what they
are looking for.
Senator Ferguson. Was this part of the Intelligence system that you
were looking at — were any of our other officers looking at these ads ?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir ; very much so. I was in frequent con-
sultation with the officer in charge of investigation in the Fourteenth
Naval District located in Honolulu.
Senator Ferguson. That was now Commander W. B. Stevenson.
Had you any other advertisements that you looked over ?
3348 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Zacharias. No, sir. These are the only ones.
Senator Ferguson. Now, there is one more question. Why did you
get a certificate from Munson that you had made a statement to him
in October — it is the last page of your sheet. That was in July of
1942. There is a certificate, as I read it, that you did tell Munson
this story about, this item about an attack on Sunday morning, and
he was making an investigation for someone here in Washington and
had credentials to see everything and hear everything?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Why did you get the certificate ?
Captain ZaciixVrias. That was done upon the advice of my wife,
who, through womanly instinct, felt that at some [9028] future
date the subject might come up for discussion and there might be some
short memories.
Senator Ferguson. Is j^our wife an Intelligence officer, also ?
Captain Zacharias. She is my adviser on strategv.
Senator Lucas. I don't know why you would need that. Your mem-
ory is not short.
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
The Vice Chairman. It is now 12 o'clock. We will recess until 2
o'clock this afternoon.
(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed until 2 p. m. of the
same day.)
[9029] afternoon session — 2 p. m.
The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order.
Mr. Keef e of Wisconsin will now inquire, Captain.
TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ELLIS M. ZACHARIAS, UNITED STATES
NAVY (Eesumed)
Mr. Keefe. Captain Zacharias, did you ever at any time tell Admiral
Kimmel that a Jap air attack would be made on Pearl Harbor on the
7thof December, 1941?
Captain Zacharias. I did not, sir.
Mr. Keefe. In your conversations with Admiral Kimmel did you
state anything more than your opinion based upon your study and your
experience in Intelligence?
Captain Zacharias. I did not, sir.
Mr. Keefe. That in the event of a breakdown of diplomatic relations
Japan would attack the fleet wherever it might be and, in your opinion,
the attack would come from the north and would take place probably
on a Sunday morning?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Is that all that you ever told Admiral Kimmel ?
Captain Zacharias. That is the substance of it, with the addition
of the earliest indications and the unmistakable signs.
[9030] Mr. Keefe. Of the submarines ?
Captain Zacharias. Of the submarine appearing in the operating
area.
Mr. Keefe. Now you had a discussion with Mr. Munson?
Captain Zacharias. I did, sir.
Mr. Keefe. A civilian ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3349
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
Mr. IvEEFE. In October 1941 ?
Captain Zacharias. I did, sir?
Mr. Keefe. You understood Mr. Munson had been sent to Hawaii to
make an investigation of conditions there by someone in authority at
Washington ?
Captain Zacharias. I did, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Did you learn under what authority he was acting?
Captain Zacharias. I endeavored to ascertain that but he consist-
ently refused to disclose it, other than to produce the letter signed by
Admiral Stark as Chief of Naval Operations to open up everything to
him.
Mr. Keefe. Because of the letter which he carried representing his
credentials, signed by Admiral Stark, you advised him of whatever
information you had in the interviews which he had with you ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
[903 J] Mr. Keefe. When you had this conversation with Mr.
Munson did you relate to him the same information that you had
given to Admiral Kimmel back in March of 1911 ?
Captain Zacharias. I did, sir, and in addition I indicated to him
the circumstance about the arrival of the third envoy in Washington,
as to what would take place, and I learned over the radio while at sea
that the Ambassador to Peru, the Japanese Ambassador to Peru had
arrived in Wasliington on the 2d of December, 1941.
Mr. Keefe. Did you prophesy or predict or state to Mr. Munson
that, in your opinion, the Japs would attack on Sunday, December 7,
1941, at Pearl Harbor?
Captain Zacharias. I did not, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Did you tell him any more than you had previously
told Admiral Kimmel, with the addition of the information to which
you have just alluded?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir; I did. He was interested in the ques-
tion of whether or not there would be an armed uprising in Hawaii or
on the west coast in the event of hostilities. As I have previously
testified, I told him that because of my belief that the hostilities would
commence by an air attack on the fleet, because of the necessity of
secrecy on the part of the Japanese, they would not have been able to
disseminate the necessary information on which [WS'B] to base
an uprising or extensive sabotage, and therefore he could forget about
those two items.
Mr. Keefe. I have read the report which appears in the record of
these proceedings, of January 17, in which is set out the report of Mr.
Munson, and the reason for asking you these questions is because I
do not find in his report any reference or suggestion of a proposed air
attack upon Pearl Harbor.
You have read that report, haven't you ?
Captain Zacharias. I have seen his report, but I do not know whv
he did not include it.
Mr. Keefe. The fact is, as far as my question is concerned, he did
not include it, did he, in his report?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir. However, he did authen-
ticate, in July 1942, for me the fact that I had given him those de-
tails.
3350 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Keefe. All right. Now you graduated from the Naval Acad-
emy in 1912?
Captain Zachartas. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Did they have an organization at the Academy at that
time known as the Green Bowlers ?
Captain Zacharias. I did not know of any such organization and
heard of it only recently.
190S3] Mr. Keefe. How did you happen to hear of it recently ?
Captain Zacharias. It came up in a discussion of a group of naval
officers, and later I saw an account of it in a recent publication of the
Army and Navy Bulletin in which the editorial of that paper con-
cluded that it was an organization of not much importance or influence.
Mr. Keefe. How long have you been a captain in the United States
Navy?
Captain Zacharias. Since July 1939.
Mr. Keefe. Have you been up for promotion since then?
Captain Zacharias. Not under a regular selection board of the
Navy. I might add that these selection boards as such were discon-
tinued during wartime.
Mr. Keefe. The thought just occurred to me, in all frankness. Cap-
tain Zacharias, that here is a graduate of the Naval Academy of the
class of 1912; he has been a captain since 1939, who has rendered
distinguished service both in the line and in Intelligence, and he is still
a captain when others have been carried on to considerably higher
rank ; is there any reason for that, that you know of, or are conscious
of, today ?
Captain Zacharias. I appreciate the thought, and I might add that
that never has been a consideration with me and will so remain. Why
I was not promoted is something [9034] within the knowledge
of the former Chief of the Bureau of Personnel and the former Chief
of Naval Operations.
Mr. Keefe. Thank you. That is all.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I ask two questions ?
The Vice Chairman. May I ask a question first ?
Mr. Murphy. Surely.
The Vice Chairman. Wouldn't any other officers, Captain, have
anything to do with promotions besides the Chief of the Bureau of
Naval Personnel and the Chief of Naval Operations?
Captain Zacharias. I am not entirely familiar with the methods
by which promotions were made during wartime. It was something
different from the process of selection for promotion as established by
the Congress.
The Vice Chairman. Do not the commanding officers under whom
officers serve have some power of recommending, and so on ?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. They make out periodic reports of
fitness of the officers concerned. My reports for service at sea have
been uniformly excellent, as can be noted in the record.
The Vice Chairman. One reason that prompted me to ask that ques-
tion— I recall Admiral Richardson testified here that he included Ad-
miral Kimmel on his list for Commander of [00-35] the Pacific
Fleet. Admiral Stark stated that he had included Admiral Kimmel
on his for that. And that carried a promotion. So I was just wonder-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3351
ing whether commanding officers did make recommendations that had
something to do with the question of promotions.
Captain Zacharias. I think that he was referring to his position
as a member of the selection board whicli passed upon tlie record
of all officers coming up for consideration for promotion.
The Vice Chairman. Of course, I don't know about the Navy, and
you do ; but I got the impression that Admiral Eichardson had sub-
mitted a list of names for the position of commander in chief of the
Pacific Fleet, and Admiral Kimmel was included on that list ; and Ad-
miral Stark — I got the impression with regard to him, that he had a
list that he had made up which included Admiral Kimmel for the
position of commander of the Pacific Fleet.
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. I think that was probably a special
list of those eligible for commander in chief and not in the general
run of selection for promotion.
The Vice Chairman. Well, I had also understood that in the Army
probably a list of names was submitted for special assignment which
carried with it a promotion and the appointing authority selected one
of those names on that [0036] list.
Captain Zacharias. That is quite true.
The Vice Chairman. So I had assumed that commanding officers
had some function to perform in the preparation of those lists and
had something to do with the question of promotion. I am just ask-
ing for information.
C;iptain Zacharias. Yes, sir. The only part the commanding officer
plays is to submit the })eriodic reports of fitness which go into the
record of that officer and are kept in the Bureau of Personnel, which
are later considered by the board when they meet regularly for con-
siderations of that kind.
The Vice Chairman. Well, in fairness to you as a witness before
us here, I will ask you : Do you want to give the committee any fur-
ther information with respect to the question asked you by Mr. Keefe
about your promotion ?
Captain Zacharias. Why, no, sir. I would not inject that into the
question at all.
The Vice Chairman. All right. Mr. Murphy, of Pennsylvania,
will inquire.
Mr. Murphy. I have two questions. Captain.
You testified this morning, Captain, that you talked at Annapolis
to the student body on the question of intelligence, and I assume from
your past experience plus the fact that [90371 you were se-
lected to address the student body that you can answer this question
quite satisfactorily: What is the significance of the destruction of
codes by an expected enemy at a time when international relations are
tense between our Nation and the supposed enemy?
Captain Zacharias. It means that that nation intends to resort
to hostilities in the country in which the codes are destroyed.
[9038] Mr. Murpht. Do you know of any teaching anywhere
in the Naval Academy, or anywhere in the United States Navy, that
would justify an admiral in charge of the fleet in saying that the
destruction of codes was a matter of little importance, or not of vital
imi)or(ance? Do you know of any books, any pamphlet, or any ad-
3352 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
dress anywhere in your lifetime where you ever heard that until this
case?
Captain Zacharias. There is nothing of that nature on which he
could base it, unless he had information that was specially available
to him.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, all of the textbooks and the authorities
are to the effect, are they not, that the destruction of codes by an ex-
pected enemy at a time when relations are tense is a very good indi-
cation of the probability of war ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Murphy. That is all.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman
The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson, of Michigan, will inquire.
Senator Ferguson. Captain, what is your present assignment with
the Navy ?
Captain Zacharias. I am still attached to the office of the Secre-
tary of the Navy, the administrative office of [9039] the Navy
Department, where I was attached at the time I was engaged in the
project of conducting a psychological warfare campaign against the
Japanese high command. That has not been changed as yet.
Senator Ferguson. Is that considered an assignment in the Intel-
ligence Branch 'i
Captain Zacharias. It is not, sir.
Senator Ferguson. It is a special branch in that section of the
Navy office ?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. It is more in the light of ability, be-
ing attached to the administrative office, and that assignment was
simply to facilitate the handling of my records while I was on this
other special duty.
I might add that the last word I had from the Secretary was to
wait further word from him.
Senator Ferguson. On your new assignment, if there is to be one?
Captain Zacharias. I don't know as there is a new assignment yet
in prospect, but I am waiting, and covering the situations and occa-
sionally making out estimates and memorandums for him.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do you want to add to or subtract any-
thing from your testimony, or do you want to change it in any way ?
[9040] Captain Zacharias. Nothing whatever.
Senator Ferguson. Is there anything that you think of that you
could tell this committee that would help us in the solution of the
problem now before us as to how this surprise attack could have taken
place in Pearl Harbor in December, on December 7, 1941 ?
Captain Zacharias. There is nothing that I can add to what I
termed as organizational deficiencies, which had some effect and
which I feel should be remedied in the future in order to add better
security to the Nation.
Senator Ferguson. Have you an opinion on the unification of the
Intelligence in all the services?
Captain Zacharias. I have long advocated a joint intelligence
agency for the purpose of handling all intelligence.
I made a plan, made up a plan, in 1942 which contemplated such
an organization and would have incorporated in time of war all intelli-
gence agencies under a joint committee, and directly under the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3353
In peacetime such an organization would have to be a little differ-
ently constituted, but there should be something, in my opinion, to
coordinate all of the efforts, eliminate duplication, and assure us
that all information is available to those wlio might require it.
[904-1] Senator Ferguson. Isn't it important that in peacetime
the Navy has all of the intelligence the Army has and that the Army
all that the Navy has, and the Marines, including all of the services,
so that evaluation will include the evaluation of all pertinent facts?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Can you get that under a system such as we had
in the two services prior to the 7th of December 1941 ?
Captain Zacharias. The likelihood is that some information would
not reach those who should be using it.
Senator Ferguson. Now, wasn't it true that IVIr. Munson repre-
sented some other agency outside of the Army and Navy when he
came out working on intelligence?
Captain Zacharias. I don't know, sir. I was never able to estab-
lish the source of his representation.
Senator Ferguson. Well, you have in the last sheet of your report —
do you have it before you there?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. The word that he was — well, did you say "pos-
sibly" or "presumably"?
Captain Zacharias. I presumed that he was a representative of
the President. I did not know.
Senator Ferguson. Why did you presume it ? Was there [904^1
any facts?
Captain Zacharias. No, sir. His refusal to tell me, and his — quite
properly so — and his coming out as a civilian with a letter from the
Chief of Naval Operations to have things opened up to him. That
did not bear — have any bearhig on the information that I gave to him
or the expression of my opinion to him.
Senator Ferguson. Have you ever talked to him as to why he left
out of his report to the Secretary of State the facts of what you told
him about the attack on Sunday ?
Captain Zacharias. No, sir ; I have not. At the time I saw him in
1942 I had not seen his report, and I haven't seen him since then, as I
recall.
Senator Ferguson. So you have no knowledge on it ?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
Mr. Murphy. Mr, Chairman, one other question.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Captain, da you know of any rule in the Intelligence
field or any authority or any reason after an admiral of the fleet gets
a war warning, and thereafter from December 3 on, gets several mes-
sages in regard to code destruction, do you know of any reason for his
not making that information available to the Commanding General
[9043] _ at Hawaii ?
Captain Zacharias. I am not in a position to answer that, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Well, are there any rules that prohibit the handing
over of code-destruction messages to your counterpart in the other
service, when you are expecting a war ?
Captain Zacharias. I am not aware of any.
79716—46 — pt. 7 29
3354 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Murphy. All right ; that is all.
Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question ?
The Vice Chairman. Counsel will inquire.
Mr. Richardson. Captain, following out the inquiry of Congress-
man Murphy briefly, you regard information with reference to code
burning as being of the first importance ?
Captain Zacharias. Of the highest importance.
Mr. Richardson. And you Avould regard it as the duty of any com-
petent Intelligence service to place that information in the hands of
people in the held from whom action was expected 'i
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Richardson. And you would expect those people in the field
to extend that information to all persons with whom they were associ-
ated, who could be helpful in defending the interests of the United
States?
Captain Zacharias. I would sir.
[90U\ Mr. Richardson. That is all.
The Vice Chairman. Are there any further questions?
(No response.)
The Vice Chairman. I believe you have already been asked. Cap-
tain, if you have any further information or knowledge you desire to
give to the committee.
Captain Zacharias. I have nothing else.
The Vice Chairman. On behalf of the committee, I thank you f >r
your appearance, the infoimation you have given to the conmiittee,
and your apparent desire to be helpful in brmging to the attention
of the committee all information you have on the question here under
consideration.
You may now be excused, sir.
Captain Zacharias. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
The Vice Chairman. Counsel may proceed.
Mr. Richardson. I would like, Mr. Chairman, to present to the
committee Admiral Smith.
The Vice Chairman. Admiral Smith will please come forward.
Admiral, will you please be sworn ?
[9045] TESTIMONY OF VICE ADM. WILLIAM WAKD SMITH,
UNITED STATES NAVY
(Having been first duly sworn by the Vice Chairman.)
Mr. Richardson. Admiral Smith, what is your full name?
Admiral Smith. William Ward Smith.
Mr. Richardson. How long have you been connected with the
Navy?
Admiral Smith. It would be 41 years next June.
Mr. Richardson. You are a graduate of Annapolis?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir ; class of 1909.
Mr. Richardson. Are you still in active service ?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
[904.6] Mr, Richardson. You are the Admiral Smith who was
chief of staff for Admiral Kinnnel for the Pacific Fleet in the summer
and fall and winter of 1941 ?
Admiral Smith. I am.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3355
Mr. Richardson. You are the Admiral Smith referred to here in
the testimony of the previous witness, Captain Zacharias?
Admiral Smith. I am.
Mr. Richardson. Were you present at any conversation between
Captain Zacharias and Admiral Kimmel during 1941 ?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; I was.
Mr. Richardson. And was the time and place of tliat conversation
that which was named by Captain Zacharias?
Admiral Smith. The .exact date I do not know but it was after
Admiral Kimmel transferred his headquarters from the Pennsylvania
to shore ; I should say approximately April 1, possibly at the time given
by the last witness.
Mr. Richardson. How long had you known Captain Zacharias?
Admiral Smith. I knew him slightly at the Naval Academy. I was
a first classman when he was a plebe. I have seen him from time to
time since but have never served in the same organization with him.
Mr. Richardson. Your relations with him have always been
[90Ji7^ friendly?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. And how long had you known Admiral Kimmel?
Admiral Smith. I first served with Admiral Kimmel in the sum-
mer of 1939 and from then on until after Pearl Harbor. I had known
him, had met him on one or two occasions previously, but had never
been with him, never had served with him.
Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral, will you advise the committee of
what your recollection is of this conversation at which you were
l^resent and referred to by Captain Zacharias as having taken place
in Honolulu on or about April 1, 1941 ?
Admiral Smith. I remember the meeting very well, but Captain
Zacharias is in error when he says that Kimmel sent for me. Zacha-
rias came to my office and I took him down to the War Plans office
where I knew Kimmel to be at the time. So far as I recollect, no one
else was present. Kimmel was studying war plans.
I introduced Captain Zacharias and had the impression at that
time that they had never met before. The meeting, to my recollec-
tion, did not last an hour and a half but I believe more likely 15
minutes, and during this meeting Admiral Kimmel did most of the
talking.
After the first few minutes of the conversation, which \^90Jf8'\
concerned the Jap situation as it existed at the time, Admiral Kimmel
questioned Zacharias on the characteristics of some of the Japanese
leaders, naval leaders. He had already had from Admiral Hart very
good reports of these leaders and Admiral Hart's information turned
out to be correct.
Admiral Kimmel then asked about the efficiency of operations of
the Japanese Fleet, and, as I recall, Captain Zacharias could give
him no information on that. We already knew that he probably could
not, since none of our Intelligence officers or students, language stu-
dents, had ever been able to get about in Japan to see the things they
would have to see to learn something of the operations efficiency
and gTinnery of the Japanese Fleet.
The conversation was brief and, as I recall it, when Zacharias left,
Admiral Kimmel was disappointed and said to the effect that he had
jiain^d no now information.
3356 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Now, to cover this meeting more thoroughly, I would like to refer
to a few items mentioned by Captain Zacharias.
Mr. Richardson. Before you do that might I ask you, Admiral,
to state how the meeting came about ?
Admiral Smith. Captain Zacharias came to my office and asked to
see Admiral Kinimel and tell him that he had had a great deal of
Intelligence duty and I believe he just came from Naval Intelligence
and had brought the Salt Lake City and had [904^] just
joined up, as I remember.
Mr. Richardson. Go ahead.
Admiral Smith. I listened to that testimony, I might say, with
astonishment. It struck me as the testimony of clairvoyance operating
in reverse. I am absolutely positive that at this meeting there was
never mentioned the question of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, a
submarine attack, or the question of seaplanes arriving in merchant
ships and taking off from the nearby islands.
There are two statements in this testimony, one where Zacharias
is alleged to have told Kimmel that an air attack was certain and
Kimmel replied, "How can I prevent this?"
Now, those words do not sound like Kimmel to me as I know him.
This was a subordinate officer just joining up and I believe that
Kimmel knew very little about him.
The next statement, that when he informed Admiral Kim.mel
about an air attack — about a reconnaissance to 500 miles — and when
Kimmel replied that he had neither men nor materials to carry out
such reconnaissance and that Captain Zacharias states that he re-
plied, "You had better get them, Admiral, for that is what is com-
ing."
Had any officer of any rank ever made a statement like that to
Kimmel it would have been so impressed upon my memory that I
would never have forgotten it, and I do not recollect [9050]
that statement.
Now, Captain Zacharias states also that Captain Smith has since
discussed — since Pearl Harbor has discussed this meeting, this air
attack with others on several occasions. I would like to know with
whom I held these discussions and where. I am certain that the
matter passes out of my mind.
Never since that meeting was Captain Zacharias in my office, I
never saw him with Admiral Kimmel, he was never at a meeting of
the staff though he probably did have meetings with the fleet Intelli-
gence officer, Captain Lay ton. I have never heard his name men-
tioned in staff meetings.
Now, as for this Sundaj'^ business, that was not questioned. A
Sunday attack had been discussed as far back as 1935 when I was
fleet operations officer to Admiral Reeves and the fleet was in San
Pedro. Admiral Reeves feared a Sunday attack, but we were lying
in an open harbor with no protection whatever. Officers and men
had their families there, so that on Sunday morning probably half
of the officers and half of the men would be on shore. There was
no protection against submarines.
At Pearl Harbor it was different, after we left Lahaina Roads.
Very few had their families in Honolulu. There was a net at the
gate; there was no danger from torpedo attacks from submarines.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3357
[OOSl] As for the attitude of McMorris — that he was preoccu-
pied. I can believe that he was often preoccupied. It may be that
this reflects the fact that Kimmel had more confidence in his own
Intelligence officer, Captain Layton, than he had in Captain
Zacharias or in anyone else, and I think this is confirmed by the fact
that after Admiral Nimitz took over the fleet he kept Captain Lay-
ton on as his fleet Intelligence officer throughout the war.
As for Mr. Munson, I never heard of him until a few days ago.
I doubt that he represented the Chief of Naval Operations Jbecause
it was customary and a matter of courtesy when a special agent was
arriving at Pearl Harbor for the Chief of Naval Operations to notify
the commander in chief in advance of his coming. No such notice
was received to the best of my knowledge and I did not know that
Mr. Munson had ever been in the Pearl Harbor area.
As for the statement to Mr. Munson that he can forget sabotage and
consider only an air attack, I do not see how sabotage could be over-
looked. We all knew that the islands had many Japanese spies in them,
some as consular agents and some as priests. I know the Army was
afraid of sabotage. I talked to many civilians who spent their lives
in the Islands and it was their opinion that the most dangerous Jap
was the one born in Honolulu and taken at a very early age to
Japan, [90-52'\ educated there and brought back to the islands
in early manhood. They said that that type of Jap could never be
converted to the American system.
If I may touch upon a few other statements it may clear up questions
in the minds of the committee.
Halsey was not delayed in his return to Pearl Harbor. There was
no haste in his return to Pearl Harbor. It was natural for him to
return at an economic speed so as not to consume too much fuel. He
had to fuel his destroyers from his heavy ships regardless of weather
conditions and there was no need for him to be back in Pearl Harbor
on the 5th of December, no necessity for his arriving at that time.
The balance of his force, including his three battleships, did return
on the 5th of December as they were scheduled.
As for the reason for the search to the south : It is true that the
weather in the north after you get a few hundred miles north of Mid-
way is likely to be very thick. I had 6 months in the Aleutians and
believe I understand that weather; it also may be very rough, but
the Japanese Fleet had to fuel en route and fueling in the water is
not always easy, but it must be remembered that two carriers had been
reported in the Marshall s, not very far away. That was an Intelli-
gence report.
Our best Intelligence, except for the absence of radio interception,
was that the Japanese main carrier strength was [9053] in
Empire waters.
On the morning of the attack and shortly after the attack a report
was received by radio that a Jap carrier had been sighted to the south.
This later proved incorrect. It was the cruiser Minneapolis operating
under Admiral Brown. Shortly after that report was received and
while we were still uncertain, the fleet Intelligence officer ran over to
the plotting board with radio bearings and stated, "Here they are"
and he cut them into the southward. Present at the plotting board were
Admiral Kimmel, Captain McMorris, the war plans officer, Captain
3358 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Delaney, the operations officer, and myself. For that reason the search
was ordered to the south.
The fleet Intelligence officer's explanation of that later is, as we
knew at the time, radio bearings from a single station were then
and may still be subject to only one error, that is an error of 180 degrees.
That was Layton's explanation the last time I talked to him and
shortly after Pearl Harbor.
The statement is made that the Japs knew all the fundamentals of
naval warfare. I think this war has proved that they did not.
As for Mr. Thurston and the station KGU: It is true that KGU
did send out this warning to keep the streets clear, to permit freedom
for the military, to keep cool, summoning [9054^ the Red
Cross, and so on, but when the attack struck, the telephone system of
Honolulu was blocked because the Honolulu Advertiser had not been
delivered that morning and everyone was calling for his paper. The
radio was carrjdng on as usual with morning music. I left the house
and was informed later by my wife that the music was interrupted
and KGU announced "Pearl Harbor under attack," then went on with
the music for something like one hour before it gave the instructions
what to do. Where it got those instructions I do not know.
As for the appointment of Captain Layton, I do not know anything
of that except that when Admiral Reeves had the fleet in 1935 and
1936 and Admiral J. O. Richardson was his chief of staff, Layton was
on the Pennsylvania^ was known to be a Japanese language student,
was the officer usually sent to board an incoming Japanese naval vessel.
He had the high respect of Admiral Richardson.
About surprise inspections : Surprise inspections were never held
on Mondaj's. Surprise inspections referred to the captain's inspec-
tion on Saturday morning, which was always held, unless the ship
were fueling or taking on board ammunition; it was held from 9: 30
until 11 : 30 in the morning. All that it iuA^-olved was the inspection
of the crew and of the living quarters and of a few other compart-
ments. It did not involve the inspection of double bottoms.
[9055] The system was that a division commander just before
morning quarters at 9 : 30 would send a signal to a ship stating "You
will receive a surprise inspection this morning," and then accom-
panied by the captain of another ship of the division and of an in-
spection crew of many officers the admiral would go to that ship under
inspection and while he inspected the crew and the living quarters
the younger officers would go to the engine room and to various parts
of the machinery spaces and storerooms.
The inspection was brief. A very brief report was put in on it.
The captains liked this inspection because it gave them an oppor-
tunity to exchange ideas with other ships and the}^ would come back
and make improvements in their own and, consequently, get less
reprimand perhaps from the admiral on his next inspection.
A question has been asked this morning whether carrier planes
could take off from the carriers while in Pearl Harbor. Planes were
never on the carrier decks in Pearl Harbor. They were flown off,
sometimes as much as 200 miles, but always before entry and were
dispersed into air fields at Ewa and other places where they could
continue their training in case the carrier were to remain for a long
time.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3359
When the carrier sortied from Pearl Harbor the planes joined her
at sea. This practice had been going on long [9056] before
Pearl Harbor.
The Utah may have been mistaken by the Japanese for a carrier.
Her deck ws flat and covered by 12 by 12 lumber because she was
used for bombing purposes, bombing from the air. To them from
the mountains she may have appeared to be a carrier. She was
occupying the berth of the Enterprise and I believe that she received
the torpedoes intended for the Enterprise.
The question was asked this morning whether a ship had been
alerted at sea. Ships at sea were always alerted and the moment the
Salt Lake City sortied from Pearl Harbor she was automatically
alerted by Admiral Kimmel's order 2 CL-41, which is an exhibit
before this committee. She then went to condition 3, and I would like
to explain that condition 3 is ample on a ship at sea. It is quite dif-
ferent from a shore establishment.
At condition 3 the aircraft battery of the ship is manned, ammuni-
tion is at the guns, lookouts are stationed. There is an air patrol of
some kind in the air from the ship's own planes if from no other
source, so that a surface enemy could be sighted when many miles out
of range. It is only a very few minutes to go from condition 3 to a
full alert manning all guns. It is obviously unnecessary to man
turret guns when there is no possible enemy within range.
In confirmation of what Captain Zacharias has said, he [9057]
never arrived before a board of nine admirals in accordance with the
old, regular Navy selection system. The last officer selected by that
system was the top man in 1911, so that his failure of promotion
cannot be blamed upon the Navy promotion system, as it exists except
in time of war.
The fleet Intelligence officer did evaluate all of the information he
had and bring it to the commander in chief every day, and when other
task force commanders or type commanders were in port and came
to the admiral's morning conferences the fleet intelligence officer in-
variably, on a chart which covered one whole wall of the room, ex-
plained the information received by Intelligence and his evaluation
of where the enemy was and what he was doing.
Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Having been unavoidably absent during the Ad-
miral's testimony I am not advised of his testimony. Therefore, I
cannot at this time make any inquiries and therefore I will not do so
at the moment. Congressman Cooper ?
The Vice Chairman. No questions now.
The Chairman. Senator George?
Senator George. I have no questions on the points covered by
Admiral Smith. If there are any questions asked on any other mat-
ters, I may have a few questions later.
The Chairman. Congressman Clark?
[9053] Mr. Clark. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Lucas ?
Senator Lucas. I have no questions. '
The Chairman. Mr. Murphy?
The Vice Chairman. He just stepped out.
3360 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Chairman. Senator Brewster?
(No response.)
The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart.
Mr. Gearhart. The Admiral's testimony was very clear. I do not
have any questions at this time.
The Chairman. Senator Ferguson ?
Senator Ferguson. Admiral Kimmel when he was on the stand
related a conversation that he had with Secretary Knox in relation
to a message being sent on the 6th. Were you present at that con-
ference or conversation ?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; I was.
Senator Ferguson. Will you explain that?
Admiral Smith. I remember that, I believe, word for word because
it impressed me so at the time.
Admiral Kimmel, General Short, Admiral Bloch, and Admiral Pye
had been in conference all morning and I had been invited to ]oin
up at 12 o'clock and be there for lunch. I joined them in a small
room. Present, in addition to those mentioned, were the Secretary of
the Navy and his aide, Captain Beattie.
[9059] Secretary Knox made a statement — I don't know what
had been discussed before my arrival — but Secretary Knox made a
statement :
I don't believe anyone in the War Department or in tlie Navy Department
expected an air attack on Pearl Harbor, not even Kelly Ttirner.
He then said :
But did you not receive on the Saturday preceding Pearl Harbor a warning
message that we had learned surreptitiously that Kurusu and Nomura had been
directed by their home government to deliver their final message to Mr. Hull at
one o'clock on Sunday, December 7th?
Everyone in the room said "No."
Whereupon Secretary Knox stated :
That is strange. I know that such a message was sent to Hart and I thought
it was sent to you.
Senator Ferguson. Did he say when it was sent, Saturday or Sun-
day?
Admiral Smith. I understood him to say Saturday, the night before.
Senator Ferguson. The night before.
Admiral Smith. But I checked it later on with Admiral Hart and
found he had never received it either.
Senator Ferguson. Did you see all the messages that came to Ad-
miral Kimmel?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether they were considered
[9060] and did you pass judgment on the war warning message?
Admiral Smith. I was at the conference when it was discussed;
yes, sir. I saw all of his messages, I saw every letter that he wrote
or received to or from Admiral Stark.
Senator Ferguson. Can you tell us the impression that the war
warning message had on you, what it meant to you as a war warning?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Would you do that?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3361
Admiral Smith. We had had many warnings but this warning as
analyzed, if written in letter form by the War College System and the
system in use in the fleet, would have been in two paragraphs.
Paragraph 1, Information :
Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the
Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next
few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization
of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Phil-
ippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo.
Paragraph 2 : Which is always the action paragraph :
Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the
tasks assigned in WPL-46. Infoi-m [9061] District and Army authorities.
That meant to me, since all previous warnings had been to the effect
that the attack was bound to the southward, toward the Kra Peninsula
and a previous message about an attack, an aggressive attack in any
direction, including the Philippines, in my mind confined the possible
attack to that area and this message warned us to take a defensive
deployment so that we could carry out our tasks in the war plan, the
first of which would have been a raid on the Marshalls. It did not
convey to me that we were likely to be attacked.
Senator Ferguson. Was there an opinion of the group that were
studjdng this message expressed at that time ?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us what that opinion was?
Admiral Smith. There was general discussion. Always in a case
of that kind Admiral Pye, if in port, and always Admiral Bloch as
previous commander in chief, with the members of the staff who were
concerned, and they reached the same agreement that I have told you
of, and there was no opposition that I recall.
Senator Ferguson. Did the staff have daily staff conferences?
Admiral Smith. Not every day ; no. sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did they have them prior to the 7th?
[9062] Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And if so, what date?
Admiral Smith. They had them practically every morning; Ad-
miral Kimmel had certain members of his staff, not the entire staff,
in his office. It is my recollection there was a staff meeting on the
morning of the 27th before this message was received.
The message was received some time in the afternoon and Admiral
Bloch was sent for and did not come. I believe it was the only con-
ference he missed. He had been to the hospital to see his wife. He
was represented by Captain Earle. I believe Admiral Halsey was
there but am not certain. The message was sent by courier, by
Captain Layton to General Short and on the following morning, to
the best of my recollection, there was a full conference between Ad-
miral Kimmel and General Short and the principal members of their
staffs and that this conference lasted all morning.
Senator Ferguson. Did you see the message that went to General
Short in relation to that on the 27th ?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. That was brought over by Captain
Earle.
3362 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Did that change your opinion in any way as
to your opinion on this?
Admiral Smith. No, sir.
[906S] Senator Ferguson. Did you have the same opinion about
that instrument?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Was the relationship good between the officers
and Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Smith. Very good ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What were the relations between your organi-
zation, the Navy, and the Army? Was it good or was it not co-
operative?
Admiral Smith. It was good and Admiral Kimmel and General
Short were together very frequently. Sometimes Admiral Kimmel
would go over to see him. There was liaison between the fleet gun-
nery officer and the Army, the fleet aviation officer and the Army Air
Force. The two staffs did not get together very frequently except
in the presence of the commanding general and Admiral Kimmel.
Senator Ferguson. Were these liaison officers competent to do the
job between the two. to have coordination between the two services?
Admiral Smith, Yes, sir. I believe every member of Admiral
Kimmel's staff has since been promoted. They had to be competent
to serve with him.
Senator Ferguson. And I take it that included your own pro-
motion ?
\9064] Admiral Smith. Well, I hope so. I don't know.
Senator Ferguson. Well, I mean you were on his staff.
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You were speaking of those on his staff. You
have been promoted after that?
Admiral Smith. I had been promoted before that. I had been
selected by the Navy Board of Selection in September 1941, some
time after I became Chief of Staff, but I had not yet made my number
when Pearl Harbor struck, and when I was promoted it was dated
back to November 1941.
Senator Ferguson. Just the one promotion, that is the only one
you have had since Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Smith. Well, I have been made Vice Admiral since. That
was March 1945.
Senator Ferguson. So there were really two promotions after Pearl
Harbor as far as you are concerned?
Admiral Smith. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Now, were you familiar with the demands for
more material and more men by Admiral Kimmel?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Were there such demands?
Admiral Smith. There were very many of them. In fact, we some-
times thought he was sending in too many. He was demnnding radar,
all kinds of late materials, more planes, anti- [90651 aircraft
guns, more men, and stability of officers.
Of course, we realized that men trained in the fleet had to be sent
to new construction and his principal demand was that they send
men out for training to overcomplement ships so that taking expe-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3363
rienced men out and sending them home to new construction would
not handicap) the efficiency of the ship. In the last message I remem-
ber he asked for something like 20,000 men, I think it was, or perhaps
19,000, 9,000 to fill up the fleet and 10,000 additional for training.
He did not get them.
Senator Fergusojs^. Prior to Pearl Harbor were you in on the con-
versations in relation to taking ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic?
Admiral Smith. Moving ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic,
that movement was made after I was Chief of Staff. There was no
conference on the subject. We simply received orders to do so.
Senator Ferguson. Were there some ships returned after Pearl
Harbor?
Admiral Smith. After Pearl Harbor I believe everything we sent
was returned with the exception of two light cruisers, the BrooMyn
and tlie Philadelphia. The carrier Yorktoion — in fact two cruisers
of that type, the three battleships Neio Mexico., Idaho, and Mississippi
and the destroyers were promptly [^9066'] returned to the Pa-
cific after Pearl Harbor.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral Smith, do you know of anything that
you could give this committee to help us in deciding the question be-
fore it as to how this surprise attack could happen at Pearl Harbor
and we not be prepared for it ?
Admiral Smith. I might say for one thing, not as an explanation
of Pearl Harbor but in the interests of the future. I believe there
was entirely too much secrecy in all branches of the Government con-
nected with national defense. I see no use in breaking a cipher unless
you use its contents.
I can think of one incident to explain what I mean by "too much
secrecy."
Senator Ferguson. Will you do that?
Admiral Smith. In about May 1941, while we were at sea in exer-
cises, the commander in chief was in my cabin when we received from
the Chief of Naval Operations a dispatch directing us to send two
divisions of cruisers and two squadrons of destroj^^ers to Samoa to
stand by for distant reconnaissance and to occupy the torpedoes of
these destroyers with the mark VI exploder. The commander in chief
was no informed where these ships were going and did not know until
they received their direct orders from Washington after their arrival
in Samoa.
[9067'] The commander in chief asked if I knew the meaning of
the term "Mark VI exploder" because he did not, and I told him that
I had a suspicion that it was an exploder for the mag-netic head of a
torpedo. I gave as my reason for this the fact that 15 years previ-
ously I had been in charge of torpedo manufacture at Newport and
we then had an order for a new type of torpedo to use a magnetic head.
The torpedo was very successful. The magnetic exploder which had
been tested proved an absolute failure.
Captain Hart, now Senator and Admiral Hart, was the inspector
in charge at Newport. He promptly called in the engineers of the
Westinghouse Co. to design a magnetic head that would work, and
their en.frineers were there frequently and would return to their labora-
tories, all at no expense to the Government, to attempt to develop this
device.
3364 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I left Newport in 1929 and was never able to learn whether that tor-
pedo head had proved successful.
Senator Ferguson. And you were captain at that time?
Admiral Smith. I was a commander when I had the torpedo desk,
the torpedo I manufactured. In 1939 I asked an oflEicer who was in
a position to know what results had been obtained and he said that
the head was successful but was so secret that it could not even be talked
about.
[9068] Admiral Kimmel then sent for the fleet gunnery officer,
Captain Kitts.
Senator Ferguson. Do I understand this was an order from Wash-
ington that you received?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You were trying to interpret it ?
Admiral Smith. We were trying to fulfill the contract for 250 tor-
pedoes equipped with that head, and I dare say many contracts fol-
lowed.
On the receipt of this message on the Pennsylvania^ Admiral Kim-
mel sent for the fleet gunnery officer and asked if he knew the meaning
of the words "Mark VI exploder." Captain Kitts had spent most of
his career in gunnery. He is now Assistant Chief of the Bureau of
Ordnance. He admitted to me that he had never heard of a mag-
netically exploded head.
Admiral Draemel, then in command of the destroyers of the Pacific
Fleet, was sent for, and he stated that he had never heard of such a
device. The exploders we found on our return to port were in the
storehouse on the submarine base, and certain submarine officers had
been given instruction on how to use them. There was a test stand of
some sort to indicate whether they were active or inactive, and all
were tested out before being issued.
[9069] Now, shortly before Pearl Harbor, a squadron of sub-
marines was moved from Pearl to Cavite and these were equipped with
this new magnetic device. I am informed that early in the war the
heart of many a submarine captain was broken when he fired these
torpedoes and they passed under the ships without exploding, when
they were designed to exj^lode under the ship and blow her belly
through the smokestack. They all ran deeper than they were sup-
posed to run.
Now, in my opinion, had we not been so secret about that device
and had taken some of them out and tested them, we would, of course,
have had a much more effective weapon.
I believe that this matter of secrecy has some bearing also on Pearl
Harbor. All of these magic messages — none of which I ever heard of
until I arrived here before this committee and listened to the testi-
mony— these messages should certainly have been sent to the com-
mander in the field, and to permit him and his staff to evaluate the
information they received. I think it is admitted that all the naval
brains are not concentrated in Washington,
[9070] Admiral Kimmel had a staff and many good advisers in
the Pacific Fleet. He had no chance to evaluate this information
which I learned was available in Washington.
I believe there was a state of mind in Washington that the war is
in the Atlantic. In fact, one letter received after Pearl Harbor but
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3365
written before, stated something to the effect, "I know you need more
men, and would be glad to give them to you, but they are not available ;
and remember the war is in the Pacific and we here in the Atlantic
think that you are sitting pretty."
The Chairman. You do not quite mean that. You mean the war
is in the Atlantic, don't you?
Admiral Smith. "The war is in the Atlantic, and you in the Pacific
are sitting pretty," yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Have you since then read over the diplomatic
messages in exhibit 1, and the messages in exhibit 2, the so-called ship-
movement messages ?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; I have heard them read before this
committee.
Senator Ferguson. And that is what you are now referring to ?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; particularly the bomb plot message of
October 10, and the two deadline messages of November 25 and No-
vember 29, and the 1 o'clock message.
[9071] Senator Ferguson. And the 13-part message, or what-
ever it is.
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well now, do you have a judgment that if you
had seen those messages, you would have had a different idea about
what was going to happen at Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Smith. The dead-line messages would have indicated war,
but not necessarily Pearl Harbor. The message dividing Pearl Har-
bor into five sectors, and demanding information even to the detail of
reporting at least twice per week, when two large ships were tied up
abreast, would certainly have indicated to us that Pearl Harbor was
a dangerous place for our fleet to remain. I believe had that message
been received, the fleet would have spent most of its time at sea, with
small detachments in port.
The message about the delivery at 1 o'clock, meaning, 7 : 30 at Pearl
Harbor, and about midnight in the Philippines would have been a
matter for grave discussion. I cannot say now that we would have
known that to mean an air attack on Pearl Harbor, but I think it very
likely that someone in the conference would have advanced that idea,
and the matter could have been discussed and evaluated, and I think
most certainly any land radar would have been [9072] manned
at that time, and I believe that planes would have been ready for
take-off, or might have been in the air rather than grouped.
Senator Ferguson. That is all I have.
The Chairman. Congressman Keefe.
Mr. Keefe. I have just one question. Admiral. In all the discus-
sions relative to the construction or interpretation of these messages
which were received by the Navy at Pearl Harbor, the staff of Admiral
Kimmel was advised, and discussed what the meaning of those mes-
sages was?
Admiral Smith. Invariably; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And any determination which was made by the com-
mander in chief, while that determination was his fundamental re-
sponsibility, necessarily arose as the result of those discussions had
with Jiis staff members?
3366 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Smith. Always, and at the end of the conference, the war
plans officer, or the operations officer would be directed to draw up
the paper or plan, and that paper or plan, when drawn up, would be
brought to me, slight changes might be made in discussion among the
war plans officer, the operations officer, and me, and then the paper
would be taken in to Admiral Kimmel for signature.
To my knowledge, he never issued any plan entirely on his own.
The staff was always in on the discussion.
[907S] JMr. Keefe. Well, of course, the reason for my asking
that question is perfectly obvious I think. The responsibility for
Pearl Harbor has heretofore been placed largely upon General Short
and Admiral Kimmel, and no responsibility in any of these findings
that I have read has been placed upon the distinguished members of
the staff of Admiral Kimmel.
Admiral Smith. That is right, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now, while it is true that the determination of war
plans for any orders to be issued, was the function and responsibility
of the commander in chief, whatever he did resulted from the joint
conference with his staff officers?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir ; that is true.
Mr. Keefe. That also is true of the Army, in its operations there, is
it not ?
Admiral Smith. I would expect it to be so ; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. That is all.
The Chairman. The Chair would like to ask a question or two,
prompted by Admiral Smith's comments here.
I do not know just what prompted your comment upon Captain
Zacharias' failure to be promoted. Evidently that was prompted by
a question that was asked before I came in.
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
[9074] The Chairman. You said that he had no complaint at
his failure to be promoted according to the rules that prevail in time
of peace.
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And I gather from that there may have been a dif-
ferent situation in time of war. My impression is that both in the
Navy and Army, nearly everybody has been promoted on account of
the war, because of their services. Lieutenants in the Army, second
lieutenants, have become majors, and lieutenant colonels, and some of
them colonels, and men low down in rank in the Navy have become
vice admirals, and so on.
I do not know that there is any reason for that, and I do not know
as it is pertinent to what had happened at Pearl Harbor, but I am
wondering whether, in view of that general course during the war
of promoting the men in the Army and Navy time and time again,
that Captain Zacharias' precocity, or disposition to give to his superior
officers, or even go over the heads of some superiors to give his opinions
to others, had anything to do with his failure to be promoted during
the war.
Do you know anything about that ?
Admiral Smith. I do not. I would have to see his record. I know
he is very smart and he is a very brilliant [9073] Japanese stu-
dent, and has been studying naval intelligence during most of his
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3367
career. I know that he has had the necessary sea duty for promo-
tion, but I have never served with him at sea and don't know what
his record in that respect is.
If I might say so, in the peacetime system, the board looking over
the oflicers for promotion has available their entire record, the entire
possible for them to see the written record. The time of officers re-
Naval Academy. Under the wartime system of promotion — and I
do not know what it is — these records cannot be available because
the opinions are asked of officers at sea in both oceans and it is not
possible for tliem to see the written record. The time of officers re-
quired to look over the many records would take too many officers
away from their jobs. It is true that promotion in wartime has
been very rapid in both the Army and Navy, but there has been a
great deal of selectivity in the Navy from captain to flag rank. There
are many good officers who have not been promoted to flag rank.
[9076] The Chairman. I make no point of it, I do not know
anything about it, but in view of the fact that this man graduated
from the Naval Academy in 1912, has given 37 years in the Navy and
he was a captain, I believe, at the time he says that he gave this infor-
mation or his views back in 1941 — he was made a captain in 1939 — that
he is still a captain when practically everybody else who has been in the
Navy that long has been promoted, and I am just wondering whether
something failed to click there, whether it is his fault or the fault of
those who are responsible for promotion? I still insist that it has
nothing to do with what happened prior to Pearl Harbor, but inas-
much as you mentioned it a while ago, evidently in response to a
question that I did not hear, I am wondering whether there is some
sort of penalty that has been assessed because he took it upon himself
to communicate his views to some of his superiors?
Admiral Smith. That conversation referred to the last few ques-
tions asked of Captain Zacharias when some of the members of the
committee asked for his opinion why he had not been promoted and he
stated that he had not come before a Regular Navy selection board. I
merely confirm that. I am not qualified to express an opinion on why
he was not promoted.
[9077] The Chairman. I appreciate that. Were you present
during the entire conference between Captain Zacharias and Admiral
Kimmel ?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir ; I was.
The Chairman. My recollection is that Admiral Kimmel stated
that that conversation lasted an hour and a half and that Captain
Zacharias also stated it lasted an hour and a half, whereas you say it
only lasted about 15 minutes.
Admiral Smith. I am positive of that.
The Chairman. How do you reconcile that ?
Admiral Smith, I did not know that Admiral Kimmel did state
an hour and a half.
The Chairman. My recollection is he said he thought he recalled it
lasted about that long. It may have just seemed that long to him, but
my recollection is he said that he recalled it lasted about that long, and
I understand Captain Zacharias fixed the same length of time. That
is a pretty wide difference as to the length of the conversation.
3368 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
It may not be material, but I am wondering whether you were there
all the time?
Admiral Smith. There were so many administrative details to my
job that I never spent an hour and a half out of that office without
growling, unless in one of Admiral [9078^ Kimmel's confer-
ences, and I do recall that I stayed through this conference because I
remained and talked to him afterward.
The Chairman. After Captain Zacliarias left?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Well, now, one other question. It has been testi-
fied here by Admiral Stark and Admirals Wilkinson and Turner, and
also the Chief of Staff of the Army and his assistants, in regard to
these magic messages, that one of the reasons why they did not transmit
them to Hawaii was their fear that the Japanese might discover that
they were being intercepted, and in the interest of safety they did not
transmit them.
Your position is, as I understand it, and that of Admiral Kimmel,
that they should have been sent regardless of that; that that risk
should have been taken and they should have been transmitted to
Hawaii.
Now if that had been done, or if in a similar circumstance, an
evaluation made in Washington through messages received by the
high-ranking officers in the Army and Navy had fixed an evaluation on
this situation and that had gone out, as it is claimed in this case they
did send out their evaluation of the situation based upon these mes-
sages, if the messages actually had gone and Admiral Kimmel and
General [9079] Short had assessed a different evaluation on
them so that there would have been a conflict between Washington
and the field, which evaluation would have taken precedence?
Admiral Smith. The one in the field.
The Chairman. The one in the field ?
Admiral Smith. Yes; because the field commander was carrying
the responsibility.
The Chairman. Would that precedence go to the extent of the action
in the field countermanding the directions of the high-ranking officers
in the War and Navy Departments?
Admiral Smith. Throughout the war the evaluations were made
and the operations executed by orders in the field, and I never heard
of any conflict with Washington.
The Chairman. I am wondering if there had been a conflict based
upon the same information, whose orders and directions would have
been entitled to precedence or priority in controlling what happened
in the field. I can understand that where an officer is in the field
he has a wide discretion to exercise his own judgment under cir-
cumstances that may arise, but where in the office of the Chief of
Staff, or the Chief of Naval Operations, based upon information re-
ceived, an evaluation is made and that is sent out in the field with
instructions as to what to do, that same information had been sent
in the field and the commanding officer [9080] there had
reached a different conclusion to what ought to be done, without any
further communication between Washington and the field, which
yould have taken precedence? Which would have been carried out? ,
Admiral Smith. Well, Senator, I do not know in what legal posi-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3369
tion that commander in chief would have found himself, but I do know
that every commander in chief with whom I have served would take
action on his own evaluation if he thought he was in danger, just as
a ship's captain will drop out of formation if he thinks the formation
is in danger; he is then on his own, and I have never heard of anyone
being hanged for it.
The Chairman. Being what?
Admiral SMrra. Being hanged for it, or punished for it.
The Chairman. I am not talking about being hanged; I am trying
to determine, from the information available at both ends of the
• line, whose commands, whose directives were to be obeyed in the event
there is a different assessment or evalution. I believe there is nothing
that succeeds like success, and even if the commander in the field
violated instructions from Washington and gets away with it and
succeeds in it nobody raises any question, but suppose he acts on his
own judgment and violates the direction [9081] from Wash-
ington and it turns out to be bad judgment, then what would happen?
It might be an academic question, but it is entirely possible that that
might arise, and it might have arisen here.
Admiral Smith. I do not know that that is laid down. Of course,
the general plan is issued from headquarters in the Navy Department
and the details of carrying it out are the responsibility of the officer
in the field. That is one reason I believe that our fleet has been so
successful.
If an operation is planned and something comes up that the enemy
changes his plan, the task-force commander at sea is entirely free to
depart from the plan laid down for him and to get the enemy where
he can find him.
[9082] The Chairman. Yes, I agree, but even in that case I
suppose it would be the duty of the commanding officer in the field
to advise the Department in Washington what it was doing.
Admiral Smith. Immediately.
The Chairman. That is all.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question or two?
The Chairman. Senator Lucas.
Senator Lucas. Admiral, how many meetings did the staff officers
of General Short and the staff officers of Admiral Kimmel have from
February on? I am talking about the combination of the two, joint
meetings.
Admiral Smith. I should say an average of once in 2 weeks.
Senator Lucas.* There wasn't any specific time.
Admiral Smith. No, sir.
Senator Lucas. For these meetings ?
Admiral Smith. No, sir. They would be called, but the meetings
between General Short and Admiral Kimmel were much more fre-
quent than that.
Senator Lucas. I understand that.
Now you said in your testimony, in answer to questions by Senator
Ferguson, that you had certain joint-staff [9083'] meetings
from time to time, as I recall.
Admiral Smith. Not regular meetings ; no, sir.
Senator Lucas. Not regular meetings?
Admiral Smith., Not regular.
79716— 46— pt. 7 30
3370 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Lucas. This message of November 27, which was the war-
warning message, as I understand it, didn't mean very much to you
as Chief of Admiral Kimmel's staff?
Admiral Smith. Frankly, not much more than the others had, no,
sir.
Senator Lucas. What would it indicate to a reasonably prudent
commander when it starts out by saying "This is a war-warning
message" ?
Admiral Smith. Well, I have heard others testify here that they
never heard the expression used before in an official message. It is
quite true. But when you look back through the messages that
preceded it, they were war warnings also.
Senator Lucas. I have read all of these messages, and I heard Ad-
miral Kimmel's testimony along that line and I heard him quote froii^
different messages, but there isn't a single one of those messages that
Admiral Kimmel quoted which directly states in such terms^it seems
to me, as given to the command at that time.
It starts out by saying "This is a war-warning message."
[9084] Now, I don't know what construction you, as chief of
staff, would place upon those words.
Admiral Smith. Then it told us what to do.
Senator Lucas. That is right.
Admiral Smith. We were already prepared to do that.
Senator Lucas. Yes.
Admiral Smith. But we couldn't go ahead with it. Had we re-
ceived a message "Mobilize," or "Execute WPL-46," that would have
meant something. WPL-46 would have meant war.
"Mobilize" wouldn't have meant war.
Senator Lucas. That message caused you to have a meeting of two
staffs, the following morning, did it not ?
Admiral Smith. Yes. We had a meeting not only on that but at
the same conference discussed the replacement or reinforcement of the
marines on the outlying islands by Army troops. That is one reason
the conference was so large, that we had the head of the Army Air
Force there, because planes were also considered.
Senator Lucas. That was discussed at the same conference?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. That was one of the reasons for calling [9086]
it?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. I believe that same matter had been
discussed on the 27th.
Senator Lucas. It has been disclosed. Admiral, that the Navy lost
105 planes in the raid and the Army I think lost something like 95.
Can you tell the committee, how those planes, the naval planes were
dispersed at the time ?
Admiral Smith. I cannot in detail, but I believe that that may be
explained by the fact that Ford Island has such a limited field, it is
impossible to put large numbers of planes on it without having them
very, very closely bunched. There is no place to disperse them.
I believe that is one reason. And of course the JapS concentrated
on Ford Island.
Senator Lucas. Well, I understand Admiral Bellinger will be here,
and he can tell us about that.
PROCEEDINflfS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3371
Admiral Smith. It may J3e possible also that the Navy had more
planes than the Army.
Senator Lucas. One other question before you retire, sir.
Did you know that General Short was alerted to sabotage ?
Admiral Smith. No, sir. I knew he was alerted.
Senator Lucas. Why didn't you know that, as chief of staff ?
[9086] Admiral Smith. I have inquired since I have been here.
I find there was an order issued called Operation Procedure, or some-
thing of that sort, and it was issued only very shortly before Pearl
Harbor, I believe it was in the month of November, possibly on the
5th, in whicli the Army prescribed these three types of alerts. That
letter went to Admiral Bloch because in the defense of the island
Admiral Bloch was the naval base defense officer and his control post
and his patrols had to work with the Army.
I have checked up with several members of the staff now on duty
in this vicinity and none of them recall having seen that letter or that
procedure. I doubt if it ever reached the commander in chief's office.
Senator Lucas. Well, would that be of some interest to you had you
known that General Short was alerted only to sabotage in view of
the fact that it was General Short's duty to protect the fleet while it
was in the harbor ?
Admiral Smith. It might have ; yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. It might not have ?
Admiral Smith. Of course, I did know that what the Army seemed
to fear most was sabotage.
Senator Lucas. Was that what the Navy feared, also ?
Admiral Smith. No, sir. The Navy was — Admiral [9087]
Kinnnel was offensive-minded, and he was thinking of what he could
do in attacking when the time came. The Navy did not fear sabotage
because the saboteurs could not get near the Navy.
Senator Lucas. Do you know why it was, if the Navy didn't fear
sabotage, that General Short's No. 1 order was sabotage?
Admiral Smith. Well, his problem was much different.
Senator Lucas. His problem was different, but his main problem, as
I understand it was the defense of the fleet when it was in harbor. That
was his main duty, was it not?
Admiral Smith. That is correct.
Senator Lucas. As I understand, you say that the question of sabo-
tage was npt important from the standpoint of the fleet, even while it
was in the harbor?
Admiral Smith. No, sir ; it was not.
Senator Lucas. Then it is still difficult for me to understand why
the Navy didn't know exactly what General Short was doing with re-
spect to sabotage, or with respect to his alerts, in view of the fact that
General Short's great responsibility was to protect that fleet while it
was in the harbor.
Admiral Smith. I saw the Army go on the alert on the late after-
noon of the 27th, the streets were full of them, [9088] going
in all directions, manning the bridges, public utilities, but I did not
know how far their alert went.
Senator Lucas. And you never inquired, as chief of Admiral Kim-
mel's s(:aff?
Admiral Smith. No, sir; I did not.
3372 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Lucas. Did you assume that General Short's movement of
troops at that time was in response to the message of the 27th he had
received ?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. I returned the next morning and reported
to Admiral Kimmel that the Army was on the alert ?
Senator Lucas. Did you see the message that General Short re-
ceived, that was sent by General Marshall on November 27 ?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Did you have a chance to analyze that ?
Admiral Smith. Yes, I did.
Senator Lucas. Was there anything in that message which would
have caused you as chief of staff to have gone on a sabotage alert and
that alone?
Admiral Smith. I don't recall the wording of that message, but I
do recall that he was cautioned not to disclose intent and not to alarm
the civilian population.
[9089] Senator Lucas. That is right. That is one of the many
things that was in there.
Also, to take a defensive deployment. That was Kimmel, as I
recall it.
Admiral Smith. That was the Navy message.
Senator Lucas. That is right.
Well, the morning that you saw the troops of General Short moving
around in the streets, did you report that to Admiral Kimmel ?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; I did.
Senator Lucas. What did you tell him?
Admiral Smith. I said the Army went on the alert last night, I saw
them do it.
Senator Lucas. You believed as a result of what you saw that they
were really on an all-out alert ?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir ; I thought they only had one kind.
Senator Lucas. I think that is all.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I Avould like to ask a few questions.
The Chairman. Congressman Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral, how many times have you testified before
today about Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Smith. I testified before the Hart Board, [9090]
the Naval Court of Inquiry, and the Hewitt Board. I was not called
before the Roberts Commission.
Mr. Murphy. Are you the Admiral Smith who described Admiral
Kimmel saying that the situation in the outlying islands would be
a certain way over his dead body ?
Admiral Smith. That wasn't exactly as it happened.
[9091] Mr. Murphy. Will counsel produce that testimony.
Where was that expression used, "over his dead body"?
Admiral Smith. That was in a conference between Admiral Kim-
mel and General Short.
Mr. Murphy. Where did you give the testimony ?
Admiral Smith. In Admiral Kimmel's office.
Mr. Murphy. Before what board and in what inquiry ?
Admiral Smith. I think it is in the Hart inquiry. I remember the
testimony. I can give it to you.
Mr, Murphy. I would like to have it exactly so there will be no
mistake and no misquoting.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3373
Does counsel have it? Do you know where it is, Mr. Hasten?
Admiral, while I am looking for that, you say the Navy didn't fear
sabotage ?
Admiral Smith. No, sir ; not so far as the fleet was concerned.
Mr. MuEPHY. Isn't it a fact that you were on a sabotage warning
at Hawaii on an order issued on it for two solid year before Pearl
Harbor and the reason you didn't go on sabotage was that you were
sabotage-minded for two solid years and were guarding against it?
Is that a fact or not ?
Admiral Smith. What would sabotage be, a ship in the fleet? It
would be something from the inside, would [9092'] it not?
We have always been alerted against that.
Mr. MuBPHY. I am saying that there is testimony in one of these
hearings that the reason why you didn't go on a special sabotage alert
is that you were alerted to it for two solid years. Is that not a fact?
Admiral Smith. I should say for more than two solid years if you
have in mind the kind of alert, sabotage alert, that I mean. We had
liad cases in the past where a ship prepared to leave a navy yard would
find emery in her bearings or when a ship was overhauled. We were
always alerted against sabotage.
Mr. Murphy. Is it or is it not a fact that there had been sabotage
precautions taken for two solid years by the Navy at Pearl Harbor
before December 1941 ?
Admiral Smith. I don't doubt it.
Mr. Murphy. Isn't that the reason why you didn't have to take any
special precautions, you already were taking them ?
Admiral Smith. No ; that is not. I hope the ships are still alerted
against sabotage.
Mr. Murphy. Let me take the next proposition. You said you saw
the Army guarding the public utilities ; that was your testimony ?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
[9093] Mr. Murphy. Didn't you know that the Army had been
guarding public utilities for 2 months before, that they were guarding
the public utilities ever since the freezing of the assets ?
Admiral Smith. It was not in evidence to the man in the street.
Mr. Murphy. What is that?
Admiral Smith. It was not in evidence to the man on the street.
Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate, you were the chief of staff, do you
now know whether or not the Army at Pearl Harbor was guarding
the public utilities ever since the freezing of the assets ?
Admiral Smith. I do not.
Mr. Murphy. Did you have any conference at all with the chief of
staff of the Army from the day of his appointment until after the
attack, and if so, when?
Admiral Smith. I had several conferences with his predecessor,
Colonel Hayes.
Mr. Murphy. No. I am talking about Colonel Phillips. From the
day of his appointment to the day of the attack, did you have a single
conference with Colonel Phillips?
Admiral Smith. No, not in person ; no.
The Vice Chairman. May I inquire while you are looking [9094-]
through your papers ?
Mr. Murphy. Yes.
3374 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Vice Chairman. Admiral, I was interested in the statement
you made about what you thought would be of value for future con-
sideration.
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And you stated you thought that there had
been too much secrecy.
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. In the Navy.
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Now, you wouldn't apply that to these
intercepted Japanese messages, would you ?
Admiral Smith. Oh, no; but I have never heard that the Japanese,
or that any other nation, ever broke our most secret codes. To my
mind there was no danger in transmitting those messages from Wash-
ington to Pearl Harbor over our system.
The Vice Chairman. You think there was no danger at all in-
volved ?
Admiral Smith. Absolutely.
The Vice Chairman. In transmitting those highly secret Japanese
messages from Washington to Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Smith. I am positive there was no danger. Our [909S1
own most secret messages were sent by the same system.
The Vice Chairman. Was it known at that time that there was no
danger in transmitting these highly secret Japanese messages from
Washington to Pearl Harbor ?
Admiral Smith. Well, it was believed, certainly — I was once a crypt-
analyst, in my early career, and the character of our secret devices is
such that it was certainly my opinion, and I believe the opinion of all
other naval officers, that our system was safe. If not safe, then it Avas
unsafe to send our own messages back and forth between Washington
and Pearl Harbor, messages which had to be sent.
The Vice Chairman. I can understand that, Admiral, but the fact
is that Japan did not know that we had broken her code, did not know
that we were intercepting, decoding, and translating these highly im-
portant messages ; that is a fact, isn't it?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Well, now, wasn't it highly imporant that
every effort be made to continue the situation that prevented Japan
from knowing that-?
Admiral Smith. Most important; yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And every precaution should be taken?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
[9096] The Vice Chairman. And in the opinion of those in
charge of this highly important work that there was some element of
danger involved, that certainly was an important aspect of it, wasn't
it?
Admiral Smith. The only expression I have heard of danger of im-
parting leakage is over the scrambler telephone. I agree with that.
But there was no danger of leakage in passing on the secret Japanese
messages unless a leak was expected in the headquarters of Admiral
Kimmel, and I am certain there was no more danger of a leak there
than there was in the Navy Department in Washington.
The Vice Chairman. Well, the fact that we had broken the Japanese
code and the fact that they had not broken our code always involved
some element of danger that they might break our code, didn't it ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3375
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And that was something that should have
been carefully guarded at all times, wasn't it ?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir ; but we had messages in the air every day.
They had plenty of material of our own upon which to practice. Pass-
ing on these magic messages in our code would only have added to the
quantity of material. I don't see that it would have increased the
danger.
The Vice Chairman. Well, if we had transmitted every one
[9097] of these Japanese messages that we intercepted it would
certainly have increased tlie possibility of Japan finding out that
we had broken their code, wouldn't it?
Admiral Smith. Not unless they knew that we were passing those
messages out; but that same message when placed into a naval cipher
is so disguised that there is nothing that a cryptanalyst could use to
recognize the Japanese message as a Japanese message, after placed in
the American cipher.
The Vice Chairman. Well, it was highly important?
Admiral Smith. It was highly important ; yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. To our success in the war and the security
of our armed forces that Japan not find out that we had broken their
code ?
Admiral Smith. Most important; yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And every precaution should have been used
to try to prevent them from finding that out?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. It would naturally follow if they had evei
found that out they would have changed their code?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And it might have been very disastrous to us^
mightn't it ?
Admiral Smith. It would have been disastrous to us [9098]
possibl}^ and certainly would have been advantageous to the Japanese
because had they known we were breaking their code the great am-
bush at Midway might not have taken place.
The Vice Chairman. That is the question I was going to ask you
next. Isn't it true that some of our greatest successes in battle dur-
ing this last war were due to the fact that we were breaking their
code and had the information?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Now, then, I assume, Admiral, that you would
not take the position that your general statement as to too much
secrecy in the Navy would apply to a matter of this type?
Admiral Smith. No, sir.
The Vice Chairman. All right. That is all.
Mr. Murphy. Now, Admiral, did I understand you to say that
there was a discussion at a meeting between the Army and the Navy
staff about the possfbility of an air raid after the receipt of this
war warning ?
Admiral Smith. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. It was never even discussed, was it, the possibility of
an air raid, at that conference?
3376 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK.
Admiral Smith. I do not recollect it having been discussed ; no.
Mr. Murphy. Let me refer you to your testimony in the [9099}
Hart investigation on page 50, question 130 :
Q. Were any decisions arrived at as to coordinated actioa to be taken with
respect to the security or defense of Pearl Harbor, in the light of this warning?
A. I think the question of the defense of Pearl Harbor, in the light of that
warning, was never raised excep the danger of sabotage by the large Japanese
population in the islands. That's to the best of my recollection.
Question 131 :
Q. Did the question of possible attack arise?
A. No.
Does that refresh your recollection ?
Admiral Smith. I think that is correct.
Mr. Murphy. Do you now think there was a discussion about sabo-
tage at that meeting on the 28th? Who would be talking about sabo-
tage at the time you were discussing sending planes to Wake and
Midway ?
Admiral Smith. If the question of sabotage was discussed it was
raised by the Army.
[9100 \ Mr. Murphy. My question is, Was it ?
Admiral Smith. I do not recollect.
Mr. Murphy. Now, when Admiral Kimmel was on the stand he said
that he got these code-destruction messages and he said he didn't show
them to the Army nor did he order them to be shown. Did you, as
chief of staff, order them to be shown, or did you, as chief of staff, show
them to the Army ?
Admiral Smith. It was my impression then, and is now, that the
Army had the same information.
Mr. Murphy. But the Army, according to General Short, if they
had had it even on December 7, it would have been of great significance
to them, highly important and he never received them. Why didn't
you, as chief of staff confer with somebody, your counterpart in the
Army, to find out if the people who were to protect your ships knew
those things and why they didn't ?
Admiral Smith. I was under the impression that they got news.
Mr. Murphy. Don't you think that as chief of staff your interest in
the security of the fleet should have been such that you would make
inquiry instead of resting on an assumption ?
Admiral Smith. I probably should have. There are many
[9101] things for a chief of staff to do.
We have an Intelligence officer and a district Intelligence officer.
They are in close liaison with the Army.
Mr. Murphy. The responsibility of the Army was to protect the
fleet in order for it to carry out the offense and if the fleet wasn't
protected, you had no fleet, and here is a code-destruction message —
and, by the way, what significance did the destruction of the codes
have to you as a naval officer of vast experience ?
Admiral Smith. These were diplomatic codes in various parts of
the world, not in all. To my recollection, the code-destruction mes-
sage did not include Honolulu. But if the situation had been re-
versed, if we feared that Japan intended to attack us, we might very
well have told our diplomatic officials in Japan, or Japanese-occupied
territory, to destroy their codes.
Mr. Murphy. But, Admiral, the Navy at Honolulu sent a code-
destruction message to Washington. What significance did that have
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3377
to you? The Navy, the U. S. Navy at Honolulu, sent a message to
Washington that the Japanese at Honolulu were destroying their
machines, their systems.
By the way, let me quote that exactly.
Do you have exhibit No. 37, Counsel, please?
(Counsel hands document to Mr. Murphy.)
[9102] Mr. Murphy. Admiral, on the 6th of December, there is
a message from COMFOURTEEN to OPNAV:
Believe local consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not
included your eighteen double five of third.
The "eighteen double five of third" was another message.
There is the U. S. Navy informing Washington about the destruc-
tion of systems at Honolulu. Wouldn't that be highly significant
to you ?
Admiral Smith. There is a very good point to be raised. That is
the commander of the Fourteenth Naval District, the naval base
defense officer.
If the fleet is in port, it helps him support the Army. If the fleet
has one ship in port, that one ship helps him.
If the fleet is not in port, he does it himself. But that is his duty,
to keep the Army informed. He is working for and with the Army
in this respect. That is not the function of the commander in chief.
Mr. Murphy. I will come to that.
First of all, what conferences did you have with the chief of staff
of Admiral Bloch in this critical period ?
Admiral Smith. I had none.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, you say it was Admiral Bloch's [9103]
responsibility to protect the fleet.
Isn't it a fact that all Admiral Bloch had was four old destroyers,
one or two small ships, and nothing else ?
Admiral Smith. Quite true, but this message refers to something
else. This refers to his Intelligence. He had plenty of that.
Mr. Murphy. But if there was a conference between the chiefs of
staff, don't you think that you would call on your Intelligence to give
each of the chiefs of staff a report on Intelligence, and then have the
combined judgment of the three chiefs of staff as to how best to meet
the danger?
Admiral Smith. No; I would say that was rather a matter between
the two Intelligence officers.
[9104] Mr. Murphy. But if the Intelligence officer does not do
his work, who is over the Intelligence officer and who is responsible
for him? Isn't it the chief of staff?
Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. Let me come, if you will, to page 48 of this report.
I see question 114:
Q. Did these discussions include coordinated efforts to resist any attempt by
the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor?
A. Frankly, I do not believe that the Commanding General or Admiral Bloch
or Admiral Kimmel expected an attack upon Pearl Harbor, except by submarine.
But the question is, Admiral, did the discussions include a possible
attack on Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Smith. I do not recollect that.
Mr. Murphy. AU right. I will now take you to page 42 of the Hart
inquiry, question 67 :
Was it your belief that the Army and the Navy, operating 1 1 rough the local
3378 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
defense forces, were capable of furnishing complete defense of tlie Pearl Harbor
base against air attack?
A. We thought so at the time. I realize now we were not.
Did you so think, Admiral ?
lOlOS'] Admiral Smith. I did. I also thought that Oahu could
not be taken. I know now that it could have been.
Mr. MuEPHY. Oahu ?
Admiral Smfth. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. You say it was taken ?
Admiral Smith. It could have been at the time, had the Japanese
broufrht with them an amphibious force such as we now know in our
own Navy, today.
Mr. MuEPHY. Now, in the Naval narrative there is a report and I hope
counsel can locate it. I have it, but I cannot put my finger on it, where
you spoke about Admiral Kimmel saying "Not over my dead body."
I refer you, however, in the Hart inquiry to page 40, question 57 :
Was Admiral Kimmel familiar with the state of personnel and material readi-
ness of the Army to carry out its commitments as to the defense of Pearl Harbor,
just prior to the Japanese attack?
A. Yes. He had a shock, though, in the week preceding Pearl Harbor, when
we had orders from the Navy Department, and General Short had orders from
the War Department, to prepare a plan immediately for bringing all the Marines
off of the outlying islands, and all the Marine and Navy planes in the outlying
islands, and replacing [9106^ them with soldiers and with Army planes,
and, as I remember it, practically the entire week before Pearl Harbor was spent
with the two Staffs together. The Army was undecided whether to put P-39's
or P-40's on these islands. We told them that any planes they put on Wake
would remain there for the diu*ation, in case of war, because they would have to
take off from a carrier and could not come back, and we had no means of
putting a ship in there to bring them off, and during the discussion of this, with
General Short and his staff, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force
(General Martin) and Admiral Pye were present, and also Admiral Wilson
Brown, the War Plans Officer, the Operations Officers, and I believe Admiral
Bloch. Admiral Kimmel said, "What can I expect of Army fighters on Wake^"
And General Martin replied, "We do not allow them to go more than fifteen miles
off shore." That was a shock to all of us, and Admiral Kimmel's reply was, "Then
they will be no damn good to me." The exchange was never made because the
war broke beforehand. The only dispute between the Army and Navy over that
exchange was that General Short said, "If I have to man these islands, I shall
have to command them." Admiral Kimmel replied, "No, that won't do. If the
Army commanded one of the islands I wouldn't be able to get a ship into one
of the ports," or [9i07] words to that effect, and General Short said,
"Mind you, I do not want to man these islands, I think they are better manned
by Marines, but if I man them, I must command them." That was as near to
a dispute between General Short and Admiral Kimmel as I ever saw, but the
plan as made and submitted but never carried out.
Now, then, in the naval narrative. Admiral, they quote you in dif-
ferent fashion. Are you aware of how they quote you about this
"dead body" business?
Admiral Smith. I have been told about that naval narrative. I
don't know who prepared it but someone did it in great haste and I
understand that it is full of errors.^
The Chairman. We will recess at this time until 10 o'clock tomorrow
morning.
(Whereupon, at 4: 15 p. m., January 29, 1916, an adjournment was
taken until 10 a. m., Wednesday, January 30, 1946-.)
Part 8— January 30 and 31 and February 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946—
follows.
1 Admiral Smith's testimony is resumed in Hearings, Part 8, p. 3521.
X
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