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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE TBCE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEAEL HAEBOK ATTACK ^^^7^7 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES ' ^^ 
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS / A^ 

SECOND SESSION iQilL 

PURSUANT TO / /V 

S. Con. Res. 27 

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress) 



A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 8 

JANUARY 30 AND 31 AND FEBRUARY 1, 2, 4, 5, AND 6, 1946 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




r\ 



PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



k 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

r 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES q^^ 
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS * A< 

SECOND SESSION /T^S^ 

PURSUANT TO J ^ i j /_ 

S. Con. Res. 27 P-fe,P 

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress) 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

H.\RBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 8 

JANUARY 30 AND 31 AND FEBRUARY 1, 2, 4, 5, AND 6, 1946 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
79713 WASHINGTON : 1946 



«. t. 'Si/t'ERINrEllKNT OfOOCUMEMk 

SEP 18 194S 






JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL 
HARBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERE COOl'ER, Ri'presentative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 
SCOTT \V. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BRIOWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Mielii- tive from California 

gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from 

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin 
North Carolina 



COUNSEL 
(Through January 14, 1940) 
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel 
Gerhard A. Geskll, Chief Assistant Counsel 
JULE M. Hanxaford, Assistant Counsel 
JOHx E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 1946) 
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel 
Samuel H. Kaufman. As>iociate General Counsel 
John B. Masten, Assistant Counsel 
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel 
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 



HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 


Pages 


Transcript 




nearings 


No. 




pages 






1 


1- 399 


1- 1058 


Nov, 


, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 


2 


401- 982 


1059- 2586 


Nov, 


. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945, 


3 


983-1583 


2587- 4194 


Dec. 


5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945. 


4 


1585-2063 


4195- 5460 


Dec. 


14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 


5 


2065-2492 


5461- 6646 


Dec. 


31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946. 


6 


2493-2920 


6647- 7888 


Jan. 


15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946. 


7 


2921-3378 


7889- 9107 


Jan. 


22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946., 


8 


3379-3927 


9108-10517 


Jan. 


30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 


9 


3929-4599 


10518-12277 


Feb. 


7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 


10 


4601-5151 


12278-13708 


Feb. 


15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 


11 


5153-5560 


13709-14765 


Apr. 


9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 
No. 

12 



13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 through 25 

26 

27 through 31 

32 through 33 

34 

35 

36 through 38 

39 



Exhibits Nos. 

1 through 6. 

7 and 8. 

9 through 43. 

44 through 87. 

88 through 110. 

Ill through 128. 

129 through 156. 

157 through 172. 

173 through 179. 

180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations. 

Roberts Commission Proceedings. 

Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 

Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

Clarke Investigation Proceedings. 

Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



IV 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 






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VI 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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■yill CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


I I 1?S 1 1 I I 1 I I I I I I I ll>"o"io"|l [ !^ 00* COIN 

111 1 1 ! 1 1 1 1 !! 1 1 1 1 1 1 iN-*i> 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

428-432 
414-417 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23. 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 
212-213 

ioo-ioi 

182 

"ioo-ioi' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


^ 1 1 i 1 1 MM 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

,'Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
1070-1076 



""461-469 

"'763-772' 
816-851 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Hoard, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

2030-2090' 
3957-3971 

"241-274' 

"'207-240' 
2934-2942 

2200-2214 
1914-1917 

""745-778' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
417-430 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 

1571-1574" 

1664-1670 
"469-473' 


1 


Hamilton, Maxwell M., State Dept 

Hannum, Warren T., Brig. Gen 

Harrington, Cyril J 

Hart, Thomas Charles, Senator 

Hayes, Philip, Maj. Gen 

Heard, William A., Capt., USN 

Henderson, H. H., Lt., USA 

Herron, Charles D., Maj. Gen 

HiU, William H., Sen.ntor 

Holmes, J. Wilfred., Capt., USN 

Holtwick, J. S., Jr., Comdr 

Hoppough, Clay, Lt. Col 

Hornbeck, Stanley K 

Home, Walter Wilton 

Howard, Jack W., Col 

Hubbell, Monroe H., Lt. Comdr 

Huckins, Thomas A., Capt., USN 

Hull, Cordell 

Humphrey, Richard W. RM 3/c 

Hunt, John A., Col 

IngersoU, Royal E., Adm 

Inglis, R. B., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



IX 



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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


0111111000,11 cT^'O 1 1 

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Joint 

Committee 

E.x-hibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

541-553 
182-292 

""140^142' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sent. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

103 
107-112 

186 
219-222 

102 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


, T-l 1 , , , 1 1 1 1 , , 

^ i i i i i i ! i ; i i i i ; i i i i i i i 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


iiiii,,C0ii,,,C0iiiiOi»O II 

i,,ii,,.-,iiiiiTi<ii,iT^ioo II 

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ft< 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 O 1 1 1 1 1 (N 1 1 i 1 CO r lO II 

illiliiOiiiiiCDiiiit^iOO II 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

2665-2695' 
3028-3067 

1161-1185' 

2787-2802' 
101-1-1034 
1678-1694 
3226-3250 

2362--2374' 

2-54' 

T. S. 2-52, 

192-226 

3126-3152 

1816-1913 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

)44 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


lO it^ 1 1 1 1 i , 1 1 1 1 1 11 

11 (N i<£> 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II 

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& ; 1 ! ! ! ! !4^ .IcJs 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 ! 

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Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

toJan. 2;j, 1942) 


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,,rHli— 11 1—111,1—1, ,11 111,— 1 1 


a 


Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN 

Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen 

Landreth, J. L., Ens 

Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/0 

Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col 

Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC 

Lawton, William S., Col 

Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN 

Leahy, William D., Adm 

Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm 

Lewis, Fulton, Jr 

Litell, S. H 

Locey, Frank H 

Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA 

Lorence, Walter E., Col 

Lumsden, George, Mai 

Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN 

Lynch, Paul J 

Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr 

MacArtluir, Douglas, Gen 

Marshall, George C, Gen 

Marston, Morrill W., Col 

Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XI 



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XII 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 

5210 
4933-5009 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

""387-388" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

14S 

(Clausen 

Investiijation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Oil III 11^ 1 (Nil it^ll 

■^11 III 1 100 1 CO 1 1 it>. 1 1 

pill 111 1 I.-I 1 (Nil III' 

(^-^ 1 1 1 1 1 ! ig 1 i i i ! i 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1914; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


t \\\ \ \ \ III I ill 1 ; 1 i 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


1 1 lO III III _rro-rrC<N'l^'~<N 1 1 O i 1 00 00 
1 1(35 ZlfZiZ'XiCOiO 1 irJH 1 lOO 

2 1 It 111 111 Tc^l^S::;:! 1 It I l"?::! 
li 1^ III 111 "ic^IcAO^ 1 1^ 1 I^J. 

I iTj4 III 111 J5f;:(XlCOiO 1 irH 1 iiOOi 

II 111 111 "^ "^ O ^^ ^H II 1 1 O 

II III III r- It— It— III III— 1 


Joint 
Committee 
E.xhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

1107-1160,' 
1240-1252 

3636^3640 
2375-2398, 
3990-3996 
3153-3165 
2923-2933 
3885-3915 

1968^1988" 
1035-1070 

778-789 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
147-169 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


1 IkJ"!^"* I 1 «0 1,^,^00 1 1 iCOTf 1 1 1 1 

1 1 1^72 1 1 2 17^^ ; 11^°?!:!! 

1 \^^^ 1 ; ^ liSS 1 ! Ig°^ 1 1 1 1 


1 


Pettigrew, Moses W., Col 

Phelan, John, Ens 

Phillips, Walter C, Col 

Pickett, Harry K., Col 

Pierson, Millard, Col 

Pine, Willard B 

Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov 

Powell, BoUing R., Jr., Maj 

Powell, C. A., Col 

Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr 

Prather, Lonise 

Pratt, John S., Col 

Pye, William S., Vice Adm 

Rafter, Case B 

Raley, Edward W., Col 

Ramsey, Logan C, Capt., USN 

Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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109- 
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4164-4186 

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XIV CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee. 

Nov. 15, 1915, 

to May 31, 

1946 


;§ 1 1 i i ip 1 ig 1 i|ggp i lis i I i 
2 17 1 1 1 1 i?o7 1 1? 1 i^^^S- i ;:s;S 1 1 1 

^ lo 1111 li^S I 18 1 Ig^SS^ ' '^^ 1 ' > 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11. 1945) 


11 iiOliiiO llllll III iCOi 

II 1 1 1 1 ll> 1 III 1-11 

"11 IITJHIICO llllll III IT+ll 

s. 1 1 II 111 llllll III 1 ] 1 

o 1 lO llllll III 1 —1 1 

(^ CO Ill 1— II 

II II 1 1 CO Ill ITjl 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

69" 
195-197 

203-204 
185" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to AuR. 

4, 1945) 


11 1 1 1(N 1 1 1 1 l<N I 1 111 III 

t \ \ 111 II i j 1 1 i I i i i i 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


lO IM —lllll /■ /-O III III 

g iS^ 1 1 1 1 If;; § 1 1 1 isis III III 
1 i^ i i i i i?^ S i i i i^^i i i i i i i 

|(N 1 1 1 1 i»0 l^ 1 1 1 1 ^t- III III 
1 lllll O 1 1 1 1 " III III 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 
3644-3650 
276-541, 
4411-4445 

3265-3286" 

1539^1575" 
4037-4094 
C 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
32-65" 

323-334 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


lOt^iOlllli iC^iiOOO III III 

ico-^irjiiiii i-^iiojo 

•• 1 — 1 CD ■*! lllll it>. 1 1 — 1 00 III J 1 1 

§.l|— 'llllll ll-MII— IrH III III 

e it^ 1 (N 1 1 1 1 1 1 L 1 1 L 1 1 

ft« icoi>io lllll lob 1 icolo III III 

1— i-*iilll iCOiiOOO III III 
ICD lllll it^ii— 100 III III 

1— 1 lllll 1— liirH— I III III 


1 


Short, Arthur T 

Short, Walter C, Maj. Gen 

Shortt, Creed, Pvt 

Sisson, George A 

Smedberg, William R., II, Capt. USN_- 

Smith, Ralph C, Maj. Gen 

Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen 

Smith, William W., Rear Adm 

Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN 

Smoot, Perry M., Col 

Sonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr 

Spalding, Isaac, Brig. Gen 

Staff, W. F, CH/CM 

Stork, Harold R., Adm 

Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR 

Stilphen, Benjamin L 

Stimson, Henry L 

Stone, John F 

Street, George_l 

Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XV 



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XVI CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


M i i i ii i i i ! i M i i i i li i 

z ' 1 =? 1 1 

o, CO 1 1 1 1 ' CO 1 

t^ 1 I 1 : 1 IS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 i|g I 
1 1 1 1 1 r 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ! 1 1 ;??^ 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


1 1 1 1 1 lo 1 1 1 1 1 lcDCO(M lo 1 1 1 1 

iiiiiir-iiiiiiiocmOiiOiii 1 

£ TtiiiiiiiCOLOCDi-^iii 1 

§■ lOliiiiiicir-it^KNili 1 

R, 1 1 1 1 1 1 OO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1^ -* Oi 1 Tt< III 1 
iiiiiiCOiiiiiiCOiCOi-^iii 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 lo 1 1 1 1 IcD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 100 I 1 1 1 1 o 

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 17 I 1 1 1 17 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

.° 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

c-iiiiiiiiooiiiiio 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

SeiJt. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


^ i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
1083-1696 


Joint 
Committre 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 
2722-2744 
3120-3124 

1989^2667" 
2456-2478 

1345^1381' 

910-931 
3663-3665 

3677-3683" 

3750-3773 
3357-3586" 

2580a-2596 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

"279-288" 
379-382 


Joint 

CoiiiiTiittpe 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

toJan.23, 1942) 


Pages 

1311-1329 

496-499 

1830-1842 

1334-1346" 

""247-259' 

1525^1538" 
1683-1705 


c 


Wells, B. n., Maj. Gen 

West, Melbourne IE, Lt. Col 

Whaling, William J., Lt. Col 

White, William R., Brig. Gen 

Wichiser, Rea B 

Wilke, Weslie T 

Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm 

Willoughby, C. A., Maj. Gen 

Wilson, Durward R., Maj. Gen 

Wilson, Erie M., Col 

Wimer, Benjamin R., Col 

Withers, Ihomas, Rear Adm 

Wong, Ahoon H 

Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR 

Woodward, Farnsley C, Lt. (jg), USN. 

Woolley, Ralph E 

Wright, Wesley A., Comdr 

Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col 

York, Yee Kam 

Zacharias, P^his M., Capt., USN 

Zucca, Emil Lawrence 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3379 



[9108-] ^ PEARL HAEBOR ATTACK 



WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 30, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

or THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

President: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson; and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. 
Morgan and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee. 

[9109] The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

I believe the comittee had not finished with Admiral Smith. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, yesterday I was questioning Admiral 
Smith. It was the understanding that he would be here this morning 
at 10 o'clock. He is not here. 

Yesterday the statement was made by Mr. Richardson of counsel 
that it would be desirable if possible to hold the testimony to 10 min- 
utes, because of the urgency of finishing with the testimony of Cap- 
tain or Admiral McCollum. 

Mr. Kaufman. Captain McCollum. 

Mr. Murphy. Captain McCollum. 

Now, then I have silent considerable time on the previous testimony 
of Admiral Smith, and I find, Mr. Chairman, that there is a vast 
amount of very important material in the previous testimony of Ad- 
miral Smith as to why they didn't use the Army planes, as to basing 
the fleet at Pearl Harbor, as to the propriety of it, as to the efficiency 
of the fleet at the time of December 7, as well as one more important 
thing, that when Admiral Kimmel was on the stand I asked at that 
time if he consulted his air man. Admiral Bellinger, and he said "no," 
that he consulted Captain Davis. 

[9J10] Mr. I^efe. Admiral Smith is here now. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. I want to show by this witness on the stand that 
Captain Davis was never consulted either. 

For those reasons, I cannot agree to restricting myself to 10 min- 
utes, and if Captain McCollum — I ask tliat this testimony of Admiral 
Smith be put over until later. 

I think the testimony too important not to be developed. 

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, if I may make this suggestion: 
There isn't the slightest necessity of the Congressman or any other 

^ Italic figures In Iirnckets throucliont rpfer to page niimbprs of tho officinl transoript 
of tpstimony. 

7971fi 4R pt. 8 2 



3380 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

member of the committee curtailing his examination of Admiral 
Smith. My suggestion is that the Admiral be permitted to step aside, 
so that we can present the testimony of Captain McCollum and Ad- 
miral Bellinger, who are under very imperative orders, and when they 
are through, there is no reason why Admiral Smith can't be examined 
to the limit. 

And I M^ant to make this statement to the committe : 

There has never been any idea in our minds that Admiral Smith 
might not be able to give material testimony. The point that we 
make, and which has been in my mind, is that he has testified two or 
three times. There will be in the record a very full statement. I 
have an apprehension that all of the testimony that will be brought 
from the Admiral [9111] here may be just cumulative to that 
testimony. 

If, of course, there are neAv facts to be elicited, not only with Ad- 
miral Smith but with any other witness, there should be further 
examination. 

But now I would ask the chairman to permit the admiral to pause 
in his testimony to get rid of these other two witnesses, and then take 
up the testimony. I have been advised, too, by Captain Zacharias 
that he desires to offer some further remarks in connection with the 
matter. 

The Chairman. Admiral Smith may step aside then, and these 
other witnesses will be called. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman — — 

The Chairmax. The Chair would like to call attention to an article 
that appears in this morning's Washington Post, with the headline, 
'•Pearl Harbor Report to Hit Army, ISavj — Congress to be told High 
Command, as well as Kimmel and Short, 'Muffed Ball.' " 

The article goes on to say : 

The joint congressional committee investigating Pearl Harbor will repoi't to 
Congress that the War and Navy Departments in Washington share the respon- 
sibility for the disaster with Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and Major General 
Walter C. Short, 1941 Hawaiian Commanders, The Washington Post learned 
exclusively yesterday. 

[9112^ The Committee, which is now at work on its report to Congress has 
tentatively decided, a member disclosed that the High Command here, as well as 
Kimmel and Short "muffed the ball" and gave the Japs the chance to inflict 
this nation's greatest naval disaster. 

And the article goes on further. 

The Chair wishes to snj that the committee has not met, nor dis- 
cussed its report, even informally, or casually. It has been the Chair's 
understanding, and I think that of the committee, that the committee 
will not make up its mind on its report until the evidence is in, and it 
has met and gone over the situation, and agreed on its report. 

There isn't any basis for any article in any newspaper that this com- 
mittee is now writing its report, or that anybody on the committee 
knows what its report will be. 

I think it is a distinct disservice to this committee to be predicting 
and prognosticating a report when the committee has not met or dis- 
cussed its report. 

Senator Fergusox. Mr. Chairman, I want to say as a member of 
the committee that I certainly have never heard of any member of 
the committee having an idea as to what the report should be, and that 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3381 

I personally have not commented upon the evidence or made up my 
mind in any way in relation to what the report should be. 

[91 J S] My sole purpose has been and will be during the hear- 
ings to get the facts and then I know the committee as a whole will 
consider those facts and make a report. 

The Chairiman. I appreciate the member's comment. If there is 
any member of the committee that has any other view or objective, I 
don't know who it is, but I do feel the committee ought not in advance 
to be put in the position of having made up its mind, when we haven't 
even concluded the evidence, and when we will in all likelihood want 
to take a little time when we have concluded the evidence to consider 
it, and probably reread some of it in order to get the picture appro- 
priately before the committee before we attempt to write a report. 

I felt in justice to the committee that that comment ought to be 
made. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman 

The Chairmax. Congressman Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. I want to thank the chairman for making that state- 
ment. I had intended to make a similar statement when the chair- 
man very graciously called attention to the article which appeared in 
this morning's Washington Post. 

I agree with the chairman that I think a disservice has been done 
the committee and the country by the speculation that is contained in 
this article, but perhaps it may [9J14-] ho-ve been prompted by 
the face that it has been suggested that we have been indulging some- 
what in clairvoyance in some of the evidence that has been given here. 
Maybe that is what tended to influence this particular writer. I don't 
know. 

The Chairman. I appreciate that. 

Mr. Keefe. So far as I am concerned, I have never met with the 
committee to discuss that matter ; I don't know of any committee meet- 
ing, and if there has been any such agreement by any group on the 
committee, I know nothing about it. 

The Chairman. I want to say there has been no meeting, so far as 
the Chair knows, of any group, and so far as the Chair's intention is 
concerned there would be no meeting called of the committee to con- 
sider the evidence and consider its report until all of the evidence is 
in ; and while it may be that there has been some clairvoyance indulged 
in here, at least the Chair hopes it will not become contagious. 

That is all. 

Mr. ICaufman. May we then present Captain McCollum? 

The Chairman. Yes, 

Mr. Kauttman. Captain McCollum. 

[9115] The Chairman. Captain, will you be sworn ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ARTHUR HOWARD McCOLLUM, UNITED 

STATES NAVY 

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. All right, you may proceed. 

Mr. Kautman. Captain, where were you born ? 

Captain McCollum. I was born in Nagasaki, Japan. 

Mr. Kaufman. And how long have you been in the Navy ? 



3382 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain McCollum. I have been in the Navy for 28 years con- 
tinuously. 

Mr, KLautman. Will you tell us briefly your experience in the Navy ? 

Captain McColluim. I was appointed to the Naval Academy in 1917 
by the late Senator Bankhead, of Alabama. I was graduated in 1921, 
in June. 

I served for 6 months on the battleship Arkansas and for 2 months 
on the derstroyer Argonne en route to the Orient. I arrived in Japan, 
in Tokyo, in March of 1922 for the purpose of studying the Japanese 
language. I remained, I think it was, until 1925. 

During that period, for 4 months I served with the destroyers of 
the Asiatic Fleet who were at that time serving in conjunction with 
Japanese destroyers assisting the Army planes flying around the 
world in 1924. Most of that service [^i^^] was in the Kurile 
Islands, where I spent nearly 6 weeks at that time. 

I returned to the United States in June of 1925, went to submarine 
school, finished there and in June 1926 I was assigned to duty on board 
the U. S. S. 0-7, a submarine operating out of the Canal Zone. I served 
in that submarine for 2^ years, the last of which I was in command 
of it. I shifted from the IT. S. S. 0-7 to executive officer of a larger 
submarine, the S-11, returned to the United States in that ship in June 
of 1928 and was ordered to duty as assistant naval attache at the 
American Embassay in Tokyo. I arrived in Tokyo in about October 
of 1928 and served on that up until June of 1930. 

I returned then to the United States and served for 3 years on the 
battleship West Vh-ginia. In 1933, 1 returned to the Navy Department 
as head of the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence. 
In February of 1935 I was detached from that duty and ordered to 
San Pedro, Calif., to set up a special Intelligence (Dffice to work in 
conjunction with tlie staff of the commander in chief of the fleet, at 
that time, Admiral Eeeves, to make an effort to stop the Japanese 
espionage attack on the vessels of our fleet. 

I completed that duty in 1936 and was assigned as assistant opera- 
tions officer and fleet intelligence officer on [9117'\ the staff of 
the commander in chief of the United States Fleet, Admiral A. J. 
Hepburn. I continued in that duty until about February 1, 1938. The 
last 7 months of that duty I was acting operations officer of the fleet, 
having no senior in that billing. 

I spent then 2 months on temporary duty here in the Navy Depart- 
ment in connection with the installing of a new system for keeping 
check of the movements of vessels of the fleet ; was assigned to the com- 
mand of the destroyer Jacob Jones. In the course of that cruise I was 
detached from the cormnand of the Jacoh Jones in the latter part of 
September of 1939, returned to the United States, and was assigned to 
duty in the Division of Naval Intelligence, where I was detailed as 
officer in charge of the far eastern section. 

I was relieved from that duty in October of 1942, was ordered as 
operations officer on the staff of the commander of the Southwest 
Pacific force, which was later called the Seventh Fleet, which was 
that part of the Navy serving under General MacArthur's orders, his 
over-all command. Upon arrival I was directed by the admiral to 
assume duty as intelligence officer of that fleet and served and de- 
veloped an intelligence organization for him. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3383 

I served as intelligence ofticer of that fleet until about May 1 of 1945, 
when I returned to this country. I am now [9118^ assigned 
as commanding ofiicer of the heavy cruiser Helena. 

Mr. KAurMAN. During the months of October and November 1941 
what was your assignment ? 

Captain McCollum. I was head of the far eastern section of the 
Division of Naval Intelligence. I might add that from the 25th 
of August until about the 14th of October I was absent from the 
United States. 

Mr. IL\UFMAN. You returned here around the 14th of October 1941 ? 

CajDtain McCollum. That is correct, sir. 

^Mr. K.VUFMAN. And you continued as chief of the far eastern sec- 
tion until October of 1942? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And who was the counterpart of your particular 
position in the Army ? 

Captain McCollum. Colonel Bratton. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now, as part of your duties as chief of the far 
eastern section was it part of your duties to keep track of the fleet 
movements, of the Japanese fleet movements, and will you explain to 
the committee the manner in which that was done? 

Captain McCollum. It was. I had a special section in my office 
who were charged witli that particular duty. We had a large chart 
spread on the wall with the ocean divided up into [91J9] cer- 
tain zones to which we had given names. All sorts of information 
concerning the movements of any Japanese man-of-war were entered 
on a card and that card index was kept together and daily or more 
often as necessary pins representing the various ships of the fleet 
were moved around on this chart, and for my own purposes there was 
a sheet summarizing the situation. 

Mr. KiVUFMAN. Did the time come in November 1941 when you 
determined that the Intelligence Office in Washington had lost track 
of part of the Japanese fleet? 

Captain McCollum. By the time you speak of, we were almost 
wholly dependent on one form of radio intelligence for information 
concerning the Japanese fleet which was not on the China coast. That 
form is known as traffic analysis, whereby inferences are drawn from 
such things as the volume of radio traffic and call signs and so on. 

Those inferences were drawn and were made based largely on 
radio intelligence bj^ that particular section of the Communications In- 
telligence organization. Their conclusions were then submitted to my 
office. 

Radio intelligence, of course, has very definite limitations. If the 
man you are trying to find out about does not use the radio, radio 
falls down. After a fleet has been in port a certain length of time, 
in the absence of other informa- [91£0] tion, that is, informa- 
tion other than radio intelligence, such as sight contact or some other 
report from an observer, unless the call signs of those ships are heard 
very definitely and plotted in by compass a doubt arises as to whether 
those ships are where radio intelligence thinks that they are. That 
situation existed, to my mind, from about the middle of November on. 

Mr. KL\UFMAN. And as a result of that doubt did you dispatch to 
the commander of the Asiatic Fleet a dispatch which is dated No- 



3384 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

vember 24, 1941, part of exhibit 37 [handing document to witness] ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir, I drafted that dispatch and it was 
released by my chief, Admiral Wilkinson. 

Mr. KAUFMAN. And in reply to that dispatch did you get commu- 
nications from the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and the 
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet which are referred to on page 
7610 of the record before this committee, pages 7610 and 7611 [hand- 
ing transcript to witness] ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. On or about December 1, 1941, did you cause to be 
prepared a memorandum showing the disposition or location of the 
Japanese fleet ? 

Captain McCollum. May I just see it, sir? I think I know wh^t 
you mean, Mr. Counsel, but I would just like to refresh my mind, sir. 

[91£1] (The document referred to was handed to the witness.) 

Captain McCollijm. Yes, sir ; this is a routine report on this par- 
ticular subject and under the office orders that existed at the time, 
while that is dated December 1, the information and the time, the 
dead line for preparing this report was about 2 days before that, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And in that memorandum that you prepared you 
indicated that part of the Japanese fleet was in Japanese home waters? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. That is in Exhibit 85 before this committee. 

On or about December 6 did you prepare another memorandum as 
to the disposition of the Japanese fleet [handing document to witness] ? 

Captain McCollum. December 6 ? 

Mr. Kaufman. December 1. 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. This memorandum that you have 
shown me here on December 1 is a memorandum which I person- 
ally prepared covering the development of the entire situation, the 
general location on the idea of the Japanese fleet and it is only one 
part of it. This summarizes the situation and is an attempt to show 
what to my mind was the very critical situation that had been brought 
about step by [9122] step. 

Mr. Kaufman. And was that communicated to the commander in 
chief of the Pacific Fleet ? 

Captain McCollum. So far as I know it was not, sir. This thing 
was actuallj^ drafted by me on the Friday and Saturday preceding. 

If I remember correctly, December 1 was Monday. I polished 
it up in some aspects and took it to my chief. Admiral Wilkinson, 
early Monday morning in finished form. He read this document 
over, directed me to wait in his office and disappeared. He came 
liack in about 10 minutes and said : 

You be ready to go to the office of Admiral Stark with me between 11 and 
11:30 this morning, and make a number of copies of this thing that you have 
given me. 

I did that and at the time stated I appeared in Admiral Stark's 
office. Present in that office at the time were Admiral Stark, Chief 
of Naval Operations, Admiral Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Naval 
Operations, Admiral Turner, the Director of War Plans, of course 
my chief. Admiral Wilkinson, and one or two other flag officers — I 
believe Admirals Brainard and Noyes. 



PKOCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3385 

At the direction of Adminil Wilkinson copies of this memorandum 
were passed to each of the flag officers present. I then read the mem- 
orandum personally and engaged a discussion at that time and pointed 
out that in my opinion war or [9123] rupture of diplomatic 
relations was imminent, and I requested information as to w'hether 
or not the fleets in the Pacific had been adequately alerted. 

I was given a categorical assurance by both Admiral Stark and 
Admiral Turner that dispatches fully alerting the fleets and placing 
them on a war basis had been sent. I had seen no such dispatches at 
that time. 

Mr. Kaufman. Were you informed at that time of the w^ar message 
sent by Admiral Stark to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet 
under date of November 27 ? 

Captain McCollum. Not except in the form of the assurance that 
adequate information in alerting the fleet had been sent. 

Mr. Kaufman. In connection with the preparation of the mem- 
orandum to which you have just referred did you rely to any extent on 
the traffic analysis reports received by you from Admiral Kimmel? 

Captain McCollum. Oh, yes. I might point out that the best 
stations for traffic analysis were at Corregidor, the fadio intelligence 
center there, and at Hawaii on Oahu. We were dependent on those 
places for our information here. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now, Captain, we will go to another subject. You 
are familiar with the intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic code re- 
garding the setting up of the so-called [912 J;,] winds code? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. I had first heard it called 
the winds code upon my return to Washington last May, sir. 

Mr, Kaufman. But you are familiar with the two intercepts that 
are part of Exhibit 1 ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman, On pages 154 and 155 of Exhibit 1. 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir; I am familiar with these. 

Mr. KAUFMAN. And they are dated when, sir ? 

Captain McCollum. The first one is dated from Tokyo to Wash- 
ington November 19, 1941, translated apparently in the Navy Depart- 
ment on November 28, 1941. The second one is also dated Tokyo to 
Washington November 19, 1941, translated in the Navy Department 
on November 26, 1941. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now, after those two messages were called to your 
attention what did you do to insure receipt of any execute message 
in furtherance of that code? 

Captain McCollum. At my recommendation my chief, Admiral 
Wilkinson, went to the director of communications. Admiral Noyes, 
and asked him to set up everything he possibly could to intercept the 
execute of these dispatches, and it is my understanding that that was 
done. That would be done by that technical service. 

[9125] Mr, Kaufman. And any reports with respect to the 
execute of the winds code would normally come to you ? 

Captain McCollum, That is correct, sir — should have. 

!Mr. Kauf^ian. Did you. up to November 7, get any information 
that an execute message of the winds code had come through ? 

Captain McCollum. About the middle of the week I was told — I 
had heard that an execute wdiich would have meant relations with 



3386 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Russia in danger had been received. In checking back on the Japanese 
original, or in tr3dng to run down the Japanese original of that par- 
ticular dispatch, we checked it very carefully, and we came to the con- 
clusion that it was not an execute whatsoever; that it was merely a 
part of an ordinary weather broadcast. 

Mr. Kaufman. And the only one that was called to your attention 
was that relations with Russia had been broken. 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. It did not relate to relations Avith the United States 
or with Britain ? 

Captain McColluim. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And it did not relate to war with either one ? 

Captain McCollum. None of these related to war, sir ; that is, being 
exact about it. The translations all used the euphemism of strained 
relations, or what have you, sir. 

[9126] Mr. Kaufman. Would you explain the Japanese lan- 
guage relating to the setting up of those codes ? 

Captain McCollum. I presume either one of them will do, Avill it, 
sir? 

Mr. Kaufman. I thmk so. 

Captain McCollum. In the first one here the dispatch says : 

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency. 

In case of emei-gency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the 
cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added 
in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast. 

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZBAME. 

That means "east wind rain." 

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI. 
That is "north wind cloudy." 

(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KASE HARE. 
That means "west wind clear." 

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast 
and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all 
code papers, etc. [9127] This is as yet to be a completely secret arrange- 
ment. 

Forward as urgent intelligence. 

I would like to point out that the value of this thing as a code is 
wholly dependent upon the use of particular and precise Japanese 
words, used in a precise position within a broadcast. Any departure 
from that order must necessarily cause the code to be in doubt. 

For instance, one might say "east wind rain" in a number of dif- 
ferent Avays in Japanese. Here it is in the rather emphatic and brief 
form "Higashi No Kazeame." We might as well say "Kaze Higashi 
Ame," which means exactly the same thing in another form. 

So I may point out the translation will not suffice. It must be the 
particular Japanese words used in a particular sequence in a dis- 
patch. They deal with weather matters here and they could so easily 
be confused that the value of this thing as a code avouIcI be nil. 

Mr. Kaufman. Exactitude is necessary ? 

Captain McCoLLUivr. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And if other words Avere used meaning the same 
thing then you would not regard that as being an execute of the code ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir; not in this type of thing. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3387 

Mr. Kaufman. I asked 3^ou just a few moments ago as to [91^8] 
when your attention was called to a break in Russian relations. Do 
you recall when and where that information came to you ? 

Captain McCollum. That came to me from Captain Kramer, who 
is, I think — I cannot be certain on this, but I heard later — excuse me, 
I am wandering. I heard later that Admiral Noyes, Director of Com- 
munications, set up a special system for warning me and the officers 
in the Naval Plans about the arrival of any of these winds messages, or 
winds information. That I did not know about at the time . 

I heard one morning somewhere about the middle of the week of 
December 1 to 7 that such a dispatch had been received, and I sent for 
Kramer and we went over it in detail and came to the conclusion that 
it was not the real thing, and I am fairly certain that Colonel Bratton 
of the Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Service also 
worked on it with his experts and came to the same conclusion, and we 
continued to check back and forward with each other. 

Mr. ILA.UFMAX. Captain McCollum, I direct your attention to a 
communication from the FCC, Federal Communications Commission, 
which is part of Exhibit 142, and ask you whether that is the informa- 
tion that you got to which you just referred? 

Captain McCollum. I cannot be certain that it was this [9129^ 
particular one, but it was one of this same general connotation, because 
we went back, or tried to go back, to the original Japanese on this 
thing. 

Mr. Kaufman. Will you look at the one on the next page and see 
whether that refreshes your recollection ? 

Captain McCollum. I am sorry, Mr. Counsellor, I cannot identify 
any one of these as the exact one I saw. It might have been either 
one of them. 

Mr. Kaufman. The two papers to which I just referred are items 
3-B and 3-C of Exhibit 142. 

Aside from the suggestion that there may have been an execute of 
that portion of the code as related to Russia, you had no other infor- 
mation? 

Captain McCollum. Not until after the war had started, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. I am talking about up to and including December 7. 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. 

Mr. KjiUFMAN. After December 7, the da}' after Pearl Harbor, did 
a message come in in execution of the winds code ? 

Captain McColluji. Yes, sir; one that we thought was an execute, 
and that either came in late on the afternoon of the 7th or sometime on 
the 8th. The code, as translated, if you can use that term, would 
liave indicated strained [9130] relations between England and 
Japan. 

Mr. IL^UTMAN. You refer now to item 3-B of Exhibit 142? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. Captain SafTord has testified that a winds execute 
message was received in tlie Navy Department on December 3 or 4. 
Did any such information come to you ? 

Captain McCollum. I saw nothing of that sort, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. Captain Safford testified in substance that, predi- 
cated on information that an execute message had been received, 
you prepared a dispatch to go to tlie various outposts. Did you pre- 
pare any such dispatch? 



3388 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain McColltjm. I did prepare such dispatcli, but it was not 
predicated on the winds execute, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. What dispatch are you referring to now? 

Captain McCollum. After submitting my memorandum to Ad- 
miral Wilkinson and through him to the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions 

Mr. Kaufmax. You are referring noAV to exhibit Avhat? Exhibit 
81?^ 

Captain McCollum. The December 1, 1041. [Contiiuiing:] I was 
jDUt in the rather difficult position of not personally knowing what had 
been sent out to the fleet. Possibly it was none of my business. As I 
pointed out to you, the basis of this memorandum — the information 
it [9131] was based on — was actually as of about the 28th of 
November. As time went on we had sent out dispatches to our naval 
attaches in Tokyo, Pieping. Bangkok, and Shanghai to destroy all 
of their codes, and to report by the use of a code word, and those codes 
were destroj^ed. 

[9132] We were getting reports from our observers of the Japa- 
nese task force which was moving down the Kra Peninsula. Our 
planes were sighting forces moving; our submarines w^ere trailing 
them. We had some little information in addition. I still did not 
know what had been sent to the fleet. 

I drafted a rather brief dispatch, outlining the information pretty 
much as is in this memorandum, but greatly condensed. I went further 
and stated that w^e felt everything pointed to an imminent outbreak of 
hostilities between Japan and the United States. That dispatch was 
taken by me to my Chief, Captain Hurd, and together we went in to 
see Admiral Wilkinson. We did it in view of the fact that the function 
of evaluation of Intelligence, that is, the drawing of inferences there- 
from, had been transferred over to be a function of the War Plans 
Division. 

I was directed to take that dispatch and present it for the considera- 
tion of Admiral Turner, the Director of the War Plans Division, 
which I did. 

Admiral Turner read the dispatch over. He then made a number of 
corrections in it, striking out all except the information parts of it, 
more or less, and then showed me for the first time the dispatch which 
he had sent on the 27th, which I believe is referred to as the "war 
warning" [9133] dispatch, and the one which was sent, I 

believe, on the 24th— wasn't it ? 

Mr. Kaufman. That is right. 

Captain McCollum (continuing). Which preceded that dispatch, 
and said did not I think that was enough. I said, "Well, good gosh, 
you put in the words "war warning.' I do not know what could be 
plainer than that, but, nevertheless, I would like to see mine go too." 

He said, "Well, if you want to send it, you either send it the way I 
corrected it, or take it back to Wilkinson and we will argue about it" — 
or words to that effect. 

I cannot presume to remember precisely. 

I took it back to Admiral Wilkinson and discussed it with him, and 
he said, "Leave it here with me for a while," and that is all. 

Now, I would like it understood that merely because this was pre- 
pared on a dispatch blank in no sense means it was an official dispatch. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3389 

It was merely my recommendation to my seniors which they were 
privileged to throw in the wastebasket, I imagine. It was in no sense 
a i^art of the official file. It is nothing other than a recommendation 
for the dispatch officer. I have written dozens of dispatches for the 
admiral, and he could either throw them away, or use them. There 
was no record kept of that sort [0134] of thing. 

Mr. Kaufman. That dispatch, or that memorandum that you pre- 
pared had no relation or no reference at all, to the winds execute 
message ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And if Captain Safford says that the dispatch or 
memorandum that you prepared had Telation to the winds execute 
message, what is your version of it ? 

Captain McCollum. I think Safford would be misinformed in that. 
He has judged my intentions in what motivated me, sir, and I believe 
I am a better judge of that than he is, although I do not impugn his 
motives whatsoever. He may sincerely believe that to be ti'ue, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. Captain Safford testified at one place that the last 
paragraph of your memorandum or ditspatch had particular reference 
to the winds execute messasre, and a suggestion by you that you wanted 
to avoid another Port Arthur. 

Captain McCollum. No, sir; I could not have done anything like 
that, Mr. Counsellor, when I did not have the winds execute message. 

Mr. Keefe. May I inquire, Mr. Chairman? Am I correct in the 
understanding that this purported message [9135] drawn by 
Captain McCollum is not in evidence, and is not in existence? 

Captain McCollum. As I explained, sir, this sort of thing was 
merely my recommendation on a dispatch blank, drafted in dispatch 
form, 

Mr. Keefe. But it is not in existence ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir, it is not in existence, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You are testifying from recollection ? 

Captain McCoLLunr. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. As to what was written in it ? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. The document itself is not available ? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. ICeefe. And is not before the committee ? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. I just wanted to be sure of that. 

Senator Lucas. May I make an inquiry at this point ? 

As I understand you, sir. Admiral Wilkinson did not act on your 
recommendation. 

Captain McCollum. That, Senator, I do not know, sir. I do not 
know what further Admiral Wilkinson did with it. He may have 
gone up with it to higher authority, and it was turned down, or he 
may have decided not to go further with it, sir. 

[9136] Senator Lucas. As far as the evidence is concerned, there 
is no evidence in the record that any dispatch of this character was 
ever sent ? 

Captain McCollum. There is no evidence that any dispatch of this 
character was ever sent. 

Senator Lucas. By the Chief of Naval Operations? 



3390 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir ; no dispatch was ever sent. 

Mr. Keefe. Does the evidence disclose the date of this alleged con- 
versation, or the writing of this dispatch ? 

Captain McCollum. Tliese things are entirely memory on my part, 
sir. There is no record of this thmg at all. As I explained to you, 
this was drawn up and written on the dispatch form. When the dis- 
patch does not go, you wind it up, and throw it in the waste basket. 
That is what happened probably in this case, 

Mr. Keefe. -Do you recall the date that this took place ? 

Captain ISIcCollum. It was either the 4th or 5th, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Of December? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That would be on a Saturday or a Friday ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. It was about that time. 

[91S7] The Chairman. The 7th was Sunday, the 6th was Sat- 
urday, and the 5th would be Friday, 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And the 4th would be Thursday. 

The Chairman. The 4th would be Thursday. 

Captain McCollum. Yes, 

The Chairman. And so on, backward. 

Senator Ferguson. Let the record show that I asked the question 
thinking it might refresh his memory if he knew what day of the 
week it was. 

I know just as well as the other members of the committee what 
day these dates fall on. 

The Chairiman. The Chair recognizes that. 

[9138] Mr. Kaufman, We will go now. Captain, to another 
item, I direct your attention to a dispatch from Tokyo to Honolulu 
dated September 24, which is part of Exhibit 2, and being on page 
12 of Exhibit 2. 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir, I have seen this dispatch since com- 
ing to Washington this time, sir, 

Mr, Kaufman, Did you see it at or about the time it was trans- 
lated on October 9 ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir; I was not in Washington at that 
time, sir, 

Mr, Kaufman. You arrived in Washington about the 16th? 

Captain McCollum. I arrived in Washington about the 11th, sir, 
but that was Friday and I had certain notes and reports that I made. 
I had been to Europe and I had to knock some of my notes in shape, 
and I called in at the office and then went home where I got my notes 
in shape, and actually went down to the office on Monday, sir, and 
it was probably 2 or 3 days after that before I got myself into the 
saddle again, sir, 

Mr, Kaufman, Do you recall whether that particular memoran- 
dum, or that particular dispatch, which has been referred to here 
as plotting a chart of Pearl Harbor, whether that came to your at- 
tention at any time after you came back and before December 7 ? 

[OlSO] "Captain McCollum. Mr. Counselor, I cannot be cer- 
tain. If it did not it should have been called to my attention as Chief 
of that Division, sir. I have heard it in the testimony before this 
committee, that I have read, sir, I have heard it referred to as the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3391 

bombing plan. All I can say about that, sir, is, if I saw it, it did 
not make much impression on my mind, nor did it make much im- 
pression on the minds of any of the considerable number of what were 
supposed to be quite capable officers who saw this dispatch at that 
time, sir. 

The first time I ever heard it referred to as being any definite 
bombing arrangement was when I believe the former counsel ad- 
vanced that hypothesis before this conmiittee, sir. 

Mr. Kaufaian. And what interpretation, if you saw it, did you 
put on it, or what interpretation do you put on that chart now? 

Captain McCollum. The situation in regard to the Japanese ob- 
taining intelligence in this country was this : 

Back in 1935 the Japanese Navy was apparently not satisfied with 
the type of intelligence forwarded to them by their consular agents 
in this country and undertook the setting up, on the west coast of the 
United States, of an observation net of their own. We knew about 
it in [9U0] 1935 and broke it up by 1936. We purposely let 
a certain portion of it run along so that we had an insight into the 
organization on this coast, on the west coast of the United States. 

During all of this time it was my feeling then, and it is my feeling 
now, that the Japanese had been unable to put naval observers into 
the consulate general at Honolulu. In 1941 they had them at Seattle, 
San Francisco, the Los Angeles-San Diego area, and Panama. Pan- 
ama was serviced from the Japanese naval attache's office in Peru. 
These officers, you will remember — we were able to run two of them 
out. One was arrested I think in Los Angeles in about June of 
1941. Okada, lieutenant commander, and son of the former Premier 
of Japan, was chased out of the country about the same time. He 
had been operating in Seattle. 

As we estimated it, the consul general at Honolulu was receiving, 
through the Foreign Office at the instance of the Japanese Naval De- 
partment, explicit directions of the type of intelligence that was 
needed, much more in detail than any of the other key consulates on 
the west coast, because he did not have the benefit of the services 
of a Japanese Naval Intelligence officer within his consulate. 

Therefore this thing here, if I saw it, I am quite certain I would 
have felt it was just another move to get [914-1] explicit in- 
formation, to cut down the frequently voluble type of reports made 
by consular officials which the Jap Navy did not like. 

More than that, sir, I cannot say. 

Mr. Kautiman. You do not now regard it as a bombing plan for 
Pearl Harbor? 

Captain McCollum. Not necessarily, sir, not unless I had known 
that Pearl Harbor had been bombed, and then I could say this cer- 
tainly looks like it might be such a plan, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now we will go to the last item. Captain, and that 
is the 14-part message, part of which arrived on Saturday, December 6. 

Were you on duty at that time ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. When did you first receive the 13 parts of that 
message ? 



3392 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain McCollum. I was receiving parts of that message as they 
came in. I was down in my office until late Saturday night, sir. They 
called me up at my home in the middle of the night and told me that 
the rest of it had come in, but they did not have the last part, there 
was one still to come. I inquired right away what steps had been 
taken to deliver it and to whom. I was informed it had been 
[5i^2] delivered by Captain Kramer to the Director of Naval 
Intelligence. Fortunately the naval aide for the President happened 
to be at his house, as was, I believe, the Director of Military Intelli- 
gence, General Miles, who had all seen it at that time, and that steps 
had been taken to deliver it to others of the high command in the 
Navy Department and presumably to the White House, because our 
channel there was with the aide to the President, Admiral Beardall. 

Mr. Kaufman. What time, to your recollection, did this message 
begin to come in on Saturday? 

Captain McCollum. I cannot say, sir. About 5 o'clock in the after- 
noon was the first time that I heard about it, sir, that it was coming 
in. It might have come in before that. 

Mr. Kaufman. Did you stay on duty until that entire message had 
been received ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir; my office was on a 24-hour basis by 
early November, sir. I had a total of six officers, including myself 
and including Kramer, who was excluded because of his special rela- 
tionship there. Early in November, I take it, the three senior officers, 
that is, from experience, either myself. Captain Watts, or Colonel 
Boone were on duty in my office, together with adequate assistants 
such as we had on a 24-hour basis, sir. I took over the watch on Sun- 
day morning sometime between 7 : 30 and 8, and about 9 [914^] 
o'clock I went home to get some sleep so I could be bright eyed the 
next morning, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. What time did the 14th part of that message come 
in on Sunday morning? 

Captain McCollum. I received it I think about 9 o'clock, sir. My 
recollections, as to the exact time, I might add are not precise. I know 
I was on duty and relieved Watts in my office in the Navy Department 
on Sunday morning prior to 8 o'clock, probably about f: 45. 

This was brought to me, I think, when I was in the outer office of 
Admiral Stark's office. That would be about 9 or 9 : 30, would be my 
guess, sir, on Sunday morning. Now I say again, sir, my time refers 
back to the time I came on duty, sir. I do not remember the times 
precisely. 

Mr. Kaufman, Was Admiral Stark there when this message was 
brought to you in his outer office ? 

Captain McCollum. The sequence of events on Sunday morning 
was something like this, if you are interested 

Mr. Kaufman. I know the committee is very much interested in 
this particular phase of it. 

Captain McCollum. I went over the situation with Watts when I 
arrived and was trying to digest the 13 parts of this thing when I 
received word that Admiral Wilkinson, my chief, [9U4] had 
arrived and desired to see me. I went up to Admiral Wilkinson's 
office and we entered into a discussion of the first 13 parts of this dis- 
patch. I should say that would be 9 o'clock or maybe a little later. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3393 

While we were talking an orderly or someone came in and said Ad- 
miral Stark had come into his office, and Admiral Wilkinson said, 
"Well, come on, let's go and see the Chief." We went down the pas- 
sageway and went into Admiral Stark's office. At that time there was 
no one in Admiral Stark's office except himsell None of his aides 
were present in the outer office. We went in and discussed this thing 
with Admiral Stark and then came on out. That was the IH parts. 

[9145] Shortly after that, the 14th part was delivered to me. 
I took it up with Admiral Wilkinson, and pointed out to' him the dif- 
ference in the tenor of the language of the 14th part from that of the 
other. We immediately took it to Admiral Stark and pointed out to 
him the virulence and tenor of the language of the 14th part of it. 

Mr. Kaufman. What time would you say it was that you and Ad- 
miral Stark discussed it? 

Captain McCollum. Certainly before 10 o'clock, sir, 9 : 30, or 10. 
I cannot be exact, Mr. Counselor. I am trying to do the best I can, 
sir, but I just did not have the time to check the time precisely, sir. 

At that time, the suggestion w^as made that it looked right there 
that that was enough to indicate that we could expect war. That 
term was used. That was an inference. I mean there was nothing 
about war in this dispatch at all, and possibly was loose language, un- 
questionably was loose language, but we were all rather thinking in 
those terms. 

The suggestion w^as then made that an additional warning be sent 
to Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Keefe, By whom? Who made the suggestion? 

Captain McCollum. Admiral Wilkinson, sir. Some little discus- 
sion went on, and, as far as I know nothing was done [9146] at 
that time. 

About a half-hour later — I was still in Admiral Stark's office— 
when word was sent in that one of my officers wished to see me, and I 
stepped out, and Kramer was standing there with the time part of 
the dispatch ; that is, an additional dispatch which directed the Japa- 
nese Ambassadors in Washington to deliver this note at 1 o'clock 
Washington time. 

Mr, Kaufman. That was the 14th part of the message, was it not ? 

Captain McCollum. I am not certain without referring to it, I 
thought it was a separate message, that was my impression, sir, and 
that the 14th part in it, the last thing, was rather a Philippic thing 
against the United States, It followed the usual procedure, and this 
procedure was used as an emphasis. There was nothing unusual 
about that. 

The Chairman. You are either too close or too far from the micro- 
phone. Some of the members have difficulty hearing you. Will you 
raise your voice a little? 

Captain McCollum. Is this better, sir? 

The Chairman. That is better. 

Captain McCollum. The time zone is set up as a routine procedure 
in my office, and in order to keep track of what [9147] time of 
day it was there, whether it was sunset or sunrise, or moonset, we had 
a standard procedure that when any dispatch of which time was an 
element came in, we immediately converted that time to not only our 
own time but usually set up Washington time, West Coast time, Hono- 



3394 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

lulu time, Manila time, and Tokyo time. That was all set forth, be- 
cause the Japanese operate entirely on Tokyo time, that is, all of their 
time business in the Japanese Navy is run on Tokyo time. 

So that a consideration of these times is necessary to get a view as 
to what is understandable in relation to sunrise and sunset, and other 
phenomena that have a rather important effect on naval operations. 

Senator Lucas. You mean the Navy was run on Tokyo time ? 

Captain McCollum. The Japanese navy was run on Tokyo time; 
that IS correct, sir. 

Senator Lucas. I am sorry I interrupted you. 

Captain McCollum. Thank you sir. 

As a result of that, Kramer had worked out these times and those 
times were shown just on a rough sheet of paper as they appeared to 
Admiral Stark. The suggestion was made at that time that this in- 
dicated that if anything was going to occur, it would probably start 
about that time. 

[914^] As I remember it. Admiral Stark picked up the receiver 
of his telephone and attempted to contact someone over the telephone. 
It was my impression at the time that he had tried to get the Chief of 
Staff of the Army, and had been unsuccessful in getting through. 

By this time, a good many of the senior officers of the Division of 
Operations had come in. They were in and out of Admiral Stark's 
office. Various times of the morning, Admiral Turner was there, 
Admiral Ingersoll was there, Admiral Brainard, I am certain Ad- 
miral Noyes was there, and of course, my chief. Admiral Wilkinson, 

Later on, about 11 o'clock or maybe later in the morning, I was given 
to understand that it had been decided to send a warning to Pearl 
Harbor — I wish to stand corrected there, to the forces in Hawaii, in- 
cluding the fleet, and that the warning dispatch was to be handled by 
the Chief of Staff of the Army and it would be in a form which would 
be sent to General Short who would be instructed to transmit the sub- 
stance of that dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief of our fleet, Ad- 
miral Kimmel. 

Mr. Kaufman. One further question, Captain. 

An examination of Exhibits 1 and 2, and some of the other intercepts, 
indicates delays in transmission. Will you tell us whether anything 
was done about that? 

[914^] Captain McCollum. As to that part of it, there are 
officers of the technical service that are probably better qualified to 
answer that than I am. However, I would venture this general 
explanation : 

These dispatches were intercepted at a great many intercept or pick- 
up stations located in various parts of the world. 

One they were picked up, the pick-up station had no personnel quali- 
fied to either decode or translate any of this material. They only had 
operators who were skilled in taking the Japanese equivalent of our 
Morse code. Those dispatches, therefore, from any given pick-up sta- 
tion, when received, were sent to a center, depending on who was the 
control center — either Washington, Pearl Harbor, or Corregidor. 

They might have sent it either by radio, teletype, or by mail. 

Radio and teletype facilities were not always available. 

When sent by mail to one of the decryption and translational centers, 
as soon as they arrived, there was an office procedure for taking through 
the dispatch, and an attempt was made to decrypt the code. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3395 

It is my understanding that priorities were first given on the basis 
of the code classification. In other [0150'] words, the higher 
the code classification, probably the more important the information 
was. 

There was also the precedence of the dispatch, that is the urgency 
with which it was sent. Those were obtained from the normal pro- 
cedure signs at the head of the dispatch. 

Then an attempt was made to decrypt them together, if we had the 
particular code table in which that code was sent. 

We did not always have it. Sometimes these codes would be re- 
ceived and we did not have the method or means of decrypting them 
until sometime afterwards. 

Once it was decrypted, or sufficiently decrypted to indicate some 
importance, it was handed to one of the translators who took a look 
at it to determine whether he thought it should be completely broken 
down for further decryption. That had to be done because of the 
limited number of people capable of translating the language, and to 
make the very best use of the people we had. 

When we were working full blast, the way we were, oh, for the 
month immediately preceding the attack on our fleet, great effort was 
made to get the stuff out on these negotiations right away, just as 
quickly as we possibly could. 

Now, that was dependent on the time of arrival at the [0151] 
decoding center, which was not of necessity directly related to the time 
of transmission from Tokyo, whether the code to decode it was avail- 
able or not, and dependent upon the relative importance of it as de- 
termined prior to reading any of the contents. 

[0152] Now, Avhen you come then to a slack period, that is, when 
we weren't getting so many messages, they would go back and work 
on the old ones. The effort was to decode everything but to try to de- 
code the most important ones first. 

Mr. Bjvufman. Captain, you said a moment ago that Pearl Harbor 
was a central point for decryption. What type messages were de- 
crypted at Pearl Harbor, if you know ? 

Captain McCollum, Going back somewhat here, sir, the Navy Com- 
munications Intelligence organization was set up first with headquar- 
ters in Washington, Then we put an organization out in the Asiatic 
sphere with headquarters in Cavite first, and Inter at Corregiddr. We 
originally had pick-up stations in Pekin, Shanghai, Guam, and I 
think at one time one almost in Japan, some years ago. 

Until the earl}'- 30's very little had been done so far as Honolulu was 
concerned. We didn't have very many people. The first idea was 
that they would be a mobile movement, that would move with the 
commander in chief of the fleet. I had such a movement when I 
was Fleet Intelligence Officer. That was found unworkable. They 
couldn't get the sets. As a result of that, a route of entry Avas set up 
in Honolulu with the hope that that could be built [0153] up. 

Until about early 1941, we had only, it is my understanding, a 
very rudimentary organization in Honolulu, At that time we were 
very fortunate in having become available the services of Captain 
Rochefort, who is the only officer in our Navy who is a top-flight 
cryptographer and radio man, and who also has a thorough knowl- 
edge of the Japanese language. He was obtained from the staff of 

79716— 46— pt. 8 3 



3396 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Vice Admiral Andrews, and put in charge at Honolulu with instruc- 
tions to build up his organization as rapidly as he could. 

He did not get very much help, I believe, from Washington. We 
didn't have the people, and he was in the process of building up 
that organization with the primary job of making an effort to break 
Japanese naval codes and ciphers when the war occurred. 

It is my understanding that they did not have the complete codes 
to enable them to read the Japanese diplomatic messages, nor is it 
my understanding that they were expected to; that their principal 
effort was to be directed on an attack on Japanese naval codes. 

Mr. KIaufman. Do you know whether Admiral Turner thought 
that the organization in Hawaii could decode Japanese diplomatic 
codes ? 

[91S4] Captain McCollum. This is hearsay, Mr. Counsellor. 
I heard him say before this committee that he thought so, sir. 

I wish to clarify one point. This organization at Honolulu, by 
dropping everything else that they were doing and using some of 
the standard books that they had, and by exercising cryptographic 
efforts, in other words, a direct attack with some of the very clever 
officers they then had out there, were able to read the gist of some 
of the low-grade stuff' in the Japanese diplomatic ciphers. 

In other words, it was a major cryptographic effort on each code; 
that was my understanding, but they couldn't read it right straight 
through. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now, coming back to the meeting at Admiral 
Stark's office on Sunday morning after you had the 1 o'clock de- 
livery date for the message, did any officer at that meeting suggest 
Pearl Harbor was a possible point of attack ? 

Captain McCollum. Pearl Harbor as such was never mentioned. 
The feeling that I had. and I think the feeling that most officers 
there had. was that at or near the outbreak of war with Japan, we 
could expect a surprise attack on the fleet. 

When I was acting fleet-operations officer of the fleet [9155] 
right in our standard fleet operating plans of war Avas the major 
assumption that upon the outbreak of war with Japan, or the near 
outbreak of war with Japan, we could expect a surprise attack, or 
an attempted surprise attack, on the fleet. 

I recollect, by way of illustration, if I may, at Christmas, 1937, 
we went on an all-out alert on the battleships and fleet based on 
the west coast, and that went on for some time. 

Mr. Kaufman. If it was the assumption of all of the officers there 
that there would be an attempted surprise attack on the fleet, did 
not that mean Pearl Harbor because the fleet was at Pearl Harbor? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct; but if the fleet had not been 
at Pearl Harbor it would mean wherever the fleet was. 

[9156] Mr. Kaufman. But it was never suggested that Pearl 
Harbor better go on an all-out alert immediately? 

Captain McCollum. I think the thinking was in terms of the 
fleet, Mr. Counselor, that the fleet should have been alerted all the 
way through. 

Mr. Kaufman. Did the officers there assume that Pearl Harbor 
was on an all-out alert, both Army and Navy? 

Captain McCollum. I had been given to understand that they 
had been thoroughly alerted, sir, and on their toes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3397 

Mr. Kaufman. No further questions, Mr. Chairman? 

The Chairman. Just one or two questions, Captain. 

Did you state what date it was in December that this message 
came through that seemed to refer to Kussia but which you did not 
regard as an execute? 

Captain McCollum. I think, Senator, that it is right here, sir, 
if I may refer to it. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Captain McCollum. One of them here is on the 5th of December 
and 1 think there is one preceding that. Here is one on the 4th of 
December, sir 

The Chairman. If any execute message, in view of your posi- 
tion, which could liave been regarded as an execute message, predi- 
cated upon this winds forecast, liad come to the Navy Department, 
would you have seen it? 

[9167] Captain McCollum. I should have seen it; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Was there any reason, if it did come, why you 
wouldn't have seen it? 

Captain McCollum. Oh, occasionally, I believe it has been tes- 
tified here before, there was a sj)ecial arrangement made here by 
the director of communications, Admiral Noyes, to get this infor- 
mation promptly higher up in the chain than I Avas, xVdmiral Stark 
and Admiral Turner, aiid so on; under those conditions it would 
be possible that they would overlook me, but in the normal chain 
I should have seen that first, sir. 

The Chairman. If such a message or a similar message came 
through, in what office would a record of it be kept ? 

Captain McCollum. That should be kept down in the communi- 
cations intelligence office. 

The Chairman. It would have come there first ? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct. 

The Chairman. They would have kept a record or a copy of it 
and sent it up to the next order ? 

Captain McCollum. They would have gone through their office- 
filing procedure, Senator, on that, and Kramer or one of his assist- 
ants would have brought me that instantly. 

The Chairman. When it got to you, would there be a record of it 
in your office? 

[9158] Captain McCollum. No, sir. 

The Chairman. You passed it on upstairs. You kept no record 
then? 

Captain McCollum. I took those messages in my office, Senator, and 
filed them in a file and kept them for a period of about 2 weeks, when 
they were then returned to the Communications Intelligence Section, 
where those messages were destroyed, sir. 

The Chairman. In case such a message went up to Admiral Wilkin- 
son and thence up to Admiral Stark, so that all of them saw it, would 
there be any record in each of those offices that the message had been 
received ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Would not ? 



3398 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain McColltjm. No, sir. It was carried by an officer by hand 
to these people and every effort made to get a copy and return it to the 
communications intelligence center, who then kept the mascer file. 

The Chairman. So that the only office in which there would be a 
written record of the receipt of this message would be in the office 
where it was received ? 

Captain McCollum. That is right. 

The Chairman. Wlio was in charge of that ? 

Captain ]\IcCollum, Captain Safford would be the head [91S9] 
of that office. 

The Chairman. Now, the intercept that was received indicated that 
if certain things happened, if they got this wpather forecast from 
Tokyo, east-wind rain, and so forth, it was based upon an assumption 
that an emergency came into being, and then then they spell out what 
the emergency is in their mind by saying "breaking off relations". 

Captain McCollum. That parenthesis is a translator's explanation, 
Senator. In other words, the translator has given you the exact Japa- 
nese translation and then he in parentheses gives you the full force 
and meaning of the Japanese, sir, which is not always possible in a 
direct translation. 

The Chairman. In other words, what is in the parentheses is his 
interpretation. 

Captain McCollum. Is tlie translator's interpretation and explana- 
tion of his use of the words. 

The Chairman. And the other part is as to the breaking of communi- 
cations. They are two separate things. 

Captain INIcCullom. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Diplomatic relations might be broken between the 
two Governments. 

Captain McCollum. That is correct. 

The Chairman. But without any breaking of diplomatic [91601 
relations, communications might be cut off ? 

Captain McCollum. That is right. 

The Chairman. Even private communications, telegraph or radio? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. In case those things happened and they got this 
broadcast about the weather they would understand. 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. So that the basis upon which the execute message 
would be sent was never in existence. There was no diplomatic break 
of relations and no breaking of communications between Japan and 
the United States or between the communications systems, public or 
private, prior to the attack ? 

Captain McCollum. That is right. 

The Chair:man. So the basis upon which they were predicting that 
such an execute message might come through never transpired? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct. 

The Chairman. If such a message had come through it would have 
been in a sense premature because conditions for forecasting it did 
not take place ? 

Captain McCollum. That is right; unless they wished to use this 
and forecast the action which they expected to [9161] occur 
some hours later, but as you pointed out, that did not occur. 

The Chairman. That is all. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3399 

Congressman Cooper. 

The Vice Chairman. Captain, why was not priority given to the 
decoding, decrypting, and translating of these Japanese messages? 

In other words, what I am trying to ascertain is this, 1 got the 
impression that these intercepted Japanese messages were handled 
more or less in a routine manner. I was wondering why the highest 
type of priority was not given for the immediate decoding, decrypting, 
and translating of these messages intercepted from Japanese sources. 

Captain McColltjivi. Oh, but they were^ sir. If the impression was 
given that the thing was routine, that is a wrong impression, sir. 
Everyone was working tooth and nail to get these things out as quickly 
as they possibly could, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. To the exclusion of others ? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. In other words, the 
people working on the Japanese, the major effort was put on the 
Japanese and all other things that had relations to it were dropped 
completely out of the picture. Every effort of that organization was 
bent on this thing, the decrypting of these dispatches. 

[9162] The Vice Chairman. My recollection is that the evidence 
presented here during the appearance of General Miles, who was G-2 
of the General Staff of the Army, as you know, it was called to his 
attention that all the way from two to twenty-odd days of time elapsed 
from the time the Japanese message was sent before it was decoded 
and translated. 

Now, did anything of that kind happen with the Navy? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir ; I have tried to explain that, sir. In 
other words, if I may take a hypothetical case, assume that a Japanese 
diplomatic dispatch was picked up in one of the pick-up stations in 
Alaska. I, again, do not know the physical means they had but there 
were such stations that the only communication they had was by mail. 
Assume, again, that that was the only station that picked up that 
particular dispatch. That would come in to us here in Washington 
we will say by mail. As much as a week might elapse from the time 
it was actually received at the pick-up station until it was received in 
the decoding center in Washington. The minute that thing then came 
in it would be looked at to see if we had the code that would permit 
us to decode it, sir. If we had that code it would be decoded in part, 
handed to a translator, who would translate part of it to ascertain 
whether, as far as he had gone, whether it merited complete break- 
down, particularly if there [91631 was more code work to be 
done on it. 

Then if it didn't look important it would be set aside in favor of 
things that looked to be more important and pressing, sir. 

Those things were done first. Then when you came to a slack time 
everything that you hadn't done before would be decoded. The set-up 
was to try to decode what appeared to be the most important things 
first and get them out just as quickly as we could, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, can you tell by review of these messages 
that have been presented here in evidence that the most important 
messages were handled more promptly than the less important 
messages ? 

Captain McCollum. I think so, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. You think that is the true situation ? 



3400 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain McCollum. I think that is the true situation looking at it 
all over, sir. I think the most important ones went out first. 

The Vice Chairman. Of course, you are an expert in this and I 
am not. 

Captain McCpllum. No, sir, I am not an expert. As I said before, 
sir, I am not an expert in that field and I believe there will be an officer 
here, Captain Safford, and perhaps others, who are much better quali- 
fied to explain [9164] in detail on those points than I am, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, at least you have had much more exper- 
ience with it than I have; that is a fair statement, isn't it? 

Captain McCollum. Thank you, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Of course, there is a definite physical prob- 
lem involved in this type of work. 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. Not only that, I might add, Mr. 
Congressman, but there is a mental problem involved. 

Senator Lucas. A what? 

Captain McCollum. A mental problem. This type of work is one 
of the most trying mental exercises that you have. 

The Vice Chairman. I can appeciate that. 

Captain McCollum. We have had a number of our officers and a 
number of our civil people break down rather badly under continual 
punching on this sort of thing and it is a continual concern of officers 
who handle those people to keep them from coming to a mental break- 
down on this type of work. 

The Vice Chairman. I can readily appreciate that it is a difficult 
task. That would certainly be my idea about it. 

I want to see if j'^ou can clear me up on this point. The records 
presented here, these exhibits of the messages, [9166] rather 
indicate that some relatively unimportant messages were decoded and 
translated more promptlv than some other messages here which were 
much more important. Now, can you help me some on that ? 

Captain McCollum. That may be because on the more important 
messages they weren't able to break them at the time they arrived. 
They might not have arrived until after the unimportant ones were 
here. On the more important messages we couldn't use all of our 
translators. We had to use only the few top-flight ones. We only 
had six or seven. We had increased our number 100 percent, sir, but 
it was still six or seven when we got through with that in 1941. 

And, if I may be pardoned for going back to this, the so-called 
translator in this type of stuff almost has to be a cryptographer him- 
self. You understand that these things come out in the form of 
syllables, and it is how you group your syllables that you make your 
words. There is no punctuation. 

Now, without the Chinese ideograph to read from, it is most difficult 
to group these things together. That is, any two sounds grouped to- 
gether to make a word may mean a variety of things. For instance, 
"Ba," may mean horses or fields, old women, or my hand, all 
depending on the ideographs with which it is written. On the 
so-called [9166] translator is forced the job of taking from un- 
related syllables and grouping them into what looks to him to be 
intelligible words, substituting then such of the Chinese ideographs 
necessary to pin it down, and then going ahead with the translation, 
which is a much more difficult job than simple translation, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3401 

For that reason all of the people, however qualified they might be 
in the Japanese language, had to have considerable experience in this 
particular field before they could be trusted to come through -with a 
correct interpretation of the dispatch. 

The VrcE Chairman. I can understand those difficulties. Is it true 
that many words in the Japanese language can be given a variety of 
meanings, as you have indicated by this one word you have used here ? 

Captain McCollum. It depends on the Chinese ideograph. The 
reason is this : The Japanese language is an uninflected language. It 
is straight out. They borrowed and applied to the Japanese the 
Chinese characters. The Chinese indicate a difference between the 
characters by a difference of inflection. Therefore the Chinese, when 
he talks, sounds like he is singing. The Japanese, not being able to 
sing, when he says '"Ba,'' we will say, he doesn't know whether it is 
one of a half a dozen different things that he means. It * [9167] 
is not uncommon to see two Japanese in discussion who get out of tune 
and one of them has to write the character down to show the other what 
he is talking about. 

The Vice Chairman. In ordinary conversation ? 

Captain MoCollum. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, I might take a second to state that I had 
the exj>erience one time when I was in school of meeting a Chinese 
student, and he said, "So many words in your language mean such a 
different thing." He said, "You talk about a horse running fast 
and then you talk about a man being tied hard and fast." He said, 
"One is going, and the other can't move at all. What do you mean f 

I can understand some of the difficulties. Let me ask, if I maj^— 
assume that one of our stations somewhere picked up a Japanese mes- 
sage. It is then rushed by the fastest available means of communica- 
tion to a center where the decoding, decrypting, and translating is 
done. Is that correct ? 

[^^6"^] Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Then there is somebody there who has to 
make an appraisal on the value of the information contained in 
that message ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir; that is correct, but that appraisal 
in the first instance is done without the benefit of reading any of it. 

The Vice Chairman. Just by looking at it? 

Captain ]McCoLLtiM. By judging from the — as I say, I may be 
contradicted later on because I am not exact on this, but you have 
at least two methods of judgment of that. One is the urgency of the 
dispatch, in other words, Avhether it is priority, triple priority, oi' 
so on. 

The Vice Chairman. The Japanese — do they use terms for that? 

Captain McCoLLu:\r. Not those terms, but I mean they use a simi- 
lar system. Tliey have to in practically all of these systems. 

The Vice Chairman. I see. 

Captain McCollum. Then by looking at it they could tell whether 
it was in one of the highest security codes or a code of less security 
or what kind of code, and the presumption was that the higher the 
security of the code the moiv i)nportant was the information con- 
tained in that, sir. 

[Bl'O^ The VrCF, Chairman. And then after thnt appraisal 
was made 



3402 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain McCollum. Then, after that, you would look to see where 
it came from, whether it was the Embassy in Washington, the For- 
eign Office in Tokyo talking, or something that concerned us more 
directly. 

The Vice Chairman. And after that appraisal was made, why, 
then 

Captain McCoLLuar. After that they would then see whether it 
was a code thej could read themselves or whether some crytographic 
work was required, how much of it we had, how much could be 
decrypted of that, if it could all be decrypted or not. It would be 
decrypted, or parts of it would be, and then handed to a translator 
if it looked urgent. All these factors were considered in there ; and 
it was then sent to a man who then said — from virtually looking at 
the Japanese syllables — said: "I think that they ought to work full 
blast on this one or spend more time on that one and get it out." 

The Vice Chairman. Then your explanation of the details of get- 
ting at these messages is to explain, apparently, the delay in the de- 
coding, decrypting, and translating of some of them? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. We tried to run time after time 
what we called, technically, time studies in there ; [9170'] that 
is, to see how fast we could get them out. 

The Vice Chairman. As I recall, we also received information 
that one difficulty was the lack of trained, qualified personnel. 

Captain McCollum. Oh, yes, sir ; that was all the way through. I 
might add on that, sir, that from 1907 until the outbreak of the 
war in 1941 the Navy had exposed to Japanese language instruction 
a total of about 50 officers. By 1941 about 43 of those were avail- 
able, either active or retired. All but 8 of those people were on 
specialty jobs when the war commenced. 

In October of 1941 the Navj^ started schools for the instruction 
of college men in the Japanese language, and those schools opened on 
October 1, 1941, I think, with about 40 selected students, one at 
Harvard and the other at the University of California out in Berke- 
ley. They were subsequently combined at Boulder in Colorado, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, Captain, to invite your attention to 
what I have been trying to inquire about, on page 245 of Exhibit 1, in 
the middle of the page, there appears a brief message there from 
Tokyo to Washington. It apparently was sent December 6, 1941, 
and is shown to have been translated the same day. That would 
not be a very important message, would it ? 

• [9171] Captain McCollum. No, sir; but on this thing, this 
might have cleared right away as it came m. In other words, the 
code might have been immediately available. It was a simple mat- 
ter to put it into Japanese, and it was simple, and it was translated 
almost by looking at it. 

The Vice Chairman. But you would not regard this as an impor- 
tant message, the opening words there, "There is really no need to 
tell you this?" 

Captain McCollum. No, sir; that is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. But that was translated the same day it 
was sent. 

Captain McCollum. That is right, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, then, I invite your attention to page 
29 of Exhibit 2. Do you have it there ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3403 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chair^man. A message from Honolulu to Tokyo sent 
December 6, 1941, not translated until the 8th, December 8, 1941. 
That was 2 clays later. • Tliat would be 

Captain McCollum. That is an important message. 

Tlie Vice Chairman. That would be an important message, 
wouldn't it ? 

Captain McCollum. That is an important message. 

The Vice Chairman. What I am trying to get at is— two mes- 
sages sent on December 6th, one of them of practically no [9172] 
importance translated that day; another message sent on Decembei 
the 6th that was important, not translated for 2 days later. 

Captain McColluri. Yes, sir; that is correct. As I have said 
before, sir, I cannot answer that directly because it would depend 
so much, sir, on where the pick-up station was located that got this 
thing and how fast they got it in to Washington, sir. There is 
nothing in this dispatch to indicate when it was received in the 
decryption centers here, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. But it is an important message 

Captain McCollum. It is. 

The Vice Chairman (continuing). Because they were inquiring 
about our air reconnaissance. 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And things there in Hawaii. 

Captain McCollum. That is right, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, Captain, did you state that the best 
decoding, decrypting, and translating officer in the United States 
Navy was at Pearl Harbor? You gave the name of some man. 

Captain INIcCollum. That was my impression, Mr. Cooper. I 
have known Rochefort a good^many years. 

The Vice Chairan. What is the name ? 

Captain McCollum. Rochefort, sir; R-o-c-h-e-f-o-r-t. 

[9173] The Vice Chairman. What was his rank? 

Captain McCollum. He was then a commander, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Commander Rochefort ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. As early as 1925, Mr. Cooper, he 
was looked on as being one of the outstanding cryptographers and 
radio officers in the service, and because of those special qualifica- 
tions he was sent to Japan to acquire a knowledge of the Japanese 
language, which he did, and to my mind he is the only officer in 
the entire naval service that in this particular field is preeminent be- 
cause of his training in both the language and the decryption, to- 
gether with my evaluation of his ability. I rate him as one of the 
ablest officers in the service, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And he was on duty thei-e in Hawaii on 
December 7? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And had been for some time prior thereto? 

Captain McCollum. In May, I believe it was, of 1941 he took 
over that job. 

The Vice Chairman. He went to Hawaii in May 1941 and con- 
tinued there until after December 7, 1941 ? 

Captain_ McCollum. And he stayed there until the Battle of 
Midway, sir. 



3404 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[9174'] Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield for a ques- 
tion on that point? 

The Vice Chairman. Yes, I yield, Senator. 

Senator Lucas. What equipment did he have compared with what 
you had in the center here at Washington for decrypting, decoding, 
and translating? - 

Captain McCollum. As I have indicated, Senator, he was in the 
process of getting things organized. His job was to make an attack 
on the naval codes. I am not informed as to the details of the equip- 
ment, sir. I believe that Captain Safford, who was the head of that 
section, can give you that information in detail, sir, and anything 
I might say might merely becloud the issue, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Is that all ? 

Senator Lucas. Thank you, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Then this Commander Rochefort, you say, 
had been engaged in this type of work from 1925 ? 

Captain McCollum. It was my understanding, sir — well, Mr. Con- 
gressman, the first time I had ever heard of this sort of thing was in 
1925, when I worked for a brief period here in the Navy Department, 
sir. At that time Safford was in that section, and I understood that 
he and Rochefort more or less alternated in that job. Safford, I be- 
lieve, was a lieutenant then, and Rocheford was a lieutenant, junior 
grade; and when I [9176] was assistant naval attache in 
Tokyo this fellow Rochefort was up there with a wife and a child, 
and I sent a dispatch to the Navy Department protesting the sending 
of a married naval officer out there because living conditions were most 
difficult; and our general rule was that an officer that studied Japa- 
nese was unmarried, largely because of the difficulty of supporting a 
family and keeping his wife and children happy while he buried him- 
self in this language business; and I was told that they had special 
reasons for overlooking the normal incumbrance of a wife and a 
child — that this fellow was going to stay anyway; so it was only 
after I got back to Washington and talked to him about it later, in 
1930, that I commenced to realize why they had sent this individual 
out there. 

The Vice Chairman, It was because of his ability in that field ? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. When was that that he arrived in Japan? 

Captain McCollum, That, I believe, was in 1929, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, did you state that these intercepted 
Japanese messages were sent to Pearl Harbor by the stations that 
picked up the message ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir ; they had a pick-up method. Whether 
Pearl Harbor merely passed them on to the decryption [9176] 
center here or not, I do not know, sir, I think each one of these cen- 
ters — the idea was that each one of these centers controlled a certain 
pick-up station. Those pick-up stations flowed — the information went 
from the pick-up station to the center, and then anything that center 
could not do they sent on to another center that could handle it. 

For instance, these diplomatic messages of the Pearl Harbor net — 
or the Hawaii net — might well be flown into the — might well have 
moved first into the center at Hawaii and then been transmitted by 
radio or cable direct to Washington, because they were not working 
on this particular type of stuff out there, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3405 

The Vice Chairman. Well, now, Honolulu was a center 

Captain McCollum' That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman (continuing). For those intercepted Japanese 
messages to be sent to ? \ 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. / 

The Vice Chairman. And they had the best man in the Navy in 
Hawaii at the time qualified to do this type of work ? 

Captain McCollum, Yes, sir; that is my opinion as to his ability, 
sir. Someone else might differ with me on that. 

The Vice Chairman. You certainly ought to know more about 
that than I do. 

Now, on that question, Captain, of this message that you [9177] 
referred to as the bomb plotting message, dividing up of Pearl Har- 
bor into five sectors. 

Captain McCollum. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, did you ever in all of your wide expe- 
rience in the Navy know of any request for such detailed information 
about the location of our fleet as was called for in that message ? 

Captain McCollum. No. sir. Might I elaborate on it a bit, sir? 

The Vice Chairman. Yes ; I would be glad for you to. 

Captain McCollum. The anchorage there at Pearl Harbor is 
chopped up into a number of more or less independent locks there. 
When we moved the fleet in and out of that place where the ships were 
moored in there, whether they were pointing in or pointing out, 
whether they were double banked or whether they were in the east 
lock or west lock or wherever they might be, was indicative of the fa- 
cility with which the ships could move out. The channel going in 
is fairly shallow and a ship the size of a battleship has to move at 
relatively reduced speeds. 

I am speaking, if I may say so, from my experience as operations 
officer on Admiral Hepburn's flag when we moved the fleet in and out 
of that place two or three times. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you serve at one time as opera- [91781 
tions officer of the fleet? ^ 

Captain McCollum. I was assistant operations officer of the fleet 
and acting operations officer of the United States Fleet for about 7 
months, sir. I served as assistant operations officer for about 18 
months. 

The Vice Chairman. While the fleet was based at Pearl Harbor? 

Captain McCollum. Well, sir, we were not based there but we went 
there. 

The Vice Chairman. You went there ? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. All right, go ahead. 

Captain McCollum. So that those questions relating to how the 
ships were anchored and where they were anchored in there might 
be interpreted to indicate the facility with which that fleet was 
prepared to move. 

To give a general statement of where the ships were, the stuff 
they are requiring here, would require a rather long-winded dis- 
patch, where the same dgvice, such as breaking it up into areas A, 
B, and C, such a simple device could be used. With this area dis- 
covered a rather simple and short dispatch would suffice to give 
the essential information as to the location of the fleet and also an 



3406 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

indication of their readiness for sortie. I would suggest that that 
is a reasonable, tenable [OITO] hypothesis as to why they 
wished information, apparently, in this detail. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, then, one other question, if I may, 
please, Captain. Did 3'ou ever know of a fleet commander taking 
the position that all information received by the Navy Department 
in Washington should be sent to him for his evaluation ? 

Captain McCollum. Well, sir, I have not served intimately with 
au}^ large number of fleet commanders, but certainly neither the 
fleet commander, Admiral Hepburn, that 1 served with, nor the 
fleet commander, Admiral Kincaid, that I recently served with, took 
that attitude, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Hasn't it always been generally recognized 
that the Navy Department is supposed to make certain evaluations 
and give appropriate information and instructions to fleet com- 
manders ? 

Captain McCollum. That was the basis on which I understood 
that we were operating liere in Washington, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, hasn't that been the traditional policy 
of the United States Navy ? 

Captain McCollum. So far as I am aware ; yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. All right, thank you. Senator George, of 
Georgia, may inquire. 

Senator George. 1 never heard the direct, Mr. Chairman, 
[9180] so I will pass. I did not hear his direct. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Clark had to go to a meeting of the 
Rules Committee. Senator Lucas, of Illinois, is recognized at this 
time. It is now about 3 minutes to 12, Senator. Would you like to 
start after lunch? 

Senator Lucas. I will start after lunch. 

The Vice Chairman. As this point the committee will take a 
recess until 2 o'clock, please. Captain. Be back at that time. 

(Whereupon, at 11 : 57 a. m., January 30, 1946, a recess was taken 
until 2 p. m. of the same day.) 

[9181'] afternoon session — 2 p. m. 

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order. 
Come forward, please, Captain. 

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ARTHUR HOWARD McCOLLUM, UNITED 
STATES NAVY— Resumed 

The Vice Chairman. Does counsel have anything at this time before 
examination is resumed ? 

Mr. Richardson. No. 

The Vice Chairman. Captain, do you have anything you want to 
bring to the attention of the committee before your examination is 
resumed ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas, of Illinois, will now inquire. 

Senator Lucas. Captain, I am not sure just the route that one of 
these messages takes from the time it is intercepted until it finally gets 
into the high command. With the hope of avoiding repetition I 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3407 

should like to have you take, for instance, the so-called pilot message — 
which, as I understand, you saw and were familiar with? 

Captain McCollum, Yes. sir. 

Senator Lucas. Now, where was that intercepted, if you remember? 

[9182] Captain McCollum. Senator, I do not know where it was 
intercepted, sir. 

Senator Lucas. I see. Where was it analyzed, decrypted, and de- 
coded, or whatever term you use ? 

Captain McCollum. My impression is that that was done here in 
Washington. 

Senator Lucas. Where is that station located ? 

Captain McCollum. The center for doing that work was right in 
the Navy Department at that time. 

Senator Lucas. In the Navy Department? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. "Wlio would be in charge of that work in December 
1941? 

Captain McCollum. Captain Safford was the officer in charge of 
that section, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Captain Safford was the offer in charge ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Did he possess all of the necessary knowledge in 
order to properly decrypt, translate, decode these messages? 

Captain McCollum. Not in his person, but within his organization ; 
yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. He did not have that peculiar information within 
himself? 

[9183] Captain McCollum. He is one of the best cryptographers 
and experts on the radio aspects of this thing in the Navy. That is 
his reputation, sir. He is not a Japanese language man, sir. 

Senator Lucas. I understand. So you would have to rely upon the 
Japanese language'men for proper translation? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And when he would translate it he would then 
transmit it to — what is the name. Captain Safford ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. When translated that came directly 
to me, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Where did Captain Safford get in on it? 

Captain McCollum. Captain Safford was the administrative head 
and the director of the whole organization. Then that organization is 
broken down into certain parts, one of which you might call the trans- 
lation-distribution center whose people were actually attached to my 
office but worked under Safford and were headed up by Kramer. 

Senator Lucas. Do I understand Safford then saw all of the 
messages ? 

Captain McCollum. Ordinarily he would see them all, either as a 
check-up or as they went through office procedure, but occasionally, if 
something hot came in Kramer could come directly with it to me or 
higher authority. 

Senator Lucas. After the Japanese language student [918^.] 
translated the messages they were presumed to go to Captain Safford ? 

Captain McCollum. I didn't quite understand. 



3408 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. I say, after they were translated by the Japanese 
language student these messages were presumed at least to go to 
Safford? 

Captain McCollum. Captain Safford would see them sooner or later, 
but not necessarily immediately. 

Senator Lucas. You saw them all, is that correct ? 

Captain McCollu3I. That was the idea ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Is that an answer to your question, Senator ? 

Senator Lucas. He said that was the idea. 

Captain McCollum. If I haven't answered your question I will 
try to do so. 

Senator Lucas. I said, was it j^our duty as a result of the position 
you held at that time to examine each and every one of the messages 
that came from the language student? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. After ^'^ou examined one of these messages "what did 
you do with it? 

Captain McCollum. I tlien indicated the distribution within the 
Navy Department, sir, and made sure that my opposite numbers in the 
AVar Department had it, sir. 

Senator Lucas. That was ordinarily a standard distribution? 

[PISSI Captain McCollum. If that distribution within the Navy 
Department needed additional ones. I added that, for if the ones I 
considered important had not been so marked I added those marks 
to them. '• 

Senator Lucas. Who delivered the so-called pilot message, what did 
you do with it, if you remember? 

Captain McCoLLU]\r. That pilot message was distributed on the 
standard distribution in the Navy Department. 

Senator Lucas. Who did that? 

Captain McCollum. Captain Kramer. 

Senator Lucas. Captain Kramer was the individual who was held 
responsible ? 

[9186'\ Captain McCollum. He actually carried it around and 
delivered it to the various officers who should have received it, sir, in- 
cluding mine. 

Senator Lucas. That helps me just a little. Captain. One further 
question. You have repeatedly said that at no time did you ever 
see an implementing winds message after you had the original pilot 
message. 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. That is prior to the at- 
tack on Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Lucas. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. I want to 
examine you just briefly upon the so-called pilot message with which 
you are familiar. 

I call your attention to that message which is No. 2353, and then I 
also direct j^our attention to the message sent from Tokyo to Washing- 
ton on that same day, November 19, 1941, known as Circular No. 2354: 

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the fol- 
lowing at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts. 

And at the bottom of that it says : 

The above will be repeated five times and included at the beginning and end. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3409 

Will you explain that to me, what that means ? 

Captain McCollum. This, I take it, sir, is an additional [9187] 
word code to the one we had before. As you notice, the word 
"HIGASHI'' up there means '"east" and this is an additional word 
code to be used in either the voice broadcasts or jDossibly in the news 
broadcasts sent out in Morse and would be repeated five times at the 
start of the message and five times at the end of the message, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Do you consider that this message identified as 23.54 
has anything to do with 2353 'i 

Captain McCollum. It is the same sort of thing, sir. It brings out 
the same — it is an attempt to convey the same information. 

Senator Lucas. Well, that was the way I construed it from my 
limited knowledge of the type of message that was sent. I admit that 
I have no particular powers of analyzation of a message of this kind 
but as a layman in reading these two messages I could not help but 
read one unless I read the other and then attempt to construe both of 
them as really one message. Am I correct about that? 

Captain McCollum. They are not one message. 

Senator Lucas. No ; they are not one message. 

Captain McCollum. But they are attempting to convey the same 
information. The Japanese at that time were trying, as I remem- 
ber — were most anxious to convey this information and they appar- 
ently rigged up an additional word — two [9188] additional 
word codes, that is, hidden word codes here to accomplish that purpose, 
sir. 

Senator Lucas. Counsel seems to think, after giving these two mes- 
sages some study, that they set up both of these types of message, one 
to go to the general public and one to go more or less to the diplomatic 
representatives, but they both mean the same thing. 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Well, I was just wondering whether or not any 
message, any purported implementing message, was ever received, oi- 
it is contended was received, whereby they repeated the particular 
word five times including it ait the beginning and the end ? Have you 
ever heard that discussed ? 

Captain McCollum. I never saw such an information message. 

Senator Lucas. Let me ask you this : If an implementing message of 
any kind came from the result of the information contained in Cir- 
cular 2353 or Circular 23.54 wouldn't it be necessary in order that the 
people receiving it, the Japs receiving that message in this country, 
would thoroughly understand what it means, to have the names re- 
peated five times and included at the beginning and end ''. 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. That is, regardless of what message \9189\ 
whether it was based upon 2353 or 2354? 

Captain McCollum. I believe, sir, that there are two separate sys- 
tems ; that it could be either this system, 2354, or the S3^stem set forth 
in 2353, sir, not to go in the one message. 

Senator Lucas. You were testifying this morning upon a question 
that I want to raise. Do you recall that the Navy Department here 
in Washington at one time did send to Admiral Kimmel some of these 
intercepts? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 



3410 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. Do you know why they discontinued that practice ? 

Captain McCoLLuar. I do not know that it was ever a practice. 
When the Japanese fleet would start an aggressive move, when the 
movement was actually going, there were times when we were unable 
to keep up with the evaluation process and at that time certain se- 
lected things were sent in a special code system breakable only by the 
Communication Intelligence organization attached to the staff of the 
admiral and was sent for that purpose and it is my recollection that 
that series of dispatches along, I believe, in July of 1941 will coin- 
cide, sir, ver}^ closely with Japanese movements into French Indo- 
china. 

Senator Lucas. Well, as I understood from the previous 
[9190] testimony, there was a while there that they sent these 
intercepts direct to Admiral Kimmel in the Pacific. 

Captain McCoixum. Not all of them by any means, sir. 

Senator Lucas. A^^lo determined what should be sent at that par- 
ticular time? 

Captain McCollum. We had that in my office, sir. 

Senator Lucas. AVell, did you get any orders from the higher 
command to cease and desist sending those messages to Kimmel? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir; no such orders, except that there 
were constant reminders to reduce the sending of these verbatim 
translations of these dispatches to the ultimate degree, sir, and the 
matter of the security of the information that we were able to 
break these codes was continually and repeatedly stressed. Where 
it was possible to draw an evaluation from this material and to send 
the substance of that evaluation out in the form of orders to the 
fleet commander or as an evaluated Intelligence message it was so 
sent. 

Senator Lucas. W^ell, now, returning to the exhibit that contains 
the message from Tokj'o to Honolulu with respect to getting in- 
formation and dividing the harbor up into five sectors. You are 
familiar with that message ? 

Captain McColluivi. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Whose definite responsibility was it to [9191] 
analyze and evaluate that particular message along with the rest 
that came in from time to time ? 

Captain McCollum. That would have been the responsibility of 
the Intelligence Division and then to pass that information, to- 
gether with their evaluation, to the Plans Division, who would di- 
rect any dissemination to any outfit other than the Plans Division 
of the Navy Department, 

Senator Lucas. Well, now, in your Intelligence Division, who 
initiated the original analyzation of a message of that kind? 

Captain McCollum. My office. 

Senator Lucas. Your what? 

Captain McColluivi. My ofiice. 

Senator Lucas. Your office? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Your office was responsible for analyzing any 
message from time to time and then whatever evaluation you placed 
upon that message you sent it on to Admiral Wilkinson ? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3411 

Senator Lucas. Did Admiral Wilkinson have the experience and 
inside knovrledge of the Intelligence work that you and your staff 
had? 

Captain McCollum. Admiral Wilkinson had not previous- 
[9192] ly served in Intelligence, sir. He is by reputation one of 
our most brilliant officers. It is my opinion he has a magnificent 
mind. lie accepted my recommendations almost in toto. 

One of the reasons that Captain Kramer carried these messages 
around is that Captain Kramer had served in an analytical capacity 
in my office, was completely aware of all of the ramifications, and 
in addition to any written evaluation could in person add a verbal 
evaluation that might be necessary or send for me in case of neces- 
sity, sir. 

Senator Lucas. One other question, Captain. After the so-called 
pilot winds message was received did you continue to look there- 
after for this implementing message that might come in? 

Captain McCollum. So far as I am aware, we were continuing 
to look for that after the bombs had started falling on the fleet, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Did Captain Safford ever discuss this question with 
you at any time after the pilot message came in ? 

Captain McCollum. Not that I remember, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Well, was there any particular reason why in view 
of your position that you held at that time that you should not have 
received this implementing winds message if such a one had come in ? 

Captain McCollutvi. No, sir. 

[919S~\ Senator Lucas. Do you know of any other message 
of importance whereby you were passed up completely and the Com- 
munications officer sent it direct over your head to the higher com- 
mand ? 

Captain McCollum. There might have been one or two instances 
in which they did go directly over my head to the higher command, 
but in almost every instance I would know about it shortly there- 
after, sir. 

Senator Lucas. As I understand. Captain Safford says that he 
took this message direct to you and handed it to you. 

Captain McCollum. I have no recollection of that, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Well, an important message of that kind cer- 
tainly would have made an impression upon you ? 

Captain McCollum. Very definitely, sir. We were all looking 
for it. Senator; everybody. 

Senator Lucas. You were all looking for it ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And you would have remembered it, I take it, if 
such a message had been brought to you ? 

Captain McCollum. I feel quite certain I would have, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Did you have an opportunity to look at the mes- 
sage that was prepared by Admiral Turner and finally sent through 
by Admiral Stark, known as the war warning mes- [9194-1 
sage ? 

Captain McColluivi. I first saw that message about the 4th or 5th 
of December, sir. I saw no messages prepared by Admiral Turner 
of that nature, either that one or any of the others that preceded it, 
before they were sent, sir. 

79716 — 46— pt. 8 4 



3412 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. ,Well, you are an officer with a wide range of ex- 
perience in the Intelligence Department and as such you have had 
an opportunity from time to time to construe messages of all types 
and character, have you not ? 

Captain McColltjm. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. You had an opportunity to analyze and construe 
the message that was sent b}^ Admiral Stark on November the 27th 
to Admiral Kimmel, known as the war warning message? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir ; I have read it repeatedly lately. 

Senator Lucas. What would that message mean to you if you had 
been out in the Pacific and had received it ? 

Captain McCollum. Well, sir, the outstanding part of that mes- 
sage is that it says, "This is a war warning." It does not come in 
the life of most naval officers to receive or see a message containing 
such words and my personal feeling is that a message containing the 
information, "This is a war warning", indicated clearly that the 
Department expected a war \9195\ to break out there at any 
moment from then on, sir. 

Senator Lucas. I think that is all. 

The Chairman. Mr. Murphy. 

The Vice Chairiman. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question? 

The Chairman. Congressman Cooper. 

The Vice Chairman. Captain, I would like to clear up on point 
in connection with some questions I asked you this morning, and 
some just now asked you by Senator Lucas. 

With respect to the so-called bomb plot message, was that before 
you assumed your duties or after? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. I was on duty there, but I left Wash- 
ington on the 25th of August and I returned to the Navy Department 
about — I got back to Washington on the 11th of October and I did 
not really commence to function in my office down here until about 
the 15th, sir. The 11th I believe was Friday and it was a week end 
and I had notes and so on to prepare, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, was that bomb plot message received 
(hiring that interval when you were away? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. It has a note here. It says that it 
was translated on the 9th of October 1941, sir, so it must have 
been distributed about that time very closely. 

The Vice Chairman. And that was before you resumed your work 
after you came back? 

lows'] Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Thank you, sir. 

The Chairman. Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. Captain McCollum, as I understand it you stated 
as an explanation of the bomb plot, so called, on page 12 of Exhibit 
No. 2, the fact that they had no naval men at the consulate in Hono- 
lulu and the fact that Pearl Harbor was an unusually complicated 
condition. Do you know whether or not those two factors were known 
to others in Naval Intelligence ? 

Captain McCollum. I think that was the general feeling, sir, of 
the Intelligence officers who were working there. 

Mr. MuRPHT. And in your judgment would that have minimized 
the importance of that rather than have it as an outstanding message 
that would indicate an air raid on Pearl Harbor? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3413 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MuKPHY. Now, as I understand it, you did testify as to page 
154 in Exhibit 1. Will you hand that to the Captain, please ? Page 
154. 

Captain McCollum. I have it, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, that message, if it were not sent by way of an 
implementing message to the winds code, if it were sent by the Japa- 
nese, what were the people to do who received it? 

[9197] Captain McCollum. It says in this message here, "When 
this is heard, please destroy all code papers," and so forth, sir. 

Mr, Murphy. Right. Now, the fact is that the Navy did receive 
messages from Japan through the consulates telling them to destroy 
the codes ? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And the very reason why the winds code, so-called, 
was set up was that if they did send an nnplementing message that 
way, to destroy the codes ; isn't that right ? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Actually there were messages sent spelling out ex- 
actly what to do to destroy the codes, isn't that right ? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, after that message was received or, 
rather, intercepted in Washington, who was it who prepared the 
messages to CINCPAC by way of information and by way of au- 
thority as to code destruction at Guam and also informing CINCPAC 
that the codes were being destroyed at different points throughout the 
world by the Japanese ? 

I direct your attention to your testimony, Captain, along that line 
at page 21 of the Hewitt testimony. That reads as follows : 

Subsequent to this the situation further deteriorated [9198] and I 
recommended to Admiral Wilkinson and we did send dispatches out to our 
naval attaches and various naval agencies throughout the Far East dix'ectlng 
that they destroy all their codes and ciphers, and so on, and so forth, and to 
affirmatively report when these had been destroyed. That despatch was sent 
so that the fleet commanders on the chain going out and coming back would 
have the information that the order had been issued. Some time after the 
first, possibly around the fourth, I prepared this. 

Now, was it you who jjrepured that message to the islands to take 
steps about destroying their particular codes, our own naval codes? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. 

[9199] Mr. Murphy. 'What was it? 

Captain McColluivi. That would be Captain Safford who prepared 
that sort of thing, and his division, sir, in our own islands. The in- 
struction that actually had been given was this, sir : The naval at- 
taches, the people whose codes could be seized by the Japanese, were 
our responsibility. The general destruction of codes in their out- 
lying areas was the responsibility of the communications division. 
I conferred with Captain Safford, and in view of the fact that it 
involved codes I asked him to draw up the appropriate thin^ to 
send to the naval attaches, so there would be no misunderstanding 
about which ones they were to destroy. 

Mr. Murphy. Now why was it sent out? 

Captain McCollum. He drafted this despatch. I had expected 
that he would bring it to me. I wished to add something more to 



3414 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

it at the time. In his hurry he did not and got it released directly, 
which was quite all right with me. I had some discussion with 
Admiral Wilkinson as to Avhether we should send another one direct 
to these fellows to destroy other things in addition to codes, 

Mr. MuRPHT. What was the purpose of sending the message? 

Captain McCollum. The purpose of sending the message was to 
insure that none of our cryptographic systems' should fall into the 
liMnds of the enemy should war ensue. 

[OWO] Mr. Murphy. And at that time was the reason for send- 
ing it the fact that you thought war was imminent ? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. MuEPHY. You have been in Naval Intelligence for a good 
many years. What is the significance in the Navy of a message stat- 
ing that an expected enemy is destroying his codes, all the different 
systems ? 

Captain McCollum. Iwould interpret that to mean that the enemy 
expects to be at war with us in the immediate future, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. On page 359 of the Hart testimony Captain Safford 
testified : 

Q. Was any of the foregoing information, nnder dates of November and 
December, 1941, disseminated by the main Washington unit direct to the cor- 
responding unit in the 14th NaA'al District? 

A. (Captain SalTord.) No, sir. That was not permitted by a written order 
then ia force. 

Was there ever any such order by anybody prohibiting that? 

Captain McCollum. Not that I know of, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you ever hear of it ? 

Captain McCollum, No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. If there was such an order, don't you think [OWl] 
it should have come to your attention ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Murphy, Now, I direct your attention to page 359, to Captain 
Safford's testimony. Do you have a copy of it available? If not, I 
will read it to you. 

After speaking about the order in question Captain Safford said: 

— but there was one exception. On the 3rd of December, I prepared OPNAV 
Secret Dispatch 031855, which was released by Captain Redman, the Assistant 
Director of Naval Communications. 

Was that the one you spoke of, which he prepared without taking 
it up with you ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy, I will go on then — we will come back to that. 

A similar dispatch was released by Admiral Wilkinson and filed at 031850. 
Admiral Wilkinson's message is referred to in the Roberts Report. Before 
drafting my message, I called Commander McCollum on the telephone and asked 
him "Are you people in Naval Intelligence doing anything to get a warning out 
to the Pacific Fleet", and McCollum replied, "We are doing everything we can 
to get the news out to the Fleet." McCollum emphasized both "we's". In send- 
ing this [9202] information, I was over-stepping the bounds as established 
by approved war plans and joint agreement between Naval Communications and 
Naval Intelligence, but I did it because I thought McCollum had been unable to 
get his message released. 

Do you recall such phone call from Captain Safford? 
Captain McCollum. I remember talking to Safford on this sub- 
ject about that time, sir. The specific things that I said I do not 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3415 

remember, sir. I drafted the dispatch which ONI sent out about the 
same time. That starts out, I think, "Categorical and specific in- 
structions herein." 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you remember Safford did call you ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you agree with him, that it was your function 
and his function to send messages out to the fleet? 

Captain McCollum. I felt that messages should have gone to the 
fleet, sir. The effort was to get it out there. Now you will notice, 
sir, Safford's message here, or the one that you refer to, is sent in this 
system to his eonnnunication intelligence organizations out there. 
That would probably be in a code only very closely held by his imme- 
diate, you might say, subordinates. 

Mr. Murphy. He speaks in his testimony of sending a message to 
Hawaii, that only one man in Hawaii would understand [^03] 
what was in it. Why would it be sent that way ? He says the only man 
at Hawaii who would understand it was Lieutenant Coleman. Do you 
have a copy of that message, do you know? 

Captain McCollum. I do not know, sir, unless he had some private 
arrangement of wording with Coleman, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. I am referring to the Navy liaison officer, to page 
359, in which Captain Safford said, at page 360 : 

OPNAV 031855 was addressed to CINCAF and COMSIXTEEN for action but 
was routed to CINCPAC and COMFOURTEEN for information. It was written 
in highly technical language and only one officer present at Pearl Harbor, the 
late Lieutenant H. M. Coleman, on CINCPAO's staff, could have explained its 
significance. 

I suppose the "late Lieutenant Coleman" means that he is dead, 
the man who could understand it. There is a message that only a dead 
man could understand at Hawaii. I wonder if we have somebody here 
with that message? 

Captain McCollum. Mr. Congressman, is that the dispatch which 
says : 

Circular 244. From Tokyo. 1 December. Order London, Hongkong, Singa- 
pore and Manila to destroy machine — 

Is that what you are referring to ? 

Mr. Murphy. I don't know. All it says is "OPNAV 031855 was 
addressed to CINCAF", and so forth. He says it was in [O^Oi] 
highly technical language and only one officer present at Pearl Harbor, 
the late Lieutenant Coleman, on CINCPAC's staff, could have ex- 
plained its sig-nificance. Is there anything about that that everybody 
cannot understand ? 

Captain McCollum, Not that I see, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Do you know why only one person at Hawaii could 
explain that ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. There might be some minor details 
in there that might not be entirely clear. 

Mr. Murphy. He says it is highly technical language, that only one 
officer present at Pearl Harbor could have explained. Surely it was 
not in tliat highly technical language so that Admiral Kimmel would 
not get the significance of it. I mean he did not put much stock in 
the code-instruction messages. 



3416 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. I think the entire effort was to try 
to see that he got the information. 
Mr. MuEPHY. I would think so. 
Now, then, you did testify at page 30 of the Hewitt report as follows : 

About the middle of the week 1-7 December, the Federal Communications 
Commission reported the accurrence of one of the words in a .Japanese news 
broadcast from Tokyo which indicated war with Russia. In studying the 
message [9205] at the time, it did not appear that this was a bona fide 
warning in the terms as set forth. It did not appear in the proper sequence 
and proper number of times in the broadcast, as I remember it, and it was 
thought at the time that this was a bona fide weather report which happened 
to use the code word for Russia. I know of no message received prior to the 
attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December which indicated that diplomatic rela- 
tions with the United States would be ruptured. 

After the attack on Pearl Harbor had been made, either late afternoon of 
the 7th, Washington time, or sometime on the 8th, a dispatch was translated 
which indicated war with England. I think you have got some exhibits on 
that point there. 

That testimony was accurate, was it ? 

Captain McColltoi. Yes, sir; except for the word "war," sir. 
That was loose language, Mr. Congressman. 

Mr. Murphy. The language, so far as you understood, was "rup- 
tured in relations," is that right ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now Captain Safford testified at page 362 of the 
Hart testimony : 

The following officers knew by hearsay that the "winds message" has been 
intercepted but did not actually see it [9206] themselves — 

and then he gives the following officers who had some recollection of 
the winds message, and among them he lists Captain McCollum. 

So far as you know, is the one which is referred to in this testi- 
mony which I have just read the only winds intercept that you had 
heard of up to December 7, 1941 ? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sh-. 

Mr. Murphy. Captain, the particular' message that you referred 
to on page 41, dated December 3, 1941, should have on the second 
line after "destroy" the word "purple," and on the fourth line after 
"destroy" the word "purple." That had been left out because at 
one time there was greater effort being made to protect this code 
than subsequently. 

No other questions. 

19207] The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster would be next. 
He is not here. 

Mr. Gearhart? 

Mr. Gearhart. No questions. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will now in- 
quire, Captain. 

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that you testified just re- 
cently in your testimony that the message destroying the code 
meant war between the countries ? 

Captain McColluivi. That would be my interpretation, that it not 
necessarily meant war, but that they expected war to break out, and 
it was a step looking to safeguard their systems, to prevent them 
from being compromised in case war eventuated as expected. 



PKOCEEUINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3417 

Senator Fekguson. Then, as I understand it, it did not mean to 
you immediate war ? 

Caj^tain McCollum. Pretty close to it. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, when you sent to our Embassy, mili- 
tary attache and naval attache in Tokyo, on the 5th, a message to 
destroy our codes and code machines, did it mean that we were going 
to war? You were familiar with the fact that a message was sent 
to Tok3^o to destroy our codes, were you not? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. That message, T believe, 
[9208] was sent on the 4th. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; on the 4th, 

Captain McCollum. It was sent on the 4th with the idea that 
we felt war might break out any time, sir, and we did not want our 
codes and other papers compromised, and the safe thing to do in 
that dangerous situation was to destroy them. 

If war did not develop, then we could always replace them, but 
the situation was so acute that we felt that they had to be destroyed 
at once. 

Senator Ferguson. So you anticipated w^ar immediately ? 

Captain McCollum. That is right, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you, on the 27th of November anticipate 
war immediately, and if you did, why did you not send messages 
to destroy our codes on the 27th ? 

Captain McCollum. It was merely a matter of how you judged 
it at the time, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You were in the Intelligence Branch ? 

Captain McCollum. I judged that it was time to send the mes- 
sage on the 4th, Senator, and that is all I can say now, sir. 

Why I did not do it on the 27th or why I did not wait until the 
5th, sir, I am sorry I cannot reconstruct, but on the 4th, I was con- 
vinced that the situation was so acute that [OBOO] we might 
have war at once. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, was there a change sometime between 
the 27th of November and the 4th of December which brought you 
to the conclusion, as the head of the Intelligence Branch, that war 
was imminent on the 4th, and was not so imminent on the 27th? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir; I think so, sir. We had watched 
the Japanese task force moving, and up until about the 4th their 
exact intentions were presumed. They became much clearer after 
the 4th. 

Senator Ferguson. Then there w^as in the War Department, as I 
understand, owing to the coordination between the War and Navy 
Departments, there was a message from General Short to the Com- 
mander in Chief, or to the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, that he 
was only alerted to sabotage. 

Now, that being true, and you being in charge of the Intelligence 
Branch, and having access to it all, don't you think that some other 
steps should have been taken on the 4th ? 

Captain McCollu^i. I did not see the message from General Short, 
Senator. I am not sure that it was well known all around, sir — 
that is, to me, anyway. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for the fact, if there was 
coordination between the two branches of [9210] Intelligence, 
that it did not reach you as to how they were alerted ? 



3418 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain McCollum, I cannot account for it, sir. 

Senator Feeguson. Would you let me see, Counsel, the message that 
was sent on the 5th, and finally sent on the 7th to Panama? 

Mr, MuEPHT. Will the Senator yield just to make a request? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. "VVliile Counsel are looking for the message from Gen- 
eral Miles to Panama, I would like to have the Army produce another 
message sent from ISIiles to Honolulu, from G-2 in Washington to G-2 
in Honolulu. 

Senator Lucas. "What date ? 

Mr. Murphy. It was sent subsequent to November 27, in which it 
speaks of being alerted against sabotage, and in addition to sabotage, it 
expected hostilities to ensue.^ 

Senator Ferguson. I will come back to that a little later, as soon 
as we get that message. 

You testified before how many boards, or commissions ? 

Captain McCollum. Only one be.f ore this one, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And that was before the Hewitt Board ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

[9211] Senator Ferguson. They have found this Miles message 
now, so I will go back to that. 

Did you know that a message, about on the 27th or a day later, 
similar to the one that was sent to General Short, to be distributed to 
Admiral Kimmel, had been sent to Panama ^ 

Captain McCollum. I do not remember precisely. Senator. I may 
have known it. 

Senator Ferguson. If war was much nearer, and I assume it was 
from your answers, on the 4th than it was on the 27th, how would you 
account for this message, being dated the 5th, not marked "priority" 
and on its face showing it was sent on the 7th to the Panama Canal 
Department, which states : 

U. S.-Japanese relations strained stop Will inform you if and when severance 
of diplomatic relations imminent. "Si«^ned Mixes " 

Captain McCollum. General Miles, as Director of Militaiy Intelli- 
gence, was privileged to make his own evaluation, sir, and that pre- 
sumably reflects his views. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know anything in the two Intelligence 
branches that would warrant such a change of heart, or change of 
message ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. I might add. Senator, that [9212] 
the head of the Far Eastern section of the Military Intelligence Service 
was Colonel Bratton at the time. I had known Colonel Bratton and 
worked with him since 1923. 

There were not only the closest possible official relations between us, 
but we have also maintained exceedingly close personal relations. 

Every effort was made by me to see that my views were explained in 
detail to Colonel Bratton, and I am satisfied that that was reciprocated 
in full, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You were in a different department than Captain 
Safford? He was in Communications, and you were in Intelligence? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. He would get the winds message if it came prior 
to the time it would come to you ? 

1 Included in Exhibit No. 32. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3419 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Feijguson, Did you ever know of any slip-up, any failure to 
deliver to one and not to another in the Navy ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. Those things are human, sir. Slips 
are bound to occur. I have known of slips, sir. I do not recollect 
any important slips in this respect, on this particular magic stuff, sir. 
It was guarded very closely, with check-up systems all the way 
[9213^ through, sir, both up and down. 

Senator Ferguson. How did they check whether a man got the 
message or not ? 

Captain McColulm. It was delivered in person to that man, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But what if a man failed to make delivery, there 
was not any check-up, was there ? Wliat if Kramer happened to miss 
one, was there an}?^ way of checking it ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir ; not any mechanical way, or to say that 
Kramer had failed to show it to Admiral Stark or something like that. 

Senator Ferguson. Not failed, but just made a mistake? 

Captain McCollum. Had overlooked doing it; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to know whether you can explain 
how Admiral Ingersoll could see the winds message, and he being in 
the Navy and on the list just the same as you, if he did see it. I am 
going to read you his testimony. This is question No, 69 before the 
Hart board. 

\_921Jf\ The Vice Chairman. Which record, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. The Hart record. It is question No. 68 : 

Question. During November or December 1941, were you cognizant of a spe- 
cial code which tiie Japanese had arranged under which they were to inform 
their nationals concerning against what nations they would make aggressive 
movements by means of a partial weather report? 

Answer. Yes, I do recall such a message. 

Would you take that to be an answer that that was the original 
setting up of a code of east wind, west wind, and south wind? 
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now the next question. No. 69. 

Question. Do you recall having seen, on or about 4th of December, the broad- 
cast directive thus given indicating that the Japanese were about to attack 
both Britain and the United States? 

Now that question would ask for an implementing message, would 
it not? 

Captain McCollum. That is *the way it would appear, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the way it would appear ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And the answer is "yes." 

[921o] To show that he had that in mind I would read ques- 
tion No. 70 and the answer : 

Do you know why that particular information was not sent to the commander 
in chief, Pacific? 

Answer. I do not know, except it was problably supposed that the intercept 
station in the Hawaiian Islands had also received this broadcast. However, 
it may have been because of a message sent in regards to the destruction of the 
Japanese codes that had been sent to London and Washington which indicated 
that war with the United States and with Great Britain was imminent. 

Those would be two logical answers, would they not ? 
Captain McCollum. Those would be logical answers. 



3420 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. One was that we thought here in Washington 
thti't Hawaii knew about it because they had a code machine and 
they had the means of getting it, and the other was, as you have 
testified and indicated, as I understand it, in your testimony, that 
the destruction of the codes and code machines meant the same 
thing. Is that correct. 

Captain MoCollum. Not from the Japanese point of view, sir, 
that is our order for code destruction. We would then draw the 
inference that the Japanese would start war, but the Japanese had 
not aifirmatively used that code, sir. 

[9216] Senator Ferguson. And that gives the same date and 
it is indicated by some at least that the code was in. 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do j^ou have any way of accounting for the 
fact that Ingersoll, who was Deputy to Admiral Stark, saw the code, 
the winds code, the implementing message and you do not recall see- 
ing it, and you did not see it, you say ? 

Captain McCollum. I am quite certain if there was such a mes- 
sage, sir, that I would have seen it. It is my suggestion at this time 
that Admiral Ingersoll might have been referring to the false message 
relating to Russia, which I believe he was called up in the middle 
of the night about, and in his testimony confused that with the one 
that w^as the real implementation, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But he said here it was the third or fourth, 
and he said the United States and Great Britain. Wlien did the one 
with Russia come in? 

Ca])tain McCoLLuai. About the same time, sir. 

Senator Fekguson. Do you think that as important a thing as that 
was, that j'ou could get confused on war with Russia instead of war 
with the United States ? 

Captain McCollum. Knowing Admiral Ingersoll, sir, I believe 
he would have taken positive steps had it been the definite one that 
called for war with the United States, or [9217] called for 
I'upture of diplomatic relations with the United States, sir. The 
very fact he did not do so would indicate that his testimony there is 
based on memory, which did not serve him too well, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now reading from the Navj^ testimony, so 
that we get all of this, on page 825, the fortieth question is — I better 
read the question before, question No. 39 : 

Oil or prior to the 7th of December did you receive any information as to 
whether or not code words had been received in the Navy Department whicli 
would put in effect the action contemplated by the so-called winds message? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Will you state the circumstances? 

A. I recall that sometime I did see the messages which were supposed to 
put the winds messa,ge translated on the 28th into eifect. I do not recall 
whether I saw that prior to December 7 or afterward. If I saw that prior to 
December 7 I am quite sure that that would have been considered confirmation 
of the information which had previously been received and which had been 
sent to the Fleet on December 3 or 4 regarding the destruction of the codes at 
London, Washington, Manila, and elsewhere, which indicated definitely that 
war was imminent. 

Whether he saw it before or after, it would indicate [9218] 
that the message had come in, would it? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir; not afterward, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3421 

Senator Ferguson, AVhy not? 

Captain McCollum. The message did come in afterward, sir. The 
war with England, or rupture of diplomatic relations with England, 
we received on the 8th, I believe. 

Senator Ferguson. And with the United States ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But he was specific that he saw a message 
showing a break, the war break or diplomatic break between the 
United States and Japan, and Britain and Japan. 

Captain McCollum. Well, Senator, all I can say is I saw no such 
dispatch, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. On page 204 of Exhibit 1 there is a message 
from Tokyo to Berlin, November 30, 1941, in three parts, that indi- 
cates part 1 of 3. It is : 

Re my circular #2387. 

Have you got that ? 

Captain ]\1cCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now I want to ask you whether you noticed, 
when you got that message, that you did not get part 2, whether 
you recall that. Have you read those ? 

Captain McCollum. Those are the messages, Senator, starting 
towards the top of page 204 and running over to [9£19] page 
205, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, No. 985, and No. 985 at the bottom of the 
page. 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir ; I saw those, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When those came through your hands did 
you notice that part 2 was not there ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was not that a very significant thing ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir ; not necessarily, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Not necessarily? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. Part 2 might have been received. 

Senator Ferguson. Let us read the last sentence of part 1 and the 
first sentence of part 3 : 

Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may sud- 
denly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some 
clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may 
come quicker than anyone dreams. 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. He was talking to Von Kibbontrop and Hitler? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

[92£0] Senator Ferguson. Part 3, but missing part 2, reads: 

If when you tell them this, the German and Italians question you about 
our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude 
toward the Russians in our statement of last July. 

Does not that indicate that there is a missing part also? 
Captain McColluim. Yes, sir ; there is a missing part. 
Senator Ferguson. There is a missing number? 
Captain McCollum. There is a missing number here. 
Senator Ferguson. Now, did you get in touch with the British 
to see whether or not they got that No. 2 ? 



3422 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. That exchange was rim between 
the Communications and Intelligence Service, as to the check-up of 
these things, sir ; not by me, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you miss it at the time? Do you remem- 
ber this? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, we frequently would pick up one part 
of a dispatch. In other words, this was one transmission and then 
the other part would be sent in another transmission, and not in- 
frequently you would pick up one part sent as one transmission and 
not get the other part seht as another transmission, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. We had the same kind of station in [9221'] 
the Philippines that we had in Washington, to get the secret 
messages ? 

Captain McCollum. Not precisely the same, sir, but they were 
merely technical differences. They were substantially the same, sir. 

Senator Fergusox. Do you know whether you ever took it up, 
to try to find this second part ? 

Captain McCollum. There was a regular exchange between all 
of the stations and Washington, and vice versa, sir. Everything 
that we got, they had a system of checking up on, to see whether 
they got it, and possibly they did have the fill-in, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then we should find some message if we in- 
quire from the Philippines about this second part, should we not? 

Captain McCollum. They can check through the numbers to see 
whether they have it or not ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. The Army has No. 2, and we are going to get it. 

Mr. Masten. Mr. Murphy 

Mr. Murphy. The Army has been working on it. They reported 
it to us. 

[9222] Mr. Masten. Mr. Murphy, Senator Ferguson asked for 
that second part, as I recall it, and we have delivered to him certificates 
by both the Army and Navy — I think I am correct 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Masten. To the effect that they have no record in either de- 
partment of this part 2 ever having been received. 

Mr. Murphy. That is before you had the material from Tokyo. 
They have the movies down there now, and they are transcribing 
those messages. 

Mr. Masten. That may be, but the point is it had not been re- 
ceived prior to December 7, 1941. , 

Mr. Murphy. I know, but this business I am talking about will 
be available from the movies. 

Mr. Masten. If it is in the reels. I think it would be well to 
read into the record at this point the two certificates that Mr. Fer- 
guson has that were received from the Army and Navy. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have that ? 

Mr. Masten. We will get them and give them to the reporter. 

Senator Ferguson. Put them in at this place. 

The Vice Chahjman. They will be inserted in the record at this 
point. Please supply them to the reporter. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3423 

[9223] (The matter referred to follows:) 

January 7, 194G. 
Memorandum for Senatoi* Ferguson : 

With reference to your request for additional information regarding the Japa- 
nese intercepts appearing on pages 195 and 204 of exhibit 1, I enclose copies of 
memoranda received from Lt. Col. Harmon Buncombe and Lt. Comdr. Baecher 
in this connection. 

WiTXIAjr D. MlTCHKLL. 



WAR DEPARTMENT 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 

Room 4D757, The Pentagon 

28 December 19Jf5. 
Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell : 

1. SIS No. 25445 (p. 195 Exhibit 1) was intercepted by Navy Station S, Bain- 
bridge Island. Washington, at 1149 GMT, 28 November 1941 (6:40 a. m., 28 
November, Washington time). No information has been found in the records 
concerning the time the message was received by the Navy from Station S, or by 
Army SIS from the Navy. 

2. A thorough search of the Signal Intelligence Service records discloses no 
evidence that Part 2 of Tokyo-to-Berlin [922^] message No. 985 (Parts 
1 and 3 of which appear on p. 204 of Exhibit 1) was ever intercepted. 

(Sgd) Harmon Buncombe, 
BB 
Hakmon Buncombe, 

Lt. Col., 08C. 

Bepaetment of the Navy, 

Office of the Secretary, 
Washington, 5 January 19^6. 
1083A 
R#94 

Memorandum 
To : Mr. William D. Mitchell 

1. Mr. John Masten of your staff in a telephone conversation on 28 Becember 
1945, requested that the Navy Department institute a search to ascertain whether 
there existed in the records of the Navy Bepartment part 2 of the Japanese inter- 
cept, identified as Message 985 from Tokyo to Berlin and contained in Exhibit #1 
at page 204. 

2. You are informed that after an extensive search of pertinent files in the 
Navy Bepartment and Archives, it has been determined that part 2 of Message 
985 is not contained in the files and there is no evidence that part 2 [9225] 
of Message 985 was ever intercepted and decoded. 

(Sgd) John Ford Baecher, 
John Ford Baecheb, 
Lietit. Comdr. USNR. 
January 22, 1946. 



Memorandum for Senator Ferguson 

With reference to your further request of January 8, 1946, regarding Part 2 
of Message 985 appearing at page 204 of Exhibit 1, I enclose herewith a copy of a 
memorandum dated January 10, 1946, from Lt. Col. Harmon Buncombe, together 
with a copy of the certificate enclosed therewith. 

It is our understanding that all of the information regarding receipt of this 
message would be found in tlie Signal Intelligence Service records and that 
further inquiry of the radio stations would not throw any further light on the 
matter. 

We have forwarded a copy of your request to the Navy Bepartment and will 
advise you of their reply. 

Seth W. Richardson. 

SWR :MBB 

encs. 



3424 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[9226] War Department 

washington, d. c. 
Room 4D761, The Pentagon 

16 January 1946. 
Memorandum for Mr. Richardson : 

Pursuant to Senator Ferguson's request, there is inclosed a certificate relating 
to Tokyo-to-Berlin Message No. 985 (Parts 1 and 3 of which are printed at page 
204 of Committee Exhibit No. 1 ) . 

Harmon Duncombb, 

Lt. Col., GSC. 
Incl. 

10 January 1946. 
I, Harold G. Hayes, Colonel, Signal Corps, hereby certify: 

(1) That the Signal Intelligence Service records, which are now in my 
custody, disclose the following information on Parts 1 and 3 of Tokyo-to-Berlin 
message No. 985 (which are printed at Page 204 of Committee Exhibit 1) : 

Intercepted by Navy Radio : 

Pftrt 1 Part 3 

Coded text received by 10:06 A. M. 10.06 A. M. 

Army SIS from Navy 1 Dec 1 Dec 

[9227] Decoded by Army SIS 305 P. M. 3 :59 P. M. 

1 Dec 1 Dec 

Translated by Army SIS 1 Dec 1 Dec 

(2) That a thorough search of the Signal Intelligence Service records discloses 
no evidence that Part 2 of the message was ever intercepted. 

Harold G. Hayes, 
Colonel, Signal Corps. 

Senator Fergusox. To complete the record on the question of Ad- 
miral Ingersoll on this subject, I would like to insert another question 
and another answer. 

Would counsel have any objection to that? 

Mr. Richardson. No, no. 

Senator Ferguson. Question No. 41. I did not read far enough 
back. I want to put this in : 

Can you recall whether or not on or before 7 December 1941, any action was 
taken in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, as the result of the informa- 
tion contained in this execution of the winds code, which you state you saw? 

As I stated before, I do not recall when I saw the answer, whether it was on 
or before or prior to December 7, or whether it was after December 7. 

[9228] If it was after December 7 there was no purpose in sending it out. 
If it was before December 7, I think it was not sent out because we considered 
that the dispatch sent to all fleets regarding the destruction of codes was ample 
warning that war was imminent, or that diplomatic negotiations were going to be 
broken off, and that this dispatch was only confirmatory. 

That would be speaking about the United States, would it not? Talking about 
our fleet? 

Captain McCollum. That is what he is talking about, I judge, sir. 

[9229'] Senator Ferguson. Now, when you testified before the 
Hewitt Board — I want to go over some of your testimony there with 
relation to that. You were asked the question and made this an- 
swer 

Mr. Murphy. What page? 

Senator Ferguson. 1 do not have it here. You will probably 
be able to find it. It is about in the center of his testimony : 

That was the night of the 6th and 7th? 

Yes, sir. By late Saturday night we had, if I remember correctly, 13 of 
the parts. 

You are referring there to the 14-part message ? 



PROCEEDINGS 01<' J OUST COMMITTEE 3425 

Captain McCollum. That is the final Japanese note; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any other occasions where you 
ever delivered any intercept to the White House at night? 

Captain McCollum. I did not make the deliveries, sir. Those de- 
liveries were made by Captain Kramer, and I believe there were oc- 
casions when they were delivered to the naval aide to the President 
at night. 

[9230] Senator Ferguson. At night? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of those occasions? AVhat they 
were ? 

Captain McCollum. I do not specifically at this distance, sir, but 
it Avas common practice to make those deliveries at night, and re- 
port things to the people that had to know, including the Director 
of Intelligence, Chief of Operations, Director of War Plans, and 
the naval aide to the President. 

Senator F'erguson. Do you know what the hours of the naval 
aide were at the White House ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether Admiral Beardall, who 
was the regular naval aide, was at the White House on the night of 
the 6th? 

Captain McCollum. I understand he Avas at dinner with Admiral 
Wilkinson on that night. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, there would be an assistant, would there 
not, to the aide? 

Captain McCollum. It would be delivered at the homes of these 
people wherever they were in town. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not the copy for the 
President was delivered to Admiral Beardall [9231'] at Ad- 
miral Wilkinson's home? 

Captain McCullom. It is my understanding that he saw it at 
Admiral Wilkinson's home on the night of the 6th. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you understand then that if the aide of 
the President read the message that that was all that was required? 
It didn't go to the President personally? 

Captain McCollum. That the aide would take it to the President. 

Senator Ferguson. That is Avhat I Avanted to knoAV, whether or not 
you have any knowledge of whether the aide took the message to the 
JPresident ; that is. Admiral Beardall when he saAv it at Admiral Wil- 
kinson's home, whether he took it that night to the President ? 

Captain McCollum. I have no knowledge of that, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Will the gentleman yield? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. My understanding of the testimony is that it will clearly 
show that Captain Kramer delivered this message to the White House 
and left it Avith the under aide, if you may call him such, to Admiral 
Beardall, Admiral Beardall not being present, and when he got to 
Admiral Wilkinson's home he found Admiral Beardall there along 
with General Miles. It Avas actually deliA^ered to the White [9232} 
House that night. 

Captain McCollum. Thank you, sir. 



3426 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. I think that the aide on duty that night will be 
able to explain that it was delivered that night. I think his name is 
Schultz. 

Now, going on with your testimony : 

They were transmitted, almost as soon as received, to the Secretary of State, 
to the President, to the Chief of Naval Operations, and to people over here in 
the War Department. 

Would you say that that was a correct statement ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what time you went home on the 
evening of the 6th ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. Sometime between 9 and 10 o'clock, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And the 13 parts were in when you went home? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Not all of them ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How many were in ? 

Captain McCollum. I don't remember exactly how many. Prob- 
ably six or seven. 

\93S3] Senator Ferguson. Had you left any instructions ? 

Captain McCollum. They called me when they were all in, and told 
me they had been delivered to the correct people. Both Kramer and 
Watts called me probably between 11 and 12 that night. 

Senator Ferguson. Between 11 and 12 you received the call show- 
ing they were all in and delivered? 

Captain McCollum. Thirteen parts, and they were looking for the 
14th. 

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, on the day of the 6th, your 
office was fully alerted to the seriousness of this whole situation ? 

Captain McCollum. We thought so, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And did you know whether the Army was fully 
alerted to the seriousness of the situation ? 

Captain McCollum. That was my impression, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, the next part of your testimony — have 
you found it ? 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. I find it, but I find there are two errors in the rest of 
his sentence. He says the White House, but he also says it went to 
Admiral Stark, but it didn't, as I understand it. At the top of page 33. 

[9234] Senator Ferguson. Let me have it. 

Mr. EiCHARDSON. If I may interject, I think you have to remember 
that this witness's testimony on delivery is purely hearsay. 

Mr. Murphy. Of course it is. 

Mr. Richardson. Of course he cannot be held accountable for 
whether it was delivered to Stark or not. 

Senator Ferguson. I read it just as it is. 

Mr. Murphy. You said it went to the White House but you didn't 
read the rest to show it went to the Chief of Naval Operations, and to 
the War Department ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I have the identical language. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3427 

Mr. Murphy. You read the whole sentence ? All right. 
Senator Ferguson. I will read it from the original. 
Mr. Murphy. I am not sure. I don't want to say that you misread it. 
Senator Ferguson. We don't want to misquote the witness. 

Captain McCoixum. That was the night of the 6th-7th yes, Sir. By late Satur- 
day night, we had. If I remember correctly, 13 of the parts. They were trans- 
mitted almost as soon as received, to the Secretary of State, to the President, to 
the Chief of Naval Operations, and to the people over here in the War Department. 

[933S] And your reason for making that answer, as I under- 
stand it, was you got a call from Kramer and Watts ? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Between 11 and 12 o'clock that night, that they 
had done that very thing ? 

Captain McCollum. That they had made the proper deliveries. 
They did not go into detail, and that is possibly wrong in detail as 
brought out later. 

I have only reported that it had been delivered to the proper people. 

Senator Ferguson. Among the proper people, was the Secretary of 
State, the President, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the War 
Department ? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. My only reason in raising it was that I didn't want 
to have the captain up here to be saying that he knew of his own knowl- 
edge that it went to Admiral Stark because all the testimony is that it 
didn't, as I understand it. 

Captain McCollum. As counsel said, what I am giving is hearsay, 
and it is based on reports. It is my impression at the time. It is 
undoubtedly wrong in minor detail. 

[9236] ' Senator Ferguson. But it was an official report from one 
of the men working with you or under you ? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. And j^ou explained what kind of hearsay it was? 

Captain McCoLLuar. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Going on with your answer : 

Early Sunday morning, when 1 arrived to take over the duty in my office, 
where we had a special watch set up since early November, the I4th part was 
coming in ; and while Admiral Willvinson and I were discussing the situation 
about nine o'clock Sunday morning, or possibly earlier, nearer 8:30 with 
Admiral Stark 

You recall that testimony ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct ? 

Captain McCollum. The times may be off. Senator, as I explained 
before. In other words, my basis of judging time is the time that I 
arrived at the Navy Department. 

Senator Ferguson. And that was your best judgment when you gave 
this testimony ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. 

— the instruction which diiected the delivery of the note to the Secretary of 
State, was brought in, shown [9237] to Admiral Stark, who immediately 
called the White House on the telephone, and the draft was taken over to the 
Secretary of State and to the White House. 
79716--46— pt. 8 5 



3428 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAKL HAKBOK ATTACK 

Captain McCollum. That is my understanding. 
Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that testimony (^ 
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson. Now : 

At the time, the possible significance of the time of delivery was pointed out 
to all hands. 

Captain MoCollum. That is right, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. AVill yon tell us who "all hands" were ? 

Captain McCollum. Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Stark, Admiral 
Ingersoll, and possibly Captain Schuirmann, who I think was in 
Admiral Stark's office at that time. sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The next question is by Admiral Hewitt : 

You are referring to the one p. m. delivery time? 

And you answered : 

Yes, sir. In other words, it was pointed out that one p. ni. Washington time 
would mean about 8 o'clock in the morning Honolulu time. 
Admiral Hewitt. 7 : 30. 
Captain McCollum. 7 : 30, yes, sir 

You remember that ^ 

[9238] Captain IVIcCollum. That is correct, sir. 
Senator Ferguson. That is cori'ect ( 
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Going on with your answer after the words 
"7 : 30, yes, sir" : 

And very early in the morning out in the Far East, that is, out in the Philippines 
and those places ; and that we didn't know what this signified, but that if an at- 
tack were coining, it looked like the timing was such that it was timed for opera- 
tions out in the Far East and possibly on Hawaii at the time. We had no way 
of knowing, but because of the fact that the exact time for delivery of this note 
had been stressed to the Ambassadors — 

There is where you were referring to an intercepted note i* 
Captain McCollum. Xo; still time of delivery, 1 o'clock. 
[9239] Senator Ferguson. But it had been in a message that 
we intercepted to the Jap Ambassadors i 
Captain McCollum. That is right. 
Senator Ferguson. Reading on : 

we felt that there were important things which would move at that time, and 
that was pointed out not only to Admii-al Stark, but I know it was pointed out to 
the Secretary of State. 

Captain McCollum. I will have to amend my former testimony on 
that latter point. I do not know of that of my own knowledge. 

Senator Ferguson. Did somebody tell you ? 

Captain McCollum. Kramer went over with instructions to point 
out the time business to the Secretary, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So officially Kramer w^as told? 

Captain McCollum. I told him. 

Senator Ferguson. Or ordered to tell and point this out to the 
Secretary of State ? 

Captain McCollum. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the reason you have put in "but I know 
it was pointed out to the Secretary of State" ? 

Captain McCollum. I should not have said it in that categorical 
language because I do not know that of my own knowledge. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3429 

[9£40'] Senator Ferguson, But you had every reason to be- 
lieve that because you instructed Kramer to do it ? 
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

I was present and assisted in pointing it out to Admiral Stark and it was 
taken over, with instructions to jwint that out, to the Secretary of State. 

So you do explain it. 
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

I was not present at that. I do not know, I would add, however, that 
the Secretary of State was not available at the time that the Japanese Am- 
bassadors desired to deliver their note, and it is my recollection in the discussion 
at the time with the Chief of Naval Operations — 

That is Admiral Stark, is it not? 
Captain McCollum. That is correct. 
Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

and his admirals in there that that was a deliberate move on our part. 

Captain McCollum. That was my impression at that time, sir; 
it may have been wrong. 

Senator Ferguson. You had a discussion with Admiral Stark and 
his admirals that he had deliberately moved so that [9241] 
the Secretary of State would not be present at 1 o'clock for the 
delivery ? 

Captain McCollum. That was the impression I was under, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. From the conversation that took place? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, to go on : 

Admiral Hewitt. Do you remember who it was delivered the message to fbe 
Secretary of State and the White House? 

He is talking there about the fourteenth part, is he not, and the 
1 o'clock message ? 

Captain McCollum, I am not sure which. 
Senator Ferguson. I will go on : 

Captain McCollum. No, sir, I do not, but it was probably Lieutenant Com- 
mander, now Captain, Kramer. I can't say that for sure because some of these 
things Admiral Turner himself would run over to see the Seci-etary, or Captain 
Schuirmann would run over. The normal routine would have been for Kramer 
to have delivered it. 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you would be talking about tlie fourteenth 
part and the 1 o'clock message? 
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

Admiral HEwrrr. Do you recall wlio was present when 

[9242] Captain McCollum. Yes. May I elaborate a little? 

Adniiral Hewitt. Yes. 

Captain McCollum. By mid-November the situation in the Far East had ap- 
peared oo acute that in addition to tiie usual duty watches in the Division of 
Naval Intelligence, one of the three regular officers assigned to th(\ Far East 
Section— that is, Commander Watts, Colonel Boone and myself — was constantly 
on duty in our offices, with adequate office help, on a 24-hour basis. 



3430 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Do you recall that? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is accurate? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MuKPHT. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. MuRPHT. I just have it in the back of my head that there is 
some testimony that for sometime before the Tth, there was a divi- 
sion betAveen the Army and Navy where the Army was to cover the 
State Department and the Navy the White House. 

Senator Ferguson. That is correct, but it was changed. There 
was a change made. 

Mr. JNIuRPHY. You mean the Nav}^ tlien covered both of them? 

[924^3] Senator Ferguson. Yes. As I understand, that is cor- 
rect. Isn't it, Captain ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. Normally the Navy covered the 
White House, and the War Department covered the State Department. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. 

Captain McCollum. This dispatch was considered so important 
that rather than wait for it to go to the War Department to be 
picked up by Colonel Bratton, and taken over to the State Depart- 
ment, we cut short and delivered direct telling Colonel Bratton what 
we had done. 

Mr. Murphy. That explains it. 

Senator Ferguson. So this was an unusual situation and you were 
making delivery to the State Department even though that was the 
Army's job? 

Captain McCollum. It was a situation that we believe required 
the quickest possible delivery and the quickest possible was for us to 
deliver rather than pass it on to the Army and then have them pass 
it further, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, the danger wasn't in Washington. There 
wasn't danger in Washington because of which you were delivering 
this message out of the ordinary rules to the Secretary of State. 
The clanger was on our fronts, was it not, and our outposts ? 

[9244] Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. You mean the danger 
of actual physical damage? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir. 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you say anything about getting it to them 
where the danger was ? 

Captain McCollum. Senator, I have already said that that sug- 
gestion was definitely made, that a dispatch be sent to the fleet point- 
ing out that something could be expected to happen at the time. 

Senator Ferguson. That was before it was sent to the State 
Department ? 

Captain McCollum. About that same time, sir. We continued to 
discuss this thing. Whether it was before or immediately after, I 
can't say at this time, sir. But the situation was very definitely dis- 
cussed and in my recollection Admiral Stark made an effort to get 
in touch with General Marshall by the telephone and couldn't. 

Now, I can't say who he tried to get in touch with. That is my 
impression at the time. 



PKOCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3431 

Seiifitor Ferguson. Have 5^011 finished ? 
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson. Going on : 

I arrived at the Navy Department about 7 : 30 or a quarter [9245] of 
8, December 7 — 

What Avas your regular time to get there? Did you have a watcli 
on certain hours? 

(^aptain jNIcCollum. Yes, sir. That was the normal time to shift 
the watch, quarter to 8. That left the other fellow time to get home 
for breakfast. 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

— to take over the watch from Commander Watts. Shortly after my arrival 
In the Navy Department, Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of Intelligence, 
arrived and sent for me and we had a discussion concerning the situation in 
the Far East. 

Do you recall that? 

Captain INIcCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. About how long had you been on your post 
that morning until Wilkinson called you, or came in — sent for you? 

Captain McColluivi. It is hard to estimate the time. Senator, but 
I hadn't completed reading carefully the 13 parts of the dispatch 
note at that time, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, Hadn't you had the night before to read it? 

Captain McCollum. I had had part of it. Not all of it. 

Senator Ferguson, They didn't then deliver it to you [9246] 
the night before ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But they talked to you on the telephone? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator F'erguson (reading) : 

After 15 or 20 minutes of the discussion, we received word that Admiral 
Stark had arrived in the Navy Department and both Admiral Wilkinson and 
myself went down to talk to Admiral Stark. 

Do you recall that? 
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

At that time he was alone. While were in there discussing the situa- 
tion with Admiral Stark, various officers of the Division of Operations came 
into the oflace. I believe Admiral Ingersoll was present, Admiral Brainard, 
Admiral Noyes, Admiral Turner, and possibly Captain Schuirman. There 
may have been others ; I don't know. Certainly Admiral Turner and Admiral 
Ingersoll were present. Whether they were present all the time, I do not 
know. There was considerable going in and out at that time. 

Admiral Turner was head of the War Plans ? 

Captain INIcCollum. That is right, sir. 

[9£47'\ Senator Ferguson, Under the rule that had been laid 
down, he received the messages in the raw and did not get your 
interpretation of them? 

Captain McCollum. He got both. He received them in the raw, 
and I w'as careful to give him my interpretation of it. That was 
my duty. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that what you were doing there that morn- 
ing on the 7th, giving these men your interpretation, as head of 
the Intelligence? 



3432 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain McCollum. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. So yon were carrying out your function at 
that time. 
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson. Now, continuing: 

About 9 o'clock, or a little earlier, I received word from the outside room 
that one of my oflScers wished to see me urgently, and I stepped outside and 
received the last part of the message, concerning the final note to be delivered 
on the United States by the Japanese Ambassadors. 

That would be the fourteenth part that you received while you 
were discussing the 13 parts? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir, that would seern to be so. I am not 
certain from what you have read, whether that is the fourteenth part, 
or whether I am referring now to the time [9^4^] there, sir. 

Possibly reading further will clear that up. 

Senator Ferguson. I will go on. 

Admiral Hewitt. The last part of the long message? 

Captain McCollum. The long message, and the dispatch directing its presen- 
tation on the Secretary of State at one o'clock, Washington time. 

So there were both ? 

Captain McCollum. That was my recollection at the time, sir. I 
had not had opportunity to read over very much. I would like to 
amend that to this degree : 

I think that the times that I gave there are erroneous. They are 
probably off by as much as an hour there, sir. The fourteenth part 
came in separately and was brought up by Admiral Wilkinson and 
myself to Admiral Stark after we had talked to him about the 13 
, parts. While we were discussing the fourteenth part, and its lan- 
guage, then this word came in that an oflScer wanted to see me outside. 
It was Kramer with the time-delivery dispatch, which was separate 
from the other dispatch. 

Senator Ferguson. But the fourteenth part was in English, this 
message all came in in English, didn't it ? 

Captain McCollum. That I don't know. It may have; I don't 
know. 

[9249] Senator Ferguson. Didn't we have both the cipher and 
the code so that we could read this 14-part message? 

Captain McCollum. Apparently so, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And that made it quite easy to read, if we had 
both the cipher and the code ? 

Captain McCollum. I don't know about that aspect. I would like 
to answer that question, but I am simply not technically qualified to 
answer it. I don't know those technical details. 

Mr. Murphy. Don't we have an exhibit showing exactly that? I 
mean_ showing what the times were, and when they got each one. 
Isn't it in evidence ? 

Senator Ferguson. We have. 

Mr. Murphy. It might help in your examination. 

Senator Ferguson. I may not have read all of your answer. I will 
go back : 

Captain McCollxjm. The long message, and the dispatch directing its presen- 
tation on the Secretary of State at one o'clock Washington time. I held a short 
discussion with Lieutenant Commander Kramer as to the significance at the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3433 

time, and he it was who pointed out the time at Honolulu at 7 : 30 and in the 
Far East as dawn, and so on. 

Admiral Hewitt. Before dawn. Wouldn't that be before dawn? 

[9250] Captain McCollum. Before dawn, yes, sir. That would be about 
2 o'clock in the morning out there. 

So, you corrected yourself there, did you not ? 

Captain McCollum. You have to take those time zones and add 
them up. It is difficult to add under discussion, and I may be errone- 
ous in the addition. But they can be added out. 

Senator Ferguson. I read on. 

I took that in to Admiral Stark and pointed out the possible significance of 
the time in conjunction with the note, and it was also pointed out to other ofli- 
cers of the Division of Operations who were present at the time. 

The Division of Operations was War Plans, was it not? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. The Division of Operations con- 
sisted of the staff, you might say, of the Chief of Naval Operations. 
War Plans was one of the divisions of Operations. 

Senator Ferguson. Who were you talking about when you said the 
"officers of the Division of Operations"? 

Captain McCollum. I was talking about War Plans, Intelligence, 
Communications, Ship Movements, the Central Division, and so on, 
sir. 

[d^SlI Senator Ferguson. Then, going on : 

Admiral Stark talked over the telephone, I think, with the Chief of StafE of 
the Army, who presently came over with Colonel Bratton. 

Now, you testified there that General Marshall came over with 
Colonel Bratton. Is that correct ? 

Captain McCollum. I testified to that effect, but I am in error on 
that, Senator. I did not have the privilege of reading over the testi- 
mony that I gave before Admiral Hewitt, and amend it at that time, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, how could you be mistaken on such 
an important thing as the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, coming 
over with Bratton ? 

Captain McCollum. He was over that afternoon, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I didn't catch your answer. 

Captain McCollum. I say, the general was over in Admiral Stark's 
office that afternoon. 

Senator Ferguson. But you were talking about the morning. 

Captain INIcCollum. That is correct, sir, and I was confused when 
I gave that testimony as to time, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, you said : 

I was not there the whole time, and later on I came in and by ten o'clock that 
morning we were given to [9252] understand that a warning message 
iiad been sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, via Army channels. 

Captain McCollum. As I told you, sir, the time is off. I believe that 
that message was sent out sometime between 11 and noon, sir. 

The only basis on which I have discussed the time was the time 
I got there first in the morning. I was extremely busy, as I am sure 
you will understand, in moving in and out, and those statements I 
made at the time are probably not accurate. 

[9^6-/] Senator Fehciusox. Well, if you were an hour off, it 
would only be 11 o'clock. You said "by 10 o'clock." 



3434 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

In other words, the warning was to go to the Commanding General of the 
Hawaiian Department with instructions to transmit it to the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Pacific Fleet. 

Captain MgCollu^i. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand that the Navy did not 
consider this any more important than to send it to the Army and then 
have them look up the commander in chief in the Pacific and give him 
a copy of it ? Is that how you treated it ? 

Captain McCollum. That was not my decision, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Whose decision was that ? 

Captain McCollum. That decision was made by the Chief of Naval 
Operations. 

Senator Ferguson. Now% Admiral Hewitt said : 

Now, go back to the winds code message — 
and then he changes the subject so we are no longer on that subject. 
Is that correct ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Will you yield, Senator, so that I may [9254] 
ask him a question 'i 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; certainly. 

Senator Lucas. May I ask you, Captain, when it was you gave the 
testimony that Senator Ferguson has been reading from ? 

Captain McCollum. That was in May of this year, sir. 

The Chairman. Last year, you mean. 

Captain McCollum. Or last year; I beg your pardon. May of 
19i5, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Is that the first time you testified ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. I might add, by way of explanation, 
sir, that unfortunately every time they would get ready to hold one of 
these previous inquiries we w^ould be in the midst of an operation 
against the Japs at the time, and my admiral asked that I not appear 
at that time, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Did you discuss this matter with anyone from De- 
cember 7 on to the time that Admiral Hewitt took your testimony ? 

Captain McCollum. Not in detail. Senator. I may have discussed 
it with various people shortly after that time here in Washington 
and around that I saw, but certainly not since October or November of 
1942, sir. 

Senator Lucas. In other words, you w^ere giving your best recollec- 
tion at the time with respect to dates and times, and so forth and so on ? 

[9255] Captain McCollum. That is right ; yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you state in your testimony or before that 
it was a fact that you had made an analysis of the situation in the 
Pacific and that you and Wilkinson — that is, Admiral Wilkinson — 
had a discussion with Admiral Stark and urged a warning be sent to 
the fleet ? That was around about December the 1st. 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that the one you described this morning ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3435 

Senator Fekguson. Now, will yon tell us what the nature of the 
warning is that you wanted sent about the 1st of Docember? 

Captain McCollum. The situation, Senator, was this — that this in- 
formation, not only from this source but from all other information 
sources we had, was coming in, was being sent to the War Plans Divi- 
sion with evaluation as to the credibility of the information as it came 
in. I had several discussions with Admiral Turner, as we always did 
during the days going on, and by 1 December I had personally not 
seen anything going out to anybody Avarning people outside that there 
was danger. 

[92S6] Senator Ferguson. Did you know that we had sent a 
message or delivered a message to Japan from the Secretary of State 
on the 26th? 

Captain McCollum. Most of my information as to what we had 
delivered to the Japanese, sir, came from my reading of the intercepts 
of the outgoing Japanese dispatches. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that was a fact ? 

Captain McCollum. I knew it from reading the break-down — I am 
not certain on that point, sir. I probably knew it from reading the 
decode of the outgoing dispatch here from the Japanese Ambassador. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, the State Department 
did not convey that to you ? 

Captain McCollum. Not to me, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You were trying to evaluate what you had 
without knowing what the State Department was doing on December 
the 1st, when you had this conversation with Admiral Wilkinson? 

Captain McCollum. That is right, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know at that time about the message 
of the dead line of the 25th and then being shifted to the 29th ? 

Captain McCollum. Those were Japanese dispatches. Yes, sir; I 
saw that. 

[92S7] Senator Ferguson. Were those significant to you? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It has been discussed here in other testimony 
about your drafting a long message. Was that the one of Decem- 
ber the 1st? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. I drafted no message on December 
the 1st. There is a memorandum that I drafted here on December 
the 1st, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And is that the one that you discussed with 
Admiral Stark? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you draft a long — it is de- 
scribed as a long message ? 

Captain McCollum. About the middle of the week of 1 to 7 De- 
cember I drafted a dispatcli which contained certain items of in- 
formation, drawing deductions from it, which covered about, I should 
say, a half of a page of this size. That would be a normal dispatch 
blank. 

Senator F'erguson. Well, now, will you give us the — you said 
this morning that that is not existent; that it has been destroyed. 

Captain McCollum. No, sir; that type of thing, Senator, would 
be purely indicative of my recommendations and to be submitted in 



3436 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAKL HAKBOK ATTACK 

final form to my chiefs, who normally, if they [9£58] did 
not elect to send it out, would destroy it, and there would be no 
record of it anywhere, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, that wqjild require us to try to get 
from you as nearly as possible the contents of that instrument. Would 
you give it to us ? 

Captain McCollum. It has been a long time ago, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I realize that. 

Captain JNIcCollum. I don't know that I can give it with any 
exactitude at all, sir. The message, I believe. Senator — all the major 
points contained in this memorandum of mine of the 1st of De- 
cember were secured out of bits of what I considered to be significant 
information and drew from that the conclusion that the Japanese 
were definitely bent on war and that we could expect the opening 
of hostilities almost at any time, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, hostilities against us? 

Captain McCollum. Sir? 

Senator Ferguson. Hostilities against America? 

Captain INIcCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you surprised when the Japanese at- 
tacked on Sunday morning at Hawaii ? 

Captain McCollum. I was not surprised at the Japanese attack, 
sir. I was astonished at the success attained by that attack, sir. 

[9259] Senator Ferguson. Well, now, there is a difference be- 
tween that and the question I asked you. Were you surprised that 
we were attacked at Hawaii on Sunday morning? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You were not? 

Captain McCollum, I do not mean by that statement to imply 
that I had any knowledge that the Japanese were going to attack 
Pearl Harbor, and I wish to state categorically that there was no 
bit of intelligence that I had at my disposal that definitely to my 
mind indicated that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor, but 
T had 

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the 

The Chairman. Let him finish that answer. 

Mr. Murphy. This is important. He was riglit in the midst of a 
sentence. 

Senator Ferguson. I will let him complete it. Read the last 
jmrt of it. 

Mr. Murphy. He said, "But I had" — and then you interrupted 
him. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read his answer so that he gets the 
exact point ? I don't want to cut him off. 

(Answer read.) 

Captain McCollum (continuing). For many years felt that in the 
event of an outbreak of hostilities between the [9260] United 
States and Japan that the Japanese would make a very definite at- 
tempt to strike the fleet at or near the commencement time of those 
hostilities. 

Senator Ferguson. Did not any of the messages in Exhibit 2 give 
you information that they would strike, or intended to strike, at 
Pearl Harbor? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3437 

Captain McColltjm. Not to my mind, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you knew that war was very immi- 
nent in the middle of the week. You expected an attack, and you 
were not surprised at the attack, and you thought that they would 
attack our fleet wherever it was. 

Captain McCollum. That is right, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then why were you surprised that they at- 
tacked Pearl Harbor? Didn't you have information that they would 
attack Pearl Harbor ? 

Captain McCollum. I did not know that the fleet was in Pearl 
Harbor exactly, sir. I knew that they were operating in that area, 
but I presumed that the attack would be made on the fleet wherever 
it was, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So that if you would have known that the 
fleet was in Pearl Harbor, at least six battleships, eight battleships 
and, outside of the task forces, were sitting like ducks in Pearl Harbor, 
you would have anticipated an attack upon that fleet in Pearl Harbor'^ 

[OEGll Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. If it had been in San 
Pedro I would have anticipated the attack there, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. So that it was because you 
did not know where the fleet was that you made this explanation ? 

Captain McCollum. I do not quite follow you. 

Senator Ferguson. You made an explanation after your answer 
that you were not surprised. Then you made an explanation. Do 
you remember that ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And it was because you did not know where 
the fleet was that you made that explanation ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. I meant to make the explanation to 
try to make it clear that at no time did I predict a definite Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor, nor was there any intelligence at my dis- 
posal that I considered conclusively showed that the Japanese in- 
tended to attack Pearl Harbor. I felt that the fact that the Japanese 
intended to go to war carried with it the possibility of an attack 
on the fleet wherever it might be, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now of course, in Intelligence you do 
do not always deal upon absolute certainties, do you ? 

Captain McCollum. As near as possible, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; but you have to evaluate certain [9262] 
things to determine what you anticipate from the enemy? 

Captain McCollum. That is right, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And it is a matter of estimate, is it not? 

Captain McCollum. Judgment ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And that you talked to Admiral Stark 
and showed him the significance of the 9 o'clock message being 7:30 
at Pearl Harbor ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And that you did then and there — 

Captain IMcCollum. That was not a significant time, Senator, at 
Pearl Harbor. I have explained that it was standard practice for 
use to check up times at the major points that Ave had throughout 
the Pacific so that we could get a clear view of what the daylight 
and dark status, and so on, was at the time, sir. 



3438 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Fergusox. But it was your estimate that a message should 
go to the Admiral of the Fleet no matter where it was; that is what 
you were figuring on ? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And to go immediately because you expected 
something to happen at 1 o'clock. 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did tliat message that j^ou drew up, that 
\9263'] j^'ou indicated was about a half a page — that is ]ust for 
description — did it have any so-called orders in it? 

Captain McCollu^i. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Or was it only information? 

Captain ]McCollu:m. It was information and conclusions drawn 
therefrom, sir. In other words, it was a broad-gaged estimate of the 
intent of the Japanese, sir. 

Senator P'erguson. And the substance of that estimate was that 
we were going to war with Japan ? 

Captain McColi.u:\i. That Japan would strike. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; would strike. Now, you knew of the 
movement to the south, to the Kra Peninsula? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. I estimated on the 1st of December 
that they would strike the Kra Peninsula in force. 

Senator Ferguson. Did that mean anything to you in evaluating 
the evidence, that they would strike both America and the British 
at the same ? 

Captain McCollum. I felt that they were definitely capable of it, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, was that your estimate, that if they struck 
the one thev would strilce the other? 

Captain JSIcCollum. I cannot answer that precisely at this time, 
sir. I felt that if the Japanese were convinced that we would strike 
if they went down to the Kra Peninsula, then [9364] they 
would strike us at the same time. 

Senator Ferguson. You say if they were convinced that we would 
strike ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. In other words, if the Japanese 
high command became convinced that we would interpret their move 
against the Kra Peninsula as a warlike move against us and would 
go to war with them, then they would strike us. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, were you familiar then with the mes- 
sage of the I7th of August 1941 ? It is in that book, volume II here. 
I will show you the message. 

The Chairman. The Chair would like to say to the committee that 
counsel has indicated that Captain McCollum is compelled to leave 
for his command tonight. 

Mr. Kal^man. That is correct. 

The Chairman. And, therefore, I hope the committee will be 
willing to sit a little longer so that we may conclude his testimony. 

Senator Ferguson. I will do everything I can. I will hurry right 
along. 

I wish to show you now an exhibits in the case. It is the Foreign 
Kelations, volume II. And will you state the page, Mr. Masten ? 

Mr. Masten. Pace 556. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3439 

Senator Ferguson. Page 556. Now, it is the last paragraph 
[9265] at the bottom of the page and runs over onto the top of the 
next page. I wish that you would read it. 

Captain McCollum (reading) : 

Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the 
Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps 
in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat 
of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be 
compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary 
toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States 
and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the 
United States. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know about that ? 

Captain McCollum. Through reading the intercepts I niaj^ have, 
sir. I did not know about these notes as they were delivered, nor did 
I see any of the notes as they were delivered. 

Senator Ferguson. "Wouldn't that be notice to the Japanese that we 
were interested in a matter as vital to our country as the question of 
going into the southwest ? 

Captain McCollum. The impression was that we were going to 
safeguard the interests of the United States and the safety of our 
nationals. That is what it says here, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And did you know of the various messages 
[9266] from Great Britain, the message from Winant to the Secre- 
tary of State being, in effect, from Mr. Churchill to the Secretary of 
State, at 10 : 40 on the morning of the 6th ? 

Captain McCollum. Saying what, Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. Saying that the ships were going into the Kra 
Peninsula and that they were 14 hours away. 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir ; I suav that, but we already had it from 
our own source, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You already had it from your own source? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. That was merely passing on infor- 
mation along to us that we already had, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you have any knowledge about the 
question of what we would do in case they went into the southwest? 

Captain McCollutvi. No, sir. That was a matter of Government 
policy. That was way over my head, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you did not get Government policy? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir ; not of that level, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then I will ask you how you could evaluate 
Intelligence if you did not get all of the Government policy ? 

Captain McCollum. All I can say to that. Senator, is that I did the 
best I could with what I had, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You did the best you could with what [9267] 
you had. Now I will ask you about a meeting or a conference on the 
morning of the 6th ; that is Saturday. 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you go into that with Miles, or Avas there a 
conference of Miles and Bratton and Wilkinson and McCollum and 
probably Heinmarsh ? 

Captain McCollum. There may have been, Senator. We frequently 
saw each other either in one office or another. We ran backward and 
forward all the time, sir. 



3440 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you recall anything being considered 
Saturday morning, that being a very important day, was it not? It 
stood out to you ? 

Captain McCollum. Not much more than the days preceding and 
immediately following, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you had the pilot message on the morning 
of Saturday morning which indicated that they were going to deliver 
a message in reply to the message of the 26th. You had the Tokyo 
to Berlin saying that war would come quicker than some people 
thought? 

Captain McCollum. Might I just offer one suggestion on the inter- 
pretation of that Tokyo to Berlin dispatch if I may, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir ; that is what I would like to have you do. 

[9£68] Captain ]\IcCollum. Berlin up until that time had been 
pressing the Japanese to go to war with the Russians, they had been 
doing everything they could to kick the Japanese into jumping on the 
backs of the Russians, and the first time I read that dispatch it im- 
pressed me as being a Japanese excuse to the Germans not to jump on 
the Russians. 

Senator Ferguson. But a message that they were going to jump 
both on the United States and Britain ? 

Captain McCollum. They frequently at other times sent messages 
that they were going to do things in other areas and we were fairly 
certain that they were driving to the south then. 

Senator Ferguson. And is that the reason that you discounted that 
message that they were not going to jump on us, because they were 
only using it as an excuse ? 

Captain INIcCollum. I discounted anything which showed that they 
were not going to jump on us. Everything I tried to say is that I felt 
that thej^ were going to jump on us, that I was convinced that the 
situation between us and Japan was intensely acute. Had I not felt 
that way I certainly should not have put my office on a 24 hour basis 
early in November. 

As a matter of fact, if the Senator will indulge me, my wife remon- 
strated with me as to how hard I was working my people at that time, 
sir. In other words, I felt that the situation between us and Japan 
was extremely explosive and would [9269'] erupt at any time, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, getting back to the morning of the 6th. I 
only raised that point to see whether or not you could recall a confer- 
ence on that particular morning. 

Captain McCollum. Yes ; I appreciate that. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you remember such a conference that morn- 
ing in relation to trying to get a message out to the so-called outposts ? 

Captain McCollum. Senator, I am afraid I would be confusing if 
I said I did. 

Senator Ferguson, I certainly to do want you to do that. 

Captain McCollum. I cannot answer that directly. There may 
have been such a conference. It does not stand out in my memory at 
this time, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But you were, as a Director of Intelligence, 
greatly concerned that there be sufficient messages go from time to time 
as the situation increased in danger to the front ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3441 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, yes, sir; very nuieli so. 

Senator Ferguson. And you had taken it up with your superior 
officers, that is correct? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, And you had considered it with youi lower 
officers, is that correct ? 

[0270] Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, was it unusual to send out information 
from the War Plans Avhich you did not know about ? 

Captain McCollum. That apparently was the practice, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not know it until recently, is that it'^ 
You say it apparently was the practice. 

Captain McCollum. Well, you hear some of these things by rumors 
in a place like the Navy Department, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. They do have rumors, then, in the Navy De- 
])artment? 

Captain McColluim. That is right, sir. They are pretty human 
tlown there after all, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The Kochefort that you described this morn- 
ing was a very efficient officer? 

Captain McCollum. In my opinion, he is one of the most efficient 
officers in the Navy, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted about a message to him 
from Miles about the Avind code message? 

Captain McCoLLu:Nr. From General Miles to Commander Roche- 
fort? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Captain McCollum. I cannot conceive of a message of that sort 
being sent except through me or through Captain Safford. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, from their G-2 to get in touch [9271] 
with Rochefort? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir ; I knew that their G-2 had been told 
to get in touch — I don't know whether the term "Rochefort" was men- 
tioned or not, but that was the intention, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. There was a rather iron-clad rule tliat you never 
got in touch with an Army man, a Navy man would never directly get 
in touch from your department with the Army? 

Captain McCollum. Oh, no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well you said before it would be unusual to 
have one sent 

Captain McColluim. No. What I said was, it would be unusual 
for General Miles to send a dispatch to Rochefort to get in touch with 
someone. That is what I understood you to say, Senator. In other 
words, he would have normally come to me and asked me to send a 
dispatch to Rochefort from the Navy here; merely a matter of 
technique, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted with about getting in 
touch with Rochefort in Hawaii in relation to the weather message, 
the wind core? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you understand then that they would get 
the interpretation of the message? 



3442 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain McCollum. I understood that G-2 was very anxious for 
their G-2 in Hawaii to have direct access with Commander [9272] 
Rochef ort, who had the only agency capable of intercepting, the winds 
message in Hawaii, sir. The Army, as I understand it, had no par- 
allel set-up in Hawaii at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with plan WPL-46 ? 

Captain McCollum. In a general way, sir. I read it at the time. 
I haven't read it since, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that it considered or it required 
certain action upon the part of Admiral Kimmel to take action in 
the Marshalls and places such as that? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Could a war warning have meant that? 

Captain McCollum, No, sir ; not a war warning. The commander 
in chief of the fleet would not have been authorized to undertake hos- 
tilities on the basis of a war warning. What you are suggesting, as 
I understand it, sir, is that Admiral Kimmel would undertake immedi- 
ately to start war. I did not so interpret that message of the 27th of 
November. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, there was a way to put the War Plan into 
effect, wasn't there? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir, but when that War Plan went into 
effect, that was war, sir. The War Plan called for active operations, 
and when we got to operate under WPL-46 you can bet we started 
shooting, Senator. 

[9273] Senator Ferguson. Well, if you wanted to alert Admiral 
Kimmel to an air attack upon Hawaii, there would be very simple 
words that you could do that in, wouldn't there? 

Captain McCollum. Probably so, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, only probably so ? 

Captain McCollum. Well, sir, how would you suggest it? 

Senator Ferguson. If you wanted no misunderstanding, what 
words would you use as an Intelligence oflScer ? That was your duty, 
was it not, to help to draw up these alerts ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That was not your duty ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. That duty was taken away from us 
in about February 1941, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. In February of 1941 that duty was taken away 
from you ? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And it was placed where ? 

Captain McCollum. Placed in the Division of War Plans of the 
office of the Chief of Naval Operations. 

Senator Ferguson, That is all. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to just clear up three 
matters briefly. It won't take long. 

The Chairman. Proceed. 

Mr. MuEPHT. Captain, there was a dead line of the 25th of 
[9274'] November ; you recall that ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir, 

Mr. MuEPHY. On the day immediately preceding that there was a 
message sent by the Navy that hostilities may commence in any direc- 
tion, is that right ? Do you remember that ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3443 

Captain McCollum. That is my understanding now, sir. 

Mr. MuKPHT. Now, then, the second dead line was the 29th of No- 
vember and 2 days previously to that there was a war-warning 
message sent to Hawaii ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, the other thing that you testified about was that 
the significance of the 1 p. m. message was pointed out to different 
people. As I understand it, you did not talk to anyone except to 
Turner, IngersoU, and Admiral Stark, is that right? 

Captain McCollum. And Admiral Wilkinson, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And Admiral Wilkinson. 

Captain McCollum. And there may have been others. Admiral 
IngersoU may have been there, there may have been others in Admiral 
Stark's office there. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate you have definite knowledge of the 
facts as to what occurred there because j^ou were present. 

Captain McCollum. I was there. 

[927S] Mr. Murphy. And you did point out the significance 
of the 1 o'clock p. m. to them, did you ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, what did you say the significance was? 

Captain McCollum. I felt that if the Japanese intended to have 
war with us they would strike at or near 1 o'clock Washington time, 
sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you say you felt that they would commence at 
1 o'clock at Pearl Harbor ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. You felt that the}^ would commence hostilities 
against us at 1 o'clock? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And you always felt that if the Japs were going 
to strike with her fleets the place to start was by attacking our fleet ? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct. 

Mr, Murphy. The place they would start would be by attacking the 
fleet. 

Captain McCollum. They not only would do that, but that there 
was historical precedent, if the Japanese wished to start a war 
with us. Their war with China in 1895 was started that way; their 
war with Russia in 1907 was started that way; their war against 
Germany in Tsingtao in 1914 [9276] was started in that way. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, the starting of their war with the Chinese 
and starting war with anyone else was by attacking their fleet? 

Captain McCollum. Attacking their fleet and timing a declara- 
tion of war on presentation of the final notes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. No other questions. 

[9277] Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, the time has finally ar- 
rived, as usual, when my questions start at the end of the day's 
hearing. 

Mr. Murphy. I did not mean to take up any part of your time. 

Mr. Keefe. Nobody ever intends to mean anything, except it places 
me in an unfortunate position as to time, being compelled to forgo 
asking as many questions as I would like. 

79716— 46— pt. 8 6 



3444 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. The Chair indicated we would sit longer in or- 
der to conclude with Captain McCollum, "We do not intend to 
shorten the examination of any member of the committee. 

Mr. Keefe. I liave a desire, the same as everybody else, to get 
through here. 

Captain, did you have any information, obtained as the result 
of your position, prior to the receipt of the 1 o'clock message on 
the morning of December 7, 1941, from which you concluded that 
the Japs would strike at Pearl Harbor ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir, 

Mr. I^EFE. That is all. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question before the 
witness leaves? 

The Chairman. Go ahead. 

Senator Lucas. Captain, through what instrumentalities did you 
receive your intelligence? 

[9278] Captain McCollum. The Communications Division of 
the Navy Department, sir. 

Senator Lucas. I would like to have the different methods that were 
used. 

Captain McCollum. The different methods, sir? 

Senator Lucas. Yes. 

Captain McCollum. Some came in by mail. We got regular mail 
reports sent to us. Other things were sent by telegraph. Some came 
by Western Union. When people traveled over those countries they 
frequently came in to see me and talk about it. Business firms and 
other interested Americans here who had contacts out there would let 
us know any news they received through those contacts. Our press 
associations were most cooperative in giving us their sidelines, the 
benefit of their views. It was that sort of thing. Senator. 

Senator Lucas. All of that information was directed to your 
department ? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir. It would come in to the 
Nav}^ Department ; it would be sent to the Intelligence Division, and 
there it was blocked out bj^ the strategic sphere, sir, and if it concerned 
the Far East it came to my section, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Did that include diplomatic messages or diplomatic 
intercepts that came from Japan ? 

[9279] Captain MoCollum. Intercepts, sir? You mean this 
magic business? 

Senator Lucas. Yes. 

Captain McCollum. That magic business was a special set-up in the 
Navy Department and that was received by that special organization 
and that product came to us as a source of intelligence, sir. 

Senator Lucas. You were the one who first saw all those diplomatic 
inessages that came through magic? 

Captin McCollum. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Lucas. So you had in your office all of the intelligence 
information that came from any source? 

Captain McCollum. That was the design ; yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. That is what the office was designed for ? 

( 'aptain McCollum. That is correct, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3445 

Senator Lucas. Aiid you tell the committee that, with all of the 
information that you had, at no time did you ever receive any message 
that indicated that Japan was going to attack Pearl Harbor on Decem- 
ber 7 with a surprise move ? 

Captain McCollum. That is right, sir. That is my opinion, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I just want to show 

Mr. E^EEFE. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Mr. Keefe. 

[9280] Mr. KJEEFE. May I check my notes just long enough, sir, 
1 o see whether I have another question ? 

The Chairman, I suppose no one has any objection to that. You 
have been very modest in your questions. 

Mr. Keefe. I want to clear up one thing in my mind, Captain. 

I understood you to say in response to many questions that were 
asked in reference to it, that at sometime between the 1st and 7th of 
December, at a date which you did not definuitely fix, you did consider 
it necessary to send some additional warning to the fleet and prepared 
a draft of the message which you thought ought to be sent; is that 
correct ? 

Captain McCollum. That is correct. 

Mr. Iveefe. I understood you to say that you took that message to 
your superior and discussed it and then went to Admiral Stark. 

Captain McCollum. No, sir ; Admiral Turner, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Noav, at the time you drafted that mesage, am I correct 
in assuming that you had not had previous knowledge of the contents 
of the message sent to Admiral Kimmel on the :27th of November? 

Captain McCollum. I had no knowledge of that other than the 
statement made to me on the 1st by both Admiral Stark and Admiral 
Turner, that the fleet had received adequate and cate- [9281'] 
gorical warning, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, on the day that you discussed the message that you 
proposed sending did you see this message, the so-called war-warning 
message ? 

Captain McCollu^i. That message was then shown to me by Ad- 
miral Turner, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Is that the first time you had actually seen the contents 
of that message ? 

Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. 

INIr. Keefe. I understood you to say, when asked a question as an 
expert naval officer, that the language in that message of the 27th, 
which you saw for the first time when it was shown to you by Admiral 
Turner, containing the words "This is a war warning," would have 
been sufficient notice to you, as an officer with the fleet, to put you on 
notice that war was about to break out. 

Captain McCollum. That would have been my reaction, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, if you read the entire message, and I assume you 
did, that day, was there anything in that message that would lead you, 
as an experienced naval officer, assuming you had received it, to assume 
that war was going to break out at Pearl Harbor or any other specific 
place ? 

Captain McCollum. I think that a commander to whom such a 
message as that is addressed must assume that war is going to 



3446 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[9282] break out over his forces and take the steps necessary to 
cover it, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. The contention has been made repeatedly and repeat- 
edly here, by almost every officer that has testified, with the exception 
of Admiral Turner and I believe the testimony which you have given 
this afternoon, that everyone was surprised that this attack took place 
at Pearl Harbor; no one expected the attack to take place there. You 
have heard that testimony ? 

Captain McCglltjm. Yes, sir. I think I have elaborated on mine, 
sir. I had no intention to show myself as a clairvoyant at all. I was 
not surprised that war was started by an attack on the fleet. The fleet 
was at Pearl Harbor, and therefore the fact that the war was started 
by an attack on the fleet was not a surprise. 

Mr. Keefe. I think I understand you. That is all. 

Captain McCollum, In other words, I had no preknowledge, or 
made no preestimate, that the Japanese would attack at Pearl Harbor, 
sir. 

192831 Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman • 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman 

The Chairman. The Chair recognizes Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. On page 22 of Exhibit 2, do you remember seeing 
that message on the Gth? As I understand it, the testimony shows 
that it was translated in the rough. 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. I saw nothing of this sort until about 
the 11th or 12th, sir, that is, that I now recollect. I might have seen 
that before. A great many of these things were coming in, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did not these fleet movements mean anything 
to you in the Intelligence Branch? Were not they considered the 
same as the diplomatic messages? 

Captain McCollu:m. Senator, this is translated on the 11th. 

Senator Ferguson. Mrs. Edgers testified before one of the boards 
that she made it in the rough. 

Captain McColluim. Let me make one explanation in regard to 
Mrs. Edgers : I was instrumental in employing Mrs. Edgers. She is 
an extremely able translator. She has a magnificent Japanese and a 
magnificent English education. 

At the time of which you are now speaking, she was not a reliable 
translator. She was nof able at that time to accurately transfer from 
the Japanese into English, and [9284] _ vice versa, sir. I had 
to check a number of her translations, sir. I just offer that by way of 
background, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Notwithstanding that, if it was translated in 
the rough, would it not be significant to show that on the 3d of Decem- 
ber they were inquiring, particularly on the second page, about the 
lights ? 

Captain McCollum. Senator, I did not see this, that I recollect, at 
the time you indicate, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you treat these messages in relation to ship 
movements on the same basis as you did the diplomatic, or did you 
translate the diplomatic prior to the ship movements? 

Captain McCollum. As the the priority, I tried to explain how that 
was done before, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. I would like to know which had priority be- 
tween them. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3447 

Captain McCollum, At this particular time, top priority, as I re- 
member it, was given to trying to listen for the war-warning messages 
out of the code, and to be sure that we did not miss any part of the inter- 
change of Japanese notes between this Government and the Govern- 
ment of Japan. 

[9285] Senator Ferguson. But you had two questions, didn't 
you? That was when war would start. These may indicate and did 
indicate where war would start. Was there any difference between 
the two ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir; these merely indicated the setting up 
of a signal system out of Honolulu. 

Senator Ferguson. Wasn't that significant? 

Captain McCollum. Not necessarily, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, you didn't treat these on the same basis 
as you did the diplomatic messages? 

Captain McCollum. We treated them all alike. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, were you familiar with the other mes- 
sages that came in, page 27 

Captain McCollum. I must have been familiar with all. I said that 
I read them all or thought I was reading them all. 

Senator Ferguson. And page 29. 

Captain McCollum. I have. 

Senator Ferguson. Where it says : 

It appears no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm. 

And is from Honolulu to Tokyo on December 6. 

Captain McCollum. What time was it translated ? 

Senator Ferguson. Translated 12/8. What I am trying to get at 
is, if we were fully alerted, we had a pilot message, why we didn't put 
every effort on translating these messages that [,9286] now ap- 
pear so significant showing that there would be an attack on Pearl 
Harbor. 

Captain McCollum. I think the effort was there, but I believe at 
the time it was considered the first word would come through diplo- 
matic interchange and the primary service of the Government was 
given to learning what the Japanese Ambassador was talking about 
and what instructions he was receiving. 

Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't that only relate to when the war would 
start? "Where the war would start would be where our fleet was. 

Captain McCollum. Once we knew when the war would start and 
the fleet was told when it would start, we were under the impression 
they were able to handle the situation from there on, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

The Chairman. Mr. Gearhart. 

Mr. Geaehart. I wanted to ask who the next witness will be to- 
morrow. 

Mr. Richardson. Admiral Bellinger. 

Senator Lucas. May I ask one question, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator Lucas. 

Senator Lucas. Captain, with all of (he knowledge that you had 
as an Intelligence officer, and in view of the top position [9287] 
that you held in Intelligence at that time, do you know of anyone in 
your branch of the service or any other department of the Navy who 



3448 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATIACK 

attempted to trick or maneuver the Japs into attacking the United 
States on December 7, 1941 ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir. 

Senator Lucas. That is all. 

The Chairman. Captain, was your immediate superior Admiral 
Turner ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir ; my immediate superior was Admiral 
Wilkinson. 

The Chairman. So that this draft of the message that you sug- 
gested was sent or taken by you to Admiral Wilkinson i 

Captain McCollum. Senator, I carried it personally to Captain 
Hurd, wlio was my immediate chief. We walked in together with it 
to Admiral Wilkinson, and I carried it to Admiral Turner. 

The Chairman. Now, do you know whether it ever got beyond him ? 

Captain McCollum. I brought it back with me to Admiral Wilkin- 
son after it had been amended and corrected. 

The Chairman. And if that message had been sent under whose 
name would it have been sent? 

Captain McC ollum. All messages from the Navy Department, Sen- 
ator, go out from one major office. It would have gone out as by the 
Chief of Naval Operations. 

[9288] The Chairman. In other words, Admiral Stark? 

Captain McCollum. It would have gone out under the blanket num- 
ber. We don"t use names, as you know. 

The Chairman. Do you know whether that contemplated message 
was ever taken to him? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir ; I do not. 

The Chairman. AVhether he passed upon it or not ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir ; I do not know that, sir. 

The Chairman. Well, Captain, the committee thanks you very much 
for your cooperation in trying to reveal the facts here. The Chair 
would like to ask you if there is any other information you have that 
is pertinent to this inquiry that has not been brought out by the ques- 
tions asked ? 

Captain McCollum. No, sir ; I don't think so, Senator. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. 

Captain McCollum. I appreciate the indulgence of the committee. 

The Chairman. You are excused, Captain. 

(The witness was excused.) 

The Chairman. The committee will recess until 10 o'clock to- 
morrow morning. 

(Whereupon, at 4:25 p. m., January 30, 1046, a recess Avas taken 
until 10 a. m., Thursday, January 31, 1946.) 



PKOCEEDINGS OK JOINT COMMITTEE 3449 



[.9289^, PEAKL HAEBOE ATTACK 



THURSDAY, JANUARY 31, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF the Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington^ D. 0. 

The joint comiiiitlee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Albeii 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barlviley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster 
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, associate general counsel ; John E. Masten, Edward P. Mor- 
gan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee. 

[9290] Tlie Chairman. Tlie committee will please come to 
order. 

The Chair understands counsel has some documents to file before 
proceeding with Admiral Bellinger. 

Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, we have distributed to the committee 
a number of additional documents w^hich we would like to add to the 
exhibits w^hich have been previously introduced. 

The first, which we would like to add to Exhibit 113 as Exhibit 113- 
C, is a document which on the cover bears the heading, "I. Revised em- 
ployment schedule of Task Force Nine, for remainder of second quar- 
ter of fiscal year 1942." We would like to offer that as 113-C. 

I call your attention to the fact that on page 4-J of that exhibit there 
is a letter signed by Admiral Bellinger, transmitting the proposed em- 
ployment schedule to the commander in chief of the United States 
Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel. 

This exhibit shows on the two or three pages following 6-J, down 
at the bottom of the page, the proposed employment schedules of 
Patrol Wing 2 and the various other patrol squadrons of fleet aviation. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 113-C.") 

As Exhibit 115-A, we would like to offer the document entitled, 
"Communication Intelligence Summaries of 9 and 10 December 1941," 
showing assumed composition of Japanese strik- [93911; ing 
force. 

On the first page of that exhibit under the paragraph entitled, 
"First Fleet" you will see the expression in the ninth line, "Blue 
Pacific." We understand from the Navy that that is an area of the 
Pacific which was regarded as a United States area. 

We have previously introduced Communication Intelligence Sum- 
maries through December 6th, and this adds to those exhibits the 
Intelligence Summaries for December 9 and 10. It is our under- 
standing that no summaries were prepared for December 7 and 8. 



3450 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 115-A.") 

Finally, as Exhibit 115-B, we would like to offer the document en- 
titled, "Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41," which bears the 
date of November 27, 1941. 

Reference was made to this at the time the other Intelligence Bulle- 
tins were introduced and it has only now been duplicated and we 
are making it available to the committee as promptly as possible. 

In this connection I would say that the Navy has furnished us and 
we have examined Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 44-41, which 
is dated November 10, 1941, as well as Intelligence Bulletin No. 46-41, 
which is dated December the 6th, 1941. We had not had these dupli- 
cated as they [9292^ do not appear to us to be relevant in this 
connection. If any of the committee members wish to examine them, 
we have them here. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 115-B.") 

The Chairman. These various documents will be filed under the 
numbers indicated. 

Mr. RicHARDSOx. Mr. Chairman, in connection with Admiral Bell- 
inger's testimony, he has presented and we have distributed to the 
committee a short statement which he desires to make. Now, we 
just got it this morning and we have no desire to infringe on the 
committee's announcement that each member should be furnished 
these a day ahead. 

Whether the committee accepts this statement and permits it to 
be read or not is immaterial to us. I have gone over it. I think it 
is pretty largely facts which are well grouped in the statement and 
I would recommend that you permit it to be read by him. It has 
only been placed before you this morning. 

The Chairman. Is there objection to that? 

(No response.) 

The Chairman. If not, it will be done. 

Will you be sworn, Admiral? 

[92931^ TESTIMONY OF VICE ADM. PATRICK NEISON LYNCH 
BELLINGER, UNITED STATES NAVY 

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.) 

Mr. Eichardson. Admiral, will you state your name, your age, and 
the length of time you have been in the Navy ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Patrick Neison Lynch Bellinger. Age 60. 
Date of birth, October the 8, 1885. I entered the Naval Academy in 
June 1903. 

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that there has 
been distributed to each member of the committee the detailed history 
of Admiral Bellinger and his service in the Navy I will not encumber 
the record with an examination of that from him on direct. 

Admiral, have you prepared a statement which you would like to 
read to the committee? 

Admiral Bellinger. I have. 

Mr. Richardson. Will you proceed and read that ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I have been in some doubt about whether to 
prepare a statement for the committee in advance. I thought I might 
save the committee's time by simply presenting myself for question- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3451 

ing. However, I feel that my command relationship at Pearl Har- 
bor at the time of the Japanese attack might be more readily grasped 
by the committee if I first describe it to you. 

On December 6, 1941, and, for several months prior thereto, my 
duties were as follows: 

[9394-] (1) Commander, Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings and 
commander, Patrol Wing 2. Included in the larger command were the 
patrol squadrons and aircraft tenders attached to Patrol Wings 1 and 2. 

(2) Commander, Task Force 9. This comprised Patrol Wings 1 
and 2 with attending surface craft plus such other units as might be 
assigned by commander in chief, Pacific Fleet. 

(3) Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor. The re- 
sponsibilities of this function included administrative authority in 
local matters over all aircraft actually based on the Naval Air Sta- 
tion, Pearl Harbor, but did not include operational authority. 

(4) Liaison with commandant. Fourteenth Naval District, for avia- 
tion development within the district, including Midway, Wake, Pal- 
myra, and Johnston Islands. 

(5) Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force. 

In connection with these duties, I functioned under the following 
seniors : 

(a) Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force, who as type commander 
for patrol wings, was based at San Diego. 

(b) Commander Scouting Force, the force command of which 
Patrol Wings 1 and 2 were a part. 

(c) Directly under commander in chief, Pacific Fleet in [9£95] 
my capacity as commander, Task Force 9. 

(d) Commanders of Task Forces 1, 2, and 3 for operation of patrol 
planes assigned those forces for specific operations. 

(e) Under commandant, J'ourteenth Naval District, in his ca- 
pacity as commander. Naval Base Defense Force when I was per- 
forming duties as commander. Naval Base Defense Air Force. 

Shortly after my taking command of Patrol Wing 2 on Novem- 
ber 1, 1940, Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, U. S. Army, arrived to take 
command of the Hawaiian Air Force. He and I almost at once 
arranged to conduct joint training operations for the purpose of 
preparing our personnel to work together and to utilize opportuni- 
ties to prepare ourselves for war. This was an arrangement en- 
tirely between General Martin and myself, although the comman- 
der. Scouting Force, was informed by me of this arrangement. 
Whenever patrol planes were scheduled for wing tactics, the Army 
Air Command also took part if it was practical for them to do so. 
These arrangements were over and above the regularly scheduled 
joint Army and Navy tactical exercises. Upon completion of patrol 
wing and Army air groups joint exercises, I held a critique in the 
auditorium of the air station, Pearl Harbor, on that operation and 
I remember stating at the first critique, at which Army personnel 
were present, that the Army Air and Navy Air should [9296] 
learn to work so close together that it would be difficult to tell us 
apart, that in order to perfect our technique we must be able to 
criticize one another without fear of giving offense, that this was 
all necessary in the preparation for war. The relationship between 
the Hawaiian Air Force and the Navy patrol wings was very close 
and cooperative. 



3452 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

About March 1, 1941. the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, di- 
rected me to report to the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, 
in connection with the preparation of an air-defense plan in con- 
junction with the commanding general, Hawaiian Air Force. I 
so reported and proceeded with the assigned task, working directly 
with General Martin. 

[9297] It was agreed by General Martin and myself that the 
first action to be taken was the preparation of an estimate of the 
situation, and from this estimate would be evolved a joint air-opera- 
tion plan followed by detailed contributory plans, these latter to be 
prepared bv General Martin for Armv Air and by me for Navy 
Air. 

This was done. The estimate of the situation was signed jointly 
by General Martin and myself. The detailed contributory plans 
were prepared and signed by General Martin for Army Air and 
by me for Navy Air. 

The estimate and plans were officially forwarded through the 
respective echelons of command. The commandant, Fourteenth 
Naval District (commander. Naval Base Defense Force), was my 
immediate superior in connection with naval base defense, and to 
him were delivered the joint estimate of the situation and the plans 
tor Naval Air. 

Based upon this estimate and plans was the organization that 
was termed the Naval Base Defense Air Force, and commander. 
Naval Base Defense Air Force, became one of my duties. 

The term "commander. Naval Base Defense Air Force" might be 
considered a misnomer, as it was not an actual command until the 
Naval Base Defense Force Organization was placed in a functioning 
status. It was even more of [9298] a misnomer as it im- 
plied authority over operating units to a degree which did not exist. 
My authorit}', even after the naval base defense plan took effect, 
extended only over the search and attack groups of the Naval Base 
Defense Air Force, and was nonexistent concerning Army pursuit 
aviation and Navy fighter aviation which were to function under 
the Army Air Command. 

The Naval Base Defense Air Force was a paper organization ; it did 
not exist, in fact, as an entity unto itself. It was not an organization 
sj)ecifically manned and equipped to perform a definite job. It existed 
only when called into being by proper authority — and under the cir- 
cumstances this necessarily required joint Army-Navy action — or it 
could be brought into being by an actual emergency that was apparent 
to those concerned. Its composition was variable, depending entirely 
upon the availability of aircraft and personnel that might happen to 
be on Oahu at the time it was called into being. 

As commander. Naval Base Defense Air Force, I did not have the 
authority to place that organization in a functioning status, except 
in the case of an actual emergency. After the start of the attack on 
December 7, 1941, the Naval Base Defense Air Force did assume a 
functioning status immediatel}^ without orders from higher authority. 

[9'29d] A message, 'Air raid Pearl Harbor X This is no drill" 
was ordered broadcasted at 0758 that morning and orders to planes 
in the air were sent and received by 0805. 

The composition of the Naval Base Defense Air Force varied from 
day to day with the number of aircraft made "available" to it by 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3453 

the various air commands of both Army and Navy. The determining 
factor in this technical availability was the daily employment sched- 
ule of aircraft belonging to the various air units. Aircraft reported 
available were classified as available in the prevailing category of 
readiness for the search and attack group (commander, Naval Base 
Defense Air Force) or for the air combat group (commander, Hawai- 
ian Air Force), depending on their types. 

The normal procedure for vitalizing the Naval Base Defense Air 
Force for drills was for the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, 
in his capacity as commander, Naval Base Defense Force, to send a 
dispatch reading, "Drill, Danger of an air raid on Pearl Harbor exists, 
Drill". This placed the Naval Base Defense Force in a functioning 
status. Upon receipt of this message I, as commander of the search 
and attack group, immediately sent a message to the air units assigned 
to this group, to place all available aircraft in the highest degree of 
\9300] readiness. My staff officers assumed the duties involved 
in the operational control of the search and attack group. Search 
operations were immediately ordered. Those patrol planes that were 
initially in the highest degree of readiness were assigned the north- 
west sector, which were considered the most vital. 

This was because the prevailing winds were from the northeast, 
and enemy carriers could thus recover their planes while retiring from 
the Oahu area. 

These were supplemented by other patrol planes a§ they were made 
ready for flight, covering other sections in accordance with their rela- 
tive importance until 360° was covered or all available planes had 
been employed. 

Available bombing planes of the Army comprising the attack group 
were placed in the highest degree of readiness and were maintained 
in a stand-by condition awaiting instructions to attack the enemy when 
located. 

When Navy patrol planes were insufficient to search the necessary 
sectors and Army bomber planes were available for this purpose, the 
bombers were assigned sectors for search. 

As I have said. Task Force Nine, which I commanded, normally 
included patrol planes of Patrol Wings One and Two with attending 
surface craft. 

[9-301] The primary missions of Task Force Nine, as stated 
in Pacific Fleet confidential letter 14CL-41 were : 

(1) To organize, train and concurrently with execution of the expansion 
program, to continue development of doctrine and tactics in order to provide 
an efficient long-range air scouting and air striking force for independent 
operations or operations coordinated with other forces. 

(2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander 
in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet in order to improve security of fleet units and bases. 

During the period immediately preceding the Japanese attack, 
the squadrons of Patrol Wings One and Two were carrying out 
those missions, operating on regular employment schedules approved 
by the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet. 

\9302'] Both the Army and the Navy were in the process of 
receiving replacements of obsolescent planes. Army B-18's were 
being replaced by the more modern B-17's and in Patrol Wings One 
and Two PBY-l's, 2's, and 3's were being replaced by PBY-5's. 



3454 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

There were 5 squadrons of patrol planes with operating comple- 
ment of 12 planes each and 1 squadron with operating complement 
of 6 patrol planes based on Oahu and 1 squadron with 12 planes 
based on Midway. In addition, there were 3 spare patrol planes, 
making a total of 81 patrol planes in the Pacific Fleet within the 
Hawaiian area. 

Of the Patrol planes, 27 were of the PBY-3 type, an older model, 
and 54 were of the PBY-5 type, the latest model. Twelve of the 
PBY-3 air planes had returned on December 5 after extended oper- 
ations at Midway and Wake with inadequate facilities for normal 
upkeep and repair. Ten of them were due for overhaul. The 54 
PBY-5 planes had recenth'' arrived in Oahu from the Pacific coast 
for replacement of obsolescent planes in increments as follows: 18 
planes on October 28. 1941 ; 12 planes on November 8, 1941 ; 24 planes 
on November 23, 1941. Attention is invited to the dates of their 
arrived. The PBY-5 planes were [930S] experiencing the 
usual shake-down difficulties of new planes and their maintenance 
was hampered by an almost complete absence of spare parts. 

Of the 81 patrol planes listed above, 12 were conducting operations 
at Midway, 3 planes armed with gun and depth charges were en- 
gaged in the morning security patrol of fleet operating areas, 4 planes 
were conducting intertype tactics with submarines. Of the remain- 
ing 62 planes, 2 were on 15-minute notice, 8 were on 30-minute notice 
for operations, § were undergoing repairs, 43 were on 4-hour notice. 

For a commander to be reasonably sure that no hostile carrier 
could reach a spot 250 miles away and launch an attack without prior 
detection, would have required an effective daily search through 360° 
to a distance of at least 800 miles. Assuming a 25-mile radius of 
visibility this would have required a daily 16i/^-hour flight of 50 
PBY-5 planes. This, in turn, would have necessitated a force of 
not less than 150 patrol planes, adequate spare parts and ample well- 
trained personnel. We had 81 patrol planes in the whole Hawaiian 
area, including Midway. 

The major effort of Patrol Wings One and Two during 1941 prior 
to December 7 was expansion training, operational trainmg, security 
operations, development and equipping of [930f\ air facili- 
ties — all in preparation for war. Aviation training facilities and out- 
put of trained personnel in the Navy at that time was considerably 
behind the contemplated increase in the number of squadrons. Par- 
ticular stress was placed, therefore, on the need for expansion train- 
ing. Each squadron was required not only to train additional combat 
crews for their own aircraft, but also to form nucleii for new squad- 
rons being commissioned back on the mainland. 

Despite this continuing emphasis on training, every effort was 
being made to increase the local readiness for war. Squadron and 
patrol plane commanders were indoctrinated with the necessity of 
keeping their planes so equipped and their crews so trained that at 
any time during a flight they could be converted from their peace- 
time objectives to combat missions. 

It was a definite policy that all planes on all operations be equipped 
with full allowance of machine guns and ammunition. On special 
missions connected with the securiity, such as in searching operating 
areas, planes were also equipped with depth charges. This was justi- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3455 

fied when planes in the air on December 7 were diverted immediately 
from their peacetime duties to war missions. 

Vitalizing the Naval Base Defense Air Force organization would 
liave necessitated a substantial cessation of [9305] training 
activities and a concentration on defense. The dispatching of planes 
on distant search operations would not have caused more work, it 
merely would have changed the type of employment of the patrol 
planes and of course would have caused a reduction in their train- 
ing effort and thereby affected their readiness for war. As pointed 
out in the Martin-Bellinger estimate, the problem of when to place 
the Naval Base Defense Air Force in a functioning status resolved 
itself into one of timing with respect to the current status of our 
relations with Japan, and required specific information as to the 
probablity of an air attack within rather narrow time limits. 

In the absence of such information, the patrol planes available 
were carrying out their regularly assigned schedules when the 
Japanese struck. 

I had no knowledge of any of the warning messages emanating 
from the Navy and War Departments during October, November, and 
December. I never knew of any warning dispatches until a few days 
after the attack — on the evening of about December 10, 1 think it was — 
when I was told by one of my officers that he had just heard that there 
had been a warning dispatch received in the district Naval Intelligence 
Office and that the local Intelligence officer of the naval air station 
knew about it. I immediately [9M6] sent for the Intelligence 
officer and he confirmed this information. Several days after that, 
when I was working on some papers with Admiral Kimmel, I first saw 
one of the warning dispatches. 

During October, November, and December my only information 
concerning our relation with Japan and the imminence of war came 
from the Honolulu newspapers. These newspapers described a tense 
situation, but this had not been the first time during the year that such 
situations were indicated between the United States and Japan. Also, 
there were Japanese envoys in Washington who, according to the 
papers, were endeavoring to bring about a peaceful settlement. The 
information available to me — limited and unofficial as it was — did not 
indicate that I should recommend to the commander in chief, Pacific 
Fleet, that distant patrol plane search for the security of Pearl Harbor 
be undertaken at that time. 

[9-307] Mr. Richardson. Admiral, how many planes of all kinds 
did the Navy have at Oahu on December 6, approximately ? 

Admiral Bellinger. In accordance with the plans and directives, 
each command 

Mr. Richardson (interposing). Just give me the numbers of all 
the planes, without all this explanation. 

Admiral Bellinger. Well, I cannot do it. I have the number of 
planes that were reported to me as available for the Naval Base 
Advance Air Force. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, how many? 

Admiral Bellinger. The marines reported 18 scout bombers — 3 
ready in 2 hours, 15 ready in 4 hours. 

Mr. Richardson. Never mind the "readiness," just give me the 
number. 



3456 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Bellinger. Seven fighters. The Army reported 8 B-17, 
21 B-18, 6 A-20, and I reported to the commander, Hawaiian Air 
Force, which was in accordance with our agreement, 7 fighters, which 
were the marines, and 9 scouts, which were also the marines. 

Mr. Richardson. Can you give me the total number of planes 
available for long-distance reconnaissance on December 6, 1941, the 
gross number of the Navy? 

Admiral Bellinger. In accordance with my figures there were 48 
patrol planes. There were no other planes that were [9308~t 
considered available for long-distance search. The Army B-l7's 
reported to be were for bombardment. They did not report any for 
long-distance search. 

Mr. Richardson, The marine planes were not suitable for long- 
distance search? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Whatever B-l7's the Army had were available, 
or were planes that could be used for long-distance search ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. How many Army B-l7's were reported to you as 
being available on December 6 ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Eight. 

Mr. Richardson. Then that would make a total of planes that you 
had, and Army B-l7's, of 54? 

Admiral Bellinger. Fifty-seven. 

Mr. Richardson. Now where were those planes located, the 57? 

Admiral Bellinger. At Pearl Harbor,' Kaneohe, and Army fields, 
I think Hickam. 

[9309] Mr. Richardson. Now, the fighter planes that would be 
available for use in event of an air attack were Army planes? 

Admiral Bellinger. Army planes and sucli Navy fighter planes as 
were available to be assigned to the Army. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you have any fighter planes of the Navy that 
were in condition for use as fighters on December 6 ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Seven fighters were reported as available to 
the Army. 

Mr, Richardson. And how many Army fighters were reported as 
available ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That I don't know. I was not in control of 
that. 

Mr. Richardson. And you have no information about it? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. You made no inquiry concerning it at the time? 

Admiral Bellinger. Not any specific inquiry. I was cognizant of 
about 140 being available. 

Mr. Richardson. That was your understanding ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And it was your understanding that they were all 
in shape to go up and fight on proper notice ? 

[9SJ0] Admiral Bellinger, No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. How many were available to get up in the air and 
fight, do you know ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you ever make inquiry as to that? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3457 

Mr. Richardson. So far as you are concerned, if an attack came 
yon had no information as to how many fighters you would have to 
use in that attack from the Army ? 

Admiral Bellinger. It was the Army's 

Mr. Richardson. Leave the Army's job out. I am asking about 
your information as to what you knew. Did you know ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I did not know. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, what is the length of a long-distance patrol 
suitable for guarding a post such as Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Eight hundred miles is what we try to get. 
Witli some planes we could get only 700, even with what are consid- 
ered long-range planes. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you make any request at any time prior to 
the attack on December 7 for the use of the Army B-17's for distance 
patrol ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And you yourself with the planes [9S11] 
available to you, were making no distance patrol prior to December 7? 

Admiral Bellinger. Not for security purposes, no. 

Mr. Richardson. For any purpose ? 

Admiral Bellinger. On December 7, 2, 3, 4, and 5, we had what 
we termed wing tactical exercise. 

Mr. Richardson. How far? 

Admiral Bellinger. Three hundred miles. 

Mr. Richardson. Then it wasn't a long-distance patrol? 

Admiral Bellinger. No. 

Mr. Ri€HARDS0N. I asked whether you were conducting any long- 
distance patrol. 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Before December 7. And the answer is no ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I am forgetting one thing. The squadrons 
that went to Wake and Midway and that area covered an area in 
scouting en route. 

Mr. Richardson. That was not undertaken for the purpose of fur- 
nishing a defense to Pearl Harbor, was it ? Didn't you so testify ? 

Admiral Bellinger. The only reason they were sent out in this 
spread-out fashion was to get information that was supposed to be 
vital. 

[931£] Mr. Richardson. The patrol that you are talking 
about — — 

Admiral Bellinger. Negative or positive. 

Mr. Richardson. The patrol that you are talking about is the 
patrol that was carried on by the task forces as they proceeded on 
their mission? 

Admiral Bellinger. No. I am talking about the patrol plane 
squadrons. 

Mr. Richardson. Where? Where based? 

Admiral Bellinger. Those that went from Pearl to Midway and 
from Midway to Pearl on the 5tli of December, and from Midway 
to Wake. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you intend to testify, Admiral, that there 
was any 700-mile long distance patrol operating out of either Mid- 
way or Wake at any time? 



3458 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Bellinger. If a plane is out at sea 

Mr. Richardson. Will you please answer my question? 

Admiral Bellinger. If 3'ou are speaking about solely for long dis- 
tance patrol, that is one thing, but you have got to realize that if a 
plane goes on a passage from one place to another, and its job in that 
passage is to look and see and report, why, that is accomplishment. 

Mr. Richardson. Admiral, you know just as well as I do, I think, 
that those task forces were going to Midway [9313] and 
Wake for purposes that were connected with Midway and Wake. 

Admiral Bellinger. Certainly. 

Mr. RiCHARDsox. They were not going for the purpose of con- 
ducting a distance patrol for the protection of Pearl Harbor, were 
they ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Not in protection of Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Richardson. That is what I am talking about now — the pro- 
tection of Pearl Harbor. Was there any long-distance patrol on 
December 6 out of Pearl Harbor for the protection of Pearl Harbor 
that you know of? 

Admiral Bellinger. In spite of the fact that it may not have been 
specifically for the protection of Pearl Harbor, undoubtedly it fur- 
nished information which had a bearing on the protection of Pearl 
Harbor. 

Mr. Richardson. As the fleet task forces proceeded to Midway and 
Wake, their planes would be out scouting their path ? 

Admiral Bellinger. The carrier planes ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. How far would they go from the ship on that 
scouting ? 

Admiral Bellinger. About 200, 250 miles. 

Mr. Richardson. What additional scouting was being done by 
the task forces as they proceeded to Midway and [9314] Wake 
except that form of scouting? 

Admiral Bellinger. I am not speaking 

Mr. Richardson. Will vou please answer my question, Admiral? 

Admiral Bellinger. I clon't know what they did. I was at Pearl 
Harbor. They were out at sea. 

Mr. Richardson. How many patrol planes were, based on Mid- 
way on December 6 ? Do you know that ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Twelve. 

Mr. Richardson. How many at Wake ? 

Admiral Bellinger. None. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, there wasn't any distance patrol 
out of Wake, was there? 

Admiral Bellinger. Not on December 6. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you know anything about there being a dis- 
tant patrol out of Midway on the 6th ? 

If you don't know, tell me. I am asking your understanding. 

Admiral Bellinger. I have got to refresh my memory and check 
definitely whether it was the 6th or the 7th. I think it was the 6th 
and the Tth. 

Mr. Richardson. Keep in mind we are referring to what you have 
defined as the long-distance patrol being a 700-mile sweep with patrol 
planes, and I am asking whether there was any such patrol as that 
conducted from Midway. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3459 

[9S15] Admiral Bellinger. No, sir ; not 700 miles ; no, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, the patrol planes that the Navy had at Oahu 
were necessary for the use of the fleet if the fleet should initiate an 
offensive operation out of the Pearl Harbor base, were they not. 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. They were there primarily for the 
fleet use. 

Mr. Richardson. And you are familiar with WPL-46? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And you knew that in connection with that im- 
mediately upon a declaration of hostilities, it was planned that a raid- 
ing expedition would be conducted toward the Mandates? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. If that raiding operation was to be conducted, it 
would be necessary for the fleet to have long-distance reconnaissance 
planes cooperating with them ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, upon such a raid as that where would those 
patrol planes be based? 

Admiral Bellinger. First at Wake supported by planes from 
Midway. 

Mr. Richardson. How many squadrons of planes was Wake in a po- 
sition to take care of on the week prior to December [9316] 7? 

Admiral Bellinger. Two squadrons could have operated from there 
for a short time. 

Mr. Richardson. What do you mean by a short time ? 

Admiral Bellinger. About 2 weeks. 

Mr. Richardson. And the length of time would be dictated by what? 

Admiral Bellinger. By lack of adequate facilities for maintenance. 

Mr. Richardson. Fueling? 

Admiral Bellinger. Fueling could be done. 

Mr. Richardson. How many planes are there in a squadron? 

Admiral Bellinger. Twelve. 

Mr. Richardson. Then the most that Wake could take care of would 
be 24 planes? 

Admiral Bellinger. Practically, yes. 

Mr. Richardson. On a raiding expedition to the Mandates, Wake 
would be the suitable basing pomt for long distance reconnaissance 
planes ? 

Admiral Bellinger. On account of its strategic location with ref- 
erence to those mandated islands. 

Mr. Richardson. And that would be the place where the long dis- 
tance patrol planes would be based to aid that raiding expedition? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, that would leave you, subtracting 24 from 
57, with 33 planes at Pearl Harbor suitable for long-distance patrol ? 
You stated there were 57 in all. Deducing 24, that, under my arith- 
metic, would be 33, including the Army planes? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, all you had to do to get the Army planes 
was to ask for them, wasn't it? 

Admiral Bellinger. I never found it exactly that way. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you ever ask for them and not get them ? 

Admiral Bellinger. In connection with drills, yes. 

79716— 46— pt. 8 7 



3460 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Richardson. Have you any doubt today, Admiral, that if you 
had asked for those 8 B-17's to use in long-distance reconnaissance 
out of Pearl Harbor you would have had any difficulty in getting 
them? 

Admiral Bellinger. If I asked for them entirely from information 
I had which was not concurred in by the Army, I would not have 
gotten them. It had to be a mutual approval and a recognition of a 
situation that demanded that sort of action. 

[9318] Mr. Richardson. In other words, if you concluded that 
you wanted to initiate a long-distance patrol out of Pearl Harbor on 
the morning of December 6, you would first have had to persuade the 
Army that you were exercising good judgment in planning that patrol, 
and if they agreed with you, then they would let you have the planes? 

Admiral Bellinger. If they had them, yes. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, they did have them? 

Admiral Bellinger. They reported eight as available for this work. 

Mr. Richardson. You had no doubt they were telling the truth ? 

Admiral Bellinger. They said for bombardment. 

Mr. Richardson. They were suitable for long-distance patrol, 
weren't they ? Why fence with this ? Did you ask for those planes ? 

Admiral Bellinger. There is no fencing. You have got to be clear. 
You liave got to come out so that people know what you are talking 
about. 

[9319] Mr. Richardson. Did you ask for those planes? 

Admiral Bellinger. I did not. 

Mr. Richardson. For any purpose? 

Admiral Bellinger. I did not. 

Mr. Richardson. You don't know whether you could have gotten 
them if you had asked for them ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. That is what I asked. 

Admiral Bellinger. But I doubt seriously. I know what they 
were doing. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you know they were doing anything with their 
long-distance B-17's? 

Admiral Bellinger. I know they were trying their best training 
pilots to fly the B-17 planes. Now, when you talk about long-distance 
reconnaissance, you have got to have qualified people to fly these planes, 
because they have got to come back to the island from the long-distance. 
You can't just say that because the plane is available that a crew can 
do it. 

Mr. Richardson. Have you ever contended in any of your former 
testimony, Admiral, that there was not available pilots that could 
operate the B-17's in long-distance reconnaissance on December 6 ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

[9320] Mr. Richardson. Have you ever made such a contention ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir ; but that is speaking for the Army, and 
I don't want to speak for the Army, but you are asking me questions 
I have to answer. 

Mr. Richardson. You knew on December 6 about the general task 
missions of the task forces that were operating to Johnston to Midway 
and Wake? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3461 

Mr. Richardson. And as an experienced air officer familiar with 
long-distance reconnaissance, in your opinion the presence of those 
task forces in the area south of Midway, the Midway sector, and as far 
south as Johnston, was being adequately protected by Ihose task 
missions? 

Admiral Bellinger. Not necessarily adequately, no. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, you have told me they were running long- 
distance reconnaissance out of Midway and there were three task forces. 

Admiral Bellinger. I didn't say long-distance. 

Mr. Richardson. Four hundred miles. 

Admiral Bellinger. Four hundred and fifty. 

Mr. Richardson. They were sending out these task forces with their 
protecting planes a couple of hundred miles away from the course of 
the fleet? 

Admiral Bellinger. That was on one day with reference [9321] 
to the transfer of those planes. 

Mr. Richardson. What do you mean? Didn't those planes scout 
the course of the fleet after it left Pearl Harbor until it got to Midway 
and Wake? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir : I think we are a little confused on this. 

Mr. Richakdson. Let me go back. I am a little confused. What 
more could you have had in the southwest sector, what more could you 
have had by way of protective airplane search than was conducted by 
the three task fleets, by the planes they had on the carriers, and by the 
planes out of Midway t What more could you ask for ? 

Admiral Bellinger. For instance, during the daylight you were 
covering a circular area of about 400 miles diameter with tlie carrier 
as the center. That is what you are covering. As the carrier moves 
the circular area moves with it. 

Mr, Richardson. Well, then, anything that crosses that circular area 
would be pretty apt to be seen ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. As you proceeded from Oahu to Midway the line 
of the fleet as it moved to Midway would cover a space 200 miles to the 
north of that line, wouldn't it ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Aiid 200 miles south ? 

[932S] Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. Then as the task force moved between Oahu and 
Wake that would cover the area still further to the south? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. As the task force moved from Oahu to Johnston 
that would cover the bottom of the arc ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. I ask you again whether the entire area west from 
Oahu and south to Wake and Midway and south to Johnston wasn't 
being adequatelv searched in effect by the task forces that were moving 
there, the 4th, 5th and 6th ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is a question. You have got to consider 
the time that a certain area is searched. I have had a lot to do with 
searching operations and the only way you can search is by searching 
and you have got to make sure that the area is covered and covered in a 
timely way in accordance with the schedule to make sure that nothing 
gets through. 



3462 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Richardson. Let's see 



Admiral Bellinger. Now, I quite agree with you that that sounds 
very well but the question is the timing. For instance, a force moving 
and searching leaves something behind, something may come behind, 
something may go ahead [9323] of it before it gets there. It is 
covering only, say, a 400-mile circular area. 

Mr, Richardson. I can't see any reason why something couldn't come 
behind your planes if they came from Oahu. 

Admiral Bellinger. It could but the plane is coming back again. 

Mr. Richardson. Suppose it wasn't there when it came back then 
it would miss it? 

Admiral Bellinger. There is a possibility. 

Mr. Richardson. I grant you. Admiral, the possibility that a search 
may not be 100 percent successful, but I am asKing you what more, if 
you wanted to make a search of the area between Oahu and Midway, 
Wake and Johnston, what more you could have done than was being 
done by the operations of the task forces and their planes and the 
scouting planes at Midwa}'' than was being done on the 5th and the 6th 
of December? 

Admiral Bellinger. Oh, planes flying long-distance reconnaissance 
from those islands, I would saj^ an adequate number would have 
furnished a better search. 

Mr. Richardson. But from Oahu ? 

Admiral Bellinger. From Oahu, from Midway, or from Wake. 

Mr. Richardson. How far is it from Oahu to Midway? 

Admiral Bellinger. About 1,200 — well, 1,140 miles. 

[9324] IMr. Richardson. Then your long-distance patrols 
wouldn't get within 400 miles of Midway ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; but I was speaking about from Mid- 
way also. 

Mr. Richardson. I grant you if you had patrol planes flying out 
from Wake and from Midway and flying out from Jolinston it would 
help. 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. But you didn't have any patrol planes flying out 
from any of them, did you ? 

Admiral Bellinger. On what date? 

Mr. Richardson. On the 5th or 6th. 

Admiral Bellinger. They were flying out from Midway on the 6th 
and I think on the 7th. I mean, I think on the 6th. 

Mr. Richardson. There weren't any planes or any ships that you 
knew of in the north or northwest area from Oahu, were there ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. So that if you were then going to put on an addi- 
tional search it would have occurred to you to make it in that sector, 
wouldn't it ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Normally speaking, as far as our plans were 
concerned, the northwest sector was the first sector [9325] cov- 
ered when planes were available. 

Mr. Richardson. And a northwest sector would be what we call 

Admiral Bellinger. A north by west. 

Mr. Richardson. How many degrees would that cover ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Ninety. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3463 

Mr. Richardson. How many degrees will a patrol plane ordinarily 
in your charting cover ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Eight degrees, 700 miles. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

You had left, according to my figures, in Oahu 33 patrol planes that 
could have been used with the Army planes for long-distance patrol. 

Admiral Bellinger. That 33 — I presume that is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. Page 6. 

Admiral Bellinger. I have a statement written down here which 
was done by looking over figures and trying to get the best answer and 
it says this : » 

If no other operatious had been scheduled for December 7, 1941 there could 
have been considered to be a total of 48 patrol planes that could have been made 
available for long-distance reconnaissance. 

Mr. Richardson. "What ones of those 48 planes were you using for 
any other mission on the 6th day of December ? 

[9326] Admiral Bellinger. The exercises carried on in connec- 
tion with the schedule were in progress. 

Mr. Richardson. Were you using long-distance patrols for those? 

Admiral Bellinger. Not long-distance patrols. 

Mr. Richardson. I am talking about the 48 long-distance patrol 
planes. What other mission were they operating on on December 6? 

Admiral Bellinger. You are talking about planes 

Mr. Richardson, That is exactly what I am talking about. 

Admiral Bellinger. It is a question of what the schedule was. I 
have it here somewhere if you would like me to read it. 

Mr. Richardson. All I am trying to have you tell me is what possi- 
ble use you were making of any of those 48 patrol planes on Decem- 
ber 6. 

Admiral Bellinger. From a security point of view other than the 
search of the operating areas, I w^ould say none. 

Mr. Richardson. The search of operating areas was simply the 
perimeter where vou were accustomed to conduct maneuvers for the 
fleet? 

Admiral Bellinger. Correct. 

Mr. Richardson. That was very largely a training proposition ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

[9327] Mr. Richardson. It wasn't a long-distance search? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir ; but it was not training. 

Mr. Richardson. And it was an operation which you could have 
changed any time you wanted to, wasn't it? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Couldn't you have initiated a long-distance patrol 
on December 6th of your own authority ? 

Admiral Bellinger. By virtue of having command certainly I 
could have issued orders to planes, but I would have had to notify the 
Commander in Chief immediately and have gotten his concurrence. 
He must know what is available to him. A commander below him 
having forces such as that has no real authority to utilize his planes 
and so put them in condition where they are not available to him in 
accordance with his information. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you make any effort to get his permission to 
fly any long-distance reconnaissance on December 5 or December 6 ? 



3464 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Bellinger. I did not. 

Mr. Murphy. May I suggest that the witness was sick in bed with 
the flu for 5 daj^s before December 7 and had never heard of a war 
warning over a period of 2 months. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there ever any decision, Admiral, that you 
knew anything about, made by your superiors, that 19^28] 
there would not be any long-distance reconnaissance patrol flown from 
Oahu? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. How did it come about, if you know, that no 
long-distance patrol was initiated prior to the attack? 

Admiral Bellinger. That, I think, is a question which higher au- 
thority in the fleet and the Navy Department will have to answer. 

Mr. Richardson. I am asking you whether any ever was given 
to you ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Then you today have no knowledge of your own 
why a long-distance reconnaissance wasn't flown out of Oahu on the 
6th or 6th or the Tth of December, of your own knowledge? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, it is my understanding. Admiral, that in 
flying long-distance reconnaissance it isn't well to operate the same 
crew and the same ship oftener than once in 3 days; is that right? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct for the crew and practically 
correct for the ship. The ship, for instance, that is, the plane, might 
be used somewhat more than the crew. 

[9329] Mr. Richardson. But the plane and crew could be used 
once every 3 da3's ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And if you had 33 long-distance patrol planes 
available on the 5th, 6th, and Tth of December, 11 of them could have 
been used for long-distance search? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct. 

Mf. Richardson. And if each plane covered 8 degrees that would 
be an 88 degree search, wouldn't it? 

Admiral Bellinger. Correct. 

Mr. Richardson. It would be just as thorough for those 88 degrees 
as it would be if other planes were scouting the other part of the 
whole arc of 360 degrees ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is a question of mathematics. 

Mr. Richardson. Yes, and a question of fact, too, isn't it? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; it depends on which way the force is 
moving. 

Mr. Richardson. Well 

Admiral Belling^er. There is a sector in one case where there is 
question of passage through the area. But I grant you that that has 
very little to do with it and is a technicality. 

Mr. Richardson. And the 11 planes that would have been sent out 
could have given a first-class proper military scout of the entire north- 
west sector out of Oahu; isn t that [9330] correct? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And it could have been continued, an echelon 
of 11 planes, for several weeks, couldn't it? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3465 

Admiral Bellinger. Now we are talking about something that is a 
variable quantity. I don't know anything I could have done to have 
gotten spare parts for these planes more than I did. The 54 planes 
which arrived on the date as you have noted in my statements had 
practically no spare parts. 

Mr. Richardson. Then am I to understand the reason you didn't 
want to use your planes at all was because they might wear out if you 
did use them ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No ; you asked me how many they could use. 

Mr. Richardson. How many could they ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is a question 

Mr. Richardson. I am asking for your judgment, Admiral. 

Admiral Bellinger. I would say that they probably could have 
kept up, with a slight reduction maybe in the 11 per day, or about 2 
weeks and maybe longer. It is a question of spare parts to replace 
the parts that are vital in a plane to keep the plane in commission. If 
there are no spare parts the plane stays on the beach. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, we will never know because [9SS1] 
nothing was ever done about it? 

Admiral Bellinger. Oh, for instance, after December 7 it became 
a major mission. 

Mr. Richardson. Why ? Why after December 7 ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Because we were then very mucli on the 
defensive. 

Mr. Richardson. And on the alert? 

Admiral Billingeb. Well, that depends on how you mean "alert." 
There was peace on December 6. 

Mr. Richardson. Let me ask you this question, Admiral, prompted 
by a question asked here, how were these Navy planes parked? 

Senator Ferguson. May I have the last part of the answer read. 

(The record was read by the reporter.) 

Mr. Richardson. In other words, you had to see the planes come 
in over the mountains around Pearl Harbor before the idea of patrol 
planes and alert entered your mind? 

Admiral Bellinger. I suppose that is true with everybody in the 
United States. 

Mr. Richardson. Maybe. 

Now, let me ask you this : How were these planes parked, these 48 
planes that you refer to, just describe to us where they were and how 
they were parked and what was the nature [93S2] of their 
moorings ? 

Admiral Bellinger. On account of the size and type of planes — 
which was a flying boat weighing about, fully loaded, about 34,000 
pounds — they were put on wheels, carts, run up ramps and put on the 
concrete parkways. They have to be on concrete parkways if they 
are put on the beach. It is the only practical way actually of oper- 
ating patrol planes with any degree of efficiency or effectiveness from 
the beach. That was a question of dispersal and was a question with 
which I was very much concerned prior to Pearl Harbor, for some 
months prior. It was a question, how could we disperse planes prop- 
erly. It was a question of trying to build up Hilo or another place. 
A qiiestion of buihling up Hilo Lagoon, whiHi was just finished a few 
months, I think, ago. 



3466 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Richardson. Why were you pxercised ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I was considerably exercised, from the time I 
got out there, with the situation. 

Mr. Richardson. Why? 

Admiral Bellixger. Because I thought war was coming and we 
were not ready for it. 

Mr. Richardson. What was there in the way in which you had to 
park your planes that would exercise your interest? Were they 
parked too closely together? 

Admiral Bellinger. They were parked as far apart as [9333] 
they could be on the concrete. There were some in the water moored 
by these buoys in Kaneohe Bay, but we did not have them on those 
buoys that day because of the combination of work. You are losing 
time and losing effort when you do park them out in the water. 

As a matter of fact, those that were moored out in the water at 
Kaneohe Bay were sunk and completelj' lost and those that were 
actually on the beach and were damaged, many of them were put back 
into commission. 

Mr, Richardson. Is it a fact that the conditions were such in Pearl 
Harbor there that, in your opinion, your planes, when parked on the 
beach, were not sufficiently dispersed for safety ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Well, actually, in fact, no, they were not suffi- 
ciently dispersed for safety. It is a very difficult proposition to figure 
how far you have got to park them for safety, but we had worked it 
out from the point of view of the explosion of bombs in planes in 
case the bombs in the planes were exploded. Bombs were on the 
planes. And with the idea of the effect on other planes. The limita- 
tion of dispersion at a place like Pearl Harbor was the limitation of 
the concrete area on which to put the planes. 

Mr. Richardson. I am confused. Is it your position [9334] 
that you had plenty of room at Pearl Harbor to disperse your planes 
or that you did pot? 

Admiral Bellinger. We did not at any place. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. But you parked your planes as best 
you could with the room you had ? 

Admiral Bellinger, With the type of planes we had. 

Mr, Richardson, Now, speaking; generally, as a result of this raid 
you lost about half your planes? 

Admiral Bellinger. Not quite half. 

Mr. Richardson. Have you the figures? 

Admiral Bellinger. I think so. 

On December 30 of the 81 planes we had, 44 were operating and 
37 were not. 

The Vice Chairman. December 30? 

Admiral Bellinger. December 30. 

Mr. Richardson. Your idea is that the 37 that were not were 
those that were basically destroyed? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir; although I think some later were 
gotten back in commission. I haven't the exact figures on that. 

Mr. Richardson. Did any Navy planes get in the air while the 
attack was on on that morning? 

Admiral Bellinger, Some patrol planes. 

Mr. Richardson. They were saved ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3467 

Admiral Bellixger. Those patrol planes went on search [93SS] 
missions, that is the reason they took off. 

Mr. RiciiARDSox. Did they search before or after the attack? 

Admiral Bellinger. After. 

Mr. RiciiARDsox. Durin«: the nttack \\oy\ many of your planes got 
in the air? 

^fr. MuRPTiY. I sugrgest we have the report of the Admiral dated 
December IT in the record with these details in it. I think the witness 
might be presented with his own report of December 17. 

Mr. Richardson. Go ahead, Admiral, if you have the information 

Admiral Bellinger. I have a rather elaborate answer to that. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

Admiral Bellinger (reading) : 

Accdnling to my data the following operations took place ou December 7, 1941 : 

At 0700— Patrol Plane 14 P-1 assisted in the sinking of a Japanese submarine 
ofC Pearl Harbor entrance. 

At 0715 — Message giving above information was coded and transmitted to 
Patrol Wing Two. 

At 0735 — This message was received, decoded and information received by 
Patrol Wing Two Staff Duty Officer. 

[9336] At 0737 — This message was relayed to Patrol Wing Two Opera- 
tions Officer. 

At 0740 — This message was relayed by telephone to Staff Duty Officer of 
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. 

At 0750 — The patrol plane search plan assigning squadrons in accordance with 
their readiness was drafted. 

At 0757— The first bomb dropped by Japanese aircraft was seen by the Opera- 
tions Officer of Patrol Wing Two. It fell and exploded in the vicinity of the 
bangar utilized by Patrol Squadron 22. 

At 0758 — A message emanating from headquarters. Patrol Wing Two. was 
broadcast to all ships and units present, quote "Air raid Pearl Harbor X This is 
no drill" unquote. 

At 0800— Search plan was transmitted by radio and telephone. This was 
received and acted upon by some of the patrol planes in the air at 0805. 

An accurate chronological account of events from then on during the attack 
was impracticable. 

At one time during the first attack wave, both radio and telephone communica- 
tions from headquarters of Patrol Wing Two were temporarily out of commis- 
sion due to the attack; however, these were shortly put back in commission. 

The three patrol planes, 14 P-1, 2 and 3, on early morning security search, 
were assigned search sector between [9337] north and northwest, and 
proceeded on search. After the first phase of the attack, Patrol Wing One re- 
ported two planes at Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, available for immediate opera- 
tion, and was directed to send these two planes on a northwesterly sector. Before 
these could be dispatched, another Japanese attack wave put them out of com- 
mission, at about the same time communications between Kaneohe and Pearl 
were knocked out. 

Patrol Wing One, on own initiative, diverted the two planes then on northerly 
sector search, 14 P-1 and 3 to cover a westerly sector because of the loss of the 
two planes originally detailed, and in his effort to comply with instructions. 

This diversion was not known to me until a few days after December 7 when 
checking the sectors covered by planes. This diversion removed two planes from 
a sector where the Japanese task force was later determined to be near. 

[9338] The four patrol planes that were engaged in tactical exercises with 
submarines, 24 P-1, 2, 4, and 5, had difficulty in shifting their radio frequency, 
so that receipt of their originally planned assignment of sector was delayed. At 
this time, information was received that a chart taken from a Jap plane that had 
been destroyed indicated enemy rendezvous bearing 223 degrees and 90 miles 
from Pearl. These four planes were then assigned to cover sector 240 degrees to 
280 degrees for at the time it was tiiought the enemy might retire westward. 

Two patrol planes, 23 P-1 and 6, took off from Pearl and were assigned to a 
sector to the southwest. 



3468 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

One patrol plane, 23 P-4, taking off from Pearl, was assigned a sector to the 
■westward. 

The above ten patrol planes were all that could be put in search during the 
attack because of damage from the attack to the other planes, and to facilities. 

The Army were directed to search to the northward, and they reported dis- 
patching three groups : 

One at 1115, consisting of 2 B-17's and four A-20A's. 
One at 1255, consisting of 2 A-20A's. 
One at 1330, consisting of 3 B-18's. 
The 3-20's and B-18's were very limited in range. 

Eight utility planes were dispatched on search as [9339] they were made 
ready later in the forenoon. Two of these were assigned a northerly sector, and 
the remainder a westerly sector. 

The utility planes are for service to the Fleet and are not really military 
planes, but they were part of tliis naval defense air force, and some were made 
uvaihible. 

Six VO-VS shiihspaced planes, short range, were assigned to a sector to the 
southward. 

In the afternoon 9-SBD carrier planes of the Lexington, short range, were 
assigned to sector from NW to NE. 

In the late afternoon, three B-17's (Army) took off to cover a sector to the 
soutlieast. This sector was at the instance of the Commander in Chief, Pacific, 
as a result of a suppo.sedly radio compass bearing on Japan's radio. 

It was impossible to formulate and carry out a thorough search plan because 
as planes at the air-bases were assigned and detailed for sectors, many were put 
out of commission, at least temporarily, by the Japanese attack. 

In accordance with my data, the following planes engaged in search operations 
on December 7, with ranges from long to sliow : 
10 — Patrol planes ( Navy ) . 
S — Utility planes (Navy). 
[93m 6— VO-VS planes (Navy). 
9 — SBD planes from Lexington group (Navy). 
5— B-17's (Army). 
3— B-18's (Army). 
&— A-20's (Army). 
Total — 17 planes. 

\93Jfl^ Mr. Richardson. And that was all after the attack? 

Admiral Bellinger. During and after. 

Mr. Richardson. Please answer my question. Did you make any 
.search while the attack was on by any planes? 

Admiral Bellinger. Immediately. 

Mr. Richardson. What kind of a search did you make while the 
attack was on? What did you search for? 

Admiral Bellinger. To search for where the carriers were. 

Mr. Richardson. They were right there pouring bombs on you, 
weren't they ? 

Admiral Bellinger. The planes were, not the carriers. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you mean to tell me that planes were sent 
out during the first or second attack ■ 

Admiral Bellinger. I do. 

Mr. Richardson (continuing). On long-distance reconnaissance? 

Admiral Bellinger. I do. 

Mr. Richardson. What planes? Before 11 o'clock — before 10:30 
on Sunday morning, what planes were sent out on any search in any 
direction for any purpose? 

Admiral Bellinger. Two patrol planes, 23 Prep. 1 and 6, 1 patrol 
plane Prep. 34 

Mr. Richardson. Wait just a minute. Who sent them out? Who 
sent out the two ? 

\93Jf^] Admiral Bellinger. I did. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3469 

Mr, Richardson. What kind of planes were they ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Patrol planes. 

Mr. Richardson. Long-distance patrol? 

Admiral Bellinger. Long-distance patrol. • 

Mr. Richardson. What were their orders? 

Admiral Bellinger. 23 Prep. No. 16 were assigned a sector to 
the southwest. 23 Prep. 4 were assigned a sector to the westward. 

Mr. Richardson. Just a minute. That was the area where you had 
your three task forces, and these various planes that you have told 
about earlier was the southwest, wasn't it? 

Admiral Bellinger. The question was where was this task force 
going to go after it made a strike. 

Mr. Richardson. Which task force do you mean ? 

Admiral Bellinger. The Japanese. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, in order to find them you sent two more 
l^lanes out into the area where all your task forces were and the rest 
of your planes. Was that your order. Admiral ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I take responsibility for it. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, let me ask you a question there. 
Had you familiarized yourself at all with your radar? 

Admiral Bellinger. We did not have any radar in planes. 

[93j^S] Mr. Richardson. Did you familiarize yourself 

Admiral Bellinger. We were familiar with it b}^ technical in- 
formation and had asked for it. 

Mr. Richardson. I did not make myself clear. Did you have any 
information with reference to the operation of the Army radar? 

Admiral Bellinger. I knew the Army were setting up their radar 
section and combining it in the air combat command. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you know it was working? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. I did not think it was working. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you telephone to find out on the morning 
of December 7? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; I did not telephone to find out 
but I knew somewhat about it because Navy Lieutenant Commander 
Taylor was sent over; I don't know whether it was definitely on 
my initiative or not, to work with the Army in connection with this 
and he was working with the Army air combat group in connection 
with the establishment of this center. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, did you have nnj contact with him on the 
morning of the 7th ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I am not positive but I think I telephoned — 
I think he called me up. 

Mr. Richardson. Why would he call you? You did not have 
[9344] any information, did you? 

Admiral Bellinger. I did not have any information but we 
were 

Mr. Richardson. He might have had some ? 

Admiral Bellinger. We were interested in any information about 
where the planes were coming from, these Japanese planes. 

Mr. Richardson. And did you call anybody in the Army that 
had anything to do with their radar in order to get what infor- 
mation they had ? 



3470 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. I did not know if it was working. 

Mr. Richardson. As far as you were concerned that radar sta- 
tion of the Army might just as well have been in Australia. 

I^^dmiral Bellinger. Insofar as what good it did me on December 
7, correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, you knew there was no information cen- 
ter for the radar, didn't you ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I knew that there was a center where this 
information came into; yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you phone that center? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; I did not phone that center. 

Mr. Richardson. That is one of the reasons why you did not know 
which way the planes came in from, wasn't it. Admiral ? 

[934s] Admiral Bellinger. I doubt that very seriously. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, if it is true that the chart in the radar 
section showed planes discovered 132 miles north of Oahu and the 
chart showed them followed in until they were within a few miles 
of Oahu, there would have been some information there as to where 
the planes came from, wouldn't there ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir, if those planes had been identified. 
That was one thing that at that stage of war readiness that we had, 
the question of identifying planes. Now, radar can pick up planes 
but the question is what planes are they? 

Mr. Richardson. But you did not go to the trouble of telephoning 
the station to get what information they might have had? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. I was pretty busy doing other things, 
and I did not know that I would get any information from them. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, you were not doing anything more im- 
portant then than to find out where those attacking planes came from ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I would have been delighted to find out where 
they came from, but it did not seem to me that they could tell me 
and I don't think they could have. 

Mr. Richardson. At any rate, as the result of your ef- [9S4^] 
forts in that connection practically all of the search that was made 
to find where the raiders came from was to the west and southwest ? 

Admiral Bellinger. As I said in my statement here, our first effort 
was to cover the northwest area. Two planes were removed from that 
by a combination of circumstances. That was not known. 

Mr. Richardson. Wliat was not known ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That was not known, what I just read in this 
statement. 

Mr. Richardson. Wliat was not known ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That they were removed from the search in 
that area. 

Mr. Richardson. Somebody must have removed them, mustn't they? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. I just read it for you. 

Mr. Richardson. Who removed them ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Commander of the Patrol Wing, in his effort 
to carry out what he understood to be a prior directive. 

Mr. Richardson. That was the one to the southwest ? 

Admiral Bellinger. We had two patrol planes to the north-north- 
west area. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3471 

Mr. Richardson. Well, I don't seem to get it into my thick head. 
You started out two planes to the northwest [9347'\ and then 
they were removed. Now, where were they removed to? 

Admiral Bellinger. I would like to repeat just exactly what I read. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, please tell me again. 

Admiral Bellinger. There were three planes assigned to a sector 
between north and northwest. 

Mr. Richardson. And who assigned them ? 

Admiral Bellinger. My organization. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

Admiral Bellinger. The operations officer, to be exact. 

Mr. Richardson. What became of those three planes? 

Admiral Bellinger. One proceeded on. That was the one furthest 
to the north. 

Mr. Richardson. How far did it go ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I am not positive exactly, but I think it was 
about 450 miles. I am not positive on that. 

Mr. Richardson. What became of the other two ? 

Admiral Bellinger. The other two, as I said, were diverted after 
they were on this search to the westward. 

Mr. Richardson. By whom? 

Admiral Bellinger. By commander Patrol Wing I's organization. 

Mr. Richardson. And was that because of a report that sent the 
search to the south and southwest ? 

[984.8] Admiral Bellinger. No. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. Where were they diverted to ? 

Admiral Bellinger. They were diverted to a westerly area. 

Mr. Richardson. That was the area that was being covered by the 
two task forces ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Excuse me. The reason that the — I would 
like to repeat this. In making out a search plan you try to cover 
an area and you take the planes in almost in sequence as we can get 
them, as they are located, and we were trying to cover a north to west 
sector first. The planes that we thought were available to cover cer- 
tain sectors did not become available later on account of being put 
out of commission. Two planes that were on this north-northwest- 
erly area were diverted to a westerly area to comply with the instruc- 
tion which we had given to the commander of the Patrol Wing some 
time previous to that when he said he had two planes available, but 
those two planes did not become available later because of being 
knocked out by the Japanese. So in an effort to comply with the 
original instructions he diverted those two planes that were with 
the third up north. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, how many planes went into the north 
sector before 10 : 30 o'clock on Sunday ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That I cannot give exactly. I do not know 
the time proposition on that. 

[9349] Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, let me ask you this : 
Had you any knowledge at the time of the attack that the Army was 
on a sabotage alert? 

Admiral Bellinger. I cannot say as a fact that I did. I probably 
did. I knew — in looking back I remember that there was a consider- 



3472 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

able effort made to prevent sabotage. I know I was concerned with 
that to give the general lay of the land and in the general set-up of 
security measures on shore. 

Mr. Richardson. Let me ask you this question: It has interested 
me, Admiral. You saw these planes come in and bomb Pearl Harbor, 
didn't you? 

Admiral Bellinger. The first planes I saw were three planes 
that 

Mr. Richardson. Well, you saw some of them? 

Admiral Bellinger (continuing). — which passed over the Arizona. 
The next instant the Arizona blew up. I had also been informed at 
that time, just about 2 minutes prior to that, by telephone that we 
were under attack, so I assumed those were Japanese planes after the 
Arizona blew up. The next I saw was nine planes overhead and I 
assumed that they were Japanese planes, too. 

Mr. Richardson. I am not interested in how many planes you saw. 
I am simply asking you the general question if you saw the planes 
coming in on the attack? 

[9350^ Admiral Bellinger. I did not see them coming in. I 
saw them there. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, tlien, did you see the planes 
that were using the aerial torpedoes? 

Admiral Bellinger. I assumed these planese that passed over the 
Arizona had used torpedoes because they acted like it. They were 
flying at about 150 feet and had just dropped their torpedoes, appar- 
ently, and liad passed over the AHzona. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, would it be fair to say that the planes 
which did the bombing with the torpedoes came in over the harbor at 
approximately 150 to 200 feet height? 

Admiral Bellinger. I would say so ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Could you, in your opinion. Admiral, have done 
the full duty of long distance reconnaissance during the week prior to 
Pearl Harbor without neglecting or slowing down the training pro- 
gram that the fleet was undergoing? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. They were really two irreconciliable duties, were 
they not? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir ; I would say very definitely. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, when you went on the job out there, or 
shortly afterward, you got together with Martin and made an esti- 
mate, didn't you? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

[9S51] Mr. Richardson, And that estimate was never used after 
that prior to December 7, was it? 

Admiral Bellinger. The estimate was not used. 

Mr. Richardson. That is right. Now, you also testified, did you 
not. Admiral, that the mission sanction in the plan that you and 
Martin prepared was that there was no unity of command ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And that plan in order to be a successful plan, or 
to have the greatest chance of success, should have had unity of 
command ? 

Admiral Bellinger. You are asking me? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3473 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, that is the answer, unity of command. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, you also testified 

Admiral Bellinger. In other words, definite, specific command in 
one individual. 

Mr. Richardson. That is right. Now, you also testified in one of 
your former hearings, did you not, that the primary duty of the Army 
aircraft you considered to be in expansion training? 

Admiral Bellinger. The Army ? You said "the Army" ? 

Mr. Richardson. Referring to the Army aircraft. 

[9S6£} Admiral Bellinger. I don't think I said that, sir. I 
never used the word "expansion." I think the Navy used that term. 
The Army had "training." 

Mr. Richardson. Didn't you also testify that the primary duty of 
the Navy aircraft was in expansion training ? 

Admiral Bellinger. The primary duty was getting ready for war 
and in connection with that duty it required definite expansion train- 
ing and that was assigned as such. 

Mr. Richardson. And then you further testified, did you not, that 
when you came to look around you after you took command you found 
you were operating on a shoestring and a very slim shoe string at 
that? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson, What did you mean by that? Or let me make it 
more direct. 

Admiral Bellinger. That is all right, I can answer that. 

Mr. Richardson. You meant by that, didn't you, that you did not 
have enough planes and you did not have enough spare parts and 
you did not have enough crews to do a good job ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I mean that and a lot more. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, you meant that, as far as I went? 

Admiral Bellinger. I meant that definitely but a lot more. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, you also came to the conclusion, [9353] 
did you not, when you surveyed this shoestring that you wei-e sup- 
posed to operate on, you came to the conclusion and testified that the 
Navy Department, in your opinion, could not view the situation at 
Hawaii with any alarm if that was all they gave you to go on ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is what I inferred in my letter. 

Mr. Richardson. That was your opinion. 

Admiral Bellinger. You must remember this : I came out there to 
l*earl Harbor; I thought the situation was going to gradually run 
into war. The question was what did we have and what did we require 
and what could I do about it? That letter was a month — took a month 
to prepare, trying to figure how was the best way to bring this to 
the attention, the situation, and I used certain language in there with 
the idea of making that letter strong enough to bring it to the atten- 
tion. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, now. Admiral, I am not referring to that 
letter. I am not referring to what you wrote to the War Department. 

Admiral Bellinger. That is the Navy Department. 

Mr. Richardson. Or the Navy Department. I am referring to 
your own testimony, as to whether you did not testify that from all 
of these facts you concluded that the Navy Department did not view 



3474 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the situation in Hawaii with alarm in view [936.^] of what they 
gave you to do business with. Isn't that 

Admiral Bellinger. In view of 

Mr. Richardson. Didn't you so testify ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Excuse me; you have got to be correct on this. 

Mr. Richardson. Didn't you so testify? 

Admiral Bellinger. There is a reference in the letter and I spoke 
about a reference. 

Mr. Richardson (to counsel). Will vou give me 668 of the Naval 
Court? 

Admiral Bellinger. I think reference A indicates that. 

Mr. Richardson. You will find you never mentioned reference A 
here in the testimony. 

Admiral Bellinger. Maybe not. It is a long time ago. 

Mr. Richardson. We will pass it until it comes in. 

You also envisioned at the time, did you not, Admiral, as an air 
expert, after you had surveyed the situation in Hawaii, that an attack 
from the air was the most likely form of attack? 

Admiral Bellinger. Correct. I would like to invite particular 
attention to that statement. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

Admiral Bellinger. This estimate of the situation has this intro- 
duction on top : 

Joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air [9355] action in the 
event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or Fleet units in the Hawaiian area. 

By that I mean to infer that this is not an estimate of Japanese 
strategy, over-all strategy. It is the strategy they would employ and 
the tactics they would employ when they decided to make an attack 
on Oahu. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, was an air attack on Pearl Harbor, in your 
opinion, the most likely form of attack ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Correct. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. That is what I asked you in the first 
place. Admiral. 

Now, between November 26 and December 7 you never had occasion 
to confer with the Army or any representative of the Army in ref- 
erence to the installation of long distance reconnaissance ? 

Admiral Bellingjer. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Admiral, if you had had your planes ready and 
you had received the radar warning promptly as soon as they dis- 
covered it, which was, say, an hour before the attack, in your opinion 
from your experience could you have taken any measures which would 
have reasonably insured minimizing the strength and force and dam- 
age of that attack ? 

Admiral Bellinger. The question of minimizing would have been 
ready at the guns, knowing that the attack was coming and [9S56] 
the readiness of the air combat planes to meet the attack. There 
would have been an indication of where the carrier force was and 
there is a possibility that some planes might have gotten through 
without being shot down and we might have located the carrier. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, do you think that on the Pearl Harbor end 
there would have been any reasonable certainty that the attack could 
have been seriously minimized if you had had that information? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3475 

Wliiit I am (hiving at is, once planes leave the carrier in force and 
tliat force is greater than the number of defending planes, don't 
you as an expert on the matter recognize that the probability is that 
the attack can be carried through in substantial force regardless of 
the defense? 

Admiral Bellinger. The attack could have been carried through, 
there is no doubt about that, under those conditions that you just 
mentioned, but the severity of the attack might have been reduced. 
For instance, on ships the antiaircraft guns knowing that the planes 
coming in were Japanese prior to their coming in Within gunfire, for 
instance, would have brought about a situation which would have 
been quite difterent. 

[9So7] Mr. Richardson. How long would it take to put a plane 
that was on the concrete of your beach in readiness to go in the air 
either for search or combat ? 

Admiral Bellinger. You are speaking about patrol planes, I 
assume. 

Mr. EicHARDsoN. Yes. 

Admiral Bellinger. The degree of readiness has a great deal to do 
with it. Fifteen minutes, I w^ould say, if the plane is standing by 
ready with the crew. 

Mr. Richardson. I am speaking about a plane that is not ready at 
all. That is a perfectly cold plane. It hasn't done anything to get 
ready. How long would it take to get the plkne in the air? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is a difficult question to answer, because 
where do you start from ? 

Mr. Richardson. I am starting from just where you started when 
you said in your statement that you had planes on 15 minutes' notice, 
and you had planes on 30 minutes' notice, and planes on 4 hours' 
notice. 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, what I am wondering is why the difference 
in that time. 

Admiral Bellinger. The 15 minutes' notice was in order to keep a 
plane availble at Kaneohe and one at Pearl [9358] Harbor, 
available to go immediately on call. 

Mr. Richardson. They were all ready to go ? 

Admiral Bellinger. They were all ready to go. 

Mr. Richardson. AVliat about the next group ? 

Admiral Bellinger. The 30 minutes were the detail on alert. 

Mr. Richardson. Let me ask you a question right there, Admiral. 

When these planes were on the beach, were they fueled ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Oh, yes. 

Mr. Richardson. And did they have ammunition ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. They were ready for every purpose, then ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. Except to put the men in and warm the engine up? 

Admiral Bellinger. To warm the engine np, to put the men in, and 
get their orders. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, what is it that would cause a delay of 4 
hours? 

79716— 46— pt. 8 8 



3476 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Bellinger. As a matter of fact, the 4-hour information 
is the availability that was ordered by the naval base defense force 
commander. The idea was not [9859] that the planes them- 
selves would be only ready in 4 hours but that they were not supposed 
to be called prior to giving a 4-hour notice. 

Now, for instance, I know one plane got under way out of Pearl 
Harbor when the attack was on and was even fired at by our own 
people. That plane was one of those on a 4-hour basis, and it got 
under way in about between 30 and 40 minutes. 

Mr. Richardson. By the way, Admiral, when Halsey's task force 
came in, some of the planes of his carrier that were coming in to the 
base at Pearl Harbor were fired on as hostile planes, were they not? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. There was not sufficient control of communica- 
tions between Pearl Harbor and the Halsey task force to prevent that 
disaster? 

Admiral Bellinger. Either a question of that or a question of itchy 
fingers. 

INIr. Richardson. What is that? 

Admiral Bellinger. Itchy fingers of inexperienced personnel. I 
knew they were coming in. I made arrangements with every com- 
mand that it was possible to get through on to inform them that they 
were coming in. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you have any way of contacting [9360] 
your planes in the air with information ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Why did not that work ? 

Admiral Bellinger. What planes do you mean in the air? Do you 
mean the Halsey planes? 

Mr. Richardson. No. These Halsey planes that were shot down 
were shot down by what fire ? The fleet or antiaircraft guns ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Both. I do not know which ones actually hit 
( liem, but I saw the fire, which was considerable fire. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there any attempt made when you found out 
that Halsey's planes were coming in to notify the antiaircraft bat- 
teries and the fleet that they were coming in ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And despite that, they were fired on ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. I call your attention to a colloquy 

Senator Lucas. Will the counsel yield for one point that I would 
like to get clear in my mind? 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. Did you get the proper information to [9S61] 
all these battery commanders, advising them that Halsey's planes 
were coming in ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I got it through the channel that I could get, 
which was a set-up for that whole control. In other words, the con- 
trol base at the navy yard — not my base, but the control base at the 
navy yard — had their circuits which went out. 

Senator Lucas. Were they all working ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir ; as far as I know. 

Senator Lucas. Then they all did get the information ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3477 

Admiral Bellinger. 1 think so. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? I believe you will find in 
the record the reason for it was there was an order not to fire; but 
as they came in there was a very peculiar smoke condition there, and 
these planes came in through the smoke; and when they did, one 
fellow got itchy fingers and started firing, and the others followed suit, 
and Admiral Kimmel ordered them to stop firing, in order to stop 
that. 

Admiral Bellinger. As a matter of fact, I tried to stop it. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, Admiral Kimmel took credit for it, no matter 
who did it. 

Mr. Richardson. I assume if Admiral Kimmel was to get the bene- 
fit of the good results, he must take the burden [9S62] too of 
the bad ones. 

Going back to my colloquy a moment ago, let me read from your 
testimony before the naval board, page 668 : 

I refer to a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations, Serial 095323, in which it 
was indicated to me that there was no intention to replace present obsolescent 
type of patrol planes of Patrol Wing Two, prior to one year, and that Patrol 
Wing Two would practically be the last wing to be furnished new planes. I stated 
that this, together with the many existing deficiencies indicated to ine that the 
Navy Department as a whole, did not view the situation in the Pacific with alarm, 
or else is not taking steps in keeping with their views. 

You remember so testifying, don't you ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And that was your information at the time ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct, sir. All I wanted to point 
out was that reference A had a bearing on the subject. It indicated 
that the Patrol Wing 2 was to be the last wing to be equipped with new 
planes. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral, you did not see the warning mes- 
sage of November 24 ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I saw none of the warning messages. 

[9863] Mr. Richardson. You received no information with ref- 
erence to any of the diplomatic intercepts? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. You have seen them since ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I have read most of them, I think. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, I will ask you this : 

If you had had knowledge of those dispatches and the information 
conveyed thereby, would your orders, or action or advice, or efforts 
have been changed with respect to the status quo of the ])art of the 
Navy that was under you in Hawaii on December 7 ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I was asked that question on two different 
boards, and I can only state this: As to whether I would have done it, 
I would like to think I would have done it, but only God knows what 
I would have done. I would rather leave that for those who know me 
lo make their estimate. 

Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions. 

The Vice Chairman. Admiral, when did you arrive in Hawaii ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I think it was the 28th of October 1940. I 
took over on the 1st of November 1940. 

The Vice Chairman. You took over on November 1, 1940? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 



3478 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[9.36i] The Vice Chairman. Just what was your appointment? 
Admiral Bellinger. Commander of Patrol Wing 2. 
The Vice Chairman. And you continued thereon until the time of 
the attack on December 7, 1941 ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Things changed a little bit. For instance, 
Patrol Wing 1 was established, and I was given control over that wing 
also as an additional job. 

It had a patrol wing commander, but I had control over it. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you finally reach the point that you were 
the air officer of the Pacific Fleet based in Hawaii? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; I never reached that condition at any 
time. For instance, the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, had an 
aviator on his staff who was called the aviation aide on his staft', so he 
was the staff officer of the revised conunander in chief of the Pacific 
Fleet. 

The Vice Chairman. Who was that ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That was Commander A. C. Davis, now rear 
admiral. There were other commands out in that area in the carrier 
forces. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, I understand you to state that from the 
time you arrived in Hawaii you expected war. Is [9365] that 
correct? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And your defense plan that you prepared pro- 
vided for defense against air attack, l)ecause you thought that was the 
most likely form of hostile attack? 

Admiral Bellinger. As a matter of fact, Admiral Kimmel had the 
idea that it was necessary to bring about a cooperative, or coordinated, 
so far as practical, plan of air defense of the Pearl Harbor area, and 
the reason for this estimate of the situation was his directive to me to 
report to Admiral Bloch, who was going to be the commander of the 
naval base defense force, and to work out a plan with General Martin, 
the commander, Hawaiian Air Force. 

The Vice Chairman. General Martin was the commander of the 
Army Air Force at Hawaii ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Wlio was the commander of the Navy Air 
Force at Hawaii ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Martin, did you say ? 

The Vice Chairman, General Martin. 

'^ dmiral Bellinger. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman, General Martin was the commander of the 
Army Air Force at Hawaii ? 

[OSdO] Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chapman. Who was the commander of the Navy Air 
Force at Hawaii ? 

Admiral Bellinger. There was no such term as Navy Air Force at 
that time. I was merely commander of Patrol Wing 2 and later com- 
mander of Patrol Wings, Hawaiian Area. 

The Vice Chakman. Well, in that capacity, were you Martin's 
opposite number? 

Admiral Bellinger. Not exactly. In many cases, I was, and in this 
particular set-up, which I was directed to work out with him, in that 
I was. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3479 

The Vice Chairman. That was one of the reasons I was inquir- 
ing, Admiral, as to why it was that you happened to be the Navy 
man who participated in the Martin-Bellinger report unless you were 
the opposite of General Martin. 

Admiral Bellinger. On account of the nature of patrol planes, 
my base of operation was necessarily on shore, except when I went 
out on tenders at bases where they may operate, and on account 
of my being based on shore, and also on account of the fact that 
in connection with this defense plan patrol planes would undoubtedly 
enter into it to a big extent — that, I think, was the particular rea- 
son that Admiral Kimmel gave this to me. 

[9367] The Vice Chairman. Now, you say at the time you ar- 
rived at Hawaii, and all the time after that, you expected war. 

Admiral Bellinger. Eventually; yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you think the war would start by a 
surprise air attack? 

Admiral Bellinger. Knowing the background of the Japanese, 
I thought it would probably start with an attack somewhere; not 
necessarily at Oahu, and not necessarily an air attack, but that if 
an attack was planned for Oahu, that it would be an air attack. 

The Vice Chairman. I see. But you had not reached the point 
in your thinking that your conclusion was that the war would start 
with an attack on the Pacific Fleet? 

Admiral Bellinger. At Pearl Harbor? 

The Vice Chairman. Wherever the Pacific Fleet was. 

Admiral Bellinger. I had not reached any definite conclusion; 
no, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, how did you think the attack would 
start? 

Admiral Bellinger. I thought the attack would probably start 
in the Philippines. 

The Vice Chairman. In the form of an air attack ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes; air attack combined with surface at- 
tack. 

[9368] The Vice Chairman. On the Philippines? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And in your thinking, you had not reached 
(he point that you had reached the conclusion that there would be 
an air attack on Hawaii ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No; I had not reached the conclusion that 
the Japanese \yere going to attack Pearl Harbor. I think they made 
a big mistake, and it was very poor strategy on their part. 

I could not have anticipated the poor strategy prior to December, 
though. 

The Vice Chairman. At least you did not agree with them in the 
strategy they used? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

[9369] The Vice Chairman. Now on page 4 of your statement, 
Admiral, at the bottom of the page you state : 

Those patrol planes that were initially in the highest degree of readiness were 
assigned to the northwest sectors which were considered the most vital. 



3480 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

In yoiir note there you state : 

This was because the pi'availing winds were from the nortlieast and enemy 
carriers c/)uld thus recover their planes while retiring from the Oahu area. 

That would clearly show that it was your thought that if an aii' 
attack on Hawaii did come it would come from the northwest sector? 

Admiral Bellinger. Not absolutely, but when it came to starting 
something you had to start somewhere so you start with the most prob- 
able. For instance, on that base they sometimes have corner winds 
which are from the opposite direction, and under those conditions, why, 
it might have been another problem. 

Presumably the Japanese could have done their own selection as 
to when they were going to make the attack. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Assuming that Japan decided to 
initiate the war by an air attack on the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, 
then woud you assume that the most likely way they would come would 
be from the northwest [OSTO] sector? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, I thought that would give them the most 
chances. 

The Vice Chairman. I see. Now, as you have indicated in your 
answers given to the counsel, that sector was not covered by long- 
distance patrol or reconnaissance on the 6th of December, 

Admiral Bellinger. No. 

The Vice Chairman. Had it been on the 5th of December? 

Admiral Beli.ixger. Probably out to 300 miles. 

The Vice Chairman. Just to 300 miles, but under your definition 
that is not long-range reconnaissance. 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. That was entirely connected with 
the wing tactical exercises and was not for purposes of security. 

The Vice Chairman, Well, had such a search been made at any 
time before the attack on December 7? 

Admiral Bellinger, Searches beyond 500 miles I believe had never 
been carried out before from Hawaii, or from Oahu. 

The Vice Chairman. I mean by planes from Oahu. 

Admiral Bellinger, From Oahu? 

The Vice Chairman. Yes. Had that ever been done? 

Admiral Bellinger. Searches beyond 500 miles, sir, had [9371] 
never been carried out from Oahu prior to December 7, to my knowl- 
edge. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Admiral Bellinger, But searches of lesser distance, of perhaps 
400 or 450 miles, liad been carried out on occasions, when ordered. 

The Vice Chairman. But under your definition of long-range recon- 
naissance or searches, those particular searches would not qualify 
as such ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Not from the point of view of determining 
security from air attack. 

The Vice Chairman. That is what we are talking about, security 
from air attack. 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. What was done after December 7 in the way 
of long-range reconnaissance from Oahu? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3481 

Admiral Bellinger. Immediately the situation was examined into 
to determine how many planes we had available and there were pro- 
rated on long-distance search, 700 miles to 800 miles. 

The Vice Chairman. That was initiated after the attack? 

Admiral Bellinger. After the attack. 

The Vice Chairman. So that it was done after the attack but 
had not been done at any time before the attack? 

[9S7:3] Admiral Bellinger. All concentration of effort of our 
I^atrol wing after December 7 was long-range search. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. How many planes did you use 
in that long-range search after December 7? 

Admiral Bellinger. We used about 25 to 30 planes a day, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Twenty -five to thirty planes a day? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, from the patrol squadron. 

The Vice Chairman. And those searches were made from Ouhii? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. And the number of planes you had after 
December 7 were just slightly more than half of what you had before 
December 7, was it not ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir — immediately after ? 

The Vice Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Bellinger. Considerably less than that. 

The Vice Chairman. Considerably less than half ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. The planes available ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Immediately after. 

The Vice Chairman. Immediately after, than was true before 
the attack ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

[9S73] The Vice Chairman. Well, at this point we will have 
to recess until 2 o'clock. I will ask you to be back at that time, 
please, Admiral. 

(Thereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, the committee recessed until 2 
p. m. of the same day.) 

[9374^ afternoon session — 2 p. m. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

The Chair understands that at the noon recess Congressman Coojjer 
had finished with his examination. 

Senator George is not here at the moment, but will be here, and Mr. 
Clark will be here. 

Senator Lucas, you may go ahead. 

TESTIMONY OF VICE ADM. PATRICK NEISON LYNCH BELLINGER, 
UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed) 

Senator Lucas. Admiral Bellinger, on page o of your statement 
you state : 

The term "Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force" might be considered 
a misnomer as it was not an actual command until the Naval Base Defense 
Force organization was placed in a functioning status. 



3482 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAKL HARBOR ATTACK 

Who is responsible for placing it in a functioning status? 

Admiral Bellinger. The commander Naval Base Defense Force 
was the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, Admiral 
Bloch. He did not have full control of patrol planes or any definitely 
assigned to him, so before he could have put it actually in a function- 
ing status he would have really had to talk to Admiral Kimmel. 

Senator Lucas. In other words, Admiral Kimmel had the last w^ord 
as to whether or not the command was in a functioning [93751 
status ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is with reference to the Navy. 

Senator Lucas. That is what T am talking about. 

Admii-al Bellinger. With reference to the Army going into it, you 
w ould have to get the concurrence of the Army connnander. 

Senator Lucas. I understand that. I am only talking now about 
the Navy, in respect to the functioning status. 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. What do you mean by "functioning status"? 

Admiral Bellinger. I mean an actual business operating schedule. 

Senator Lucas. Well, I am speaking primarily now with respect to 
the condition of war being imminent. What would the functioning 
status mean to you if you knew that war was imminent with Japan ? 

Admiral Bellinger. A function status would have meant that 
the patrols would have been run every day, that fighter planes would 
have been standing by on an alert status, that bomber planes would 
have been standing by on a ready status, antiaircraft guns would have 
been ready to have been put in action. 

Senator Lucas. As I understand, nothing like that was ordered by 
Admiral Kimmel previous to the attack. 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

[93761 Senator Lucas. You were more or less on a routine duty 
during the months of November and December. 

Admiral Bellinger, Yes, sir; in accordance with approved 
schedules. 

Senator Lucas. Did you ever detect any change from the regular 
routine duty that you were on during the month of November? 

Admiral Bellinger. We kept one squadron ready to go wherever it 
might be ordered in an expeditious fashion. We placed a service 
group for patrol planes on Wake Island. One squadron went to Mid- 
way on October 17, I think it was. It was still out there until it 
returned on December 5. Another squadron went out to Midway, and 
the other squadron that was there went to Wake, and that was all in 
connection with special operations, in connection with reinforcement 
of Wake and Midway with Marine planes. 

Senator Lucas. When was that order put into effect ? Do you recall 
when that was ? 

Admiral Bellinger. On November 28 I received an order from the 
commander in chief. Pacific, to direct 12 patrol planes to Midway, 
proceed to Wake on December 1, search en route. 

Senator Lucas. That was an order merely carrying out the plans 
which had been agreed upon by Admiral Kimmel and [9377] 
Naval Operations in Washington to transmit those planes out to 
Midway. 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3483 

Senator Lucas. What I am talking about now is the regular, ordi- 
nary routine duties that you had. Were they changed in any way 
whatsoever after November 27, 1941 ? 

Admiral Bellinger, No, sir ; not to my recollection. 

Senator Lucas, In other words, the only change in your duties was 
with respect to some specific order that came along, and you have given 
us an example of that when you told us about sending these planes out 
to Wake Island? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Now you state on the same page : 

The Naval Base Defense Air Force was a paper organization ; it did not exist, 
in fact, as an entity unto itself. 

What do you mean by "Naval Base Defense Air Force was a paper 
organization" ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I mean that the nearest analogy I can give 
3'ou as an explanation is that if a division of ships had a landing force 
organized on board of the various ships there would be someone to 
take command of that when the landing force was ordered to be landed. 
That was not in effect and would be merely a paper organization until 
the order came to put it into effect. 

[9378] Senator Lucas. In other words, until the outbreak of war 
this probably would not be in effect ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Either that, or until joint action had been 
taken to put it into effect by proper authority. 

Senator Lucas. You were the same Admiral Bellinger who pre- 
pared or aided in preparing the so-called Martin-Bellinger report, 
were you not? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Was that submitted to Admiral Kimmel? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir ; copies went to him. 

Senator Lucas. And, he approved it? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Did he have the material to carry that plan into 
effect? 

Admiral Bellinger. Not in the complete state; no, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Did he ever do anything? Did Admiral Kimmel 
ever do an3^thiiig toward carrying into eTfect the Martin-Bellinger 
report ? 

Admiral Bellinger. He initiated this at the very beginning. Thai 
is the reason it was drawn up and became the organization that it was. 
Except for drills it was never put into a functioning status. 

Senator Lucas. What was the nature of the drills that j^ou had? 
[9379] Admiral Bellinger. The drills I am speaking about are 
the drills for the Naval Base Air Defense. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. How were they carried out? 

Admiral Bellinger. Thej^ were carried out by having — excuse me. 
This jxiper describes it minute!}'. The only thing left out of it was 
tliat a target was usually placed out at sea in the shape of a ship, a 
carrier or another type of ship, and the location of that ship would not 
be known and it would be a question of the ship being there at some 
time during the period of the drill, and it was necessary to fire on 
that ship and simulate an attack group going out to attack it and 



3484 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

simulate planes coming in from the direction in which that ship was, 
simulating aircraft coming in for attack. 

[9380] Senator Lucas. Now, were those drills held in contem- 
plation of an air raid ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. By an enemj- ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. That is the whole basis of it. 

Senator Lucas. Were they held in contemplation of a surprise 
attack ? 

Admiral Bellinger. For a real surprise, no drill is going to be 
satisfactory, because it is too late then. 

Senator Lucas. Well, you discussed in this remarkable report that 
you and General Martin, as I recall, the very route that the Japanese 
wpuld take in coming into Pearl Harbor on a surprise attack, and you 
also said it would be preceded by submarines, three or five submarines 
probably around the harbor. 

I was tremendously interested in that report, and I wondered 
whether you and General Martin were not thinking about a surprise 
attack when j'ou drew that report. 

Admiral Bellinger. Tliis organization, unless it is working prior 
to an attack, is not worth the paper it is drawn on. 

Senator Lucas. I understand that it is not worth the paper it is 
drawn on unless it is working prior to an [9381'\ attack, but 
you fellows drew it and you drew a remarkable picture of what was 
going to happen to Pearl Harbor. 

The Vice Chairman. And what did happen. 

Senator Lucas. And what did happen. It is just a little bit difficult 
for me to understand, after such a remarkable report was draw^i in 
contemplation of a surprise attack, that everybody was surprised by 
the attack. 

I wonder if you can throw any light on it. 

Admiral Bellinger. As to why we were surprised? 

Senator Lucas. Yes. 

Admiral Bellinger. Well, we were at peace on December 6. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. 

xldmiral Bellinger. There was certain information in Washington 
and certain information in Hawaii. It is a question whether or not, 
analyzing and estimating the situation, it could have been predicted 
that the attack was going to be made there, and when. 

Senator Lucas. I appreciate that. No one knew, and I do not think 
there is any evidence in this record to show that the Japs were going to 
attack at the time they did, but, nevertheless, the Navy and Army were 
out in the Pacific, and you had gone through all these air drills, you 
had drawn this plan, and it is a little difficult for me to understand 
just why there was not a little more [9382] confidence on the 
part of the Navy that there would be a possibility of an air attack on 
Pearl Harbor. 

Admiral Bellinger. To go back to this estimate again, as I brought 
out this morning, this estimate was an estimate covering the event of 
sudden hostile action against Oahu. It was not an estimate of the 
strategy that the Japanese would employ in starting this war. 

In other words, it was not an estimate which indicated that they 
were going to strike against Oahu as part of their national strategy. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3485 

In other words, if they were going to strike Oahu, this was the esti- 
mate of how it would be done. 

Senator Lucas. If they were going to strike ? 

Admiral Bellixger. If they were going to strike. 

Senator Lucas. Well now, on the question of training the men to fly 
these ships, you discussed that at some length. Did not you, as the 
commanding officer there, feel that it was necessary for these boys to 
get some training on long reconnaissance ships ? 

Admiral Bellinger. They got it, but the question is "How long ?" 

For instance, during the week of December 2 to 5 squadrons were 
used on reconnaissance. Three hundred miles was about the distance 
they went out. The question [9383] of how far to send them 
does not necessarily enter so much in the picture, except for the results 
obtained. 

Senator Lucas. Well, it is a fact that one of these aviators can get 
valuable training in doing long reconnaissance search ; can he not ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir; they had to be trained in that. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. And in 1940, when Admiral Richardson was 
out there, he had his naval planes on reconnaissance, as I recall, for 
some 6 weeks. Are j^ou familiar with that? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes; I remember that. 

Senator Lucas. Were you out there at that time? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir ; part of the time. 

Senator Lucas. You recall that he and the Army as a combination, 
I'an a long-range reconnaissance after they received the alert order 
from the Chief of Naval Operations here in Washington; do you not'? 

Admiral Bellinger. I do not think the Army took part in that. 

Senator Lucas. Just the Navy alone? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. I have never been able to understand if Admiral 
Richardson could mn long-range reconnaissance in 1940, why it was 
that Admiral Kimmel could not have [9384.] run a long-range 
reconnaissance in 1941. 

Can you give me any answer to that? 

Admiral Bellinger. The range of that reconnaissance that you are 
speaking about by Admiral Richardson, I think, was 300 miles. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. 

Admiral Bellinger. It may have been 400. I have forgotten now, 
but I do not think it was over 400 miles. 

Senator Lucas. That may be true. 

Admiral Bellinger. I am now trying to analyze the point of view 
maybe of Admiral Kimmel, in connection with trying to give you an 
answer. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. 

Admiral Bellinger. A question was asked this morning, I believe, 
as to why we did not make a long-range reconnaissance. Maybe I 
can answer that a little more fully right now. 

Senator Lucas. All right, sir. I think we are all interested in it. 

Admiral Bellinger. Admiral Kimmel knew the general situation 
in regard to patrol planes. I kept him so informed. We were try- 
ing to get these planes re-equipped with the new planes as quickly as 
we could. 



3486 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

From October 28 until November 23, 1941, 54 planes [938S] 
came out there, new planes. 

Those planes "were a late type and were not equipped with spares 
to keep them in operation. 

The planes had been giving troube with engine cowling, the nose 
section of the engine was cracking. 

That was on the first squadron that came out about midsummer. 

It was expected that these would have corrected features in them. 
It was not exactly known at that time that the full effect of correction 
was satisfactory. 

[9386] 1 think he knew all of that and knew when these planes 
arrived, and I think he also realized what was involved in patrol planes 
in connection with carrying out war plan 46, I am sure he did, and 
perhaps all of those considerations were borne in his mind. 

Senator Lucas. Assuming that you had been the commander out 
there and that you knew war was imminent, and you received a war- 
warning message, would that have made any difference in respect to 
using these planes for reconnaissance work ? 

Admiral Belonger. Perha])s. I answered that question this 
morning and said God only knows what I would have done. But I 
can say this, that I was ver}^ much surprised when I heard that there 
had been a message. 

Senator Lucas. Well, I was just coming to that. I was wondering 
whether or not Admiral Kimmel ever discussed with you any of these 
messages that came from the Chief of Naval Operations to him, start- 
ing with April on up to the time of the attack. 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Now General Davis was his air officer, as I under- 
stand it. 

Admiral Bellinger. Commander Davis. 

Senator Lucas. Commander Davis. How close were you to 
[9387] Commander Davis? 

Admiral Bellinger. Very close. 

Senator Lucas. Did Commander Davis discuss with you at any 
time the acceptance of an}' of these messages that came from the Chief 
of Naval Operations? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir, I do not know that he knew about 
that. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? I expect to go into the Davis 
matter and show that he did not know about that either. 

Senator Lucas. "What were the duties of General Davis ? 

The Chairman, Commander Davis. 

Senator Lucas. I keep getting my generals and commanders mixed. 

The Chairman. Go ahead. Pardon the interruption. 

Senator Lucas. It is perferctly all right, sir. 

What were the duties of Commander Davis ? 

Admiral Bellinger. He was the aviation aide on the staff of Ad- 
miral Kimmel and his duties were assigned by Admiral Kimmel. 

Senator Lucas. How often did you see him ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I would say I was in communication with him 
by telephone or saw him at least, I should say, on the average of every 
day. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3487 

[9388] Senator Lucas. Did he give you any direct orders as to 
what you should do with respect to the Air Force ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. He had no authority except by virtue 
of being on the staff of Admiral Kimmel. 

iSenator Lucas. What he was then was sort of a liaison man; is 
that it? 

Admiral Bellinger. He was an aide to Admiral Kimmel. 

Senator Lucas. And Admiral Kimmel was the only one who could 
give you orders as to what to do then ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. At no time, as I understand it, during the months 
of November and October did Admiral Kimmel talk to you about any 
messages that he might have received from Washington, D. C? 

Admiral Bellinger. He did not talk to me about them. 

Senator Lucas. I call your attention to Exhibit 37. As an example, 
page 1, the message of April 1, 1941, which was sent by Admiral 
Stark to Admiral Kimmel. It says : 

Personnel of your Naval Intelligence Service should be advised that because 
of the fact that from past experience shows the Axis powers often begin activities 
in a particular field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of the 
country concerned, they should take steps on such days to see that proper watches 
and precautions are in effect. 

[9389] Are you familiar with that order? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; but I was familiar with the general 
situation in that respect. As a matter of fact, my operations officer 
wrote an article which was published in the Naval Iijstitute, I think 
in 1936, which practically duplicated this estimate of the situation in 
i-cgard to an attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. 

Admiral Bellinger. So that this was not any news, particularly. 

Senator Lucas. I see. It was no news at all? It was merely a 
i-eminder of something you already knew ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Now, what was the condition of these planes that 
were destroyed by the Japanese on December 7, on the Saturday 
before ? Were they in the same places, the same conditions, the same 
spots ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; I don't think so. I can't say for sure 
but I would be willing to bet they were not in the same places. 

Senator Lucas. Were there more planes on hand at that particular 
time than there were during the other days of the week, on this par- 
ticular Sunday morning? I presume your operation schedule would 
show exactly sis to the dispersal [9390] of your planes during 
that week. 

Admiral Bellinger. I believe there were more, perhaps, on the 
beach on Saturday than there were on Sunday. 

Senator Lucas. Why was that? Was that pay day? 

Admiral Bellinger. Well, we had been working pretty strong on 
the 2d, 3d, 4tli, and 5th, and you have got to do something about 
easing up on personnel. 

Senator Lucas. I appreciate that. 



3488 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Bellinger. But every day was a working day. That was 
started in my forces about March 1, or maybe April 1. 

Senator Lucas. Well, it is a fact that there were more naval officers 
and men at Pearl Harbor on the week end than at any other time; 
is it not? 

Admiral Bellinger. On week days? 

Senator Lttcas. No; on the week ends, Saturdays and Sundays. 
That was the custom, wasn't it? 

Admiral Bellinger. Not necessarily. As far as my outfit was con- 
cerned I tried to make a schedule that would hold water utilizing 
every day as a work day, Saturdays and Sundays the same as Tuesdays 
or Wednesdays. But there were certain combinations which did make 
a let-up at times maybe more than others. 

, As I said before, if you look at this schedule you will find on Tues- 
day, Wednesday, Thursda}^ and Friday there [9o91^ was con- 
siderable activity and that was when we were having wing tactics. 

Senator Lucas. Well, was that the regular operation schedule every 
week ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir, not every week; but it was in our 
schedule of employment. 

Senator Lucas. It shows that you were busy the first part of the 
week and then over the week end these fellows were entitled to some 
rest and recreation. 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes; but that doesn't follow necessarily all 
the way through. 

Senator Lucas. Now, where were you when the attack took place? 

Admiral Bellinger. I was taken sick with what they call acute 
laryngitis, I believe, a type of flu, on December 2, and on December 
7, that was to be my first day up. 

Senator Lucas. I see. 

Admiral Bellinger. I got up very hurriedly. 

Senator Lucas. You didn't wait for the doctor to tell you? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Who was in command while you were away? 

Admiral Bellinger. I was still in command and in touch every 
day with my operations officer who was my second in command, at 
that time Commander Ramsey. 

[9'W2] Senator Lucas. Were you in the hospital ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; I was at home. The first message 
that I received about the attack was from Commander Ramsey, now 
captain, and I would say that it was probably a few seconds before 
8 o'clock. 

Senator Lucas. When did you first see Admiral Kimmel after the 
attack ? 

Admiral Belling,er. I talked to him on the telephone the day of 
the attack, over the telephone. I did not see him until a few days 
later. 

Senator Lucas. When was the last 

Admiral Bellinger. As a matter of fact, I stayed in the office 
practically all the time. 

Senator Lucas. When was the last time you talked to Admiral 
Kimmel before December 7 ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I don't remember exactly, but I think the lat- 
ter part of November, probably the 26th or 27th. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3489 

Senator Lucas. Do you recall what you talked about ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Tliere was a conference, I remember, in con- 
nection with — whether that was the last time or not I am not sure — 
but I know I was over there in a conference with reference to making- 
plans for these planes to be put on Wake and Midway. 

Senator Lucas. Tliere was nothing at that time said [dS93] 
about the imminence of war with Japan? 

Admiral Bellikoer. No; not with reference to any war warning 
or dispatches from Washington in connection with it. 

Senator Lucas. I direct your attention again to Exhibit 87. Just 
take a cursory glance at the messages sent by the Chief of Naval 
Operations, particularly the one of October 16, which says: 

The resigaation of tlie Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation. If 
a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-Ameri- 
can. If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate iindei- 
a new mandate which will not include rapprochment with the U. S. 

And so on. Are you familiar with that message ? 

Admiral Bellinger. One minute until I find it. What page is it? 

Senator Lucas. Page 18. Did you ever see that message? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; I don't remember seeing that before 
December 7. 

Senator Lucas. Have you read it since these hearings started ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Sir? 

Senator Lucas. Have you read that message since these hearings 
started ? 

[9394-] Admiral Bellinger. I think I have seen them all. 

Senator Lucas. You have seen them all ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I think so. Most of these were shown to me 
at various investigations on this subject. And, as a matter of fact, 
I didn't know that there was any message other than one message, 
the war-warning message, until 1944. 

Senator Lucas. You are familiar with all of these top secret mes- 
sages that were sent ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir ; not familiar. 

Senator Lucas. You have read them all? 

Admiral Bellinqer. I have read the testimony on a good many 
of them. 

Senator Lucas. Directing your attention to the message of Novem- 
ber 24, assuming Admiral Kimmel had given you that message — the 
Admiral has complained bitterly because Washington didn't give him 
all the information they had — I am wondering what 3^011 wotdd have 
done had Admiral Kimmel given to you the message of November 24. 
It is found on page 36. That is the message that says a surprise aggres- 
sive movement is possible in any direction. What would that message 
liave conveyed to you, if anything? Give us your best judgment on 
it now, although I appreciate it is hindsight. 

Admiral Bellinger. Hindsight is one thing and foresight is an- 
other. This situation at Pearl Harbor was another. I [9395\ 
have been asked that question many times. 

Senator Lucas. The reason I ask 

Admiral Bellinger. I wish I had seen it. I don't know what 1 
would have done. I would rather have the people who know me think 
what I would have done. Only God knows what I would have done. 
I can't make any statement on that. 



3490 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. Well, the reason I ask the question is that you were 
in charge of, more or less in charge of, the air forces there. 

Admiral Bellinger. Patrol planes only. 

Senator Lucas. Who had charge of the other planes ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Various commands of the air in the fleet. For 
instance, there were utility planes headed by a wing commander. 
There were marine planes headed by a colonel. There were carrier 
planes and organization headed by Admiral Halsey. 

Senator Lucas. I see. 

I suppose what you have said about this message would be true 
about the war-warning message, too, of November 27? 

Admiral Bellinger. If I would have gotten any of these messages 
I would have made an estimate of the situation, with my knowledge 
and understanding at the time, and taken action accordingly. 

Senator Lucas. Do you believe now, Admiral, that you [9396\ 
were entitled to receive these messages from Admiral Kimmel in 
view of the position that you had' there as commander of the patrol 
fleet? 

Admiral Bellinger. I think that was Admiral Kimmel's business 
entirely. I can't answer for that. 

Senator Lucas. Well, I was wondering what your position would 
be. You say that you would have liked to have seen the messages, 
you would have liked to have had them in your possession. You at 
least by implication say you would have had more insight into what 
was going on. I am wondering whether or not you thought it was the 
duty of Admiral Kimmel to pass this kind of message on to you 
under the arrangement that you had out there. 

Admiral Bellinger. I certainly am not one to say what the com- 
mander in chief's duty was. I was under him. 

[9397'] Senator Lucas. In other words, whatever he did was 
all right with you ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I wouldn't have been full of inhibitions, as 1 
remember. I think that if I saw something that I thought I should 
have seen at the time, I think I probably would have brought the 
question up with him. 

Senator Lucas. Well, that is what I am trying to ask you about, 
that is what I am trying to find out, whether or not you think you 
should have seen any of these messages. I am basing that now, pri- 
marily, on the contention that Admiral Kimmel has made in his 
case before the committee. He complains bitterly because Admiral 
Stark didn't send him information. 

In view of the fact that you were a subordinate of Admiral Kimmel, 
I am wondering what you think of his failing to send you information, 
if he did. 

Admiral Bellinger. I think your guess is about as good as mine. 
I can express an opinion. I can say that if he had shown me the 
messages and the situation did remain as is, why, I would be in a 
different situation at the present time. 

Senator Lucas. Well, I don't know what that situation is, and I 
am not going to inquire into it. 

Mr. Keefe. Will the Senator yield ? 
[9398] Senator Lucas. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OK JOINT COMMITTEE 3491 

Mr. Keete. I want to make just this observation. I think it is 
quite apparent that Admiral Bellinger at that time was a commander. 
Is that true? 

Admiral Belijnger. No, sir; a rear admiral. 

Mr. Keefe. a rear admiral? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. But you were serving under the direct orders of tiie 
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You were not a member of his staff ? 

Admiral Bellingii?. No, sir; I was a task force conmiander under 
liim. 

JMr. Keefe. You took orders from him ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Took orders from him ; yes sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That is the way it works in the Navy isn't it. Admiral ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. In the line of command ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Fellows down below don't usually dispute the higher- 
ups, do they? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. In good teamwork opinions are ex- 
pressed back and forth. 

[9S99] Mr. Keefe. We have had some evidence of that before 
this committee, I think. 

That is all. 

The Chairman. Are you through, Senator? 

Senator Lucas. One other question. 

The only reason I raised these questions is that you raise it yourself. 
In other words, you must have attached some significance to the fact 
that you never saw any of these papers given to Admiral Kimmel until 
after the war was on, because you so state. You state in your state- 
ment on page 8 : 

I had no knowledge of any of the warning messages emanating from the Navy 
and War Departments, during October November and December. I never knew of 
any warning dispatches until a few days after the attack — on the evening of about 
December 10, I think it was — when I was told by one of my oflScers that he had just 
heard that there had been a warning dispatch received in the District Naval 
Intelligence Office, and that the local Intelligence officer of the Naval Air Station 
knew about it. I immediately sent for that Intelligence officer, and he confirmed 
this information. Several days after that, when I was working on some papers 
with Admiral Kimmel, I first saw one of the warning dispatches. 

[O^jOO] In other words, it apparently disturbed you at the time 
that you hadn't seen any of these messages, and you immediately con- 
tacted the district naval intelligence office. 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir; I did that. I could have recom- 
mended to him that we do start patrols. 

Senator Lucas. That is right. That is the point I am trying to 
develop. You did have it within your power to make such a recom- 
mendation, that long-distance reconnaissance be used. The point that 
I was hoping you would answer was whether or not, if you had all of 
this information at hand and had the chance to analyze it, whether or 
not it might have made a difference with you in respect to the recom- 
mendations that at least you might have made ? 

Admiral Bellinger. There is a possibility. 

79716 — 46— pt. 8 9 



3492 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. There is a possibility. Was Admiral Kimmel de- 
pending upon you for recommendations as to whether or not the long- 
distance reconnaissance would be made? 

Admiral Bellinger. Not to my knowledge. 

Senator Lucas. That is what I wanted to know about. You were 
concerned about this. You wanted the committee to know that you 
didn't receive any of these messages after November 27 and before. 1 
was trying to find out why you wanted the committee to know about it. 

[9401] Admiral Bellinger. I want everybody to know about it. 

Senator Lucas. I see. I think that is all. 

The Chairman. Mr. Clark. 

Mr. Clark. I have no questions. 

The Chairman. Senator George would be next, but he will inquire 
later. The Chair would like to advise that he is advised that if pos- 
sible without restricting any members' interrogation, that Admiral 
Bellinger is on an assignment that makes it important that he get 
away tonight, if possible; but I am just advising the committee of 
that so we may keep it in mind. 

Mr. Murpht. Admiral Bellinger, there has been handed to the 
committee a statement on your career with the United States Navy 
covering the time from 1913 on. 

I note in the sketch that was given to us that from 1914 on, 3^ou 
had a very active participation in the air activities of the United 
States Navy ; that is a fact, is it not? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. You were in the first Navy plane that was ever 
struck by an enemy bullet ; isn't that? right? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. sir. 

[9402] Mr. Murphy. That was down at Vera Cruz ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Then you went to Pensacola, Fla., in 1915 and in 
the following year — rather, on January 21, you were designated 
naval air pilot No. 4? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Thereafter, in 191.5, you participated in the develop- 
ment of the use of the catapult ; is that right ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Thereafter you piloted flying boat AB-3 and were 
on the first extended flight of this kind ordered and carried out? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. In 1915 you made the American altitude record for 
a seaplane of 10,000 feet; in 1915 you participated in the first actual 
instance in the Navy where Navy aircraft spotted actual gun or 
mortar fire; in 1916 you conducted live bomb-dropping tests from a 
plane, the first test of this nature to be conducted by the Navy; in 
1916 you participated in the first instance of spotting, and firing at 
regular targets at sea by the Navy. 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. In 1916, you conducted experimental tests with radio 
set in pontoon type of seaplanes ; in 1917 you made the first machine- 
gun firing tests ever made in a Navy plane; in 1917 you conducted 
the first night seaplane flight in which floodlights were employed on 
the beach for illuminating the water, and that marks the beginning 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3493 

of night flying at Pensacola and of regnlar night flying instructions 
in the Navy. 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Murphy. In 1919, you participated in the first trans- Atlantic 
flight as commanding officer of the NC-1. You made a long over- 
seas flight from Newfoundland to the vicinity of the Azores m May 
1919. 

In other words, on down through the years, those I have outlined 
together with others that follow, you had a very distinguished and 
outstanding career in the Navy, on which I want to congratulate you 
at this time. 

And you were the type of man that was selected by Washington 
to be sent to Honolulu ; that is right, isn't it? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir ; but 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you were sent there ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I was ordered there. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, after you got to Honolulu, you were also 
ordered to conduct a survey and to prepare a plan ni conjunction with 
General Martin of the Army Air Corps; that is right too, isn't it? 

[9404-] Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And that plan which you developed, was in effect a 
chart of exactly what happened at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, 
with the exception of a few details; that is right, too, isn't it? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now then, you were placed under that plan in charge 
of certain operations which you did not have the authority to carry 
out until the means with which to carry it out were made available 
to you by higher authority ; isn't that so ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. The fact is that throughout this entire critical period, 
you were never shown any of these dispatches which in an official 
way showed the development of a tense and critical situation; that 
is true, isn't it ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. When Admiral Kimmel was on the stand I questioned 
him as to why he had not consulted you who were unquestionably an 
outstanding air expert, and he said that he consulted his own man. 
Commander Davis. I would now like to direct your attention to the 
fact that Commander Davis was called to testify before Admiral 
Hewitt [94iOS] and his testimony appears in the record as 
that of Rear Admiral Arthur C. Davis, commencing at page 96. 

Mr. Masten. Pardon me. Is that the Hart or the Hewitt report? 

Mr. Murphy. This is the Hart report. I beg your pardon. 

And the same Rear Adm. Arthur C. Davis was the airman on the 
staff of Admiral Kimmel immediately preceding 

The Vice Chairman. The air aide. 

Mr. Murphy. was his air aide on the staff of Admiral Kimmel 

immediately preceding December 1941. 

Isn't that right, Admiral ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to go to the testimony in question. 

Admiral Davis, as I recollect it, did think that there could have 
been instituted a system of reconnaissance whereby you would use 
certain planes in the less critical areas and other planes in the more 



3494 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

critical areas. Do you know of any such possibility? For recon- 
naissance purposes? 

Admiral Bellinger. Actually, on December 7 we used planes of 
every type and description, some that could only go 200 miles. On 
the days following December 7 we used [9400] planes that 
were made available for the distances that they could go. That was 
to get information as far out as we could through all the various sec- 
tors surrounding Pearl Harbor. 

Actually, in fact, for prevention of an air raid, the farther out you 
can get information the better. And in order to figure on preventing 
an air raid in the early morning and having this information, it was 
considered that the patrol planes should go out between 7 and 8 
hundred miles. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, Admiral, you were never confronted 
with the problem because you weren't taken into the confidence of 
those in command ; isn't that right? 

Admiral Bellinger. In general, yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And the best — excuse me. 

Admiral Bellinger. I was not asked or shown. 

Mr. Murphy. The best we can do is to ask you as an air expert to 
speculate by way of hindsight wliat you would have done before 
December 7; that is right too, isn't it? 

At any rate, you didn't see them, you weren't asked to pass on them ; 
it wasn't your problem directly until you were consulted on them; 
isn't that true ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. IMuRPHY. Now, I — excuse me. 

\94O7] Admiral Bellinger. On December 7. 

Mr. Murphy. I say, up to December 7, Admiral. 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Up to December 7. 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. The fact is that up to the morning of December 
7. you were a man sick in bed and pretty much concerned about im- 
proving the health of Admiral Bellinger, I assume. I didn't mean 
(o go into the actual attack itself. 

Now, then, on page 97, tlie question was asked — you do not have 
this, Admiral — page 97, the question was asked of Rear Admiral 
Davis, who was the air aide on Admiral Kimmel's staff : 

Q. Admiral, available records indicate that you have knowledge pertinent 
to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that occurred on 7 December, 1941. 
Please state the facts within your knowledge concerning the attack and the 
major events leading up thereto. It is especially desired that you cover the 
following, and a written copy of this question is handed you so that you may 
refer to it as you testify — 

Now, then, the admiral testified for several paragraphs as to the 
question itself, and what it was looking for, and [P.^5] then 
appears his answer, the last paragraph on the bottom of page 97 : 

A. My duty as Fleet Aviation Officer was primarily, if not almost entirely, 
concerned with technical training and logistics matters. As the case with the 
Staff as a whole, our primary interest for many months had been the improve- 
ment in strength and proficiency of the Pacific Fleet. 

As is no doubt well known, it had not been possible, for various reasons, includ- 
ing appropriations, to develop the Fleet to a point which, it is now known, was 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3495 

necessary. However, this fact made it all the more important to concentrate 
on. all phases of materiel and training. 

I, myself, had little to do with considerations of attack possibilities, and I 
do not recall ever being directly consulted on such matters by the Commander 
in Chief. Naturally, the subject was frequently discussed among members of 
the Staff and also by the Commander in Chief with the Staff at times when I 
was present. 

From these discussions, I can definitely state my opinion that it was the Com- 
mander in Chief's belief that it was vitally necessary to continue as long as 
possible with the training and other Fleet improvements, and that going into 
a defensive status would interfere with this [57,09] work, so that I am 
convinced it was his sincere intention to acconiplisli all that could be done 
before hostilities began and that he believed there was still time to keep the work 
going. 

As to the imminent possibility of attack, I only occasionally saw or heard 
(jf vparnings that may have been received by the Commander in Chief. I know 
that there had been many warnings of varying degrees of seriousness over a 
number of months, and I had the impression that it was within the Commander 
in Chief's discretion to determine how far to go in action with regard to such 
warnings. 

I believe his thought throughout was to take precautionary steps within 
reason but to regard the xvarnings as all the more reason for concentration 
on improving the Fleet's readiness 

During the period of strain which finally led up to the events of 7 December, 
I am certain that the Commander in Chief gave the situation the carefulest 
possible consideration. I have to admit, however, that I was, myself concerned 
becau.se of information that was available in the press and that I concluded 
that tliere must be other information which had not been shown me that 
influenced the decision to take no greater precautionary steps than were taken. 

As to advice with regard to precautions, I was asked [9JflO] not so 
much for an opinion as to whether or not the fullest precautions should be 
taken, as for information with regard to the practicability of comprehensive 
searches, and their effect on training. Comprehensive and extensive air searches 
were practicable, and I so stated. I also stated the fact that this would very 
definitely interfere with the progress in general in aviation training in the 
Fleet. 

This, as was the case in the Fleet as a whole, was important in view of the 
training demanded by the rapid expansion that was already beginning to take 
place. 

With respect to the surprise air attack, I naturally expressed the opinion 
that this was possible and that it could only be prevented by the most extensive 
searches and efforts to intercept at sea by air and surface vessels. 

I did not, however, realize to what a high degree of proficiency Japanese naval 
aviation had been developed. I do not believe that anybody else in the American 
Navy had any proper conception of this development either. Certainly I had 
never seen anything, either oflScially or unoflicially that would lead me to suppose 
that Japanese naval aviation was so tremendously effective and well developed 
as it turned out to be. 

At that point I would like to ask you, did you in [^4^-?] 
Hawaii, consider the ability of Yamamoto and his daring? 

Admiral Bellinger. I was asked the question at one other hearing, 
whether I was fully cognizant of Yamamoto's background. I am 
not sure whether I was conscious of it before December 7 or after. 
I think I was. 

Mr, Murphy. Captain Layton — Excuse me. Go ahead. 

Admiral Bellinger, With reference to the ability of the Japanese, 
which they showed in their attack on December 7, it far surpassed 
my estimate of their ability. 

Mr, Murphy. There was a book about which Captain Layton testi- 
fied in the Hart proceedings, and that book seemed to discuss the 
question of a possible raid on Pearl Harbor and the capabilities of the 
Japanese. Were you considered and brought into those discussions 
or given the benefit of that ? 



3496 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to i-efer now particularly to the testimony 
of Captain Layton, at page 214. At any rate you were not in those 
discussions about Yamamoto and this book that was published and 
the discussions about a possible raid on Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, Admiral, there has also been testimony in this 
record that the north was not the most dangerous [94-12] sec- 
tion. As I recall, reading the record of all the hearings, there seemed 
to be almost a unanimous opinion that the north was the most dan- 
gerous, and in your statement you so state, do you not? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, you give as the reason for feeling that it was 
the most dangerous, the wind conditions. Did you also take into 
consideration the fact that in the north, where tliey did come from, 
was the so-called "vacant sea"? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you also 

Excuse me. Let me add this, and then j'ou can answer both. Did 
you also take into consideration the fact that whatever shipping there 
had been previousl}^ in that area, it had been eliminated prior to 
December 7 ? 

Now, will you answer both ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I didn't know (hat it had been eliminated uj) 
there. I am not so sure that it was. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, there is some testimony to that effect. 

Admiral Bellinger. The question was where the Japanese were 
going to come from, and we were not conducting patrols from 
Palmyra, or Johnston Islands, as a regular proposition, and I presume 
that the Japanese would have known [94-13] about it, so there 
was nothing to stop them from coming from that direction either ; but 
it is a very serious proposition, a vital proposition to a carrier, in con- 
nection with the operation of planes. 

It must head into the wind, and it must get up enough speed to 
compensate for the wind that is blowing in order to have a sufficient 
force of wind over the deck. So that the wind controls the direction 
of movement of the carrier, and I don't believe an attack of the kind 
that was made on Pearl Harbor where surprise was expected to be the 
major affair, or where they felt there might be considerable jeopardy 
would take place in a direction wherein the carrier had to take on her 
planes after having launched them, heading toward the island, 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate. Admiral, had you had any knowledge of 
the fact that all shipping had been directed to the south through the 
Torres Strait before December 7? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. That had been done since October, but you didn't 
know about that, did you ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I am practically sure, I didn't. I don't recall 
any knowledge of it. 

[94J4-] Mr. Murphy. That is another of the dispatches in that 
period. 

Now, there was a conference at which time the possibility of an air 
raid on Oahu or Hawaii was discussed, at which time Captain Mc- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3497 

Morris made a certain statement. That would be on November 27 or 
28. You were not present at that conference, were you ? 

Admiral Bellingp:r. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, you do believe that there could have been 
reconnaissance if the command had been issued to have it ; isn't that so? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. AVith the planes we had there could 
have been reconnaissance. 

Mr. MuRPiiY. I would like to direct your attention in that regard to 
the testimony of your Chief of Staff at page 595 of the record of the 
court of inquiry conducted by officers of the Navy. On page 596 : 

Q. That is a very clear explanation. However, will you please answer the 
question. We will put the question another way. Where there any planes at 
Pearl Harbor which could have been used and were not used for distance recon- 
naissance on the morning of December 7? 

A. Yes, sir; there were planes that could have been used had such a search 
been ordered by higher [9-^15] authority. 

Q. How many of these planes were in that category? 

A. For an emergency effort, approximately 60 planes could have been made 
available in four hours or less. 

Q. Who would have ordered the distance reconnaissance and under whose 
authority would the directive have been made? 

A. For the full utilization of all aircraft, both Army and Navy, available on 
Oahu, the orders to us would have come from the Commander, Naval Base 
Defense Force. 

Q. Who is that? 

A. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District. Orders solely for the Navy 
planes would probably have come from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacitic Fleet. 

Q. Did you consider in these plans and orders wliich you had that the Com- 
mander of the Naval Base Defense Force was the one who would have originated 
the idea of distance reconnaissance and would have directed you or Admiral 
Bellinger to have sent planes out on this mission? 

A. I would have assumed it would be the duty of any officer higher in the 
echelon of command above Admiral Bellinger to have taken action on receipt of 
the information indicating that action was necessary. 

[94I6] Do you agree with those answers of your chief of staff ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. What was the name of your chief of staff' at that 
time, Admiral? 

Admiral Bellinger. He was Commander Ramsey ; Logan C. 
Ramsey. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. Now I direct your attention to the questions at 
page 597 of the same record, question 110 : 

Q. You stated that in your opinion there might be or could he an air attack on 
Oahu. Had you ever thought from what direction the air attack would come or 
the most probable direction? 

A. Yes, sir, we had. We had great discussions on it, and in view of the pre- 
vailing wind conditions and the presence of outlying islands and other factors, 
we had decided the northwest sector was the most likely line of approach, and 
in our drills the squadron in the highest degree of readiness was always ordered 
to take up that sector from 315 to 00. 

Then, if you, with your limited number of planes, had sent out distance recon- 
naissance, you would have sent them to tlie northwest sector so as to cover that 
sector? 

For any single day, yes, sir. 

[H17] Question 115 : 

Why did you select that sector? 

A. Because we had always decided that was the most likely direction of 
approach. 

Q. But that sector was not based on the sighting of any Japanese planes? 



3498 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. No, sir, it was in accordance with our estimate and preconceived ideas. We 
always selected that sector 315 to 00, as the first sector. The second sector was 
from 315 to around 270. We placed other sectors in their relative idea of impor- 
tance. 

I take it you agree with that statement or testimony because it is 
substantially what you yourself have stated. 

Admiral Bellinger. I do. 

Mr. MuEPHY. I would now like to refer to page 578 of the same 
record and the same witness, question 24 : 

Arriving at this estimate, did you consider any particular nation — 

he was speaking of the Martin-Bellinger report — 

did you consider any particular nation, or was this just a generality for any 
country — any enemy which might attack without a declaration of war? 

A. It was obviously and solely Japan. I use the pre-war phraseology inten- 
tionally in trying to get myself into a pre-war frame of mind. 

[9418] Q. Then your conclusion was that if any attack at all were made 
on Oahu it would be by air and not by some other means? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. At the time you made this estimate of the situation, did you conclude from 
the international situation as it existed on that date, that Japan would attack the 
United States? 

A. It is impossible for me to say at this late date, but I do recall having men- 
tioned to Admiral Bellinger, half in eai'nest and half in pure speculation, that it 
way my belief that if the Japanese did attack us by an air raid, that the attack 
would probably come on Christmas Eve or New Year's Day. 

Of course, that was just discussion over the table I assume, but the 
fact is, Admiral, that if you had been at a conference — and now I am 
taking you back before December 7— and the discussions were to come 
up as to the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor, would it not have 
been your opinion at that conference, being an airman, that the most 
likely danger was air rather than submarine i 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir ; that was my estimate throughout. 

Mr. Murphy. In other words, at the conferences that were [94^9} 
lield Rear Admiral Davis was not voicing too much of an opinion or 
asked for too manj'^ opinions and you were not consulted ac all, the 
opinion of those at the conference was that there would be an attack on 
Hawaii but it would be a mass submarine attack and I take it you 
would have differed with that. You felt it would come from the air ? 

Admiral Bellinger. The attack most easily for the Japanese to make 
would be a submarine attack and a general submarine menace in and 
around Pearl Harbor area. If they had contemplated an attack on 
Pearl Harbor, why, I certainly thought it would be air, an air attack. 
We suspected submarines to be out in the area, in the operating area, 
for some time. There were many contacts, sound contacts that were 
investigated but did not conclusively show any definite results, but 
there was a suspicion that their submarines were about, even before 
December 7. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, were you at any time between the 1st of 
December and the 7th of December acquainted with the fact that there 
was some definite uncertainty as to wliei'e the Japanese carriers were? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. So that between November 27 and December 7 you 
yourself or no one under you ordered any change in the status of alert 
of the planes under your command, isn't [94^0] th.at right? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3499 

Mr. Murphy. You mean it is right ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I mean the schedule was being carried out, to 
the best of my knowledge, in the activities connected with fleet tactics 
that 1 referred to before. There may have been certain changes so 
far as readiness made in those squadrons and connected in that exercise, 
but not in connection with any security. 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to now refer, Admiral, to page 583 of 
the naval court of inquiry, question 44, to your chief of staff. 
I Reading:] 

Q. With the combined Navy-Army aircraft that were available for operation 
between 27 November and 7 December 1941, could yon have complied with a 
directive to conduct a long-range reconnaissance through 360 degrees/ 

A. No. Using the most economical aircraft type of search that we could devise, 
a single plane going to 700 miles would only cover a sector of 8 degrees. There- 
fore, with 66 planes, only 50 per cent of which could be used continuously from a 
maintenance and pilot fatigue standpoint, only 264 degrees could be covered daily. 
360 degrees could be covered only one day, possibly only two days as an emergency 
measure, but it could not be [9421] maintained. It would only cover 
about three-quarters of the circle day in and day out until the exhaustion point 
from not only of personnel but from the materiel standpoint, as well, was reached. 
The exhaustion period would have been reached in materiel before it was reached 
in personnel. As nearly as I could estimate the situation and in view of our 
almost total lack of spare parts for the PBY-5 planes, I believe that three weeks 
of intensive daily searches would have been approximately a 75 per cent reduction 
in material readiness of the entire outfit and we would have been placing planes 
cut of commission and robbing them for spare parts to keep other planes going. 
The pilots, I believe, could have kept going approximately a six week period, but 
at the end of that time they would have all required a protracted rest period. 

I take it you agree with that ? 

Admiral Bellinger. In general, yes. I think very probably the 
pilots could not have kept up that long. That is at least a 14- to a 
16-hour flight. We have on occasions, particularly in the Battle of 
Midway, I think, put pilots on patrol covering longer periods of 
patrol for consecutive days and any time I know of they were practi- 
cally on their last legs at the end of it. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, under the plan, the Martin-Bellinger 
[9Jt22'] plan, in order for you to have any authority it was neces- 
sary for an emergency to arise. That is right, isn't it ? 

xVdmiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. It had to be apparent. 

Mr. Murphy. Right. It would be rather difficult for you, who was 
to be apprised of the existence of an emergency, to recognize the exist- 
ence of one if you did not have this information, isn't that right? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, on page 584 the question was asked of your 
chief of staff : 

Had you heard anything about an Army condition of readiness designed to 
prevent sabotage? 

A. I had heard indirectly and unofficially of various rumors of attempted 
sabotage and counter measures against sabotage, none of which appeared at the 
time to be of great importance. 

My question to you is, did you know what type of alert the Army 
was on ? 

Admiral Bei-linger. I don't think so. I knew that at some stage 
of events at that time there was a great deal of thought given to 
sabotage. I am not sure whether I knew that they were in a sabotage 
alert or not, but I do know that the subject was a live subject and I 
had done something about it in my force and Various other naval 



3500 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

forces were taking action [942311 of that kind and whether I 
knew the Army was actually in it or not I am not sure. 

Mr. MuRPHT. Your chief of staff, of course, had no more informa- 
tion about these war-warning messages than you had, did he? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. I questioned him on that. 

Mr. Murphy. You also, I take it, Admiral, had no information 
whatsoever to the effect that the Japanese were destroying their codes 
£lnd their systems? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir ; I knew nothing of that. 

Mr. MuRPHT. Nor any information about the Japanese consul at 
Honolulu destroying some of his systems or all of them, I take it ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir ; I did not know that. 

Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield ? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. With respect to your not knowing the Army was 
alerted to sabotage, did you have occasion to see on the Saturday before 
the Sunday morning how the Army planes were lined up on their fields 
from wing tip to wing tip ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. I was in bed most of Saturday. 

Senator Lucas. Oh, yes ; that is right. And you did not receive any 
information from anyone that the Army was alerted [94^4] to 
sabotage ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Not that I can say definitely. I may have 
known it ; I am not sure.. 

Mr. Murphy. Are you through, Senator? 

Senator Lucas. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. I would like also to refer to page 99 of the Hart 
inquiry. Rear Admiral Davis speaking: 

Although I did not feel that I had sufficient Information as to the actual situa- 
tion to undertake to question the Commander-in-Chief's iwlicy as 7 December 
approached, I was concerned about the general situation with respect to bur 
outlying islands. For this reason I stressed the necessity for providing some 
form of air protection at Wake and Midway, which it would have been too late 
to attempt after actual emergency had arisen. Action was finally taken in this 
connection and that is why the attack on 7 December found the Enterprise task 
force on its way back, having landed Marine fighting planes at Wake, and the 
Lexington task force on its way to land Marine aircraft at Midway. 

Now, the question was asked of Admiral Davis, referring to the 
Martin Bellinger report, a question on page 99 : 

Did you have that estimate at all in mind during the days which led up to 
7 December? 

[9^25] A. I did. 

Q. But I understand, from your testimony, that you made no jiarticular estimate 
yourself along that same line, formal or otherwise? 

A. No, sir ; it was not that I made no estimate, or did not consider it ; it was 
rather that this, like all of the other very comprehensive and thorough pre- 
paratory plans that were made, was contingent, as to its being placed in effect, 
on prior decision that the situation justified taking up what might be called 
a defensive deployment. As to whether or not it should, at any given point, have 
been taken up, I necessarily considered that the Commander-in-Chief's estimate 
was final. 

Q. And your advice on the point was not asked? 

A. No, sir. 

Q. Did you see the Navy Department's dispatch of 27 November, the one which 
has come to be known as the war warning [indicating exhibit 8] ? 

A. No, sir. 

Q. You never saw it prior to 7 Decembei-? 

A. No, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3501 

Q. Admiral, did I understand you correctly earlier in your testimony to say 
that in your opinion a comprehensive air search could have been carried on at 
tliat time? 

[9426] A. Yes, it could. 

Q. Would you elaborate on that just a little bit, as to how a 360 degree distant 
reconnaissance could have been carried on with the material at hand at that 
time? 

A. There were not enough planes and pilots to establish and maintain a long- 
range, 360 degree search indefinitely, or even for more than a limited time. There 
were, however, enough to approximate this by using relatively short-range planes 
in the least dangerous sectors, and by obtaining some assistance from available 
Army aircraft, so that I think it could have been undertaken, had it been 
considered essential, on tlie basis that reenforcements could have arrived before 
l)ersonnel and material fatigue set in. Unless reenforcements arrived, it could not 
have been maintained. 

Q. You may proceed to the written question given you, passing on to the 
Army part. 

A. Prior to 7 December I had relatively little detailed information regarding 
the Aimy Interceptor Command. I knew approximately the numbers and types 
and my recollection is that they had about 170 P-36's, P-39's, and P-40's, of 
which the greater number were P-36's and P-39's. Judged by modem war 
standards, there were enough air fields to operate them, but not enough to 
[9427] provide adequate dispersal and protection, nor were revetments and 
dispersal runways provided at the various fields. 

In that connection, Admiral, as I understand your testimony you 
knew that the Interceptor Command was not properly functioning, 
or not ? Do you recall what your state of mind was before December 7 ? 

Admiral Bellinger. It is my understanding that it was not func- 
tioning as a regular agency. 

Mr. Murphy. You say what? 

Admiral Bellinger. That it was not functioning as a regular con- 
tinuous agency. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral Kimmel testified that radar would give him 
coverage, at one time in one hearing, of 200 miles and in this hearing, 
of 100 miles. Did you so understand it '^ 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. I did not expect it to be that effective. 
As a matter of fact, it was not that effe<;tive to the fullest extent sev- 
eral months after December 7. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, in connection with that and in corroboration of 
your feeling about it in connection with Admiral Kimmel's testimony, 
his airman said at page 100 : 

I did not feel, however, that it was yet ready for full effective employment. 

[94^8] That is Admiral Davis speaking. 

Now, what was your information as to the ability of the Army to 
participate in or cooperate with you by way of help in the event you 
called on them? Did you feel the fliers were competent? 

Admiral Bellinger, From mj^ information from General Martin, 
he had difficulty in getting enough competent crews, air combat crews 
to man the planes he had and he was also confronted with a job of 
training personnel to man B-17's for further transfer to the Philip- 
pines. I know of this only because of conversations with General 
Martin, so that I know that he had problems of that nature which 
were of considerable importance. 

Mr. Murphy. Now I would like to direct your attention to page 44 
of the Hart inquiry, to the testimony of Vice Admiral Smith, Ques- 
tion 81 : 

What do you know about their combat efficiency, particularly as regards 

personnel? 



3502 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Well, we didn't have a very high regard for it. That was based upon our 
observation during Fleet Operations, wlien their Flying Fortresses would come 
over at almost smoke-stack level, and showed an utter disregard for possible 
anti-aircraft fire. In the operations between our planes and theirs, our aviators, 
possibly 19429] prejudiced, expressed the opinion that they were not 
very good. 

I was wondering if that feeling prevailed so that it would prevent 
calling on the Army to help in reconnaissance. It certainly did not 
with you, did it? 

Admiral Bellinger. I knew that reconnaissance requires special 
(raining; it requires training which the Army had not utilized very 
much because it was not considered part of the job that they were 
going to do; at least, they had not undertaken it. Therefore, I did 
not think that the Army could do very much in assisting in long- 
range reconnaissance. It took some time after December the 7th for 
1 hem to train their crews sufRcientl}' to be really effective. That was 
shown up actually after December the 7th, when they did assist in 
the reconnaissance around Oahu. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you know, Admiral, that when Kurusu was 
on his way to the States to participate in the conferences in Washing- 
ton that his plane landed at Midway ? 

Admiral Bellixger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you believe that the plane had really broken 
down? 

Admiral Bellinger. I don't know, but I was directed to have two 
})lanes to bring him to Oahu in case the Pan American plane was 
not made ready in time. 

[94^0] Mr, Murphy. You decided to let him wait there, didn't 
you ? You did not use the planes, did you ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. He came finally by Pan American. 

[94SI] Mr. Murphy. At any rate, on His way to America 
Kurusu's plane appeared apparently to be disabled and did land at 
Midway for some time, did it not ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. I have been told Kurusu was kept 
in the hotel there, and I have also been told that the Marine guard, 
every time they moved, went around the building three times. 

Mr, Murphy. Did you have called to your attention. Admiral, the 
fact that the Army, on November 5, had a new operating procedure 
order? Admiral Kimmel apparently did not know of it and I was 
wondering if you did. 

Admiral Bellinger. The one with reference to one, two, and three 
alerts? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; I do not think I knew of that, or 
the details of it. I would not normally know of the details of it, so 
I do not think I did know of it. 

Mr. Murphy. For a long time the Army had only one kind of 
an alert, and then they had three alerts and they sent copies to the 
Navy? 

Admiral Bellinger. I do not think they sent me a copy. If I 
knew about it, it was from conversation with General Martin. 

Mr. Murphy. There has been some testimony here that [94^] 
the Japanese knew about the workings of our radars. The fact is 
chat the radar at the Opana station did detect the Japanese at dis- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3503 

tances of 132 miles. If the Japanese were aware of our radar func- 
tioning that morning, would they have been at a sujfficient height in 
the air for radar to have detected them at 132 miles? 

Admiral Bellinger, The high altitude bombing planes — and they 
were I assume between eight and ten thousand feet when they made 
their attack — probably would have been detected. The torpedo planes, 
according to my information, assembled at very low altitudes and made 
their approach at a very low altitude, and they probably would not 
have been detected that far by radar. 

Mr. MuRriiY. I would like to just ask one question. Do we have 
available any Navy exhibit showing the damage to the Aiizonaf I 
understood you to say this morning that the damage to the Arizona 
was from torpedoes. 

Admiral Bellinger. This was the first attack on the Arizona^ and I 
assume that there were three torpedoes that hit the Arizona, merely 
from seeing these three planes pass over the Arizona. 

Mr. Murphy. I just wanted to check it. 

Admiral Bellinger. And immediately afterward a tremendous 
explosion. 

[9433] Mr. Murphy. I just wanted to check with the actual 
records so we will have it straight. I believe there were some bombs. 

Admiral Bellinger. There may have been bombs, in addition. 

Mr. Murphy. I do not know. Do you have that, Counsel? 

Let me ask two other questions. Admiral. You did prepare, did 
you not, a report, which is in the record as exhibit No. 120, dated De- 
cember 19, 1911, a memorandum for information for Admiral Kimmel? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir, I have it right here. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you prepare that report then at the request of 
Admiral Kimmel, as to what occurred on December 7 and immediately 
thereafter? 

Admiral Bellinger. I am not sure whether it was made at his 
request or not, but I made it up for him. 

Mr. Murphy. And that was your judgment, as of that date, as to 
wliat actually occurred at that time? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir; that was the situation as I knew 
about it on that day. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, Admiral, in regard to the Arizona, the Navy 
report is that she was hit by one or more aircraft torpedoes and about 
eight heavy bombs. 

I have no other questions. 

\_9Jt3If\ The Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

The Senator indicates that he is willing to yield to Congressman 
Keefe. 

Senator Ferguson. I am willing to yield to Congressman Keefe. 
He is always on the end. 

The Chairman. Congi^essman, the Chair takes great pleasure in 
recognizing you. 

Senator Lucas. I want to remind the Congressman it is a quarter 
of 4. 

Mr. Keefe. Do I understand this is just a temporary yielding or 
does that end the examination? 

Th« Chairman. No, no ; I cannot guarantee anything of that kind. 



3504 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. I will take what is left. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, you can take it all, because it will be very brief. 

Admiral, I listened carefully to your testimony and I am interested 
in certain ultimate facts. From listening to your testimony I gained 
certain impressions, and I want to ascertain whether they are in accord 
with what you have testified. 

You were a task force commander prior to December 7, in charge 
of the reconnaissance planes; is that right? 

Admiral Bellinger. They were called patrol planes. 

[94^5] Mr. Keete. We will call them patrol planes, then. 

Admiral Bellinger. We expected to use them for anything and 
everything we could. 

Mr. Keefe. As such you were not a member of the staff of the Coju- 
mander in Chief, Admiral Kimmel ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I w'as not a member of his staff. 

Mr. Keefe. And as such you were not given information as to the 
so-called warning messages that were sent to Admiral Kimmel from 
Washington ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I was not given those warnings ; no, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you had no information concerning those until 
after the attack? 

Admiral Bellin(jer. Not until after the attack. 

Mr. Keefe. Am I correct in the assumption that you had sufficient 
planes at Pearl Harbor on December 7, and prior thereto, for a period 
of at least a week, to have enabled you to conduct long-range recon- 
naissance to the north for a period of a week? 

Admiral Bellinger. I would say "yes" to that question, 

Mr. Keefe. I understand that you, yourself, as a task force com- 
mander, would not put into effect the provisions of the Martin-Bellin- 
ger plan for long-range reconnaissance without an order from the 
commander in chief, except in case of an emergency. Is that your 
testimony ? 

[9436] Admiral Bellinger. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. Therefore, do I understand your testimony to be that 
the reason there was no long-range reconnaissance in the sector to the 
north in the week preceding Pearl Harbor is because you had received 
no order from the commander in chief to effect or carry out such 
reconnaissance ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. I understand your testimony also to be — and you may 
correct me if I am in error — ^that as an air man familiar with the 
situation in Hawaii you were in agreement with Admiral Davis that 
the greatest possibility of a successful air attack lay in an attack 
coming in from the sector to the north because of the prevailing wind 
conditions ; is that right ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is practically correct; yes, sir. You 
have got to utilize the conditions as you find them at the time when 
you make the attack, and the prevailing wind was normally about 
65° or 70° coming from that direction. 

Mr. KJEEFE. I understand your testimony to be in order to recap- 
ture your planes you have to head into the wind. 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. So if planes were launched downwind 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3505 

Admiral Bellinger, (interposing). Into the wind. 

Mr. Keefe. They were launched into the wind? 

[94^7] Admiral Bellinger. Into the wind. 

Mr. Keefe. Now when they leave the carrier they would come 
downwind, would they not ? I am not an air expert, but I have been 
following your testimony. When they come back onto the carrier 
they have to land into the wind ; is that correct, or am I in error ? 

Admiral Bellinger. They take off and land with the carrier heading 
into the wind. 

Mr. Keefe. Then the carrier turns around when they take off to 
head into the wind ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. If the prevailing wind is down toward Oahu and they 
are assembled up to the northwest, then when they take off they 
take off into the wind and circle and come down; is that right? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. So the best opportunity to get away is when the car- 
riers are headed out away from Oahu and the planes can be recaptured 
by the carrier heading right into the wind ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Is tliat right ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That is, as I understood, your plan set out [94^8] 
in the Martin-Bellinger Report. You set that out, did you not? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir, that is not in that report. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, I got it from some place else. I would not be 
surprised if I misunderstood w^iat the report might be. At any rate, 
whether it is in the report or whether it is not, that is a fact, isn't it? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is a fact ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You do not make any complaint today because you were 
not made aware of the messages that were received by the commander 
in chief, do you. Admiral ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. My recollection of this war-warning message is that 
at the end an injunction was laid upon the commander in chief to 
distribute it only to certain restricted essential officers. Do you 
remember that ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; I think it was left to his own discre- 
tion, but I know nothing about that. 

Mr. Kj':efe. Isn't that in the record ? I have forgotten. 

Admiral Bellinger. I think you are correct on some messages, but 
I am not familiar with them enough to answer. 

Mr. Kjeefe. I guess that is riglit. That would be the Army mes- 
sage. That was General Short. 

Then am I to see this picture from your testimony to the effect 
that here is a task force coimnander in command of [9439] pa- 
trol planes w4io isn't given any information at all as to what is going 
on in the international situation and in the relations with Japan except 
what you got from the newspapers, perhaps, while you were lying 
sick in bed 4 or 5 days before the 7th of December ; that no long-dis- 
tance reconnaissance is ordered at all, some people claiming that that 
fould not be effected because of lack of personnel and lack of planes, 
but you are of the opinion that if there had been a utilization of the 



3506 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

patrol planes that were available it could have been carried on for at 
least a week. 

Admiral Bellinger. I think it could have, yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And effectively covered the arc from which you, as an 
Air Force commander, at all times believed an air attack on Hawaii 
would come. Do I so understand it to be your testimony^ 

Admiral Bellinger. It could have covered that particular arc ; yes, 
sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Narrowing this matter down, if I interpret your testi- 
mony correctly — and if 1 am in error you can challenge me. Admiral — 
the failure to conduct a long-range reconnaissance which was, under 
the circumstances existant on December 7 at Pearl Harbor, practically 
the only way in which an attacking force of carriers could be dis- 
covered, rested entirely with the commander in chief and his staff, 
[944^] and until an order came from the commander in chief you 
would not, as a task force commander, control the planes to effect such 
reconnaissance, is that correct? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. That is all. 

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, did you have a conversation with Ad- 
miral Smith in relation to the Kurusu plane at Midway? 

Admiral Bellinger. I am not sure whether it was Admiral Smith 
or who it was. 1 got the message from someone, from the commander 
m chief. Pacific, to have two planes out there in case they were needed. 

Senator Ferguson. Let me refresh your memory. Admiral Smith 
was asked' this question on page 52 of the Hart Board, No. 147 : 

This particular dispatch [iudicating exhibit 8] is different from all other 
warnings received previously in that the words "war warning"' were used. What 
was your own reaction to those particular words? 

He answers this way: 

My reaction was we knew that negotiations were still going on ; Mr. Kurusu 
had flown through a few days before; we were in great doubt as to what was 
happening. Mr. [9441] Kurusu's plane broke down in Midway. Admiral 
Bellinger called up at night and asked permission to fly him on in a PBY, and 
I said "No, it may be that the plane was told by the administration to break 
down. They know more what's going on than we do. Let him stay there." 

Did you have a conversation like that with Admiral Smith ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I do not remember that ; no, sir. I remember 
a conversation with reference to Kurusu and with reference to bring- 
ing him from Midway to Pearl. I do not remember that any of my 
organization suggested it in any way. 

Now in connection with the two planes standing by to bring him, 
one being an escort plane, as I remember now, they were sent out there 
to stand by to bring him back. The question was evidently whether 
to bring him or let him wait for the Pan American plane which 
appeared to be about to be fixed. 

Senator Ferguson. Why were you concerned about bringing him? 
Why did you want to get him to Washington ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I was not concerned about him at all, except 
I was told by the commander in chief, as I remember now, to furnish 
these planes to bring him. The question was whether they should sit 
there waiting for him to make [944-2] up his mind and wait 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3507 

for the Pan American, or to bring him right away. I had no reason 
to get him to Honohiki or anywhere. 

Senator Ferguson. At least you did not fly the PBY? 

Admiral Bellixger. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now you have in your statement here some- 
thing that I would like to have cleared u}). You say: 

As pointed out in the Martin-Belliuger estimate, the problem of when to place 
the Naval Base Defense Air Force in a functioning status resolved itself into 
one of timing with respect to the current status of our relations with Japan, and 
required specific information as to the probability of an air attack within rather 
narrow time limits. 

Now what do you mean by "rather narrow time limits"? 

Admiral Bellinger. For instance, the question comes up now could 
we have covered a sector or could we have covered 360° ; "for how long 
could you cover 360°, and for how long could you cover a sector of 
about 90° ?" The only definite assurance of early information of an 
air attack is by covering 360°, and- 



Senator Ferguson. Now take that answer- 



The Chairman. I do not think he finished his answer, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you v/ant to go on? 

[9443] Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Admiral Bellinger. So that if you were going to cover 360° it is 
going to come down to a question of a very few days. If it is going to 
come to the question of a sector of 90° even, that is going to cause a 
reduction in your forces sooner or later. 

Senator Ferguson. Isn't it better, in case of an anticipated attack, 
to use what vou have even though vou are not able to use the full 
360° ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir, that is perfectly true. 

Senator Ferguson. Then wh}^ consider the question of 360° when 
we did not have enough planes for 360° ? 

Admiral Bellinger. In an estimate of the situation you are trying 
to work this out so as to weigh all the situations; 360° on an island 
is the only way you can make sure that there is not a force coming in. 
Actually for months after Pearl Harbor, December 7, we endeavored 
to have 360° covered from Oahu. 

Senator Ferguson. Is this the truble, that we were trying to work 
from a war plan which said that the absolute way was to cover 360°, 
and if we could not work from the war plan we were not going to work 
at all? 

Admiral Bellinger. Oh, no, sir; that is not the idea. UM-U] 
The estimate can only figure on a basis of 360°, otherwise where is the 
attack going to come from ? If you do not put the 360° in what are 
you going to put in ? The idea is to stop the raid. 

Senator Ferguson. Isn't it a question of trying to figure out where 
he may come from? Isn't that part of your Intelligence system? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is part of it, and that was the plan as 
devolved from this estimate later with reference to where we put the 
first available planes, and if we had no more, why, that was all. 

Senator Ferguson. Now did you consider in any plan that if you 
did not have enough planes for 360° — and we were in that condition 
up to the time we were going to war — that you would use the planes 
that you did have? Did we have any war plan on such a basis? 

79716— 46— pt. 8 10 



3508 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Bellinger. The war plans called for planes to be on Wake, 
Midwa}', Palmyra, Johnston, and Oahu. 

Senator Ferguson. On Oahu ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any war plan that called for any- 
thing less, on long-distance reconnaissance, than 360°, the entire 
circle ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Why, certainly. The operating plan [94-4^] 
called for planes as they were available. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you have a plan that said if war 
was imminent you would conduct a reconnaissance in the segment 
north, into the vacant sea 'i 

Admiral Bellinger. I am not sure. I haven't a copy of this latest 
subsidiary plan that was gotten out over my signature. I do not know 
whether that is available or not. 1 was discussing the other day with 
my operations officer if he remembered whether or not that northwest 
sector was put down in that plan as a vital sector. He thought it was. 
I am not sure. That was a question in our minds anyway, if not defi- 
nitely on paper. 

Senator Ferguson. Now isn't this true, that your plan with General 
Martin covered a 360° reconnaissance? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And it did not cover any particular segment 
in case you did not have enough to go on 360° ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Well, that is down in black and white. If 
3^ou have got something and haven't got enough you will do what 
you can with what you have got. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Did you have a plan to do what 
you could with what you had '( 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir ; that is exactly what I read out this 
morning. The first sector was from north around [94-46] to 
west to be covered by the first available planes. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then I will ask you this : If you did 
not know where these carriers were, why did not you send your 
planes up in that direction, with the first planes that you got off 
the ground, to locate these carriers? 

Admiral Bellinger. On December 7 ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Bellinger. That is what was done. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you get me the evidence that you sent 
them up north ? You sent one up north. 

Admiral Bellinger. It is in my statement this morning, I thought 
very clearly. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us what time you sent them up 
there, up to the north ? 

Admiral Bellinger. The three patrol planes 14 P-1, 2, and 3 on 
early morning security search were assigned a search sector between 
north and northwest. Those were the first ones available. 

Senator Ferguson. What time was that ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That was about 8 o'clock, or 8 : 05 when they 
got the message, according to my information. 

Senator Ferguson. 8 : 05, and the attack took place at 7 : 55. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3509 

Admiral Bellinger. Now there is a little hitch in [94W] 
that. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to get the hitch out of it. Let us know 
Avhat happened. 

Admiral Bellinger. These three planes were assigned this north 
(o northwest sector and proceeded on search. After the first phase 
of the attack Patrol Wing 1 reported two planes at Kaneohe available 
for immediate oj^eration and was directed to send these two planes on 
a northwesterly sector. 

Senator Ferguson. That is another search ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is another besides those three? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Bellinger. One second. Before these could be dispatched 
another Japanese attack put them out of commission. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Bellinger. At about the same time communications be- 
tween Kaneohe and Pearl were Imocked out. Patrol Wing 1 on own 
initiative diverted the two planes then on that northerly sector, that 
is .the 1 and 3, to cover a westerly sector because of the loss of the 
( wo planes originally detailed. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Admiral Bellinger. In an effort to comply with instructions. 

[944^] Senator Ferguson. Then they violated the war plan that 
you and Martin had drawn up, because your first one was to be to 
the north? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. They may have violated it but not 
with the idea of violating, because they were not controlling the plan. 
They were carrying out orders from the patrol wing to headquarters. 

Senator Ferguson. But the headquarters policy was to send them 
in another direction. How do you account for the fact, if this map 
is correct, of these carriers, six of them, and their task force, as being 
200 miles north of Hawaii, if you had these planes and if you did 
have them sent up there, that you did not see these carriers? 

I think from the data we have now they were 200 miles out, that is 
where they were stationed when their planes took off. 

Admiral Bellinger. This diversion of those two planes removed 
two planes from the sector where the Japanese task force was later 
determined to be near. 

Senator Ferguson. Could I have that answer read? 

(The answer was read by the reporter.) 

[94W] Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that someone at 
lieadquarters diverted the two planes and that if they hadn't been di- 
verted, they would have located the task force? 

Admiral Bellinger. I wouldn't say they would have, but it was in 
that area. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, who was the man that diverted those two 
planes? 

Admiral Bellinger. The Patrol Wing 1 organization. 

Senator Ferguson. What ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Over Kaneohe. 



3510 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson, What about the one plane that kept going up, 
how do you account for not seeing those planes going back to the 
carrier and landing ? 

Admiral Bellinger. They didn't see it go. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you ever see this radar chart, where 
these planes came down and they caught them at 302, and they came 
straight down, and we found planes going straight back to the north? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir, I never saw that before. 

Senator Ferguson. Well 

Admiral Bellinger. I would like to elaborate on a [94^0] 
question of this morning, if I may, in connection with this general 
subject. 

I understand that my operations officer. Captain Ramsey, made a 
statement that he had telephoned and he thought I had telephoned to 
the Army on December 7 with reference to the radar detection on those 
planes going north after they had left. 

Now, in the plan for the carrying out of this Navai Base Defense 
Air Force in the event of a raid, there were planes assigned by the 
Army to follow the carrier planes back with the idea that this radar 
existed at this time, which it didn't, when this was made out. And so 
I was interested in trying to find out where these planes went to. 

Commander Ramsey was also. 

He says I telephoned over to Army headquarters to find out about 
it. I don't know whether I did or not. I don't remember doing it 
now, but I did ask him questions to find out where they went. We 
did not get information from the radar at that time that planes went 
north to the carrier. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any communication, any means 
of communication to the radar station? 

Admiral Bellinger. Only throuiih the Army. 

['94S1] Senator Ferguson. Only througli the Army? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. You had to go through headquarters? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It turns up that the Army had this chart, and 
knew about it. How do you account for your not getting it? 

Admiral Bellinger. I don't know. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know the radars were not supposed to 
be working that morning? 

Admiral Bellinger. I was surprised that they were working that 
morning. 

Senator Ferguson. Why would you be surprised that the radar 
was working ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Because I didn't tliink they were set up and 
ready to go. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, you didn't even know 
that the Island had radar? 

Admiral Bellinger. Oh, I knew that the radar was being installed, 
we were very interested in that. 

Senator Ferguson. But you didn't know they had actually the 
radar working? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, I didn't know it was actually working that 
morning. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3511 

[94S2] Senator Ferguson. At any time did you know it was 
working before that? 

Admiral Bellingek. I knew that they were establishing their sys- 
tem and the radar had been set up, and the individual radars were 
working, yes, but the system had to be set up to make it work intel- 
ligently, and they were in the process of putting that into effect. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, that isn't quite an answer to my question. 
My question is, did you know prior to the 7th that radar was estab- 
lished on the Island? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, why didn't you get in touch with the 
radar stations to ascertain if they had picked up anything coming in 
or going out ? 

Admiral Bellinger. It would have been impossible to have gotten 
in touch with the radar station. You have got to go through the 
Army headquarters to get in touch with it. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you have to call General Short? 

Admiral Bellinger. General Martin, General Martin's office. 

Senator Ferguson. Why didn't you call General Martin to find 
out what he had from his radar ? That was one of [94^3] the 
greatest instruments we had. wasn't it? 

Admiral Bellinger. I am not positive I didn't do it. I talked to 
Martin that day twice. I think I did, as a matter of fact. I am not 
saying positively I did or not, 

I could have also gotten that information from the Air Combat, 
the fighter commander. He had that — General Davidson was the one 
that was in charge of the interceptor. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, we come down to this, that you did not 
get any news about any radar on the Tth ? 

Admiral Belliger. No, we did not not ; at least I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. You were in command ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I was in command of the long-range recon- 
naissance, and this striking force. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, part of the duty of the striking force 
would be to go out and get these carriers? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir; we wanted to know about that; that 
was our main effort then. 

Senator Ferguson. The reconnaissance would be to locate them, 
so you had the most important force, as far as intercepting this task 
force was concerned ; is that not true? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is true. 

Senator Ferguson. You don't remember now that you ever 
\94S4] made any inquiry as to what radar showed? 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. If he had asked General Davidson, General Davidson 
couldn't tell him. He didn't know. 

Admiral Bellinger. You are trying to get me to say something 
definite describing my action. I probably did. I don't know. I 
know I wanted that information. I took it up with my operations 
officers to see if he couldn't get it too. We were both trying to figure 
how we could get that information. 

Whether I talked personally, I am not sure. We were trying to get 
the information. 



3512 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. How far would your headquarters be from 
where this information would be ? 

Admiral Bellinger. About 6 miles. 

Senator Ferguson. And the first attack was at 7 : 55. When was the 
last one ? 

Admiral Bellinger. It lasted about 2 hours. 

Senator Ferguson. About 2 hours. 

So you had 2 hours time there to try to locate where this task force 
was? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. If they have got the information 
coming in there is the question of getting the [94SS] informa- 
tion. It is 2 hours then, yes, but the getting of the information is 
only while the planes are in motion, coming from and going to. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, is this true, that you had an untrained 
Navy there as far as getting intelligence from radar? Is that true, 
that you didn't know how to use radar, you had it but you didn't know 
that it was operating and you didn't know whether it was operating 
that morning ? 

Admiral Bellinger. The radar installations, the whole set-up was 
an Army project. 

Senator Ferguson. Then do we come 

Admiral Bellinger. The Navy did have radar on some of their 
ships. As a matter of fact that question has been discussed with refer- 
ence to the use of that radar, when it could be used, and where it could 
be used. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the answer? 

Admiral Bellinger. There were certain sectors, certain places in 
Pearl Harbor where it could work. 

Senator Ferguson. Would it work in the sector here [indicating 
chart] ? 

Admiral Bellinger. It would have to work in a sector to the south, 
to the southward, on account of the hills, et cetera. 

Senator Ferguson. You are talking about the ship radar ? 

[94S6] Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about the Army radar. 

Admiral Bellinger. What I meant was that the ship radar aug- 
mented and could augment Army radar when it was in a place where 
it could be used. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did the Army have radio to the Navy 
airplanes and did the Navy airplanes have radio to the Army air- 
planes ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words 

Admiral Bellinger. The communication to the Navy planes was 
by Navy and the Army planes by the Army, and if the Navy wanted 
to send information to any Army planes, the information was tele- 
phoned over and they sent it. 

[94S7] Senator Ferguson. Then I understand that if the com- 
munications center had wanted to know, desired to know whether 
those were Army planes up to the north that morning the Army 
would have to get in touch with the Army, and if they desired to 
know whether they were Navy planes they would have to call the 
Navy? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3513 

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. And you could not communicate- 



Admiral Bellinger. There was no set-up at that time for the con- 
trol of all planes to keep knowledge of that kind. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did we have such a system that the 
planes of the Navy had no communication with the Army radio? 
Is that where we stand on the 7th ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Why was that true? Was that coordination? 

Admiral Bellinger. That was the situation. The Army did not 
control Navy and Navy did not conjtrol Army. 

Senator Ferguson. I understand. 

Admiral Bellinger. And, as a matter of fact, even up until about 
2 months after December the 7th did we work out a situation whereby 
the Army planes on long-range scouting could be communicated with 
directly from my headquarters. Now, that had to be worked out and, 
as I say, it took about [94-58] 2 months to do that. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Was that due to lack of material 
and manpower? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is a difficult thing to say. I would say 
no, it w^as not. 

Senator Ferguson. What was it diie to? Because the two depart- 
ments did not coordinate ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Primarily that, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, how do you account for the Army and 
the Navy expecting war and no cooperation to the extent that you 
could communicate from the ground to both the Army and the Navy 
planes in each of the Army and Navy set-ups? 

Admiral Bellinger. Well, that is very easily explained. 

Senator Ferguson. All right, explain it. 

Admiral Bellinger. There was one and there was another. One 
force was working under the Navy Department and one was working 
under the AVar Department. They were two separate entities. 

Senator Ferguson. And do I understand that you thought that 
war was imminent ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I thought war was coming. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, how far away ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Well, that was a question which I was very 
much interested in. 

[94S9] Senator Ferguson. Well, you were out there on the 
ground. 

Admiral Bellinger. When I went out there in 1940 I felt that it 
was coming. It was a question how soon. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, you knew in 1940 that war 
was coming; it was a question of how soon. Then why didn't you 
get into a condition so that you would have one command on that 
small island? 

Admiral Bellinger. I would like to ask you how I was going to 
do that. 

Senator Ferguson. Then I will ask you. I won't answer you but 
I will ask you. 

Admiral Bellinger. I brought that subject up, too. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 



3514 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Bellinger. I mean in Oaliu. 

Senator Ferguson. Why couldn't it be done? You give me tlie 
facts. 

Admiral Bellinger. I think you are in a much better position 
than I am. I have been watching this. 

Senator Ferglsox. It could be done. You did it after Pearl 
Harbor, didn't you ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Unity of command was placed in effect very 
shortly after Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, could someone of the superiors in 
Washington in the Army and Navy cause that to be done. 

\04G0] Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir, I should think so. 

Senator Ferguson. There is no doubt about that, is there? 

Admiral Bellinger. I don't think there is any doubt about it. 
There might have been some objections raised; I don't know. 

The Chairman. May I ask there, Senator? Could that have been 
done in Oahu without referring it to Washington, under what they 
had as an agreement as to the cooperation between the Arm}' and 
Nav}' forces out there ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I don't believe it could have been. 

The Chairman. You do not. 

Admiral Bellinger. At least I know I discussed this same sub- 
ject with Admiral Kimmel. 

Mr. Murphy. AVill the Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. I want to just 

Mr. Murphy. There is evidence in the record that it could be done 
in Oahu. 

Admiral Bellinger. It could be? 

]Mr. Murphy. Yes. very definite evidence. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to read his answer now. 

Mr. Murphy. There is also evidence that they talked for 4 or 5 
days on some little island. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you asked this question: 

If a message had been relayed to the Army that an [9461] enemy sub- 
marine had been sunk, would that have* placed your air operating plan in 
effect? 

Now, this answer is not clear to me and that is the reason I am 
going to read it. [Reading :] 

I doubt it. I think it would have required some higher authority in tlie 
Army to place it in effect. Now. in order to amplify that statement, I would 
like to refer to an air raid drill which was planned by the Army si^bsequent to 
the joint estimate and orders issued setting up the air defense plan. During 
one night, prior to the operations for the next day, I received a message stating 
that the Bomlier Command was no longer subject to the order of Commander, 
Patrol Wing Two. I wondered what was the matter. I finally found out that 
the Army wanted to revert to the old "Joint Action" wherein, if the Navy wanted 
the Army to assist, it was necessary for the Navy command to so request the 
Army. Therefore, in the early morning, at five o'clock, the Army Bomber 
command asked if I was going to request the Army to assist. I informed 
him that I did not understand that that was necessary in our agreement, that 
the Commander-in-Chief. Pacific, was the only one to asii the Army to assist. He 
stated he would like to participate in this drill. I said I would give him 
the information and he could act as [94^2] he saw fit, and in accordance 
with his orders. After that I made an ofiicial report of same to the Commander- 
in-Chief and also the Commander, Naval Base Defense, and also prepared a 
letter for the Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, to General Short, trying 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3515 

to straighten this out. In other words, to place tlie plan for air defense into 
etfect evidently required authorization from higher Army authority for each 
instance. My letter, just referred to, was designed to correct that situation. 

Did you ever correct the situation ? 

Admircil Bellinger, Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When Avas this? 

Admiral Bellinger. Within limitations. It did not actually bring 
about a coordination like was necessary or unity of command like was 
necessary, but we did not have that same situation come up again. 

Senator Ferguson. When had this happened at five o'clock in the 
morning that you tried to get this straightened out^ Do you know 
about what month or what part of the month? 

Admiral Bellinger. It happened about July ; July 1941. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you told us this morning that your intel- 
ligence officer knew about these war warnings. 

Admiral Bellinger, No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Whose intelligence officer? 

[94G3] Admiral Bellinger. An intelligence officer of the naval 
air station, who was attached to the district but he was on the air 
station. 

Senator Ferguson. Didn't you have access to him ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I had access to him by sending for him and 
he came. He was not under me, not part of my command, no. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you send for him ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I sent for him when I heard that there was or 
had been a warning message of some description and he w^as supposed 
to have known about it and he w^as the one that gave information to 
this officer who was in my command. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, on the sixth you have told us that there 
was peace in Hawaii. 

Admiral Bellinger. Peace with Japan. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. AVell, between whom was the war going 
on in Hawaii? 

Admiral Bellinger. Excuse me. 

Senator Ferguson. You indicate then that there was war in Hawaii 
between some other people, not Japan. Who was it between ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I don't know exactly what you mean. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I took your answer when you said "peace 
with Japan" 

[9404^] Admiral Bellinger. That is what I meant, what I was 
referring to. We were at peace with Japan, that is all. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. And you did not anticipate any war 
that morning ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It was the farthest thing from your mind prob- 
ably, is that right i 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. He was thinking about his sore throat. 

Senator Ferguson. If you would have had more air fields in 
Hawaii — you said something about you did not have space for your 
planes. Were you crowded for air space ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Let me go back to that. The planes that I 
am speaking about are seaplanes, great big two-motored seaplanes, 



3516 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

which come out of the water, come up a concrete ramp and are pulled 
up a concrete platform and you have got to keep them on that or else 
you cannot handle them. 

Senator Ferguson. Was the Navy ready for war on the 6th and 7th 
of December 1941 as far as Hawaii was concerned — I'earl Harbor? 

Admiral Bellinger. Ready for war? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Bellinger. I would say "No," neither was any other place 
in the United States. 

[94-65] Senator Ferguson. And you are definite that in that 
month, that we were not ready for war in Hawaii ? 

Admiral Bellinger. When I say "ready for war" I mean in every 
way that they are supposed to be ready. I do not mean just merely the 
individual but I mean in the over-all picture. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have enough of equipment ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then as I understand it, you were not ready for 
war. 

Admiral Bellinger. That is what I said; we were not ready for 
war. 

Senator Ferguson. And you did not expect it ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I did not expect it then ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

Mr. Murphy, May I ask this question ? 

Admiral, we were still getting ready for war a month before and 
a day before the war ended, weren't we, still getting more prepared? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir ; we were. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you ever see a commander who felt that he had 
what he would have liked to have to fight the enemy and feel perfectly 
satisfied, fully satisfied? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir ; but there are times that you like to get 
at the enemy with what you have got. 

[■9466] Mr. Murphy. Now, I would like to say this : The ques- 
tion was asked of you why didn't you call the interceptor command? 
The evidence in that regard is that General Short did not have this 
information at least until the day after, that Admiral Kimmel did not 
know it until at least the day after and if j^ou called General Davidson 
he would not know and if you had called the interceptor command, 
unless Lieutenant Tyler was there to tell you, you would not be able 
to find out, either him or McDonald. 

Senator Lucas. May I ask one question? 

The Vice Chairman. Were you through. Senator Ferguson? 

Senator Ferguson. No, I had a question, but go ahead. Senator. 

Senator Lucas. Admiral Bellinger, what did you understand by 
the war warning message of November 27, 1941, sent by Admiral 
Stark to Admiral Kimmel when Admiral Stark advised Admiral 
Kimmel to "execute an appropriate defensive deployment prepara- 
tory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46"? What does that 
mean to you ? What would that mean to you ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Of course, noAv it would mean a great deal 
different than it might have meant then and that is one of those ques- 
tions that your guess is as good as mine now. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3517 

Senator Lucas. Well, what did the Navy Department have 
[0467] in mind when they said, "Execute an appropriate defensive 
deployment" ? What did that mean to you as a part of the force out 
there? 

Admiral Bellinger. Well, "deployment" means to place units. 

Senator Lucas. What would you do with your planes under that 
sort of an order ? 

(No response.) 

Senator Lucas. You don't know? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is a question, of course, that I could say 
I might have done anything, I could have done anything, but what 
does it mean now ? I am not an individual that wants to say what I 
am going to do or what I could have done. 

Senator Lucas. I understand. 

Admiral Bellinger. I am perfectly willing to stand on what I do. 

Senator Lucas. Assuming that you had seen General Marshall's 
message, which went to Admiral Kimmel, where they directed long- 
range reconnaissance in his message — you are familiar with that? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. Take Marshall's message and take Stark's message 
and construe them together. What would you have done [94^8] 
with your planes? 

Admiral Bellinger. Well, it does say, "Make a reconnaissance." I 
have forgotten whether it said "long-range" or not. 

Senator Lucas. Well, "make a reconnaissance," I think is what it 
says, "that you deem necessary." "Make such reconnaissance as you 
deem necessary," I think is the way it reads. 

Senator Lucas. Take Marshall's message and take Stark's message 
of Admiral Stark's, which starts out, "This is a war warning and take 
appropriate defensive deployment", a combination of the two of them. 
"What would that tell you as a man that had charge of the patrol and 
long-range planes? Don't you scratch your head too hard over that 
one. 

Admiral Bellinger. Well, I see you are trying to get me to make an 
answer which 

Senator Lucas. No, if you cannot make an answer I don't want 
you to. 

Admiral Bellinger (continuing). I don't think I can do. As I 
say, I am not going to make an answer as to saying what I might have 
done or what I would have done because this is 4 years since it hap- 
pened. As I say, I would like to think I would have taken the appro- 
priate action immediately. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. I appreciate that it is a most [94^9'] 
difficult question for you to answer and the only reason 

Admiral Bellinger. I cannot answer it. 

Senator Lucas (continuing) . That I place that question before you, 
sir, is in view of the fact that you desired to have before the committee 
the fact that you did not have any of these messages and I presumed 
that you would want us to interrogate you just a little bit upon that 
fact because you told us that you did not see any of these messages 
and it would give me some indication that you thought somebody 
should have given them to you, otherwise you would not have told the 
committee that. 



3518 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Bellinger. Well, I assumed you would have asked me if 
I had not told you. 

Senator Lucas. Well, that may be true. 

Admiral Bellinger. As a matter of fact, I did not state that in any 
statement. 

Senator Lucas. I will not press the question, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. May I ask one question? 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson has some questions to ask at 
this time. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, I would like to read to you the last 
sentence : 

You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as 
you deem necessary, but these [^P'O] measures should he carried out so 
as not, comma, repeat not, comma, to ahirm the civil population or disclose intent. 

Would that have made any difference with that in it? 

Admiral Bellinger. I think all modifications have a bearing on the 
general thought. 

[94'/J] Senator Ferguson. One or two more questions. You 
got out a letter on Xovember 19, a revised schedule for remainder of 
the second quarter fiscal year. Did that carry through December, 
November and December ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That was going on in December, yes. 

Mr. Murphy. 1941 ? 

Senator Ferguson. That is Exhibit 113-C. Xow that would cover 
November and December? 

Admiral Bellinger. That covers a part of November and Decem- 
ber. I believe I am correct in that. 

Mr. Murphy. 1941? 

Admiral Bellinger. It covers a part of November and December. 

The Vice Chairman. What year? 

Admiral Bellinger. 1941. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Kimmel approved that, did he not? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. He approved it on November 22, 1941 ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Then we have charts in the back of that indicat- 
ing what you did with certain planes. 

[9472] Admiral Bellinger. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, was there any alteration of that after 
you had it appro A^ed by Admiral Kimmel? Did you make any 
changes in the schedule ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Not to my knowledge ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. There were no changes at all ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all I have. 

Admiral Bellinger. Except this; to be technically correct, patrol 
squadron 22 came back on the 5th of December. 

Senator Ferguson. But that was under a specific order? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy has a question. 

Mr. Murphy. I was just going to say in conclusion. Admiral, that 
I am not asking you to place yourself in Admiral Kimmel's position 
with all of the material he had through the months, but, as I take it, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3519 

since you were an air officer, and air-minded, if there was a discussion 
about the possibility of an attack on Hawaii, your mind would have 
been that it would be from the air and there was danger of the attack 
coming from the air? 

Admiral Bellinger. If there was dangei- of an attack [9473] 
on Hawaii, I would expect it to come from the air. 

Mr. Murphy. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. Does counsel have anything? 

Mr. Richardson. No. 

The Vice Chairman. Admiral, do you have any further informa- 
tion that you feel could be of assistance to this committee in consider- 
ing the question here under consideration? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir; I do not think I can add anything 
more to it. 

The Vice Chairman. Do you have any other evidence that you 
desire to present? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. On belialf of the committee I want to thank 
you for your appearance, the information you have given the com- 
mittee, and your apparent desire to be helpful to us in this inquiry. 

Admiral Bellinger. Thank you very much. I appreciate the com- 
mittee's consideratiton. 

The Vice Chairman. You may now be excused with the thanks of 
the committee. 

Admiral Bellinger. Thank you very much, sir. 

(The witness was excused.) 

The Vice Chairman. The committee will now adjourn until 10 
o'clock in the morning. 

(Whereupon, at 4 : 40 p. m. January 31, 1946, the committee recessed 
until 10 a. m., Friday, February 1, 1946.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3521 



[om-] PEAHL HARBOR^ATTACK 



FRIDAY, FEBEUARY 1, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation, 

OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington, D. G. 
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murph}^, Gearhart, and Keefe, 

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. 

Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Hasten, Edward P. 

Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee. 

[9475] The Chairman. The committee will be in order. 

Wlien the examination of Admiral Smith was suspended the other 

day, Mr. Murphy was in the process of examining, so you may proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF VICE ADM. WILLIAM WARD SMITH, UNITED 
STATES NAVY (Resumed) 

Admiral Smith. Mr. Chairman, may I make a brief statement, sir? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Smith. In connection with the length of the meeting 
between Admiral Kimmel and Captain Zacharias, when I last took 
the stand the chairman remarked on the fact that Admiral Kimmel 
had agreed that the meeting was an hour and a half long, and I had 
said 15 minutes. I have searched the record of Admiral Kimmel's 
testimony, and I cannot find that anywhere he mentioned any time. 

However, sometime prior to his testimony, in the presence of two 
or more members of his staff, the legal staff, he told me that the 
meeting was, as he placed it, not more than 30 minutes. 

The Chairman. I was speaking from memory when I was quoting 
him. 

Admiral Smith. Yes. I would like to make a brief [9476'] 
statement of fact to the committee in connection with the berthing 
system at Pearl Harbor. I believe this is pertinent to the testimony of 
two witnesses whom I have heard, and possibly to that of more whom 
I did not hear. 

General Marshall, when asked how long it would take for the fleet 
to sortie from Pearl Harbor, qualified his answer by stating it de- 
pended on whether the ships were headed in or out. Captain McCol- 
lum in his testimony 



3522 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe (interposing). May I inquire, you said General Mar- 
shall? Did I understand you correctly? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; General Marshall. He was asked the 
question, "Had the message gone through, how long would it take the 
fleet to go out ?" Captain McCollum, in discussing what is now called 
the bomb plot message, where Pearl Harbor is divided into five sec- 
tions, five areas, said possibly because in some of those areas ships 
were headed in while in others they were headed out. 

Now, anywhere in Pearl Harbor, to turn a big ship, battleship, or 
carrier, results in a temporary blocking of the passage. For that 
reason, and to facilitate very quick sortie, either day or night, all 
big ships throughout the period of Admiral Kimmel's command, all big 
ships, on entering Pearl Harbor, were turned around and pointed 
out before they were moored. That reduced the tugboat operations 
[9477] in getting them clear. All other ships, cruisers, and de- 
stroyers, were nested between buoys and they were enabled to get 
out without the use of tugs, and as all ships could pass on either side 
of Ford Island, there was no difficulty on the part of the light forces 
in getting clear when the battleships were leaving their moorings. 

Like Captain McCollum, I was once a fleet operations officer and 
I know that when the fleet went to Pearl Harbor once per year, or 
once in 2 years, it was a staff study proposition to get the fleet into 
Pearl Harbor and practically an all-day job to get them out. 

We had been working in 1941 in and out of Pearl Harbor so much 
that we could clear the entire fleet in about 3 hours. The only limit 
to getting them out was the fact that they had to go in single file 
through the channel entrance, and that the speed was limited to 12 
knots. Beyond that, in shallow water, the light forces pulled such 
a wave that they would have wrecked everything on the beach on 
both sides. 

But there was never any difficulty in sortieing and, as I said, the 
big ships were always headed out. 

\9478] The Chairman. Go ahead. Congressman Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral Smith, you testified, did you not, before 
Admiral Hart ? 

Admiral Smith. Yes. sir. 

Mr. Murphy. I direct your attention to page 38 of the testimony, 
your testimony before Admiral Hart. At that time you were asked 
this question : 

What was the result in your opinion, of these personnel and materiel shortages 
on the training program — the efficiency of the training program of the fleet? 

Answer. I think it did not lower the etRciency of the Pacific Fleet. As a 
matter of fact the complements had just been revised, and I have always felt 
that they were unnecessarily large. The fleet was adequately manned, and I 
consider the ships very efiicient, and the eflSciency of the fleet was not harmed 
by this ; but the Commander in Cliief was looking into the future when he 
would have to send these men home for new construction. 

Were you asked that question, and did you make that answer? 

Admiral Smith. That is correct. If I may do so, I would like to 
modify it slightly. 

I will say that I went into the Hart Board absolutely cold. In the 
year immediately following Pearl Harbor, I [9479] was at 
sea practically all the time, with six different flagships from the 
Coral Sea through Midway, and 6 months in the Aleutians, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3523 

At the time I was called before the Hart Board I had a busy war- 
time job, and since I never kept a diary, I had no papers to refresh 
my memory. I believe my testimony, now that I have had a chance 
to think about it, is probably better than it was then — on the other 
hand, it may be worse. In "either case, I stand responsible for my 
testimony. 

As to the efficiency of the fleet, I did believe that the complements 
as revised were larger than necessary at that time because we had not 
received the additional antiaircraft guns and radar and many things 
that we needed. 

The fleet was in a very efficient condition. We had the highest 
type of men I have ever seen in this Navy at that time. They learned 
quickly. 

I believe what is meant in men being demanded more and more, 
it required more constant training; whereas if you had a crew that 
is well experienced, every man knows his station, and knows what 
to do, you do not require this constant day and night training that 
you have to have. 

Very few officers had ever seen one of these permanent crews. 

[94^0] I had one on one occasion for 2 years, which makes all 
the difference in the world. We did not have it then. But the 
efficiency of the fleet was not impaired by the turn-over, in my 
opinion. 

Mr. MuKPHY. You were also asked this question : 

Q. Did that condition ever develop prior to the 7th of December whereby the 
Fleet was reduced due to transfers to new construction? 
A. No, it did not ; not below the level necessary. 

And again, question 47 : 

Q. Did any of these matters affect the maintenance of the Fleet and the 
efficient condition of maintenance of materiel? 

A. No. Units of the Fleet were sent to the Coast shortly before Admiral 
Kimmel assumed his duties of Commander in Chief for degaussing and the 
installation of armor — what do you call it, splinter armor around the decks 
and anti-aircraft guns. We had a plan mapped out approximately a year in 
advance for the overhaul of ships when they needed docking and repairs, and that 
was continued and was in effect when the attack was made on Pearl Harbor. 
The materiel condition of the Fleet was all right. It was satisfactory to the 
Commander in Chief. 

[94^1] And again, question 50 : 

Q. Did these conditions such as you have outlined have any adverse effect 
on the morale and health of the personnel of the Fleet? 

A. As far as morale and health of the personnel of the Fleet is concerned, 
remember that the Fleet went out there in April of 1940, with the idea of carry- 
ing on a six-weeks Pleet problem, and was held out there indefinitely. 

There is considerable more in that paragraph, but I just read that 
part. 

Now, question 51 : 

Q. Did the fact that the Fleet was based at Pearl Harbor rather than on 
the mainland, affect the material conditions and the materiel readiness of 
the fleet? 

A. No, it did not. 
And question 52 : 

Q. For war? 

A. No, it did not. I might add to that last statement that he often discussed 
the question of the condition of the Fleet and we felt that it was better out 
79716— 46— pt. 8 Jl 



3524 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

there than when it had been based on San Pedro, and I remember the Com- 
mander in Chief making the statement that we had been wrong by basing our 
ships at San Pedro and going out for [9.'f82] the day, and shooting, that 
he found the best thing was for them to take them out for a week and keep 
them going day and night. 

You were asked that question, and you made that answer? 

Admiral Smith. That is correct. I believe what Admiral Kimmel 
actually said was if the fleet were to return to the coast, he would not 
keep them in San Pedro where they anchored off San Clemintine every 
night, and came in every Friday, he would keep them going day and 
night for a week. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, did you make that statement at any rate? 
[Reading :] 

when it had been based on San Pedro, and I remember the Commander in Chief 
making the statement that we had been wrong by basing our ships at San Pedro 
and going out for the day and shooting, that he found the best thing was for them 
to take them out for a week and keep going day and night. 

Admiral Smith. That is correct. 
Mr. Murphy. Now, question 53: 

Q. Within your knowledge, did Kimmel ever make any definite recommenda- 
tions that the custom of basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor should be changed — 
during 1941, I am speaking of — and returning to the old way of basing [9Jf8S] 
on the California coast? 

A. To my absolute knowledge, he never made such a recommendation by letter 
or dispatch. In July, I think, 1941, he made a trip to Washington. He was 
accompanied only by Captain McMorris. If he ever made any such recom- 
mendation, it might have been done at that time, but I think I should have 
heard about it. I never heard him say to me or any member of his staff that the 
fleet should return to the coast, although he knew that his predecessor had 
recommended it. 

Then again, question 55: 

Q. Then, I understand you to mean that, in your opinion, the general war- 
mindedness of the personnel of the fleet was improved by its retention in Hawaii? 

A. Yes, sir; I think it was. You see, in the early part of our stay out there 
the entire fleet was anchored at Lahaina Roads, with all lights on. I think the 
Fleet did get war-minded, because they began moving into Pearl Harbor, and 
even moved the carriers in — moved everything in, and, of course, invariably 
operated without lights. 

Admiral, yesterday, in questioning Admiral Bellinger — you were 
here, were you? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir ; I was. 

Mr. Murphy. I recalled that when Admiral Kimmel was [^•^'§^] 
on the stand, he said that he did not take the air matters up with 
Admiral Bellinger, that he took them up with his own air man, 
Admiral Davis. I read from testimony yesterday to the effect that 
Admiral Davis said he apparently was not consulted except as to 
logistics. 

Do you know who was consulted in the air matters, if it wasn't 
Admiral Davis, or Admiral Bellinger? 

Admiral Smith. I think I can make a good effort to explain that if 
I may have the time to do it, sir. 

Davis was the fleet aviation officer. Dispatches such as the war 
warning, which Davis states he did not get, passed first, of course, 
through the communications officer. 

The communications officer or the communications security officer, 
checked on each message the officers to whom it should be shown. These 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3525 

messages were carried about by a junior officer of the communications 
department, and shown to the officers whose names had been checked. 

A copy of the message was never left with the officer, even with the 
commander in chief. As the commander in chief read the secret 
dispatch, the officer waited outside and took custody of it. 

Now, Davis and I lived within a few blocks of each other in Hono- 
lulu. We almost invariably drove to and from Pearl Harbor together. 
That gave us a half hour going and . [9485] a half hour returning 
each day. We talked a great deal of shop and did a great deal of 
business on those trips. 

For example, on the evening of the 27th of November 1941, Davis 
drove his car, a roadster, and had great difficulty in getting to Honolulu 
because of the caravans of trucks and troops. I do not know what 
we talked about that afternoon, but I think it very probable that we 
talked about the war warning. 

Davis was a very good friend of mine and I had no secrets from 
him on anything that happened. I think it might be well to read the 
duties of the fleet aviation officer as written in staff instructions, 
signed by me, and approved by Admiral Kimmel on July 14, 1941 : 

Fleet Aviation Officer — 

(a) advises with reference to: 

(1) all aircraft operations and aviation matters including those per- 
taining to policy with respect to : 

(A) materiel; (B) personnel; (C) gunnery and bombing ; (D) 
radio. 

(2) aircraft operations and aviation short facilities. 

(3) coordination of aviation activities of the Fleet. 

[9^86] (4) employment of aircraft in tactical exercises, analyses 
and reports thereon. 

(5) by the development of aircraft tactics, gunnery, and doctrine. 

(6) naval air operating policy. 

(b) assists War Plans Officer in the preparation of war plans. 

(c) keeps informed as to the effectiveness of aircraft units of the Fleet. 

(d) assists Operations Officer in the preparation of Fleet schedules dealing 
with aircraft and aircraft services. 

(e) consults gunnery officer in connection with aircraft and anti-aircraft 
gunnery 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, I have no objection to your reading that, 
but will it in any way clear the fact that the airman was not consulted 
about these matters, and was not shown the war warning and the 
other messages ? 

Admiral Smith. I am merely trying to confirm an impression that 
I have that he was consulted. Now, I don't know what was shown 
to him, but his desk was almost adjoining that of the operati,ons 
officer 

Mr. Murphy. Are you going to show us by way of contradiction 
of his sworn testimony something in the staff [9487] regula- 
tions to the effect that he should have been shown them but was not 
shown them ? 

Admiral Smith. No, sir. I am telling you that he was an excellent 
fleet aviation officer and these were some of the reasons why he had 
to keep in close touch, and he did. 

[9488] Mr. Murphy. He was an excellent Fleet Aviation Officer. 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And you had the No. 2 aviation man at Pearl Harbor, 
you had some of the best air brains there, and they both say they 
weren't consulted. 



3526 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Smith. We had anotlier airman at Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Murphy. "Was he the man consnlted? 

Admiral Smith. Davis was consulted by the commander in chief. 

Mr. Murphy. You heard me read yesterday testimony where he 
said he wasn't? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, you say there was another airman there ? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Who was that? 

Admiral Smith. Admiral Halsey was the No. 1 airman in the 
whole area. He had more planes than all of them. 

Mr .Murphy. Admiral Halsey was a busy man, was he not? 

Admiral Smith. When Halsey came into port the first thing he 
did was to come over to see the commander in chief. 

Mr. Murphy. When did Halsey leave port, Admiral, before De- 
cember 7? 

[9489^ Admiral Smith. He left on the 28th. 

Mr. Murphy. The 28th. And the message came in on the 27th, 
didn't it? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. So that he was gone from then until after December 
7? 

Admiral Smith. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. So, surely he wasn't consulted in his absence? 

Admiral Smith. No, sir; but he was present, he saw the 27th 
message. 

Mr. Murphy. He saw the 27th message and went out with orders 
to shoot down every plane seen and to sink every submarine in the 
ocean, every submarine sighted ; is that not correct? 

Admiral Smith. That is what I understand him to say; that was 
not his orders but I understand that is what he says. 

Mr. Murphy. That is what he did with his ships, wasn't it? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, as I understand it, on the night of the 27th 
you were going over to the city of Honolulu in your car 

Admiral Smith. No, Captain Davis' car. He was driving. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. And the Army had some men out and [94^0] 
some materiel out, the roads were blocked? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. So that every civilian could at least see that the roads 
were blocked with the Army going on an alert ? 

Admiral Smith. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. There is no doubt in your mind that anyone who 
had eyes could see tliat the Army was making some special move ? 

Admiral Smith. Not only then but after that they were at the bridges 
along the highways; they were very much in evidence. 

Mr. Murphy. Different than they had been before November 27 ? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, I direct your attention, Admiral, to question 106 : 

Q. What about the carriers? 

A. We had no knowledge of those ; no. The Fleet Intelligence OflBcer said that 
he did not know where they were. 

That was your impression ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3527 

Admiral Smith. That was my impression at that time. I am in- 
formed now that I was in eri'or. Tlie only one that I I'ecalled was tlie 
report of two carriers in the Marslialls sometime previously. 

[9401] INIr. jMukphy. I direct your attention to question 87 : 

Q. Do you recall the Fleet Aviation Officer having given any opinions or advice 
on the matter? 

A. No, sir ; I do not recall that he ever did. 

That M\as Admiral Davis, wasn't it? 
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 
Mr. MuKPHY. Question 85: 

Q. You also knew that as against a Japanese carrier raid, the Army radar could 
not be depended upon to give warning? 
A. Yes, sir. 

That was your testimony, was it not? 

Admiral Smith. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. Now. Admiral Kimmel says that he expected a warn- 
ing, was quite sure he was going to get a warning of 100 miles. How 
would you account for that difference of opinion on a vital subject if 
this had been discussed at a conference? 

Admiral Smith. I believe it has been thoroughly covered that the 
radar liad been working and had been working in exercises with the 
fleet veiT shortly previous to Pearl Harbor but the system was not 
complete. The information center, as I understand it, was not work- 
ing. As the radar works today there would have been in one room a 
representative \94'92'\ from egch command. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, I would like to talk about December 7 and 
prior thereto. As I understand it, you say that you knew you would 
not get a warning. Admiral Kimmel felt that he would get a warning. 
Now, if there was a conference, how do you account for tliat disparity, 
you feeling you were not going to get a warning and the commander in 
chief saying he expected and was assurred at one time of 200 miles and 
later correct it 100 miles, that he M'as depending on Army radar for a 
warning and you, as Chief of Staff, say you knew there wasn't going to 
be any. 

Admiral Smith. I did. 

Mr. Murphy. Question 85. 

Q. You also knew that as against a Japanese carrier raid, the Army radar could 
not be depended on to give warning? 
A., Yes, sir. 

Admiral Smith. That is correct. 
Mr. Murphy. Question 86 : 

Q. Then, if you realized the danger of such an air raid, which events proved was 
not only possible but probable, yon would have seen that outside of anti-aircraft 
gunfire, there was no .security to our installations in Pearl Harbor, including the 
fleet — is that right? 

[9493] A. Yes, sir. 

Now, Admiral, I would like to ask you a question or two about your 
feeling about the competency of the Army flyers. Did you have an 
opinion on that matter? And particularly I would like to read to 
you question 81 : 

Q. What do you know about their combat efficiency, particularly as regards 
personnel. 



3528 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. Well, we didn't have a very high regard for it. That vt^as based upon our 
observations during Fleet operations, when their Flying Fortresses would come 
over at almost smokestack level and showed an utter disregard for possible anti- 
aircraft fire. In the operations between our planes and theirs, our aviators, pos- 
sibly, prejudiced, expressed the opinion that they were not very good. 

Question 82 : 

Q. Now, you are talking about the Army bombers, or the Army pursuits? 
A. Both. 

Was that the feeling of the Navy at that time, Admiral, in regard 
to the flyers? 

Admiral Smith, I do not know what the feeling of the Navy was. 
That was probably an unfortunate statement of mine. I believe that 
I gathered most of that information from my conversations to and 
from Pearl Harbor with the fleet [9W4-] aviator. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, I might say you are justified in that 

Admiral Smith. I might also say probably he got his reports from 
young aviators, who were rivals, and who were prejudiced. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate you stated that ? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Question 84 : 

Q. Do you say that because of the doubt you had of the efficiency of Army 
aircraft ? 

A. That is part of it, yes, sir. I may be unjust to the Army in that. It may 
have been prejudice on the part of Navy flyers, but the opinions expressed by our 
aviators, as I saw, were not very complimentary to the Army flyers. 

You were asked question 90 : - 

Q. Do you recall whether the tasks assigned the United States Pacific Fleet 
were offensive or defensive, in their nature? 
A. My recollection is — they were defensive. 

You were in error a little, in part, there ? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. As I say, I went into that cold, and I 
believe they told me to refresh my memory on that. 

[94^5] Mr. Murphy. There is one other thing I would like to 
ask you in conclusion. When you were before the Navy Board you 
made a statement from which I get the impression that the feeling you 
and the entire staff had was that the fleet had a job to do, to carry out a 
certain defensive operation, and that it was not a part of the fleet's 
duty to be defending Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Smith. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. And is it a fair assumption that the fact that the 
fleet did have this offensive problem ahead of them, that having con- 
centrated so much on the anxiety to be ready for the offensive, they 
overlooked the duty they had by command from the Chief of Naval 
Operations to help and aid the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor 
because of the deficiency of the local forces in materiel ? 

Admiral Smith. I would not say that they overlooked anything. 
The matter of an air attack on the fleet, either at its base or at sea, 
was frequently the subject of discussion in the staff and with the com- 
mander in chief. 

[9496] I do not recall at which conferences these discussions 
were held but they were so frequent that I would say we did not over- 
look the possibility. We did not expect the attack. 

Mr. Murphy. AVell, I do not mean overlook in the sense of entirely 
ignoring, but the fact is you were so offensive minded that you stressed 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3529 

offense to the detriment, perhaps, of a little bit of defense in order to 
protect the base itself. 

Admiral Smith. Well, I believe that is for you gentlemen to decide. 

Mr. Murphy. All right. 

Admiral Smith. I did not think so at the time. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, I have no other questions. I am awfully sorry, 
Admiral, to have kept you waiting. 

The Vice Chairman. Are you through ? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster ? Not present. Mr. Gear- 
hart '? You passed, I believe, once, didn't you ? 

Mr. Gearhart. I did once but I would like to ask a question or two 
now, if I may. 

The Vice Chairman. You told the committee that you did pass, as I 
recall it. 

Mr. Gearhart. I think nearly all of us did. 

The Vice Chairman. I think all of us did down to — as [9497] 
I remember, Mr. Murphy was examining Admiral Smith at his last 
appearance, and I was thinking no one passed except possibly Mr. 
Keefe and Senator Ferguson. If there is no objection from the com- 
mittee I think you can go ahead. 

Mr. Murphy. I think the facts are the Admiral had been taken 
around down the line and when he was about to be excused I asked 
permission of the committee to ask him a few questions. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Gearhart. I think everybody has passed. 

The Vice Chairman. All right, you are probably correct. 

Mr. Gearhart of California will inquire. Admiral. 

Mr. Gearhart. Admiral, were you with the Pacific Fleet during the 
days when Achniral Richardson was the commander in chief ? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. From June 1939 — well, I was in the fleet 
when Admiral Richardson took over in 1940. I joined the fleet in 1939 
with the command of the cruiser Brooklyn. 

Mr. Gearhart. When did you become a member of Admiral Rich- 
ardson's staff, if you ever did? 

Admiral Smith. I never did. I was present at a conference between 
Admiral Richardson and Admiral Kimmel on Admiral Richardson's 
flagship about mid-January prior to the time [94^8] that Ad- 
miral Kimmel had taken over but after Admiral Kimmel had asked 
me to become his Chief of Staff. 

Mr. Gearhart. Those were conferences after Admiral Kimmel had 
learned that he was to take over ? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. As Fleet Chief of Staff you were present at all 
staff meetings? 

Admiral Smith. All of the important ones, yes, sir, where the 
commander in chief was present. 

]\Ir. Gearhart. I will ask you if there were any discussions at the 
staff meetings you attended from the beginning down until the fateful 
day of the Japanese problem insofar as hostilities with the United 
States was concerned? 

Admiral Smith. Well, there were many discussions along that line ; 
yes, sir. 



3530 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gearhart. And in those discussions members of the staff would 
endeavor to put themselves in the position of the Japanese and try to 
think as the Jap would in order to be able to think tlirough the answers 
to the questions that might be in the Japanese mind ? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. In those discussions that preceded the catastrophe 
of December 7 did anybody in any of those staff meetings raise the 
question of the necessity for Japan's [94^9] immobilization 
of our fleet? 

Admiral Smith. Not that I recall ; no, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, everyone knew that Japan was interested in 
the Southwest Pacific? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Everyone expected that their ultimate objective 
was to conquer and to consolidate their conquests in that area? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; but also it must be remembered that the 
Japanese undoubtedly knew that our fleet could not leave Pearl Har- 
bor to interfere with their movement to the southwest. We did not 
have the auxiliaries to do it. I believe Admiral Kimmel testified that 
we had 11 oilers, only 4 of which could fuel at sea, whereas I know 
from experience this summer as Commander Surface Forces, Pacific, 
that for operations that we were carrying out in the Far East we had 
71 modern oilers with the fleet that could fuel at sea and 467 commer- 
cial tankers on the pipe line and the same was true of food and ammu- 
nition. We did not have these things out there in the Pacific Ocean 
or in the Atlantic which could have supported a movement so far west 
as the Philippines. 

Mr. Gearhart. Why are you so sure or were you so sure at that 
time that the Japanese knew that we were that short of auxiliary 
ships ? 

[9500] Admiral Smith. Well, we were very positive that they 
were watching our every move. All they had to do was stand on the 
hills surrounding Pearl Harbor and they could see what we had. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, if they were sure of that and sure of our lack 
of capacity to go to the aid of the Philippines and interfere with their 
operations in the South Pacific why did they take this great chance 
and come to the Hawaiian Islands to immobilize the American fleet? 

Admiral Smith. I do not know. That is where they took us by 
surprise. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, if they knew that we lacked the auxiliary 
ships and supply ships so necessary and the other necessary equipment 
to go to the aid of the Philippines their coming to Hawaii was an 
unnecessary action and one which would result in no benefit to them 
whatsoever, isn't that correct? 

Admiral Smith. I believe that is the way it turned out, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, in view of the fact that they came, are you 
willing to say that in your opinion that they knew that we could not 
go to the aid of MacArthur had we desired to do so ? 

Admiral Smith. It would appear from the results that they did 
not but I do not know why they could not have known. [95011 
I would have thought that if in an attack on Pearl Harbor their idea 
would have been to blast out the oil tanks and the machine shops, then 
we would have been helpless for a very long time. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3531 

Mr. Gearhart. But in coming to the Islands to attack our fleet in 
Pearl Harbor they risked a good proportion or segment of their own 
fleet, did they not? 

Admiral S311TH. Very much so, yes, sir. 

Mr. Geahhart. And since there was no purpose in their mind to 
serve by immobilizing our fleet doesn't it seem absurd that they should 
luive come at all ^ 

Admiral Smith. It does, but long before Pearl Harbor, sir, we 
often said it was impossible to read the Oriental mind, what they 
might do. 

Mr. Geakhart. Well, now, supposing our fleet had been taken to 
the Pacific coast do you think they would have still risked this large 
armada of theirs in going to the Pacific coast to immobilize the fleet 
which could not be, according to your testimony, any source of clanger 
to them ? 

Admiral S:mitii. I have been interested here in some of the naval 
strategy I have heard from officers who are not naval strategists and 
I do not claim to be one by any means, but it is my opinion, had the 
fleet been on the Pacific coast, the Japanese would not have attacked 
it in the manner of the [9502] attack on Pearl Harbor. 

It is ridiculous to believe that a large force such as the Japs had 
could approach San Pedro without being detected because that part 
of the ocean is pretty well filled with merchant ships. They would 
have been detected by someone. 

Then there was the question they would probably have had to fuel 
three times on the way over and the same on the way back. They 
would not have dared, in my opinion, to approach the west coast of 
the United States. 

I have even heard testimony that they might have attacked at 
Panama or anj^where. I suppose that includes New York, I do not 
know, but I do not believe that any intelligent enemy would attack 
the west coast and leave Hawaii as a place from which we could hit 
it on its way back, because it is a simple matter to fly bombers from 
tlie United States to the fields on Hawaii. 

What I believe the Japs would have done had our fleet been on the 
coast is that they would have taken Oahu or one of the other islands 
of the Pacific in an amphibious operation and it is my opinion that 
they could have done it. 

Mr. Gearhart. It is your opinion that they could what? 

Admiral Smith. That they could have done it. 

Mr. Gearhart. That they could have made a landing on Oahu if 
our fleet had been on the Pacific coast? 

[9503] Admiral Smith. I would say that from what we know 
now of amphibious operations, certainly we could have done it to other 
islands. Maui, Hawaii, were not protected at all. They could have 
taken one of those islands without any difficulty and from there attack 
Pearl Harbor. 

I do not believe that they would have risked their fleet to the Pacific 
coast of the United States without first knocking out Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Gearhart, Anyway, the 

Admiral Smith. I am an amateur strategist like the rest of them. I 
am just giving my opinions. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, I know you haven't got your ruler and your 
locking chair there but I am willing to concede that you are a naval 



3532 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

strategist because I don't thiiik you could live for so many years in 
that sort of atmosphere and in constant touch with people who do know 
that without being one yourself, but anyway it is plain to you as one 
who is not a strategist "that the hazards to the Japanese fleet and to 
the Japanese as such would have been greatly increased if they had 
attempted to negotiate an additional 2,000 miles to the Pacific coast? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. And the reasons for it are that they would have 
been compelled to cross many a shipping lane which would [9504.] 
be in use at that time even though one was anticipated? 

Admiral Smith. Yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. All right; you said no intelligent enemy would do 
a thing of that kind. You have already stripped the enemy of intelli- 
gence in saying that their expedition to Hawaii was a useless one. 

Admiral Smith. I would say even the Japanese would not have 
attempted that, in my opinion. 

Mr. Gearhart. So you say this whole Pacific operation was one that 
was devoid of intelligence, not only the question of intelligence work. 
I mean intelligence in the contemplation of that which exists under the 
canopy known as the skull. Is that correct? 

Admiral Smith. I think so; yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, in view of the fact that the Japanese were not 
prepared for that landing, were not prepared for any landing opera- 
tions, brought no transports with their armada, it would seem that 
they had but one objective and that was to immobilize our fleet. 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; there is no question about it. 

Mr. Gearhart. And in view of the fact that you say they knew or 
must have known or must be held to have known that we had no auxil- 
iary ships, which would make it impossible for our fleet to be ready to 
interfere in any way with their [9505] operations in their 
advance in the Southwest Pacific — I am asking you for your hind 
thought — why did they do all these things ? 

Admiral Smith. We had for years had a plan of what we would do 
in the Pacific in case of war with Japan and it had been studied at the 
War College for years. It was steam roller tactics, but we departed 
from that plan in this war. I do not know but I think it possible that 
the Japanese had had a similar plan for years and they have shown in 
this war that once a plan is made they rarely depart from it. 

It may be they carried that plan too long. I mean if they had had 
a plan years ago to do that, to immobilize our fleet, they naturally 
would not suppose that our fleet could move to the westward that 
far. T think that it was the greatest mistake they ever made to have 
hit Pearl Harbor as they did but it is without question that the pur- 
pose was to immobilize our heavy ships. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, have you learned either prior to Pearl Har- 
bor or since Pearl Harbor anything which would lead you to believe 
that they possessed this WPL No. 46 ? 

Admiral Smith. No, sir; I do not believe they had. I have not 
heard anything to that effect. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then in coming to the Hawaii attack you do not 
know that they know about our intentions with respect [9506] 
to the Marshalls ? 

Admiral Smith. No, I do not ; no, sir, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3533 

Mr. Gearhart. The fact that they came when there was so little 
reason behind their coming, does it not suggest to your mind that pos- 
sibly they had some idea of WPI^-4G and wanted to prevent us from 
going into the Marshalls and interfering with their installations m 
that neighborhood ? 

Admiral Smith. It does look that way, yes, sir. Now, it may be 
possible that such information is now available in the Navy Depart- 
ment. A great deal of intelligence has been gathered after the war 
I understand. That is a very interesting subject and it may be true; 
1 don't know. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, did you have discussions in the staff meet- 
ings prior to Pearl Harbor about these same things that I have been 
interrogating you about these last few minutes ? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir, we had them very frequently. 

Mr. Gearhart. Was there an assumption upon the part of those who 
participated in those staff conferences that the Japanese were too in- 
telligent to have undertaken such an operation against Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Do you think that any sense of security was de- 
veloped or grew from that conviction among the members of the 
staff? 

[9S07] Admiral Smith. It is possible. I do not know. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, drawing upon your opinion, because you were 
there and you took part in those conferences, I will ask you, do you 
think that the Navy air force would have been used in long distance 
patrols if they did not have that conviction and that belief that the 
Japanese were too intelligent to have embarked upon so dangerous 
an enterprise and so foolhardy an enterprise in the light of the lack 
of profit to result from an unsuccessful attack ? Does that account for 
the lack of patrols and lack of plans for the protection of the island 
against such an attack? 

Admiral Smith, I would say no, sir. I believe that the lack of 
patrols was not only due to the small number of planes we had and 
the offensive operations that were planned, where it was stated maxi- 
mum operations out of Wake would take a minimum of two patrol 
squadrons to be held at Oahu — I believe the greatest influence was our 
intelligence as to the position of the Japanese fleet, the fact that we 
knew they were on the way south, had been seen going south, and al- 
though it is true we did not know the position of the carriers, the last 
intelligence information that we had and I believe that the intelligence 
issued in the biweekly bulletin by ONI on December 1 showed that the 
main carrier strength was in Japanese waters. 

[9S08] It has been testified here that planes could have been 
sent out there and that the crews would have broken down in a few 
weeks and the planes would have broken down also. When the time 
came that there Avas an indication of any such possible movement 
toward Hawaii, then it would have been time to put the planes out to 
their maximum at the risk of wearing them out entirely, but we had 
no such intelligence and did not expect it. Everyone kept talking 
about the Philippines, Guam, and the Kra Peninsula; they never got 
east of that. I don't know what else I can add to that, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, let us pass the whole subject. 



3534 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Now, in some of the testimony that has been taken in the course of 
this investigation it has appeared that there was a radio silence order 
which was made shortly before Pearl Harbor. Do you know any- 
thing about tliat? 

Admiral Smith. On the part of whom, sir ? 

Mr. Gearhart. I got the impression it was made by the commander- 
in-chief of the fleet restricting the use of radio by ships at sea. Is that 
not correct ? 

Admiral Smith. That had been an order in effect for a very long 
time. Individual ships were not allowed to use their radio. If a 
message was absolutely necessary it would be sent out by one of the 
task force commanders perhaps. They even went so far — well, I 
wouldn't be so sure of that [9r50t9] because I get events just 
before Pearl Harbor and just after mixed, but it was the practice 
when it was necessary to send a message either to fly planes inshore 
and send it over a shore station or if too far at sea to send a destroyer 
on the flank fifty to a hundred miles and have him broadcast the 
message from there so that no one could cut the fleet in. 

Mr. Gearhart. So that the position of the ships or the group of 
ships might not be disclosed ? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; and when the move of taking ships was 
made from the Pacific to the Atlantic in Msij 1941 they observed radio 
silence all, the way and arrived at Panama with their names painted 
out and were supposed to have gone through as a complete surprise. 
Those ships had no radio whatever all the way. 

Mr. Gearhart. AVere any changes tightening or broadening the 
radio restriction made within a few weeks before Pearl Harbor Y 

Admiral Smith. No, sir; that had been going on for Avell, almost 
from the time that Admiral Kimmel took over, possibly before. 

Mr. Gearhart. We have had the log of the USS Boise before us and 
it discloses that on the 27th and 28th of November 1941 that ship 
encountered enemy ships in Guam waters to whom they signaled but 
their signals were not returned and [9510] then the Boise 
turned out of its course. 

Admiral Smith. I believe she was on the way from Pearl Harbor 
to Manila escorting a transport or something. She was away from the 
fleet. 

Mr. Gearhart. Information has reached me that an argument en- 
sued between the captain of the ship and the chief executive officer 
as to whether or not radio silence should be broken to transmit that 
information to American naval authorities in higher authority but 
that under the letter of the regulation that it was determined not to 
send that information. You did not receive any radios as chief of 
staff, did you ? 

Admiral Smith. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Or in general with respect to the presence in Ameri- 
can waters around Guam that there was enemy craft? 

Admiral Smith. No, sir ; I heard that rumor long after the war. I 
never heard it at the time. I would say that it is possible. I know 
of one transport that went out and she carried radar to be delivered 
to our submarines in the Philippines and the commanding officer told 
me that his orders from the Navy Department were to destroy the 
ship if she were overhauled by Japanese forces because conditions 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3535 

were tight, but it is possible the Boise was escorting that ship, in which 
case he would have been very reluctant to use radio under [9511\ 
any conditions. 

Mr. Geariiart. AYouldn't it have been the duty — wouldn't you con- 
ceive it to have been you duty it" you had been captain of that ship, 
to have changed your course and gotten beyond the range of the 
Japanese patrols or warships of whatever type they were and to advise 
your commander in chief of their presence in American waters? 

Admiral Smith. I would not have avoided them unless he was too 
big, but I would have found some way, I believe,- to inform the com- 
mander in chief and his best method of doing that was to, if within 
perhaps 800 miles of (luam. to have flown one of his planes to shore 
and sent the message from there. 

Mr. Geariiart. But that was not done either? 

Admiral Smith. Sir? 

Mr. Gearhart. You as chief of staff saw no message? 

Admiral Smith. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Or received a message to that effect ? 

Admiral Smith. None whatever, sir. That would have been the 
captain's responsibility, what he did by his action, but I know of no 
such messages. 

Mr. Gearhart. If you received information at that time, you having 
just received the so-called war warning message, that the Japanese 
were prowling American waters in the neighbor- [9S1^~\ hood 
of Guam, would that have made any difference in your attitude to- 
wards the kind of a defense that should have been invoked at Pearl 
Harbor ? 

Admiral Smith. Well, we had been told that Guam was one of the 
probable places to come under attack and it could not be defended. 
I don't know what effect that might have had on us, but it seems to 
me that it would have confirmed the information that they were going 
to hit Guam and possibly the Philippines. We knew they w^ere on 
the move to the southward. 

Mr. Gearhart. But in all messages received they spoke of an attack 
upon Guam and an attack on Borneo as merely the outside possi- 
bilities, did they not? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. One message said: 

in any direction, inchuling Guam and the Philippines. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. And you interpreted that, didn't you, as 
meaning the outside limits 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; I did. 

Mr. Gearhart (continuing). Of the Japanese operations? 

Admiral Smith. I did; yes, sir. 

Mr. Geariiart. Well, would the knowledge that the Japanese war- 
ships were prowling Guam waters have made any difference in your 
orders or tictivities if you had been informed of it ? 

Admiral S:mitii. It depends upon the nature of tlie prowl. 
[0S13] If they were light forces, not concentrated, they might have 
been merely scouting their flank to make certain that we did not put 
something over there. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, all right. If you had received air messages 
that the U. S. S. Wright on the 6th of December had sighted planes 



3536 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that they could not identify as bearing American insignia, unidentified 
planes — if you had received a radio indication to that effect — what 
would you have done? 

Admiral Smith. That would depend, of course, upon the position 
of the U. S. S. Wright. I don't know where she was at that time, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. According to the testimony, she was then three or 
four hundred miles off Hawaii. 

Admiral Smith. I never received any such report. 

Mr. Gearhart. She was returning with Admiral Halsey's con- 
tingent. 

Admiral Smith. I don't remember that rumor. We had another 
one that went out that Admiral Halsey's planes had sighted two planes 
that they could not identify ; but when that was run down, it proved 
to be incorrect. I don't remember 

Mr. Gearhart. But this one I am asking you about is not rumor. 
It is fact. These unidentified planes were flying in American waters 
surrounding Hawaii just preceding the attack on Hawaii. Now, did 
you receive any radio messages [9514] from the U. S. S. 
Wright 

Admiral Smith. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart (continuing). That they had seen this? 

Admiral Smith. No, sir; absolutely no. Had we received- 



Mr. Gearhart. You have been informed that the log discloses that 
fact, haven't you, since that time? 

Admiral Smith. No; I aiever heard it until you just told me. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, we have the log before the committee, and 
I read it. Now, the presence of unidentified planes or an unidentifi- 
able plane would indicate that there was a carrier somewhere near, 
wouldn't it? 

Admiral Smith. It could not indicate anything else, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. But because of your order for radio silence, no mes- 
sage was received by the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet of 
this suspicious circumstance? 

Admiral Smith. I would not say because of an order for radio 
silence. I would say it was because the captain of the ship had very 
poor judgment. Any order of that nature should be broken in an 
emergency. I am astounded, if such a thing had happened, why he 
did not report it, because the Wnght^ as I recall now, was plying 
between Pearl Harbor and Midway, possibly Wake. He was in our 
waters. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, it has been disclosel that the ship [9515] 
was part of the detachment which Admiral Halsey was the com- 
mander of and had been recently delivering planes to one of the 
far western islands of the United States. 

Admiral Smith. It could not have been a part of Admiral Halsey's 
forces, because the Wright is not fast enough to go with that force. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, it has been identified by naval experts to 
have been within three or four hundred miles of Hawaii. 

Admiral Smith. It is all new to me, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. What? 

Admiral Smith. It is all new to me. I never heard of it. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then what would you have done if, on the 6th day 
of December, a message had been received indicating that there were 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3537 

unidentified planes flying within three or four hundred miles of 
Hawaii ? 

Admiral Smith. I would have made every effort to locate her, 
both by patrol planes and by the task force that was in that area 
not too far away. 

Mr. Gearhart. You would have probably — even though you had a 
few planes to keep at your command — you would have inaugurated, 
would you not 

Admiral Smith. Stopped everything. 

Mr. Gearhart (continuing). A distance reconnaissance? 

[9516] Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; stopped everything and put 
all effort on that one problem. 

Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield so that I can ask one 
question ? 

Mr. Gearhart. I yield ; yes. 

Senator Lucas. What date was the Wright seen? 

Mr. Gearhart. I understood it to be the 6th. 

Senator Lucas. The day before the attack ? 

Mr. Gearhart. The day before the attack. 

Senator Lucas. Thank you. 

Mr. Murphy. The Wright is shown directly above the islands there. 
The log is available to the members of the committee. 

Mr. Gearhart. May I have the log of the Wright? It is in my 
file, but I do not know where to look for it. 

Mr, Kaufman. I have already sent for it, Mr. Congressman. It 
will be up in a moment. 

The Vice Chairman. Counsel has already sent for it. It will be 
up in a moment. 

Mr. Kaufman. I have already sent for the log of the Wright^ and 
it will be up here in a moment, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, while we are waiting for the log — and I won't 
wait very long for it, because we can return to it later — did you dur- 
ing all of the time that you were acting [9517] as Chief of 
Staff see any reports of any shooting or firing between American 
and Japanese ships? 

Admiral Smith. None whatever : no, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Would you receive — as the chief of staff for the 
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet — would you receive any 
reports from the Asiatic Fleet in that regard if there had been any 
exchange of fire betAveen American and Japanese ships? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; I am positive we should have, because 
Admiral Hart kept us very well informed on what he was doing. The 
report would certainly have gone to the Navy Department, and it 
would in any case have gone to us for information. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then out at Pearl Harbor there was no knowledge 
of any firing in the Pacific, so far as you know, as between the fleet of 
the United States and the fleet of Japan, or any of its ships? 

Admiral Smith. No, sir. There had not even been a depth charge 
dropped. 

Mr. Gearhart. I beg pardon? 

Admiral Smith. There had not even been a depth charge dropped. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is, until the morning of the 7th. 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 



3538 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[dSlS] Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield for a moment? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, on the ship-location charts wliich we have 
been furnished, I understand that the Xavy has been asked to give the 
list of the names; but on the 5th and the 6tli of December there ^Yas 
some ship right up in the vicinity from which that attack came. Now, 
I don't mean the exact vicinity, but to the north, and it went into Pearl 
Harbor that Sunday. It was not indicated what that ship was. Do we 
have those ship-location charts here ? 

Admiral Smith. I think it is very probable that was one of our 
destroyers. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate, on the 5th and 6th Senator Fergu- 
son and I remember observing that there was a ship to the north of 
Oahu, and then it is gradually going in and it is in port on Sunday. 

I ask counsel if they will produce those ship charts ? Will you please 
produce those ship-location charts? They are photostats. Do you 
have the one I mean ? There it is. 

Senator Ferguson. It is a large map. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, I will read this to you : 

Saturday, December (!-20 to 24. Sighted vessel bearing one point abaft port 
beam running without lights on course approximately 300 degrees, true, distance 
four [9519] miles. Average steam, 200 lbs., average R. P. M., 86.1. 

Now, I will ask you if that was sighted — that ship was sighted — 
and that seems to be a ship on the seas — on the 0th day of December 
and they could not identify it, what would you have done under the 
silence of the radio order? 

Admiral Smith. Told the ship who reported it to identify it or send 
a destroyer immediately to investigate. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, here is a ship that had a one-point bearing 
and was running without lights on a course approximately 300°, true, 
whatever that means. 

Admiral Smith. Of course, the first thing to have been done in that 
case was to go to the operations officer's board and find whether we had 
a possible ship in that location, because a ship then, a merchant ship, 
was not running without lights at that time. If we could not identify 
her, then send something out to identify her. Of course, I don't know 
what ship reported this. 

Mr. Gearhart. This was reported by the Wright. 

Admiral Smith. Oh, that was reported by the Wright. 

Mr. Gearhart. This was recorded in the log of the Wright as of 
the 6th day of December 1941 between the hours of 20 and 24. 

Now, if that had been reported to you as chief of staff to the com- 
mander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, would that have [9S20] 
alerted the fleet? 

Admiral Smith. I believe it would have ; yes, sir. The probability, 
of course, was that that ship was a submarine on the surface. 

[9531] Senator Lucas. Do I understand it was an unidentified 
ship rather than an unidentified plane ? 

Mr. Gearhart. This particular item I read reveals the presence of 
an unidentified surface .ship. My interrogatories prior to getting this 
log in my hand were in reference to an unidentified aircraft. 

Senator Lucas. Is the unidentified aircraft in the log also? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3539 

Mr. Geakhakt. I saw it the other time I had the h)g in my hand. 
This is an additional item that I have run across. 

Senator Lucas. What kind of a ship was the Wright^ Admiral? 
It was an airplane tender, was it not? 

Admiral Smith. The Wright was an airplane tender of the type 
like the transport Chateau Thien-y. They were built during the last 
war. The bow and stern looked alike ; they were good for 12 knots, 
and 14 if they were in good shape. 

Their speed is limited. She carried mostly parts for seaplanes and 
I believe was on the way to Midway at that time. 

Mr. MuRPiiY. AVill the gentleman yield for a question? 

Mr. Gearhakt. I yield. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, I show you a Guide to Symbols, [9522^ 
and then I show you a chart. What would be the technical name of 
that chart. Admiral, do you know, in the Navy? That would be a 
ship-location chart, would it not? 

Admiral Smith. No; I would not say so. 

Mr. Murphy. What would you call that? I understand it is to 
keep a daily record of the ships of the United States throughout the 
world. 

Admiral Smith. Yes. That is a secret chart and would show the 
convoys. These are Great Circle routes, of course. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, with particular reference to the Guide to Sym- 
bols, I direct your attention to a ship which is to the north of Pearl 
Harbor. At what degree would you say that was on the chart, this 
being 160 here [ indicating] ? 

Admiral Smith. It would be about 155 west, I should say. 

Mr. Murphy. And how many degrees north i 

Admiral Smith. I should say about 3° south. 

Senator Fergusox. How many? 

Admiral Smith. No ; no. That is north latitude. I think that is 
about 18° north. It looks like it to me. The chart should have in 
the margin somewhere the latitudes. That is probably about 18° 
north, I should say. 

[9623^ Mr. Murphy. Will you i-esunie your seat, Admiral, and 
I will put this before you. 

I direct your attention to Exhibit 100, a secret chart that is part of 
Exhibit 109. and I direct particularly your attention to a ship to the 
north of Oahu, and about 155° west longitude, the location being that 
of the ship m question on the 5th of December 1941, and I ask you 
if you will look to the Guide to Symbols and tell us what kind of a 
ship that is. 

Admiral Smith. It would appear to be a i)atrol vessel. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, I show you another exhibit, a chart in the same 
exhibit, the secret chart for December 6. With reference to the 
same patrol vessel, will you compare for us the relative position of 
the vessel in question on the 6th of December as compared to the 5th '. 
Is there anything that would indicate to you on the chart on the 6th 
as to the relative position of the vessel which was to the north of 
Oahu, 155° longitude, on the 5th ( 

Admiral Smith. It seems to have disappeared from this chart. I 
see nothing of the same ship or symbol. 

79716— 46— pt. 8 12 



3540 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, Admiral, will you look at the map on 
the wall, the Disposition of United States Pacific Fleet, 7 December, 
1941, and the point from which the Japanese force came, and compare 
it with the secret chart [OS^^] for December 5? What, in 
your judgment, is the relative position of the vessel in question to 
the north of Oahu, as compared with the point from which the Japa- 
nese force came. I am referring to this one right here [indicating]. 

Admiral Smith. Yes; I see it. Slightly to the east of the path, 
through which the Japanese force went. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, it is in the same general location, is it not? 

Admiral Smith. It is; yes. 

Mr. Murphy. On the 5th of December? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, If you are trying to identify that ship 

Mr. Murphy. I would like very much to. 

Admiral Smith. If you are trying to identify that ship, I would 
say that since we now know that the Japanese had special code mes- 
sages arranged between the consul general and Tokyo about the mean- 
ing of a light in one or two houses on the north shore of Oahu, and 
the meaning of two lights so far as the movement of our ships in and 
out of Pearl Harbor is concerned, and of the hanging of sheets, I 
believe, in the back yard during the day, that there is no question 
whatever that Japanese submarines were operating to the north of 
Oahu, and they came to see those signals, and instead of a patrol boat 
this may very well have [9o2S^ been a submarine. 

Mr. Murphy. That is an American ship. Admiral. These are our 
reports of only American ships. 

Admiral Smith. I did not know that. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes, this is the American secret chart. 

Admiral Smith. I cannot identify it; no, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Just to interpolate a question right there, Admiral, 
on the chart of the Gth, that vessel seems not to be present. It seems 
to have moved out of that area. 

Admiral Smith. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. Can you identify where that vessel is on the 6th 
on that chart ? 

Admiral Smith. No, sir ; I cannot on the chart. 

Senator Lucas. I suggest the Congressman from Pennsylvania start 
all over again. 

Mr. Murphy. I will ask the naval liaison officer to furnish us with 
an explanation of the ship and its name to the north of Oahu on 
December 6, the name of the ship, the type of the ship, and where 
it went after it was in the position of 155° west, and 18° north.^ 

Senator Ferguson. We had asked for that before. 

Mr. Murphy. I am renewing it. I would like to know what hap- 
pened to the ship that was to the north of Oahu [9S26] on 
December 5, and where it went on the 7th. 

I refer to the ship shown on the secret chart, giving the location of 
the United States snips on December 5, 1941. 

Admiral Smith. It would have been possible that that ship was 
proceeding to or from Pearl Harbor, to Pearl Harbor from the coast, 
and it is not very far from the great circle course between San Fran- 
cisco and Oahu. 



1 The information, supplied by the Navy Department, appears in Hearings, Part 11, 
p. 5504. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3541 

Mr. Murphy. Except, as T understand, Admiral, there had been 
some order or understanding that all vessels were to be out of the north 
and were to take some other route, and we would ship everj^thing 
down by the Torres Strait. If it was a merchant vessel, I do not 
know whether it would have shown on that secret chart, or not. 

I believe it is only meant to show United States vessels as such. I 
mean patrol vessels, war vessels of different types. So, at any rate, 
on the chart that is before you that ship to the north of the island of 
Oahu appears to be in the same general direction, does it not, as the 
point from which the Japanese came on December 7 ? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; it does. 

[95^7] The Vice Chair]man. Mr. Gearhart. 

Mr. Gearhart. I find, as far as I can find from this log, that we 
sighted a surface ship. This is a verification of a letter which I 
have referred to from one of the lookouts on that ship who has 
written to the effect that that ship was challenged and it turned and 
fled, and they turned and went the other way. 

It appears conclusively on the log of the ship of December 6 that 
between the hours of 20^ and 24 a ship was sighted by the U. S. S. 
Wright. 

Mr. Richardson. You cannot find any airships on there? 

Mr. Gearhart. No. It must be in one of the other logs. It is 
not in this one. I read it into the record the last time I had a log in 
my hand. There were two unidentified planes. 

Mr. Murphy. One plane. 

Mr. Gearhart. So if we are looking for precise reasons for Pearl 
Harbor we might fasten upon the failure of the captain of the 
Wright to have reported to you the unidentified vessel in Hawaiian 
waters on the 6th day of December 1941 ? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. There is no order issued that is so hard 
and fast that in the interests of the security of the fleet or of the 
country a captain with any judgment cannot break a radio silence 
when it is necessarv. 

[95^8] Mr. Gearhart. That is all. 

The Vice Chairman. Admiral. I would like to ask a question or 
two, if I may, on some of the information you gave us a short time 
ago. 

I believe you stated that, in your opinion, the Japs could have cap- 
tured Pearl Harbor or the adiacent islands if the fleet were not 
present there on December 7, 1941. 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. Bv that I mean their objective would 
have been different. In fact, had they been accompanied by an 
amphibious force two days behin.d that strike they could have accom- 
plished the same thing. But I believe their intentions would have 
been different. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, if that had happened, if they had cap- 
tured Pearl Harbor or the adjacent islands there, then we would 
have had to recapture Hawaii in order to conduct a successful war 
against Japan, would we not? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. I understood you also to state that if they 
had destroyed our oil supplies and our shore installations there rather 



3542 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

than attacking the fleet, the situation would have been worse for this 
country than it was by what they did do. 

Admiral Smith. Much worse; yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Are there any other questions? 

[9S29] Senator Ferguson. Yes; I have some. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire. 

Senator Ferguson. You think then that the oil at Pearl Harbor 
was more important than our fleet ? Is that your answer ? 

Admiral Smith. The type of ships that we had at that time in 
Pearl Harbor, the battleships, had been so overloaded with additional 
gear in the past 20 3'ears that they were well down in the water, their 
speed was so reduced that we had a fleet speed of 15 knots. Our light 
forces were not hurt very much, and it is the light forces and carriers 
that carried on the war from that point until we got modern heavy 
ships that could travel at a fleet speed of, say, 28 knots. I would say 
that the result of the disaster in Pearl Harbor is, first, the unfortunate 
and terrible loss of life. 

Senator Ferguson. No doubt about that. 

Admiral Smith. The other, the material, the expense, is not so 
important, because after those ships were raised they were entirely 
modernized and rebuilt along the lines that they should have been 
rebuilt several years before. 

Senator Ferguson. Then this fleet that we had at Pearl Harbor, 
in your opinion, was of very little value as far as a fighting force is 
concerned ? 

[9SS0] Admiral Smith. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. It did not make any difference where it was, as 
far as the actual ships were concerned? 

Admiral S311T11. No, sir; except as a supporting force. That is, 
if the Japs sent over surface ships in connection with our move against 
the Marshalls — after our strike in the Marshalls we needed a support- 
ing force beyond which the carriers could go for protection, fueling, 
getting ready for something else. 

Senator Ferguson. Then it was a real value? 

Admiral S^iith. It was a real value in that respect, yes, sir, but not 
as a fleet that could have gone to seek out the Japanese fleet. 

Senator Ferguson. But we had more than that to do. They had 
taken so many islands that there was a lot to do. Would not it have 
been valuable to go with our landing forces, with these large guns and 
all, and did not it delay us because we did not have this fleet? 

Admiral S311TH. No, sir; it did not delay us, because to recapture 
those islands, to take the islands awfwv from them we had to develop 
an enormous amphibious force with trained men. and we did not have 
them at that time. By the time we got ready to move we had the ships 
necessary, not only for support but for bombardment. 

[9531] Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, this fleet 
was of no value to defend Midway or to defend Guam in case they 
would have struck there, or struck first in the Philippines? 

Admiral Smith. We could have defended Midw^ay ; yes, sir, but not 
Guam. Midway is not so far. 

Senator Ferguson. Could not have defended Guam ? 

Admiral Smith. Not in my opinion ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It could not have gone down there after they 
were trying to take Guam and been of any aid ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3543 

Admiral Smith. No, sir. 

Senator Fekcuson. Then you come back to this, that this fleet was 
of very little value at the time, as far as the big ships were coiK-erned? 

Admiral Smith. The heavy ships were of very little value, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What about the airplanes that were destroyed i' 
What value were they? We were very low in airplanes, were we not? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How much did that interfere with our action 
in the Pacific, the destruction of these planes? 

Admiral Smith. I do not knoAv how rapidly those planes were re- 
placed because I left very shortly afterward, but it \9532\ 
seems to me that we were very soon able to carry out a proper recon- 
naissance and that Army and Navy planes must have been sent out 
there promptly. 1 do not know. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not we had long-range 
I'econnaissance there in July, or ])revious to July? 

Admiral Smith. Only intermittently. 

Senator Ferguson. Was there any order that ever was issued by 
anyone stopping that reconnaissance sometime during the summer? 

Admiral Smith. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, You never heard of an order to stop it? 

Admiral Smith. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it only for training purposes? 

Admiral Smith. That I am unable to state. There were times when 
the fleet exercises were carried out to the north. Wherever w^e car- 
ried out the exercises the long-range reconnaissance planes took part. 

Yes; you might say it was for training exercises. 

Senator Ferguson. It was training? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I did not wish to go back to the alert in the sum- 
mer of 1940, 1 was not talking about that reconnaissance at all. There 
was never any reconnaissance for any other purposes than training, 
and there was no order [9o-33~\ stopping long-distance recon- 
juiissance? 

Admiral Smith. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, Any time during the year 1941? 

Admiral Smith, To the best of my knowledge there was never any 
such order. 

Senator Ferguson. You would know about that? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You were the Chief of Staff, were 3'ou not? 

Admiral Smith. Yes. sir; I would know. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you give me the order of command, as far 
as air was concerned, in Hawaii ? How did Admiral Bloch fit into the 
command ? 

Admiral Smith. I will try to ex])lain the command organization 
at that time. Admiral Bellinger, as he showed yesterday, had several 
different titles. As Commander Task Force 9, he worked with the 
Fleet, and had we advanced on the Marshalls he would have done so 
as Commander of Task Force 9, working directly under the Com- 
mander in Chief. 

Now Admiral Bloch was the Naval Base Defense Officer and as 
such he was charged by this order, which is an exhibit, the letter 



3544 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2 CL-41, he was charged with the distant reconnaissance. Two short 
excerpts from those orders are : 

The Commandant 14th Naval District is the Naval Base [9534] Defense 
Officer. As such he shall — 

and one of his duties is — 

exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through 
Commander Patrol Wing 2 — 

that is Bellinger — 

for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy. 

Ajid later : 

In case of an attack the Naval Base Defense Officer shall launch air search 
for enemy ships. 

Mr, Murphy. Will the Senator yield at that point? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; I will yield. 

Mr. Murphy. If you look at page 398 of this hearing you will find 
Admiral Bloch says all they were was a volunteer fire department. 

Senator Ferguson. Even though they were a volunteer fire depart- 
ment I want to know who was the head of the volunteer fire depart- 
ment. 

Admiral Smith. I believe I am coming to that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, xlll right, go ahead. 

Admiral Smith. So you see, had Admiral Bellinger had all this 
information which he said yesterday he did not have, he could not 
initiate a long-range search. 

Senator Ferguson. "Who could? 

Admiral Smith. Admiral Bloch. But, of course, had that in- 
formation been in Bellinger's hands he could have advised Admiral 
Block of the search that should be carried out. Now [9536] 
Admiral Bloch knew all of these things, but Admiral Bloch had no 
planes. So as naval base defense officer he executed these orders. 

Senator Ferguson. Without planes? 

Admiral Smith. By borrowing planes from the fleet, by getting his 
planes from Admiral Kimmel, and he had the planes that Admiral 
Kimmel could spare from his other exercises or intentions. 

[95-36] Senator Ferguson. Well, as Chief of Staff, did you ever 
find these men getting tangled up in these orders ? 

Admiral Smitpi. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. They were able to keep everything in miiid ? 

Admiral Smith. Yes. 

So that if a long-range reconnaissance was thought necessary 

Senator Ferguson. If you had really had to operatte this system, 
in anticipation of an air attack, wasn't it very confusing? 

Is it because they weren't doing anything that they didn't get tangled 
up in the red tape ? 

Admiral Smith. Well, they were doing things. Admiral Bellinger 
was over there very often. The commander in chief sent for him 
very often. 

But if I may continue, this involved command organization 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Admiral Smith. So Admiral Bloch had the responsibility of con- 
ducting this search. To do so, he had to call upon the commander in 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3545 

chief for planes, and the commander in chief could say "yes," or "no," 
of course. 

On the other hand, if the commander in chief thought \9537'] 
a long-distance reconnaissance necessary, he would have commanded 
Admiral Bloch, who was one of his task-force commanders, to carry 
on the search. So that after you analyze it, the responsibility comes 
back to the commander in chief and Admiral Kimmel in his testimony 
has accepted that responsibility. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Now, between Admiral Kimmel, there came next in line Admiral 
Bloch. 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And then who would be under that, on long- 
range reconnaissance ? 

Admiral Smith. Bellinger. 

Senator Ferguson. Bellinger? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So if Bloch and Kimmel decided there wasn't 
to be any long-range reconnaissance, Bellinger would never hear 
about it ? 

Admiral Smith. Quite possible; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Quite possible? There wouldn't be any need 
for him to know about it if they decided not to have long-distance 
reconnaissance, would there? 

Admiral Smith. I think he would have heard about it. 

[9358'] Senator Ferguson. How? Did they have rumors that 
they relied upon ? 

Admiral Smith. No, sir ; but 

Senator Ferguson. Was it his duty to ask about it ? 

Admiral Smith. No, sir; but the fleet aviator, as x4.dmiral Bellinger 
testified yesterday, I believe, was in touch with him every day by 
telephone and certainly the fleet aviation officer would have known 
had the staff met and decided not to have a reconnaissance. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, as I understand it, it never arose. They 
never decided yes or no, on long-distance reconnaissance; isn't that 
right? There was no decision, was there? 

Admiral Smith. Xot that I know of; no, sir. The matter was dis- 
cussed very frequently, but I doi^'t know that they ever reached a 
decision not to do it. 

Senator Ferguson. Thej^ didn't reach anv decision to do it; is that 
right ? 

Admiral Smith. I know that they always had in mind doing it, 
because you note that Admiral Bloch had requested 200 long-range 
planes and received none of them. There is only one rp.ason he wanted 
those planes and that was for reconnaissance. That wa.« his job. 

Senator Ferguson. Now you stated that the Japanese [9539] 
were taking great chances on this attack, and, in fact, it was a wrong 
thing to do. 

Did you know that on tlie Gth day of December, 1041, that Honolulu 
notified Tokyo and we intercepted a message, we didn't translate it, 
but we intercepted it, and had it, with this statement in it : 

It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the Fleet air arm. 



3546 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

On page 27 of Exhibit 2, Honolulu notifies Tokyo, December 6, 1941. 
It was intercepted but not shown to have been ' decoded on the 6th. 
Then there is this information : 

I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take 
advantage for a surprise attack against these places. 

Now, suppose that the task force was up, as shown on that map, up 
there, and was receiving this information, and knew by their intel- 
ligence that our radar was shut off at 7 o'clock, and that we had no 
balloons over the ships, and the information that I have read to you 
was available, what changes were they taking? Your ships were tied 
up there. There was nobody manning the anti-aircraft guns. They 
knew that. They knew there was no air reconnaissance. What chance 
were the Japanese taking? 

[0S40] We had cut off the traffic from the north. We had issued 
two orders, one of the 16th of October and one on the 25th of Novem- 
ber to divert all traffic south. 

Admiral Smith. The only traffic north. I believe, was Russian ships 
carrying lend-lease materials to Vladivostok. 

Senator Ferguson. Didn't we divert all those ships? 

Admiral Smith. No, sir; we had no control over the Russian ships. 

Senator Ferguson. Oh, the Russian ships. 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. Those are the only ships that might have 
been in the area. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you anticipate that if Russia had seen 
this Japanese task force they would have done anything about it? 

Admiral Smith. I doubt it very much. In fact, I understand that 
the Japanese task force had orders to sink them. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, with what you know now, with what I 
read you here, what risks were the Japanese taking for the oppor- 
tunity to sink all of our battleships, f)r destroy them, and to destroy 
as many planes as they did on our airfields, and in our hangars; what 
risks were they taking? Use hindsight on that. 

[d54^] Admiral Smith. Well, there was a risk, of course, from 
our two carrier task forces that were missing from Pearl Harbor. 
They couldn't have known where those ships were, and they were pre- 
pared to meet them anyway. But if these two messages that you 
read — the first one I heard read for the first time, I believe, here yes- 
terday, the second I had never heard 

Senator Ferguson. You never heard ? 

Admiral Smith. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. In the light of this, this intelligence that was 
going out of Honolulu to the Japs — and we must assume that it was 
going to their fleet ? 

Admiral Smith. It was, of course. 

Senator Ferguson. That was the purpose. They had a design map 
of the harbor and these messages were going from Pearl Harbor to 
the Japs, and the Japs were making inquiries right along, as shown 
by these exhibits. 

Now, under those circumstances, with that kind of intelligence 
against us, what chance were they taking? 

Admiral Smith. Not so much as I had testified to, sir. That maked 
a great difference. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3547 

Senator Fi:m;usoN. Now, I want to show you this message of the 
25th. 

The Vice Chairman. Will the gentleman yield? 

[954£\ Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. Admiral, I didn't quite understand you at 
one place. You said something with respect to the Russian ships and 
the Japanese striking force, that somebody had orders to sink some- 
body else. What was that? 

Admiral Smith. There is always the opportunity in a movement of 
a large naval force that a merchant vessel will sight that force and 
report it to someone, so that it would be necessary for the Japs to 
have intercepted that ship and secured or destroyed her radio, or 
otherwise to have sunk her. I have been told since the war ended 
that the orders of that Jap task force were to sink anything that they 
found on the way. 

I don't know that that is absolutely correct, but I believe it is. 

The Vice Chairman. Even though it might have been a Russian 
ship? 

Admiral Smith. Even though it might have been their own ships. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, let's assume that they were 20 miles 
away : the message would be sent communicating that prior to their 
sinking it, would it not? 

Admiral Smith. Naturally, if they expected 

[9S43] Senator Ferguson. It would be too late to sink it after 
they communicated with their Government!; 

Admiral Smith. What I mean is that had they sighted a ship 20 
miles from their course, they probably would have sent a destroyer or 
a light ship and placed a boarding officer on board merely to ask ques- 
tions. Once he arrived on board it w'ould be too late to send a radio. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Smith. If the neutral ship suspected that she was going to 
be sunk, of course she would send a radio. 

Senator Ferguson. So we must also assume that they would send a 
radio first, the minute she sighted that Japanese Fleet. 

Look at this message that we had changing the course of our ships. 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir ; I remember that message. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, didn't that take our vessels out of this 
area? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, we had one area that we weren't 
looking into at all, we were not using submarines, we were not using 
air reconnaissance, we were not using our battleships, w^e were using 
no ships at all ; isn't that true? 

\95Ji4\ Admiral Smith. By routing through Torres Strait, you 
will notice that the ships are not only south of that area, but they 
were well south of the Hawaiian Islands. I mean, between Oahu and 
the Marshalls, and the Carolines there was no shipping either. 

Senator Ferguson. So we left our flank to the south open ? 

Admiral Smith. We moved all the merchant shipping well to the 
south so that the area to the northward and to the westward and to 
tlie southwestward was clear of our shipping. 

Senator Ferguson. Now. you say they were taking a chance so far 
as our two task forces were concerned. That is, Halsey and Newton. 



3548 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Knowing now what the Japanese had, six car- 
riers, three battleships, and whatever the other part of the task force 
was, was either one of these task forces a match for that task force of 
the Japanese ? 

Admiral Smith. By no means. If they had joined up, they were 
not a match for it, unless they caught them while the Jap planes were 
over Pearl Harbor. If they caught them with their planes not on the 
deck, they would have then done considerable damage. 

{9545^ Senator Ferguson. But our airplanes, our bombers, 
would have been quite a match for them either with the planes on them, 
or the planes off? 

Admiral Smith. You mean our long-range bombers? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Smith. We had only six, as I understand. They wouldn't 
have lasted very long. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, do I understand that we were absolutely 
helpless, whether we knew it or not ? Is that wdiat you want to tell us ? 

Admiral Smith. No, sir; I wouldn't say that. I will say that, as 
has been proved throughout this war, there is no way to stop a deter- 
mined air attack. Some of them w'ill get through no matter how 
strong you are in the antiaircraft guns and fighters. Some will always 
get through if it is a determined attack, as all Japanese attacks were. 

Senator Ferguson. Did we know that on the 6th and the 7th? 

Admiral Smith. I think so; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then we couldn't have stopped them? 

Admiral Smith. No, sir; we couldn't have stopped them. In the 
sinking of the Yorktown^ 18 planes came in. Sixteen were shot down. 
Two got off their torpedoes [9546] and were shot down. But 
the Yorktown was sunk. That is a determined air attack. None of 
them got out, but they sank their ship. 

Senator Ferguson. Then the thing to have done here would have 
been to have taken all the men off of the ships, except those with the 
antiaircraft guns, and in that way minimize our loss of sailors ; is that 
what you would say? Whether we knew they were coming or not? 

Admiral Smith. It depends on how much advance information we 
had, sir. The first thing to do was to get the light forces at sea and 
get everything at sea, if possible. 

Senator Ferguson. Did we have enough at Pearl Harbor to get 
them at sea and take care of these carriers and win a battle with this 
J apanese task force ? 

Admiral Smith. No ; but had we gotten that fleet to sea, of course, 
any commander in chief would seek out the enemy. He probably 
would have suffered great damage. 

Senator Ferguson. What would you anticipate he would have in- 
flicted on the enemy ? That is the test, isn't it ? 

Admiral Smith. I think we probably would have sunk at least two 
of their carriers, but we would probably have lost our own in doing it. 

We would have delayed the war for another year. There would be 
no battle of the Coral Sea and probably no battle [954-7] of 
Midway had we lost those two carriers at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, you come back to the proposition that we 
were not prepared for war in the Pacific ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3549 

Admiral Smith. Not for the kind of war that was thrust upon us ; 
no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, didn't we know the kind of war the Japa- 
nese could wage in the Pacific ? Weren't we prepared on that ? Didn't 
our intelligence tell us that? 

I am asking you as chief of staff. 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. As chief of staff of the commander in chief of 
the Pacific. 

Admiral Smith. But to meet that kind of an attack you had to 
have more fighting planes and long-range planes, of course, and you 
had to have modern antiaircraft guns which we did not have. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that what Admiral Stark and General Mar- 
shall were talking about when they wrote the message of the 5th of 
November and the message of the 27th of November telling Mr. Hull 
that they didn't want any ultimatum with Japan? 

Admiral Smith. That is what I understand from their testimony ; 
yes, sir. They wanted a delay so that these things could be provided. 

[954.8] Senator Ferguson. That is what you are telling us this 
morning ? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That we were not prepared for war? 

Admiral Smith. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. With the Japanese at that time ; is that right ? 

Admiral Smith. That is right, and we did not get such things as 
40 millimeter guns and modern radar on some of the ships for almost 
a year. We had, for example, a 4-barreled antiaircraft gun called the 
1.1, but no controls had been installed for it, and after a few rounds, 
the men were blinded by the smoke from the barrels.' 

It turned out to be a very poor gun, but that was the best we had 
at that time, and very few ships had that. 

Senator Ferguson. Didn't we ever try it out before ? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. We tried it out repeatedly. 

Senator Ferguson. Did we know that this would happen with it, 
that the men would be blinded after a few rounds? 

Admiral Smith. The controls had been designed, the foundations 
were in place on the battleships, but the gear had not arrived from 
the United States so that a man could control that gun from one side, 
to keep him clear of the gun blast. 

\9o)f9'\ Senator Ferguson. You mentioned a letter the other day, 
and I would like to straighten that matter out. 

To refresh your memory on the letter, I will read from the Hart 
report : 

In fact, a few days after Pearl Harbor, we received an official letter stating, 
"I know that you would like to have 20.000 men and we would like to give them 
to you," as I remember the exact wording: "The war is in the Atlantic and we 
here in Washington think you are sitting pretty in the Pacific." This letter was 
actually received a few days after Pearl Harbor, although written before, of 
course. 

Now. there is a note — and you indicated in your testimony that this 
was sent by Admiral Stark ?^ 

Admiral Smith. No, sir. I notice I was quoted in the newspapers 
that way. I did not say by Admiral Stark. 



3550 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. The newspaper item siiid Admiral Stark. 

Admiral Smith. No; that is incorrect. 

Senator Fergusox. And it was Admiral Nimitz; was it not? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That letter was written by Admiral Nimitz? 

[9549a] Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; and I mentioned that the 
Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, now Personnel, was in no way 
responsible for not furnishing us with information. 

I merely mentioned that to show the apparent attitude of mind 
among the Navy in Washington. 

Senator Ferguson. Here in Washington ? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I will read this note : 

The Examining Officer identified the letter mentioned by the witness as being 
one in the form of a personal letter from the Chief of Bureau of Navigation 
to Admiral II. E. Kinimel, dated 2.". November, 1941, file No. FF 12/MM (55) 
and copy is now on file in the secret-confidential file room of the Bureau of 
Personnel, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 

How long was it taking you to get mail there — if a letter was 
^^Titten on the 25th of November ? 

Admiral Smith. The air mail was rather uncertain. It was car- 
ried by the clipper. I remember that many people decided that 
straight ship mail was, for personal letters, was quicker than air mail, 
because often the plane would take off and have to come back. That 
is, going to the eastward, which is the worst way, but the mail by air 
was not nearly so rapid as it is today, and was not [9SS0] 
reliable. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all I liave. I will ask counsel to get 
this letter.^ 

Mr. Kaufman. I think it is in the record. 

Senator Ferguson. I have looked for it, and I haven't found it. 

The Vice Chairman. Are there any further questions ? 

If not, Admiral, do you have any further information that you can 
give this conunittee that would be helpful in this investigation that 
has not been brought out by questions ? 

Admiral Smith. No, sir. I wish I could give you more. I would 
only like to say that if any impression has been gained by the com- 
mittee that Armiral Hart — or that Admiral Kimmel, rather, was 
closed to suggestions, that impression is in error. All channels to 
him were open at all times, and I could take anyone to see him, and 
I believe he listened to everyone. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question or two 
of this witness, in view of what has gone on. 

The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your statement, Admiral ? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe. 

[9551] Mr. Keefe. Admiral, were there minutes kept of the 
meetings of the staff out at Hawaii ? 

Admiral Smith. No, sir; never. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you have a present recollection of the staff meeting 
which discussed the receipt of the message of November 24? 

Admiral Smith. No, I do not, sir. There were too many of them 
for me to remember that. I do remember the one of the 2Tth, be- 
cause it was held the same afternoon. 



^ The letter referred to appears in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5304 et seq. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3551 

Mr. Keefe. Do you luive a present recollection as to the discussion 
that took place at the staff meeting after the receipt of the so-called 
war-warnino; messa<re of November 27? 

Admiral Smith. I do not recall the details of the discussion; no, 
sir. I know that there was a discussion and meeting. 

Mr. Keefe Is there anybody that would be able to say and tell 
this connnittee what took place in your staff and what the discussion 
was when this war- warning message w^as discussed? 

Admiral Smith. Not unless someone present at that time has a 
better memory than I have, sir. I do not know. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you recall who was present at that particular staff 
meeting ? 

[955£] Admiral Smith. There were present Captain McMorris 
and Captain DeLany, both of whom are now admirals. I believe 
Admiral McMorris is scheduled to be a witness before this committee. 
He is in the city. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, in view of the tremendous amount of paper 
work that seems to be obvious in connection with the slightest activity 
of the Navy, it is rather astonishing to me that there wasn't a secre- 
tary of these meetings that kept some minutes or some records; but 
I assume that your statement is correct that there was no record kept 
of any of these staff meetings. 

Admiral Smith. There was no record. The paper work load was 
very high, and we had been trying for years, and I suppose they 
are still trying to reduce it. 

Mr. Keefe. I should hope so. 

Admiral Smith. And I too, sir. But to have brought in a secretary 
and taken down minutes for all of the meetings we had would have 
filled the files with a lot more of this secret correspondence, or paper 
work. 

Mr. Keefe. Admiral, my purpose is this. It appears quite clearly 
that the message of November 27 in which the language appears 
"This is a war warning" is the first message of that character that 
any witness from the Navy has ever remembered ever having been 
received by the Nav}' — [9553] "this is a war warning." 

Admiral Smith. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, that would mean that a staff meeting would be 
called to discuss the meaning of that message and the measures that 
should be taken in connection therewith. 

Am I to understand your testimony to be that you cannot tell now, 
or have no present recollection as to what took place at the staff 
meeting at which this very unusual message was discussed ? 

Admiral Smith. I cannot, sir. I know that a meeting was called 
as soon as the message came in, and that Admiral Bloch was sent 
for, but what the details of the discussion were, I simply cannot 
remember. 

Mr. Keefe. Can you tell us what determination was arrived, if any, 
as a result of the collective judgnient of the members of the staff? 

Admiral Smith. The action paragraph of that dispatch said "Take 
defensive deployment." The other was information. The steps that 
we had taken in defensive deployment 

Mr. Keefe. Admiral, I haven't asked you that 



3552 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Smith. Had already been made. 

Mr. Keefe. I didn't ask you that. 

Admiral Smith. You are asking what action we took. 

Mr. Keefe. No. T asked you whether you have any [9564] 
present recollection of the agreement that was reached as a result of 
that staff meeting. 

Admiral Smith. I have not. 

Mr. Keefe^ Held on the 27th. 

Admiral Smith. I have not. 

Mr. Keefe. Resulting from the receipt of this telegram. 

Admiral Smith. I have not. 

Mr. Keefe. Have jon any present recollection of any discussion by 
the staff after the receipt ol the November 24 message? 

Admiral Smith. I have not. We had too many conferences. I 
can't remember the details of one from another. It is too long ago. 

Mr. Keefe. And there is no record of any kind that you can think 
of that would assist this committee in gaining information along the 
lines that I have inquired ? 

Admiral Smith. It possibly may be found in the daily estimate 
submitted to the commander in chief on steps to be taken in the 
event of war with Japan within 24 hours. That would show, I be- 
lieve — would reflect the action that was taken in those meetings. 

[9555] Mr. Keefe. There was offered here the other day in con- 
nection with the examination of one of the witnesses two written pro- 
posals as to steps to be taken in the event of war within 48 hours, I 
believe, and steps to be taken in the event of war within 24 hours. 
Do you recall that memorandum ? 

A^dmiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. "Who prepared that ? 

Admiral Smith. That was prepared by Captain McMorris, the war 
plans officer, and was considered by the commander in chief, the opera- 
tions officer and myself every morning. 

Mr. Keefe. That is signed by C. H. McMorris. 

Admiral Smith. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. KJEEFE. The first one is dated the 30th day of November 1941 
and the next one is dated December 5, 1941. The first is entitled 
"Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war within the next 
24 hours," and the next one is entitled "Recommended steps to be 
taken in case of American-Japanese war within the next 48 hours." 

Were those orders or were those just suggestions ? 

Admiral Smith. That was an estimate of the situation, of what we 
should do, something there to put right on the air when we got word, 
"This is^war." 

Mr. Keefe. Well, you got word on November 27th, "This is a war 
warning" ? 

[9656] Admiral Smith. They did not say, "This is war." We 
could not go ahead with WPL-46. There is a difference between a war 
warning and war. They did not mobilize and they did not execute 
the plan. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, you testified before the Navy court of inquiry 
that you thought it was the intent to put you on your toes and get 
ready to carry out the mission required in the war plans. 

Admiral Smith. That is right, sir; but we had been on our toes for 
some time, or thought we had. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3553 

Mr. Keefe. Well, I don't want to prolong this, Admiral, to any 
extent, but I confess that I would like very much to get clearly in 
my mind just what you do at these so-called meetings that the staff 
liad out there. A message comes in, it is brought in to somebody and 
you sit around a table and talk about it and decide what you are going 
to do and you had those meetings almost daily. 

Admiral S:^riTH. Yes, sir; and whenever an important message came 
in we also had the type and force commanders, task force commanders 
present in port over, and always Admiral Bloch. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, was there always a unanimity of opinion ex- 
pressed in the meetings? 

Admiral Smith. No, sir. 

[9557] Mr, Keefe. Or was there debate? Didn't anybody ever 
disagree with 

Admiral Smith. Oh, plenty; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, was there any disagreement as to what this mes- 
sage of Xovember 27 meant? 

Admiral Smith. I cannot remember that far back just what the 
particular debate on that message was. I wish I could but I do not. 

Mr. Keefe. That is a pretty important matter for this committee, 
at least it is for me. You cannot recall whether there was any dis- 
agreement among any members of the staff as to whether or not that 
message meant war, "Let's get to it and go to it"? 

Admiral Smith. I do not; no, sir. 

Mr, Keefe. And you cannot recall now whether at the staff meeting 
whicli considered that November 27 war-warning message there was 
any disagreement at all ? 

Admiral Smith. I don't remember whether there was or not. 

Mr. Keefe. Obviously I cannot ask you any more questions because 
you don't remember anything that took place then. 

Admiral Smith. I cannot remember any particular one conference. 
We had been there practicalh^ a year and we were having conferences 
all the time and debates all the time and [9558] now — 3^ou will 
have before you, if anyone will remember, the opinions it is more 
likely to be Admiral Pye or Admiral McMorris. 

Mr. KJEEFE.. Well, Admiral, so far as any action that was taken or 
not taken, either affirmative or negative, the staff evidently was in 
agreement with the action taken by the commander in chief ; is that a 
fair statement ? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ? 

Mr. Keefe. And all of you experienced officers out there agreed 
with the course of action, or took the course of action that represented 
your considered judgment? 

Admiral' S:\nTii. Yes, sir. I would say that, assuming that this 
debate or conference was similar to all others held, that the commander 
in chief did not make his decision imtil the discussion had finished. 
We did not go in there to discuss whether his decision was correct or 
not. We debated it before he reached his decision. 

Mr. Keefe. I understand. 

Admiral Smith. And very often some of his decisions. 

Mr. Keefe. Was Halsey at this meeting on the 27th? 

Admiral Smith. Halsey did not get in there until the — yes, Halsey 
was in on the 27th. He left on the 28th. Admiral Pye was in on the 



3554 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

morning of the 28th, when we had another [OSSd] conference 
with the Army present at that time. 

Mr. Keefe. Did Halsey's so-called shooting orders have anything 
to do with this message of the 27th, do you suppose? 

Admiral Smith. I think it very probably did. 

Mr. Keefe. It was known that Halsey was going to leave on the 
28th, wasn't it? 

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Ej:efe. Was the question discussed at that meeting, if I can 
refresh your recollection, as to what kind of orders Halsey would sail 
pnder ? 

Admiral Smith. No, sir. Admiral Halsey received his orders from 
the commander in chief direct. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, didn't the staff discuss the question, "Now, if 
we are going to send these task forces out to deliver planes to Midway 
and Wake, what kind of orders are they going to go under?" 

Admiral Smith. I think they very probably did. 

Mr. Keefe. You wouldn't think that the commanding officer. Ad- 
miral Kimmel, would give shooting orders to Halsey unless there had 
been some unanimity of thought in the discussion of the staff, would 
you? 

Admiral Smith. No. I would not; no, sir. I think there very 
probably was a discussion in the staff, but I do not remember it. 

[9660] Mr. Keefe. That is all. 

Mt. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I want to add but very little right 
there. 

You said that Admiral Pye liad to make a report, but I think you 
will find on page 424, question 31, in the Naval Court of Inquiry that 
Admiral Pye testified : 

The instructions in elTect to the Piicific Fleet were that tasl^ force commanders 
would not report to the Commander-in-Chief upon their return from duties unless 
they were so directed. I therefore did not see the Commander-in-Chief until 
Saturday, when I went to talk to him concerning the tactical exercises which had 
been carried out during the last period at sea. He then showed me tliis dispatch. 

That was on the 29th. 

The Vice Chairman. On what date ? 

Mr. Murphy. Well, on the 29th. He was not present at the con- 
ferences of the 27th and 28th. 

Reference was made to another thing. The reference which the 
distinguished Congressman from Wisconsin asked you about, I think 
is on page 561, question 159, before the Naval Court of Inquiry: 

Q. Well, what did you consider the intent of this message by heading it "A 
war warning"? 

[9561] A. Well, I thought that the intent was to put us on our toes and get 
ready to carry out the mission required by the War Plan. The War Plan was not 
executed by the Navy Department. 

And, lastly, on page 351 of the Hewitt report : 

Q. Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state what that was? 

Vice Admiral Smith. During the discussion, we informed the Army that the 
planes they placed on Wake would have to remain thei-e for the duration of a 
war, if any, because it was impossible to put a ship in thei'e and take them out 
and Army planes are not equipi^ed to land on a carrier, although they can take 
off from a carrier. Admiral Kimmel then asked, "What may I expect of Army 
fighters on Wake?" and General Martin of the Army Air Force replied, "We do 
not allow them to go more than fifteen miles offshore," to which Admiral Kimmel 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3555 

replied, "Then they are no damn good to me," or words to that effect. General 
Short stated, not angrily at all, that, "If I man these islands, I mnst command 
them," and Kimmel replied, "Only over my dead body. The Army should exercise 
no command over Navy bases." General Short replied, "Mind you, I do not want 
these islands. I think they are better manned by Marines. But if I must put 
troops and planes on them, then I must command them." 
[9562] And that was the extent of the controversy. 

Which was the extent of the controversy. No more questions. 

Admiral Smith. I Avill say that they both smiled when that discus- 
sion was going on. 

The Vice Chairman. We thank you, Admiral, for your appearance 
and the information given the committee and your apparent desire 
to be helpful to us in this inquir3^ You may be excused. 

(The Avitness was excused.) 

The committee will now adjourn until 2 o'clock. 

("Wliereupon, at 12:20 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of 
the same day.) 

[dSdS] AFTERNOON SESSION — 2 P. M. 

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order. 

Counsel will please call the next witness. 

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I desire to present to the committee 
Captain SafFord. I may state for the information of the committee 
that Captain Safford's testimony is desired on two main questions : 
First his knowledge and information with reference to the so-called 
14-part message which came in on December G and 7, and the second 
subject is the question of the winds execute message which has been 
a matter of some interest and controversy Avith the committee. 

I propose, with the permi.ssion of the Chairman, to go over the 
14-part message testimony of- Captain Safford first. Then he has 
advised me. and there has been circulated to the committee, a written 
statement which he has prepared concerning his views on the winds 
message. 

I would like to suggest that the Chair permit him to read his state- 
ment on the winds message, after which I will ask him a few questions 
and then turn him over to the committee for general examination on 
both of these subjects. 

The Vice Chairman. Without objection, it will be so ordered. 

Captain, will you please be sworn. 

[9S64] TESTIMONY OF CAPT. LAURENCE FRYE SAFFORD, UNITED 

STATES NAVY 

(Having been duly sworn by the Vice Chairman.) 

Mr. Richardson. Captain Safford, will give your full name and 
your age to the reporter ? 

Captain Saeford. Laurence Frye Safford. Age 53 years. 

Mr. Richardson. How long have you been in the Navy? 

Captain Safford. Thirty-four years this June. 

Mr. Richardson. Will you detail in a general way to the conmiittee, 
Captain, just what your naval experience has been, the general work 
that you have done and the present position which you occupy? 

Captain Safford. After graduation from the Naval Academy I 
served in battleships, destroyers, subnuirines, mine craft, cruisers, 
and battleships. I have had a total of 14 years' sea duty, the last 3 

79716— 46— pt. 8 13 



3556 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of which being spent as gunnery officer on the battleship New Mexico. 

I was in charge of the Antiaircraft Gunnery School in the summer 
of 1935, which was fairly successful. 

All my shore duty has been spent in my specialty as a cipher expert 
and radio intelligence expert, I came ashore to assume this duty in 
charge of the Navy Department Communications Intelligenre Unit 
in May 1936, and remained on that duty until February 15, 1942, at 
which time I was removed [9565] by the orders of Admiral 
Home. 

In 1938 I was assigned to engineering duty only by the Secretary 
of the Navy and ordered to remain on shore duty at my post at that 
time in order to get ready for the war which everybody could see 
was coming. 

Mr. Richardson. Are you on active service in the Navy now ? 

Captain Saftord. At the present time I am on active service in 
the Navy and am called the Assistant Director of Naval Communi- 
cations for cryptrographic research, 

Mr. Richardson, Will you detail a little more what you mean by 
the work that you did in cryptology and in intelligence, what the scope 
of those activities was, what the general field was that you were 
working in when you were doing that work? 

Captain Safford, I was ordered to duty in the Navy Department 
in January 1924, to establish a radio intelligence system for the United 
States Navy. At that time, and previous to that time, I was given 
some reports and told to study them and to see what I could accomplish. 

Mr. Richardson, What do you mean by "radio intelligence"? 

Captain Safford, By "radio intelligence" I mean the interception 
of the radio messages of enemy foreign nations and agents, their 
solution by cryptanalytic processes. 

[9567] Mr. Richardson. You recall in a general way that it 
was a message which came into this country from Japan in 13 — first 
a pilot message that was followed by a 13-part message. 

Now, will you tell me when you first heard of anything with ref- 
erence to what turned out to be the 14th part message ? 

Captain Safford, I probably heard of the pilot message in the 
early afternoon of Saturday, December 6, 1941, although I cannot 
recall it. 

Mr. Richardson. Would it have been the regular procedure or cus- 
tom there to have acquainted you with such a pilot message ? 

Captain Safford, It was the regular procedure to immediately 
acquaint me with anything of particular importance and this was of 
particular importance. 

Mr, Richardson. Why would you think that would be a particularly 
important message? 

Captain Safford, Because it gave information that the long-awaited 
reply to the Secretary of State note of the 26th of November was 
about to be transmitted. 

Mr. Richardson, Now, you were acquainted, were you not, with 
the fact that the Secretary of State had submitted such a note about 
the 26th? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3557 

Captain Safford. We had read the text of his note from [9S68] 
the Japanese intercept. We also knew the Japanese reaction to it. 

Mr. Richardson. And your knowledge and that reaction made you 
very much interested in when the answer would come in ? 

Captain Safford. That was extremely important to me, both for 
information and to perform my duty, in getting this information 
to higher authority with the least possible delay. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, would there be any duty on your part when 
the pilot message came in to take any steps to circulate the pilot 
message as an independent message of itself ? 

Captain Safford. That was the duty of Naval Intelligence and was 
normally performed by Lieutenant Commander Kramer who was 
attached to that office but working under me in space of my section. 

Mr. Richardson. Would it have been the regular practice where 
the first message that came in was a pilot message for Lieutenant 
Kramer to proceed to deliver that message without waiting for any 
further message in confirmation thereof ^ 

Captain Safford. That is correct, it would be, and this pilot message 
indicated that the next message would probably not be received until 
the following day. 

[9569] Mr. Richardson. Have you any recollection that the 
pilot message as a separate message was delivered by Lieutenant 
Kramer ? 

Captain Safford. Lieutenant Commander Kramer was absent from 
the office from noon until about 3 : UO p. m. I do not know where he 
was. I doubt if he can recall, but he was probably delivering this 
message. We know now from information which has become avail- 
able to me in the last 2 weeks that there was a time stamp on the War 
Department copy of this message which said, "Received 12 : 05 p. m. 
December 6." I think that is the time. That is a matter of record. 
It was about 12 : 05. 

Mr. Richardson. That would refer to the pilot message? 

Captain Safford. That refers to the pilot message. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, there was an answer of the witness 
to the question just before that indicated there was something that 
said the 14th part would come in the next day. May I have that? 

Mr. Richardson. Let me ask him. 

Captain, was there aiwthing in connection with the pilot message 
that would inform you that there was another message to come? 

Captain Safford. Yes. It says in the second paragraph, "This 
separate message is a very long one. I will send \_9o70\ it in 
11 parts and imagine that j^ou will receive it tomorrow. However, 
I am not sure." 

Mr. Richardson. And it was that language which informed you 
that there would be more to follow ? 

Captain Safford. It was that language which informed me there 
was more to follow. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, if this message was delivered and how it 
was delivered would be the responsibility and act of someone other 
than yourself? 



3558 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Safford. That is correct. That message was translated 
by the Army and the time of delibery in the Navy Department all 
depended ui)on what time the Army sent our copies of the translation 
over to the Navy Department. That is not a matter of record and 
we can only guess. 

Mr. RiciiARDSOX. Can you tell me how long it was after your atten- 
tion was called to the pilot message that any execute appeared on the 
long 14-part message to which it referred? 

Captain Safford. The long 14-part message actually was received 
in the Navy Department and our men on Avatch began what we call 
processing it before I could have seen the translation of the pilot 
message. 

Mr. RiciiARnsox. What do yon mean by, before your men were 
processing it. what do you mean by that, what is "processing"? 

Captain Safford. The first five or six parts of the long 14-part 
message were received in the Navy Department I believe about 10 
minutes of 12, just before noon. The officer on watch telephoned 
over to the War Department and found out that the War Department 
unit was securing it at 1 o'clock because they were observing the normal 
working hours prescribed by the Civil Service Commission at that 
time and therefore he held itand worked on it himself although it was 
an Army responsibility under a joint agreement under date of 1941 
whereby the Army processed the messages on the even days of the 
month and the Navy on the odd days. Processing means decoding or 
decrypting where it had to be done, exclusion of the code where that 
had to be done, recovery of the key where that had to be done, transla- 
tion and finally smoothing up and typing the smooth copies for dis- 
tribution to higher authority. 

A number of copies were ty])ed; early in the year I think we were 
limited to 4; by December 1941 I think there were 12 or 14 copies 
prepared,*half of which went to the Navy and half to the Army for 
distribution. 

Mr. Richardson. Would they go to anyone else than the Army and 
the Navy? 

Captain Safford. By agreement which was made and [957^] 
approved on the 12th of November 1941 the Navy made all deliveries 
to the White House via the Naval Aide to the President, who at that 
time was Rear Admiral Beardall and the Army made all deliveries to 
the Secretary of State. 

Mr. RiciiARDSox. Well, would those deliveries be made out of the 
number of copies that had been furnished to the Navy and to the 
Army ? 

Captain Safford. They were made out of the total number of copies 
and their copy was identical with the ones of the Army and Navy. 

Mr. Richardson. Would there be new copies or simply one of the 
multifold copies that had been delivered to them? 

Captain Safford. They were one of the multifold number of copies. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, when that message was delivered in 
that way a copy of what was delivered, in the ordinary course of re- 
cording, would appear in the files of the particular department that 
got the copy? 



PROCEEDINGS OK .JOINT COMMITTEE 3559 

Captain Safford. There was a file copy kept in the Navy Depart- 
ment in my section. There was a file copy kept in the War Depart- 
ment. I think it was originally kept by the SIS and later taken over 
by G-2 after there had been an nnfortunate leak and name calling 
in connection Avith it which was followed by a controversy as to who 
was responsible [0573] for the leak. 

Mr. Richardson. And the Navy assumed the responsibility for send- 
ing one of these copies to the White House? 

Captain Safford. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And the Army would have the responsibility of 
sending a copy to the Secretary of State? 

Captain Safford. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And when those copies were delivered they would 
become a part of the files of the office or person to whom they were 
delivered? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. They were collected afterwards. Some- 
t imes they were allowed to keep them 24 hours. We wanted them back 
as soon as we could get them. And they were destroyed. I believe 
the Army destroyed everything but the file copy. The Navy kept one 
lile copy and also another copy so that w^e would have a loose copy 
to work with and not have to remove a copy from the file. 

Mr. Richardson. Then there would be one copy remaining in the 
files of the Navy and one copyy remaining in the files of the Army? 

Captain Safford. At all times. 

Mr. Richardson. How many copies would come to rest and remain 
in your files ? 

Captain Safford. Always one ; generally a second. 

[9S7i] Mr. Richardson. How many communications units, 
where messages were being intercepted and brought in, were we main- 
taining at that time ? 

Captain Safford. Do you mean the intercept stations where we 
were intercepting ? 

Mr. Richardson. I want the intercept stations first. 

Captain Safford. We had major intercept stations at Winter Har- 
bor, Me.; Cheltenham, Md. ; Bainbridge Island, Wash.; Heeia on 
the island of Oahu, and at Corregidor. 

We had a small intercept direction-finding station at Guam, a 
small one at Imperial Beach, Calif. We had a small intercepting 
direction-finding station at Amagansett, Long Island; and Jupiter, 
Fla. 

In addition a number of direction-finder stations which did not 
attempt any intercepting. 

Mr. Richardson. If anyone made an intercept that would be trans- 
ferred by them where ? 

Captain Safford. Normally to their primary control station or 
office, or CI unit, as we called it. 

Occasionally it would come direct to Washington, depending upon 
what type of message it was, and what the instructions were in the 
case. 

Mr. RiCHARDSf)N. It is a fact, is it not. Captain, that \Po7r')] 
the Washington office had the most experienced i)ersonnel and was 



3560 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAiRL HARBOR ATTACK 

the most extensive office of that kind that we had in the world, was 
it not? 

Captain Saffokd. It had a few of the most experienced personnel, 
but 90 percent of them had been in service less than a year. It was a 
training ground, as well as a working place. 

Mr. Richardson. But it was the best we had ? 

Captain Safford. It was the largest we had. I would say that the 
best we had, as far as experience and all-around skill was up at 
Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there any division of activity assigned to 
these various stations, for instance, Washington, Pearl Harbor, and 
Corregidor, as to what character of work they should do, or were 
they all doing the same thing? 

Captain Safford. That was highly specialized. The Navy De- 
partment was responsible exclusively for the handling of anything 
which originated in the Atlantic Ocean, I mean from the European 
Continent. It was responsible for Japanese diplomatic communica- 
tions ; it was responsible for backing up our other two stations on their 
particular problems, and was responsible for the training of per- 
sonnel to send out to the outlying stations, because we did not believe 
in sending untrained personnel into the field. 

\9576] Mr. Richardson. Then this 14th part message we are 
talking about came into the station here in Washington in the regular 
course of the kind of intercepting that that station was supposed to do ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. RiCHARDSox. Now, I think you testified that around 12 o'clock 
the first four or five sections of this 14-part message came in. 

Does that mean when they came in in code ? 

Captain Safford. That is when they came in, in code in teletype 
from Bainbridge Island, Wash., or other stations which had inter- 
cepted the message. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, how long did it take before those various 
sections of the message that came in were translated into English? 

Captain Safford. Bainbridge Island copied a whole what we call 
schedule of radio transmissions from Tokyo to San Francisco. They 
transcribed all of the Government messages and ignored the commer- 
cial messages. The Government messages included in other sj^stems 
on other points, and a lot of messages which had no connection with 
the 14-part. There was no external way to differentiate. Everything 
of interest to Washington was punched on a [9577] teletype 
tape and when the tape was completely prepared it was sent into the 
Navy Department by TWX through the teletype wire exchange by 
mechanical transmission at a rate of 60 words a minute, and received 
by the Navy Department. 

This high speed transmission cut our tolls to a third, and we got 
faster service. 

[9578] Then it was taken by the watch officer and decoded into 
the basic form as rapidly as possible. Then we knew what we had to 
do with it next. In many cases the Japanese would use another code 
underneath this so-called purple machine. In this case they did not. 
Therefore we saved time. Usually these messages came in Japanese 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3561 

and had to be translated into English. In this case it came in English. 

Mr. Richardson. Let me be sure that I understand. This message, 
14-part, as I understand it, came in in ordinary code which, when 
translated in the ordinary way, gave you the English translation? 

Captain Safford. Not translated in the ordinary way. We were 
in possession of the Japanese diplomatic cipher machine known as 
purple to conceal its real nature. The Army got that for us. We 
helped build the machines. 

Mr. jMurpiiy. Mr. Chairman, I am wondering if it is necessary to 
go into technicalities. We have gone far enough in attacking national 
security without going into details on this. 

Mr. Richardson. Since this is the first time anybody has raised that 
point I am perfectly willing to stop. 

Mr. Murphy. It was raised before by me and I want to again protest 
the necessity of the Captain revealing the mechanics and the details 
of how we broke the code. I do [9S79'] not see how it could 
help national security or help national defense or add anything to 
the inquiry. 

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I have no intention of going into it. 

Mr. Murphy. I don't mean counsel ; I don't mean to criticise counsel. 

Mr. Richardson. Captain, don't give us any of the operative details 
as to just how a code is broken. All I am interested in is that the code 
came in. 

[9580] Mr. Murphy. May I move that the part that the witness 
already related so far as the mechanics are concerned be stricken from 
the record ? 

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, that is absurd. Why be so secretive 
about things that every foreign agent in the world knows all about? 
These matters are well known, well understood, have already been 
the subject of books and magazine articles, there is no secret about 
them and there is no use pretending that there is. 

Mr. Murphy. I want my position to be clear. I move that the part 
that is in the record about the mechanics and the construction oi the 
where-with-all be stricken from the record. 

The Vice Chairman. Permit the Chair to inquire. You are in a 
position, Captain, to know better than we are what the situation is 
with respect to this matter. 

Captain Saftord. Mr. Chairman, I think I can answer the essential 
part of the questions as regards the time element, which is very im- 
portant, and not give away anything that is essential to security. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, have you said an3^thing so far that 
would endanger the element of security ? 

Captain Saftord. No, sir; nothing that has not been brought out 
in the papers. 

[9581] The Vice Chairman. All right. Does that take care of 
the situation? 

Mr. Murphy. May I ask one question ? You say that the mechanics 
which you have just outlined have been in the papers? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to know which one ? Well, I will go into 
that later, as to what paper. 



3562 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. All right. You understand the counsel's 
statement ? 

Captain Safford. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. And the committee's desire along that line, 
Captain, and I feel sure that you are in better position to help take 
care of that than even we are. 

Mr. Richardson. When this message began to come in was there any 
attempt made to make any delivery of any portion of it prior to the 
reception of the first 13 parts? 

Captain Safford. No, sir ; not to my knowledge, except that Com- 
mander McCollum, who was the head of the Japanese section of 
Naval Intelligence, knew that the message was in and coming in and 
being worked on when it was partially in. I think he knew that around 
3 or 4 o'clock in the afternoon. 

Mr. Richardson. But there was no delivery outside of [9582] 
your office of this message so that anyone could read it or see it or 
know of it or act on it or deliver it until the first 13 parts had come in, 
was there? 

Captain Safford. The message was not ready for delivery until 
about 9 o'clock in the evening. It might have been ready for delivery 
a little earlier on a limited scale. 

Mr. RiCHARDS(^N. Now, by "the message'' you refer to the first 13 
parts? 

Captain Safford. I mean the first 13 parts. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you consider the first 13 parts as a complete 
message for the purpose of delivery? 

Captain Safford. I never saw the first 13 parts until Monday 
morning. 

Mr. Richardson. When did you last see or hear anything of this 
message of Saturday. December 6th ? 

Captain Safford. I left the office at the close of working hours, at 
4:30 p. m. on Saturday, December 6th. It was the first time in 2 
weeks that I had observed normal working hours. 

At that time Commander Linn had come on and was re-working 
the message. There had been a mistake in the key which was set up 
on the machine which decoded the message and the whole entire jDart 
we had in there was badly garbled and because of its importance Linn 
thought it was better to check the key [9o8S] first and find out 
the mistake and produce perfect copy rather than to clear the garble 
by guess and maybe make mistakes at critical points in the message. 
This would take quite a little bit of time and we simply had to throw 
away all the work that had been done before, 

Linn was my best man on the watch side. Normally I do not expect 
watches from a man in charge of a section. He was taking the place 
of a man whom we had let go on Christmas eve and we were hoping 
that we would be able to get somebody else to take his place. 

Kramer was standing by to deliver the message. As soon as it was 
completed McCollum knew about it. 
Mr. Richardson. Were you there ? 
Captain Safford. I was there until 4:30. I checked it and said: 

There is nothing I can do but get in your way and malie you nervous. I am 
going home. 

Mr, Richardson. Then after 4 : 30 you knew nothing of your own 
knowledge as to what happened to the 13-part message? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3563 

Captain Safford. Until Monday morning, when I got the reports 
from Linn and Kramer on it. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, did you on Monday morning get re- 
ports from them with reference to the 13 parts ? 

Captain Safford. I did immediately and about anything [0584-^ 
else that happened over the week end. 

Senator Lucas. May I ask a question at this point, counsel ? 

Captain, did you know that these 13 parts were coming? 

Captain Safford. We could read enough to 

Senator Lucas. No, I am talking about j'ou, not "we". Did you 
yourself personally know that these 13 i)arts were coming in? 

Captain Safford. We knew — I knew at 4 : 30 from what we had 
that it was the first part of the long message. In fact, the rest of it 
was coming in, began coming in I think^around 3 : 30 and it took about 
an hour for the whole message to come in and other messages mixed 
up with it. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you see the 13 parts before you left at 4 : 30 
that afternoon? 

Captain Safford. No. I saw all 13 parts in their original code 
form but you could not identify them until they had been decoded. 

Senator Lucas. That is what I say. You could not identify them. 

Captain Safford. They had probably 20 or 25 messages on hand, 
13 of which were the various parts of this and the rest were other 
messages. They could not be [9585] identified until they had 
all been decoded. 

Mr. Richardson. Then you left your office at 4 : 30 ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And you did not again see any part of this mes- 
sage until Monday ? 

Captain Safford. Until Monday. 

Mr. Richardson. And all of the transactions that occurred after 
4 : 30 on Saturday — on Saturday evening and Sunday morning came 
after you left ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And you had no independent knowledge of this? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Might 1 ask of the committee 

Senator Ferguson. Did he work Sunday ? 

Mr. Richardson. Might I ask the committee whether the committee 
desires 'me to interrogate Captain Safford as to the hearsay report 
which he got with reference to this message on Monday? Because 
it is apparent from his testimony that his own personal knowledge 
ceased at 4 : 30 on Saturday afternoon. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I think we should have that 
because that was an official report. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, permit the Chair to inquire at 
[9586] this point. Is counsel prepared to present other witnesses 
who can give definite testimony and not hearsay on these points? 

Mr. Richardson. Yes, that is riglit. 

Senator Lucas. May I ask counsel if there is any conflict in the 
report that was made to the captain and what the witnesses will tes- 
tify to when they come to the stand ? 



3564 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. RiCHAKDSoN. I do not know what the captain's testimony will 
be. I am entirely willing to elicit that if the committee wants it, in 
view of the fact that it came to him on Monday. 

Mr. Murphy. May I, as one member of the committee, say that I 
would like to hear what he heard on Monday? I am very much 
interested in that. 

Senator Ferguson. I move, Mr. Chairman, that we take that 
because it was an official report. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, I had rather assumed that the com- 
mittee would prefer to have the best evidence. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, you will have it anyway. 

The Vice Chairman. And that is the reason I was inquiring of 
counsel, if he expects to get the best evidence, which is not hearsay. 
Does counsel state that he expects to present that ? 

Mr. Richardson. Yes, we expect to have Lieutenant Kramer, 
[9587] who is the man who handled it, who was there and knows 
more about it than anyone else and I just want to exhaust the point 
with Captain Safford and to do it I would have to ask him now to 
relate to you what he learned on Monday when he returned to his 
office. 

The Vice Chahiman. It will be, of course, hearsay evidence. 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. 

Mr. Murpht. May I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the events that 
occurred between Saturday and Monday would be hearsay but what 
he heard on Monday is direct evidence and in view of him being here 
and covering the general picture, what he heard on Monday and, 
therefore, as it impressed him, I think the whole situation would be 
direct evidence. 

Mr. Richardson. Let us be realistic. What the captain heard on 
Monday would be a fact, of course, but it would be a fact that would 
ordinarily be best testified to by the people who created the acts which 
he heard. 

The Chairman. Permit me to inquire of counsel. Are the people 
who reported to Captain Safford on Monday and gave him this hearsay 
information that is now being discussed the witnesses that counsel ex- 
pects to present here ? 

Mr. Richardson. Well, until I hear the captain's statement I would 
not be able to say that I have the witnesses that [96881 he con- 
tacted, that all of the witnesses that he contacted on Monday will be 
here. 

The Vice Chaiuman. All right. 

Mr, Richardson. I propose, in view of the interest of so many 
members, to go right on and inquire. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, without objection then, you may pro- 
ceed. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

The Vice Chairman. That takes care of your motion, doesn't it, 
Senator ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. At what time did you return to your office on 
Monday? 

Captain Safford. At the beginning of working hours, which I be- 
lieve was 8 a. m. at that time. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3565 

Mr. Richardson. And was your attention then called to anything 
relating to this 14-part message ? 

Captain Safford. I immediately called all of my heads of sub- 
sections mider me into conference. 

Senator Lucas. Who was it that you called ? 

Mr. Richardson. Whom did you call into conference? 

Captain Safford. Commander Kramer, Commander Linn, particu- 
larly, and Commander Parke. I believe they were all lieutenants at 
the time. I called them in to find out what [9S89] had gone 
wrong and how the people had been surprised the way they had ; first, 
to see if our section had been to blame in any other way and the sec- 
ond, to immediately start writing out a full report of the circum- 
stances, as required by Navy regulations, I believe, and certainly by 
Navy custom. 

Now, I have been in other accidents and collisions, and so forth, 
and that was always done. In view of so many people being involved 
it seemed better to prepare such a statement or report of those in my 
section and let those who were in agreement with that report sign 
with me and those who held counterviews submit their own views. 

Sometime within the week following Pearl Harbor I and the other 
officers were called into conference in the office of the Director of 
Naval Communications; I am not certain whether Admiral Noyes 
presided and he was called away suddenly and Captain Redmond, 
the Assistant Director of Naval Communications, presided. 

Mr. Richardson. When was this? 

Captain Safford. This was in the week following the attack on 
Pearl Harbor; some time prior to the 15th I remember, probably 
Thursday or Friday. 

Mr. Richardson. And where did it take place ? 

Captain Safford. In the office of the Director of. Naval Communi- 
cations. 

[95901 Mr. Richardson. The meeting was called for what pur- 
pose ? 

Captain Safford. The meeting was called of all of the section heads 
to discuss the attack on Pearl Harbor and the whispering campaign 
against Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch which was then getting 
into full swing. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, we are concentrating here at this moment 
on the 14-part message. 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. May I finish my statement? 

Mr. Richardson. Will you bring your testimony to that point ? 

Captain Safford. The discussion in that meeting was that all sec- 
tion heads were asked to tell all the people not to talk, there was too 
much loose talk going around, that there would undoubtedly be an 
investigation later and that anybody who had anything to say would 
be called before that investigation and permitted to say all they had 
to say, if they had anything to say, and if we had written out any- 
thing to destroy it immediatelj^ I considered it a perfectly logical 
order from my superior. 

Mr. Richardson. Who gave you the order that you were to destroy 
anything, name these people? 

Captain Safford. It was either Admiral Noyes or Captain Red- 
mond, the director or assistant director, on the instructions of Admiral 
Stark. 



3566 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[969 J] Mr, KiCHARDSON. Was it in writing? 

Captain Safford. It was not in writing. 

Mr. Richardson. Who told it to you ? 

Captain Safford. Whichever officer presided at this conference and 
I cannot remember which one they sent. 

Mr. Richardson. It was an oral direction? 

Captain Safford. It was an oral direction. 

Mr. Richardson. Given to you by either Noyes or Redmond ? 

Captain Safford. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. What did they say ? 

Captain Safford. I have said it once before. 

Mr. Richardson. Say it again. 

Captain Safford. We had standing orders not to talk, not to spread 
the gossip against Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, to keep any- 
thing we had to ourselves until we were called to a witness stand to 
testify officially and if we had anything in writing to destroy it im- 
mediately and pass that word on to our subordinates, and I carried 
out that order. 

Mr. Richardson. What was meant by "anything in writing" ? What 
did you understand it to mean ? 

Captain Safford. I presumed it to mean notes or any other kind 
of records which he had in writing. 

Mr. Richardson. About what? 

[9692] Captain Safford. About the circumstances leading up 
to the attack upon Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, you understood that it became your 
duty to go to your office, accumulate all of the files of your office that 
had to do with the events leading up to Pearl Harbor, and destroy 
them? 

Captain Safford. No, sir; only notes which we had made ourselves. 

Mr. Richardson. Oh. Was there any reason given why those 
should be destroyed? 

Captain Safford. Yes; that this was an emergency situation, we 
had just suffered a terrible defeat, the morale was low, that all kinds 
of rumors were going out from the Navy Department and we had to 
put a stop to this whispering campaign. It seemed perfectly logical 
at the time. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, how would you stop the whispering cam- 
paign by destroying the notes you made as to the facts? 

Captain Safford. At that time I did not question my orders any 
more than Admiral Wilkinson questioned his verbal orders. We car- 
ried them out. 

Mr. Richardson. What did you destroy yourself? 

Captain Safford. I destroyed considerable notes concerning state- 
ments given to me by Lieutenant Linn and Lieutenant Commander 
Kramer and other people who were intimately asso- [9693] 
ciated with them. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, let us get this straight. Before you 
left on Saturday at 4 : 30 the first part of the 14-part message was 
coming in, was it not? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And you did not have any notes with you about 
anything informative with reference to the parts of that message 
that had come in, did you ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3567 

Captain Safford. The 14-pai't message is only one small part of 
the whole affair. 

Mr. Richardson. That may be and yon may be very anxious to get 
on to the otlier points, but what I am driving at now is to give the 
connnittee all of the facts we can find out about the 14-part message. 

Now, you say that when you came back on Monday you got a report 
with reference to the 14-part message? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. What was that report ? Give us the details of it. 

Captain Safford. Well, I 

Mr. Keefe. May we find out whether that report was in writing, 
Mr. Chairman? I understood the captain to say that he destroyed, 
tliat he instructed his heads, tliat as a result of calling his heads in, he 
instructed them to make 1^594] sure that they make out a re- 
port in writing and sign it. 

Captain Safford. No, sir. Those w^ere verbal reports to me. I 
was going to make up a consolidated report which everybody would 
sign when we had all of the facts straightened out. 

Mr. Keefe. And those that were in opposition to that, that were 
dissatisfied with that report? 

Captain Safford. They could make out their own report if they 
thought that were incorrect as to the facts. 

Mr. Keefe. May I ask counsel, Avas such a report as that actually 
made up in writing and signed by him and the other persons involved? 

Mr. -Richardson. Let us get first things first. 

When you went back on Monday to your ofhce and met with your 
associates and subordinates was there any discussion there before any 
report was made up ? Was there any discussion there as to wdiat had 
happened with respect to the 14-part message? 

Captain Safford. There were many discussions. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, tell us what that discussion was, what was 
it about, if anything? 

Captain Safford. Linn told me that the fourteenth part did not 
come in before midnight. He liad waited up beyond midnight and 
it had not come in until the next morning. We \0S95~\ found 
out from tlie records of the people on watch that it had come in around 
5 a. m. on Sunday morning and had been sent over to the Army 
for translation and there was a little doubt as to just what time the 
Army had sent the translatiton back. 
Commander Kramer 

Mr. Richardson. Was there anything said about what had been 
done with the 18 parts? 

Captain Safford. Lieutenant Linn said that his work on the 13 
parts had been completed about 7 p. m. and after that it was Kramer's 
resj^onsibility to straighten the message out and get it typed. 

Kramer told me that he left the Navy Department about 9 p. m.; 
that he first telephoned to Admiral Stark at his residence in the 
Observatory Circle and found that he was not at home. Then he 
telephoned to Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of Naval Intelligence, 
and requested instructions. 

Admiral Wilkinson ordered him to leave a copy at the White House 
with the President, explaining its urgency and then to come out to Ad- 
miral Wilkinson's residence and report to him with the other copies. 



3568 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Kramer carried those orders out. Kramer told me he did not see 
the President because the President was having a dinner party and 
entertaining some high-ranking British official, who I think has 
turned out to be Vice Admiral [9596] French. 

Kramer left the copj^ of that with the President's aide, out in the 
code room, and told him to get word to the President that this was 
very urgent, and he was to interrupt his dinner party and let him 
see it as soon as possible. 

Senator Lucas. 'VVliat night was this, now? 

Captain Safford. This is the night of Saturday, December 6, 
1941. 

I believe that Kramer — Kramer told me a lot of things at that 
time which are rather dim in my memory, having lost the notes. I 
believe that on the wa}^ to Admiral Wilkinson's residence he stopped 
at the Wardman Park and gave a copy to Secretary Hull and dis- 
cussed the matter at length with the Secretary. I know that he saw 
the Secretary that night and then took the copy to Admiral Wilkin- 
son's residence. Secretary Hull called up several people 

Mr. Keefe, You don't mean Secretary Hull ? 

Captain Safford. Secretary Knox, 

Mr. Murphy. He said "Hull" twice. 

Mr. Richardson. Let us get this straight. Was this delivered at 
the Wardman Park or to Secretary Knox? 

Captain Safford. It was Secretary Knox, and Secretary Knox 
called up Secretary Hull and other people and discussed the rnessage 
with him. In the meantime, Secretary Hull had [96971 re- 
ceived his copy 

Mr. Richardson. Go on. 

Captain Safford. (Continuing). From the Army, and an appoint- 
ment was made the nest morning for Secretary Knox, Secretary Hull, 
and Secretary Stimson to meet in Secretary Hull's office at 10 o'clock 
and Kramer and Colonel Bratton were requested to be there also. 

Then Kramer went to Admiral Wilkinson's house, gave him the 
messages; he had given him the substance of the message over the 
telephone. 

Mr. Keefe. May I interrupt you a moment ? AVhat you are telling 
now is what you claim Kramer told you on Monday ? 

Captain Safford. Kramer told me on Monday the best I can re- 
member it. 

Mr. Richardson. Go ahead. Captain. 

Captain Safford. So they got it, and I specifically asked him, I 
asked him about Admiral Stark, and he said Admiral Stark did not 
receive it but that he was told about it Saturday night and gave 
orders which he received through Admiral Wilkinson — I think he was 
a captain at that particular time — to deliver the written message to 
Admiral Stark's office the following morning, Sunday, at 9 a. m., which 
he did. 

Mr. Richardson. Anything said about General Marshall? 

[9698] Captain Safford. I asked him about the Army and the 
only thing he said that he knew about the Army was that they had 
been given their copies at 9 p. m. and that Colonel Bratton had gotten 
a copy to Secretary Hull. He knew nothing about the rest of the 
Army delivery. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3569 

Mr. EiCHARDsoN. All right. Go right ahead and give us all that 
3'ou can recall, Captain. 

CajDtain Safford. He had made personal delivery to the Assistant 
Chief of Naval Operations, who was Rear Admiral Ingersoll. He 
had also given a copy to the Director of War Plans, who was Rear 
Admiral Turner. 

Kramer remained at Admiral Wilkinson's until about midnight, 
and then when he went home he stopped by the Navy Department to 
see if the fourteenth part had come in there, to find out if it had been, 
and he told the man on watch to give him a call if anything happened 
and that he would be down the next morning early because he had 
to make this 9 o'clock appointment at Admiral Stark's office with the 
thirteen parts of the message. 

I believe that some time during the evening that Kramer had 
phoned Captain McCollum, but Captain McCollum lived way out in 
Virginia and did not see the message until the next morning when he 
came into his own office. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, do you recall any other facts which 
[9599] were reported to you when you got back to your office on 
Monday? I am only asking you to tell us what you can remember. 

Captain Safford. Yes.' 

Mr. Richardson. I am not blaming you for not remembering, but 
is that all you can remember ? 

Captain Safford. That is, in regard to the 14-part message. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Mr. Chairman 

Mr. Murphy. May I interrupt, counsel? He said that after he 
wa.s told to destroy the papers that he went and gave orders to those 
under him. I would like to know whom he gave orders to to destroy 
papers, the names. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, that is later in the week. 

Mr. Richardson. Let me ask the chairman this : This is the testi- 
mony by this witness with reference to the 14-part message. Is it the 
desire of the committee to interrogate now individually on that ex- 
amination of the witness as to the 14-part message, or is it the desire 
of the committee to have me now turn from the 14-part message to the 
question of the winds message? 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I have a request to make. Here is 
{I witness who has told us that he went out and carried out orders to 
destroy papers and that he ordered those under his jurisdiction to 
destroy them and I think that is one of the most [9600] im- 
))ortant things before us, and I suggest that we proceed to it im- 
mediately. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I move that the counsel proceed 
with the whole examination of this witness on eveiy point that there 
is, and then when the committee gets to examining him it will be an 
over-all coverage, just like we have done with every other witness. 

The Vice Chairman. I a mreally inclined to think that would be 
the better course. In other words, counsel, you conduct the examina- 
tion of this witness as you have on the others. 

Mr. Richardson. Until I am through. 

The Vice Chairman. Until you get through, and then the com- 
mittee will inquire. 



3570 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Richardson, Noav, go right ahead, Captain, if you think of 
anything that you have overlooked. 

Captain Safford. I asked him if he was certain that the 

Mr. Richardson. You asked whom? 

Captain Safford. Kramer: if he thought that the President had 
seen it that night, and he said he thought he did, that 

The Vice Chairman. Repeat that. Captain. I am sorry, I did not 
hear it. 

Captain Safford. Kramer said he thought that the President had 
seen it that night; that the naval aide to the Presi- [9601] 
dent. Admiral Beardall, was a dinner guest at Admiral Wilkinson's 
and that he had phoned in at the White House and that the aide 
had informed him that the President had seen those 13 parts, and 
the President then had expressed the desire to do everything possible 
t oget the fourteenth part to him as soon as it came in. 

Mr. Richardson. Can you think of anything else now? 

Captain Safford. Not on the 14 parts. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, Captain, a few moments ago 
you referred to a meeting later in the week at which some instruc- 
tions were given with respect to a whispering campaign and about 
destruction of notes. When did that take place? 

Captain Safford. It was jjrobably a Thursday or Friday follow- 
ing the 7th of December. 

Mr. Richardson. And in whose office? 

Captain Safford. It was in the office of the Director of Naval 
Communications. 

Mr. Richardson. That would be Wilkinson ? 

Captain Safford. That would be Admiral Noyes' office. 

Mr. Richardson. And who w-ere present? 

Captain Safford. All the section heads who were on duty at that 
time and who were present in the building that day. 

Mr. Richardson. And as far as you can remember them give me 
the names. Who presided? 

[9602] Captain Safford. Admiral Noyes presided at the meet- 
ing. Then he was called away 

Mr. Richardson. Who was Admiral Noyes? 

Captain Safford. He was the Director of Naval Communications. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. Go ahead, now. 

Captain Safford. He was called away some time before the con- 
ference broke up and Captain Redmond, the Assistant Director of 
Naval Communications, took on in his place. 

This word was given us, came down in the name of the Chief of 
Naval Operations. It seemed a perfectly logical and reasonable order. 
We were in an emergency situation and there was panic running 
through the Navy Department at that particular time and there 
were desperate measures used, it seemed, to get the situation in hand. 

Mr. Murphy. I suggest to counsel, he says it came down in the 
name of the Chief of Naval Operations. Was it wa-itten ? 

Mr. Richardson. How did it come down, orally or in writing? 

Captain Safford. It came down orally. I presumed there had been 
an earlier conference in Admiral Stark's office. 

Mr. Richardson. And who purported to convey the information 
in the first instance, what person? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3571 

1960S] Captain Safford. The Director of Naval Communica- 
tions. 

Mr. KiCHARDSON. Who was that? 

Captain Safford. Rear Admiral Noyes. 

Mr. Richardson. Just what did he say as near as you can recall 
it ? How did he phrase what he had to tell you ? Give me your best 
recollection, that is all I want, Captain. 

Captain Safford. He started off that there were altogether too 
many rumors running around the Navy Department and people 
running to the newspapers telling them, they were getting in the 
newspapers and on the radio, they were saying all manner of things 
against Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch which were not true, 
that we liad to put a stop to that ; that we would have to stop these 
rumors ourselves, if we knew anything let it die with us, pass that 
word to our subordinates; we have got to stop this thing and not 
originate any rumors ourselves or any suspicion or anything. 

He said if anybody wanted to talk they would be given all the 
opportunity to talk that they wanted because there would be an official 
investigation held, and w^e could appear on the witness stand under 
oath and be responsible for what we said. 

He said : 

Furthermore, if you have got any notes or anything in writing, destroy them 
because somebody might see them and start something which you don't intend. 

[9604] It seemed a perfectly logical and fair order at the time. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, you had present, according to the rec- 
ord, yourself and Admiral Noyes and Captain Redmond. Can you 
think of anyone else who was there ? 

Captain Safford. I am not certain what ranks they hold now. 
They were all captains at the time. 

Captain Patterson I believe was there; Capt. F. O. Willenbucher. 
I could probably get a list of the other section heads on duty at the 
time. I cannot remember them all from memory. 

Mr. Murphy. Will you give us your present recollection? 

The Vice Chairman. Give us your present recollection of all who 
were present. Give them slowly and if there is any doubt about the 
spelling of the name give the spelling of the name to the reporter. 

Senator Lucas. And also what department they were the head of. 

Mr. Murphy. If you know. 

Senator Lucas. If you know. 

Mr. Murphy. We have already, I think, the names of Noyes, Red- 
mond, Patterson, Willenbucher, and yourself. 

Captain Safford. I could not give any more names at the present 
time without a chance to refresh my memory, without guessing. I did 
not expect to make this statement, I did [960S] not expect this 
matter to come up at all. I am totally unprepared to answer that 
question any further, 

Mr. Richardson. Were you given any direction to destroy any files 
or oflicial records? 

Captain Safford. We were not given any instructions to destroy 
files or any official records. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, did you destroy any notes as a result of that 
direction ? 

79716— 46— pt. 8 14 



3572 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Safford. I destroyed all the notes I had prepared. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you destroy any note that had reference to 
the 14-part message ? 

Captain Safford. Only such notes as I had made concerning the time 
of delivery, yes, I did. 

Mr. Richardson. And those were the notes you had made when 
Kramer reported to you? 

Captain Safford. When Kramer reported to me. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, we have spoken of the fourteenth part mes- 
sage. There was a part of that message that contained the equivalent 
of 1 o'clock p. m. Was that a part of the fourteenth part? 

Captain Safford. No ; that was a separate message, No. 907. 

Mr. Richardson. Did it come in in the same sort of a code 
[9606] that the other message did ? 

Captain Safford. It came in the same sort of a code exactly except 
that it was in Japanese and had to be translated. 

Mr. Murphy. May I inquire, counsel? Will you have him give the 
names of the people that he gave orders to to destroy it? I think that 
is important. 

Mr, Richardson. Did you give any specific orders yourself, based 
upon what Admiral Noyes said, to any other persons with reference to 
the destruction of any of their notes ? 

Captain Safford. I passed these orders down to my immediate 
subordinates whom I can name. 

Mr. Murphy. Can or cannot? 

Captain Safford. I can. 

Mr. Murphy. Will you name them, please, the ones that you gave 
orders to to destroy notes? 

Captain Safford. Captain G. W. Welker, OP 20-GX. That was 
his official designation. Captain L. W. Parke, OP 20-GY. Captain 
A. D. Kramer, OP 20-GZ. These were the people it directly applied 
to. 

Mr. Murphy. How about Linn ? 

Captain Safford. I probably also told Linn the same thing, al- 
though Linn came under Parke, and we would have depended upon 
Parke to do it. 

[9607] Mr. Murphy. How about Brotherhood? 

Captain Safford. Brotherhood was only one of the watch officers 
who came in there under Linn. I did not give it to the watch officers 
individually, with the possible exception of Linn, who was the senior 
watch officer. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to object, but it seems 
to me that there is quite a radical departure from the usual practice 
of the committee. I thought it was understood that counsel was to 
examine the witness, and when he is through each individual member 
of the committee would have a right to go into any matter that he 
wanted to. I do not want to interrupt the witness or the counsel dur- 
ing his examination. 

Mr. R'cHARDSON. I will say this, Mr. Chairman, that I rather wel- 
come Mr. Murphy's suggestions. I have no objection. 

The Chairman. Well, the Chair will say that the point made by 
Congressman Keefe is well taken, although the members have, since 
the beginning of the hearing, violated it by interjecting questions dur- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3573 

ing the interrogation of counsel and other members of the committee, 
but the Chair thinks it ought to be observed. If the witness makes a 
statement that any member of the conunittee does not understand or 
gives some name that is indistinct the member has a right, of course, 
to chirify that, but the Chair thinks that counsel and mem- [960S] 
bers of the committee when they are interrogating a witness should 
be permitted to do so witliout interruption. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, you stated that the socalled 1 
o'clock section of the message came in in a separate message in 
Japanese. 

Captain Saptord. In Japanese. 

Mr. Richardson. That was different from the way the first 14 parts 
came in ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, because they were in English. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, do you know, or was it reported to you how 
long after the 14th part came in that the 1 o'clock message came in? 

Captain Sajtord. The two parts came in about half an hour or an 
hour apart, maybe closer. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, what was your information that you 
got on Monday as to when the 1 o'clock message came in and was ready 
for delivery on Sunday? 

Captain Safford. It was ready for delivery some time Sunday 
morning. 

Mr. Richardson. You cannot be more definite than that ? 

Captain Safford. I cannot be more definite from my memory. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, is it your distinct recollection. Captain, that 
Lieutenant Commander Kramer told you that this 13- [9609] 
part message, the arrival of the lo-part message had been telephoned 
to Admiral Stark on Saturday night? 

Captain Safford. That was his report to me ; it is my recollection 
that it was his report to me at the time. I asked him about that par- 
ticularly because everybody else in authority had received a written 
copy in person and Admiral Stark had not and I particularly asked 
him about that, "Did Admiral Stark get it?" and he said, "Yes." He 
assured me that Admiral Stark knew about that message. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you know whether any part of the 13-part 
message as such had been sent to Hawaii? I am speaking of the 13 
parts now. 

Captain Safford. I know that none of that was ever sent to Hawaii. 
I did not know that Monday morning, I will add. 

[9610] Mr. Richardson. From your experience in that office, 
did you regard the 13-part section of the whole message as important ? 

Captain Safford. I regarded the first 13 parts just as important as 
the 14th part. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there anything about the first 13 parts that 
was unusual ? 

Captain Safford. The Japanese, for the first time in the whole 
series of negotiations, became very abusive in their language in an 
official note to be presented to the United States Government. 

Mr. Richardson. And what conclusion did you draw or would you 
draw, in view of your experience, with those messages, from the tone 
of those first 13 parts ? 

Captain Safford. That they were breaking off diplomatic relations 
with the presentation of that note, and this was particularly in view 



3574 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of the instructions which they had given in the pilot message about 
its presentation and holding its presentation uiitil they were told 
to do it. 

Mr. Murphy. What was that last? 

Captain Safford. Holding the presentation until they were told to 
present it. 

Mr. Richardson. That made you intensely interested, did it not, in 
the 14th part that was coming ? 

[9611] Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Then will you explain to me why it was that you 
made no inquiry about the lith part of the message until you got 
to your office on Monday? Why did not you call up Sunday morn- 
ing the first thing and find out about the 14th part? Have you 
any explanation for that ? 

Captain Safford. I have an explanation that is perfectly logical 
in my own mind. 

Mr. Richardson. Give it to me. 

Captain Safford. I stayed out late Saturday night. I was eating 
breakfast in my pajamas and bathrobe when I received a telephone 
call from the watch officer that the Japanese had attacked Hawaii. 
I realized there had been a slip and a bad slip high up in the Navy 
Department. 

Senator Lucas. What was that last? 

Captain Safford. That there was a slip in the Navy Department, 
high up. I told the watch officer I would be on call, I would not leave 
my house, but if my presence was needed in the Navy Department I 
would go down, but I would not go down unless called for. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you make any reference at all to the 14th 
part of the message ? 

Captain SAFif'ORD. I did not make any reference to the 14th part to 
him that I can recall. 

[9612'] Mr. Richardson. Before you left at 4 : 30, Captain, did 
you read and understand the character of the parts of the 14-part 
message that had come in up to the time you left ? 

Captain Safford. Enough to realize that it was the 14th part of it 
that they were talking about. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you read it far enough to conclude that there 
was anything unusual about it? 

Captain Safford. To conclude that it was particularly hot, and it 
was probably the last message we would ever receive fromx the Jap- 
anese. 

Mr. Richardson. Would you say you read enough of it to arouse 
your curiosity as to what the rest of it would be? 

Captain Safford. Not curiosity. It gave me a sample of what the 
rest of it would be. 

Mr. Richardson. At any rate, whatever you knew about it, when 
you left your office at 4 : 30 you did not thereafter make any inquiry 
with reference to it until you came to your office on Monday? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Your office was then on a 24-hour basis ? 

Captan Safford. My office was on a 24-hour basis since the first of 
February, 1941. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3575 

Mr. KicHARDSON. Then there were in your office persons to whom 
you could have telephoned on Sunday morning and gotten [9613'] 
the particulars of whatever had happened to the 14th part message'^ 

Captain Saftord. That is correct. 
" Mr. Richardson. Did you receive any telephone from anybody until 
you got the telephone about the attack ? 

Captain Satford. Not that I can definitely recall. I usually got 
three or four telephone calls at night and one more or less telephone 
call made no impression on me whatsoever. I imagine I was called 
and told what they had delivered and I promptly forgot about it. 
I cannot say I recall receiving any calls until I received the call that 
the attack was on. 

Mr. Richardson. You are quite sure that there was no telephone 
to you that had any reference specifically to this so-called fourteenth 
part message? 

Captain Safford. I can recall nothing about the fourteenth part 
specifically. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there anything said about the 14-part mes- 
sage in this conference that you had later in the week that you testi- 
fied to? 

Captain Safford. There was no mention of the 14-part message 
whatsoever. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you talk to anybody else about the 14-part 
message after you talked with Kramer on Monday when you got 
back and got his report ? 

[9614] Captain Safford. I asked Kramer if a warning message 
had been sent out and he said he thought of course it had been, but 
that would be for his superior officers and he did not know. 

Mr. Richardson. How far did you live from your office ? 

Captain Safford. About 2 miles. 

Mr, Richardson. Have you anything further, Captain, that you 
would like to tell the committee with reference to the 14-part message, 
or the 14th part, or the 1 : 00 o'clock end of it, or the pilot message ? 
Is there anything further you would like to tell the committee ? 

Captain Safford. In checking up on the message afterwards we 
discovered that Tokyo filed the first 13 parts as separate messages a 
few minutes apart over a span of about 3 or 4 hours, apparently, to 
finish encoding it. Then they delayed about 12 hours before they filed 
the 14th part. We received the messages, or the parts of it in approxi- 
mately the same order and the same span of time in which filed. Our 
people had thought for a long time that they had missed the 14th part, 
or for some reason we failed to intercept it, and they put in some very 
worried hours, the men who watched it, and they were very relieved 
themselves when the fourteenth part came in and they knew their 
job was done. 

Mr. Richardson. How long was it from the time that [9616] 

they reported to you that the first part came in until the fourteenth 
part showed up ? 

Captain Safford. It was roughly 12 hours. 

Mr. Richardson. Now was there anyone else at this meeting later 
in the week, when there was this admonition from Admiral Noyes,. 
was there anyone else there from your immediate section but you ? 



3576 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Safford. I was the only one from my immediate section. 

Mr. RicPiARDSOisr. Wliat time of day was that meetins:? 

Captain Safford. In the morning, I would say around 10 : 00 o'clock, 
10: 00 or 10: 30. 

Mr. RicirARDSON. How long did it last? 

Captain Safford. About 15 minutes. 

Mr. Richardson. When you left it did you go right back to your 
section ? 

Captain Safford. I went right back to my section, called my section 
heads in, and passed the news to them. 

Mr. Richardson. Orally? 

Captain Safford. Orally ; nothing in writing. 

Mr. Richardson. And told them just what Noyes told you? 

Captain Safford. Just what I had been told, and if they had any 
notes about the thing, to get rid of them. There was nothing said 
about destruction of official papers. 

[9616] Mr. Richardson. Can you tell us a little more in detail 
as to what you said? Is your recollection keen enough to tell us just 
what you said to your men ? 

Captain Safford. As well as I could, I passed on to them the exact 
words that had been eriven to me. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there any discussion of that? 

Captain Safford. There was no discussion. It seemed the correct 
thing to do under the circumstances. 

Mr. Richardson, You had no idea, did you, Captain, that you were 
being asked to do anything that was improper or surreptitious? 

Captain Safford. Absolutely not, or I would not have done it. 

Mr. Richardson. You have no sense of embarrassment or shame for 
transmitting the report to your division heads ? 

Captain Safford. None at all. 

Mr. Richardson. Now when this message would come in. as you 
testified it did. would it be taken by one man or would several people 
cooperate in receiving it? 

Captain Safford. I did not quite understand the question. 

Mr. Richardson. You had how many watch officers on duty ? 

Captain Safford. We had two men on watch, an officer and chief 
petty officer on a particular system. We had [9617'} four of 
each on the watch list, and each one stood 8 hours on and 16 off. 

Mr. Richardson. Would such a message, when it came in, be handled 
by one man or more than one man ? 

Captain Safford. By two men together, 

Mr. Richardson, It would take two men to handle this 14-part 
message as it came in ? 

Captain Safford, The 14-part message, in order to save time we 
called the Army in and they ran off part of it on their machine in the 
Munitions Building, and part of it was run on our machine in the Navy 
Building. 

Mr. Richardson. How long after the pilot message came in did you 
ask the Army for help ? 

Captain Safford. We did not ask the Army for help until about 
3 : 00 p. m. when the rest of the 14-part message came in and decided 
with what we had it was more than we could handle. 

Mr. Richardson. Then you wanted help ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3577 

Captain Safford. Then we wanted help. 

Mr. Richardson. And you called on the Army ? 

Captain Safford. We called on the Army- 
Mr. Richardson. Now who called on the Army ? Did you ? 

Captain Safford. Commander Kramer called the Army and got in 
touch with some officer over there and he called [9618] some of 
his people. 

INIr. Richardson. Would they come to your office ? 

Captain Safford. They worked in their own office on their own 
machine. 

Mr. Richardson. And then when all the work was done it was 
brought together as a complete job? 

Captain Safford. It was brought together as a complete job. 

ISIr. Richardson. What did you mean by your reference a few 
moments ago of having it translated by the Army ? 

Captain Safford. That was the 1 : 00 p. m. message. It is in Japa- 
nese and we did not have a Japanese-speaking officer on watch, so we 
had to send it over to the Army where they arranged for that Sunday, 
they would handle any transmission, because Kramer had all these 
appoinments with Admiral Stark and with Secretary Knox. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you speak Japanese? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Kramer does, does he not ? 

Captain Safford. Kramer does. 

]Mr. Richardson. Have you anything further now that you would 
like to tell us that has any reference to the 14-part message, or any 
part of it ? 

Captain Safford. I would like to say this, that calling [9619] 
extra men in the Navy would not have speeded up any work because 
we only had one machine and could only run one thing at a time. We 
had to call the Army people, to use their machine over in their own 
office. 

Furthermore, the 6th was supposed to be the Army's day of respon- 
sibility, and the only reason we were handling this message was 
because M^e were standing a 24-hour watch, week-ends and everything 
else, and that is the reason for breaking the normal day's duty that was 
carried on up until this time. I think they went on a 24-hour basis at 
6 p. m. on Saturday, December 6, 1941. 

Mr. Richardson. How long have you known Commander Kramer? 

Captain Safford. He had served under me 2 years, I believe. 

]^Ir. Richardson. I now want to ask you some questions. Captain, 
about what is known as the winds code. 

How many times, in how many different investigations of this 
Pearl Harbor matter, have you testified? 

Captain Safford. I have testified four times. 

Mr. Richardson. In which hearings? 

Captain Safford. I testified before Admiral Hart, before the Navy 
Court of Inquiry, before the Army Board of Investigation, before 
Admiral Hewitt, but I was not permitted [9620] to testify 
before the Roberts Commission. 

' Mr. Richardson. And in each of those examinations you testified 
in considerable detail to the various particulars in connection with 
what we call the winds code and winds code execute ? 



3578 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATIACK 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And when you were called, you knew you were 
going to be a witness here, yon prepared a written statement as in- 
dicating what you wished to present to the committee on the winds 
code? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson, And would you like to read! that in presentation 
to the committee at this time? 

Captain Safford. I would. 

Mr. Richardson. With the committee's permission I would ask 
him to read it. 

The Chairman. Without objection, it will be read. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, in order to save time, I believe 
every member of the committee has read the statement, and I was 
just wondering whether or not counsel could proceed to examine 
him on it and let the statement go in the record at this time? 

I do not care to read it again. I would rather have counsel get 
through with his examination. 

[962J] Mr. Keefe. I would like to hear the witness read this 
statement. 

The Chahiman. All right. Proceed to read it. 

Mr. Keefe. I have read it carefully, but I would like to have him 
read it. 

The Chairman. Go ahead and read it. 

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart. 

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I forgot to bring my copy over. 
Is there an extra copy ? 

Senator Lucas. I would like to have a copy too, as long as he is 
going to read it. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, before the starting of the reading 
of this statement, I would like to say I think Captain Safford has 
put parts in this statement that reveal certain mechanics which 
should not be revealed. I think the captain knows where they are. 
However, the statement has been given out so the press and every- 
body else has it. I will call attention to that when you come to it, 

Mr, Keefe. Everything is revealed in the letters of Dewey and 
Marshall, 

The Chahiman, We will not go into the Dewey and Marshall let- 
ters. Everything that has been produced before this committee has 
been produced without any deletion or [9622] any exceptions 
to it, and we will make no exception in this case. You will read the 
entire statement. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, as one member of the eommittee when 
we come to that part, I would just like to enter my protest. 

The Chairman. All right. It will be entered. Enter it now. 

Mr. Murphy, I do not want to single it out now, but I have it 
marked. 

The Chahiman. Will you go ahead, Captain? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. The statement regarding the winds 
message will start with — 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3579 

PREVIEW 

There was a Winds Message. It meant War — and we knew it 
meant War. By tlie best estimate that can be made from my recol- 
lection and the circumstantial evidence now available, the "Winds 
Message" was part of a Japanese Overseas "News" Broadcast from 
Station JAP (Tokyo) on 11980 kilocycles beginning at 1330 Green- 
wich Civil Time on Thursday, December 4, 1941. This time cor- 
responded to 10 : 30 p. m. Tokyo time and 8 : 30 a. m, Washington time, 
December 4, 1941. The broadcast was probably in Japanese Morse 
code, and was originally written in the Kata-Kana form of written, 
plain-language Japanese. It was intercepted by the U. S. [962S] 
Navy at the big radio receiving station at Cheltenham, Maryland, 
which serves the Navy Department. It was recorded on a special type- 
writer, developed by the Navy, which types the Koman-letter equiva'- 
lents of the Japanese characters. 

Mr. Murphy. That is the part I do not think should be in this 
statement, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman". We will note your objection to the reading of that 
at this point. 

Mr. Murphy. I just want to say I do not think the witness should 
go into the mechanics of how this thing was done. 

The Chairman. What is the will of the committee about it? 
Mr. Murphy. All the papers have been given copies. I just call 
attention to that fact, that it is improper to do it. 

The Chairman. Go ahead and read it. If the Chair is going to 
pass on it, he will hold that it will all be read without deletion. 
Mr. KJEEFE. Mr. Chairman ? 
The Chairman. Mr. Keef e. 

Mr. Keefe. May I interrupt at this time to ask the captain who 
is an officer in the United States Navy, and [96^4] who has 
carefully prepared this statement, who knows the limitations that 
have been placed upon him in statements heretofore made by the 
committee, whether or not there is anything in this statement that, 
in his judgment as an expert in this field, reveals anything that 
would be of value today to any potential or real enemy of the United 
States? ^ 

Captain Saffgrd. No, sir. I have gone over this whole statement 
with the legal representative of the Director of Naval Communica- 
tions. 

Mr. Keefe. And it has his approval ? 
Captain Safford. His qualified approval. 

Mr. Keefe. I mean as to the question raised by Congressman 
Murphy. 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 
The Chairman, Go ahead and read it. 

Captain Safford. And it has been given thorough weight by me. 
The Winds Message broadcast was forwarded to the Navy De- 
partment by TWX (teletypewriter exchange) from the teletj^pe- 
transmitter in the "Intercept" receiving room at Cheltenliam to 
"WA91," the page-printer located beside the GY Watch Officer's 
desk, in the Navy Department Communication Intelligence Unit 



3580 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

under my command. I saw the Winds Message [9625'\ typed 
in page form on yellow teletype paper, with the translation written 
below. I immediately forwardecl this message to my Commanding 
Officer (Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, USN), thus fully discharging 
my responsibility in the matter. 

PREPARATIONS FOR INTERCEPTION 

There are various sources of the so-called "Winds Code," two of 
which have already been introduced as evidence: Tokyo Circular 
2353 on page 154 of Exhibit Xo. 1 and Tokyo Circular 2354 on page 
155 of Exhibit No. 1. The most important source was Commander 
in Chief Asiatic Fleet secret dispatch 281430 of November 28, 1941, 
addressed for information to the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet 
and Commandant 14tli Naval District — thus letting them in on the 
secret. I had taken no action personally on the first tip-off (Tokyo 
Circular 2354), because I was still awaiting the instructions of 
higher authority. CINCAF 281430 together with Tokyo Circular 
2353 and other collateral intercept information apparently made an 
impression upon the Director of Naval Intelligence, for he immedi- 
ately sent word to me, through the Director of Naval Communica- 
tions, that he wished the Communication Intelligence Organization to 
make every attempt to intercept any message sent in accordance with 
the Winds Codes. It was a request from Admiral Wilkinson and 
an order from Admiral Noyes. 

[9626] I hastened to comply, with the secondary motive that 
it would be a feather in our cap if the Navy got it and our sister 
service didn't. 

Just about the time I received Admiral Wilkinson's request, I was 
shown Tokyo to Washington Serial 843, dated November 27, 1941, 
prescribing a "schedule of (Tokyo News) Broadcasts," which gave 
me something tangible to work with as well as giving added meaning 
to the Winds Code. The "November 29 deadline" indicated that the 
Winds Code might be used to notify overseas officials as to things 
which would "automatically begin to happen." Tokyo Circulars 
2353 and 2354 blueprinted what this action would be. Tokyo Serial 
843 implied that such notification would be made. After a confer- 
ence with my subordinates, I drafted a summary of Tokyo Serial 843 
(or had Kramer do it for me), had it coded in the COPEK system, 
and released it myself at 6 p. m. (Washington time) on November 
28, 1941. This secret message was transmitted "Priority" to the 
Commandants of the 14th and 16th Naval Districts for action, and 
to the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and Asiatic Fleet for in- 
formation, and may be identified as OPNAV 282301. This took care 
of our overseas Communication Intelligence Units; they now had 
all the available technical information on the subject. I know that 
they monitored the Tokyo Voice Broadcasts; I [9627] also 
know that Corregidor monitored the Tokyo Morse Broadcasts; in 
fact, Corregidor and Heeia went beyond their instructions and 
guarded the Tokyo Broadcasts 24 hours a day. Captain Rochefort 
and Commander Lietwiler can verify this. 

I discussed the situation with Commander Welker, in charge of the 
intercept and direction-finder stations, and with Chief Radioman 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3581 

Lewis, his technical assistant. Our prospects for interception looked 
somewhat dubious. We were not encouraged when a day or two 
later Washington and Rio objected to the new frequency assignments 
and Rome complained about the poor quality of the Tokyo Voice 
Broadcasts. 

I would like to digress long enough to invite the attention of the 
committee to the fact that OPNAV 282301 is not included in the 
"Basic Exhibit of Dispatches" (Exhibit No. 37), and that Tokyo 
Serial 843 ( JD-1 #6899 : SIS #25446) is not included in the "Inter- 
cepted Japanese Diplomatic Messages" (Exihibt No. 1). Three other 
relevant intercepts not appearing in Exhibit No. 1 are also of inter- 
est at this point, namely : Washington to Tokyo Serial 1197 of Novem- 
ber 27, 1941 (JD-1 #6908: SIS #25476), Rio to Tokyo Serial 482 of 
November 30, 1941 (JD-1 #6982: SIS 25571), Rome to Tokyo Serial 
768 of November 29, 1941 (JD-1 #6981 : SIS #25604). 

These 5 documents should be introduced as evidence for the purposes 
of record. 

[9628] Welker, Lewis and I agreed that 5160 kilcycles would 
probably come in nicely at Manila and at Pearl Harbor. Station JHL 
was of too low power to reach the greater distances to the continental 
United States. 9430 kilocycles appeared a bit high for a night fre- 
quency in winter, as far as the West Coast was concerned. There did 
not seem to be a remote possibility of the 11980 kilocycles and 12265 
kilocycles being heard by any station in the Pacific Ocean or along 
either shore at the time of day scheduled. 

Nevertheless, we decided to have Bainbridge Island monitor the 
Tokyo Morse Code Broadcasts on the chance that the times given in 
Tokyo Serial 843 might not be gi\en in Tokyo time or the schedules 
could be heard because of freak conditions. 

We did not order Bainbridge Island to monitor the Tokyo Voice 
Broadcasts because its two sound recorders were guarding the two 
ends of the Tokyo-San Francisco radio telephone circuit. Our esti- 
mates for Bainbridge Island were closely realized: Excellent receiv- 
ability at the wrong time of day and almost a complete "black-out" of 
reception on the higher frequencies during the period scheduled for 
the winds message broadcast. 

We agreed that the best chance of intercepting the listed schedules 
(other than those on 5160 kilocycles) was [9629] on the East 
Coast of the United States. During the winter months the East 
Coast had good reception of Tokyo during the few hours included in 
the schedules. Our best bet was Cheltenham, which had been guard- 
ing the MAM (Tokyo) Broadcasts to Japanese merchant vessels, so 
we had up-to-the-minute data on the receivability of Tokyo. 

According to my memory we decided to play safe and have all East 
Coast intercept stations monitor the Tokyo broadcasts. We agreed 
it would be impossible to hear voice broadcasts from Tokyo on the 
East Coast and therefore did not attempt it. We did not order 
Guam or Imperial Beach (California) to monitor any of the Tokj'o 
broadcast schedules. 

Commander Welker or I sent TWX messages directing the inter- 
cept stations at Bainbridge Island (Washington) and at Cheltenham 
(Maryland) to monitor the schedules given in Tokyo Serial 843 as 
first priority and to forward all plain-language Japanese intercepts 



3582 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

on these schedules to the Navy Department by teletype. We may 
have set these instructions to other stations also. We did not want 
English or coded messages — only written Japanese. We gave the 
same instructions to both stations, and sent them out immediately after 
releasing the previously mentioned OPNAV 282301. 

[9630] I have confirmation of the above orders plus knowledge of 
existing receiving conditions in the monthly reports from Cheltenham, 
Winter Harbor, and Bainbridge Island, extracts from which are quoted 
below : 

Station "M" (Cheltenham) — Operations — l^ovem'ber 1941 

Receiving conditions throughout the month were very good on all frequencies. 
Atmospheric disturbances have been at a minimum. Orders received from 
OP-20-GX at 2315 (GCT) November 28, via teletype to give highest priority to 
various broadcasts at designated Japanese broadcast stations. These schedules 
were covered and found to be press broadcasts sent in both Kana and English. 
Log sheets were forwarded to OP-20-GX daily with regular traffic files. 

Station "M" (Cheltenham) — Operations — December 19^1 

Receiving conditions during the month were fair to good on all frequencies. At 
2300, 7 December 1941, telephone orders received from OP-20-GX to drop the 
Tokyo JJC/MAM schedules and assignments ; continued watch for Orange activity. 

Station "W" (Winter Harbor) — Operations — December 19^1 

Receiving conditions in general. Daily attempts were made to intercept Tokyo 
and Osaka channels employed to Europe, but only on a few occasions was any 
intercept [9631] possible. 

Station "S" (Bainbridge Island) — Operations — November 19ffl 

During the month of November a sharp increase has been noticed in the amount 
of message traffic sent on the Kana General Information Broadcasts. Where 
before we seldom averaged more than one or two such messages monthly, it is now 
not unusual for two or three such messages to appear daily. These messages are 
sent in both number code and Kana. 

On 28 November, a directive was received by TWX from OP-20-GX which 
called for coverage of the following stations at times specified, with priority trans- 
mission of intercepted material by TWX. Times listed were given as PST. Be- 
cause the use of PST time designation is unusual, we asked for a verification, but 
were told that time zone was uncertain and verification was not possible. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I am wondering if the witness would 
tell us as he goes along what those symbols mean. 

Captain Saffokd. Yes. TWX was the teletype exchange you call 
the switchboard. They plug you in and charge you by the minute. 

PST is Pacific Standard Time. And GCT, Greenwich Civil 
[9632] Time. 

PST OCT 

0100 (0900) 

0130 (0930) 

O20O (1000) 

0300 (1100) 

O40O (1200) 

0500 (1300) 

0530 (1330) 

Since the time zone indicated was not certain, we were faced with 
the possibility that the time could be either GCT, PST, zone-9, or 
even a combination of these. As soon as the directive was received 
we started copying all broadcasts of this same type which were read- 
able at "S". We found that in some cases other stations were tied in 
with the stations listed in the original directive, and that although we 
could not copy the station listed we could copy the cornetted channel 
carrying the same broadcast. 



tation 


Frequency 


JVJ 


12275 


JUO 


9430 


JVJ 


12275 


JHL 


5160 


JHL 


5160 


JHL 


5160 


JHP 


11960 • 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3583 



The stations and times that we can copy are listed below. Time 
used is GCT. 



OCT 


Station 


Frequency 


Oornetted with 


0000 


JVJ 


12275 


J UP 


0030 


JUD 


15880 


JVJ/JAU2 


0100 


JUD 


15880 


JVJ 


[963S] GCT 


Station 


Frequency 


Oornetted with 


0130 


JVJ 


12275 




0200 


JVJ 


12275 




0230 


JVJ 


12275 


JUP/JUD 


0300 


JVJ 


12275 


JUD 


0330 


JVJ 


12275 


JUD 


0400 


JVJ 


12275 




0430 


JVJ 


12275 




0500 


JVJ 


12275 


JUD 


1300 


JHL 


5160 




2200 


JVJ 


12275 




2300 


JVJ 


12275 




2330 


JVJ 


12275 





The important thing is that with the exception of the 1300 sched- 
ule from station JHL on 5160 kilocycles there was a complete "black- 
out" for 16 or 18 hours where no broadcasts from Tokyo could be 
heard and the schedules on which we' expected the winds message 
came in the middle of this long period of "black-out". 

At my instructions, or at least with my concurrence, Commander 
Welker consulted with his opposite number in the War Department, 
Captain Schukraft, and ascertained that the Army was monitoring 
for the winds message at San Francisco, and possibly elsewhere, but 
vras not monitoring [9634] for the winds message anywhere 
on the East Coast of the United States. I do not know what sort of 
instructions the Army gave its intercept stations. I do not know why 
the Army failed to monitor for the winds message on the East Coast 
of the United States; Colonel Sadtler or Colonel Schukraft may 
remember. 

I believe that the above-mentioned conference was held before we 
issued instructions to our own intercept stations. 

The F. C. C. was requested by the War Department to monitor 
for the winds message on the Tokyo voice broadcasts and was given 
the code words of Tokyo Circular 2353 but without their meaning. 
The F. C. C. was not furnished the Tokyo broadcast schedules nor 
any mention of the fact that the winds message could come by 
Morse code. 

The F. C. C. was requested to monitor the winds message at its 
monitor station at Portland, Oregon, and also at one of its monitor- 
ing stations on the East Coast of the United States. The latter re- 
quest was not complied with because the F. C. C. doubted if voice 
broadcasts from Tokyo could be heard on the East Coast of the 
United States. The F. C. C. monitor station at Honolulu also moni- 
tored for the winds message, at the request of the local military 
authorities. 

The F. C. C. monitor station at Portland, Oregon, could [9635] 
not possibly have intercepted the same winds message that Chelten- 
ham did because Cheltenham was monitoring for Morse code, ex- 
clusively, and the F. C. C. station at Portland was monitoring for 
voice, exclusively. 



3584 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

In addition to the stations previously named, the winds message 
was monitored for at the following localities, to my personal 
knowledge : 

Heeia, T. H. (U. S. Navy) Voice only 

Corregidor, P. I. (U. S. Navy) Voice and Morse 

Singapore (British Intelligence) — ? — 

Australia (Australian Intelligence) — ? — 

Java (NEI Intelligence) — ? — 

Intercept stations in Canada, England, and China probably 
watched for it too. And, of course, the Japanese diplomatic and 
consular stations listened for the winds message themselves on their 
own receiving sets. 

On December 1, 1941, I was shown the translation of Tokyo 
Circular 2444 (Exhibit No. 1, page 209), advising that London, 
Hongkong, Singapore and Manila had been ordered to destroy their 
code machines, and instructing Washington to retain its machine 
regardless of other instructions. 

The significance of the winds message now became very clear to me 
and I began to take the matter most seriously. [9636] So did 
Colonel Sadtler, over in the War, Department. The only means by 
which Tokyo could announce its decisions of peace or war to its over- 
seas diplomatic representatives who had destroyed their regular codes 
was by means of the emergency winds code. This applied to London 
and the Far East but not to Washington'. Higher authority in the 
War and Navy Departments likewise took a greatly increased inter- 
est in the winds message, and began heckling me as to the possibility 
of having missed it. I instituted a daily check of the incoming tele- 
type messages to see that our intercept stations were doing as much 
as could be expected of them. 

One evening, about December 1, 1941, 1 drove out to Station "M" at 
Cheltenham, Maryland, and remained until about midnight. The 
primary purpose of my visit was to inspect the new landline tele- 
graph for direction-finder control which had been completed at Chel- 
tenham and the Navy Department, which was scheduled to be placed 
in service on December 1, 1941, but which had been delayed by instal- 
lation difficulties at some of the outlying stations. I made a personal 
check of the winds message watch and, as I recall, found that Chief 
Radioman Wigle was monitoring the Tokyo News Broadcasts 24 
hours a day and had assigned qualified Kana operators to this duty. 
I have further [9637] documentary proof that Cheltenham 
was monitoring the Tokyo broadcasts in the fact that between 1200 
and 1500 GCT, on December 6, 1941, Cheltenham intercepted and 
forwarded to the Navy Department Tokyo Serials 902-2 and 904, 
plus two other messages. This is entered in the GY log for December 
6, 1941 : Items Nos. 6609, 6610, 6618, and 6619. These messages were 
transmitted by Station JAH (Tokyo) to San Francisco on 7630 kilo- 
cycles. The Tokyo-San Francisco circuit was not a regular Chelten- 
ham assignment. 

I may summarize the preparations for interception by stating that 
the United States Navy listened for the winds message at Chelten- 
ham, Maryland, and did everything that it possibly could to inter- 
cept it elsewhere, and that the other services did all that they con- 
sidered reasonable. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3585 

INTERCEPTION 

There is no basis for assuming that the winds message had to be 
sent on a voice broadcast. In 1941, the Japanese Government was 
sending out "General Information Broadcasts" as well as "Domei 
News" to its diplomatic and consular officials in foreign lands. This 
was partly to give speedier service, partly to permit use of the Japanese 
Morse Code and the Kata-Kana form of written Japanese, and partly 
to be independent of foreign communication [9638] systems 
in emergency. 

Each office had its own Japanese radio operator and its own short- 
wave receiving set. We knew it. The United States Government 
was doing the same thing itself, with a Navy radio operator serving 
at each post. The German Government was doing likewise but was 
a bit ahead of us, with machine reception. We used to "sample" these 
broadcasts periodically until the F. C. C.'s Foreign Broadcast Intel- 
ligence Service came into existence and relieved the U. S. Navy of 
this duty. I wish to reiterate that neither Japan, the United States, 
nor Germany was dependent on voice broadcasts for direct communi- 
cation from the seat of government to overseas officials. 

The radio schedules listed in Tokyo Serial 843 were in Morse (i. e., 
dot-and-dash) code exclusively; either Japanese Morse, International 
Morse, or both. We expected that the winds message would be sent 
in Morse Code — and it was. If the winds message had been sent on 
a voice broadcast the U. S. Navy would have missed it, unless it came 
on a schedule receivable at Pearl Harbor or Corregidor. 

The original documents giving details of the interception of the 
winds message are not available. Therefore it is necessary to recon- 
struct the situation from circumstantial evidence and by process of 
elimination. Collateral [96391 information has been plotted 
or recorded on a single sheet, a reduced size photograph of which is 
appended. This graph tells the story better than words and shows 
just what actually happened. It should convince the most skeptical. 

As I have previously testified, the frequency, distances, and time of 
day were such that the winds message could be heard on the East 
Coasts of the United States and Canada, while it was a physical im- 
possibility for it to be heard (except under freak conditions) on the 
West Coast of the United States and Canada, Pearl Harbor, Manila, 
Java, and Singapore. Everything checks perfectly; there is no ele- 
ment of doubt as to conditions of radio wave propagation. 

The winds message could be heard also in the North Atlantic Ocean, 
British Isles, and Western Europe, but it could not be heard in Burma, 
Australia, or in Rio de Janeiro. It was sent on the so-called "European 
Schedule" of Tokyo's big foreign broadcasting station "J-A-P" and 
was intended for London. We knew that the Japanese Ambassador in 
London had destroyed his secret codes three days previously ; this was 
the only way that Tokyo could get news to him secretly. Reception 
or non-reception at other points was irrelevant. Tokyo knew full well, 
before the winds message was sent, that it probably would not be 
[ 964/)] received in Washington or in Rio. That was immaterial — 
the winds message was intended for London. 



3586 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

In the next sentence I would like to make a change. I would like 
to change the word "my" to "our", so that the sentence would read : 

[964-1] Our ability to intercept it was due partly to good luck, 
partly to our foresight, and partly to the high quality of the Navy 
operators and receiving apparatus at Cheltenham. 

The winds message broadcast was forwarded by teletype (TWX) 
from Cheltenham to the Navy Department (Op-20-GY) shortly be- 
fore 9 a. m. on December 4, 1941. Kramer distinctly recalls that the 
Winds Message was shown to him by the GY watch Officer after 8 : 30 
a. m. on that date. It was my recollection, as stated in previous 
testimony, that I had first seen the Winds Message a little after eight 
a. m. on December 4, 1941. The Winds Message broadcast was about 
200 wards long, with the code words prescribed in Tokyo Circular 2353 
appearing in the middle of the message, whereas we had expected to 
find the code words of Tokyo Circular 2354 in a Morse broadcast. All 
three "code words" were used, but the expression meaning "North 
Wind Cloudy" was in the negative form. 

When I first saw the Winds Message, it had already been translated 
by Lieutenant Commander Kramer, in charge of the Translation Sec- 
tion of the >Javy Department Communication Intelligence Unit. 
Kramer had underscored all three "code phrases" on the original in- 
coming teletype sheet. Below the printed message was written in pen- 
cil or colored [964^] crayon in Kramer's handwriting, the fol- 
lowing free translations : 

War with England (including NEI, etc.) 
War with the U. S. 
Peace with Russia. 

I am not sure of the order ; but it was the same as in the broadcast 
and I think England appeared first. I think Kramer used "U. S." 
rather than "United States." It is possible that the words "No war," 
instead of "Peace," were used to describe Japan's intentions with 
regards to Russia. 

"This is it !" said Kramer as he handed me the Winds Message. This 
was the broadcast we had strained every nerve to intercept. This was 
the feather in our cap. This was the tip-off which would prevent the 
U. S. Pacific Fleet being surprised at Pearl Harbor the way the 
Russians had been surprised at Port Arthur. This was what the Navy 
Communication Intelligence had been preparing for since its estab- 
lishment in 1924 — War with Japan/ 

DISTRIBUTION 

I immediately sent the original of the Winds Message up to the 
Director of Naval Communications (Rear Admiral Noyes) by one of 
the officers serving under me and told him to deliver this paper to 
Admiral Noyes in person, to track him down and not take "no" for an 
answer, and if he could [964^] not find him in a reasonable time 
to let me know. I did not explain the nature or significance of the 
Winds Message to this officer. In a few minutes I received a report 
to the effect that the message had been delivered. 

It is my recollection that Kramer and I knew at the time that 
Admiral Noyes had telephoned the substance of the Winds Message 
to the War Department, to the "Magic" distribution list in the Navy 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3587 

Department, and to the Naval Aide to the President. For that reason, 
no immediate distribution of the smooth translation of the Winds 
Message was made in the Navy Department. The six or seven copies 
for the Army were rushed over to the War Department as rapidly as 
possible : here the Navy's responsibility ended. The individual smooth 
translations for authorized Navy Department officials and the White 
House were distributed at noon on December 4, 1941, in accordance 
with standard operating procedure. I have no reason for believing 
that the Army failed to make a prompt distribution of its translations 
of the Winds Message. 

I am thoroughly satisfied in my own mind that Admiral Noyes 
telephoned to everyone on his list without delay ; I cannot bring myself 
to imagine otherwise. There is some question as to whether the Ad- 
miral was understood, but this only shows the unreliability of telephone 
messages. Any [9644] misunderstanding of what Admiral 
Noyes said was of negligible effect because written translations of the 
Winds Message were distributed within 2 or 3 hours of his telephone 
calls. In fact it was not until 1944 that any suggestion or criticism 
was offered that any official on the "Magic" distribution list — Navy, 
Army, State Department, or White House — had not been notified 
that the Winds Message had been received or that the Winds Message 
had been translated in any terms other than War and Peace. 

My final verification of the fact that the Winds Message transla- 
tion was typed and distributed lies in the fact that about December 
15, 1941, I saw a copy of it in the special folder of messages which 
were being assembled for Admiral Noyes to present to the Roberts 
Commission. I checked these over with Kramer for completeness as 
well as for the elimination of irrelevant material. Kramer told me 
in 1944 that he had shown Assistant Secretary Forrestal a special 
set of Pre-Pearl Harbor messages about December 10, 1941, when 
Secretary Knox was making his personal investigation at Pearl Har- 
bor, and that he discussed those messages with Mr. Forrestal for about 
two hours. This set of messages was apparently the basis and pos- 
ibly the identical file that was given Admiral Noyes and shown to 
the Roberts Commission via Admiral Wilkinson. This was the last 
time I [964'5] saw the Winds Message. I believe that the 
translation of the Winds Message was given the JD-1 Serial number 
of 7001, because this number is missing and unaccounted for, and 
comes within the range of messages translated on December 3 and 4, 
1941. 

The distribution of the Winds Message was the responsibility of 
Naval Intelligence and not Naval Communications. I had no respon- 
sibility in the matter after forwarding the original message to Admiral 
Noyes and after checking Kramer's "folder" to see that the messages 
were presented in a logical and understandable order. 

ACTION TAKEN AS A DIRECT RESULT OF THE WINDS MESSAGE 

About an hour after I had sent the original Winds Message up 
to Admiral Noyes, I received a call from him on the inter-phone to 
the effect that we ought to tell Guam to burn their excess codes and 
ciphers. I replied that I was in full agreement but there were other 
odds and ends to be taken care of, and that I would have some messages 
ready for his approval by noon. 

79716 — i6— pt. 8 15 



3588 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

As a direct result of the Winds Message and other contemporaneous 
information from intercepted Japanese messages, I prepared the 
following secret message : 

OPNAV 041754 (Priority) — Not vet introduced as evidence. 

OPNAV 042000 (Prioritv)— Not vet introduced as evidence. 

[9646] OPNAV 042017 (Deferred)— Page 44 of Exhibit No. 
37. 

OPNAV 042018 (Deferred) — Not yet introduced as evidence. 

OPNAV 042019 (Deferred) — Not yet introduced as evidence. 
I took four of these messages up to Admiral Noyes' office, cleared 
them through the Assistant Director of Naval Communications (Cap- 
tain Joseph R. Redman) and made an appointment to see the Admiral 
with his secretary, as per office instruction. I was called to his office 
shortly before 3 :00 p. m. 

OPNAV 041754 was a correction to a previous Priority message, 
and was sent in response to a Prioritv service message requesting veri- 
fication of the last four groups of OPNAV 040343 (page 43 of Exhibit 
No. 37). I released this message mj^self during the noon hour to save 
time. 

OPNAV Priority 042000 for action of CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 
16, C0M14. Guam and Samoa, made a "new Intelligence" cipher effec- 
tive immediately and directed the immediate destruction of the old 
cipher by Guam and Samoa. This message was released by Admiral 
Noyes himself, and is the most important of the five which were sent 
on this occasion because the precedence did give some idea of urgency. 
OPNAV Deferred 042017, for action of Guam and for information 
of CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 14 and COM 16 was sent in the new 
cipher made effective by OPNAV 042000. It [964,7] directed 
Guam to destroy excess cryptogi'aphic aids and other secret matter. 
This message was rewritten by Admiral Noyes and was released by 
Admiral Ingersoll. My original wording was much stronger than the 
message actually sent, because I had directed the destruction of every- 
thing except the system in which sent and the current edition of the 
Direction Finder Code. However, I was not trying to use this mes- 
sage as the vehicle for a war warning as I had the day before in 
OPNAV 031855 (page 41, Exhibit No. 37) . I was just trying to insure 
that Grum "stripped ship" before a Japanese Commando-raid from 
Saipan, 100 miles away, captured a complete allowance of codes and 
ciphers, a matter for which I was officially responsible. Admiral 
Noyee made no mention of a war warning when he directed me to 
prepare this message and I feel sure he did no have any such warning 
in mind when he toned down my original draft. This message had 
to be sent "for Information" to CINCPAC, and others, as notification 
that Guam's allowance of codes and ciphers was being reduced, and 
as a reminder to Guam to notify the addressees what systems would be 
available for its future communications. This message was sent 
DEFERRED to insure that OPNAV 042000 would arrive well in 
advance and thus avoid confusion and unnecessary messages at this 
critical time. 

[9648] ' OPNAV 042018 and OPNAV 042019 are not important 
except that they help establish the date the Winds Message was inter- 
cepted and the time and date that the unsent warning message, pre- 
pared by Commander McCollum, was seen by me. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3589 

EVALUATION OF THE WINDS MESSAGE 

Evaluation of the Winds Message was not based on JD-1 #6850 
and #6875 alone. CINCAF 281430 gave much stronger translations 
of Tokyo Circulars 2353 and 2354, which dispelled any doubt as to 
whether or not WAR was meant by the literal translation : 

Japan= (blank) relations are in danger. 

This message contained official British translation furnished by 
Singapore, from which I quote : 

NISHI NISHI England including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malay and 
N. E. I. 

That means war, no matter how worded. No one disputed this 
British translation in November-December, 1941 : in fact our own 
translation was considered consistent with it. 

Two confirmations of the British translation came from the official 
Netherlands East Indies Government translations of Tokyo Circu- 
lars 2353 and 2354. Colonel Thorpe, the Senior Army Intelligence Of- 
ficer in Java, sent an official message via the Navy addressed to (General 
Miles, the Chief of Army Intelligence in Washington, which is a 
[9649] matter of record in previous Pearl Harbor investigations. 
This message may be identified as Alusna Batavia 031030 dated De- 
cember 3, 1941. I quoted from this message : 

From Thorpe for Miles War Dept, Code intercept : 

Japan will notify her consults of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as 
weather report at end. 

East wind rain United States ; 

North wind cloudy Russia ; 

West wind clear England with attack on Thailand Malay and Dutch East 
Indies. 

Copies of this message were circulated in the Navy Department, 
and the Chief of Naval Operations was indicated as receiving a copy. 

Consul General Foote, our Senior Diplomatic Representative in the 
Netherlands East Indies, on December 4, 1941 (Java time), which is 
December 3, 1941 (Washington time) sent a similar message to the 
Secretary of St^e, from which I quote : 

"When crisis leading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end weather 
reports : 

One east wind rain war with United States, 

Two north wind cloudy war with Russia, 

Three west wind clear war with Britain including attack on Thailand or 
Malaya and Dutch Indies. 

[9650] When threat of crisis exists following will be used five times in 
texts of general reports and radio broadcasts: 

One HIGASHI east America, 

Two KITA north Russia, 

Three NISHI west Britain with advance into Thailand and attack on Malaya 
and Dutch Indies. 

This message was received in the State Department at 9 : 19 a. m. 
on December 4, 1941 (Washington time). Copies were forwarded to 
the War and Navy Departments by the State Department liaison 
officer. Mr. Orme Wilson. They were given a wide circulation in the 
Na\^ Department. 

My own evaluation of the foregoing, on December 4, 1941, was 
about as follows : 



3590 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(A) The Basic Japanese War Plan was divided into 3 categories 
or provided for 3 contingencies, any or all of which might be followed, 
namely : 

(1) War with the United States. 

(2) War with Kussia. 

(3) With with England including the invasion of Thailand and the 
capture of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. 

^B) The Winds Message gave us the answer in all 3 cases : 

Affirmative for the 1st and 3rd categories, and Negative for the 2nd. 

[9651] (C) The Winds Message was probably a "Signal of 
Execute" of some sort. 

The "Signal of Execute" theory received strong confirmation from 
a secret message received from the Philippines in the early afternoon 
of December 4, 1941. This message informed us that the Japanese 
Navy had introduced a new cipher system for its so-called "Operations 
Code" at 0600 GCT that date. This time was 71/2 hours before the 
Winds Message was broadcast. I might add that there was only one 
J-A-P European broadcast per day, so the times coincided as closely 
as possible. I would like to add also that my subordinates on Cor- 
regidor spotted and reported this change only nine hours after it was 
made. The message may be identified as Commandant 16th Naval 
District Priority 041502 dated December 4, 1941, and was addressed 
to Naval Operations and the Commandant 14th Naval District but not 
to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. So far as I know, 
this message has not been introduced as evidence before any previous 
investigation of the Pearl Harbor disaster. In fact, this is the first 
time it has ever been mentioned except to Admiral Hart. The unusual 
hour and unusual date at which the Japanese Navy changed its "Op- 
erations Code," combined with the Winds Message and other collateral 
information available in the Navy Department, [OSS^] made 
this message highly significant as the probable "Signal of Execute" to 
the Japanese Navy. Up till now the Winds Message has had to bear 
a double burden in my testimony. 

[DOSS] . As I have previously testified, we expected that if the 
Japanese did suddenly attack the United States this attack would 
come on a week-end or national holiday. In fact, a warning message 
to this effect had been sent out in April, 1941 (page 1 of Exhibit No. 
37). The War Department over-emphasized the imminence of war 
as forecast by the "November 29, deadline" and predicted that the 
Japanese would strike during the week-end of November 29-30, 1941. 

The Navy Department estimated the situation more accurately — 
the Japanese armada which had been concentrating for the southern 
invasion was too far from any conceivable objective to give serious 
consideration to this date. Also the covering Naval forces were not 
yet deployed and other signs indicated that the U. S. Army estimate 
was a bit premature. 

The next week-end, December 6-7, 1941, was just the reverse. The 
winds message and the change of the Naval Operations Code came in 
the middle of the week ; 2 days to Saturday and 3 days to Sunday. It 
was unthinkable that the Japanese would surrender their hopes of 
surprise by delaying until the week-end of December 13-14, 1941. 
This was not crystal gazing or "intuition" — It was just the plain, 
common sense acceptance of a self-evident proposition. Colonel 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3591 

Sadtler saw it, and so did Captain Joseph [9654-] ^- Redman, 
U. S. N. — according to Colonel Sadtler's testimony in 1944, before the 
Army Board of Investigation. 

The Japanese were going to start the war on Saturday, December 6, 
1941, or Sunday, December 7, 1941. 

In the next sentence I would like to change the words "Pearl Harbor" 
to "England and the United States", so that the sentence reads : 

The War and Navy Departments had been given 72 hours' advance 
notification of the attack on England and the United States by the 
Japanese themselves. 

The Chairman. It is now a quarter after four, and we will recess 
until 10 o'clock tomorrow. 

(Whereupon, at 4 : 15 p. m. February 1, 1946, the committee recessed 
until 10 a. m., Saturday, February 2, 1946.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3593 



[966S] PEARL HAEBOR ATTACK 



SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington, D. C, 

The joint conunittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., 
in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster 
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. 
Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee. 

[9656] The Chairman. The committee will be in order. 

Counsel, I believe, was still examining the witness. 

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. LAUEENCE FRYE SAFFORD, UNITED STATES 

NAVY— Resumed 

Mr. Richardson. Captain, have you a copy of Exhibit 142 before 
you? 

Captain Safford. I have. 

Mr. Richardson. As I understand it, the first winds message that 
was intercepted was Circular No. 2353 show^n in Exhibit 142 ; is that 
correct? 

Captain Safford. Not necessarily. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, was there one before that? 

Captain Safford. Circulars 2353 and 2354 were intercepted on the 
same date, and I do not know which came first. Circular 2354 was 
translated by us 2 days before 2353. 

Mr. Richardson. Then the only two intercepts establishing the 
so-called winds codes are contained in circulars 2353 and 2354? 

Captain Safford. The only ones that we had in the Navy De- 
partment. 

Mr. Richardson. The only ones that we knew anything ai;bou,t 
at the time of this episode ? 

Captain Safford. Yes. 

[,%'J7] Mr. Richardson. And after those messages came in 
every effort was made that could be made to see to it that stations were 
warned to monitor, for the executes under those messages? 

Captain Safford. Nothing was done until we had received a mes- 
sage from the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, containing the trans- 
lation of the same messages made by the British at Singapore. 



3594 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Then we made every effort to monitor for those messages. 

Mr. Richardson. How long after this message came in on Novem- 
ber 19 then was the first monitoring direction given to intercepting 
stations ? 

Captain Safford. It was sent out about 6 p. m. Washington time 
on November 28, 1941. 

Mr. Richardson. Was it sent generally to all stations that it was 
felt might be in a position to intercept the execute ? 

Captain Safford. It was sent to all stations which we considered 
had the personnel problem, the trained personnel, available personnel, 
and proper material, to intercept the message. 

Mr. Richardson. How many stations do you know picked up the 
messages now identified as 2353 and 2354 ? 

Captain Safford. I cannot tell you off-hand. I will [96S8] 
have to search through the records. 

Mr, Richardson. Were there a great many of them ? 

Captain Safford. There were at least two in the United States 
Navy, because they had translated the message, the Dutch must have 
intercepted it because they translated it, and the Australians knew 
about it, and I don't know how they got it. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, how did 2353 come in in the first instance 
to tlie intercepting station in the United States ? 

Captain Safford. It was in the intercept of a radio message from 
Tokyo to San Francisco, but addressed to Washington. 

Mr. Richardson, Was it in code? 

Captain Safford. It was in code, in the Japanese code which we 
call J-19. 

Mr. Richardson. Was it in the form of message in which the Japa- 
nese were accustomed to send out weather broadcasts ? 

Captain Safford. I don't understand that question, 

Mr. Richardson. Do you know of weather broadcasts the Japanese 
stations were sending out generally ? 

Captain Safford. The Japanese sent out weather forecasts on most 
of their broadcasts just the way the United [9659]^ Stat^ sent 
out weather forecasts on most of its official broadcasts. 

Mr. Richardson, Would the form of broadcast as sent out by the 
Japanese be the form in which Circular 2353 came in? 

Captain Safford, No; because a weather broadcast would consist 
of nothing but weather, and this prescribed that an apparent or false 
weather report be inserted in the middle of news. That was never 
done in the Japanese broadcasts. 

Mr. Richardson. Was 2353 sent out in Morse code? 

Captain Safford. I do not understand. 

Mr. Richardson. You understand what the Japanese sending mes- 
sages in the Morse code in Japanese means ? 

Captain Safford, Yes, 

Mr. Richardson, Was this message 2353 sent out in that way ? 

Captain Safford, That was sent out in International Morse Code, 
because it had to be received by American operators at San Francisco 
who did not know the Morse code. 

Mr. Richardson, And that was true of 2353 ? 

Captain Safford. It was true of 2353 and true of every translation 
given in this book. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3595 

Mr, Richardson. That would include 2353? 

[9660] Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, the witness had some paper in his 
left hand when he said everything in there was by International Morse 
Code. May we have what that paper is? He had it in his left hand. 
He said everything was International Morse Code. 

Mr. KL^UFMAN. That is exhibit 142. 

Captain Safford. Every message quoted in exhibit 142, also the 
message quoted in exhibit 1, was sent out in International Morse Code. 

Mr. Murphy. Every message? 

Mr. Richardson. That is right. 

Now, in that code, the Japanese words which are shown in Circular 
2353 as appear in Exhibit 142, appear as shown : 

HIGASHI NO KAZEAME. 

The three Japanese words were in the message as sent out in Inter- 
national Code? 

Captain Safford. The words HIGASHI NO KAZEAME and the 
other two Japanese expressions were taken after decrypting the 
original Japanese message and converting the codes language into 
Japanese, 

Mr. Richardson. And then the next step would be to translate the 
Japanese ? 

Captain Safford. The next step would be to translate [9661] 
the Japanese into English, but leaving the code expressions alone 
because we didn't want to alter the exact wording used. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, the meaning of the Japanese words that 
remain in Circular 2353 as it appears in Exhibit 142 is the meaning 
that appears in the lower left-hand corner : 

East wind rain, would be HIGASHI NO KAZEAME; 

North wind cloudy — you pronounce that 

Captain Safford. Kitanokaze Kumori. 

Mr. Richardson. West wind clear. 

Captain Safford. Nishi no kaze hare. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

Now, M'hen you turn to Circular 2354, the only difference between 
the two messages would be that under 2354 only a single word indi- 
cating a compass point would be included in the general intelligence 
broadcast referred to in that dispatch ? 

Captain Safford. That is partially correct. There was also the 
further requirement that that single word be repeated five times at 
the beginning and at the end of the message. 2353 required that 
phrase be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short- 
wave broadcast. 

Mi\ Richardson. As a matter of fact there were three [966^] 
requirements to comply with 2353 ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. The signal had to be in the middle, it also had 
to be at the end ; the broadcast had to be a weather forecast, and each 
sentence had to be repeated twice? 

Captain Safford. And it had to be in the Japanese language. 

[9663] Mr. Richardson. Where do you find in circular 2353 
that it had to be in the Japanese language? 



3596 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Satford. It says : 

The following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese 
language short wave news broadcast. 

JNIr. Richardson. You interpreted that to mean that in addition 
to being in the middle of the daily Japanese language short-wave news 
broadcast the words themselves had to be in Japanese^ 

Captain Safford. That is true, and the rest of the broadcast had 
to be in Japanese also. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, it doesn't say so ; does it? 

Captain Safford. It does say so. 

Mr. Richardson. Where ? 

Captain Safford. It says: 

The daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast. 

Mr. Richardson. Yes; it says that the warning will be added in 
the middle of the daily Japanese language short-wave news broadcast. 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. But it does not say what is put in the middle 
had to be in Sanskrit or Latin or English or Japanese, does it? 

Captain Safford. It merely gave the words which they [9664'] 
would use. 

]Mr. Richardson. Right. Now, on 2345, Captain, the first require- 
ment was that the dispatch — the notice was to be a general intelligence 
broadcast ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Would that mean a radio broadcast ? 

Captain Safford. That meant a radio broadcast. 

Mr. Richardson. And then those compass words that we have 
referred to that are shown in 2354 had to be at the beginning of that 
broadcast ? 

Captain Safford. And at the end. 

JNIr. Richardson. And at the end of the broadcast and had to be 
repeated five times? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And included at the beginning and end ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, unless the execute or an alleged 
execute that came to your attention complied with the directions con- 
tained in one or the other of those two code messages, would you inter- 
pret it to be an execute of the original message ? 

Captain Safford. If it departed radically from those instructions, 
we would regard it as having nothing to do with the expected execute 
of those messages. 

[966S] Mr. Richardson. Suppose it did not appear in the mid- 
dle, would that eliminate it? 

Captain Safford. Not necessarily, but we would regard it with sus- 
picion. 

Mr. Richardson. Suppose it was not in a short wave news broad- 
cast, would that eliminate it ? 

Captain Safford. The word on "short wave" was incorrectly trans- 
lated by a green translator. The correct translation of that word was 
"overseas broadcast." 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3597 

Mr. KiCHARDSON. Well, now, just wait a minute. You do not under- 
stand the Japanese languajje yourself, do you? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr, Richardson. Well, then, are you in a position of your own 
knowledge to tell us what that correct translation would be ? 

Captain Safford. I suggest that the committee get a correct trans- 
lation both in 2B53 and 2354, a full translation with no words on it at 
the discretion of the translator. 

Mr. Richardson-. And the only message that you knew anything 
about when this episode on the winds execute came up was this message 
2353 and 2354? 

Captain Safford. Oh, no; we had the British translation at the 
same time, and we had probably verified our own translations immedi- 
ately we found a conflicting translation coming [9006] in 
from the Navy, from the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet. That was 
custom. 

Mr. Richardson. I don't want any probably business in this. Was 
there another translation of the Japanese broadcast that was the basis 
for 2353'that was made by our authority here ? If so, where is it ? 

Captain Safford. There is no other on record. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, the only one that you had available to 
you that was over our own stations was 2353 and 2354 on the morning 
of December 4? 

Captain Safford. That is correct, if we are restricted to what was 
intercepted by our own stations. 

Mr. Richardson. That is right. Now, the only other one available 
to you was the one sent in from the commander of the Asiatic Fleet ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct, up until shortly after we had 
actually intercepted the winds execute message. 

Mr. Richardson. The fact is, is it not. Captain, that in your earlier 
testimony before Admiral Hewitt and in your earlier testimony before 
Admiral Hart you testified, did you not, that the interpretation that 
was placed upon the message that you saw on the morning of Decem- 
ber 4 was based upon the meaning given to you by the Foote and the 
Thorpe broadcast that had come in from Canberra and Batavia? 
Didn't you so [9667] testify? 

Captain Safford. I will have to check that. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

Captain Safford. What page is that on? 

Mr. Richardson. I am referring firs to page 748 of the Navy court 
of inquiry. My point is. Captain — I want you to get the point— 
didn't you in your testimonj' there base your interpretation of tne 
meaning of this execute on the Dutch translation and the Foote trans- 
lation and that you did not say anything whatever about the Hart 
translation? 

Mr, Murphy. Hart? The Hart translation? 

Mr. Richardson. Admiral Hart, the commander in chief of the 
Asiatic Fleet. 

Captain Safford. What page is that again, please? 

Mr. Richardson. This is 748 of the Navy inquiry. 

Captain Safford. I answered those questions as you stated. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. And in your written statement that 
you have read to the committee in this proceeding you base your 



3598 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

interpretation on the message that had come in on November 28 from 
the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet. 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, isn't the reason that you changed because 
you discovered that the Foote message and the Thorpe [9668'\ 
message had come in after you made j^our interpretation of the mes- 
sage on the morning of December 4 and therefore you could not have 
relied on it, and then didn't you turn to the message from the com- 
mander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet as the source of your interpreta- 
tion ? Isn't that a specific reason why you did it ? 

Captain Safford. No. 

Mr. Richardson. All right; that is all; that answers it. 

Now, will you turn to 1-C in Exhibit 142? It is about the third 
or fourth page. 

Captain Safford. I see it. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, that is a copy of our message from the com- 
mander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, isn't it ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And that is the one that in your statement to 
the committee you relied on for j^our interpretation of the message 
that you got on the morning of December 4 ? 

Captain Safford. At the time the winds message was intercepted 
and translated by Kramer and sent up to higher authority; that is 
correct. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, will you tell me what there is 
in that message that says that the language that was to be used meant 
war? Read it to me from the message. 

Captain Safford (reading) : 

NISHI NISHI England including occupa- [9669] tion of Thai or invasion 
of Malaya and NEI — 

which is an abbreviation for Netherlands East Indies. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, stop right there. We had been getting mes- 
sages, had we not, for 10 days with reference to the movements of 
the Japanese toward the Thai Peninsula and the occupation of Ma- 
lasia, hadn't we? 

Captain Safford. We had numerous signs indicating that they 
were possibly contemplating an act of war ; correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Toward those places ; toward the Thai Peninsula 
and Malasia ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

INIr. Richardson. So there wasn't anything in that language with 
reference to "NISHI NISHI" that was either new or particularly 
startling to us, was there, at that time ? 

Captain Safford. Nothing except the confirmation of our suspi- 
cions or deductions. 

Mr. Richardson. And the only thing you could draw — the only 
deduction you could draw from it fairly, Captain, would be that if 
the execute message came in that said "NISHI NISH" it would mean 
that the Japs were going after England by going upon that occupa- 
tion, did it not, or invasion of Malaya ? 

Captain Safford. And the Netherlands East Indies ; that is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, proceed and show me what there is [9670] 
in that dispatch that shows war on the United States ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3599 

Captain Sattord. There is nothing in the literal translation of that 
dispatch which says war on the United States. 

Mr. Richardson. Now. when vou turn back, Captain, to 1-A, which 
is 2353, you find the phrase "HlGASHI NO KAZEAME," with the 
definition, "Japan-U. S. relations in danger." • 

Do you find anything in the dispatch from the commander in chief 
of the Asiatic Fleet that changes that interpretation of "HIGASHI 
NO KAZEAME," or whatever it is? 

Captain Safiord. There is nothing that changes the translation of 
that* phrase. 

Mr. EicHARDSON. All right. This dispatch that you say was the 
execute, which you say was what you had been looking for, which 
was the great triumph of the Navy over the Army, you say came in 
on the morning of December 4 about 8 o'clock ? 

Captain Saftord. After 8: 30; shortly before 9. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, you testified at least twice before, didn't 
you. Captain, that it came in on the evening of December 3? 

Captain Safford. I was testifying from memory and doing the best 

1 could without the aid of the written notes which I had unfortunately 
destroyed in December 1941. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, they were still destroyed when you [9671] 
made your statement here to the committee, weren't they? They still 
remained destroyed, didn't they? 

Captain Safford. Those notes remained destroyed ; yes. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, what you mean is after you testified in 
these earlier hearings you sat down with yourself and your pencil 
and you made some new notes, is that true ? 

Captain Safford. I got new written evidence about 2 weeks ago 
which up till that time had not been in my possession. It helped me 
tremendously in reconstructing what had happened as well as re- 
freshing my memory. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, Captain, let us go into this question. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I request that the written evidence 
be now produced so that we may examine it? I ask that his written 
evidence that was produced 2 weeks ago be submitted to the committee. 

The Vice Chairman. He said he obtained written evidence about 

2 weeks ago that refreshed his memory. Mr. Murphy asks that that 
written evidence be produced. 

Mr. Murphy. And that it be spread on the record.^ 

Mr. Richardson. What was that written evidence, Captain — what 
is the nature of it? 

Captain Safford. Monthly reports from the interceptor stations at 
Winter Harbor, Maine, and at Cheltenham, Md., [9672] which 
I had requested 2 years ago and had been informed could not be 
discovered. We made one more attempt about 2 weeks ago, and those 
particular reports were located, and my assistant read them and got 
pertinent parts for me, and I have his penciled copies of that stuflf. 
I have quoted those parts in my testimony, in these extracts from the 
logs — rather, the monthly reports of Winter Harbor, Maine, and 
Cheltenham, Md. 

Mr. Richardson. But it is true. Captain, is it not, that at least 
twice before under oath you placed the date of the receipt of this 

^ Id this connection see a letter from the Navy Department In Hearings, Part 11, p. 6493. 



3600 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

execute message that you testified concerning on the evening of 
December 3? 

Captain Saftord. I belicA^e I said "December 3 or 4." I think I 
made it broader than that. 

Mr. RiCHARDsox. I don't think you did. Let me call your attention 
to your testimony at page 361 of the Hart investigation. Didn't you 
testify there as follows : 

The winds message was actually broadcast during the evening of December 3, 
1941 Washington time, which was December 4th by Greenwich time and Tokyo 
time. 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And then, to make sure that that was not an error, 
didn't you testify a little later in that same examination as follows : 

[9673] The winds message was received in the Navy Department during the 
evening of December 3rd while Lieutenant ( J. G.) Francis M. Brotherhood, USNR, 
was on watch. 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, Captain, you do not know yourself of 
your own knowledge, when the message was received, do you ? 

Captain Safford. I do not know from first-hand knowledge exactly 
what time it was received. 

Mr. Richardson. All you know. Captain, is that Kramer came to 
you with a piece of paper in his hand that had a message on it? 

Captain Safford. It was a piece of paper which I recognized as the 
yellow paper from a roll on a teletype machine. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, before we go into that, let me 
inquire. Captain, along this line : Now, after all of this episode had 
transpired and you had destroyed your notes — by the way, do you now 
contend that you made notes of what occurred at the time this message 
came in ? 

Captain Safford. I made notes while events were fresh in my mem- 
ory as to the things which were not matters of official record and were 
important to know, such as such things as times of deliveries of certain 
messages, and so forth. The winds message was then in existence. I 
could have re- [9674] ferred to it for anything that I wanted, 
and there would be no occasion to try to check the exact time at which 
it was intercepted. 

Mr. Richardson. You testified before the Army board, didn't you ? 

Captain Safford. Correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And I refer now to page 160 of the Army board. 
Didn't you testify as follows there. Captain : 

Captain Safford. Kramer made his statements of 8th and ^th of December 
immediately after the event when I discussed it fully with him. I called for 
statements. I talked to everybody concerned to see if my people had been negli- 
gent in any way, that this thing had been our fault. I made a very careful 
investigation. 

General Russehx. Did you make any records of that investigation? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

Was that true ? 

Captain Safford. There was no written record made. All the notes 
I had in the rough form were destroyed when I got the orders. 
Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, Captain 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3601 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I — well, I don't want to inter- 
rupt. He testified yesterday the meeting was on the [9675] 
15th and now he says there were notes made on the 8th and now he says 
that on the 14th or 15tli they were destroyed. 

Mr. Richardson. Captain, after all of this episode and at the time 
of this episode yon had been a very busy man, hadn't you? 

Captain Saptord. That is correct; yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Yon miglit almost say that you worked day and 
night. 

Captain Saitgrd. Not quite that much, but I was working long 
hours. 

Mr. Richardson. And your staff was working hard? 

Captain Saffgrd. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And your office had never been as busy as it was 
during this week before the Pearl Harbor attack, had it? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

[9076] Mr. Richardson. And after this episode with refer- 
ence to this so-called winds execute, you never turned your attention 
to thftt matter until prior to the summer or fall of 1943, did you, ap- 
proximately 2 years? 

Captain Safford. Approximately 2 years; a few months less. 

Mr. Richardson. And the fact is, is it not. Captain, that in the fall 
of 1943, you concluded that you might be a witness, and then you un- 
dertook, by inquiry, by investigation, by conversation, by letters, to 
try and remember what occurred during that period before the at- 
tack in December 1941? 

Captain Safford. I was doing more than that at that time. I was 
engaged in writing up a history of radio intelligence from 1924 to 
1941 by the direction and instruction of the Director of Naval Intel- 
ligence. That was carried for 7 months in my monthly report of 
progress, in addition to doing that work. 

Mr. Richardson. It was the official work you had to do. You were 
very deeply exercised in trying to make up your mind as to what you 
might testify to, if you were called as a witness? 

Captain Safford. I was trying to do double duty with the same set 
of data. 

[9677] IVIr. Richardson. And the other duty, I .repeat again, 
was to get your mind made up as to what the facts were, so if 
you were called as a witness you could testify ? 

Captain Safford. So I could testify and not be confused on the wit- 
ness stand by counsel. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, I want you to know that I do not 
care a tinker's damn whether the winds execute message came in or 
whether it did not. I am only interested in whether there should be 
reviewed by the committee all of the reliable facts that can be adduced 
so they can reach a conclusion. 

I do not want to mislead you or browbeat you, if I talk rather loudly. 
It is because I am a rather loud talking individual. 

I just want to make it clear that when you started, in the fall of 
1943 to prepare yourself as a witness, your whole recollection was 
exceedingly hazy as to what had happened 2 years before, wasn't it? 

Captain Safford. There were a few outstanding facts and the de- 
tails linking them together were very hazy. 



3602 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Richardson. Now, let me read you what you testified to on 
that point in the Hewitt investigation, at page 112 : 

Captain Saffobd. In the fall of 1943, it appeared [9678] there was going 
to be a trial, a court martial of Admiral Kimmel. It was hinted in the news- 
papers and various people in the Navy Department were getting testimony ready 
for it. I realized I would be one of the important vritnesses, that my memory 
was very vague, and I began looking around to get everything that I could 
to prepare a written statement which I could follow as testimony. 

That was the time when I studied the Roberts report carefully for the first 
time, and noted no reference to the winds message, or to the message which 
McCoIlum had written, and which I had seen, and which I thought had been 
sent, and then I began talking to everybody who had been around at the time 
and who knew I had been mixed up in it, to see what they could remember to 
straighten me out on the thing, and give me leads to follow down to where 
I got my hands on ofiicial messages, and things so it would be a matter of fact 
and not a matter of memory. 

I also talked the thing over with whatever Army people were still around at 
the time, and had anything in this line, and bit by bit these facts appeared to 
come together. 

The investigation was conducted, if you call it that, for the purpose of pre- 
paring myself to take the stand as a witness in a prospective court martial of 
Admiral Kimmel. 

[96791 Now, you regard that today, do you not, Captain, as a 
fair statement of how you brought your mind to a factual conclusion 
as to what happened during that period, that week prior to Pearl 
Harbor, in the. fall of 1943 ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Senator Lucas. 1941 ? 

Mr. Richardson. 1943. 

Now, Captain 

Captain Safford. May I add something to that statement? 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. 

Captain Safford. At the time I did this, I expected to be called as 
a witness for the prosecution, to represent the Navy Department, in 
the charges which I thought would be preferred against Admiral 
Kimmel. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, that made it all the more im])ortant, did 
it not, Captain, that you should testify as to what you knew and 
not what you found out from what somebody told you, because you 
were then dealing with the guilt or innocence of a human being ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. RicHL:\.RDS0N. Now, Captain, you were exceedingly anxious to 
get hold of an execute message to the winds code, were you not ? 

Captain Safford. I first looked for the 

[96S0] Mr. Richardson (interposing). No, no. I am asking 
you as to your mental condition. You were very anxious, while you 
waited to see what the monitoring stations would send in to see when 
an execute code would come in ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now the first time you ever saw the 
message that you say in your statement was an execute message, was 
when Kramer brought it to you, sometime after 8 o'clock on the morn- 
ing of December 4 ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. You were not a Japanese linguist ? 

Captain Safford. No. 

Mr. Richardson. You did not decode the message? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3603 

Captain Safford. No. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you know under whose watch station the mes- 
sage came in ? 

Captain Safford. Lieutenant Murray was on watch at the time. 

Mr. Richardson. Did not you specifically testify in the fomer hear- 
ing that it came in to Lieutenant Brotherhood? 

Captain Safford. I did on the first hearing, when I was under the 
belief that it had come in on Brotherhood's watch, because he told me 
it had. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, I will take up the Brotherhood [9681] 
matter w^ith you a little later. 

I want to pursue this matter just a moment. 

Now, Kramer brought you this message, is that correct ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, there was some writing on the message 
when he brought it to you ? 

Captain Safford. There was writing on the message. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, outside of that writing, what was on that 
message when he brought it to you ? 

Captain Safford. He had underscored the code words in the middle 
of the message, so they stood out very plainly. 

Mr. Richardson. Just tell me Captain, in- what form was this mes- 
sage? Was it in English? 

Captain Safford. The message was in Japanese. 

Mr. Richardson. All of it? 

Captain Safford. All of it. 

Mr. Richardson. And you could not read Japanese ? 

Captain Safford. I can read a few words in Japanese, if they point 
it out by underscoring, and I compared them with the original words 
of the two winds codes. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, let us not go quite so fast on that, Captain. 

[9682] When the message was brought to you by Kramer, was 
it typewritten ? 

Captain Safford. It was the teletype message as it came in the 
machine. 

Mr. Richardson. In Japanese ? 

Captain Safford. In Japanese. 

Mr. Richardson. And with the exception of these specific words 
that you were watching for, you did not attempt to read it in Japanese? 

Captain Safford. I did not attempt to read it. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, there was some writing on that message, 
was there not? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. In handwriting ? 

Captain Safford. In handwriting. 

Mr. Richardson. In English ? 

Captain Safford. In English. 

Mr. Richardson. What was written in longhand on that message? 

Captain Safford. "War with England including NEI," and so 
forth. "War with the U. S.," or possibly United States, and "Peace 
with Russia." 

That is to the best of my recollection after 4 years. 

79716 — 46 — pt. 8 16 



3604 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. EiCHARDsoN. Well, it is not quite 4 years, [9683] in view 
of the fact that this is the fifth time you are testifying on it, is it, 
Captain ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there anything else written in longhand on 
this message in Japanese, except those three phrases ? 

Captain Saftord. There was nothing in Kramer's handwriting. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, there was no other handwriting on it but 
Kramer's ? 

Captain Safford. No. 

Mr. Richardson. The only other writing there was on the paper 
was the teletype message in Japanese ? 

Captain Safford. And the identifying data, such as the frequency, 
time of intercept, station which sent it, which I glanced at, but 
promptly forgot. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, that is not unreasonable. 

Now then Captain, that message that you got, with respect to the 
Japanese words that were underlined, which you say Kramer inter- 
preted in longhand on the message, was a dead ringer execute for 
the original code message 2353 that had been sent out, was it not? 

Captain Safford. That is correct, except that it reversed it in the 
case of Russia, because we thought no [9684] war would be 
no mention, but they gave a positive, specific mention as to Russia, 
but in a negative sense, which we concluded meant peace, or not war 
as yet. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, then. Captain, we can dismiss from our 
attention in connection with any examination of you, or any conten- 
tion of you as to the winds execute circular 2354, cannot we 1 

Captain Safford. Let me see that. 

Mr. Richards. Because this execute could not have been in comple- 
tion of circular 2354, could it ? 

Captain Safford. 2354 is out completely, except for the fact that 
is what we expected to find in a Morse code message, and it did not 
turn out that way. 

Mr. Richardson. So that the only code message, winds code mes- 
sage, so far as your testimony is concerned, that the committee need 
pay any attention to is 2353 ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

Now, were the words "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME" in the middle 
of the broadcast ? 

Captain Safford. That is the place they were underscored. 

Mr. Richardson. Were they also at the end ? 

Captain Safford. I do not know now. The were not [9685] 
underscored at the end if they were there. 

Mr. Richardson. That would be a very important item in order to 
ascertain whether this was intended to be an execute of 2353, would 
it not? 

Captain Safford. Not necessarily. They would be repeated at the 
end only as a precaution so that if they missed the early part of the 
broadcast, they could pick it up at the last and not lose it. 

Mr. Richardson. Just a minute, Captain. Don't you think you are 
extending your authority a little when you interpret what the Japanese 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE ^ 3605 

meant in a code direction? Did not you tell me a few minutes ago 
that every one of those directions that were contained in 2353 were 
important to be considered in determining whether or not a given 
message was an execute message ? 

Captain S afford. I said they were important, that is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, you did not even look to find out whether 
these three sets of words that had been translated were also at the end 
of the message, did you ? 

Captain Safford, I never made such a statement. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, you did not? 

Captain Safford. I said I cannot remember whether they were re- 
peated at the end or not. I was well satisfied that [9686] that 
message was authentic, an authentic signal of the execute given by the 
Japanese Government. 

Mr. Richardson. Captain, I am not the least interested in whether 
you are satisfied or not. I am only interested in ascertaining whether, 
when you saw the message, you endeavored to ascertain, as a careful, 
trained Intelligence man, whether it was an execute of the winds code 
message 2353, and consequently I asked you, first, was it in the middle 
and you said "yes"; and I then asked you, was it at the end, and you 
said you did not look. 

Now, third, was each sentence repeated twice? 

Captain Safford. I did not say I did not look. I said I could not 
tell you from present memory. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, you cannot give us any help as to 
whether it was at the end, can you ? 

Captain SxVfford. I can give you no help at the present time. 

Mr. Richardson. But the fact that it was in the message just im- 
pressed you, so that to this day you can remember just those words 
that were underlined, cannot you ? 

Captain Safford. I can remember them because we had the words 
preserved in the written record in circular 2353. I cannot remember 
the words in my mind. I can only leave them to this which had been 
preserved in the written record, [9687] and I knew it was this 
form, and not the other form. 

Mr. Richardson. And when you looked at 2353, right in front of 
your nose was the phrase that all three of these phrases had also to 
appear at the end of the broadcast message, but that did not seem to 
impress you as being important. 

Have you any reaction on that now? Does your mind give any 
reaction on that now ? 

Captain Safford. I have no doubt that I checked through tlie rest 
of the message, and found everything in due form and technically 
correct, according to 2353, but I cannot swear from memory to it at 
this late date. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, at the present time. Captain, regardless of 
what you had no doubt of, you have no recollection, under oath, that 
you saw anything in that message except the three phrases under- 
lined by Kramer in the message he handed you ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. Those are the things that re- 
main in my memory through all this period of time. 

Mr. Richardson. Now do you have any recollection, Captain, that 
these sentences, these groups of words were repeated twice in the 
message? That would be important, would it not? 



3606 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Safford. It is my impression they were, but [9688] 
I am not certain. 

Mr. Richardson. Was this message, Captain, a short-wave news 
broadcast ? 

Captain Safford. It was a short-wave news broadcast. 

Mr. Richardson. How do you know ? 

Captain Safford. Because the frequency was recorded on the mes- 
sage, and we could not hear the long wave or low-power stuff, any- 
how; the only thing we could hear in Washington from Tokyo was 
on short wave. 

Mr. Richardson. How did you know it was news if you could not 
read Japanese? 

Captain Safford. I counted on Kramer to do that. 

Mr, Richardson. Well, you could have counted on Kramer to do 
it, but now you have not testified that you asked him anything 
about it. 

Captain Safford. Kramer told me when he gave me the paper, he 
said, "This is it." There is no (juestion in my mind or the mind of 
anybody else what he meant by it. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, let us just temporarily, because I am going 
to question you about it again, Captain, probe that question. 

You know, do you not. Captain, now that Kramer has three times in 
his sworn testimony heretofore, denied that he saw anything in this 
message with reference to Japanese [9689] words relating to 
the United States, and says that the only thing there was in the message 
he saw had reference to Russia. You know that, don't you? 

Captain Safford. I did not know that. 

Mr. Richardson. He told you that, didn't he? 

Captain Safford. Kramer never told me anything about Russia. 

Mr. Richardson. Did not he tell you that he was completely un- 
certain as to what the Japanese words were in this message? 

Captain Safford. I think that Kramer had been pretty well 
befuddled by the middle of 1945. 

Mr. Richardson. Had been pretty well what? 

Captain Safford. Well, befuddled. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, did the befuddling. Captain apply only to 
Kramer? Were you befuddled at all in 1945? 

Captain Safford. In 1945 there was a determined effort made to 
have me reverse my testimony before previous investigations and to 
say I had never seen the winds message. 

Mr. , Richardson. All right. 

Now, explain to the committee in detail just who started to exercise 
influence on you to make you change your testimony. Give name and 
dates, and the full conversations. 

Mr. Murphy. May I request, Mr. Chairman, that we also [9690] 
have him produce the original memorandum he made 2 weeks ago? 

Mr. Richardson. I did not hear that. 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to request that we have presented the 
written memorandum of 2 weeks ago. He said he had a written memo- 
randum of 2 weeks ago that he just got for the first time. 

Mr. Keefe. He already identified it. 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to have that produced. 

Mr. Richardson. Go ahead and read it in detail. Give us now all 
of the evidence that you have to indicate that anybody tried to get 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3607 

you to change your testimony in just as much detail as you can, 
Captain, 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Counsel, may I inquire when this statement 
was prepared ? 

Mr. RicHAKi>soN. Which statement? 

Senator Lucas. What he is about to read. 

Captain Safford. This statement was prepared on the 14th of July 
1945. 

Senator Lucas. How did you happen to prepare that statement at 
that time? 

Captain Safford. There were certain things that occurred that 
struck me as quite unusual. I had never seen anything like it in all 
my experience as a commissioned oflScer [9691'] of the Navy, 
and I made notes on the spot, and combined it all into one memoran- 
dum while the events were still fresh in my memory. 

Senator Lucas. You did not have this previously? 

Mr. Richardson. No, this is the first I have heard of it. 

The Vice Chairman. Do you set out in that statement what those 
certain events were that impressed you? 

Captain Safford. I have it here. I merely had it with me to refresh 
my memory. I did not expect to produce it as evidence. I am now 
asked to produce it, and I have it here, if it is desired by the com- 
mittee. 

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead. 

Captain Safford. I would just as soon not go into this here. 

Mr. Richardson. I think it would be well, if he read his paper 
rather than testifying from it, simply in refreshing his recollection. 

The Vice Chairman. Yes, just read your paper completely to the 
committee, please, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. May I suggest, counsel, if there is anything 
that is not in this memorandum that he recalls, that he give that also? 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. I thought it was all oral, when [9692] 

1 asked the question. 
Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. Read your paper completely, and distinctly, 
so we may all hear it, and then when you have finished reading it, 
why you may supplement it by any other statement you desire to make 
on this subject, in response to the question counsel has asked you. 

Senator Ferguson. Might I suggest that he read it not so fast. 

Captain Safford. All right. 

Senator Ferguson. I have difficulty at times hearing you. 

Captain Safford. This paper is dated July 14, 1945 : "Memoran- 
dum of Conversations in Connection With Admiral Hewitt's In- 
vestigation of the Pearl Harbor Distaster." 

Mr. Richardson. This was after you had testified before Admiral 
Hewitt? 

Captain Safford. This was after I had testified before Admiral 
Hewitt. 

^Ir. Richardson. All right, go ahead. 

Captain Safford. I believe — I am not certain on the dates. 

Mr. Murphy. The Hewitt testimony was taken between May 14 
and July 12, 1945, and this memorandum is [9693] July 14, 

2 days after Admiral Hewitt concluded taking testimony. 



3608 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain S afford (reading) : 

1. This memorandum is prepared, while events are still fresh in my mind, 
for possible use in connection with future Investigation of the Pearl Harbor 
Disaster, or Court-martials in connection with Pearl Harbor. It includes cer- 
tain acts which strike me as irregular or unusual, and probably illegal. 

2. On or about Friday, 11 May 1945, I was called to an unofficial conference 
(or meeting) conducted by Lieutenant Commander John Sonnett, U. S. N. R., in 
room 1083A, Navy Building. 

The Vice Chairman. Spell that man's name. 

Captain Safford. S-o-n-n-e-t-t. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, he has been connected with the 
Hart hearing, had not he? 

Captain Safford. He had not. 

Mr. Richardson. Wliat hearing was he connected with? 

Captain Safford. He was connected with the Hewitt hearing. 

Mr. Richardson. I mean the Hewitt hearing. What was his func- 
tion in the Hewitt hearing ? Do you remember ? 

Captain Safford. He was a legal adviser to Admiral [969 Jf] 
Hewitt, and a special representative of the Secretary of the Navy. 

Mr. Richardson. And took part in that investigation ? 

Captain Safford. And took part in that investigation. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now go ahead. 

Captain Safford. (continuing reading) : 

He was in civilian clothes, as he has been on every occasion on which. I have 
seen him. Sonnet told me that he had been assigned as a legal assistant to 
Admiral Hewitt in an investigation of the responsibility for the Pearl Harbor 
Disaster, that he was also a special representative for Secretary Forrestal in 
this investigation and that he was authorized to handle Top-Secret and Secret 
information and documents. He showed me papers signed by Secretary For- 
restal and Fleet Admiral King verifying these statements. 

At my request he let me read the Precept which directed Admiral Hewitt to 
conduct the investigation. It was my understanding that Admiral Hewitt had 
not yet returned to Washington and that Sonnett was getting things lined up 
to expedite matters after the Admiral's arrival. 

3. I answered many questions pertaining to my testimony before previous in- 
vestigations, and discussed discrepancies between my testimony and the testi- 
mony of other [9695] witnesses. 

Mr. Richardson. Let me stop you right there. Captain. 

Does not it commence to dawn on you that this statement of yours 
was made before you testified in the Hewitt examination ? 

Captain Safford. Some of the notes were made before, but it was 
written up and typed and dated afterward. 

Mr. Richardson. I see. But this conversation that you had with 
Sonnett took place before you testified in the Hewitt investigation ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

Captain Safford (continuing reading) : 

Sonnett requested that I give him, by the end of the next week, written memo- 
randa to be used as a basis of study and examination (under oath) on the sub- 
jects listed below. T*his was done and the memoranda submitted as follows : 



Subject 


Date submitted 


Remarks 


"Winds Message" (6 pages) 


15 May 1945 


Withdrawn on 18 May 1945 at the suggestion 




of Lt. Comdr. Sonnett. Original retained 
for possible future use. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3609 



Mr. Richardson. By the way, have you a copy of that paper that 
you gave to Sonnett ? 

Captain Safford. I believe I have. 

\9696] Mr. Richardson. All right, go ahead. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the captain go a little more slowly? 

Captain Safford. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. There was something said before May 15, 1945. Wliat 
was that ? 

Captain Safford. "Six pages." 

Mr. Murphy. All right. 

Captain Safford (reading) : 



Subject 



Evaluation of messages ofSe Nov. 1941 

(6 pages). 
Evaluation of "UTU" broadcasts (8 

pages). 

Tatuta Mara and the President Maidson 
(1 page). 



Date sub- 
mitted 



17 May 1945_.. 
19 May 1945... 

21 May 1945... 



Remarks 



Also lists the 6 carriers described by Com. 16 
as "all known first and second fleet carriers." 

No action was taken because Jap invasion fleet 
had been sighted by RAF planes off Kota 
Bhara. 

Indicates that on 7 Dec. 1941 the CNO refused 
to believe that the U. S. would be involved 
in the war that was imminent in East Asia. 



On Sonnett's request, I prepared and furnished him copies of certain U. S. 
Naval messages, the Station "H" Chronology for 1-6 December, 1941, and Com 
14 Daily CI Summaries for 1 Nov.-6 Dec. 1941. 

4. It was appai-ent to me on ray very first meeting with Lieutenant Commander 
Sonnett that he vpas acting as [9697] a "counsel for the defense" for the 
late Secretary Knox, and Admiral Stark rather than as the legal assistant to 
the investigating officer. His purpose semed to be to refute testimony (before 
earlier investigations) that was unfavorable to anyone in Washington, to beguile 
"hostile" witnesses into changing their stories and to introduce an element of 
doubt where he could not effect a reversal of testimony. Above all, he attempted 
to make nie reverse my testimony regarding the "Winds Execute" Message and 
to make me believe I was suffering from hallucinations. 

5. I talked to Sonnett the second time on 18 May 1945, and the third time a 
day or two later. On these latter occasions, like the first, Sonnett tried to per- 
suade me that there had been no "Winds Execute" Message, that my memory 
had been playing me tricks, that I had confused the "False Winds Message" with 
what I had been expecting, and that I ought to change my testimony to permit 
reconciling all previous discrepancies and thereby wind up the affair. In some 
cases the idea was stated outright, in some cases it was implied, and in other 
cases it was unexpressed but obviously the end in view. 

Senator Lucas. The what ? 
Captain Safford (reading) : 

The end in view. 

6. I distinctly recall Lieutenant Commander John [9698] Sonnett, 
U. S. N. R., making the following statements to me during the course of the above- 
mentioned conferences: 

"You are the only one who seems to have ever seen the 'Winds Execute' Mes- 
sage." 

"How could the 'Winds Execute' be heard on the east coast of the U. S. and not 
at any of the places nearer Japan?" 

"It is very doubtful that there ever was a 'Winds Execute' Message." 

"It is no reflection on your veracity to change your testimony." 

"It is no reflection on your mentality to have your memory play you tricks — 
after such a long period." 

"Numerous witnesses that you have named have denied all knowledge of a 
'Winds Execute' Message." 

"You do not have to carry the torch for Admiral Kimmel." 



3610 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

7. I testified before Admiral Hewitt the first time on or about 24 May 1945, 
before he went to Pearl Harbor. I testified before Admiral Hewitt a second time 
on 22 June, 1945, after bis return from examining witnesses at Pearl Harbor. 
Upon completion of my testimony (in which the "Winds Execute" Message had 
figured), I asked him, "off-the-record" [9699] if there was still any doubts 
in his mind as to the "Winds Message" having been sent by Japan and dissemi- 
nated in the War and Navy Departments. The Admiral looked startled, and be- 
fore he could reply Sonnett said ■ 

"Of course, I am not conducting the case, and I do not know what Admiral 
Hewitt has decided, but to me it is very doubtful that the so-called 'Winds 
Execute' Message was ever sent." 
Admiral Hewitt thought a minute or two more, and then said : 
"You are not entitled to my opinion, but I will answer your question. There 
is no evidence of a 'Winds Execute' Message beyond your unsupported testi- 
mony. I do not doubt your sincerity, but I believe that you have confused 
one of the other messages containing the name of a wind with the message you 
were expecting to receive." 

Maybe I ought to go on with paragraph 9. 

8. For my part, I do not doubt Admiral Hewitt's integrity 

The Vice Chairman. Just a minute. You are reading everything 
that is on that paper ? 

Captain Safford. I am reading everything that is on this paper. 
The Vice Chairman. All right. Go ahead. 
[9700] Captain Safford (reading) : 

For my part, I do not doubt Admiral Hewitt's integrity, but I do believe that 
Sonnett has succeeded in pulling the wool over his eyes. 

9. I also believe that Sonnett employed similar tactics on other witnesses 
whose testimony had favored Admiral Kimmel, particularly Rochefort and 
Kramer. 

10. Copies of thp Memorandum described in paragraph 3 are appended hereto. 
Also appended is a memorandum to Admiral Hewitt dated 22 June, 1945, clari- 
fying my testimony regarding the "Winds Execute" Message and indicating 
that Sonnett had attempted to trick me into stating the opposite of what I in- 
tended to say. 

Signed, "L. F. Safford, Captain, U. S. N." 

Mr. Murphy. There are more pages? 

The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your statement? 

Captain Safford. That completes my statement. The other pages 
appended are copies of the memoranda which were referred to in 
paragraph 2. 

The Vice Chairman. All right, proceed and read them, read every 
word of those papers attached to your statement. 

Captain Safford (reading) : 

Secret 

Memorandum for Lieut. Commander John F. Sonnett, U. S. N. R. 

[9701] The Vice Chairman. Permit me to ask you, is that your 
memorandum ? 

Captain Safford. That is my memorandum. 
The Vice Chairman. Prepared by you ? 
Captain Safford. Prepared by me. 
The Vice Chairman. Go ahead and read it. 
Captain Safford (reading) : 

Subject : Winds Message. 

1. To the best of my knowledge and believe, the following officers knew, in 
December, 1941, that the Winds "Execute" message had been broadcast from 
Tokyo on (or about) 4 December, 1941 (and prior to 7 December 1941) although 
some of them did not learn about it until after the attack on Pearl Harbor. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3611 



Then I have listed the name, present rank, station, and duty on 
December 7, 1941, first for the Army, and second for the Navy. 

The Vice Chairman. Are those names there ? 

Captain Safford. The names are there, which I will read, if you 
are interested. 

The Vice Chairman. All right, go ahead. 

Captain Safford (reading) : 



[9702] 



Name 



Present Rank 



Station and Duty on 7 December 1941 



George C. Marshall 
Leonard T. Qerow. 
Dawson Olmstead.. 

Sherman Miles 

Clayton Bissell 

OtisK. Sadtler 

Rufus S. Bratton. -. 



General of the Army 

Lt. Gen., U.S. A 

Maj. Gen., U. S. A. (Ret.) 

Maj. Gen., U. S. A._. 

Maj. Gen., U. S. A_ 

Col., U. S. A 

Brig. Gen., U. S. A 



Chief of StafT, U. S. Army. 

Director, War Plans Div. 

Chief Signal Officer. 

Director of Military Intelligence. 

War Plans Division (WDGS). 

Army Communications, Office of Chief Sig- 
nal Officer. 

In charge. Far Eastern Section, Military 
Intelligence. 



I believe I was mistaken. He was only a colonel at the time. 

The Vice Chairman. That is the first time you heard of him l^eing 
a brigadier general? 

Captain Safford. I heard he had been promoted. That was my 
mistake. That is what it should be. [Resumes reading:] 



9702] 



Name 



Present Rank 



Station and Duty on 7 December 1941 



Rex W. Minckler 

Harold Doud 

Robert E. Schukraft 

[970S] Frank B. Rowlett 

H. R. Stark_. 

H. E. IngersoU... 

R.K. Turner 

T. S. Wilkinson 

Leigh Noyes 

J. R. Beardall 

J. R. Redman 

F. E. Beatty 

L. F. Saflord 

A. H. McCollum... 

G. W. Welker 

A. D. Kramer 

[9704] L.W.Parke 

A. A. Murray 

H. L. Bryant 



Col., U.S. A 

Col., U.S. A.- 

Col., U.S. A 

Lt Col. (Signal Corps Re- 
serve), U. S. Army. 

Admiral, U. S. Navy 

Admiral, U. S. Navy 

ViceAdm., U.S. N_ _ 

ViceAdm., U. S.N... 

Rear Adm., U. S. N 

Rear Adm., U. S. N 

Rear Adm., U. S.N._ 

Rear Adm., U. S. N 

Capt., U. S. N 

Capt., U. S. N 

Capt., U.S.N 

Capt., U.S. N 

Comdr., U.S.N 

Lt. Comdr., U. S. N. R.... 
Chief Ship's Clerk, U. S. N 



Chief of Signal Intelligence, Service, Office 
of Chief Signal Officer. 

In charge, Japanese Section, SIS, Office of 
Chief Signal Officer. 

In charge, Intercept Section, SIS, Office of 
Chief Signal Officer. 

Principal Cryptanalyst Japanese Section, 
SIS, Office of Chief Signal Officer. 

Chief of Naval Operations. 

Asst., Chief of Naval Operations. 

Director, War Plans Division. 

Director of Naval Intelligence. 

Director of Naval Communications. 

Naval Aide to the President. 

Asst. Director of Naval Communications. 

Aide to the Secretary of the Navy. 

Op-20-G. In charge. Security Section, Naval 
Communications. 

Op-16-F2. In charge, Far Eastern Sect., 
Naval Intelligence. 

Op;-20-GX. In charge Intercept and Direc- 
tion Finding Section. 

Op-20-GZ. In charge. Translation and Dis- 
semination Section. (Actually attached to 
Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence.) 

Op-20-GY. In charge, Cryptanalytical Sec- 
tion. 

Watch Officer in Op-20-GY. 

Confidential Yeoman in Op-20-QZ. 



[9705] Senator Lucas. May I ask one question? Are those 
names you read those who are presumed to have seen the winds 
message ? 

Captain Safford. Seen or have been told about it; knew about it 
at the time. Whether they have forgotten it since I have no idea. 

Senator Lucas. I see. 

Mr. Richardson. You might indicate at this point which ones of 
these names according to your information actually saw this message 
that you say was the winds execute. 



3612 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Those that were in position to see it or that 
did see it. 

Mr. Richardson. That he knows saw it. 

Captain, I don't want the report, or anything, but I want your 
own knowledge as to which ones of these names saw it. 

Captain Safford. In this memorandum which I gave Commander 
Sonnett I only told him which ones knew about the winds message 
either before December 7 or shortly after. 

Mr. Richardson. Then you don't know of your own knowledge that 
any one of these persons so named ever actually saw the message? 

Mr. Keefe. Except Kramer, who he has testified gave him the 
message. 

[9706] Mr. Richardson. Wait just a minute 

Captain Safford. So far as direct evidence is concerned I have no 
knowledge that any of those people saw it. These are turned in as a 
list of prospective witnesses on the winds code. 

Mr. Richardson. You do know that Kramer saw it? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. That is the only one. 

Captain Safford. And I saw it. 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. 

Captain Safford. And I sent it to Admiral Noyes and the courier 
who took it up reported, "Message delivered." 

Mr. Richardson. Now, have you anything further ? 

Captain Safford. I have a great deal more. 

The Vice Chairman. Go right ahead from where you left off. 

Senator Ferguson. Will counsel inquire as to whether these ex- 
hibits he is now reading were turned over to Commander Sonnett? 

Captain Safford. These were all turned over on the days indicated. 
He talked to me about these things and asked me to write a complete 
statement to help him and Admiral Hewitt in the subsequent investi- 
gation conducted. They were not evidence. These were leads. Off 
the record and [9707] private examinations. 

Mr. Richardson. But all given to Sonnett ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; to help him and help Admiral Hewitt. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I wanted. 

Senator Lucas. Do I understand that just Kramer and yourself 
saw this message ? 

Mr. Richardson. That is of his own knowledge. 

Captain Safford. That I know from my own knowledge. 

Senator Lucas. McCoUum didn't see the message ? 

Captain Safford. I have no direct knowledge that McCollum ever 
saw it. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, in the statement he gives us he said 
they all had them delivered to them. He is only reading now the 
memorandum. 

Captain Safford. Yes; on this list were people who knew about it, 
not people who necessarily had copies. 

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead, Captain, read from the point you 
left off. 

Captain Safford (reading) : 

2. An element of confusion was caused by the Tokyo weather forecast or 
"false" winds message intercepted by the FCC at 2200 GCT, 4 December 1941, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3613 

and phones to Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood during the evening of 4 
December 1941. It is believed that certain [5708] officers attached to 
Op-20-G 

The Vice Chairman. Not quite so fast. 
Captain Safford (continuing) : 

in December 1941 had in mind the "false" vpinds message when they informed 
me that they knew of the "winds message". Their names are as follows : 
Lieutenant Commander G. W. Linn, U. S. N. R. 

Senator Lucas. Pull the microphone in front of you, please. 
Captain Safford (reading) : 

Lieutenant Commander F. M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R. 

Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering, U. S. N. R. 

Lieutenant F. L. Freeman, U. S. N. 

Ensign Wilmer Fox, U. S. N. 

The FCC interception of another winds execute message between 0002 and 
0035 (OCT), 8 December 1941, proves that the Japanese Government did use 
this system for broadcasting war warnings. 

3. There never has been any doubt in my mind that the winds execute message 
was broadcast from Tokyo two or three days prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor 
and forwarded to the Navy Department. The points in doubt, which I sought 
to clarify by sighting the incoming Japanese message (or its translation), were: 

[7909] (a) Exact date [i. e. December 4 (Thursday) or December 5 (Fri- 
day) 1941]. 

(b) Exact wording of the original Japanese broadcast. 

(c) Station call, time and frequency of the Japanese Radio Station which 
broadcast it. (This would reconcile "skip" phenomena.) 

(d) Whether received in voice or Morse code. 

(e) Station which intercepted the message. 

4. After receiving the winds "execute" message I discussed with Lieutenant 
Commander Welker (Op-20-GX) the advisability of discontinuing the special 
intercept watches being maintained to pick up the winds "execute". However, 
only two days previously we had translated Tokyo Circular #2409 (JD #6985) 
dated 27 November 1941 — setting up a system for sending out "Hidden Word 
Messages" (INGO DENPO) in event of strained relations. Although we expected 
these would come over regular commercial circuits (as proved the case on the 
morning of 7 December 1941 ) , we could not be sure, and it seemed advisable to 
continue the existing set-up which covered all possibilities (even though it 
meant the operators continuing their doubled-up watches), and required no fur- 
ther orders and no possibility of misunderstanding and confusion. It is my 
impression that Welker discussed the matter with Captain Schukraft, and 
[97^0] the Army made a similar decision. I have not discussed this with 
Welker since September 1942 and I have no idea how well he remembers this 
Incident. 

5. Somebody must have notified the War Department about the winds 
"execute" message because Colonel Bratton telephoned to Admiral Noyes and re- 
quested a copy of the original Japanese broadcast so that he could verify the 
translation. (This was customary in highly important intercepts). Admiral 
Noyes got quite indignant and told Colonel Bratton that the Navy's translation 
was correct and that the War Department would not be furnished a copy of 
the original message. 

Mr. Murphy. May I ask if you are now speaking of the actual in- 
tercept which you claim j^ou saw right there ? 

Captain Safford. Speaking of what account I could get of the 
winds message from people in the War Department, and this was not 
testimony, this was furnished as a lead. 

Mr. Richardson. But it referred to your winds execute message? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. All right. 

Captain Safford (reading) : 

The foregoing incident, If verified by Colonel Bratton, will prove that the 
winds "execute" got as far as Rear Admiral Noyes and 0-2. 



3614 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[9711] 6. There is one possible source of information on tlie winds message 
which has not been checked, namely — the Australian C. I. Organization. The 
Australians had a small C. I. Organization and in December 1941 they were 
intercepting Japanese diplomatic radio traffic and reading messages in the J-19 
system. (The Dutch in Java were also reading J-19, as well as the British in 
Singapore and London and the U. S. Army and Navy in Corregidor and Wash- 
ington.) The Australian C. I. Unit had liaison with the Singapore C. I. Unit, 
including exchange of translation and keys, except for tlie purple and red ma- 
chines. The winds "set-up" message (Tokyo Circulars #2353 (JD #6875) and 
#2354 (JD #6850), dated 19 November 1941) were in J-19. Singapore sent 
translations to Corregidor (CinCAF 281430 (COPEK) to OpNav) and undoubt- 
edly sent these same translations to Australia. The Australians may have 
intercepted the winds "execute" message on 4 December 1941. If so, this was 
the basis of Senator Fergu.son's "Australian War Warning" which received much 
publicity in December 1943. 

Mr. Murphy. Kead that again, please. 
Captain Satford (reading) : 

The Australians may have intercepted the winds "execute" message on 4 De- 
cember 1941. 

Mr. MuEPHY. Yes. 
Captain Satford (reading) : 

If so, this was the basis of Senator [9712] Ferguson's "Australian War 
Warning" which received much publicity in December 1943. 

Maybe is was 1944. 
Mr. Murphy. Senator Ferguson's Australian war warning? 
Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Keefe. You heard it the first time. 
Captain Safford (reading) : 

This hypothesis could be easily proved or dis-proved. 

And remember this is written in July 1945. 

Seantor Ferguson. Might I inquire whether or not that was to 
Australian Minister Dixon ? 

Captain Safford. That is what I was referring to, yes. 

Mr. Richardson, Go ahead. 

Captain Safford. I think I have a newspaper clipping of it. That 
is what I was referring to : 

This hypothesis could be easily proved or dis-proved. The following secret 
message to the Fleet Radio Radio Unit, Melbourne, is suggested : — 

And I have a proposed message from the Secretary of the Navy to 
that Unit in which they were being asked to contact the Australians and 
see if the Australians would tell them yes or no. I will quote the 
message if desired. 

Mr. Richardson. Quote it. 

Captain Safford (reading) : 

[9713] "From : Secretary of the Navy 
"To : Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne 

"Referring CINCAF Twentyeight Fourteen Thirty November Nineteen Forty- 
one and Tokyo circulars Twentythree Fiftythree and Twentythree Fiftyfour 
dated Nineteen November same year in JIG Nineteen did Australians intercept or 
know of such a warning broadcast from Tokyo on or about Four December 
Nineteen Fortyone X if affirmative forward by airmail certified transcript of 
broadcast as received with notation as to date X time X frequency X voice or 
Morse X call letters of transmitting station X location of intei-cepting station and 
other relevant data" 

7. Lieutenant Colonel Rowlett heard of the winds "execute" by office gossip 
a day or two before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor- A few days after the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3615 

attack Colonel Sadtler came to him and said, "I would like to see the winds 
message," or words to that effect. Rowlett referred him to Major Doud, in charge 
of the section, who in turn referred him to Colonel Minckler, the Chief of SIS. 
The rest of the story belongs to tlie Army Investigation rather than the Navy 
Investigation except for the fact that it furnishes further proof of the authenticity 
of the winds "execute" message and that some written record of it did exist in the 
War Department in December 1941. 

[9713A] 8. A complete exposition of radio wave propagation would be very 
lengthy and out of place. It is sufficient to say that tlie radio frequencies used 
between Japan and the United States were quite erratic in performance, and 
that long distance radio communications in an East-West direction are more 
difficult and less x'eliable than those in a North-South direction. A few pertinent 
examples can be given, namely: 

(a) Tlie long fourteen (14) part Tokyo Serial #902 (JD-1 #7143) was inter- 
cepted solid at Bainbridge Island, Washington. Part Two (of Tokyo Serial 
#902) and Tokyo Serial #904 (JD-1 #7144) were also copied at Cheltenham, 
Maryland, and forwarded to the Navy Department and used for the actual 
decryption. (This is verified in the GY Log for 6 December 1941.) The rest of 
Tokyo Serial #902 was "uncopyable" at Cheltenham. 

I would like to add after the memorandum, outside the memoran- 
dum, that that statement was possibly incorrect, but it was my recol- 
lection at the time. 

(b) Part Two of the very important three-part Tokyo to Berlin #985 (JD-1 
#6943) was missed but the first and third parts were copied solid. 

I would like to add, this is not in the memorandum, that both Cor- 
regidor and England missed, and we only have [9714] the 
first and third parts here. We received a copy from London as well as 
a copy from Corregidor. 

(c) We finally had to call on Corregidor to cover the Berlin-Tokyo circuits as 
the combined efforts of intercept stations in the East Coast, West Coast, Hawaii 
and England could not provide better than about fifty (50) percent coverage. 
During the period 1 December-7 December 1941, the Navy Department received 
seventy (70) Japanese diplomatic intercepts from Corregidor as compared with 
seventy-three (73) from Bainbridge Island, twenty (20) for all other U. S. Navy 
Stations, and ninety-three (93) for all U. S. Army stations. The Japanese were 
trying to reach Rio and Buenos Aires as well as San Francisco, Mexico City, and 
Washington. (See distribution of Tokyo Serial #2354). It is not at all sur- 
prising that the frequency used to reacli Washington, Rio, and Buenos Aires 
skipped over the West Coast and Hawaii. Tliere is a possibility that this fre- 
quency was heard in Australia even though it skipped over Manila, Singapore 
and Java. 

I would like to add also, off the memorandum, that this is written 
many months ago, when I did not have information which I now have. 

9. There is one final place where written confirmation of the winds "execute" 
message may exist — the Record of [97151 Proceedings of the Roberts 
Commission. I cannot believe that they could cover up so completely that some 
mention of the winds "execute" did not slip into the record. First they said I 
didn't know what was going on around me; now they claim I am suffering from 
hallucinations. Under the circumstances it is only fair that I be permitted to 
search through the record for such evidence in oi'der to prove my sanity, as well 
as my intelligence and my veracity. 

10. In conclusion the following quotation from my .secret memorandum to 
Colonel West, dated 2 October 1944, is submitted for consideration : 

Mr. Richardson. Just one moment. Captain. Was there a memor- 
andum that you gave to Colonel West ? 
Captain Safford. There was a memorandum. 
Mr. Richardson. Have you a copy of that memorandum? 
Captain Saftord. I believe I can find a copy. 



3616 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Richardson. Will you produce it so that we may see it, if you 
can ? You don't need to do it now. 

Captain Safford. I will later. fReading::! 

"The reason for my stressing the 'winds message' so much in my testimony 
(in all three cases) is because we could afford to talk about it, even print it in 
the newspaper, without detriment to the war effort. Even the Dutch knew of 
the code and the FCC listened for the message. [9716] We had the same 
information — at the same time — from more secret but less dramatic sources. 
Also the 'winds set-up' was the nearest thing to a warning CINCPAC ever got. 
If the 'winds execute' had been heard at Pearl Harbor, the fleet would not have 
been surprised. And because CINCPAC was given no information that the 
'winds execute' had been sent, everybody at Pearl Harbor believed it had not 
been sent and that the Japs were still making up their minds as to the next 
step." 

Mr. Murphy. There is still more ? 

Captain Safford. That is the end of that memorandum on the 
winds message, which is official and before the investigation given to 
Mr. Sonnett to help him and Admiral Hewitt get leads for their 
investigation. 

The Vice Chairman. What else do you have ? 

Mr. Richardson. Have you finished with that statement? 

Captain Safford. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. Have you some other memorandums ? 

Captain Safford. The other memorandums do not have a bearing 
on the winds message. 

Mr. Richardson. Let me ask you this : You prefaced this reading 
with a statement that efforts had been made to silence you and in- 
fluence you. Have you any other record of any kind, manner of de- 
scription, that shows or tends to [9717] show or relates to any 
pressure or influence exerted upon you or towards you to get you to 
change your testimony or give no testimony ? 

Captain Safford. This has been the only time and it was before 
the investigation. Not during the investigation. I want to make 
that very distinct. 

Mr. Richardson. Then you have no more to add to what you have 
read ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct, 

Mr. Richardson. Now, after you wrote that and gave that to Son- 
nett you were examined before Admiral Hewitt ? 

Captain Safford. I was examined before Admiral Hewitt. 

Mr. Richardson. And you were given an opportunity to testify 
fully and completely on every subject that you wanted to? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And you were sworn on that testimony ? 

Captain Safford. I was sworn on that testimony. 

Mr. Richardson. And after the testimony was taken and tran- 
scribed, you read it and signed it, did you not? 

Captain Safford. I do not believe that I ever read it or was given 
the opportunity to verify it. 

Mr. Richardson. Have you ever read it since ? 

Captain Safford. I have read it since. 

[9718] Mr. Richardson. It is correct, is it not. Captain ? 

Captain Safford. It is correct with a few minor errors in typing 
where they left out some words. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3617 

Mr. Richardson, Oh, I see. But generally speaking 

Captain Safford. General speaking it is correct. 

Mr. Richardson (continuing). It was a correct report? 

Captain Safford. That is right. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain 

Mr. Keefe. May we understand what these other items are that are 
attached to this so-called exhibit that he has there? He says it does 
not have reference to the winds code but it may have quite a bearing 
on this case. They are part of the same exhibit. 

The Vice Chairman. Captain, tell us 

Captain Safford. Could I explain them? 

The Vice Chairman. Tell us as plainly and as completely as you 
can what the other papers are that you have in your hand in addition 
to what you have read to the committee? 

Captain Safford. I believe there were two conflicting Intelligence 
reports, one sent on the 26th of November 1941, one was sent from 
the Fourteenth District at Pearl Harbor and the other from the 
Sixteenth District at Manila, this concerning the question or the 
possibility of Japanese carriers in the Mandated Islands. They did 
not agree. 

[9719] This is a long dissertation on that giving my impression 
or evaluation of it for their benefit. I was also asked to explain what 
the commandant Sixteenth District meant when he said, "All known 
first and second fleet carriers." That is the number and their identity. 

The Vice Chairman. That is the contents of the second memoran- 
dum after the point w^here you stopped reading? 

Captam Safford. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. Then tell us what the next is. Each additional 
paper that you have in your hand, tell us what it is. 

Mr. Murphy. May we find out how many pages there are on the 
carriers? 

Captain Safford. Six pages. 

Mr. Murphy. You say there are only six between what you read 
and what you have there in your hand, you mean there are only six 
pages there? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. It is that one [indicating]. 

Mr. Murphy. Oh, I see. 

Captain Safford. It was the one I just read. 

Mr. Murphy. All right. Captain, excuse me. 

Captain Safford. On the 5th of December 1941 

The Vice Chairman. Well, now, what is this — a memo- [9720] 
randum ? 

Captain Safford. This is the evaluation of the "UTU" broadcasts. 

The Vice Chairman. This is a memorandum from you ? 

Captain Safford. It is a memorandum of eight pages from me to 
Mr. Sonnett. 

The Vice Chairman. From you to whom, please? 

Captain Safford. To Lieutenant Commander Sonnett. 

The Vice Chairman. All right ; give us an idea of what is in it. 

Captain Safford. Dated the 19th of May 1941 and it is my evalua- 
tion 

Mr. Murphy. May I just inquire, Mr. Chairman? The six pages 
on the carriers was also given to Sonnett ? 



3618 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Smtord. That was also given to him. 

Mr. Murphy. All right. 

Mr. Richardson. Go ahead. 

The Vice Chairman. Tell us what these eight pages are that you 
have before you now ? 

Captain Safford. On the 5th of December 1941 the commandant 
Fourteenth Naval District reported to the commandant Sixteenth 
District and Chief of Naval Operations by a message identified as 
052220 : 

UTU's are being sent by HA FU 6 (Tokyo Radio) [9721] on 32 kilo- 
cycles instead of 39 kcs as before — 

and there had been a lot of discussion. I explained it all to Mr. 
Sonnett and then he asked me to give him a complete writeup, as much 
as I could tell him about it, which I did. 

The Vice Chairman. And what does this relate to now ? 

Captain Safford. Tokyo normally broadcast messages to the fleet 
on 39 kilocycles. On the 5th of December 1941 they suddenly dis- 
continued their 39 kilocj^cles and opened up on 32. 

The Vice Chairman. And that is what this eight-page memoran- 
dum is ? 

Captain Safford. This is all about what significance that might 
have had as a war warning or as regards Japanese intentions of a 
naval war. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, Mr. Chairman, I think that it is important that 
we go into that for the reason that the Captain in his statement said 
that the codes were changed on December 4. 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. He now says that there was a change on December 5. 

Captain Safford. In the broadcasting frequency. 

Mr. Murphy. All right, and the naval narrative says 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, that is not a correct state- [97221 
ment of the witness, that he testified to a change in code. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I move that we proceed in order. 

Mr. Murphy. I am taking it from the statement of the witness. 
So far as I know the witness is now referring to December 5. 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. In his statement he refers to December 4. 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. And the naval narrative refers to December 1 on the 
change of signals. I think we ought to have it shown. 

The Vice Chairman. Do you request that this eight-page memo- 
randum be read ? 

Mr. Murphy. I request that it be examined over the noon hour by 
counsel to see whether or not it is of help to the committee. 

The Vice Chairinian. Without objection, it will be so ordered. 
Now, what is the next, Captain ? 

Captain Safford. The final memorandum was a one-page memo- 
randum from myself to Commander Sonnett dated 21 May 1945 con- 
cerning the Tatuta Maru and the American passenger ship President 
Madison. 

The circumstances of that were there had been a lot of, \9723'\ 
I believe newspaper talk, possibly something elsewhere, that the Jap- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3619 

anese had sent the Tatuta Maru over as a kind of a spy, a decoy, and 
that we had been taken in with it and I just brought out that they 
had arranged it long in advance, they had clearance from the State 
Department, that everything was in proper order and that no sig- 
nificance could have attached to this whatever, to this trip of the 
Tatuta Maru^ so far as I could see. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, does that complete either a reading or a 
description of all the papers that you have there before you? 

Captain Safford. Those were all that were referenced in this memo- 
randum. I had some additional papers clipped together for con- 
venience, so that they would not get displaced. I will hand them in 
if you care to have me to. 

The Vice Chairman. Wliat is that now? 

Captain Safford. I had some additional papers clipped to this other 
bunch for convenience so they would not get displaced. 

Mr. Richardson. Where are those papers that were clipped ? What 
were they ? 

Captain Safford. I have a memorandum addressed to Admiral 
Hewitt dated June 22, 1945, correcting some of my previous testimony 
before him, where I had slipped and said [97^4] things which 
were not quite correct and I was able to verify it on the spot and turn 
it in so that my testimony would be corrected. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, I think you had better read that memo- 
randum. It was addressed to Admiral Hewitt? 

Captain Safford. It was addressed to Admiral Hewitt. 

The Vice Chairman. About your testimony? 

Captain SaFford. About my testimony. 

The Vice Chairman. All right, read it, please, sir. 

Captain Safford (reading) : 

SECEET 

22 JUNE 1945. 
Memorandum -for Admiral Heioitt 
Subj : Pearl Harbor Investigation. 
Ref : (a) My testimony given this date. 

1. I now recall that Lieut. Commander Brotherhood told me that he did not 
receive a written copy of the "False" Winds Message from the F. C. C, but merely 
received the information by telephone. The only written version of the "False" 
Winds Message we ever had prior to 1944 was a memorandum of the phone call 
in Brotherhood's handwriting. Only one significant word (North) appeared and 
it was in English. It was this memorandum that Kramer threw in the "burn 
bag" after [9725] telling Brotherhood that this was not what we were 
looking for. 

2. The Winds "Execute" Message which passed through my hands on the 
morning of 4 December 1941 was a teletype copy (typed on yellow teletype 
paper) of the entire Japanese broadcast about 200 or 300 words long. Three 
significant words (Kita, Higashi, and Nishi) appeared and they were in Japanese. 
Kramer's translation appeared in pencil, or colored crayon, at the bottom of the 
sheet. There was very little chance of confusion. 

3. I would like to make one correction in the testimony I gave today : 

"Mr. Phillip Gate, Japanese translator, employed by the Navy Department is 
still alive. It was his brother, employed as a Japanese translator by the War 
Department, who died a few weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor." 
Respectfully, 

L. F. Safford, 
Captain, U. S. Navy. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. What else is there ? 
Mr. Richardson, What is the date of that memo ? 

79716 — 46— pt. 8 17 



3620 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Safford. That is the 22d of June 1945. 

[9726] Mr. KicHARDSON. And that was to Sonnett? 

Captain Safford. No, that was to Admiral Hewitt. 

Mr. Richardson. Oh, yes, I see. 

Captain Safford. That was referring to 

Mr. BiCHARDSON. 22d of what? 

Captain Safford. June. He will have that with his papers. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

The Vice Chairman. 22d of June 1945 ? 

Captain Safford. Yes. In going over it afterward I realized that 
possibly my answers had not been clear or correct in one case, where 
I had him alive, Cate, and I was simply trying to make minor cor- 
rections in the testimony I had given. 

The Vice Chairman. I think we understand your reasons for the 
memorandum. Now, what is the next ? 

Captain Safford. The other, the final one is a memorandum of a 
conversation with Mr. Walter Foote at the State Department on 
Wednesday, May 30, 1945, and I have a note, "Not given to Admiral 
Hewitt or Lieutenant Sonnett," but I did discuss it with them and I 
gave a very, very brief summary of this memorandum, which I believe 
is contained in the record of the Hewitt investigation. 

Mr. Walter Foote was the American Consul General at [9727] 
Batavia who sent one of the winds code messages and he was in touch 
with the situation. 

When he came back to the United States I talked with him to see 
if he could recall any further information on the subject. Mr. Foote 
said that he was positive that the Dutch in Java had not received the 
execute on the winds message. 

The Vice Chairman. And that is what is covered in that statement? 

Captain Safford. No, this is a part of it ; that is the substance of it. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Captain Safford. And it was in the Hewitt report. 

The Vice Chairman. That was a memorandum from you? 

Captain Safford. That was a memorandum of me to myself just 
so I would not forget what Mr. Foote had said on the subject. 

The Vice Chairman. It was not given to Sonnett or Hewitt ? 

Captain Safford. It was taken in and they merely asked me to 
take it and condense it in one paragraph in my testimony, which I did. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. What else can you think of? 

Captain Safford. The other papers here are merely cop- [9728] 
ies of the various circulars and forms of the winds code to refresh 
my memory. 

The Vice Chairman. What do you mean by "circulars and copies''? 

Captain Safford. Tokyo circular 2353, 2354. 

Mr. Richardson. Just copies of those exhibits ? 

Captain Safford. Copies of those exhibits. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Anything else ? 

Captain Safford. That is all. 

The Vice Chairman. That is all, all right. Please go on now. 
Please hand that to counsel so they may examine the part they were 
requested to examine. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I think this is important and I ask 
that all of the papers from which the witness read be made an ex- 
hibit and that we have an exact copy of those papers. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3621 

The Vice Chairman. Well, of course, all that he read has gone 
ill the transcript of the record. 

Mr. Murphy. All that he read and quoted from here is in the 
record. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, counsel has been requested to ex- 
amine the other parts that he did not read and when he reports to 
us on that we will be prepared to pass on that question, I imagine. 

[9729'] Mr. Murphy. I am just being thorough, I think 
counsel ought to examine what was read in connection with what we 
actually heard here and see if we have all of the papers in the record 
that are in the group. 

Mr. Richardson. I do not care, Mr. Chairman, to raise any ques- 
tion that the Captain has read his records correctly. I am perfectly 
willing to examine them but I do not raise any question but what 
he read them correctly and the record has all of them in, unless there 
is a point to the Congressman's point that if these were in an exhibit 
they would be a little easier of examination by the committee possibly 
as a unit than to follow it through the transcript. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, probably it might be helpful to have 
them as exhibits so that we might have them together. You can have 
it mimeographed for us and furnish it to the committee. Without 
objection then that will be done. 

Now, I would think that the reporter might want to refer to the 
part that the Captain read because there were a great many names 
and some Japanese words that most any reporter might have diffi- 
culty in getting exactly right, so, Captain, will you please hand them 
over to counsel ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Counsel will proceed. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question of [9730] 
the Captain? 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas. 

Senator Lucas. Are these some of your personal papers, part of 
your personal files that you are reading from now? 

Captain Safford. This is a part of my personal records which I 
have made up in connection with these investigations from the be- 
ginning. 

Senator Lucas. But do you care to have them at some time returned 
to you ? 

Captain Safford. I do not care to have them returned. That is 
final, I hope. 

The Vice Chairman. We hope so, too. All right, counsel may 
proceed. 

Mr. Richardson. Our hopes synchronize on that last, Captain. 

Two things came to my attention as you read. You have no doubt 
that the Dutch stations did not get any execute of the winds message. 

Captain Safford. I have it from two sources now; an officer who 
was there serving in liaison with the Dutch and Mr. Foote. 

Mr. Richardson. And they both said they did not get it? 

Captain Saiford. And they both said they did not get it. 

Mr. Richardson. And that station did get the original [9731] 
winds message ? 



3622 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Satford. They knew about the original message, either got 
it direct or possibly the British sent it to them or we presumed they 
got it themselves. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, a second thing that caught my attention 
was that in one of these documents that you wrote for your own ref- 
erence you said that the message that came in had the single words 
"HIGASHI NISHI" and something else. Now, there is no doubt in 
your mind, is there, that the execute message you saw had the three 
groups of Japanese words that are contained in 2353, with the excep- 
tion of the negative being applied to Russia ? 

Captain Sattord. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

Captain Safford. I was trying to clarify the question of misinter- 
pretation of one of those compass directions which were the governing 
things. 

The Vice Chairman. If counsel permits an interruption, the Cap- 
tain states that in his written statement on page 12. 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, in circular 2353 the emergency 
which gave birth to the desire for the new code, winds code, is recited 
as "the danger of cutting off of our diplomatic relations and the cut- 
ting off of international [9732] communications," is it not? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. That would mean, would it not, that the Japanese 
felt that there might come a time when because of the status of their 
diplomatic relations and their international communications that they 
would have to have some new way of communicating and to furnish 
that new way they invented this so-called winds code ? 

Captain Saffdrd. This so-called winds code which was to be used 
there by their broadcasts and not by the commercial telegraph com 
panics. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, it is a fact, is it not. Captain, that on 
the 4th of December all of the methods of communication were open 
to the Japanese that had been open at any time since the 1st of Janu- 
ary 1941, were they not ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. So there wasn't au}^ reason on the basis of a, loss 
of other methods of communication on December 4th to use this winds 
code at all, was there ? 

Captain Safford. There was no reason that you could account for 
but we had been listening for it from the 28th of November and we 
had made every effort to get it. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, keeping in mind your testimony that the 
message which Lieutenant Kramer brought to you was in [9733] 
Japanese and in that message, in the middle of that message were 
the phrases in Japanese which are used as 1, 2, and 3 and mentioned 
in circular 2353, keeping that in mind can you point to any record 
then in existence of which either you or Kramer had any knowledge 
that interpreted or translated those words as meaning war? 

Captain Safford. War was the meaning that we gave it and war 
was what appeared in the translation, whether justified or not. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3623 

Mr. Richardson. All right. Except for the written words that 
Lieutenant Commander Kramer put on this dispatch there is no known 
writing emanating from Japan or any other source at that time that 
puts the interpretation on the language "HIGASHI NA KAZEAME" 
as meaning war with the United States, is there? 

Captain Safford. If that word had appeared alone it might have 
merely meant the breaking off of diplomatic relations, they might 
have meant n6thing else. 

Mr. Rtchardsox. Now, Captain, you pay attention to my question. 
I want to find out whether you can put your finger on any existing 
authority that up to the time you saw the message interpreted the 
phrase "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME" to mean war with the United 
States? 

Now, let me carry it further. The message from the [97S4.'\ 
Commander of the Asiatic Fleet does not so say, does it? 

Captain Safford. Not for "Higashi", and so forth. 

Mr. Richardson. And the message 2353 does not so say, does it? 

Captain Safford. No. 

Mr. Richardson. And you did not have the Foote or Thorpe mes- 
sages available at 8 o'clock on the morning of December 4, did you? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. So that so far as you know the definition of those 
words that appeared on that message that morning was the invention 
of Lieutenant Commander Kramer ? 

Captain Safford. I would not call it that. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, it was the act of Lieutenant Commander 
Kramer. 

Captain Safford. I would say that all the higher authority — ■ — 

Mr. Richardson. Now, wait a minute, I am speaking about this 
specific message when it was brought to you by Lieutenant Com- 
mander Kramer and I want to know what authority he had, if you 
know, for translating the phrase "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME'' as 
meaning war with the United States? 

Captain Safford. I do not know now what authority he [973S] 
had for using those words. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. And it was the first time in your whole 
life up to that point that you had ever seen the word "War" used 
as a part of the definition of the words "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME"? 

Captain Safford. In written form, correct. 

Mr. Richardson. That is right. But when this yellow sheet was 
brought to you with Lieutenant Commander Kramer's notation on it 
he had written out, as I understand it, "War with the United States" 
in English ? 

Mr. Richardson. Are you sure about that, Captain ? 

Captain Safford. As sure as I can be about anything when I first 
recorded it in writing at the end of 2 years. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, was that point, Captain, one of the 
things which you said was very hazy in your mind when you com- 
menced to remembering in the fall of 1943 under your testimony 
that I have read to you ? Was that one of the points that was very 
hazy in your mind as to just what that interpretation of Lieutenant 
Commander Kramer read ? 

Captain Safford. I wanted verification of my memory that he used 
the actual word "war." That was the only word that I could re- 
member. 



3624 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Richardson. But you remembered the word "war" ? 

[9736] Captain Safford. Rather than merely the weaker form, 
"Relations in danger." 

Mr. Richardson. Well, the form "Relations in danger" would be a 
good deal weaker, wouldn't it. Captain ? 

Captain Safford. It would be very much weaker. 

Mr. Richardson. It would be right along the line of the various 
messages that had been going back and forth for several days, wouldn't 
it? 

Captain Safford. That is correct, as far as the wording is con- 
cerned. 

Mr. Richardson. You knew that the Japanese-United States rela- 
tions were in danger? 

Captain Safford. We had known that for 3 months. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, after you saw the message, the yellow 
message that had the written words on it from Lieutenant Commander 
Kramer, you sent that to Admiral Noyes ? 

Captain Safford. I sent it up to Admiral Noyes exactly as it was. 

Mr. Richardson. And who took it up to Admiral Noyes? 

Captain Safford. One of the officers serving under me, and I cannot 
be certain who it was. It was probably Lieutenant Howes. 

Mr. Richardson. Lieutenant who? 

Captain Safford, Howes. 

[97S7] Mr. Richardson. Spell it. 

Captain Safford. H-o-w-e-s. The natural presumption Would be 
that Kramer or Morey had taken it up there but both of them said they 
did not, and I should think their memory on that is better than mine. 

Mr. Richardson. Then your idea as to who took it up is just a guess 
on your part at this time ? 

Captain Safford. I stated in my written statement it was taken 
up by one of the officers serving under me ; I did not take it up myself, 
and I received a report from him "Message delivered." 

Mr. Richardson. But you have no recollection what officer it was? 

Captain Safford. I cannot be certain which of about five officers, 
who might have taken it up, actually took it up. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, give us the names of the five officers, one 
of whom must have taken it up. 

Captain Safford. From memory it was Howes — I can give you the 
initials later — Peterson, Densford, Clark, or White — P. R. White, 
Paul R. White. 

Their names and present stations are : 

Commander Robert L. Densford, U. S. N., staff, commander in chief, 
Pacific Fleet, headquarters Pearl Harbor, Hawaiian Islands. 

[97S8] Commander William C. Howes, USNR, 142 Southwest 
Seventeenth Court, Miami, Fla. I believe that he has been demobil- 
ized. 

Lieutenant Commander Frederick A. Peterson, Jr., USNR, South- 
borough, Mass. He has also been demobilized. 

Commander C. F. Clark, USNR, Pearl Harbor, T. H. 

And finally Lieutenant Commander Paul R. White, USNR, who is 
on duty in Naval Communications in Washington. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, as I understand it this was a list of the 
possible persons who might have been the one who took the paper to 
Admiral Noyes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3625 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, he said, as I understood him, one of 
those named would have. 

Captain S^^fford. One of those named. 

The Vice Chairman. Would have had to have taken it to Admiral 
Noyes ? 

Captain Safford. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Richardson. One thing further I neglected to call to your at- 
tention in circular 2853 and that is the notation toward the end, 
"When this is heard, please destroy all code papers." 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. You are familiar with that? 

[97S9] Captain Safford. Very definitely; I was familiar with 
that. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, as a matter of fact, Captain, before this 
message was received there had been a series of messages sent out by 
Japanese by other methods of communication all over the world di- 
recting the destruction of codes ? 

Captain Safford, That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. So there wasn't any reason to use this message on 
December 4 for that purpose either, was there ? 

Captain Safford. Not for just t^e destruction of codes. 

Mr. Richardson. I see. 

Mr. Gearhart, But there was a purpose indicated by you in your 
original statement, was there not ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr, Gearhart. The British had destroyed their codes. There were 
no Japanese codes in London. This is the only way they had of in- 
forming the Japanese at London that something was imminent? 

Captain Safford. That is correct, and the same situation existed at 
Singapore and Hong Kong. 

Mr. Richardson, I would like at this point, in view of the interroga- 
tion of the Congressman, to advise the committee that under date of 
January 31, 1946, we have a memorandum from the War Department 
reading as follows : 

[9740] Pursuant to your request the War Department has made inquiry of 
the British concerning the number of coded messages sent by the Japanese repre- 
sentatives in London subsequent to December 2, 1941. 

The War Department has been informed that two coded messages were sent 
by the Japanese represenatives in London on the 3rd of December 1941 and one 
coded message on the 5th of December 1941 and one coded message sent on the 
6th of December 1941 and all four messages were sent on the code system known 
as PA-K2— 

indicating that coded messages were proceeding to England both be- 
fore and after December 4, 

[9741] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may we request that we 
have produced the memorandum which the witness acquired 2 weeks 
ago ? If there was information made available to him 2 weeks, I think 
it should be produced at this time. 

Mr, Gearhart. May I inquire of counsel? I am interested in it 
very, very much. If that is true, as reported by the British, it merely 
means the British Ambassador had violated the instructions and had 
not destroyed his codes; isn't that right? 

Mr. Richardson. I am not going into the implication. 



3626 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Saptord. May I explain that? 

There were two systems that were exempt from destruction. One 
was PA-K2, and the other was LA, neither of which were considered 
by ourselves as secret, and we presumed the Japanese did not consider 
them secret. 

Mr. EicHARDSON. The only point, Captain, involved in it would be 
there was still a method open to the Japanese to communicate with 
the British outside of the winds code. 

Captain Safford. Yes, but not to communicate secretly. I used that 
word "secretly" in my statement. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is the point. 

Senator Lucas. Does the counsel now know what messages went 
from Japan? 

Mr. Richardson. I read everything that the War Department 
[97^] gave us. 

What is the system known as PA-K2 ? 

Captain Safford. That is a minor system which had been in effect 
for a very long time, and was used for matters of negligible importance, 
but they presumably wanted to keep up with the newspapers, minor 
money matters, visas, things like that. 

I believe there were only three or four PA-K2 messages that had 
ever been submitted in evidence before this investigation and that 
were sent by Pearl Harbor after Pearl Harbor had destroyed its 
J-19 system, and I do not — I won'^go into that. 

Mr. Richardson. Are you sure, Captain, that you are correct when 
you say that important messages were not sent in this code PA-K2 ? 

Captain Safford. Until after Pearl Harbor had destroyed its J'-19 
system, which really had some security . 

Mr. Richardson. Let me read you from Exhibit 2, page 29, which 
is a message that went from Honolulu to Tokyo on December 6, 1941. 
It is No. 254. 

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were 

and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor 

on the 6th : 

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, [9743] 17 destroy- 
ers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the 
heavy cruisers and air plane cai-riers have all left). 

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the Fleet 
air arm. 

That would be a rather important message, would it not. Captain ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct, and that message was sent after 
the Japanese Consulate had destroyed its J-19 system. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, there was in existence, between Honolulu 
and Tokyo, after the winds code had been promulgated and after the 
codes had been directed to be destroyed, a method of communicating 
under PA-K2 that took care of important messages, was there not? 

Captain Safford. There was not. 

Mr. Richardson. There was not? 

Captain Safford. PA-K2 was specifically exempt from destruc- 
tion by the orders telling them to destroy the other things. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. It was in existence, wasn't it ? 

Captain Safford. There was a code of a very low security sub- 
stantially no better than plain language, which [9744] they 
had, and could use. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3627 

Mr. KiCHARDSON. Just forget the low security for a moment. The 
code was in existence, wasn't it? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And it was in use, was it not ? 

Captain Safford. It was in use by one man. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, it was in use, was it not? 

Captain Safford. It was in use at one station. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, we only live once. It was in use by one 
station, then ? 

Captain Safford. Correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And that man at that one station could send in 
that code to Tokyo ? 

Captain Safford. Correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And he could send important messages to Tokyo ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there any reason that London could not send 
under that code to Tokyo? 

Captain Safford, But Tokyo was not sending anything important 
to London in that code, or to Honolulu. 

Mr. Richardson. Let us not go into that. Let us inquire whether 
it was possible for London to use that code for communicating with 
Tokyo. 

[974s] Captain Safford. It was physically possible. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

Now, do you see anything particularly exciting in a code that only 
broadcasts the weather message? Is not that a very low degree of 
secret information? 

Captain Safford. That was set up in what the Japanese considered 
one of the high security systems, their second level of security. 

Mr. Richardson. Then it is your idea, is it, that the Japanese, in 
promulgating a weather report, a daily weather report in the ordinary 
news broadcast, was putting it into their most difficult code in order 
to convince them that it was an ordinary weather broadcast ? Is that 
your testimony? 

Captain Safford. Not at all. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, wherein do not we agree ? 

Captain Safford. I do not follow you, that is all, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. What I am interested in is this. It was my idea 
of the winds code, Captain, that it was to be used to deceive other 
nations, because the broadcasting of weather infomiation in a news 
broadcast was relatively unimportant, and by injecting certain key 
words in that message you could use the humble method of a news 
broadcast [9746] to convey very important information. 

Now, was that right? 

Captain Safford. That is not correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, all right. Give me your explanation. 

Captain Safford. The Japanese Government had been sending 
these news broadcasts to its stations overseas, diplomatic posts, for 
several .months. They were always copied; they knew they could be 
heard, and therefore if they wanted to send a message not through 
any commercial channels and be certain it would not be held up by 
censorship or delayed purposely, as sometimes happens, to be abso- 
lutely certain of it, they could include a war warning message or any- 



3628 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

thing else of that nature in one of their own news broadcasts, which 
they controlled. 

They could not afford to send it out in plain language, that "we are 
going to have war," they had to give it a somewhat disguised form 
which could be understood when received. 

Mr. Richardson. Why would they put it in a weather message? 

Captain Safford. Because that is merely the form that they hap- 
pened to choose for it. If we had merely the word "higashi" and the 
rest of it, and had not had the translation of these messages, we would 
not have had the slightest idea [9747] what they were talking 
about. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, the witness has said this could be 
translated easily, as I understand it, the one sent from Honolulu to 
Tokyo. I think it is important, since it says : 

it appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the Fleet air arm. 

I do not see why it could not have been translated before December 8. 
It is of the utmost importance. 

Mr. Richardson. I did not get your point. 

Mr. Murphy. It was sent out on the 6th, and not translated until 
the 8th, and it says 

it appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the Fleet air arm. 

That was an important message from Honolulu to Tokyo, so why 
was not it translated before the 8th? 

[974s] Mr. Richardson. Well, my associate suggests to me that 
that is an Army translation. 

Mr. Murphy. He said it is easy. It is one of the most important 
messages. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, you can take it up with him. 

Now, Captain, will you turn 

Senator Lucas, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we let counsel pro- 
ceed in order so as not to interrupt his train of thought. 

The Vice Chairman. Yes ; I think it is better if counsel proceeds. 

Go ahead, Counsel. 

Mr. Richardson. Captain, let me call your attention to document 
No. 4—3 (d) of Exhibit 142. 

Captain Safford. That is what? 

Mr. Richardson. It is 3 (d). 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Entitled "Document No. 4." 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, referring back to 2353, what did "West 
Wind Clear" mean when translated under the Japanese phrase, ac- 
cording to 2353 ? 

Captain Safford. According to the full and correct translation of 
2353, it meant Japan-British relations in- [9749] eluding in- 
vasion of Thailand and occupation of Malay and the Netherlands 
East Indies. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, turning to document 4, that you have there, 
have you not, a full admitted execute of the winds message 2353, 
don't you ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3629 

Mr. KiCHABDSoN. And the words "West Winds Clear" are repeated 
twice? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. At the end of the document? 

Captain Safford. It would appear they were repeated twice in the 
middle of the document rather than the end. 

Mr. Richardson. Did that message "Document No. 4" — did that 
look anything like the message that you saw on the morning of 
December 7? 

Captain Safford. No, sir ; because this was a transcript of a voice 
broadcast, and what I saw was the Morse broadcast. 

Mr. Richardson. Then the only actual execute that we all agree 
was sent, didn't look anything like the message that Kramer handed 
to you on the morning of December 4, did it ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, you have been very much concerned about 
this wind execute, haven't you. Captain, for a number [9760] 
of years? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. You made a great many inquiries? 

Captain Safford. I have. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you know a single intercepting station on the 
face of the earth that has ever reported it received a wind-code execute, 
except the one, document No. 4, that came from Japan on December 8 ? 

Captain Safford. I know of my own personal knowledge that it 
was received from one of the east-coast intercept stations, and shown 
to me shortly after 8 or shortly before 9 o'clock on Thursday, December 
4, 1941. 

At the time I, within a few months, I could have named the station. 
Later on that detail slipped my memory. I discussed the matter after- 
ward with Welker and we remarked how fortunate it had been that 
we had made a careful study of the proposition and it seemed that 
our best chances for interception were on the east coast of the United 
States rather than the west coast. If we, like the Army, had failed 
to monitor for it on the east coast of the United States, we never would 
have received it at all. 

Mr. Richardson. You have covered that. You said that in some 
detail. But conceding the correctness of your analysis, that is the 
only single station on earth that you [9751] claim picked up 
this execute winds broadcast? 

Captain Safford. I do not know what provisions the English may 
have made to monitor for this message in London and whether there 
were in England any operators capable of copying the Japanese Morse 
code. They had such operators at Singapore and Singapore was 
listening for the winds code, but I have been assured by a British 
officer who was in Singapore at the time Pearl Harbor was attacked, 
and who later came to Washington, that the British listened in vain 
for the winds message at Singapore, and when the attack at Pearl 
Harbor did come, they were just as much surprised as we were. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. Captain. 

Again I say — we have that in your statement. I repeat my question : 

Do you know of any station on the face of the earth that has ever 

reported to anybody, you or anybody else, that they received a wind 



3630 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

execute message prior to the one on December 8 except what you now 
testify with reference to Cheltenham, the Cheltenham station? 

Please answer that question directly, Captain. 

Captain Saffgrd. None, except Cheltenham station. 

Mr. Richardson. You are familiar with the documents contained 
in exhibit 142, are you ? 

Captain Safford. I am. 

[97S3] Mr. Richardson. You know that they indicate, in the 
reports given by the British, that they have intercepted, they found 
no record of the intercept of a winds execute ? 

Captain Safford. That is possibly true. 

Mr. Richardson. And you found out that the Dutch hadn't, when 
you talked to the representative of the Dutch Government? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, let's go into this Cheltenham matter for 
just a minute. When you testified in the Hart hearing you testified 
that you didn't know what station in the east got the message, didn't 
you? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, when j^ou testified before the naval board 
you testified you didn't know what station got the message? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And you told the reason why you couldn't find 
it, didn't you, before the naval board ^ 

Captain Safford. I also told Admiral Hart, but he didn't include 
it in the record because he thought it was irrelevant. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, you said before the naval board that the 
reason j^ou couldn't get the message was because all the records had 
been destroyed ? 

\9753] Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Then at the Hewitt hearing, less than a year ago, 
you testified that you didn't know what station got it, but you gave 
first guess to Cheltenham or Winter Harbor because they had better 
facilities ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, have you got any record from the Chelten- 
ham station that shows that this wind execute message that came into 
Washington and came to you from Kramer on the morning of De- 
cember 4 was ever received at the Cheltenham station ? 

Captain Safford. There is no existing record because all the in- 
tercepted messages for that period have been destroyed and cannot 
be located in spite of repeated search for more than 2 years now. 

Mr. Richardson. Then you don't know any more about what sta- 
tion intercepted the message today than you did when you started to 
make up your memory test in the fall of 1942, do you ? 

Captain Safford. I know a great deal more now. 

Mr. Richardson. What more information have you had? 

Captain Safford. About 2 weeks ago I was given access, or one of 
the officers under me was given access and permitted to read the reports 
from the stations at Winter Harbor, [9754] Maine, and at 
Cheltenham, Md., for the months of November and December 1941. 
Where they had been before I don't know. I had requested them 2 
years ago and was informed they could not be located. The inter- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3631 

cepted messages are still missing. We have nothing but the reports. 
We did not tell the operators what to listen for. They did not know 
anything about the winds message. We merely told them to copy ev- 
erything on the schedules and forward them to us. 

The operator who did get the winds message never knew and was 
never told because we were afraid there would be a leak. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, Captain, what you are telling me is this, if 
I understand, you are proving conclusively that you have no evidence 
that the message was ever received at Cheltenham; isn't that the re- 
sult of it? 

Captain Saftord. There is 

Mr. Richardson. I am not objecting to it. I simply want to know 
if you have any evidence tliat Cheltenham got this message. 

Captain Saftord. There is no evidence in existence now that Chelten- 
ham actually got that message. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. Then your information as to what sta- 
tion got the message is just as indefinite today [9755] as it was 
in the fall of 1942 when you started tamake up your mind ? 

Captain Sajtord. Not at all. 

Mr. Richardson. What evidence have you discovered ? 

Captain Safford. We know from the record that 

Mr. Richardson. What record, what record that you have seen and 
examined? 

Captain Safford. That Cheltenham received the order to monitor 
for these messages. 

Mr. Richardson. Agreed. 

Captain Safford. That it did. 

Mr. Richardson. Agreed. 

Captain Safford. It could hear them all. 

Mr. Richardson. Agreed. 

Captain Safford. That some were in English, which we weren't in- 
terested in. 

Mr. Richardson. Agreed. 

Captain Safford. Others in Japanese Morse code. They were all 
sent into the Navy Department. 

Mr. Richardson. Then your point is that since you think Chelten- 
ham could get them all and since you are convinced that this came it 
must have got this one ? 

Captain Safford. We also had another thing from Winter Haven 
which said they had been unable to copy Tokyo or Osaka [9756] 
communicating with Europe except at rare intervals, which elimi- 
nates Winter Harbor. That refreshes my memory and I remembered 
at the time of Pearl Harbor receiving conditions at Winter Haven were 
very unsatisfactory. It was on Interior Department land, and we 
were up against the same thing the Army were with regard to the ra- 
dars at Pearl Harbor, except this was less important. We could h«ar 
the strongest signals but the pine trees, which were higher than the 
antenna, shielded out the weaker signals, and we couldn't get them. 

As a result we gave the easier work to Winter Harbor and the 
harder work to Cheltenham. Immediately after Pearl Harbor the 
park system said those trees could be cut down and the receivability 
increased. So, by the middle of 1943 Winter Harbor was as good 



3632 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

or better than Cheltenham. Winter Harbor had the best of appa- 
ratus, but we had this other unfortunate situation. I did not remem- 
ber in 1943 that it was not until after Pearl Harbor that we had 
improved the receivability. 

Mr. Richardson. What you mean is that when you discovered 
that it couldn't have been received by Winter Harbor, then you crossed 
Winter Harbor off? 

Captain S AFFORD. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. And then that left Cheltenham ? 

Captain Safford. We 

[97S7] Mr. Richardson. Wait a minute. Please answer that 
question. 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Then you came to Cheltenham, didn't you, in your 
mind? 

Captain Safford. At the same time. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, then, you took the position, did you not, 
that Cheltenham could get all the stations because of its location? 

Captain Safford. And for 

Mr. Richardson. Please answer my question. Captain. 

Captain Safford. Not all but certain frequencies at certain times of 
day. 

Mr. Richardson. And you felt that this message would come in 
under one of those frequencies? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And because of that you inferred that since Win- 
ter Harbor was out it must have come in through Cheltenham ; is that 
correct ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, if it never came to Cheltenham you 
would be in exactly the same position you are today, wouldn't you? 

In other words. Captain — I don't want to misstate you — [97581 
you have got to presume that the message was sent out by Japan? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Before you can ever get to Cheltenham ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And if you assume that the message was sent out 
by Japan then you think Cheltenham must have got it because it was 
on that wave length and because they were properly situated ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, do you suppose that broadcast was intended 
to go to England? 

Captain Safford. The Japanese themselves, in their own instruc- 
tions, said that, the literal translation of that message said, smoothed 
up a little, "From JAP to Europe," at such and such a frequency, at 
the 1330 GC schedule. 

Mr. Richardson. What I want to find out is whether the message 
which you say Cheltenham might have picked up if there was such 
a message — was that a message started by Japan to go to England? 

Captain Safford. By Japan presumably intended for England, but 
it was broadcast with no address. 

Mr. Richardson. Then it would be rather significant, wouldn't it, 
that England reports to us officially that they [97S9] have been 
unable to find any such message? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3633 

Captain Safford. Not necessarily. 

Mr. Richardson. Not necessarily, but it would be a strong proba- 
bility, wouldn't it? 

Captain Saffofd. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. It wouldn't? 

Well, we come back. Captain — I want to labor the point so that you 
can't be misled — the only station that you think could have gotten it 
was Cheltenham, and you don't know whether it got it or not? 

Captain Safford. Or Halifax. They would be in a receiving con- 
dition and the Canadians were guarding those Japanese stations the 
way we were. 

Mr. Richardson. Captain, don't give me any more stations that 
couldn't get it, tell me some stations that could. 

Captain Safford. Halifax could have got it if they were capable of 
copying the Japanese Morse code. 

Mr. Richardson. You didn't hear anybody suggest that Halifax did 
get it? 

Captain Safford. I never did; and never that they didn't. 

Mr. Richardson. I press you again, the only station on which you 
pin your faith that they received this execute message was Chelten- 
ham ; isn't that correct ? 

Captain Safford. We had two 

[9760] Mr. Richardson. Please answer my question. Wasn't 
Cheltenham the only station at the conclusion of your evidentiary 
efforts at which you now assert to the committee this message was 
received? 

Captain Safford. With any degree of confidence, yes. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there any other intercepting station in which 
you didn't have so much confidence that you have any evidence they 
received it? 

Captain Safford. To my recollection I think we told Amagansett, 
Long Island, to listen for it. 

Mr. Richardson. Did they report 

Captain Safford. And Jupiter, Fla,, to guard the schedules and 
send them in. 

[9761] Mr. Richardson. Did they report thejr found it ? 

Captain Safford. They were submitting some intercepts of those 
schedules as they got them. How many they sent I do not know 
because we didn't attempt to save any of the matter we were not 
interested in. 

Mr. Richardson. Are you suggesting that maybe this message on 
the morning of December 4 came from either of those station ? 

Captain Safford. I don't but I have a vague memory that we got a 
confirmation of it from some secondary station. 

Mr. Richardson. Let me make this suggestion : 

Isn't all you know about this winds message, how it came in, the same 
vague memory? 

Captain Safford. It is not a vague memory. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

The Vice Chairman. It is now 1 : 30. We will recess until 2 o'clock. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a request of the 
Navy liaison as to the monthly reports from Cheltenham, Winter 
Harbor, and Bainbridge Island, as to who was the custodian, where 



3634 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

these reports were made to, and whether or not they have been avail- 
able since 1941. 

Mr. Richardson. We have been trying to get them for 2 weeks. 

[9762] The Vice Chairman. We will adjourn until 2 o'clock. 

(Whereupon, at 12 : 30 p. m., the committee adjourned until 2 p. m., 
of the same day.) 

[9763] AFTERNOON SESSION 2 P. M. 

The Vice Chairman. The committee will be in order. 

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. LAURENCE FRYE SAFFORD, UNITED STATES 

NAVY— Resumed 

The Vice Chairman. Does counsel have anything before resuming 
examination ? 

Mr. Richardson. No. 

The Vice Chairman. Do you have anything, Captain? 

Captain Safford. No. 

The Vice Chairman. Counsel is recognized. 

Mr. Richardson. Captain, after you handed this message which 
Kramer gave to you to an officer whose name you can't be sure of, and 
which is understandable, to take to Admiral Noyes, you never saw 
I hat message again, did you ? 

Captain Safford. I never saw that particular message in that parti- 
cular form. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

Now, did you — well, wait a minute. What do you mean, you never 
saw that message in that particular form? Did you see that message 
in some other form ? 

Captain Safford. I saw that message in the smooth write-up as a 
translation with the Japanese eliminated and merly the translation of 
the code part. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, then, the message that you ^ave [976/f.] 
to Kramer — that you gave to this ojQflcer to take up to Admiral Noyes, 
was an approximately 200- word message? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. All in Japanese? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you know whethpr Admiral Noyes could read 
Japanese ? 

Captain Safford. Admiral Noyes could not read Japanese. 

Mr. Richardson. Then all he had to go on was what you had to go 
on, the presence in the dispatch of these words that were set forth in 
2353? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And the writing of Kramer on the bottom ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct, plus 

Mr. Richardson. And 

Captain Safford. May I finish my answer ? 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. 

Captain Safford. Admiral Noyes also had a card on his person on 
which was written the Japanese expressions and their meaning, their 
translation. 

Mr. Richardson. And that translation that he had on the card was 
the translation taken from the original winds code message 2353? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3635 

[9765] Captain Saffokd. I presume so. I believe that Kramer 
])reparefl the card. I didn't 

Mi-. Kichardsox. Now, I would like to have you. Captain, if you 
will ohlioe me, iu answering these questions I am going to ask you, 
to routine yourself to what yon know and not what anybody told you 
or what you have reason to infer. 

We will go back to those others later. 

No^^ . did Kramer hand you more than one paper copy of the mes- 
sage ( 

(^il)tain Safford. Not at that time. 

Mr. Richardson. And that one copy that he handed to you then 
was the precise copy which you gave to your officer to take up to 
Noyes ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And you never saw that precise paper again? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. What did you make your copies from then? 

Captain Safford. Everything that came in by the teletype was in 
duplicate. There was a whole i)aper in duplicate with a carbon be- 
hind it. The original remained in the role. 

Mr. Richardson. But the duplicate wouldn't have Kramer's writ- 
ing on it, would it? 

\f/700'] Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. When you made up your smooth copies, did you 
put on the bottom that Kramer translation? 

Cajjtain Safford. Kramer made up those smooth copies, not me. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you make up any copies of it? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. I made up no copies. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you know of your own knowledge when 
Kramer made up the copies? Did you see him make them up? 

Captain Safford. I did not. 

Mr. Richardson. Did he deliver them to you or expose them to you 
after he had made them up? 

Ca])tain Safford. I saw one copy about noon between 11 and 12 
o'clock on the morning of the 4th of December 1941. 

I took it for granted 

Mr. Richardson. Now, wait a uiinute. Don't let's take anything 
for granted. You saw a copy? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, that copy that you saw, was it in Japanese? 

Captain Safford. That was in English. 

Mr. RicHxVRDSON. Then the copy that you saw was a translation of 
the whole message? 

[9767] Captain Safford. It was a translation of only the part 
that contained the warning, the hidden warning. 

Air. Richardson. Did the rest of the 200 words, outside of these 
three set Jepanese phrases, remain in Japanese? 

Captain Safford. They were disregarded, 

Mr. Richardson. They didn't aj^pear in the message you saw? 

Captain Safford. They did not appear in the message I saw at noon. 

Mr. Richardson. Then all von saw in these copies that were circu- 
lated with the three code phrases HIGASHI NO KAZEAME— what 
is the rest of it? 

Captain Safford. I will have to look. 

79716— 46— pt. 8 18 



3636 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK" 

Mr. Richardson. I will get it. HIGASHI NO KAZEAME, 
KITANOKAZE KUMORI, and NISHI NO KAZE HARE. 

Captain Saffokd. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. Were those three Japanese phrases all there was 
on the one message that you saw around noon on that day? 

Captain Safford. It was the translation 

Mr. Richardson. Just answer my question, please. Was there any- 
thing on the message that you saw around noon except those three 
phrases in Japanese ? 

Captain Safford. Yes ; there was. 

[9768] Mr. Richardson. "^Yliat else was there? 

Captain Safford. There was the identification date of the intercept- 
ing station at the time and other things that were customarily put on 
messages. 

Mr. Richardson. I realize that. What, with reference to the sub- 
stance of the message ? 

Captain Safford. The translation as to what it meant. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, that translation was in type? 

Captain Safford. That was typed. 

Mr. Richardson. You don't know of your own knowledge who 
typed it? 

Captain Safford. No ; I didn't see it typed. 

Mr. Richardson. What did that typed translation say ? 

Captain Safford. It said the same thing as was said in pencil at the 
bottom of the other message. 

Mr. Richardson. And it said that the words HIGASHI NO 
KAZEAME meant war with the United States? 

Captain Safford. I do not believe that the words HIGASHI NO 
KAZEAME appeared. I believe only the translation of what it 
meant in English. Its meaning. Not the literal translation. The 
meaning was there. 

Mr. Richardson. Let me reform our recollection. You just told 
me in detail that on the copy you saw were the [9769] three 
Japanese phrases to which we refer. Now am I to understand you 
were in error and that all there was on the copy that you saw were 
the three English phrases which you said were an interpretation of 
these Japanese phrases ? 

Captain Safford. I am sorry, I did not understand your question. 

Mr. Richardson. That is all right. 

Captain Safford. The Japanese did not appear there. It merely 
would have had the expression in the upper left-hand corner in plain 
language, possibly the winds code, and then would have mention of 
these three code words; and it was the same wording that had been 
written in pencil on the bottom of the sheet that was sent up to 
Admiral Noyes. 

Mr. Richardson. Then it is perfectly clear in your mind, is it, 
that there were no Japanese words on the message that you saw around 
noon ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And the English words that were there were sim- 
ply the definition of these Japanese phrases; and that definition was 
given, was it, the same as that written by Kramer on the bottom of 
the original message you saw ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3637 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

ISIr. Richardson. Then there was no part on this message in type 
with the phrase "War with the United States" ? 

[9770] Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. That copy that you had was one of a number of 
copies that had been made for circulation? 

Captain Safford. It was a flimsy copy and presumably one of a 
book which had been typed at the same time. 

Mr. Richardson. That is, you mean, at the same time that the copies 
were prepared for distribution ? 

Captain Safford. For distribution. We prepared 12 or 14 at one 
time. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, when they were distributed, where would 
they go in the ordinary practice ? 

Captain Safford. Half would be sent over to the War Department 
and in the case of important messages they were sent immediately by 
special courier and the less important messages were sent over in a 
routine delivery trip which were two or three a day. 

Mr. Richardson. Y>niere would they go to in the War Department, 
what division ? 

Captain Safford. I believe they were sent over to the Japanese sec- 
tion of the Signal Intelligence Service and they took off the file copy. 

Mr. Richardson. Don't say what they did. They went to that 
office. 

Captain Safford. And they made subsequent delivery to [9771] 
Military Intelligence, who were responsible for the detailed distribu- 
tion. 

Mr. Richardson. You are getting into the realm of supposition. 
I only asked you where they would send the message. You said, it 
would go to the War Department. Now, I asked you what division 
of the War Department it would be ; and that would be the Japanese 
section ? 

Captain Safford. Of the Signal Intelligence Service. Office of the 
Signal Intelligence Service. 

Mr. Richardson. Who was in charge of that office at that time, if 
you know ? 

Captain Safford. Major Doud was in charge of that office. 
D-o-u-d. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, the other copies would be sent to the Navy 
Department? 

Captain Safford. Were sent to the Navy Department. One copy 
was retained in Commander Kramer's own files, never left there ; one 
copy was given to the naval aide to the President ; one copy was given 
to the naval aide to the Secretary of the Navy ; one copy was given to 
the Director of Naval Intelligence; one copy given or shown to the 
Director of War Plans. Admiral Turner; and one copy was given to 
the aide to the Chief of Naval Operations who showed it to both 
Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral Stark. That is the best [9772] 
distribution that I can give you at the present time irom memory. 
There are written notes to that effect. 

[9773] Mr. Richardson. Well, now. Captain, all of those offi- 
cers, how many or few they were, would simply get a sheet of paper 



3538 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[9518] Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield for a moment? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, on the ship-location charts wliich we have 
been furnished, I understand that the Xavy has been asked to give the 
list of the names ; but on the 5th and the 6th of December there was 
some ship right up in the vicinity from which that attack came. Now, 
1 don't mean the exact vicinity, but to the north, and it went into Pearl 
Harbor that Sunday. It was not indicated what that ship was. Do we 
have those ship-location charts here '( 

Admiral Smith. I think it is very probable that was one of our 
destroyers. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate, on the 5th and 6th Senator Fergu- 
son and I remember observing that there was a ship to the north of 
Oahu, and then it is gradually going in and it is in port on Sunday. 

I ask counsel if they will produce those ship charts ? Will you please 
produce those ship-location charts? They are photostats. Do you 
have the one I mean ? There it is. 

Senator Ferguson. It is a large map. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, I will read this to you : 

Saturday, December G-20 to 24. Sighted vessel ))earing one point abaft port 
beam running without lights on course approximately 300 degrees, true, distance 
four [9519] miles. Average steam, 200 lbs., average R. P. M., 86.1. 

Now, I will ask you if that was sighted — that ship was sighted — 
and that seems to be a ship on the seas — on the 6th day of December 
and they could not identify it, what would you have done under the 
silence of the radio order? 

Admiral Smith. Told the ship who reported it to identify it or send 
a destroyer immediately to investigate. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, here is a ship that had a one-point bearing 
and was running without lights on a course approximately 300°, true, 
whatever that means. 

Admiral Smith. Of course, the first thing to have been done in that 
case was to go to the operations officer's board and find whether we had 
a possible ship in that location, because a ship then, a merchant ship, 
was not running without lights at that time. If we could not identify 
her. then send something out to identify her. Of course, I don't know 
what ship reported this. 

Mr. Gearhart. This was reported by the Wright. 

Admiral Smith. Oh, that was reported by the Wright. 

Mr. Gearhart. This was recorded in the log of the Wright as of 
the 6th day of December 1941 between the hours of 20 and 24. 

Now, if "that had been reported to you as chief of staff to the com- 
mander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, would that have [9620] 
alerted the fleet? 

Admiral Smith. I believe it would have ; yes, sir. The probability, 
of course, was that that ship was a submarine on the surface. 

[9531] Senator Lucas. Do I understand it was an unidentified 
ship rather than an unidentified plane ? 

Mr. Gearhart. This particular item I read reveals the presence of 
an unidentified surface ship. My interrogatories prior to getting this 
log in my hand were in reference to an unidentified aircraft. 

Senator Lucas. Is the unidentified aircraft in the log also? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3539 

Mr. Geakhakt. I saw it the other time I had the log in my hand. 
This is an additional item that I have run across. 

Senator Lucas. What kind of a ship was the Wright^ Admiral? 
It was an airplane tender, was it not? 

Admiral Smith. The Wright was an airplane tender of the type 
like the transport Chateau Thierry. They were built during the last 
war. The bow and stern looked alike; they were good for 12 knots, 
and 14 if they were in good shape. 

Their speed is limited. She carried mostly parts for seaplanes and 
I believe was on the way to Midway at that time. 
Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield for a question? 
Mr. Gearhart. I yield. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, I show you a Guide to Symbols, [9522^ 
and then I show- you a chart. What would be the technical name of 
that chart, Admiral, do you know, in the Navy? That would be a 
ship-location chart, would it not? 

Admiral Smith. No ; I would not say so. 

Mr. Murphy. What would you call that? I understand it is to 
keep a daily record of the ships of the United States throughout the 
world. 

Admiral Smith. Yes. That is a secret chart and would show the 
convoys. These are Great Circle routes, of course. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, with particular reference to the Guide to Sym- 
bols, I direct your attention to a ship which is to the north of Pearl 
Harbor. At what degree would you say that was on the chart, this 
being 160 here [indicating] ? 

Admiral Smith. It would be about 155 west, I should say. 
Mr. Murphy. And how many degrees north ? 
Admiral Smith. I should say about 3° south. 
Senator Ferguson. How many? 

Admiral Smith. No ; no. That is north latitude. I think that is 
about 18° north. It looks like it to me. The chart should have in 
the margin somewhere the latitudes. That is probably about 18° 
north, I should say. 

[9523] Mr. Murphy. Will you resume your seat. Admiral, and 
I will put this before you. 

I direct your attention to Exhibit 109, a secret chart that is part of 
Exhibit 109. and I direct particularly your attention to a ship to the 
north of Oahu, and about 155° west longitude, the location being that 
of the ship in question on the 5th of December 1941, and I ask you 
if you will look to the Guide to Symbols and tell us what kind of a 
ship that is. 

Admiral Smith. It would appear to be a patrol vessel. 
Mr. Murphy. Now, I show you another exhibit, a chart in the same 
exhibit, the secret chart for December 6. With reference to the 
same patrol vessel, will you compare for us the relative position of 
the vessel in question on the Oth of December as compared to the 5th? 
Is there anything that would indicate to you t)n the cliart on the Gth 
as to the relative position of the vessel which was to the north of 
Oahu, 155° longitude, on the 5th? 

Admiral Smith. It seems to have disappeared from this chart. I 
see nothing of the same ship or symbol. 

79716— 46— pt. 8 12 



3640 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Safford. For one thing there is instruction to \9778~\ 
destroy all code papers. If that is regarded as synonomous with the 
outbreak of war, as I have heard testified before in this room, that by 
itself means something more than the wording in these three para- 
graphs above. 

Mr. Richardson. And you had had a number of dispatches with 
reference to burning of codes and this Government, your own Govern- 
ment, had sent out a number of dispatches with reference to burning 
of codes before the morning of the 4th, hadn't they? 

Captain Safford. The warnings from 

Mr. Richardson. Now you can answer my question "Yes" or "No." 

Captain Safford. That question cannot be answered by a plain 
"Yes" or "No." 

Mr. Richardson. All right, go ahead. I think it can; but I will 
take your explanation. 

Captain Safford. Tokyo had sent out instructions to various people 
telling them to burn their most important codes but to leave two codes 
open. One was the so-called PA-K2 code and the other was the 
LA code. Now, with those two exceptions all codes had been burnt, 
but this said, "Please destroy all code papers," and so forth. In other 
words, there were no exceptions in this one. 

Mr. Richardson, And it is that phrase which led you to [9779] 
believe that when you got an execute message that said "HIGASHI 
NO KAZEAME" you could safely interpret it as meaning "war with 
the United States"? 

Captain Safford. There was much beyond what appears in this 
paper that led to our interpretation of it in that way. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, the men who were getting a copy of that 
dispatch with this dispatch wouldn't have your imagination as to 
what it meant. How would he find out what it meant? 

Captain Safford. The Navy Department had been very jittery about 
whether by any chance this winds execute might have been sent out 
before the 28th, when we began listening for it. I have been ques- 
tioned on that repeatedly. They were also very much worried about 
the fear that with all the stations which were known to be listening 
for it, by some freak chance we might fail to catch it and the reason 
for that was everyone in authority from the President down believed 
that this would be the Japanese Government's decision as to peace or 
war announced to their own officials overseas and that was our chance 
of a tip-off, to gain the necessary time to prevent a surprise attack on 
our fleet. 

Mr. Richardson. Captain, did it ever occur to you that you are 
taking in an elastic authority when you quote what the President 
understood and and every other important official [9780] 
clown ? Was there any official in the Government, from the President 
down, that had any basis, sir, for the interpretation of this message 
2353 except what the message 2353 said ? 

Captain Safford. I do not know the basis on which they made their 
evaluation. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, will you take a look again at Ex- 
hibit 142 and turn over to the dispatch from the commander in chief 
of the Army forces in the Pacific under date of November 13, 1945? 
There seems to be no page number. It is under 4-A. Have you the 
one of November 13th ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3641 

Captain Safford. I have BSG 19C. Is that the one? 

Mr. KicHARDsoN. That is right. Now, from your experience in this 
message and intelligence work wouldn't you construe that message 
from MacArthur as indicating that the Japanese never sent out an 
implementing message ? 

Captain Safford. I would not. 

Mr. Richardson. Wliy not? 

Captain Safford. It says here : 

Interrogation of authorities so far has resulted in absolute denial of trans- 
mission of such an implementing message and existence of any prearranged in- 
structions which would permit transmission of such an implementing signal. 

In other words, the Japanese authorities denied ever [97811 
having sent Tokyo circular 2353 and 2354. 

Mr. EiCHARDSON. All right. You find from that, do you, evidence 
that they did send out the execute? 

Captain Safford. I find evidence from that that they had denied 
everything. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

Captain Safford. And also that they burned all pertinent records 
prior to August 14, 1945. 

Mr. Richardson. All right ; we will take the Japanese at any sort 
of an estimate you want, but insofar as that message refers to an 
execute winds message they deny having sent it, don't they ? 

Captain Safford. The Japanese deny having sent it. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, turning over to the dispatch 
from MacArthur of November 21, how do you interpret the language 
used : 

That signal implementing circular 2353 and 2354, was probably not transmitted 
prior to 8 December, Tokyo time, but was transmitted by radio voice broadcast 
at some hour after 0230, 8 December, Tokyo time. Exact hour unknown. 

How would you interpret that language ? 

Captain Saffxdrd. That they had not found anybody who knew it 
or admitted it but MacArthur was not certain and, [9782] 
therefore, he said "probably" "probably not then transmitted." 

Mr. Richardson. Well, we have got on the antiexecute side the word 
"probably," haven't we? 

Captain Safford. Correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, lower in the message there is another ref- 
erence there to information from another employee that he did hear 
an execute message under date of December 8. 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, turn over to the dispatch of the 24th, the 
next following, the language reading : 

Only use of Winds code (either voice or radio telegraph) shown here by avail- 
able contemporaneous records is voice broadcast from Tokyo between 0902 and 
0935 on 8 December. 

That also indicates that the response from the Japanese records 
further was negative on this execute, doesn't it? 

Captain Safford. I do not agree with that, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. What does it indicate ? 

Captain Safford. That was from the War Department to General 
MacArthur. 

Mr. Richardson. That does not spoil it, does it? 



3642 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Safford. And they were referring to the FCC monitoring 
records and the FCC were only monitoring voice, [9783] and 
the winds message intercepted by the Navy came in Morse code. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, it shows that there was a message, however, 
that was sent on December 8. 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, go on over to the one of the 27th 
from MacArthiir where he says that : 

Persons who eoiuhicted interrogation Imd no knowledge tliat prior to interro- 
gation United States had itiformation estahlishing use of Winds code on 8 Decem- 
ber Tokyo time. 

Making it certain that the people who were doing the interrogating 
did not know what they did it for would be important, wouldn't it? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, turn over now to the document entitled, 
"U. S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan,'' one or two pages follow- 
ing the one I just read from. Do you have that before you? 

Captain Safford. I have that before me. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, look at the last paragraph on that page, 
where the person making the document says : 

He stated that he would have known of it if a message such as that described 
as being broadcast December [978.'f\ 4 had been transmitted and that he 
had no recollection at all of any "east wind rain" report or any similar phrase 
being broadcast prior to December S. 

That would also indicate that they did not know out there if this 
man was telling the truth that there had been any winds execute 
message until December 8, doesn't it ? 

Captain Safford. I would not consider that conclusive. 

Mr. Richardson. It is quite pertinently suggestive, though, isn't it, 
Captain ? 

Captain Safford. From one point of view ; yes. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, following 8 o'clock on the morning of 
December 4, when did you see McCoUum ? 

Captain Safford. I cannot state any specific time that I saw McCol- 
lum in 1941. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you go to him with a message that you had 
prepared suggestive of one that should be sent to the field? 

Captain Safford. I did not. 

Mr. Richardson. You had nothing to do then with a so-called Mc- 
Collum message? 

Captain Safford. That is correct ; except for seeing it. 

[9785] Mr. Richardson. Now Brotherhood was one of your 
watch officers? 

Captain Safford. That is coi-rect. 

Mr. Richardson. If there was an execute message that came in on 
the morning of December 4, Brotherhood would naturally know about 
it, would not he ? 

Caj^tain Safford. Not in the morning. 

Mr. Richardson. Beg pardon ? 

Captain Safford. Not in the morning of December 4. 

Mr. Richardson. Would he naturally know about it during the 
day? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3643 

Captain S afford. If it came in on his watch he would have known 
about it. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, what was his watch? 

Captain Safford. He was on watch from 4 p. m. to midnight on the 
3d and from 4 p. m. to midnight on the 4th of December 1941. That 
is established from an official record. 

Mr. Richardson. Now all of those w'atch officers were on edge to 
pick up this winds execute, weren't they? 
Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And that message coming in, as it did, at 8 o'clock, 
Captain, on the morning of December 4, was the most important piece 
of business transacted in that [9786] office that morning, 

wasn't it ? 

Captain Safford. I will go further and say it was the most im- 
portant piece of business transacted up to the time of the attack on 
Pearl Harbor in 1941. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. Then don't you think it quite reason- 
able that as soon as Brotherhood came into the office at 4 o'clock for his 
watch, that someone there would tell him that the great day had come, 
that the execute was there and they all knew about it? 

Captain Safford. It has been my impression all along that Brother- 
hood did know it. 

Mr. Richardson. _ All right. You know now, don't you, that he, 
under oath, testified that he never heard anything about the winds 
execute message in the office there on December 4? 
Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And you know also that on the evening of Decem- 
ber 4 he, as one of your watch officers, was telephoning to the Federal 
Communications Commission to find out if they had located any piece 
of an execute message? 

Captain Safford. No, it was just the reverse. 
Mr. Richardson. All right. They phoned him? 
Captain Safi'ord. And said they had one. 
Afr. Richardson. They knew that he was looking for one? 
[97S7] Captain Safford. They had been requested if anything 
came in to call up certain telephone numbers, including the GY watch 
officer. 

Mr. Richardson. Captain, he certainly told them just as soon as 
they phoned him that the stuff was all off and you had the message ? 
Captain Safford. We were telling the FCC nothing. 
Mr. Richardson. That was not because nothing had happened, was 
it, Captain? 

Captain Safford. We did not tell the station at Cheltenham that 
we had intercepted anything we wanted. 

Mr. Richardson. I have before me, Captain, under Exhibit 142-A, 
a copy of the log, if you may call it that, of the FCC on the 4th day 

of December. Under item 6 

Captain Safford. I haven't gotten to it yet. 

Mr. Richardson. Have you got a copy that you can lay in front of 
the captain? 

Captain Safford. I have got it. What was that date? 
Mr. Richardson. I will get it for you. 
Captain Safford. December 6? 



3644 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. EiCHARDSON. December 4. Item 6, reading as follows : 

9 : 05 p. m. Lieutenant Brotherhood 20-G Watch OflBcer, Navy Department, 
telephoned to state that he was authorized [97S8] to accept message in 
question. Gave Lieutenant Brotherhood the message from Mr. Carter. 

Going back to No. 2 is a notation : 

8 : 12 p. m. received a message from Mr. Carter at Portland, Oregon, 

Now you know, don't you, Captain, that the message that was re- 
ceived from Carter was one of these false winds messages ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, a true weather report. 

Mr. Richardson. So Brotherhood was telephoning the Communica- 
tions Commission about that message, wasn't he ? 

Captain Safford. No, they told him. 

Mr. Richardson". Now just let us look 

Captain Safford (interposing). Let me read 5 first, please. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

Captain Safford (reading) : 

8: 45 p. m. called ONI Watch Officer at Navy Department to ascertain if he was 
permitted to accept messages of interest to Colonel Bratton's office. The officer 
in charge stated that he was not certain, but that he would inquire and call back. 

Mr. Richardson. Read the next one. 

Captain Safford. That was standard practice, to check up to be 
certain we did not get pulled in by some unauthorized [97S9] 
person. 

Mr. Richardson. All right, read the next one. 

Captain Safford (reading) : 

9 : 05 p. m. Lieutenant Brothei-hood 20-G Watch Officer, Navy Department, tele- 
phoned to state 

Mr. Richardson. Telephoned whom ? 
Captain Safford. He telephoned the FCC. 
Mr. Richardson. All right. 
Captain Safford (reading) : 

— to state that he was authorized to accept message in question. Gave Lieutenant 
Brotherhood the message from Mr. Carter. 

Mr. Richardson. Now read No. 7. 
Captain Safford (reading) : 

9 : 32 p. m. Lieutenant Brotherhood called to inquire if any other reference to 
weather was made previously in program intercepted by Portland. Informed 
him no other reference was made. 

Mr. Richardson. That would rather throw some light on your 
suggestion that Brotherhood did not telephone the FCC, wouldn't it. 
Captain ? 

Captain Safford. Brotherhood called back for a verification and 
check-up to see if he had the whole story ; that is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Now if a copy of this alleged winds execute mes- 
sage that you said came in went to the War Department, you would 
expect that Colonel Bratton would see it, [9790] wouldn't you ? 

Captain Safford. I would expect they would all see it. 

Mr. Richardson. You would expect Colonel Bratton, from his 
position as Chief of Staff, to see it, wouldn't you? 

Captain Safford. I would. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3645 

Mr. EiCPiARDSON. Then would it be a matter of surprise to you that 
Colonel Bratton was telephoning the FCC at 7 : 50 p. m. on the 5th 
day of December trying to find out if there had been any receipt of 
any winds execute message? 

Captain Safford. I would not expect such a thing as that. 

Mr, EiCHARDSoisr. And the only inference that you, with your ex- 
perience, could draw from such a telephone, Captain, would be that 
Bratton did not know there had been any winds execute message re- 
ceived 56 hours before, or 36 hours before? That would be your in- 
ference, wouldn't it? 

Let me turn it around. I don't want to confuse you. There would 
be no reason for Bratton telephoning to find out something that he 
already knew, would there? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

[OTOl] Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, let us pursue this ques- 
tion of when this elusive document appeared a little further. 

Did you testify. Captain, in the Hart hearing, at page 361, that the 
winds message was received while Lieutenant Brotherhood was on 
watch on December 3? 

Captain Safford. I did, and that statement was incorrect. 

Mr. EicHARDSON. You did not correct it because you found out 
later that Lieutenant Brotherhood denied that he ever saw any such 
message, did you. Captain ? 

Captain Safford. I did that because that was the best information 
that was available to me at that time as to the exact time and date 
at which the winds message had been broadcast, which turned out 
to be incorrect. 

Mr. Richardson". Now, Captain, you were advised, after you testi- 
fied in the Hart hearing, that Brotherhood did deny that any winds 
execute message ever came in to him, were j^ou not? 

Captain Safford. Not as such. I was informed afterward, that 
what Brotherhood had seen was this so-called false winds message 
which had been telephoned over by the FCC. 

Mr. Richardson. Precisely, the only message that Brotherhood 
had any knowledge of, was one of these false winds code messages, 
wasn't it? 

Captain Safford. Apparently. 

Mr. Richardson. Did it ever occur to you that that was the only 
message that ever came in there on the 4th, and that you were mis- 
taken ? 

Captain Safford. This is only about the 20th time such suggestion 
has been made to me, but I saw the winds message myself. 

Mr. Richardson. I understand that, but you first saw it on Decem- 
ber 3, and then you saw it on December 4. 

Captain Safford. Oh, no. 

Mr. RiCHiNJiDSON. Wait a minute. I believe you testified that it 
came in on Brotherhood's watch, and then you testified it did not come 
in on Brotherhood's watch, and then you said you did not know what 
station it had come in on, and then you testified it came in from the 
Cheltenham station, so consequently most of the things relating to 
the message, except the fact that it came in, are rather sadly messed, 
aren't they. Captain? 



3346 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Safford. I do not consider it so at all. I thought my testi- 
mony was fairly consistent. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

Now, let us go a little further with it. You testified, [979S] 
did you not. that when you went back to try and find out what the 
facts were, you found that these copies that should have been around 
in the various departments were all missing. 

You did so find, did you not ? 

Captain Safford. We only expected one — we could only count on 
one department in all these departments for it to be in existence. 

Mr. KiciiARDSON. And they were all missing, weren't they? 

Captain Safford. They were missing. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

Then you had a conversation, you testified, with Brotherhood in 
which you said that Brotherhood said, "I know what became of the 
copies, but I won't tell you," and then were not you pressed later in 
the Hewitt investigation, and did not you testify that Friedman, who 
had been a cryptologist, whom you knew, had told you that a Colonel 
Bissell had said to him, Friedman, that he had destroyed all of these 
copies under the direct order of (len. George C. Marshall ? Did not 
you so testify? 

Captain Safford. I would like that question repeated. 

Mr. Richardson. Read it to him, Mr. Reporter. 

(The question was read by the reporter.) 

Captain Safford. jNIay I be informed of the page that [9794^ 
is on in the Hewitt report ? 

Mr. Richardson. Well, let's see. It appears several times. You 
won't have any trouble findino; it. 

Mr. ^NIuRPHY. Page 114 of tlie Hewitt report. 

Mr. Richardson. Look at page 114 of the Hewitt report, Captain. 

Captain Safford. May I read from this report about half that page? 

Mr. Richardson. Beg pardon? 

Captain Safford. May I read from that report into this record? 

Mr. Richardson. Yes, sir. 

Captain Safford (reading) : 

Admiral Hewitt. Then you have no information that the Army ever got copies 
of the winds message relating to the United States to which you testified? 

Captain Saffokd. I have no information which will be acceptable as evidence 
before this court. I heard the story, and I believe it true, but it is very third- 
hand. 

Admiral Hewitt. The information that you have, even though second or 
third-hand, may be of assistance in furnishing a lead. Will you tell us your 
information? 

It does not show in the record, but I believe I was asked that about 
three times before I made my answer. 

[9795] Captain Saffori. The information that I got was that written 
copies of the winds message liad been destroyed in the War Department by then 
Colonel Bissell on the direct orders of General Marshall. 

Admiral Hewitt. You do Tiot recall the direct source of that information? 

Captain Saffobd. I would prefer not to give the direct s'^'m-co. but I think it 
may be confirmed in the testimony of Colonel Sadtler before the A-my Investiga- 
tion. 

The question first asked me, the original question, with the state- 
ment that I had made charges against General Marshall, may I state 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3647 

that I was testifyino- in secret before a Navy court, and the evidence 
was all marked ''top secret,'' was not t) be made public. 

I was asked to give a lead to assist Admiral Hewitt. I was pressed 
for an answ^er, and I reluctantly gave it. I was not testifying in a 
public hearing. 

Ml-. Richardson. Well now. Captain, let us orient this just a little. 
You did have a talk with Brotherhood about what had become of these 
cojjies, did you not ? 

Captain Safford. No; I wrote t) him. He was out in 

Mr. RicHARDSOx (interposing). Wait a minute. Before you wrote 
to him, you had a talk with him, did you not? 

Captain Safford. Not about the copies. 

[9796] Mr. Richardson. What did you write to him about the 
copies ? 

Captain Safford. Brotherliood had t )ld me it had come in on his 
Avatch. He verified that. Then I wrote him, *T)o you know what 
became of the copies?'' 

Mr. Richardson. Wait a minute. Captain. Did you ever testify 
in any hearing anywhere that Brotherhood told you that the winds 
execute message had come in on his watch? If so, give me the page 
where you so testified. 

Captain Safford, I believe that is in the Hart report on page 361, 
which you have just quoted from. 

Mr. Richardson. I was quoting from the Hewitt report. 

Captain Safford (reading) : 

The winds message was received in tlie Navy Department during the night of 
December 

Mr. Richardson. Wait a minute until I find it. Page 3612 
Captain Safford. Near the middle. 
Mr. Richardson. Go ahead. 
Captain Safford (reading) : 

The winds message was received in the Navy Department during the evening 
of Dacember 3, 1941, while Lieutenant (jg) Francis M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., 
was on watcii. 

Mr. Richardson. Read the rest of it. 
Captain Safford (reading) : 

There was some question in Brotherhood's mind as to what this message meant, 
because it came [.9797] in a dilTerent form from what was anticipated. 

Brotherhood called in Lieutenant Commander Kramer who came down that 
evening and identified that message as the winds message we had been looking 
for. 

^Ir. Richardson. Well, now. Captain, it would be pretty hard for 
him to come down that evening when the message came in the next 
morning, would it not? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. You refer to that as an error that you made in 
fixing the time about when the message came? 

Captain Safford. The time of the officer on watch when the message 
came in. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you take that testimony there as the basis for 
your claim that Brotherhood told you a real, genuine execute message 
came in on his watch? 



3648 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Sattord. I never used such explicit terms with him. I 
merely said the winds message he told me had come in on his watch. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

Now, after that you had some talk with him about what became of 
these copies, didn't you ? 

Captain SArroRo. I wrote him. 

Mr. Richardson. And he told you, as I recall the testimony — I can 
find it, but I haven't been able to [9798] just this minute — he 
told you that he knew but would not tell you ? 

Captain Safford. That he would not tell me now. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

Mr. Murphy. Page 113 of the Hewitt report is what you are 
looking for. 

Mr. Richardson. Let me see it. 

Mr. Murphy. That is right in the middle of the page. 

Mr. Richardson. Oh, yes. 

Now, let us take the exact language here on page 113 of the Hewitt 
report. You are right, Captain, when you say this : 

I wrote him a letter about the thing because that was looked for throughout a 
period of six months repeatedly. Various people looked for it in the Army and 
finally couldn't find it, and I asked him il' he knew anything about it. He said 
yes, but he did not care to tell me about it then ; but when he came back to the 
States, I asked him about it and found out he hadn't understood. We were work- 
ing at cross-purposes. I found out that he was referring to the false "winds" 
message, which we had thrown in the wastebasket. 

[9799] Mr. Richardson. So it was the false winds message that 
Brotherhood was talking about when he mentioned the winds execute 
message that came in on his watch ? 

Captain Safford. Yes ; but we only called it the winds message. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

Now this story that you told in secret — and, Captain, I am not criti- 
cizing you for telling it in secret, because all of those hearings were 
secret and had to be — but the story you told here that Friedman had 
told you that the messages had been destroyed by Colonel Bissell under 
the direction of General Marshall 

Captain Safford (interposing). That is the way I got the story 
and remembered it. I did not write it down. 

Mr. Richardson. And you said you thought it was true ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, you know, later, do you not, 
Captain, that Mr. Friedman denied having made any such statement 
to either you or anybody else — you know that, don't you ? 

Captain Safford. I did not Imow that he denied it. 

Mr. Richardson. And you know that Colonel Bissell also, in 
sworn testimony, before Admiral Hewitt, or before Colonel Clarke 
in the Clarke investigation, denied having [9800] destroyed 
any records? 

Captain Safford. I did not know that until this moment. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

The Chairman. You mean Clarke or Hart? 

Mr. Richardson. I mean Clarke. 

Senator Ferguson. General Clark? 

Mr. Richardson. Colonel Clarke. 

You don't now believe it, do you, Captain ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3649 

Senator Lucas. What was the last question ? 

Mr. EicHAKDSON. You don't now believe that Bissell destroyed any 
copies under the direction of General Marshall, do you ? 

Captain Safford. That is another question which I prefer not to 
answer. 

Mr. EiCHARDSON. All right. 

Now, let me call your attention to page 114 of the Hewitt investi- 
gation, and let me ask you whether this question was asked you, 
Captain : 

Admiral Hewitt, Then you have no information that the Army ever got 
copies of the winds message relating to the United States to which you testi- 
fied? 

Captain Saffokd. I have no information which would be acceptable as evi- 
dence before this court. I heard the [9801] story and believe it true, but 
it is very third-hand. 

Then followed the testimony : 

The information that I got was that written copies of the winds message had 
been destroyed in the War Department by Colonel Bissell under the direct order 
of General Marshall. 

That is what we have been talking about ? 

Captain Saffokd. That is correct. 

Mr. KicHAKDsoisr. Now, there is another thing that I would like to 
have you explain. Captain. 

On page 361 of the Hart testimony, you testified that the execute 
message came in full form of words in accord with the original winds 
message just as you testified. That is your recollection ? 

Captain Safford. That is from my own recollection and nobody 
else. 

Mr. Richardsox. Now, then, before the naval board, at page 746, 
you testified — did you not? — that the message came in in the Jap 
language and had a full translation on it into English when you first 
saw it. Now, by that you mean simply that those Japanese phrases 
had been translated into English? 

Captain Safford. May I see it? 

Mr. Richardson. Page 746. 

[9802] Captain Safford. I meant by that, and I thought it was 
clear : 

The translation consisted of the words which I quoted in my answer, namely, 
war with America; war with England, and peace with Russia, to the best of 
my recollection after almost three years. 

The only part of that message which was translated was the winds 
code words. The rest was a pure Japanese broadcast of news of no 
importance at all to us. 

Mr. Richardson. Are you, Captain, familiar with the testimony of 
Lieutenant Kramer, or Commander Kramer, in the naval court of 
inquiry ? 

Captain Safford. Only in a general way. 

Mr. Richardson. You know, do you not, Captain, that Kramer 
testified that he never would have gathered the winds execute message, 
if received, to mean war? 

Captain Safford. You were quoting from that? 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. 

Captain Safford. All right. 



3650 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Richardson. I give you pages 968 and 969 in Kramer's testi- 
mony before the naval court, and I am wondering whether you were 
familiar with the fact that Kramer took the position that the winds 
message, under code 2353, would not mean war, the winds execute 
message ? 

[9803] Captain Safford. Kramer left the United States, I be- 
lieve, in the spring of 1943, and did not return until, I believe, the 
spring of 1945, or possibly late in 1944; I am not certain. I had no 
idea what Kramer's answer had been, and I am giving the translation 
of the winds message from my memory and nobody else's. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, now. Captain, you did get some command 
from Admiral Xoyes, after you sent up the message to Noyes— you did 
get a report through Brotherhood, did you not, that Noyes complained 
that the message he got "showed the wind blowing from a strange 
direction"? 

Captain Safford. That was not sent up to Admiral Noyes. That 
was telephoned to him in the night. 

Mr. Richardson. He did not have the actual physical message be- 
fore him then when he made that remark? 

Captain Safford. He received nothing but a phone call from 
Brotherhood, and he immediately spotted it was the wrong thing and 
made that remark; and I asked Brotherhood the next time I saw him, 
""Why did you call the admiral?" 

And he said, "I had written orders; and remember what you told 
me when you first came to duty here — that no watch officer was ever 
given a court martial for calling the captain in the middle of the 
night," or words to that effect, 

[9804] Mr. Richardson. All right. Captain. Did you consider 
that a reasonable order? 

Captain Safford. I do not understand. 

Mr. Richardson. Will you read the captain's previous answer, Mr. 
Reporter ? 

(The answer was read by the reporter.) 

Captain Safford. What I meant was that Brotherhood knew it was 
a false alarm, but was taking no chances and was calling Admiral 
Noyes as per orders, and he did the correct thing, and I complimented 
him for it. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, you have no doubt, have you, that 
all of these copies that were sent out to be distributed were distributed 
in the regular order to the people who should have received them? 
Captain Safford. I have not, or I had no reason for doubting it. 
[9805] Mr. Richardson. And there should be in the files of 
those respective departments the one copy of that message which 
they are supposed to keep? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And when you investigated you found that none 
of the files had any copy ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson, Including your own files in your own office? 
Captain Safford. There was only one other file in which it could 
be expected and that was in the War Department. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, then, in order to completely 
erase that order from the entire Military Establishment in Washing- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3651 

ton. there would first have to be deleted from the file the copy that 
went to Beardall in the AVhite House, would not there ? 

Captain Safford. No, because that Avas taken back and destroyed 
as a matter of routine within probably 24 hours. 

Mr. Richardson. And nothing: was left with him? 

Captain Safford. Nothino; was left with him. 

Mr. Richardson. All rii2:ht. You would expect him to remember 
the message, would not you ? 

Captain Safford. I would expect him to remember the message; 

yes. 

[9806] Mr. Richardson. So that if the message was destroyed 
he should remember that he saw it regardless of the destruction, should 
not he? Keep in mind, Captain, that this message, according to you, 
meant war. Can you think of anything that would fix a man's 
mind more than such a message as that ? 

Captain Safford. He should have remembered it. 

Mr. Richardson. And the President should have been very in- 
terested in it, should not he ? 

Captain Safford. He should have been. I think he was. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, then, someone would have had 
to have gone into the office in the War Department and filched the 
copy there and destroyed it, would not he? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And someone would have to go in the Navy De- 
partment office where a file copy was kept and destroy the copy 
there ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. And somebody must have gone into your office 
and destroyed the copy there? 

Captain Safford. I had no personal copy. 

Mr. Richardson. Was not there a copy kept in your section? 

Captain Safford. Kramer was the sole custodian. 

[9807] Mr. Richardson. AVhere would he keep it? In his 
pocket ? 

Captain Safford. In his safe. 

Mr. Richardson. Then somebody would have to get into Kramer's 
safe to destroy his copy? 

Captain Sai^ord. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, who was in charge of the files in the Navy 
Department? 

Captain Safford. These magic or intercepts, Kramer was in charge 
of them. I was indirectly responsible up to the 15th of February 1942. 
The actual custodian was Lieutenant Commander Harrison, U. S. 
Naval Reserve. 

Mr. Richardson. What was that last statement ? 

Captain Safford. The actual custodian was Lieutenant Connuander 
Harrison. U. S. Naval Reserve. He had the physical custody. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, do you think that there was a general con- 
spiracy running from the White House through the War Department 
and Navy Department and through Kramer's section to destroy these 
copies ? 

Captain Safford. I have never indicated the White House at any 
time in my testimony. 

79716— 46— pt. 8 19 



3652 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Richardson. Well, do you think there was an conspiracy be- 
tween the Navy Department and War Department [9808] to 
destroy these copies ? 

Captain Safford. There is an appearance of it. 

Mr. Richardson. And whom do you suspect as individuals who took 
part in that conspiracy ? 

Captain Safford. I have no first-hand knowledge. 

Mr. Richardson. All j^ou have is a suspicion ? 

Captain Safford. I have more that that. 

Mr. Richardson, Well, let us have your knowledge, let us have you 
tell this committee in words of one syllable what evidence you have 
that any human being in Washington sought to destroy official copies 
in the military department. 

Captain Safford. Messages have been known to be mislaid, but we 
always, as a matter of policy from the very beginning, kept a file copy 
of the original incoming message, we kept a copy of all our codes and 
we could prepare a new message at will. When I began working on 
the winds message I was much more interested in the intercept form 
of it than I was in its translation. We were requested first and I think 
finally we were permitted to search ourselves through the files of inter- 
cepted messages in the custody of OP-20-GX, that is the intercepting 
direction finder station of the Navy Department, and not only was 
there no copy of the winds message but there was no copy of any inter- 
cepted messages from any of our east coast stations for the month 
[OSOP] of December 1941, and possibly other times. That search 
was made repeatedly. The men in charge did not know that these 
were missing, they had no record of it being missing, they had no 
authority for destruction and no record of destruction. 

Wlien that became known Capt. E. E. Stone, who was in charge of 
the Navy Department Communications Intelligence Unit at that time 
and is now Rear Admiral Stone and Director of Naval Communica- 
tions, immediately called for written statements from everybody con- 
cerned, to see what could be found out about it, and nothing showed up. 

They had simply evaporated from the face of the earth. They were 
gone, and no records of them. 

It was an unwritten law in that section that we retain the original 
intercept forever, because we could never tell when it would be useful 
or how many years we might want to go back to verify something. 
At the time I turned over the section some of our logs were running 
back, without missing, as far as 1925. Then we tried to find the orders 
which had gone out, and there was no trace of the original teletype 
orders to either Cheltenham or to Bainbridge Island, that we had 
ever told them to do anything about trying to monitor for the winds 
message. 

[9810] They did find the reports as well as the intercepted mes- 
sages from Bainbridge Island and that told us the whole story. 
They were intact and the monthly report acknowledged the orders 
to monitor the message and told exactly what they had done toward 
it, as appears in my written statement. 

Mr. Richardson. But they didn't report at Bainbridge that they 
had any winds execute message, did they ? 

Captain Safford. Because they did not know what they were look- 
ing for but their message reports, when we finally checked them over 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3653 

in January 1946 — I don't mean the messages — not only the messages 
but also in their reports it showed specifically that they had monitored 
every one of those schedules given them and had not been able to 
hear the message on December 4, or practically on any other day. They 
were listening for them but did not hear them. We got that distinct 
negative information. They attempted to hear the message but didn't 
get anything. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, I don't want to burden you any 
further 

Captain SAFroRD. May I add this 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

Captain Safford. Then I tried to find out what the Army had done 
in the line of monitoring for the winds message. [9811'] Cap- 
tain Schukraft at that time was in India — or abroad somewhere. 

Mr. Richardson. Captain, just a moment. Are you under the im- 
pression that there is any doubt that the monitoring admonition 
went out ? We were talking about whether the execute message came 
in. I am wondering what the connection is. 

Captain Safford. The Army tried to check through their records 
to see what kind of instructions had gone out and that was com- 
pletely gone. There was no record in the War Department, in other 
words, except for the hazy memory of one or two individuals, that 
the Army had made an attempt to monitor the winds message at all 
anywhere, although later I believe Captain Schukraft did state they 
had monitored for it at San Francisco. I was trying to confirm the 
fact which is my memory after several years that the Army had made 
no attempt to listen for the winds message on the east coast of the 
United States. It was important to me where they had not monitored 
for it rather than where they did. 

Those letters had disappeared without trace. It was not only the 
winds message itself ; it was everything connected with the winds mes- 
sage which had disappeared. 

Mr. RicKARDSON. Now, Captain, you commenced in the [98W\ 
fall of 1943 to collect your thoughts and information on the subject 
of this wind execute message, did you not? 

Captain Safford. And other matters associated with it. 

Mr. Richardson. You have continued that down to the present 
time? 

Captain Safford. Intermittently; yes. 

Mr. Richardson. You filed this written statement which you read 
to the committee on the subject, did you not? 

Captain Safford. I did. 
^ Mr. Richardson. Now, it is a fact, isn't it, Captain, that every 
single witness who has testified on the winds code, on the subject of 
having received or seen a wind execute message, testifies that they 
never saw one; isn't that a fact? Every single one of them. 

Captain Safford. Do you mean before this committee or other in- 
vestigations? 

Mr. Richardson. I mean before any investigating committee, in- 
cluding this one. 

Captain Safford, I don't think it is as complete as "everyone." 

Mr. Richardson. Can you think of one individual today that has 
not under oath testified that he never saw a wind execute message with 



3654 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the exception of the one that came in [9813] on the 7th or 8th 
whicli all agree npon ? 

Captain Safford, I think that Admiral Ingersoll for one has testi- 
fied that he saw the wind message and it meant war with the United 
States. I think he gave that testimony before the Navy Court of 
Inquiry, 

Mr. Richardson. Doesn't Admiral Ingersoll's testimony specifically 
say that he doesn't remember whether he saw a written execute mes- 
sage before December T or after; isn't that what he testified to? 

Captain Safford. He also testified to that. He wasn't certain as 
to the date but he saw it and it was in writing. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, there was a wind execute message came in 
on the 8th? 

Saptain Safford. Yes; but it was not in writing in the Navy De- 
IJartment. 

Mr. Richardson. It eventually was in writing, wasn't it? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir ; in the summer of 1944. 

Mr. Richardson. We have it here in the exhibit in writing, don't 
we? 

Captain Safford. May I see it, please? 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. I read it to you this morning and showed 
it to you. I refer to the message 3 (d) which I read this morning 
and which you identified this morning [9814] as having been 
the message of December 8 out of Tokyo. 

Captain Safford. That is cort^ect. 

Have I been asked a question, or what ? 

Mr, Richardson. I asked you this morning to look at 3 (d) and 
called your attention to the form of that message. 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. To point out to you that that was a very different 
looking message from the one you described of December 4. 

Captain Safford. That is correct, 

Mr, Richardson, Now, the admonition at the bottom discloses that 
was a message of December 8, 1941 ? 

Captain Safford, Correct. 

Mr, Richardson, It meant war with England ? 

Captain Safi"ord. Correct, 

Mr, Richardson. Now, the point that I make with reference to it is 
that there was, and everybody admits there was and almost every 
station took it as it came in, an execute message on the 8th of December, 
so that when you say that Admiral Ingersoll admitted that he saw a 
wind execute message, I ask you whether he didn't testify that he didn't 
remember whether he saw one before or after December 7, so it may 
have been this message that he saw. 

Captain Safford, Admiral Ingersoll could not possibly [9816] 
have seen that message on, before, or shortly after December 7, 1941. 

Mr. Richardson. Why not? 

Captain Safford. This page 3 which precedes — sheet 3 which pre- 
cedes 3 (d), the certificate from the Federal Communications Commis- 
sion dated August 18, 1944, and signed by T. J. Slowie, secretary, states 
in part : 

Document No. 4 is a true copy of two weather messages intercepted by Com- 
mission monitors from Tokyo stations JLG-4 and JZJ between 0002 and 0035 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3655 

GMT, December S, 1941, and telephoned to Lieulenant Colonel C. C. Dusenbury, 
U. S. Army Service Corps, at the retpiest of Colonel Bratton's office at approxi- 
mately 8:00 p. m. EST, December 7, 1941. Document No. 4 also contains the 
Riomaji version of these messages, 
on tile in this Commission and I am the proper custodian of the same. 

That was a telephoned message to the War Department and no 
written copy of this was received in the Navy Department prior to 
August 18, 1944. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, in Exhibit 1 at page 251 it is shown 
dated December 7, transhited by the Navy December 7 : 

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation. 

[9S16] Captain Safford. That is a different one. 

Mr. Murphy. There is an execute on the 7th. 

Mr. Richardson. Were there two executes on December 

Captain Safford. That was in the so-called hidden word code. 

Mr. Richardson. That is right. 

Now, Captain, let me ask you this question : Why do you think any- 
body wanted to destroy the wind execute message that came in as you 
say on December 4? 

Captain Safford. Because that was the unheeded warning of war. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, everybody in the Military Establishment in 
Washington was looking for war, weren't they? 

Captain Safford. That question cannot be given a simple answer. 

Mr. Richardson. If you can't answer it simply, was there any doubt 
generally in the minds of the people, the heads, the high command 
and the Military Establishment, tliat we w^ere heading for a war with 
Japan ? 

Captain Safford. There was considerable doubt in the high com- 
mand of the Navy Department, at least, that war with Japan would 
commence in early December 1941. Eventually, yes; but not at that 
particular time. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. And nothing on earth was [9817] 
of more interest to them than to try and find out when that would be? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. That is the reason we had all 
the pressure put on us to monitor, to intercept that wind message if 
it were humanly possible to get it. 

Mr. Richardson. And you believe, do you not, that everyone of the 
ofRceis in a subordinate capacity and in the high command were 
anxious to find out when and where war Avould begin? 

Captain Safford. And also against whom. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

[9818] Now, why would anyone want to fail to make use of a 
wind execute message that meant war. just the minute it came in? 
What motive would they have in doing it ? 

Captain Safford. That is a question that has puzzled me for 4 years. 
I have no logical answer to it. 

Mr. Richardson. The reason that it wasn't used is because it is 
diametrically contrary to the theory you have got in your head that 
there was a winds execute message on December 4, isn't it? 

Captain Safford. By no means. 

Mr. Richardson. Don't you think. Captain, with your long ex- 
perience in the Navy, that there were a hundred officers in the military 



3656 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

establishments that woiild be anxious to get their hands on a winds 
execute message that meant war on December 4 ? 

Captain Safford. I would doubt if more than 20 officers in both the 
Army and Navy ever knew about the winds message at the time it was 
sent or immediately thereafter. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you think seriously, Captain, that any of those 
20 would secrete, delete, purloin, destroy, cover up that message so that 
our people here and our people on the Pacific front wouldn't know 
that Japan was about to commence war; is that your belief? 

[98J9] Captain Safford. No. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, why would anybody want to press the 
veil of secrecy, destruction, on this wind execute message that you 
say came on the 4th of December, why would they ? 

Captain Safford. It is human to try to cover up mistakes. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, what was the mistake that was made with 
reference to that message? 

Captain Safford. The fact that no war warning was ever sent. The 
fact that an attempted war warning in the Navy Department was sup- 
pressed by higher authority and that the War Department didn't even 
attempt to get a war warning out. 

Mr. Richardson. Then it is your idea that, with a message in the 
hands of the officers of the Navy, the officers of the Army, and the 
President of the United States, that everybody forgot that they were 
interested in the war and forgot to make use of this message ? 

Captain Safford. I do not know why the warning did not go out. 

Mr. Richardson. I suggest. Captain, that the reason the warning 
didn't go out was because there never was a winds execute message on 
the 4th day of December. You disagree with that? 

[98£0] Captain Safford. I disagree with that. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

That is all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. May I ask one question only at this time, because I 
have not been privileged to hear Captain Safford's testimony. 

Captain, if there were any officers in the War or Navy Departments, 
who desired to cover up the fact that an execute message was received 
by destroying that execute message, why wouldn't they have gone all 
the way and destroyed all of the other messages that predicted that 
such a message was coming in, so there wouldn't be any evidence at 
all that anybody ever talked about it? 

Captain Stafford, I cannot account for other people's motives or 
actions. 

The Chairman. Well, vou have stated here in answer to a question 
by counsel, that there was evidence to justify your suspicions that some- 
bodj^ had destroyed this message purposely for the purpose of cover- 
ing up the record. 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

The Chairman. Well, now, if they were seeking to destroy a record 
in order to cover up any mistake, why didn't they destroy the messages 
that were on file there predicting that there might be an execute mes- 
sage coming [9821] in shortly? They could have done that as 
well as destroying this execute message, couldn't they ? 

Captain Safford. Yes ; except that, that information had been sent 
out to the Asiatic stations, to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3657 

and also the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. I think 
it would have been impossible to get all those things destroyed on that 
theory. 

The Chairman. Well, one of the complaints made by Admiral 
Kimmel and General Short, was, as I recall, that they did not receive 
that information. That is one of the bills of particular against which 
the^'^ complain against the Departments here. 

Captain Safford. They received the message sent by the com- 
mander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, giving the so-called British or Singa- 
pore version, or translation of Tokyo's circulars 2353 and 2354, setting 
up the wind code. They immediately monitored for the wind message 
themselves at Pearl Harbor, but did not hear it. 

Not hearing from the Navy Department, they naturally came to 
the conclusion that the wind message had never been sent. And when 
some of those officers came East I talked to them and told them that 
the winds message had been sent, and they were surprised, naturally, 
and wanted to know why no warning had been sent out. 

[98i22] The Chairman. Did those who you think destroyed this 
message in the War and Navy Departments, know that this Singapore 
intercept of the Japanese message had been forwarded to Oahu or 
Pearl Harbor ? 

Captain Safford. I don't know whether they knew. Probably they 
didn't. 

The Chairman. Probably did not? 

Captain Safford. Yes. 

The Chairman. If they did not know it then they would have had 
the same incentive to destroy that here in the Department as they did 
in the execute message that you say came in, so that there wouldn't 
be any message at all. 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

The Chairman. That is all. I may want to ask some questions 
later. I did not have a chance to hear Captain Safford's entire testi- 
mony. I want to read it over the week end and may have some ques- 
tions later. 

Congressman Cooper. 

The Vice Chairman. Captain Safford, what is the important in- 
formation that you are conveying to this committee about the so- 
called 14 parts message and the so-called winds message ? 

Captain Safford. The 14-part message and my connection with it 
was introduced by the counsel, not by myself. 

[98^3-9824] The Vict: Chairjman. Pardon me. I am asking 
you now. You are appearing as a witness. We appreciate your ap- 
pearance and the information you have given us. I am just asking you 
if you can tell me Avhat the important information is that you want to 
give us about the 14-part message and the winds message? 

Captain Safford. The 14-part message was another opportunity 
that tlie Office of Naval Operations and the General Staff had to get a 
warning out to Hawaii before the actual attack occurred. 

Whether people believed the wind message or not, the 14-part mes- 
sage is a matter of record. It is also a matter of record. I believe, in 
our investigations that the first 13 parts had been distributed before 
midnight on Saturday, December 6, 1941, to all the important officials 
in the Navy Department who had cognizance of the matter. 



3658 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

That is, Admiral Wilkinson, who was the Director of Naval In- 
telligence, and who had authority to send out war warnings; to Ad- 
miral Turner, the Director of War Plans, with authority to send out 
war warnings, and to Admiral Ingersoll, who was the Assistant Chief 
of Naval Operations, and also had the authority to send out war warn- 
ings. 

There is a question as to whether or not Admiral Stark was notified, 
and Admiral Stark did not see the 108£5] message until about 
9 : 30 the next morning. 

In addition to these, the Secretary of the Navy saw it, though he 
would not initiate a war warning, he would do that through the Chief 
of Naval Operations, and the President of the United States saw it, but 
he would not initiate a war warning on his own accord, but go through 
the Secretary of the Navy. 

In addition, General Miles, the Director of Military Intelligence, 
saw it at Admiral Wilkinson's home, and he had the right, at least I 
])resume he had the right to send out a war warning, or call it to the 
attention of his superior officer, and he did nothing about it. 

All this time, time was running out. 

The Vice Chairman. Captain — ^- 

Captain Safford. May I go on, please? 

The Vice Chairmax. Yes; but I wanted to try to direct your at- 
tention more specifically to what I was asking you for. 

Do you consider that you are giving the committee important in- 
formation when you state that these responsible officials of the Govern- 
ment received the information about the 14-part message? 

Captain Safford. I do. I think that is highly important informa- 
tion. 

[9826] The Vice Chairman. Don't you know we have received 
that information from a number of witnesses? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. What is it that you can give us about it here 
that w^e haven't already received from a number of witnesses? 

Captain Safford. I understand. 

I can give you one thing in regard to some of the junior officers who 
handled it, if I may. 

The Vice Chairman. The 14-part ? 

Captain Safford. The 14-part message. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Captain Safford. I have no authority to issue war warnings, and 
could only pass it on to higher authority. Furthermore, as soon as 
the message had been decoded and was in Commander Kramer's hands, 
the responsibility belonged to Naval Intelligence and not to Naval 
Communications. 

Kramer had no authority to issue war warnings, but he did notify 
his superior officer. Captain McCollum, as I believe testified by the 
captain here, and from that time on it was Captain McCollum's re- 
sponsibility. 

Furthermore, Kramer had the messages delivered to Admiral 
Wilkinson by around 10 o'clock, I believe, at [9827] the latest, 
and after that, it became Admiral Wilkinson's responsibility to take 
action of some kind. That automatically relieved Kramer and Captain 
McCollum of any further responsibility. So it passes up the line. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3659 

Once Admiral Turner knew about it, he Avas senior to Admiral 
Wilkinson, it was his responsibility. 

The last man that w^e know definitely got it was Rear Admiral 
In^ersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and it w^as his respon- 
sibdity to send out the war warning, or to get that message to the 
Chief of Naval Operations, or if he took no action he was responsible 
for the result. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, from a practical standpoint, as one 
member of this committee, I w^as just trying to find out from you 
what important information you were prepared to give us that you 
thought we ought to have about the 14-part message that we didn't 
already have. 

[98£8] The only thing about it was the recei]it of it and the 
decoding and the transmitting of it to these officials wdiom you have 
named. That was the whole thing, wasn't it ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. Then, of course, you know Admiral Stark, 
Admiral Turner, Admiral AVilkinson, and Captain McCollum have 
all testified here. You know that General Mashall and General Miles 
and General Gerow have already testified here ? You knew that, didn't 
you ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. All right; now, then with respect to this 14- 
part message, only the first lo parts of it came in before the morning of 
December 7; that is true, isn't it? 

Captain Safford. That is true. 

The Vice Chairman. And you testified that you left your office 
about 4 : 30 on Saturday afternoon, December 6 ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. And that at that time the 13 parts had been 
received but in the decoding and translating it had been so garbled that 
it was thought that all ought to be discarded and the whole thing done 
over again ; you said that, didn't you ? 

[9829] Captain Safford. They had to correct the key set up on 
the machine so as to get out perfect copy instead of imperfect copy, 
which delayed it about 2 hours, so I was told. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, anyhow, at the time you left the office 
it had been decided that the whole thing should be done over again to 
(Xet at absolutely right ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. Then you never did see it after it was fixed 
right until the following Monday, did you ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, I am not quite clear on one othei' point 
in connection with that. I believe you testified that you had not even 
seen all of the lo parts in the incorrect form up to the time you left 
at 4: 30. Is that right? 

Captain Safford. About half ot it. 

The Vice Chairman. About half of it; about five or six parts of it. 

Captain Safford. And then they stopped to straighten out the key 
before they went ahead again. 

The Vice Chairman. I see. As I remember you said about 5 or 
C) parts of it. So that you did not at any time see the finished copy 
of the first 13 parts of that message until the following Monday? 



3660 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Safford. Until the following Monday. 

[9830] The Vice Chairman. Now, you regarded that as highly 
important, you stated that here ? 

Captain Safford. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. And you stated that you considered the first 
13 parts as important as the fourteenth part, didn't you? 

Captain Safford. I did after I saw it afterwards, not at the time. 

The Vice Chairman. After you saw it afterwards. Did you at 
the time you left your office at 4 : 30 on Saturday afternoon regard 
what you had seen and understood about it as highly important? 

Captain Safford. I did. 

The Vice Chairman. You did ? 

Captain Safford. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. You stated that you were out late Saturday 
night. 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. Would you mind telling us what kept you 
out late Saturday night? 

(No response.) 

The Vice Chairman. Nothing connected with your business or 
your office work? 

Captain Safford. No. 

[9831] The Vice Chairman. And you stated that you were in 
your pajamas and bath robe eating breakfast when the word came of 
the attack on Pearl Harbor on Sunday? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, then, you never had at any time from 
the time you left your office at 4 : 30 on Saturday with a highly impor- 
tant message coming in, 3^011 never at any time inquired about that 
message until after the attack, did you ? 

Captain Safford. Not that I remember. 

The Vice Chairman. Not that you remember. You did not call 
3'our office to find out whether the other parts had come in or what they 
might say or what the meaning might be? 

Captain Safford. We thought we had the whole message there and 
more. There were about, roughly, 20 messages. 

The Vice Chairman. Never mind about "we." I am asking about 
you. 

Captain Safford. Well, I. 

The Vice Chairman. You thought you had what? 

Captain Safford. The full 14 ; we did not know. I mean the people 
on watch did not know until the last and everything on hand had been 
translated, if the fourteenth part had been made up. There were a 
lot of other messages in at the same time and I think they were fully 
taken up ; we didn't know which was which. 

[9832] The Vice Chairman. But of the first five or six parts 
which were not in complete form, that you did see at the time you left 
your office at 4 : 30, you considered it highly important ? 

Captain Safford. Very important. 

The Vice Chairman. And you did not make any effort to inquire 
from 3 : 30 in the afternoon on Saturday until after the attack as to 
whether the rest of the parts of the message had come in or what they 
said? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3661 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. I see. Now, you did see the full 14 parts of 
the message on Monday when j' ou came to the office ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. All right ; now, then, I understood you to say 
you did not regard the fourteenth part of that message as any more 
important than the first 13 parts. 

Captain Safford. Than the first 13 combined. 

The Vice Chairman. The first 13 combined. 

Captain Safford. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, the opinion given to this committee, as 
I recall it, by everybody who has testified is to the effect that the 
fourteenth part was really the important part of the message and that 
the 13 parts were just a [9838] restatement of Japan's position 
and views and ideas that everybody had known about all along. Did 
anybody call that to your attention ? 

Captain Safford. 1 have heard some of the witnesses state that and 
I have read it in the newspapers numerous times. 

The Vice Chairman. But you do not agree with it ? 

Captain Safford. That was not my impression at the time. 

The Vice Chairman. You regarded the first 13 parts just as impor- 
tant as the 14th part? 

Captain Safford. Correct. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, then, you have no personal knowledge 
as to what was done about that 14-part message or the first 13 parts of 
it on Saturday night or Sunday, no personal knowledge on your part ? 

Captain Safford. Except as I have checked up all the written docu- 
ments, what written documents were available to see, the times of 
intercept, and see if there were any unreasonable delays at any stage of 
the game. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, you did not find any indication of any 
unreasonable delays; did you? 

Captain Safford. There was no indication of unreasonable delay. 

The Vice Chairman. All right ; so that is all, really, that you know 
about the 14-part message then, is what \_983Ji\ you have 
told us? 

Captain Safford. I would like to make one statement which may or 
may not be important, that the Navy completed its distribution of 
that message, all 14 parts, plus the pilot message, about 3 hours before 
the Japanese Embassy in Washington called up the State Department 
and asked for a delay in their appointment wath Secretary Hull be- 
cause they were not ready. 

The Vice Chairman. Where did you get that information. Captain ? 

Captain Safford. That comes from one of the State Department 
white papers. 

The Vice Chairman. One of the State Department papers? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. You did not deliver the message. Captain 
Kramer is the man wiio was charged with that responsibility ; wasn't 
he? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. So you did not know anything about it of 
your personal knowledge; 'did you? 



3662 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Saffdrd. Only now that it is a matter of record. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, yon did not have any personal knowl- 
edge about it yourself? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

[983o] The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Captain Safford. I am only mentioning the fact that in connection 
with possible delays on the part of my people we handled it much more 
expeditiously than did the Japanese Embassy. 

The Vice Chairman. All right ; now, then, I would like to ask you 
a few questions, if I may. I do not want to dwell too long on that 
because I don't think there is any material dispute in the record or any 
variance from your testimony of any importance so far as this 14-part 
message is concerned. 

Now, Admiral Noyes was the Chief of Naval Comnmnications at 
that time? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. How far was his ofHce from your office? 

Ca])tain Safford. His was upstairs and almost directly over it. 

The Vice Chairman. The next floor above you? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. In other Avords, just one floor above you and 
almost exactly over your office? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now. then, you say that you had been 
[9836] looking for some time and had your whole organization 
on an intensive alert looking for this winds execute message; that is 
true, isn't it? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. That was the most highly important thing 
that you had in mind at that time ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, then, you finally received the message? 

Captain Saf-ford. Correct. 

The Vice Chairman. Why wasn't it important enough for you to 
take it yourself to Admiral Noyes? 

Captain Safford. I did not expect Admiral Noyes would be in his 
office and I thought it might take as long as a half an hour to find 
him. He was a very busy man serving on two or three selection 
boards and had told his office that they might have to chase him all 
over the Navy Department to find him. As soon as I could dispatch 
this by courier I immediately called in my other people and partic- 
ularly the office in charge of the Register Publication Section and we 
began looking through everything to see what would have to be done 
to set our house in order for the immediate outbreak of war. I was 
actually working on it at that time when Admiral Noyes gave me the 
call and suggested that we tell Guam to [^9837] destroy all 
their excess codes and ciphers. 

The Vice Chairman. I know, but going back to the great import- 
ance of this message that you had been looking for for days and 
exerting every effort to try to get it, then when it did come did it 
ever occur to you that that was so important that you ought to take 
it yourself to Admiral Noyes ? 

Captain Safford. It did not. I wished I had afterwards. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3663 

The Vice Chairman. I see, but it did not occur to you then ? 

Captain SArroRn. The only thoujLiht was to ^et it up to A(huiral 
Xoyes as soon as I possibly could by a commissioned officer. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you think anybody could take it to him 
faster than you could yourself^ 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now. then, did this winds mes- 
sage say anything al)out when or where Mar with the United States 
Mould be ? 

Captain Safford. There was no time or place. It merely gave this 
raw information, general information I might say. 

The Vice Chairman. Then the immediate transmission of that 
message to Admiral Kimmel would not have given him any infor- 
mation about M'hen or where the war Avould start, would it? 

Captain Safford. It Mould only give him the fact that the 
[9SS8] M'ar was about to start and very definitely and that the 
United States was in it and not a spectator at the beginning. 

The Vice Chairman. You stated in your testimony that if this 
message had been promptly transmitted to the commander in chief of 
the Pacific Fleet it would have saved the fleet at Pearl Harbor. 

Captain Safford. I believe it M'ould have. 

The Vice Chairman. You believe it M'ould have? 

Captain Safford. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, the main point stressed by Admiral 
Kimmel in his testimony before this connnittee Mas that he had not 
been given information as to just Mhen or M'here the M'ar M'ould start, 
and this message M^ould not have given him that information, M'ould it? 

Captain Safford. I considered that the — as I have testified pre- 
viously, that the M^inds message, the winds execute marked the out- 
break of the war for Saturday, December 6th or Sunday, December 
7tli, for that w^eek end, for that span of 48 hours, and we had it 48 or 
72 hours in advance. It Mas no long i-ange forecast. It was a short 
range forecast. It could have been a false alarm but it M"as an alarm. 

The Vice Chairman. I knoM', but. Captain, the fact is, as you have 
just stated, there M'asn't anything in this M'inds [0839] execute 
message about the time or the place that the M^ar M'ould start. 

Captain Safford. There M^as nothing in that ; no. 

The Vice Chairman. All right ; and Admiral Kimmel has told us 
that that M'as the most important thing of all to him, so this message if 
sent to him Mould not have given him that information, M-ould it? 

Captain Safford. No the winds message of itself. 

The Vice Chairman. All right ; noM', then, all the M^inds message 
could have told Admiral Kimmel M^as that M'ar M-as imminent between 
the United States and Japan, M'as it? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Captain Safford. As Mell as war M-ith England. 

The Vice (^ifauoian. Hom^? 

Captain Safford. As well as M-ai' MMth England. 

The Vice Chairman. That Mar Mas imminent between Japan and 
the United States and England? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 



3664 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, don't you know that on 
November 27, 1941, several days before you say you saw the winds 
message on December 4, that Admiral Ki'mmel had been sent the war 
warning message by the Chief of Naval Operations? 

Captain Safford. He had been sent a message in which the [9840'] 
words appeared, "This is a war warning." 

The Vice Chairman. All right. This is the message appearing on 
page 36 of exhibit 37 of this hearing. I will only read you the first 
words. It is known by heart by everybody on the committee and 
everybody in this room I think. It has been put in the record a 
thousand times more or less, very few less, I believe. 

Mr. Keefe. 1001 now. 

The Vice Chairman. But this message states in the opening words : 
"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning." 

That is all your winds message could have been, isn't it, a war 
warning? 

Captain Safford. This message of November 27 represented our 
estimate of what might happen. The winds message announced the 
intentions and deci^on of the Japanese Government. That was some- 
thing very different. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, could anything in the winds message 
have conveyed more clearly to Admiral Kimmel a war warning than 
the plain bold words, "This message is to be considered a war 
warning" ? 

Captain Safford. It is my opinion as a communication expert and 
not as a strategist or line officer 

The Vice Chair:man. You are a communications expert? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

[9841] The Vice Chairman. And are testifying as such here? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. All right, go ahead. 

Captain Safford (continuing). That the effect of this first sentence 
was largely nullified by what followed as regards any implication 
that the Navy Department expected Japan to suddenly declare war on 
the United States. 

The Vice Chairman, So then you discount the meaning of the 
words, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning," as not 
amounting to much? 

Captain Safford. As not amounting to as much as it would if the 
words had stood alone or there had been less stress on the Far East 
and equal stress on the fact that Japan might deliberately start a war 
against the United States. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, who was there in the Pacific that the 
United States might be involved with in war except Japan ? 

Captain Safford. Nobody as far as Japan. 

The Vice Chairman. Nobody out there. We had no potential 
enemy of this country in the Pacific area except Japan, did we? 

Captain Saford. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. All right And the fortress at Pearl Harbor 
had been built as a protection of this country against [984^] 
Japan, hadn't it? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3665 

The Vice Chairman. Everybody in the Navy knew that, didn't 
they ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, then, 3 days prior to No- 
vember 27, or on November 2-1-, a message was sent from the Chief of 
Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel, commander in chief of the 
Pacific P'leet, known as the message of November 24, 1941. You are 
familiar with that, aren't you? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. In which it is stated : 

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. 
This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements 
their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive 
movement in any direction, including attack on Philippines or Guam, is a 
possibility. 

That is a pretty fair war warning message, isn't it? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. It certainly relates to the very strained rela- 
tions with Japan. 

Captain Safford. And may I comment that if those two messages 
had been sent in reverse order I think the effect would [984S] 
have been much better as regarding a warning of war against the 
United States and United States territory. 

The Vice Chairman. You think if the message of November 27 
had been sent on November 24 and the message of November 24 had 
been sent on November 27, why, the situation would have been better? 

Captain Safford. I think it would have been much clearer in Ad- 
miral Kimmel's mind. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. In other words, then, as a com- 
munications experts you think if you had prepared these messages 
you could have done a better job than was done with these two? 

Captain Safford. As a communications expert I have seen a lot of 
confusion by messages which were not understood or, worse, which 
were misunderstood by the party that received them. The party that 
receives a message has no choice, he has to take it as it is. If he 
recognizes two meanings, he asks for clarification. If he only recog- 
nizes one meaning and it is the wrong one, it is too bad and it does 
happen from time to time. 

The Vice Chairman. Tell me then: You think then as an expert 
communications officer you could have prepared better messages for 
Admiral Kimmel than these tAvo to which I have referred? 

[0844] Captain Safford. I believe that if either or both mes- 
sages had been shown to some disinterested party, possibly correspond- 
ing to General Grant's fabulous Colonel Smith, that they might have 
changed the wording out and got the meaning across a little more 
accurately to Admiral Kimmel. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, you mean to say then that you think 
you could have written better messages than these? 

Captain Saitord. I think that anybody who tried to read those 
messages from the point of view, first, were they capable of misinter- 
pretation would have suggested certain changes in them which would 
have clarified the situation to the man who received that, not only 
Admiral Kimmel but to Admiral Hart just as well. 



3666 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. Captain, I want to l^e just as fair and i-easoii- 
able with you as I know how. I am only seeking information. I am 
only trying to find the truth about this question that we are called 
upon to consider here. I have asked you twice. I will ask you the 
third time. Do you think you could have written better messages 
than these two? 

Captain S afford. I should have been able to write a better message 
but I might have done worse myself if I had been writing the message. 
If I had an important message I always left it to somebody else to 
see if he knew what I was talking about. 

[.9845] The Vice Chairman. Well, hindsight is always better 
than foresight anyhow, isn't it? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

The Vice Chatrmax. But I think the testimony shows that Admiral 
Turner, the head of War Plans of the Navy Department, prepared 
these two messages. Now, was there any reason why Admiral Kimmel 
could not have asked the Chief of Naval Operations for clarification 
or an explanation of either one of these messages if he had thought it 
necessary? 

Captain Safford. There is no reason except there is always a natural 
hesitancy of a junior to request clarification from a senior. It gen- 
erally works the other way around. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, I know, but, Captain, Admiral Kimmel 
was in command of the Pacific Fleet of the United States Navy. That 
was the greatest possession that this Government owned, wasn't it? 

Captain Safford. That was. 

The Vice Chairman. And he was resi)onsible for that fleet as its 
commander in chief. 

Captain Safford. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. If there had been any doubt in his mind as to 
the meaning of these messages wasn't it his plain duty to call for 
clarification or an explanation about it? 

Captain Safford. If there had been doubt 

[9846] The Vice Chairman. If there had been any doubt. 

Captain Safford (continuing). It was his duty. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, wdiat was Captain McCol- 
lum's position at that time? 

Captain Safford. He was Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the 
Office of Naval Intelligence. 

The Vice Chairman. Was he superior to you? 

Captain Safford. He had a corresponding job to me. He was 
junior to me in rank. 

The Vice Chairman. He was junior to you in rank? 

Captain Safford. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. You w^ere senior to him ? 

Captain Safford. I was senior to him by 3 years. 

The Vice Chairman. In rank ? 

Captain Safford. In rank. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, how did your respective jobs compare? 

Captain Safford. They were essentially on the same level of im- 
portance. 

The Vice Chairman. On the same level of importance? 

Captain Safford. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3667 

The Vice Ciiaikman. But he was the man in charge of intelligence 
for the far eastern part of the world, wasn't he? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

[0847] The Vice Chairman. Now, did yon ever bi-ing this winds 
message to his office? 

Captain Safford. Not as such. 

The Vice Ciiairmax. He testified here that he had been anxiously 
looking and watching, exerting every effort to try to get it for days, 
and he never did see it ; so you never did bring it to his attention ? 

Captain Safford. The message that I saw in Admiral Wilkinson's 
hand at about 3 p. m. on the afternoon of December 4, 1941, which had 
been certainly prepared in Captain McCollum's section, it bore all 
the earmarks, no other section of Naval Intelligence could have pre- 
pared it, gave every indication to me that Captain AlcCollum had read 
the winds message, had appreciated its importance, and was trying to 
get an urgent war warning out to the Pacific Fleet. 

Furthermore, I thought it had been sent and I just did not discuss it. 

The Vice Chairman. Did not what? 

Captain Safford. I did not discuss the message with McCollum. 

The Vice Chairman. Oh, you did not ? 

Captain. Safford. No. I took it for granted that it had been sent 
and I just merely shook hands with McCollum for doing such a splen- 
did job and Avriting up such a comprehensive [984S~\ war 
warning. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, yon did talk to him a long time ago? 

Captain Safford. I had talked to him on the phone the day before 
about getting out a war warning and at that time I understood from 
McCollum that he just could not get it out, that he was stuck. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. You talked to him on the third? 

Captain Safford. On the third. 

The Vice Chairman. And you knew of his anxiety in the matter 
and how anxious he was to try to get out all the information that would 
help the fleet in the Pacific and then the following day you get this 
winds message and you did not say anything to him about it? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. You did not mention it to him. Now, 
tiien 

Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield there? 

The Vice Chair:man. Yes: I yield. 

Senator Lucas. Why w^as it you did not talk to McCollum about 
this message at the time? 

Captain Safford. Well, it just did not occur to me to mention it. 
Kramer had it ; Kramer was McCollum's immediate [984^] 
subordinate. Kramer was up there every day and sometimes twice 
a day. We were sending a written copy around and I was busy. I 
could see no reason for bringing it up with him. I was going to 
anyway. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you ask Ki'amer whether he showed that 
message to McCollum? 

Captain Safford. 1 don't believe I ever did. T cannot recall it. 

The Vice Chairman. It did not occur to you to say to Kramer, 
'*Why, IMcCollum and I were talking yesterday. I know he is ex- 
ceedingly anxious about this thing. Did you show him that message?" 

79716— 46— pt. 8 20 



3668 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Didn't it occur to you to do that? 

Captain Safford. We did not discuss the winds message the other 
day. We had discussed other war warnings or warnings as to the 
approach of war, which had come in, particularly the message from 
Tokyo which had been sent on Monday to destroy the codes and here 
it was Wednesday and no notification of that had gone out from the 
Navy Department. I was trying to find out from McCollum why it 
had not gone out and what its prospect was. 

When I found that ISIcCollum could not get one out I wrote one 
myself and succeeded in getting it released, but I tried to convey 
a hint or an evaluation by means of sending that [98S0^ mes- 
sage out with an "urgent" precedence. "Urgent" was so important 
and so rarely used except to float, that there was no place on the 
Navy Department message blanks for "urgent" and it had to be 
tyiDed in. I had the stenographer who prepared it type out the word 
""Priority," type out "Urgent" and put the X marks beside it. 

I sent the message to the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet and 
the commandant Sixteenth Naval District, who were apparently 
working on the purple system and drafted it in highly technical terms 
so they would, know that the local purpose machines were being de- 
stroyed, there would be no more purpose traftic and they could turn 
their energies elsewhere. It was also sent "Priority" to the com- 
mander in chief. Pacific Fleet, and the commandant Fourteenth Naval 
District for information. 

This was the first time for a long time anything pertaining to 
diplomatic traffic had been sent to the commander in chief. Pacific 
Fleet, with the exception of a message released on the 1st bj^ Admiral 
Noyes discussing the Japanese intrigue in Thailand and that was 
also sent "Urgent." 

I sent that message up at noon and I initialed it, then Captain Red- 
mond initialed it and he took it in to Admiral Noyes, found Admiral 
Noyes was out, so he signed it himself and released it, but Captain 
Redmond made one change. Knowing the tradition that we had not 
sent an urgent message from the [98ol] Navy Department 
since 1918, with the exception of this one which had been released by 
Admiral Noyes personally, he erased the "Urgent" designation, re- 
placed it with check marks in pencil beside "Priority" and it went out 
in that form. 

The result was that the people at Pearl Harbor, Captain Layton, 
also Rochef ort, could not read between the lines and missed the warn- 
ing that I was trying to get out there. Captain Layton, I believe, has 
told me that he did discuss what was meant by the words "purple 
machine" with Lieutenant Coleman, who stood watch for 2 months 
in the Navy Department and was thoroughly familiar with it and 
Coleman more or less decrypted "machine" as being of no particular 
importance. 

Admiral Hart did get the news as he told me in his investigation ; 
and I sought, in other words, to just take 

The Vice Chairman. Captain, is all this you are telling us now in 
response to my question ? I want to be highly respectful. 

Captain Saford. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. I just want to know. Is all this you are tell- 
ing us now responsive to the question I asked you ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3669 

Captain Safford. That is what I thought. 

[9SS2] The Vice Ciiaiiuian. I want you to be the judge, of 
course, but I just asked you if you did not think it was highly impor- 
tant that you tell McCollum about receiving this winds execute 
message. 

Captain Safford. I did not at the time or I would have done it. 

The Vice Chairman. Let me see. You say you had a conversation 
with Captain McCollum on December 3. 

Captain Safford. On December 3. 

The Vice Chairman. And you saw the winds execute message the 
following day, December 4. 

Captain Safford. December 4. 

The Vice Chairman. And you did not at any time have any conver- 
sation with him about the winds execute message? 

Captain Safford. Not that I can recall. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, I invite your attention to your testi- 
mony appearing at page 360 of the Hart investigation, and I will read 
you this from it and ask for your comment on it : 

On the 4th of December 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning 
message to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets summariz- 
ing significant events up to that date, quoting the winds message. 

Do you see that ? 

[9853] Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. You testified to that, did you ? 

Captain Safford. I testified to that. 

The Vice Ch^vir]\l\n. Now you say you do not know whether 
McCollum ever knew anything about the winds message. Is that 
right? 

Captain Safford. That is the reason I took for granted that 
McCollum had seen the winds message, because he used the same 
thought, if not the exact words of the winds message in his closing 
paragraph in his message before the final statement ''War is immi- 
nent." 

The Vice Chairman. I understood you to tell me just a moment 
ago that you did not know McCollum ever saw the winds message or 
knew about it. 

Captain Safford. I believed at the time, and I still believe, that 
McCollum did get a copy of the winds message, was shown it, and 
that McCollum has not remembered it; but I have no first-hand in- 
formation that he ever saw it. I did not give him a copy in person 
and I did not discuss it with him on the telephone or in person. 

The Vice Chairman. You haven't discussed it with him at all? 

Captain Safford. No. 

The Vice Chairman. Then how did you know, in this [9854-] 
answer you gave here, that he used the winds message in this dispatch 
that he drafted? 

Captain Safford. The one thing above all I was interested in that 
message, that long message, was to see if it did bring in the winds 
message, or the information contained in the winds message. It did, 
and I took for granted that McCollum had seen the winds message and 
was quoting from it. 

The Vice Chairman. I understood you to say that you did not 
talk to McCollum about the winds message at all on December 4 ; that 
you had talked to him the day before, December 3. 



3670 CONCiRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain SArroRD. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. So then when yoii state here : 

On the 4th of December, 1941, ("oiiiiiiander MoColluni dfafted a long warning 
message to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets sum- 
marizing significant events np to that dftte. quoting tlie winds message 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman (continuing). If yon did not even see him 
on the 4th of December how did you know about this? 

Captain Safford. I saw the message, I read the message; I was in 
Admiral Noyes' office when Captain Wilkinson brought it in, the 
Director of Naval Intelligence, and he gave it \98o5] to Ad- 
miral Noyes to read and Admiral Noyes read it page by P'lge, and 
as Admiral Noyes finished the page lie gave it to me and permitted 
me to read it foi' my information, too. So I saw the message; I 
read the whole message. 

The Vice Chairman. I remember Captain McCollum said the 
whole message was about a half page, and he also stated that it had 
no reference to the winds message or winds code. 

Captain Safford. That is correct. I heard Captain McCollum 
say that same thing. 

The Vice Chairman. You heard him testify, did you not ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. He said that, did he not? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. There is a mistake somewhere, isn't there? 

Captain Safford. IMr. Cooper, I can only tell you things — that is 
one thing I do know from my own memory and that is I saw that 
message myself. 

The Vice Chairman. You have said that. Captain, repeatedly. 

Captain Safford. And, furthermore, I described the message in 
detail to Admiral Hart, but he did not want the details, he wanted 
to keep the record just as short as he could. 

The Vice Chairman. As least you do not remember anything 
[9856] like Captain McCollum says he remembers, do you? 

Captain Safford. No, sir; and I testified in detail on that, I believe, 
ine some of the other investigations, as I remember. 

The Vice Chairman. And he testified several times too, did he not? 

Captain Safford, Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield? 

The Vice Chairman. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. I want to clear this one question up that he is now 
discussing. 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator Li^cas. Captain McCollum Avas head of the Intelligence 
Branch, Far Eastern Division? 

Captain Safford. He was the head of the Far Eastern Division 
Intelligence Branch. 

Senator Lucas. Now, wasn't it your duty to see that he got this 
winds message in order that he might make proper evaluations to 
the Chief of Naval Intelligence? AVas not that the orderly way in 
which these messages went, as a general rule? 

Captain Safford. The messages were ^iven to Commander Kramer, 
who was officially attached to McCoIlum's office, but looking down, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3671 

in space, to my office. As soon as the [0867] message in the 
decoded form was turned over to McCoHum — I mean to Kramer — my 
responsibility ceased. It Avas Kramer's responsibility to complete 
them and to tyj)e them smooth and to make a distribution. Its distri- 
bution included McCollum. 

Senator Lucas. But in this particular case you directed a man in 
your office to take this particular message direct to Admiral Noyes. 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Senator Lucas. Why was that done instead of giving it to Mc- 
Collum? 

Captain Safford. Admiral Noyes issued special instructions on the 
matter and I carried out the instructions of my connnanding officer. 

Senator Lucas. I mean before. 

Captain Safford. Before. 

Senator Lucas. Before the so-called execute winds message. 

Captain Safford. At the time they set the watches on November 
28, and I presume that Admiral Noyes had discussed the matter with 
Admiral Wilkinson and they were both in agreement on this method 
of doing business. 

Senator Lucas. You had si)ecific instructions from Admiral Noyes 
to deliver any so-called winds message direct [08o8] to him? 

Captain Safford. Direct to him if it came during office hours, and 
to telephone it to him if it came outside of office hours. That is the 
reason Brotherhood gave him that call on the message which Brother- 
hood knew we were looking for. 

Senator Lucas. Did McCollum know about this? 

Captain Safford. McCollum know^ about that ; Kramer knew about 
that; and Admiral Wilkinson knew about that. 

The Chairman. The Chair would like for the committee to give 
consideration over the week-end to the possibility of meeting a little 
earlier and sitting a little longer as our present extension runs out 
on the 15th. I am not asking you to make any decision now, but it is 
a pleasant subject for you to be thinking about over the week-end. 

We will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. 

(Whereupon, at 4:25 p. m., February 2, 194(), the committee ad- 
journed to reconvene at 10 a. m., on Monday, February 4, 194G.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3673 



[.9859^ FEAKL HARBOR ATTACK 



MONDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1946 

CONGIJESS OF THE UnITED StATES, 

Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF the Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington^ D. G . 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the 
Caucus Room (room 318) Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. 
Barkle}^ (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Hasten, Edward P. 
Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee. 

\986()\ The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in 
order. 

Chairman Barkley was called to the White House for the usual Mon- 
day morning conference of the leaders and will be detained a little 
while and we will go ahead, without objection. 

Does counsel have anything to present to the committee at this time 
before the examination of the witness is resumed ? 

Mr. ISLvsTEN. ISIr. Chairman, on page 9850 of our transcript, Captain 
Safford referred to a telegram which was sent on December 1, 1941, 
from Washington to Admiral Hart and the Commandant of the Six- 
teenth Naval District, for the information also of Admiral Kimmel 
and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. Inasmuch 
as that telegram or dispatch has not previously been made a part of 
this record we would like to have permission to have it copied into the 
transcript at this point. 

The Vice Chairman. Without objection it is so ordered. 

Mr. Masten. It was distributed to the committee last Saturday. 

The Vice Chair3Ian. All right. 

(The dispatch referred to is as follows :) 

Naval Message 

Navy Department 

Extension Number 2027 
From: OPNAV Urgent 

[986-?] Released by Adm L. Noyes 

Cincaf 
Com 16 
Date : 1 December 1941 

Priority 
Com 14 
CinCPac 
Typed by : McClellan 
011926 
Ambassador Tsubokami in Bangkok on 29th sent to Tokyo as number 872 the 
following "conferences now in progress in Bangkok considering plans aimed at 
forcing British to attack Thai at Padang Bessa near Singora. 



3674 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

As counter move to Japanese landing at Kota Bahru, since Thai intends to 
consider first invader as her enemy. Orange believes this landing in Malay would 
force British to invade Thai at Padang Bessa. 

Thai would then declare war and request Orange help. This plan appears to 
have approval of Thai Chief of Staff Bijitto. 

Thai Government circles have been sharply divided between pro British and 
pro Orange until 25 November but now Wantto and Shin who favor joint military 
action with Orange, have silenced anti Orange group and intend to force Premier 
Pibul to make a decision. Early and favorable [9862] developments are 
possible." 

Certified to be a true copy of unencrypted version of original 011926 Dec 1941. 
Decrypted from original code on 1/31/46 

SECBErr 

/s/ V. H. Cook, 

Conidr. USNR 
011926. 

Mr. Masten. We would also like to add to Exhibit 142, as Exhibit 
142-B, the material AA'hich was distributed to the committee last Fri- 
day or Saturda}^, and which relates to Circular No. 2494 from Tokyo 
and is translated as follows : 

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations. 

That intercept appears at page 251 of Exhibit 1, and the four pages 
which have been distributed to the committee are further information 
in connection with that message, which is one of the so-called "hidden 
word" messages from Tokyo to Washington and other points. We 
would like to offer that as Exhibit 142-B. 

Tlie Vice Chairman. It will be so received. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 142-B.") 

The Vice Chairman. Does counsel have anything else at this time ? 

[9863] Mr. Richardson. No. 

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. LAURENCE FRYE SAFFORD, UNITED STATES 

NAVY— (Resumed) 

The Vice Chairman. Captain, do 3'ou have anything you want to 
present to the committee before your examination is resumed? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. I would like to ask you just a few more ques- 
tions, please. Captain. 

I understood you to state to us Saturday that you would provide 
the committee a copy of the memorandum from you to Colonel West. 
Have you been able to locate that over the week end ? 

Captain Safford. I have a copy; yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. You have it ? 

Captain Safford. Yes. 

The Vice Chair3Ian. Well, counsel had inquired about it. Does 
counsel desire to examine it ? 

Mr. Richardson. You may proceed and I will look it over. 

The Vice Chairman. I will proceed to ask you a few more ques- 
tions then, Captain. 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Captain, did you read to the committee from 
your memorandums or tell the committee everything [.9864.] 
you know" about anybody trying to get you to change your testimony 
about the winds message ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3675 

Captain Safford. I have. There is nothing to be added to that. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. You gave us all the information 
either in 5'our oral statements or the memorandums that you read to 
us bearing on that subject^ 

Captain Saftord. That is correct, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, I believe you stated that the 
copy of this winds execute message that should have been kept in the 
files of your division would have been in the safe of then Commander, 
now Captain. Kramer, is that riglit ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir, and the personal or immediate custodian 
was Lieutenant Commander H. S. Harrison, U. S. Naval Reserve. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, who would have had access to Captain 
Kramer's safe? 

Captain Safford. Normally only the people on duty under Captain 
Kramer. That is, all the translators had access to those messages 
when necessary, though everything was normally cleared through 
Commander Harrison. 

The Vice Chairman. Commander Harrison was in immediate 
charge of the files in Captain Kramer's safe? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

[9865^ The Vice Chairman. And nobody would have had ac- 
cess to those files without the knowledge of Commander Harrison? 

Captain Safford. Except in Connnander Harrison's absence. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, now, what was the situation there? If 
he wasn't there could anybody 

Captain Safford. Commander Harrison left the office every day 
to go to lunch and occasionally he would make a messenger trip in 
place of Captain Kramer, but he was in the office almost all the time. 
Captain Kramer was absent from his office a good part of the time. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, how many people do you think would 
have had access to Captain Kramer's safe, lunch time or any other 
time? How many people could have gone into Kramer's safe and 
had access to these secret files? 

Captain Safford, Not more than ten at the most. 

The Vice Chairman. So about ten people then would have had ac- 
cess to Kramer's secret files ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. I believe you said they were translators. 

Captain Safford. The translators and the yeomen on duty in 
Kramer's section and the head of the section could call for a file at 
any time. I could call for a file from Kramer, or the people that re- 
lieved me could have called for a file. 

[9860] The Vice Chairman. People where? 

Captain Safford. The officer that relieved me could have called 
for the files or it is possible that the Director of Naval Intelligence 
might have wanted to see them. Any higher authority would have 
been given the file without question if he had requested it. 

The Vice Chairman. I understand that. Captain. I assume Ad- 
miral Stark could ask for one of those files and it would be brought 
to him. 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. I am trying to get down to the point of how 
many people had the combination to the safe or the key to the safe 
or could get in there ? 



3676 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Saitord. To the best of my knowledge the combination 
to the safe was held by Kramer and Harrison alone. There was a 
copy of the combination in a sealed envelope in my safe. There was 
another copy of the combination in a sealed envelope in the safe of 
the Aide to the Chief of Naval Operations. That was required for 
all safes in naval operations, so in case of casualty to the man who 
regularly opened the safe the safe could be opened when we had to. 

[9867] The Vice Chairman. When did you ever use this secret 
combination that you had to Kramer's safe ? 
Captain Safford. I never used it. 

The Vice Chairman. Do you know of any of these other people 
having the secret combination, in an envelope or otherwise, ever hav- 
ing used the combination to enter the safe ? 

Captain Safford, I know of no occasion when we ever had to open 
those sealed envelopes, and enter the safe. I might add, whenever an 
officer was relieved, we clianged the combination on his safe and sub- 
stituted the new cards, and that was the only time we ever had to go 
into those envelopes. 

The Vice Chairman. Then is it your best judgment. Captain, that 
Captain Kramer and Commander Harrison were the only two people 
who were actually in control of this safe and the secret files in it? 
Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And anybody else going in there for any file 
that had been called for, or that was needed, would really have to go 
to Captain Kramer or Commander Harrison to do that ? 
Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 
The Vice Chairman. All right. 

[9868] Now, this winds execute message that you have testified 
about was kept in the secret file in Captain Kramer's safe? 
Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, I would like to ask you just one more 
question, I believe. Captain, and invite your attention to the last line 
of your written statement that you presented to the committee, in 
which statement, as you prepared it, and as it was distributed to the 
committee, — you wrote the statement yourself, did you? 
Captain Safford. I wrote the statement myself. 
The Vice Chairman. All right. You used the words "Pearl 
Harbor"? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, when you read the statement to us, you 
said you wanted to change those words "Pearl Harbor" to "England 
and the United States." 
Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Why was that change necessary? 
Captain Safford. I had used the words "Attack on Pearl Harbor" 
mentally as synon3anous with the outbreak of the war. I realized, in 
my statement in the winds message there was nothing whatsoever 
which pointed at Pearl Harbor specifically. 

[9869] The Vice Chairman. So you had just used the words 
"Pearl Harbor" inadvertently ? 

Captain Safford. I used the words "Pearl Harbor" inadvertently, 
and I made that correction when I noticed it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3677 

The Vice Chairman. You say here, "The War and Navy Department 
had been given 72 hours' advance notification of the attack on Pearl 
Harbor by the Japanese themselves." 

Well, that was not correct, was it? 

Captain Safford. That was not correct, and when I read it, I 
realized it. 

The Vice Chairman. When you first wrote your statement, why 
did you use the words "Pearl Harbor" if that w^as not correct ? 

Captain Safford. I wrote that statement, the final draft, on Thurs- 
day night, and the next night at 5 : 30 it had been presented to Com- 
mander Baecher for clearance to the committee counsel, and I had not 
bad the opportunity to proof read it, to see exactly w^hat impression I 
might be giving, or if I made a mistake inadvertently. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, you did make a mistake when you used 
"Pearl Harbor" in that sentence? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And you changed that to "England and the 
United States"? 

[9870] Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Because you realized that there was nothing 
in the winds execute message that related to Pearl Harbor at all? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Thank you. 

Senator George will inquire. 

Senator George. Captain, you were aware of the constantly dete- 
riorating relations between Japan and the United States for some 3 
months at least; were you not ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. Prior to Pearl Harbor ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. You had known of the Secretary of State's state- 
ment made in the council to both the Secretary of Navy and Secretary 
of War in November, specifically about the 26th of November, that 
sets forth the safety and security and defense of the country was in 
the hands of the Army and Navy ? 

Captain Safford. I knew" nothing about that, sir. 

Senator George. You had no information about that? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

Senator George. Well, you did know that practically the diplo- 
matic relations had broken off ; did you not ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir, 

[0871] What I knew was entirely from my reading of the inter- 
cepted messages passing between Washington and Tokyo. 

Senator George. You were familiar with the so-called war message, 
or "This is to be construed as a war message," that went to the Com- 
mander of the Pacific Fleet on the 2Tth of November ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; I had been permitted to read that. 

Senator George. Therefore you knew that diplomatic relations had 
ended; that is, from all the information you had, you knew that con- 
ditions had progressed to the point where diplomatic relations had 
practically ended ? 

Captain Safford, Yes, sir. 



3678 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator George. And you testified, I believe, in your direct, that 
for 8 months you regarded war as inevitable with Japan — or did you 
use the word ''inevitable"^ 

Captain Safford. I do not recall makiufr that statement, but I did 
regard wur with Jajjan as just a matter of time. 

Senator George. Just a matter of time? 

Captain Safford. Yes. 

Senator George. In other words, yon regarded a war with Japan 
as certain Avithin some reasonablj' early time, and for some 3 months 
you had had that view? 

[,9^97^] Captain Stafford. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. Well, now. Captain, let me ask you, what was the 
special significance of the winds execute message of December -4 — I 
believe you have identified that day — to you? What additional spe- 
cial information did it give to you, or convey to you? 

Captain Safford. It confirmed the suspicion that I and I believe 
most of the high ranking officers in the War and Navy Departments 
held, that Jai)an was intending to {)roceed with its program of con- 
quest in the Far East, and tliat would include invasion of Thailand 
and the capture of Malaya and Netherlands East Indies, if and when 
Japan decided to make war on England. 

Tl^.e United States would not necessarily be involved. In fact, 
the wliole tone and purpose of the diplomatic negotiations between 
Tokyo and Washington had been to isolate the Far East and to per- 
suade the United States to give a free hand out there. So the winds 
message meant not only that Japan was about to declare war on Eng- 
land and attack foreign territory out in the Far East, it also meant 
that Japan realized that the United States would not yield, as a matter 
of principle, and that she had determined to bring the war to us 
rather than to start the war in the Far East with a neutral but hostile 
nation on the flank. 

[9873] Senator George. Well, it was abundantly clear, was it 
not, after Secretary of State Hull's message, or answer to the Japanese 
note, that the United States would not yield, and I believe you tes- 
tified that the winds execute message did not designate any time or 
place where the war on the ITnited States would begin, and therefore, 
I am asking you what additional significance did the winds execute 
message, conceding for the purpose of the question that it came 
through as you have testified, what additional significance it had to 
you, in vieAv of the reply of the Secretary of State, in view of what 
had hap})ened, in view of the message of November 27 of the Com- 
mander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, in view of the Marshall message 
to General Short, the Military Commander of the Hawaiian Area? 

Is the committee to understand that it only had the additional sig- 
nificance of confirming what you already believed, what you had al- 
ready concluded ? 

Captain Safford. My interpretation was that it gave a tip-off 
or preview of what Japan's reply to Secretary Hull's note of Novem- 
ber 26 was going to be. 

[98741 Senator George. Well, now, we come to the 14 parts 
message of December 6. I believe your testimony is that you left 
your office at about 4 : 30 on the afternoon of December 6, at which 
time some portions of the 14-part message had come in, but that you 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3679 

had not carefully studied the portions that had been received; is that 
correct ? 

Captain S afford. That is correct. 

Senator George. And then you left your office and learned noth- 
ing more about the 14-])arts message, or the message directing the de- 
livery to Secretary Hull at 1 p. m., until you were advised over the 
radio on Sunday afternoon, after the attack on Pearl Harbor. 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. You did not follow up, during Saturday evening 
or Saturday night, or early Sunday morning, the fourteenth part 
of the message ? 

Captain Safford. I did not. 

Senator George. Well, you did not think that there was anything 
especially significant about so much of the 14-parts message as you 
had seen before you left your office at 4 : 30, did you ? 

Captain Safford. I considered that as the confirmation of my 
evaluation of the winds message 48 hours earlier. 

Senator George. Youmeanthefirst 13 partsorthe [9875] 13 
parts taken all together ? 

Captain Safford. What I had seen, the five or six portions in their 
garbled form. They did not arrive in serial order, they were quite 
mixed up as we broke them down, but we could get the sense of the 
whole thing. The Japanese were rejecting the American proposal 
of November 26. 

Senator George. And that reply was somewhat more abusive in 
tone, was it not, than the ordinary Japanese message? 

Captain Safford. The ordinary Japanese message had been very 
courteous in tone up to this particular message. 

Senator George. Up to this particular message? 

Captain Safford. Yes. 

Senator George. And did you take any steps to see that your evalu- 
ation of the 14-parts message was transmitted on Saturday afternoon 
or evening, or night, or early Sunday morning? 

Captain Safford. No, sir; I did not. 

Senator George. There was nothing in the 14-parts message itself 
that indicated an attack at any particular place? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

Senator George. If any particular place was indicated at all it was 
in the pilot message, the message we refer to [9876] here as the 
pilot message, the message directing the delivery to the Secretary of 
State Hull at a given hour? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt there? 

The Vice Chairman. I believe we agreed Saturday we would not 
have any interruptions. 

Mr. Keefe. I wanted to ask the Senator only a question, to clear 
this up. 

The Vice Chairman. Are we going to have the rule lived up to? 

Senator George. I have no objection, so far as I am concerned. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Keefe. He is referring to the pilot message. 

The Vice Chairman. Do you want the Senator to yield ? 



3680 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. I ask the Senator if he will yield ; yes. 

Senator George. I will be glad to. 

Mr. Keefe. You referred to the pilot message as being the message 
which called for delivery at 1 o'clock. My understanding of the 
situation is that the pilot message, referred to as such, is the message 
that came in first indicating that the 14-part message would be 
received, and that the message, as heretofore referred to, the last mes- 
sage received was the 1 o'clock message. I am offering that [9877^ 
so the record will not be mixed up. 

Senator George. I think. Congressman, you are correct. I was 
referring to the 1 o'clock message, that is the message directing de- 
livery of the 14-parts message to the Secretary of State. 

You did not see that until the 8th ? 

Captain Safford. I did not see that until the 8th. 

Senator George. You did not know anything of it until the 8th? 

Captain Safford. It is possible that my people on watch telephoned 
it out, but I have forgotten it if they did. 

Senator George. Well, Captain, you say that the winds execute 
message was seen by you under the circumstances detailed by you on 
the 4th of December ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. That is your testimony, as I understand it. 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. That message contained the definite statement, 
along with others, of "'west wind clear," did it not? 

Captain Safford. That included "west wind clear." 

Senator George. Meaning war with England ? 

Captain Safford. Meaning war with England and invasion of 
Thailand and attack or occupation of Malaya and the [9878] 
Netherlands East Indies. 

Senator George. Well, Captain, can you give any reason why, on 
the afternoon of December 7, after the attack at Pearl Harbor, I 
believe, the message referring alone to England, using the same code 
words or same weather forecast terms "west wind clear" was sent out? 
If it had already been sent out on December 4, why was it agai^ 
repeated on December 7 ? 

Captain Safford. I do not know. 

Senator George. Well, if your memory is not playing tricks with 
you and there really was, as you have testified, the winds execute 
message of December 4, which contained the same information, why 
was it again repeated, and your answer is that you are not able to 
say, is that correct ? 

Captain Safford. I never saw or heard of that FCC intercepted 
winds message which was broadcast about 6 hours after the attack 
on Pearl Harbor until the summer of 1944. 

Senator George. You haven't any reason to think it was not re- 
ported to the Navy Department on the afternoon of the 7th, have 



you 



Captain Safford. The FCC document stated that that message was 
telephoned to Colonel Dusenbury, I believe, of the Army, and I think 
it was at his home. I have no personal knowledge and no record can 
be found that that message was [9879] delivered to the Navy 
Department either by telephone or in written form. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3681 

Senator George. I have no further questions. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Clark, of North Carolina, will inquire, 
Captain. 

Mr. Clark. Captain, you understand that the intercepted messages 
have been referred to in this hearing as magic, do you not? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. I believe General Marshall of the Army and Admiral 
Stark for the Navy established a rather particular method for the 
handling and distribution and final disposition of magic, did they 
not? 

Captain Safford. Are you referring to within the War and Navy 
Departments and in Washington ? Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Now, on the Army side, copies of this magic were en- 
closed in a leather pouch which was locked and sent by messenger 
from person to person among those who were entitled under that plan 
to have access to magic ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. And when that was presented to an officer he was per- 
mitted to read the message and then return it to the pouch to be 
carried on to the next person ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

[9S80] Mr. Clark. And I believe Admiral Stark established in 
the Navy a very similar method except perhaps they did not use the 
leather pouch ? 

Captain Safford. I believe we ended up by using leather pouches 
the same as the Army did. 

Mr. Clark. So that the system in the two Departments was prac- 
tically the same ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Now, that having been established by the Chief of Staff 
of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, no one would have 
the right to vary or change that method except with the knowledge 
and consent of General Marshall and Admiral Stark, would they? 

Captain Safford. Yes; or except in emergencj?;, when the officer 
who made the change had to accept the responsibility for it if he 
guessed wrong. 

Mr. Clark. And that would have to be some high-ranking officer 
to assume that responsibility ? 

Captain Safj^ord. I believe that Kramer made an emergencj'^ change 
on the evening of the 6th of December 1941. 

Mr. Clark. Was that for the purpose of expediting the delivery of 
magic ? 

Captain Safford. That was for the purpose of expediting delivery. 

[9881] Mr. Clark. And it was supposed to be made available 
very promptly when it came in ? 

Captain Safford, Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Am I right in thinking that this magic was distributed 
to the Wliite House, to the Department of State, the Secretary of 
War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff of the Army and the 
Chief of Naval Operations, the War Plans Division, the head of In- 
telligence in the Army and the Navy ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 



3682 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Clark. And was there anyone else to whom it was accessible to 
your knowledge ? 

Captain Safford. The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations always 
saw it. I believe that the Naval Aide to the President always saw 
them and reviewed them, with Kramer, in the name and acting for 
the President. 

Mr. Clark. The oflEices I have named or people in tliose offices were 
trusted to see the magic? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. There was one more exception. Cap- 
tain Schuirmann, wlio was the Navy liaison officer with the State De- 
partment, was sometimes shown them by the direct orders of Admiral 
Stark or Admiral Ingersoll. There was an excejition made in his 
case in each individual instance. 

Mr. Clark. Now, aside from the ones you have mentioned [9882] 
do you know of anyone else who was entitled to examine tliis magic? 

Captain Safford. Tlie Director of Naval Conmumications and the 
Chief Signal Officer of course were entitled to see it. And I was en- 
titled to see it because my people were working with it. Everybody 
working with it. The heads of the Far Eastern Section of the Naval 
Intelligence and Military Intelligence were, of course. We who were 
working with it had to see it in order to know what was going on. 

Mr. Clark. It was limited to a comparatively few i)eople, was it not? 

Captain Safford. Just as few as we coidd and still have the proper 
peo})le know it. 

Mr. Clarke. I see. 

By whom Avas this distribution made in the Navy Dej)artpment? 

Captain Safford. The distribution was normally made by Captain 
Kramer. 

Mr. Clark. Do you know who did it in the Army ? 

Captain Safford. Colonel Bratton. 

Mr. Clark. Now, do you think of anyone in that group who were 
entitled to examine magic that you would not classify as a highly 
intelligent and competently loyal American ? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

Mr. Clark. I presume that magic was limited to a comparatively 
few because of its very great significance and [988S] im- 

portance ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir, and to minimize the chance of a leak 
and to enable us to place resonsibility in case a leak should occur. 

Mr. Clark. I see. And, of course, a leak was to be avoided because 
of the great importance of magic ? 

Captain Safford. We were afraid our source of information would 
dry up. 

Mr. Clark. I didn't quite get that. 

Captain Safford. We were afraid our source of information would 
dry up if there was a leak. 

Mr. Clark. You are familiar with the episode between General 
Marshall and Governor Dewey in which General Marshall went to 
some trouble to be sure that the Governor thoroughly appreciated the 
importance of keeping the magic secret? 

Captain Safford. I read about it in the newspapers. 

Mr. Clark. How is that ? 

Captain Safford. I have read about it in the newspapers. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3683 

Mr. Clark. A\'el]. that indicated that General Marshall regarded 
magic as being highly important, did it? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. After the original winds message which disclosed that 
weather forecasting language was to be used as a code there was a 
great interest in all the group who had [9884] access to magic 
to know whether and when the winds execute message might come, 
was there not? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir, 

Mr. Clark. I believe you had your people on a 24-hour basis? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. And you were, I think, as you have expressed it, strain- 
ing every fiber to pick this winds execute message out of the air? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Can you think of anything that the War and Navy 
Departments in those clays just before Pearl Harbor, when so many 
people thought we were on the brink of war with Japan, considered 
of more interest or considered of more importance than the winds 
execute message? 

Captain Safford. That was the most important message we had up 
to the time of the pilot message on December 6. 

Mr. Clark. And it was so considered by the group who had the right 
to read magic? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. And they were expecting or at least they were anxious 
to know whether the message came and when? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. And I believe jou have testified that you [9885] 
received this message and immediately put it in the process of handling 
and distribution and disposal just as in the case of all other magic? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; and in addition it was telephoned around 
to various people by Admiral Xoyes and so far as I know that was the 
first time that had ever been done. 

Mr. Clark. Now, you say it was telephoned around. What do 
you mean ? 

Captain Safford. I am afraid I am possibly giving second-hand 
information, but if the committee wants to hear it I will answer the 
question. 

Mr. Clark. I am very much obliged to you. Captain, but so far as 
I am concerned we can leave it out. 

You put this particular message in course of distribution on the 
4th of December? 

Captain Safford. I sent it originally up to Admiral Noyes with 
the expectation and belief that he was going to telephone it to a 
selected list of the same officials who received all other magic. He 
would not give it to the Army distribution list. He would only give 
it to the Navy. 

Mr. Clark. I am very sorry, I am not hearing you, for some reason, 
Captain. 

Captain Safford. I sent the first winds execute message to the Di- 
rector of Naval Communications, Admiral Noyes. It [9886] 
was my expectation and my belief at the time that he telephoned the 
substance of that message to somebody in the War Department who 

79716 — 46— pt. 8 21 



3684 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

was authorized to receive it and also to the naval aide to the Presi- 
dent and to the various officials in the Navy Department who were 
entitled to receive magic information. 

Mr. Clark. Do you know whether he did telephone it or not ? 

Captain S afford. I do not know of my own direct knowledge. 

Mr. Clark. Well, now, the question I asked you. was whether you 
filed this for distribution in the same manner as other magic. 

Captain Safford. Would you repeat the question? 

Mr. Clark. The question was whether or not on the 4th day of 
December you filed this particular message for distribution in the same 
manner as other magic. 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir ; we did that also. 

Mr. Clark. That is what I was asking you. 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. That, of course, was 3 days before Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Can you think of any reason at all why this important 
message, this message of such wide interest [9887] shouldn't 
be immediately handled and distributed and examined and disposed 
of in exactly the same manner as all other magic ? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

ISIr. Clark. So far as you know that was done? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. And if it was done then that message went immediately 
to the group of people we have just referred to as being entitled to 
receive magic? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Captain, will you tell me, please, exactly why this mes- 
sage made such an impression on your mind ? 

Captain Safford. Because I expected to see a very strongly worded 
war warning sent out to Admiral Hart and to Admiral Kimmel as the 
direct result of receiving this winds execute message. 

Mr. Clark. But I am asking you about the impression that the 
message made on your mind, not your impression of what some naval 
officer might have been going to do. 

Captain Safford. I understand. 

To me that message meant that the war would commence within 
two or three days in all probability, possibly Saturday, December 6, 
possibly Sunday, December 7. That was the best estimate that could 
be made as to the timing [9888] implied by a message of that 
nature. 

Mr. Clark. Now, can you think of any reason why it wouldn't have 
made exactly the same or very similar impression upon the minds of the 
members of this group who were so interested in that very question, 
too? 

Captain Safford. I can see no reason why it did not make the same 
impression on their minds. 

Mr. Clark. Well, it was almost bound to make the same impres- 
sion ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

[9889] Mr. Clark. As a matter of just plain common sense. 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. So that if the members of that group later denied having 
ever seen that message that could not be explained upon any theory that 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3685 

it was not important, or that they were not interested, or that it didn't 
mean anything to them ? 

Capain SArroRD, No, sir. 

Mr. Cii^vRK. And their statement that they hadn't seen it would have 
to be Iniowing and willful ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Now, you have referred in your testimony to the fact 
that the only theory upon which you can explain what has happened, 
is that this message was destroyed to cover up mistakes ; is that right ? 

Captain Safford. I believe I have given that implication. 

Mr. Clark. Yes, sir. Of course, it wouldn't have done any good to 
have destroyed the message and all records about the message, in the 
War Department unless it was qlso done in the Navy Department ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. And in the Secretary of — well, it wouldn't be there. 

[9890] No one in the Navy below the rank of Admiral Stark 
would rest under any duty or obligation or have any right to send a 
warning message to the commander of the fleet in the Pacific, would 
he? 

Captain Safford. The director of naval intelligence had always 
the authority to send out what we might call enemy information. 

Mr. Clark. Yes ; but I am not talking about that. 

Captain Safford. He could not direct action to be taken. 

Mr. Clark. Pardon me. You referred here to the kind of a warn- 
ing message that would put the Navy on the alert and have it ready 
for imminent war. No one below Admiral Stark would have the 
right to send that message without his knowledge ? 

Captain Safford. Without his knowledge, except in an emergency. 

Mr. Clark. Well, there wouldn't be an emergency of that kind if 
he was in Washington? 

Captain Safford. If Admiral Stark was available no one junior 
to him would take that step. 

Mr. Clark. And he was available at that time. 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; he was in his own office, so far as I 
know. 

[9891] Mr. Clark. So then, it comes down to the proposition 
that nobody below him in rank would have any duty to cut loose and 
notify the commander of the Pacific fleet as to something about war 
breaking out, would he ? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Therefore, nobody below him in rank would have any 
motive for covering up any mistakes, would they ? 

Captain Safford. It would be the duty of somebody below Admiral 
Stark to prepare a message of warning and submit it to Admiral 
Stark for approval and release. 

Mr. Clark. But what I am asking you is this; if that authority 
and that responsibility rested upon Admiral Stark, it wouldn't be 
neglect of duty for some man below him in rank not to have sent out 
that kind of message ? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. ' 

Mr. Clark. Therefore, there would be no mistake to be covered up, 
would there ? I am talking about below Admiral Stark. 

Captain Safford. That question goes beyond anything I want to 
answer. 



3686 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Clark. Well, Captain, you are dealing with a very serious 
situation here, and I am submitting to you a fair question. 

Captain Safford. It is possible that some subordinate [9892] 
might have given Admiral Stark some very bad advice at that par- 
ticular time. I don't know. That is only 

Mr. Clark. Pardon me, Captain. I am confining myself to the 
sending of a warning, the kind that you have been talking about, 
not advice. 

Now, I am asking you if it is true that it wouldn't be a mistake 
or a breach of duty for any man in the Navy Department below 
Admiral Stark to have failed to send that kind of a warming message? 

Captain Safford. You are right. 

Mr. Clark. And the same would be true in the Army as to every- 
body below General Marshall, wouldn't it? 

Captain Safford. You are riglit. 

Mr. Clark. So that the neglect of duty if there was any rested 
in the realms of Admiral Stark and General Marshall. 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Captain, did you know that it was then and is now, 
a violation of the criminal law of the United States to secrete or 
remove or deface or destroy a public record? 

Captain Safford. I knew that in a general way, 

Mr. Clark. To have cleaned the record of the winds execute message 
of all reference to it in the War and Navy Departments, General 
Marshall and Admiral Stark would have [9893] had to violate 
the law? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. And destroy public records? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Now, do you charge that tliey did that? 

Captain Safford. I am merely stating that not only the transla- 
tion of the winds message is missing, but the intercepted messages of 
that time which were also public records are also missing and unac- 
counted for. I cannot go beyond that statement. 

Mr. Clark. You don't mean to make that kind of a charge? 

Captain Safford. I will not make that charge and I am not deny- 
ing that charge. 

Mr. Clark. I am not asking you abont denying it, I am asking 
you if you make that charge. 

Captain Safford. I understand. 

Mr. Clark. I ask you again whether or not you make such a charge 
against General Marshall and Admiral Stark. 

Captain Safford. Not personally. 

Mr. Clark. What is that? 

Captain Safford. Not against them personally. 

Mr. Clark. Well, if you made it at all against them it would be 
personally, wouldn't it? 

[9S94] Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Do you make any assertion to that effect against 
General Marshall and Admiral Stark? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

Mr. Clark, Do you make any suggestion to that effect against 
them ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3687 

Captain Safi-okd. I am not ^oinp; to make anj^ suggestions of any 
sort. 

Mr. Clark. I beg j^our pardon? 

Captain Safford. I am not making S'lggestions of any sort. 

Mr. Clark. And you don't make an}- suspicion of that character 
against them ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; there is a suspicion. 

Mr. Clark. Against them? 

Captain Safford. Against them. 

Mr. Clark. And you as a -witness before tliis committee are sug- 
gesting this suspicion 't 

Captain Safford. No, sir; I am answering a question. 

Mr. Clark. Well, my question was whether or not you did sug- 
gest a suspicion against them. 

Captain, on yesterday, the press carried pretty well throughout 
the country and the world the news that there was a suspicion cast 
in that direction by your testimony [^9895 \ here. 

I want to know^ from you, please, sir, wdiether by your appearance 
and testimony before this conmiittee, you mean even to create the 
suspicion in the minds of the committee or the public that either 
General Marshall or Admiral Stark violated the law of this Nation 
by destroying a public record in order to cover up a mistake ? 

Captain Safford. In 

Mr. Clark. Let me add, I think j^ou owe it to them and to your- 
self and to the public to make a frank statement in response to that 
question. 

Captain Safford. In my own mind that suspicion does exist. 

Mr. Clark. Captain, I have been impressed by your testimony 
that you are a man of fine ability. I believe you have been diligent 
and interested in your work. I don't mean to ask you an unusual 
question, or one that w^ould be embarrassing, but I am a little per- 
plexed, and consequently I want to ask this final question : 

You have testified here to the existence of the winds execute mes- 
sage and have referred to a certain memorandum that might have 
been made in connection wath it, and you have testified both the winds 
execute message and interception memorandum have disappeared 
from the face of the earth, but [^9896^ it seems from this record 
and all of the witnesses we have heard and the records in previous 
examinations, that there isn't a line of written evidence to corrobo- 
rate 3^our statement, or support it in any respect, nor is there a w'ord 
of oral evidence to corroborate or support your statement in any 
respect, and, in fact, all those w'ho would have had access to this 
message had it been distributed in the regular course in which magic 
was distributed have denied that they ever saw it. 

Now, can you suggest any theory to me as a member of committee 
under which I might consistently accept your statement as being 
correct ? 

If so, I would like to have it. 

Captain Safford. I realize that my statements are diametrically 
opposite to the testimony that you have quoted. 

Mr. Clark. That is all I have. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas of Illinois will inquire, Cap- 
tain. 



3688 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. Captain, I should like to develop a thought or two 
advanced by the able Congressman from North Carolina. 

You stated definitely that you thought the message that came in on 
the Cth and 7th, known as the 14-parts message was an extremely 
important one as far as the breaking of [9897] our relations 
with Japan at that time was concerned? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. In fact, that was more important, was it not, than 
the execute winds message? 

Captain Safford. It was more important to the State Department 
and to the White House, but not to the Navy Department. 

Senator Lucas. Well, of course, the Navy and War Departments 
would know about the 14-parts message ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And did know about it? 

Captain Safford. Did know about it. 

Senator Lucas. Now, can you tell this committee, in vieAv of your 
statement of the importance of this 14-parts message, why it is you 
have labored so long on the execute winds message, and yet on the 6th 
of December you left at -1 : 30 and never took any more interest in the 
14-parts message ? 

Captain Safford. I regarded my work as completed when that 14- 
part message had been intercepted, relayed to the Navy Department, 
broken down enough to see that we did have the correct key, with a 
minor change in it to make smooth language, my best watch officer 
available to process it, and the officer who was charged with responsi- 
bility was there and assured me he would stay with it until the distri- 
[989S] bution had been completed. I figured I could do no more. 
It merely expresses my confidence in the people under me. 

Senator Lucas. Did you have that same confidence in your people 
with respect to the winds execute message ? 

Ca])tain Safford. Yes, sir ; I did. 

Senator Lucas. And still have ? 

Captain Safford. And still have. 

Senator Lucas. The point I am trying to develop in order that 
I might weigh 3'our relative comparison of the importance of the two 
messages deals with the fact that 3'ou were extremely interested in the 
winds execute message, and that you labored overtime in order to try 
to get that message, and you did a great number of things after the 
message came in, as I recall, in order to see that it was properly deliv- 
ered, as you say — that is correct, isn't it ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir ; and also to make the final arrangements 
to set my own house in order before the war hit us. 

Senator Lucas. What do you mean by setting your own house in 
order? 

Captain Safford. We had a few codes and secret papers exposed to 
danger of capture in outlying stations. Everything that we could 
think of had been taken care of prior to that, [9899] which 
came within my cognizance and responsibility, had been completed 
prior to 4 p. m. on Saturday, December 6. 

Senator Lucas. Did you have a copy of this winds execute message 
for your own files? 

Captain Safford. I did not have a personal file. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3689 

Senator Lucas.. Did you have a file over which you had control, 
to which you had access, in your department where this message was 

filed? , ^, 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir; in Captain Kramer s file. 

Senator Lucas. You had access to Captain Kramer's file where the 
winds execute message was filed ? 

Captain Stafford. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. How long did you have access to that file after the 
winds execute message came in on December 4? 

Captain Safford. Up until the 15th of February 1942. 

Senator Lucas. The 15th of February 1942? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Well, now, was there ever any discussion with you 
and anyone else in the Navy up to that time about this winds execute 
message ? 

Captain Safford. There was not, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Did you ever have occasion to go to that file and 
investigate up until the time you left to see whether it was there? 

[9900] Captain Safford. No, sir. 

Senator Lucas. How was that? 

Captain Safford. No, sir; I never checked it one way or the other. 

[990J] Senator Lucas. You did not? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Didn't you say something in your original state- 
ment to the committee about examining that file in the presence of 
Ingersoll and some other men when they were getting ready to submit 
the file to the Roberts Commission ? 

Captain Safford. About the 15th of December 1941 Captain 
Kramer brought in to me a special folder of messages leading up to 
Pearl Harbor which he was preparing to give, to show or give to Ad- 
miral Noyes, and as I understood it to be given or shown to the Rob- 
erts Commission. In fact, I think the order came down from Admiral 
Noyes to prepare this special folder. I checked it over with Kramer 
to see that it was reasonably complete, that we had the important mes- 
sages there, and that we did not have a lot of unimportant messages 
there. I believe that I suggested no change. I approved what 
Kramer had and it was sent up to Admiral Noyes. 

Senator Lucas. Why would Kramer discuss that with you? 

Captain Safford. As verification of his own judgment before he 
gave it to Admiral Noyes because I was very familiar with events. 

Senator Lucas. And now you state that in your opinion this execute 
winds message was in this folder that Captain Kramer discussed with 
you? 

[9902] Captain Safford. In my opinion and to the best of my 
recollection the winds execute message was in that folder I have just 
described. 

Senator Lucas. What other messages were in that folder? 
Captain Safford. There was the pilot message, the 14-part mes- 
sage, the 1 p. m. message, there was this message from Tokyo to 
Berlin which had been introduced in testimony, every message that 
was in that folder. I believe, has been introduced as evidence. 

Senator Lucas. Did you personally examine each and every one 
of the messages ? 



3690 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Sap^ford. I looked through each one to see if it read up and 
told a complete story. 

Senator Lucas. And again you saw the wind execute message, these 
same figures of speech, that you witnessed on the day the message 
came in ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. That is, the English. There was no 
Japanese there at all. 

Senator Lucas. That is your best recollection ? 

Captain Safford. That is my best recollection. 

Senator Lucas. Captain, when you received this execute message 
you telephoned Admiral Xoyes? 

Captain Safford. No, sir; I sent it up to him by an office messenger. 

[9903] Senator Lucas. Yes, and you do not recall what sub- 
ordinate in your office took it? 

Captain Safford. I do not recall which particular subordinate took 
it up. 

Senator Lucas. What liapi)ene(l after that. Captain, with respect 
to that message ? 

Captain Safford. The next thing wjtli respect to the message, 
about an hour latei- Admiral Xoyes called me on the office inter- 
phone, which did not go througli a switchboard, and told me that we 
had better tell Guam to destroy a^J their excess codes and ciphers. 

Senator Luc^as. Did he say anything about the execute message in 
that telephone conversation ? 

Captain Safford. He did not sj)ecifically mention it. 

Senator Lucas. Wasn't that a little strange, for Admiral Noyes not 
to speak about this message in view of its importance? 

Captain Safford. I did not thiid? it strange, no, sir. 

Senator Lu(\\s. Now, did you do any more with respect to that 
execute message after that ? 

Captain Safford. When Kramer commenced his daily routine de- 
livery at noon, he took in one folder, as had been his practice, to 
let me look at it and tell me the high lights of the news, and that 
message was present at that time. 

Senator Lucas. Did you make any further inquiry about it 
[9904] in view of the importance of it? 

Captain Safford. I did not, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And no one ever talked to you about it after until 
these investigations started? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And it was how many years after you first saw the 
message until someone first started discussing it with you? 

Captain Safford. A])proximately 2 years. 

Senator Lucas. Approximately 2 years? 

Cai)tain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. During that time you have been exceedingly busy 
in connection with the prosecution of the war, have you not? 

Captain Safford. I have been attending my duties in the prosecu- 
tion of the war. 

Senator Lucas. Well, with whom did you first discuss it in 1943? 

Captain Safford. I ])robably first discussed it with Commander 
Lynn, who was serving in my office, and who had been on duty before 
Pefud Harbor and had been working with these magic messages. 

Senator Lucas. Did he recall it? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3691 

Captain Saffokd. He thou^lit he knew about it, but said [9905\ 
he had never seen it. 

Sejiator Lucas. In other words, it was hearsay with him? 

Captain Saffokd. That is correct. 

Senator Lucas. He could have received that information from you 
because he was on duty there with you ? 

Captain Saitord. He coukl have received it from me at the time of 
Pearl Harbor, either before or afterward. 

Senator Lucas. Now, when did you next talk about this message 
and to whom? 

Captain Safford. Any time that I came in contact wuth anybody 
who had been on duty in the War and Navy Departments, prior to 
Pearl Harbor, and might have been expected to have first-hand knowl- 
edge of the winds message, 1 talked to them to see what they could 
remember. I remember I specifically talked to Colonel Rowlett. 

Senator Lucas. What did he say? 

Captain Safford. He said he knew about it in office gossip, but had 
not seen it himself. 

Senator Lucas. Would he be one of the individuals wdio should have 
seen it? 

Captain Safford. He normally would not have, because he was 
interested in decoding and breaking down the Japanese cipher systems. 

[WOG] Senator Lucas. Why did you talk to him about it? 

Captain Safford. Because he was one of the officers who had more 
direct contact with all officers at that time. He had been serving 
throughout the war there. I knew him personally. And there was 
a chance he might have been shown it or knew something about it. 

Senator Lucas. Did you talk to Captain Kramer about it at that 
time? He was the individual who translated it. Did you talk to him? 

Captain Saffokd. Captain Kramer at that time was at Pearl Harboi-, 
and later on he went to the South Pacific, He was not axailable to 
talk to. 

Senator Lucas. Did you communicate with Captain Kramer about 
this winds message? 

Captain Sap^ford. I wrote him one letter asking him if he could 
i-ecall anything about it, and, if so, please let me know. 

Senator Lucas. When was that, sir? 

Captain Safford. I do not know. It was about December, I would 
say, 1943 ; possibly January 19-1:4. 

Senator Lucas. Do you have a copy of that letter ? 

Captain Saffokd. I do not have a copy of that letter. 

Senator Lucas. Do you know whether Captain Kramer has the 
original ? 

[9907] Captain Safford. I do not know. 

Senator Lucas. Do you recall what you said ? 

Captain Safford. I asked him about the winds message and asked 
him if he could recall it because we were looking for it. 

Senator Lucas. Whatever you said in that letter, Captain, at that 
time, would probably be your best recollection of what happened in 
connection with the winds message, would it not? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Your memory would bet better then than it is now, 
would it not ? 



3692 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Safford. As far as that aspect was concerned. 

SenatorXucAS. In other words, whatever happened with respect to 
the winds message when you wrote to Captain Kramer, your memory 
would be more reflective to what actually hapened, than it would be 
now? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And if, in that letter you said the whole thing was 
somewhat vague and uncertain — I don't know whether it did or not, 
I haven't seen the letter, but maybe we can get it — that would be true, 
would it not ? 

Captain Safford. I believe I did not go into details at all. 

[OPOS] Senator Lucas. I see. 

Captain Safford. And I did not want to suggest anything to 
Kramer. I was trying to ask a question. 

Senator Lucas. I see. 

Is Captain Kramer in the room? 

Captain Kramer. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. Do you have that letter. Captain ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; I do. I made it available to counsel. 
Senator. 

Senator Lucas. May I see it ? 

Captain Kramer. Mr. Baecher has a photostatic copy of it. 

[9909] Senator Lucas. Will counsel mark this as an exhibit and 
put it in the record? Or maybe read it into the record, that might be 
better. Submit it to the Captain and ask him about it. 

(Document referred to handed to the witness.) 

Senator Lucas. Captain, have you seen this letter dated December 
22,1943? 

Captain Safford. I have, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Is that the letter you wrote Kramer? 

Captain Safford. That is the letter I wrote to Kramer. 

Senator Lucas. Did Kramer ever reply to that letter, do you know? 

Captain Safford. He gave me a reply. 

Senator Lucas. Do you have the reply ? 

Captain Safford. I do not have the reply. 

Senator Lucas. How is that? 

Captain Safford. I do not. 

Senator Lucas. Why? Where is it, do you know? 

Captain Safford. That was destroyed some time ago, after I took 
the information out, what little he was able to give me. 

Senator Lucas. That is, you mean you destroyed the letter ? 

Captain Safford. I destroyed the letter. 

[9910] Senator Lucas. Well, you say in this letter : 

My dear Kramer-San. 

What does the "San" mean? 

Captain Safford. That is Japanese for "envoy." "My dear Envoy 
Kramer." 

Senator Lucas. I see ; that is the Japanese word for "envoy." 

I am preparing a secret paper covering events which took place the early part 
of December 1941. I am getting all the help that I can from Linn and from such 
records as are still available. 

Now, why were you preparing that record ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3693 

Captain Safford. For one thing I had been ordered by the Director 
of Naval Communications to prepare a history of radio intelligence 
up to and including the attack on Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Lucas. Had anything been said to you at that time about 
the winds execute message or the 14-part message by any individuals 
who were your superiors in the Navy Department ? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

Senator Lucas. In other words, the winds execute message was not 
a controversial matter at the time you wrote this letter? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

[^9911^ Senator Lucas. You say : 

I am getting all the help that I can from Linn and from such records as are 
still available. My memory is bad as to details. 

Was that true of the winds execute message at that time? 

Captain Safford. That is true on the details. You will see I had 
not been able to establish the date at that time, the exact date. I knew 
it within 2 or 3 days. 

Senator Lucas. Well, the date is a detail but something else would 
be details, would it not ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas (reading) : 

My memory is bad as to details, which is the reason for preparing this memo- 
randum, and I have forgotten or am very vague as to certain things which I 
clearly recalled a year ago. 

What do you mean by that? 

Captain Safford. That in the course of time I did not remember as 
well at that time at the end of 2 years after Pearl Harbor as at the 
end of 1 year after Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Lucas. Well, now, when you wrote this letter you had no 
reason whatsoever for talking about the winds execute message? 

Captain Safford. Only incidentally, as you will see [9912] 
later on the second page. 

Senator Lucas. But there was no controversy at that time as to 
whether or not a winds execute message was ever received or whether 
it was missing or anything of that kind ? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. It could not be located but I was con- 
cerned mostly with the time of delivery of the 14-part message. 

Senator Lucas. And at that time, up to December 1943, which was 
2 years after the war started, you had never discussed the execute 
winds message with anyone? 

Captain Safford. I believe I had discussed that with Kramer 6 or 
S months previously, before he went to Pearl Harbor. We did not look 
for it. We just discussed the significance of general things. We 
discussed everything and I believe the winds message came up. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. I am talking about the details now of the 
winds execute message. You did not go into that, did you? 

Captain Safford. We did not go into the details particularly. 

Senator Lucas. You just talked about it in a general way? 

Captain Safford. In a general way. 

Senator Lucas. You further say : 

[9913] I realize that your reply will have to be censored and therefore you 
must be guarded as to what you state. Also, I am phrasing my questions very 
carefully, in the event that my letter might fall into unauthorized hands. 



3694 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

What did you mean by '•unauthorized hands"? 
Captain Safford. There is always danger of mail miscarrying, par- 
ticularly in war. 

Senator Lucas (reading) : 

I am saving a copj' of my letter so it will be merely necessary to give the ques- 
tion number and a brief answer, which shoultl not disclose anything to an 
outsider. 

Then you go ahead and ask a series of questions which apparently 
have nothing to do with the winds execute message at all. 
Captain Saftord. That is correct. 
Senator Lucas. Then on the second page you ask this question : 

Did you ever tell Admiral W. what you told me? 

Who was that, Admiral W. ? 

Captain Safford. That was Admiral Wilkinson. 

Senator Lucas. What were you talking about there? 

Captain Safford. That hatl reference to informing Secretary Knox 
about the significance of the times; that 1 [OOI4] o'clock 
AVashington time Avas approximately sunrise at Pearl Hai'bor and 
around the middle of the night in the Far East. 

Senator Lucas. That is, you were talking to Kramer about that in 
tl lis message? 

Captain Safford. I was asking him — he had told me that some time 
before and I was asking him if he had told Admiral Wilkinson about 
that'. 

Senator Lucas. What was his reply when he wrote you? 

Captain Safford. I do not know for certain. I believe he said that 
he had. 

Senator Lucas. Why did you destroy that letter. Captain? You 
have been talking about a good many things that have been destroyed 
around here in the Navy and Army and I am anxious to know wliy you 
destroyed that letter ? 

Captain Safford. That all went into my testimony before Admiral 
Hart. It became a matter of official record then. 

Senator Lucas. That is. the letter itself? 

Captain Safford. Xo, the facts of the statements in the answer. 

Senator Lucas. I know but that does not answer my question. I am 
asking you why you destroyed the letter in answer to these questions? 

Captain Safford. Because I had the evidence that I wanted and I 
could see no purpose in retaining it. 

[9/)lo] Senator Lit-as. I see. In other words, you obtained the 
evidence 

Captain Safford. The information. 

Senator Lucas. How is that ? 

Captain Safford. I obtained the information, such information as 
Kramer could give me. 

Senator Lucas. You obtained the information through other sources 
after that that you had requested Captain Kramer to send to you, is 
that it? 

Captain Safford. I beg your pardon? 

Senator Lucas. I was wondering whether you mean to tell the com- 
mittee that you had obtained this same information you were request- 
ing from Captain Kramer through other sources? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3695 

Captain Saffoiu). No. Some of tlies(^ thin<j;s Kramer was (he only 
one who could possibly tell nie, as to his inovenKMits on tlie ni<;ht of the 
6tli of December. 

Senator Lucas. You asked him in question IT: 

When did Adiiiiinl ^^■. tiist sec or Irani about Part 14 and other papers'.' 
18. 

We can't find the original "Weather Heporf (sent on Dec. .1th) and it.s trans- 
lation. What became of it'? 

What was that weather report? 

Captain Safford. That is what we now call the winds [^9916] 
message. 

Senator Lucas (reading) : 

We can't find the original "Weather Report" (sent on Dec. 5th.) and its 
translation. What became of it'.' 

What did he say when he wrote back'^ 

Captain Safford. Kramer had that confused with the — I think it 
^\ as with the hidden word message which was received on December 
6th. Anyhow, he said it came in — on December Tth. He replied that 
it came in on the morning of December Tth after 10 o'clock and was 
given out on the delivery trip which ended up at Secretary Hull's 
office at 11 a. m. on Sunday. 

Senator Lucas. Why would Kramer be confused about this mes- 
sage? He was the fellow who translated it, wasn't he ? 

Captain Safford. He had not seen it for a long time. 

Senator Lucas. Well, but you are asking Captain Kramer there 
in question 18 for information on the weather report which, as you 
say, was the winds execute message sent on December the 5th? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Senator Lucas. And its translation, you asked what became of it 
and you say that he did not understand that question? 

Captain Safford. His answer was that it came in on the [9917] 
morning of December Tth and was distributed in the morning of 
December Tth. 

Senator Lucas. Well. now. isn't that the false weather message 
that actually did come in at that time? ^ 

Captain Safford. The only thing of that nature wdiich was dis- 
tributed on the morning of December Tth was this hidden word code 
which said, "Relations between Japan and England ai'e not in ac- 
cordance with ex])ectations." or something like that. 

Senator Li^cas. That is the one that he was talking about. That 
is the one he was talking about when he replied to you. 

Captain Safford. When he replied to me. 

Senator Licas. Yes, Now, certainly if there had been an im- 
portant message, an important message that you claim came in on 
December 5th. which was known as the winds execute message, with 
all the furore that we now find about this winds execute message 
don't you think that Captain Kramer would have been able to reply 
direct to that question 18 and give you some definite information as 
to what happened to the so-called winds execute message as you des- 
ignate here as the "weather report"? 

Captain Safford. Not necessarily. 

' See meiroraudum from the Navy Department iu Hearings, Part 11, p. 5304. 



3696 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. Was everybody out of step here but you, [9918] 
Captain, in this matter ? 

Captain Safford. I wrote to Captain Welker after VJ-day to see 
if he could recall an3^thing about it. The letter apparently was lost 
in a typhoon. I wrote to him some time later and he replied that 
he not only could not remember it, that he had done nothing whatsoever 
about it. In other words, it was completely erased from his memory. 

Senator Lucas. Well, I cannot quite understand a number of these 
ciphers and letters that are in here. Did you have a sort of code be- 
tween you and Captain Kramer that you were operating under? 

Captain Safford. May I see what you are referring to ? 

Senator Lucas. Here is a memorandum that was prepared for Cap- 
tain Satford by Commander Kramer or Captain Kramer in response 
to a letter written by Captain Safford in December 1943. You take a 
look at that. Captain, and see whether or not that is a true and correct 
copy of the letter you received from Captain Kramer. 

daptain Safford. That looks like it. 

Senator Lucas. All right. Now, look at the answer to question 
18, Captain, and give the committee the information here as to what 
Captain Kramer meant by that answer. 

Captain Safford. May I see the original letter, please? 

Senator Lucas. Yes, sir. You Avant to see Captain [9919'] 
Kramer's letter ? 

Mr. Kaufman. His own letter. 

Senator Lucas. Yes ; that is, your own letter you want to see. 

Captain Safford (reading) : 

The first one of the quotes was not as indicated in parentheses, but as indicated 
in Item 10-c above, 

and that refers to messages which were delivered by Kramer on the 
morning of December 7, 1941. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. Well, now, do you believe that Kramer's 
memory was as good as yours about this winds execute message? 

Captain Safford. I thought it was or I would not have asked him. 

Senator Lucas. That is exactly what I thought. In other words, 
you were not certain of your own memory at that time with respect 
to what happened to the weather report which is known as the winds 
execute message and you were making inquiry from Kramer to see 
whether or not he knew anything about it and you were asking him for 
this information in order to rely upon it or to aid you in fixing a 
definite opinion as to what did happen to this message ? 

Captain Safford. As to the disposition of it ; yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. As to the disposition of the message; [99£0] 
yes. Now, was there any man in the Navy Department more inter- 
ested in the winds execute message than Kramer ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. That was myself and higher authority. 
I was responsible for its interception and if I had missed its inter- 
ception and its interception would have been humanly possible I would 
have been held to blame. Kramer was only responsible for its brief 
translation, which took a matter of a minute or two and its subsequent 
distribution. He took no other personal action on it. 

Senator Lucas. I understand, but Captain Kramer was the indi- 
vidual who translated this message from Japanese into English ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3697 

Senator Lucas. Captain Kramer is the individual when he trans- 
lated it would have known, if his position was the same as yours, that 
war was definite with Japan as a result of it i 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And is there any question in your mind that a mes- 
sage of that kind would make any lighter impression upon Kramer 
than it did upon you ? 

Captain Safford. I discussed that iiiatter with Kramer in the spring 
of 1943 before he left Washington to go to Hawaii and he recalled 
it and his impression or memory and mine agi'eed as to the fact of its 
interception, not the date. I do not [9921] think we said spe- 
cifically what date. It was a few days before Pearl Harbor, I think 
that is as close as we came, but that we received it and what its signifi- 
cance was. 

Senator Lucas. Yes, and what its significance was, you discussed 
that? 

Captain Safford. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. And notwithstanding that, later in the fall you are 
still asking him for information? 

Captain Safford. One question out of eighteen. 

Senator Lucas. Yes, but that is the big question. Captain, in this 
entire proceeding here right now. In one question out of eighteen 
you say but that is the only one that I am vitally interested in, sir. 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And it goes without saying that you were still look- 
ing for some information about this message or you never would have 
written to Kramer, and the fact of the matter is at that time there was 
no execute winds message in controversy at all insofar as the Navy 
Department is concerned. 

Captain Safford. When I had talked about that message with 
Kramer in the spring of 1943 neither of us had the slightest knowledge 
that we would not find everything pertaining to that winds message in 
the files. 

Senator Lucas. Are you certain that when you talked to [9922] 
Kramer in the spring that you did not have in mind the same answer 
that he gave you in this letter, where he specifically refers to the mes- 
sage that came in on the 7th ? 

Captain Safford. I am positive. 

Senator Lucas. Why would he put that in writing? Why would 
he answer about a completely different message than what you were 
inquiring about? Does his memory play him tricks, too? 

Captain Safford. I cannot understand. I was very surprised when 
I received that answer because the other answers I got just as I ex- 
pected. 

Senator Lucas. In other words, of all of the questions that you 
asked him here, which were nineteen in all, in your letter of December 
the 22d, the only answer that came back from Kramer which was 
wrong was No, 18, dealing with the implementing winds message? 

Captain Safford. That was the only one in which I was disap- 
pointed. 

Senator Lucas. Well, the only one you were disappointed in? 

Captain Safford. Yes. 



3698 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. And it was at complete variance with the question, 
his answer was at complete variance with the question propounded by 
you ? 

[9923] Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that those letters be 
incorporated in the record at this point? 

The Vice Chairman. Well, I was going to suggest that they be 
copied by the rejoorter in full at this point in the record. It will be 
so ordered. Counsel will please supply the reporter with the two 
letters and they will be spread on the record in full at this point. 

Mr. Kaufiviax. The offer will be a letter from Captain Safford to 
Captain Kramer dated the 22d of December 1943, a memorandum 
from Captain Kramer to Captain Safford dated 28 December 1943 
and a letter from Captain Safford to Captain Kramer dated 22 
January 1944. 

The Vice Chairman. All right: it will be so ordered. 

(The documents referred to follow :) 

Navy Depaktment, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Washington, 22 December 1943. 

My Deak Kkamer-San: I am preparing a secret paper covering events which 
took place the early part of December, 1941. I am getting all the help that I 
can from Linn and from such records as are still [9924] available. My 
memor.v is bad as to details, which is the reason for preparing this memoran- 
dum, and I have forgotten or am very vague as to certain things which I clearly 
recalled a year ago. I am writing to you to ask you to help me as far as you 
may be able to do so. 

I realize that your reply will have to be censored and therefore you must be 
guarded as to what you state. Also, I am phrasing my questions very care- 
fully, in the event that my letter might fall into authorized hands. I am saving 
a copy of my letter so it will be merely necessary to give the question number 
and a brief answer, wlhich should not disclose anything to an outsider. 

With reference to events on December 6, 1941 : 

1. What time did you see Mr. R. that evening and show him the papers? 

2. Was Mr. H. there or was he called in, or did you see him tirst and go over 
to Mr. R. with him? 

5. What time did you see Admiral S. that evening and show him the papers? 
4. If answer to 3 is negative, how and when was Admiral S. first informed? 
rt. How and when was Admiral W. first informed? 

6. Linn remembers that you sta.ved till after 1 a. m. What time did you 
leave the Navy Building and go home? 

[9925] 7. What time did you get down to the Navy Building the next 
morning? (Brotherhood said it was sometime after 0700). 

8. W^hat time did you see Mr. R. that morning and show him the new papers? 

9. Was Mr. H. there or was he called in? 

10. My check shows you had Part 14 plus another paper setting the conference 
time at 1 p. m. Do you recall taking any other papers with you, and can you 
give me a hint as to their contents? 

11. W'ere Mr. K. and Mr. S. called in that morning or were they notified in 
any way? 

12. How long did you stay with Mr. R. ? 

13. When did you see Admiral S. that morning? 

14. With reference to a certain conference held that morning, do you know 
who attended it and how long it lasted? 

With regards to what happened afterwards : 

in. Did you ever tell Admiral W. what you told me? 

16. Or McCollum, or anyone else? 

17. When did Admiral W. first see or learn about Part 14 and other papers? 

18. We can't find the original "Weather Report"' (sent Dec. 5th) and its 
translation. What became of it? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3699 

19. Can you offer any pertinent remarks? 

Things seem running better out at the Annex now that [9926] Wright 
is here. I think he has done a marvelous job of creating order out of chaos, but 
his task is by no means finished. 

I hope you are enjoying the balmy climate of Hawaii. I certainly think that 
you, personally, have benefitted by the change of duty. 

Please give my regards to Dyer, Huckins, Williams, and the others. 
With best wishes for the Holidays, 
Sincerely, 

L. F. Safford, 
Captain, U. S. Navy. 
Commander A. D. Kramer, U. S. N., 
Fourteenth Naval District, Pearl Harbor, T. H. 



Joint Intelligence Ceh^ter, 

Pacific Ocean Areas, 
Commandant, Navv 128, 
% Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif., 28 December 1943. 
Memorandum for Capt. Safford 
1510 First indications of arrival 

2100 Completed. Left after phoning to locate Adm B., Adm. T., Col. B. of M. I. D., 
Adm. W., etc. 

1. Did not, personally, but left with one of Adm. B's [992T\ ass'ts in 
the situation room on Penn Ave. with positive instructions re-urgency (to be 
delivered at once). He was entertaining at the time, but I learned later in the 
evening he had seen it. 

2. No, on all counts. Army was taking care of that and I know only that he 
knew of it by 2230 (see item 9) and possibly had seen it % Col. B. by then. 

3. Did not. (See items 4 and 5.) 

4. Believe Item 5 phoned that eve (see next). Possibly Adm. T. did too. 
I know he saw it as soon as he reached oflice next A. M. (about 0900). 

5. At 210.5 by phone to his home where he was entertaining Adm. B and 
others, told him what I planned to do. His chief concern was getting it to Item 

1 and 2, which are covered above. Arrived at his home at 2320 where he, 
and Adm. B. also, saw it and were informed re-others, particularly Item 1. I 
don't recall whether B then phoned re-Item 1 to check delivery or not. Believe 
at this time Item 5 phoned 3. 

6. Left Item 5 place about 0030, stopped by, then proceeded. 

7. About 0730. 

8. Did not personally, but left first batch about 0945, 2nd about 1100 at Item 
8 house, c/o Adm. B. 

9. No. ; at his oflSce. Item 11 (first one) was shown it [9928] at his 
home about 2200 previous night and he made a number of phone calls including 
Item 2. Meeting was then arranged for Item 2, 11 (both) and others at Item 

2 oflBce at 10 : 00 A. M. where I was instructed to be with it and anything else. 
Meeting held at 1000 as scheduled and new items (1st batch) delivered together 
with old. Col. B. was on hand there too for Item 11 (second). 

10. (a) I don't recall precisely how our friend's numbers ran in the hundreds 
(or thousands) but in units from about 02 to 09 or 10. 

(b) The first few of these, NOT including first sentence last half this item, 
were on hand by 0900 and were completed and being delivered at 0945 (to 
Item 8) and 1000 (see Items 9 above). Item 5, 3, T, and others got them about 
0930 at a meeting held in Item 3 oflJce. 

(c) On returning about 1020 from Item 9 oflice the remainder of #02-10 were 
arriving, including this item, i. e., 1st sentence last half, and also quotes in 
Item 18. These were delivered to all hands, including Items 11 (both) at Item 
2 office by 1100 with my comments to Item 11 (first one) on how the hour tied 
with the sun, and moves in progress, elsewhere. 

11. Yes. See 9 and 10 above. 

12. Did not. See 8 above. , 

[9929] 13. About 0900 at his office with others, and left night before mat- 
ters. 1st batch of new given about 0940, 2nd about 1045 (all this was not 
personal but via his senior aide because of meeting in progress. They were 
passed in to him promptly however.) 
79716 — 46— pt 8 22 



3700 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

14. There were 2 I know of, and I believe another c/o Col. B. The one in 
Item 9 above was at least IV2 hours. Another started about 0900 with 10, 11, 
12, 16, 20, and others there, lasting to 1130 that I know of, and probably later. 

15-16. Reference obscure. Would you clarify? If regeueral security (i. e. 
lack) late in spring, yes. 

17. See Items 13 and 14 above. 

18. The first one of the " " was not as indicated in parentheses, but as indi- 
cated in Item 10-c above. It went into Z files. GL should have it now unless 
it was among files turned over to Army. 

19. For the most part covered above, until Item 15 (16) is clarified." 



[9930] Navy Department, 

OinoB OF THE Chief of Naval Opekations, 

Washington, 22 January 1944- 

My dear Keamee-san : Thanks for your very prompt reply. I did not receive 
your Dec. 28th letter until Jan. 17th, and had almost given up hopes. What a 
break for you, as well as the cause, to be ordered to Admiral Halsey's staff. I 
can see the hand of Providence in it. 

I am sending by separate cover (air mail) a condensation code to use. If you 
want to add to it, use numbers #151-#200 inclusive. I would like to hold it 
down to a single .sheet of paper. I am also sending by ordinary mail a copy of 
#35 and a clipping to give to #42 at some auspicious occasion. You will under- 
stand this letter better^ when they arrive. 

With regard to taking #42 into confidence, wait patiently for the proper mo- 
ment, and then shoot the works. Tell him everything he will listen to and show 
him whatever documentary proof you may have. Use your own judgment and 
don't force the issue. Do as good a job as you did on #136 and #137. In my 
opinion the proper moment for disclosure would be any of the following : 

[9931] (a) #42 is detached from Sopac 

(b) #5 is detached from Sopac; 

(c) #10 is detached from Sopac; 

(d) #9 calls on #42 or #10; 

(e) #18 calls on #42 or #10; 

(f ) #42 discusses #31 or attack on #92 in your presence; 

(g) #42 asks you the reason for the alleged failure of 20-G to know what was 
going on ; 

(h) #137 (plus 3 years) ; 

(i) #6 visits #42; 

(j) #42 visits #6. 

Be prudent and be patient. I am just beginning to get things lined up on this 
end. No one in #15 can be trusted. Premature action would only tip off the 
people who framed #31 and #32, and will also get #8 and #10 into very serious 
trouble. Yet we must have the backing, the rank, and the prestige afforded by 
#42. Tell #42 that I knew #31 was a .scapegoat from the start, but I did not 
suspect that he was victim of a frame-up until about #114 (plus 2 years), could 
not confirm it until #132 (plus 2 years), and did not have absolute proof until 
about January 18, 1944. #8 has overwhelming proof of the guilt of #15 and #65 
plus a list of about fifteen reliable witnesses. 

[9932] Please answer the following questions by Item No. : 

20. Re your Item #2, is Col. B. #59? 

21. What or whose job in the Navy did Col. B.'s job correspond to? 

22. Do you know what Army officers were notified or shown the papers by 
Col. B., and when? 

In amplification of my items #15 and #16: 

I recall your telling me that you saw #2 about O90O (EST) on #137. 

He looked at the papers and exclaimed, "My God! This means War!" 

You said, "Admiral, it has meant war for the past three months." 

#3 continued, "I must get word to #31", and picked up a message blank. 

Then another idea entered his mind, and he said, "Does #53 know of this?" 

You replied, "Most of it was sent over to his office last night. This last part 

(#77) was sent over ten minutes ago and should be on the General's desk 

now." 

#3 dropped the message blank and reached for the telephone. 
(End of your tale.) 

23. Can you verify or correct the foregoing? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3701 

24. Did #3 get #53 on the telephone and what did he [9933] say? 

25. Were there any other witnesses; If so, who? 

26. Did .von tell #9 or #5, or anyone else? 

(Be sure to tell Admiral Ilalsey — when the time comes.) 

27. Re your Item #15 and #16. What do you mean by "general security" 
(i. e. lack) late in spring? Was it the Chicago Tribune leak after Midway? 
Incidentally, tell the full story of this to #42 and explain that #5 tried to stop 
the prosecution and attending pulilicity but #24 insisted (to give Publicity to 
himself and to #25) and was backed up by #29 and #28. 

28. Do vou know if anv of the following were called as witnesses by #36? 

(a) #5 

(b) #9 

(c) #10 

(d) #6 

29. Were the JD files in GZ custody or any message from these hies ever 
sumbitted to #36? 

30. Were #5, #9, #10, or anyone else, cautioned or warned, or instructed 
not to ever mention the events of #136 and #137 or the investigations conducted 
l)y #36? In this connection. I am sending you #35 by ordinary ship's mail. 
\h93.'f] I will comment on it in further correspondence. 

31. Do you know when and how #53 tirst got the news of #75 and #76, and 
what action he took? 

32. Same for #77 and #78. 

33. Re my #14. I meant the conference on #137 between #3 and #53 which 
restdted in #89. I did not know of the other conferences and am delighted to 
learn of them. Can you add any names to those already given by you for : 

34. The one in #2 office? 

35. The one in #3 office? 

36. The one "% Col. B."? 

37. The one between #3 and #53? 

38. How much does #9 know? 

39. Will #9 come through willingly? 

40. What is your estimate of #5 in this respect? 

41. Will he talk for #42? 

42. What about #6? 

COMMENT 

With regard to the quotes of my Item 18 and your Items 18 and 10 (c), you 
were describing #80, of which we have copies of the original and its transla- 
tion in the GZ files. This was sent and received on #137. I was asking about 
#74 which was broadcast at 0430 (EST) on #134 or #135. (Not sure of 
exact date.) It was heard by "M" and "W" and sent in by [9935] tele- 
type. It was unheard by "S", "H", and "C", who listened for it. (I have this 
from the Station "A"' files, plus .statements of #19 and #23.) This message 
(in Morse) included the words— "Higashi no kazeame. Nishi no kaze hare. 
(Negative form of kita no kaze Kuniori)" The warning was not sent in the 
manner prescribed by #72 or #73, but was a mixture. The GY watch officer 
was not sure of it so he called you and you came in early and verified it. 
Murray recalls it and so do I. Either you or Brotherhood (?) were waiting in 
my office when I came in tliat morning and said, "Here it is!" We had been 
waiting for it and Station "S" had been forwarding reams of P/L messages 
by teletype. 

As a result of #74. #0 prepared #90 — which was a very long message 
ending tip with the translation and significance of the warning in #74. I read 
the message in #7's office and was witness to the discussion of it between #7 
and #5. I took for granted that # 90 would be sent and did not know other- 
wise until #132 (plus 2 years). I believe that I told you about this message 
and stated that it had been sent. Anyway, I was living in a fool's paradise 
from #134 to #137. I learned from #19 that #9 knew #90 had not been 
sent (#19 was informed by #9 at #92). 

MORE QUESTIONS 

43. Do you recall #74? 

[9936] 44. Did you know any or all of the circumstances of #90, how 
much, and when did yon learn it? 



3702 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

45. When did #9 learn that #90 had not been released? 

46. Do you know who blocked #90 or refused to I'elease it? (#5 was push- 
ing it but apparently did not feel he had the authority to release it himself.) 

47. Can you throw any other light on the subject? 

One final word — I do not know how well you knew #18. I have known him 
for 18 years. He can be trusted and will come through for us. Get in touch 
with him out there if you can. 

Well, this is about enough for one installment. Please give my best regards 
to any of my friends that you may run into out there. 
Sincerely, 

/s/ L. F. Saflord 
L. F. Safford, 
Captain, U. S. Navy. 
Commander Alwin D. Kbameb, U. S. N., 

COMSOPAC Staff, c/o F. P. O. San Francisco, Calif. 



(Note. — Enclosed with the above letter dated January 22, 1944 
were the following excerpts from an article in the Saturday Evening 
Post dated December 25, 1943.) 

[9937] Four-Star Sea Dog 

By J. Bryan, III Lieutenant, U. S. N. R. 

Cusser extraordinary, tattooed like any other gob, one-time owner of a parrot, 
bluff Buck Halsey, commander of our South Pacific Fleet, is the saltiest admiral 
of them all. 

******* 

There is only one flaw in his role. When he retires, it won't be to the sailor's 
usual farm, but to Alexandria, Virginia. He bought a house there in 1939, but has 
never had time to live in it. His friends doubt his intentions "to play golf and 
do nothing else — nothing!" They believe that he will not relax until he has 
discharged a duty of his own assumption. They can cite the day, even the hour, 
when he assumed it — eight p. m. on December 8, 1941. 

His flagship, the Enterprise, had reached Pearl Harbor that afternoon, and 
Halsey had stepped off his barge into a sucking undertow of accusations against 
Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, then commander in chief of the United States Fleet. 

"Sound asleep," the murmurs said. "Criminal negligence — court-martial. — " 

Halsey's devotion to Kimmel, an Annapolis classmate, is almost religious. He 
was shocked to see him cast as a scapegoat. When the Roberts Committee of 
Investigation asked Halsey how he, almost alone, happened to be ready for the 
Japanese attack, his answer was, "Because of one man — Admiral Kimmel." It 
would surprise none of Halsey's friends if, on retirement, he applied himself to 
Kimmel's exoneration. 

(The above article also included a photograph of Admiral William 
F. Halsey, Jr., with the following caption : "Adm. William F. Halsey, 
Jr., who restored public confidence in the Navy and gave a fearful 
drubbing to the mushrooming myth of Japanese invincibility," be- 
neath which appeared the following typewritten note :) 

January 19, 1944. 
My Deak Kramer : When the proper time comes, show the above to Admiral 
Halsey as a sort of letter of introduction. Assure him that his ambition will 
come true. And it will not be necessary for him to wait until his retirement to 
see Admiral Kimmel completely exonerated. But we will need Admiral Halsey's 
help. Do not hesitate to tell him everything. 
Sincerely, 

(S) L. F. Saflord 
L. F. Saffoed. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3703 



[9938] 



SECBET 



Air-mail code for personal correspondence, January 21, 1944 



#1 — Mr. Roosevelt 

#2— Mr. Hull 

#3— Ad. Stark 

#4 — Ad. IngersoU 

#5 — Ad. Wilkinson 

#6— Ad. T. 

#7— Ad. N. 

#&— Safford 

#9— McCollum 

#10 — Kramer 

#11— Mr. Knox (#11— first 

#12— Linn 

#13- 

#14- 

#15 — Opnav 

#16— Nav. Intell. 

#17 — Nav. Comm. 

#18— Rochefort 

#1»— Wright 

#20— Dyer 

#21— Huckins 

#22— Holt wick 

#23— Mason 

#24— Big JRR 

#25— Little JRR 

#26— Wenger 

#27— Goggins 

#2.S— Ad. King 

#29— Ad. Home 

#30— Ad. Nimitz 

#31— Ad. Kimmel 

#32— Gen. Short 

#33— Ad. Bloch 

#34— Ad. Hart 

#35 — Roberts Report 

#36 — Roberts Commission 

#37— Chief Justice Roberts 

#38— Ad. Standley 

#39— Ad. Reeves 

#40— Gen. McCoy 

#41 — Gen. McNarney 

f42 — Admiral Halsey 
43— Ad. Beardall 
#44— White House Aide 
[9939] #45— Aide to CNO 
#46— CincAF 
#47— Com 16 
#48 — Comsopac 
#49 — Cincpac 
#50— Com 14 
#51- 
#52- 

#53— Gen. Marshall 
#54— Deputy Chief of StafC 
#55— D. M. I. 
#56— D. W. P. 
#57— C. S. O. (Gen. O.) 
#58 — Minckler 
#59— Brattan (?) 



#60— Dowd 

#61— Mr. Stimson (#11 last) 

#62— Rowlett 

#63— Adjutant General 

#64— Chief of Air Corps 

#65— General Staff 

#66— M. I. D. 

#67— Signal Corps 

#68- 

#69— J-19 

#70 — Machine 

#71 — Minor System 

#72— Circular #2353 (Sets up #74) 

#73— Circular #2354 (Sets up #74) 

#74 — General Intelligence Broadcast 

containing false "Weather 

Report" 
#75— Serial #901 (Sets up #902) 
#76— Serial #902 (1-13) (The Works) 
#77— Serial #902 (14) (The Finale) 
#78— Serial #907 (1:00 p. m.) 
#79— Circular #2409 (Sets up #80) 
#80— Circular #2494 (PL code msg.) 
#81— Tokyo Circular # 
#82— Tokyo-Washington Serial # 
#83— Washington-Tokyo Serial # 
#84— Tokyo-Berlin Serial # 
#85— Tokyo-Hsinking Serial # 
#86 — Hsinking-Hongkong Serial # 
#87 — Message sent on date indicated 
#88 — Message indicated by following 

ref. No. 
[9940] #8&— * 
#90—** 
# 91 — Washington 

f 92— Pearl Harbor 
93 — Guadalcanal 
#94 — London 
#95 — Corregidor 
#96 — Singapore 

f97 — Melbourne 
98— Tokyo 
#99— Berlin 
#100— Rome 
#101- 
#102— 
#103— 

#104 — Nomura 
#105— Kurusu 

fl06 — Gen. Umedzu (Hsinking) 
107 — Jap. Prime Minister 
#108 — Gaimudaijln 
#109— The Son of Heaven 
#110- 

#111— Oct. 16, 1941 
#112— Nov. 6, 1941 
#113— Nov. 14, 1»41 

f 114— Nov. 15, 1941 
115— Nov. 16, 1941 



• Message described in par. 50 (Paige 9-XI of #35). 

•♦ Message to #31 originated by #9 on #134 (or #135) but never released. 



3704 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Air-mail code for personal correspondence, January 21, 1944 — Continued 

#116— Nov. 17, 1941 #128— Nov. 29, 1941 

#117— Nov. 18, 1941 #129— Nov. 30, 1941 

#118— Nov. 19, 1941 #130— 

#119— Nov. 20, 1941 #131— Dec. 1, 1941 

#120— Nov. 21, 1941 #132— Dec. 2, 1941 

#121— Nov. 22, 1941 [9941] #133— Dec. 3, 1941 

#122— Nov. 23, 1941 #134— Dec. 4, 1941 

#123— Nov. 24, 1941 #135— Dec. 5, 1941 

#124— Nov. 25, 1941 #136— Dec. 6, 1941 

#125— Nov. 26, 1941 #137— Dec. 7, 1941 

#126— Nov. 27, 1941 #13S— 1325 (EST) Dec. 7, 1941 

#127— Nov. 28, 1941 

[994^] Senator Lucas. Well, I am not going to direct any ques- 
tions to the witness on this letter of January 22. It is at some length 
and I think perhaps counsel should make some study of it over the 
noon hour and see whether there are any questions in it that are ma- 
terial and pertinent to ascertain. 

Captain, I want to examine you just a moment or two on the first 
statement that you made in your statement to his committee. You 
state: "There was a winds message, it meant war and we knew it 
meant war." 

Who do you include in that word "we"? 

Captain Safford. The people who were working on magic and 
whom I was in close enough touch with to be able to know how they 
viewed it. 

Senator Lucas. Name those people, please. 

Captain Safford. That would be Kramer — myself first, Kramer, 
McCollum, Admiral Wilkinson, and possibly Admiral Noyes. 

Senator Lucas. Possibly Admiral Noyes? 

Captain Safford. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. Now. those are the five that you have named here 
when you give out this statement that goes to the press of the country 
and you want the people of this country to know that you claim that 
this message meant war, and by that you would have to imply at least 
that they received the message and that they knew about it sti the time. 
Is that [994^] what you want to tell the committee ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Is that it ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. How can all these fellows be wrong. Captain, when 
they say they never saw this winds message? 

Captain Safford. I cannot explain other people. 

Senator Lucas. Well, you never had any trouble with Captain Mc- 
Collum, did you ? ' 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

Senator Lucas. You were on good terms with him ? 

Captain Safford. Very good terms. 

Senator Lucas. Was there any reason to believe that Captain Mc- 
Collum would want to secrete or destroy this message? 

Captain Safford. To the best of my knowledge and recollection 
Captain McCollum tried to send out a war warning as a result of that 
message. 

Senator Lucas. Just answer my question now, Captain. 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3705 

Senator Luoas. Repeat it for him, please. 

(Question read.) 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Were you on friendly terms with A(hniral Wil- 
kinson? 

[9944] Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Did you ever have any tr()ul)le with him at any time 
before December 7, 1941? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

Senator Lucas. He never gave you any orders that you could ]u)t, 
execute, I take it ? 

Captain Safford. No, sii-. T was not at all well acquainted with 
him. I had only known him for 10 weeks but we were on good 
terms. 

Senator Lucas. Well, do you know of any reason why Admiral 
Wilkinson, a man who went out and did what he did in this war, would 
want to secrete or destroy or disturb an important message of this 
kind ? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

[994-5] Senator Lucas. Is that true of Admiral Noyes? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And Captain Kramer? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. You were on good terms with him? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. So there is no reason that you know of, of any 
kind, why these men, who all contend, as I understand from previous 
testimony, that they never saw the winds message, would want to do 
anvthing but what was the correct thing in order to prosecute the war 
successf ull}' ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. They are loyal and highly patriotic Americans, all 
of them ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, all of them. 

Senator Lucas. Now let me ask you this, following Congressman 
Clark's questions : Do you have a suspicion that any of these men that 
you mentioned would destroy or secrete any of these messages? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

Senator Lucas. But you do have a suspicion toward Admiral Stark 
and General Marshall ? 

Captain Safford. I presume I have no proper basis for suspicion. 
I have no proper basis for suspicion against any [9946] indi- 
vidual. 

Senator Lucas. Then you want to change your testimony that you 
gave awhile ago with respect to having that suspicion against Admiral 
Stark and General Marshall ? I think I am correct in my understand- 
ing of your answer to Congressman Clark's question. If I am not, 
you may correct me. 

Captain Safford. I would like to change my answer to Congress- 
man Clark's question, and in reply to yours, that I have no suspicion 
directed against any individual who can be named. 

The Vice Chairman. What was that answer? 
(The answer was read by the reporter.) 



3706 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. We are now talking about the winds execute 
message ? 

Captain Saftord. I am now talking about the winds execute 
message. 

Senator Lucas. Congressman Clark asked you a series of questions 
along that line. 

Captain Saftord. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. You answered strictly in the negative until you 
got to the last question in regard to suspicion and your answer was in 
the affirmative, and you now desire to make a change in that. 

The Vice Chairman. Will the Senator yield? 

[9947] Senator Lucas. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. I do not quite understand that kind of a reply, 
Captain. How can you suspect somebody that you cannot name? 

Senator Lucas. He is changing it. 

The Vice Chairman. I understood you to say you did not suspect 
anybody that you could name. 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. What do you mean by that? 

Captain Safford. Official records have disappeared from the files 
of the Navy Department, and that is a suspicious circumstance. I 
have no idea how they disappeared. It is a fact that they are not 
present and cannot be accounted for. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, do you have any suspicion against 
anybody ? 

Captain Safford. I have no suspicion against any individual. 

Senator Lucas. Well, if these files had been destroyed and you 
cannot account for them, then some one of these individuals that you 
named would have to be responsible for the destruction of them, 
would they not ? 

Captain Safford. Not necessarily. 

Senator Lucas. Well, name others that would have the custody of 
the files to the point where they could get in and [994^'] fool 
around with them. 

Captain Safford. I can name nobody. 

Senator Lucas. I see. Now you said a moment ago that there was 
no record that the FCC had ever telephoned or sent a written order 
to the Navy Department with respect to the false winds message — 
on December 6, was it? 

Captain Safford. No; December 7, after the attack on Pearl Har- 
bor. That is to the best of my knowledge and belief. 

Senator Lucas. Well, you have made an examination of that, I take 
it? 

Captain Safford. I have made an examination and I request to be 
furnished a written copy, if there was one, or a photograph. I re- 
quested that through Captain Walsh of the Navy Department several 
days ago, and there has been no reply. 

Senator Lucas. Well, in your testimony on Saturday you indicated 
that there was apparently a conspiracy to get rid of this message. 
Then you must include the FCC record on this, must you not ? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Well, would not that be true by implication, in view 
of the question asked you by Senator George, as to why the Japanese 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3707 

would want to send out a similar message on December 7, 1 think it 
was, or the 8th, which was practically [99JtD'\ the same mes- 
sage as the winds execute message, and then you said you made an 
examination of the FCC records and there was nothing there what- 
ever to show that such a message was received ? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

Senator Lucas. What did you say ? 

Captain Safford. I said that the Navy Department had received no 
notification of such a message either by telephone or in writing prior 
to the summer of 1944, to the best of my knowledge and belief, as far 
as I have been able to ascertain. 

Senator Lucas. Do you believe the FCC received such a message ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir ; but the Navy Department did not know 
about it at the time. 

Senator Lucas. And you do not believe that they telephoned ? 

Captain Safford. They telephoned to somebody in the Army; yes, 
sir. 

Senator Lucas. But they did not telephone to the Navy ? 

Captain Safford. I do not think that they telephoned to the Navy, 
and if they did there has been no record preserved of it and I never 
knew of it at that time. 

Senator Lucas. Was there a written record that they \9950'\ 
telephoned or sent a copy of this message to the Army ? 

Captain Safford. There is in the files of the FCC. 

Senator Lucas. There is in the files of the FCC ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. What about the Army files? 

Captain Safford. To the best of my knowledge they had no record 
of receiving this telephone call. I may be wrong. 

Senator Lucas. Keceiving what? 

Captain Safford. To the best of my knowledge the War Depart- 
ment had no record of receiving this telephone call from the FCC. 

Senator Lucas. I am talking about whether or not there are any 
files in the Army that show that a report on the message had been 
received. You say there is not, to the best of your knowledge; is 
that correct ? 

Captain Safford. To the best of my knowledge. It was looked for, 
we will put it that way, a couple of years ago and nothing could be 
discovered. 

Senator Lucas. I would like to ask counsel to see if they can find 
the FCC report on the false winds message of December 8, I believe 
it was, and whether or not the Armv or the Navy has a copy of it in 
its files. If it is not here I would like to have you make a search. It 
is very important. 

[9951'] The Vice Chairman. It is now a little past 12. Do you 
want to complete, Senator ? 

Senator Lucas. I have a few more questions. 

The Vice Chairman. It is now a little past twelve o'clock. The 
committee will recess until 2 o'clock. 

Captain, please be back at that time. 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

(Whereupon, at 12 : 10 p. m., the committee recessed until 2 p. m. of 
the same day.) 



3708 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
[99S2] AFTERNOON SESSION 2 P. M. 

The Vice Chairman, The committee will be in order. 

Does counsel have anything at this point before the examination 
is resumed ? 

Mr. KiciiARDsoN. I don't think so, Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Do you have anything you want to present, 
Captain, before your examination is resumed? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

The Vice Caiiirman. Senator Lucas of Illinois will inquire. 

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. LAURENCE ERYE SAEFORD, UNITED STATES 

NAVY— (Resumed) 

Senator Lucas. I may want to return to the line of questioning that 
I was following just before lunch, but I would like to talk to you for 
just a moment about another matter. 

In this statement that you read to the connnittee you state on page 
one that, ''this message was intercepted by the United States Navy at 
the big radio receiving station at Cheltenham, Md., which serves the 
Navy Department. 

When did you finally reach the conclusion. Captain, that this sta- 
tion was the one that did receive it? 

Captain Safford. That was a week ago, about, by the elimination 
of the other possibilities and by the confirmation of the fact by docu- 
mentary evidence which I had just been [995r]] able to see, that 
Cheltenham was in fact covering other messages broadcast from 
Tokyo, had received orders to monitor for the winds message, at least 
to guard specific Tokyo broadcasts and had reported in writing that 
it was receiving those broadcasts. I had had nothing as strongly 
confirmatory as that since 1941. 

Senator Lucas. What other stations could possibly have received 
this message? 

Captain Safford. I had thought at the time that Winter Harbor. 
Maine 

Senator Lucas. I am not talking at the time. I am talking what you 
think today as a result of your latest investigation, what other sta- 
tions do you believe, if there are any, that possibly could have re- 
ceived this ? 

Captain Safford. There was a possibility that it could have been 
heard at Amagansett, Long Island, and at Jupiter, Fla. The 
monthly reports 

Senator Lucas. I understand. Now, just a moment. 

Captain Safford. All right. 

Senator Lucas. Those two are the only two stations, you believe, in 
the world that were monitoring messages at that time, that could have 
possibly received it? 

Captain Safford. No, sir; those are the only ones in the United 
States Navy. 

[9954] Senator Lucas. All right. Now, what other stations 
that were operating at that time that you knew about had the oppor- 
tunity or the possibility of receiving it, at least? 

Captain Safford. The British were operatin.o: a monitoring sta- 
tion at Halifax, which I was told about by a British officer who spent 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3709 

about 2 weeks in my section in the spring of 1941. He was a liaison 
officer. 

Senator Lucas. Was that station capable of receiving a message 
of this character ? 

Captain S afford. I don't know whether they had any 

Senator Lucas. That is all I am interested in, just the stations that 
were capable of receiving a message of this kind throughout the 
world. 

Captain Safford. The capability of any station to receive that 
message would depend upon whether the operators were capable of 
copying the Japanese ]Morse code. That is something that I do not 
know for any station outside those the United States Navy controlled. 

Senator Lucas. From your previous experience in this particular 
department and from your careful investigation of the different mes- 
sages that have come into these hearings from these various monitor- 
ing stations throughout the world do you know of any that were 
capable of deciphering the Morse code ? 

Captain Safford. I do not know what the qualifications of 
[09S'5] the operators at Halifax were or at other stations, outside 
of our own United States Navy controlled. 

Senator Lucas. So outside of the two stations in the United States 
you do not know of any others in the world that were capable of re- 
ceiving this message ? 

Captain Safford. I cannot specifically name any. 

Senator Lucas. I understand. And the records of these two sta- 
tions show that they did not, as I understand it, intercept a message 
of this kind on December the 5th ? 

Captain Safford. The record of those two other stations cannot 
be located. It is missing even today. 

Senator Lucas. Well, are there are records of any kind, or from 
your investigation — as I understand it, you have pursued this rather 
vigorously — show that these stations ever received a message of that 
kind? 

Captain Safford. There are no records from those stations of any 
sort which could be located in 1943 or at the present time. 

Senator Lucas. What is the practice with respect to those records 
that come into these stations from time to time, about keeping them 
or destro3'ing them ? What do they do at these stations? 

Captain Safford. The monthly reports were supposed to be re- 
tained for a permanent record in the Navy Department. [9956] 
Messages were submitted in duplicate. One set of messages was 
broken up for immediate use at the time and their identity lost. The 
other set of messages was supposed to be retained for permanent 
record. 

Senator Lucas. Well, have you examined the various stations 
throughout the United States with respect to monthly reports? 

Ca})tain Safford. I have requested them and I have been informed 
that those monthly reports for November and December 1941 for 
those two stations, as well as all their intercepted messages of any 
nature, could not be located. 

Senator Lucas. What about the other stations in the United States? 
What about their monthly reports ? 



3710 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Satford. The remaining station of Winter Harbor, Maine, 
the monthly reports were located or at least were made available to 
me 2 months ago— I mean 2 weeks ago although they could not be 
located 2 years ago. However, none of the intercepted messages 
from Winter Harbor for this period can be located now, or 2 years 
ago. We have one more station, which is Bainbridge Island near 
Bremerton, Wash., and we have both the monthly reports and the 
complete file of intercepted messages. 

Senator Lucas. Would there be any reason why these monthly re- 
ports, say, for November should not be sent in here [9967] to 
the Department ? 

Captain Saftord. They were sent in and receipt was given by the 
Department, receipt was acknowledged by the Department, and if by 
any chance it miscarried in the mail a duplicate would be sent in from 
the station. The station kept a duplicate report and also a third set 
of messages which they held until after they had heard, after they 
had received word from the Navy Department that the previous 
report and previous messages had been received. 

Senator Lucas. You have stated that the station at Singapore and 
the station at Australia, the station at Corregidor and the station at 
Java used both the voice and the Morse method in transmitting mes- 
sages. It that right ? 

Captain Saitord. I believe I said I was doubtful as to which series 
they had listened for and indicated that by a question mark. 

Senator Lucas. How about those at Corregidor'^ You just had 
Corregidor voice and Morse and the three remaining stations you do 
not know ? 

Captain Saftord. Corregidor had voice and Morse and Pearl Har- 
bor for voice only and the others I do not know whether they listened 
for one or the other or both. 

Senator Lucas. Well, they could have received the message at Cor- 
regidor ? 

[9958] Captain Saftord. They coukl have received the message 
at Corregidor. 

Senator Lucas. And we were supposed to have the best men in 
the Pacific in every branch of the naval service there, were we not ? 

Captain Satford. That is correct. 

[9959] Senator Lucas. On page 12 you said : 

Kramer distinctly recalls that the winds message was shown to him by the GY 
watch officer after 8 : 30 a. m. on that date. 

Captain Saftord. That is correct. 

Senator Lucas. You are sure that is not the false winds message 
that you are talking about here? 

Captain Saffokd. Kramer told me that shortly before Christmas 
of 1945, either in his room or in the rotunda just outside of it. 

Senator Lucas. Wlien was that? Just before Christmas? 

Captain Safford. Just before Christmas, during the early part 
of this investigation. 

Senator Lucas. And you were talking about the winds execute 
message ? 

Captain Saffobd. We were talking about the winds execute mes- 
sage. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3711 

Senator Lucas. You are sure he knew what you were talking about? 

Captain Saftord. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. You fellows did not know what you were talking 
about when you wrote that letter in December, I think it was, did you ? 

Captain Saftord. We certainly knew what we were talking about 
this time. 

[9960] Senator Lucas. You say this is a tip-off which would 
prevent the United States Pacific Fleet being surprised at Pearl 
Harbor? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Well, if it was simply a war message and did not 
give any place of attack, how did you figure that ? 

Captain Safford. It gave a tip-off that we could expect war almost 
immediately. 

Senator Lucas. Everybody knew that. It was testified around here 
that they all knew the war was imminent, as the result of messages 
received. You make the statement here that this was a tip-off in 
the event the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor. I would like to 
know what the basis of that was. 

Captain Safford, This was positive to me, it was positive evidence 
that Japan was going to reject our terms as presented in the note of 
November 26 and declare war on the United States. 

Senator Lucas. Well, you were very much excited about this mes- 
sage, too, were you not, when you got it ? 

Captain Safford. My main excitement had been as to the ques- 
tion of 

Senator Lucas. Well 



Captain Safford. Yes ; I was. 

[9961] Senator Lucas. I mean by that you were highly satis- 
fied that you had received it ? 

Captain Safford. Highly satisfied that I had received it. 

Senator Lucas. You knew war was imminent as the result of that 
message ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. You knew war was more imminent following the 
beginning of the receipt of the 14-part message, did you not ? 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Senator Lucas. Notwithstanding that you knew war was imminent 
when you received the winds message, and notwithstanding you knew 
war was imminent when you received the beginning of the 14-part 
message, you left on Saturday, December 6, at 4 : 30, when this mes- 
sage was coming in, and you never knew any more about the 14-part 
message until after the bombs struck Pearl Harbor? . 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. You told Senator George that you knew war was 
imminent within 2 or 3 days after the receipt of this so-called winds 
message. Did you not believe that it was your duty to stay right 
around as close as it was possible from that time on, to see just what 
would happen ? 

Captain Safford. I had done everything I could do by [9962] 
4:30 p. m., on Saturday, December 0. 



3712 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. You were not interested in whether they struck us 
or did not? 

Captain Safford. I was very interested, but there was nothing I 
could do to help. 

Senator Lucas. I only ask this question because under the heading 
''Distribution" you say : 

I immediately sent the original of the winds message up to the Director of 
Naval Communications (Rear Admiral Noyes) by one of the officers serving 
under me and told him to deliver this paper to Admiral Noyes in person, to track 
him down and not take "no" for an answer, and if he could not find him in a 
reasonable time to let me know. 

You did not show the same concern about the 14-part message as 
you tell us you showed about this winds message? 

Captain Safford. We had orders — no, sir. 

Senator Lucas. In other words, you did not tell those delivering 
the winds message to track anybody down, that if they could not find 
the fellow to be sure to report back to you ? 

Captain Safford. Will you please repeat the question, sir? 

Senator Lucas. I say you did not show the same concern about this 
14-part message, which was a message that brought us closer to the 
peril than the winds message. That is a [9963] little difficult 
for me to understand. You knew these messages were coming in ; you 
knew the significance of the few that you read, and you did not take 
the same precaution with the 14-part message, with the messengers, 
your couriers, or whatever it was. as you did with the winds message? 

Captain Safford. It was not carrying out a precaution. We had 
direct orders from Admiral Noyes wfien the winds message came in 
to get it to him as soon as possible, to get it to him personally, and he 
was going to attend to the emergency distribution. 

Senator Lucas. And you had no such order on the 14-part message? 

Captain Safford. I had no such order on the 14-part. It was han- 
dled by Naval Intelligence in the customary manner. 

Senator Lucas. All right. You did not testify before the Roberts 
Commission ? 

Captain Safford. I did not testify ])efore the Roberts Commission. 

Senator Lucas. You heard Justice Roberts testify that there was 
no wands message delivered to the commission, did you not ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Do you believe him ? 

Captain Safford. I will believe him, as far as the [9964] 
statement is concerned. 

Senator Lucas. What do you mean by that ? 

Captain Safford. Well, it is possible that his memor}^ was not of 
the best on this. -That was only one of many top-secret matters which 
were discussed and not made a matter of official record at that time. 

Senator Lucas. You contended right along that this was probably 
the most important message you ever received. Don't you believe it 
would make an impression on Justice Roberts at that particular time 
and he would recall it? 

Captain Safford. I thought it would. 

Senatoi- Lucas. You are not sure wdiether he saw it or whether he 
did not ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3713 

Captain 8Arix)Hi). I haA^e no idea what was shown to or discussed 
with Mr. Koberts, or any of the other members of the Koberts Com- 
mission. 

[9965] Senator Lucas. The only reason I ask this question, sir, 
is because you stated flatly that it was presented to the Roberts Com- 
mission, that it was being assembled by Admiral Noyes for being 
presented to the Roberts Commission, and that gives an indication, 
at least, that you believed this was presented to the Roberts Com- 
mission. 

Captain Saffokd. That is what I was informed at the time — that 
these papers were being assembled to be shown to the Roberts Com- 
mission. 

Senator Lucas. As far as you are concerned, you are not sure 
whether Roberts remembers whether it was in there or not? 

Captain S afford. I have no idea whether he remembers that or 
whether he was ever shown it. 

Senator Lucas. With respect to Captain McCollum, who was the 
head of the Intelligence Branch of the Far Eastern Division, and 
you were working very close to him, as I understand, you did not 
submit to him a copy of the so-called winds message at the time it 
came in? 

Captain Safford. Not to him personally from me. It was handled 
through our liaison officer, who was Captain Kramer. 

Senator Lucas. Do you now say Captain Kramer talked to Mc- 
Collum about this so-called winds-execute message ? 

[9966] Captain Safford. I do not know what Captain Kramer 
ever said to Captain McCollum on the subject. 

Senator Lucas. You sent the message direct to Noyes because he had 
requested you to do that? 

Captain Safford. He had directed that that be done. It was an 
order, not a request. 

Senator Lucas. Now, is that the only time that Noyes ever directed 
you, during the months of November and December, to send a special 
message of that kind to him ? 

Captain Safford. That is the only time that I ever recall at any 
time. 

Senator Lucas. At any time? In the regular routine of affairs, 
McCollum would be the first fellow to get the message, would he not? 

Captain Safford. The first man assigned from Kramer who had 
any responsibility for it. Kramer usually showed me the message 
on the way up to McCollum as a matter of convenience, to keep me 
posted, and also to see if he could explain the circumstances and sig- 
nificance clearly, so then they could ask him questions and he would 
have a clearer story to tell the other officers that he showed the mes- 
sages to. 

Senator Lucas. But you never talked to McCollum about this mes- 
sage at all ? 

[9967] Captain Safford. I never talked to McCollum about this 
message at all. 

Senator Lucas. And McCollum was the man upon whom the Naval 
Intelligence depended for his proper evaluation of intelligence, as far 
as the Far East was concerned? 



3714 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Safford. That is correct. 

Senator Lucas. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy, of Pennsylvania, will inquire. 
Captain. 

Mr. Murphy. Captain Safford, I understand this morning you were 
shown a photostatic copy of a letter dated January 22', 1944, purporting 
to be signed by you, and, as I understand it you said you did sign that 
letter addressed "My dear Kramer-san." 

Captain Safford. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. That letter was dated January 22, 1944, was it not? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. I wish counsel would hand the witness a copy of the 
letter so I can go over it with him. 

I would like to go over it with you. Captain. The letter which was 
shown to you this morning had certain omissions, did it not, certain 
blank spaces for certain numbers? 

Captain Safford. I was not shown this letter that [QOSSI I 
have here. I was shown the letter that was sent, I believe, December 
22 or 23. 

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest that during the 
noon hour, we took the original letter which refers to names by num- 
ber and prepared a copy of it where we retained the number but 
added the name of the person, so the letter could be read intelligently. 
That is the copy handed the witness. We could furnish the original 
photostat. 

Mr. Murphy. I think that is important, in view of the testimony 
here, I think it is important to be shown the photostat. I would like 
to have him read the photostat. 

Senator Lucas. Is this the copy that I have ? 

The Vice Chairman. I think the reporter took the photostat with 
him. It is probably not available at this time. 

Mr. Murphy. It is important that we have it. In the meantime 
I am going to proceed with my examination. 

Captain, as I understand it, you wrote a letter to Kramer, and 
then there was a separate code which you had with him whereby 
you had certain numbers and those numbers referred to certain in- 
dividuals, and to certain incidents ; that is right, isn't it? 

Captain Safford. I sent him such a letter ; yes, sir. 

[9969] Mr. Murphy. Who prepared the secret code ? 

Captain Safford. I did. 

Mr. Murphy. You did. 

Now, then, that secret code that you supplied to Kramer was to 
refer to^ certain incidents by way of intercepts, and also to refer to 
certain individuals ; that is right, isn't it ? 

Captain Safford. That is right. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, as I understand you, you said that you began 
preparation in this case because you thought you would be called 
as a witness for the prosecution against AdmiralKimmel. 

Was that an accurate statement ? 

Captain Safford. Will you please repeat the question ? 

Mr. Murphy. Read the question, Mr. Reporter, please. 

(The question was read by the reporter.) 

Captain Safford. That is a correct statement. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3715 

Mr. Murphy. Was that before or after you read the Roberts re- 
port that you felt you would be a witness for the prosecution? 

Captain SArroRD, That was after I had read the Roberts report. 

Mr. Murphy. What was that, please ? 

[9970] Captain SArrouD. It was after I had read the Roberts 
report. 

Mr. Murphy. You still felt you would be called as a witness for the 
prosecution? Would that be a correct statement? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And you felt you were a prosecution witness? 

Captain Safford. I expected to be called as a prosecution witness. 

Mr. Murphy. And not a defense witness? 

Captain Safford. Not a defense witness. 

Mr. Murphy. And then you went about preparing the prosecution 
as against the defendant, isn't that correct? 

Captain Safford. That is correct; yes. 

Mr. Murphy. You sent a letter to Kramer and then, under separate 
enclosure, you sent the secret code, did you not ? 

Captain Safford. That is right. 

Mr. Murphy. On January 22, 1944, you were preparing material as 
a prosecution witness. I repeat that because I want to emphasize it. 
Is that right? _ . 

Captain Safford. I was not preparing material as a prosecution 
witness in January 1944. 

Mr. Murphy. When did you shift? I want to be fair with 
[9971] you now. 

Captain Safford. I shifted at the time that I had definitely deter- 
mined that the war warning message which I saw and read on the 
afternoon of December 4, 1941, at about 3 p. m., in Admiral Noyes 
office had not been sent out from the Navy Department. 

Mr. Murphy. Will you tell us when you shifted from a prosecution 
to a defense witness ? Give us the date, please. Up to this moment 
5^ou have held yourself up as preparing yourself, as a witnes for the 
prosecution, and now you have just shifted to the defense. 

Tell us when you shifted from a prosecution witness to a defense 
witness. 

Captain Safford. About the middle of January 1944. 

[9972] Mr. Murphy. Now where were you on Saturday night 
the 6th of December 1941 ? You were asked that question before and 
did not answer it, but I feel this committee is entitled to an answer 
from you, sir. Where were you and what did you do? 

Captain Safford. I was out with my wife visiting friends, and I 
do not recall whom we saw that morning. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you do any drinking? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. You were still in your pajamas the next afternoon 
at 2:20, having breakfast, on December 7, is that right? 

Captain Safford. That is right. 

Mr. Murphy. At 2:20 you were still in your pajamas having 
breakfast ? 

Captain Safford. That is right. 

Mr. Murphy. Now the fact is that the 1 o'clock message was a very 
important tip-off, was it not? 

79716 — 46— pt. 8 23 



3716 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Safford. Yes. 

Mr. MuRPiiY. xVnd the fact is further, Captain, that the man under 
you had the 1 o'clock messa^re translated at 5 o'clock in the morning, 
did he not? Did not Brotherhood knoAv what was in that message at 
5 o'clock in the morning of the 7th ? 

[9,973] Captain Safford. He knew what it meant before 7 
o'clock. 

Mr. MuRPiiY. Did not he know at 5 o'clock what was in it? 

Captain Safford. Not to my knowledge that early. 

Mr. Murphy. Did not it take about 2 minutes to translate it ? 

Captain Safford. It took a little time to break it dowm into its 
Japanese. 

Ml". Murphy. Is it not a fact that just shortly after 5 o'clock, of 
7 hours before Pearl Harbor, in your department, while you were 
not in your department, they knew that the warning was given that 
1 o'clock was the deadline ( Isn't that right? 

Captain Safford. Brotherhood did. that is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. What is that ? 

Captain Safford. Brotherhood did. 

Mr. Murphy. And Brotherhood was directly under you and you 
were responsible for your subordinate, weren't you? 

Captain Safford. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Where were you at 5 o'clock in the morning? 

Captain Safford. I was at home. 

Mr. Murphy. At home. The fact is further that the [9974] 
7th was the Navy day for translating, was it not ? 

Captain Safford. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. There was no interpreter who knew Japanese in your 
Department, was there? 

Captain Safford. There was not. 

Mr. Murphy. And you are over home at a time when you think 
war is coming, because you have told this committee that war was 
coming on Saturday or Sunday, you knew that there is going to be 
a time fixed which will fix the deadline and you leave on Saturday 
afternoon at 4 : 30, and you do not inquii^e as to anyone under you 
until after the war has started ; that is right ? 

Captain Safford. That is right. 

Mr. Murphy. And if you had followed your subordinates at 5 
o'clock in the morning we would have known that 1 o'clock was the 
deadline, wouldn't we ? 

Will you answer that, please? 

Captain Safford. My subordinate sent it over to the Army for 
translation. There had been a local arrangement made whereby the 
Army would provide a translator for the 7th because we had furnished 
the translations for the 6th, and that was sent over in accordance with 
those instructions from Kramer. Also Brotherhood called Kramer 
to tell him what was in and to be sure Kramer would come down. 

[997S] Mr. Murphy. We are talking about you, in charge of 200 
men. You, the witness before the committee, accusing everybody else 
of having heard. We are now talking about you. 

The fact is that in your Department at 5 o'clock in the morning 
of Pearl Harbor Day your subordinates knew that 1 o'clock was the 
time for the delivery of this fatal message, didn't he ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3717 

Captain Safford. He thought, but ho couhl not be sure. He was 
not a qualified Japanese translator. 

Mr. Murphy. Did he not say that he knew what was in that mes- 
sage but he was not sure : is that right ? 

Captain Safford. I don't know what he said. 

Mr. Murphy. The fact is that you had no interpreter there on the 
day you expected the war to start, did you ? Kramer was a subordinate 
of yours. You had no interpreter there, did you ? 

Captain Safford. We had no interpreter there at the time. 

Mr. Murphy. The 7th was the Navy's day? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And it was the day that you expected war to start, 
wasn't it? 

Captain Safford, Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And you are still in pajamas having breakfast 
[9976'] at 2 o'clock? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Do you have any sense of responsibility for the failure 
of this 1 o'clock message to get to the proper people in time ? Do you 
feel responsible? 

Captain Safford. Not in the least. 

Mr. Murphy. In other words, yovi are not responsible for the failure 
of Brotherhood to do something about it when he knew it was 1 o'clock 
in the day at 5 o'clock in the morning and he knew the time of de- 
livery? Why aren't you responsible? You are responsible for your 
subordinate aren't you? 

Captain Safford. Three official naval investigations have listened 
to all the facts and none of them found me responsible. 

Mr. Murphy. Not one of them have gone into this, have they? 
This is the first time you have been confronted with these questions, 
isn't it ? 

Captain Safford. I don't believe so. 

Mr. Murphy. Whoever asked you about your responsibility and 
failure to be there on Sunday, whoever asked you that question before? 

Captain Safford. That question was not specifically asked. 

Mr. Murphy. You believe that the best defense is an \9977] 
attack, don't you? 

Captain Safford. I believe that the best defense is telling the truth. 

Mr. Murphy. Right. 

Now, then, the fact is in all these investigations you have been talk- 
ing about a so-called winds execute and nobody has questioned you as 
to your responsibility, since this 1 o'clock hour was known under you, 
directly under you, from 5 o'clock in the morning; isn't that right? 

Captain Safford. Approximately 5 o'clock. 

Mr. Murphy. Everybody is asking how soon General Marshall got 
it, and as I understand it, it was around 11 : 30, ami how soon Admiral 
Stark got it, which was somewhere after 9 : 30 to 10 : 30, and your 
subordinate knew it at 5 o'clock in the morning, didn't he? 

Captain Safford. Or maybe 6. 

Mr. Murphy. You weren't concerned about your Department then, 
you were taking some time off on the day the war was to start ; isn't 
that right? 

Captain Safford. I was taking time out. 



3718 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. You felt you had done all you could even though 
you knew that there was a definite time of delivering to be fixed when 
you left on that Saturday afternoon ? 

Captain Safford. That is right. 

[9.978] Mr. Murphy. Do you think if vou had followed your 
Department or watched it closely on that dead-line day you wouldn't 
have seen there was somebod}^ from 5 o'clock in the morning for 4 or 5 
hours to translate it ? 

What do you say to that ? 

Captain Safford. If I had seen that message at 6 or 6 a. m. on the 
7th, all I could have done was put in a telephone call for Kramer to 
come down. 

Mr. Murphy. The fact is you or somebody would have seen that 1 
o'clock was significant because that was sunrise at Pearl Harbor, 
wasn't it ? You knew that ? 

Captain Safford. I knew that. 

Mr. Murphy. It was your department that had it from 5 o'clock 
until at least some time about 9 : 30 or 10 : 30 before it got to your 
people, wasn't it? 

Captain Safford. We sent it over to the War Department about 7 
o'clock for translation. They had from 7 o'clock until the transla- 
tion was returned. 

Mr. Murphy. And your department, when you knew, and you say 
you knew 3 days before that war was coming on Sunday, your De- 
partment on the day that war was supposed to start has no inter- 
preter on hand at all to handle the Navy's obligation, which was to 
translate the messages on Sunday, December 7 ? That is right, isn't 
it? 

[9979] Captain Safford. On a matter of technicalities naval 
intelligence was entirely responsible for translation. Not naval com- 
munications. 

Mr. Murphy. Will you please answer my question. Your depart- 
ment knew, did they not, and didn't you know, that there wasn't a 
translator on hand to translate anything in Japanese on the day that 
you knew the war going to start? You say you are the only one in 
Washington now that recognizes the — withdraw that. You are the 
one who says that you knew 3 days before that war would start on 
Sunday, and you are responsible for the communications, and you 
said you saw every translation. The fact is that in that department, 
sir, there wasn't a person on the day that you expected war to start 
to translate a word of Japanese, was there? 

Captain Safford. Not until Kramer came down about 8 a. m. 

Mr. Murphy. From 5 o'clock until 8 o'clock there was no one in 
your department on that day that war was going to start ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. So that is 3 hours, isn't it? 

In other words, you blamed the Americans because you said the 
Japanese had given a certain notice, as I recall, but you didn't say 
anything about the 3 h ours in your department [9980] did you ? 

Captain Safford. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, Captain, let me go over this letter with you, 
if you will, please. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3719 

Navy Department, 
Office of the Chief of Nav^vl Operations, 

Washington, 22 January 1944- 

And as soon as we come to anything that you feel is not correct, sir, 

please stop me. 

My Dear Kramer-san : Thanks for your very prompt reply. I did not receive 
your December 28 letter till January 17, and had almost given up hopes. What a 
break for you, as well as the cause, to be ordered to Admiral Halsey's staff. I can 
see the hand of Providence in it. 

"What cause ? My question is, What cause ? You say "as well as the 

cause." 

What a break for you, as well as the cause. 

What was the cause? 

Captain Saftord. I didn't know if Kramer would understand that 
or not. 

Mr. Murphy. Will you please tell us, sir. They are your words. 
What cause, please ? 

[9981] Captain Saffoed. I meant the cause of Admiral Kimmel. 

Mr. Murphy. In other words, you were bending every effort to have 
Admiral Kimmel freed, weren't you ? 

Captain Safford. At that time. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. Now, after December 7, 1941, you did not re- 
main in Washington, did you? 

Captain Safford. I was attached to the Navy Department through- 
out that period. 

Mr. Murphy. Weren't you on the Nem Mexico? 

Captain Safford. I was on the New Mexico from about 1934 to 1936. 

Mr. Murphy. Then you have not left Washington from December 
7, 1941, for official assignment until today? 

Captain Safford. Except on temporary duty. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate we proceed : 

I am sending by separate cover (airmail) a condensation code to use. If you 
want to add to it, use Nos. 151-200, inclusive. I would like to hold it down to a 
single sheet of paper. I am also sending by ordinary mail a copy of #35 

which was the Eoberts report, was it not ? 
Captain Safford. That is right. 
[9982'] Mr. Murphy, (reading) : 

And a clipping to give to #42 

What was Admiral Halsey, was it not ? 
Captain Safford. That is right. 
Mr. Murphy (reading) : 

At some auspicious occasion. You will understand this letter better when 
they arrive. 

What was the clipping ? 

Captain Safford. That was a clipping from the Saturday Evening 
Post. 

Mr. Murphy. About what? 

Captain Safford. It was an article about Admiral Halsey which 
had been written by a Reserve officer who, I think, was on his staff. 

Mr. Murphy. In which you learned Admiral Halsey had said, sir, 
that he would devote his life after retirement to having Kimmel freed; 
is that right? 



3720 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Safford. Right. 

Mr. Murphy. You wanted to send that clipping to him and have 
Kramer turn it over ; right ? 
Captain Safford. Right. 
Mr. Murphy. Now, the next paragraph : 

With regard to taking #42 (Admiral Halsey) into confidence wait patiently 
for the proper moment, and then shoot the works. Tell him everything he will 
listen to, and show him whatever documentary proof you may have. Use 
[9983] your own judgment and don't force the issue. Do as good a job as 
you did on #136 (December 6, 1941) 

What job did he do on that? 

Captain Safford. The distribution of that message to the various 
people for whom the Navy Department was responsible. 
Mr. Murphy. Right. And it follows : 

and #137 (December 7, 1941). 

Captain Safford. That is the same thinar. 
Mr. Murphy (reading) : 

In my opinion, the proper moment for disclosure would be any of the following : 

(a) #^ (Admiral Halsay) is detached from Sopac 

That is the South Pacific? 
Captain Safford. Correct. 
Mr. Murphy (reading) : 

(b) #5 (Admiral Wilkinson) is detached from Sopac; 

(c) #10 (Kramer) is detached from Sopac; 

(d) #9 (McCoIlum) calls on #42 (Admiral Halsey) or #10 (Kramer) ; 

(e) #18 (Rochefort) calls on #42 (Admiral Halsey) or #9 (Kramer) 

At that time you had become counsel for the defense, had you not, 
an advocate for the defense instead of a [9984^] witness, hadn't^ 
you? Is that a fair statement? 

Captain Safford. That is a fair statement. 

Mr. Murphy. You were planning and plotting then different ways 
of getting evidence to prepare for a defense when the occasion arose; 
isn't that ri^ht? 

Captain Safford. That is right. 

Mr. Murphy. Next : 

(f) #42 (Admiral Halsey) discusses #31 (Admiral Kimmel) on attack on 
#92 (Pearl Harbor) in your presence; 

In other words, you were telling Kramer to wait for the auspicious 
moment when he might get Halsey 's ear and then start to work to- 
gether with Halsey : isn't that right ? 

Captain Safford. That is right. 

Mr. Murphy. Next. 

(g) #42 (Admiral Halsey) asks you the reasons for the alleged failure of 
20-G to know what was going on 

That would be Kramer that you were suggesting? 
Captain Safford. That is right. 
Mr. Murphy (reading) : 

(h) #137 (December 7, 1941) (plus 3 years) ; 

(i) #6 (Admiral Turner) visits #42 [9985] (Admiral Halsey) ; 

(j) #42 (Admiral Halsey) visits #6 (Admiral Turner). 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3721 

The next paragraph. 

Be prudent and be patient. I am just beginning to get thiiij^s lini'd up on 
this end. 

By that you mean what? 

Captain Safford. By finding out what happened. 

Mr. MuKPHY. Finding out what happened, or lining up evidence? 

Captain Saffokd. Lining up evidence. Not witnesses. 

Mr. Murphy. Not necessarily what happened, but lining up evi- 
dence ? 

Captain Safford. Evidence. 

Mr. Murphy. Not necessarily what actually happened, but evi- 
dence; isn't that right? 

That is a keen question, now. Think before your answer it. 

Captain Safford. Evidence is the answer I want to make. 

Mr. Murphy. What is it? 

Captain Safford. Evidence is the answer I want to make. 

Mr. Murphy. Do you understand the distinction between the two 
now? That is an important question. Do you understand the 
question ? 

[9986] Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And you want to make the answer "evidence" ? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy (reading) : 

No one in #15 (Opnav) can be trusted. 

Will you give us who you felt was not worthy of trust in the Navy 
of the United States during the course of the war on January 22, 1944 i 
Captain Saffcrd. That is a rash statement; I will not expand it. 
Mr. Murphy. It is a rash statement, is it ? 
Captain Safford. Yes. 
Mr. Murphy (reading) : 

No one in #15 (Opnav) can be trusted, 

said you. 

Did you mean also Admiral King, at that time? Wasn't he in 
Opnav ^ 

Captain Safford. No; he was connnander in chief, U. S. Fleet and 
was not in Opnav. 

Mr. Murphy. Tell us who was in Opnav who could not be trusted, 
even though it is a rash statement ( You made a lot of setatements 
here, sir. Let's find out who couldn't be trusted. 

Please give us some names. 

Who do you mean then couldn't be trusted on January 22, 1944? 

[99871 Captain Safford. I will not give any names. 

Mr. ]MuRPiiY. You will not ^ You refuse!? I ask you to tell us. 
You are now under (nith. Please tell us, sir. who you say there cannot 
be trusted, because, sir, that is an important accusation. It is an 
accusation against one of the important dei)artments of the United 
States Navy during the war. 

You were making assertions. This is going into the papers of the 
country as well as are your other statements. 

You say ''they cannot be trusted. '" Who were you saying could not 
be trusted i 



3722 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Names, please. 
Who could not be trusted ? 
Senator Lucas. He says all of them. 
Mr. Murphy. I would like to have names. 

Here is a man making an accusation in writing. This is going to 
the papers. 

You, sir, a captain in the United States Navy, say : 

No one in No. 15 (Opnav) can be trusted. 

Who did you mean ? 

I don't want any sweeping statement. We are going to get down 
to details. Who could not be trusted ? , 

Names, please. 

I am still waiting. Waiting. Will you please give [9988] 
us the names as to who could not be trusted in Opnav ? 

Please, sir. 

What did you mean by saying no one in No. 15, Opnav, can be, 
trusted ? 

The Chairman. Do you wish to answer? 

Captain Safford. I would prefer not to answer. 

The Chairman. Do you want to refresh your recollection about the 
names ? 

Captain Safford. I prefer not to answer. 

Mr. Murphy. JMr. Chairman, I submit when an officer of the United 
States Navy, a captain, who has made some statements before the com- 
mittee over the past 3 days, says "No one in Opnav can be trusted," in 
view of the statements of this morning, should be obliged to answer. 

Senator Lucas. This was made in January 1941? 

Mr. Murphy. 1944; during the course of the war. 

The Chairman. The Chair thinks you should answer if you can 
answer. We are trying to hold these hearings in public without con- 
cealing anything, and it occurs to the Chair that you have n