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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."




^ 



Given By 
J, S; SUPT. C» DOCUMENTS 



3^ 



PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFOEB THB 

JOINT COMfflTTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEAEL HAEBOE ATTACK ^. . ^ ,^ 
CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES ^^'^^ 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS ' *\ ^ 

SECOND SESSION | J^S'' 

PURSUANT TO /^V^ 



S. Con. Res. 27 F'^ . 

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress) 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



1 



PART 9 

FEBRUARY 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, AND 14, 1946 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

ly C BEFORE THE 

" JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES t3>7^7 
SEVENTY-XINTH CONGRESS , ^2 

SECOND SESSION ^ /3s<* 

PURSUANT TO i A \J / 

S. Con. Res. 27 



(As extended by S. Con, Res. 49, 79th Congress) 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

■ RELATING THERETO 



*7 



PART 9 

FEBRUARY 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, AND 14, 1946 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
79718 WASHINGTON ; 1946 



"■ S. SU««,«TE««Kr OF DOCU«Em» /^'^ 

SEP 23 1948 /^.^ 



JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL 
HARBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tire from California 

gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from 

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin 
North Carolina 



COUNSEL 



(Through January 14, 1946) 
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel 
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel 
JULE M. Hanxapord, Assistant Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 1946) 
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel 
Samdel H. Kadfman. Associate General Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel 
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 



HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 


Pages 


Transcript 




Hearings 


No. 




pages 






1 


1- 399 


1- 1058 


Nov, 


. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 


2 


401- 982 


1059- 2586 


Nov, 


, 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945. 


3 


983-1583 


2587- 4194 


Dec. 


5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945. 


4 


1585-2063 


4195- 5460 


Dec. 


14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 


5 


2065-2492 


5461- 6646 


Dec. 


31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946, 


6 


2493-2920 


6647- 7888 


Jan. 


15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946. 


7 


2921-3378 


7889- 9107 


Jan. 


22, 23, 24, 25, 26. 28 and 29, 1946., 


8 


3379-3927 


9108-10517 


Jan. 


30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 


9 


3929-4599 


10518-12277 


Feb. 


7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 


10 


4601-5151 


12278-13708 


Feb. 


15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 


11 


5153-5560 


13709-14765 


Apr. 


9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COIVIMITTEE 



Part 
No. 



12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 through 25 

26 

27 through 31 

32 through 33 

34 

35 

36 through 38 

39 



Exhibits Nos. 

1 through 6. 

7 and 8. 

9 through 43. 

44 through 87. 

88 through 110. 

Ill through 128. 

129 through 156. 

157 through 172. 

173 through 179. 

180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations. 

Roberts Comniission Proceedings. 

Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 

Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

Clarke Investigation Proceedings. 

Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



IV 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 

5269-5291 

3814-3826 
3450-3519 

"""5089-5122 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 ^ 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 
""471-516" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investi!,'ation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


1 1 Tt^ 1 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 ^ CO 1 
1 ICO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 05C0 1 

2 ; ; \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 'r^ \ 
(^ ; ; 1 ; i 1 ! ; ; ; ; ; ; ! 1 1 ; 1 ; ; "= ! 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Au?. 

4, 1945) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 i(N 

. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i-T 

^ i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 

""660-688" 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

3105-3125" 

2479-2491" 

4022-4027" 
148-186 

2.'567-2.5S0" 

3972-3988 

2492-2515 

1575-1643" 

3720-3749" 
1186-1220 

1413-1442' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

""391-398" 
""115-134' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 
203-209 

1127-1138 
1033-1038 

1719-1721' 

1219-1224' 

"886-951' 
1382-1399 

""377-389" 
1224-1229 

"314-320' 


i 


Allen, Brooke E., Maj 

Allen, Riley H 

Anderson, Edward B., Maj 

Anderson, Ray 

Anderson, Walter S., Rear Adrn 

Anstey, Alice 

Arnold, H. H., Gen 

Asher, N. F., Ens 

Ball, N. F., Ens 

Ballard, Emma Jane 

Barber, Bruce G 

Bartlett, George Francis 

Bates, Paul M., Lt. Coradr 

Beardall, John R., Rear Adm 

Beardall, John R., Jr., Ens 

Beatty, Frank E., Rear Adm 

Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Adm 

Benny, Chris J 

Benson, Henry P .__ 

Berquist, Kenneth P., Col 

Berry, Frank M., S 1/c 

Betts, Thomas J., Brig. Gen 

Bicknell. George W., Col 

Bissell, John T., Col 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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VI 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1948 


Pages 
5080-5089 

3826-3838 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Paget 

163-181 

"418^423" 
"451-464' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Paget 

205 

B223-224" 
B65-66 
B229-231 
49-51 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investieation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


M M 1 ! 1 1 1 1 1 M 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

140 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
495-510 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

4125^4151 

1695-1732 

2745-2785 
4186-4196 

3190^3201' 
1928-1965 

3642-3643 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Paget 
179-184 

96-105 

74^85 

"368-378" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941. 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Paget 
478-483, 
301-310 

1171-1178" 

1178-1180" 
1659-1663, 
170-198 

""812-843," 
1538-1571 
504-509 

2-32" 
365-368 

1747-1753" 


1 


Craige, Nelvin L., Lt. Col 

Creighton, John M., Capt. (USN) 

Crosley, Paul C, Comdr 

Curley, J. J. (Ch/CM) 

Curts, M. E., Capt., USN 

Daubin, F. A., Capt., USN 

Davidson, Howard C, Maj. Gen 

Davis, Arthur C, Rear Adm 

Dawson Harry L 

Deane, John R., Maj. Gen 

DeLany, Walter S., Rear Adm 

Dickens, June D., Sgt 

DiUingham, Walter F 

Dillon, James P 

Dillon, John H., Maj 

Dingcmau, Ray E., Col 

Donegan, William Col 

Doud, Harold, Col 

Dunlop, Rol:>ert H., Col 

Dunning, Mary J 

Dusenhnry, Carhsle Clyde, Col 

Dyer, Thomas H., Capt., USN 

Earle, Frederick M., W/0 

Earle, John Bayliss, Capt., USN 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



VII 



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VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


OIIIIIIOOO IIIIII _r -o 1 1 

CO 1 1 1 1 1 loco Ill igfr^o 1 1 

lO OCOiiiiiiiiiii£2r^<Mi' 

lo 1 MH 1 1 ' ^ ;2 o 1 1 

M i i i M ii^ i i 1 i i i i ; ; i i||g i j 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


CO I c<J c-i 1 \ II 

lOiO IIIITt^ll II 

« lO 1 (M 1 1 1 1 1 —Ill II 

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a 1 1 1 1 1 —1 1 rN 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 O 1 1 II 

(S TflOOilllllllll-'lJHll II 

iiiiiiOi— iiiiiiiiiii— III II 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

103 
107-112 

180 
219-222 

102 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1915) 


►° 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


iiliiiiOCiiiiiCOiiiiOiiO II 

iiiiiii— iiiiii^iiii-^ioo II 

g OiiiiicOiiii|>iOO II 

S'iiiiiil4< OOiiii-^ilN II 

Q, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 O 1 1 1 1 1 <M 1 1 1 1 CO 1 lO II 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 O r 1 1 1 1 CO 1 1 1 1 t^ 1 CO 11 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

2665-2695' 
302S-3067 

iiei-iiss" 

2787-2802" 
1014-1034 
1678-1694 
3226-3250 

2362-2374" 

2-54" 

T. S. 2-52, 

192-226 

3126-3152 

1816-1913 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

214-225 
363-367 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

toJan.23, 1912) 


II 1 1 III 1 1 1 1 III 1 . 

iiOi-Hi(NiOiiitOiiii-HiiiiO ilMIOi 

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11—11—11 Oiii<Nii t^ 1 


5 
^ 


Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN 

Ivroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen 

Landreth, J. L., Ens 

Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/O 

Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col 

Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC 

Lawton, William S., Col 

Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN 

Leahy, William D., Adm 

Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm 

Lewis, Fulton, Jr 

Litell, S. H 

Locey, Frank H 

Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA 

Lorence, Walter E., Col 

Lumsden, George, Maj 

Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN 

Lynch, Paul J 

Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr 

Mac Arthur, Douglas, Gen 

Marshall, George C, Gen 

Marston, Morrill W., Col _. 

Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XI 



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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION TEARL HARBOR ATTACK 









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XIV CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

194S 


ijo III: ig'S 1 1^ 1 i?:fE:ie§-S i lo^ i I i 

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Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


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Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

69" 
195-197 

203-204 
185" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1346) 


II 1 1 l(N 1 1 1 1 llN 1 1 III III 

t \ \ III 1 I III 1 i III III 


Joint 
Committee 
E-fhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


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Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Out. 20, 1944) 


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Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
32-65' 

323-334 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 

"""37-169," 
1617-1647 
452-455 

1738^1742 

1186-1190" 
1805-1808 


1 


Short, Arthur T 

Short, Walter C, Maj. Gen 

Shortt, Creed, Pvt 

Sisson, George A 

Smedberg, William R., II, Capt. USN.. 

Smith, Ralph C, Maj. Gen 

Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen 

Smith, William W., Rear Adm 

Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN 

Smoot, Perry M., Col 

Sonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr 

Spalding, Isaac, Brig. Gen 

Staff, W. F, CH/CM 

Stark, Harold R., Adm 

Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR 

Stilphen, Benjamin L 

Stimson, Henry L 

Stone, John F 

Street, George 

Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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XVI 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HAREOR ATTAC] 



n3 


Joint 

Congressional 
CommittPO, 

Nov. 15, 1945. 

to May 31, 

195G 


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PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3929 



[105m ' PEAEL HARBOE ATTACK 



THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington^ D. G. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. 
Morgan and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee. 

[10519] The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 
The Chair understands that counsel concluded last evening. 

Mr. Richardson. Yes, I had, but I have some other matters, Mr. 
Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as the committee has indicated that it 
proposes to make the evidence and proceedings contained in the earlier 
investigations a part of the record of the committee here, I would like 
to ask the committee to reserve Exhibit Nos. 143 to 149, inclusive, to 
cover the seven reports, the Roberts, the Hart, the Navy, the Army, 
the Hewitt, the Clarke, and possibly the Clausen, if the Clausen should 
come in — reserve those exhibit numbers for those reports so that those 
exhibits might run in a list of exhibits in consecutive numbers.^ 

The Chairman. Without objection that will be done. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, next: Some time ago, the committee, or 
members of the committee, asked that the prior testimony of Admiral 
Bloch and Admiral Stark and General Marshall be collated and mime- 
ographed copies of it made up, the same as had been done for General 
Short and Admiral Kimmel. 

Now, we have done that and we will have during the day available 
for distribution to the committee the compiled testimony of Bloch 
and Stark and Marshall if the committee wants [10520] us to 
deliver it to the members of the committee in view of the later deter- 
mination of the committee that all of the earlier reports, which would 
include all of the testimony, is to be put in the record generally and 
printed copies of all of this will, in due course, be laid before each 
member of the committee in the page proof sheets that are now being 
delivered to us. We have the mimeographed copies if members of the 
committee want us to furnish them. 



* Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript 
of testimony. 

* See Index of Exhibits in Part 12. 

79716 — 46 — pt. 9 2 



3930 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Thank you, counseL 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I mquired yesterday some- 
thing about the progress that was being made with regard to print- 
ing, and I understood from Mr. Masten — is he here now ? 

Mr. Richardson. He was here just a minute ago. 

Mr. Masten. We have solved that problem. 

The Vice Chairman. You have taken care of that all right ? 

Mr, Masten. Yes. 

The Chairman. The Chair might state — this is off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KRAMEE, UNITED STATES NAVY 

(Resumed)^ 

The Chairman. Captain, I only have a few questions. I have to 
go and preside over another committee at 10 : 30, so I will have to 
be brief, and I would be, anyhow. 

[10521] You are familiar, of course, with the Japanese inter- 
cepts setting forth the conditions under which a winds execute mes- 
sage might be expected. That is, if communications were cut off, or 
diplomatic relations broken so that the ordinary methods of com- 
munication could not be utilized, if this broadcast about the weather 
should appear, that would mean certain things. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

The Chairivian. With respect to the United States and Great 
Britain and Russia. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That w^as the basis upon which you were looking 
for, and as far as you know, and I believe you testified, that every- 
body in the Department was looking for, or expecting, an execute 
based upon that? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. As a matter of fact, the conditions under which 
such a message should come through were never fulfilled. That is, 
there was never any breaking in communications or in diplomatic 
i-elations prior to the 7th of December, is that true? 

Captain Kramer. Precisely, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, the message that you referred to as the one 
having been brought b^ your door on the 5th of December and taken 
to Captain Safford — I want to clear up in my [10522] own 
mind whether you regarded that message as an exec^ute based 
upon the previous messages with regard to the winds situation? 

Captain Kramer. I did so regard it ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You did? 

Captain Kramer. However, if I may interject at this point, Mr. 
Chairman, in the last few minutes here I have been making some notes 
regarding this winds message which I consider part of the answers 
to some of the questions of the counselor yesterday afternoon which, 
however, were not included in my ans\^■er due to interspersed ques- 
tions about points that came up in the part of the answer that I gave. 
If I may do so, I would like to cover these loose points at this point. 

The Chairman. Yes, go ahead. 

Captain Kramer. I mentioned the fact regarding this so-called 
skipped file number, that there are a number of reasons why such a 

^ Capt. Kramer's testimony begins in Hearings, Part 8, p. 3893. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3931 

file number should be canceled or skipped in the JD file by section 
GZ. I specifically covered two of the points, the two primary reasons 
why such file numbers were skipped. 

There are two others which I meant to include in that and explain 
them. I would like to do so now. 

One reason is the fact that occasionally the numbering machine 
which we used skipped a number in changing from one [105^3] 
number to the next. I previously indicated that there were 14 copies 
to number. There was no automatic shift on the machine at the end 
of 14 numberings, it had to be done by hand. 

The notation in the particular blank we are talking about, 7001, in 
the file indicates it was canceled. It may have been canceled rather 
than skipped. However, earlier in the year file No. 2074 has a notation 
in Lieutenant Harrison's handwriting that the number was skipped in 
error. 

I should like to mention at this point that for the first time since 1941 
I have had access to these files or, rather, I might put it I have exam- 
ined these files this Monday. In the course of this examination I looked 
back into the 1940 files and found similar canceled numbers. In fact, 
there is one block of numbers from, as I recollect. No. 4100 through 
4499 that is skipped in that file : in other words, a block of approxi- 
mately 400 numbers skipped in that file. At the time it was noted, a 
day or two later, as I recollect it, I said not to bother going back to 
fill in those numbers. 

Regarding another possibility of a canceled number, it will be noted 
in this Exhibit 142 that there is a notation under file No. 4647 by Lieu- 
tenant Harrison in his handwriting — he customarily used handwriting 
because he was not a typist — [10624] that that number was 
canceled by Army after being numbered by Navy. 

In other words, apj^arently, a dispatch, a decryption was sent over 
to us by Army and subsequently canceled. My guess at this time as to 
the reason for the cancellation is that it was Army practice not to in- 
clude in these numbered series messages bearing on the text of this 
decryption work. They customarily left that out of the file. That was 
not, however, the Navy practice. We left them in the files. 

That covers the points I wanted to bring out about the canceled num- 
ber. Regarding the interception of the message 

The Chairman. May I ask you, then, if you are through with that 
part just this question: If I understand your testimony, there was 
nothing particularly unusual about this 7001 being a blank sheet? 

Captain Kramer. That is precisely the point I am trying to empha- 
size, sir. 

The Chairman. So that whatever should have been on it, or might 
have been on it if it had been filled out, was somewhere else in the files, 
is that true ? 

Captain Kramer. It would not necessarily be anywhere else in the 
files. It might, of course, be because of a duplication of the file number 
message. 

[1052S] The Chairman. Yesterday ^^ou talked about changing 
the file numbers or sw^itching it from one file number to another and 
I got the impression that it might be located on some other file number 
Maybe I was wrong about that. 



3932 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. No, sir ; that was purely a question of the number 
they gave to a particular message. That number might be canceled 
for the various reasons I have given. 

The Chairman. Well, if that number were canceled, though, would 
it appear on some other file ? 

Captain Kramer. Oftentimes it was reallocated if it occurred the 
same day, particularly to fill out the solid block, but particularly dur- 
ing the latter part of 1941 that was rare because of the fact that with 
the earlier episodes of that kind I had cautioned the men doing that 
particular work on the point and there are none apparently in the 
latter part of 1941 of that kind of error, skipping or allocating num- 
bers erroneously. By that I mean, as I explained yesterday, the two 
primary reasons for the cancellation of numbers would be allocating 
a number to a part of a multipart message the first parts of which 
we had previously received. In other words, it was purely a clerical 
matter of making a proper check of our files to see whether or not we 
had those previous parts of that multipart message before allocating 
a number to the current part that had come in. 

[105'26'] The Chairman. Are we to understand, then, your testi- 
mony to mean that there is no particular significance to be attached 
to the fact that this 7001 is a blank sheet ? 

Captain Kramer. That is precisely what 1 mean to indicate, sir. 
The Chairman. All right. Now you were about to interpret the 
message. 
Mr. Richardson. I think he has one thing further he wants to say. 
The Chairman. Proceed in any way you wish. 

Captain Kramer. I am going off this subject of the canceled number 
now, but it is on the general subject of this winds message. I have 
been under the impression during the past 4 years, purely as a matter 
of memory, that in that piece of teletype that was shown me by the 
GY watch officer only one country was involved. I so indicated the 
first time I had occasion to testify on that point before the court of 
Admiral Murfin. 

The Chairman. You referred to that as a court of Admiral Murfin. 
It was the Naval Court of Inquiry ? 
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 
The Chairman. Yes. 

Captain Kramer. I am still under that impression. I, however, am 
not positive and have never been positive on the [10527} pre- 
cise wording of that message since I first attempted to recollect what 
the wording was. 

In that connection, too, I should like to emphasize this point. I 
heard Captain Safford in the last few days indicate that in that piece 
of teletype Russia was also included but in the negative form. I can 
categorically state that if any of that phraseology had appeared in the 
negative form in my mind it would have thrown the whole thing out, 
because there was no provision whatsoever for a negative form of any 
of these phrases. 

Regarding the question of my memory, I would like to comment 
to this effect: My contact with that piece of teletype totaled only a 
few seconds in duration, I probably saw it not over 10 or 15 seconds. 
I did not see it while Captain Safford was examining it. He was 
standing — he was holding it, and standing in front of me. At no 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3933 

occasion from December of 1941 until the question was asked me be- 
fore Admiral Murfin's court of inquiry, was the question of what 
country was involved brought up in conversion or on any other oc- 
casion. That question took me, you might term it, cold. 

In that connection, too, I would like to comment on my testimony 
before Admiral Murfin's court of inquiry, that my testimony was 
given without any preparation whatsoever. I had [10528] 
been detached 2 days before from the South Pacific, ordered north 
under priority one transportation by air. I had been traveling 2 
days and arrived in Pearl Harbor around midnight. 

I phoned Captain Layton, whose number as Fleet Intelligence 
officer I readily found, to find out what my assignment was to be. It 
was then that I first learned that the purpose of ordering me up on 
fast transportation was to testify before this court of inquiry. I was 
not aware even that it was meeting there. 

I called Captain Layton from the airport. It was not until the 
following morning at 8:30 that I first learned that I was free to 
disclose to this court of inquiry anything having to do with radio 
intelligence. In other words, I was still strongly impressed by all the 
security indoctrination connected with this work. I was not at all 
certain that it was proper in the interest of national security to dis- 
close any matters concerning radio intelligence or cryptanalysis before 
this court of inquiry. For that reason I stopped at Captain Layton's 
office before proceeding to where the court was meeting and asked 
him about that specific point and was first assured at that time, one- 
half hour before I commenced testifying, that this court had full 
authority to delve into all aspects of cryptanalysis as far as the Navy 
was con- [1052d] cerned, that such testimony would be made 
a top secret supplement to their record of proceedings. 

That is what I mean by being caught cold on what my recollections 
were in testifying before that court. 

The Chairman. Is that all you wanted to say about that ? 

Captain Kramer. In further amplification of the question of my 
memory I should like to make this brief comment also : 

Every other — perhaps not other — but every message that was typed 
up and disseminated by section GZ of Naval Communications was 
seen by me at least six or eight and sometimes as many as a dozen 
times. I invariably examined the file of current traffic quite closely; 
in fact, early in the year I studied it closely enough to write a gist 
of each message; the last month or so before December 1941, when 
we had ceased the practice of gisting the day's traffic because of the 
urgency of getting the material out promptly, I studied these things 
particularly closely because I did not have a gist before me while 
the recipients to whom I normally delivered this material were ex- 
amining it. I felt that it was a part of my job to be thoroughly 
familiar with what they were looking at, so that in case questions were 
asked, references given, personalities whose names appeared therein 
were asked about, that I would be familiar with what they were talk- 
ing about and could elucidate. 

[10530] By contrast this particular winds message that I have 
described I saw only once and for not more than 15 seconds or so. 

One further point in connection with this winds message. Captain 
Safford has testified that the translation of the set-up of these winds 



3934 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

messages is incorrect. I agree to that to this extent. The version 
on the work slieet from which the translation was made in the Navy 
Department was garbled, appreciably garbled. 

Mr. Richardson. You are speaking now, Captain, of the original 
winds code message? 

Captain Kramer. Original set-up of this message: yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

Captain Kramer. I think it is Circular 2343. 

The Chairman. Fifty-three. 

Captain Kramer. I have had occasion in the last few days to exam- 
ine that work sheet again and confirm my memory on that point. 
Without changing those garbles the translation as it appears in Ex- 
hibit 1 is still correct, but by modifying the garbles or clearing these 
garbles it can be made to fit fairly precisely the British translation 
submitted by Singapore to commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet. 

Senator Lucas. Just a moment. 

[10531] Captain Kramer. One final point in connection with 
this thing 

Senator Lucas. Will you kindly go into that just a little more, that 
last statement you made about fitting the parts ? 

Captain Kramer. That is what I am going to do now, sir. 

Senator Lucas. But you are starting with another subject. 

[10532] Captain Kramer. No, sir. That version furnished by 
the British to the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, which was 
put on the Kopek channel, w-as put on that circuit and came into 
the Navy Department, as I recollect, the same date that we had 
our translation in that winds set-up. 

It was for that reason that no message was drafted by the Navy 
Department covering this winds set-up. We felt it was fully and 
adequately covered by the translation of the circuit already. It was 
in more emphatic form. 

From current examination, it was in more precise form than the 
version we had in the Navy Department. 

That is all I have to state. 

The Chairman. I am sorry, Captain, I have to go to another 
committee, and I will not be able to finish my examination. 

Will it be agreeable to the committee if I reserve the right to 
resume my examination later, unless some other member covers the 
points I have in mind? I am sorry I have to leave, but I have to 
go to another committee. 

Thank you very much. 

The Vice Chairman. Captain, do you now have, or have you ever 
at any time had any interest in the prosecution or the defense of 
Admiral Kimmel, or anybody else connected [10533] with 
this Pearl Harbor attack? 

Captain Kramer. Most emphatically no, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Have you ever at any time exercised yourself 
in helping to prepare any type or form of prosecution or defense of 
Admiral Kimmel, or anybody else connected with the Pearl Harbor 
attack ? 

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Have you ever at any time, or do you now 
feel that the officers of the General Staff of the Army or the Navy, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3935 

in effect, are crooks or would indulge in framing Admiral Kimmel 
or anybody else connected with this Pearl Harbor attack, or that 
they are not to be trusted? 

Captain Kramer. Such phenomena are inconceivable to my mind, 
sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, with respect to the so-called winds 
execute message. Captain, just a few questions in connection with 
that. 

I have before me page 12 of the statement read to this committee 
by Captain Safford. I assume counsel can supply you a copy of it, 
if you do not have it. 

Captain Kramer. T have one. 

The Vice Chairman. I ask you to please turn to page 12 of Cap- 
tain SafFord's prepared statement, which lie read to this committee 
about the middle of the page, and I [1053i] invite your at- 
tention to the paragi'aph beginning: 

When I first saw tlie winds message, it had already been translated by- 
Lieutenant Commander Kramer, in charge of the Translation Section of the 
Navy Department Communications Intelligence Unit. Kramer had underscored 
all three "code phrases" on the original incoming teletype sheet. Below the 
printed message was written in pencil or colored crayon in Kramer's hand- 
writing the following three translations: 

"War with England (including NET, etc) 

"War with the U. S. 

"Peace with Russia." 

I am not sure of the order ; but it was the same in the broadcast, and I think 
England appeared first. I think Kramer used "U. S." rather than "United 
States." It is possible that the words "No war" instead of "Peace" were 
used to describe Japan's intentions with regard to Russia. 

Now, having read that part of Captain Safford's testimony. Captain, 
are you prepared to give this committee information bearing on that? 

Captain Kramer. I think the testimony I have given already covers 
most of this point. I can only reiterate those statements. Anything 
appearing in one of these winds \10o3o] broadcasts indicat- 
ing a negative form, in other words, as interpreted on this page, peace 
with someone would have immediately discarded it in my mind as 
being a signal in this winds svstem. 

I might further comment along that line that I think it would 
be a very strange sort of disguising on the part of the Japanese to 
have said "No north wind." 

The winds set-up was to be ostensibly an authentic weather broad- 
cast. 

I would like to comment further, that there were at least six or 
eight false alarms on this weather broadcast. 

From the time we were set up at the end of November, I was called 
down, I definitely recollect one time, I believe three times at night 
to check with the GY watch officers on some of the reams, yards, of 
teletype paper covering the plain language broadcasts of the Japanese. 

In every case that I have just des; ribed, what I examined was on 
long lengths of teletype with solid blocks of Japanese news appearing 
on the teletype as well. 

In each case a careful examination of this plain language broad- 
cast of weather made me reach the conclusion that it was nothing 
more than ordinary weather broadcasts. 



3936 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR AITACK 

The specific piece of teletype that was shown me and which I 
accompanied the watch officer with to Captain Saltord s [lUddbj 
office, was a short piece of teletype paper torn off the teletype machine. 
My presumption at the time was that the GY watch officer had deter- 
mined that it fitted the general conditions required by this weather 
broadcast, namely that it appeared in its proper location in the text 
of a news broadcast, either at the beginning or at the end or both, 
and that it had been repeated the required number of times. 

That was part of the function of the GY watch officer not only 
on this particular weather system but on all systems. They were 
the break-down people, they identified systems; they turned into my 
section only the final Japanese text. j -, 

That applies to evervthing except incompletely recovered codes 
in which the coded Japanese text would be turned into my section. 

I therefore personally, in the case of this Friday morning so-caiied 
winds message, had no occasion to check on these points the question 
of whether it appeared in its proper context of a news broadcast or 
whether it was repeated the proper number of times. It may have 
been repeated the proper number of times on the piece of teletype 
paper. I am not positive as to the precise wording of that. 

[10SS7] In the last few weeks, I have had occasion to see some 
interrogations conducted by General MacArthur's headquarters m 
Japan of high Japanese officials who were concerned with these broad- 

In view of their statements that no such weather signal was made, 
it is my present belief, in the light of my recollections on this matter, 
as well, that what I saw Friday morning in December before Pearl 
Harbor was also a false alarm on this winds system. It was, never- 
theless, definitely my conception at the time that it was an authentic 
broadcast of that nature. I am still of that opinion, that it used that 
precise wording, keeping in mind, as I indicated this niornmg, that 
my recollections on that are that only one country was involved. 

'The Vice Chairman. What country was that? 

Captain Kramer. To the best of my recollection, it was England. 

I would like to point out one other item in connection therewith. 

I have already indicated that the first time the question of what 
country appeared on that winds broadcast came up in conversation, 
or anything that we had in connection with this matter, was when that 
one question was asked me by the court of inquiry at Pearl Harbor. 

[1053S] My first reaction was, without having thought about 
it since December 1941, that it was the United States, because of the 
fact we were at war with Japan, so of course, it must have been the 

United States. . . , -^^ , x- 

[10539] I would like, however, to mvite the committee s atten- 
tion to the fact that later on, in the course of questioning me at Pearl 
Harbor, on page 187 of the transcript of that court of inquiry, I made 
the statement that through the latter part of that week and until the 
attack on Pearl Harbor there was still nothing whatsoever m this 
traffic to indicate any overt intentions of the Japanese directed at the 
United States. That I believe appreciably modifies my first hasty 
reactions to the first time the question was propounded to me. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3937 

The Vice Chairman. Then, Captain, returning to the testimony 
here of Captain Safford which I have read, it states there : 

When I first saw the winds message, it had already been translated by Lieuten- 
ant Commander Kramer. 

Is that true ? 

Captain Kramer. I am fairly definite on the point that I did not 
make the original translation, I may have corrected a hand-written 
translation already made by the GY watch officer who had all these 
three Japanese phrases, the translation on hand in pursuance of in- 
structions from Captain Safford and Admiral Xoyes, to be able to take 
care of this matter during the night promptly by the Navy Department 
communications officers. 

[IO54O] The Vice Chairman. Well, if you and the watch officer 
went to Captain Safford's office and simply handed him the paper he 
could not have known who translated it, could he ? 

Captain Kramer. Unless he recognized the handwriting, I do not 
see how he could. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Was not the tiling supposed to be 
typewritten ? 

Captain Ejiamer. It was a piece of teletype paper, which of course 
is typewritten. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Then he goes on to say : 

Kramer had underscoi-ed all three "code phrases" on the original incoming 
teletype sheet. 

Had you done that ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not recall that, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. "Below the printed message was written in 
pencil or colored crayon in Kramer's handwriting, the following free 
translations :" which I have read. 

Did you write in colored pencil or crayon in your handwriting these 
phrases that are mentioned here in Captain Safford's statement? 

Captain Kramer. I have no recollection that I used my colored 
pencil or that I made the original translation. I can most emphatically 
state that any translation I might have made would most emphatically 
not have used the expression "war." That was entirely outside the 
provisions of the winds set-up called for by the message appearing in 
Exhibit 1, which refers only to disruption of communications. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, you are confident, Captain, that there 
was no use of the word "war" in this so-called winds message on that 
occasion ? 

Captain Kjiamer. Certainly not by me, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you see or hear anything to indicate that 
anybody at that time saw or thought they saw the word "war" in 
the message. 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. I understand then, Captain, that these mes- 
sages, including the number 7001, were in your custody. 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And were kept in your safe in your office ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 



3938 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. Now, were any of those files ever stolen, 
filched, or removed from the file there in your custody ? 

Captain Kramer. In my period of duty in that section there was 
never such an occasion, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And all of the files were in their [10542] 
proper order and in their proper place and kept there in your safe ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

I might further amplify that answer, sir, to this effect, that the 
so-called numerical file, after a series of messages were numbered for 
dissemination, a copy was invariably and immediately inserted in 
that numerical file. Messages were never removed from that nu- 
merical file for reference or for any other purpose. That numerical 
file had two primary purposes, one to have a solid file of what had 
been translated and disseminated and, two, the primary purpose was 
to have something to which the translators could turn in case of ref- 
erences to back traffic when future messages were received. 

We had a very complete and involved cross-index system on 3 by 
5 cards, covering every originator in the Japanese diplomatic service. 
By that I mean every consulate, every embassy, every legation that 
originated messages had their own serial numbers for their series of 
messages. 

In addition there was a series of circulars by each originating major 
diplomatic post. All that was very carefully cross-indexed by my 
chief yeoman. That was the primary file to which we turned for 
determining the duplication of incoming traffic. Sometimes we re- 
ceived as many as [10S4^] six or seven copies of a particular 
message. Later copies were as a rule simply filed without any fur- 
ther work on them if it had been received earlier and translated and 
disseminated. On occasion, if the earlier copy were appreciably gar- 
bled a corrected translation would be made from one of these later 
copies if it were in better or less-garbled form. 

From this exhaustive cross-index 1 have described and which in- 
cluded references to the numerical file of translations, the translator 
would determine whether we had a previous translation and could 
refer then to the previous translation for interpretation of the ref- 
erence. That numerical file, as I have indicated, was never touched 
for the purpose of inserting in subsequent folders these back refer- 
ences in disseminating later traffic to the normal recipients of this later 
traffic. The extra copies that had previously been disseminated and 
returned were normally retained for a jDeriod varying from a few days 
to a few weeks for that purpose. 

In fact, there were two or three other files that we normally kept on 
other subjects, namely, the war in Europe and the United States nego- 
tiations. We had a subfile for that covering particular phases of the 
negotiations and on the file arranging all the Washington and Tokyo 
serial numbers in order. 

[10544-] The Vice Chairman. Captain, you were constantly 
using these messages and these files, as I understand it? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, were any of them ever destroyed or 
removed or done away with during your tour of duty in that office? 

Captain Kramer. From this basic numerical file there was no oc- 
casion that I know of where anything was removed or destroyed 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3939 

from that file with the exception of the fact that if it was determined 
later, probably a few days or a week later, that we had two identical 
messages, one of which was a duplication of another, when that was 
discovered the latest numerical file number would be canceled as a 
duplication of the earlier one. 

Examples of that appear in this Exhibit l-i2. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, the point I am getting at. Captain, is 
this, if anybody had wilfully taken out of those files all messages 
relating to this winds execute message you would have known about 
it, wouldn't you? 

Captain Kramer. I most certainly think I would have, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And you say nothing of that kind ever 
happened during your tour of dut}^ there? 

Captain Kramer. To my best knowledge and belief most cate- 
gorically no, sir. 

[10S4S] The Vice Chairman. Well, could anybody have gone 
in there and filched or stolen all of the messages relating to the winds 
execute message and you have known nothing about it? 

Captain Kramer. I don't see how that would be possible, sir, with 
this possible exception, that the combination of the safe in which 
these were kept, there was a copy of that combination in a double- 
sealed envelope in some of the front offices. If that envelope had 
been opened someone else would, of course, be able to open my safe. 
Otherwise, the only people who knew the combination of the safe 
in which that particular file was kept were three people. Lieutenant 
Harrison, the then Chief Yeoman Bryant, and mj^self. 

The Vice Chairman. Do you feel confident that nobody in the 
so-called front office who had the combination in the sealed envelope 
never removed any of those files ? 

Captain Kramer. I am thoroughly confident of that point, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. All those files were in a locked safe there in 
your office ? 

Captain Kramer. At all times, yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Are you positive. Captain, that 7001 had no 
relation whatever to the so-called winds execute message? 

[10546] Captain Kramer. From an examination of the files 
last Saturday in the Xavy Department and this study, Exhibit 142, 
of about a week or so ago, I am almost positive, I am as positive as 
1 can be that that file number 7001 could not possibly have been any 
winds message. That is in addition to the fact that I have absolutely 
no matter of any kind, no recollection, no knowledge that a winds 
message was ever written up by my section. 

The Vice Chairman. Xow, then, one more question, if I may, 
Captain. 

Captain Safford says he received orders to destroy notes, memo- 
randa, and so forth. Did you ever hear of any such order as that? 

Captain Kramer. I first heard of that a few days ago when Cap- 
tain Safford testified. 

The Vice Chairman. And heard it from him? 

Captain Kramer. From him on this witness stand. 

The Vice Chairman. That is the only time you ever heard of 
anything like that? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 



3940 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. May I have that question ? 

The Vice Chairman. Captain Safford says he received orders to 
destroy notes, memoranda, and so forth. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. 

[10547] The Vice Chairman. You recall that? 

Mr. Keefe. Yes, I remember. 

Captain Kramer. I might further amplify that reply in this re- 
spect: I have appeared as a spectator in these hearings only four or 
five times before last Friday, initially while General Marshall was 
testifying, again while Admiral Wilkinson was testifying, and while 
Captain McCollum was testifying. I have had at least a half dozen 
conversations during the past year with Captain Safford going over 
a number of points connected with Pearl Harbor. Last Saturday 
I had intended with my wife to go out of town for the day. I was so 
astonished by some of the statements made on Friday afternoon I 
felt that I better remain here Saturday, which I did. 

The Vice Chairman. You mean statements made by Captain Saf- 
ford? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Go ahead. 

Captain Kramer. That is all I have to say. 

The Vice Chairman. Could you indicate 

Senator Ferguson. May I inquire what question the witness was 
answering by that last remark ? 

Captain Kramer. I was amplifying my earlier reply. 

Senator Ferguson. To what question ? 

[1054^'] The Vice Chairman. I asked him the question. Senator, 
I stated that Captain Safford had testified 

Senator Ferguson. I wanted it from the witness, what question he 
was answering, if I can get it. 

The Vice Chairman. Do you want the reporter to read it ? 

Senator Ferguson. If the Chairman would allow me I would like 
to ask the witness what question he thought he was answering when 
he gave that answer. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, I don't see that that is especially ma- 
terial, but if the Captain 

Senator Ferguson. I will question him about it later. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Senator George would be next in line for recognition. He is not 
here. Mr. Clark, of North Carolina, will inquire, Captain. 

Mr. Clark. Captain, was this piece of paper that you did see at 
your office door ever distributed as magic? 

Captain Kramer. I didn't understand. 

Mr. Clark. The piece of paper that you saw at your office door and 
which went to Captain Safford's office, was that ever distributed as 
magic ? 

Captain Kramer, It never came into my office, was never written 
up, was never disseminated by me. 

Mr. Clark. You mean it was never distributed as magic, 
[1054^] was not distributed by you ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Who determined what portion of this radio traffic, as 
I believe you call it, would be distributed as magic ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3941 

Captain Kramer. That was done by my office, sir. 

In amplification of that point and your previous question I might 
state that nothing was ever disseminated by my office until we had a 
piece of paper in my office to work from. No piece of paper, either 
this — specifically this piece of paper — that was taken to Captain 
Safford's office ever came back to my office. 

Mf. Clark. Well, you were the judge of what should be dis- 
seminated, as you call it, of magic. Why didn't this paper come to 
your office in the first instance? 

Captain Kramer. The things that came to my office were determined 
in the first instance by the GY watch officers. There were many sys- 
tems in various states of analysis. After an attack on a new system 
the traffic in that new system might be held for periods varying from 
weeks to years before any of that material ever came to my office. 
When a system was sufficiently broken down to pull any intelligible 
text out of it, however, it then came to my office. The determination 
of what was of sufficient importance to write up was the function of 
my office and that is what I referred to. 

[10550^ Mr. Clark. But if someone else determined what should 
come to your office, then you didn't really have the determination of 
what should be distributed as magic, did you? 

Suppose something came in that was magic and wasn't sent to 
your office ? 

Captain Kramer. Then I would have nothing to do with its dis- 
semination ; no, sir. However, there was no provision for any other 
means of dissemination that I am aware of except the special pro- 
vision set up by Admiral Noyes for handling anything that came in 
in this particular winds system. 

That was an unprecedented set-up and was the only instance of 
that kind that T am aware of. 

Mr. Clark. Now, did I understand you that anything that came in 
in the nature of a winds execute would go to Admiral Noyes and not 
to you ? 

Captain Kramer. It was not very clear-cut how that particular 
message would be handled during the daytime. The provisions set 
up by Admiral Noyes and Captain Safford were primarily intended 
to promptly take care of that at night. 

In carrying out the provisions of those instructions, however, ap- 
parently the GY watch officer was proceeding [10S51'] to Cap- 
tain Safford's office and then to Admiral Noyes. 

My only possible explanation at this time of why that did not come 
back to my office for normal dissemination, translating and dissemina- 
tion — this is merelj'- presumptions, I might interpolate — is that who- 
ever saw it after I saw it, which I have already indicated was a matter 
of only a few seconds, must have determined that it was only another 
instance of a false weather broadcast, of which we had had numerous 
examples during the previous week or ten days. 

Mr. Clark. Just exactly who would that be ? 

Captain Kramer. I don't know just who it would have been be- 
cause I don't know who that piece of teletype paper was passed on to. 

Mr. Clark. Well, who could it have been passed on to. 

Captain Kramer. My presumption was and still is that Captain 
Safford was heading for Admiral Noyes' office with it. 



3942 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Clark. Did all the magic that was disseminated as such have 
to come through your office ? , ■ '■ ^ ^ 

Captain Kramer. So far as I am aware, that is precisely correct, 
sir, so far as the Navy Department is concerned and responsibilities 
outside of the Navy Department that the Navy had. 

Mr. Clark. I am speaking only about the Navy Depart- [lOdd^ij 
ment. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Can you advise the committee with certainty as to 
whether all messages disseminated as magic had to come through your 

office ? 

Captain I^amer. I know of no instance when any dissemination 

was made not through my office. . . 

Mr. Clark. Who set up this plan for disseminating magic < Who 
established it ? 

^ Captain Kramer. I do not know, sir. It had been in effect for at 
least 15 or 20 years when I took charge of that office. 

Mr. Clark. I see. 

You say this particular piece of paper never came back to your 
office, and was never disseminated as magic? 

Captain Kramer. Precisely, sir. -,^ ,, , 

Mr. Clark. I understood you to answer Senator Barkley's question 
on one point that you considered this some kind of a winds message? 

Captain Kramer. I did at the time, sir, because of the fact that it 
used the phraseology called for by the set-up of that winds message. 

[105S3] Mr. Clark. I am under the impression from the testi- 
mony that has been given here, that all of you were very particularly 
interested in any winds execute message that might come m ; is that 

correct ? 

Captain Kramer. Very particularly what, sir? 

Mr. Clark. Interested. 

Captain Kramer. Precisely. 

Mr. Clark. And on the lookout for it? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Do you consider that this slip of paper that you saw 
was a winds execute message? 

Captain Kramer. I did at the time ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. And you interpreted it to mean what? 

Captain Kramer. That the provisions called for by Tokyo s Cir- 
cular 2353 were in effect regarding the country mentioned in that 
particular winds message. ■ a f 

The provisions referring purely and simply to the cutting oil ot 
communications with supplementary instructions to burn certain 

papers. , 

Mr. Clark. Well, broken down in language which I can understand, 

you interpreted it to mean that it was war with England ? 
Captain Kramer. Not war with England ; no, sir. 
Mr. Clark. Well, what? 
[10S54] Captain Kramer. That the winds message applied to 

England, in my best recollection. 

Mr. Clark. And referred to diplomatic relations, rather than war i 
Captain Kramer. Perhaps better would be a diplomatic crisis; 

yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3943 

Mr. Clark. Did you make any effort to ascertain where tliis piece 
of paper went, or what became of it ? 

Captain Kramer, Never. 

Mr. Clark. Did you discuss it or mention it to any of the people 
to whom 3^ou liad been distributing magic? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Did you consider 

Captain Kramer. I would like to modify that, however, by saying 
that I may have mentioned it in the course of distribution of the other 
traffic on Friday to the usual recipients. 

I am uncertain of that point. 

Mr, Clark. Now, did you consider this a winds execute message 
insofar as the United States was concerned? 

Captain Kramer. My best recollection now is, and I believe has 
been throughout the period since 1941, that it did not apply to the 
United States. 

Mr. Clark. And consequently it was of much less [10565'] 
importance than if it had referred to the United States? 

Captain Kramer. It was not only of much less importance than if 
it had applied to the United States, but it was nothing new in its 
reference to England. It was more emphatic in nature than any such 
winds message might have been. Was the scheme being cooked up 
between the Japanese Ambassador in Bangkok and the Thai Chief of 
State for an occupation of Thailand and forcing of the Thai premier's 
hand to throw in Thailand in Japan ? We knew about that in appre- 
ciable detail. 

In fact, on 1 December, the subject of the dispatches relating to that 
were drafted by me, sent, I believe, initially, as was usual, to Captain 
Safford's office, and released by Admiral Noyes, and appears, I believe, 
as an exhibit in this hearing as Opnav Dispatch 011926, dated Decem- 
ber 1941. 

Senator Ferguson. December what? 

Captain Kramer. 01. 01 indicates the first day. 

Senator Ferguson, The 1st of December? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Captain Kramer, I must confess to some little confu- 
sion. As I understand the winds code set-up, it was arranged so that 
if an execute message came in, it would indicate, or certain words would 
be taken to indicate [10556] war with the United States? 

Captain Kramer. I have never had that conception, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Well, will you, if you don't mind — well, I think Senator 
Lucas is going into that. I will not pursue it. 

Senator Lucas. Go ahead. 

Mr. Clark. No. 

It merely related to the severance of diplomatic relations, and not 
war? 

Captain Kramer. Not necessarily the severance of diplomatic rela- 
tions. Fundamentally and primarily severance of communications 
which, of course, normally accompanies severance of diplomatic rela- 
tions also. 

Mr, Clark. Then they would use this weather broadcast, too, as a 
means of communication. 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 



3944 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Clark. And certain words used, however, were to indicate cer- 
tain things, were they not ? 

Captain Kjramer. Were to indicate certain countries, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Yes. 

Well, anyway, I may be a little confused on the technicalities of that, 
but what is in my mind is that whenever a winds execute message 
should come in, it was con- [10657] sidered by all of the people 
who had access to magic to be very important and significant, and you 
were on the alert in looking for it? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Clark. Still, you now say that a message came in which you 
regarded as a winds execute message but which doesn't seem to have 
been of any importance. There is where my confusion is. 

Now, if this was a winds execute message why did it not have the 
significance and the importance that the people in the Department 
had attached to it ? 

Captain Kramer. It had importance, yes, sir. No more importance, 
however, than many other things that we were getting. As regards 
England in my mind, at least, it had less importance because of its 
very unspecific character than this contemplated invasion or demon- 
stration before Kota Bharu, which was something specific. Impor- 
tant, yes, sir, in that it would be another straw in the wind indicating 
a further reaching of a climax in diplomatic relations. 

Mr. Clark. Well, now, what kind of a winds execute message would 
have qualified in importance and significance with what was expected 
here in such a message ? 

I mean to say this, stating the question this way : It is in evidence, 
and I have already referred to it, [105581 that everyone here 
who was familiar with magic was particularly interested in a winds 
execute message. 

Now, what kind of a message, a winds execute message, would have 
met that interest and expectation? What would it have had to say 
to be of that importance and interest? 

Captain Kramer. I believe the primary interest of all of the high 
officials in Washington receiving these intercepts was the United 
States. We were still conducting negotiations with Japan, even 
though those negotiations had been de facto terminated. 

One of the principal things that we were still interested in would 
be the nature and character of Japan's reply to Mr. Hull's note of 
26 November which we had not yet received. 

There were many indications of Japanese intentions directed at 
England, specifically, this Kota Bharu affair. There still was no 
intention of an overt nature anywhere in this traffic directed at the 
United States, with the possible exception of the dispatch late m 
November from Tokvo to Berlin, disclosing for the first time to the 
Germans, their Tri-Partite partners, the nature and terms of nego- 
tiations that were being conducted through 1941 with the United 
States. 

Up to that time Japan had been consistently and con- [10569] 
tinually putting off Kibbentrop and Hitler in their direct inquiries 
on this subject. 

The Japanese ambassador in Berlin was not cognizant of the nature 
and character of these negotiations. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3945 

Mr. Clark. Then the lack of interest and importance of the par- 
ticular message to which you refer, that was on this yellow teletype 
paper, was, that it did not refer to the United States ? 

Captain Kramer. That is the best of my present recollection; yes, 
sir. 

Mr. Clark. Well, do you know about that ? 

Captain Kramer. I am not positive of the wording appearing on 
that piece of teletype paper. My connection with it was so fleeting 
that I do not believe it is strange that I do not recollect it. 

Mr. Clark. Well, Captain, I do not mean to suggest anything 
strange about it, but here you were performing a very long faithful 
service as you were 

Captain Kramer. I would like to state further, sir, that if it had 
referred to the United States, I am quite positive that it would have 
impressed itself on my memory. 

The fact that it does not impress itself at this time, and without 
reference prior to 4 days ago to any of this material — I remember some 
details of all this [10560] traffic — is a further indication that 
I did not consider it, as I do not now, as referring to the United 
States. 

The fact that it did not impress itself on my memory is a further 
indication to me now that it in most probability referred to England, 
which, of course, would not have impressed it on my memory because 
of the fact that we knew so much more in detail Japanese intentions 
directed to England. 

Mr. Clark. That is about what I was fixing to call to your atten- 
tion, but it still strikes me as strange that with everyone here who 
knew anything about magic interested in this particular winds execute 
message, and with tension high on that subject, it is hard for me to 
understand how an accomplished officer like yourself in this line could 
have read a message that did refer to the United States, and therefore 
qualified as a winds execute message, without being immediately im- 
pressed by that fact. 

Captain Kramer. I am sure it would have been impressed on my 
memory if it had referred to the United States. 

Mr. Clark. And still you can't tell this committee positively whether 
it did or whether it didn't ? 

Captain Kramer. The reason I have not categorically stated what 
the wording of that is, is the fact that I have no positive, had no posi- 
tive recollection of that, and that any statement I would make now as 
to its precise wording [10561'] would be reconstruction in my 
mind of what it might have said. 

Mr. Clark. But I am not asking you. Captain, to repeat the word- 
ing. I am suggesting to you that if under those tense conditions, this 
paper had qualified as a winds execute message, you certainl}^ would 
have known it ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, I would. 

Mr. Clark. Then don't you know whether it did or not? 

Captain Krainier. To the best of my current belief, it did not. 

Mr. Clark. And you are not in a position to make a positive state- 
ment on that particular point to the committee ? 

Captain Kramer. Not purely from memory. I could make a posi- 
tive statement on reconstruction as I have outlined. 

79716— 46— pt. 9 3 



3946 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr Clark. But you would have to proceed by reconstruction on 
that most vital and important point in the situation that then existed i 

Captain Kramer. I am sure, sir, that if the United States had been 
mentioned, that a dissemination of that piece of paper would have 

been made. , ^i ^ • 4= ^„ 

I am further of the belief, sir, that whoever saw that piece ot paper 

after it left Captain Safford's office came to the conclusion that it was 

only one of many of [10562-] these other apparent winds 

"^ TM?particular piece of paper apparently impressed itself on my 
memory not appreciably more than these other false winds messages 
for which I was called to the office several times during the night ot 
the week or ten days preceding Pearl Harbor, and which at the time 
we determined to be false winds messages. 

[10563] Mr. Clark. Well, that all looks reasonable to me and 
still we are left more or less in the realm of speculation ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir, speculation insofar as my 
precise memory of the wording of that piece of teletype paper is 

ooTicGrri6cl« 

Mr. Clark. Speculation insofar as you cannot tell this committee 
positively that you never saw a message that completely qualihes as a 

winds execute message? , -r-r • ^ o. . t t- 

Captain Kramer. With reference to the United States I cannot 

make that categorical statement purely from memory. 
Mr. Clark. That is all. . . 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas, of Illinois, will inquire. 

Captain. . n ^ ^i • 

Senator Lucas. Captain, in the statement presented to this com- 
mittee by Captain Safford, the Captain said that when you and the 
watch officer came to his office you made the statement, ^ Ihis is it, as 
you handed him the winds message, and he has underscored the word 

"it." 

bo you care to elaborate upon your previous statement ? 

Captain Kramer. The "it" which I may have used referred to the 
fact that this was the first determination of anything appearing with 
the phraseology called for by this winds system. 

Senator Lucas. Do I understand you to tell the committee 
[10564-] that when you made that statement to Captain battord 
that you did not mean that it referred to the United States ? 

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Captain, as I understand this is the only message m 
traffic, if there was such a message of this kind, that was not actually 
translated and delivered to the proper recipients m the days ot No- 
vember and December 1941 ? 

Captain Kramer. That is not an accurate statement. Senator. 

Senator Lucas. Well, you correct me. Captain. You may have to do 
that frequently. , . ^ . - . j 

Captain Kramer. I should sav that the translations disseminated 
not only during this period but prior and subsequent periods were only 
a small percentage of all traffic received by this section of the Navy 
Department. I previously indicated that a percentage of that traffic 
was in various states of analysis by the crypt-analysts. Other parts 
of this traffic were in various states of code recovery by my section. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3947 

Other parts of this traffic were in minor systems which were given 
only a partial translation to determine their character. If they were 
purely of an administrative nature they were frequently not trans- 
lated if we were pressed by more important traffic. By "administrative 
[10S6S] nature" I mean that some office, diplomatic post of the 
Japanese, might be asking for more funds for a certain purpose, and 
elaborating in some detail the purpose for which they wanted their 
funds, and so forth. 

Senator Lucas. I understand. 

Now, did Captain Safford talk with you about this message at any 
time between December 3 or 4 and the date of the attack on December 
7 after you met in his office ? 

Captain Kramer. I have no recollection of discussing this piece of 
teletype with Captain Safford between the time I took it to his office 
and the attack on Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Lucas. Did you ever talk to him about this particular mes- 
sage thereafter? 

Captain Kramer. To my best recollection and belief the first time 
it was discussed subsequent to the attack on Pearl Harbor Avas this past 
spring. 

Senator Lucas. And how did that happen? 

Captain Kramer. Captain Safford is an acquaintance of mine for 
some years back. He had written me a letter concerning certain 
phases of this subject in late December 1943 and early 1944. Shortly 
after I returned to Washington last spring I had occasion to be in the 
branch building of the Navy Department where his office was and 
looked him up, more in the nature of a greeting of him after a couple 
of [10566] years absence. During the course of that and 
subsequent conversations we discussed some of the points concerning 
this matter. 

Senator Lucas. Did you ever agree with him in these discussions 
that this particular message in controversy was a genuine imple- 
menting winds message ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir; I did not. I tried to disillusion him of 
that idea since it was so diametrically contrary to the conception of 
it that I had. 

Senator Lucas. Did you ever talk to him again about this same 
winds message following that conversation ? 

Captain Kramer. I have met him, I think, about half a dozen 
times during this past year prior to seeing him during these hearings 
in the last few days where I have had further conversations with him. 

Senator Lucas. And I presume you two reached the same conclu- 
sion about the type of a message this was ? 

Captain Kjramer. We did not on that point as well as on a number 
of other points concerning this. I, however, expressed my opinions 
to him on a number of points. In fact, he showed me the courtesy 
of permitting me to examine some of the files that he had been pre- 
paring. I looked through some of those files partly with the idea of 
refreshing my memory on some points that he had material on. 
That, [10567] incidentally, was the first occasion since 1941 
that I had seen any pieces of paper connected with this matter with 
the exception of the exhibits shown to me during previous hearings 
I appeared at. 



3948 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. Well, if you never saw this so-called execute mes- 
sage after your conversation with Safford on either December 4th or 
5th where, in the course of natural events, or in the course of under- 
standing, would that message go after it left Safford's office? 

Captain Kramer. I have already indicated. Senator, that that par- 
ticular message came in as a j)art of a news broadcast coverage 
which we had not been customarily covering during the course of 
1941, except occasional sampling of that coverage, primarily because 
of the fact the FCC then had that function of monitoring foreign 
broadcasts. That coverage was instituted only after we were aware 
of the Japanese setting up this particular winds system of signals. 
It was an added burden not only to my section, with limited trans- 
lating talent, but, of course, to Captain Safford's whole organization, 
including the monitoring stations and his watch officers in the de- 
crypting section, to examine this plain language coverage. 

Senator Lucas. Did that come through in Morse code ? 

Captain Kramer. I believe it did, sir. However, I [10568] 
cannot be certain of that from first-hand knowledge because of the 
fact that material coming in in teletype would normally be tran- 
scribed onto a teletype ribbon for rapid transmission and such tran- 
scription would not clearly indicate whether it was Romaji, in other 
words, Arabic letter transmission or Kana Morse, Japanese Morse 
transmission. 

Senator Lucas. That is, by an examination of the teletype itself 
you could not tell whether it was Morse code or not? 

Captain Kramer. You could not tell whether it was international 
Morse or Japanese Kana Morse. 

Senator Lucas. There is quite a difference, as I understand it, be- 
tween the two. 

Captain Kramer. There is a difference when picked out of the air, 
yes, sir, but not when transcribed on a teletype. 

Senator Lucas. I mean as far as the interception is concerned, 
there is quite a difference ? 

Captain Khamer. As far as the interception, but not when it is 
transcribed to English letters. 

[10S69] Senator Lucas. Well, this message, according to the 
evidence that is before this committee at the present time, could only 
go to one place after it left Stafford's office and that would be to Ad- 
miral Noyes' offices, isn't that correct ? 

Captain Kramer. That was my understanding at the time, and 
still is. 

Senator Lucas. Well, it is my understanding that Safford has told 
the committee that he directed one of the men in his office to take this 
message to Admiral Noyes, but he does not remember who it was. 
Now, do you recall the watch officer that came to your door that 
morning ? 

Captain Kramer. I am not positive of his name. It, however, does 
impress itself on my memory that he was approximately my height. 
I recall that because we talked for approximately 150 yards. My 
belief has been and still is, that it was a Lieutenant Murray, one of 
the watch officers. 

Senator Lucas. If Admiral Noyes received this so-called execute 
winds message, or this false weather message, whatever it was, what 
would be his duties, Captain, with respect to that message ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3949 

Captain Kramer. This is purely presumption on my part based 
on his instruction to me to prepare certain cards concerning this 
winds message. I presumed if he received such a [10570] 
winds message that he would at once telephone the sense of that mes- 
sage to these usual recipients of this decrypted traffic. 

Senator Lucas. "Well, would he follow the telej^hone communica- 
tion with the delivery to these proper recipients of that type message? 

Captain Kramer. Would he what? 

Senator Lucas. Would he follow the telephone communication with 
an actual delivery of this type of a message to these various recipients ? 
That is the custom 3'ou followed, as I recall. 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And I presumed he would follow the same course, 
would he not? Of course, you are speculating now. 

Captain Kramer. I do not know about that point, sir. 

Senator Lucas. All right. In Captain Saflford's statement on page 
14 he says : 

It is my recollection that Kramer and I knew at the time that Admiral Noyes 
had telephoned the substance of the Winds IMessage to the War Department, to 
the "INIaglc" distribution list in the Navy Department, and to the Naval Aide to 
the President. For that reason, no immediate distribution of the smooth trans- 
lation of the Winds Message was made in the Navy Department. The six or 
[10571] seven copies for the Army were rushed over to the War Department 
as rapidly as possible; here the Navy's responsibility ended. The individual 
smooth translations for authorized Navy Department ofl5cials and the White 
House were distributed at noon on December 4, 1941, in accordance with standard 
operating procedure. 

Now, who delivered those smooth copies, who delivered the smooth 
translations around noon of December 4, 1941, if you know ? Whose 
responsibility would that be ? Assuming now that it is in Noyes' office 
and assuming that the statement of Captain Saflford is correct, who 
would have the responsibility for ultimately making the distribution 
of the smooth translations as is stated here? 

Captain Kramer. With the exception of certain deliveries made on 
my instructions by Lieutenant Harrison, I know of no one else who 
ever made a dissemination in the Navy Department of the final trans- 
lations except myself. 

Senator Lucas. That was my understanding. In other words, if 
Admiral Noyes had considered this message as a winds message, then 
it would have been your duty, under the previous arrangement that 
you had, to have delivered these smooth translations to the proper 
recipients? 

Captain Kramer. That is precisely correct, sir. 

Senator Lucas. In other words, Admiral Noyes would not 
[1057^] have detailed some other officer who was not familiar with 
magic and familiar with the recipients to have made the delivery in 
this particular and special case? 

Captain Kramer. It would have been unprecedented and I cannot 
conceive of his so doing. 

Senator Lucas. Well, now, it is a fact, and I think you stated it 
categorically, that jou, as the one individual who had delivered all 
these magic messages, never received from Admiral Noyes any in- 
structions of any kind to deliver to the proper recipients this so-called 
execute winds message ? 

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir. 



3950 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. And you know of no one who did make this de- 
livery ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not, sir. .,, . . -, 

Senator Lucas. Do you agree with me that if this winds execute 
message was the type and kind as was outhned m circular 2353, that 
it would have been absolutely the thing to do, to make such a delivery i 
Captain Krammee. It would have been if it had come into my sec- 
tion for translation and dissemination. However, as has been re- 
peatedly pointed out, there were special provisions made to handle 
this particular winds system messages. 

Senator Lucas. Yes, I understand that, but even though this par- 
ticular provision was made whereby Admiral Noyes was [10S73] 
to receive this kind of a winds execute, as I understood you to say it 
would still have been your duty, if the delivery of the smooth transla- 
tion had been requested, it would have been your duty to do it ( 
Captain Kramer. It certainly would, yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And if Admiral Noyes, who will testify later about 
this, if Admiral Noyes selected any other officer, then he broke a 
precedent up to that time as far as delivering this magic ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. I might state further, sir, m connection 
with this whole subject that it was my presumption that this particular 
message would not come into my section because of the special pro- 
visions made by Admiral Noyes and Captain Safford for dissemina- 
tion. However, if it came into my section, it would have been dis- 
seminated through the usual channels, via myself. I have not had 
this particular winds message impressed on my memory during the 
intervening years partly for that reason, partly for other reasons I 
have already given and partly because what is apparently a consider- 
able issue on this particular winds message apparently came to a head 
not before at least two years or so after Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Lucas. Two years after Pearl Harbor, about the time when 
Captain Safford started writing you asking you [1057^] while 
you were serving in the Pacific whether or not you knew anything 
about this particular message? 

Captain Kramer. That is just about the time, sir, that I was first 

aware that there were any questions or issues concerning this subject. 

Senator Lucas. And he asked you in question 18 of that letter as to 

whether or not you knew anything about this particular message and 

your reply was wholly on another message at that time ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. In other words, your memory two years afterwards 
did not coincide with Stafford's memory about that message the first 
time that it was ever brought to your attention? 
Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And as far as you know that is the first time that the 
so-called winds execute message was ever called to the attention of 
anyone in connection with the Pearl Harbor controversy? 
Captain Kramer. Precisely, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Now, in this same statement Captain Safford said 
that it was his recollection that "Kramer and I knew that Admiral 
Noyes had telephoned the substance of the winds message." 

[10576] Do you recall that Admiral Noyes told you at any time 
that he had telephoned the substance of this so-called winds execute 
message to the proper recipients ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3951 

Captain Kramer. I was never aware of what phone calls Admiral 
Noyes made, if he made any. In fact, I have no knowledge of what 
happened to this particular piece of paper, this so-called winds mess- 
age, after I left Captain Safford's office. 

Senator Lucas. All right. Now, returning for a moment. Captain, 
to circular 2353 : Are you the individual who originally translated that 
message when it was intercepted ? 

Captain Kramer. My section translated it, sir — one of my trans- 
lators did. The "Y" at the bottom before the expression, "Navy 
translation" indicated that it was a Mr. Cory. 

Senator Lucas. Who ? 

Captain Kramer. Cory; C-o-r-y, who about 8 months later was 
killed on Guadalcanal as a young officer in the Marines, into which he 
was commissioned in the spring of 1942. 

Senator Lucas. Well, you were familiar, of course, with this par- 
ticular message after it came in and was translated ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. You were the one who made the delivery of this 
message 

Captain Kramer. I did, sir. 

[J0S76] Senator Lucas (continuing) . To the proper people here 
in Washington who were on the "in", so to speak, on magic? 

Captain Kramer. I think that probably the first delivery was made 
to Captain Safford because it was my {customary practice to bring 
at once to his attention anything bearing on the technicalities of his 
section. 

Senator Lucas. Now, the first part of that message is as follows : 

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the 
cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added 
in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast. 

That was thoroughly understood by you ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Was there ever anyone who translated those words 
from the intercepted message in different language than what we find 
now in this circular? 

Captain Kramer. At no time, sir. There was only one translation 
made of this in the Navy Department. About the same date as this 
translation we received a translation from the Far East of this same 
circular. • 

Senator Lucas. Is that the one Captain Safford gives to the com- 
mittee in his statement which is found on 

[10577] Captain Kramer. A dispatch originated by commander 
in chief, Asiatic Fleet, as a translation furnished by Singapore. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. That is the one that Captain Safford 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. That translation from the Asiatic Fleet 
was essentially the same as ours, disagreed only in certain paren- 
thetical points with reference to the southwest Pacific. My recollec- 
tions now of my reaction at the time were that the Asiatic Fleet 
version of it differed from ours; it further made it — was probably 
made more emphatic than ours because of the closer proximity of 
those people to danger ; that for that reason alone I would not ques- 
tion their translation. I recall at no time going back to the original 
decryption of ours to determine why the two translations were dif- 



3952 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ferent — I first saw, since those days, the work sheet of this message 
a few days ago — and that there would be no necessity of our briefing 
and drafting the subject of this message to send to the usual recipients, 
the Asiatic Fleet specifically, and commander in chief. Pacific Fleet, 
because it was already on that channel, they already had it. 

Senator Lucas. Well, I notice in Captain Safford's statement that 
he says : 

[10578] Consul-General Foote, our Senior Diplomatic Representative in 
the Netherlands East ladies, on December 4, 1941 (Java time), which is Decem- 
ber 3, 1941 (Washington time), sent a similar message to the Secretary of 
State, from which I quote: 

"When crisis leading to \vorst«arises following will be broadcast at end weather 
reports : One east wind rain war with United States. Two north wind cloudy 
war with Russia. Three west wind clear war with Britain including attack 
on Thailand or Malaya and Dutch Indies." 

Now, do you consider that message any different than the one which 
you received in circular 2353 ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not believe I saw until some time later that 
particular message. I may have. I know that I was told about it, 
however, because my reactions at the time I was told about it, about 
3 or 4 December, were that that particular subject was getting a pretty 
wide dissemination. 

I was concerned purely from the security angle. I was concerned 
that if too many people became cognizant of it, inasmuch as this thing 
was set up in a secret Japanese code, that the Japanese might get wind 
of the fact that that code was broken. 

Senator Lucas. Well, did Admiral Noyes know about this 
[J0S79] particular message which was sent in by Consul-General 
Foote? 

Captain Kramer. Very probably he did. 

Senator Lucas. Could it be that this so-called winds execute mes- 
sage that we have been talking about was following the pattern as 
laid down here in this message that I have just read? 

Captain Kramer. So far as I am aware, sir, those messages from 
Java were never used by Captain Safford's organization in connection 
with interception or attempted interception of anything on this winds 
system. We had our own translation, which was the primary and 
initial translation, and we had the Asiatic Fleet version of the transla- 
tion furnished by the British, which in most essentials were identical. 
Those two versions oi^it were the basis on which instructions, in my 
understanding, were sent to our intercept stations and provisions made, 
all the provisions made to handle this particular winds system. 

Senator Lucas. Well, do I understand you to say, then, from your 
last answer, that Captain Safford and yourself and all other individ- 
uals who were intercepting and decoding and translating these mes- 
sages from Japan were following the pattern as laid down in circular 
2353 or circular 2354 and you were eliminating any message that you 
might have received from Java ? 

Captain Kramer. My only reaction to those messages from 
[10580] Java, was that, as' I have indicated, it was getting a very 
wide dissemination. Incidentally, I might interpolate that to my 
best recollection this is the first instance that I was aware that the 
Dutch were working on this traffic. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3953 

Senator Lucas. So you had good reasons to discount, I presume, in 
view of the fact that j'ou fellows had been working on it a long, long 
time, and thought that your system of analysis of these intercepts was 
as good as any, or better? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. I might amplify my previous 
answer by stating that although it was obvious that the Dutch had 
diiferences on the subject, my first reaction was that very likely the 
British at Singapore had furnished it to them. 

Senator Lucas. Well, if Captain Safford was not using these reports 
that came in from Java, why does he use it here ; can you tell that ? 

Captain Kramer. I cannot presume to diagnose the thought proc- 
esses of Captain Safford. 

Senator Lucas. Getting back to circulars 2353 and 2354, the one 
which all responsible people in the Army and Navy had, there is noth- 
ing in that message which speaks about war with the United States 
or Russia or Britain ? 

Captain Kramer. Nothing whatsoever in the text of the message. 
The war angle could be only personal inference and [10581'\ 
deductions of what a diplomatic crisis involving severance of com- 
munications might lead up to. 

Senator Lucas. That is right. So in the event that any winds im- 
plement message had come in on the basis of what is laid down in cir- 
cular 2353 it could only mean, if this message is correct, that diplo- 
matic relations were cut off or international communications had 
ceased, isn't that right ? 

Captain Kramer. Precisely correct, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And at the time, either on December 4 or 5, we 
were carrying on diplomatic relations with Japan ? 

Captain Kramer. We were, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And the communications between Tokyo and her 
people in this country and all over the world were continuing, were 
they not ? 

Captain Kramer. So far as the United States is concerned, they 
continued in full effect ; yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas, Well, negotiation and communications both con- 
tinued right up almost until the bomb fell? 

Captain Kramer, Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. The first bomb fell at Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. So if this message is correct there was never any 
reason for Japan ever sending out an implementing [10582] 
winds message because no communications ceased and no diplomatic 
relations ceased between the two countries? 

Captain Kramer. So far as the United States was concerned, it 
appears to me to have been an extremely illogical thing for Japan to 
have sent such a message with reference to the United States since 
they took such stringent precautions to safeguard the fact that they 
contemplated not only a break but actually an overt act directed toward 
the United States. 

[10583] Senator Lucas, All right, now. Captain, one more 
question. 

I have always considered circulars 2353 and 2354 of tremendous 
importance, and I always thought any implementing winds message 
following the plan laid down, was also of tremendous importance. 



3954 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Do you agree with me that if an implementing message had come 
with tile instructions as set forth in these circuhirs, it would have been 
followed distinctly and carefully ? o ^ q 

Captain Kramer. What instructions do you refer to, Senator < 
Senator Lucas. I am speaking now of the latter part of the circular 
which savs, "This signal will be given in the middle and at the end 
as a weather forecast, and each sentence will be repeated twice. 
Now, that is clear, isn't it ? 
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. If the words "Higashi— "' you pronounce them tor 
me please. 

Captain Kramer. Higashi no kaze ame. 

Senator Lucas. If they had appeared only m the middle ot the 
winds execute message, would that, standing alone have been sufficient 
for you to reach the conclusion [lOoSJi^ that that was an im- 
plementation of the winds message, or false message? 

Captain Kramer. In my examination of these earlier false alarms 
where I saw the full teletype paper, sometimes running to 12 and 
15 yards in length, in analyzing those weather reports, that was one 
of the points I looked for, to see whether it appeared m the middle 
and at the end. 
Senator Lucas, Yes. i i i 

Captain Kramer. If it did not appear at the end, it would have 
tended to discount anything appearing in the middle. 

However, its omission from the end would very likely be accom- 
panied by an omission of part of the end of the weather broadcast 
due to interference or atmospherics, and therefore incomplete recep- 
tion of that news broadcast. 

Senator Lucas. That could happen ? 
Captain Kramer. It might possibly happen ; yes, sir. 
Senator Lucas. It might possibly happen? 
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Well, vou would have to consider under those cir- 
cumstances then, if you' received any one of these danger signals, 
either in the middle or the end of the message, I take it, you would 
have to give that some weight, [10586'] and consideration so 
far as beings a winds execute message is concerned ? . , . 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; and I did m those earlier things i 

mentioned. ,. , , i - ^.i,- 

The Vice Chairman. Would it disturb you to suspend at this 

point ? 

Senator Lucas. No. . ^^ ^^ ■ .-u 

The Vice Chairman. There is a very important roll call m the 

House, and as soon as the House convenes, the House Members will 

have to be present for that. 

Without objection, the committee will now stand m recess until 

1 ■ 30. 

(Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m. the committee recessed until 1:30 

p. m. of the same day.) 

[10586] ArTERNOON session — 1 : 30 p. m. 

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3955 

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KKAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY 

(Resumed) 

The Vice Chairman. Does counsel have anything at this time ? 

Mr. Richardson. No. 

The Vice Chairman. Captain, do you have anything you desire 
to submit before your examination is resumed ? 

Captain Kramer. Mr. Chairman, in the past few minutes I have 
examined a document presented to me this morning as I commenced 
to testify. There is a notation on here that it is exhibit 41. I have 
never seen it before, however. It is information from documentary 
evidence on messages 901, 2, 7, and 10. The first one of those, 901, 
is what has been termed in this liearing the "pilot" message. 

Yesterday I testified concerning the time of receipt of the transla- 
tion of that message in the Navy Department. I was unpositive as 
to the exact time. My impressions were purely from memory after 
over 4 years that it was received late in the afternoon, after the first of 
the parts of the Japanese note were coming in. 

An examination of this document would tend to confirm [10587] 
such testimony inasmuch as in the fourth paragraph under 901 it 
states : 

Teletype sheet containing Japanese code received by Army SIS from Navy 
(A) 12 : 05 P. M. 6 December. 

In the normal course of processing this material it took several 
hours. It is therefore extremely unlikely that that message was 
processed, translated, and disseminated prior to late Saturday 
afternoon. 

That is the only thing I wanted to bring up at this time, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas of Illinois will continue his 
inquiry. 

Senator Lucas. Do you recall. Captain, what we were talking about 
just before lunch? There were a number of things but I am trying 
to think of the last one. 

Captain Kramer. I have forgotten just the line of the questioning, 
sir. 

Senator Lucas. We were discussing the circular 2353 with respect 
to whether or not it was necessary in order to complete the cycle that 
the word, for instance, which means "East wind-rain" should appear 
in the center and at the end of the message. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And then there was another warning in [105881 
there which said that each sentence will be repeated twice. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Now, w^ould atmospheric conditions interfere with 
that last instruction with respect to each sentence being repeated 
twice ? 

Captain Kramer. On that point, Senator, 1 was somewhat confused 
at the time and still am confused because it disagrees with the sub- 
sequent directive on this subject, 2354. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. In a subsequent directive it says: 

The above will be repeated five times. 
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 



3956 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas (reading) : 

And included at the beginning and end. 

Captain Ejiamer. That is correct. We expected, certainly, that 
that would be repeated. Just which of those would apply, we were 
still uncertain what the Japanese intended. 

Senator Lucas. That is right. In other words, if they followed 
either one of these circulars, which they would be compelled to do in 
the implementing wind message, it would be necessary that they either 
repeat twice or five times ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. I might comment further on that to 
this effect, that in 2354 it says it will be included at the beginning and 
the end ; 2353 says in the middle and at the end. 

[10S89] I have previously indicated that it was only a few days 
ago that I saw the original work sheets since 1941 of these two mes- 
sages. There is still doubt in the minds of any person in the United 
States as to the precise meaning as to what the Japanese intended. 
Those discrepancies are undoubtedly due to only tentative or errone- 
ous recoveries by my code recovery section. As a matter of fact, that 
beginning in 2354 from a personal examination of the work sheet ap- 
pears to be a tentative and erroneous recovery which could very well 
be better recovered, more precisely and accurately recovered as "the 
middle." 

The expression actually appearing on the work sheet now in the 
files of the Navy Department is "Boto," meaning "beginning." It 
was a tentative recovery. In contexts in which that code group have 
previously appeared it seemed to be a logical recovery. With subse- 
quent appearances of those code groups we very likely would have 
made a more accurate recovery. That is just another indication of 
doubt with reference to the precise meaning intended by the Japanese 
in these two messages. 

Senator Lucas. Well, I can understand that from an examination 
of the two Circulars and your explanation of it, too. What I want to 
know. Captain, is whether or not if this implementing wind message 
had been a genuine one if it [10590] would have been necessary 
for them to repeat the message twice or at least five times ? 

Captain IvRiVMER. We certainly expected that it would be repeated ; 
yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. From what you saw in these three lines that came 
into your office was that message repeated more than once? 

Captain Kjjamer. My recollection is that there was repetition. 

Senator Lucas. There was repetition in there ? 

Captain ICramek. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. In that particular message? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And you do not recall, now, how many times, I 
take it? 

Captain Kramer. I am not certain on the number of times ; no, sir. 
I have previously commented on that particular point, that it was the 
function of the Gy section of cryptanalysis to determine the authen- 
ticity of codes. They for the most part examined these various other 
weather reports that had been coming in, threw many of them out 
themselves as not fitting the precise phraseology or the repetition 
called for, and did not call on me. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3957 

Senator Lucas. Well, now, in this same message it fur- [10591'] 
ther states : 

When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a 
completely secret arrangement. 

Now, as I understand it there was a message went out from Tokyo 
to Washington on December the 4th telling them : 

Before you burn the codes brought you by KOSAKA, have him teach all your 
telegraphic staff how to use them — 

and so forth. 

Are you familiar with that one in Exhibit 1 on page 231? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir ; I am familiar with that. 

Senator Lucas. Well, now, that message could have nothing to do 
with the winds execute message. 

Captain Kramer. Nothing whatsoever, sir. That would, in that 
connection, tend to prove that there was no winds execute message up 
to that time. 

Senator Lucas. That is exactly the point I wanted to raise. In other 
words, in view of the fact that they said here in Circular 2353 : 

When this is heard please destroy all code papers — 

in other words, on December the 4th, 1941, if a winds execute message 
had been sent from Tokyo there wouldn't have been any reason for 
them on December the 4th to send out that kind of a message, would 
there ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. Also, there would be no point [10593] 
to addressing such a winds system message to Washington in view of the 
precise .instructions that they had sent Washington on the third to 
retain certain systems and codes. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. There is another message here about burning 
of codes some place that I want to call your attention to. It is on 
page 236 of Exhibit 1, Captain, from Washington to Tokyo, Decem- 
ber the 5th, 1941 : 

We have completed destruction of codes, but since the U. S.-Japanese negotia- 
tions are still continuing I request your approval of our desire to delay for a 
while yet the destruction of the one code machine. 

Now, do you agree with me that that message from Washington to 
Tokyo, when it talks about negotiations still continuing, is in line 
with what they were talking about in Circular 2353 about negotia- 
tions there ? 

Captain Kramer. There is no connection whatsoever, sir. 

Senator Lucas. It has none ? 

Captain Kramer. None, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Well, now, will you explain that and get me straight 
on that, please ? 

Captain Kramer. On page 215 is a directive from Tokyo to Wash- 
ington. 

Senator Lucas. In Exhibit 1 ? 

Captain Kramer. In Exhibit 1. 

[10593] Senator Lucas. All right. 

Captain Kramer. The translation reads, of a message dated 2 
December : 

Among the telegraphic codes vrith which your oflSce is equipped burn all but 
those now used with the machine and one copy each of "O" code — 



3958 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

a character Japan intended as "Oite"— 

and abbreviating code (L) — 

which we knew as "L. A." 

(Burn also the various other codes which you have in your custody.) 

That is presumably for distribution. 

Stop at once using one code machine unit and destroy it completely. 

That, incidentally, is the first time we knew that Washington had 
more than one code machine. We were curious about that point. 

When you have finished this, wire me back the one word "haruna." 

At the time and in the manner you deem most proper dispose of all hies ot 
messages coming and going and all other secret documents. 

Burn all the codes which Telegraphic Official KOSAKA brought you. 

That is the one you referred to initially, sir. In view of that and 
the fact that Washington's dispatch of 5 December {1059J^\ re- 
fers back to that, it is quite evident, it appears to me, that Washing- 
ton's destruction of part of their codes was the direct result of that 
dispatch from Tokyo of 2 December and had no connection whatso- 
ever with any winds system message. . 

Senator Lucas. Well, I refer you, Captain, to the language m there, 
"We have completed destruction of codes," afld I agree with you that 
is in line with the message that you have read into the record here 
dated December the 2nd. 

Captain Kramer. The one of December 5, Senator, says, Ke your 

867." 

Senator Lucas. Yes. 

Captain Kramer. Which is the one of December 2 ? 

Senator Lucas. But isn't it a fact when they state : 
But since the U. S.-Japanese negotiations are still continuing I request your 
approval of our desire to delay for a while yet the destruction of the one code 
machine — 

in other words, this is Circular 2353— no, I am wrong on that. You 
are right and I am wrong. . 

Anyhow, this message of December the 5th definitely indicates that 
no additional winds execute message had been received or there would 
not have been any necessity for that. 

Captain Kramer. It certainly indicates that the Japanese embassy 
in Washington was not talking about, and presumably had received 
nothing, concerning any winds message. 

[10S9S^ Senator Lucas. Well, if this had been a genuine winds 
execute message and had followed the advice given in Circular 2353 
when it says, "When this is heard please destroy all code papers," there 
wouldn't be any necessity for them sending this message of Decem- 
ber the 5th. 

Captain Kramer. I do not see that it would, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Well, now. Captain, we have spent a good long 
time about this so-called winds execute message and assuming that 
this winds execute message had been a genuine one, what would that 
have added to what you already had as far as the tenseness of the 
situation is concerned between Japan and this country? 

Captain Kramer. It would have added considerable to the already 
tense situation between AVashington and this country because it would 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3959 

have indicated a contemplated break with this country. To date 
and up until December 7, the time of the attack, there was still no indi- 
cation that the Japanese definitely contemplated a complete break 
in relations with this country, to say nothing about the slightest 
indication of any intention to attack this country. 

Senator Lucas. Well, is the so-called execute winds message, if it 
had been a genuine one and if it had been understood, more important 
than the 14-point message? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir ; it is not. 

[10596] Senator Lucas. In other words, the so-called winds 
execute message did not say when war was going to break out ^ 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Lucas. It did not say where war was going to break out^ 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Assuming Captain Safford's theory of this thing or 
his explanation is correct, all it said was, "War with United States," 
that is correct, isn't it ? 

Captain Kramer. Not necessarily war, sir. 

Senator Lucas. AVell, I am assuming that his theory of this is cor- 
rect, all that it said on that message was, "War with United States, 
war with England and peace with Russia." That is what he had on 
there. 

Now, everybody knew at that time that has testified here, practically, 
that war was coming sooner or later with Japan, didn't they? 

Captain Kramer. From the general situation, yes, sir; that is true. 

Senator Lucas. Nobody knew when that message came in '( 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And nobody knew where the attacks were going 
to — where the Japs were going to attack the United [105971 
States if they attacked us at all ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir; or that they would attack the United 
States. In fact, I am speaking from my own personal recollections, 
but I believe that it was the consensus of the opinion of my associates 
and many of the high officials in Washington, that it was very illogical 
and foolish on the part of Japan to undertake open warfare with the 
United States, that it was ahnost inconceivable that they would in 
view of the fact that it was very likely that they could get everything 
that they wanted and as they had got in French Indochina and what 
they wanted in the south of French Indochina, without any action 
being taken b}^ the United States. 

Senator Lucas. Well, Captain Safl'ord in his statement to the com- 
mittee said this : 

The Japanese were going to start the war on Saturday, December 6, 1941, or 
Sunday, December 7, 1941. The War and Navy Departments had been given 
72 hours" advance notification of the attack on England and the United States 
by the Japanese themselves. 

Assuming, sir, that Captain Safford's statement is absolutely cor- 
rect, that there was this execute winds message and it said on it just 
what he contends that it says, is there any reason to deduce a state- 
ment of that kind, in your opinion, from that message? 

[10598] Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir. 

Senator Lucas. There is one other question. You prepared a file 
for Secretary Forrestal ? 



3960 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kkamer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. You have said tliat you did not discuss with Saf- 
f ord at that time about the preparation of that file. 

Captain Kramer. In reply to that, Senator, I would like to refer 
to page 15 of Captain Safford's statement. 

I do not believe that Captain Safford knew until some years after 
Pearl Harbor that I had prepared any such folder for Secretar}' 
Forrestal. When I returned to this countiy last spring and had some 
of my conversations with Captain Safford I told him specifically that 
only one folder had been prepared ; no material from my section in 
the Navy Department had ever been presented before the Roberts 
hearing. 

I testified, I believe, yesterday that during the course of the Roberts 
hearing I was curious on that point myself. I had no knowledge of 
whether these decryptions were being presented as evidence in that 
hearing. I asked my immediate superior, Captain McCollum, about 
that point. That was the first time I knew that they were being 
presented. 

I was very curious about what safeguards were being maintained on 
tlje handling of that in that hearing. Captain McCollum was 
uncertain. 

[10599] As regards the statement made in the bottom of page 
15 of Captain Safford's statement, he says : 

I had no responsibility in the matter after forwarding the original message to 
Admiral Noyes — 

and this is the point particularly — 

and after checking Kramer's "folder" to see that the messages wei-e presented 
in a logical and understandable order. 

At no time during all my duty in that section of Naval Operations 
do I have any recollection of my presenting a folder to Captain Safford 
for his checking m}^ manner of presentation or being shown anything 
except what I showed him. 

Senator Lucas. That was your responsibility? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Not Safford's responsibility. 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Well, now, when you talked to Secretary Forrestal, 
according to Safford you told him that you discussed this message 
along with others with Forrestal for about 2 hours. Now, in that 
conversation was there anything ever said about this so-called con- 
troversial execute winds message? 

Captain Kramer. Captain Stafford's statement in that regard is ap- 
parently a garbled recollection of our conversations of this past spring. 
I told him that I was in Secretary Forrestal's office not more than 15 
or 20 minutes ex- [10600] plaining the general nature of the 
material in that folder. He read some of the things in my presence: 
Captain McCollum was also there. The folder was then left with 
him to study further since he had not customarily been seeing any of 
this traffic. On a few occasions he did see it. 

One specifically I recall was when I was at Secretary Knox's desk 
while he was examining a folder and Mr. Forrestal came into the 
office. Secretary Knox called Mr. Forrestal over to point it out to 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3961 

him; he let him read one of the particuh\rly interesting items in the 
folder he was reading. 

There was no winds message in that at all. There was the one 
referred to as the hidden-word message, which I specifically took pains 
to point out was an error in that it omitted the United States. That 
was one that appeared Sunday morning, 7 December 1941. 

Senator Lucas. But insofar as this message is concerned that is in 
controversy here and the one that Captain Safford claims that he saw 
and delivered to Noyes, that was not in the file and that was not 
discussed with Forrestal ? 

Captain Kraivier. No winds message of any nature or kind whatso- 
ever was discussed with Mr. Forrestal. In fact, not even the nature 
or system by which that hidden-word message came was discussed 
with Mr. Forrestal, only the text of the messages themselves. 

[^10601^ Senator Lucas. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman. 

The ViCvE Chairman. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will inquire, 
Captain. 

Mr. Murphy. Captain, when I was questioning Captain Safford on 
the stand I asked him to give the names of those officers who might 
corroborate him as to the winds execute and in giving me those names 
he listed your name and then he also listed Colonel Bratton of the 
Army; he also listed Colonel Sadtler of the Army and while he was 
on the stand I read to him what Colonel Bratton had to say about it. 

According to the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board in Top 
Secret Report at page 7 Colonel Bratton testified that no information 
reached him as to iho. break in relations shown by the winds message 
prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster December 7, 1941, and he does not 
believe anybody else in G-2 received such information. So much for 
Colonel Bratton. 

I now go to the Army Pearl Harbor Board report dated October 6, 
1944, at page 251. This is the testimony of the second witness, Colonel 
Sadtler, claimed by Captain Safford. [Reading:] 

General Fr.\nk. Go ahead. 

Colonel Sadtlek. We paid a great deal of attention to that message, and then 
when the directive came from Toliyo regarding the destruction of codes, that 
message [10602] began to assume some importance, or a great deal of 
importance. 

General Frank. That is, in the estimation of the people who were handling it? 

Colonel Sadtleb. That was in the estimation of General Miles, Colonel Bratton, 
and myself ; others, maybe ; I don't know. 

On the morning of the 5th of December, Admiral Noyes, who was Chief of 
Naval Communications at that time, called me, about 9 : 30, wjth words to the 
effect, "Sadtler, the message is in." I aslied him which one it was and he said 
he didn't know, but he thought it was the one that meant war between Japan and 
Great Britain. I asked him for the Japanese word, and he said he didn't know 
it, but to please tell G-2. 

I went immediately to General Miles' nfl3ce and told him that the word was in. 
He said, "Wait a minute, I will call Colonel Bratton," and in a very short while 
Colonel Bratton came into the office, and we sat down at General Miles' desk. 
There were General Miles, Colonel Bratton; some officer, I don't know who it 
was. I think he has since been identified as General Roderick, who is now dead ; 
and myself. 

I then reported what General Noyes had told me, \_1060S] and Colonel 
Bratton took out his little notebook, and he said, "Which one of these three 
words is it?" And I said, "I don't kaow, but Admiral Noyes says it is the one 
meaning war between Japan and Great Britain." "Well," he said, "do you think 
you can verify that word? This may be a false alarm." I says, "I will go back 
and call Admiral Noyes on the secret phone." 
79716 — 46 — pt. 9 4 



3962 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I got Admiral Noyes, and he said, "I don't know," and I said, "can you verify 
it?" He said, '"I can't do it riglit now, as I have to attend a meeting in the Office 
of the Chief of Naval Operations," or some place, I don't know where; but he 
was unable to verify that at the time, "and," he says, "I will do it later." I 
says, "I think later will be too late." I went back to General Miles' office and 
told them that Admiral Noyes was unable to verify the word at that time, that 
he had to go to a meeting, but he was positive that it was the word meaning 
Japan and Great Britain, and it was the implementation of that "Winds" mes- 
sage. I would like to add here that my memory is a little bit faulty as to 
whether it was not Japan and Great Britain. It may have been Japan and Russia, 
but I am positive it was not Japan and the United States. 

I went back to my office. Rather, General Miles [10604] said, "Well, 
I don't know what we will do. You keep on the lookout for anything that comes 
in and let us know just as soon as possible." 

I went back to the office, and then I went down to see General Gerow, who 
was head of the War Plans, told him the effect of what Admiral Noyes had 
said, and didn't he think we should send a message to Hawaii. I don't mean 
Hawaii — to Panama, the Philippines, and Hawaii. He says, "I think they have 
had plenty of notification." And the matter dropped. 

So much for Colonel Sadtler. 

Captain, you have talked, as I understand it, to Captain SafFord 
on a great many occasioiis. Do you know of any feeling between 
Captain Safford and Redman of the Navy? Was it Admiral Red- 
man or Captain Redman ( 

Captain Kramer. It was Captain Redman in 1941 and in 1942. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, now, Captain Safford has talked about orders 
from Redman in the week of December 14 and 15. He has spoken 
of Redman wanting publicity in connection with the trial in Chicago, 
with apparently some feeling as to Chicago, about his loving publicity. 
Do you know of any feeling between those two men or any reason for 
any ill feeling between them? 

[IO6O0] Captain Kramer. Well, sir, in answer to that question I 
attended some conferences in late January of 1942 and in early Febru- 
ary 1942 aimed at splitting up the three primary functions of the 
Communications Security Group, then under Captain Safford, into 
three subsections. Captain Safford was in charge of Section 20-G, 
known as the Communications Security Group. 

One of its primary functions was the development, the preparation, 
and the dissemination of all United States Navy codes and ciphers. 
That function occupied a large part of the time of Captain Safford 
from my general understanding at that time because of the rapid 
expansion of the Navy at that time, particularly in view of the way 
developments were taking place in Europe. Among the things being 
developed were new U. S. Nav}^ machines, cipher machines. 

There were many conferences that I became aware of between Cap- 
tain Safford and various manufacturers who were contracted to make 
parts of these machines. Without digressing into that function of 
Captain Saff'orcl's office any more, there was another function which 
was carried on on only a minor scale, namely, the policing function 
on our own use of Navy systems. It was a function that I first became 
aware of in 1935, when I went to sea after returning from Japan, 
although it had been carried on for years before that. It, among 
other things, required that every ship originating a code or cipher- 
[10606~\ ing a message had to send a copy of that message to the 
flagship of the fleet for checking as to violations of security measures. 

As part of the function and competition in vogue in those clays 
certain demerits were assigned in the Communications competition for 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3963 

such violations. That function, that manner of activity, was still 
going on and was intensified — in 1941 and was intensified after the 
war between Japan and the United States broke out. That was 
another reason, I believe from these conferences, we had for splitting 
up Captain SafFord's three functions. 

A third reason was a desire on the part of the director to further 
intensify our efforts in the cryptanalytical field. Apparently the 
Director of Naval Communications felt that in view of the contem- 
plated intensified efforts in these three functions the job now became 
too big for one individual, regardless of how remarkable his talents 
might be, to handle. Therefore, these conferences aimed a splitting 
up these functions into three subsections. 

During the course of these conferences Captain Safford presented 
some papers giving his views on how to split up, on how the split-up 
should take place, and what officers should be in charge of the respec- 
tive contemplated three subsections. He suggested himself to head 
the Communication Intelligence {106C77^ subsection engaged 
in cryptanalysis. 

After these several conferences the final conclusion, whether by 
Captain Redman or by higher officers in naval operations, I do not 
know ; in any case the decision was to put a Commander John Redman 
and a Commander Wenger in charge of that cryptanalytical section, 
to leave with Captain Safford as his primary function full charge of 
the continued development of our own naval codes and ciphers, which 
function I believe he continued to exercise at least during the early 
part of the war. 

Mr, Murphy. In other words, the recommendation of Captain 
Safford as to his particular assignment was not given to Captain 
Safford as requested or recommended, but given to Commander Red- 
mond ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. The son of Captain Redman ? 

Captain Kramer. The younger brother of Captain Redman. 

Mr. Murphy. A younger brother? 

Captain Kramer. Who had had long communications experience. 

Mr. Murphy. Did he ever express any particular peeve to you over 
that? 

Captain Kramer. I do not recall any particular expression along 
that line before my return from the Pacific last year \^10608'] 
There may have been ; certainly there was during the course of these 
conferences an expression of his desire to head that section. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, he did say in his letter to you in the Pacific 
that both Redmans, both brothers, the Admiral and the Commander, 
both loved publicity, didn't he, that they were after publicity in 
Chicago ? 

Captain Kramer. He said that, yes sir. 

Mr. Murphy. But did he ever use any stronger words or other 
words to indicate any feeling as to the Redmans, either one of them? 

Captain Kramer. No conversations along that line stand out in my 
mind although there may have been before my departure from Wasli- 
ington for the Pacific. 

Mr. Murphy. Do you know if he had any grievances against — 
well, I withdraw that. 



3964 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Who would be responsible for making that decision that he did not 
get the assignment that he desired ? In the last analysis who would 
make the final decision? Would that be Admiral Stark? 

Captain Kramer. Normally such allocations as to duty in the Di- 
vision of Naval Operations is made by the Director of that Division. 
I believe it is customary on occasion, however, to confer with the As- 
sistant Chief of Naval Opera- [10609'] tions on those issues, on 
those assignments. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, would Admiral Stark's office have the right 
to say "Yes" or "No" as to that ? 

Captain Kramer. They most certainly would, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Did he ever express any feeling to you about Admiral 
Stark subsequent to his failure to get that assignment ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir ; he did not. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, did you have any information as to his — he 
said that for a long time he had a certain attitude toward what hap- 
pened at Pearl Harbor and then he made a change. Did he ever tell 
you why he made the change ? 

Captain Kramer. The first indication I had of what I might term 
bitterness on the part of Captain Safford toward any other officers 
in the Navy Department was Captain Safford's second letter to me. 

Mr. MuRPPiY. That was the one I read in detail on the record? 

Captain Kramer. Dated, I believe, January 22, 1944. 

Mr. Murphy. Right. Now, then, you went to the hospital at 
Bethesda on the 28th of September 1945, did you not ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And you had a visit from Captain Safford on October 
the 3rd, that is right, isn't it? 

Captain Kramer. Approximately that date, yes, sir. 

[10610] Mr. Murphy. What was the purpose of that visit? 

Captain Kramer. Quite frankly, Mr. Murphy, I was somewhat sur- 
prised at that visit. My relations with Captain Safford have been, I 
believe, cordial; I believe they still are. They have never been inti- 
mate to the extent of myself or my wife making social calls on Captain 
Safford and his wife. It was purely office and official contacts. That 
is part of the reason at my surprise at his visit to me at the hospital. 
It was not too surprising, however, inasmuch as he was a long-time 
acquaintance of mine. 

We discussed a few things, not bearing on Pearl Harbor. We played 
a game of chess that evening. He brought me a box of chocolates, for 
which I thanked him, naturally. 

He called again about 3 or 4 days later and picked up a book which 
he had left with me, a book of cartoons, on his first visit. Our conver- 
sations then were of the same character. We may have played a game 
of chess then, too. He was one of probably six or eight visitors I had 
during that first few weeks there. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate did you ever discuss Pearl Harbor 
with him while you were at the hospital ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir ; we did not because all our contact was in 
the company of other patients in the hospital. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, I notice here a headline in a New York 
[10611] paper, "Key Pearl Harbor Witness Vanishes." 

Captain Kramer. I was made aware of that headline, yes, sir. 



• PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3965 

Mr. Murphy. Now, can you tell us where you were on that particular 
day ? This is a headline of the New York Journal-American of Fri- 
day, November the 9th, 1945. Wliere were you that day ? Or at least 
it had reference to your vanishing. Did you leave the hospital ? 

Captain Kramer. The day before, Mr. Murphy, my wife arrived in 
Washington from Florida. After one or two discussions with my 
doctors, and I believe on my request, I was permitted to what is termed 
"subsist" out of the hospital. 

My wife contacted that afternoon the Red Cross in the hospital 
about locating a room near the hospital. We got such a room and 
stayed there that night. The following day, since it was several days 
before I had any appointment for further treatments, my wife and I 
went to Washington shopping, I got permission from the doctor 
before I left the hospital. 

I learned on returning to the hospital the following morning from 
the nurse that on the previous afternoon there had been another visitor 
trying to see me. The visitor was described to me as a woman. From 
the description I could not determine who it might have been. It was 
that morning about 9 : 15 in the company of my wife at the hospital 
that I was preparing [10612] to leave the hospital again, 
having gotten the doctor's permission to do so, to go into town, when 
the medical officer in charge. Dr. Duncan, informed me that he had a 
phone call just then from the Navy Department to the effect that a Mr. 
Gearhart and Mr. Keefe were on their way out there to interview me. 
It was not until Mr. Keefe, I believe, explained to me that it was his 
secretary or someone from his office that had come out the day before 
that I first had any clue as to who my previous day's visitor was. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, there have been statements in the press — and 
I am reading now from the New York Times of November the 12th, 
the byline of C. P. Trussel, a very able and distinguished writer for 
that great paper — there is a statement there that — 

Navy Captain issues a denial that he had been beset and beleagured ; asserted 
tliat he was feeling very well and would appear before the committee prepared to 
state fully "anything I know that they may want to know." 

Now, were you ever beset or beleaguered by anybody in regard to 
this case ? And, if so, I think the committee are entitled to every detail. 

Captain Kramer. At no time have I been what is termed beset and 
beleaguered, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. There is a statement further in this article that — 

Captain Kramer had been badgered and beset by an effort [10613] to 
breakdown his testimony. 

Now, do you know of anybody and if you do I think we ought to have 
the details. 

Captain Kramer. That statement, sir, is false. 

Senator Lucas. Did Trussel make those statements? 

Mr, Murphy. No; Mr. Trussel is not making them himself but quot- 
ing a very distinguished gentleman, not the writer. 

Mr. Gearhart. Name him. Don't hold it back. 

Mr. Murphy, Now, then, I come to the Washington Times-Herald, 
the United Press. 

Senator Lucas. What is the date of that ? 

Mr. Murphy. I don't know the date of this but it is current or about 
the same time as the New York Times. This is the Washington Times- 



3966 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Herald and the only reason I think is pertinent to go into these matters 
is that the composite mind of America is influenced by everything they 
hear on this case and I think we ought to go into the whole story. I see 
here a statement: 

I stand exactly on my statement that Kramer is being badgered and beset. 
Here is tlie most important witness in the investigation. He entered the Naval 
Hospital under orders. They took away his uniform, gave him pajamas, bath-robe 
a'nd slippers. His meals were served in a ward from September 28 to the 
morning of [IO6I4] November 7. I know that Kramer is chafing under 
this restraint. 

Were you chafing under any restraint at the hospital ? 

Captain Kramer. I was getting restless in the hospital because that 
was the longest hospitalization I had ever had. My previous hospital- 
izations in the Navy had never been of more than a few days duration. 

In that respect I might refer back to about 15 years ago when I was 
operated on for tonsilectomy in the Navy Hospital in Boston. The 
normal period in such operations, I was informed, was to keep the 
patient in the hospital not less than a week. After 3 days following my 
operation I walked out of the hospital and returned to my ship. I again 
was "chafing," if you want to use that term, sir. 

Mr, Murphy. Well, I am just quoting from the paper, sir. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. I now quote from the Washington Post, something by 
the Associated Press, that you were being — quoting a distinguished 
gentleman — that you were being badgered to — 

change his original testimony, meaning he was being badgered to change his 
original testimony. 

Had anybody asked you to change your original testimony? 

Captain Kramer. At no time during my hospitalization at Bethesda 
Naval Hospital has anything in connection with decryption or testi- 
mony been brought up in any conversation in which I engaged. 

Mr. Murphy. There is also a statement in this same piece from the 
Washington Post by the Associated Press, not that of the Associated 
Press writer, but that of a distinguished gentleman, that the Navy was 
holding you incommunicado. 

Captain Kra3her. That statement is incorrect, sir. 

I have previously indicated that I had a number of visitors, and I 
made some phone calls as well. 

Mr. ISIuRPHY. I am referring now to another story from another 
issue of the Washington Times Herald, an article by an able writer, 
Ted Lewis, in which he quotes another distinguished gentleman, other 
than the one who had made the previous statement, to the effect that 
there was a missing winds message of December 6, 1941, which pur- 
portedly showed that the Japs were committed to immediate attack. 

You do not know anything about any message of December 6, do 
you? 

Captain Kramer. I do not, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. I now quote from the Scranton Times of Scranton, 
Pa., United Press dispatch of November 7: 

The Navy today denied Republican charges that a potential witness in the Pearl 
Harbor inquiry had been "broken in mind and body" and was being held in- 
communicado [10616] in a hospital psychopathic ward. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3967 

Were you broken in mind or body? 

Captain Kramer. I do not believe so, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. You were in this room for several days were you not ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And under questioning by members of this committee 
yesterday morning and yesterday afternoon, this morning and this 
afternoon ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, when you were at the hospital, you were inter- 
viewed, were you? 

Captain Kramer. By Mr. Keefe and Mr. Gearhart, yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you tell them what you know about this inquiry, 
and what facts you knew? 

Captain Kramer. Our discussions lasted approximately 41/2 hours, 
interrupted in the early part of those discussions by some members of 
the press. I believe we covered most of my story that I had given in 
previous hearings and have given in this hearing in those conversa- 
tions. 

Mr. Murphy. Do vou feel you told them the truth at that time? 

[10617] Captain Kramer. I did, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Is what you are telling today and told yesterday under 
oath different in any respect from what you told them at that time? 

Captain Kramer. In no respect whatsoever, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. My reason for going into this is, if there is one single 
individual who has approached you in any way, low or high, no matter 
who he is, in any way to attempt to influence your testimony, I think 
in fairness to j^ourself , and the members of this committee, we ought 
to know about it. 

Was there ever any such person? 

Captain Kramer. There was never any such person, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now. sir ; I would like to review with you your testi- 
mony before the Hewitt inquiry. You stated at page V28 : 

The evaluation was normally done by Commander McCollum, the head of the 
Far Eastern Section, or Admiral Wilkinson, but I gave them the benefit of my 
opinion about it too. 

Is that so ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. You stated on page 129, that you had seen those two 
dispatches set forth on pages 154 and 155 of Exhibit 1. That would be 
Circular 2353 and Circular [10618] 2354, would it not? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Then you were asked if you had seen the dispatch 
marked "exhibit No. 3" from Alusna, Batavia, and you said : 

I do not recall having seen that. 

Which one was that? Would that be the one sent to the Pacific, or 
would that be the so-called Foote dispatch ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir ; it would be the dispatch from the United 
States Naval Liaison Officer stationed in Batavia. 

Mr. Murphy. And distinct from either 2353, 2354, and the so-called 
dispatch that we received by way of Admiral Hart ? 

Captain Kramer. That is right, sir. 



3968 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr, Murphy. At page 130, you stated : 

We were very interested in seeing any of this traffic after the thing was set up, 
which was about the end of November, but traffic did not appear in this system 
until the 7th of December and the latter part of of December, 1941. 

I take it at that time you were talking about the hidden word 
dispatches. 

Captain Kramer. Mr. Murphy, until I was shown a photostat of the 
hidden word message during Admiral Hewitt's hearing, I was still 
under the impression that the dispatch received [10619] Sun- 
day morning was a winds message. 

Mr. Murphy. Is it not a fact that from December 7, 1941, down to 
the time you testified before Admiral Hewitt, you thought the Decem- 
ber 7 dispatch was an execute of the winds code ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir ; that is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, I take you to the bottom of page 130: 

Captain Kramer. That is correct. That refreshes my memory now. I remem- 
ber now that you remind me of it, that these reams of plain language traffic that 
we were getting in, several weeks weeks before Pearl Harbor, were searched for 
that indicator. That, however, I didn't recall specifically, because I didn't do 
the searching. It was done by the GY watch officers. 

Admiral Hewitt. I believe that about the middle of the first week of December, 
there was a teletype message which, to the best of your recollection, one of the 
watch officers had in his possession and which was subsequently delivered to 
Admiral Noyes. Will you tell me about that to the best of your recollection? 

Captain Kbamer. I previously testified on that matter at Pearl Harbor, 
Admiral. I would like to go over that previous testimony again in the light 
of thinking it over since [10620] that time. 

I had no recollection of that message at the time it was first mentioned to 
me in the spring of 1944. However, after being given some of the details of 
the circumstances surrounding it, I did recall a message some days before 
7 December 1941, I believe about the middle of the week 1-7 December, and 
I do recall definitely being shown such a message by the GY watch officer and 
walking down with him to Captain Safford's office, and being present while 
the GY watch officer turned it over to him. 

A brief conversation ensued, and Captain Safford then took it, I assumed, 
to Admiral Noyes, since that message we had all been on the qui vive about for 
a week or ten days. 

That is the last I saw of such a message. 

Admiral Hewitt. Can you recall what the general subject of the message was? 

Now this is important. You speak up above about the one on 
December 7 and here, as I understand it, you are describing the one 
you saw with Safford. 

Admiral Hewitt. Can you recall what the general subject of the message was? 

Captain Kramee. It was, as I recall it, a "winds" code message. The word- 
ing of it I do not recall. It may have been, "Higashi no kaze ame", specifically 
referring to the United States, as I have previously testified at Pearl Harbor, 
but I am less positive of that now than I believe I was at that time. The 
reason for revision in my view on that is the fact that in thinking it over, 
I have a rather sharp recollection in the latter part of that week of feeling 
there was still no overt mention or specific mention of the United States in 
any of this traffic, which I was seeing all of and which also was the only 
source iu general of my information since I did not see. as a rule, the dispatches 
from the Fleet Commanders or going out to them from Operations. 

Is your memory more clear now than it was then on that subject, 
or do you still feel the same v/ay ? 

Captain Kramer. I still feel the same way regarding the precise 
wording of that piece of teletype. I, however, [lOS^B] am 
thorouglily convinced from my study of the papers in the last few 
days, in the last few weeks, that the United States did not appear 
on that thing. That is my current conviction. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3969 

At the time I was testifying in previous hearings I had not thought 
particularly about this. In fact, the first time that there was occasion 
to think about it at all was in preparing my reply to Captain Safford's 
first letter, in which there is no mention or reference to what country 
was involved. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, Admiral Hewitt then said to you : 

Then it is still your belief, the best you can recall in view of that, there was no 
indication 

Captain Kramer. I would like to continue that statement. Admiral, by saying : 
For that reason I am now at least under the impression that the message referred 
to England and possibly the Dutch rather than the United States, although it 
may have referred to the United States, too. 

Captain Kramer. That is simply because I was unpositive, and still 
am unpositive, of the precise wording. 
Mr. Murphy. Then Admiral Hewitt says : 

Or possibly it may have referred to Russia? 
Captain Keamek. I just don't recall. 

Now Admiral Hewitt said : 

[10623] Reference to one or more of the messages supplied by the FCC 
is in Exhibit 65. Can you recall whether any of those may have been seen by 
you? 

Is it your recollection that you did or did not see any of those? 
Captain Kramer. I believe I saw some of those ; yes, sir. 
Mr. Murphy. You said then : 

Captain Kramer. This document 1 is not a message and document 4 is the one 
of the Sth of December about midnight GMT. I may have seen these specific 
messages. I cannot be certain, however, because we saw a great many messages 
of this kind in looking for this particular type of "winds" code message. 
When we started monitoring all Japanese plain language some weeks before 
Pearl Harbor, the volume of material coming in was simply tremendous, 
swamping. We had only three linguists at the time for translation purjwses, 
with a pretty heavy volume of coded traffic concerning the negotiations. Con- 
sequently, we felt the extra burden of having to scan all this Japanese plain 
language stuff and there were many instances of weather occurring in that, 
but because of the fact that the particular code thing we were looking for, we 
felt it was incumbent on us to examine it all. The reason I cannot state 
specifically that these particular ones were ones I had seen, but they were of the 
[10624] same nature as many I did see. 

Then at the bottom of the page Admiral Hewitt said : 

My understanding is that when that was first decoded, the word "minami," 
which related to the United States, was overlooked, so that the translation merely 
referred to England. Is that your recollection? 

Captain Keameb. Last summer when that question of the late morning of 
7 December had come up at Pearl Harbor, my recollection had been that it was a 
"winds" message. It wasn't until I saw these exhibits yesterday afternoon — 

and that would be sometime between May and July of 1945, would it 
not? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Your testimony was on Tuesday, May 22, 1945, so I 
take it that you saw the message on May 21, the day before. 

Captain Kramer. I believe that is correct, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. You said : 

It wasn't until I saw these exhibits yesterday afternoon that my recollection 
was refreshed to the extent that I thought it was one of these hidden word mes- 
sages rather than the "winds." I do recall on that that after my return from the 



3970 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

State Department near 10: 30 the morning of 7 December, we had just had trans- 
lated a message specifying the time of delivery of the 14-part [10625] note 
from the Japanese Government to the United States. That item, together with 
several other minor messages, one thanking the Ambassador for his services 
and another to the Embassy Staff and another directing final destruction of codes, 
all added up in my mind to a crisis to take place at 1 o'clock. Consequently, I 
was in very much of a hurry to get the word out. The books were made up in the 
course of a couple of minutes and as I was leaving the office, I looked at another 
short plain language message that had just come in, had just been brought in, 
and I recognized, as I recall it now, the first word in there as being a code word 
in this plain language text. 

Now at that point, do we have here, or is it available, the plain lan- 
guage text of the Japanese message before translation ? 

Captain Kramer. Here it is [indicating]. 

Mr. Murphy. Now will you look at that just a minute please? The 
first word was "Koyanagi," was it not ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And if you will look at page 186 of Exhibit 1, "Koya- 
nagi" was England, wasn't it? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Then there are several other words, "rijivori seirino- 
tugoo, arunituki," and then "hattori," and \_10626'\ "hattori" 
meant "relations between Japan and (blank country) are not in accord- 
ance with expectation," is that not right? 

Captain Kramer. That is precisely what it means, sir. If the 
committee is interested they, of course, may call a Japanese expert 
other than presumably myself, and refer to a dictionary which I have 
in front of me. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, the way it was set up for the Navy on 
page 187 was precisely "relations between Japan and (blank country) 
are not in accordance with expectation," is that not so ? 

Captain Kramer. That is precisely an exact translation, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, after "hattori," which was the general 
part, the next word is "minami," which means the U. S. A., is that 
right? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, at that time you said you dictated a trans- 
lation of this particular message. Is that true ? 

Captain Kramer. That is true, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And then you apparently, in your hurry, left with 
the translation as you thought it was at the time, having overlooked 
"minami" or the U. S. A. word. 

Captain Kramer. I did not overlook it exactly. I \^10627^ 
overlooked it to the extent of not identifying it as a code word. The 
plain text message, which this is, should be translated : 

Please have director Koyanagi send a wire stating the sum which has been 
decided to be spent on the hattori minami memorial library in order that this 
business may be wound up — 

and then the code indicated a stop. 

Now in translating this message — the word "minami" I might ex- 
plain is a very common word in the Japanese language. It simply 
means "south". In a hasty scanning of this message, without refer- 
ring to the Japanese code list on this hidden word set-up, that mes- 
sage could be translated in the same way I have just read, except 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3971 

that it could also mean, if it was not immediately apparent that 
"minami" was a code word: 

Please have director Koyanagi send a wire stating the sum whicli has been 
decided to be spent on the hattori southern memorial library in order that 
this business may be wound up. 

It was for that reason, the fact that that word "minami" fitted 
very well into a normal translation, did not stand out at the moment 
as a code word, that it was overlooked. The words "Koyanagi" and 
"hattori" are proper names in the Japanese language, which can 
readily immediately be distinguished from any ordinary Japanese 
word. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate, upon examination of [106^8'] 
part 4 of the hidden word code set-up on page 187 you found that 
"minami" was a code word meaning "U. S. A."? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, you did add in pencil on that particular 
paper that correction, did you not? 

Captain Kramer. On one copy of that particular write-up, yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And that copy, did it have any more than just the 
word "minami," or did it have some of your writings ? 

Captain Kramer. Just an insertion with the word "United States", 
and it was done with a view to sending around a corrected transla- 
tion, which was not at all an infrequent occurrence, on the next 
dissemination of this material. 

Mr. Murphy. I was wondering if Captain Safford saw that mes- 
sage with your handwriting in it "United States." 

Captain Kramer. I doubt if he did, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. I think you will find from the evidence that he 
did, or at least he examined it later. 

Captain Kj{amer. Normally the copies of this traffic 

Mr. Murphy (interposing). I do not mean on December 7, but 
at a subsequent time he saw the message. 

Captain Kramer. That is what I am referring to. [Continuing :] — 
were destroyed, except the numerical file copy for reference, and 
occasionally one, and at one [10639] time during 1941, two 
other copies which we retained for cross-references by subjects. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, when you translated this message which 
would then say that relations between Japan and England are not 
in accordance with expectations on the 7th of December, you imme- 
diately put that into the pouch and took that to the addressees, did 
you not, the receivers of the pouch ? 

Captain Kramer. That first version; yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Then subsequently you made a phone call saying there 
would be a correction adding the translation of the word "minami"? 

Captain Kramer. My memory on that point is not very clear. That, 
too, was not an unusual thing to do. I made frequent phone calls, 
and in fact every time I started delivery prior to leaving the office 
I made a number of phone calls to locate recipients. There were a 
number of times that I specifically recall during 1941 when I made 
calls indicating corrections, whether major or minor. 

My recollection on this thing is that when I first noted it I did make 
two or three phone calls indicating that the United States should 
be included in that. 



3972 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, the force and effect of it had been con- 
siderably lessened by the delivery of the 1 o'clock message to the re- 
cipients of the poucii before you [10630] had discovered that 
"minami" was a code word ? 

Captain Kramer. I believe that was my impression at the time, 
sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now what puzzles me is, that here is a message that 
is a hidden word message on the 7th, and it immediately comes to you 
and it immediately is distributed to all of the receivers of the pouches, 
and I am wondering why the difference was made between that one 
of the 7th and why there was this treatment of this other one of the 
5th which would go direct to Noyes. 

Captain Kramer. Wlien this so-called hidden word system was set 
up, the first knowledge of which we had, I believe, in early December, 
it was so involved by comparison with the winds system, which was 
extremely simple in nature and character, there were so many code 
words involved, that no special provision was made to handle it. It 
would have required, in view of the complicated character of this by 
comparison with the winds thing, processing like our other coded 
traffic. 

Mr. Murphy. Is it not a fact. Captain, that the cards that were 
distributed to Noyes and the others had the code words from the 
messages of 2353 and 2354? 

Captain Kramer. That is precisely correct, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Thev did not, however, have the code words 
[10631] _ of 

Captain Kramer (interposing). They had the translations of those 
code words. 

Mr. Murphy. The translations. They did not have the word 
"minami," which meant "U. S. A." or the word "kodama", which meant 
"Japan", or the word "Ko3^anagi", which meant England, or the word 
"hattori", which meant "relations between Japan and (blank country) 
are not in accordance with expectation" ? 

Captain Kramer. Absolutely not, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. So then, if they got a message which purported to be 
an intercept and it was under the hidden word code, and they were to 
make any comparisons at all they would not know whether it was a 
real execute under that code because they did not have that translated ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not see how they could possibly have gotten 
anything under this hidden word system in other than the pouch 
I delivered to recipients. 

Mr. Murphy. I do not know that they did. I am just talking about 
Noyes. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now the message that was delivered to Noyes, is it 
your recollection that the Japanese words as such were delivered to him 
or an English translation of the words? 

[10632] Captain Kramer. My recollection and understanding 
is that the piece of teletype which I saw was taken by Captain Safford 
to Admiral Noyes' office. 

Mr. Murphy. Do you recall my reading from Sadtler's testi- 
mony, that he wanted to know what word was used ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3973 

Mr. Murphy. And I take it from that that he apparently had cer- 
tain Jap words such as "kita" and the other words from the winds 
code. Do vou know whether they were furnished the Japanese or 
English? 

Captain Kramer. I do not know, sir, what Admiral Noyes phoned 
to him. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, so far as your testimony goes, you state 
that it is your best recollection that you did not see a message, which 
was a winds intercept, referring to the United States? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir ; I never did. 

Mr. Murphy. And are you able to state "yes" or "no" to the question 
as to whether or not, on December 4, 5 — let me change that — on De- 
cember 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 you delivered any message in any pouch 
which would be a winds intercept to the White House and the other 
recipients showing a break in relations, negotiations, either one of 
those two, between Japan and the United States? 

[10633] Captain Kramer. I can categorically state, sir, that no 
message in the winds system was delivered in any pouch which I 
brought to the recipients of this material. 

Mr. Murphy. Now. let me ask you just one final question. 

If you will refer. Captain, to Exhibit 1, at page 226 — do you have 
a copy of Exhibit 1 ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. There is a message from Tokyo to (Circular) 3 
December 1941, "Please keep the code list (INGO HIKAE ) "—which 
means "hidden words," and "INGO DENPO," which means "hidden 
words," too, doesn't it ? 

Captain Kramer. "DENPO" means "telegram." 

Mr. Murphy. That is important, for this reason, that in setting 
up the hidden word code on page 186 of Exhibit 1 they refer to "INGO 
DENPO" as "hidden word" and that would be the hidden telegram, 
is that it ? 

Captain Kramer. "IN" means "hidden," "GO' means "word," and 
"DENPO" means "telegram." 

Mr. Murphy. Now, on page 226 they speak of "INGO HIKAE." 
Would that mean one would be by telegram and the other would be by 
voice ? 

Captain Kramer. There is no distinction of that kind that I am 
aware of. sir. I am uncertain offliand as to the reason for the dis- 
crepancy between those two. "HIKAE" might [10634] be an 
inaccurate recovery of the code group applying to that, and this cir- 
cular may have been sent in a quite different system from the earlier 
one. 

Mr. Murphy. Now these two messages then on page 226 : 

Please keep the cofle list (INGO HIKAE) (including those in connection with 
broadcasts) until the last moment — 

and then the next one from Tokyo to Vancouver : 

Please retain the "hidden meaning" codes and the codes to be used in con- 
junction with radio broadcasts until the last moment — 

would that indicate to you the possibility, and the ability of Tokyo 
to broadcast to London by the PA-K2 code any message they wanted 
to about relations between the two countries not being in accordance 
with expectations ? 



3974 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer, These two dispatches do not refer to the so-called 
PA-K2. That was still another system which the Japanese referred 
to, I believe, by the name "O" or "Oite". 

Mr. Murphy. Will you get the original, Mr. Masten, and have it 
here ? 

You think it is "O", is that right? You think it would be the code 
"O", or "Oite"? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. In that connection, if it is "Oite" I woulld like to 
refer you to page 216, a dispatch from Bern [lO^dSd] to 

Ankara. In that case it says : 

Orders have been issued to our diplomatic officials in North America (includ- 
ing Manila), Canada, Panama, Cuba, the South Seas (including Timor), Singora, 
Chienmai, and to all our officials in British (including our Embassy in London) 
and Netherlands territory to inform me immediat«.\y upon the burning of all 
their telegraphic codes except one copy of Oite "L." 

So if it is "Oite" they could still get the broadcast about the break 
in relations, could they not, on the code referred to on page 226 ? 

Captain Kramer. There are three codes involved, Mr. Murphy: 
The Oite, the L, which we knew as LA, and the hidden word code, 
which had been set up only a few days previously. 

Mr. Murphy. Right. Well, do you know of any reason why, on 
December 3, 4, and 5, Tokyo coidd not broadcast to England, as well 
as to all other places, a message to the effect, by international Morse 
or by what you call Kani Morse, or by any other system of communica- 
tion generally used, the fact that relations were in danger? 

Captain Kramer. I do not have any first-hand knowledge of what 
systems were actually held or burned by the Japanese Embassy in 
London. From this dispatch which you have read on page 216, how- 
ever, it is apparent to me that Japan [10,636'] could have sent 
via either of these code systems or via the hidden words system indi- 
cations of any disruption in relations to England. 

Mr. Murphy. The fact is that on the 7th of December Japan did 
send such a message, did it not, referring to England? I refer you 
now to page 251, from Tokyo to (Circular Telegram), 7 December 
1941: 

(plain Japanese language using code names) Circular #2494, Relations between 
Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation. 

Captain Kramer. That was a circular telegram which could very 
well have included England ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. You mean as a recipient ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir ; as a recipient. 

Mr. Murphy. But it did refer to relations between Japan and Eng- 
land on the 7th of December ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. I have no other questions. 

The Chairman. Senator Brewster being absent, Congressman 
Gearhart is recognized. 

Mr. Gearhart. Captain, there are certain respects in which your 
testimony coincides completely with that of Captain Safford, is that 
not correct? 

Captain Kramer. I believe that is the case, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF J-QINT COMMITTEE 3975 

Mr. Gearhart. Captain Safford testified that on the 4th [10637] 
of December 1941 you appeared before him at his office with a yellow 
teletype paper in your hands and said to him "This is it." To that 
extent your testimony is in agreement, is it not? 

Captain Kramer. Except for the date in my present conviction on 
the matter ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Wliat is your present conviction ? 

Captain Kramer. That incident occurred on the morning of 5 
December. 

Mr. Gearhart. Not the 4th ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. I explained, I believe, yesterday after- 
noon the reason for the confirmation of my conviction on that is that 
was an examination of our directives to our outposts in the western 
Pacific and Asia on destruction of codes. That showed the dis- 
patches were drafted, as indicated by the date time group on the dis- 
patch on the afternoon of 4 December. I specifically have had my 
memory refreshed by these things on that point, because I do have 
a definite recollection of the fact that those dispatches were drafted, 
the first two, I think, by Admiral Noyes in his office in my presence 
while he was examining a folder which included the directive from 
Japan to the Western Hemisphere to burn and destroy certain sys- 
tems. 

There was nothings "winds" whatsoever connected therewith. 

[10638'] Mr. Gearhart. Is that the only reason why you think 
that the date was the 5th instead of the 4th, the fact that Admiral 
Noyes was writing these messages directly to our outlying positions 
to destroy their codes, code machines and particular papers, and you 
do not remember that contemporaneously with the preparation of 
those orders there had been any discussion of a winds message, is 
that it? 

Captain Kramer. Until I saw those dispatches quite recently and 
read parts of the so-called Navy Narrative prepared by Lieutenant 
Commander Baecher, in which there is quoted some of the Army 
testimony bearing on this point of the date, I was still uncertain as 
to the precise date that this incident occurred. 

Mr. Gearhart. But you did not indicate in any of your previous 
testimony that there was any uncertainty in your mind until you 
came here to testify? 

Captain Kramer. I invariably indicated that there was uncertainty 
as regarding the date that incident occurred. My mind was only re- 
freshed on that point when I saw this series of our directives, and — 

Mr. Gearhart (interposing). Then the only basis 

The Chairman. Let the witness finish his answer, please. 

Mr. Gearhart. Is there anything further you wanted to say, Cap- 
tain? 

[10639] Captain Kramer. I do not think it is material. I have 
given what I was about to say already, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now is the only basis for your saying that it was the 
5th, instead of the 4th, that you remember distinctly the sending out 
of the code destruction method, and you remember distinctly that 
preceding that there was no discussion of a winds message, is that it? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is the only basis for it ? 



3976 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. That is the only basis. That was testimony taken 
from the Army inquiries that fixed positively the date in my mind; 
yes, sir. 

Mr. Geaehart. Then you want us to understand that your memory 
5 years later is better than it was shortly after the event, is that cor- 
rect? 

Captain Kramer. I do not want to create that impression, sir, I 
never have created, or intended to create, that impression. 

Mr. Gearhart. Your attention has been called to the fact that a 
certain message was sent out by direction of Admiral Noyes to destroy 
codes, which had been prepared by Captain Safford. 

Captain Kramer. They were prepared in final form, I believe, by 
Captain Safford ; yes, sir. 

[IO64O] Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Now for the first time you re- 
member that those messages were sent out at a date different from the 
date upon which there was discussion of the winds message? 

Captain Kramer. I recall no discussion of any winds message, sir, 
except the few words exchanged with Captain Safford and the GY 
watch officer, and a few remarks I may have made on the date the 
winds message was received in the process of disseminating the folders 
of other decrypted traflSc. 

Mr. Gearhart. And now, after 5 years, you are positive that those 
two subjects were on different days. Now will you tell me why it was 
on the 5th that the winds message was discussed rather than on the 
4th? 

Captain Kramer. I have never been positive of the date, sir. I 
stated 

Mr. Gearhart (interposing). Well, you mean- 



The Chairman. Let the witness finish his answer. 

Mr. Gearhart. Go ahead. 

Captain Kramer. I stated that my memory was refreshed only in 
the last few days as to the date, and that is my current conviction, 
sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. And are you positive today ? 

Captain Kramer. I am positive only to the extent that these things 
I have mentioned refresh my memory, sir. 

[IO64I] Mr. Gearhart. Well, there is nothing to refresh your 
memory in respect to the date when the winds message was received. 
There is no record you have been able to look at. You simply say it 
was the 5th because it was not the 4th, is that it ? 

Captain Kramer. That is not quite it, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. All right, name one paper that refreshes your mem- 
ory in respect to the discussion of the winds message. Upon what do 
you base your conviction of today ? 

Captain Kramer. On the relative times of occurrence of this in- 
cident in Admiral Noyes' office when he drafted these dispatches and 
I received this piece of teletype paper containing the words which 
might have been the winds message. 

Mr. Gearhart. All right. I know that you have the evidence of 
the messages that were sent forth to destroy the codes and code ma- 
chines and secret papers, 3'ou have refreshed your memory on that 
occurrence, but tell me from what record do you refresh your memory 
in respect of the day when the winds code message was received. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3977 

Captain I^amer. On the basis of no record whatsoever, sir. 
Mr. Geakhart. Then you want us to understand that that is purely 
memory bestirred after five years of discussion to the contrary, is that 

correct ? 

Captain Kramer. My first recollection of this incident [1061^2^ 
in Admiral Noyes' office was only after I saw those four dispatches 
which we sent out directing our destruction of codes. At that time my 
memory was refreshed to that extent. 

I might remark in that regard, sir, that my memory has been re- 
freshed on a number of otliei^details connected with this hearing— — 

Mr. Gearhart. (interposing). I am only asking about one thing 
now. 

The Chairman. Let the witness finish his answer. 

Captain Kramer (continuing). Concerning events taking place 
about the time of Pearl Harbor. , • i ^ u • 

Mr. Gearhart. Has anybodv pointed out to you that it might be m 
corroboration of Captain Safford's testimony that when they re- 
ceived the winds code they immediately prepared the code destruction 
notices and that, therefore, you better put it on a subsequent day? 

Captain Kramer. Will you repeat that question ? 

Mr. Gearhart. Has anybody suggested that to you recently? 

The Chairman. What was that question? 

Mr. Gearhart. Read it, Mr. Reporter. 

(The question was read by the reporter.) 

Captain Kramer. Mr. Gearhart, no one has pointed out anything to 
me at any time concerning the matter you just [106^3'] men- 
tioned. My current conviction, based on refreshing due to examina- 
tion of these dispatches, was my own personal conviction, not due to 
pointing out or discussions with anyone, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now the winds message was being watched for, 
wasn't it ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Everybody having to do with the interception ot 
the messages was on his toes, very alert, looking for the winds mess- 



age 



Captain Kramer. I believe that was the case, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. And you received a message which related to the 
possibility that it was a whids message that came on the teletype paper 
and vou went in and said to Captain Safford, "This is it"? 

Captain Kramer. It was far more than a possibility m my mmd, 
sir. The fact is it was a conviction in my mind at that time, that the 
words appearing on that piece of teletype paper coincided precisely 
with what was called for by this winds system. That could very well 
be, since it was very simple Japanese language, which might well be 
used in any normal weather broadcast. 

[lOSJfJi] Mr. Gearhart. When you were on your toes, alert, look- 
ing for this message, and were at the time convinced that it was the 
message, convinced at the time that it contained the words directly 
pointing to the United States, how do you explain the fact after 5 
years your conviction today is to the contrary ? 

Captain Kramer. Mr. Gearhart, I have never been of the positive 
conviction that that piece of teletype paper referred to the United 
States. My statement as to the wording of that is hazy. It has always 

79716— 46— pt. 9 5 



3978 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

been hazy. My contact with that was only for a few seconds duration 
If it had referred to the United States, I am fairly certain that it 
would have impressed itself on my memory . „ 

Mr GE4RHART. Captain, you had been looking for this paper for a 
loni time. You had it in your own hands. You looked at it, and you 
said after reading it, "This is it." Do you mean to say that you weren t 
convinced at that moment that it was it ^ -, ^, , -, _ •. .^ .Up p^ 

Captain Kramer. I certainly was convinced that it was it t9 the ex- 
tent if being the first thing that we had seen '7^^]f ^"^^^^^'^^^^^^ 
me and by the GY watch officer was something m that hidden woi^- 
rather in that winds system. That, purely, and simply, is what I 
meant by this expression which I apparently used. I have no positive 
llCrnS] recollection of using that expression, incidentally. 

Mr. Gearhart. You have no positive recollection of having said, 

"This is it"? ^^ ^ .„ , 

Captain Kramer. I have repeatedly so testified. 

Mr. Gearhart. You have testified in this hearing that it was the 
expression vou used, haven't you? • j ^i f t t.o^o 

Captain Kramer. I have stated I may well have said that, i have 
no positive recollection of having said it. •, . u -. 

Mr Gearhart. Now, will you tell us why, when you had been wait- 
ing for this paper for a long time, when you read it and you telt it 
was a winds message, why you didn't make out any hie tor it? 

Captain Kramer. Of this approximately quarter of a mile ot plain 
lancTuage traffic that we had been receiving for a week or 10 days past, 
there is no record that I am aware of that was ever maintained on all 

that traffic. . • ^r, j: i, i 

The only record I kept in mv section, section GZ, was ot brolien- 
down messages by the decrypters, or in the case of plain language 
papers that were 'sent in to my section for translation, every one ot 
those papers were filed. . 

I am fairly certain every one of those papers will now be tound m 
the files of the Navy Department. 

Mr. Gearhart. The paper you had been waiting for, the paper you 
thought was the paper vou had been waiting for, [106J^6] the 
one you took to Captain SaHord, you made no file out for it i 

Captain Kramer. Made no file of anything, sir, except what came 
in to my section. That did not come in to my section. There were 
specific provisions made why it should not have come m to my section. 
I do not believe, sir, that any record was kept by the GY section ot any 
of that plain language traffic coining in either. 

Mr. Gearhart. Who was this watch officer that brought it to you ? 

Captain Kramer. To the best of my recollection it was a Lieutenant 
Murray, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Was he in your section? 

Captain Kramer. He was in the adjacent section, GY. 

Mr. Gearhart. The missing file 7001 is a file that might have been 
filled by paper that came in during the first week in December ; is that 
right ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. What was the last you saw of this teletype yellow 

sheet of paper ? . „ -, 

Captain Kramer. The last I saw of that piece of teletype paper was 
when I left Captain Safford's office. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3979 

Mr. Gearhart. It was then in his possession ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

[10647] Mr. Gearhart. At the time, as you have testified, you 
considered that message to be the winds execute ? 

Captain Kramer. I did, sir. 

I might amplify that remark, as I believe I have previously testi- 
fied, that that is the first occasion I know of where I left my oftice and 
accompanied a GY watch officer to Captain Safford's office. It was pri- 
marily for the purpose of confirming with Captain Safford the lan- 
guage appearing on that piece of teletype paper. 

The watch officer himself had instructions on how to handle any- 
thing coming in in that particular winds system. 

Mr. Gearhart. Why did he bring it to you ? 

Captain Kramer. He did not bring it to me, sir. As he was passing 
the door of my office, he noted that I was in and he called me to the 
door to confirm his interpretation of what appeared on that piece of 
teletype. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then you read it carefully to confirm his interpreta- 
tion, and you don't remember anything about it now? 

Captain Kramer. I do not, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart, Well, you weren't too much help to him in reading 
it, were you, then? 

Captain Kramer. T believe T was of some help at the time, sir. I 
saw that paper for only a few seconds. All [10648] these other 
things which my section handled, I saw from six or eight to two or three 
dozen times. I read and studied them carefully in order to be familiar 
with what the recipients were reading when I was present while they 
were reading. 

Mr. Gearhart. He asked you for the purpose of checking himself, 
asked you to read it with care and to see if he interpreted it correctly. 

In the days gone by, you remembered that it contained words re- 
ferring to the United States, and now you are uncertain because the 
paper was in your'hands so fleetingly ? 

Captain Kramer. In days gone by, sir, I have never definitely re- 
membered that piece of teletype as referring to the United States. 
I have never recalled, and still do not recall, the precise wording of 
that piece of teletype. 

Mr. Gearhart. And upon that you are sure and you are willing to 
say that you never testified that it did refer to the United States? 

Captain Kjramer. My first reaction when that question was first 
propounded to me during the course of Admiral Murfin's court of 
inquiry was having in mind very well the expressions involved and in 
view of the fact that we had been engaged in a serious war for 2 years 
with Japan, that, of course, it was the United States. 

[1064-9] Later on in that hearing, however, I indicated in reply 
to another question that the only thing involving the United States 
in all this decrypted traffic was the disclosure at the end of November 
to Berlin wherein they used the expression "Anglo-Saxon," which in- 
cluded the United States, presumably. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, a question has been raised as to whether or 
not there was any reason behind the winds message being sent by direc- 
tional broadcast to London 2 or 3 days before the actual breaking out 
of hostilities. 



3980 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Can you think of any reasons why the Japanese would want London 
advised in advance of the event and would take great chances possibly 
of exposing their hand to advise London ? 

Captain Kramer. I believe, sir, that it would have been an illogical 
thing to do, 

Mr. Gearhart. A what ? 

Captain KjrAmer. An illogical thing to do. 

Mr. Gearhart. You can't think of any reason why London, that is, 
the Japanese Embassy in London, would want to know in advance? 

Captain Kramer. In view, Mr. Gearhart, of the stringent security 
measures imposed by the Japanese military on all their moves con- 
nected with the outbreak of war between Japan [10650] and 
England and the United States, I very much doubt it. 

Mr. Gearhart. I direct your attention to intercept No. 1410, which 
appears on page 234 of Exhibit 1, the message from Berlin to Tokyo, 
December 4, 1941, translated December 5, 1941 : 

In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London — 

That would seem to indicate that Berlin was expecting evacuation 
and war, wouldn't it ? 

Captain Kramer. Not necessarily war, sir. We ourselves had evac- 
uated all of our language officers from Tokyo in August of 1941. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is probably another explanation, isn't it ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. War is still another possibility, isn't it? 

Captain Kramer. That would be a matter of personal deduction, if 
you wanted to stretch this thing to that meaning, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is no more of a stretch than the other, is it? 

Captain Kramer. By that token, you could stretch our evacuation 
of our language officers from Tokyo as meaning we intended to go to 
war with Japan. 

[10651] Mr. Gearhart. It says : 

evacuation by the members of our Embassy. 

That means all, doesn't it? 

Captain Kramer. I don't see that it does, sir. We evacuated mem- 
bers of our Embassy, namely, the language officers. 

Mr. Gearhart. This doesn't say anything about part of the mem- 
bers, but it says "the members." A fair interpretation of that, even 
to an Intelligence officer, is that it would mean all, wouldn't it ? 

Captain Kramer. You could put that extreme interpretation on it ; 
yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, let's go on : 

In the case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I vpould 
like to arrange to have Secretary MATSUI of that office and three others— 

And they are named in the message. 

—stay here. Please do your best to this end. 

That is from Berlin. 

Now, there is a possible direct reason, is there not, why London 
should know before the breaking out of hostilities, because after the 
breaking out of hostilities there would be no chance to evacuate any 
members of the Japanese Embassy in London, would there? 

[10652] Captain Kramer. Presumably not. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3981 

Mr. Gearhart. They would be immediately interned, would they 
not? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct. 

Mr. Gearhart, So there is a reason given right here, given in the 
intercept, why London should be advised in order to accomplish a 
purpose before it was too late; is that not true? 

Captain Kramer. I would invite your attention, Mr. Gearhart, to 
the following message. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is right; but we are talking about this one 
first. 

In that message we have been discussing, the one I have just read, 
is contained a possible reason why London should be advised before 
the outbreak of hostilities, isn't there ? 

Captain Kramer. Not necessarily hostilities. It might be the break- 
ing of diplomatic relations, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Diplomatic relations does not mean internment, does 
it? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, then, they could go on and evacuate their men 
if it was just a breach of diplomatic relations? 

Captain Kramer. Not necessarily. They would be dependent then, 
presumably, on special arrangements for shipping. 

[106SS] Mr. Gearhart. That is right, unless they had arranged 
to take their people off the island by the German submarines ? 

Captain Kramer. That is possible, of course, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then, in all fairness — now, I am not asking you to 
strain your conclusions — in all fairness, if the Japanese wanted to get 
some people off the British Isles, and over to Berlin before the outbreak 
of hostilities, that would be a reason for a directional broadcast of a 
winds message 3 days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, is that 
correct ? 

Captain Kramer. You could put such a construction on that, yes, 
sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, it has been testified that any directional broad- 
cast from Tokyo to London could be heard on the East Coast of the 
United States; is that not so? 

Captain Kramer. I am not familiar with the technicalities of what 
could be heard or not heard in various parts of the world. 

Mr, Gearhart. You were present in this room when testimony was 
given that because of atmospheric conditions, natural phenomena, 
scientific consequences, that a directional broadcast from Tokyo to 
London could be and would be heard on the Atlantic Coast of the 
United States? 

[10654] Captain Kramer. I heard that testimony, sir, and I 
am in general familiar with the subject of communications as a line 
ofiicer in the Navy, and also with the difficulties which we had at vari- 
ous times with our own intercept set and the reallocation of certain 
monitoring stations to cover certain circuits, yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart, If that were the consequence of that kind of a di- 
rectional broadcast, the Japanese would know it, their scientists would 
know it there, just as ours here? 

Captain Kramer. Presumably ; yes, sir. 



3982 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr Gearhaet. It seems, by the next message that Tokyo wanted 
to gei some people out of the United States before hostihties broke 

out. 

The next message reads : 

From : Tokyo 
To : Washington 
5 December, 1941. 

"" wfu yot'pfelse have Terasaki, Takagi, Ando, Yamamoto and others leave by 
plane within the next couple of days. 

In that message you see a possible '-^^^^^^'^y, T^^" g^^tt i,e 
TTnitPrI States to know that relations with the United states were 
Sng and weJe about to end; isn't that correct? Isn't that a fair 

''TmS'i ' Captain Kramer. That is a possible conclusion, sir. 

However, there are many movements of dijDlomatic officials dis- 
closed by this traffic to us. In fact, every transfer of a Japanese dip- 
fonfatic official was as a result of instructions of this kind. Referring 
baTtSpa-e 227 of this exhibit, in a message from Washington to 
Tokyo dateS 3 December, Washington apparently objects to detaching 

^ The7es^agr?incomplete. Apparently badly garbled. Presum- 
ablv there had been prior discussion in this traffic which we had not 
read because of its not being picked up, or other reasons, concernmg 
the movement of Secretary Terasaki. ,.1 4^ „ 

This one that you hav, just read, of 5 December, apparently is a 
later message bearing on the subject of evacuation-not evacuation- 
biit the tSSsfer or movement of Terasaki and certain other people, 

'"m^khakt. I was merely asking you the possibility. I don't 
care to pursue it any further. 

The Chairman. Is that all? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. 

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

ienator Fergxtson. Captain, f am not going to speak to you abou 
the winds message for a while. We will take a [106o6\ lest 
on that message. 

Captain Kramer. Thank you, sir. . „,•,.,-, t^_ 

Senator Ferguson. I want to show you a message in H^xhibit 1, JNO. 
904, page 245. Are you familiar with that message i 

Captain Kramer. 'I am, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you first see that messaged 

Captain Kramer. I believe on Saturday evenmg, 6 December 1941, 
sir. It was translated, as indicated at the bottom, on the 6th of De- 
cember. 

Now' wnfthTmSs^T'delivered to the Secretary of the Na.y and 

'''^Cr;tSu^° mS^ ^Z'^:^, sir, that that was included in 
the folder delivered that night. will vnn « 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, ]ust read that message, will you. 
I want to ask you some questions about it. 

The Vice Chairman. Read it aloud for the record. Captain. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3983 

Captain Kramer (reading) : 

From : Tokyo 

To : Washington 

December 6, 1941 

#904. 

[10657] Re My #902 

There is really no need to tell you this, but in the preparation of the aide 
memoire be absolutely sure not to use a typist or other ijerson. 

Be most extremely cautious in preserving secrecy. 

Senator Ferguson. Now. that message, "In re my 4;t902" referred 
to the long diplomatic reply to Secretary Hull's message of the 26th? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What interpretation did you give this message 
that the}^ were to use no typist on it. they were to do it personally, 
themselves, and to "he most extremely cautious in preserving secrecy"? 

I want you to consider that at the same time you had a pilot message 
indicating that this 902 was to be delivered when a certain time was 
given to them here in Washington. 

How do you interpret this message? 

Captain Kramer. I do not recollect precisely my reaction to this 
thing, sir. It was included, however, as I told you in the folders 
delivered that night with the first 13 parts of the note. I believe my 
reaction at the time was that the note itself was of a much more serious 
nature than previous notes forwarded to this country. 

Senator Ferguson. You had read tlie 13 parts, had you? 

[106'58] Captain Kramer. I believe I had read part of the 13 
parts at the time this came in. I believe this came in while we were 
still writing up the 13 parts. 

Senator Ferguson. Before they went to the White House had you 
read the 13 parts? 

Captain Kramer. Before I went to the White House I had; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you come to the conclusion that the end 
had come as far as relations between the United States and Japan were 
concerned ? 

Captain Kramer. There was certainly a strong possibility of that ; 
yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Just a possibility? 

Captain Kramer. Well, perhaps a probability. 

Senator Ferguson. Didn't this message, that they were to be siire 
and not use a typist or any other person on it, together with the pilot 
message, indicate to you that the time had come when negotiations 
were ended? 

Captain Kramer. I believe my reaction at the time was. particu- 
larly after reading most of the note, that negotiations which had been 
going on were ended, yes, sir; but as regards the interpretation or 
construction to be put on this cautionary message. 904, the Japanese 
Embassy in Washington had previously in very strong language 
[106o9] been cautioned on security, particularly in the spring of 
1941 when quite categorical orders were sent from Tokyo to the 
Japanese ambassador in Washington that no one except himself and 
his Counsellor of Embassy was to handle a certain code. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, at one time the messages indicated that 
they knew that we were breaking their code ; isn't that true ? 



3984 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. As a result of their investigation in the spring 
of 1941, they concluded that we were reading something. We did not 
know, and do not know to this date, what they found out at that time. 
Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that, but you had indications that 
they knew that you were breaking the code and reading messages; 
isn't that true ? 

Captain Kramer. Breaking some code, yes, sir, because one of their 
messages so stated. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Now, their method then, to keep you from, or to slow you down 
on reading their code, was to change the cipher, was it not 'i 

Captain Kramer. Was to change a cipher they suspected our 
reading. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

[10660] Captain Kramer. In that connection, sir, there were a 
number of incidents, not only during 1941, but during 1940, when 
they cancelled codes arbitrarity as soon as they had the first inkling 
or suspicion that we were reading their code. 

A code which we designated as AJ-12, in my recollection, I have 
not seen the message since those days, I remember Japan cancelling 
arbitrarily, because as I recall that message, they suspected that the 
British and the Dutch, I believe, were reading that system. 

In, I think it was May of 1941, one of their systems, a naval system 
in this case, was compromised by a search of narcotic agents in San 
Francisco. Within 24 hours of the time that search was made, a 
report had been made to Tokyo about this search and Tokyo had 
issued instructions to cancel it at once. 

Senator Ferguson. There is nothing unusual about the changing 
of ciphers so that someone can't read your code, is there? 

Captain Kramer. Not at all, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And that saves you at times changing your code 
book, isn't that true, by changing your cipher ? 

Captain Kjramer. That was the usual practice. 

Senator Ferguson. Then it takes some time to get back [10661] 
into stride, as it were, to get the cipher, and then you can decode 
again, but if they change again on you, you have the same trouble? 
Isn't that true f 

Captain Cramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I notice in reading your testimony of yes- 
terday that you didn't mention this 904 as being taken to the White 
House and the Secretary of the Navy the niglit before. 

Captain Kramer. I was not questioned on that point, sir. That 
night, however, there were probably five or six messages in the folders 
distributed. 

Senator Lucas. Will you tell us what five or six messages were in 
the folders the night you left the 13 parts at the White House ? 

Captain Kramer. This is the first time that question has been pro- 
pounded, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I am not going to repeat, if I can help it. 

Captain Kramer. I would presume, without having made a study 
of this traffic to determine that point, that you ask, that my file num- 
bers 7142 through 7149 were distributed that night. 

Senator Ferguson. What book have you got? You are reading 
from another book ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3985 

[10663] Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Four one what? 

Captain Kramer. I will correct that 7143, which was the note. 

Senator Ferguson. That was the 13 parts ? 

Mr. Murphy. The JG number is at the bottom of the page. 

Senator Ferguson. "Wliat other numbers — 7144? 

Captain Kramer. Presumably numbers 7143 through 7149, sir. I 
recall distinctly that one of the messages in that folder was on the 
Tokyo-Berlin circuit, or vice versa. I have made no study of this 
file to determine the particular point you are bringing up, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, Now, did you have a conversation with the aide 
at the White House? 

Captain Kramer. A brief one ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What was said? 

Captain Kramer, The general tenor of our conversation was to the 
effect that there was something of high importance in that pouch, 
which the President should see as soon as possible. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall who the aide was? 

Captain Kramer, I do not recall his name, sir, but it was one of 
the junior officers which Qaptain Beardall [10663] had on 
duty in that office he set up. 

Senator Ferguson, Do you know whether it was Schmidt? 

Captain Kramer, I cannot be sure, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, Do you know a man named Schmidt? 

Captain Kramer, I do not recall him now, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, Was he the same man as you delivered the 
14th part and the 1 o'clock message to the following morning? 

Captain Kramer, I again do not know who the man was. The de- 
livery, however, was made to the Situation Room in the White House 
where these men were on watch. 

Senator Ferguson, The Situation Room was merely a map room 
was it not ? 

Captain Kramer, A map room and a file of considerable classified 
material including dispatches from the Navy Department, 

Senator Ferguson, Wasn't this true, that that was one of the few 
times that you left a message there? As a rule you waited until it was 
read, did you not? 

Captain Kramer. There were only two occasions, sir, one subse- 
quent to Pearl Harbor, but one occasion prior to Pearl Harbor, when 
I took material directly into the President, and that occurred in the 
late summer or early fall of 1941, At other times delivery was made 
to the naval [10664] aide. 

There was a short period during the summer when there was no 
naval aide, and Admiral Mclntyre, the Surgeon General of the Navy, 
acted in that capacity. 

Senator Ferguson, Well, now, what was the occasion that you took 
it in to the President personally ? 

Captain Kramer, I do not recall just what was in the dispatches, 
sir, but it was something bearing on these negotiations which I might 
characterize as "hot" and I felt the President should see at once, and 
Admiral Mclntyre was not available to take charge of this par- 
ticular pouch and I did not entrust it to Mr. Roosevelt's private secre- 
tary to take. 



3986 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Being that "hot" you can't recall it? As you 
say, it was so "hot" you wanted to take it in personally? 

Captain Kramer. My principal purpose, Senator, was to see that 
the President got it promptly, and it was of sufficient importance to 
see that he did get it promptly. It probably concerned some negotia- 
tions to take place the following morning. That may have been the 
"hot" aspect of it. 

Senator Ferguson. You didn't consider this 13th part as "hot" 
then, because you left that with an assistant ; [106G5] is that 
true? 

Captain Kramer. I believe I left that with an assistant, yes, sir, but 
I further stated during this brief conversation that I had learned in 
phoning to Admiral Wilkinson's home, that Admiral Beardall was 
there, and I stated that undoubtedly Admiral Beardall would check 
up later in the evening to see whether the President had yet received 
it, presuming that if he had not, Admiral Beardall himself would 
then come down to the Wliite House to see that he did see it. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you tell the aide that? 

Captain Kramer. I did. 

Senator Ferguson. So the aide was instructed that if he didn't get 
it to the President, that Admiral Beardall would check up later in 
the evening ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you ever learned as to whether or not 
Admiral Beardall did check up with the President as to whether or 
not he got that 13th part, and this 904? 

Captain Kramer. I know, sir, only that I informed Admiral 
Beardall when I arrived at Admiral Wilkinson's home of the instruc- 
tions I left with his assistant in the White House. I do not know 
what further action Admiral Beardall took. 

[10666] Senator Ferguson. You never learned later ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, there wasn't any doubt that Admiral 
Beardall was not the appraiser or the evaluator of these messages, the 
President received these messages and he evaluated them personally, 
so far as 5^ou know. 

Captain Kramer, Presumably Admiral Beardall did do evaluating, 
but undoubtedly the President had evaluations from many other high 
officials too. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, were these delivered to Beardall for the 
President, or to Beardall for Beardall? Who was getting these 
messages? 

Captain Kramer. They were intended for the President, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Wasn't it your understanding that the President 
was personall}^ receiving these raw messages to place his own evalua- 
tion on? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And that was why you told the aide in charge 
on Saturday night, that he was to give it to him, and it was important 
and that you would speak to Beardall later about it? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, before you went to the White [10667] 
House, did you telephone the Wliite House ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3987 

Captain Kramer. No, sir ; I did not. I had prior to setting up of 
that Situation Room. After that was set up, I knew it was manned 
24 hours, there was no need to phone. 

Senator Ferguson. So you went to the White House knowing that 
there would be someone in the map room, or Situation Room, and 
would see him without calling. 

Now, who did you call before you left the Navy Department ? 

Captain Kramer. I attempted to call Admiral Stark's home. Ad- 
miral Turner's home. I didn't succeed in reaching either of those 
people. I called my own home, requested my wife to bring the car 
down to expedite delivery that night. 

I called Captain McCollum at his home in Alexandria. 

I called Secretary Knox's apartment at the Wardman Park hotel. 
And after making all these calls, I then called Admiral Wilkinson 
to inform him of whom I had been able to contact and what I pro- 
posed to do in the way of delivery. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral Stark, next to the President, was 
in charge in the Navy ? ^^ 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The Commander in Chief, and then [1066S] 
Admiral Stark? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. In the line of orders, the Secret arj' of the Navy 
came in between 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. In a certain way. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But the highest ranking officer was Admiral 
Stark ; is that correct ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you know that the evaluation of these 
messages had been turned over to Admiral Turner's office and taken 
away from the Intelligence Branch? Did you know that? 

Captain Kramer. I was unfamiliar with that, sir, until these hear- 
ings commenced. 

Senator Ferguson. You didn't know it then, when you called Ad- 
miral Turner ; is that correct ? 

Captain Kramer. On that particular point, 3^es, sir; that was my 
understanding. 

Senator Ferguson. So, as I understand it, your office was fully 
alerted to war on the evening of the 6th of December lOll ? 

Captain Kramer. I believe it was, sir. It was no [10669] 
differently alerted, however, than it had been during a large part of 
the year of 1941. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, when did the change in the kind of alert 
come in your office? 

Captain Kramer. When the volume of this traffic, particularly with 
reference to the war in Europe and the negotiations of the United 
States 

Senator Ferguson. Do you include in the war in Europe the war 
in the Atlantic that we have heard here from the witness stand, about 
the undeclared war that started in August? Is that what you have 
reference to ? 



3988 CONGRESSIOISrAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. By the war in Europe, I refer specifically to the 
Tokyo-Berlin circuit and anything bearing on hostile action of the 
Germans and the Italians. That would include, of course, the war 
in the Atlantic, if anything came up in this traffic. 

Senator Ferguson. If it came in on this same traffic? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, from the testimony 
we have here now, that Admiral Turner's office had taken over the 
evaluation of these messages, his office was apparently not alerted for 
war on the night of the 6th, because you couldn't reach him ; is that 
correct ? 

Captain Kramer. I am unfamiliar with that point, sir. 

[10670] Senator Ferguson. "Well, you couldn't reach him? 

Captain Kramer. I could not reach him ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Where did you call ? 

Captain Kr^\mer. His home. 

Senator Ferguson. You had that telephone number ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes^ sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And Admiral Stark, apparently his office was 
not alerted, because you couldn't reach him; is that correct? 

Captain Kramer. I was unable to reach him, sir ; that is all I can 
say. 

[1067J] Senator Ferguson. You personally tried to call his 
home and your couldn't reach him? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did the telephone not answer or he was not 
there, which? 

Captain Kjramer. My recollection is that the telephone did not 
answer. 

Senator Ferguson, The telephone did not answer. Did it answer 
at Admiral Turner's? 

Captain Kr.\mer. I believe the same thing in the case of Admiral 
Turner. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you try the Deputy, Ingersoll? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know any reason ^^'hy you didn't call 
him? Hadn't it been your custom to deliver to Ingersoll if you 
couldn't reach Stark ? 

Captain Kramer. It had not, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever delivered to Ingersoll? 

Captain Kramer. On a few occasions when Admiral Stark was ab- 
sent from his office and liis flag secretary, Commander Wellborn, in- 
dicated that Admiral Ingersoll would probably want to see that 
right then, and because the flag secretary was busy at the moment 
with other paper work. Normally deliveries to Admiral Stark's of- 
fice were made to Admiral [10672] Stark's private secretary, 
his flag secretary, rather. Commander Wellborn, who got them to 
Admiral Stark, as well as the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, 
Admiral Ingersoll, as well as many of them to then Captain Schuir- 
mann, head of the Central Division. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you try Admiral Stark's office that night? 

Captain I^jiamer. I did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did it answer ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3989 

Captain Kramer. I do not believe it did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you try Turner's office that night? 

Captain Kramer. I tried those first before 1 tried their homes. 

Senator Ferguson". And it didn't answer? 

Captain Kramer. It did not, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So there were two offices and their homes that 
were not alerted to war that evennig as far as telephone communi- 
cations were concerned? 

Captain Kramer. On that interpretation of the alerting for war, 
sir, I know nothing about it. A^Hiat provisions Admiral Stark and 
Admiral Turner had made in that regard I am not familiar with, 
only in a general way in that there were certain senior captains on 
duty at night in the Navy [10673] Department to take care 
of getting dispatches that might come into those officers. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you find any of these officers in charge to 
get these dispatches to that night? 

Captain Kramer. Those officers, sir, on the watch list that I re- 
ferred to included many captains, I believe certain admirals as well, 
who never had access to this decrypted material, and they were, 
therefore, never shown it, and woukl not be shown it that night. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then as I understand it now, 
Opnav, Admiral Stark's office, could not be reached. His home 
couldn't be reached. The next in line, the War Plans, which was 
Operations at the time, couldn't be reached, and his home couldn't 
be reached, and there were no other officers assigned to which these 
important messages could be delivered? 

Captain Kjjamer. Yes, sir, there were. 

Senator Ferguson. Who were the officers? 

Captain KIramer. Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of Naval Intel- 
ligence, whose prime responsibility it was to see that these things were 
delivered. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Now, do I understand that you were not the man to deliver these 
messages, but Wilkinson's duty was to make [10674] deliv- 
eries ? 

Captain Kramer. It was my responsibility as a subordinate of 
Admiral Wilkinson to make such deliveries as I was instructed to 
make. 

Senator Ferguson. Then do I understand you conferred with 
Wilkinson and that it didn't reach anyone out of his office — and he 
didn't have the authority, we have learned here, to evaluate these mes- 
sages, they were to be delivered to War Plans for evaluation as far as 
the Navy was concerned, were they not ? 

Captain Kramer. I have stated I am unaware of what arrange- 
ments were made regarding evaluation. My position on that was 
that in carrying out the general instructions in effect to deliver this 
traffic to the normal recipients, in case I was unable to reach Admiral 
Wilkinson first, which was the normal procedure, that that particular 
night when I informed Admiral Wilkinson of who I had been able to 
reach and what I proposed to do, and further that later that night 
when I showed these things to Admiral Wilkinson, that if he decided 
further efforts should be made in reaching the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions that he would so instruct me. 



3990 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

His instructions to me were to have this material ready to deliver 
promptly early the following morning as soon as the Admiral reached 
his office. 

[1067S] Senator Ferguson. I understand then that you called 
AVilkinson before you called Stark and Turner? 

Captain Kramer. I called Admiral Wilkinson last, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Last. Did you call him and tell him that you 
couldn't reach these two men or reach anyone in their offices? 

Captain Kramer. I did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And did he tell you to bring it out to his home? 

Captain Kramer. He approved my proposed distribution first to 
the White House and then to Mr. Knox and then to his home. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did he sa,y then that you were not to de- 
liver to Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner that night? You didn't 
try them again after that one call, did you ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And what time would you say you called their 
homes ? 

Captain Kramer. It was within a few minutes of 9 o'clock. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, let's go to Mr. Knox. Did you call him 
on the phone and offer to deliver these messages, which included the 
one not to use any typist or any other person? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, I did call his home. 

[10676] Senator Ferguson. When you went there you found 
Mr. Knox there? 

Captain Kramer. I did, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he read all of the information that was in 
your folder? 

Captain Kramer. He did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he remark anything, did he make any re- 
marks to you ? 

Captain Kramer. There were some brief remarks and conversa- 
tion, none that stands out in my mind, however. 

Senator Ferguson. Was there anything said about evaluating these 
messages ? That is, as far as Knox was concerned ? 

Captain Kramer. My recollection is that he agreed with the con- 
struction I had placed on it, that it aimed towards a conclusion of 
negotiations. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you tell him that there was a 14th part yet to 
come ? 

Captain Kramer. I did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And what other conversation had you on this 
14th part? 

Captain Kramer. After he made his phone calls, apparently to 
Mr. Hull and Mr. Stimson, he instructed me to appear at "the State 
Department the following morning by 10 o'clock, [10677] when 
there would be a conference of the three Secretaries and to bring at 
that time the material I had just shown him, as well as the 14th part, 
and any other thing of that type which might have come in during 
the night up to the time that delivery was made at 10 o'clock. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any discussion with him that 
prior to the 14th part, or did you remind him that there had been a 
message which indicated it was to be delivered to the American Gov- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3991 

ernment at a certain time and that that time would come later, did 
you explain that to Mr. Knox? 

Captain Kramer. I believe that message was also in the folder, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The pilot message then was in the folder that 
you were delivering to the White House and to Knox? 

Captain Kramer. I am quite certain it was, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, Admiral Stark didn't 
have this pilot message on Saturday at all, or he didn't have any of 
the 13 parts, or this message about the typing; is that true? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You say it is not true? 

Captain Kramer. That is true, sir ; he did not have it. 

Senator Ferguson. And Turner had none of those messages? 

[10678] Captain Kjramer. So far as I am aware, no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Because they hadn't been delivered, and you 
were the only one that had the pouches ? 

Captain Kramer. That was normally the case. However, it is pos- 
sible that they would get delivery or at least see these things by other 
means, namely, the Director of Intelligence or Captain McCollum or 
possibly some officers, senior officers in the War Department, 

Senator Ferguson. But as far as delivery was concerned they had 
not seen them ? 

Captain Kramer. So far as my delivery was concerned they had 
not. 

Senator Ferguson. And j^ou had no knowledge that they had seen 
them or had copies or you wouldn't have taken the trouble to deliver to 
them ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I will take up later when these messages 
were received but I want to go along on this. 

Did you hear Secretary Knox telephone ? 

Captain Kramer. I did not hear his phone conversation ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That I assume was in another room ? 

Captain Kramer. I believe it was in an adjacent room. 

Senator Ferguson. In an adjacent room. When he came [10679] 
back he told you that he had arranged a conference with the Secretary 
of war and the Secretary of the Navy at the State Department with 
the Secretary of State at 10 o'clock on the following morning ; is that 
correct ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did he tell you to bring the 13-part mes- 
sage, the pilot message, and this typist message to the State Depart- 
ment at 10 o'clock? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; he told me to bring all the messages in 
that folder. 

Senator Ferguson. And whatever came in that night ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, then, I assume that you drove — is that all 
the conversation you had with Secretary Knox ? 

Captain Kramer. That was approximately the sum total of the 
sense of our conversations in private. There was a subsequent con- 
versation for about 10 minutes in which Mrs. Knox and the business 
associate of Mr. Knox engaged. 



3992 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Did he ask you what your evaluation — by the 
way, you were in the Intelligence Branch of the Government ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And part of your job was to know all of the 
Intelligence and therefore have an over-all view [106S0] of 
it to evaluate these things ? 

Captain Kjiamer. At that time I had a comparatively limited view 
sir. Approximately 2 years before, when I was in charge of the Japa- 
nese desk in the Far East Branch of Naval Intelligence I had a much 
more comprehensive picture than I did at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Who was the man in that depart- 
ment or the Intelligence Branch that had the comprehensive view and 
the over-all view? 

Captain Kramer. Captain McCoUum, Admiral Wilkinson, and pre- 
sumably their seniors. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Wilkinson had only been there, had 
never been in Intelligence before, he only came there October 15 ; isn't 
that true ? 

Captain Kramer. That is true as far as his arrival is concerned, sir. 
Just what his intelligence background was, I was and am unfamiliar 
with. 

Senator Ferguson. Are you just assuming that he had the over-all 
view of this ? 

Captain Kramer. It is my presumption that a director of Naval 
Intelligence would have a much more comprehensive view than I had. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, even though he had only been there a month 
and a half? 

[10681] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you went down to Wilkinson's home, 
did you not ? 

Captain Kramer. Admiral Wilkinson's home, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you found there what officers? 

Captain Kramer. The naval aide to the President, Beardall, Ad- 
miral Wilkinson, and, as my memory has been recently refreshed, 
General Miles, the head of Military Intelligence. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you really had Intelligence in one 
office, didn't you ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; one room. 

Senator Ferguson. One room. You had the top man in the Army, 
you had the top man in the Navy, and you had the top man in the 
White House, as far as Intelligence was concerned ; isn't that true ? 

Captain Kramer. I can say that is approximately true. 

Senator Ferguson. That Army and Navy Intelligence for one 
time in one room ; isn't that correct ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you had in a bag, in a brief case, a pilot 
message for delivery of a 14:-part message, and you knew of the mes- 
sage between Tokyo and Berlin telling us that there was going to be 
war sooner than they would think between the Anglo-Saxons, mean- 
ing America and Britain, you [10682] had the 13th part of 
this message, and you have described what you thought of it, and 
you had this typist part and these other messages; is that correct? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3993 

Senator Ferguson. You gentlemen took them out there and read 
them ; is that correct ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you now, what was the conclusion of 
the Army and the Navy Intelligence after they read these various 
messages ? 

Captain Kramer. I cannot state what their conclusions were, what 
the conclusions they reached in their minds were, sir. There was 
some conversation 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I want, the conversation, and 
that will tell me what the attitude of mind was. 

Captain Kramer. There were some conversations during that 
period in Admiral Wilkinson's home that I took part in. The general 
tenor of the conversations in which I took part was approximately 
as I have described in the case of Secretary Knox. There were other 
conversations at the side of the room one or two times, while I left 
that room to go out to my car where my wife was waiting, that I did 
not engage in. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, let's keep to the part that [10683] 
you were In. How long were you in this room with these gentlemen ? 

Captain Kramer. I should say approximately one-half hour be- 
fore we all left that room and went to another room where a nmnber of 
Admiral Wilkinson's dinner guests were. 

Senator Ferguson. I assume that nothing was discussed there in 
relation to the message ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Now, I assume, and is it correct, that you told them that the Secre- 
tary of the Navy was the only man in the Navy outside of the Pres- 
ident that you had been able to reach on these messages? 

Captain Kra:mer. Except for the fact that I informed Admiral 
Wilkinson that I had phoned Captain McCollum about them. 

Senator Ferguson. I will come back to get Captain McCollum's 
conversation with you later. 

Now, did 3^ou tell them that Secretary Knox had arranged a meet- 
ing for the following morning at 10 o'clock with the Secretary of 
War and the Secretary of State? 

Captain Kramer. I did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, And what was their reply and who replied to it? 

[10684] Captain Kramer, I do not recall the precise wording 
of their reply. Admiral Wilkinson, I believe, told me to be sure to 
be there on time, or something to that effect. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he tell you that it would not be necessary 
for you to try later to get Stark ? 

Captain Kramer. My recollection is that I asked him about that 
point and I was not so instructed. 

Senator Ferguson, What did he tell you? 

Captain Kramer. He told me specifically to be sure to have those 
things ready for delivery to Admiral Stark as soon as he arrived in 
the office the following morning. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he tell you not to bother him that night, 
it was late, and therefore you could give it to him the next morning ? 

79716 — 4&— pt. 9 6 



3994 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. I don't recall that lie put it in so many words, sir, 
but that was the general effect of what he told me. 

Senator Ferguson. Prior to that time did you know that Admiral 
Stark had not visited his office on Sunday ? 

Captain Kramer. I am uncertain of what Sundays Admiral Stark 
visited his office. He was there on some Sundays during 1941. Other 
Sundays I know he was not because I made delivery to him at his 
home. 

Senator Ferguson. What I am getting at is, you couldn't 
[^10685'] reach him on the phone at night, and you had no knowl- 
edge that "Wilkinson had reached him on the phone ? 

Captain Kramer. I was under the impression that Admiral Wilkin- 
son phoned Admiral Stark that night, but that was only an impression. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Now, he phoned him, and when he came back he said : 

Deliver him the information tomorrow morning, he will come down to the 
office to get it. 

Captain Kramer. Admiral Wilkinson left that room on several 
occasions during the approximately half-hour while these officers were 
reading this material. I simply presumed that he may have made 
phone calls similarly to those made by Secretary Knox. 

In any case, he instructed me to be sure that Admiral Stark saw 
them the first thing in the morning. 

\^10686'\ Senator Ferguson. Somehow Wilkinson knew that 
night and told you to deliver this to Admiral Stark the next morning 
at his office ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And that is the reason that you paid no more 
attention to delivering it that night, and didn't try to deliver it that 
night? 

Captain Kramer. That is not quite accurate, sir, in that the im- 
pression I had from the instructions and the conversations with Ad- 
miral Wilkinson were that no efforts to reach those officers that night 
were called for. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Then we come to the conclusion that one of the intelligence officers, 
the top — 3^ou told us Wilkinson was the top of the evaluation section 
because you didn't know that that had been taken away by Admiral 
Turner? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. He told you that these messages were not so 
important that they should receive attention that night? That was 
the substance of what he told you. It would be perfectly all right 
the next morning. 

Captain Kramer. This is the substance; yes, sir. There was no 
evaluation or construction of that kind put on. I am referring in 
what I am saying simply to when I [10687'\ was instructed to 
get them to Admiral Stark. 

Senator Ferguson. You drew that conclusion from what he said 
after he read them? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. By the way, how did they read them? You 
had enough copies for all, and they sat there and read them, or did one 
read it aloud? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3995 

Captain Kramee. I believe I had two copies with me. I may have 
had three when I went to Admiral Wilkinson's home. I am sure I had 
two, and those three officers read them between them. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did each one sit and read them, or did 
someone read them aloud so they could all hear? 

Captain Kramer. There was no reading aloud. 

Senator Ferguson. So it was necessary that each one take them and 
read them? 

Captain Kjiamer. I believe two of those individuals were read- 
ing one copy at certain parts of that half hour. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, do I understand now that that wasn't of 
such importance that a man would sit and really read it, but that he 
would Just look over the other man's shoulder and read part of it? 

Captain Kjiamer. I believe all three of those officers [10688\ 
read every word appearing in that folder. 

Senator Ferguson. All of the words in the folder ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did General Miles tell you anything about 
or comment in any way about these messages? 

Captain Kramer. I have no recollection of anything General Miles 
may have stated. I could very well have informed Admiral Wilkin- 
son at that time — I believe I did inform him that all this traffic, spe- 
cifically the note which we had been writing up, had been sent to the 
Army by 9 o'clock. 

I believe that Colonel Bratton Iniew about it. I presume that as 
he always did in the past, that he was making his usual prompt 
deliveries of that material. 

Senator Ferguson. And therefore you would assume that Colonel 
Bratton had delivered them the same as you were delivering them ? 

Captain Kramer. That was my presumption ; yes, sir. 

I have a distinct impression that Colonel Bratton knew about it that 
night. In fact, I even may have called him as I did on a number of 
occasions in the past to make sure that he had gotten something. 

Senator Ferguson. Your best recollection is that you didn^ want 
to scoop him on this delivery, that you called \^10689'] him ? 

Captain Kjiamer. There was no question of scooping, sir. Nor- 
mally delivery was made about the same time by both Colonel Bratton 
and myself. 

Senator Ferguson. And you wanted that to continue so that they 
would be able to be delivered at the same time ? 

Captain Kjramer. Colonel Bratton had responsibility for delivering 
to different officials than I did ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But you wanted to see that he could deliver 
them at the same time so there would be no change in time, one 
wouldn't get it before the other ? 

Captain Kramer. I intended to make no reference or presumption 
to the time of delivery. My reference is simply to the fact that it is 
my distinct impression and was at that time that Colonel Bratton 
knew about it that night, and my presumption merely is that he was 
making his usual delivery. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you tell him that you were going to 
deliver that night? 

Captain Kramer. I may have said that if I phoned him ; yes, sir. 



3996 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Fergusox, Now, I take it, because you were delivering at 
night, you were quite concerned with the [10690] importance 
of these messages ? 

Captain Kramer. Of course I was concerned ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, But that concern was not present with these 
three men at Wilkinson's home, because they then said : 

Well, deliver them tomorrow morning. Be sure and be at the State Depart- 
ment at ten o'clock and see that Admiral Stark gets his in the morning — 

is that correct ? 

Captain Kramer. I have another impression on that point. 

Senator Ferguson. Give it to us. 

Captain Kramer. Concerning Admiral Wilkinson's reaction when 
I first phoned him, he was concerned that the President and Secretary 
Knox got it promptly. 

Senator Ferguson. He was concerned that those two gentlemen get 
it promptly, but he wasn't so concerned about Admiral Stark, or 
Admiral Turner getting it promptly ? 

Captain Kramer. What his concern was in that respect, I don't 
know, except as I can deduce. 

Senator Ferguson. Would your deduction be along that same line ? 

Captain Kramer. It would be that Admiral Wilkinson did not feel 
sufficiently concerned to instruct me to attempt further delivery to 
Admiral Stark that night; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What did Admiral Wilkinson say to [106911 
you about delivery to Admiral Turner ? 

Captain Kramer. The same thing applies to Admiral Turner as to 
Admiral Stark. 

Senator Ferguson. He told you that ? 

Captain Kramer. That is my distinct recollection of the impression 
I had. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether he tried to call Admiral 
Turner that night ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not know that he did, sir. It was my im- 
pression at the time that he did make some phone calls. 

I presume that a phone call would be made to Admiral Turner, 

Senator Ferguson. The next morning did you deliver to Admiral 
Turner ? 

Captain Kramer. I don't believe that Admiral Turner first saw the 
material when I delivered it. I think Captain McCoUum got it to 
him that morning. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, you didn't follow out the instruc- 
tions of Admiral Wilkinson to deliver to Admiral Turner immedi- 
ately? 

Captain Kramer. I was not instructed regarding Admiral Turner. 

Senator Ferguson. I misunderstood you then. 

[10692] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, that night Admiral 
Wilkinson did not tell you to deliver to Admiral Turner the next 
morning ? 

Captain Kramer. I have no recollection of any such instructions; 
no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then the only one vou were to deliver to was 
Admiral Stark? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3997 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. However, I, of course, would 
continue efforts as soon as I arrived at the office the following morning 
to make delivery to Admiral Turner. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, the next morning, as I miderstand it, you 
arrived at 7 : 30 in the morning ? 

Captain Kramer. Thereabouts, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And immediately, I assume, you got in touch 
with Admiral Stark's office ? 

Captain Kramer. I believe I phoned it shortly after that; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Wlio did you reach ? 

Captain Kramer. I don't recall reaching anyone, although I may 
have. In any case, Admiral Stark was not there on my first phone 
call, nor his Flag Secretary, with whom I could leave a pouch for 
Admiral Stark. 

110693] Senator Ferguson. When were you first able to alert 
or to get an answer from OpNav that you could deliver to Admiral 
Stark's office? 

Captain Kramer. I 

Senator Ferguson. I assume j^ou kept trying all the time after 
7:30? 

Captain Kramer. I did not keep trying ; no, sir. It was, I believe, 
around 8 o'clock or shortly after, it may have been shorty before, 
that those folders were brought to Captain McCollum in the Far 
Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence. 

Senator Ferguson. The ones that you had? 

Captain Kramer. The folders I had ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Captain Kramer. Captain McCollum had not seen the material the 
night before. He was my next senior responsible for these deliveries ; 
he indicated that he would also keep in touch with Admiral Stark's 
office and get it to him as soon as he arrived. 

I believe I left an extra folder; I may have left two extra folders 
with Captain McCollum at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you are of the opinion that Captain Mc- 
Collum delivered to Admiral Stark? 

Captain Kramer. I believe that is the case, sir. 

[10694^ Senator Ferguson. And you therefore do not know the 
hour it was actually delivered? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But it would include all of these messages, pilot 
and the other 13 parts and the typist and the other messages? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then did you leave a copy for Admiral Turner ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not recollect that particular point, sir. I 
don't believe I left a copy for Admiral Turner with Captain Mc- 
Collum. However, he could make use of one of the copies I did leave. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand it, the so-called 1 o'clock 
message came in at 5 o'clock in the morning. 

That is on page 248. I wish you would refer to that. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, when we get a message from Tokyo to 
Washington and there is a date, is that the Tokyo date ? 



3998 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain McCollum. That is the Tokyo date, presumably, of its 
drafting, but certainly the date of the cipher used to encode or en- 
cipher the message. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

[10695] Now, look at that message at the top of the page. 

It says : 

To be handled in Government code. 

It is No. 907. 

Re my #902. 

So you could tell immediately it was in relation to the 14-part 
message ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

[10696] Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if pos- 
sible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1: 00 p. m. on 
the 7th, your time. 

So that made it so that there was to be a delivery to the United 
States, to the Secretary of State, on a Sunday at 1 o'clock. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. There wasn't any doubt about that. 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now I want you to look at page 249, the top 
message, from Tokyo to Washington, December the 7, 1941, "Ex- 
tremely urgent." The other one was listed, 907, "Urgent, very im- 
portant," but this is "Extremely urgent" and I will read it : 

After deciphering part 14 of my #902'' and also #907^ 908 and 909, please 
destroy at once the remaining cipher machine — 

You will notice it says : 

the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner 
also secret documents. 

Now, I will ask you when that message was received and decoded. 

[1069'/] Captain Kramer. I cannot state, sir, from first-hand 
knowledge when it was received and when it was decoded. I do know 
that it was not received, or at least seen by me, until about the middle 
of Sunday morning. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, what hour would that be ? 

Captain Kramer. I believe that this particular one, 910, which you 
read, was seen by me first when I returned from my appointment at 
the State Department, 

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that it was seen at the same 
time as the 1 o'clock message ? 

Captain Kramer. That is my recollection, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, I have information here that a 910 
and 907 — 907 — there are two short messages I have just read — was 
filed in Tokyo on 4 : 18 a. m. on the 7th of December. That is Exhibit 
41. It is page 248 of Exhibit 1. And it was intercepted in Japanese 
code by the Navy station at Bainbridge Island, Washington, at 
4 : 35 a. m. 

Captain Kramer. It says "4 : 37". 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3999 

Senator Ferguson. And it appears in the testimony that it was in 
your possession at 5 o'clock in the morning. Now, going over to the 
next page: 

Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy — 
blank. 

Decoded by Navy — 
blank. 

Sent by Navy to Army SIS — 

blank. 

[10698] Translated and typed by Army SIS on basis of Navy decode— 
December Tth. 

How do you account for the fact that that very vital message that 
had an investigation by the Roberts Commission immediately follow- 
ing, that you could not get the time when that message was decoded 
so that it would be part of the files of the Navy Department? 

Captain Kramer. I know nothing about the records kept on those 
times, sir. It was entirely outside the province of my section. Cer- 
tain files in that regard were kept by the GY watch officers with which 
I have only a general acquaintance; certain other times I believe 
that time stamps were used by the Signal Intelligence section which 
I have no first-hand knowledge of. 

Senator Ferguson. Whose duty was it to get that information and 
see that the time stamps were used on this kind of material? 

Captain Kramer. I am not sure that the Navy ever used a time 
stamp. I know that the SIS did on certain things. The question of 
the keeping of a log on these incoming messages was, I presume, on 
Captain Safford's office orders or instructions, the duty of Section GY 
and its watch officers. 

Senator Ferguson. It was their duty to get that information and 
put it there ? 

[lOOOBI Captain Kramer. I am unfamiliar with what instruc- 
tions were in effect in that regard. 

Senator Ferguson. You don't know ; all right. 

Now, let iis get to 910, this message about : 

Please destroy at once After deciphering part 14 of my #902 and also 

#907, #908 and #909, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and 
all machine codes — 

and so forth. 

Then after that is code destruction. That describes that message, 
doesn't it, on page 249 of Exhibit 1 ? 

•Filed by the Japanese 6: 44 p. m. 7 December Tokyo time (N & A). 

What does that stand for? 
Captain Kramer. What page are you on now ? 
Senator Ferguson. I am looking at — I don't know whether you 
have got a copy of it. This has been furnished by the Navy. 
Captain ICramer (reading) : 

Filed by the Japanese 6 : 44 p. m. 

That is under No. 910, sir. 
Senator Ferguson. Yes, No. 910. 



4000 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What is the "N & A"? 

Mr. Kautman. "N" is Navy files and "A" is Army files. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, the next is 4 : 47 on the 7th. In [10700'] 
other words, it came in at 4 : 44 and the 1 o'clock message came in at 
4:18. [Eeading:] 

Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S (Bainbridge) — 

that is the same one that intercepted 907 — 

at 5:: 07 A. M. 7 December — 

and the other one was 4 : 37, so it is just 30 minutes apart. 
Then it says : 

Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (A) — 
blank. 

Decoded by Navy (A) — 
blank. 

Sent by Navy to Army SIS — 
blank. 

Translated and typed by Army SIS on basis of Navy decode (A) 7 December. 

Now, your answer would be the same in relation to that? 

Captain Kj?amer. Precisely, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you had a teletype to Bainbridge? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Therefore, these two messages — and I assume 
that you alerted Bainbridge; that you were looking for valuable in- 
formation, because you were looking for the fourteenth part ; you were 
looking for the time of delivery ; you had alerted them to that effect, 
had you not? 

Captain Kramer. Any alerting that might have been done I am 
entirely unfamiliar with, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And we have information here that it 
[10701] was in the office at 5 o'clock. How do you account for 
the fact, if this office was alerted to war or near war, that those two 
messages were not immediately decoded and translated in the morn- 
ing at 5 o'clock? 

Captain Kramer. I cannot account for anything in that connec- 
tion, sir. I would like to state, however, that these messages in gen- 
eral were handled far more promptly than was the normal course 
throughout early months and years. In the usual routine of handling 
messages for which we already had broken the cipher or code it was 
quite normal for a period of anywhere from 4 to 6 hours to several 
days to elapse before such message was processed, translated, and 
disseminated. These particular messages were handled, in my opinion, 
extremely promptly by all hands. As regarding a precise time 
schedule on which piece of paper moved where, I am unfamiliar with 
that aspect of it. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what code those two messages 
were in ? Were they in the same code ? 

Captain Kramer. I believe all these were in the so-called purple 
machine, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, it has been testified here that you 
found the key immediately, or at least you found the key on the 6th 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4001 

for this particular fourteenth part message, and this code had a dif- 
ferent key to it as far as [10702] ciphering was concerned, 
and you had the code. Now, how long would it take you. the depart- 
ment, to decode those messages that contained three lines ? 

Captain Kramer. It probably would not take very long, but there 
are a number of reasons why it might not be decoded promptly. The 
machines we were using were constructed from a variety of manufac- 
tured parts. Our own machine in the Navy Department — we had only 
one in the Navy — broke down at various times and— — 

Senator Fergusox. Was it broken down this morning? 

[107031 Captain Kramer. Not that I am aware of, sir. There 
were occasions when a particular key which we presumed we had re- 
covered was inaccurate in some respects, maybe three or four letters 
in the whole key were inaccurate, and therefore throughout the text 
of a message coming out of that machine there would be what appeared 
to be garbles appearing every three or four or six or eight letters, or 
oftener. 

All of those aspects of it were purely within the province of GY. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Now, did you translate these two messages? 

Captain Kramer. I am certain I did not, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You are certain that you did not ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you give us any information as to how long 
it would take to translate those messages after they were decoded? 

Captain Kramer. Messages of this length in Japanese text, pro- 
vided there were no bad garbles in them, should not take more than a 
very few minutes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Fifteen minutes apiece? 

Captain Kramer. Less than that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Less than that. 

[10704] Now, if you were trying to find out in that department 
in connection with the receipt of these messages, if you wanted to find 
out just when they were received, how long it took to decode them, what 
the delay was, if any, and the time for reciphering them and translat- 
ing them, whom would you call to this witness stand, if you wanted 
to get that information ? 

Captain Kramer. On those technicalities, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. They are not technicalities. It is infor- 
mation I am asking about. 

Captain Kramer. I think Captain Safford would be fully competent 
on that point. 

Senator Ferguson. And if he was not there that morning whom 
would you call ? 

Captain Kramer. I think further that any of the GY watch officers 
would be fully competent to give you full information in that respect, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I understand also that the watch officers 
that were on at that time — that record is not in existence. Do you 
know anything about that? 

Captain Kramer. I am entirely unfamiliar with that record, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know who was on that morning, whom 
we can call ? That is what I am trying to get at. 



4002 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[1070S] Captain Kramer. I cannot recall the names of the watch 
officers that were on that Sunday morning. My impression is there 
was not only the regular one on, but there was another one. 

Senator Fergusox. Who was the regular one? 

Captain Kjramer. I do not recollect who the particular one who was 
on that morning. Evidence has been presented here that Brotherhood 
was there. I have no first-hand recollection on that point. 

Senator Ferguson. Is he a decoder or translator ? 

Captain Kramer. He was one of the watch officers, and was pri- 
marily a cryptanalyst or decoder. He, however, had some familiarity 
with simple Japanese, particularly the Japanese appearing in these 
dispatches. 

Senator Ferguson. Then he may have translated these two ? 

Captain Kramer. That is extremely doubtful, sir. His knowledge 
of Japanese would not have extended that far. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. I think you will find in the record he said around 
5 in the morning he knew what was in it, but he was not positive. Then 
it waited in the Navy from [10706] then until morning, then it 
was sent from the Navy to tlie Army and then translated by the Army 
and then sent back to the Navy. 

Senator Ferguson. It is possible, if we would get a sergeant in the 
Army or a yeoman in the Navy, we would get answers to some of these 
questions. 

Captain Kramer. Senator, may I further possibly enlighten you 
on certain aspects of that ? I do not know whether it has been brought 
out fully in previous testimony, at least I am unfamiliar with it. 

I have indicated already, I believe, the translator situation in effect 
that particular night, and the following morning, in the Navy. 

I would like to make further this point, however, that on the eve- 
ning of December 6 the Army Signal Intelligence Section instituted 
an overnight watch for the first time of translators. My distinct 
impression is that there were no Army translators there from the end 
of working hours shortly after Saturday noon until around 6 that 
evening, when that watch was to start. I am uncertain of the time, 
but, in any case, there were translators on duty in the Army Signal 
Intelligence Section that night, a newly instituted watch. I was aware 
of that point, sir. 

I left instructions as I had frequently done, so in [10707] the 
past with my watch officers to call me down if anything important 
came in which required the efforts of a translator. 

Apparently — this is purely my presumption — the GY watch officer 
exercised some discretion on Sunday morning in not calling me, as he 
was instructed to, but sent certain of these dispatches over to the Army 
to be translated rather than calling me up, probably in view of the 
fact that I had been up quite late the night before and he knew I would 
be in quite early the following morning. 

Senator Ferguson. I did not want this to be intended in any way as 
criticism of your actions. 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. I was intending by my last statement 
to amplify some point that may not have been brought out here. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4003 

Senator Fekguson. You were one man that was apparently alert, 
as you worked until after midnight and you were in the next morning 
at 7 : 30. 

Captain Kramer. I do not wish to create the impression I was 
any more alert than any other officers in those departments. 

Senator Ferguson. JBut you tell us this, that the Army was closed 
from noon until 6 o'clock on this important [10708] day of 
Saturday, the 6th of December 1941, as far as interceptors, decoders, 
or translators were concerned. 

Captain Kramer. That is not correct, sir. I was referring purely 
to translators. 

Senator Ferguson. Then I got the wrong impression. 

Captain Kramer. That is simply my impression. 

Senator Ferguson. The translators went home at noon ? 

Captain Kramer. I am not certain on that point, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You stated that, did you not? 

Captain Kramer. That was my impression. 

Senator Ferguson. How many translators had they in the Army? 

Captain Kramer. I do not know, sir. I think they had at least 
as many as we did. 

Senator Ferguson. How many did you have ? 

Captain Kramer. I had six, three of which were highly competent, 
and three others of which were much less competent as regards the 
work of our office. 

One was a top notch expert in Japanese, but was in training as 
far as the work of our office was concerned. 

The other two were what I might term our weakest translators. 

Senator Ferguson. We had 12 translators between the Army and 
Navy. How many decrypters and decoders were there [10709] 
in your department in the Navy? 

Captain Kramer. I have only a general knowledge of that, sir; 
nothing first hand. There are other officers who can give you pre- 
cise information in that respect. 

Senator Ferguson. Haven't you any idea how many we had ? 

Captain Kramer. My impression is that we had probably a dozen 
quite competent cryptanalysts on duty, and several dozen others of 
various degrees of competency, and in various states of training. 

Senator Ferguson. And how many had the Armj^^, if you know ? 

Captain Kramer. My general impression is that the Army estab- 
lishment was approximately our size. 

Senator Ferguson. That would be 24 or 25 decrypters, and so 
forth? 

Captain Kramer. Cryptanalysts, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And a dozen translators. I want you to tell 
me why they were not all on duty that night when you had these 
13 parts and these other messages coming in, so that they would get 
them early in the morning. 

Captain Kramer. Senator, the reason I did not specifically order 
any of my translators — in that connection I might point out too, 
that these translators were all [10710] civil-service personnel. 
There was no overtime pay in those days. Any extended hours which 
they worked was in effect a gift to the Government. Those translators, 



4004 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

particular certain ones, worked a great many hours overtime on some 
occasions quite late into the night. I wanted to be certain that on 
Sunday we had competent translators available who had not worked 
all night the night before. That is the reason that I did not institute 
an overnight watch that night myself. 

However, I, as I had frequently done in the past, left instructions 
I was to be called. I considered myself as an available translator 
who could arrive at the Navy Department within not over 10 min- 
utes, probably less than that, of the time I received a phone call. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, that is the explanation of not having 
people work that night on this important occasion ? 

Captain Kramer. That is the explanation of why I had no Navy 
translator in my office all night that night, yes, sir. 

In that connection, too, I might point out. Senator, there is one other 
aspect of that. 

An institution of a 24-hour watch, with only three highly competent 
translators, meant that the talents of these highly competent individ- 
uals would be wasted for many [10711] hours during periods 
of time when no traffic was coming in. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you know this, that on Saturday 
evening, when you had the 13 parts, and the 14th part did not come 
in in the same intervals as the other parts, that they were greatly 
concerned about it ? Did you know that ? 

Captain Kramer. I believe all recipients I delivered it to that night 
were greatly concerned, at least greatly interested in seeing that 14th 
part ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So the President of the United States, the Sec- 
retary of the Navy, the top of the Army and Navy being together, 
Wilkinson and Miles, were all greatly concerned about this 14-part 
message coming in and getting it immediately. 

Now, we find that it came in intercepted in Japanese code by the 
Navy station S — and, by the way, station S had a teletype in it, and 
the teletype works in minutes, doesn't it ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. It takes time, however, to cut the rib- 
bon for transmission. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. It came in from 3 : 05 to 3 : 10 a. m. on 
December 7 ? 

Captain Kramer. Wliich one ? 

[10712] Senator Ferguson. That important message came in to 
the Navy. It was intercepted at that time, and again we come to the 
point that the time that it was teletyped from Japanese code in the 
Navy was blank. How do you account for that ? 

Captain Kramer. I cannot account for that. I have no first-hand 
knowledge whatsoever of the details of filing and traffic logs kept by 
those GY and Signal Intelligence sections. 

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it now. we had no one in the 
Navy Department as a translator from 12 o'clock at night until 7 : 30 
when you got there ? 

Captain Kramer. Not actually present; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Not actually present. 

Do you know of any decoders or decryptors present from 12 o'clock 
until you got there Sunday morning ? 

Captain Ejiamer. I know there was a 24-hour watch on, as there 
had been for many months in the Navy ; yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4005 

Senator Ferguson. Then it could have been decrypted but not de- 
coded ? 

Captain Kramer. Decrypted. 

Senator Ferguson. And not translated ? 

Captain Kramer. And decoded if it were in code, but not translated. 

[10713] Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Now, as I understand it, this message was in English. 

Captain Kramer. "Which message do you refer to ? 

Senator Ferguson. The 14 parts I am talking about, 902. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; that is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. But it did have to be decoded, did it not? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And decrypted ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not believe there was any coding. It was 
purely a cipher ; in other words, decrypted. 

Senator Ferguson. When 3'ou broke the cipher, you had the English 
words, and they were in order ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So that took less time, and you had the machine 
set up, as I understand it, so you had the key to these 13 parts, so 
you could get immediately the fourteenth part, isn't that right? 

Captain Kramer. I believe they had those keys predicted ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Now, there was no one there to translate, and in fact you did not 
need a translator for the 14th part, isn't [10714] that correct? 

Captain Kramer. Not quite correct, sir. 

There were introductory instructions. Probably the first three 
lines would have instructions in Japanese, but the main text of the 
14th part of the note was in English, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was in English. 

So the minute it was deciphered, it could be sent off to the White 
House and to the various departments; isn't that correct? 

Captain Kramer. Not quite correct, sir. 

[10715] Senator Ferguson. Well, will you tell me what is 
correct ? 

Captain Kramer. There were throughout the text of this decrypted 
version of it frequent three-letter code groups which, of course, were 
in the hands of the GY section, concerning punctuation, capitaliza- 
tion, and so forth, quotations, parentheses, spacing, indentation, and 
what not, that had to be transcribed to a finished version. A multiple 
set of copies of these would have had to be prepared before dissemi- 
nation could be made. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, and it is about one-third of a page, isn't it? 

Captain Kramer. The length of the message, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now what you told me about is done by the 
translator or the decrypter ? 

Captain Kramer, This thing could have been done, I think, by a 
translator. I am unfamiliar with how much Japanese text there was 
in that thing. Probably very little, except the introductory instruc- 
tions I referred to. 

Senator Ferguson. Now the first thing, the note, "In the forward- 
ing instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the 
plain English phrase 'Very important,' " who put that in ? 



4006 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kkamer, I believe I inserted that note at [107161 
the time it was written up. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. So in English to the broadcasting station 
were the words "Very important," isn't that correct? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So there you had the flag that you had the 14th 
part, because it said "#902 part 14 of 14" and "VERY IMPORTANT". 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now when did that reach you? When is the 
first that you saw that in the rough on Sunday morning ? 

Captain Kramer. I am uncertain of the precise time. Probably 
very shortly after I arrived at the oflSce. 

Senator Ferguson. At 7 : 30, or within the next half -hour ? 

Captain Kramer. I should say so, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Was it in the rough then, and how 
long did it take you to smooth it out ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not believe it took as much as a half hour, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. A half hour. So you would say sometime be- 
tween 8 : 00 and 8 : 30 on Sunday morning you had the 14th part ? 

Captain Kramer. I believe that is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now will you tell us — you being the deliverer, 
as it were — why you did not awaken these [10717] people if 
there were any of them asleep and deliver this 14th part, to show them 
what they had all told you they were waiting for? Now why did not 
you get it to them at 8 : 30 ? 

Captain Kramer. As soon as this 14th part was typed up, which 
I believe was shortly after 8 : 00 o'clock, delivery was made to Captain 
McCollum along with the other 13 parts and the other traffic. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, as I understand it then, about 
8 : 15 Captain McCollum had the full 14 parts message. 

Captain Kramer. I believe that is the case, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And that is the message that Secretary Hull 
has described in the Foreign Relations book, and Peace and War ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now can you tell me why it was not delivered 
immediately ? Why you did not deliver it ? It was your duty, as I 
understand it, to deliver these messages. 

Captain Kramer. It was my duty subject to modification by my 
two seniors, namely. Captain McCollum and Admiral Wilkinson, to 
make deliveries on their instructions. Captain McCollum did not 
direct me to deliver that at once to the White House. I indicated, I 
believe, at that time other [10718] mesages were coming in 
which I was in the process of preparing. I returned to my office to 
complete those other messages. 

I believe that a first delivery was made to Admiral Stark's office by 
me about 9 : 30 of these supplementary messages, on my way initially 
to the White House and then to the State Department. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, I understand that you said you did 
not get to the White House with this 14th part until close to 10 : 00 
o'clock. 

Captain Kramer. I went there first before going to the State Depart- 
ment, sir ; and I arrived at the State Department on foot by 10 minutes 
of 10. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4007 

Senator Ferguson. And you went from the White House acroos the 
street to the State Department ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So you would say you delivered it to the White 
House at what time ? 

Captain Kramer. I should say it was between twenty and a quarter 
of 10. 

Senator Ferguson. Twenty and a quarter of 10. But McCollum 
had it, and you had it by 8:15 that morning, is that right? 

Captain Kramer. That is my recollection now ; yes, sir. 

[10719] Senator Ferguson. Now do you know why McCollum 
held this 14th part message from 8 : 15 until 9 : 30, because that would 
be about the time you left the Navy Department to go to the White 
House ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not know ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Has it ever been explained to you ? 

Captain Kramer. The subject has been brought up for the first 
time now, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. This is the first time you heard about it ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now the only message that you had then, when 
you went over there at 9 : 30, 20 minutes to 10, or a quarter to 10, was 
this 14th part? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir ; that is not the only message. 

Senator Ferguson. All right, tell me what other messages you had. 

Captain Kramer. I have not made a study of this traffic to see pre- 
cisely what other ones there were. 

Senator Ferguson. Apparently I am not going to finish with you 
tonight and therefore you will have over the night to think about it. 

Captain Kramer. There are three or four others, however, in this 
series, Japanese series 902 through 910. 

[107£0] The Chairman. Without objection, we will recess until 
10 o'clock in the morning. 

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., February 7, 1946, the committee recessed 
until 10 a. m. of the following day, Friday, February 8, 1946.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4009 



\_i07M-\ PEAEL HAKBOE ATTACK 



FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF the Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington^ D. G. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the Caucus Eoom (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. 
Barkley (chairman), presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, associate general counsel ; John E. Hasten, Edward P. Mor- 
gan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee. 

[10722'] The Chair^ean. The committee will be in order. 

Senator Ferguson, I believe you were examining the witness. 

Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, we have something for the record. 

The CiiAiRMAN. Counsel, I believe, have something to put in the 
record. 

Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, during Mr. Murphy's examination of 
Captain Safford, he requested Captain Safford to produce the corre- 
spondence with Captain G. W. Welker. 

Captain Safford has delivered to us the following letter, dated 
January 15, 1946, which was written to him by Captain Welker. With 
your permission I would like to read it into the record. 

The Chairman. Yes, sir; go ahead. 

Mr. Masten (reading) : 

15 Jan. 1946. 

Deae Captain Satfoed: I was glad to receive your letter of 27 December. I 
was in Washington during the latter half- of December, but never got near the 
Navy Department. I'm sorry that I never received your letter of last fall. I 
missed a full month's mail from home and think it was destroyed in the Okinawa 
typhoon of late September. Your letter must have [i0723] been in that. 

I recalled having heard of the -winds message" when I saw it mentioned 
in the papers, but I never did know anything of it at first hand. Kramer evi- 
dently had other sources of information and contact than 20-GX, for no order 
ever went out to stations controlled by us to listen for that, insofar as I know. 
No information of that kind ever came through my office to Kramer. Of course 
I know nothing of the stations that were watching for it, how the orders went 
out to them, or how the infouuation came back. Nor do I know what the FCC 
was doing at the time or was supposed to be doing. Neither do I know when 
it came in or what was done with it in or by 20-G. 

I'm sorry that I can't be of help in this. I believe if you will get in touch 
with Daniels, you will find his m»emory the same as mine, i. e., that that was 
part of a lot of stuff going on in 20-GY that GX was never in on at all. 

When I get up to Washington again I will look you up. It will be good to 
see you again. 

Sincerely yours, 

George W. Welkeb. 

79716 — 46— pt. 9 7 



4010 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson-. Wlio is lie ? 

Mr. Mastex. Captain Welker, as I understand it, was [10724] 
under Captain Safford in Captain Safford's section. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the other name mentioned at the 
end? Danford? 

The Chairman. Daniels. 

Mr. Masten. Daniels. I do not know who he is. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not know who he is ? 

Mr. Masten. No. 

We have three other memoranda regarding the watches maintained 
in the AVar and Navy Departments on December 6 and 7, 1941. The 
first is a memorandum dated January 14, 1946, from Lt. Harmon Dun- 
combe, addressed to Mr. Kichardson, and is as follows : 

Reference is made to Mr. Mitchell's memorandum of 31 December 1945 for- 
warding Senator Ferguson's request for any records showing who was in charge 
of the offices of the Chief of Staff and of General Gerow on the night of 6 
December 1941. 

General Gerow indicated to the committee that as of 6 December 1941 War Plans 
Division had an arrangement whereby a duty officer was designated for the 24- 
hour period and, though not required to remain at the office throughout the night, 
was required to stay within calling distance of a telephone (Tr. 4320-1). The 
Office of the Secretary [10725] General Staff maintained a similar duty 
officer arrangement for the Chief of Staff. A thorough search has been made 
for the duty rosters of War Plans Division and of the Office of the Secretary 
General Staff for the period including 6-7 December 1941. Those rosters have 
not been located and apparently it was not the practice to preserve such rosters. 

We also have a memorandum dated 31 January 1946 from Lt 
Comdr. John Ford Baecher, which reads as follows : 

1. With reference to the request made on 21 January 1946 by Senator Fergu- 
son for further information as to the working hours in Admiral Turner's office, 
the following information is submitted. 

2. There is no record of the actual working hours which prevailed in Admiral 
Turner's office (War Plans Division) on 6-7 December 1941, outside of the 
regular Navy Department working hours which were as indicated on the 
enclosure. 

3. From the recollection of officers who were on duty in the War Plans 
Division at that time, there were officers who were present for duty until late 
Saturday afternoon, 6 December, and on Sunday morning,. 7 December 1941. 
All available personnel reported for duty after [10726] news of the Pearl 
Harbor attack was received. 

John Ford Baecher, 
lAeutenant Commander, USNR. 

The enclosure to this memorandum is a circular letter dated No- 
vember 10, 1941, from the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, to 
Chiefs of Bureaus, Offices and Boards, Navy Department; Major 
General Commandant, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, and pre- 
scribed the hours of duty. 

With the committee's permission, we will have that spread in the 
record at this point, but I will not read it. 

(The circular letter referred to follows:) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4011 

[10727] Address reply to 

The Secretary of the Navy 

and refer to initials 

and No. 

PS&M-l-NGL 
Navy Depaetment 

Washington 

CIBCULAE LETTER 

From : Secretary of the Navy. 

To : Chiefs of Bureaus, Offices and Boards, Navy Department, Major General 

Commandant, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps. 
Subject : Hours of Duty. 
References : 

(a) Act of June 28, 1940 (Public No. 671-76th Congress). 

(b) Dept's. cir. Itr. NN/P18-2 (410226), February 26, 1941. 

1. Effective November 24, 1941, the regular hours of duty of all employees 
of the Navy Department and Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, except employees 
of the Professional and Subprofessional Services and blueprinters, photostat and 
rotaprint operations. Inspectors and supervisory planners and estimators of the 
Clerical, Administrative and Fiscal Service, shall be as follows : 

[10728] First Shift 

Monday to Friday, inclusive From 8 a. m. to 4:30 p. m. 

Saturday . From 8 a. m. to 12 m. 

Second Shift 

Monday to Thursday, inclusive From 4 : 15 p. m. to 12 p. m. 

Friday From 4: 15 p. m. to 11:45 p. m. 

Saturday From 11:45 a. m. to 3 : 45 p. m. 

There shall be an intermission of one-half hour for luncheon on the above-men- 
tioned days, except on Saturdays, for each shift. 

2. Where regular routine requires the staggering of work hours, the hours 
of duty for employees shall be adjusted as necessary. 

3. Where second shifts are deemed necessary and directed by Chiefs of Bureaus, 
Officers and Boards and Headquarters, U. S. ^Marine Corps, as the case may be, 
the schedule of working hours for the second shift provides a fifteen-minute 
overlap in order that the incoming shift may have contact with the outgoing shift 
for the purpose of receiving any instructions which may be necessary in preserv- 
ing the continuity of the work being prosecuted. 

4. Reference (b) is amended accordingly. 

Frank Knox. 



[10729'] Mr. Hasten. Finally we have a memorandum dated 30 
January 1946, from Lt. Comdr. John Ford Baecher to Mr. Richard- 
son which reads as follows : 

In compliance with the request of Senator Ferguson on 21 January 1946 for 
the names of the officers in charge of the office of Naval Intelligence on 6-7 Decem- 
ber 1941, the following information is submitted : 

Officers in Charge of Watch. ONI Duty Officers 

Lieutenant (now Commander) Paul L. Hopper, USNR (79836), from 2000 on 
6 December to 1400 7 December 1941. 

Lieutenant Commander (now Commander) Brockholst Livingston, USNR, 
(60646) from 1400 on 7 December to 0800 on 8 December 1941. 



4012 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Special Watch in the Far Eastern Section of ONI 

Lieutenant Commander (now Captain) Ethelbert Watts, USN, (58753) from 
1200 on 6 December to 0800 on 7 December 1941. 

Commander (now Captain) Arthur H. McCollum. USN, (57105) from 0800 on 
7 December 1941 to 0800 on 8 December 1941. 

Mr. Masten. That is all we have. 

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KEAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY 

(Resumed) 

Senator Ferguson. Captain Kramer, do you have anything you 
want to add to the record this morning before we start, [10730^ 
other than to answer the two questions that you were to look up? 

Captain Kramer. I have a number of statements or comments that 
I should like to make at this time; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you proceed then, with those? 

Captain Kramer. My first statement is as follows : 

Mr. Chairman, I have always been an admirer of Mr. Fulton Lewis, 
Jr., and in past years have frequently listened to his news broadcasts. 

I have always considered him an objective, unbiased, and accurate 
reporter and commentator. 

Last night I had occasion to listen to Mr. Lewis' broadcast, one of 
the very few opportunities I have had to do so since returning to 
Washington several weeks ago from sick leave in Miami, because of 
the fact that I had no personal radio with me here in Washington. 

In the course of reporting the Pearl Harbor hearings of yesterday, 
Mr. Lewis applied the terms "irate," "antagonistic," and "reluctant" 
to testimony I gave. 

It may well be that he is accurate in tliis regard, inasmuch as I left 
this witness chair at 5 p. m. yesterday afternoon, after testifying for 
approximately 6 hours, with a slight headache, undoubtedly due to the 
fact that I am somewhat out of condition physically. 

[10731] Mr. Chairman, my effort has been to be as objective and 
cooperative with this committee as I possibly could. In pursuance of 
this purpose I have been as truthful as I could. I have endeavored to 
be as precise as possible in distinguishing between what I know to be 
true, what I don't positively know but believe to be true, as well as what 
I don't know and what I merely surmise or presume. 

If I have created any impression of irrationalism, antagonism or 
reluctance, I feel I am under obligation to apologize to this committee 
and assure the members that my only intention in tone of voice or man- 
ner was emphasis on points I was making. I will endeavor to amend 
my tone and manner during further inquiry. 

That is the end of my first statement. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that all you wanted to state ? 

Captain Kramer. That is the end of my first statement. 

Senator Lucas. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. Captain, I heard that same broadcast last night. I 
want to say that in my opinion Fulton Lewis definitely misrepresented 
you in your testimony on yesterday. 

Captain Kramer. Thank you, Senator. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4013 

My second statement, which will be chiefly extemporaneous, is along 
the following lines : Yesterday afternoon in reply [107S2] to a 
question from Mr. Murphy I made the following answer, which I 
will quote from the record which has only been made available to me 
within the last few minutes. I stated : 

It was not until Mr. Keefe, I believe, explained to me that it was his secretary, 
or someone from his office, that had come out the day before, that I first had any 
clue as to who my previous day's visitor was. 

After the close of the hearing yesterday afternoon mv wife indicated 
to me that she thought I was in error in attributing to Mr. Keefe my 
information as to the identity of the visitor I had at the Naval Hos- 
pital the day prior to our conversations with Mr. Keefe and Mr. 
Gearhart. She further stated as her recollection that she made that 
remark to me a few minutes before the arrival of Mr. Keefe and Mr. 
Gearhart in Dr. Duncan's office where we were waiting and that the 
tenor of her remarks had been that the previous afternoon's visitor 
very likely was someone from Mr. Keefe's office which was reported in 
that effect in the press that morning. 

Mr. Keefe, it is my belief it is almost exactly 3 months since that 
episode. At no occasion after leaving Washington a few davs after 
that episode has that thing been discussed by me or recalled in any 
manner to my memory. If I have attributed, as I unquestionably have, 
erroneously [1073S] to you statements to that effect, I wish to 
apologize to you and request the Chair that my testimony of yesterday 
be amended in that respect. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman. I don't understand you are making 
any apology to me, Captain Kramer, are you ? Did I so understand, 
you are addressing your remarks to me? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, I was not impressed by that statement as calling 
for an apology. 

Captain Kramer. Thank you, sir. 

The Chatrman. The testimony will go in as of yesterday and as 
of today. 

Mr. Keefe. I think when I get to examining you myself, if I ever 
do, I think we can very easily clear that matter up, and quite a few 
other things. 

Captain Kramer. I am sure we could, sir. 

My third comment is an item that occurred to me last night during 
a study of certain files in the Navy Department in compliance with a 
request of Senator Ferguson. It concerns the question of this blank 
file number 7001. 

I have previously outlined in my testimony four reasons why there 
should be such a blank file number. Without going into detail I should 
briefly cover them by mentioning that it might have been : 

[10734] (1) A duplication of a previous translation; 

(2) A part of a multipart message given a new file number by 
mistake, and later canceled when given the file number of the first 
part of the multipart message ; 

(3) That it might have been a mechanical slip or personnel error 
in shifting the numbering machine ; and, 



4014 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(4) That it might have been the cancellation of an Army translation. 
The fifth possibility is this: We had a number of categories of 
translations which we filed. One category was the JD file, many trans- 
lations of which appear in Exhibit 1, Exhibit 2, and in various parts 
of the record. 

In addition to this JD file, which meant Japanese diplomatic file, 
there were five or six other files referring to Japan. They were JM, 
meaning Japanese military traffic ; JN, meaning Japanese naval traf- 
fic; JO, meaning Japanese official traffic, other than the three above 
categories; JP, Japanese personal traffic, meaning private communi- 
cations of various kinds; JQ, meaning Japanese commercial traffic; 
and JZ, meaning traffic whose classification could not clearly be 
determined. 

In the clerical process of numbering this traffic in my section, the 
stack of papers sometimes was as much as a foot high, referring by 
that remark to the fact that there [10735] were 14 pieces of 
paper to be given the same number of each translation. There is a 
possibility, it occurs to me, and occurred to me last night, that there 
were a number of incidents of this kind previously, that a translation 
was erroneously grouped in the JD file, given a number and only 
after numbering the whole stack was in discovered that it should have 
been in another category. 

If this happens to be the case in the instance of File No. JD-7001, 
there is a possibility that such translation might appear in another 
category file of the Navy Department with the JD file number crossed 
out and another category file number now appearing on it. 

If the committee so desires, a search for this possibility might be 
instituted, although it may already have been made since I have no 
knowledge whatsoever of what searches have been made in this con- 
nection. If such a new search is unsuccessful, however, there is not 
the slightest question in my mind that one or another of the four 
previous reasons I have given account for this canceled file number. 

I have two additional brief comments, one concerning a question by 
Senator Ferguson on the interpretation or construction to be placed 
on a dispatch from Tokyo to London concerning evacuation of per- 
sonnel. It occurred to me last night while I was making the studies 
I referred to that in [10736] the course of my duty in the 
Pacific during the war and in interrogation of prisoners and study of 
captured documents, both originals and translations thereof, we were 
fortunate from the intelligence point of view on Saipan to capture 
a Japanese chief petty officer who had been a secretary of what corre- 
sponds to our Joint Chiefs of Staff in Japan in the months preceding 
Pearl Harbor. 

This chief yeoman gave us much valuable information concerning 
the events leading up to Pearl Harbor. The impression I gained 
from reading the interrogations of this prisoner were that the Jap- 
anese military had an extremely tight rein on all events controlled 
by the Japanese Government, including control of anything the diplo- 
mats did or might send out from Tolvyo which might, by any possi- 
bility, compromise or even disclose to the officials in the Foreign 
Office or other high Japanese officials not directly concerned anything 
concerning their contemplated surprise of the United States Fleet 
in their attack on Pearl Harbor. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4015 

I mention this simply in connection, as I have stated, with the con- 
struction or interpretation to be placed on that directive to London. 

My last comment concerns Mr. Gearhart's questions regarding four 
dispatches sent out by Naval Operations to the Western Pacific which 
refreshed my memory concerning the [10737] date of the 
winds message. I would like to comment in that connection that there 
is at least the implication in Mr. Gearhart's question that something 
in this connection had been pointed out to me. I rather categoricallj^, 
I believe, denied that implication. 

I would like to state further that these dispatches were made avail- 
able to me last fall — not only these, but records of prior inquiries into 
the Pearl Harbor affair and many other documents — but I never 
midertook a study of them until about 2 weeks ago. Attention was 
again directed to these four dispatches by Captain Safford's state- 
ment of about a week ago. 

Last Saturday while Captain Safford was still on the stand I did 
not come to this hearing but took time out to go to the Navy Building 
where these Japanese diplomatic files were held in order to make a 
study of them for the first time since 1941. It was while studying 
the files that I first recalled the episode in Admiral Noyes office con- 
cerning the drafting of these dispatches. That is in essence pri- 
marily the basis for the refreshing of my memor3\ 

The last thing that I should like to bring up now is two pieces of 
f)aper I have before me summarizing the study I undertook last night, 
which was fairly exhaustive, in connection with the question that 
Senator Ferguson asked me [10738] at the close of the hear- 
ing yesterday afternoon. I believe I can answer his question now 
with some exactitude. 

I would like to state, however, that giving this information verbally 
will undoubtedly appear rather complicated. I have, a few minutes 
ago, suggested to counsel that it might be better, more readily assimi- 
lated, if a smooth copy of this study were prepared and possibly made 
an exhibit in this hearing.^ 

Senator Fergusox. My only reason for wanting it now is that I 
would like to ask you some questions on this. 

Captain KRt\MER. I can read this thing; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you can later file it as a clear copy. 

The Vice Chairman. Without objection. Captain, you may pro- 
ceed with it as you have it and later prepare a smooth copy and sub- 
mit it to counsel for inclusion as an exhibit. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Yesterday afternoon when being questioned concerning this so- 
called pilot message I made the statement that I believed that the pilot 
message had arrived sometime late Saturday afternoon, 6 December 
1941, or Saturday evening, and that I believed it was distributed Sat- 
urday evening with the Japanese note and other papers. I find as a 
result of [10739] my study last night that the pilot message 
was not disseminated, at least in the Navy, until Sunday morning sub- 
sequent to 10 o'clock, at the time when the so-called hidden word 
message and a number of other short messages, including the 1 o'clock 
message, were disseminated. 



^ The document appears in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5481. 



4016 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

\^107Jfi^ The messages disseminated Saturday evening were 
JD File No. 7138, 39, 40, 41, 42, and 43, the last one being the Jap- 
anese note. 

Senator Ferguson. May I just ask the reporter 

Captain Kramer. These messages, with the exception of two, ap- 
pear in exhibit 1, on the following pages. 

Senator Ferguson. May I just have the reporter read me the last 
answer ? I missed one of those numbers. 

(The answer was read by the reporter.) 

Senator Ferguson. The Japanese note ? 

Captain Kramer. The 14-part note. 

The Vice Chairman. Pardon me there. That was the first 13 
parts. 

Captain Kramer. The first 13 parts. 

The Vice Chairman. Of the 14-part note. 

Captain Kramer. Of the 14-part note, that is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, that was what was distributed on Satur- 
day evening? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you give us the pages of Exhibit 1 
that they are at ? 

Captain Kramer. The first one, 7138, does not appear in Exhibit 1. 
I do not know whether it appears elsewhere in this [^107Ji.l'\ 
record or not. The subject is a dispatch from Berlin to Tokyo con- 
cerning an interview with Herr Ribbentrop. 7139 appears on page 235 
of exliibit 1. 

Senator Ferguson. Page 235 ; just a moment. That is the long dis- 
patch from Washington to Tokyo ? 

Captain Kramer. Concerning an interview on 5 December. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Captain Kramer. 7140 appears on page 234 of Exhibit 1. 

Senator Ferguson. Which one of those messages? "In case of 
evacuation by the members of our Embassy"? 

Captain Kramer. It is Tokyo to Washington, serial No. 896. 

Senator Ferguson. Oh, yes, the one at the bottom of the page. 

Captain Kramer. Concerning Terasaki going out of this country. 

Senator Ferguson. And Ando ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. They were to go out the next couple of days? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. All right. 

Captain Kramer. 7141 does not appear in Exhibit 1 but its subject 
is a dispatch from Washington to Tokyo dated 5 \^107Jt2'\ De- 
cember 1941 to the effect that Ambassador Nomura wanted to keep 
Terasaki for the moment because of work in hand. 7142 appears on 
page 237 of Exhibit 1. 

Senator Ferguson. What one of those messages ? 

Captain Kramer. It is Tokyo to Washington,, serial 897, sir. 
Senator Ferguson. It is the one at the bottom of the page. 
[Reading :] 

What I meant in paragraph 2 of my #867 was that of the two sets of "B" code 
machines with which your office is equipped, you are t© burn one set and for the 
time being to continue the use of the other. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4017 

Captain Kramer. Exactly, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Captain Kramer. 7143 is the Japanese first thirteen parts of the 

Japanese note. , „ , • i i 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, that was the Saturday night de- 
liveries ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, does that complete the statement you 
desired to make before examination is resumed. Captain ? 

Captain Kramer. The Senator, I understood, desired to determine 
what was delivered when on Sunday morning. I am [10743] 
coming to that now. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. The first delivery, take Sunday morning 
first. 

Captain Kramer. I find as a result of my study last night that I 
have been under a slightly erroneous impression during the past four 
years as to precisely what was delivered when on Sunday morning. 
I will further elucidate that now. 

Prior to the deliveries made by me commencing about 10 :30 Sunday 
morning the only additional material disseminated earlier that Sun- 
day morning, that is, additional to the material of the previous eve- 
ning, was the fourteenth part Japanese note. 

On Sunday morning at 10 : 30 the following file numbers were de- 
livered: 7144 

Senator Ferguson. 7144; and where do we find that in Exhibit 1? 

Captain Kramer. I will give all those in a moment, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right, thank you. 

Captain Kramer. Through 7151, inclusive. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us where 7144 is in exhibit 1? 

Captain Kramer. It is on page 245 of Exhibit 1, the one concerning 
a typist in the Japanese embassy. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the typist, all right. 

[1074.4] Captain Kramer. 7145 is on page 248 of Exhibit 1, 
Tokyo to Washington, serial 907. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the top of the page; that is the one 
o'clock message? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Captain Kramer. 7146 is on page 248 also. 

Senator Ferguson, Is that the next message? 

Captain Kramer. That is Tokyo serial 908. 

Senator Ferguson. That is "Thank you to the two Ambassadors" ? 

Captain Kramer. To the two Ambassadors, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Captain Kramer. 7147 is on page 249 of Exhibit 1. 

Senator Ferguson. Which one is that? 

Captain Kramer. That is the one, namely, Tokyo serial 910, con- 
cerning the final destruction of cryptographic and other classified 
material. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Captain Kramer. 7148 is the so-called hidden word message ap- 
pearing on page 251. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 



4018 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. 7149 is the so-called pilot message appearing 
on page 238 of Exhibit 1. 

[1074^] Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Captain Kramer. 7150 does not appear in Exhibit 1 or elsewhere 
in this testimony so far as I am aware. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you seen it ? 

Captain Kramer. The subject of it is a very short dispatch Tokyo 
to Washington, serial 905, concerning U. P. and A. P. reports re- 
garding a message from Mr. Roosevelt to the Japanese Emperor. 

Senator Ferguson. What does it say about it ? 

Captain Kramer. It makes inquiries as to its subject and when 
it was sent. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. How about 7151 ? 

Captain Kramer. That one is on page 248, Tokyo serial 909, sub- 
ject, "Thanks to the commercial attache and members of the em- 
bassy staff." 

Senator Ferguson. I thought you gave us that one before under 46? 

Captain Kramer. That was "thanks to the two Ambassadors." 

Senator Ferguson. Oh, I see, yes. 

Captain Kramer. Those were the dispatches delivered at 10 : 30 
on Sunday morning, sir. I would like to point out, sir, additional 
material I have on this paper and refer also to previous testimony 
I have given concerning the chronological arrangement of these dis- 
patches. 

[10746] File No. 7138 through 7143, inclusive, are chronologi- 
cally dated 3 December, 5 December, 5 December, 5 December, 6 De- 
cember, 6 December. 

The group 7144 through 7151 are chronologically dated 6 December, 
7 December, 7 December, 7 December, 7 December, and then 6 Decem- 
ber, 6 December, 7 December. 

Those last three which commenced with the pilot message and end 
with the "thanks to the commercial attache" I now recall specifically 
for the first time. The first five of these, up to the hidden word mes- 
sage, but not including the hidden word message — I must amend that. 

The first four of these were in folders which I was about to leave 
the office to distribute when the hidden word message came in. At about 
the same time, to my present recollection, the three messages 7149 
through 7151 wre delivered to my office by Army. Since, in order 
to insert the hidden word message which I was dictating to my chief 
yeoman into the folders I was about to disseminate, the folders had 
to be broken apart, I directed at that time that the three newly ar- 
riving messages from Army also be inserted in those folders. That is 
the reason for the slight discrepancy in the chronological arrange- 
ment of all these dispatches in this folder, which was our invariable 
practice. 

I hope that answers your question, sir. 

[10747] Senator Ferguson. It answers it but I don't know as 
it makes it any clearer. 

Captain Kramer. I realize that that pilot message apparently com- 
plicates previous testimony given here but, nevertheless, that is my 
present conviction on the time that that pilot message was delivered 
based on my refreshing of memory of last night. 

Senator Ferguson. I don't want the answer that I made that I said 
it doesn't make it any clearer to indicate that I am commenting on 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4019 

the evidence at all, but now I do want to get something about this 
pilot message. 

If you did not know what this pilot message was until 10 : 30 in the 
morning on Sunday morning how did you know there was going to be a 
fourteenth part? 

Captain Kramer. Because, sir, when the first part of this 14-part 
message was broken down after decryption of the first few lines there 
appears, as there appeared in every Japanese dispatch, an indication 
of how many parts were in that dispatch and which part that was. 
My recollection is that the first part broken down was the eighth part 
of a 14-part message. The time when that occurred, to my best recol- 
lection, was about 3 p. m. Saturday afternoon. That made it imme- 
diately apparent that 14 parts were due to come in. 

[1074B] Senator Ferguson. How did you know without the 
pilot message that you were going to get an answer to the 26th note 
and that is what you were all standing by for and working on? 

Captain Kramer. I did not, at least, know positively but certainly 
at the time and now presumed from the context of the parts we were 
breaking down that that must be the reply to Mr. Hull's note of 26 
November. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know whether message 900 came 
in on the same teletype as 901, the pilot message ? 

Captain Kramer. I have no record of Tokyo serial 900 in the study 
I made last night, sir. I might add that 

Senator Ferguson. Were you in the Navy Department — pardon me, 
I" don't want to cut you off. 

Captain Kramer. And I believe Tokyo serials 903 and 906 do not 
appear as a part of this record. My recollection of a phone call made 
last night is that we have 906 but never intercepted or received 903. 

Senator Ferguson. That was not my question. Did you work in 
the Navy Department last night ? 

Captain Kramer. I did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. With whom did you work ? 

Captain Kramer. Commander Boone, the custodian of the file I 
referred to. 

Senator Ferguson. And it was then that you made up the 
[107^9] information that you gave us that morning? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now I will ask you what time 901 
came in and what message was on the same teletype ? 

Captain Kramer. I have no knowledge concerning that, sir; since 
I had no direct contact at any time with the incoming teletype traffic 
except on the rare occasions when I examined it, chiefly during the 
period of ten days preceding Pearl Harbor, examining plain language 
traffic. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, what is in that file specifically 
to show that you did not get 901, which is the pilot message, until after 
10 or 10: 30 on Sunday morning? Wliat was there in the file? 

Captain Kramer. I am speaking. Senator, in my comments from 
this study only of the time it was received in the Navy Department. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. What is in the file of the Navy De- 
partment to show what time 901, the pilot message, was received in 
the Navy ? 



4020 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION MARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. We used no time stamp in my section of the Navy 
Department, sir, at any time. However, every time a delivery was 
made by me, and they were frequent, between Saturday noon and 
Sunday noon, all messages on hand completely translated, either by 
Navy or Army, were disseminated [10760] at once. 

Senator Ferguson. That did not answer my question at all. 

Captain Kramer. I am sorry, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, I asked you what there was in the Navy De- 
partment to show the time of the delivery, or the receipt of 901, the 
pilot message, in the Navy Department ? 

Captain Kjiamer. I thought I was answering your question directly 
in my previous comments. I should like to further elucidate by ex- 
tending my answer. 

Senator Ferguson. Don't elucidate. Just answer that question and 
then we will let you elucidate. 

Captain Kramer. If that pilot message had been in my section when 
I left the office at 9 : 30 I would very definitely have made delivery at 
that time. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, what 

Captain Kramer. It was not in my office at that time, namely, 9 : 30, 
I am thoroughly convinced now, but arrived not during the intervening 
period between the time I left my office and returned to my office, but at 
about the time I was leaving my office for the second time. If it had 
been in my office when the folders were first made up for my departure 
on my second trip it would have been included chronologically with 
the group file Nos. 7144 through 7148 in num- [10751] beririg 
that group of messages. 

Senator Ferguson. What is in your office now to show when the pilot 
message was received? Now, watch the question. I want to know 
what I can look at in your office in the Navy Department to show what 
time 901, the pilot message, was received? 

Captain Kramer. You can look at nothing which will positively 
indicate when the pilot message was received that I am aware of, sir ; 
except the file which I studied last night, which I am attempting to 
interpret to you, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, I want that file brought here 
that we may see how you made that study. Have you got the file here ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not have it, sir. I understood that Com- 
mander Boone would be here this morning with it. I am not familiar 
with whether he is here or not. 

Senator Ferguson. Will counsel get in touch with Commander 
Boone so that we can get this file ? ^ 

Now, what was there in that file ? Tell me from your memory what 
was in that file to show that the pilot message was not translated prior 
to your delivery at 9 o'clock Saturday evening ? 

Captain Kramer. There is nothing whatsoever in the file. Senator, 
to show definitely one way or another that point. [10752] I am 
only trying to indicate that that point is my present recollection and 
conviction as the result of studying that group of messages. 

Senator Ferguson. But yesterday you had no doubt in your mind 
that the pilot message was with the 13 parts because you described it 
and you discussed it with these various men. 

1 See Hearings, Part 8, p. 3800. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4021 

Captain Kramer. I am sorry, sir; if I created that impression. I 
believe the first time, or the first few minutes that question was pro- 
pounded to me I was rather doubtful and so expressed myself, as to 
the time the pilot message was received in the Navy Department. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, will you be able to get in this Navy file 
teletype serial Nos. 347 and 348, the initial "S" before it, Tokyo serial 
900 and 901, and see whether or not these two messages, one of them 
being the pilot message, came in on the same teletype and were logged 
by Davis on the third and fourth messages on his watch ? 

Captain Kramer. I will undertake that, sir. I have previously indi- 
cated, I believe, that I had no direct connection with such teletype 
receipts, however, so I have no first-hand knowledge concerning the 
technicalities of that matter. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. And that that message was 
[10758] received in the Navy Department about 8 o'clock local 
time on the 6th day of December 1941 and whether it was not sent to 
the Army and whether it was not decoded by them and delivered on 
Saturday afternoon. 

"General Miles" — this is on page 3590. 

The Vice Chairman. Of what. Senator ? 

Senator Ferguson. Of our record. General Miles says, "Senator" — 
I had better go back and read something. I am examining; the 
Senator from Michigan is examining Miles. [Reading :] 

Senator Fbieguson. I am trying to get an answer to this question: If your 
department was alerted as you expected Hawaii to be alerted by the same message, 
how do you account personally for the pilot message not being delivered to Gen- 
eral Marshall, the Chief of Staff, who was the only man under his testimony 
that could act, he or the President or tlie Secretary of War, as I understand 
his testimony? Now, how do you account for that pilot message that came 
in separately, not part of the fourteen parts, that that was not delivered on 
the day it was translated? 

Miles says : 

Senator, my answer is, first, that I had every reason to believe that General 
Marshall did receive the [1076J^] locked pouch which contained this mes- 
sage. I heard this testimony this morning. I think he is mistaken in saying 
that he did not receive that message on the afternoon of the 6th. 

Captain Kramer. I cannot presume to state anything regarding the 
Army dissemination of that pilot message. Senator. I was comment- 
ing only concerning my dissemination of that pilot message in the 
Navy Department and to the White House. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, you haven't any idea, 
the way you testify this morning, that this pilot message which is 
numbered prior and received at some time early on the morning of the 
6th you had no knowledge of that before you had the thirteen parts 
and even the fourteenth part ? 

Captain Kramer. That is my present conviction. That was my 
conviction at the time I first commented on that point, sir, that at 
the time we were getting the first parts of that Japanese note we still 
had no knowledge of a Japanese note coming to us. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, let us take 901 from the information that 
we get. 

Filed by the Japanese 8 : 56 P. M. on the 6th, Tokyo time : Washington time 
6 : 56 A. M., December the 6th. 



4022 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[107S5] That is Saturday morning, 6 : 56. 

Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S (Bainb ridge Island, Washing- 
ton) at 7 : 15 to 7 : 20 A. M., December the 6th. 
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N & A) — 

blank time. 

Teletype sheet containing Japanese code received by Army SIS from Navy (A) 
12 : 05 P. M. December the 6th. 
Decoded, translated and typed at Army SIS (A) on the 6th of December. 

Now, that is bofere midnight? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, how do you account for this important 
pilot message not getting to the Navy before 10 : 30 on Sunday morn- 
ing and after the fourteenth part was translated by you ? 

Captain Kramer. Senator, in my reading a few mmutes ago from 
this study of mine I indicated that as a result of a refreshed memory 
from the study last night that the only additional material dissemi- 
nated in my first trips on Simday morning was the fourteenth part of 
the note from Japan which I finished translating about 8 o'clock Sun- 
day morning. 

It is apparent to me now that no deliveries of translations was made 
to my section by Army until my return from the [10756] 
State Department after my 10 o'clock appointment there. Six — 
rather, seven of the translations appearing under these file numbers 
7144 through 7151 are Army translations. The only translation in 
that block is one Navy translation, the so-called hidden word message. 
If any Army translations had been delivered to my section prior to 
my return from Mr. Hull's office or, rather, perhaps prior to my de- 
parture for Mr. Hull's office I would most definitely have made de- 
livery at that time. . 

Senator Ferguson. Now I will come back to this question : Wliat is 
there in the file that the committee can look at. This has been fur- 
nished to us by the services, this information that I told you about, 
12 : 05 on December the 6th, "Decoded, translated and typed at Army 
SIS on December the 6th." Now, what is there in the Navy file that 
this committee can look at to show that this message did not get to 
you until 10 : 30, which was after the time you had already delivered 
the fourteenth part message? I want to know what is there in the 
file that we can look at? 

Captain Kramer. Nothing, sir, except what I have already outlined. 

Senator Ferguson. What is it ? Now, tell us, what can we look at ? 

Captain Kramer. The file itself. Senator. 

[107S7] Senator Ferguson. What is in there that will show us 
this that you are telling us, that it did not get to you on the sixth ? 

Captain Kramer. Nothing more than the translations themselves 
bearing the various file numbers. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Is the man here with that file now ? 

Commander Baecher. You mean 901, Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. 901. It shows what he examined last night in 
the Navy. There is the difficulty we find here, that the Navy — they 
can examine things down in the 'Navy and this committee cannot re- 
ceive them here so that we know what these men are talking about. 

Commander Baecher. Senator, the man has brought the file up 
here. He is in the phone booth now. We can find out whether it is 
that one or not. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4023 

Senator Ferguson. See if it is that particular one. I want to know 
what the witness saw in the Navy Department last night. You saw 
a file ? 

Captain Kramer. A file ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And I want that file brought into the committee 
room, and then we can find out what you saw instead of you just tell- 
ing us. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, Mr. Chairman, there was no 
[107S8] reference to this file up until 4 or 5 minutes ago ; we have 
never seen it. We are not clairvoyants, and I don't think the Navy 
Department is either. It seems to me that if the Senator wants it, 
and I think he is entitled to it, and I would like to see it myself, that 
we should possess ourselves in patience until the Navy can get it here. 
I rather gathered from the Senator's remarks that he was criticizing 
the Navy in some respect. 

Senator Ferguson. No. 

Mr. EiCHARDSON. Of course, as far as we are concerned, we don't 
care. 

Senator Ferguson. But if a man goes in and examines a file in the 
evening and comes up here and testifies about it in the morning — and, 
as I understand, there is some conflict between what he said yesterday 
and now — it would be well for the committee to see what is in the file 
to ascertain what he saw last night to change his opinion this morning. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, I agree entirely, and 7001 

Senator Ferguson. 7001 is what is necessary. 

Mr. Richardson. 7001 is here for examination and has been here 
for a couple of days now. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, the other one is number what ? 

'110759'] Senator Ferguson. I don't know the number. He did 
not state a number. 

Captain Kramer. There is simply one file involved, Mr. Counsellor. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, we will have that here very, very shortly 
for you, Senator. 

SenatorFERGUSON. I asked eai4ier this morning for message 900. 
I will pass that part for the time being. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; I will yield. 

Mr. Murphy. At one time before Admiral Hewitt there were as 
many as three witnesses present. Why wouldn't it be a good idea to 
have the Army, or whoever prepared exhibit 41, present so that we 
would have the Army witness on those times and the Navy witness 
and then get the whole picture cleared up ? 

The Vice Chairman. Well, it looks like we do well enough if we 
proceed with one witness at a time. Go ahead, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. I won't take any more time than I have to on 
this, but I would like to get it cleared up. It is a matter that ought 
to be at least clear on the record. 

Now, you appeared before the Na /y court, did you ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir ; I did, 

1^10760'] Senator Ferguson. And they say in question No. 85 : 

I show you exhibit 38 of exhibit 63 and ask you if you had this about the 6th 
of December 1941 and, if so, at what tim«? This is the dispatch informing the 
Japanese legation that a long dispatch will be transmitted shortly and setting 



4024 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

forth that a definite time would be given later as to the delivery of the long 
dispatch. 

A. I believe that that was received and delivered the evening of the 6th, along 
vpith the first thirteen parts. 

Q. Was that one of the dispatches that was referred to in your previous testi- 
mony as being some of the other material? 

A. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Now, that was back when you testified before the Navy Court of 
Inquiry. 

Captain ICramer. In that respect, Senator, it is obvious to me now 
that my memory was faulty after 2 years intervening since I had had 
contact with that material. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, Captain, there was a Commission ap- 
pointed by the President within a few days after Pearl Harbor, isn't 
that true 'i 

Captain Kramer. If you refer to the Roberts Commission; 
[10761] yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, Yes. That Presidential Commission was to 
make an inquiry, isn't that correct ^ 

Captain Kramer. I believe so ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And at that time I assume that you thought you 
would be called as a witness. 

Captain Kramer. I was uncertain about that point. The fact is, 
I never was called. 

Senator Ferguson. I realize you were not called but I am just try- 
ing to get at that time that at least you expected you would iDe called 
because you were one of the men who delivered messages. 

Captain Kramer. I was at no time under the impression that I was 
likely to be called, although there was the possibility I might be called. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you understand then that the Roberts 
Commission was not to investigate Washington, that you would not 
be called because they were not going to investigate Washington^ 

Captain Kramer. My only knowledge, Senator, of what took place 
before the Roberts hearing was and still is the result of a few conver- 
sations I had with Captain McCollum who was a witness and the 
report subsequently published concerning that hearing. 

[10762] Senator Ferguson. What I am trying to get at. Cap- 
tain, is when you knew that this Commission was meeting and that 
you were one of the interested parties, why you did not review in 
your own mind this situation and see whether or not anything had 
happened in your office or in your deliveries that went wrong. Did 
you do that ? 

Captain Kramer. Senator, at no time subsequent to the attack on 
Pearl Harbor did I attempt to refresh my memory in that respect 
until the arrival of Captain Safford's first letter to me. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, here is the proposition: You had 
delivered the 14 parts ? 

Senator Ferguson. Thirteen and the fourteenth the next morning? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You knew that a message had been sent by 
General Marshall? 

Captain Kramer. I was not aware of that until after the Roberts 
hearings were finished, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4025 

Senator Ferguson. You then did not go over this in your own mind 
in any way to know what you liad delivered ? You were not concerned 
with it? 

Captain Kjramer. I recollect no attempt to refresh my [1076S] 
memory in that respect. My feeling now is that my memory would 
have been quite clear in the possibility I was called before this hearing. 

Senator Ferguson. You mean before the Roberts hearing? 

Captain Kramer. The Roberts hearing ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I am going to just briefly, if I can, review 
whom you delivered the 13-part message to and these others that you 
say you delivered at the same time on Saturday evening. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you give McCollum a copy? 

Captain Kjiajmer. No, sir ; I did not. I phoned him, however, about 
9 o'clock concerning the note. I would like to comment further 

Mr. Richardson. Just suppose you answer his questions, sir, and 
then later on do the commenting. 

Captain Kramer. Omit that comment. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not give a copy to McCollum. You 
telephoned to him about it. Now, you next say that the next place 
of your delivery or telephone to anyone that you reached was the 
White House, the map room. 

Captain Kjramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You delivered a copy there and left a copy there ? 

[10764] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. There isn't any doubt now in your mind about 
that? 

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever and there never has been, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. You went out to Secretary Knox, 
the next delivery? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Isn't that correct? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you made a delivery at Secretary Knox of 
all this material and he read it all ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you leave any copies of the 13 parts with 
Secretary Knox? 

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you went to Wilkinson's home and you 
found there three men that were entitled to see this, Admiral Beardall, 
Admiral Wilkinson, and General Miles? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. They read all of this material, each of them? 

Captain Kramer. They did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And the comments were as vou have said 
[1076S] isn't that correct? 

Captain Kramer. In that tenor ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, did you leave any copy with 
them ? 

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, you went home? 

Captain Kramer. I went to the Navy Department. 

79716 — 46 — pt. 9 8 



4026 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. You went to the Navy Department and you 
had in your possession then every one of the copies of the 13 parts, 
except the one you left at the White House ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir, with the exception that by 
9 o'clock 7 copies of all this material, so far as Navy translation^ 
are concerned, had been or were delivered to the Army Signal In- 
telligence section. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. In other words, the Navy deliveries had 
all been made that you could make, and you had delivered them to 
the Army at 9 o'clock that night, all these messages? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And to whom were they delivered in the Army ? 

Captain Kramer. I have no first-hand knowledge of that, 
[10766] sir. My presumption is that they were delivered to the 
same section of the Signal Intelligence that all this material was 
always delivered to. 

Senator Ferguson. And that would be to Colonel Bratton's section ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. Colonel Bratton was in the Far East 
section, the head of the Far East section of Military Intelligence. All 
this material was delivered initially to the x4.rmy Signal Intelligence 
section, which then delivered to Colonel Bratton. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, the Army Intelligence. Now, as I under- 
stand it, you brought this file back, as far as the Navy copies were con- 
cerned, and put them in your safe? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you telephone Ingersoll and — you 
know who I mean by Admiral Ingersoll ? 

Captain Kramer. I do, sir; and I did not telephone Admiral Inger- 
soll and I can recollect now no occasion during 1940 or 1941 that 
I did phone Admiral Ingersoll or attempt to make deliveries directly 
or initially to him except on the few occasions when he was in his 
office during working hours and Admiral Stark was absent. 

Senator Ferguson. And you did not deliver to Ingersoll that night 
any of these copies? 

[10767] Captain Kramer. No, sir; I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Nor the next morning? 

Captain Kramer. Not directly to Admiral Ingersoll ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. He was not at Wilkinson's ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir; not to my present recollection. 

Senator Ferguson. And he was not at the Secretary of the Navy's? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. He was not at the map room in the White 
House ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I am now going to ask you if you can explain his 
testimony on page 59 of the Navy inquiry. Tnis is extracted testi- 
mony of Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, U. S. Navy, pages 824 to 842, 
inclusive, this is on page 829. 

Now, Royal E. Ingersoll was the Chief — what do you call him — 
to Admiral Stark? 

Captain Kramer. That post was at that .Ime, as I recollect it, 
termed the Assistant Chief of Naval Oi^erations. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4027 

Senator Ferguson. All r^ght. And you told me yesterday that 
you had not delivered him a copy. You knew who I was talking about 
yesterday ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

[10768] Senator Ferguson. And no one had a copy except the 
White House, as far as the Navy was concerned ? 

Captain Krajvier. That night ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And do you know of any reason why the Army 
would go out of its way to deliver to IngersoU a copy of this message? 

Captain Kjiamer. I cannot comment directly on that. Senator. It 
is possible, however, that Admiral IngersoU may have seen a copy of 
that message pursuant to any deliveries Colonel Bratton may have 
made that night, in the same manner that General Miles saw the file 
I was delivering that night. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, he may have been at a place 
where Bratton had delivered a copy that night? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not have any assistants that night 
delivering these messages on the thirteen parts, did you ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir ; except that of my wife, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And she remained in the car? 

Captain I^amer. Most of the time except the latter part of my stay 
at Admiral Wilkinson's home. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Well, you know that she did not deliver 
any copy to Admiral IngersoU ? 

Captain Kramer. My wife at no time was ever cognizant [10769] 
of the precise nature of these messages. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. [Reading :] 

56. Q. You have testified that you did see a rather long dispatch. Did you say 
it was on the night of December 6? 

A. It was some time during the night of December 6 or 7. I don't know whether 
it was before or after midnight. 

57. Q. You do not mean the night of December 7? 

A. It was some time during the very late evening of December 6 or the early 
morning of December 7. Whether or not it was before or after midnight, I don't 
recall. 

58. Q. You have also testified that, as you remember, the latter portion of this 
rather long message was missing? 

A. As I remember, the officer who brought the dispatch to the house stated that 
there was a part of the message missing. I think he told me it was the latter part. 

59. Q. Did the tone of this rather long message which you say you received 
on the night of 6th-7th of December 1941 indicate a friendly or conciliatory 
spirit on the part of the Japanese? 

[10770] A. No ; because it merely confirmed the whole course of negotia- 
tions from the very beginning. This message was nothing but a smoke screen, 
eye wash, and window dressing for the record. 

60. Q. Did you have any opinion at the time you saw this dispatch that diplo- 
matic negotiations were then broken off officially? 

A. So far as the Navy Department was concerned, negotiations with the Japa- 
nese had stopped about the 27th of November. 

Now, will 3^ou account for Admiral Royal E. IngersoU 's testi- 
mony in that record, sworn to ? 

Captain Kramer. I cannot account for that, sir. I can only pre- 
sume that it must be attributed to faulty memory. 

Senator Ferguson. AVill you read that answer, please ? 

(The answer was read by the reporter.) 



4028 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, as I understand your testi- 
mony, you telephoned to the department where Admiral Turner was, 
who was the superior officer to Admiral Ingersoll ? You telephoned 
to that office, the War Plans, the Navy Plans, or what is the name 
of it? 

Captain Kramer. Admiral Turner was not Ingersoll's superior 
but his junior. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Oh, that is right; yes, he was his [10771'] 
junior. But you telephoned Admiral Turner and did not get him? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. And you did not get his home. He 
did not answer the phone? 

Captain Kramer. That is my present recollection; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, how do you account for Turner saying 
that he got a copy if you did not give it to him as you say here ? 

Captain Kramer. The remarks I made concerning Admiral Inger- 
soll would apply in the case of Admiral Turner. 

[10772] Senator Ferguson. Now I want to read to you 

Mr. Keefe. May I get that answer ? 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read it, please ? 

(The answer was read by the reporter.) 

Mr. Keefe. Do I understand that to mean that the remarks you 
refer to that Kramer made, that he can only explain it by faulty 
memory ? 

Captain I^amer. Or the other possibility that he may have seen 
some copy delivered by the Army. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand that you want to say now 
that it is faulty memory, that you did not deliver to Ingersoll? Is 
that faulty memory? 

Captain Kramer. I made no delivery to Admiral Ingersoll. 

Senator Ferguson. And you are positive about that ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. There is no faulty memory about that? 

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you made none to Turner, and you have 
no faulty memory about that? 

Captain Kramer. I am quite clear on that point, too, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Turner says, on page 5219 of the testi- 
mony, while he is being examined by Mr. Mitchell [reading] : 

Admiral Tuknee. Yes, sir. 

[1077S'] Now this is on page 5219 : 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, turning now to the messages that were intercepted be- 
tween Japan and her Ambassadors here in Washington on the day of the 6th and 
7th of December 1941, what are known as tlie pilot message, the 14-part message 
and the 1 : 00 p. m'. message, when did you first have called to your attention or 
see any part or all of those messages? You know what I am talking about? 

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. I think I testified that my recollection is that 
sometime just preceding the 7th, some night, and I now believe it to have been 
the night of December 6th, about 11 : 30 p. m. an oflBcer came to my house and 
I was in bed and went down and read a long dispatch in several part?. I believe 
that that was the dispatch in question. I asked the officer to whom he had suown 
these, and he said, "Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Ingersoll, and Secretary Knox," 
and I did nothing more about it. 

Captain Kramer. Senator, in that connection I should like to re- 
mark that I believe, in my present recollection, that approximately a 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4029 

week, it may have been more than that, preceding Pearl Harbor I did 
make a delivery to Admiral Turner's home late one evening. It is pos- 
sible that Admiral Turner is confusing that incident with this subject. 
Senator Ferguson. I want to read on : 

[10174] Mr. Mitchell. Well, when you say that was the dispatch in ques- 
tion, my question was probably too broad. 

Admiral Tubneb. The first 13 parts. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Admiral Turner. The first 13 parts, I believe. 

The Vice Chaieman. What time did he say he saw it? 

Admiral Tdeneb. 11 : 30 p. m. 

Mr. MTTrTT FT.T. , 11 1 30 in the evening at his house. 

Admiral Tuener. About 11 : 30 at night. 

The Vice Chairman. Of the 6th? 

Admiral Turner. Of the 6th ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Where had you been at about that time? 

Admiral Turner. I had been home. 

Mr. Mitchell. All evening? 

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. That is confirmed by a telegram which I just re- 
ceived from my wife as to where we were that night. She said we were home 
and that is my recollection. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, the next day what was the first hour you say at 
which you saw the 14th part and the 1 p. m.? 

Admiral Turner. I do not recall seeing the 14th part until after the attack 
I did see the 1 p. m. part. 

I had stayed at home Sunday morning and about 10 : 30, as I recall it, Admiral 
Stark called up and said there was [/ 0,775] a dispatch from Admiral 
Hart or a letter, rather, and he wanted me to come down to the ofiice. I went 
down to the office, arriving there sometime, I believe, about 11 : 15, it may have 
been a little ahead of that, and it was quite urgent that a letter be written to 
Admiral Hart and he gave me the necessary information. I went to my office 
and started writing the reply and had just about finished and looked over my 
dispatches for the day and Admiral Stark called me on the interphone and told 
me to come to his office. That, as I recall, was about 12 or 12 : 15. 

Now there isn't any doubt that Admiral Turner knew what he was 
talking about, the 13-part message, and that he saw it that night, is 
there, in your mind, from his testimony ? 

Captain Kramer. That appears obvious from his testimony. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Captain Kramer. It further, however, obviously differs from my 
recollections. 

Senator Ferguson, There isn't any doubt now that you say it differs 
from your recollection ? 

Captain Kramer. There is no doubt about that ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Isn't it very important in this case, if this com- 
mittee is ever going to solve these problems, that we can get some kind 
of reconciliation between this testimony, so we know actually what 
happened and who had this knowledge [10,776] in Washing- 
ton ( Isn't that your opinion ? 

Captain Kramer. That would be my personal opinion, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know how this committee is going to gel 
t he testimony ? 

Captain Ivramer. I am afraid I can offer no further suggestions. 

Senator Ferguson. You haven't any suggestions 'i 

Captain Kramer. In that connection to this committee; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think it is important as to whether Inger- 
soll or Turner knew about this on the night of the 6th ? 

Captain Kjramer. I believe so ; yes, sir. 



4030 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Mtirpht. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Feegusox. Now do you know, or do you have any informa- 
tion that Admiral Ingersoll or Admiral Turner were in touch with 
the Secretary of the Navy that night, and that somehow they got copies 
from there, or that the one out of the White House was circulated to 
anybody after you left it there that night ? 

Captain Kramer. Not that I am aware of ; no, sir. 

Senator Fergusox. Have you ever heard about it ? 

Captain Kramer. No. sir. 

[10,777] Senator Fejiguson. So the only one, so far as the Navy 
was concerned, that was outside of your safe — and these were secret 
documents ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Fergusox (continuing). Was in the White House, in the 
Map Room ? 

Captain Kramer. So far as I am aware ; yes. 

Senator Fergusox. And here were two men who testified under 
oath, one before this committee and one before the Navy Board, that 
they were delivered copies on Saturday night. Have you any way 
that you can reconcile that ? You are the only man that can reconcile 
that, are you not? 

Captain Kramer. I cannot reconcile that conflict ; no, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Fergusox. Yes; I will yield. 

Mr. Murphy. I just wanted to point out that at page 962 of the 
Naval Court of Inquiry Captain Kramer says that he had not de- 
livered that to Admiral Turner on that evening. The same conflict 
existed there as it does here. 

Senator Fergusox. All right. Now we are back — and I am sorry 
this takes so much time, but I do not know of any other way to get 
it than to get it from witnesses, if there is even that way. As far as my 
ability is concerned, I seem to be unable to understand it. 

[10778] Now let us get to the morning of the 7th. I do not 
suppose that there was any time more important in the history of 
this Nation than the morning of the 7th of December 1941. Will 
you agree with me on that? 

Captain Kramer. Certainly during my lifetime, I believe that is 
correct, sir. 

Senator Fergusox. So we agree on the importance of this morning. 
Now you told us that the 14th part message was translated by you 
and ready for delivery at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 7th. 

Captain Kramer. About that time, or a very few minutes after; 
yes, sir. 

Senator Fergusox. All right. We will then speak of it as 8 o'clock, 
and you delivered that to the head of the Far Eastern Section, which 
was McCollum ? 

Captain Kramer. I have a quite definite recollection that the first 
time Captain McCollum saw any part of this note, the 14th part was 
included. I had informed him the previous night about the 13 parts 
and he had told me in words to the effect that he would be down early 
the following morning and would look at it then. 

Senator Ferguson. Now how early did you see him Sunday 
morning ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4031 

Captain Kjramer. My present recollection on that is [10779] 
that it was between 8 and 8 : 15. 

Senator Ferguson. And therefore you delivered to him this 14th 
part and the 13 parts at that time ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; together with other traffic. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; with this other traffic that you have 
mentioned. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that in your office or his office? 

Captain Kramer. In Captain McCollum's office, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And how far was his office from yours? 

Captain I^amer. Up two decks and two corridors away in the Navy 
Department. 

Senator Ferguson. Two corridors and up two decks. You went 
to his office, I assume, with this message? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And did you leave the 14 parts with him ? 

Captain Ivramer. I did, sir. Invariably, a copy of all this traffic 
was left in the Far East Section for periods varying from a few days 
to, more normally, several weeks. 

Senator Ferguson. And did you leave more than one copy there? 

Captain Kramer. My present recollection is that I left several 
copies with him, so that he could make deliveiy as [10780] soon 
as he learned that Admiral Stark or Admiral Wilkinson arrived at 
the Navy Department. 

Senator Ferguson. Then between 8 and 8 : 15 he had copies for 
Stark and Wilkinson ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. That was Stark and Wilkinson. 

Captain Kramer. Presumably for Admiral Turner, too, who could 
be shown one of those copies. 

Senator Ferguson. You left two copies with him ? 

Captain Kramer. That is my present recollection, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is your present recollection? 

Captain Kramer. Yes; that is, two copies in addition to the one 
for the Far East Section. 

Senator Ferguson. That would make three copies that you left? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir ; that is my present recollection. 

Senator Ferguson. Three out of seven, one being at the White 
House, that left three in your possession, is that correct? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now did he say that he had an ap- 
pointment with Admiral Stark that morning ? 

Captain Kramer. I recollect no comment of that nature ; no, sir. 

[10781] Senator Ferguson. But you had been told by Wilkinson 
that Stark would be down at the office? 

Captain Kramer. It was not quite as categorical as that, sir. It 
was to the effect that Admiral Stark would ahnost certainly, or very 
likely, some words to that effect, be at the Navy Department early the 
next morning and I was to get it to him as soon as he arrived there. 

[10782] Senator Ferguson. Now, as far as McCollum was con- 
cerned, he did not mention what time Stark would be down, or 



4032 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

whether Stark would be down— and when I use "Stark" I would 
like to have the stenographer always put the word "Admiral" before 
it, because this is no disrespect 

Captain Kramer. No mention whatsoever that I recall, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So that you left the copy there and then you 
went out of the office. You left the three copies and you left the 
office ? 

Captain Kramer. Returning to my office ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Now, wasn't it your duty at that time to deliver at 8 : 15 or 8 o'clock 
a copy of this fourteenth' part to the Secretary of the Navy, to the 
President of the United States, wasn't it your duty to do that? Why 
did you go to the office and keep your copies there, and not make your 
deliveries? 

Captain Kramer. Senator, in all my activities concerned with the 
dissemination or delivery of this traffic, I was acting as a subordinate 
of Captain McCollum, and Director of Naval Intelligence. Frequent 
diversions on their direction, were made from routine. I, as a rule, 
attempted to get all traffic to Captain McCollum, or [10783] 
Admiral Wilkinson, or both, prior to deliveries to any other recipient. 
If they had instructions concerning a particular folder, they would give 
them to me at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I am going to get at now. Did 
they have instructions, did they give you any instructions in relation 
to that folder, that you did not make' a delivery to the White House 
and one to the Secretary of the Navy? 

Captain Kramer. None that I recall, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, do I understand that you made no de- 
liveries unless you had specific directions or instructions from Mc- 
Collum? 

Captain Kramer. That is not correct, sir. Frequently, when unable 
to contact Captain McCollum, in fact, normally when I was unable 
to contact Captain McCollum, or Admiral Wilkinson, I made de- 
liveries, as far as possible, to all other recipients, and informed those 
two officers, as soon as practicable, of who had these copies. 

Senator Ferguson. You had then specific instructions to deliver to 
the President of the United States the 13 parts on Saturday night, 
did you? 

Captain Kramer. I had no specific instructions. I made that in 
pursuance of what I have just outlined. 

[10784] Senator Ferguson. Then I will ask you why the same 
rule did not apply the next morning at 8 o'clock when you had a copy, 
and you knew how important the fourteenth part was, because it had 
at the top of it "Very Important," even by the Japanese, why you 
did not immediately take that to the President of the United States. 

Captain Kramer. I informed Captain McCollum of my 1 o'clock 
appointment — rather my 10 o'clock appointment at the State Depart- 
ment; outlined to him at that time in more detail just what deliveries 
had been made the night before; indicated to him that I had work 
in hand in my office, and at least gained the impression that my con- 
templated departure from the Navy Department a half or three- 
quarters or perhaps an hour later would be sufficiently rapid delivery 
of this material, which, I should like to further comment on, was 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4033 

far more expeditious than had been the case on any other day durins 
1941, prior to this time. ^ 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you what deliveries you had ever made 
to the Secretary of the Navy at his home at night before; I mean 
you personally ? 

Captain Kramer. I can recollect no previous occasion when I deliv- 
ered personally to Secretary Knox at his home. In elucidation of 
that point, I should like to mention, [10785] however that my 
initial attempt in deliveries to the Secretary of the Navy was always 
to get his Naval Aide, then Captain and now Admiral Beatty who 
customarily took any copies for the Secretary's perusal. ' 

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever delivered personally to the Presi- 
dent a message at 9 o'clock, or any time at night, other than on this 
December 6 ? ' 

Captain Kramer. Not at night, personally, to the President, sir. 
Ihe only occasion when I did make personal delivery in the late sum- 
mer or early fall of 1941, was late in the afternoon, as I recollect 
6 or 5 : 30 p. m. ' 

On another occasion, in fact two other occasions, on the direction of 
Admiral Stark, I made late evening deliveries to Mr. Hopkins in the 
Naval Hospital, then located at the west end of Constitution Avenue 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Now, do I understand Mr. Harry Hopkins was on the list to get 
these secret code messages? Is that what you are telling me? 

Captain Kramer. He was not on any list; no, sir; butl was given 
to understand by Admiral Stark that he customarily saw the copy 
left for the President. ^-^ 

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you tell me what messages \ 10786] 
you delivered to Harry Hopkins on the instructions of Admiral 
Stark i 

Captain Kramer. I do not recall specifically what messages, sir 
1 might be able to reconstruct that by an examination of the files 
althought I doubt it. However, it could be determined within limits 
by determining the dates during which Mr. Hopkins was in the hos- 
pital. My recollection is, in connection with those deliveries to Mr 
Hopkins that Admiral Stark indicated, or told me, or asked me rather! 
whether I had any instructions from the White House to show these 
copies to Mr. Hopkins during his hospitalization. 

On my reply in the negative, he directed me to make such delivery 

Senator Ferguson. Now, over how long a period did this delivery 
to Harry Hopkins, or Mr. Hopkins, continue ? 

Captain Kramer. My present recollection is, sir, that it occurred 
twice, about 4 or 5 days apart, during one period of Mr. Hopkins' 
hospitalization. ^ 

Senator Ferguson. To whom did you deliver that? Mr Hopkins 
personally? " ^ 

Captain Kramer. I sat with Mr. Hopkins while he perused them- 

yes, sir. ' 

Senator Ferguson. You were in the room, you delivered [10787] 
giem personally, and you waited until he went over the messages « 
Ihey were magic, no doubt about that ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Purple? 



4034 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. Purple and other systems, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you evaluate them for Mr. Hopkins, or did 
he evaluate them for you, or did you discuss them ? 

Captain Kramer. I commented on them, yes, sir ; elucidated refer- 
ences, names, and some background in connection therewith, if that 
may be termed evaluation ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is some evaluation, is it not? 

Captain Kj^amer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And did Mr. Hopkins discuss these secret mes- 
sages with you ? 

Captain Kramer. There was a rather extended discussion, not only 
concerning these messages, but various security aspects of this work 
during my first visit to Mr. Hopkins. 

Senator Ferguson. And what month was this in, that you delivered 
these secret codes to Mr. Hopkins ? 

Captain Kramer. I am not certain of the month, sir. My recollec- 
tion is it was the late summer or early fall of 1941. 

[10788] Senator Ferguson. Now, was this a delivery over and 
above what you took to the White House, or did you not deliver those 
to the White House when you took them to Mr. Hopkins ? 

Captain Kramer. This was a delivery over and above the delivery 
to the White House. It was the first occasion I had made such delivery 
to Mr. Hopkins. 

Senator Ferguson. As T understand it. Admiral Stark told you Mr. 
Hopkins was evaluating these and therefore you should make these 
deliveries? 

Captain Kramer. I recollect no comment to the effect that Mr. 
Hopkins was evaluating this traffic, but that Mr. Hopkins cus- 
tomarily saw this traffic in the White House. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, will you tell me, after you 
remember this conversation about the messages, and so forth, what the 
messages were ? 

Captain Kramer. I cannot recall precisely. My guess at this time 
is that they chiefly concerned the United States- Japanese negotiations. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, that, of course, is what this purple system 
was, wasn't it, concerning the negotiations between Japan and the 
United States? 

Captain Kramer. In the purple system. Senator, there [10789] 
were not only messages concerning our negotiations by messages di- 
rected to approximately one dozen other Japanese major diplomatic 
posts which held this purple machine. 

Senator Ferguson. So this is between the United States and Japan, 
these messages, on that diplomatic phase of it ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did Mr. Hopkins at that time comment 
on these two messages? 

Captain Kramer. There were not two messages, sir. I did not 
mean to imply that. There were two folders involved. 

Senator Ferguson. Two folders. Did he comment on the folders, 
on what was in the folders at different times ? 

Captain Kramer. There was conversation, as I have outlined, con- 
cerning the various messages in these two folders, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did not this rather impress you, delivering 
this outside the White House and to Mr. Hopkins, so you can i-e- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4035 

member what the conversation was? He was the only civilian out- 
side of the Navy that had ever seen or heard of this magic, isn't 
that true? 

Captain Kramer. The State Department officials saw it, sir, and 
they were civilians. 

[10790] Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Captain Kramer. Mr. Knox was a civilian and Mr. Stimson was 
a civilian. 

Senator Ferguson. Was there anybody else besides Hopkins, the 
Secretary of State's office, and the Secretary of the Navy? Was 
there anybody else? 

Captain Kramer. I am familiar only in a general way with what 
civilians in the State Department or in the White House, might 
possibly have seen this traffic. 

In the case of the White House I have no first-hand knowledge 
other than that I knew that the naval aide, or during the period when 
there was none, Surgeon General Mclntire, was seeing this. 

The first definite information to me that Mr. Hopkins was seeing 
this was Admiral Stark's comment to me. 

In the case of the State Department, I knew that Mr. Welles, 
that Mr. Hornbeck, the political adviser on Far Eastern affairs, and 
that Mr. Hamilton, the head of the Far East Division of the State 
Department, were regularly seeing this. I am under the impression 
that there may have been one or two or more others who were 
seeing this. 

Senator Ferguson. In the State Department? 

Captain K!ramer. In the State Department, although when this 
material was first introduced to the State Depart- [10791] 
ment on a regular basis, it was only after a conference attended by 
Admiral Anderson, then director of Naval Intelligence, his opposite 
number in Army Intelligence, Colonel Bratton, Captain McCollum, 
and myself in Mr. Hull's office, during which conference, chiefly 
Admiral Anderson, as I now recollect it, commented at some length 
on the security features absolutely essential to handling this material. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did I understand that when you delivered 
these to Mr. Hopkins, it was only when you had specific instructions 
from Admiral Stark and that is why you only did it twice? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you think of delivering the 13 parts on 
the night of the 6th to Mr. Hopkins? Was there anything said 
about that? 

Captain IO?amer. I made no deliveries, or I recollect no contact 
with Mr. Harry Hopkins other than v/hat I mentioned. 

Senator Ferguson. Those were the two occasions, and they were 
on specific instructions? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you have given us, as well as you can, all 
of the instructions that you had about Mr. [10793] Hopkins? 

Captain Kramer. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, no one else outside of the ones you have 
spoken about has ever received magic, that is these intercepts? 

Captain Kramer. Not that I am presently aware of ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you think you would recall deliveries to 
anyone else ? 



4036 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. I can recall no one else ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When you went i o the Wliite House on Sunday 
morning with the 14th part— no ; I want to go back to the Navy for 
a while. We got off on another course. 

Now, you left at 8 o'clock or a few minutes after— you gave Mc- 
Collum the reason that you were busy, as I understand it — or am I 
correct on that— that you did not feel you ought to go to the White 
House and the Secretary of the Navy that morning, because you were 
going to make another delivery at 10 : 30 to the Secretary of the Navy 
and the Secretary of State? 

Captain Ej^amer. At 10 o'clock; yes, sir. 

[10793] Senator Ferguson. Is that right? 

Captain Kramer. That is in general correct, sir; yes sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But we have 2 hours until 10 o'clock, and we have 
the 14th part which is the summary of the whole thing, and the 13 parts 
were important enough that you went to the Secretary of the Navy's 
home at 9 or 9 : 30, you went to the President and had a message 
delivered to him of these 13 parts, and then you personally the next 
morning gave the excuse that you had something else to do and no 
delivery of the 14th part, which was in a way the key to the whole 
situation, was delayed for 2 hours in going from the Secretary of 
the Navy to the President of the United States; is that what you tell 
us? Is that what you want this committee to understand? 

Captain Kramer. In reply to those remarks and that question. 
Senator, I should like to state that I had two primary functions in 
connection with the duties of my office. One was technical. The other 
was purely a messenger boy function. There, of course, must at times 
be a conflict between prioritv to be given those two functions. 

In order to be at the State Department to meet my appointment 
with Mr Knox I would have to leave the Navy Department at about 
the time I did so that if Mr. Knox arrived [10794.] there a few 
minutes before 10 o'clock I could get it to him. If at that time, speak- 
ing now of approximately 9 : 15, when I went to Captain McCollum s 
office, I had taken time to make phone calls to Mr. Knox or to other 
recipients, which sometimes involved 15 or 20 minutes phoning to 
various possible locations of these individuals, taken further time to 
dig up transportation to reach these individuals ; my present recollec- 
tion of the thought processes of that time is that time might be 
wasted. . . , 

My only explanation in answer to your question is that at the mo- 
ment it was considered sufficiently early for me to leave when I con- 
templated to make these deliveries. * i • i 

Senator Ferguson. You told us yesterday, if I recall, that Admiral 
Wilkinson made certain that you had made a delivery of the thirteenth 
part to the President and one to the Secretary of Navy? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And, therefore, you knew the importance of the 
President getting this and the Secretary of the Navy getting it? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Didn't it occur to you that morning, and to 
Captain McCollum, that there was more than two persons m the 
Navy, and that there might be someone else that could [10795] 
be a delivery man, as you say you were, in this one case, that he could 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4037 

run it, if necessary, yes, run it to the Wardman Park and run it to the 
White House to deliver this most important message, the fourteenth 
part, so that if there was going to be trouble the high, the tops in this 
Government could act in an emergency, and isn't it true that you 
felt there was an emergency or you wouldn't have taken the 13 parts 
at night ? 

Captain Kramer. Certainly a crisis ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. A crisis. Now, didn't it occur to you or didn't 
Captain McCollum say something, such as "This fourteenth part 
must get to the President and the Secretaiy of Navy and to Admiral 
Stark?" You had read it. You had interpreted it. You had trans- 
lated it. You knew how important it was; isn't that correct? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It was more important, wasn't it, than an ulti- 
matum? An ultimatum is usually "You do or else." This was the 
"else," was it not? It was no ultimatum. It was over. 

Captain Kramer. It was certainly emphatic; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And now you tell us that the reason you didn't 
deliver it was that you wanted to go back to your office for an hour 
and a half or an hour and three-quarters [10796] so you could 
deliver it on the same trip that you went to the Secretary of the 
Navy ; is that correct ? 

Captain Kramer. That is not quite accurate, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you get it accurate ? 

Captain Kramer. The times involved, as I have stated, was three 
quarters of an hour to perhaps an hour. At the time the initial de- 
livery was made to Captain McCollum, probably around 8 : 15, no 
folders had been prepared with the 14th part inserted yet. There 
would be time involved in doing that clerical chore. There on the 
point of making an immediate delivery to Mr. Knox or other high of- 
ficials I believe occurred to us the possibility that we might pass them 
on their way to the State Department or to the Navy Department. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand this, this all describes the 
attitude of your Department and the Navy when they were alerted 
to war on the Sunday morning ? 

Captain Kramer. That is my present recollection of what we thought 
then. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what you were describing as being 
alerted to war ; is that correct ? 

Captain Kramer. I believe, Senator, that even in the light of hind- 
sight a present perusal of the 14th part cannot be categorically in- 
terpreted as a Japanese intention to declare [10797] war on 
the United States. 

Senator Ferguson. So then you don't agree with Mr. Hull as to 
what he thought about that message ? 

Captain Kramer. I am unaware, except in a general way from 
newspapers, of what Mr. Hull thought. 

Senator Ferguson. You haven't read his testimony ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir ; I have not. 

Senator Ferguson. So then you were undertaking to evaluate this 
14th part but you had previously evaluated the 13 parts as being 
of such importance that you went at night and delivered it? 



4038 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. I should like to state on that point, Senator, that 
at no time did I presume to evaluate this traffic. I did, however, offer 
such comments or opinions at various times as I might have had on 
this traffic if it were called for or appeared to be called for. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, at 9 : 15 was Admiral Stark in his office? 

Captain Kramer. Not to my present recollection ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you Icnow what time he got down there? 
First, of your own knpwledge, and if you don't know that, from hear- 
say, and who told you ? 

Captain Kramer. I am still unpositive of the precise time he ar- 
rived, sir. My recollection is that he was there [1079S] at 
about 9 : 30. I should like to further point out that I have previously 
testified and it is still my recollection that Captain McCollum indi- 
cated to me that he would get this traffic to the Admiral as soon as he 
arrived at the Navy Department. 

Senator Ferguson. So that he wasn't going out for him, but he was 
going to w^ait until he arrived Sunday morning, and now you went 
back to your office and. I assume, started to work^ 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And what did you do for the next hour or hour 
and a half? 

Captain Kramer. I cannot recall specifically, sir, except that I un- 
questionably was engaged in going over traffic; its precise nature 
I do not recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, at least, the pilot message didn't come to 
you in that hour and a half, did it ? 

Captain Kramer. There would be no necessity of my going over a 
pilot message since it was a complete translation and the only func- 
tion I would then have would be immediate dissemination. 

Senator Ferguson. It didn't come to your attention during that 
hour and a half ? 

Captain I^amer. No, sir ; not to my present recollection [10799] 
and conviction. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. I am going to take that period of an 
hour and a half, about the time, until the time that you put it in the 
folder and proceeded to the White House and the Secretary of State. 
You know what time I am referreing to, do you not ^ 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The 1 o'clock message didn't come to your atten- 
tion during that period ? 

Captain Kramer. It did not, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The message in relation to the destruction of 
the last code machine — you know the one I am talking about? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir ; I do. 

Senator Ferguson. That didn't come to your attention? 

Captain Kramer. Not to my present recollection and belief, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The other messages, the 908 — I wish you would 
read 908 and 909 into the record, from Exhibit 1, because they have 
been referred to so much and they are not in the record, as I under- 
stand it. 

Captain Kramer. They are both. Senator, part of Exhibit 1, on page 
248 of that exhibit. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4039 

The Vice Chairmax. They are in Exhibit 1. Does the [10800] 
Senator desire them read into the record i 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I think they are very significant here be- 
cause they convey an idea of how serious they think it is, because, as 
I read the two letters, they indicate at least that they are going to 
be interned here in the United States, that the end has come. 

Captain Kramer (reading) : 

From : Tokyo. 

To: Washington. 

December 7, 1941. 

Urgent. 

#908 (to be handled in Government code). 

All concerned regret very much that due to failure in adjusting Japanese- 
American relations, matters have come to what they are now, despite all efforts 
you two Ambassadors have been making. I wish to take this opportunity to offer 
my deepest thanks to you both for your endeavors and hard work as well as for 
what all the members of the Embassy have done. 



From: Tokyo. 
To: Washington. 
December 7, 1941. 
(Urgent) . 
#909. 

[lOSOl] From Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO to Commercial Attache IGUCHI 
and his staff as well as to Secretary YUKI 
I, together with the members of the Bureau, deeply appreciate and heartily 
thank you for your great effort which you have been making for many months 
in behalf of our country despite all difficulties in coping with the unprecendented 
crisis. We pray that you will continue to be in good health. 

Senator Ferguson. Take the last line. Does that mean anything 
to you? Did that indicate that they were going to be interned? 

Captain Kramer. That is not an unusual expression on the part of 
a Japanese, Senator. In fact, expressions of that nature appear in 
most correspondence, personal letters, and so forth. 

Senator Ferguson. I haven't found it in any of these other messages. 

So you didn't interpret it as meaning anything? 

Captain Kramer. This particular message, which is in the char- 
acter of a personal nature, would not be unusual in that respect ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, what time did you have the file completed 
to deliver the fourteenth part? As I understand it, this is a special 
delivery of one part, the fourteenth part; is that correct? 

[10802] Captain Kramer. Special delivery was not made of that 
one part. It was included with the traffic of the night before. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you give me a description of what was with 
the fourteenth part ? 

Captain Kramer. In some detail ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The whole message was with it ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So it was 14 parts of the message, the entire 
message ? 

Captain Kramer. The entire message ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were there any other messages with it ? 

Captain Kramer. The messages I have described as being delivered 
on Saturday evening; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You included what you had in the file of Satur- 
day evening ? 



4040 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So that you duplicated the 13 parts and those 
other messages and the fourteenth part. The only new material was 
the fourteenth part ? 

Captain Kramer. Such duplication was frequent, Senator, and my 
answer, of course, is yes. 

Senator Ferguson. I am not criticizing. If I get a little insistent 
it is because I am just trying to get the [10803] facts. 

Captain Kramer. I do not interpret that as a criticism, Senator; I 
simply wanted to bring to your attention again that frequently earlier 
traffic references and background were included in these folders. 

Senator Ferguson. The only new material then was the 14th part? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, what time of the day did you get that 
ready for delivery — and I am going to talk about — when I ask you 
questions now, when I say the 14th part it will include all the others, 
but I will specifically apply it to that 14th part. 

Captain Kramer. It would be sometime between the time I re- 
turned to my office from Captain McCollum's office and my departure 
from my office approximately 9 : 30. I do not recall precisely. 

Senator Ferguson. When you were told by Secretary Knox to be 
at the State Department with the Secretary of War and the Secretary 
of State on Sunday morning that looked to you like a very important 
assignment, did it not? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And he instructed you what to bring with you ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

[10804] Senator Ferguson. What was that instruction? Did 
he tell you to bring the 14th part if it came in? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he tell you anything else ? 

Captain Kramer. To bring the material that was shown him the 
night before, and any new material that came in including, of course, 
the 14th part if it had arrived. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, didn't you convey that to the people who 
were in the decoding section, so. that if anything came in during the 
night, or up until the time you were getting this, that you wanted it 
to be in that file so you could take it to this most important meeting 
of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of 
the Navy ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not believe that my instructions to the GY 
watch officers on departure from the Navy Department that night in- 
cluded any details of whom I had made deliveries to. 

It was, however, as I now recollect, the specific instructions that 
anything further coming in on the Tokyo-to- Washington circuit 
should be, I should be informed about, should be called to the Navy 
Department, as I frequently had been on other occasions. I was not 
so called to the Navy Department. 

I indicated, I believe, yesterday, that apparently — [10805] 
this is purely my present presumption — the GY watch officer exer- 
cised his own judgment about calling me, and in view of the fact that 
that night the Army had translatoi"s on duty, sent it over to them 
rather than calling me down. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4041 

[10806} Senator Ferguson. Did you have all the translators and 
all of the decipherers, and decoders at work that night because of the 
fact that you were to meet with the three important Secretaries of this 
Government the next morning at 10 o'clock and they told you to bring, 
one of them, Secretary of the Navy, had told you to bring with you 
all of the messages that came in that night ? 

Captain Kramer. That is not my understanding at all, Senator. 

My understanding then as I now recollect it, and my present under- 
standing is that no additional watches were put on that Saturday night 
with the exception of the translator watch in the War Department 
institued for he first time that evening. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, the alert, so-called, in 
your department was not changed, the regular procedure took place 
on Saturday night and Sunday morning that had taken place on pre- 
vious Saturdays and Sundays ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So this message, this information that you got 
from the Secretary of the Navy, really didn't change things at all ; it 
went on the same as in the usual way; isn't that correct? 

Captain Kramer. The usual way, yes. Senator; but I [10807] 
should like to point out that we were working then at capacity trying 
strenuously at the same time to train additional experts in cryptanalysis 
and translation to amplify the scope of our efforts. 

If any additional watch — and this is again purely my present pre- 
sumption 

Senator Ferguson. I don't want presumptions. 

Captain Kramer (continuing). Had been instituted that night, it 
would undoubtedly, unquestionably in my opinion, have disrupted 
the work of these sections in following hours or days when something 
extremely important might also have occurred. 

There was no clue to the precise date of the culmination of what 
appeared to be a crisis with the United States. There had been many 
crises during the course of 1941. I recall now specifically a number 
concerned during the summer of 1941 with the movements of Japanese 
forces, military and naval, into French Indochina. There were many 
other crises of a diplomatic nature during the latter part of 1941. 

Senator Ferguson. Is this true, that there wasn't really a crisis as 
far as the Intelligence Branch of the Navy of the United States was 
concerned on that clay and previous days? 

[10808] Captain Kramer, The crisis, so far as the United States 
was concerned, could only be deduced as being perhaps more acute 
than it had been earlier that year, from a reading of the 13 parts of the 
14-part note. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you read the note from Tokyo to Berlin 
where the two parts came in indicating there was going to be war? 
Had you read the previous messages that things would happen auto- 
matically ? Had you read this traffic, or is this true : That the Intelli- 
gence Branch was relegated to doing nothing, that the raw material 
was being delivered to superior officers and that, therefore, the Intelli- 
gence Branch of the Navy of the United States was, in effect, function- 
ing on the 6th and the Tth of December 1941 ; is that a fair statement? 

Captain Kramer. I do not think that is quite a fair statement. 
Senator. 

79716— 46— pt. 9 9 



4042 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Will you correct it ? 

Captain Kramer. I may have given the wrong impression in my 
reply to your previous question that our idea of the increasing acute- 
ness of the crisis with the United States was based purely on this 13 
parts of the 14-part note. 

There were many other clues to that, including the things you have 
mentioned, namely, the note to Berlin, [10809] but also the 
movements of the Japanese convoy which was sighted during the week 
1-7 December, and on which we had frequent reports from Admiral 
Hart and in order to keep contact with, special search planes had been 
ordered into the South China Sea. 

There was also, of course, the information we had concerning con- 
templated Japanese action against British Malaya and Thailand. 
Those were a number of many clues pointing toward an increasing 
crisis in diplomatic relations. 

There was still, however, in my present recollection of my reaction 
at that time, no positive clue of a definite Japanese intention to at- 
tack the United States. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand, _^then, that the Intelli- 
gence Branch of the Nation only deals in positive things? 

Captain Kramer. That is not correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, why did you say that there wasn't 
any information which was positive that there would be any conflict 
with the United States if they don't deal with other things than 
positive information ? 

Captain Kramer. I should say, Senator, in that regard, from my 
background on Intelligence duties, that at least three-quarters of the 
information with which Intelligence, at least Naval Intelligence, deals, 
perhaps 90 percent is [10810] of anything but a positive 
nature. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, is this one of the troubles, that your de- 
partment and you thought that Japan was going to war with the 
British and not with the United States; was that one of the troubles? 
Talking about Sunday morning. 

Captain Kramer. There was certainly a possibility, and perhaps 
even a probability that the Japanese contemplated hostilities with the 
United States. It was much more specific and definite in the case of 
England. The date when such hostilities would take place, however, 
was not known in the case of the United States. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it known as to the British? 

Captain Kramer. It was known within closer limits because of the 
fact that this convoy we were sighting during the latter part of that 
week was in a position to effect the scheme we first learned about 
directed toward the British and Thailand. 

Senator Ferguson. On Sunday morning did you have any doubt 
the Japanese were going to strike in the Kra Peninsula, and it meant 
war with Great Britain? 

Captain Kramer. None in my mind, no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Because you knew that the Admiralty through 
Ambassador Winant, had sent at 10 : 40 the day before, [10811] 
on the 6th, this message : 

British Admiralty reports that at 3 a. m. London time this morning two parties 
seen off Cambodia Point, sailing slowly westward toward Kra 14 hours distant in 
time. First party 25 transports, 6 cruisers, 10 destroyers. Second party 10 trans- 
ports, 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4043 

Signed "Winant". 

Then he goes on in the next telegram that he sends in at 3 : 05 that 
Saturday afternoon which we got, that they were 14 hours out. You 
knew about those telegrams ? 

Captain Kramer. 1 believe, Senator, this is the first time I have ever 
heard of those telegrams or heard them read to me. 

Senator Ferguson. So you didn't know about these telegrams? 

Captain Kramer. I customarily did not see State Department dis- 
patches, or for that matter, Naval Department dispatches, except occa- 
sionally some that Captain McCollum might have shown me. 

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, you knew from other in- 
formation that Great Britain and Japan were going to war, and it was 
usual that war broke out on Sunday ? As far as the Kra Peninsula was 
concerned? 

[10812] Captain Kramer. It was not positive that the Japanese 
contemplated an actual attack on the Kra Peninsula Sunday morning. 
It was, however, from an evaluation of the information we had, ap- 
parent that it was a very strong probability that they would, in view of 
the position of that convoy, and its capabilities of carrying out an 
attack Sunday morning. 

The Vice Chairman. It is now 12 : 30. 

If it is convenient. Senator, the committee will recess until 1 : 30. 

(Whereupon, at 12 : 30 p. m., the committee recessed until 1 : 30 p. m. 
of the same day.) 

[10813] afternoon SESSION— 1 : 30 p. M. 

The Vice Chairman. The committee will be in order. 
Senator Ferguson will resume his inquiry. 

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KRAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY 

(Resumed) 

Senator Ferguson. I am just going on with the Navy Department 
now, the fourteenth part message, which was at about 9 : 30 or a 
quarter to 10. 

Captain Kramer. It was about 9 : 30, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How far was it from your office to the map room 
in the White House? 

Captain Kramer. Between 8 and 10 blocks, I should say, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you drive or walk? 

Captain Kramer. I walked, sir. It was partly almost on the double," 
I should say. 

Senator Ferguson. Almost a dog trot ? 

Captain Kjiamer. Something of that nature, sir. I at least trotted 
part of the way. 

Senator Ferguson. At least we have got somebody running on Sun- 
day morning now. Is that right? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. To deliver a message. 

Captain Kramer. I believe so, sir. 

[10814] Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Now, before you went there, you went up to see McCollum again with 
the fourteenth part? 



4044 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. I thought I stated fairly clearly that the 
fourteenth part was delivered to McCollum along with the 13 parts. 

Senator Ferguson. That is very clear, as to what you stated, but I 
understood the other day 3'ou said you went up and saw McCollum and 
drew some kind of a time circle. 

Captain Kramer. No, sir ; that did not take place until my return 
from the State Department, the 10 o'clock appointment. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the second time that you got messages 
that morning, that you drew the time circle ? 

Captain Kramer. The occasion for drawing that time circle 

Senator Ferguson. Please answer my question, and we will get 
along a little faster. 

Captain Kramer. At the arrival of the 1 o'clock message, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Captain Kramer. My first sighting of that. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you this : You made up a file down 
m your office, you had the fourteenth part, the [1081S] 13 parts 
and the other parts at 8 : 15. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you kept them on your desk until the time 
came for you to leave and go over to the White House? 

Captain Kramer. That is my present recollection, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So that was satisfactorv to at least McCollum? 

Captain Kramer. I think that is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When you got to the White House, it was about 
what time ? 

Captain Kramer. I should say about a quarter of 10 sir, because my 
recollection is I was at the State Department after leaving the White 
House at 10 minutes to 10. 

Senator Ferguson. A quarter to 10. 

Now, who was there to receive the pouch? 

Captain Kramer. I do not know his name, sir. It was left, how- 
ever, in the situation room. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it a Naval or Military attache or aide? 

Captain Kramer. It may have been either one or both, I do not 
recall, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask counsel — and I think [10816] 
we have a letter here stating that it is impossible to find out who was 
the aide on Sunday morning. We know the name of the aide on 
Saturday night, but we cannot find the name of the aide on Sunday 
morning. 

Now, can you help us ? 

Captain IOiaimer. I am afraid my memory fails me in that respect, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, there wasn't any doubt that Admiral 
Beardall knew that you were to go to the Secretary of the Navy at 
10 o'clock the next morning ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. he mentioned that in Admiral Wilkin- 
son's home. 

Senator Ferguson. Now did he say he would get in touch with the 
President sometime that night? 

Captain Kramer. I do not recall precisely what he said in that 
regard. My present impression is that he did phone probably the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4045 



situation room at the White House. At least my present impression 
is, and I think was at the time, that I was given to understand, when 
T left Admiral Wilkinson's home, that the President had seen it. 

Senator Ferguson. So you assumed then, that Admiral Beardall 
had talked to the White House, and learned that he had seen it, and 
you learned that that night from Admiral Beardall ? 

[10817] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you ever hear that there was a meeting 
that night and the 13 parts that you left at the White House had been 
delivered by other officers, or by another officer to A.dmiral Turner 
ancl Admiral Ingersoll ? They do not say in their testimony that you 
delivered it. 

Captain Kramer. I know of no such possible delivery, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You never heard of such a meeting ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, when you delivered this message, this 14th 
part on Sunday morning, a quarter to 10 to the map room, what did 
you say to the man who were in charge, the military and/or naval 
aide, or both ? 

Captain Kramer. This is the first time I have had occasion to recol- 
lect exactly what I said at that time. Senator. I believe it was in the 
same tenor as my instructions had been the night before. 

Senator Ferguson. That it was very urgent, and that the President 
was to see it immediately ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for the fact that Admiral 
Beardall was not down that morning on this important assignment? 

[10818] Captain Kramer. I cannot, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You cannot account for that? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But you are certain he was not there ? 

Captain Kramer. I am not even certain of that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then do you think Admiral Beardall was there 
to get that message that morning ? 

Captain Kramer. He may have been there. In any case it has not 
impressed itself on my memory so that I now recollect exactly who 
received it at the White House that morning. 

Senator Ferguson. Whoever it was, was in uniform, either the 
Army or the Navy ? 

Captain Kramer. In those days, sir, the military officers stationed 
in duty in Washington, except on certain occasions, were in civilian 
clothes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How did you know that these men were author- 
ized to receive this for the President Sunday morning? 

Captain Kramer. They were introduced to me in the first instance 
by then Captain Beardall as his assistants, and the purpose for his 
setting up the situation room with these watch officers. 

[10819] Senator Ferguson. Then they were watch officers that 
you had met before through Admiral Beardall ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And therefore you had authority to deliver to 
them? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 



4046 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[1081 9-A] Senator Ferguson. Now, how many times did you 
go to the State Department that morning on the 7th? 

Captain Kramer. Twice, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. You went there twice ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The first time you had just this 14th part mes- 
sage and you arrived there 10 minutes to ? 

Captain Kramer. 10 minutes to 10, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Whom did you have a conversation with, and 
what was it? 

Captain Kramer. There was one I know of, and possibly two or 
three of Mr. Hull's private secretaries there, all of whom had been 
indoctrinated on the security features involved in this traffic, and 
customarily received these folders for Mr. Hull. The Army courier 
was there at about the same time. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Wliowashe? 

Captain Kramer. I have been under the impression through the 
past years that it was Colonel Bratton. I am still of that impression, 
although he states that it is his belief he spent most or all of that 
morning in the War Department. If it were not Colonel Bratton 
then it was very likely one of his senior officer assistants, all of whom 
I knew. 

Senator Ferguson. So you remember the Army officer [108201 
being there. Was he in uniform ? 

Captain Kramer. We were not wearing a uniform in those days. 

Senator Ferguson. Not wearing a uniform ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But you know he was an Army officer? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Because you had seen him in connection with 
this magic before the delivery of it ? 

Captain Kramer. Frequently in the past, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now was he there the second time you went 
over? 

Captain Kramer. The Army courier was there within almost a 
minute or two of the time I arrived at the State Department on my 
second trip. 

Senator Ferguson. On your second trip as well as your first trip? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And on the first trip you had just the new mate- 
rial, the 14th part now, you are certain of that ? 

Captain Kramer. That is my present conviction* yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you see Mr. Hull at all that morning? 

Captain Kramer. I think I saw him, but whether it was [10821] 
in his office or passing through his outer office going in, I am not at 
present certain. In the case of Mr. Knox I can be specific, because I 
arrived there before he did and pointed out the 14th part in the 
folder which I handed him. 

Senator Ferguson. So you showed Mr. Knox personally the 14th 
part? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And how long did you remain there? Did you 
see Secretary of War Stimson ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4047 

Captain Kramer. I think I did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How long did you remain at the State Depart- 
ment that morning ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not believe I spent more than a minute after 
Mr. Knox' arrival in Mr. Hull's outer officer before returning to the 
Navy Department. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. You were not over 10 minutes there ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now I will ask you whether or not you left these 
papers there, the 14 parts and the other data ? 

Captain Kramer. I left one folder there for Mr. Knox, the ohly 
one of the three Secretaries for which I was responsible ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You left it there for him ? 

[10822] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The other courier was there in relation to Mr. 
Stimson ? 

Captain Kramer. Mr. Stimson and Mr. Hull, for which the Army 
then had responsibility. 

Senator Ferguson. Both of those. Do you know wJ ether or not 
he left the 14 parts, the two folders ? 

Captain Kramer. That is my definite impression; ye , sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now you came back to the office is that correct? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What time did you get back? 

Captain Kramer. My current estimate is about ,0 : 20, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. About 10 : 20. Then wha< did you do ? 

Captain Kramer. For the first time I saw a few messages. Army 
translations, which apparently had arrived ir my office between the 
time I left it and the time I returned. As I'le result of seeing the 
1 o'clock message I directed immediate preparations of another set 
of folders, with a view to departing again for delivery as early as 
possible. 

Senator Ferguson. And in that folder — and you have told us what 
was in it, it was the 1 o'clock message, the pilot message, the burning 
of the last code machine message 

[10823] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct? » 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And the two so-called "thank you" messages ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What time did you have that folder completed? 

Captain Kramer. I believe the total time I was in my office was not 
over 10 minutes. It was probably less than that. 

Senator Ferguson. That let you go out at what time? 

Captain Kramer. About 10 : 30, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. About 10 : 30. And you then went to see 
McCollum? 

Captain Kramer. I went first to Admiral Stark's office. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Captain Kramer. And McCollum came to the door of Admiral 
Stark's office, at which time I pointed out the new material I had in 
the folder, specifically the 1 o'clock delivery message, and explained 



4048 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK- 

very briefly and hurriedly its possible and probable tie-up with the 
movement of the Japanese convoy and contemplated Japanese action 
against the British and \^10821^\ Thailand. My distinct recol- 
lection IS that McCollum grasped that point almost instantaneusly 
and I then departed from the State Department, after not more than 
probably one-half minute's conversation. 

Senator Ferguson. Now you said you drew a time circle. 

Captain Kramer. That was in my office while the folders were 
being prepared, sir. 

\108^5\ Senator Ferguson. Just explain that. 

You took a piece of paper and put a circle on indicating the earth? 

Captain Kramer. A navigator's time circle. 

Senator Ferguson. A navigator's time circle. And you put on a 
circle down around, or down through the Pacific Coast ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. Greenwich, Washington 

Senator Ferguson. Where? 

Captain Kramer. Greenwich, England. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Captain Kramer. Washington 

Senator Ferguson. Washington? 

Captain Kramer. The South China Sea area. I did not take the 
time to determine the precise time zone involved. And Pearl Harbor 
that is the Hawaiian Island time zone, lOi/^. ' 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Now what you did you put on the Greenwich time, whatever it was 
and you put on the Washington time, which was 1 o'clock, is that 
right, and you put on 7 : 30 at Hawaii ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you put on what time in the [108261 
South Sea area? 

Captain Kj?amer. I simply estimated that point, sir, and it appeared 
to be, from my estimation, my hasty estimation, probably 2 or 3 hours 
before dawn. I did not check the time of sunrise out there. 

Senator Ferguson. Two or three hours before dawn? 
^ Captain Kramer. Yes; which, incidentally, is the normal time to 
institute amphibious operations. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you told us this morning that you did not 
see the Wmant note that said they were 14 hours out on the previous 
day, but you had other information that they were going to attack 
on the Kra Peninsula, or in that area. 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What was your other information? 

Captain Kramer. I am not positive on just where I got it from 
My present recollection is that I was told about those dispatches, of 
sightings of this convoy, by Captain McCollum during the several 
previous days. 

Senator Ferguson. So you knew about that. Did you know about 
the incident of sending the three little men-of-war with the second 
rate Filipinos on them over into that area to watch? Do vou remem- 
ber that? 

Captain Kramer. I am not familiar with that episode, [10827] 
no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You are not familiar with that? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4049 

Senator Ferguson. That was sent out on the 3d. You did not know 
about that? 

Captain Kramer. I may be able to refresh my memory. I do not 
recall at the moment, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. We will get to it in a moment. I will let you 
see the message. I want you to look at page 39 in Exhibit 37. 

(The document was handed to Captain Kramer.) 

Captain Kramer. I believe this is ^he first time I have read that 
dispatch, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The first time you ever knew about that ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever had any information as to what 
this countrj^ would do in case of a Japanese attack on the British ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir ; I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. No information whatever? 

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, it would not have meant to you at all, 
about war with Britain, as far as Japan was concerned, it would not 
have meant anything to this country ? 

[10828] Captain Ivramer. Not so far as I was concerned ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you ever seen WPL-46, the war plan? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir; I have not. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, you had no informa- 
tion, and 3^ou did not interpret this message that you got Sunday 
morning about the strained relations with Britain as meaning any- 
thing at all ? 

Captain Kramer. Which message do you refer to, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. That is the one on page 251, the one that you 
misread and corrected before you gave it to Secretaiy Forrestal, on 
top of page 251 : 

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations. 

That did not mean anything? How does it come then, that you put 
it in the file and delivered ? 

Captain Kramer. Because that was just another confirmatory item 
)f what appeared to be definite Japanese hostile intentions towards 
England. 

Senator Ferguson. Why were you concerned with that? You had 
never heard anything about it. 

Captain Kramer. I do not know that we were more concerned with 
contemplated hostile action towards England [10829] than 

towards us. I should say we would have been far more concerned 
about any contemplated hostile action towards us. 

Senator Ferguson. Then as far as you are concerned, prior to the 
shells, the bombs dropping on Pearl Harbor, you did not have the least 
idea or expectation of war between the United States and Japan? 

Captain Kramer. That is putting it in rather superlative language, 
Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. You put it in your language. 

Captain Kramer. I certainly knew a crisis was developing and de- 
veloping rapidly. Whether it would culminate in actual outbreak of 
war, I did not know. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, what is the purpose of an Intelligence 
Branch ? What is the purpose ? Isn't it to do three things 



4050 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer (interposing). To evaluate information received, 
and pass it to higher authority, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Evahiate it to ascertain first if there is going 
to be a war, and, second, where that war would break out ? 

Captain Kraivier. If possible ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Sure, if possible. And third, the strength of 
the enemv? 

110830] Captain Kraimer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, where did you stand on the proposition as 
to whether or not there was going to be a war ? Wliat evaluation was 
there ? You had to, as I understand, tell these men, that you delivered 
the messages to in effect what they meant. 

Captain Kramer. I, on occasion, expressed an opinion when it ap- 
peared to be called for, or was invited, yes, sir. 

Ssna-tor Ferguson. Yes. 

Now, what was your opinion on that morning, as to whether or not 
there was going to be war — and that is all the United States was con- 
cerned in, as I understand it — as you thought, between the United 
States and Japan? 

Captain Kramer. Senator, the only distinct recollection I have of 
expressions of my opinion during those two days was one remark T 
made during the course of my visit at Secretary Knox's apartment, 
to the effect tliat I certainly saw no possibility of reconciliation of the 
differences between the United States and Japan. Other remarks I 
made during the course of those two days, I believe were of like t-enor. 

[10S31] Senator Ferguson. Then you anticipated war? 

Captain Kramer. That does not necessarily mean war, sir. It could 
mean a disruption in negotiations, a break in relations ; but, of course, 
could mean Avar, too. That would be the extreme view to take. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, during this morning you read this message 
when you put it in the folder : 

After deciphering part 14 of my #902 and also #907, #908 and #909, please 
destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in 
like manner also secret documents. 

What did that message mean to an Intelligence Officer, together 
with the 1 : 00 o'clock delivery message? 

Captain Kramer. Both of them struck me as forcibly indicating an 
acute crisis. Just what its nature was I was uncertain, but certainly a 
crisis in which the Japanese visualized the possibility of our seizure 
of their diplomatic establishments in this country. 

Senator Ferguson. And that could only occur under one condition ; 
that was war ? 

Captain Kramer. I am not sure that that is the only condition, sir. 
That is certainly one condition. 

Senator Ferguson. That is at least one condition ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

[108S2] Senator Ferguson. So if they destroyed their last cipher 
machine they were through as far as receiving cipher code messages 
in this country ? 

Captain ICramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And they were cut off from Japan ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir ; as far as those kinds of messages ; yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4051 

Senator Ferguson. And you say that you didn't come to the con- 
clusion that that message, together with the 1 o'clock delivery message, 
meant war with the United States ? 

Captain Kramer. Not to my mind, sir. It did not positively mean 
war. It indicated an extreme likelihood of war. 

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, you used the word "posi- 
tively" this morning, that you need positive information to make up 
your mind on a thing like that ? 

Captain Kjramer. I would like to indicate to the Senator again that 
at no time in my handling of this traffic was I considered responsible 
for its evaluation. 

Senator Ferguson. But you had to give advice on it and did on 
occasions give advice ? 

Captain Kramer. My advice chiefly and primarily and almost solely 
concerned references and explanation of the texts of this traffic. 

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, it was a secret [10833] 
as far as you were concerned, that the Intelligence Branch of our Navy 
was not evaluating this evidence, but that the War Plans was evaluat- 
ing it, they were the evaluator. Admiral Turner's department ? 

Captain I^amer. My present recollection is that I had no knowl- 
edge of such an understanding. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. 

Captain Kramer. Or method of procedure. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, the people who had a right to evaluate 
were not in the office as far as you were concerned, you didn't get a 
copy of it that night or the next morning, the fourteenth part, you left 
it with Captain McCollum, and Admiral Turner you didn't reach? 

Captain Kramer. I did not reach Admiral Turner; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Wlien you came back to the office did you feel 
certain they were going to attack Britain that morning ? 

Captain Kramer. I felt reasonably certain in my own mind; yes, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Before 1 o'clock our time, that Britain would 
be attacked ? 

Captain Kramer. Probably about 1 o'clock ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, when you drew this so-called time circle 
you had Pearl Harbor on it, 7 : 30 ? 

[1083^] Captain Kjeiamer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Meaning 1 o'clock here, 7 : 30 there ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then for the British at Singapore you had a 
time? 

Captain Kra]^ er. Yes, sir ; South China Sea area. 

Senator Ferguson. Two or three hours ; you didn't put the Philip- 
pines on it ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you had a conversation with Captain Mc- 
Collum outside of Admiral Stark's office about this 1 o'clock, that it 
meant 7 : 30 at Pearl Harbor, because you showed him that map ? 

Captain Kjiamer. I showed him no map, sir. It was purely verbal 
of a few seconds' duration. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you had a piece of paper with you? 

Captain Kjeiamek. No, sir. 



4052 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. You didn't carry that with you ? 

Captain Ejiamer. I did not ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you tell him you had drawn one? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. That is normally to determine, unless 
you have it readily in mind, the time zones involved. It was to deter- 
mine such relative time zones. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, what did you tell Captain [1083S'\ 
McCollum about the 1 o'clock in Washington ? Just give us it as near 
as you can. 

Captain Kjiamer. My recollection of my remarks to Captain Mc- 
Collum is that it involved only the South China Sea. I do not be- 
lieve I took the time, since I was in very much of a hurry, to mention 
or refer in any way to Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you told Mr. Richardson that 7 : 30 at 
Hawaii would be breakfast time and that certain watches would be 
at breakfast. What did you tell him that for ? 

Captain Kramer. I commented on that because I had had before 
coming to Washington 2 years' duty in a ship based at Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Ferguson. Was this just something in your mind at that 
time and not expressed to any one? 

Captain Kramer. It was expressed, as I recollect it, only in Mr. 
Hull's outer office. It was, of course, in my mind when I drew the 
time circle. 

Senator Ferguson. It was in your mind when you drew the time 
circle. You didn't tell it to Captain McCollum. You only told him 
about the one down through the China Sea. Then you went over to 
Secretary Knox's office? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you met Colonel Bratton? 

Captain Kramer. Either he or one of his senior assistants. 

[108S6] Senator Ferguson. And some aides to Secretary Knox? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it 

Captain Kramer. Secretary Hull. 

Senator Ferguson. Secretary Hull? Was the meeting over then? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. My purpose in hurrying so rapidly from 
Admiral Stark's office was to get to the State Department before that 
meeting broke up. 

Senator Ferguson. What time did you get there? 

Captain Kramer. I am less specific on the time I arrived there, but 
1 should say it would be about a quarter of 11. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you walk ? 

Captain Kramer. I walked again as I had on the earlier trip. 

Senator Ferguson. So you got there about a quarter to 11, you 
think? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. It may have been nearer 11 o'clock. 

Senator Ferguson. And then is when you told this Military Aide 
and Secretary of State Hull's aide that 1 o'clock meant 7 : 30 at Pearl 
Harbor, and that the watches would be eating breakfast there and 
there would be less men on the ships? 

[10837] Captain Kramer. T made no such comment, sir. The 
reference which I made to Pearl Harbor there was not emphatic in 
any way. As I recollect it, it was only a passing remark after these 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4053 

folders had been delivered and in the few minutes I remained there, 
as I recollect it — I "would like to amend that, sir. 

It was part of my remarks when I was explaining to Mr. Hull's 
secretary the significance, the likely significance of this 1 o'clock time 
in Washington and its tie-up with the movement of the sun. In 
other words, time of day in the South China Sea. My recollection 
is that I mentioned something about the time of day at Pearl Harbor 
and that point in the conversation. In the few minutes following 
that my recollection is that I referred again to that purely in passing 
and I believe primarily for the benefit of the Army officer and these 
civilian State Department officers who might not be familiar with 
the ships' routine or Fleet routine on a Sunday morning. 

Senator Ferguson. And you then, as I understand it, mentioned 
about eating breakfast? 

Captain Kramer. I don't recall referring to that, no, sir. It was 
a general remark to the effect that 7 : 30 on a Sunday morning in the 
Fleet was probably the quietest time of the week. Something along 
that line. I cannot be [10838] specific. 

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to get the substance. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You told Mr. Richardson something about this 
messing at 7 : 30 and that some of the officers would be there rather 
than on their actual watch. I was trying to get whether or not you 
made that same statement or a similar statement to these officers or 
these people in the outer office of Secretary Hull's office. 

Captain Kjiamer. That is what I am trying to say, sir ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You did ? 

Captain Kramer. I did, yes, sir. 

[lOSSB] Senator Ferguson. And now you say that it was only 
in passing, that Pearl Harbor being attacked never entered your mind ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And it was only in a passing way that you said 
that to these officers? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you in any way connected with ONI? 

Captain Kramer. I was attached to the Far East section of ONI; 
yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It appears that on December 6 there was a 
memorandum for Colonel Holbrook. Do you know him ? 

Captain Kramer. I may have. I don't recollect him now, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know James F. Perry ? 

Captain Kramer. The same applies to him, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the memorandum that went from the 
War Department General Staff, Military Division, G-2, memorandum 
for Colonel Holbrook, as follows : 

Word has just been received from ONI by telephone to the effect that the 
Japanese Embassy in Washington, D. C, was reliably reported to have burned 
a code book and ciphers [10840] last night. 

Signed "James F. Perry." 

Did you have any information in ONI that that had taken place? 

Captain Kramer. Not that I am aware of ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Would that have meant anything to you? 



4054 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. We knew that the Embassy had burned many of 
their systems, because I have seen the directive from Tokyo to that 
effect. The fact that trajEfic was still coming to that embassy on the 
morning of 7 December indicated to me they still had some systems 
in hand. 

Senator Fercuson. Did it indicate they had at least one machine? 

Captain Kramer. At least some systems, yes, sir ; one code machine 
among others. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, Captain, do j^ou reconcile your testimony 
before the Pearl Harbor Navy Board, the Hewitt committee, and this 
committee, as far as the winds message is concerned ? You know what 
I speak of when I say wind message. This is the one implementing 
the wind messages. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Fergusox. Now, do you claim that they are consistent? 

[IO84I] Captain Kramer. I would state in that respect that they 
are not consistent, that until a few days ago I was testifying purely 
from memory after several years, that only in the last few days 
has my memory been refreshed from an examination of these docu- 
ments in that respect, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, you don't claim now, and I am 
going to ask you later exactly what documents you had to refresh 
your memory, but you don't claim now that jour testimony in relation 
to the winds message is consistent ? 

Captain Kramer. It is not inconsistent in any respect except as to 
the date involved. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you say that your testimony is the same 
except as to date ? 

Captain Kr.\.mer. I believe that is the case, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I just want to take a short time, if I may, 
on this testimony. This I am taking from the Pearl Harbor Court of 
Inquiry of 1944. 

Mr. Murphy. Page? 

Senator Ferguson. On the bottom of page 956 : 

Because of that special arrangement for this particular plain language mes- 
sage, when such a message came through, I believe either the third or the fourth 
of December — 

[1084^] You were not certain. You are not really contradicting 
the date there. 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 
Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

—I was shown such a message by the GY watch officer, recognized it as being of 
this nature, walked with him to Captain Safford's office, and from that point 
Captain Safford took the ball. I believe Captain Safford went directly to Admiral 
Noyes' office at that time. Again, because of the fact that this was a plain 
language message, and because of the fact that special arrangements had been 
made to handle this Japanese plain language message which had special meaning, 
I did not handle the distribution of this particular message, the one of the 3rd 
or 4th. 

Now, that is perfectly consistent with your present testimony, is it 
not? 

Captain Kramer. I believe it is, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Because you used the two dates. 

Captain Kramer. What was that last remark, Senator? 



' PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4055 

Senator Ferguson. You used the two dates there, the 3d or 4th. 
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. My impression was a few days before 
Pearl Harbor, probably about the middle of the week. 
Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

[10843] Q. You say it is your recollection that you received some Japanese 
plain language words which corresponded with the language set out in Document 
15; is that correct? 

A. My statement was, not that I received it, but I was shown it. 

Q. Can you recall from looking at Document 15, which Japanese language words 
you received? 

That is question 34. 

A. Higashi no kazeame, I am quite certain. The literal meaning of higashi no 
kazeame is east wind rain. That is plain Japanese language. The sense of that, 
however, meant strained relations or a break in relations, possibly even implying 
war with a nation to the eastward, the United States. 

Now, it was not suggested in the question any Japanese words. 
Nothing was suggested in the question. It says : 

Can you recall from looking at Document 15 which Japanese language words 
you received. 

And you answered in that language. 

Now, is that consistent with your present testimony ? 

Captain Kramer. I believe it is, sir, in the light of what I stated 
yesterday afternoon in that regard, that until I testified before that 
hearing I had had no occasion [10844] whatsoever to recall or 
refresh my memory. I do not believe it was ever discussed as to what 
country was involved in that wind message which I saw. My reaction 
at the time when that question was first propounded was that in view 
of the fact we were in the midst of a serious war with Japan, it of 
course must have been the United States. 

I had well in mind the Japanese expressions referring to the United 
States. 

Senator Ferguson. But wouldn't it stand to reason that a spontane- 
ous answer made by you at that time, and after you had received 
Captain Safford's memorandum and had answered him on the 28th 
or sometime about that time, the 22d of December 1943, your answer 
that you had been thinking about this, wouldn't a spontaneous answer 
be correct ? Do you now dispute that answer ? 

Captain Kramer. I was faulty in my recollection at that time, yes, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you want to now dispute that answer? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. I think I have clearly indicated that fact 
already in this hearing. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you told me you thought your testimony 
was correct, that you didn't want to change it except as to date ? 

[10845] Captain Kjiamer. On that point. Senator, I pointed out 
yesterday, I think, that later on in that hearing I testified to the effect 
that in all this traffic, which was my primary source of information 
at the time of Pearl Harbor, there was still nothing to indicate Japa- 
nese overt intentions toward the United States, except the message 
from Tokyo to Berlin at about the end of November. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, that was an overt act, was it not; that 
was a proposition that they w^ere going to war? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 



4056 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Fergusox. Now, do you swear, as you did swear, as you 
did swear before the Pearl Harbor Board, before three of your own 
admirals, that that statement is false, that I read to you ? 

Captain Kramer. That is my present belief ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is it any more than your belief ? Are you cer- 
tain about it ? 

Captain Kramer. It is conviction, too, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So, then, you contradict your testimony in its 
entirety as far as that answer is concerned ? 

Captain Kramer. So far as that point is concerned • yes sir. 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : j ? • 

[10846] Q. Do you remember in what form this communication was that 
you saw which contained the words about which you have testified, higashi no 
kazeame? * 

A. I am almost certain it was typewritten. I believe it was on teletype paper. 

Is that true or false? 

Captain Kramer. That is still my recollection on that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct? 

Captain Kramer. I believe it is; yes, sir. 

[10847] Senator Ferguson, then you saw those words on the 
typewritten paper? 

Captain Kramer. I saw certain words on this typewritten paper 
which I have repeatedly emphasized I do not precisely recall. It was, 
and this is the only thing on which I am certain of in that respect of 
the winds code characters. ' 

Senator Ferguson. I read you another question, question num- 
ber 143 : 

Q. Were you the officer who went to the Communications Officer and said 
"Here it is"? ' 

A. I believe I used that expression when I accompanied the watch officer to 
Commander Safford's office. 

Now, is that a true or false answer ? 
Captain Kramer. That could very well be true ; yes, sir. 
Mr. Murphy. For the record, that is on page 980 of the Naval Court 
of Inquiry. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you appeared before the Hewitt com- 
mittee, did you not? 

Captain Kramer. I did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you talked to anyone before you appeared 
at the Hewitt Committee ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir ; I did. 

Senator Ferguson. With whom did you talk ? 

Captain Kramer. To an assistant of Admiral Hewitt's, [10848] 
a Lieutenant or Lieutenant Commander Sonnett. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell me your conversation with him? 

Captain Kramer. I saw him perhaps three or four times. The 
total time of those several talks I do not believe amounted to more 
than three-quarters of an hour. The nature of those conversations 
were of precisely the same kind that I had engaged in on occasions in 
the past when I was involved in legal duties in the Navy, namely 

Senator Ferguson. Are you a lawyer ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. Every line officer, however, is required 
to take examinations on Navy law for each promotion in normal 
limes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4057 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Did he make any suggestions to you, 
did he show you any papers i 

Captain Kramer. I recollect being shown no papers, sir, although 
he may have. I believe some dispatches were shown me. I recollect 
being shown no copies of the transcript of previous hearings I testified 
before. Admiral Murfin's. It was chiefly conversation with regard 
to discrepancies between my testimony and other witnesses before 
previous hearings. 

Senator Ferguson. And what he did was to discuss with you the 
discrepancy between your testimony and other witnesses who testified 
before the Navy Board ? 

[1084^] Captain Kramer. That is in effect correct. 

Senator Ferguson. And therefore I assume that he pointed out 
what the other witnesses had testified to and what you had testified to? 

Captain Kramer. The chief subject of conversation was concerning 
this winds thing in which it appeared my discrepancies chiefly rested. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, he stated to you then that your testi- 
mony was not in accordance with other witnesses' testimony and he 
explained what these other witnesses had testified to as it related to 
the wind code? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And did he tell you who had testified and in 
what way they had testified? 

Captain Kramer. I don't recollect that any particular names were 
mentioned. Some may have been. Captain Safford's may have been. 
The chief point of conversation was the discrepancies themselves. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, to point out the discrepancies he would 
have to have with him the testimony or would have to tell you what 
they had testified to and how it contradicted or was not in accordance 
with your testimony ; isn't that correct ? 

Captain Kramer. He would have had to study it, I presume; 
[108S0] yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And did he do that ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not know, sir. I knew that there were some 
papers before him. I recollect no copy of the Murfin Court of Inquiry 
being before him while we conversed at any time. He had various 
notes before him. 

Senator Ferguson. Who did he tell you he represented? 

Captain KIramer. Before I engaged in any conversations with him 
I was given a clear assurance that he was fully authorized to discuss 
radio intelligence, that he was fully authorized as an assistant of 
Admiral Hewitt's, to discuss with me these matters on which I had 
previously testified. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, I come back to the point, if he was 
telling you the purpose of the examination in relation to reconciling 
your testimony with other witnesses' testimony in relation to the winds 
message, wasn't it then by necessity necessary for him to tell you what 
these other witnesses had testified to ? 

Captain Kramer. Just what his source of information was in mak- 
ing statements to me I do not know, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What did he say to you about the other testi- 
mony ? 

Captain Kramer. That my testimcwiy differed from other 
[J 0851] witnesses. 

79716— 46— pt. 9 10 



4058 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. How did it differ ? 

Captain Kramer. In respect primarily to the existence of any wind- 
system message. 

Senator Ferguson. I take it then that he stated to you that other 
people had testified that it didn't exist? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you had testified that it did exist? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is correct ? 

Captain Kjiamer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator 1 erguson. And what did he say about that, what was wrong 
about that? 

Captain Kramer. Whatever he said about that I do not precisely 
recall, Senator, but I insisted on the accuracy to my best recollection 
of what I had previously testified to. 

Senator Ferguson. And did you so testify before him ? 

Captain Kramer. I did not testify before him, but before Admiral 
Hewitt, I believe in his presence. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, you kept to that first testimony 
before Admiral Hewitt; you didn't change? 

Captain Kramer. To my first testimony before Admiral Murfin and 
his court. 

110852] Senator Ferguson. In other words, what Sonnett told 
you didn't cause you to change your testimony and you kept to the 
same testimony before Admiral Hewitt ? 

Captain Kraaier. In most respects no change whatsoever, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was there any relation to the winds message? 

Captain Kramer. The only respect in which it differed — and, inci- 
dentally, I might state I never read to date the transcript of either the 
Court of Inquiry or the Board of Investigation, except certain parts 
of my testimony in the Court of Inquiry, not all of it, and such parts 
as appear m the Naval Narrative— I stated that in the light of think- 
ing about that thing since my previous testimony, in which I believe 
he pointed out to me what you have just pointed out to me, that I 
testified it referred to the United States, that I believed that recol- 
lection was false at the time of these conversations. At the time of 
these conversations I was still unaware of what my subsequent testi- 
mony before Admiral Murfin's Board was, which I have referred to. 

Senator Ferguson. But didn't he tell you what your testimony was 
before the Murfin Board? 

Captain I^amer. No, sir ; except in general terms. 

[108SS] Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did he tell you they were 
only taking testimony of those witnesses that had seen the winds 
code? 

Captain Kramer. That was not the impression I gathered whatso- 
ever, sir. I gained the distinct impression that the chief purpose of 
Admiral Hewitt's inquiry or investigation was to fill in the gaps in 
previous hearings, specifically this I had first-hand knowledo-e 
of from being m the South Pacific, to get the testimony of Captain 
McCollum and Admiral Wilkinson who had not previously testified 
before a naval inquiry, also to reconcile discrepancies before this pre- 
vious hearing. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4059 

Senator Ferguson. And he stated that the discrepancies were so 
that you would have an opportunity to change your testimony if you 
wanted to? 

Captain Kramer. If I wanted to; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to read from the Hewitt investi- 
gation. Your testimony was taken on the 7th and 8th days. 

Mr. Murphy. ^Yhat page? 

Senator Ferguson. 151. I am going to read the record of the 
8th day before Admiral Hewitt. It is the 23d day of May 1945. 
Your previous testimony had been on the 22d day of May 1945. 
[108S4] [Reading :] 

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, 
Navy Department, at 2 p. m., Wednesday, 23 May 1945. 

Present : Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. N. ; Mr. John S. Sonnett ; Lt. Comdr. 
Benjamin H. Griswold, U. S. N. R. : and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, U. S. N. R. 

Admiral Hjewitt. Careful consideration has been given to the evidence con- 
cerning the so-called "winds" message with a view to determining whether or 
not Read Admiral Leigh Noyes, U. S. N., formerly Director of Naval Communi- 
cations, should be called as a witness. It appears from the testimony of Cap- 
tain SafEord that he thought that a "winds" message relating to the United States 
was received about 4 December 1941 and was shown to him by Captain Kramer 
and a watch officer and then delivered to Admiral Noyes. It appears from the 
testimony of Captain Kramer that he believes that there was some such mes- 
rage at about that time, but that he cannot recall whether or not it referred to 
the United States, and he is under the impression that it referred to England 
and possibly to the Dutch rather than to the United States although it may — 

and "may" is underscored, 

— have referred to the United States also. Captain [10855] Kramer 
believed that the message in question was delivered to Admiral Noyes. There 
is yet no other evidence to the effect that a "winds" code message relating to the 
United States was received. 

Upon review of the sworn testimony of Admiral Noyes, given before the Naval 
Com't of Inquiry, it appears that he recalled no such message and that he did 
not believe that any such message relating to the United States had ever been 
received by the Navy, although he had some i-ecollection of a "false alarm". 
Accordingly, I find that no useful purpose would be served by calling Admiral 
Noyes as a ■uitness in this investigation, and direct that the portions of his 
previous testimony relating to this sub.iect be incorporated in this record. This 
decision will be reconsidered should further evidence be developed indicating 
that a useful purpose would be served by reexamining Admiral Noyes. 

(The extracts of testimony of Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, U. S. N., before 
the Naval Court of Inquiry, follow.) 

And then they put in certain questions and certain answers. 

Now, is his description of your testimony a fair analysis of your 
testimony ? 

Captain Kramer. I believe it is, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? 

[10856] Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. At page 7969 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, ques- 
tion 96 : 

Q. Do I understand you to mean that your Section could not have stated 
categorically that the message meant war or merely a break in diplomatic rela- 
tions but that all three of tho.se possibilities were available to anyone interpret- 
ing that message? 

A. That is precisely correct. I can definitely state that I would not interpret 
that message as meaning definitely war. 



4060 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

That is also in the Naval Court of Inquiry. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Are you through, Mr. Murphy? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Coming back to your testimony. Captain Kra- 
mer, testifying before Admiral Hewitt, after your memory had been 
refreshed as to whether or not it conflicted with other witnesses, you 
said this : 

I would like to continue the statement. Admiral, by saying for that reason 
I am now at least under the impression that the message referred to England 
and possibly the Dutch rather than the United States, although it may have 
referred to the United States, too. 

[10857] Or possibly it may have referred to Russia? — 

Hewitt said. Said Captain Kramer : 

I just don't recall. 

Captain Kramer. In that connection, Senator, I would like to point 
out that my only intention in stating that I did not recall was that 
I did not and still do not recall precisely the wording of that piece 
of teletype paper. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Now, I want to read some answers that are in Admiral Noyes' 
testimon}' and ask you if you can enlighten me on those answers. 
Did you ever talk to Admiral Noyes on this question ? 

Captain Kramer. I have never seen Admiral Noyes since a few 
days, possibly as late as a month, after Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you talk to him about Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Kramer. I recollect no conversations although there may 
have been. 

Senator Ferguson. Just recently did you meet with any admirals or 
any Navy men to discuss your testimony or discuss Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Who were they ? 

Captain Kramer. Admiral Stark, Admiral Schuirmann and 
[10SS8] Captain McCollum. 

Senator Ferguson. And where did you meet and when ? 

Captain Kramer. At Admiral Stark's home last fall. 

Seriator Ferguson. About when? 

Captain Kramer. It was, I believe, the middle or latter part of 
September. 

Senator Ferguson. That was after this inquiry was started? 

Captain Kramer. I do not believe the inquiry had started then 
but was directed to be started. 

Mr. Keete. Will the Senator, as we are going along, to save time 
later, will you ascertain whether or not this meeting wasn't just 
before Captain Kramer went to the hospital? 

Senator Ferguson. Was it. Captain, just before you went to the 
hospital ? 

Captain Kramer. It was a few days before I went to the hospital 
for the second time. The first time I had gone there for a routine 
check-up and remained there for about a week, following which I 
was given sick leave and went to Miami. 

110869] Senator Ferguson. But this second time was before 
you went back to the hospital the second time ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4061 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, how long were you. Admiral 
Stark, Admiral Schirmann, and Captain McCollum together ? 

Captain Kramer. For a period of about 1 hour, perhaps one hour 
and a half, most of which time we were at lunch. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you discuss Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Kramer. We discussed some aspects of it ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What were the aspects? 

Captain Kramer. The principal one that stands out in my mind 
now, and I have referred to being refreshed on this point before 
this hearing by Captain McCollum, is with respect to the presence 
or absence of Admiral Stark's flag secretary, Commander Wellborn, 
or of Captain McCollum in Admiral Stark's office that Sunday 
morning. 

Senator Ferguson. How did you get to Admiral Stark's home? 
I mean were you invited, called up, or by letter or what? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; I had a short note from him inviting 
me to a luncheon. 

Senator Ferguson. At a specific time ? 

Captain Kramer. At a specific date and time ; yes, sir. 

110860] Senator Ferguson. Did he tell you who would be 
there? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. I did not know until I arrived there. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, going back to this question, one of 
the questions brought up was as to what time Admiral Stark got 
down and whether there was a conference in his office at a certain 
time Sunday morning? 

Captain Kramer, That was the chief point that now stands out 
in my memory that we specifically discussed. The other things that 
we discussed were of a very general nature. It was largely and 
primarily a social affair and we discussed old times at that luncheon. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, at that time Pearl Harbor was rather old. 

Captain Kramer. Of course it was, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And do you now tell us that that is all 
of the conversation that you had at this meeting with Admiral Stark 
as it related to Pearl Harbor ? 

Captain Kramer. Senator, at no time during that luncheon do I 
recall that any details such as this winds message were discussed. 
It was very general in nature. 

Senator Ferguson, Did you find out or ask Admiral Stark where 
he was Saturday night that you could not reach him on the telephone ? 

[10861] Captain Kramer, That point came up, too; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And what did he say as to where he had been ? 

Captain Kramer, My recollection now is that he does not or did 
not remember to this date where he was that j)articular night. 

Senator Ferguson, Did you mention that you had tried to reach 
him? 

Captain Kramer. I did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, This is Admiral Wilkinson's testimony. I 
want to see whether I can refresh your memory on this. This is page 
4664 of our record, [Reading:] 

I am not sure of my own recollection. Captain Kramer tells me I went to 
the phone and called up, apparently, Admiral Stark, or Admiral Turner. I 
asked Kramer whom he had shown it to, and he said he left a copy at the White 



4062 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

House, and had shown it in person to Secretary Knox, who had gone over it, 
made some telephone calls, and told him to bring it back to the Secretary of 
State the next morning. 

This is Wilkinson. 
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

While Kramer was there, or perhaps after he left — [10852] again my 
recollection is stimulated by him, but it is not very clear — he said I made some 
telephone calls. I may have attempted to raise Admiral Stark and Admiral 
Tui'ner again, on the basis of his information that they were not there. How- 
ever, both General Miles and myself, and to some extent Captain Kramer, felt 
that this was a diplomatic message ; it was a message that indicated, or that 
resembled the diplomatic White Papers, of which we had often seen examples, 
that it was a justification of the Japanese position. 

The strain was largely in the fourteenth part which we discussed the next 
morning. 

Now, does that recall to your memory that you discussed with 
Wilkinson these question ? 

Captain Kjjamer. On the night of 6 December 1941 I did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. 6th of December 1941 ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, as I assume, you and Wilkinson re- 
viewed this on the night of the 6th and is that when he is telling that 
3'ou refreshed his memor}^? Is that what he is talking about? 

Captain Kramer tells me I went to the phone and called up. 

If you were at his home you would not be telling him [10863] 
that. This is a later conversation ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir ; it is. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. When did you discuss that with 
Wilkinson ? 

Captain Kramer. I have seen Admiral Wilkinson since Pearl Har- 
bor three or four times. Three of those times were in the South Pa- 
cific. At none of those three occasions were things discussed concern- 
ing Pearl Harbor in any way. They were all of very short duration, 3 
to 5 minutes, because he was a very busy man, in charge of the Third 
Amphibious Force. The occasions of those conversations were purely 
social in nature. In fact, one of them was call by me at his office 
to meet him again. 

On two of those occasions I recollect his introducing me to some of 
his senior staff officers, one of whom I had known as a midshipman, 
on a midshipman practice cruise. He was then Captain Doyle. 

The next occasion on which I saw Admiral Wilkinson was after he 
returned to the United States from Japan, I believe around the middle 
of December 1945, by air after 4 days flight, when I saw him in one 
of the rooms in the Navy Department made available to contemplated 
witnesses before this hearing. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that a room where the officers [10864-] 
could get together and discuss the testimony ? 

Captain Kramer. It was a room which was made available to wit- 
nesses where they could have a desk if they wanted one — I have never 
requested a personal desk, although in the past 2 or 3 weeks I have 
been using one — and leave their outer garments and make such 
studies of the documents as Mr. Baecher, the liaison officer with 
counsel for this committee, had. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4063 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do you remember having this con- 
versation? You gave a long answer, but do you remember having 
such a conversation with Wilkinson? 

Captain Kramer. There was a conversation with Admiral Wilkin- 
son. In fact, during the course of the conversation — this was the 
afternoon of the day I arrived back from sick leave from Miami, I can 
refresh my memory on the precise date ; I had arrived after an over- 
night train ride early in the morning. 

During the course of that conversation Admiral Kirk came into 
the office, too. He is now, I believe, on the General Board of the 
Navy. Admiral Kirk was Admiral Wilkinson's predecessor in 

Senator Ferguson. Well, can't you answer that question a little 
shorter than you are answering? I don't want to cut you off in any 
way. 

[1086S] Captain Kramer. I want to be as clear as I possibly 
can on the circumstances of that meeting, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have a conversation such as he relates ? 
"Captain Kramer tells me." 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; we did. 

Senator Ferguson. You did have? 

Captain Kramer. We did ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did Admiral Stark or anyone at the Stark 
meeting have any of the testimony, any particular testimony that you 
reviewed ? 

Captain Kramer. There were no papers whatsoever at that luncheon 
with Admiral Stark. 

Senator Ferguson. And the wind message or any connection with it 
was not mentioned? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The pilot message or the 14 parts were not men- 
tioned? 

Captain Kramer. Not that I presently recollect ; no, sir. 
^ Senator Ferguson. And the only thing that you remember in rela- 
tion to Pearl Harbor was the fact as to whether or not there was a 
meeting on the morning as far as McCollum and Admiral Stark were 
concerned, is that correct ? 

^ Captain Kramer. It was at that point, sir. during the conversa- 
tions we had that my memory was first refreshed on the [10866] 
fact that it was Captain McCollum and not Admiral Stark's flag sec- 
retary who had received those folders from me that morning. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, were they trying to refresh your memory 
on a point like that ? 

Captain Kramer, No, sir ; not at all. It just occurred in the course 
of our conversation. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, was the conversation about Pearl Harbor ? 

Captain Kramer. There was some conversation about Pearl Haif- 
bor; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the other part of the conversation 
about if this thing just occurred in that conversation ? 

Captain Kramer. That point. Senator, is the only one in which 
I believe my memory was refreshed concerning Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the only one that you can give us at 
this time ? 



4064 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. It is my belief that I did more refresh- 
ing during the course of that luncheon to these other officers than 
otherwise. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to go back to Admiral Noyes, to 
some of his testimony and ask you about it. Question IM on page 155 
of Noyes' testimony [reading] : 

[10867] Did you ever discuss tlie winds message or the receipt of it with 
the Chief of Naval Operations? 

A. When the message came in, as I remember it, we considered it more im- 
portant than a later study indicated. The message only said that relations 
Were strained. 

Captain Kramer. Which message? 

Senator Ferguson. Talking about the winds message. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The message of the fourth or fifth, or the third 
as it is now indicated, the implementing message. 

Captain Kramer. The winds message ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; the winds. When I speak of the "winds" 
message I mean the implementing message. 

Now, do you remember any discussion in the Department that it 
was not as strong as war, that it only said, the message only said that 
relations were strained ? Do you remember a discussion about that ? 

Captain Kramer. You are speaking about a discussion in Admiral 
Stark's office, sir? 

Mr. KiCHARDSON. I think you had better read the question to him. 

(The question was read by the reporter.) 

Captain Kramer. I recall no specific discussion with [10,868] 
Admiral Stark concerning the winds message. 

Senator Ferguson. No, no ; with Noyes, with anyone about it. 

Captain Kramer. I have previously testified and it is my present 
recollection that in making deliveries after the winds message was 
received I very probably mentioned it to recipients, at least some of 
them ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, a message came from Batavia. Did 
you see that message ? 

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir, until quite recently. 

Mr. Murphy. May I have the previous question and answer read? 

(The question and answer were read by the reporter.) 

Captain Kramer. Although I probably was shown it as one of the 
exhibits before previous hearings. 

Senator Ferguson. Read the last answer. 

Mr. Murphy. And the previous question also, please. 

(The question and answer were read by the reporter.) 

Senator Ferguson. Now, this Batavia message indicates that Batavia 
or the Dutch had anticipated or intercepted the two messages 2353 
aiad 2354^ 

Captain Kramer. Not necessarily, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson (continuing) . In another message. 

Captain Kramer. My recollection is that at the time I [10,869] 
was under the impression that in all probability the British at Singa- 
pore had given that information to the Dutch, although there was a 
possibility that the Dutch themselves were engaged in this crypt- 
analytical work. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4065 

Senator Ferguson. Now, going back : You said that you talked to 
the recipients about this winds message and when we are talking about 
the winds message we are talking about the implementing message. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How would you have discussed that with them 
if you had never delivered it to them ? 

Captain Kramer. I knew of its existence. I knew in detail, in some 
detail the special provisions for its handling and it was only natural 
that I might have mentioned it; very probably did, during the course 
of deliveries of other traffic that day. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, there was a winds mes- 
sage. Now, let us leave out what was in it. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; there was. 

Senator Ferguson. There was a winds message ? 

Captain Kjjamer. Which I recognized at the time as such. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. Now, we are definite on that 
one thing, that there was a winds message and you recognized it as 
such on the day in question ? 

[108/0] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now I will ask you this: You mentioned this 
morning that you might be able to do some searching to find out some 
questions, and one was — and I am going to ask you to do two things. 
One was in relation to the file, and what I would like to have you do 
is to get an expert with you to ascertain whether the typewriter that 
wrote that "Cancelled'' on that file was ever used in your department 
or in some other. Now, there are Washington people that can help 
you on that question. 

Then I would like to have you do another thing, to try to locate the 
winds message, I don't care what is in it, that you now say definitely 
was received and, as you say, it was in line with what you thought on 
that day as being a reply to those two previous questions. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Now, wait. 

Mr. Murphy. I think I ought to object, Mr. Chairman. I don't 
see how this committee can assign to any naval officer, a captain who 
is a witness, the obligation of engaging experts to go over and test 
papers, and I think if we need an expert the committee ought to en- 
gage one. 

Senator Ferguson. Let him try to find this winds message for us 
and let him then try to find how this file was. He [10871] 
offered this morning to do that, he thought that he could do it. 

Mr. Murphy. You are assigning the responsibility to a witness to 
engage an expert. Let the committee engage one if we need one, but 
don't let the witnesses go around to engage experts on their own re- 
sponsibility. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask counsel to do the same thing. Let 
this man look. Maybe he can find some of this stuff. 

Now, the next thing is 

Captain Kramer. Senator, with respect to the winds message, I 
would like to state that it would be an extremely unusual thing for 
such a winds message to be in existence for more than a few hours 
after receipt in the Navy Department unless it came into my section, 
which it never did. All that plain-language traffic for which special 



4066 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

monitoring was set up about 10 days before Pearl Harbor was burnt, 
to my best knowledge and belief, as a matter of routine. As soon as it 
had been scanned to determine whether there was or was not a winds 
message in it it was destroyed. 

As far as the likelihood or otherwise of the existence of such a piece 
of teletype paper now in the files of the Navy Department, it is my 
present understanding, and was then, that it would not be preserved 
unless it came into my section, [10872] where everything that 
we translated was preserved and filed. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then if it did not come into your 
section, as I understand the way it was set up that these cards were to 
be used and, therefore, delivery was to be made by telephone or some 
other handling than by you, it would not come into your section. 

Captain Kramer. It very probably would not althought it might 
come into my section. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then if it might, see what you can 
do about it. 

Now, let me take you to this message from Batavia. It is dated 
the 5th of December 1941, according to our copy, and this is not a 
photostatic copy. It is a mimeographed paper. 

The photostatic copy is dated the 5th of December 1941. Now, I 
want you to look at the so-called date on when it was received, if you 
can give it to us. On the copy that I have got is "O" canceled through, 
310, "O" canceled through, 30 "O" canceled through. You see what 
I am talking about? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, what is that date ? 

Captain Kramer. That is 10 : 30 Greenwich time on the 3d of 
December Greenwich date. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, does that indicate that it was received here 
on the third ? 

[10873] Captain Kramer. Not necessarily; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, what date was it received here? 

Captain Kramer. I see nothing on this piece of paper to indicate 
when it was received here, sir, except the date "5 December" at the 
top, which may be that. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, at least when that was re- 
ceived in the War and in the Navy Department and the State De- 
partment the Dutch interpreted the setting up of a winds code mes- 
sage, that it meant war, whereas we interpreted it as meaning a 
breaking off of strained relations, is that correct? 

Captain Kjramer. I never saw this message. Senator, at the time. 
I was told about it and the only reaction I recall to this message was 
in connection with the security aspects of my work, the wider dissemi- 
nation of this crypt-analytical material than I had heretofore been 
aware of. 

Senator Ferguson. I am now informed that the Navy records show 
that this message I am talking about, that is ^ated the 5th and is 
shown here as "313" was received at 1 : 21 a. m. on the 4th of December 
1941 by the Navy. 

So the Navy knew on the 4th at 1 : 21 a. m., on the morning of the 
4th, that the Dutch interpreted these two messages that we had re- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4067 

ceived setting up the code as being a decision of war rather than just 
strained relations, because it reads this way : 

[10874] From Thorpe for Miles War Dept.— 

this is OPNAV— 

Code intercept: Japan will — 

showing that they got it by code, intercepted a code and cipher : 

Japan will notify her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as 
weather report at end. East wind rain XXXXX United States : North wind 
cloudy Russia : West wind clear England with attack on Thailand Malay and 
Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass directions only. 
In this case words will be introduced five times in general text. 

Now, the part I was interested in is that the Dutch interpreted it to 
mean war and the Navy had a copy of that Dutch interpretation. 

Captain Kramer. Senator, I have no first-hand knowledge of how 
this message was handled, but on that point I should like to remark 
that the British translation furnished to the Asiatic Fleet, Admiral 
Hart, I consider a j)recise and accurate translation now of those 
Japanese circulars; that from a present scanning of these documents 
I do not consider it unusual that the Dutch considered this thing as 
referring to a war decision so far as the Dutch were concerned since, 
as I recall it, the expression used with regard to the Netherlands East 
[10875] Indies was the Japanese w^ord "koreauku," which means 
"occupation." 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then you explain that at least, that 
it would mean war with the Dutch the way it read? 

Captain Kramer. There had been previous occupations which did 
not involve war, such as that of French Indochina. 

Senator Ferguson. But it was not Holland. 

Captain Kj?amer. It was the French, no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, if you surrender it never means war. That 
is what the French did. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, is it fair to say that what I read you from 
Batavia is a fair translation of message circular 2353, page 154 of 
Exhibit 1 ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not consider that a translation, sir. It is 
apparently a version of that translation which passed through several 
hands before being drafted by Alusna of Batavia. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Well, at least it was their intelligence 
that it meant war, that same message ? 

Captain Kramer. That appears to be or have been the feeling in 
Java, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you ever instructed in any way that cer- 
tain memorandums, files, and so forth were to be destroyed — not files. 
I will change that. Any memorandums, [10S76] diaries, and 
things of that nature were to be destroyed or handed over to the 
service ? 

Captain Ej{Amer. Until I arrived in the Central Pacific in June of 
1943 I was aware of no such orders to destroy memoranda. Those I 
became aware of when I arrived there were orders and directives 
issued by Admiral Nimitz with reference to the keeping of diaries in 
the Pacific area. 



4068 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that in the Clausen report this 
appears on page 253 as far as it relates to the Army, and I will try 
and get another order of the Navy [reading] : 

It is recommended that, for security reasons, the Secretary of War direct all 
witnesses heretofore and hereafter examined by me — 

that is, either Army or Navy witnesses — 

to send or give me forthwith, for filing with the records of this investigation, 
any copies of aflSdavits made before me and any incidental and related notes 
or papers which may be in their possession or under their control, they to 
advise me in writing that this has been done or that there are no such records, 
and that they be advised that tliese records will be available in the War Depart- 
ment in tlie event access thereto is ever required. 

Now, did you hear of that instruction ? 

[10877] Captain Kramer. I never did ; no, sir. I did receive an 
official letter from Admiral Theobald, Director of Naval Intelligence, 
last summer or late spring to the effect that Mr. Clausen, then I believe 
a major, was conducting an investigation and was authorized to take 
testimony. I was never called before Clausen. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you know of any order in October 
1942 in relation to memorandums and papers in the Navy? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. In your opinion did the destroying of codes 
mean war, if a nation orders its codes and machines destroyed? 

Captain Kramer. That is one construction, certainly, to be placed 
on it; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, when did we instruct our mili- 
tary and naval attache in Tokyo to destroy their code machine and, 
as a matter of fact, it was destroyed ? 

Captain Kramer. I am not aware that our attaches in the Far East 
at any time held code machines, although I am not familiar precisely 
with what cryptographic systems they held. I do distinctly recall in 
connection with the drafting of those directives, at least, the first one 
or two of them in Admiral Noyes' office, shortly after lunch on De- 
cember 4, 1941, [10878] that Admiral Noyes' remarks while 
I was present were to the effect that as a precautionary measure he 
contemplated or intended to have all superfluous material destroyed 
but that one channel was to be left to these attaches, namely, a private 
channel between their post and Washington. 

Senator Ferguson. So, then, you did not know that the naval attache 
in Tokyo had a machine ? 

Captain Kramer. I knew he used cryptographic aids. I never have 
known just what ones they were; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you know that he was instructed on 
the fourth or fifth to destroy the machine and the codes ? 

Captain Kramer. I know that Admiral Noyes contemplated and, 
in fact, drafted in my presence a message directing destruction of cer- 
tain or most, at least with one exception, of their crypotographic aids. 

Senator Ferguson. Wasn't that on Guam where that message was 
sent rather than to Tokyo ? 

Captain Kramer. I believe the second message drafted in my pres- 
ence was only addressed to Guam, with many other information ad- 
dressees. Captain Safford was called to Admiral Noyes' office while 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4069 

this discussion in my presence took place, because Captain Safford 
was in charge of the registered publications section of the Navy De- 
partment, could determine in detail just what systems those attaches 
held and could [10879] put those messages into final form for 
sending. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, will you look at Exhibit 37, page 42? 
Do you know what one was left, or did that indicate that one was left 
on the 4th of December 1941 ? 

Destroy this system at discretion and report. 

Mr. Murphy. You have taken the copy, Senator. The witness 
does not have any. Will you read the question to the witness ? 

(The question was read by the reporter.) 

Captain Kramer. What was the question, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. This would indicate that they were just to de- 
stroy a part, and that part of the machine was to remain in existence? 

Captain Kramer. That one cryptographic system, whether it was a 
machine or not I did not and I do not know, was to be kept but could 
be destroyed at discretion and if destroyed a report to that effect was 
to be made during the word "Javorach." 

Senator Ferguson. Now, when were the language officers taken 
from Japan? 

Captain Kramer. In about August 1941, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what part of August? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that we had given Japan 
[10880] a note on August the 17th indicating that she was not to 
move any farther south ? 

Captain Kramer. I had no first-hand contact at any time with 
diplomatic notes except what I saw in this decrypted traffic. 

Senator Ferguson. And you do not recall that message delivered on 
a Sunday morning when the President returned from the Atlantic 
conference ? You don't remember that message ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not recall it specifically now. An exami- 
nation of those documents might refresh my memory. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you know what our policy was in 
relation to Japan moving south ? 

Captain Kramer. As regards high policy here in Washington and 
of the United States Government most of my information — I cannot 
state categorically that all of my information, but I say nearly all, 
was based on newspapers and other periodicals. 

Senator Ferguson. So far as the foreign policy of America was 
concerned and as far as you were concerned, it was based on news- 
papers and articles that appeared in the public press ? 

Captain Kramer. For the most part ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. You were not given any particular brief- 
ing in what our policy was so that you would be able to interpret these 
messages ? 

[10881] Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I will read to you this message and see 
whether or not you know anything about the part I have in mind. 
This is on page 556 of Foreign Kelations of the United States and 



4070 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Japan, 1931-1941, volume 2, printed about 1943, after Pearl Harbor. 
[Reading from Exhibit No. 29 :] 

Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Gov- 
ernment of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in 
pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of 
force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be com- 
pelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward 
safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and Ameri- 
can nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States. 

Did you know that that note was delivered on the l7th of August 
1941? 

Captain Kramer. If it appeared in this decrypted traflSc I un- 
doubtedly would have known of it. 

Senator Ferguson. But you do not recall it ; it did not impress you 
any? 

Captain Kramer. I do not recall now on that point ; no, sir. 

\^10882'] Senator Ferguson. Well, having that in mind now, 
would it mean anything if they were going to strike down in the Kra 
Peninsula or the British near Singapore the morning of the 7th, after 
your memory being refreshed on this thing I just read you? 

Captain Kramer. I do not know, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You took a file over to Secretary Forrestal's 
office while Mr. Knox was out at Pearl Harbor making an investiga- 
tion, did you not? 

Captain Kramer. I did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And do you know where that file is today ? 

Captain Kramer. I doubt very much whether that file existed for 
more than a day or two, perhaps as long as a week after it was shown 
to Mr. Forrestal. It was made up from extra copies we still had in 
our office of this decrypted material not yet destroyed. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, there was then an investigation going 
on by Mr. Knox and onl}' a little later, about a week later, by the 
Roberts commission ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you did not keep this extra material; it 
was destroyed later ? 

Captain Kramer. It was not kept in a separate folder \^10883] 
that I recall, sir, although Mr. Forrestal may have held it for a few 
days. I simply do not recall that point. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you have a conversation with 
Mr. Forrestal as to whether or not he wanted that for Mr. Knox^ 
knowledge? Was that his purpose? 

Captain Kramer. That is not my understanding of it at all, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Why was it taken to Mr. Forrestal? 

Captain Kj?amer. Because of the fact that it was my understand- 
ing, and still is, that he saw practically none of this traffic but Mr. 
Knox saw most of it or all of it. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, do I understand Mr. Forrestal was 
making an investigation of this case ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. The purpose of bringing that file up 
at all, as I understood it then, and still understand it, was simply 
to acquaint Mr. Forrestal, who then was Acting Secretary of the 
Navy in Mr. Knox's absence, with the traffic immediately preceding 
Pearl Harbor. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4071 

Senator Feeguson. Well, now, war had started then. Did he ex- 
plain why he wanted to see it if it was not an investigation ? 

Captain E^ramee. He did not explain to me, sir, and it was not ex- 
plained specifically in so many terms why he wanted to see it. I was 
told to prepare snch a folder. I do not [10884.] recall who 
told me ; very likely Captain McCollum. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you look for this wind execute message 
to put it in at that time ? 

Captain Kramer. There was no wind execute message in my files 
at that time, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Captain Kramer. Or at any time that I am aware of. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then if it was not in your file 
you did not look for it to put it into this file for the Secretary of the 
Navy. 

Captain Kramer. I specifically recall that this so-called hidden 
word message was included in that file. There was no discussion 
whatsoever as to the systems these different messages in that file 
came in. I further specifically recall that I pointed out to Mr. For- 
restal that the United States should be included in the wording of 
that message as typed up. 

Senator Ferguson. Then how do you account for this fact, that 
we were furnished at this late date the message on page 251 : 

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expecta- 
tions — 

and that you knew a few days later that that was a Avrong translation? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

[10885] Senator Ferguson. Why were we not furnished with 
both copies? Why did we get this copy only that indicated a breach 
with England? 

Captain Kramer. I do not know who prepared Exhibit 1, 

Senator Ferguson. But that is not a correct translation of the 
message ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, look on page 201 of Exhibit 1. Did the 
President ever ask you for that message that he might retain it ? 

Senator Lucas. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Wliat is the difference between those two messages 
that you just inquired about ? 

Senator Ferguson. That the "United States" ought to be inserted. 
To make this clear for Senator Lucas and for the record : 

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expecta- 
tions — 

a true translation of that message is what ? 
Captain Kramer (reading) : 

Relations between Japan and England and the United States are not in 
accordance with expectations. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

[10886] Senator Ferguson. The corrected one, as I understand 
it, is in the Hewitt report, but to correct this one — we were handed 
this one and that is not a correct translation. 



4072 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know of any other translations that 
are not correct in this book ? 

Captain Kramer. I have pointed out a discrepancy in our trans- 
lation of Tokyo's circular 2353 and 2354 due to the garbled version of 
that message we liad at the time of the translation. That is the only 
other one of which I am now aware of any discrepancy in. 

Senator Ferguson. You have pointed that out in the record. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Is this not in the book 251 a correct copy of magic as 
such ? I mean exhibit 1 is supposed to be the magic that was delivered 
to all of these recipients. It was delivered to the recipients as it is 
here. The correction was made after he went back to the department. 
As I understand it, he made some phone calls then and then the war 
started. 

[10887] Captain Kramer. That is correct, Mr. Murphy. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do you understand that this is only 
the way it was delivered and no corrections have been given to us if 
there were corrections ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not know just what has been given to this 
committee, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now look at page 204. Were you 
ever asked by the President or his aide to leave with him or to return 
to him that Tokyo to Berlin message ? 

Captain Kramer. A day or two after the original version as it 
appears here was delivered to the President I received a request from 
the President's aide. Captain Beardall, to the effect that the President 
desired to retain a copy of this message. I, in compliance with that 
request, prepared a paraphrase of this message which was turned over 
to Captain Beardall. It's present disposition I do not know. 

Senator Ferguson. To the best of your knowledge what date is 
that? 

Captain Kramer. Probably about the 2d or 3d of December 1941. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the one that says : 

Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly 
break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan thi'ough some clash of 
arms and [10888] add that the time of the breaking out of this war may 
come quicker than anyone dreams. 

That conversation was to be between the Jap Ambassador in Ger- 
many and Hitler and Ribbentrop ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You never took it back then to the office after 
5'ou gave a copy to the aide ? 

Captain ICramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now. to make the record clear, we have been 
furnished a correct translation of that message on page 251 of 142-C 
and it reads this way : 

Relations between .Japan and ai'e approaching a crisis, on the verge of 

danger, England, United States. 

Is that a fair translation ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4073 

Captain Kramer. That, sir, I consider an inaccurate translation of 
the Japanese translation, which in the light of seeing the work sheet 
jnst a few days ago I believe reads : 

NIHON to TORRO KITAI NX HAN SU. 

The essential part of that Japanese sentence is "KITAI NI HAN 
SU," which means, precisely, and can be determined from this standard 
Japanese-English dictionary before me, "Not in accordance with ex- 
pectations," or it means "Disappointment in expectations," or things 
to that effect. Tliere is nothing whatsoever implying crisis or war in 
the [10889] Japanese phraseology. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you attend a meeting on the morning of 
the 6th between some Navy officers who were in consultation about 
getting news to the Pacific ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that McCollum had prepared a 
message of information? 

Captain Kramer. I heard about that one during the course of the 
Roberts hearings from, I believe. Captain McCollum. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you meant while the Roberts hearings 
were going on. You were not a witness there ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did McCollum tell you that? 

Captain Kramer. In a few of the brief conversations we had my 
recollection is that I learned at one of those conversations that he had 
prepared some type of message. I never saw it and am unfamiliar 
and was unfamiliar at the time with the detailed phraseology used. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he tell you what was in the message ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir; not in detail, just in general terms that 
he had drafted a message about the general situation. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, isn't this a fair statement, or is [10890] 
it, that the officers down in the Department, in the Intelligence De- 
partment there, were greatly concerned about information going or 
not going to the Pacific and that they were attempting to get some 
information out or drafting messages to suggest information ? Is that 
a correct statement? 

Captain Kj^amer. I believe it is ; yeSj sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I asked you this before but I want to be sure 
of this: You had no concern over the question as to whether or not 
relations were broken between Japan and England ? 

Captain Kraheer. What do you mean by "concern" ? 

Senator Ferguson. Well, grave concern that it would mean war to us. 

Captain Kramer. Naturally, Senator, as a United States citizen I 
was concerned, as I believe many other citizens were, with a possibility 
of the collapse of England. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the way it concerned you, not that it 
meant war between Japan and this country ? 

Captain Kramee. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, did we have a watch on the 
Tokyo-England-London circuit? 

Captain Kramer. I am not familiar with the details of precisely 
what circuits we covered, sir. Certainly, during the period of days 
and weeks preceding Pearl Harbor we were [10891] getting 
some traffic addressed to London or originating in London. 

79716— 46— pt. 9 11 



4074 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Now I come back to one question that I would 
like to work out and that is this 901 and 900. I can pass that now and 
look over it and then come back to it some time later. I will look at 
that and then I will come back later and ask you some questions. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all I have at the present time. 

The Vice Chairman. You are through for the present, Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; and then I will come back later. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keef e of Wisconsin will inquire, Captain. 

Mr. Keefe. Captain Kramer, what is your age ? 

Captain Kramer. About forty-two and a half, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You graduated from the Naval Academy when? 

Captain Kramer. 1925, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You and Captain Saiford have always been, at least 
up until now, good friends, have you not ? 

Captain Kramer. Unless testimony I have given before this hear- 
ing has altered his views I do not think our relations have changed in 
any respect, sir. 

[10892] Mr. Keefe. That is not an answer to my question. You 
have been good friends, have you not ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes. sir; oflBce friends, not social friends. 

Mr. Keefe. I was a little disturbed by some testimony that you 
gave yesterday with respect to a visit by Captain Safford to you in 
the hospital. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Am I to assume that you intended to convey the im- 
pression that that was a gratuitous visit on the part of Captain Safford 
which your relations with him did not justify? 

Captain Kramer. That is not quite the impression I intended to 
convey ; no, sir. I was somewhat surprised at that visit but not at all 
too surprised, I believe I expressed myself. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, you stated that he had brought you a box of candy. 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. As though that were wholly unexpected and perhaps 
had some sinister purpose behind it. Did you mean anything like 
that? 

Captain Safford. None whatsoever, sir. I believe it is customary 
in making visits to patients in a hospital to bring [10893] 
things of that nature. 

Mr. Keefe. Wliy, of course, and you did not intend bv that state- 
ment that you made yesterdaj' to imply that Captain Saflford had any 
sinister purpose in visiting you at the hospital, did you? 

Captain Krasier. None whatsoever, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. No. Or that he came out there for the purpose of try- 
ing to enlist your aid in connection with testimony to be given before 
this committee? 

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. He did not even discuss Pearl Harbor with you at the 
time he visited you at the hospital, did he? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You played a game of chess ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Did he visit you more than once? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4075 

Captain Ejiamer. On two occasions, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, you stated yesterday that you had about eight 
visitors, you think, while you were at the hospital. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Will you tell us who those visitors were besides Captain 
Safford? 

Captain Kramer. I did not expect to be questioned on that point, 
Mr. Keefe. 

[10894] Mr. Keefe. If there is anything 

Captain Kramer. I believe I could refresh my memory in detail 
on that. Offhand I can recall the name of one of them. Mister — 
rather, retired Maj. A. B. C. Graves, who is a member of the Wash- 
ington Chess Divan, of which I have been a member. 

Mr. Keefe. Did any person other than Mr. Gearhart and myself 
talk to you about Pearl Harbor at any time that you were at the 
hospital? 

Captain Kramer. That is precisely accurate, sir, except one patient 
in the hospital, namely, a former classmate of mine, a Commander 
Powell, who was in a room near mine in the hospital. In the course 
of our general conversations I mentioned the fact that I was engaged 
at the time of Pearl Harbor in handling cryptographic material and 
I undoubtedly mentioned the fact and the thought I might be a witness 
before the contemplated hearing, this hearing. 

Mr. KJEEFE. Commander Powell was a classmate of yours? 

Captain Kjjamer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. He had been retired from the Navy for some years and 
had come back into the Navy ? 

Captain I^amer. Yes, sir; during the war. 

Mr. Keefe. Mrs. Powell and Mrs. Kramer were friends, too, were 
they not ? 

[1089i5} Captain Kramer. Mrs. Kramer has never met Mrs. 
Powell until recently, last fall. 

Mr. Keefe. I see, but she met Mrs. Powell then ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Are those all the people that you can recall? Com- 
mander Powell was a patient suffering from arthritis, was he not ? 

Captain Ejiamer. I am not sure what the diagnosis in his case was, 
Mr. Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, in any event he was taking treatment out there? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, then, you have told us of some General or some 
man that was in some chess divan. You talked about chess? 

Captain Kramer. There was one other individual from the chess 
divan. Just which one I do not recall at the moment. 

Mr. Keefe. Of course, the reason that I ask these questions is be- 
cause the hospital record which I have examined only shows the visit 
of Captain Safford. You are sure that there were others ? 

Captain Kramer. I am positive of that, sir. In connection with 
the hospital record I would like to point out [10896] that it was 
not until last month that I was aware of a hospital rule to the effect 
that patients leaving the hospital during the day should sign out in a 
book. That, incidentally, Mr. Keefe, is the reason I believe why you 
were not able to be informed on the occasion of the day before our 



4076 CONGRESSIONAL iNVESTlGATlOM PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

interview last fall of where I was. I had apparently violated a hospital 
regulation in that respect. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, Mr. Gearhart and I did speak to you at the hos- 
pital? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And we had about 4i^-hour conversation with you ? 

Captain Kramer. Which I would characterize as very pleasant in 
nature. 

Mr. Keefe. A very pleasant conversation. There was no attempt to 
bulldoze you or change your opinion or anything of that kind, was 
there? 

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And Mrs. Kramer was present during the entire course 
of that conversation ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And Captain Duncan was kind enough to serve us a 
luncheon while we were sitting in the room ? 

Captain Kramer. A brief lunch, yes, sir. 

[10897] Mr. Keefe. You recall that very well ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, you had been chafing some beause of the fact 
that you were required to stay out there in the hospital, weren't 
you. Captain? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you had expressed that to your Commander friend 
and others that came to see you, hadn't a'ou ? 

Captain Kramer. I believe I expressed it only to Commander 
Powell, who was the only patient I had previously known. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes, and you gave expression to the fact that you 
felt if you could get word to Ross Mclntire you might be permitted 
to leave the hospital, didn't you ? 

Captain Kramer. I don't recall that statement. 

Mr. Keefe. You don't recall that? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You were clothed in pajamas and bathrobe, were you 
not? 

Captain Kramer. That was customary for all patients. 

Mr. Keefe. Why, exactly. There was nothing unusual about it. 

Captain Kramer. None at all, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You were not permitted to eat at the officers' 
[10898] mess out there, were you ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. The meals were served to all patients 
in that particular part of the hospital on trays. 

Mr. Keefe. Exactly. Now, the day defore Mr. Gearhart and I 
came out your uniform was restored so that you could go with Mrs. 
Kramer on a shopping tour? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. She had arrived just a 
few days before. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. And there had been some publicity in the news- 
papers about the speech that had been made on the floor of Congress 
the day before, hadn't there? 

Captain Kramer. I became aware of that, yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4077 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. And the next day was the day that your uni- 
form was restored to you and you were permitted temporary leave 
from the hospital, isn't that true ? 

Captain Kramer. I am not sure which event preceeded or followed 
which, Mr. Keefe. I undoubtedly could refresh my memory on that 
by going over it in more detail. I know, however, that the proxi- 
mate and prime cause of the uniform being restored was so that I 
could leave the hospital with my wife who had just arrived there. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Captain Kramer. Before that there was no reason for my sub- 
sisting out. 

[10899] Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now, you first went to the hospital in 
August, did you not? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. About the 28th of August? 

Captain Kramer. That may be correct, sir. I believe it is. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes, I checked it. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And then you went back to the hospital the 23d of 
September. 

Captain Kramer. About that date I believe, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And in the meantime had you been down to Miami with 
your family ? 

Captain Kramer. On sick leave, yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, you. Captain Kramer — and I want this to be said 
in the record — had, prior to that time, rendered a most distinguished 
service to your country, there is no question about that fact. That 
should appear clearly. Now, you would say also that Captain Safford 
had rendered a most distinguished service to his country, would you 
not? 

Captain Kramer, Mr. Keefe, I have always had a very high regard 
for Captain Safford's professional abilities. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, have you had a regard for him in any other re- 
spect ? 

[10900] Captain Kramer. As a personal friend I had a regard 
for him which warranted the continuance of that friendship, yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. And you feel that way today, do you not? 

Captain Kramer. I do, yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, did you express any concern to any of your 
friends over the fact that you viewed with some apprehension the 
necessity for your appearing before this Congressional investigating 
committee? 

Captain Kramer. At no time do I recall making expressions of that 
nature, sir. I have never been in a state of apprehension that I am 
aware of in any hearing I appeared before. 

Mr. Keefe. After you left the hospital did you visit the Public 
Eelations Department of the Navy Department? 

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Did anybody visit you from that Department ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Mr, KJEEFE. Were you given any instructions as to statements to be 
issued or not to be issued ? 



4078 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir. If you will recall, during 
the course of our conversation at the Naval Hospital, Captain Duncan 
broke into our discussions with words to the effect that the press was 
outside and champing at the [10901] bits to get an interview 
from me. I expressed myself in answer to Captain Duncan along the 
lines that it appeared as though I could not avoid such an interview 
and that it might just as well take place now. 

With that expression of my opinion I ask Mrs. Kramer to leave 
the room; certain members of the press came in and I extemporane- 
ously dictated a statement. On the completion of that statement I 
asked the correspondent who took it down what service he represented, 
turned to Captain Duncan, the medical officer in charge of the hos- 
pital, and requested him to obtain a copy of that statement and fur- 
nish it to the Navy Department Public Relations Officer because any 
further statement I might have occasion to make to the press would 
be of identical tenor. 

Mr. Keefe. I see. Do you recall at that time that when Captain 
Duncan came in he stated that he had communicated with the Public 
Relations Department of the Navy and that it was all right for them 
to take pictures or for you to make a statement? Do you recall him 
making that statement? 

Captain Kramer. I believe that at one time, either just before or 
just after that interview with the press, he indicated that the Public 
Relations Office desired to arrange an interview in the Navy Depart- 
ment that afternoon. 

Mr. Keefe. No ; I am asking you that specific question. 

[10902] Isn't it a fact before any newspaper reporters or photog- 
raphers were in that there was some objection expressed by me to the 
fact of their taking pictures or having newspaper reporters there and 
did not Dr. Duncan say that he had taken the matter up with the Public 
Relations Department of the Navy and that it was all right to take 
the pictures and make a statement at that time? 

Captain Kramer. You are very likely precisely accurate in that 
respect, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. I don't like this "very likely" and "very 
probably." Isn't that it exactly. 

Captain Kramer. I used that "very likely," Mr. Keefe, because I 
do not recall precisely. If I attempted to refresh my niemory I 
probably could. 

Mr. Keefe. Isn't that precisely correct, Captain Kramer ? 

Captain Kramer. I think it is, sir. 

[10903] Mr. Keefe. Yes, you think it is, of course. 

Well, now, Pearl Harbor happened, and the Secretary of the Navy 
flew out to Pearl Harboi to see what had happened, and while he was 
gone the first person that talked to you about the situation, as I under- 
stand your testimony, was the Undt' Secretary of the Navy, Mr. 
Forrestal, then acting as Secretary of the Navy. 

He requested you, during the absence of Secretary Knox, to pre- 
pare a file showing the intercepts, is that correct? 

Captain Kramer. Mr. Forrestal did not request me. I was di- 
rected, as I recall, by Captain McCollum to prepare a folder, which 
I was given to understand Mr. Forrestal desired to see. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4079 

Mr. Keefe. Well, all right, we will go through the chain of com- 
mand, then. It went from Forrestal to your superior, McCollum, 
and from McCollum to you ; is that right l 

Captain Kramer. That is undoubtedly correct, yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. By virtue of that order, or command, you then as- 
sembled the file and went to Mr. Forrestal ? 

Captain Kramer. Accompanied by Captain McCollum, yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. So you and Captain McCollum discussed the intercepts 
for the first time during the absence of Secretary [10904] Knox 
with Under Secretary, and Acting Secretary, Forrestal ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. I^efe. Now, following that, who was the next person that you 
talked with, that you can now recall, with respect to Pearl Harbor, 
and the incidents prior thereto, during the month of December, or at 
any other time, in relation to Pearl Harbor ? 

Captain Kramer. Other than the usual conversations I might have 
had with normal recipients of this traffic, the identical type of conver- 
sations that I would have had through 1941. The only time I dis- 
cussed in detail any events connected with Pearl Harbor was when I 
testified before the court of Admiral Murfin with one exception ; that 
was Admiral Halsey. 

Mr. Iveefe. All right. 

Now, you did talk with Admiral Halsey. When was that, and 
where ? 

Captain Kramer. About May 1944, at the headquarters building of 
Admiral Halsey in Noumea, New Caledonia. 

Mr. Keefe. Was that after you had received the letter from Captain 
Safford which has been introduced in evidence ? 

Captain IOiamer. Some months after, yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And what was the occasion of your talk with Admiral 
Halsey? 

[10905] Captain Kramer. A letter from Admiral Kimmel to Ad- 
miral Halsey. It was a personal letter. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you see the letter ? 

Captain Kramer. I did, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. 

Is that letter in existence ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not know whether the original is or not, sir. 
I have a copy of it. 

Mr, Keefe. Well, where is the copy ? 

Captain Kramer. Here [handing document to Mr. Keefe]. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, as I understand it. Admiral Halsey called you 
to his command post, or office, and told you that he had received a letter 
from Admiral Kimmel ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. How did you get the copy of that letter? 

Captain Kramer. The letter requests that I prepare answers in the 
form of a deposition to certain questions propounded in that letter. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you prepare such answers ? 

Captain Kramer. I prepared no deposition as such. I did prepare, 
however, an answer to Captain Safford's second letter, which I felt 



4080 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

was in the nature of a deposition, in case I wanted to comj^ly with 
Admiral Kimmel's request. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, did you comply with Admiral Kimmel's 
[10906'] request? 

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir, other than what I have outlined. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, did you give to Admiral Halsey the answers to 
the questions that Admiral Kimmel had asked ? 

Captain Kramer. Well, when I went to Admiral Halsey's office, at 
his request, he showed me the letter, which I read. He indicated that 
he would leave it entirely to me as to whether or not I should comply 
with that request. 

After reading the letter, I felt that the questions covered in that 
letter were of such limited character as regarding the events pre- 
ceding Pearl Harbor, that a broader picture of events should be given 
Admiral Halsey. 

In fact, my idea was to give a pretty thorough picture of the events 
as I knew them to Admiral Halsey, and request his advice on what 
I should do. 

I did not, during the course of that first interview. 

What I did request, however, was that I be given that letter, and I 
had in mind preparing a full reply to Captain Safford's second letter, 
which I felt would pretty thoroughly cover those events, that I would 
like a few days to prepare that reply and would then have something 
to show him, and would give him a fairly comprehensive picture of it. 

[10907'] Mr. Keefe. Now, let us see — 

Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield for just a moment? 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. I wonder if the committee cannot have the letter. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes ; I am going to read it into the record to facilitate 
this thing a little bit, without all this rambling around about it. 

Now, let us get right down to the facts. 

You got the copy of this letter from Admiral Halsey ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Is that right ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. In order that you might prepare an answer; is that 
correct ? 

Captain Kramer. If I so desired ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. If you so desired. 
' Now, the letter reads : 

280 Bkonxville Road, 
Bronxville, New York, 18 March 1944- 
Admiral William F. Halsey, U. S. Navy, 
Commander South Pacific Fleet, 

[10908] c/o Fleet Post Office 
San Francisco, California. 

Dear Bill : You have on your staff Commander A. D. Kramer, U. S. N., veho 
was on duty in the Communications OflBce in the Navy Department at the time 
of the attack on Pearl Harbor and for some time prior to that date. I believe 
he has knowledge of facts and incidents which occurred in the Navy Department 
which are of interest and value to me. Will you please obtain from him an 
affidavit and ask him if he will supply me with a copy. I will assure him that 
I will make no use of the aflidavit without his permission so long as he is alive. 
If he does not wish to supply me with a copy of the aflSdavit, I would appreciate 
it very much if he will make the affidavit, put it in a secure place and inform 
me when I can obtain it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4081 

There was a message received in the Navy Department on December 4th or 
5th, 1941, which came to be called the "winds message". I should like to know : 
What station first received the Winds Message ? 
What date was it received in Washington? 

When was it deciphered, translated, decoded and delivered to responsible 
officials in Washington? 

What officials in Washington saw the translation of [10909] the 
Winds Message and when? 

What was the substance of the information contained in the Winds 
Message? 

What action towards notification of Field Commanders of contents of 
message and implications thereof was taken? 
There was a note delivered by the Japanese Ambassador to Mr. Hull on 7 
December liMl. 

When were the first 13 parts of this message received, decoded, and de- 
livered to responsible officials in Washington? 

What officials in Washington received translations of the first 13 parts 
of this message and when did each receive them? 

When was the 14th part of the message received, decoded and delivered? 
What officials in Washington received translations of the 14th part of this 
message and when did each receive it? 

What action was recommended by you or anyone else of which you have 
knowledge ? 
There was a message directing the Japanese Ambassador to deliver a note to 
Secretary Hull in person at 1 : 00 P. M., Eastern Standard Time on 7 Decem- 
ber 1941. 

[10910] When was this message received in the Navy Department? 
What agency decoded the message and when was decoding completed? 
What agency translated the message and when was the translation de- 
livered to the Navy Department? 

What officials in Washington received translations of this message and 
when did each receive it? 

What action was taken as a result of this message? 
When Commander Kramer delivered this message to Mr. Knox a memorandum 
pointing out that 1 : 00 P. M. Eastern Standard Time was sunrise in Honolulu 
and midnight in Manila and that the whole thing me&nt sunrise raid in Pearl 
Harbor within a few minutes after the delivery of the Japanese note. 

Will you please have Commander Kramer answer all of the foregoing ques- 
tions of which he has knowledge and put them in the form of an affidavit and 
also request him to include in his affidavit any other matters of which he may 
have first-hand knowledge. I shall be very grateful to him for this matter will 
be of considerable interest and value to me. 
My kindest regards to you alwlays Bill. 
Most sincerely yours, 

/S/ H. E. KiMMEL. 

[10911] Now, then. Admiral Halsey showed you that letter? 

Captain Kramer, Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Oil what date? 

Captain Kramer. I do not recall the exact date. I believe it was 
about the middle of May. It may have been a few days before that. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, at that time, did you have in your possession the 
letter which had been written to you under date of January 22, 1941, 
by Captain Safford? 

Captain Kramer. I did, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you have not replied to the letter that Captain 
Safford had written you ? 

Captain Kramer. Not only not replied, but did not contemplate 
replying, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You say you did not contemplate replying? 

Captain Kramer. At no time, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Why not? 



4082 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. If it is not apparent from the letter itself, I will 
go into more detailed explanation, Mr. Keefe. 

When I first received that letter, shortly after 1 arrived in the South 
Pacific, 1 was, to put it mildly, somewhat flabbergasted. I did not 
read through more than the first few paragraphs appearing on page 
one of that letter, and then put it away with my other papers. 

[10912) Mr. Keefe. You did not read the rest of it? 

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You decided you would not even answer it? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. 

Now, when Admiral Halsey showed you this letter you had in mind 
the letter that had been written by Captain Safford ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; as a fairly complete coverage of events 
preceding Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Keefe. Did I understand you correctly to say that you told 
Admiral Halsey that you would like to have a copy of this letter from 
Kimmel, and go over it for a few days to decide what the answers 
would be ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir; the original letter was given to me. The 
copy was made only for the purpose of any future preparation of an 
affidavit, in compliance with Admiral Kimmel's request. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, did you give any thought at that time to these 
requests of Admiral Kimmel ? 

Captain Kramer. I read through the letter; yes, sir. I was con- 
cerned at that time, and for some months afterward, on how any piece 
of paper covering this subject, whether affidavit or letter, or reply to 
that letter, could be [10913^ returned to Admiral Kimmel 
without going through normal censorship channels, which, of course, 
would disclose to unauthorized persons many aspects of this crypt- 
analytic traffic, to which they were not entitled. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. 

So you did not make up a reply? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. In affidavit form or otherwise? 

Captain Kjiamer. No, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you discuss the matter with Admiral Halsey ? 

Captain Kramer. On my second visit to his office, I believe I touched 
on that point, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. ; Now, you say you believe you touched on that pointt 
That does not mean anything to me, and it will not when I read the 
record. 

Captain Kramer. My recollection, Mr. Keefe, is 

Mr. Keefe (interposing). Did you discuss this letter and its con- 
tents with Admiral Halsey when you came to see him the second time? 
That is all I want to know. 

Captain Kramer. I did, sir. I definitely stated, in my present recol- 
lection, that I would prepare such a deposition or affidavit for Ad- 
miral Kimmel and notify Admiral Kimmel where it was. 

[1091j!i,'\ Mr. Keefe. Will you read that answer, Mr. Eeporter? 

(The answer was read by the reporter.) 

Mr. Keefe. Now, if I read that in the record after this record is 
printed, it would seem to me that you did decide to prepare an affidavit 
and to advise Admiral Kjmmel as to where it would be obtained. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4083 

Captain Kjiamer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Is that what you mean to tell me ? 

Captain Kramer. That is what I mean, yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you prepare such an affidavit ? 

Captain Kramer. No affidavit, as such. 

Mr. Keefe, Well, did you prepare any paper ? 

Captain Kramer. I prepared some jjieces of paper. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, have you got them ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. All right, let us see them. 

I would like to have this letter, Mr. Chairman, identified as an 
exhibit. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, it has been read into the record. 

Mr. Keefe. I think the letter perhaps ought to be in our file. I 
would like to have it marked as an exhibit. 

The Vice Chairman. Permit the Chair to inquire, Mr. [10915] 
Keefe, in addition to this letter being read into the record, as has been 
done, do you also want it marked as an exhibit ? 

Mr. Keefe. I think it would be advisable to do so. 

Mr. Kaufman. This would be Exhibit 150. 

The Vice Chairman. Exhibit No. 150, and it will be so ordered. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 150".) 

Mr. Keefe. If you will pardon me being here next to you, Captain 
Kramer, it is just so we will understand it. I do not want to run back 
and forth. 

Captain Kramer, if I understand your testimony up to date, with 
respect to this incident, correctly, you received from Admiral Halsey 
a letter, which has been read into this record, asking certain questions. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. At that time, you had in your possession a long letter 
from Captain Safford asking you certain questions ? 

Captain Kjiamer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You also had in your possession a previous letter from 
Captain Safford to which you had replied ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

[10916] Mr. Keefe. The first letter, with its reply, and the letter 
which you received from Captain Safford, which I have referred to as 
the second letter, is also in evidence. 

Now, I want to know : Did you make any reply to the second letter 
written to you by Captain Safford ? Your answer has been "No." 

Captain Kramer. Correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. I ask you, did you make any reply to the questions pro- 
pounded in the letter from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Halsey ? 

Captain Kramer. No reply, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you make any memorandum at all for Admiral 
Halsey, or Admiral Kimmel, or Captain Safford, in response to the 
questions in both or either of these latter two letters ? 

Captain Kramer. Only those pieces of paper in your hand for 
Admiral Halsey. They have been shown to no one except Admiral 
Halsey until this hearing commenced. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, let me just take a minute to compare these with 
these other ones. 



4084 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

In response to the last question, your answer is that you have handed 
to the member of the committee now interrogating you several papers. 

1^10917'] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KJEEFE. The first one of which is a typewritten page, dated 
December 28, 1943, entitled "Memorandum for Captain Safford"? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Is that identical with the December 28 letter, which is in 
evidence, the "Memorandum for Captain Stafford"? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir ; it is a copy of it. The first part of the 
piece of paper you are discussing is a copy of my reply to Captain 
Safford. 

Mr. Keefe. No ; it is not. 

Captain Kramer. Except that it is not left in the cryptic form I 
used in my reply, but expanded for ready perusal by Admiral Halsey. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. 

In other words, then, am I to understand that, so far as the first 21/2 
pages of these documents that you have submitted are concerned, you 
intended to write up for the use of Admiral Halsey, the exact infor- 
mation which is contained in your letter of 28 December, 1943, entitled 
"Memorandum for Captain Safford," without code language in it, is 
that right? 

Captain Kramer. That is right, sir. 

[10918^ Mr. Keefe. Well, then, there appears also a letter dated 
22 January 1944, "My dear Kramer-san." 

That is a decoding of the letter of Captain Safford to you? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. In plain English ? 

Captain Kr^^mer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And is it exactly the same as the letter which was written 
by Captain Safford to you, with some expansion on your part? Is it 
identical as you translate his code ? 

Captain Kramer. It is exactly Captain Safford's wording with the 
exception that it expands the code he used into plain English. 

Mr. Keefe. And in this instrument that you have given us now, you 
have inserted the answers to Captain Safford's questions, have you not? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. For the benefit of Admiral Halsey? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. In other words, had you answered the letter of Captain 
Safford which Safford had written you under date of January 22, 1944^ 
and which you had not answered, you would have answered it as it 
appears in this memorandum which you prepared for Admiral Halsey, 
is that correct? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

[10919^^ Mr. Keefe. Did you turn this over to Admiral Halsey? 

Captain Kramer. I showed it to him and he read it. There was 
only the one copy made. I have retained it thereafter. 

Mr. Keefe. This is the first time that anyone on this committee has 
seen this correspondence, is it? 

Captain Kramer. I believe that is correct, sir. Counsel has not 
been shown it, so far as I am aware, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You have not turned it over to the Navy Department 
heretofore ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4085 

Captain Kramer. On that point, Mr. Baecher, Lieutenant Com- 
mander Baecher, the naval liaison officer with counsel for this com- 
mittee, requested some days ago that he be permitted to photostat this 
in case it was called for by the committee while I was a witness, in 
case the subject came up and those letters were called for. 

Mr. Keefe. How did he know that you had such a letter? 

Captain Kramer. I mentioned that in conversations with Mr. 
Baecher, chiefly because a reference to that appears in the record of 
my testimony before Admiral Hewitt, I believe in reply to one or more 
questions when I referred to Captain Safford's letters. 

Mr. Keefe. When was this written? 

Captain Kramer. About the middle of May 1944. 

[109^0] Mr. Keefe. Did you dictate it to anyone to type? 

Captain Kramer. I typed it entirely myself, sir, taking many hours 
of about four nights to do so. 

Mr. Keefe. And that perhaps accounts for the apparent differences 
in the ribbons that were used ; is that right ? 

Captain Kjiamer. That could well be; yes, sir; or using different 
typewriters. 

Mr. Keefe. Using different typewriters; is that right? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. So this was all typed by you yourself ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And contains the information and the study that you 
had given to this whole situation sometime in 1944? 

Captain Kramer. That was the second occasion on which I had had 
occasion to recollect events about Pearl Harbor, the first occasion being 
my reply to Captain Safford's first letter. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you have this before you when you testified before 
the Naval Court of Inquiry? 

Captain Kramer. I had that in my possession ; not before me during 
those proceedings. 

Mr. Keefe. Then, Captain Kramer, when you came back from the 
South Pacific and flew in there after 4 days, and all tired out, as you 
said, you were caught cold when [lOO^l] you testified before 
the Naval Court of Inquiry, as a matter of fact, you had given long 
study to these facts and had reduced the story doAvn to writing and 
had it in your possession at that time, had you not, as you remembered 
it out there in the South Pacific? 

Captain Kramer. Mr. Keefe 

Mr. Keefe (interposing) . Is that a fact or isn't it? 

Captain Kramer. It is not, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. The witness is entitled to give his answer, I sub- 
mit, and we are entitled to hear his answer. 

Mr. Keefe. I want to hear it, too. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, let us hear it. 

The Vice Chairman. The witness may reply. 

Captain Kramer. I have not read that letter at any time to date 
since our conversations, or my conversations with Admiral Halsey 
about the middle of May 1944. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, you had it, did not you, when you testified before 
the Naval Court of Inquiry at Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 



4086 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. You had it with you in your files, didn't you? 

Captain KJRAivrER. ^In my possession ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You could have referred to it had you wanted to, 
could not you? 

[100£2] Captain Kramer. I could have, had I wanted to ; yes, 
sir. 

Mr. Keefe. The point I am making, Captain, is before you testi- 
fied before the Naval Court of Inquiry you had, in response to this 
request of Admiral Kimmel and prompted by Admiral Halsey, made 
up this statement which you have submitted to me and which I have 
not had a chance yet to read ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now was that statement supposed to be a full and com- 
plete statement of the facts, so as to give answers to Admiral Kim- 
mel's questions in the letter written to Admiral Halsey ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Or was it supposed to be categorically answers to the 
questions asked of you by Captain Stafford? 

Captain Kramer. For neither purpose, sir. It was simply to ap- 
prise Admiral Halsey with a fairly comprehensive picture and to 
request his advice regarding the request of Admiral Kimmel. 

It was further retained by me as a piece of paper probably com- 
plying with Admiral Kimmel's request, but I never reached a deci- 
sion as to just what to do with it. I, of course, could not entrust it 
to the mail. The only other means of getting that piece of paper to a 
safe place other than keeping it in my possession would be to send it 
to the [10923] United States, to my wife, by a personal friend 
as courier. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I understand some members of the 
committee have copies of this, and I think all members ought to have 
it so we can examine it. 

Mr. Keefe. I understood him to say that they had mimeographed 
it, the Navy had. 

Mr. Murphy. If some members of the committee now have copies, 
I would like to see one, too. 

The Vice Chairman. Perhaps counsel can advise us on that. 

Mr. Kichardson. Mr. Chairman, there is a matter in connection 
with this letter and the photostatic copy we have which I think 
might be discussed with the committee in Executive session. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Richardson. That is why this has not been circulated. 

Mr. Keefe. None of the members of the committee, I take it, have 
heretofore seen this letter. I did not see it before; I did not know it 
existed until Captain Kramer just stated so. 

Senator Ferguson. Let the record show Mr. Richardson was sitting 
here reading it and I asked him what it was; I asked him if I conld 
see a copy of what they were talking about. 

[IO924) Mr. Murphy. I think everyone else should get a copy. 

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to compare it with the original 
copy, to see what it is, 

Mr. Richardson. Until the committee makes a decision I am un- 
certain whether this is the copy that the committee wants. It should 
be taken up in the committee. It will not stop your examination 
at all, Mr. Keefe. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4087 

The Vice Chairman. The committee will abide by the advice of 
counsel. 

Senator Ferguson. I have returned my copy to counsel. 

Mr. Richardson. This is not a copy. 

Senator Ferguson. This is not a copy, he says. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, Captain Kramer, in preparing this memorandum 
which you handed to me this afternoon, and which I have seen for 
the first time, which you say you prepared for the information of 
Admiral Halsey, did you attempt to follow the questions that had been 
asked by Captain Safford in his letter to you of January 22, 1944? 

Captain Kjramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Has counsel seen this before today ? 

Mr. Richardson. I never heard of it — oh, yes. Commander Baecher 
told me yesterday morning that he had some papers that had been 
exhibited to him by the witness. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, it is mighty funny, it seems to me, [1092S] 
Mr. Chairman, when all the other members down to the last member 
of the conmiittee has examined Captain Kramer at length, that our 
counsel has here eventually, at the tail end of this examination, what 
appears to me a very important and vital instrument which has been 
in the possession of the Navy and no one knew anything about it. 

Now how are we ever going to be sure unless these things are going 
to be turned over to our counsel in advance, what facts there are? 
I haven't read it, I do not know what is in it, but it seems to me, if 
we are to believe what Captain Kramer says, that it represents his 
idea as to what these facts were when he wrote this in the sprins: of 
1944. ^ ^ 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Mr. Chairman, I think a word ought to go 
on the record at this point, because I have deliberately refused to have 
any preliminary conversations with either Captain Safford or Captain 
Kramer, because the testimony was in some controversy at rather 
high points, and I concluded I did not want to go over it with either 
one, inasmuch as I had the opportunity to read their earlier 
testimony. 

I was just as surprised as any member of the committee when the 
letters appeared yesterday, or the day before, that Captain Safford 
had written including the code, the three letters, the letter of Captain 
Safford, the reply of [109£6] Captain Kramer in the third 
letter, and the second letter of Captain Safford. I knew nothing 
about it, and I expressed myself, I think, with exceeding rudeness 
to Commander Baecher with reference to not having seen it, and 
he explained to me then he had certain papers that had to do, in 
part, with certain matters not connected with Pearl Harbor that 
the Navy was anxious should not be made public, and that those letters 
and papers would be available if I insisted on seeing them. 

That is all I knew about that, and when the Congressman got this 
letter here that is the first I knew about that. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record 

The Vice Chairman. Just a moment. Let the Chair observe for 
the record that Captain Kramer has stated that he told Commander 
Baecher about this correspondence and that Commander Baecher sug- 
gested that photostatic copies of it should be made so as to be available 
for members of the committee in case questions were asked about it or 
this material was asked for of Captain Kramer. 



4088 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain, is that a fairly accurate statement ? 

Captain Kramer. That is a precise statement ; yes, sir. 

[10927] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the record note 
that there was the letter from Admiral Kimmel — we just learned about 
that, and Admiral Kimmel was a witness for many days. That was 
the first we heard of Admiral Kimmel having Admiral Halsey, after 
the witness refused to answer Captain Safford, call the witness into 
his quarters. 

The Vice Chairman. I think this is not difficult to explain. This 
was personal correspondence that Captain Safford had. 

Captain Kramer. Mr. Chairman, may I explain that I had no in- 
tention of introducing these letters into this hearing until they were 
specifically asked of me. I was a little surprised, if I may so state, 
that the issue came up during the questioning of Captain Safford. At 
that time Senator Lucas asked the question whether I was in the room! 

I stood up in the rear of the room. He asked me the direct question 
whether I had those letters in my possession or not. I replied at that 
time that I did, and made them available. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I don't think there is [10928] 
anything unusual about this. I think the Hewitt report definitely 
shows that Captain Kramer did testify that he had written such let- 
ters. He only prepared these letters for any emergency that might 
come along in view of his previous testimony. 

It is surprising to me that somebody hasn't asked for these before, 
in view of that testimony. All the captain did was to prepare these 
in the event any member of the committee wanted them. 

Captain Kramer. I simply had them there. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. There is nothing unusual about you present- 
ing this testimony in view of your previous statement before the 
Hewitt committee. 

Captain Kramer. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. If the members did want them you were ready to 
serve with the memorandum you had. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like for someone to point 
out where Captain Kramer, in his testimony, mentions this Halsey 
memorandum. 

Captain Kramer. I previously stated in reply to a question of yours. 
Senator, that I have never to date read the record of the Hewitt in- 
vestigation except such excerpts as appear in the narrative. I could 
undoubtedly [10939] locate it by examination of that record. 

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would show me where it tells about 
the Halsey memorandum in this Hewitt report. 

Captain Kramer. It w^as not a Halsey memorandum, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What? 

Captain Kramer. It was not a Halsey memorandum. 

Senator Ferguson. I mean in the Hewitt report. 

Captain Kramer. It was a reference purely to Captain Safford's 
letters. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4089 

Senator Ferguson. Haven't you said something to the effect that 
this is a memorandum for Halsey ? 

Captain Kramer. I prepared it to show to Admiral Halsey, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But never showed it to him ? 

Captain Kramer. I did show it to him. 

Senator Ferguson. You say that is in this Hewitt record ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not believe there is any reference to any reply 
of mine to Captain Saff ord's second letter in that record. 

Senator Ferguson. Then there is nothing in the record anywhere 
that you had made a memorandum and showed it to Admiral Halsey '^ 

Captain Kjlamer. No, sir. 

[10930] Senator Ferguson. That is what is surprising to me. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I do not think there is anything sur- 
prising about that. There is evidence in the record about a letter that 
the Captain had received from Captain Safford ; that is plain in the 
Hewitt report. 

Now, in view of the chain of events that followed Captain Safford's 
letter, it was certainly a most natural thing that he would have all the 
evidence that in any way was attached to or followed that letter in 
his possession and ready for the committee if it was so desired. 

Captain Kramer. Senator Lucas, I would like to remark on that, 
that if it hadn't been for the wording of Mr. Keefe's question. Did I 
discuss these matters with anyone? I would not have mentioned Ad- 
miral Halsey in connection with this hearing. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman 

The Vice Chairman. Permit me. Senator, to ask a question to see 
if I can clear this for the benefit of the record. 

This memorandum that you prepared, as I understand it. Captain, 
is a reply to Captain Safford's questions ? 

Captain Kjjamer. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And you showed that memorandum which 
was prepared in reply to Captain Safford's questions [10931] to 
Admiral Halsey ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. The memorandum was not addressed to Ad- 
miral Halsey ? 

Captain Kramer. It is not, sir. 

It is a memorandum to Captain Safford. In other words, a reply 
to Captain Safford. 

The Vice Chairman. But it was shown to Admiral Halsey ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, this witness 
delivered to us certain memoranda, the Safford letter, his first reply, 
and the second Safford letter and no reply to it. 

Now, what I would like to know is this: Is there anything else 
other than that in the memorandum that you now have given to 
Congressman Keefe? 

Captain Kramer. There is, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then why didn't you give that to the committee 
when you gave us part of the evidence, and led this committee to believe 
that that was all of the evidence in relation to that ? 

Captain Kramer. Because it was a reply, it is true, but a reply 
that was never sent, and, therefore, not a mailed reply to Captain 

79716— 46— pt. 9 12 



4090 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Safford. It was purely a memorandum prepared for Admiral Halsev 
which not necessarily need have been prepared. I might have covered 
the same thing verbally, but felt in covering that, that I should take 
a tew days to refresh my memory on those events. 

[JOm£] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, the witness will re- 
call that I was examining in relation to conversations or meetings he 
had with other officers about his testimony. 

Now, you gave me the answer as to Admiral Stark. You gave me 
the answer on Admiral Wilkinson. How did you avoid giving me 
an answer on this, of vour Admiral Halsey conversation? 

Captain Kramer. There was no discussion whatsoever with Admiral 
Halsey, sir regarding the events leading up to Pearl Harbor, except 
his perusal of that memorandum and my request following that of 
Admiral Halsey for his advice in the premises and some further 
remarks of his about his personal relations with Admiral Kimmel and 
what he was doing himself at the time of Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Ferguson. So there is nothing in this— I haven't read it 
yet— there is nothing in it in relation to a conversation with Admiral 
Halsey about what happened up to the time of the bombing- is that 
correct ? ' 

Captain Kramer. That is not correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, there is something in there about 
what happene_d, what took place here in Washington in relation to 
the attack on Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Kramer. There is, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then how did you avoid giving me [109331 
that discussion when you gave me the Admiral Stark discussion that 
you had, that you had a conference with officers, and you had had one 
with Admiral Halsey? 

Captain Kramer. There was no discussion. 

Senator Ferguson. Was this one with Admiral Stark? How did 
you keep that from your answer? 

Captain Kramer. There was no discussion with Admiral Halsey 
Senator, sir. It was my disclosing to him a background concerning 
Pearl Harbor with a view to asking his advice on what I should do in 
connection with Admiral KimmelXs request. That request appeared 
reasonable to me to this extent, that in case of my death in the Pacific 
Admiral Kimmel would not have my testimonv in any proceedings 
which might subsequently take place. " ^ 

Senator Ferguson. Now, is there any doubt, from now on, Captain, 
that you are going to give the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but? I mean m relation with whether you are asked a specific ques- 
tion or not. So that the committee might know that there is nothing 
being held back such as this. I would like to know whether you un- 
derstand now. 

Senate Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I might say that I was taken to task 
by the Senator from Maine the other day for making an implication 
I submit that if, while any man has [10934] been on the stand 
here he has attempted to tell the whole truth and nothing but the 
truth, it is Captain Kramer. 

Senator Ferguson. I am not doubting that, but I wanted to know 
whether or not there was any other thing like this that the witness 
now has, that we could review over the night. I am not casting any 
doubts. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4091 

The Vice Chairman. Permit the Chair to suggest that none of us 
have read this material, let us try to compose our patience until we do 
read it, to see whether there is anything to it. I think we would make 
time if we just suspended on this point until we have had a chance 
to look at it and see whether there is anything that will challenge 
the interest of any member of the committee and justify all of this dis- 
cussion that we are having. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I am just beginning to wonder whether 
the floor has been completely taken away from me or not in connection 
with the examination. 

The Vice Chairman. The Chair was wondering, too, and was trying 
to protect the gentleman from Wisconsin. 

The gentleman from Wisconsin will proceed with his inquiry. 

Mr. Keefe. Captain, so there can be no misunderstanding about it, 
this memorandum which you have given to me this afternoon was pre- 
pared by you out in the Pacific in 1944 ? 

\1093o] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. As a result of the conference which you had with 
Admiral Halsey when he showed you the letter that he had received 
from Admiral Kimmel? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. So in order to refresh your recollection as to the events — 
you sat down with the letter from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Halsey 
before you and the letter from Captain Safford of December 22 before 
you and decided to make up a memorandum ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And the idea of making up that memorandum was so 
that you would have a complete record of the events referred to in those 
two letters so that if anything happened to you there would be some 
record or statement from you as to those events? 

Captain Kramer. A fairly comprehensive coverage ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. As you remember the situation out there in the South 
Pacific? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, when you had completed the preparation of this 
memorandum you went back to Admiral Halsey and discussed it with 
him ? 

[109S6] Captain Kramer. There was very little discussion. In 
fact, I don't think there was any discussion about the points appear- 
ing in that. The discussion concerned things that I have outlined 
in the past few minutes. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, did you let him read it? 

Captain Kramer. He read it completely ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Then what did you do with the memorandum? 

Captain Kramer. I took it back to my quarters, sir. 

Mr. Keffe. And then what did you do with it ? 

Captain Kramer. I retained it in my possesison until now. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, you said something about sending it by courier 
to Mrs. Kramer. 

Captain Kramer. I was interrupted in my reply to that, sir, in that 
connection. 

Mr. Keefe. I want you to finish that reply. 

Captain Kramer. Any possible way of depositing such an affidavit 
in a safe place would require means that I have already outlined or 



4092 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that of a courier who could be trusted. By that I mean that 1 would 
have to give it to some close personal friend who was cognizant or 
aware or had worked with this material to take back and put it in a 
safe place in the United States. 

[109S7] Mr. Keefe. Did you do that, Captain? 

Captain Kramer. I did not do that, sir, because I did not want to 
impose on any friendships I might have to the extent of requiring 
tKMn to perjure themselves. 

Mr. Keefe. Then, there isn't any necessity to go into that discus- 
sion, if you didn't put it into execution. That is the only thing I am 
interested in. 

Captain Kramer. All right. 

Mr. Keefe. You didn't put this into execution ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct. I thought about it in fact all 
through the summer of 1944, and it was only after my testimony before 
Admiral Murfin's court of inquiry that I felt no further necessity of 
even thinking about that. 

I simply kept those papers with me. 

Mr. Keefe. And up to the time you testified before Admiral Murfin's 
court of inquiry you had been giving a lot of thought to this question ? 

Captain Kramer. A lot of thought only to what disposition I could 
make of those papers and to the form of such deposition if other than 
what I already had. Not to the subject matter of that piece of paper. 

Mr. Keefe. You were satisfied that the statements which you made 
in this memorandum prepared out there in the [10938] South 
Pacific were the truth ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, as of that time. 

Mr. Keefe. And you had that memorandum and all of the thought 
that you could put on the general subject when you testified before the 
Naval Court of Inquiry out there at Pearl Harbor ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. I have indicated, I have not read that 
letter since I prepared it for Admiral Halsey. 

Mr. Ejeefe. You mean you have had it in your possession all this 
time, and you haven't read it until now ? 

Captain Kramer. I have not read it to this moment, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. I haven't either, so you have nothing on me. 

Mr. Ribhardson. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest, in view of that 
fact, there are one or two matters that ought to be referred to in an ex- 
ecutive session, and might we have about a 10-minute executive ses- 
sion? 

Mr. Keefe. I am cognizant of that, as all members are, I assume, 
and I shall not violate that situation. 

The Vice Chairman. Permit the Chair to suggest, while there is no 
doubt that is correct, yet counsel has two or three things that he wants 
to bring to the attention of [109S9] the committee in execu- 
tive session. 

It is now almost 5, and some members of the committee have indi- 
cated they will have to leave pretty soon. 

As I understand, counsel is suggesting that we now go into executive 
session, rather than wait another 10 or 15 minutes. 

The Committee will now go into execution session. 

(Whereupon, at 4 : 50 p. m., February 8, 1946 the committee recessed 
to meet in executive session and to reconvene at 10 a. m. Saturday, Feb- 
ruary 9, 1946.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4093 



liom-\ PEAEL HAEBOK ATTACK 



SATURDAY, rEBRXJABY 9, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF the Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington^ D. C. 
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman), presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: Seth W. Eichardson, general counsel; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. 
Morgan and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee. 
[10941] The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 
Congressman Keefe will proceed. * 

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KRAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY 

(Resumed) 

Mr. Keefe. Captain Kramer, yesterday afternoon just before we 
recessed, you stated facts with reference to a conversation which you 
had with Admiral Halsey at his headquarters in early 1944 in the 
South Pacific ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And just where were his headquarters at that time ? 

Captain Kramer. In the center of the city of Noumea, New 
Caledonia. 

Mr. Keefe. And do you recall the date? 

Captain Kramer. Not the exact date but within a few days of the 
middle of May 1944. 

Mr. Keefe. You further testified that at that time he discussed 
•with you a letter which he had received from Admiral Kimmel ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And gave that letter to you so that you could go over 
it with the possibility that you might prepare an answer ? 

Captain Kramer. An affidavit, yes, sir. 

[10942} Mr. Keefe. You did not prepare a specific answer or 
a specific affidavit in response to Admiral Kimmel's request made to 
Admiral Halsey ? 

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. But you stated that you did prepare a memorandum in 
answer to the questions that had been asked of you by Captain Safford 
in his letter of December 28, 1943 ? 



4094 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. I did, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you felt that tlie answers to the questions pro- 
pounded to you by Captain Safford would likewise be answers to the 
questions asked by Admiral Kimmel in his letter to Admiral Halsey i 

Captain Kramer. I did, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. After preparing that memoranda you showed it to 
Admiral Halsey? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Then you retained it with the intention of preserving 
it for some future reference in the event you were killed or lost your 
life in the Pacific and wouldn't be available as a witness at some future 
time ? 

Captain Kramer. That was my purpose ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And the memoranda which you gave to me yesterday, 
is that original memoranda? 

Captain Kramer. It is, sir. 

[10.943] Mr. Keefe. I believe you further testified that when 
you were called to testify before the naval court of inquiry at Pearl 
Harbor you had this memorandum with you at that time ? 

Captain Kramer. I had it with my papers, but not at that hearing. 

Mr. Keefe. So am I to understand that prior to your testimony be- 
fore the naval court at Pearl Harbor you had given considerable 
thought to all of the questions propounded to you by Captain Safford 
in his letter of December 28, 1943? 

Captain Kramer. At thg time I prepared that memorandum; yes, 
sir; but not subsequent to that. My only thought and consideration 
on that subject was the handling and disposition of that memorandum 
I had prepared. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Well, I understood you to say yesterday that 
from the time you prepared it, and I assume put it in a file or envelope, 
you never looked at it? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. From that time until the present moment? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

iSIr. Keefe. You never read it before you testified at Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Nor at any subsequent time? 

[JO944] Captain Kramer. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. And have never discussed it with anybody else ? 

Captain Kramer. Until the commencement of this hearing, no, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And then you exhibited it to whom ? 

Captain Kramer. Lieutenant Commander Baecher, liaison officer 
with this committee's counsel, was shown it, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. How did you come to show it to them ? 

Captain Kramer. I felt that there was at least a likelihood that I 
might be questioned by this committee concerning the letters of Cap- 
tain Safford and all aspects surrounding them because of the fact that 
I had made reference to those letters in testifying before Admiral 
Hewitt. 

Mr. Keefe. And you thought that in case somebody happened to 
accidentally ask you about it you would be prepared with the memo- 
randum ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4095 

Mr, Keefe. You didn't volunteer the fact that you had prepared 
such a memorandum when you testified before the naval court at Pearl 
Harbor, did you? 

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you didn't volunteer that information when you 
testified before the Hewitt investigation, did you ? 

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir. I saw no point in [1094S] 
introducing Admiral Halsey's or Admiral Kimmel's name into my 
testimony. 

Mr. Keefe. You were given an opportunity to tell any facts that you 
had in your possession, though, were you not? 

Captain Kramer. I was, sir. However, I further felt and was 
thoroughly convinced that all that could be elicited from the showing 
of my memorandum was my understanding of the facts at the time I 
prepared that memorandum. I am still of that conviction, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, after reading it I am inclined to agree with you. 

Captain Kramer. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. I never saw it until yesterday. I am frank to say 
to the committee after studying it last night I think that a lot of undue 
importance has been attached to it. 

Now, I want to go through this with you because of the fact that it 
appears to be necessary. 

In preparing this memorandum you took the questions serially that 
Commander Safford had asked you in his'two letters which are before 
the committee and in evidence ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Keefe. The questions are numbered from 1 to 43, inclusive? 

Captain Kramer. I believe they run to 47. However, [1094jS] 
the last several I did not answer in that memorandum since they ap- 
peared redundant and covered previously in the memorandum. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes; I think you are right about that. 

So that the members of the committee can follow your memorandum 
they can observe the questions which were asked in the letter 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, just for the convenience of the other 
members, I wonder if counsel has prepared copies for the members of 
the committee? 

Mr. Keefe. Well, let me finish my statement so that it won't be a 
blank. 

Will you read it? 

(The statement was read by the reporter,) 

Mr. Keefe (continuing). Of Captain Safford dated December 22, 
1943. 

[JO947] The Vice Chairman. Do you yield there, Mr. Keefe? 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. There were certain photostatic copies. 

Mr, Kaufman. Copies of the Safford letter. 

The Vice Chairman. Of the Safford letter distributed to the com- 
mittee. 

Mr. Kaufman. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. But I had understood there was going to be 
a mimeographed copy prepared with the questions in them instead of 
these code numbers that were set up. Am I in error about that? 



4096 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Masten. That was read into the transcript. 

Mr. Richardson. That was done the other day in connection with 
the examination of Captain Safford, simply covered his letter and that 
has already been offered, it has been here and copies have been given 
to committee members. 

Mr. Keefe. I think you will get this quite clearly as we go along. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

The Chairman. The Chair would like to observe that if this memo- 
randum is to be the basis of inquiry that it would be a little more 
convenient for members of the committee to have copies of it, but I do 
not want to interfere; I do not want to interrupt your examination, 
but it would be a little more [109418] convenient. 

The Vice Chairman. Is it your intention to read the memorandum ? 

Mr. Keefe. Yes ; question by question, so that there will be no ques- 
tion about. 

The Chairman. You mean that you are going to read the question 'i 

Mr. Keefe. And his answer. 

The Chairman. And his answer, so that it will be in the transcript? 

Mr. Keefe. That is right. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Keefe. That is what I understood we agreed upon yesterday. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, this memorandum, the first question. You have 
indicated 1510 as "First indications of arrival." That is at the top 
of your memorandum. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. What does that have reference to ? 

Captain Kramer. That has reference to the first indications of ar- 
rival of the Japanese 14-part note. 

Mr. Keefe. That is at what time? 

Captain Kramer. That is 3 p. m. — 3 : 10 p. m. 

[IO949] Mr. Keefe. And then the next entry is : 

2100 Completed. Left after phoning to locate Admiral Beardall, Admiral 
Turner, Colonel Bratton of M. I. D., Admiral Wilkinson, etc. 

What does that mean ? 

Captain Kramer. That 2100 is 9 p. m. That refers to the time of 
completion in my section of the first 13 parts of the 14-part note. 
Mr. Keefe. Now, the first question : 

No. 1. What time did you see Mr. Roosevelt that evening and show him the 
papers? 

A. Did not, personally, but left with one of Admiral Beardall's assistants in 
the situation room on Pennsylvania Avenue with positive instructions re urgency 
(to be delivered at once). He was entertaining at the time, but I learned later 
in the evening he had seen it. 

When did you learn that Mr. Roosevelt had seen those first 13 parts 
of the 14-part message the evening of the 6th of December ? 

Captain Kramer. I cannot be precise on that, Mr. Keefe. It is my 
distinct impression, however, that I was told that by somebody. 
Whether Admiral Beardall that night late at Admiral Wilkinson's 
home or the next morning or the following day sometime, I do not 
now recall. 

[10950] Mr. Keefe. Well, you think it may have been that 
Admiral Beardall may have communicated with the White House 
after you delivered the papers to Wilkinson's home ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4097 

Captain Kjiasier. I think he may. I do not know on that point, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you think that he may have told you that night 
while you were still at Wilkinson's home making delivery to him, 
that Beardall had telephoned the White House to find out if the 
President had seen the message, and you think he may have advised 
you then that the President had seen the message that night? 

Captain Kramer. That is quite possible, sir. I think, however 

Mr. Keefe. Now, I don't want to indulge, so far as I am concerned, 
Captain Kramer, in the realm of possibilities and speculation. Now, 
if you know that the President actually saw that message that night 
or if you learned from anybody who had reliable information and can 
testify to it, I would like to have you do so ; but if you do not know, 
please don't indulge, so far as my examination is concerned, in the 
realm of speculation. That does not help anybody to determine the 
issues in this case. 

Captain Kramer. In the light of your remark, sir, my answer must 
be I do not know. 

[10951] Mr. Keefe. Very well. Question 2: 

Was Mr. Hull there or was he called in, or did you see him first and go over 
to Mr. Roosevelt with him? 

A. No, on all counts. Army was taking care of that and I know only that he 
knew of it by 2230 (see item 9) and possibly had seen it care of Colonel Bratton 
by then. 

That is your testimony today, isn't it ? 

Captain Kramer. That I think is in effect my testimony today ; yes, 
sir, my understanding now. 
Mr. Keefe. Number 3 : 

What time did you see Admiral Stark that evening and show him the papers? 
A. Did not. (See items 4 and 5.) 

That is your testimony today, that you did not see Admiral Stark. 
Captain Kramer. That is my understanding now ; yes, sir. 
Mr. Keefe. Number 4 : 

If answer to 3 is negative, how and when was Admiral Stark first informed? 
A. BeUeve Item 5 phoned that ewe (see next). Possibly Admiral Turner did 
too. I know he saw it as soon as he reached office next A. M. (about 0900). 

Now, do you have any knowledge as to whether Admiral Wilkinson 
phoned Admiral Stark that night? 

[10952'] Captain Kramer. No positive knowledge, no, sir; sim- 
ply the impression I had with me at Admiral Wilkinson's home that 
he left the room on one or two occasions, as I did, and that Admiral 
Wilkinson may well have phoned either Stark or Turner or both dur- 
ing that time. I do not know that he did, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You did not actually see him or hear him ? 

Captain Kramer. And I was not told that he did or did not. 

Mr. Keefe. But you have this fact in mind, have you not. Captain 
Kramer, that Sunday was not usually a day for the big boys in the 
Navy to assemble at their offices ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And when you got down to your office in the Navy De- 
partment the next morning, Sunday, there were 12 or 15 of them as- 
sembled, were there not? 

Captain Khamer. There were many there, yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Including Wilkinson and Turner and Stark and all of 
them in the higher echelon ? 



4098 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe, will you yield? 

Mr. Keefe. Just one second. 

I understand that it is your impression that the arrangements for 
that meeting which brought all these people together Sunday morn- 
ing at Admiral Stark's office must have [10953] been made the 
night before ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And that is the reason why you concluded that Admiral 
Wilkinson must have telephoned Admiral Stark that night? 

Captain Kramer. That, I believe, is one of the reasons; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Xow I will yield. 

The Vice Chairman. I may be mistaken, I just wanted to be clear. 
Did your previous question state that "At the time you arrived at 
your office the next day they were there?" 

Mr. Keefe. Yes — no, no, at 9 o'clock. 

Captain Kramer. That was my question when I prepared that 
memorandum ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That is when you got to Admiral Stark's office. 

Captain Kramer. As to the time, approximate time that Admiral 
Stark arrived at the Navy Department, yes, sir. 

Mr. Keef'e. You got to your office, as I understood it, about 7 :30 in 
the morning? 

Captain Kramfj?. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. They were not there at that time ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, then the next question, No. 5 : 

[10954] How and when was Admiral Wilkinson first informed? 

A. At 2105 by phone to his home where he was entertaining Admiral Beardall 
and others, told him what I planned to do. His chief concern was getting it to the 
President and Mr. Hull, which are covered above. Arrived at his home at 2320 
where he, and Admiral Beardall also, saw it and were informed re others, par- 
ticularly the White House. I don't recall whether Admiral Beardall then phoned 
to the White House to check delivery or not. Believe at this time Admiral Wilkin- 
son phoned Admiral Stark. 

No, 6. Linn remembers that you stayed till after 1 a. m. What time 
did you leave the Navy Building and go home ? 
A. Left Admiral Wilkinson's place about 0090 — 

What time would that be? 

Captain Kramer. That would be one-half hour after midnight, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. [Continuing:] 

stopped by, then proceeded — stopped by the Navy Department to drop papers and 
check on anything new, then proceeded home. 

That is as you have testified here before this inquiry ? 
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 
[1095S] Mr. Keefe. No. 7 : 

What time did you get down to the Navy Building the next morning? (Broth- 
erhood said it was sometime after 0700.) 
A. About 0730. 

That is correct, is it ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That was your memory then and that is your memoi-y 
today ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4099 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KJEEFE. So that your recollection when you were out in the South 
Pacific in your answers to question No. 7 and question No. 6, question 
No. 5 and question No. 4 is all exactly, practically, as you have testified 
here before this committee ? 

Captain Kramer. With very few minor discrepancies I believe it 
is sir, 

Mr. Keefe. Question No. 8 : 

What time did you see Mr. Roosevelt tliat morning and show him the new 
papers? 

Did not personally, but left first batch about 0945, second about 1100 at the 
White House care of Admiral Beardall. 

That is as you have testified here. 
[10956] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Keefe. Question 9 : 

Was Mr. Hull there or was he called in? 

A. No; at his oflBce. Mr. Knox (first one) was shown it at his home about 
2200 previous night and he made a number of phone calls including Mr. Hull. 
Meeting was then arranged for Mr. Hull, Mr. Knox, Mr. Stimson and others at 
Mr. Hull's oflSce at 10 : 00 A. M. where I was instructed to be with it and 
anything else. 

Meeting held at 1000— 

Well, he has got it at one thousand as scheduled. 

Captain Kramer. That is 10 o'clock in the morning. 

Mr. Keefe. I understand ; it is one thousand. That is a thousand, 
as I remember it, not being a Navy man. I will read it again. 

The Vice Chairman. It would help us to get the time so that we 
understand it on all dates. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, I think I had better because I am all mixed up 
on all these things, so I will try to get it straight. [Reading :] 

Meeting at 1000. 

That is 10 o'clock? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Keefe (reading) : 

And new items (1st batch) delivered together with [10957] old. Colonel 
Bratton was on hand there too for Mr. Stimson. 

Now, that is substantially as you have testified before this com- 
mittee ? 

Captain Kramer. It is essentially the same I believe, sir. 
Mr. Keefe. Yes. Question No. 10 : 

My check shows you had Part 14 plus another paper setting the conference 
at 1 P. INI. Do you recall taking any other papers with you, and can you give 
me a hint as to their contents? 

A. (a) I don't recall precisely how oiir friend's numbers ran in the hundreds 
(or thousands) but in units from about 02 to 09 or 10. 

What does that mean? 

Captain Kramer. That refers to the Tokyo serial numbers, which 
not only refreshment indicates — in fact, Exhibit 1 indicates run from 
901 to 910 — 902 is the Japanese note, 901 is the so-called pilot message, 
906 or 7 I think is the 1 p. m. message. 

Mr. Keefe (reading) : 

(b) The first few of these messages, not including the one setting the conference 
for 1300— 



4100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

That would be 1 o'clock, would it? 

[10958] Captain Kramer. About 1 p. m., yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe (reading) : 

were on hand by 0900. 

That is 9 o'clock, isn't it ? 

Captain Kramer. Nine o'clock in the morning ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe (reading) : 

And were completed and being delivered at 9:45 (to the White House) and at 
10 o'clock to the State Department (See Items 9 above). Admiral Stark, Wilkin- 
son, Turner and others got them about 9 :30 at a meeting held in Admiral Stark's 
office. 

(c) On returning about 10:20 from Mr. Hull's office the remainder of #02-10 
were arriving, including the one setting the one o'clock meeting time and the 
'Weather Report'. These were delivered to all hands, including Mr. Knox and 
Mr. Stimson at Mr. Hull's office with my comments to Mr. Knox on how the hour 
tied with the sun, and moves in progress, elsewhere. 

That is substantially as you have testified before this committee? 

Captain Kramer. I believe it is, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You follow it very closely. 

Captain Kramer. There are some discrepancies in that memo- 
randum from 

Mr. Keefe. Well, what is the discrepancy? 

[10959'] Captain Kramer. Well, my impression at that time was 
that certain ones of that batch from 902 to 910 had arrived before my 
10 o'clock appointment with Mr. Knox. In the light of my study the 
other night in compliance with Senator Ferguson's request I find my 
memory was faulty in that respect, that none of those additional ones 
were seen by me or arrived in my office until after my return from that 
10 o'clock appointment. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, when you say "none of them" you are referring, 
among others, to the so-called pilot message, are you not? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, that is one of them. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, if we might digress a while while we are 
on that question right now for just a moment, that is one of the things 
that I have difficulty in understanding and I know that other mem- 
bers of the committee are in a similar quandary. 

The pilot message, which is found in exhibit 1, page 238, No. 901, 
according to exhibit 41 was filed by the Japanese at 8 :56 p. m. Decem- 
ber 6, Tokyo time ( A & N) ; that is 6 :56 a. m. Delcember C, Washing- 
ton time. 

The exhibit further shows that this was intercepted in Japanese 
code by Navy station "S" — that is Bainbridge Island, Washington — 
at 12 : 15 to 'l2 : 20 GMT— Greenwich [10960] meridian time. 

Captain Kramer. Greenwich meridian time; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. December 6 — Navy, with the parentheses around "S". 

7 : 15 to 7 : 20 a. m. December 6, Washington time. 

In other words, this was intercepted between 7 : 15 and 7 : 20 a. m., 
December 6, Washington time. It was teletyped in Japanese code to 
the Navy ; no showing when it was received. 

Now, then, we have this picture, that here is this pilot message, 
which is one of the important messages in this chain of messages, 
received by the Bainbridge Island intercepting station between 7 : 15 
a. m. and 7 : 20 a . m. on Saturday morning, December 6, 1941. Now, 
that would come into the Navy "Department, wouldn't it? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4101 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

[10961] And it would be taken off the teletype almost instan- 
taneously, the telet^'pe tape from Bainbridge, would it not? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. This exhibit shows that it was teletyped in Japanese 
code to the Navy. Why did not you get that message that morning 
early ? 

Captain Kramer. December 6 was a day of Army cognizance of 
Japanese ciphers. It would, therefore have been automatically un- 
der the existing arrangements, have been sent to the Army Signal 
Intelligence Section by our GY watch officers receiving that. 

Mr. Keefe. Then, if I understand it, if it came in about 7 : 20 a. m. 
on December 6, it would be immediately taken off the teletype by the 
watch officer and transferred over to the Army Signal Intelligence 
Section ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; not necessarily immediately. 

Those tricks, however were quite frequent; they averaged about 2 
hours apart, and sometimes oftener. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, Captain Kramer, here was a pilot message, which 
indicated the reply was to be made to the Hull note. You were all 
alerted to watch for that reply, were you not ? 

Captain Kjramer. We had been looking for it for some \_1096,i] 
days ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Would the watch officer, when this message came in on 
the teletype, have any way of knowing what its contents were ? 

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir. 

Mr. I^efe. He would have to rely upon the translators over in the 
Army ? First the decoders, I suppose. 

Captain Kjiamer. Decoders, and then the subject, of course, would 
not be known until final translation. 

Mr. KJEEFE. Have you any explanation as to why it took from 7 : 20 
a. m. to 12 : 05 p. m., on Saturday, December 6, to get that message over 
to the Army Signal Intelligence Service from the Navy ? 

Captain Kjiamer. I have no first-hand knowledge on the time sched- 
ules of handling those things, so I cannot testify on that point, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, this exhibit indicates that this message was 
received at 12 : 05 p. m. by the Army Signal Intelligence Service. How 
long would it take, from your examination and knowledge of that 
message, to decode it and translate it, normally ? 

Captain Kramer. I cannot testify, except from general understand- 
ing, how long it might take to decode it. 

It might be, for example, that the cipher key for that [10963] 
day was not yet recovered, in which case it might have taken a week 
or more to recover. It might further be 

Mr. Keefe (interposing). Pardon me just a moment. There is no 
need to talk about "it might take a week or more," because we know it 
was decoded that same day. 

Captain Kjiamer. It might be, in a more specific answer to your 
question, Mr. Keefe, that a cipher key had been recovered which was 
in error for two or three letters, giving a quite garbled text, in which 
case it might require considerable reworking before a fairly smooth 
text were deciphered. 



4102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. In any event, so far as you know, you did not get it in 
your section from the Army until the next morning, Sunday, Decem- 
ber?? 

Captain Kramer. That is my present belief, sir. 

Mr. Keefe, Sometime between 9 and 10: 30 that morning? 

Captain Kramer. That is my present belief, from a study of the 
other night, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. 

Now, question No. 11 : 

Were Mr. Knox and Mr. Stimson called in that morning, or were they notified 
In any way? 

Answer : 

Yes. See 9 and 10 above. 

Question 12 : 

How long did you stay with Mr. Roosevelt? . 

[100641 Answer : 

Did not. See 8 above. 

That is as you liave testified here? 
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Keefe. Question 13 : 

When did you see Admiral Stark that morning? 

Answer : 

About 0900 at his office with others, and left night-before matters. First batch 
of new given 

Well, I don't know whether this punctuation is right. I will start 
all over again. It appears I read it improperly. 

Captain Kramer. I did not edit that thing after the first typing, sir. 
There might be typographical errors in it, and very likely there are. 

Mr. Keefe. The answer to No. 13 is 

About 0900 at his office with others, and left night-before matters. 

Captain Kramer. That means the material disseminated the eve- 
ing before, Saturday evening. 

Mr. Keefe. I see. It means you left with him that material which 
you had received the night before ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; I find now, however, that mj^ recollec- 
tion on that point is incorrect, that it was first shown to Admiral Stark 
the next morning by Captain McCollum. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, what am I to understand the fact is? 

[10965] This memorandum says, "When did you see Admiral 
Stark that morning?" The answer is "About 0900 at his office with 
others, and left night-before matters." 

Captain Kramer. Actually I did not go to Admiral Stark's office 
until about 9 : 30, sir, when I was starting on my way to the State 
Department. 

Mr. Keefe. Now you push the matter up from 9 o'clock to 9 : 30. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You have been refreshed on that since you got to study- 
ing this on your arrival at Washington? Is that right? 

Captain Kramer. Chiefly the other night, and since my arrival in 
Washington ; yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4103 

Mr. Keefe, What do you mean by "chiefly the other night"? 

Captain Kramer. As to the time when the messages were delivered, 
the study I made the other night for Senator Ferguson. 

Mr. Keefe. That would not help you any on the matter of time, 
would it? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir; I am still a little hazy on precise times. 
In fact, during our luncheon conversation at Admiral Starks' home 
in Spring Valley, we were [109661; still unclear as to exact 
times. The chief point cleared up was the fact it was Captain McCol- 
lum and not Commander Wellborn whom I had seen that morning in 
Stark's office. 

Mr. Keefe. Am I to understand that at this luncheon at Admiral 
Stark's home you were trying to figure out, and figure accurately, as 
to what time you did see Admiral Stark and what time you did deliver 
the papers to him ? 

Captain Kramer. That was not the purpose, sir. It was in the 
course of a general conversation that one or two of those points came 
up, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, Captain Kramer, I have not asked you as to 
whether that was the purpose of the luncheon or not. You volunteered 
the statement here, in addition to what you said yesterday to Sen- 
ator Ferguson about that meeting, that this quesion was discussed as 
to the exact time that you delivered papers o Admiral Stark. 

Now, either it was or Avas not. I was not there. 

I will ask you the direct question. 

At this luncheon meeting with Admiral Stark, was the question 
discussed as to the time at which you delivered the papers to him that 
morning of December 7, 19-41 ? 

Captain Kramer. Points regarding the 

Mr. Keefe (interposing). You can answer that "Yes" or "No," 
can't you ? 

[10967'] Captain Kramer. I cannot answer a categorical "Yes" 
on that point, in the light of your precise wording of your question, 
Mr. Keefe. No effort was made to determine exact times. In the 
course of general conversation, the times of arrival of Admiral Stark 
and Captain McCoUum came up in our discussion. In that respect 
my answer would be "Yes," otherwise, in answer to your question, the 
answer is "No," if you mean that we were trying to dbtermine precise 
times. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, all right. 

When you prepared this memorandum out in the solitude of the 
South Pacific, when you were alone by yourself, preparing a sort of a 
message that was to be used in the event of your death, to state facts 
so you would leave a clear record as to events, you set down that you 
saw Admiral Stark at 9 o'clock at his office with others, and left with 
him then these papers. 

Captain Kramer. That was my recollection then; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now then, since you got to talking it over with people 
after your arrival here at Washington, your memory became refreshed 
as to the events, and you now say you think it was about 9 : 30, is that 
right ? 

Captain Kramer. That is right, sir. 

[10968] Mr. Keefe. All right. 



4104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Did Admiral Stark tell you that he thought you were mistaken 
in saying it was 9 o'clock, that it was nearer 9 : 30 ? 

Captain Kramer. He did not, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Did anyone else tell you that? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. Thai was purely my own presumption 
and deduction from the fact that I have a recollection, still rather 
hazy, that I did stop at Admiral Stark's office on my way to my ap- 
pointment in the State Department. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, did you leave any papers at Admiral Stark's 
office that morning? 

Captain Kramer. I apparently did not, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Did not you take any papers to Admiral Stark's office 
that morning ? 

Captain Kramer. I did, definitely, that I recall, after my return 
from Mr. Hull's office at approximately 10 : 30. That time I am quite 
precise on. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, I am getting more confused than ever by 
your answer. You tried to see Stark the night before, on the 6th, 
to deliver this 13-part message to him along with others, did you not? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

[10969'] Mr. Keefe. You could not find him home ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Then you went on and made your deliveries to others, 
as you testified, and you think Wilkinson called Stark that night, and 
made an appointment to get all the crowd together the next morning. 
You so stated ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, you had the pouch that Stark did not get, and 
took it back to the Navy Department that Saturday night? 

Captain Kramer. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. Did not you deliver that pouch to him in the morning, 
so Stark would have the same papers you delivered to these other 
people? 

Captain Kramer. I left several pouches with Captain McCollum 
early that morning, sir. It could well be that my stopping about 9 : 30 
at Admiral Stark's office was to see and find out for myself whether 
Admiral Stark had yet seen it. 

[10970'] Mr. Keefe. Now, then, I will read on with your an- 
swer : 

First batch of new given about 0940, second about 1045 (all this was not per- 
sonal but via his senior aide because of meeting in progress. They were passed 
in to him promptly however). 

Now you say that the first batch of the new stuff that came in was 
given to him at 9:40, and the second batch at 10:45, and that was 
delivered to his senior aide. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Then you must have made three deliveries. 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Do I understand this 

Captain Kramer, (interposing), My present recollection is that 
I am somewhat faulty on precise times in that memorandum. That 
9 : 40 I now modify to the 9 : 30 stopping at Admiral Stark's office I 
have just referred to. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4105 

Mr. Keefe. Then am I to understand that you not only left the 
material that was in the pouch on the night before, but you also left 
the first batch of the material that came in on the morning of the 
7th at 9:30, is that it? 

Captain Kramer. The first batch, Mr. Keefe, now appears to be 
only the fourteenth part of that 13-part note. That was apparently 
the only new material, in the light of my study the other night, 
that was left on the first trip. 

[10971] Mr. Keefe. Well, now, am I to understand that you 
left the pouch with the fourteenth part message in it alone? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir; that together with the other material 
disseminated the previous night which Admiral Stark had not yet 
seen. 

Mr. Keefe. Now why can't we get some simple little fact clear? 
Am I correct in the assumption that whatever you did deliver, whether 
it was 9 : 30, 9 : 40, or at any other time, the first delivery you made 
on the morning of the 7th, according to your present refreshed tes- 
timony, included the fourteenth part, together with the first 13 parts. 

Now did it or didn't it? 

Captain Kramer. It did, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. It is easy to say a simple little thing like 
that if you will only listen to the question. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield? I think I can clear the 
confusion by showing you this part of the record. 

Mr. Keefe. I do not think there is any confusion right now. I 
think we have got it clear. 

Now question No. 14: 

With reference to a certain conference held that morning, do you know who 
attended it and how long it lasted? 

Answer : 

There were two I linow of, and I believe another c/o Colonel Bratton. The 
one in Mr. Hull's office was at 110972] least one and one-half hours. 
Another started about 9 : 00 o'clock with Op-10, Admiral Stark, 11 Admiral In- 
gersoll, 12 Admiral Turner, 16 Admiral Wilkinson, 20 Admiral Noyes, and others 
there, lasting to 1130 that I know of, and probably later. 

Is that correct? 

Captain Kramer. It now develops, Mr. Keefe, that there was no 
formal conference, but many officers were in Admiral Stark's office, 
and going and coming from his office. My impression, at the time I 
prepared that memorandum and at the time that Sunday morning, was 
there was a conference. It was in a similar manner that the normal 
11 o'clock conference was held more or less daily in Admiral Stark's 
office, similarly assembled. That was the reason for my impression 
that there was a formal conference of that nature. However, it was 
no formal conference but a continuing discussion that Sunday 
morning. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. Question No. 15 : 

"Did you ever tell Admiral Wilkinson what you told me?" 

Your answers appears to be to 15 and 16 : 

Reference obscure. Would you clarify? If re-general security' (i. e. lack) 
late in spring, yes. 

What does that refer to? 

79716— 46— pt. 9 13 



4106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. That is rather cryptic, I will admit, \1097S^ 
Mr. Keefe. By "spring ' I refer to the spring of 1942, regarding a 
number of security questions that came up at that time. Otherwise I 
was unaware of what Captain SafFord was referrino- to 

J^l^fyA ^fi' wr'^^'' "^.i^^you ever tell Admiral Wilkinson 
what you teld me ?" What was it that you told him ? 

Captain Kramer. I still do not know what he means bv that re- 
mark, sir. ^ 

Mr. Keefe. Then you say, "If regeneral security (i. e., lack) late in 

What did you mean by that? 

Captain Kramer. I thought I covered that point just now, sir I 
referred to a security episode that came up late in the sprint of 1942 
Mr. Keefe. Question No. 17: 

papl?^? ^'^ ^'^'^'"''^ Wilkinson first see or learn about part 14 and other 

Your answer is : 

See items 13 and 14 above. 

There is no question about that, is there? 

Captain Kramer. I do not think so, sir. 
testifie n^^^^" ^^"^ memorandum then is exactly the same as you 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

110971^1 Mr. Keefe. Question No. 18: 

laS.'wL^rU'Le'o? U? """''^"' ^■'^"^'" ^^^"^ "" ^^^- '^^^ ^"'^ ''^ t^--«- 
Answer : 

7 npppnyhi.T^^^^'■ ''^P'^J-^ ^^^^l "'** ^^^ ^"' December, 1941. but mid-morning of 
c^^^fv^} \ ^^}\ '''- '"^it'ated in 10-c above. It went into OP-2(^GZ| file 
up-_u-GL should have it now unless it was among files turned over to Army. 

Now there you are referring to the so-called weather report that 
came in on the seventh ? 

Captain Kramer. Which I learned only before Admiral Hewitt's 
investigation I was mistaken in, and actuallv that was the hidden- 
word message. 

Mr Keefe. It was the hidden- word message instead of the weather 
report « 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Question No. 19: 

Can you offer any pertinent remarks? 

Your answer : 

For the nsost part covered above, until item 15 (16) is clarified. 

Then your memorandum goes on and sets forth the first four para- 
graphs of Captain Safford's letter to you under date of January 22, 
1944, which is already in the record, and I shall not burden the record 
by reading it. 

Then you^put down his questions : 

[10915^ 'Please answer the following questions by item No." 

Item 20 : 

Re your item #2, is Colonel B. Colonel Bratton? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4107 

Answer : 

Yes. 

Item No. 21 : 

What or whose job in the Navy did Colonel Bratton's job correspond to? 

Answer : 

McCollum's (head of FE Section), and mine insofar as dissemination of this 
material is concerned. 

No question about that ? 

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Item 22 : 

Do you know what Army officers were notified or shown the papers by Colonel 
Bratton, and when? 

Answer : 

Other than as indicated in 2, 9 and 14 I do not know, but since the Colonel 
was, on frequent occasions of which I am aware, always prompt and conscien- 
tious in handling this type of material I assume that all usual recipients in the 
War Department were getting everything promptly on 6-7 December, 1941. This 
assumption is further substantiated the morning of the 7th by the fact that he 
arrived at Mr. Hull's office about the same time I did on both trips, despite the 
fact I had a few minutes start each time while delivery was being made to him 
from my office. He, as you know, was responsible for getting it to State, as well 
as to Mr. Stimson. I believe his usual practice was [10976] to get it 
to the Chief of Staff and DMI prior to delivery to Mr. Hull. 

No question about that, is there? 
Captain Kramer. No, sir. 
Mr. Keefe (continuing) : 

In amplification of my question 1.5-16 "Did you ever tell Admiral Wilkinson 
what you told me? Or MeCollum or anyone else?" I recall your telling me that 
you saw Admiral Stark about 0900 (EST) on 7 December 1941. 

He looked at the papers and exclaimed, "My God ! This means war !" 

You said. "Admiral, it has meant war for the past three months." 

Admiral Stark continued, "I must get word lo Admiral Kimmel," and picked 
up a message blank. 

Then another idea entered his mind, and he said "Does General Marshall know 
of this?" 

You replied, "Most of it was sent over to his office last night. This last part 
(Part 14) was sent over 10 minutes ago and should be on the General's desk by 
now." 

(End of your tale). 

Now, this was what amplified Captain Safford's previous question, 
which you asked him to amplify in your reply to his first letter? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; that is correct, sir. 

[10977] Mr. Keefe. And he is attempting to tell you what you 
told him in amplification and asks you to verify it ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Item 23 : 

Can you verify or correct the foregoing? 

Answer : 

Cannot verify. (See Item 1.3.) I may have made the last remark, because 
quite often during the previous year, not only he. but others would ask similar 
questions regarding who had it. I therefore frequently answered such questions 
or volunteered such information at the time of delivery, and may have as indi- 
cated in this case. 



4108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Now this question and the answer thus far contemplate that you had 
had a conversation at some time with Captain Safford and had told 
him that you had delivered these papers, or these messages, to Admiral 
Stark at about 9 o'clock, and that when he looked at it he said, "My 
God! This means war!" and you said, "Admiral, it has meant war 
for the past three months." Admiral Stark then said, "I must get 
word to Admiral Kimmel," and picked up a message blank. 

Now I understand you to say in j^our memorandum that you cannot 
verify that as having taken place, except possibly the last sentence. 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe, Yes, sir. 

Most of it was sent over to [10978] his oflSce last night. This last part 
(Part 14) was sent over 10 minutes ago and should be on the General's desk by 
now. 

What were you referring to there ? 

Captain Kramer. I was referring in the answer set forth there only 
to the general character of conversations regarding delivery, which 
I frequently made and talked about in my answer there, 

Mr. Keefe, You say in your memorandum : 

I may have made the last remark, because quite often during the previous 
year, not only he, but others would ask similar questions regarding who had it. 

Now what I want to know is, had you at any time told Captain 
Safford those facts that he set forth to refresh your recollection ? 

Captain Kramer. I am extremely doubtful of that, sir, I had 
probably three or four conversations, between the time of Pearl Harbor 
and the time of my departure in the late spring of 1943 with Captain 
Safford, During those conversations I may have referred, at one 
time or another, probably in the days just following Pearl Harbor, to 
what deliveries I had made that morning, I kept him in general 
apprised of important items in this traffic. I cannot, however, verify 
that conversation which Captain Safford puts [10979] in mine 
and Admiral Stark's mouths. 

Mr, Keefe. You do not deny it, do you, that you told that to Captain 
Safford? 

Captain Kramer. I have no recollection whatsoever of having told 
Captain Safford of such a conversation, 

Mr, Keefe, Well, now Captain Kramer, it would be perfectly the 
most natural thing in the world for an officer like Admiral Stark to 
say, "My God! This means war!" when he got these messages, 
wouldn't it? 

Captain Kramer. In that respect, sir. Admiral Stark, that I recall 
on three or four occasions, used rather emphatic expressions of that 
nature, 

Mr, Keefe. It would not be unlike Admiral Stark to make a state- 
ment of that kind, would it ? 

Captain Kramer, No, sir, 

[10980] Mr. Keefe, Then as I understand your testimony with 
respect to this particular situation, it boils down to this, that you just 
do not verify it. *Lt may have occurred, you do not deny it categor- 
ically, but you do not have any present recollection that you told 
Captain Safford that ? 

Captain Kjjamer. That is correct, sir. 



I 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4109 

Mr. B[eefe. But when you were recording your last declaration, 
that was to be used in the event of your death in the Pacific setting 
forth the facts, you did say you may have have made the last remark, 
and 1 want to quote that, when he asked the question "Does General 
Marshall know of this ?" your reply was : 

Most of it was sent over to his office last night. This last part (part 14) 
was sent over ten minutes ago, and should be on the General's desk by now. 

Caj3tain Keamer, By stating I might have made the last remark, 
I was referring purely and simply, Mr. Keefe, to the fact that assum- 
ing I saw Admiral Stark at 9 or 9 : 30 that morning, I may have 
informed him of who had already received that material. 

It was nothing more or less, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. 

Now, I go on with your further answer : 

[109S1] My recollections and most vivid impressions of that morning almost 
21/2 years ago are of urgency and perspiration. The latter from dashing through 
the corridors of the Navy Department and two trips to the White House and 
State Department on foot (partly on the double), and the former from the 
certainty that the diplomatic haymakers exchanged since five November, 1941, 
and particularly since about the 26th, were reaching a climax. The immediate 
urgency for me was to get back to my office as quickly as possible to see if any- 
thing new had come in, and then get it pushed through the breakdown, transla- 
tion, check for references, typing, arrangement of the 14 copies in folders for dis- 
semination, phoning to see where recipients were, and then to dash out with 
it again. 

Hence, my usual procedure of preparing summaries of the day's traffic and 
of references, as well as sitting alongside the desk of recipients while they 
read only the summaries if pressed for time, or the full text of the more 
important material to which I invited their attention, and so I could clarify 
obscure connotations, identify names, give background, or outline references, 
was entirely foregone that morning. 

There was no need for any of it because the items were for the most part 
self-explanatory and the background, so [10982] far as this particular 
set of traffic was concerned, was well-known to all recipients, especially because 
the volume of new material during the preceding ten days had been small (though 
important) and had given opportunity for review. 

If I appear to be hazy on some of the details you ask, in particular with 
reference to the conversation in Admiral Stark's office, the above background 
which I have given at some length should explain it in part. 

More specifically, I recall making personal delivery to only two principals that 
morning, namely, to Mr. Knox and to Admiral Stark at 09(X). 

There again, after this long explanation, you say, and I read : 

More specifically, I recall making personal delivery to only two principals 
that morning, namely, to Mr. Knox and to Admiral Stark at 0900, 



or 9 o'clock. 

I go on with your statement : 



In the case of Mr. Knox, I gave him the previous night's material, plus part 
14, and one to two less important things when he arrived at Mr. Hull's office about 
1000. My remarks then were confined to inviting attention to the new material, 
because lie had studied the previous night's material from approximately 2200 
to after 2300 in his apartment. 

That would be for an hour, wouldn't it? 

[10983] Captain Kkamee. Yes, sir. It was somewhat less than 
that. 

Mr. KJEEFE (reading) : 

Part of this time he talked to me about various phases of the matter, and 
made phone calls. The rest of the time I conversed with Mrs. Knox, and the 



4110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Secretary's Chicago Daily News manager, who was visiting and whom I had 
known slightly during the period when he was acting as Mr. Knox's personal 
secretary at the Navy Department. 

Riglit at that point, in this letter, which was written by you out 
in the Pacific, without the benefit of notes, and without the benefit of 
all this material, and without the benefit of refreshment from any- 
body, you told, in pretty meticulous detail, the same story you told 
before this committee; isn't that true, as to those facts? 

Captain Kramer. I think so, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now, I go on. 

Again, at about 1100 when I delivered the "1300 msg," the "weather report" 
and the final orders on destruction of cryptographic aids, I took time only to 
invite attention verbally to the fact "that 1300 Eastern Daylight Time was 0730 
at Pearl — 

and that means 7: 30 at Pearl, doesn't it? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

[10984] Mr. Keefe. "And 0300"— that would be what? Three 
o'clock ? 

Captain Kramer. In the morning; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. In the morning. 

approximately or shortly before morning twilight at Kota Bharu, where we had 
been expecting confirmation of the deal with the Thai Chief of Staff for this 
attack for some days. The implications were so olnious in the light of what 
we know, that it was not necessary to state that invasion of British territory 
was undoubtedly scheduled for 1.300 (EDT). and that at least a complete break 
with the U. S. was scheduled simultaneously. 

That was clear wasn't it? 
Captain Kramer. I think so, sir. 
Mr. Keefe (reading) : 

In the case of the 0900 delivery to Adniii-al Stark I was in very much of a 
hurry. I don't believe I spent as much as a minute in his oflSce. 

Now, you refer in this memorandum to the 9 o'clock delivery to 
Admiral Stark, do you not? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir ; in that respect, ^Mr. Keefe 

Mr. Keefe (interposing) . I have only asked for the "yes." 

Mr. Murphy. I submit the witness is entitled to give an explana- 
tion. We want the facts. 

[10.985] Captain Kramer. I w^ould like to make a very short 
further remark, that I was hazy then, and still am hazy. I believe 
Captain McCollum is not precise, and that Admiral Stark too is 
not precise as to tho.se exact times. I do definitely recall now, 
however, that the first delivery of that note to Admiral Stark was 
made by Captain McCollum wliere I left the folder for the Admiral. 

I may very well, since Admiral Stark's office was up on deck 
and only one corridor's length away, have gone up there at 9 o'clock 
with the flag secretary, if he were there, or to otherwise check to 
see whether Admiral Stark were in and had gotten that. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, of course, the whole thing is only a matter of a 
half hour's difference. 
Captain Kramer. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. The testimony is only a difference of a half an hour, 
which was a vital half hour that morning, was it not ? 

Captain Kramer. I presume all time that morning was very vital, 
yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4111 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 
Wei, I will go on : 

I don't believe I spent as much as a minute in his office. 

[109S6] A number of other senior officers were standing about or coming 
in for the meeting. I hardly glanced at them, mure than to note that Ad- 
miral Turner, Noyes, and Wilkinson, the principal other usual recipients, were 
also there, and consequently it would not be necessary to run them down in 
the building for separate and individual delivery. 

I had been interrupted in finishing some of tlie hot new material in my office 
to make this delivery, and was literally almost jumpy to get back and get 
it out, and to deliver to the White House as quickly as possible, and also, of 
course to keep the 1000 appointment with Mr. Knox at the State Department. 

I am almost positive I did not remain in the Admirals office while he read 
the approximately 15 pages of single-spaced text. There were undoubtedly a 
few words exchanged with the Admiral, most likely along the lines of the 
remarks you quote as my last reply. 

[10987] I want to stop right there. You sa}^ : 

I am almost positive I did not remain in the Admiral's office while he read 
the approximately 15 pages of single-spaced text. 

Now what were yon referring to there ? The whole 14 parts ? 

Captain Kramer. That was presuming that I delivered directly to 
Admiral Stark the 14-part note ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now did you or did you not deliver it to him? 

Captain Kramer. I did not, in my present best recollection, make 
that delivery; no, sir. Captain McColJum did. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, when you were making that statement that day 
you were certainly under the impression that you had delivered it 
to him, and you were setting down in this document, to be used in 
the event of your death, what you thoroughly understood the facts 
to be? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you say in this that you are certain that you did 
not remain in his office while he read the approximately 15 pages. 

There were undoubtedly a few words exchanged with the Admiral, most 
likely along the lines of the remarks you quote as my last reply. 

What were you referring to there? 

Captain Kramer. The last .sentence that Captain Safford 
[10988] quotes me as saying. 

Mr. Keefe. We will go back to it. In other words, "Does General 
Marshall know of this?'', and your reply : 

Most of it was sent over to his office last night. This last part (Part 14) was 
sent over 10 minutes ago and should be on the General's desk by now. 

Is that what you referred to ? 

Captain Kramer. I referred, as I shortly before have outlined, only 
to informing Admiral Stark, a recipient, as to other recipients who 
may or may not have received that material. 

Mr. Keefe. Now let us get a definite answer to my question. 

Captain Kramer. That, I think, is a definite answer, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. When you wrote these words : 

There were undoubtedly a few words exchanged with the Admiral, most likely 
along the lines of the remarks you quote as my last reply, 

were you then referring to the suggested words contained in Captain 
Safford 's letter to you ? 



4112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR A^ITACK 

Captain Kramer. I was not, sir. 
Mr. Keefe. What were you referring to ? 

Captain Kramer. Only to my general practice of informing reci- 
pients who else had received the material I was delivering. 
Mr. Keefe. Well, in this memorandum you say : 

There [10989] were undoubtedly a few words exchanged with the Ad- 
miral, most likely along the lines of the remarks you quote as my last reply. 

What did you mean when you set that down? 

Captain Kramer. I have already stated, a few minutes ago, Mr. 
Keefe, that I did not edit that memorandum after I wrote it. I was 
under some pressure to confer with Admiral Halsey again, as I had 
indicated when he first showed me Admiral Kimmel's letter. Despite 
that urgency, or at least haste, on my part it took me approximately 
4 or 5 days before I had this memorandum prepared. I recall now 
no attempt to go back, during the process of preparing that mem- 
orandum, to check in detail what I had said earlier. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, noAv, let us go on. The memorandum further 
says : 

The other actions of the Admiral would also be not unusual. 

What were you referring to there ? 

Captain Kramer. I was referring to an emphatic comment that 
the Admiral had made on the several previous occasions when I de- 
livered directly to him. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, this portion of your memorandum. Cap- 
tain, refers to what took place when you delivered this mesasge to 
Admiral Stark at 9 o'clock on the morning of [lOOOOl the 7th, 
or whatever time between 9 and 9 : 30 that you actually did deliver it. 

Mr. MuRPHT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. Keefe. Yes ; I yield. 

Mr. Murphy. I think if you will refer to page 9144 you will find 
Captain McCollum's explanation on the delivery of the first part of 
the message. 

Mr. Keefe. I am not interested at this time in what Captain Mc- 
Collum said. I am asking this witness who is now on the stand. 

Mr. MuEPHY. May I finish ? 

Mr. KJEEFE. No ; I do not care to be interrupted for that purpose. 
That does not add anything to this examination. 

The Chairman. Go ahead. 

Mr. Murphy. I am trying to avoid confusion. 

Mr. Keefe. You simply add more confusion to it. 

Now what remarks, if any, did Admiral Starke may to you that 
morning ? 

Captain Kramer. Admiral Stark, in my present best recollection, 
made no remark directly to me, sir. I could be — ^I have indicated my 
haziness on precise times prior to 10 o'clock, that is between about 8 : 15 
and 10, at least — that I was in Admiral Stark's outer office at about 
the time that Captain McCollum arrived there to show that memo- 
randum to Admiral Stark. I am uncertain of that, sir. 

[10991] Mr. Keefe. Then your answer is that, according to 
your present recollection, after you have been refreshed, as it were, 
you think you did not deliver this fourteenth part message, together 
with the first 13 parts, that morning at any time, to Admiral Stark? 

Captain Kramer. Directly ; yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4113 

Mr. Keefe. So that you now contend you did not have any con- 
versation with him at all that morning ; is that right ? 

Captain Kjramer. That is my present belief; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Therefore Admiral Stark did not say anything to you 
about this message at all ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Is that your present recollection ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Is that because you discussed it with Admiral Stark 
and Captain McCollum? 

Captain Kramer. Partly that, and partly by general study of this 
whole subject in the last few weeks, the last couple of months. 

Mr. Keefe. Since you got back to Washington? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That is what you meant when you said, repeatedly 
throughout your testimony that you had been refreshed, [10992] 
so that your current recollection is so and so; is that right? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. A large part of my refreshing has been 
due to a study of documents which I had not seen until recent days. 

Mr. Keefe. A study of documents would not help you any on this, 
would it ? 

Captain Kramer. No. 

Mr. Keefe. So if any refreshing at all is to be done, it is because 
somebody talked to you about it ; is that true? 

Captain Krainier. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. Nothing else ? 

Captain Kramer. Nothing else. 

Mr. Keefe. There are no documents that you could study which 
would determine whether you talked to Admiral Stark or whether you 
did not? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, let us go on with your statement : 

On a number of occasions previously he had immediately phoned General 
Marshall, or had called the White House to arrange immediate access for me to 
Mr. Roosevelt if the material were important, and delivery had been to the 
Admiral first. I definitely recall a certain feeling of [10993] relief that 
Admiral Wilkinson was thei'e, and consequently I need not be held up from 
getting back to my oflSce while it was read, because Admiral Wilkinson had 
studied it thoroughly the night before and could answer any questions the 
Admiral had. 

Now, there again, you say you definitely recall a feeling of relief 
that Admiral Wilkinson was there. Now, was where? In Admiral 
Stark's office? 

Captain Kramer. How is that? 

Mr. Keefe. Was Admiral Wilkinson in Admiral Stark's office? 

Captain Kramer. He was quite definitely at my 10 : 30 visit in 
Admiral Stark's outer office. It could very well be that he was there 
at about 9 : 30 when I stopped by Admiral Stark's office, together with 
other senior department officers, standing about in his office. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. 

Now, let us go on. 

Now, I want you to listen to this. You say you never read this 
statement before since you wrote it. 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. So it is quite new to you, too, isn't it ? 



4114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. There are some points that are new [1099 i] 
to me now, yes, sir. I do not recall just exactly what I put in that 
memorandum. 

Mr. Keefe. I want you to listen to this next one carefully : 

One or more of the other remarks may have been made also. The quoted 
exclamation of Admiral Stark would have been typical in character, because he 
had used emphatic exclamation once or twice before during the fall when par- 
ticularly 'hot' items were being shown him. But climax after climax had been 
so frequent during the previous several months that even this remark would not 
have impressed me specifically. I was used to it, with my mind focused on the 
technical and messenger boys aspects that morning, I simply do not recall the 
complete conversation in question. 

Now, does that refresh your recollection as to whether you told Cap- 
tain SafFord about the exclamations that Admiral Stark had made 
when this message was delivered to him? 

Captain Kramer. Not in the slightest, sir, 

Mr. Keefe. It does not refresh you in the slightest ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Your own words, your own language written by you ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

[1099o] Mr. Keefe. Now, I ask you again, in the light of your 
present knowledge, did you or did you not deliver the fourteenth part 
message together with the first 13 parts that morning to Admiral Stark 
personally? 

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir. 

[10996] Mr. Keefe. Then all this stuff that you have written 
down here, couldn't possibly have happened, or any inference that it 
happened, couldn't possibly show that it happened? 

Captain Kramer. It is possible that I was in Admiral Stark's outer 
office at the time Captain McCollum arrived there. He may have 
phoned me that Admiral Stark was arriving. That would not have 
been unusual. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you have any present recollection that Admiral 
Stark made any oiF the statements which are set forth in Captain 
Safford's letter to you ? 

Captain Kramer. I have none. sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now Captain Kramer, just so that we may thoroughly 
understand this, I understood you to say that you prepared this 
memorandum and intended that this memorandum should be your 
story of these events in the event you should happen to be killed in 
your service out in the South Pacific? 

Captain Kramer. That is not quite accurate, sir. My intention in 
preparing that memorandum was simply to give Admiral Halsey a 
much broader picture of events preceding Pearl Harbor than would 
be indicated by replies to Admiral KinnneFs letter. That purpose 
only. It was only later, after I had promised Admiral Halsey that 
I would prepare a [10997] deposition or affidavit in compliance 
with Admiral Wilkinson's request, that I retained this memorandum 
as being in the nature of the affidavit which Admiral Kimmel had re- 
quested. I never reviewed that as to accuracy at any time. I never 
prepared any such affidavit. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you intend that this should be used in the event any- 
thing happened to you ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4115 

Captain Kramer. I, of course, hoped that it would be necessary to 
so use it. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, in the event it would have been necessary to use 
it, did you intend this should be your statement of fact ^ 

Captain Kramer. It would have been found with my papers; yes, 
sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Sort of a last declaration, or dying declaration or some- 
thing of that kind; is that right? 

Captain Kramer. I presume so, sir; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Then you knew that an investigation was on at the 
time you prepared this, did you not? 

Captain Kramer. I did not ; no, sir. I believe I had heard, I am 
not certain of that point, that a Navy investigation was contemplated. 

Mr. Keefe. And you knew that on the possibility of the findings 
of that Navy court, the careers and perhaps [109.98] the entire 
lives of individuals depended; you knew that, didn't you? 

Captain Kramer. That undoubtedly was part of my presumption; 
yes, sir. I did not know just the purpose of the investigation. 

Mr. Keefe. So you were quite meticulous, were you not, when you 
prepared this statement, to see to it that you recorded the truth? 

Captain Kramer. I was not particularly meticulous. My only pur- 
pose and intention when I was preparing that was to give Admiral 
Halsey a broad picture. I took no time to rehash or attempt to re- 
fresh my memory precisely as to details in the preparation of that 
memorandum. 

Mr. Keefe, Now, I read on. Let's see if this refreshes your recol- 
lection any. I am trying to refresh it from your owni document. Not 
anybody else's. 

Captain Kramer, Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. This is your own writing. 

In later deliveries — 

Get this : 

In later deliveries to Admiral Stark that morning, I went only to his office 
door, which remained open, while his flag secretary took the material from me 
and gave it to the admiral. 

[10999] Captain Kramer. That was referring specifically to the 
10 : 30 delivery which I quite vividly recall. 

Mr. Keefe. That would iniply to me, reading this full statement, 
that the first delivery you made in person to Admiral Stark and then 
you say ^'In later deliveries to Admiral Stark that morning I went 
only to his office door." 

Captain Kramer. In later trips to Admiral Stark's office. Again, 
possibly clarifying a point to a slight degree, it could well be that 
Admiral Stark's door was not closed at the first trip around 9 or 9 : 30, 
whenever it was, that I may have made to Admiral Stark's office. It 
was closed, I recall quite positively, when I arrived there about 10 : 30, 
because word had to be sent in to the admiral that I was outside. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, it is quite clear from your testimony given here 
that you never delivered any papers to Admiral Stark personally that 
morning. 

Captain Kramer. That is my present belief; yes, sir; before 10 
o'clock. 



4116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. So when you say "In later deliveries to Admiral Stark, 
I went only to his office door," the fact is yon never went beyond his 
office door to make any deliveries; is that what you mean to tell us 
now? 

Captain Kramek. That is what I mean to tell yon now, sir. 

I^IIOOO'] Mr. Keefe. You have then refreshed on that point also 
since you got back to Washington ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you talk about that at Admiral Stark's luncheon? 

Captain Kramer. I don't believe that came up specifically ; no, sir. 

\^11001'\ Mr. Keefe. Then you go on to say : 

I believe I also gave him additional folders on one or both occasions for other 
recipients in the conference. But in these latter deliveries I recollect conversa- 
tion only for Mr. Knox' benefit regarding the implications of the 130O hour. 
I distinctly remember that the tie-up of these times would be apparent to 
experienced naval officers, but that a civilian (Mr. Knox) might overlook it. 
Hence the pains I took to point it out at the State Department. I repeated this 
point at least half a dozen times that morning to others, chiefly subordinates, 
I think, but including one of Mr. Hull's secretaries who handled this material 
for him, to one or two of my office workers, and I believe also to Colonel Brat- 
ton in Mr. Hull's outer office, probably to Commander Wellborn, the Admiral's 
flag secretary, possibly to McCollum, and probably to you, too. However, such 
conversations as I had that morning were more in the nature of rapid com- 
ment and abrupt departure to keep up with my chief concerns, the messenger 
boy and technical jobs. Consequently, any remai'ks made by others have left 
practically no impressions or recollections with me. 

Now, that is substantially, as to that point, what you have testified 
before us here ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

\^1100'2^ Mr. Keefe. On that issue your mind is very clear, it is 
the same today as it was when you recorded this out in the Pacific in 
the early part of 1944? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, then, questions 24 and 25 : 

Did Admiral Stark get General Marshall on the telephone and what did he 
say; were there any other witnesses? If so, who? 
See 23 above ; also 13 and 14. 

You mean by that that what I have just finished reading is the 
story so far as Admiral Stark is concerned and what you know 
about it? 

Captain Ejiamer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you know whether Admiral Stark telephoned Gen- 
eral Marshall that morning? 

Captain Kramer. I do not, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Question 26: 

Did you tell McCollum, or Admiral Wilkinson, or anyone else? 
Since I don't recall the story, I rather doubt that I could have told it to 
these two also, but I could not swear to it. 

Well, now comes this next question. That is the one you had 
reference to, Mr, 

ill003'\ The Vice Chaikman. Wlio had reference to? 

Mr. Keefe. Counsel had reference to it. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Richardson. 

Mr. EIeefe. You have seen this, Mr. Murphy. Can you see any- 
thing in it? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4117 

Mr. Murphy. I had the benefit of a half -minute glance at it. From 
what I saw I could see no reason for withholding it. 

Senator Brewster. I can't understand. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Keefe asked me if I had seen it and I said that 
I had had the benefit of a half -minute glance at it. From what I saw 
I saw no reason to withhold it. I did not see all of it. Mr. Keefe had 
it overnight. 

The Vice Chairman. Permit the Chair to inquire of counsel: Is 
there anything about this matter — counsel is familiar with it? 

Mr. Richardson. We see no reason for withholding it except the 
request of Captain Baecher. 

Mr. Murphy. The first part of the question has already been read 
into the record. 

Mr. Keefe. That is right. 

Mr. Murphy. Several days ago. 

Mr. Kjeefe. Most of the facts set forth in the next question and 
answer are already in the record, having been referred to heretofore. 

[11004] Mr. Kaufman. Commander Baecher says that the Navy 
Department requests that it be withheld and before it is made public 
they would like to make very serious representations to the com- 
mittee that it should not be disclosed. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, in view of that 

Senator Lucas. Does that have to do with magic ? 

Mr. Kaufman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. If there is anything in there of that character then I 
can't read English. I can't find it in there. 

Senator Lucas. Does the Congressman think it is material ? 

Mr. Keefe. Well, I don't know. I don't want to be quoted as saying 
that I think it is material except we have a witness on the stand and 
the materiality of it, in my opinion, could only relate to a search of his 
memory. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. To determine the possible credibility of testimony which 
he has given here and his ability to remember details and facts and 
not remember other details and facts. 

The Vice Chairman. On that point, hasn't he had a pretty fair test 
applied to him up to this point ? 

Mr. Keefe. I only raise this question, Mr. Cooper, because I like 
to keep my word, and I stated that I would not refer to anything in 
this which might by the wildest stretch of imagination be assumed to 
interfere with the [11005] security of the United States. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I suggest, while I would have no 
question about its materiality, in view of the representation of the 
Navy Department I would suggest we defer decision until noontime. 
We are nearly ready for recess. We might take a little earlier recess 
and permit the Navy to tell us in confidence why this will wreck our 
national security, 

I am at a loss to understand it, but I think we should defer to their 
desire. 

The Vice Chairman. I think in view of the request made by the 
Navy Department certainly they are entitled to that consideration. 

Mr. Murphy. May I suggest we go to question 28 and then let the 
gentleman from Wisconsin pass the sheet along and let the committee 
read it. Questions from 28 to 43 do not violate anything. 



4118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. Permit the Chair to inquire of Commander 
Baecher: Is the material upon which the Navy Department request is 
based on this one page to which Mr. Murphy has referred? 

Commander Baecher. I think, Mr. Chairman, it goes over three 
pages. 

Mr. Murphy. It is one question. Question 27. 

[11006] Commander Baecher. Yes. It begins at the bottom of 
the page, takes up a full second page and ends on top of the third 
page. 

The Vice Chairman. Is it all under one question? 

Connnander Baecher. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. Would that be agreeable, Mr. Keefe, to skip 
that one question and go on with your examination? 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. We will follow the suggestion of Senator 
Brewster. 

Mr. Keefe. Question 28 : 

Do you know if any of the following were called as witnesses by the Roberts 
Commission? Admiral Wilkinson; Admiral Turner; McCollum ; Kramer. 

I was not called.. Captain McCollum was, and he told me a little about it in- 
cluding the fact of the introduction of at least some of the Jap traflSc as evidence. 
I do not know about the others, but presume they did appear. 

Question 29 : 

Were the .ID files in GZ custody or any messages from these files ever sub- 
mitted to the Roberts Commission ? 

Answer : 

See 28. The files from GZ were never called for, but were unnecessary for 
this purpose since MID had numerous copies of everything, and a complete set 
for about [11007] a month back was normally in ONI in Op-16-FE. 

Captain Kramer. That is Captain McCollum's section, sir. 
Mr. Keefe. Question 30: 

Were Admiral Wilkinson, McCollum, or Kramer, or anyone else, cautioned or 
warned, or instructed not to ever mention the events of 6-7 December 1941, or 
the investigations conducted by the Roberts Commission? In this connection, 
I am sending you a copy of the Roberts Report by ordinary ship's m'ail. I will 
comment on it in further cori'espondence. 

Answer : 

Not that I am aware of. I was not. However, the sessions were, of course, 
secret, hence cautions or warnings of some kind should have been in order, as in 
ordinary courts. I cannot conceive of the crypto traffic being introduced in evi- 
dence without at least the elementary prudence of cautionary warnings regarding 
this material. However, I have no knowledge of this, or even of the rules of 
procedure used by the Commission. 

Question 31 : 

Do you know when and how General Marshall first got news of Serials #901 
and #902 (Parts 1-13 inc.), and what action he took? 

I do not know, but see 2, 14 and 22. I believe he got it that night. I am 
unaware of any action taken, but presume that a meeting in War Department 
the following nvorning [11008] was arranged that night. Sunday was not 
an all hands work day at that time. 

What did you mean by that answer? 

Captain Kramer. I meant precisely Avhat it says, I think, sir, that 
Sunday was normally observed as a holiday from working hours, ap- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE - 4119 

pearance at the office on Sunday except for special watches set up on 
a full week ;24-hour basis. People did not come to the Navy Depart- 
ment on Sunday except on unusual occasions and as to the War Depart- 
ment I believe it was the same case. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, you say that you believe General Marshall got 
#901 and #902 Saturday night. 

Captain Kramer. I stated definitely above that I did not have any 
first-hand knowledge on that point, sir; it was just my presumption 
that he might have gotten it. 

Mr. Keefe. And was that presumption based on the fact that they 
did have a meeting in the War Department the following morning? 

Captain Kramer. I know nothing about any meeting that may or 
may not have taken place in the War Department Sunday morning, 
sir. 

Mr. Keefe. So that your answer in this case is just pure specula- 
tion ? 

Captain Kramer. I could have answered simply "No" to \^11009'\ 
that whole question ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield? 

]Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. His answer is covered in his answer above. In No. 
22, about what material the Army had. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes; I know. He refers to it in this answer. 

Question 32 : 

Same for Part 14 of Serial #902, and for Serial #907 which set up the 1300 
delivery time? 

Your answer : 

See 31. 

In other words, you don't know anything about whether General 
Marshall got it or when he got it if at all? 
Captain Kramer. No, sir. 
Mr. Keefe. Question 33 : 

Re my 14, I meant the conference between Admiral Stark and General Marshall 
which resulted in dispatch described in Part XI of Roberts Report. I did not 
know of the other conferences and am delighted to learn of them. Can you add 
any names to those already given by you for : — 

That appears to be the end. There doesn't appear to be any answer 
to that question. There is a little lapse there and it is hard to follow. 
Maybe you can explain it to me. 

\^11010^ (The witness was handed a paper and there was a dis- 
cussion between Mr. Keefe and the witness off the record.) 

Mr. Keefe. In any event so far as this memorandum is concerned 
there does not appear to be any answer to question 33? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And your explanation to me just given is that it is very 
possible that you may have gotten up to that night that you were 
working on it and may have started in again later and forgot to 
record any answer to that question ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kjiefe. Now, then, question 34 : 

Conference in Mr. Hull's oflSce? 



4120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Answer : 

I am quite certain Mr. Hamilton (head of FE Division of State) was there, 
and believe both Mr. Hornbeck (political adviser on FE) and Mr. Welles were 
there, since they were regularly seeing the traffic. Probably about 8 persons 
altogether. 

Do you know whether Mr. Welles was there? 

Captain Kramer. I do not, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You say you believe that he was there — when you wrote 
this memorandum. 

Captain Kramer. I believe Mr. Welles was normally called in to 
conferences between those three Secretaries bearing on these Jap- 
anese-United State negotiations, sir. 

[11011] Mr. Keefe. You know that Mr. Welles has testified 
here that he was not there that morning, do you not ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir ; this is the first I ever heard that point. 

Mr. Keefe. That was just 

Captain Kramer. Presumption. 

Mr. Keefe. Presumption on your part, too, wasn't it ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

[11012] Mr. Keefe. Question 35 : 

Conference in Admiral Stark's office? 

Then your answer : 

Cannot add my name to 14, but there were quite a number, possibly 15 or more 
standing around, not yet seated when first delivery was made about 0900. 

Again you refer to the fact that all of these people were in Admiral 
Stark's onice when you made the first delivery about 9 o'clock. 

Now, you don't care to add anything to what you have already said 
on that question ? 

Mr. K^mer. No, sir ; I do not. 

Mr. KJEETE. Question 36 : 

Conference in General Marshall's office? 

Answer : 

Have your information and am not even positive there was a conference. See 
14 and 31. 

Question 37 : 

The conference between Admiral Stark and General Marshall? 
Know nothing of this. 

Question 38 : 

How much does McCollum know? 

I don't know exactly. I presume a good deal. I saw [11013] him only 
rarely after the new regime took over with delivery of material by young officer 
"couriers." 

No. 39 : 

Will McCollum come through willingly? 
I do not know. 

No. 40 : 

What is your estimate of Admiral Wilkinson in this respect? 

, I frankly don't know. Our relations have always been most cordial and 
friendly, and remain so on three occasions I have met him in SOPAC. On two 
occasions when he introduced me to other senior officers, he introduced me with 
the remark that he and I had had a rather hectic night before Pearl Harbor. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4121 

But we have never discussed any aspects of this case or subsequent developments 
such as the Roberts' Commission. 

Wliat was your understanding that Captain Safford was inquiring 
about when he said "What is your estimate of Admiral Wilkinson in 
this respect," and you answered, "Frankly I don't know" ? 

Captain Kramer. Mr. Keefe, one of numerous reasons why I did 
not reply to Captain Safford's letter Avas the fact that Captain Safford 
was apparently putting me on some sort of a team. I proposed to be 
on no team. I referred in that [IIOI4] answer there to that 
point. 

Mr. KJEETE. In other words, when you said, "I frankly don't know," 
you are referring to the fact that you weren't going to be on anybody's 
team ; is that it ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. The question is "What is your estimate of Admiral 
Wilkinson in this respect," and your answer is "I frankly don't know." 
You want us to understand that is to be interpreted as meaning you 
weren't going to play on anybody's team ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you know that, from your previous conversations 
with Captain Safford before you went to the South Pacific, that he 
was organizing a team ? 

Captain Kramer. The first intimation I had of any such develop- 
ment was Captain Safford's second letter to me. 

Mr. Keefe. And you just didn't want to get mixed up with Captain 
Saft'ord? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. So when he asked what you thought about Admiral 
Wilkinson, you just said, "I frankly don't know." 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. When he asked you whether McCollum would come 
through willingly, you said, "I don't know." 

[11015] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Then the next question is : 

Will he talk for Admiral Halsey? 

Your answer was : 

I have nothing on which to base an opinion in this regard. 

That is the same situation isn't it ? 
Captain Kramer. Precisely, sir. 
Mr. Keefe. 42 : 

What about Admiral Turner? 

Answer : 

I have not seen him since he left Washington, and have nothing on which to 
base even an estimate. 

Captain Kramer. The same thing, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, there appears on the next page, which appears 
to be comment apparently by Safford. 
This is what it says : 

With regard to the quotes of my Item 18 (the Weather Report sent 5 Dec '41) 
and your reply in 10 (c), you were describing #80 (Circular #2494, a plain 
language hidden code msg. sent the morning of 7 Dec 41) of which we have copies 
79716 — i6— pt. 9 14 



4122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of the original and its translation in the GZ files. This was sent and received 
on 7 Dec 41. I was asking about the "General Intelligence Broadcast" contain- 
ing false [11016] "Weather Report" which was broadcast at 0403 (EST) 
on the 4th and 5th of December 1941. (Not sure of exact date). It was heard 
by "M" and "W" and sent in by teletype. It was unheard by "S", "H", and "C", 
who listened for it. (I have this from Station "S" files, plus statements of 
Wright and Mason.) This message (in Morse) included the words: 
"Higashi no kaze ame." 

Captain Kramer. Very good, Mr. Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. Thank you, I hope I don't fail when the next one comes. 

"Nishi no kaze hare." 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, just as good. 

Mr. Keefe (reading) : 

(Negative form of "Kita no kaze Kumori.") 

Captain Kramer. Kimiori, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That is what I said. Do I get a hundred on that. Pro- 
fessor ? 

Captain Kramer. Very close to that, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. This has done something for us being on 
this committee. I got that much out of this hearing anyway. 

Now then, going on with this : 

The warning was not sent in the manner prescribed by [11017] Cir- 
culars #2353 and #2354, both of which listed a large number of plain language 
message texts with corresponding hidden meanings for each, but was a mixture. 
The GY watch officer was not sure of it so he called you and you came in early 
and verified it. Murray recalls it and so do I. Either you or Brotherhood (?) 
were waiting in my office when I came in that morning and said, "Here it is !" 
We had been waiting a week for it and Station "S" had been forwarding reams 
of P/L messages by teletype. 

As a result of this "General Intelligence Broadcast containing false 'Weather 
Report' McCollum prepared the message described in Paragraph 50 (page 9 — XI) 
of the Roberts Report. It was a very long message ending up with the trans- 
lation and significance of the warning in the "General Intelligence Broadcast 
Etc." I read the message in Admiral Noyes' office and was witness to the dis- 
cussion of it between Admiral Noyes and Admiral Wilkinson. I took for granted 
that the message to Admiral Kimmel originated by McCollum on 4 December 
1941 (or 5 Dec) but never released would be sent and did not know otherwise 
until 2 December 1943. I learned from Wright that McCollum knew this last 
mentioned message had not been sent (Wright was informed by McCollum 
at Pearl Harbor). 

Then follows more questions. 

[11018] Mr. Keefe. Question 45. 

Mr. Murphy. 43. 

Mr. Keefe. Is it 43 ? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. All right, I am glad you read better than I do [reading] : 

Do you recall the "General Intelligence Broadcast containing false 'Weather 
report' "? 

Yes, but I did not handle it. Without exception everything I disseminated 
was written up with 14 copies (7 for Army, 7 for Navy, with two typings). 
One copy of Navy's went at once into JD or similar category-numerical-file of 
section Op-20-GZ. After routing and return of remaining 6 copies many items 
went into two other types of files we kept in varying degrees as needed, namely, 
a "Subject" file, and a Jap msg serial file at certain times, though the latter 
was basically taken care of by a carding system of originator's serials. 

I do not have a hazy recollection of being called down to the office as you 
described, a few mornings before Pearl Harbor. I had similarly been called 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4123 

in by the GY watch officer who had standing orders from me to do so, at various 
times of the night one to thi*ee times a [11019] week since mid-summer. 

In the case of these "Weather Reports", however, elaborate arrangements 
had been made some days (or weeks) previously to have the GY watch officer 
handle this type of message himself. The arrangements included the typing up 
of a small card for at least five senior officers of the Navy Department, giving the 
translation and meaning of these "Weather Reports". I prepared these cards 
for Admiral Noyes at his direction, but from that point he carried the ball. I 
believe, but do not know, that he gave these cards to Secretary Knox, Admiral 
Stark, and others. At least that was his intention in having them prepared. 
And I think also that he completed arrangements with you for handling this 
type of message. I think the arrangement including having the Navy Depart- 
ment communication officer use his couriers at night to get the word to the 
senior officers in Washington who were concerned, though this arrangement may 
have consisted simply of phoning, with the Navy Department communication 
watch officer keeping at it till he got the word through. 

The above is given at some length to explain why this item made such a small 
impression on my memory. I was not to handle it. Complete arrangements 
to handle it expeditiously were fully set up by the Director of [11020] 
Naval Communications, when I was replying to your first letter it did not even 
occur to me as the msg. you referred to, and I in fact had completely forgotten the 
incident of the arrival of this msg. until your second letter refreshed my memory. 
The only "Weather" message I handled was the one late in the morning of 
7 Dec. The above also explains why you did not find this earlier one in GZ 
translation files. 

That ends your story. 

Now, Captain Kramer, Captain Safford started his testimony to 
this committee by reading a prepared statement and the opening 
sentence of that statement was, "There was a winds code message," or 
words to that effect. 

Captain Kramer. I confirm that point, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now you have distinctly and definitely confirmed that 
fact. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. There was a winds execute code message that came in on 
either the 4th or 5th of December 1941 ? 

Captain Kj?amer. I believe on the 5th, sir, in my present conviction. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, I want to be sure that your answer is there 
was a winds execute code message that came in, you think on the 5th, 
Captain Safford has testified on the 4th. 

[11021] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; there was a message. 

Mr. Keefe. And you were shown that message 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe (continuing). By which the watch officer who brought 
it to you and it is your present recollection that that watch officer 
was Lieutenant Murray? 

Captain IOiamer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. I^JEEFE. Do you have a present recollection that it was on yellow 
teletype paper? 

Captain Kramer. I am uncertain of the color. Two colors were in 
vogue, both yellow and pink. 

Mr. Keefe. At the time that message was received you believed 
that that was the message that these elaborate preparations had been 
set up to intercept and decode, were you not? 

Captain Kramer. I believed that it was an authentic message of 
that winds system, yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Then on that most important part of this whole matter 
you and Captain Safford are in agreement, are you not? 



4124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you never had any other at any time, did you 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

[110££] Mr, Keefe (continuing) . From that time to this ? 

Captain Kramer. Until the last few days when I have — as I have 
previously explained, I had been making further studies, including the 
reading of interrogations of high Japanese officials by General Mac- 
Arthur. 

Mr. Keefe. By the way, where are those interrogations of Japanese 
officials that you have read ? 

Mr. Kaufman. That is Exhibit 142, sir. 

Mr, Keefe. Will you get it for me ? I do not happen to have that 
in my files. Will 3^ou get me Exhibit 142, please ? 

(Whereupon counsel handed Exhibit No. 142 to Mr. Keefe.) 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to request, in view of the 
readings and interpolations on the paper read by the distinguished 
gentleman from Wisconsin, that it be spread in its entirety, with the 
exception of question 27, in the record at this point so that those who 
read the record will be able to see it and tie up the letter with the 
examination, either that or made an exhibit so that we will have a 
composite understanding of the letter itself. 

Senator Brewster. Would the gentleman be agreeable to deferring 
a decision until after recess, when, as I understand, we will discuss the 
whole situation ? 

Mr. Murphy. All right. 

The Vice Chairman. The committee will now take a recess, 

[11023] (Whereupon, at 12: 10 p. m., a recess was taken until 
1 : 30 p. m. of the same day.) 

[110^4] afternoon session — 1 : 30 p. m. 

The Vice Chairman, The committee will please be in order. 

Does counsel have anything at this time? 

Mr. Richardson. No. 

The Vice Chairman. Do j^ou have anything further before your 
examination is resumed, Captain? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. The Chair desires to announce for the record 
that during executive session of the committee at noon that question 
No. 27 and the answer thereto, appearing in the memorandum of Cap- 
tain Kramer, was examined and it is the decision of the committee that 
it is not material or relevant to this investigation and relates to mat- 
ters after the Pearl Harbor attack, and it will not be included in the 
record or released by the committee. 

The Chair also desires to announce that the committee will adjourn 
at a quarter to 4 as there is to be an important vote in the Senate at 4 
o'clock and Senators will have to be present in the Senate Chamber 
for that vote. 

Mr. Keefe, of Wisconsin, will resume his inquiry. The committee 
will adjourn at a quarter to 4 until 10 o'clock Monday morning. Mr. 
Keefe. 

Mr. Kj:efe. Yos, sir; I will proceed. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4125 

in02S] TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KRAMER, UNITED 
STATES NAVY (Resumed) 

Mr. Keefe. Captain Kramer, on July 24, 1944, you testified before 
the naval court of inquiry then sitting at Pearl Harbor? 

Captain I^amer, Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You were duly sworn to testify to the truth at that in- 
quiry, were you not ? 

Captain Keamee. I was, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you know the purpose of that inquiry at the time 
you testified? 

Captain Kramer. Other than as indicated in the precept which was 
read to me, I did not, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, what impression did you get from the reading of 
the precept as to the purpose of the inquiry ? 

Captain Kramer. I have forgotten the wording of the precept. 
I recall no distinct impression left on my memory. My general im- 
pression, however, was that in view of questions raised since that 
attack a naval inquiry had been ordered ; I do not recall at the moment 
whether it was initiated by the Navy or instigated by the desires of 
the Congress. That they were to examine, apparently, all aspects of 
incidents pertaining to Pearl Harbor. That was my general impres- 
sion and still is, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you understand at that time that it was [11026] 
the purpose of this naval court of inquiry to assess responsibility for 
Pearl Harbor ? 

Captain Kramer. I believe that was part of the precept; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes, sir. So you knew when you testified before the 
naval court of inquiry that the testimony which you then gave might 
be used by that naval court as the basis, or at least part of the basis 
for their determination in assessing responsibility for Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Kramer. I fully appreciated that point ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you knew that the findings of this naval court, 
based in part at least upon the testimony that you were about to give, 
might afi'ect the welfare and fortunes and perhaps the future of many 
men? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe, And you were conscious of that responsibility when you 
testified ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now I desire to ask you, referring to page 956 of the 
transcript of testimony taken before the naval court of inquiry, were 
these questions asked you and did you make 'these answers? 

Q. Commander, I am going to show yon some documents and ask you if you 
saw til em on or before the 7th [11027] of December, 1941. The first one 
1 shall show you is document 15 from Exhibit 63 ? 

A. Yes, sir, I did. This was written up by rny section. 

Q. Can you recall about when you first saw it? 

A. The fact that the date "28 November" is on here would indicate that I saw 
it and confirmed it for writing up on that date for the first time. Also, there is 
an indication at the bottom that it was received by teletype, which would indicate 
it was handled promptly after received. 

Were those questions asked you and did you make those answers? 
Captain Kramer, I believe that is accurate, sir. 



4126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. And at that time document 15 from Exhibit 63 referred 
to the original set-up of the Japanese winds code, did it not ? 

Captain Kramer. I believe it did ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Was this question asked you, and did you make this 
answer : 

Q. Do you know what action was taken with reference to intercepting any 
communications which would have executed the phases of this code? 

On receipt of this particular message, on instruc- [1102S] tions of the 
Director of Naval Conmiunications, Admiral Noyes, I prepared some cards, about 
six as I recall it, which I turned over to Admiral Noyes. He indicated that his 
purpose in getting these cards was to leave them with certain senior officers oi' 
the Navy Department and I do know that he arranged with Captain Saftord, the 
head of 'Oi>-20-G, the section of Communications that handled this material, to 
have any message in this phraseology handled promptly by watch officers, not 
only in Op-20-G but through the regular watch officers of the Communications 
section of the Navy Department, to those people who had the cards. These cards 
had on them the expressions contained in this exhibit, and the meaning. Be- 
cause of that special arrangement for this particular plain language message, 
when such a message came through, I believe either the third or fourth of De- 
cember, I was shown such a message by the GY watch officer, recognized it as 
being of this nature, walked with him to Captain Safford's office, and from that 
point Captain Safford took the .ball. I believe Captain Safford went directly 
to Admiral Noyes' office at that time. Again, because of the fact that this was a 
plain language message, and because of the fact that special arrangements had 
been made to handle this Japanese plain language message which [11029] 
had special meaning, I did not handle the distribution of this particular message. 
the one of the third or fourth. 

Was that question asked you and did you make that answer ? 

Captain Kramer. I believe I did, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Was tliat answer the truth ? 

Captain Kramer. I think it is accurate in all respects except that 
apparently my memory was faulty at that moment as to what was on 
the cards. My present belief and conviction is that the Japanese ex- 
pressions did not appear on those cards. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, Captain Kramer, you have so previously tes- 
tified before this board or committee, that you only wrote on these 
cards, as I understand it, the meaning. Is that it? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Meaning of what? 

Captain Kramer. The translations of those expressions and the 
countries referred to. I think that it would have been a very illogical 
thing to have put the Japanese expressions on those cards since that 
would have involved delays in teaching the Navy Communications 
officers not Section G watch officers, how to pronounce them and to do 
the same thing for the recipients of such a message. 

[11030] Mr. Keefe. Now, Captain Kramer, again let's be clear 
about this. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. The original winds code message referred to the use 
of certain Japanese words which had a specific meaning? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you were on the lookout for those Japanese words ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, it would seem to me to be perfectly in line with 
common sense to assume that when you made out these cards you would 
list these Japanese words on the card, together with their meaning, so 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4127 

that these top-flight people to whom the cards were directed when 
furnished with a message in Japanese language would be able to com- 
pare it with the Japanese words on the card and then know the mean- 
ing of those Japanese words and that is exactly and precisely what 
you testified to before the naval court of inquiry. Now you say you 
want to change that testimony. Why? 

Captain Kramer. Mr. Keefe, I can recall no time or incident at any 
time while I was on duty in that section where the question of the 
Japanese phraseology used in encoded or plain-language text was ever 
brought up with any of these re- [1X031'] cipients to whom I 
delivered this material. Further, the GY watch officer had addi- 
tional pieces of paper or a piece of paper giving the Japanese trans- 
lation, giving its translation and the country referred to and the 
instructions that were in effect regarding handling this message were 
to pass on to the Navy Department watch officers only the English 
translation of those phrases for phoning or sending by courier to the 
recipients who presumed they would get it. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. Now, Captain Kramer, what did you put 
on these cards according to your present, current, refresh recollection? 

Captain Kramer. The English translation and the country referred 
to and that was all, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, then, let's get that straight. 

Mr. Richardson. What does he mean by "the English translation" ? 

Mr. Keefe. That is what I want to find out. What do you mean 
by the "English translation"? 

Captain Kramer. "East Wind — rain United States; west 

wind — clear England; north wind — cloudy Russia." 

Mr. Keefe. Now, that is what you now claim you wrote on those 
cards? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Have you seen one of those cards since you [11032] 
came back to the United States? 

Captain Kramer. I have never seen those cards since leaving them 
with Admiral Noyes. 

Mr. I^EFE. You now say that Admiral Noyes requested you to write 
out such cards ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And pursuant to that direction you prepared them? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you personally deliver them to Admiral Noyes? 

Captain Kramer, I did, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. When? 

Captain Kramer. Within a few hours, as I recollect it, of the time 
he gave me those instructions. 

Mr. Keefe. When was that? That doesn't mean anything. 

Captain Kraimer. That, I should say, would have been either the 
28th or 29th of November 1941. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. Have you made a search in the Navy De- 
partment to try to find one of those cards? 

Captain Kramer. I have not, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. They have likewise disappeared, have they not? 

Captain Kramer. Apparently; yes, sir. 



4128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. Do you know, Mr. Counsel, whether or not a [llOSS] 
search has been instituted in the Navy Department to try to find 
one of those cards ? 

Mr. Richardson. I do not know that there has or has not, but I will 
inquire.^ 

Mr. Keefe. At least they are not presently available so far as this 
committee is concerned. 

Well, now Captain Kramer, was this question asked you and did 
you make this answer : 

Q. You say it is your recollection that you received some Japanese plain 
language words which corresponded with the language set out in document 15 ; 
is that correct? 

A. My statement was, not that I received it, but I was shown it. 

Was that question asked you and did you make that answer ? 
Captain Kramek. I believe that is accurate, sir. 
Mr. Keefe (reading) : 

Q. Can you recall from looking at document 15 which Japanese language words 
you received? 

Now, document 15 is the original message setting up the Japanese 
winds code ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And setting forth the Japanese language as meaning 
certain things ? 

[110S4] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. E^eefe (reading) : 

Higashi No Kazeame — 

I am not so good this time. 

Captain Kramer. I am afraid not, Mr. Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, you pronounce it for me. 

Captain Kramer. "Higashi No Kaze Ame." 

Mr. Keefe. "Higashi No Kaze Ame." Well, that is because the 
reporters have got it all run together. Now, I will read your answer 
again : 

Q. Can you recall from looking at document 15 which Japanese language words 
you received? 
A. Higashi No Kaze Ame, I am quite certain. 

Listen to this : 

The literal meaning of Higashi No Kaze Ame is East Wind, Rain. That is 
plain Japanese language. The sense of that, however, meant strained relations 
or a break in relations, possibly even implying war with a nation to the eastward, 
the United States. 

Was that question asked you and did j'ou make that answer ? 

Captain Kramer. I believe I did, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Was it the truth ? 

Captain Kramer. It was not, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, then, is this committee to conclude from that last 
answer. Captain Kramer, that you testified [IJOSS] falsely 
before the naval court of inquiry on this very vital and important 
question? 

Captain Kramer. It was the truth as it came to my mind at the time, 
Mr. Keefe. I have earlier in my testimony, I think, covered that 
point fairly exhaustively, that that occasion, namely, the naval court 

1 See letter from the Navy Department in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5497. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4129 

of inquiry, was the first time that the question of what country ap- 
peared in that piece of teletype ever came up in any conversation in 
which I was participating. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, Captain Kramer, the fact that it is the first 
time, that is an experience that we all have as witnesses in a court 
room. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Bat here is a situation where you are testifying under 
oath and you have already admitted that you knew the purpose of 
this examination. You have testified that the testimony which you 
then gave might be used by this commission as the basis for afi'ecting 
the lives and fortunes and the future of any number of men and still 
you testified before us this afternoon that the statement which yoa 
made, which I have just read to you, was false. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I object to the characterization of 
the testimony. The witness did not say it was false. He said that 
in the light of his recollection at that [11036^ time that was 
his best memory. 

Mr. Keefe. No, no, no. 

Mr. Murphy. He is giving us his testimony now and I say it is 
grossly and manifestly unfair to so characterize it. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, the record will show the witness' pre- 
vious answer. 

Mr. Keefe, All right. Will you go back, Mr. Reporter, and read 
the questions and answers? I don't want to treat the witness un- 
fairly and I think he knows I do not. 

(The record was read by the reporter.) 

Mr. Keefe. All right, stop right there. 

Now, did you testify to that? You did testify that that statement 
was not the truth, didn't you, Captain Kramer? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes, sir. And your later answer is an attempt to ex- 
plain why you did not state the truth at that time ; is that not true? 

Captain Kramer. What I now believe to be the truth, yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. So that we now have a situation where you make 
a statement on a vital issue before the naval court of inquiry which 
you admit was not true because you claim that subsequent events 
have now convinced you that the answer which you gave was not ; is that 
the fact? 

[11037] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Is that right ? 

Captain Ivramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That is a fair conclusion, is it not? 

Captain Kramer. It is, sir. I would like to point out at this time — 
I don't think it has been particularly emphasized before — that despite 
the fact that I was caught cold on that point when the question was 
propounded my reaction even then was that only one country was 
involved on that piece of teletype paper. 

Mr. EJEEFE. All right. Well, now. Captain Kramer, if there had 
never been any further investigation and this whole incident was 
stopped with the naval court of inquiry and its findings, then the 
findings would have been predicated in part, at least, upon a state- 
ment which did not reflect the truth, as you testify, at that time, isn't 
that right? 



4130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kjjamer. I believe that is the case, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now I want to ask you some more questions. 

Q. Do you remember in what form this communication was that you saw 

which contained the words about which you have testified, Higashi No Kaze Ame? 

A. I am almost certain it was typewritten. I believe it was on teletype paper.* 

[11038'] Was that question asked you and did you make that 
answer ? 

Cai3tain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, you M'ill see again, Captain Kramer, that that 
question refers to the words "Higashi No Kaze Ame." 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You did not qualify it when you answered that ques- 
tion either, did you ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Were you asked this question and did you make this 
answer : 

Q. Can you recall who had this paper in his possession when you saw it' 

A. I don't recall the name of the officer who had it. It was, however the GY 
watch officer, the man who had the watch breaking down current systems that 
were being read. 

Q. Can you indicate or state the source of the information that was contained 
in this communication? 

No, sir, I cannot positively, but the fact that my recollection is that it came 
m on teletype would indicate that it was a U. S. Navy intercept station. 

Q. And I believe you have testified that you have no knowledge of what disposi- 
tion was made of the communication after j^ou saw it : is that correct? 

[11039] A. No first-hand or direct knowledge. It would simplv be infer- 
ence. 

And tlien was this question asked vou and did you make this answer, 
appearing on page 968 of the Naval Court of Inquiry : 

Q. In your testimony with respect to the so-called winds code and the execute 
message following it you stated that the execute was taken to mean that strained 
relations or a break in relations or, possibly, war might follow between Japan and 
the United States. Would you indicate to the court why you phrased vour answer 
that way, tliat is, indicating that it might mean any one of those three things rather 
than one of those three specifically? 

A. That answer is inherent in the character of the Japanese language in that 
they habitually speak in circumlocutions and by indirection and bv inference. 

Q. Do I understand you to mean that your section would not have stated cate- 
gorically that this message meant war or merely a break in diplomatic relations 
but that all three of those possibilities were available to anyone interpreting 
that message? " * 

A. That is precisely correct. I can definitely state that I could not interpret 
that message as meaning definitely war. 

\_110Jfi'] Were those questions asked you and did you make 
those answers? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Were those answers the truth? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, you were referring in these questions and answers 
to this winds code execute message, were you not? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you were referring to the words that were in that 
winds code execute message, were you not ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4131 

Mr. Keefe. And as you have just testified, the words that you 
remember being in it were the words used in your answer, "Higashi 
No Kaze Ame", and so forth ; that is right, isn't it ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now j'ou want us to understand when I read 
3^our testimony before the naval court that according to your present 
refreshed and current recollection you were mistaken, that there were 
no such words in the message that you saw ? 

Captain Kr-Amer. No words referring to the United States. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, were there any words at all in it that you 
remember ? 

{^llOIi.l'l Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Keefe. Do you remember what words were in it ? 

Captain I^amer. I do not, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, that is the point exactly. You do not remember 
what words were in the message; is that your testimony. Captain? 

Captain Kramer. "\Aniat I mean to imply by that — I think it has 
been reiterated many times — is that I do not now and have never 
known since the time I saw that piece of teletype exactly what 
Japanese phraseology was in it, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, I think you should qualify that except when you 
testified under oath before the naval court of inquiry. Isn't that true ? 

Captain Kramer. Repeat that question. 

Mr. Keefe. I will strike it. You pretended to know what words 
were in it when you testified before the naval court of inquiry, did 
you not ? 

Captain Kjramer. That was apparently the impression I created; 
yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now, I want to understand what your testimony 
is today. Am I correct in the assumption that according to your 
present, or what you have referred to many times as your current, 
recollection after being refreshed, you are not able to tell this com- 
mittee what words were in that \^11042'\ code execute message? 

Captain Kramer. My present belief and conviction is that piece 
of teletype referred to one country and that country was England. 

Mr. Keefe. What were the words used that would refer to England ? 

Captain Kramer. "Nishi No Kaze Hare." 

Mr. Keefe. All right. Now, I will go on a little further. Were 
these questions asked you and did you make these answers on page 
980 of the court of inquiry of the Navy. Question 139 : 

Q. Now, referring to the winds message, you were familiar with the original 
winds message, wherein they designated at some future date in a weather 
report, if they gave execute and used certain words, it meant certain things? 

Yes, sir. 

Q. Were you standing by for an answer to that message? Did you consider 
it important enough that when that message was received it would be a most 
important message in reply? In other words, were you on the lookout for that 
answer? 

A. I am not sure what you mean by "answer." 

Q. Well, the execute of the message. 

[iiOS^] A. Yes, sir; not only myself but all that Op-2CMj organization 
was very much on the qui vive looking for that. I prefer to refer to that as a 
warning. 



4132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Were those questions asked you and did you make those answers? 

Captain Kramer. I* believe that is accurate, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And that was the truth? 

Captain Kramer. As I saw it then and as I see it now, yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe (reading) : 

Q. When this execute came in, did you receive it? 

A. I did not receive it myself but was shown it by the watch officer who 
receives the information coming off the teletype. 

Q. Were you the officer who went to tlie communications officer and said 
"Here it is." 

A. I believe I used that expression when I accompanied the watch officer to 
Commander Safford's office. 

Q. You had that information then? 

A. We had, as I recall it, this typewritten piece of paper with the meaning 
well m mind. 

Were those questions asked you and did you make those answers? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

\110JU] Mr. Keefe. And was that the truth ? 

Captain Krai^eer. It was the truth as far as it goes. My present 
recollection, still keeping in mind that my contact with that piece of 
paper was of only a few seconds' duration, probably less than half a 
minute, is that there was some handwriting on that piece of teletype 
paper in the GY watch officer's hand. There may when it was deliv- 
ered to Captain Safford's office also have been" a correction to his 
handwriting in my hand. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, is there anything more you want to elaborate 



on 



Captain Kramer. Nothing, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. I asked you the simple question as to whether th^ state- 
ment which you made, which I have read to you, the answers that you 
gave m response to those questions was the truth. Was it or wasn't it « 

Captain Kramer. I appreciate that, sir, but it was not the whole 
truth as I see it now, inasmuch as there was no reference in that answer 
to any handwriting. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, there is reference to ih^ fact that it is a type- 
written piece of paper with the meaning well in mind. What did vou 
mean by that ? 

Captain Kramer. Of course, both myself and the watch officer as 
well as everyone cognizant of this, had the mean- \110A5^ inff 
well m mind. That is all I meant by that, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, Captain Kramer, if I was sitting as a member of 
this naval court, having heard your first testimony that I have read 
as to what was on this message and then following this further exam- 
ination which took place the next day, I necessarily would assume that 
what you were referring to was the meaning which you had alreadv 
testified under oath was on that message, wouldn't I ? " 

Captain Kramer. The question is broad and complicated, sir I 
would like to have it reread. 

Mr. Keefe All right, strike it out. That perhaps is calling for a 
conclusion. I won't press it. [Reading:] 

Q. About what was the time and date when vou got that' 
u i.^^ ^°^ certain. I believe it was about the 4th of December. It may have 
been the 3rd. 
Q. Who handled it? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4133 

A. I left Commander Safford's oflSce as soon as I knew he had the picture and 
knew what the message was, and I believe he at once went to Admiral Noyes' 
office. I knew that Admiral Noyes was highly interested in that particular plain- 
language code because of his previous instructions to me to make out these cards 
so that he could leave it with certain high officers and the Secre- [11046\ 
tary, all with the view of getting the word to those people promptly, whether it 
was any time of the day or night. 

Was that question asked you and did you make that answer? 
Captain Keamer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, I want to ask you if these questions were asked 
you and if you made the following answers : 

Q. When you took the execute of the winds message in to Captain Safford and, 
I believe, said, "Here it is," did you mean by that exclamation, "Here it is", that 
this was the execution of the Japanese War Plan, or did you have any further 
discussion with Captain Safford which would indicate he thought that this was 
the message which executed the Japanese War Plan? 

A. Nothing of that nature whatsoever. I did not deliver the message myself. 
I accompanied the GY watch officer on the way to Commander Safford's office, 
and the expression, "Here it is", simply meant that finally a message in this plain- 
language code had come through — a message which we had been looking for many 
days and that we had made special provisions to handle for many days. 

Was that question asked and did you make that answer? 

Captain Kramer. I did, sir. 

Mr. Kj^efe. Was that answer the truth ? 

[11047] Captain Kramer. It was, sir. 

Mr. Keefe (reading) : 

Q. To your mind that was of no more significance then "here is the message 
which indicates a break in negotiations between Japan and the United States"? 

A. It meant more than that. This plain language code did not refer specifically 
to the United States-Japanese negotiations. It referred to the general diplo- 
matic relations between the nations concerned and therefore meant a critical 
stage in the negotiations or relations which could very well involve a break. 

Was that question asked you and did you make that answer? 
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Keefe (reading) : 

Q. Do you recall whether there was any uncertainty in the translation unit 
with respect to the meaning of the words in either the "Winds" Code, that is the 
message setting up the code,, or in the message of execution? 

A. This is very simple language and there was no doubt whatsoever of the 
literal translation of these terms. 

Your section had no difficulty in making the translation? 

[llOJfS] A. Not at all. It is very simple, every-day language. 

Now, after all that testimony which you gave before the naval court 
of inquiry you now tell this committee that you do not remember or 
recall at all what the words were that were in that winds execute 
message ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Mr. KJEEFE. All right. Now, I want to go to your subsequent exam- 
ination before the Hewitt investigating committee. You testified 
there under oath, too, didn't you? 

Captain Kramer. I did, sir. 

Mr. Kj:efe. Was your memory thoroughly refreshed when you tes- 
tified before the Hewitt committee? 

Captain Kramer. I should hardly characterize it as thoroughly 
refreshed ; no, sir. 



4134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. Well, before you testified before the Hewitt committee 
you had had many conversations with Mr. Sonnett, had you not? 

Captain Kramek. Several brief conversations ; yes, sir 

Mr. Keefe. Well, all right ; several brief conversations. And Son- 
nett had talked over your testimony with you, hadn't he? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir ; some aspects of it. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, he talked over your testimony with fllOAPl 
respect to this winds code execute, didn't he ? l ^j 

Captain Kramer. He did, sir. 

Mr Keefe. And you had a chance, then, before you went before 
the Hewitt committee, to think about that so that you were not cold 
as it were, when you went before the Hewitt committee ? ' 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe So the testimony before the Hewitt committee was more 
likely to be the truth then than the testimony before the Naw court 
of inquiry, is that right ? 

Captain Kramer. On this winds subject I should say it definitelv 
n-as, sir. "^ -^ 

Mr. Keefe. Well, was the testimony that you gave before the Hewitt 
committee the truth in full with respect to the winds execute message « 

Captain Kramer. I believe it was the truth in full and accurate in 
that respect so far as I recalled it up to the time of the Hewitt investi- 
gation. 

Mr. Keefe Well, then, that is not an answer to my question. Do I 
understand that you are now changing the testimony that you gave 
betore the Hewitt committee as a result of your refreshing and so on? 

Captam Kramer. Only insofar as I have modified my testimony be- 
tore the Hewitt board by testimony I have already lllOSOl 
given m this hearing. -* 

_Mr. Keefe. Well, now. Captain Kramer, let us go into this further. 
Ihat IS the second time that you testified under oath, before the Hewitt 
committee, and this was ■ 

Mr. Murphy. This is the second time before Hewitt or the second 
time under oath ? 

Mr. Keefe. The second time under oath was before the Hewitt com- 
mittee. I thought that was perfectly clear. 

Now, this one took place at the Navy Department at 12 : 30 p m 
Tuesday, the 22d of May 1945 : ' i^ •' 

President : Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN ; Mr. John F. Sonnett ; Lt. Comdr 
Benjamin H. Gnswold, USNR: and Shijys Clerk Ben Harold. '-"mur. 

And you were sworn, were you not 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe (continuing). To tell the truth? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

[IIOSI] Mr. Keefe. To tell the truth? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, when you talked with Mr. Sonnett, getting you 
ready tor this examination, were you advised the purpose of the 
Hewitt examination ? 

Captain Kramer. I don't recall precisely in what form he told me 
the purpose was but the general impression I gathered, whether from 
hini or from other sources, M'as that the purpose of the Hewitt investi- 
gation was to fill m gaps in the court of inquiry investigation, and 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE • 4135 

further to attempt to reconcile discrepancies appearing in the testi- 
mony of that court of inquiry. 

Mr. Keefe. Have you read the testimony before the naval court of 
inquiry ? 

Captain Kramer. Part of my own testimony and such parts as ap- 
pear in the naval narrative only, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you know of any gaps in the testimony as to this 
winds execute message ? 

Captain Kramer. There certainly is, sir ; not gaps, but discrepancies 
in the testimony. 

Mr. Keefe. In the testimony before the naval court of inquiry do 
you know of any discrepancies ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir ; I was made aware of them when I was 
talking with Mr. Sonnett. 

[11052] Mr. Keefe. All right. That is exactly it. Wliat did 
Mr. Sonnett tell you the discrepancies were when he was getting you 
ready for this examination before Admiral Hewitt ? 

Captain Kramer. I believe among other things that he stated to 
me that no one appeared to recall this winds message except myself 
and Captain Safford. It was only incidentally in the last several 
weeks when I read some excerpts from the Army investigation that 
I was aware that certain Army officers also confirmed the existence 
of a message considered authentic in this wind system. 

Mr. Keefe. Captain Kramer, the fact of the receipt of this wind 
execute message, its delivery to you by the watch officer, whom you 
believed to be lieutenant Murray, your delivery of it or taking it 
in to Captain Safford, and his going down, as you thought, to deliver 
It to Admiral Noyes, no one knows anything about those facts except 
Safford, Kramer^ and this man Murray, if he was the one; isn't 
that true? 

Captain Kramer. I believe that is true ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. So there couldn't be any gap in the testimony or any- 
thing strange in the testimony that any other witness could testify 
to because you were the only three people that knew those facts; 
isn't that true ? 

Captain Kramer. Except as I presumed, and still presume, 
[11053] Admiral Noyes also saw it. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, up to the time it reached Admiral Noyes he 
didn't know what had transpired between its receipt on the teletype 
and its delivery to Captain Safford, did he? 

Captain Kramer. I should think not, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, I want to read these questions and answers and 
see if they refresh your recollection any : 

Admiral Hewitt. I believe that about the middle of the first week of Decem- 
ber there was a teletype message which, to the best of your recollection, one 
of the watch oflBcers had in his possession and which was subsequently delivered 
to Admiral Noyes. Will you tell me about that, to the best of your recollection? 

Captain Kramer. I previously testified on that matter at Pearl Harbor, Ad- 
miral. I would like to go over that previous testimony again in the light of 
thinking it over since that time. I had no recollection of that message at the 
time it was first mentioned to me in the spring of '44. However, after being 
given some of the details of the circumstances surrounding it, I did recall a 
message some days before 7 Deceml)er "41, I believe about the middle of the 
week 1-7 December, and I do recall definitely being shown such a message by 
the GY watch officer and walking down with him to Captain Safford's office 



4136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and being present [11054] while the GY watch officer turned it over to 
him. A brief conversation ensued and Captain Safford then took it, I assumed 
to Admiral Noyes, since that message we had all been on the qui vive about 
for a week or ten days. That is the last I saw of such a message. 

Admiral Hewitt. Can you recall what the general subject of the message was** 
Captain Kramer. It was, as I recall it, a "winds" code message. The wording 
of it I do not recall. It may have been, "Higashi no kaze ame," specifically re- 
ferring to the United States, as I have previously testified at Pearl Harbor' but 
I am less positive of that now that I believe I was at that time. The reason 
for revision in my view on that is the fact that in thinking it over,, I have a 
.rather sharp recollection in the latter part of that week of feeling there was 
still no overt mention or specific mention of the United States in any of this 
traffic, which I was seeing all of and which also was the only source in general 
of my information since I did not see, as a rule, the dispatches from the fleet 
commanders or going out to them from Operations. 

Were those questions asked you and did you make those answers? 

Captain Kramer. I consider that accurate, sir ; yes, sir 

Mr. Keefe. So as late as the time you testified before [11056] 
Admiral Hewitt you were of the opinion that it may have contained 
the words "Higashi no kaze ame," but you were becoming uncertain 
about it in the light of your further refreshing? 

Captain Kramer. I meant to imply by that specifically that I did 
not recall, and still do not recall, the precise wording of the Japanese 
on the piece of teletype paper. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, then, let's go on : 

Admiral Hewitt. Then it is still your belief, the best you can recall in view 
of that, there was no indication 

And then you broke in and said : 

I would like to continue that statement, Admiral, by saying : For that reason, 
I am now at least under the impression that the message referred to England 
and possibly the Dutch rather than the United States, although it may have re- 
ferred to the United States, too. 

Admiral Hewitt. Or possibly it may have referred to Russia? 

Captain Keamek. I just don't recall. 

Were those questions asked vou and did vou make those answers 
when you testified before Admiral Hewitt? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir? 

Mr. Keefe. Now, your answer before this committee is what you 
finally got to before Admiral Hewitt and that is [11056] you 
just don't recall what this message said on it; is that right? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. So we now get to the point in your testimony here that 
there was a message, it had something on it, and must have had some- 
thing ont it to designate it as a wind code execute message ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir ; and further, to warrant my accompany- 
ing the watch officer to Captain Safford's office, an instance that I 
recall no previous occurrence of. 

Mr. Keefe. Then I am to understand, Captain Kramer, that this 
message, which was considered of top importance by everybody, which 
everybody was looking for and on the lookout for, and for which you 
have testified specific arrangements had been set up as in connection 
with no other message, after this message comes in you see it, you 
read it, you determine that this is the message you have been looking 
for, and you can't tell us now what was on that message? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Or what it said? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4137 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. Let's go on a little further. When Ad- 
miral Hewitt got through examining you Mr. Sonnett [11067] 
took you on, didn't he, and asked you some questions ? 

Captain Kramer. I don't recollect, sir. The record of the testi- 
mony should show that, whether he asked them. 

Mr. Keefb. I will read it to you : 

TWENTY-FlTTH DAY 

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, 
Navy Department, Washington, D. C, at 2 : 15 p. m., Friday, 6 July 1945. 

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hevpitt, USN ; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant 
Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, 
USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR. 

Captain Alwin D. Kramer, USN, was recalled as a witness and was warned 
. that the oath previously taken by him was still binding. 

Does that refresh your recollection ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Lt. John Ford Baecher is the gentleman that is here 
in the room ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. He was present at this hearing before Admiral Hewitt ? 

Captain Kramer. I did not recall it until you read that transcript, 
sir, but I believe he was. 

[11068] Mr. Murphy. What page? 

Mr. Keefe. That is on page 576. 

Now, I want to ask you whether these questions were asked you 
and whether you made these answers : 

Mr. Sonnett. Captain, referring to the previous testimony concerning the 
receipt of a "winds" code message relating to the United States during the 
first week of December 1941, since your last testimony in this investigation, 
have you obtained any additional information concerning the receipt or non- 
receipt of such a message? 

Captain Kramer. No first-hand information. Simply I do have some more 
specific recollection of it than I did when the matter was first broached to me 
at Pearl Harbor during Admiral Murfin's inquiry. That refreshing goes to 
the extent that I have already testified about, namely, a positive recollection 
of having accompanied the GY watch officer with a "winds" message to Com- 
mander Safford's office, at which point he carried the ball, taking it, as I un- 
derstood, directly to Admiral Noyes, who was handling it by special set-up 
that he had for that type of message. 

Did you make that answer to that question ? 

Captain Kramer. I believe I did, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. There was no refreshing about that, you had always 
testified to those facts every time you testified; [11069] isn't 
that correct? 

Captain Kramer. I may have added more to that in subsequent 
answers. 

Mr. Keefe. Up to that point that had been your story all the 
time ; isn't that true ? 

Captain Kjiamer. Precisely. 

Mr. KJEEFE. On those details there have been no question but you 
have testified to the same thing every time you testified; isn't tnat 
true? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, 

79716—46 — pt. 9 15 



4138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[11060] Mr. Keefe. Now, then the next question : 

Mr. SoNNETT. And you have now no clear recollection, Captain, as to which 
country the message referred to? 

That is a rather leading question that Mr. Sonnett is asking you 
And your answer : 

Captain Keamee. No positive recollection. It may have been any or one or all 
three of the nations covered by that Japanese code set-up. The fact that we 
jumped on the ball on that message, however, would appear to me to have 
been applicable to at least England and probably the United States as well but 
I have no first hand recollection of it. 

Did you make that answer to Mr. Sonnett's question? 
Captain Kramer. I believe I did, sir. 
Mr. Keefe (reading) : 

Mr. SoNNETT. Do you mean to imply, Captain, if you found a message in that 
code, relating to Russia during that period you wouldn't have given it as speedy 
treatment as you would if it related to England and the United States' 

Captain Kramer. Of course, we would have but there isn't the slightest indi- 
cation that the Japanese had any intention of attacking Russia. 

Did you make that answer ? 

Captain Kramer. I believe I did, sir. 

[11061] Mr. Keefe. All right. 

Then Mr. Sonnett examined you about a lot of other matters. 

Then, Captain Kramer, at the conclusion of the examination of 
Admiral Hewitt, is it a fair assumption to conclude that as far as 
your testimony discloses, there was a wind execute code message re- 
ceived m the middle of the week, the exact date of which you were 
then uncertain, which may have referred to the United States, Eng- 
land, or possibly Kussia, you were not certain ; you were not then 
certain, and you are not certain what the message specifically said, but 
it may have referred to one or both or all three of the countries in the 
original code set-up; is that what you meant to tell Admiral Hewitt? 

Captain Kramer. That is what I meant to tell him at the time- 
yes, sir. ' 

Mr. I^efe. And if it did refer to the United States by the use of 
the words "Higashi No Kaze Ame," if it did use those words, and those 
words appeared on that winds code execute message, that would refer 
to the United States, would it not? 

Captain Kramer. It would, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And in accordance with the very simple translation of 
those words, as you gave it to the Naval [11602] Court of In- 
quiry, it might mean a sharp break in relations, or it might even mean 
war; isn't that true? 

Captain Kramer. With the United States ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. With the United States. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, you, as the man in charge of translations of 
these messages, with knowledge that the whole Government was set 
up to pick up this very vital and important message, who handled 
that message, who saw it, who read it, who checked the interpretation 
of the watch officer on that message, sit here before us today, and say 
you can't tell us what the message said, you have no recollection of 
what it said at all ; is that correct? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4139 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. However, I should like to 
point out to you, Mr. Keefe, that I think that an entirely unwar- 
ranted emphasis and importance is being attributed to that message, not 
only in this hearing but in past hearings, and in the press. 

There were many other messages more specific as to Japanese inten- 
tions during this period. 

Mr. Keefe. Captain Kramer 

Captain Kramer. A wind message would have been only one fur- 
ther indication of the general trend of this traffic as well as the gen- 
eral trend of the international situation. 

[11063] Mr. Keefe. Well, I am very happy that you have made 
that statement. Captain, because I have concluded that, as one mem- 
ber of this committee, a long time ago that there were plenty of 
messages to have warned those who read them and saw them that 
war was imminent and just about to break, without this winds exe- 
cute message. 

But, Captain Kramer, the Navy Department and all of the officials 
in the Navy Department — and I assume the War Department, too — 
considered that that winds execute message was of supreme impor- 
tance, otherwise why did they set up this great set-up of cards and 
treat it as they did, with complete priority over every other message 
that was received? 

Captain Kramer. It was, of course, a very important straw, if it 
appeared. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, it did appear, didn't it ? 

Captain Kramer. Therefore, Captain Safford made rather exten- 
sive preparations to attempt to receive it, not only within this coun- 
try, but by arrangement with Army and with our outlying stations. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, Captain, let's get down to the mechanics of this 
thing so that we will understand it a little better. I don't know 
much about these teletypes. I have seen some of them in newspaper 
offices. Is that about what it is ? 

[11064] Captain Kr.vmer. Just about the same; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. The ones that I have seen usually use a sheet of yellow 
paper about 6 or 8 inches wide. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. It comes on a continuous roll. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And the teletype types out the characters; is that 
right? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And that is what this was ? 

Captain Kjramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And the roll keeps unwinding and the teletype keeps 
on working and somebody there is watching it and reading it, and 
when a message of importance appears, they tear that portion off. 
Isn't that right? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, this message came in over the teletype, didn't it? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. You saw it? 

Captain Kramer. I saw it. 



4140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. And it is of little importance as to whether it was yellow 
paper, pink paper, or red paper, or any other color of paper: isn't 
that true ? 

[11065] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. It came over the teletype ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. IvEEFE. Nothing unusual about it being torn oiF because thev 
were all torn off ? "^ 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. The watch officer had torn this off the teletype and 
came to you with it. Now, the thing that I would like to know is 
this: 

There is always a duplicate of that teletype tape, isn't there? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. So that you had the original and some place there was 
a duplicate ; isn't that right ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. What became of the duplicates of these messages ? 

Captain Kramer. I believe, Mr. Keefe, that the purpose of havino- 
duplicates for any of this traffic, whether encoded or plain language', 
was to have an extra copy for systems which we were not reading so 
that more than one person could work on that system in attempting 
to break it down. 

Mr. KJEEFE. All right. 

[11066] Now, Captain, I have never seen this winds execute 
message. Of course you saw it, you handled it ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you think you may have written something on it 
correcting the interpretation of the watch officer? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr Keefe. Now, if there was any interpretation on it at all, it 
must have been an interpretation of the Japanese words that were on 
it ; is that true ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. There would be no reason for you or the watch officer 
to write any interpretation on this message unless it was an inter- 
pretation of those simple Japanese words that appeared on it? 

Captain Kramer. The very simple translation appearing in exhibit 
1 regarding the set-up of this thing would have been all that appeared 
on that. ^^ 

Mr. Keefe. Then, Captain Kramer, there must have been some 
reason tor you to correct the interpretation of the watch officer as 
you have testified you think you did. Do you have any recollection 
at all of doing that? 

Captain Kramer. I said I may have. I have no distinct recollec- 
tion oi doing it, sir. 

1^^067] Mr. Keefe. The point I am trying to understand is this : 
ihis message must have had Japanese words on it, then; isn't that 
true ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, and 

Mr. Keefe. And it must have had the Japanese words on it that 
were specified m the original winds code set-up, otherwise why would 
the watch officer recognize it as a winds code execute : that is obvious, 
isn't it ? ' 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4141 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. The thing that attracted the attention of the GY 
watch officer was that in this message appeared the same Japanese- 
language words that were in the original set-up ; isn't that true ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you still want to say to us that you can't recall what 
those words were? 

Captain Kjiamer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. They must have been the words of the original code, 
otherwise, you wouldn't have paid any attention to it; isn't that 
correct ? 

Captain K[ramer. Precisely, sir. 

Mr. KJEEFE. And it is because the words on this teletype tape were 
the original Japanese code words, in the [llOdS] original 
code set-up that you determined that this was the coded execute message 
at that time ; isn't that true ? 

Captain Kramer. It is not, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, all right. 

Captain Kramer. I should like to explain precisely what I mean 
by that. 

The determination was not made by me in the case of this piece of 
teletype. On the number of previous times when I had been called 
down concerning possible messages in this winds system, I had exam- 
ined long sheets of this teletype paper, had looked for the point of 
whether or not the expression was repeated or appeared as it was 
supposed to appear in the middle or at the end, or both. 

In this particular case my presumption was that the GY watch 
officer had made that determination inasmuch as the piece of paper I 
saw was only a short piece of paper, 3 or 4 inches in length as I recollect, 
and that presumably he had identified this message as being an authen- 
tic winds message, not only from the wording that actually appeared 
in it, but from its location in the Japanese plain language broadcast. 
That was a function of the GY watch officer not only as regards this 
winds system, but as regards all systems- to determine its authenticity 
and to break it down. 

[11069] The only reason for having shown this piece of paper 
to me was in connection with the Japanese words thereon, and that 
is all, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, exactly. 

Now, I want to go back over that once more, Captain Kramer ; the 
GY watch officer brought you a piece of teletype paper which had 
Japanese language words thereon, which he interpreted as being the 
code execute message, and showed it to you. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you looked at those words, and looked at the in- 
terpretation which he had given them. You may have corrected it in 
some particular, and you became convinced that the Japanese lan- 
guage words on that piece of teletype made that message the Japanese 
code execute message and you so determined at that time and went 
down to Captain Safford's office and handed it to him, or saw the 
watch officer hand it to him and said, "Here it is." "This is it." "The 
thing that we have been straining ourselves for and setting up all this 
intercepting apparatus." That is true, isn't it ? 



4142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. It is, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And that message went to Admiral Noyes' office be- 
cause it was to be specially handled and wasn't to [11070] go 
through your office? 

Captain Kramer. That is precisely correct, sir. 

Mr. Keete. Because the interpretation had been given to Admiral 
Noyes on 6 cards so that he could interpret those Japanese words him- 
self when they came in ; isn't that true ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And those cards were to be sent around to the top 
flight officials of the Navy Department so that when they saw that 
m.essage they could interpret it, and determine that it was a code 
execute message; wasn't that the purpose of the cards? 

Captain Kramer. I don't believe at any time was it intended to 
send any Japanese text to these other officers. 

Mr. Keefe. No 

Captain Kramer. But that the translation was to be sent ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You misunderstood. They would get the Japanese 
words from the message itself, wouldn't they, and then with the 
Japanese words, you had the translations and gave them the transla- 
tions on the cards? That is your story? 

Captain Kramer. They had and would get by this special set-up 
only the translation. 

[11071] Mr. Keefe. All right. 

Now, then, so far as this committee is concerned, we have been un- 
able to see that message, and we have been unable to see any of these 
cards. They are not in existence so far as you know, are they? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Mr. KJEEFE. Now, you stated a few moments ago that other people 
down there knew about the receipt of this winds execute message. 
"\Yliom did you refer to? 

Captain Kramer. I am not aware that I ever testified to that effect, 
that other people knew about this message. I am reasonably certain 
that no one in my office saw it, although I believe that undoubtedly I 
mentioned it after my return to my office. 

Mr. Keefe. Mentioned it to whom? 

Captain Kramer. To some of the people in my office. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, it would be the most natural thing in the world 
if you had done so, that you had told them that this very vital mes- 
sage had finally come in, isn't that correct? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. But you referred a few moments ago — and I do not 
easily forget testimony because I have been at this for a good many 
years — you testified that you [11072] had read the hearings or 
part of the hearings of the Army board 

Captain Kramer. In the past few weeks in the naval narrative. 

Mr. Keefe. And from reading those hearings you have found out 
there were others that knew about this code execute message? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Didn't you make that statement a few moments ago? 

Captain Kramer. I did, sir. 

Mr. Ejeefe. AMiom did you refer to when you made that state- 
ment? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4143 

Captain Kjiamer. Specifically, I recall the name of Colonel 
Sadtler. 

Mr. Keefe. Col. Otis Sacltler? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You have no personal knowledge as to how Col. Otis 
Sadtler learned of this winds execute message ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You have no personal knowledge as to what Admiral 
Noyes did with this message, have you ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not, sir. 

[11073] Mr. Keefe. You don't know whether Admiral Noyes 
telephoned to any other person in the Navy with reference to the re- 
ceipt of this winds execute message, do you ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not, sir. 

[11074,] Mr. Keefe. Did you talk with Colonel Bratton about 
it? 

Captain Kramer. I have no recollection of having talked to Colonel 
Bratton about it although it is possible I did since he was frequently 
in the Navy Building in Captain McCollum's office. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, in your testimony before this committee you testi- 
fied very positively and emphatically that you would not use the 
word "war" on this interpretation of this winds code message as 
testified to by Captain Safford ? 

Captain Kramer. Most certainly not, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. In your testimony" before the Hewitt committee and 
before the naval court of inquiry which I have heretofore referred 
to 

Well, I wanted to specifically refer to you rtestimony before the 
naval court of inquiry in which you gave the interpretation of those 
Japanese words. Let me find it. 

Captain Krahier. At no time, Mr. Keefe, have I attempted to put 
any construction or interpretation on those words other than what 
appears in Circulars 2353 and 2354, the Japanese indication of what 
they meant. 

Mr. Murphy. You read from page 956. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, the point that 1 wanted to make and get clear. 
Captain, is this: Certainly there is no need for refreshment or re- 
freshing or change in recollection so [11075] far as the trans- 
lation of the words "Higashi no kaze ame" are concerned? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. The translation remains the same, doesn't it? 

Captain Kramer. Identical. 

Mr. Keefe. It will be the same when you testified at Pearl Harbor, 
the same when you testified before Admiral Hewitt, and the same 
when you testify here ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That doesn't change, does it ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir, 

Mr. Keefe. So if the words "Higashi no kaze ame" appear on this 
winds execute message the interpretation would mean "East wind 
rain"; that is right, isn't it? 

Captain Kjiamer. Yes, sir. 



4144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. Then you say that is plain Japanese language. The 
sense of that, however, meant strained relations or a break in relations, 
possibly even implying war with a nation on the eastward, the United 
States. 

Now, that interpretation is the same today as it was when you testi- 
fied out there before the naval court of inquiry, isn't it? 

Captain Kramer. Exactly, sir. 

Mr. K^EEFE. So that if you had wanted to you could have [11076'] 
indicated that those words meant war with the United States, 
couldn't you, and be within the interpretation which you had given 
to the naval court of inquiry ? It was one of the three alternatives, 
was it not 'i 

Captain Kramer. Only, Mr. Keefe, insofar as you would evaluate 
the Japanese instructions contained in the set-up of this wind mes- 
sage referring to the destruction of codes and classified papers. An 
evaluation which concluded that that meant war would then include 
that interpretation ; yes, sir. 

Mr. I^EFE. Well, looking at it from hindsight it did mean war, 
didn't it ? 

Captain Kramer. It certainly did ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And we have spent an awful lot of time figuring these 
things out, when the thing was about ready to break, evaluating and 
refreshing and all that sort of thing. 

Are you certain that on the evening of the 6th of December, when 
you made delivery to Admiral Wilkinson's home, that General Miles 
was present? 

Captain Kramer. I still have no positive recollection that he was 
there but apparently he was. That is something that my memory 
has been refreshed on only since reading the Navy narrative and other 
papers in the last few weeks. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, reading that Navy narrative, do you mean to 
say that that refreshes your recollection ? 

[11077] Captain Kramer. By that I simply mean, Mr. Keefe, 
that General Miles states that he was there. If he so states I believe 
what he says. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, you have no present recollection that General 
Miles was there ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir ; I do not have. 

Mr. Keefe. You have no present recollection that General Miles 
read this 13-part message out there at Admiral Wilkinson's house that 
night? 

Captain Ejiamer. No present first-hand or positive recollection. 
He may have very well, however, been there. 

Mr. Keefe. That is all. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman 

The Vice Chairman. Captain, allow me to ask you one question 
for information, if I may, please. 

Was there a consideable volume of this so-called traffic, as you term 
it, about the time this so-called winds execute message was to have 
come in? 

Captain Kramer. The enciphered and encoded traffic was some- 
what below normal in volume but this plain language traffic was tre- 
mendous in volume by comparison 2 days before we started special 
monitoring of this plain language traffic. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4145 

[11078] The Vice Chairman. Was the so-called winds execute 
message in plain language? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir ; it was. 

The Vice Chairman. And was the volume of the plain language 
traffic at that time the heaviest it was at any time ? 

Captain Kramer. At any time ; yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Could you give us some idea of about the 
volume of that plain-language traffic ? 

Captain Kramer. Before special provisions were set up to monitor 
this plain-language traffic it was sampled only periodically, usually 
when monitoring stations were not too busy on other traffic, or it may 
be that they undertook themselves to intercept samples of this plain 
language traffic when their encoded traffic, the circuits carrying it, 
were low in volume. I would estimate that the plain language traffic 
normally received during 1941 up to this time amounted to not more 
than 3 to 5 feet in length of teletype paper per week. During the 
period of this special monitoring set-up for plain language traffic the 
volume amounted to perhaps 200 feet per day of teletype paper. 

As soon as this paper was scanned to see whether anything in the 
winds system was in it it was thrown into a waste basket and burned. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, you had to examine a considerable 
[11079] amount of that large volume of this traffic, did you ? 

Captain Kramer. Most of the examination was done by the GY 
watch officers. It was only in a number of cases when weather re- 
ports, actual weather reports appeared in this newscast traffic and 
there was some doubt in the minds of the watch officers as to its au- 
thenticity in being a weather or winds system broadcast, that they 
phoned me at home and called me to the office, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, was it rather frequent that you had to 
examine this traffic? 

Captain Kramer. At night it occurred, during this period of a 
week or 10 days, two or three times. During working hours in the 
daytime, or when I was at the office, I think probably a half-dozen 
additional times. 

The Vice Chairman. Then you consider it entirely reasonable that 
jou might not now recall the exact wording of any one particular 
piece of that teletype paper? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas may inquire. 

Senator Lucas. Captain Kramer, from this long and exhaustive 
examination by members of this committee one could easily conclude 
that you originated the message, intercepted the message, decoded the 
message, translated the message, and delivered the message to Ad- 
miral Noyes. The [11080] truth of the matter is that you 
saw this so-called winds message some 30 seconds, as I understand it. 

Captain Kramer. Not over 30 seconds. Probably nearer 10 or 15 
seconds. 

Senator Lucas. And under the special arrangement or agreement 
that was set up between Admiral Noyes and Captain Safford, am I to 
understand that the responsibility for the translation and the de- 
livery of that particular message was solely within the power and 
jurisdiction of Captain Stafford? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir ; his G Y section and himself. 



4146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Lucas. In other words, it was by mere chance, under that 
peculiar and special arrangement set up between Admiral Noyes and 
Captain baflord, that you happened to see this so-called winds execute 
message ? 

Captain Kramer. It was pure chance that I happened to be in my 
omce as tJie (rl watch officer was passing my door ; yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. In other words, if you had, perhaps had your door 
closed or had been out of your office it was not necessary for the GY 
officer to find you to obtain your translation or your confirmation of 
this message before he took it to Captain Safford? 

Captain Kramer. That is precisely correct, sir. 

Senator Lucas. What its proper interpretation was, or \1108n 
what It actually meant, or what it actually contained in terms of 
breaking negotiations with either England, Russia, or the United 
states was the responsibility of Admiral Noyes and his subordinates 
under that special arrangement which they had ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Now, did Admiral Noves, after he received this 
so-called winds message, assuming he did receive one, ever call you into 
his office either on December 4, 5, 6, or 7, for the purpose of dijs- 
cussmg this message with you and asking for your opinion as to the 
proper translation of that so-called winds execute message? 

Captain Kjiamer. At no time, Senator, was I called to Admiral 
Aoyes office m connection with the minds message. I, however mav 
very well have discussed it briefly with him the next time I saw Ad- 
miral Noyes, m making normal deliveries of the other decrypted traffic 

Senator Lucas. Captain, in view of the fact that you were the one 
mdiyidua who had been translating nearly all of this magic code 
don t you believe that if Admiral Noyes, after his examination of this 
message, had concluded that it was the genuine winds execute message 
that you were all looking for, that he would have sent' for you in order 
that you might confirm his belief along that line ? 

Captain Kramer I do not think that was necessary at all, sir. 

feenator Lucas. Why would not he have sent for you, Captain « You 
are the one as I understand it, who had translated most of these magic 
messages that came m. *= 

Captain Kramer. That is not accurate, sir. There was only a small 
Fated some^ translated. I edited a large percentage and trans- 

Senator Lucas. Anyhow, the magic messages that were of signifi- 
cance and tremendous importance, insofar as our relations with Japan 
xvere concerned, were delivered by you to the proper recipients ? 

Captain Ivramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. I will ask you this question. I think it has been 
answered several times, but was there anyone in the Navy who ever 
toM you to include this so-called winds execute message in the deliverv 
to the recipients that obtained them from time to time « 

Captain Kramer. There never was. Senator. 

Senator Lucas. Now whose responsibility would that have been to 
have told you to include this message, if they had considered it impor- 
tant enough to send to those high in Government receiving this 
message? ^ 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4147 

Captain Kramer. I should say, Senator, that it would [11083] 
have been the responsibility of the GY watch officer on watch, or 
possibly his superior, Captain Safford, to have seen that I got a copy, 
if it was considered necessary to disseminate it additionally to the 
special provisions made up for this particular type of message. 

Further, the fact that this message never came back into my section 
for the usual translation and dissemination processes carried on by 
my office could well be, although I Imow nothing of this from first- 
hand knowledge or other knowledge, could well be that Admiral Noyes 
may have determined that it was simply another of these false alarms 
on this winds system. 

Senator Lucas. Well, Captain, this winds message comes right down 
into the hands, the juclgment, and responsibility of Admiral Noyes, 
does it not ? 

Captain Kramer. I cannot presume to assign that responsibility, 
sir. 

Senator Lucas. Well, now, under the arrangement that you had, if 
Safford sent this message, as he testified, by one of his subordinates to 
Admiral Noyes, would not it be the duty and responsibility of Admiral 
Noyes to make the determination as to whether or not it was a genuine 
winds executive message? 

Captain Kramer. I should say Admiral Noyes, or his [11084-] 
subordinate in section 20-G of Naval Communications. 

Senator Lucas. That is exactly what I am talking about. It would 
have to be, under that arrangement, either Admiral Noyes or Admiral 
Noyes and his subordinates in that particular section that would 
finally have to pass judgment as to the type and kind of message they 
received ? 

Captain Kramer. On this particular type of message, yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. That is right. In other words, this is .the only ar- 
rangement that was set up between Noyes and Safford during the first 
week of December or any time during November of 1941 ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Do you recall that during the week from De- 
cember 1 to 7, inclusive, there were other messages that were mis- 
takenly considered, for a short time, to be a winds execute message? 

Captain Kramer. I am specifically aware of being told by Lieu- 
tenant Brotherhood of one phone call that he made to Admiral 
Noyes' home at night concerning something of this winds character, 
that had been delivered or phoned to him by the Federal Com- 
munications Commission monitoring service. 

Senator Lucas. Is that Brotherhood, 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

[11085] Senator Lucas. As I understand it, Brotherhood 
thought, as a result of the message that he had received, that it was 
one of those implementing winds messages ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not laiow what he thought, sir, but I do 
know that he did phone Admiral Noyes. 

Senator Lucas. Well, at least there was some discussion and some 
stirring about at that time with respect to whatever he received? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; apparently he concluded it warranted 
phoning Admiral Noyes in the middle of the night. 

Senator Lucas. Let me ask you this question, Captain : 



4148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Did Sonnett badger or beset you at any time in an endeavor to 
change your testimony ? 

Captain Kramer. He most positively did not, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Captain Kramer, do you know anyone in the 
Navy, the Army, the State Department, the Chief Executive's office 
in December 

Captain Kramer. Or any other time. 

Senator Lucas (continuing). In 1940, 1941, or any other time, 
who provoked, angered, or tricked those peaceloving and harmless 
J aps into attacking Pearl Harbor ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Do you know anyone in the high councils of this 
Government who, from any information received prior [11086] 
to the attack on Pearl Harbor, knew when and where the attack 
was coming? 

Captain Kjramer. I do not, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Do you know of anyone in the Army or Navy who 
maneuvered, conspired, or attempted to lay the sole blame for the 
Pearl Harbor disaster on Kimmel and Short? 

Captain Kramer. I do not, sir. 

Senator Lucas. From all information you received through magic, 
including the much-discussed purported winds execute message, was 
there ever received a single word, line, phrase, or sentence that would 
lead you to believe that Pearl Harbor was going to be struck by the 
Japs on December 7, 1941? 

Captain Kjramer. There never was, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Are you acquainted with Admiral Noyes, Captain ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Do you know of any reason why Admiral Noyes 
would want to destroy an important message of this kind, assuming 
that one had been received? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Mr. Lucas. Do you know of anyone in the department of Admiral 
Noyes who would want to destroy, conceal, or secrete an important 
message of this character when everybody [11087] was looking 
for it? 

Captain Kramer. Most definitely not, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Can you give this committee any reason whatso- 
ever, if this was the genuine winds execute message, why any man 
that you knew of in the Navy, in a responsible position at that time, 
would not want to take whatever action was necessary as the result 
of receiving that message ? 

Captain Kjiamer. I do not, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Captain, there have been a lot of things said in this 
Pearl Harbor inquiry, a lot of things said before the Pearl Harbor 
inquiry started. One of the things that was said was this, and this was 
said by a responsible person long before the hearing started, who 
could not wait for the evidence : 

Everybody in authority in Washington knew late on December 6, 1941, that 
the Japs had broken relations following the decoding of the 14 paragraphs, a 
message to their Ambassadors here directing them to deliver the message to 
the White House at 1 p. m. December 7, dawn in Hawaii. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4149 

Is that a true or false statement, as far as you know ? 

Everybody in authority, 

it says — 

in "Washington knew late on December 6, 1941, that the Japs had broken relations 
following the decoding of the 14 paragraphs. 

Was the fourteenth paragraph decoded on December 6? 

Captain Kramer. It was not, sir. 

[11088] Senator Lucas. It further says : 

Every strategist interpreted it only one way, that the first bombs would fall 
on Hawaii about 7 a. m. Hawaiian time. Kimmel and Short were not advised 
of this crisis until too late. 

Do you know any naval strategists that interpreted the 11 parts 
message as this statement says, "that the first bombs would fall on 
Hawaii about 7 a. m."? 

Captain Kramer. I know of none, whatsoever, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Do you know Col. Henry C. Clausen? 

Captain Kramer. I have never met the gentleman, sir. 

Senator Lucas. You never testified, or gave him an affidavit at any 
time? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir; I did not, although early last summer 
I received from the then Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral 
Hewitt, a classified letter to the effect that I was authorized to testify 
before him if he desired to see me. 

Senator Lucas. I think that is all. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman: 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy, of Pennsylvania, will inquire, 
Captain. 

Mr. Murphy. Captain, in your reply from the South Pacific, the 
question was asked if you were in solitude [11089] in the South 
Pacific. Were you at Numea, New Caledonia, when j^ou wrote this 
letter ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Is that the time you were still being bombed by the 
Japs in New Caledonia, or had it ceased by that time ? 

Captain Kramer. For some time prior to that, as the result of 
Admiral Halsey's effort, the Japs were at some distance from New 
Caledonia, with the exception of one or two submarines that got 
down that way. 

Mr. Murphy. Right before that, even when Admiral Halsey was 
living in the home of the previous jap envoy, there were some pretty 
bad times there with bombs, were there not ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, in that letter which the gentleman from Wis- 
consin described as your last testament, or possible last testament — I 
am being facetious about that — that the letter which might have 
survived you contains the statement that there never was a file in 
your section in which a winds execute was contained; isn't that right? 

Captain I^amer. Never in my section; no, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Right. So it would be difficult, if it never got 
there, for it now to be missing from your section ? [11090] That 
is so, isn't it? 



4150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. Precisely. 

Mr. Murphy. That is exactly what you say in this letter which 
you showed to Admiral Halsey before you appeared before any par- 
ticular investigating body; is that so? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, 

Mr. Murphy. So far as files were concerned, you know that Cap- 
tain Safford had a paper. You know that it went to Admiral Noyes, 
but you know you never had it for the purpose of filing or distribu- 
tion; isn't that so. 

Captain Kramer. Exactly; yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, the question was asked you by the distinguished 
Senator from Michigan as to Admiral Turner, and apparently, by 
way of contradiction of your testimony, that Admiral Turner had 
said before this body, that he had seen the so-called 13 parts on the 
night of December 6. 

I read from page 979 of the naval court of inquiry, the same Admiral 
Turner speaking : Question 53 : 

I show you Document 39 of Exhibit 63 which is the long dispatch, and is the 
reply of the Japanese to the American notes of November 26 : 

Answer. I remember the dispatch. I did not see that on the 6th of December. 
I don't remember when I saw it. 

Now, there were some questions asked you about Lieutenant 
[11091^ Sonnett. He asked you certain questions prior to your 
testimony, did he not? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. You felt there was nothing sinister or improper 
about that ? 

Captain Kramer. Not in the slightest, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now two members of this committee spent 4i/^ hours 
vrith you before we commenced hearings in this case, did they not? 

Captain Kramer. They did, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. They asked you quite extensively about your testi- 
mony^, did they not? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Nothing improper about that was there ? 

Captain Kjramer. None whatsoever, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Were you in a room or ward at the hospital ? 

Captain Kramer. We were in a conference room adjacent to the 
office of the medical officer in charge. Captain Duncan. 

Mr. Murphy. I mean were you assigned to a room or ward at the 
hospital ? 

Captain Kramer. On my first detachment to the hospital in August, 
for the routine check-up, 1 was in a room in the tower of the hospital. 
After that routine check-up [11092'] and ensuing sick leave, 
on my second return to the hospital, I was in a ward, in a room of a 
ward. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, there was some question about having 
clearance with Public Relations before photographs were taken. Is 
not that the usual and unvarying procedure in the Navy ? Even if the 
Red Cross wanted a picture for a fund campaign, would not they have 
to have clearance before they did those things ? Or do you know that? 

Captain Kramer. I am not sure of the details of that, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4151 

I do know this, however, that it has always been my understanding 
of naval policy in this respect, that the Navy's primary concern is 
with mattei^ of security. If, for example,, a naval officer writes books, 
or newspaper or magazine articles, that officer himself is held person- 
ally responsible for any breach of security. Along that line, the Navy 
Department, that I am aware of, for many years past, has had a policy 
of desiring — I cannot state requiring — that any contemplated publica- 
tion of that kind should be accompanied by furnishing a copy to the 
Navy Department Public ^Relations office at about the same time it is 
sent to a publisher. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, there was some question asked you time 
after time after time about your being ni Admiral [1J093] 
Stark's house for lunch, and then your testifying or stating in this letter 
from the South Pacific about your having been in his office at 9, whereas 
your present recollection was 9 : 30. 

I direct your attention to page 9143 of the record: 

Captain McColltjm. I went over the situation with Watts when I arrived and 
was trying to digest the 13 parts of this thing when I received word that Admiral 
Wilkinson, my chief had arrived, and desired to see me. 

I went up to Admiral Wilkinson's oflSce and we entered into a discussion of the 
first 13 parts of this dispatch. I should say that would be nine o'clock or maybe 
a little later. While we were talking an orderly or someone came in and said 
Admiral Stark had come into his oflBce, and Admiral Wilkinson said, "Well, come 
on, let's go and see the chief." 

We went down the passageway and went into Admiral Stark's office. At that 
time there was no one in Admiral Stark's office except himself. None of his aides 
were present in the outer office. We went in and discussed this thing with 
Admiral Stark and then came on out. That was the 13 parts. 

Captain McCollum was at that same luncheon wasn't he, with 
Admiral Stark? 

[UOOJ^I Captain Kra3ier. Yes, he was. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, on the night of December 6, you delivered 
the 13 parts to the White House, and your recollection of the time 
was that j^ou got there about 9 : 15 that evening? 

Captain Kramer. About 9: 15 that evening, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Do you know whether it was at the time you arrived 
with the 9 : 15 dispatch, or before that that the President of the United 
States dispatched his message to the Emperor of Japan? 

Captain Kramer. I did not know about that until I saw the news- 
papers the following day. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you saw an account that the President 
on that very night did dispatch to the Emperor of Japan a message 
in order to forestall the war, if possible, did you not ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, you said when you received this letter from 
Captain Safford, that you were flabbergasted. You were rather sur- 
prised and astonished, were you not, to receive such a letter through 
the mails out in the South Pacific ? 

Captain Kramer. I certainly was ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. At one time you were asked about your [11095] 
testimony at a previous hearing, and I am referring to the examina- 
tion by the gentleman from Wisconsin. 

The question was, "That was false?" x4.nd you said "Yes." 

Did you mean by that that you were deliberately lying or did you 
mean that it was your best recollection in the light of the facts be- 
fore you, and the condition of your memory at the time ? 



4152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramee. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster, Which does the gentleman mean? 

Captain Kramer. I mean, of course, the last part of that question. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, did you at any time mean to tell this committee 
that you have made a false statement anywhere in this proceeding 
before the Naval Court of Inquiry, before the Hewitt inquiry, or be- 
fore this committee ? 

Captain Kramer. I have never meant to imply that I consciously 
made a false statement. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, at pages 829 and 828 of the record, when 
Admiral Ingersoll is speaking about having received the 13-part 
message on the night of the 6th, his recollection of it, he said he 
thought he had made some notes of indication indicating that he had 
received it. 

Did you have customarily in your office any kind of \^11096^^ 
a paper which would indicate by initials or otherwise, who had seen 
these particular messages ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir; we did not, although, through 1941, up 
to a month and a half prior to Pearl Harbor, there was a gist of the 
traffic in a particular folder which was often initialed, but frequently 
was not. 

Mr. Murphy. But it was not the consistent practice to have them 
all initialed, was it? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, you also referred, in your letter from the South 
Pacific, to the possibility of certain summaries. 

Did you retain summaries, or was that just to meet the situation 
from day to day in order to explain to the recipients of magic what the 
developments were ? 

Captain Kramer. I meant simply the gist that I have just referred 
to, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. I have just this last matter. 

You stated in your letter from the South Pacific that there were 
several different sets of files where a winds execute, had it gone through 
your department, would have been found. Is that true ? Would there 
have been several different places? 

\^11097^ Captain Kjramer. Yes, sir; there would have been two 
places in which that would be found. One would be the translation 
file, and the other would be a file in which was kept every piece of 
decoded or deciphered paper that came into my section. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, your best recollection is there never was a 
file in your office containing a winds execute message ? 

Captain Kramer. That is precisely correct ; yes. 

Mr. Murphy. No further questions. 

The Vice Chairman. Any further questions ? 

Senator Brewster, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask just one or 
two questions. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster will inquire, Captain. 

Senator Brewster. I understand we will recess early today. 

The Vice Chairman. The recess announced at the beginning of this 
session was we would recess at a quarter to 4. The Senators would 
have to be on the floor by 4 o'clock. 

Senator Barkley had informed me of that proposal. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4153 

Senator Brewster. Captain, I would like to have a little more clear 
in the record, and I understand it is not entirely clear, where you kept 
this memorandum that [11098] you prepared, during the in- 
terim. 

Captain Kramer. Constantly in my possession, sir. 

Senator Brewster. AVas there only one copy of it ? 

Captain Kramer. One copy, sir. 

Senator Brewster. Is that all that you ever made ? 

Captain Kramer. Only one, sir. 

Senator Brewster. And was that dictated or did you write it your- 
self on the typewriter ? 

Captain Kramer. Entirely myself, sir. 

Senator Brewster. On the typewriter ? 

Captain Kjiamer. On the typewriter. 

Senator Brewster. You operate a typewriter yourself ? 

Captain Kramer. I have never prepared any longhand rough ver- 
sion, or that kind of thing. 

Senator Brewster. And you had a file where you kept this ? 

Captain Kramer. I had many classified papers in my possession in 
connection with my work out there ; yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. And you brought that file with you when you 
came back here ? 

Captain Kjiamer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brew^ster. And you brought that file with you when you 
came back here ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

[11099] Senator Brewster. At what time did you first take 
this out of your file during the last few weeks ? 

Captain Kramer. It was never taken out of my file prior to the 
commencement of this hearing, sir. 

Senator Brewster. We began this hearing in November. Do you 
mean since that time ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. Just about what time did you then get it ? What 
were the circumstances under which you took it out ? 

Captain Kramer. Since this hearing started those papers have been 
removed from that file of mine three times, prior to the last couple 
of days when it was opened, in fact, prior to 5 or 6 days ago, when it 
was shown to Lieutenant Commander Baecher. 

On these three occasions they were shown to Admiral Wilkinson- to 
Captain Kochefort, and to Colonel Bales, Marine Corps, at that time, 
and now still head of the Far East Section of Naval Intelligence. 

Senator Brewster. When did those three examinations take place? 

Captain Kramer. The first time this occurred, was with Admiral 
Wilkinson, the afternoon I first saw him, since I left the South Pacific, 
when I arrived in Washington from [11100] Miami, and he 
had just arrived by plane after a 4-day flight from Japan, and we met 
in one of the rooms in the Navy Department made available to wit- 
nesses. 

Senator Brewster. How nearly can you fix that day ? 

Capttain Kramer. It was either the 9th — I will correct that — it was 
either the 6th or 7th of December, sir. 

79716— 46— pt. 9 16 



4154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Brewster, You had a conference with him at that time on 
this situation ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir, we had a general social conference. I 
showed him those papers. 

Senator Brewster. When you say "those papers" you mean the 
memorandum ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. Or were there other papers that you had ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir, simply these letters of Captain Safford, 
and my expanded reply. 

Senator Brewster. That comprised all that you had on this matter? 

Captain Kramer. That is all I showed him ; yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. Will you answer my question ? 

Captain Kramer. Sir ? 

Senator Brewster. I asked you if those were all the \_11101^ 
papers you had bearing on this matter ? 

Captain Kjumer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. You discussed this situation then with him ? 

Captain Kramer. What situation do you refer to, sir ? 

Senator Brewster. I mean the matter of the contents of these letters 
and your recollection as to the events with which they were concerned. 

Captain Kramer. There was very little discussion, sir. 

I handed these letters to him with some remark to the effect that I 
felt, as a previous superior of mine, a naval officer, an admiral whom 
1 considered a personal friend that I would like to have him see these 
letters, so that he might appreciate the possible reasons for some of 
what I considered entirely unwarranted publicity in connection with 
my name that had taken place in previous months. 

Senator Brewster. And this was to show him what your story 
regarding the situation was ? 

Captain Kramer. Not so much my story, sir, as to show him, or tell 
him what I considered a likely source of the origin of this unwarranted 
publicity. 

Senator Brewster. How long were you with him at that time? 

Captain Kramer. Probably about a half hour. 

\^1110'2'] During half of that time Admiral Kirk came in and 
joined in some of our discussions. But not on this matter, however. 
Admiral Kirk has never seen this paper. 

Senator Brewster. But Admiral Wilkinson read it through while 
he was with vou ? 

Captain ICramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. You did not leave any copy with him ; did you ? 

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir. 

linos'] Senator Brewster. When was the next conference on 
the matter? 

Captain Kramer. It was a few days later when, with the identical 
purpose in mind, I showed these letters to Captain Eochefort, who 
is also a long-time personal friend and was a language officer in 
Tokyo, Japan, at the same time I was. 

Senator Brewster. Wliere did he see you ? 

Captain Kramer. In one of these witness rooms in the Navy Depart- 
ment. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4155 

Senator Brewster. You met him there by appointment ? 

Captain Kramer. Not by ai^pointment. We just happened to meet, 
and I told him I would like to show him these letters too. 

Senator Brewster. You were on duty at the Department at that 
time ? 

Captain Kramer. I was still attached to the hospital, had been on 
sick leave and had been released by the hospital from the necessity of 
reporting in daily, awaiting the pleasure of this committee, sir. 

Senator Brewster. What was his comment on this after you showed 
it to him? 

Captain Kramer. He agreed with some of the comment I made as 
to the likelihood of that being a possible origin of [11104] some 
of this publicity. 

Senator Brewster. Now tell us about the next conference. When 
did that take place? 

Captain Kramer. That took place early last month, a few days 
after I arrived in Washington from Miami on sick leave over the 
holidays, the 9th of January. It was a Sunday morning at Colonel 
Vale's home in Washington, N. W. 

Senator Brewster. You went there to see him ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. At his request ? 

Captain Kramer. No. sir, at my suggestion that I would like to 
show him these papers at his convenience, and he suggested that break- 
fast appointment at his home. 

Senator Brewster. You took the papers there with you? 

Captain Kramer. I did, sir. 

Senator Brewster. And he read them over in your presence ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes. sir. 

Senator Brewster. What comment did he make? 

Captain Kramer. Along similar lines. 

Senator Brewster. With all of these gentlemen you discussed, to 
some extent, the problems that you felt you were presented with? 

Captain Kramer. I was presented with no problem, sir. 

[1.110S] Senator Brewster. That is what I thought you had 
previously said, that you were disturbed over these stories that ap- 
peared in the papers, that you discussed this with your personal friend 
the captain and asked to see the colonel, in order to point out to them 
what you thought was the source of some of these unfounded rumors 
which were disturbing you. 

Captain Kramer. I, of course, had been annoyed at many of these 
things being published in connection with mj^ name ; yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. Now, Captain, I just want to ask you one final 
question. 

Do you expect that it can be credited that during this month that 
elapsed from December 6 to January 9, during this period when you 
were showing these papers to three different men because of your 
very great concern, apparently, over your name being used in con- 
nection with this, asking your friend the captain about it, and asking 
for an interview with the colonel, that during all that period you 
never once examined, yourself, this memorandum which you present 
here now ? 



4156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. I did not, Senator. 

Senator Brewster. You realize how difficult it is for anyone to 
credit a statement of that sort, Captain, when you [11106] were 
really disturbed, that you never once examined this paper which you 
present ? 

Captain Kramer. By "examine", if you mean to infer that I read 
this paper, I did not. 

Senator Brewster. Yes, that is what I mean. 

Captain Kramer, I did not, sir. 

Senator Brewster. You must realize what a strain that is to a man's 
credulity. 

Captain Kramer. I have, without question, looked at certain items 
that I may have pointed out or that they may have pointed out. I 
do not believe that that occurred, though, sir. I think in each case. 
Senator, there was practically no conversation throughout their 
perusal of this paper. 

Senator Brewster. You were taking this to them without a state- 
ment of the background, and your recollection and your action ? We 
are going to recess now over the week end. I wish you would ponder 
that question, from the standpoint of the difficulties which we face. 
I can see no reason why you should not have examined it. I do not 
think you would be subject to any criticism if you had examined it. 
I have been amazed from the beginning that you insisted that you 
did not see it, that you base your entire present recollection on the 
refreshment you received from consultation with officers [11107] 
who examined that document ; that under those circumstances it must 
have seemed proper for you to refresh your recollection from some- 
thing you wrote more than a year and a half ago in Noumea. I think 
it would make it far easier for us to credit your story if we could 
believe you examined that paper at some time in the last month. 

Captain Kramer. I appreciate. Senator, that that implication might 
be drawn from what I have previously testified to. However, the fact 
is that I did not read that memorandum, in whole or in part, beyond 
glancing at the heading of it, the first paragraph, perhaps, as I was 
showing these letters to these three individuals, to be sure I was show- 
ing them the piece of paper that they were to read in the sequence I 
wanted to present it. 

The Vice Chairman". The committee will now recess. 

Mr. Gearhart. Captain, I wanted to ask you 

The Vice Chairman. We agreed to recess at a quarter of 4. 

Mr. Gearhart. I just have a couple of questions. 

The Vice Chairman. He will be back Monday morning, so you will 
have a chance to ask him then. 

Mr. Gearhart. All right. 

(Whereupon, at 3 : 50 p. m., February 9, 1946, the committee recessed 
until 10 a. m., Monday, February 11, 1946.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4157 



[11108^ PEAKL HARBOK ATTACK 



MONDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

or THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington^ D. G. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator AllDen 
W. Barkley (chairman), presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson; and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present : Seth W. Richardson, general counsel ; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, associate general counsel ; John E. Hasten, Edward P. 
Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee. 

[^11109'\ The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in 
order. 

Does counsel have anything at this time to present ? 

Mr. Richardson. No. 

The Vice Chairman. Captain, do you have anything you desire 
to present before the examination is resumed ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir ; in the absence of Senator Brewster, unless 
he wants any further statement. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you some questions about that. 

Captain Kramer. All right, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson, of Michigan, will inquire 
at this point. Captain. 

Captain Kramer. All right, sir. 

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KRAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY 

(Resumed) 

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, Senator Brewster is not 
going to be here this morning and that is why I will give you Ian 
opportunity to explain what he left rather up in the air on Saturday. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. As I recall, you told Senator Brewster that you 
had not read all or parts of the so-called Halsey — I will refer to it 
as that. — memorandum or the Safford letter and Halsey memorandum. 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

\^11110'\ Senator Ferguson. And he indicated that it was some- 
what hard for him to understand that a man would have that in his 
possession so long and show it to several people, three people, and not 
read any part of it. If you will recall, I asked you some questions 
about a conversation with Admiral Wilkinson the last time that I 



4158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

examined you and I asked you for the complete conversation that you 
had with him and as I understand it you never mentioned that you 
saw him and showed him this memorandum. 

Now, how do you account for the fact that you did not give to me 
at that time an indication that you had discussed or shown him this 
memorandum ? 

Captain Kramer. Senator, I did not discuss that memorandum with 
Admiral Wilkinson other than the aspects — I think I have clearly 
indicated heretofore in my testimony — concerning the possible source 
of unwarranted publicity concerning me; in other words, primarily 
concerning Safford's two letters, not my memorandum for Admiral 
Halsey. 

Senator Ferguson. But you showed him the Halsey memorandum ? 

Captain Kramer. I did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, why didn't you disclose that when I tried 
to get the full information on your conversation with Wilkinson; 
why didn't you tell me that you had [11111] shown him a 
memorandum? Was it that, as you say, you were not going to dis- 
close that unless you were asked a direct question in relation to it? 

Captain Kramer, That is precisely correct, sir, and in view of your 
line of questioning. Senator, I feel that I should read this statement 
I have prepared over the week end in compliance with the request of 
Senator Brewster that I ponder that question. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do I understand then that what you 
do in your testimony on any of these hearings is that you give only 
those things that are directly asked for and if the examiner does not 
happen to know that there is in existence a particular paper that it 
is not disclosed? I am trying to find out why I did not get the in- 
formation when I tried to get from you everything that was said 
between you and Wilkinson. 

Captain Kramer. I think that point is fully covered in my state- 
ment, sir, if I may be permitted to read it. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, in just a moment you can. Did you dis- 
cuss anything with Wilkinson in the last 6 months? On how many 
occasions did you see Wilkinson to discuss things? 

Captain Kramer. On two occasions, sir, other than a simple greet- 
ing in this hearing room when he was testifying. 

Senator Ferguson. On two occasions? 

[11112'} Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You gave me the other day the one occasion 
and then you gave Senator Brewster on Saturday the one? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That made the two? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, why did you keep from the commit- 
tee when I examined you about all your conversations with Wilkin- 
son the fact that you had had one about this Halsey memorandum ? 

Captain Kramer. The first occasion with Admiral Wilkinson did 
not bring up this question at all, sir. It was a discussion on our ex- 
periences in ONI in general in which Admiral Kirk participated for 
at least half of the time. The other half we discussed primarily — in 
fact, almost solely — the introductory remarks with which I presented 
those papers to Admiral Wilkinson, namely, what I considered the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4159 

likely source of publicity attending my name in connection with this 
Pearl Harbor affair. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, Captain, you gave to this conunit- 
tee two of those papers and only two of those, isn't that true? 

Captain Kramer. Three, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Three. But you did not give them the 
\^11113'\ memorandum, the Halsey memorandum? 

Captain Kramer. That is precisely correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, how do you account for dividing them up 
and giving the two of them 

Captain Kramer. Three. 

Senator Ferguson. Three of them — pardon me, three letters, two 
letters from Safford to you and one reply — but there was also a reply 
to one of Safford's which did exactly or almost exactly what Safford 
wanted you to do, to discuss it with Halsey? 

Captain Krajvier. Senator, how those 

Mr. Richardson. Just answer his question. Captain. 

Captain Kramer (continuing) . Letters first came up was in reply to 
a direct question to me on the part of Senator Lucas whether I had 
in my possession letters addressed to me by Captain Safford. I stood 
up in this room, in the back of this room, and I said I did. At that 
time, Senator, I not only produced the two letters but my reply to 
Captain Safford's letter, which was not asked for precisely by Senator 
Lucas' question. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, when you gave these three let- 
ters, two of the Safford's and your reply, to Commander Baecher did 
you at the same time give him the Halsey memorandum ? 

[llllJi,'] Captain Kjramer. I did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And then when he delivered the three letters 
to the committee did you have to authorize that ? "Was that an under- 
standing? 

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir. He had it in hand in case that 
question of necessity came into my testimony. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, he was holding in his possession 
four instruments ; is that correct ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And if it became necessary for him to deliver 
he would deliver only those that he thought were necessary at the time 
and hold back from the committee the others. 

Captain Kramer. I should like to point out, sir, that he also men- 
tioned the existence of that fourth letter to counsel for this committee, 
Mr. Richardson. 

Senator Ferguson. When was that? 

Captain Kramer. I am not certain, sir. Baecher, I think, can supply 
that information. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you have a conversation about that? 

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, how do you know that? 

Captain Kramer. I think I heard Mr. Richardson say that 
{11115~\ in this committee while I was testifying last Friday oi 
Saturday. 

Senator Ferguson. You understood that from 



4160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kjramer. From Mr. Richardson's statement. 

Senator Ferguson. From what was said here? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then as I understand it you personally did not 
want to disclose to this committee any of these four instruments unless 
a direct question was asked and the committee somehow out of the 
magic would uncover the fact, or out of the blue, let us say, would 
uncover the fact that there was this Halsey memorandum, is that 
correct ? . 

Captain Kramer. That is precisely correct, sir, and I think I gave 
at some length on Saturday my reasons for that position. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Captain Kramer. I also cover that in this statement. 

Senator Ferguson. So you were of the opinion at that time that this 
committee should only get those things that it could find out from 
some other source and not from you? How could the committee as- 
certain if 



Captain Kramer. They found out from me 

Senator Ferguson. How could the committee members ever ask you 
about this Halsey letter? You and Baechor and Wil- [11116] 
kinson and a few others were the only people that ever knew about it. 

Captain Kramer. The man who found out for this committee from 
me was Mr. Keefe, who asked me the direct question whether I had 
ever discussed these letters with anyone up to this moment. Your 
questions to me, sir, were not so phrased. 

Senator Ferguson. You think that they are not direct enough when 
I ask you about the Wilkinson question? 

Captain Kramer. I do. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. And, therefore, you did not give it? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, will you explain to me how it came 
by chance that you would have this Halsey letter in your possession 
down in the Navy Department the day that you met Wilkinson by 
chance ? 

Captain Kramer. I brought it with me from Miami in this case in 
which it has remained, incidentally, sealed, from the time I left the 
South Pacific on about December 10, 1944, until my arrival in this 
city on December 6, 1945, from Miami. 

Senator Ferguson. So it was sealed all the time ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And how was it sealed ? 

Captain Kramer. It was sealed in a package referred to in the 
authorization to me from commander South Pacific area [11117] 
and South Pacific Force dated 10 

Mr. Richardson. Tell him how it was sealed. That is all he wants 
to know. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; that is all I want to know. 

Mr. Richardson. What kind of a lock it had on it. 

Captain Kjiamer. It was sealed in a package No. 47,102 by the flag 
secretary to commander South Pacific under date of 10 September 
and described on this authorization for me to carry classified papers 
from this (brown wrapping paper) originated by commander South 
Pacific addressed to Comamnder A. D. Kramer by CINC South Pa- 
cific, signed by I. M. Mayfield, Chief of Staff. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4161 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you tell him when you got this 
memorandum that you had in there a memorandum that you had shown 
to Admiral Halsey ? 

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, how did he know what he was sealing? 
Did he seal among the official papers your personal memorandum to 
Halsey? 

Captain Kramer. Among those ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So, then, this personal paper was sealed among 
or along with the official documents? 

Captain Kramer. With official documents that were purely for my 
own use. I carried no official commander South Pacific [11118] 
mail. It was for use in connection with my work, 

I want to repeat again, Senator, that I should like at this point to 
read my memorandum which covers those points explicitly and fully. 

[lIlW] Senator Ferguson. You go ahead and read it and then 
I will ask you some questions later on, because I ajDparently am not 
going to get direct answers from you, so you go ahead and read it. 

The Vice Chairman. Read it. Captain. 

Captain Kramer. Mr. Chairman, I prepared a statement, in com- 
pliance with Senator Brewster's request on Saturday afternoon, which 
was put to me in the following terms, according to yesterday's Wash- 
ington Star : 

That would put a strain on anyone's credulity. I wish you would ponder over 
this question further over the week end. I am sure you will appreciate that it 
is difficult to believe your answer. 

I believe I understand correctly that the Senator's credulity applied 
only to my assertions that I have not read, since mid-May 1944, cer- 
tain papers, principally and specifically a memorandum answering, in 
expanded form, the question set forth in Captain Safford's two let- 
ters that I prepared for Admiral Halsey's perusal, but it probably 
also included Captain Safford's two letters and my reply to his first. 

I have pondered this request, with the following result, which has 
become, I am afraid, rather lengthy in text. I have attempted to keep 
it short, but a question of credulity did not warrant, I felt, leaving 
out of this summary any [11120] matter I have included. 

I have thought that it would not be necessary to bring these papers 
into the record of this hearing at all. I had no intention of doing so, 
unless directly asked for them. Such a direct request was addressed 
to me in this room by Senator Lucas last Monday when Captain Saf- 
ford was on the witness stand. At that time I considered that fur- 
nishing the Captain Safford's two letters and my reply to his first 
letter was complying fully with Senator Lucas' request. 

My memorandum answering, in expanded form, the questions set 
forth in Captain Safford's two letters would not have been introduced 
if Mr. Keefe's or other inquiries on behalf of this committee had not 
been phrased in a form requiring its introduction. Mr. Keefe's ques- 
tion asking, in substance, whether I had ever discussed Captain Saf- 
ford's letters with anyone required, I felt, the mention at that time 
of my discussion with Admiral Halsey, the only person who has seen 
these papers, except Captain Safford and myself, prior to the opening 
of this hearing. 

In the interest of the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the 
truth, when Mr. Keef e asked his next question as to why such discus- 



4162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

sion was held, I considered it incumbent on me to produce Admiral 
Kimmel's letter and my memorandum to exj^lain the discussion. 

[11121] I am of the complete conviction that no question pro- 
pounded by Senator Ferguson to me required such mention of Ad- 
miral Halsey or Admiral Kimmel, or this memorandum. 

The reasons for my position on this matter, as outlined above, are 
that I felt the only end that could possibly be served by their intro- 
duction was a picture of the events preceding Pearl Harbor as I saw 
them at the time the memorandum was drafted. That is a year and 
a half to two j^ears ago. Since both persons involved, namely Cap- 
tain Safford and mj^self, were to be witnesses before this hearing, I 
felt that first-hand, direct testimony would be developed by counsel 
and the committee and be preferred to any letters or memoranda 
which may have been written at a time when, at least in my case, 
initial attempts were made to recall those events without benefit of 
any files or pertinent documents to refresh the memory. 

To cover the question of credulity to be given my testimony con- 
cerning these papers, I therefore felt it necessary to explain the his- 
tory of their custody by me in full. 

When I received Captain Safford's first letter at the end of 1943 I 
considered it a straightforward and proper request for information 
on matters of which both he and I were cognizant. It will be noted 
that his letter of 22 [11122] December 1943 is on the official 
letterhead of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy De- 
partment, and uses the official classification stamp "Confidential." 

The letter states that he is preparing a secret paper covering events 
on early December 1941 with the aid of officers and records in the 
Navy Department. 

Three questions arose in my mind at that time. One concerning 
the classification he had used, namely, "Confidential." I thought it 
should have been "Secret." 

Second, concerning his cautions regarding "unauthorized hands 
seeing it" ; and, third, concerning why such a request for information 
had not come through official channels and the safeguards thus 
afforded. 

Since the letter had arrived safely, the first question was no longer 
pertinent. Concerning the second and third, I felt he used this means 
to keep from disclosing to unauthorized officers and enlisted men in 
the office where I was stationed at Pearl Harbor matters which had 
always been and still were restricted to only those people working 
with it and certain senior officers. 

Furthermore, the practice of discussing and reporting official mat- 
ters in personal correspondence, although abolished in the Division 
of Naval Intelligence in 1940, continued, I knew, in other divisions and 
bureaus of the [1112r3] Navy Department. I, therefore, pre- 
pared a reply, couching it in such language, by means of reference to 
the original letter, that no compromise to unauthorized persons could, 
I believed, possibly result from the letter going astray, or from ex- 
amination by censors at Pearl Harbor, or elsewhere. 

The letter thus censored by myself, was unclassified and was sub- 
mitted to the officer in my section who was censoring for my section. 
It was forwarded under his censorship seal after cursory examina- 
tion, and assurance from me that it contained nothing likely to com- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4163 

promise security. I was fully prepared to answer and assume respon- 
sibility for any future questions that might be raised by other censors 
or the Navy Department regarding this letter. 

Captain SafFord's first letter and my reply were carried by me to the 
South Pacific with other classified papers used by myself in my work 
under an official courier letter of the officer in charge, Joint Intelligence 
Center, Pacific Ocean areas, dated January 10, 1044, the original of 
which I have before me for presentation, if so desired. 

Captain Safford's second letter arrived shortly after I reached the 
South Pacific. I never answered him for reasons I have set forth at 
some length in several parts of my previous testimony. 

I did not read more than the first few paragraphs [111£4^ of 
this second letter until mid-May 1944, on the occasion of the arrival of 
Admiral Kimmel's letter to Admiral Halsey and my first conference 
with Admiral Halsey resulted in my preparation of the expanded 
memorandum reply. This also I have covered at some length in pre- 
vious testimony. 

In the second interview with Admiral Halsey, in which he read all 
these papers, there was not only no question raised by Admiral Halsey 
as to the propriety of my retaining Captain Safford's letters and as to 
the propriety of my reply to Captain Safford's first letter, but he ex- 
pressed satisfaction with my promise to prepare an affidavit or deposi- 
tion covering essentially the subject matter of the above-mentioned 
papers, and then informing Admiral Kimmel, either directly or 
through Admiral Halsey, regarding where such affidavit could be 
found in the event of my death. 

The only instance when a security point arose during our conver- 
sation was when I expressed myself on and Admiral Halsey expressed 
agreement with the view that Captain Safford was rash in having sent 
a letter of the character of his second. 

I, therefore, felt fully justified in the steps I had followed to date 
in this matter. 

As I have earlier stated in testifying before this com- [1112S] 
mittee, the safe handling and eventual disposition of these papers gave 
me some concern during the summer of 1944, after Admiral Halsey 
left the South Pacific, about June 15, 1944. 

I never prepared the deposition or the affidavit for Admiral Kimmel 
that I had promised Admiral Halsey I would. I did, however, con- 
tinue to hold these papers, more particularly the expanded memoran- 
dum reply to all Captain Safford's questions as in the nature of the 
affidavit requested. 

As long as I was in the South Pacific force and area headquarters, 
which was distant from the combat zone, I felt that the papers were 
safe in my custody at headquarters. 

I left the South Pacific on September 10. 1944, carrying these papers, 
and other classified papers used in my work in two packages, sealed by 
the flag secretary to Com So Pac, and carried under the courier 
designation dated September 10, 1944, signed by the chief of staff. 
Captain — now Achniral — ^Mayfield. The original is now before me 
for submission, if so desired. 

Since September 10, 1944, these letters have remained sealed in Com 
So Pac package No. 47102, mentioned in the above courier designa- 
tion, until the afternoon of December 6, 1945. 



4164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[11126] Subsequent to my testimony given before the Naval 
Court of Inquiry at Pearl Harbor, I gave consideration, and in fact 
almost did destroy all of these letter and memoranda. The only rea- 
son, as I have already outlined why I retained them to that point 
was in compliance with Admiral Kimmel's request. 

After testifying, however, before the court of inquiry held by 
Admiral Murfin at Pearl Harbor that reason no longer held, in view 
of the fact that my story was now a matter of record in the transcript 
of the proceeding of the court of inquiry. 

However, I continued to hold these papers more in the nature of 
mementos of that occasion, and partly with a view to having docu- 
mentary evidence of what my reply to Captain Safford's first letter 
had been. 

[11127] I have previously gone into the circumstances sur- 
rounding my arrival from the South Pacific at Pearl Harbor around 
midnight September 12-13, 1944, and the fact that I was not aware I 
had been called north to testify, before a naval inquiry on Pearl Har- 
bor. I have further testified previously that it was not until a few 
minutes prior to my appearance before this hearing that I was aware 
that I would be permitted to testify on matters involving radio 
intelligence. 

In support of this testimony I can only call on Capt. E. T. Layton, 
U. S. N., at that time and still the intelligence officer of commander 
in chief Pacific Ocean area, Admiral Nimitz, the said Captain Layton 
being my informant in each case. 

Until the Senator from Maine asked me the direct question, "Who 
has seen these memoranda and letters since this hearing opened in 
mid-November," or words to that effect, there was not only no neces- 
sity, but not even any occasion for dragging into my testimony the 
names of three close and long-time friends of mine. 

In support of my previous testimony regarding my not reading the 
letters and the memorandum answering Captain Safford's questions 
in full when I presented them for perusal to three of my friends since 
this hearing opened, [lll£8] I can only call on Admiral Wil- 
kinson, Captain Rochefort, and Colonel Bales, who are the afore- 
mentioned three friends. 

I have not seen any of these three individuals since some days prior 
to my appearance in this witness chair, and have not communicated 
with any of these three individuals directly or indirectly for several 
weeks past. 

At this point, in the interest of precision and accuracy of my testi- 
mony in the record, I should like to modify somewhat the testimony 
I gave Saturday, as to the exact dates I saw and showed these letters 
to the above-mentioned three friends. 

I find that in some notes I kept during December last, an entry for 
the day I arrived in Washington from Miami was as follows : 

December 6, Thursday, p. m. : Bull session with Wilkinson and later Kirk and 
Wilkinson. Kirk is with General Board. Saw Joe Rochefort briefly in office. 
McCollum and Layton were here for some days but left yesterday. 

December 13, Thursday, 0830: Up and to Department. 

1000 (about), showed Wilkinson Safford's letters and what had been done with 
replies (shown only to Halsey in case of No. 2) . This was my explanation to him 
of all this unwarranted publicity I have been getting. 

[11129] 1230 : Lunch and bull session with Rochefort. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4165 

1430: Bales' office and discussed Saffo letters a little. Will show him these 

^^nlcember 14 Friday, 1430: Had brief session with Safford in his office looking 
over some of his files of papers. Stated I would look at others tomorrow or 

sion continued 'til about 1530. 

This, Senator, ends my quotation from the afore-mentioned notes. 
In the event Senator Brewster's or other's creduhty is strained as to 
why I have had such notes in my possession and as to their authenticity, 
I can only assert the following, which is the sole explanation : 

In November last year , . 

Mr. Richardson ( interposing) . Captain, ] ust a minute. 

Is there any need of carrying this on? The only question as I 
understand it, that was asked you by Senator Ferguson inlJO\ 
was the (question of keeping this memorandum m your possession witli- 

""""cISair/KRAMEK. I understood the question, Mr. Counsel, to apply 
to the credulity to be applied to my testimony regarding the showing 
of these memoranda, and not reading them while they were being 

shown. ^ , - .^, ., 

Mr. Richardson. Go ahead. Get through with it. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, in fairness to the witness, the feenator 
from Maine did ask him to ponder. 

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead, Captain. 

\ni3n Captain Kramer. In November last year my wife came 
to Washington from Miami and remained with me "ntil our departure 
on November 14 for Miami. On my return alone to Washington in 
early December to await the pleasure of this committee I determined 
to keep notes in some detail of my activities, people I met, old ac^ 
quaintances seen again, and so forth, so that on my expected return 
to Miami for the Christmas holidays she could read them over and 
I would thus be able to acquaint her of the above m some detail with- 
out depending on memory alone. 

Such a set of notes or diary I have never kept since some years prior 
to Pearl Harbor. The sole reason for keeping it m this instance was 
because of the deep interest with which my wife was following these 
hearings and any connection I might have therewith. They cover the 
period from December 5, 1945, when I left Miami for Washington to 
December 20, 1945, when I left Washington for Miami. They were 
prepared by me on my return to the Bethesda Naval Hospital each 
evening before I turned in. No such notes were undertaken by me 
during my present stay in Washington for the past months because 
my wife was with me here most of this time. They consist of about 
eight and one-half pages and are rather meticulous and complete and 
mention the names of nearly every acquaintance I saw or conversed 

[111321 I am confident that Admiral Wilkinson, Captain Roche- 
fort, and Colonel Bales will substantiate my testimony previouslv 
given regarding my presentation of Safford's letters to them, as well 



4166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

as all details of which they are aware with regard to the accuracy of 
the above-quoted notes and my testimony. 

The Senator from Maine and others may have received and may 
now receive with some degree of incredulity the assertions I have made 
in the previous testimony regarding my relations with Captain 
Safford to the effect that up until last week at least they have con- 
tinued on a friendly basis and so continue unless his attitude toward 
me has changed in the past week. I have inserted above the quotation 
from my notes in support of this assertion. I am sure that Captain 
Safford's secretary, as well as certain officer subordinates of his can 
support my assertion that during my four or five visits to his office 
last year there continued to be friendly relations between us despite 
disagreement on many points. Captain Safford himself can also sup- 
port this. 

The full set of these notes I would be glad to submit to Senator 
Brewster, or others, for examination if so desired. 

In support of my previous testimony that I have not shown this 
memorandum to other than Admiral Halsey, Admiral Wilkinson, 
Captain Rochefort, and Colonel Bales, prior to [11133] show- 
ing it to Lieutenant Commander Baecher a few days ago, I can only 
call on all persons with whom I could possibly have had contact since 
mid-May 1944. I am confident no such peruser of these papers can 
be found or could ever have been found. 

In sujiport of my previous testimony that I have not read these 
papers, other than to glance at the headings or first paragraphs of 
each, from mid-Maj^ 1944 to this moment, except for certain days 
and times last December as given above, and a few days ago to 
Lieutenant Commander Baecher, I can only give my word that this 
is a meticulously truthful statement of fact. 

I hope these comments comply with the wish of the Senator from 
Maine that I ponder this question further during the week end, 
namely, the question of assertions of mine with respect to these 
papers, assertions which may possibly have resulted in straining the 
credulity to be afforded my previous testimony before this committee 
on this and other matters. 

[1113i] The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your state- 
ment, Captain? 

Captain Kramee. Yes, sir ; that completes my statement. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. I think I will leave that subject for a while 
now and go to another one. 

Will you take Exhibit 2 and turn to page 22. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. WTien is the first that you saw that message 
either in code or the rough translation ? 

Captain Kramer. The first I recollect having seen this message 
was in the form of a rough translation attached to the decoded 
Japanese text on Monday morning December 8, 1941. However, I 
have been informed 

Mr. EiCHARDsoN. He just asked you when you first saw it. 

Captain Kramer. All right. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the first you saw it? 

Captain Kj?amek. That is the first I recollect seeing it ; yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4167 

Senator Ferguson. You had a Mrs. Edgers in your department ? 

Captain Kramer. It was she I was about to refer to, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you see her on Saturday; was she 
working ? 

Captain Kramer. She was ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And did you know that she translated that in 
the rough on Saturday '^ 

Captain Kramer. I did not know she did. She has stated to me 
she did and 

Mr. Richardson. That answers the question. 

Captain Kramer. And I believe her in that respect. 

Senator Ferguson. These messages in Exhibit 2 were very impor- 
tant, were they not ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; they were. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, turn to page 27. That message came in 
on the 6th and it has this at the bottom : 

I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to 
take advantage for a surprise attack against these places. 

It was from Honolulu to Tokyo. That was a very vital message, 
was it not ? 

Captain Kramer. It certainly became one when we knew of the 
attack on Pearl Harbor; yes, sir. It would have been if we had seen 
it prior to the attack. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why no particular effort was 
being made to translate these messages as to Avhere the attack would 
be — or the same effort that was being exerted to ascertain whether 
there would be a breach of relations? 

Captain Kramer. Senator, my answer to that will fall in 
[11136] two parts. In the first place, there is no clue to the sub- 
ject or importance of a message until a translator has completed a 
translation. In the second place, this message is dated December 6, 
a date of Army responsibilitj?^, and I know nothing of their handling 
of this particular message. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, turn to page 29. The last sentence of 
that message, from Honolulu to Tokyo reads : 

It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the Fleet Air 
Arm. 

Captain Kramer. Precisely the same remarks apply to this mes- 
sage, which was translated, according to the notation at the bottom, 
and my recollection, too, incidentally, on December 8, 1941. 

Senator Ferguson. So as I understand it, our reply is that these 
were in the Army ? 

Captain Kramer. These were Army dates of responsibility to trans- 
late; yes, sir, process and translate. 

Senator Ferguson. And not the Navy ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that part of the Army, at least 
part of the Army translators, went home at noon on Saturday? 

Captain Kramer. Normally ours would have, too. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, was it true that some of your [111S7] 
translators were on their Christmas holidays as early as this? 

Captain Kramer. They were not, sir. 



4168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Were there any on furloughs or holidays ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir; all six of my translators were on duty. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, notwithstanding the fact that these mes- 
sages were in and you anticipated a reply to the memorandum of the 
26th to the Tokyo Government, certain Army translators went home 
for the afternoon on Saturday and they hacl to be called back later 
in the afternoon to help on the thirteenth part ? 

Captain IOiamer. I do not know precisely what translators were 
or were not on duty Saturday afternoon, sir. Furthermore, as 
regards any possible connection I might have had with these mes- 
sages on Saturday afternoon, these messages were undoubtedly, un- 
questionably, in my mind, sent to Army as soon as received. 

In fact, I will modify that statement because there is a notation 
in the lower right-hand corner, a parenthetical note to the eflfect 
that the station monitoring this message was station 2, received by 
teletype. Station 3 was an Army monitoring station. In the light 
of that, it would appear that this message was seen by Army and 
detained entirelj^ at all times in the Army Signal Intelligence Sec- 
tion until processed and translated. 

[11138^^ Senator Ferguson. Were any men in your department 
on Christmas leave as early as December 7 ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not recall having given Christmas leave, 
except possibly Christmas Day, to any of my translators, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. To anyone in your department, whether trans- 
lators, or otherwise? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. My department consisted of six trans- 
lators, one officer besides myself, and two yeomen. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you were responsible for the translations ? 

Captain Kramer. Translation and dissemination; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, Now, the one on page 27, No. 253. That would 
indicate that it came from the Army and therefore the Navy was 
not responsible? 

Captain Kramer. At the bottom, the lower right-hand corner of 
page 28, is the same notation as appears on the other one, namely, 
that station 2, an Army station, monitored this message. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that true of No. 245 on page 22 ? 

Captain Kramer. That is true insofar as the figure 7 in the lower 
right-hand corner indicates that an Army station monitored this 
message. Since it is dated the 3d, \^11139'\ an odd date, it 
would indicate that they sent it over to Navy, to the GY section, to 
be processed when or shortly after received by Army Signal In- 
telligence Section. 

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that the Army or Navy at 
that time could shift responsibility for translation by merely trans- 
ferring it over to the other departments ? 

Captain Kramer. They could and did, sir, based on the allocation 
of responsibility for attack on various Japanese systems and ciphers, 
which allocation consisted briefly of odd days being taken care of 
by the Navy, even days by Army. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you read Mrs. Edgers' testimony ? 

Captain Kjramer. No, sir; I have not. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear that this was translated in 
the rough on Saturdaj'" afternoon? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE • 4169 

Captain Kramer, Yes, sir; I did. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, translation in the rough would indicate 
the contents of the message, would it not; show its importance? 

Captain Kjjamer. Not necessarily, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, Were you responsible to supervise these 
translators? 

Captain Kramer. I was, sir. 

[III4O] Senator Ferguson. Reading from page 5412 of the 
Hewitt testimony, the testimony of Mrs. Edgers : 

Well, at the time it was my work to roughly translate any message which 
was put on my desk, and this was among the messages that were put on my 
desk on December 6, Saturday morning, and at the time I had only been work- 
ing in this section for about a little over two weeks, so at first glance this 
seemed to be more interesting than some of the other messages I had in my 
basket. 

I am talking about the one about the lights in the windows, on 
page 22 of exhibit 2 ; you. understand ? 
Captain Kramer, Yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

And so I selected it and asked one of the other men who were also translators 
working on other messages whether or not this shouldn't be done immediately, 
and was told that I should, and I then started to translate it. 

Well, now, is that the way that the importance of the message was 
determined ? If it was interesting to one they would go to somebody 
else and ask whether they were to translate it? Weren't you in 
charge that morning and didn't you know that there was a 13-part 
message coming in in reply to the message that Mr. Hull had given 
to the Japanese on the 26th that may or may not mean a break in 
[in 41] relations? 

Captain Kramer. Your question, I believe, is a double question, 
Senator. 

I was in charge of that section that morning. I was not aware 
until about 3 p. m,, or shortly after, about the arrival of the message 
you referred to, the note. 

Senator Ferguson, Do I understand then, that you didn't know 
until 3 o'clock in the afternoon that there was a reply coming in to 
the message of the 26th? 

Captain Kramer, That is precisely correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then it was not an unusual day in the Navy 
translation department until 3 o'clock on the 6th ? 

Captain Kramer. It was no more unusual at 3 o'clock than it was 
all that day, and for some days prior to that time. 

Senator" Ferguson, Wasn't it usual that you would leave at noon 
on Saturday? 

Captain Kramer. About a quarter of 1; yes, sir. That was the 
closing of working hours. 

Senator Ferguson, How does it come that you didn't leave on that 
Saturday, then? 

Captain Kramer, I would venture the guess that probably three- 
quarters of the days for several months prior to Pearl [11143] 
Harbor I did not leave at the close of working hours but retained in 
the section either alone or with one or more translators for periods 
varying from a few minutes to many hours after the close of working 
hours. 

79716—46 — pt. 9 17 



4170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you never saw the Winant note which 
came in at 10 : 40 to the State Department indicating that there was 
going to be an attack on the Kra Peninsula on Sunday? 

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir. However, I knew about that con- 
templated attack, at least insofar as it was disclosed in this traffic; 
and, further, I drafted a message, which I referred to a few days 
ago here, outlining the high points of that attack, a dispatch sent to 
the commander in chief. Pacific Fleet and Asiatic Fleet. 

Senator Ferguson. Then up until 3 o'clock on Saturday there was 
no re-alerting of your department? 

Captain Kramer. Re- what? 

Senator Ferguson. Re-alerting or change, that you were working 
harder or any different than you were in the normal day, because you 
hadn't received the Winant message and you had no other information 
which would indicate that there was any unusual message coming 
through on that day ? 

Captain Kramer. On that point. Senator ^ the alerting you refer to 
could not possibly have altered the situation in [1114^] my 
office since not only that day but for many days during that fall we 
were working at full capacity and over, if I may so state, in my 
section. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I go on. Mr. Sonnett is examining Mrs. 
Edgers. He says : 

About what time on that day did you complete your translation, Mrs. Edgers? 

Now referring to this light message on page 22 of Exhibit 2. She 
says: 

Well, it so happened that there was some mistakes that had to be corrected 
and so that took some time. That was at 12 : 30 or perhaps it was a little before 
12:30. Whatever time it was we were to go home, it being Saturday. We 
worked until noon. I hadn't completed it so I worked over-time and finished it, 
and I would say that between 1 : 30 and 2: 00 was when I finished my rough draft 
translation. 

She was asked : 

That is on the afternoon of December 6? 

And Mrs. Edgers says : 

On the 6th, yes, sir. 

Mr. Sonnett. For the sake of the record will you describe briefly what that 
message is? 

And the reply : 

Mrs. Edgees. Well, without reading it over again now, [11144] just 
because of the fact that the message did keep in mind — I would say that it was a 
message saying how they were going to communicate from Honolulu to the parties 
intei'ested the information of our fleet movements from Honolulu, and apparently 
it was something which they had had previous arrangements but they had changed 
some of the minor details of how to go about it. I think there was something 
to do with lights, a window of a certain house, and there was also soiuething 
about newspaper advertising. 

Now, here is a girl that is remembering this until 1945 without 
seeing the message, showing that she understood what it was from 
the rough. 

Captain Kramer. I think, Senator, on the point of remembering 
that, I have not particularly read or studied this since I did on Decem- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4171 

ber 8, 1941, but I believe I could quote the whole message almost 
verbatim from memory. 

Senator Ferguson. And you hadn't read it since the 8th of 
December ? 

Captain Kramer. Xot in full ; no, sir. 

Senator Fergusox. But you are having a great amount of difficulty 
remembering what was in the winds execute message which was only 
about two lines in len^ith? 

Captain Kramer. And, incidentally, seen by me for a period vary- 
ing from 10 to 15 seconds and containing information [1114^^ 
that was not materially different than information we had already. 

In the case of this message here. Senator, I spent several days 
clearing garbles and working with this message before it was com- 
pleted in the form you now see it. 

Senator Ferguson. "\^nien did you spend that time on it ? 

Captain Kramer. December 8-9-10, 1941, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But there was sufficient even in the rough to 
impress Mrs. Edgers with the facts that she has related in thai 
answer, which would have tipped you off, would it not, that Pearl 
Harbor was in danger that day if there was going to be an attack? 

Captain Kramer. That attention was not invited to me that I 
have any recollection of, sir. In that connection I would like to 
remark that Mrs. Edgers was still unfamiliar with the practices and 
procedures in mj office, that it was the usual if not invariable prac- 
tice of the three highly skilled and experienced translators in my 
office to always immediately invite my attention to important traffic 
they were working on or had completed. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, would j'ou consider that or would 
you not consider that important traffic ? 

Captain Kramer. This particular message? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

[111^6] Captain Kramer. If I had seen it Saturday afternoon 
I most certainly think I would have; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for the person Mrs. Edgers 
showed it to not coming to the same conclusion ? 

Captain Kramer. I cannot account for that, sir. He probably did. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, the next question (reading) : 

Do j'ou kuow whether that trauslation which you completed in the early 
afternoon of December 6, 1941, was brought to the attention of now Captain 
Kramer ? 

Mrs. Edgers. It was brought to his attention naturally because it was — well — 
well, in any case, he knew that I was working on it and I left it, as a matter of 
fact, in the hands of the Chief, whose job it was to edit messages and write 
them up, or one that was more complicated and moi-e important, like this, 
the officer in charge looked it over and edited it. 

Wlio would he be? 

Captain Kramer. That would be myself, sir. 
Senator Ferguson. Did you so edit it? 
Captain Kramer. Not Saturday; no, sir. 
Senator Ferguson. Well, then, the Chief would be you? 
Captain Kramer. The Chief would refer to Chief Yeoman Bryant, 
now Chief Ship's Clerk, U. S. Navy. 



4172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

\^lllJi7'\ Senator Ferguson. The first part of the answer would 
apply to Bryant and the last part of the answer to you, that you would 
edit it? Bryant would not edit it? 

Captain Kramer. He would edit it as far as putting it in our usual 
form. The text and contents would be edited by myself so far as the 
translation was concerned. 

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand now that your department was 
alerted to the fact that you were trying to get Intelligence to ascertain 
if the Japanese attacked where they would attack? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever talked to Mr. Bryant, Ship's Clerk 
Bryant, covering that, so that if a message came on the 6th indicating 
a transmission of information from Honolulu or Hawaii about our 
fleet by using lights in the window, that he would immediately sense 
that that was a very vital and important message and would take it 
up with his superior ? 

Captain Kj^amer. Most certainly did not, sir. I knew nothing about 
lights until I studied that message. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you take up with him the fact that you 
wanted him to take up with you any messages indicating where an 
attack might take place ? 

Captain Kramer. I at no time was aware or believed that \^lllJt8^ 
the Japanese would attack the United States, sir, until they actually 
did. 

Senator Ferguson. Then we come to this point. On Saturday 
morning your department was not even alerted to the fact that the 
Japs might attack the United States? 

Captain Kramer. I am afraid, Senator, that your construction of 
the word "alert" differs from mine. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Let's take out the word "alert" and 
say "aroused to that fact" ? 

Captain Kjiamer. We were aroused to the imminent diplomatic 
crisis, yes, sir, and were working to full capacity. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, were you familiar with the fact that there 
was a movement south which might involve the United States ? 

Captain I^amer. I had no knowledge whatsoever that such move- 
ment south, of which we had a great deal of information, would involve 
th^ United States ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, if you had had information of our 
policy — — 

Captain I^amer. About what, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. About our policy, of what it meant to the United 
States, a movement south into Malaya, would that have helped you 
on these messages to determine their importance ? 

[^lllJfO] Captain Krajier. I believe it would, sir, in that I would 
have paid far more attention to the details or elicited from Captain 
McCollum details about our fleet. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know our Fleet was in Hawaii ? 

Captain Kramer. I knew it was in the Hawaiian area, but whether 
in port or hundreds of miles away I had no knowledge of at any time 
for months prior to Pearl Harbor or in fact for months after Pearl 
Harbor. 

Senator Ferguson. So you didn't know whether we were out at sea 
or whether we were in port ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4173 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You didn't know what our policy was, if there 
was an attack on the British that we might expect an attack on our 
fleet which was on the flank, you had no knowledge of that? 

Captain Kramer. I had no knowledge of that policy ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Therefore a message such as this fleet movement, 
this message on page 22, of the lights in the window to indicate when 
our ships were in the harbor, wouldn't have really meant much to you ? 

Captain Kramer. I think 

Senator Ferguson. Because you didn't know the fleet was there? 

Captain Kramer. I think the message would have meant 
[11150] much to me if it were in legible form when I first perused 
it; yes, sir. However, I have already remarked on the fact that to 
get it into its present form required several days' work, to make much 
sense of it. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you treat this message in the same way as 
you treated the fourteenth part message ? 

Captain Kramer. As soon as I saw it I did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did your department treat or was it instructed 
to treat all messages alike on this morning, or were they put to work 
on the thirteenth part of the 14-part message ? 

Captain Kramer. I repeat again. Senator, the so-called 14-part 
message did not start coming in until the afternoon. There were no 
specific instructions, except general instructions about certain circuits 
being pushed through first, but it was the practice of my more experi- 
enced translators to glance through hastily the general tenor of all 
messages put on their desks and then give priority to those that ap- 
peared most important. Oftentimes consulting with me on that point. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand it, Bryant had instruc- 
tions when he saw the rough of this message so that he should have 
called it to your attention ? 

Captain Kramer. Not specific instructions on this message, 
[lllSl] no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Any message. 

Captain Kramer. Any message which normally such attention 
would have been drawn to me in the first instance by the translator so 
translating it, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But you had never taken up with Bryant or 
your staff that matter ? 

Captain Kramer. Normally, Senator, Bryant did not get this mate- 
rial until I edited it. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you account 

Captain Kramer. Unless a message was of simple form or was 
perfectly plain as to sense and meaning to the translator, in which 
case the translator, if it were not something that because of its content 
and importance should be at once brought to my attention, the trans- 
lator would feel it should be typed up before bringing it to my atten- 
tion. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever take up with Bryant or your staff 
the importance of ship movements as well as diplomatic matters? 

Captain Kramer. I did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What was your instruction to them ? I am talk- 
ing about these messages on ship movements in exhibit 2, where we find 



4174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

three or four not translated, at least on the smooth copy, until after 
the attack, and if translated [11152] before would have o:iven 
you definite information that there was going to be an attack on Pearl 
Harbor. 

Captain Kramer. Every message bearing on ship movements, either 
of our Navy, our merchant marine, or foreign navies, specifically Eng- 
land, was given high priority in my section and all were translated 
and disseminated by my section. 

Senator Ferguson. You knew that some of these messages w^ere 22 
days being translated. How do you account for that? And I find 
no diplomatic messages held up that long. 

Captain Kramer. I would like to have a specific one pointed out, 
sir, before commenting on that. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I wish you would look over them. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. I wonder if the Senator knows that that particular 
message was also in Honolulu on the 5th. I mean as to this signal. 
They had it there. The lights in the window message was handed over 
to them on the 5th at Honolulu. It was in Pearl Harbor at G-2 and 
they did translate it after the 7th but they didn't before. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I am trying to find out what this gentle- 
man knew about it. 

Did you know what code machines they had at Pearl Harbor ? 

[11153] Captain Kramer. I knew that they had what we call 
a RIP, meaning Radio Intelligence Publication, in fact a number of 
them, which included all systems being currently read. I was not aware 
about the status of the unit at Pearl Harbor with respect to a machine. 
In other words, the purple machine. 

Senator Ferguson. You didn't know whether they had one or did 
not have one ? 

Captain Kramer. I did not know until after Pearl Harbor ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But you weren't relying upon Pearl Harbor 
getting these messages. You were relying upon the fact that you had 
to get them and give them to these high officials from the President 
down? 

Captain Kramer. That was my prime responsibility ; yes, sir. The 
Asiatic Fleet, in other words, our unit at Corregidor, I knew did have 
the purple machine. 

Senator Ferguson. But your job was not to know or to understand 
what Pearl Harbor had, 3^our job was to get the translations and give 
them to the President and from him on down in the Navy as you 
have described? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. The allocation of effort to be carried 
on by the Pearl Harbor unit was done by Captain Safford and his 
subordinates other than myself. 

[11154] Senator Ferguson. You were not concerned with what 
they had at Pearl Harbor ? 

Captain Kramer. I had nothing to do with what they had or what 
they worked on ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, And the fact that they may have had these mes- 
sages was no concern of yours because your position was to get them 
translated, give them to the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Turner, 
Admiral Stark, and the President? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4175 

Captain Kramer. That was my prime responsibility; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That was your prime responsibility and that is 
what you were trying to do? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, the State Department didn't call you or 
get in touch with you and tell you that they had a message at 10 : 40 
indicating that there was going to be an attack on the Kra Peninsula 
and therefore you were to be alerted to get any message that might 
come in and get immediate translation so that they could ascertain 
what might happen other than in the Kra Peninsula where they saw 
the Japanese were going ? 

Captain Kramer. I knew nothing about that State Department 
message ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you had no word from the State [11155] 
Department ? 

Captain Kramer. I did not ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How long has Commander Baecher been with 
the Department ? Do you know him ? 

Captain Kramer. I first had contact that I recollect only after I 
returned to Washington from Miami on December 6, last year, I 
understand, howcA^er, that he was one of the assistants to Admiral 
Hewitt, though I do not recollect his being in those hearings. 

Senator Ferguson. He was an assistant in the hearings to Admiral 
Hewitt and helped to conduct those hearings? 

Captain Kramer. That is what I now understand. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, he hadn't been in your department? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir ; at no time. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether he is a Reserve officer or 
a Regular ? 

Captain Kramer. My understanding is that he is a Reserve officer 
with legal background, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. This message, extension No. 2027, the one re- 
leased by Admiral Noyes in relation to the Japanese movement in 
Thailand, are you familiar with that message? 

Captain Kramer. The one dated December 1, 1941? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Captain Kramer. Yes. sir. 

[11156] Senator Ferguson. Did you draft that message ? 

Captain Kramer. I believe I did, sir ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, why did you draft that message? 
Wouldn't that be out of your line entirely ? 

Captain Kramer. Not necessarily, sir. I drafted that message, as 
well as the one on Japanese diplomatic post destruction of codes, which 
was similarly forwarded to Captain Saiford and Admiral Noyes' of- 
fice. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, if you thought that Cincaf and Cincpac 
were getting the messages, why did you draft this one for Admiral 
Noyes to send out on December 1 ? 

Captain Kramer, I felt that we should insure that they got that 
picture, sir, even though they may have received it and read it on 
the Asiatic station, the British also at Singapore, and the unit at 
Honolulu, 



4176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. If you knew nothing about our policy in case 
of an attack by the Japanese on the British, I am trying to find out, 
then, from this message, why you would take special interest to send 
this message, not only to CinCaf but for CincPac, when it has nothing 
to do with an attack upon America. Thousands of miles away from 
any possession of America, was it not i 

Captain Kj?amer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Will the Senator yield? 

[11167] Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. Will the Senator tell me what that policy is? 

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to find out. 

Senator Lucas. The Senator has been assuming with this witness 
that we had a definite policy, that he didn't know anything about, in 
the event the Japanese attacked the British and the Dutch. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I am trying to find out from this wit- 
ness. If he knew nothing about any policy why, I would like to 
know, would he be sending a special message such as this. 

Will you read the message now. Let's see what is in it. Then I 
can cover it and find out whether or not you knew anything about 
policy. 

Captain Kramer (reading) : 

Ambassador Tsubokami in Bangkok on 29th sent to Tokyo as number S72 the 
following: "Conferences now in progress in Bangkok considering plans aimed 
at forcing British to attack Thai at Padang Bessa near Singoi-a as countermove 
to Japanese landing at Kota Bharu. Since Thai intends to consider first in- 
vader her enemy, Orange" — 

which means Japan — 

"Believes this landing in Malay would foire British to invade Thai at Padang 
Bessa. Thai would [11158] then declare war and request Orange help. 
This plan appears to have approval of Thai Chief of Staff Bijitto. Thai Govern- 
ment circles have been sharply divided between pro-British and pro-Orange 
until 25 November but now Wanitto and Shin who favor joint military action 
with Orange, have silenced anti-Orange group and intend to force Premier 
Pibul to make a decision. Early and favorable develoiiments are possible." 

Senator Ferguson. Now, if you knew of no policy that we had — 
how far was this from American possessions ? 

Captain Kramer. Senator, the prime reason for ever having set up 
a crypt analytical unit at Corregidor and at other times in certain 
places in China, was to keep the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, 
at that time Admiral Hart, as fully apprised as possible of political, 
military and other developments of like nature in his sphere. 

Senator Ferguson. How far was this from the Philippines? You 
didn't answer my question. 

Captain Kramer. My guess is probably 800 to a thousand miles, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, look at the message in Exhibit 2, the mes- 
sage of September 24, page 12. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Where it sets up Pearl Harbor and tells ex- 
actly what areas are to be covered in the future. [11159] It 
asks Honolulu to tell what ships are tied up at wharves, buoys, and in 
docks. Are you familiar with that message? 

Captain Kramer. I am, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you tell me why you would send a message 
that involved the British and the Japanese a thousand miles from any 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4177 

of our possessions directly to the information of CincPac, which was 
Admiral Kimmel, and yet this message, which set up a plan of Pearl 
Harbor, indicating what they wanted it for was an attack later, you 
didn't send that out to either the Pacific or to the Asiatic Fleet, and here 
you were sending one that involved a country a thousand miles from 
our possessions. 

Captain Krahier. I would like to invite the Senator's attention to 
a piece of paper which I believe is an exhibit before this hearing, 
namely, a gist of the traffic disseminated in early October 1941 to all 
recipients in the Navy Department. That gist was prepared by my 
section and was asterisked as being an item, a gist of this message, an 
item of special interest, sir. 

[11160] Senator Ferguson. I would like 

Captain Kramer. I was not directed, and I do not know whether 
any briefs of this message were ever to be sent to Pearl Harbor. Your 
interpretation, Senator, that this was a bombing map, I do not believe, 
from conversations I had at the time in showing and going over days' 
traffic with various recipients ; I do not believe it was interpreted by 
any of those persons as being materially different than other messages 
concerning ship movements being reported by the Japanese diplomatic 
service. 

I recollect that this was interpreted. I am uncertain ot the precise 
wording of the interpretation. This was considered, and I believe it 
was, approximately, my consideration at the time as being an attempt 
on the part of the Japanese diplomatic service to simplify communi- 
cations. 

That view is substantiated by many factors. 

One is that the Japanese were repeatedly and continually directing 
their diplomatic service to cut down traffic. They were repeatedly 
preparing and sending out abbreviations to be used with codes already 
in existence. Diplomatic codes were frequently asking for additional 
funds for quarterly allotments, and so forth, to cover telegraphic ex- 
penses. Those expenses were usually paid \ 11161] and fur- 
nished in part when so requested by Tokyo. Those and other con- 
siderations I think explain probably the handling of this particular 
message, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that later they used this map, 
this bombing map, in code messages? Say the one on page 14 of 
November 18 ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. They used it for all ship movements sub- 
sequently to setting up of this abbreviated system of reporting ships 
in Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Ferguson. You brought up a question about an exhibit 
in this case that indicated that they had given information on this 
message on page 12, the bombing map message. Will you get it for me ? 
1 think that is very important. 

Commander Baecher. I might say. Senator, that that was exhibited 
to a witness in the early stages of these hearings but was not introduced 
as an exhibit. I have a copy here on which I would like to write a short 
note to counsel, and hand it to him. 

Senator Ferguson. Then it is not in evidence here, that this was 
ever briefed and sent out ? 

Commander Baecher. That is correct. 



4178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. And the witness is wrong, and the record in 
that resj)ect should be corrected. 

[J116'i2] Commander Baecher. At one time this document was 
shown to another witness. I think Admiral Wilkinson. This witness 
saw it also and he assumed it had gone into evidence, and I think not 
improperly because it was passed around. 

Senator Ferguson. But it is not in evidence now, so there is no evi- 
dence before us that the contents of this bombing plot map had ever 
been sent out ; is that right ? 

Commander Beacher. That is right. Here is a copy of it. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, Captain, will you turn to page 15, the 
message which was translated on the 5th of December : 

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein : — 

You notice they want to know what ships are in the harbor. Not 
what ones are going out and coming in. 

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein : Area 
"N" Pearl Harbor ; Manila Bay, and the areas adjacent thereto. Make your 
investigation with great secrecy. 

Then the next message : 

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet * * * [11163] bases 
in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian Military Reservation. 

Next, translated on the 5th : 

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future 
will you also report even when there are no movements. 

Wasn't that a very significant message, that the Japanese were 
trying to ascertain what v>as in the harbor and where they were lo- 
cated ; whetlier there were any movements or not? 

Didn't your Department or section evaluate those to mean that they 
were trying to ascertain what was in the harbor and therefore when 
you received this 1 o'clock delivery message and as you say you 
charted the globe time on it, wasn't it significant that it was 7 : 30 
in the morning at Pearl Harbor? 

[11164] Captain Kramer. I have tAvo comments to make on 
your statement. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. That is not a statement. It is a question. 

Captain Kramer. The little message which you read, I believe that 
the original Japanese version innngarbled form if it were available 
would read: "Please investigate comprehensively" is probably "the 
fleet air bases." 

In other words, that blank refers to or represents a garbled code 
group and was left blank by the Army translator. It undoubtedly 
refers to air or other types of bases than fleet bases in the neighbor- 
hood of the Hawaiian military reservation. On your other point, 
Senator 

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment. 

Captain Kramer. On your point. Senator, regarding evaluation, 
that was never at any time a function of my section, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, if they were to investigate compre- 
hensively the fleet air bases didn't it even make the message more im- 
portant that they were concerned not alone with the fleet, where it 
was moving, but they were concerned with the protection of the fleet 
in the harbor ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4179 

Captain Kramer. Not in the slightest, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Not in the slightest i 

[1116S] Captain Kramer. No, sir. I would like to tell you why 
I make that reply. 

Senator Fergusox. I wish you would. 

Captain Kra3ier. Back in 1940, during the course of negotiations 
with the Dutch in Java the Japanese shoehorn, if I may use that term, 
was the delegation conducting those negotiations and ambassador or 
special envoy, as I recall it, was named Yoshizawa. 

Negotiations were conducted for a G- or 8-month period. During 
the period of those negotiations the Japanese conducted rather rigor- 
ous reconnaissance of all military establishments, not only, in Java but 
in other islands of the Dutch East Indies. 

I mentioned that in some detail, but the same thing applies to mili- 
tary establishments, air bases, fleet facilities, in Panama and in part 
of the Western Hemisphere under United States jurisdiction. The 
Japanese diplomatic service, as well as their military and naval at- 
taches abroad, were very conscientious people and reported in meticu- 
lous detail all facts that they could learn of. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, how do you account for the fact that these 
ship movements, these locations were being called for in the latter part 
of November as things were getting more critical between the two 
countries? You told us about a [11166] long-range program. 

Captain Kramer. Senator, it would have been a most weird phe- 
nomenon for the Japanese military to not have paid close attention not 
only during this week but during previous periods of crisis during 
1941 and 1940 and earlier to every detail they could learn concerning the 
United States Fleet. They reported in similar detail every ship move- 
ment into and out of all ports on the west coast of the United States 
and Panama, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Why were they wanting, though, to get the fleet 
and air bases that you now tell us this message means ? 

Captain Kramer. They likewise reported in great detail the air 
bases in the vicinity of Seattle and Bremerton Navy Yard, sir, simi- 
larly on the San Francisco area. 

Senator Ferguson. Show me any such messages in the latter part of 
November or December in relation to San Francisco and Seattle. 

Captain Kramer, I offhand do not know of any such message. Such 
may possibly be elicited by a study of the files. It may well be, how- 
ever, that no further reports in such detail were called for from the 
west coast of the United States because they already knew everything 
they wanted to. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you refer now to page 248 of [11167] 
Exhibit 1 ? The message is No. 25,850. It is at the top of the page. It 
is the 1 o'clock message. I want to read you from page 167 of top 
secret of the Pearl Harbor board in the Navy. Captain Safford is 
testifying. He says : 

Kramer took the message around, possibly the other message which said, 
"Submit our reply to the U. S. Government at one P. M. on the 7th your time" 
and reached the Chief of Naval Operations around 10 : 30 and then next the 
White House, where he again gave a copy to Admiral Beardall for the President 
and finally i-eached the State Department about 11 o'clock with it. There is 
another matter — 



4180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and this is what I want to call your attention to, but I wanted to read 
it in detail so that you would know what he was talking about. 

There is another matter which I would like to add, that at the time Kramer 
submitted SIS 25,850— 

which is the 1 o'clock message — 

to Secretary Knox he sent a note in with it saying, in effect, that this means a 
sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today and possibly a midnight attack on Manila. 

Now, what do you have to say to that ? 

Senator Lucas. Wlio said it ? 

Senator Ferguson. Safford. Do you want to see the original of 
this record? 

[11168] Captain Kramer. No, sir; I do not. What I am look- 
ing for is an item in my reply to Captain Safford's first letter, sir. 

Senator Fergusox. Do I understand that you have a memoran- 
dum there that you made of your conversations with Safford, or is 
that the reply ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. I am merely looking at a copy which 
I retained of my reply to Captain Safford's first letter. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Captain Kramer. I refer. Senator, in answer to your last question 
to my reply, item 10-c to Captain Safford, to the expanded version 
of that reply which appears in the memorandum I prepared for Ad- 
miral Halsey, which I will now read. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, is this to be an answer to my question ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Captain Kjiamer. A specific answer to your question. [Reading :] 

10-c : On returning about 10 : 20 from Mr. Hull's oflSce the remainder of No. 
02-10 were arriving, including the one setting the 1300 meeting time and the 
'Weather Report'. These were delivered to all hands, 111169] includ- 
ing Mr. Knox and Mr. Stimson, at Mr. Hull's ofHce, with my comments to Mr. 
Knox on how the hour tied with the sun and moves in progress elsewhere. 

All I can say, Senator, concerning Captain Safford's testimony is 
that he apparently got all his information for that reply from his 
interpretation of the wording of this reply I just read, or the ab- 
breviated version of it, rather. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you just read that again? 

Captain I{j{Amer, The last part is the pertinent part. I will read 
that again, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Just read that again. 

Captain Kramer (reading) : 

These — 

referring to the messages — 

were delivered to all hands, including Mr. Knox and Mr. Stimson, at Mr. Hull's 
oflBce with my comments to Mr. Knox on how the hour tied with the sun and 
movements in progress elsewhere. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, with your comments to Mr. 
Knox, that is what you are reading there ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, how did you make those comments to 
Mr. Knox? 

Captain Kramer. Via his personal aide, a foreign service officer. 
I would like to point out, Senator, that 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4181 

[11170] Senator Ferguson. Nothing in writing? 

Captain Kramer. Nothing whatsoever in writing, no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But you told him this? 

Captain Kramer. The word got to him via his foreign service 
oflEicer, who when I was speaking to him was about 10 or 15 feet 
away, just outside the closed door of the room, Mr. Hull's office, where 
the three Secretaries were conferring. 

Senator Ferguson. Who was Mr. Knox's foreign service officer? 

Captain Kramer. There were four, Senator, who were indoctrinated 
and rotated 

Mr. Richardson. Who was the one that you gave the message to? 

Senator Ferguson. Who was the one that you gave the message to ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not know which one of the four it was. I 
believe two of these were present that morning. As to their names, 
I recollect three names of the four, Gray, Stone, and Brown, because 
they associated with each other. 

Senator Ferguson. You expected that service officer to tell Mr. 
Knox everything? You would expect that service officer to tell Mr. 
Knox everything that you said to him? 

Captain Kramer. That is what my intention was, yes, sir. 

[11171] Senator Ferguson. And everything that you said to 
the foreign service officer for Mr. Knox, that there was something 
about the men being at breakfast or at mess who were at Pearl Harbor 
at that time, he would convey that to Mr. Knox then ? 

Captain Kramer. Not all those details, no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, wait a minute. 

Captain Kramer. I have previously specifically covered that point. 
Senator, by stating that the reference to Pearl Harbor was purely a 
passing reference for the benefit of non-naval personnel, namely, 
these foreign service officers and the Army officer present. 

Senator Ferguson. But you just told me in your last answer that 
you expected this foreign service officer to convey to Mr. Knox every 
word that you said. 

Captain Kramer. I did not expect him to convey every word but the 
essential points of my explanation to him, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you tell him not to convey to Mr. Knox 
the idea that it was sunrise and these men would be off duty at 7 : 30 
in the morning ? 

Captain Kramer. Of course not, sir. My only reason for the expla- 
nation was to have the gist or summary of my explanation to convey 
to Mr. Knox. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you tell him to only convey the [1117B] 
summary of your explanation ? 

Captain EIramer. I did not tell him which words to specifically con- 
vey ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, didn't you anticipate that he would convey 
the entire message to Mr. Knox ? 

Captain Kjramer. The essential points of it ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Why not all of it and let Mr. Knox be the judge 
as to what was essential or not essential ? 

Captain Kramer. In the first place, Senator, I indicated that I was 
not an evaluator of this material. I felt, however, that the essential 
points which I covered in that conversation should be pointed out to 
the foreign service officer, who in the same manner that I did for the 



4182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Navy Department high officials handled those documents in the State 
Department, passing it to the people who were permitted to see it. 

Senator Fergusox. Captain Kramer, on many occasions Secretary 
Knox had asked for your opinion because you were familiar with the 
messages, isn't that true ? 

Captain Kramer. Rarely my opinion, sir. My comments in the 
presence of Secretary Knox almost solely and entirely concerned an 
explanation on my part, often volunteered, occasionally asked for, 
regarding particular names appearing in the text, regarding refer- 
ences appearing therein and background concerning obscure points 
in the traffic. 

[1117o] Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand it you did 
have this conversation with this foreign service officer and it w^as your 
intention for him to convey it to Mr. Knox ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Fergusox. Now, I am going to ask you this question, I am 
going to read this again : 

That at the time Kramer submitted SIS 25,850 to Secretary Knox he sent a note 
in with it saying, in effect — 

now, that note, as you say, would be a message through the foreign 
service officer ? 

Captain Kramer. That word "note" is apparently Captain Safford's 
own construction of my sentence. 

Senator Fergusox. So instead of it being in writing you sent it in 
verbally ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

In effect that — 

this is "in effect" — 

that this means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today and possibly a midnight 
attacli on Manila. 

Now, do I understand that you swear now that that is not a fact, 
that last one ? 

Captain Kramer. I swear to it, Senator, and have always sworn 
that I never intended in the least to imply that those remarks I made 
indicated an attack on Pearl Harbor or, in [11174,] fact, any 
overt intention on the part of the Japanese directed toward the United 
States. 

Senator Ferguson. I am not asking you what you intended. I am 
asking you whether that is a fair substance of what you said to the for- 
eign-service officer ? 

Captain Kramer. It is not. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then General Russell asked this 
question of Safford : 

How do you know that? 

Reading from this transcript. 

Captain Safford. Kramer told me. 

General Russell. When did he tell you? 

Captain Satfobd. Kramer told me that just before be left Washington to go 

to Honolulu for duty. He had not dared 

General Frank. Which was when ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4183 

Captain Satford. Which was the spring of 1943 — he had not dared to let any- 
body know that at that time. 

General Russell. Are there any further matters about these messages now 
before we go to December the 7th and the other messages? 

Indicating that they had covered that subject. So yon see that 
Safford afjain has testified that in 1943 that is [11175] what 
you told him. 

Captain Kramer. That is not what I told him at any time, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. But you told here when Mr. Richardson exam- 
ined you what you told this foreign-service officer. Your answer to 
Mr. Richardson was the substance of what you told the foreign-service 
officer to convey to Mr. Knox, is that correct ? 

Captain Kramer. I was referring specifically in my last reply to the 
word "dared." I don't know where Captain Safford got that part 
of it. 

Mr. Richardson. He is talking about what you told me. 

Captain Kramer. I did convey to Captain Safford, I believe — I do 
not recall specifically, but to many of my contacts, probably 8 or 10 or 
a dozen in the Navy Department, chiefly subordinates, the substance of 
what I told Secretary Hull's foreign-service officer; yes, sir. I also 
mentioned it to McCollum that morning. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you tell them when you testified here in 
reply to Mr. Richardson's question — did you tell him what you said ? 

Mr. Richardson. Did you testify here about it to me in answer to 
my questions ? 

Captain Kramer. About what question, sir ? 

[111761 Senator Ferguson. About what you had told the for- 
eign-service officer to tell Mr. Knox. 

Captain Kramer. I did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Mr. Richardson. That answers his question. 

Senator Ferguson. How many deliveries did you make of messages 
on the 6th ? You made one at 9 at night ? 

Captain Kramer. Two that I recall, sir, it may have been three. 
I could determine that, I believe, by a study of the files similar to the 
one I undertook previously for you, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I am going to take that up some with you 
later. So you made two or three deliveries on Saturday ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the name of the secretary to Mr. Knox 
that was at the apartment at the Wardman? What was the name of 
that secretary ? You said there was a secretary. 

Captain Kramer. He had been a secretary. 

Mr. Richardson. What was his name? 

Captain Kramer. I believe it was Mr. Keefe, sir. I am not certain 
of that. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

Captain Kramer. In any case he can be identified as at that time 
being, I believe, the manager of the Chicago [11177] Daily 
News. 

The Chairman. John O'Keefe. 

Senator Ferguson. John O'Keefe, the Senator tells me. 



4184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Now, have you named all of the officers of the Army, the Navy, or 
the Marines that you have talked your testimony over with in relation 
to Pearl Harbor since the time that you testified before the Navy board ? 

Captain ICramer. As to details, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson". Well, are there any other officers that you have 
discussed it with not as to detail ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir ; there are. 

Senator Ferguson. And will you name them ? 

Captain Kramer. Colonel Laswell, Commander Rennick, Com- 
mander Benedict, Commander Hudson. In any case officers attached 
to the fleet radio unit at Pearl Harbor who were long-standing friends 
of mine and working in this kind of work. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever discuss it with Bratton ? 

Captain Kramer. Not that I have any recollection of, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You have had no conversations whatever with 
Bratton about the testimony or about the Pearl Harbor matter? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Since the Navy board ? 

[11178] Captain Kramer. Either before or after the Navy 
board, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss it with Baecher? 

Captain Kramer. There was some discussion concerning the avail- 
ability of records to which I for the first time had access in December 
last year and chiefly my discussion with Baecher was concerning ap- 
pointments with counsel for this committee and Mr. Baecher. Details 
concerning the content of my prior testimony or of testimony I would 
give I did not discuss with Mr. Baecher. 

Senator Ferguson. And he asked you nothing about any of the 
points that you have covered ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you tell me just what the occasion was that 
you took these letters to him and the Halsey memorandum ? Had he 
asked you or did you just volunteer that ? 

Captain Kramer. I volunteered that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. There wasn't any request? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir ; it was not. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you were greatly worried, were you not, 
sometime in September and October, you were worried? 

Captain Kramer. Of what year, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. This last year, 1945. 

Captain Kramer. About what, sir? 

[11179] Senator Ferguson. Well, I am just asking you whether 
you were worried ? 

Captain Kramer. Not that I have any recollection of, no, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Unless it is about Pearl Harbor I think it is an 
improper question to ask him. 

Senator Ferguson. This is in relation to Pearl Harbor or I would 
not have asked him. 

Senator Lucas. You said "about anything." 

Captain Kramer. I had some concern about my health. I don't 
think I recall any worry, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. There was nothing worrying you at that time 
that you went to the hospital ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE* 4185 

Captain KRi^MER. No, sir ; there was not. 

Senator Ferguson. Did 3^011 kno^Y that a letter had been written 
to your wife requesting her to come up on account of j'ou worrying 
about something ? 

Captain Kramer. With respect to my health, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, no, worrying about Pearl Harbor — or 
not Pearl Harbor but having something on your mind that you were 
greatly concerned with ? 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I think this is a highly improper 
question to ask this witness. 

Senator Ferguson. It only relates to Pearl Harbor. 

[11180] Captain Kramer. I am willing to answer that question. 

Senator Lucas. Well, I know, but there is a limit to everything. 
The Senator from Michigan now is asking this question about whether 
the witness was worrying about anything. 

Senator Ferguson. No, about Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Lucas. But you don't go back to Pearl Harbor. If you 
confine it to Pearl Harbor, all right. 

Captain Kramer. I would like. Senator Lucas, to answer that 
question. 

The Chadsman. The Chair thinks the witness is willmg to answer 
that question and probably can do so satisfactorily. 

[11181] Captain Kramer. At no time while I was in the Naval 
Hospital at Bethesda, either for the check-up during August or for 
my subsequent stay in the hospital in September or October, did I 
have any worries or concern about what I knew about Pearl Harbor, 
or any discussions with anyone about either my prior testimony, or 
what I knew about Pearl Harbor. 

I did have a brief discussion, which I have previously indicated in 
my testimony, with a classmate of mine, namel}', Commander Powell, 
to the eifect — and this bears particularly on your question, sir — that I 
might be called as a witness before the contemplated congressional 
jiearing. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I am talking about. Pearl Harbor. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I am not talking about anything else. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Now you had some concern as to whether or not you would be called 
as a witness ? 

Captain Kramer. No concern whatsoever sir. It was simply a con- 
versation in which Halsey mentioned, I believe, as I now recollect it, 
something to the effect that I was working on things connected witli 
Pearl Harbor in Washington [11182] at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you appreciate at that time that your testi- 
mony, that is, your so-called affidavit which you say now you did not 
swear to, but you considered it as such, that if you died, it was to be 
taken as your evidence in any case in which it might arise, and what 
you said at the Pearl Harbor board, that there may be a conflict in 
those two statements ? 

Captain Kramer. I was unaware of any such conflict, sir. 

79716 — 46— pt. 9 18 



4186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. And therefore, there was no concern over the 
fact that you had a memorandum, and j^ou had also testified in rela- 
tion to the matter before the Pearl Harbor board ? 

Captain Kramer. That is precisely correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You had also testified before the Hewitt com- 
mittee. Now, was there any concern over the fact that there may be 
a conflict between your testimony, that is, your memorandum and your 
testimony before the Pearl Harbor board, and your testimony before 
the Hewitt committee? 

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir. I at no time had concern 
about the few facts with which I was familiar concerning Pearl Har- 
bor. 

Senator Ferguson. And, as I understand it, as far as you were 
concerned, there were no conflicts between those [11183] three? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you concerned over your testimony before 
this board, that it might conflict with one or more of the testimonies 
that you had given ? 

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir. In fact, it was not until 
I began studying these documents in December last, that I was aware 
of such conflicts. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you discover that there were some 
conflicts ? 

Captain Kramer. I learned of certain minor discrepancies, such as 
the fact that I had previously testified that Commander Wellborn was 
in Admiral Stark's office on Sunday morning, but it appeared to be 
not true, inasmuch as Commander Wellborn was not in the Navy De- 
partment on Sunday, or at least Sunday morning at all, during the 
luncheon engagement which I previously testified to at Admiral Stark's 
home in talking with Captain McCbllum. 

Senator Ferguson. I do not want any more detail on that, because 
you have already covered that ; isn't that true ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you present here to the committee 
the papers and the documents that you say you [11184-] have 
examined, and which have caused you to make some alteration or 
some change from your previous testimony, or statements? 

Captain Kramer. I can refer in that respect, sir, only to the Navy 
narrative, all of which I have not read, and part of my testimony as 
set forth in the transcript of the Naval Court of Inquiry. Nothing 
else whatsoever, aside from the JD files, which I studied a few days 
ago, which I saw a week ago Saturday. 

Senator Ferguson. That brings us to the JD files, and I would like 
to get them now. 

Mr. Richardson. WTiere are they? 

Senator Ferguson. Is he in the phone booth again ? 

Commander Baecher. Which ones. Captain Kramer? 

Senator Ferguson. 7001, and the ones he refreshed his memory 
from. I want to see what he used to refresh his memory. 

Commander Baecher. The JD files go back a long way, Senator. 
They are a vast volume. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to see the files that this witness examined, 
from which he has made certain alterations. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4187 

Captcain Kramer. The 7000 file. 

Senator Ferguson. Are they here ? 

Commander Baecher. I will go to the phone booth, sir. 

[11185] Captain Kramer. Probably from 6500 on. 
The Chairman. Maybe the files are in the booth. 

Senator Ferguson. I notice in this testimony I read here this morn- 
ing that Safford says you told him that on Sunday morning you de- 
livered these copies to Admiral Beardall for the President. 

Does that refresh your memory that he was in charge of the White 
House map room ? 

Captain Kramer. It does not, sir. 

Any implications of that kind may have been gained from the fact 
that I indicated it had gone to Admiral Beardall's situation room for 
the President in the White House. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you got Exhibit 142 before you ? 

Captain Kramer. The material relating to the winds code, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, it is relating to the winds code. Just a few- 
questions on the winds code. 

What did you hand counsel ? 

Captain Kramer. A brief on that study I showed you a couple of 
days ago, sir. It is rather not a brief, but a smooth form of it. 

Senator Ferguson. Look at this page, at the 7,023. Will you refer 
to the 7,024, 7,025, the date of message [1118€] 2d October 
1941, date of translation 12/4/41. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have that page with those messages on ? 

Captain Kramer. I have, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for the long delay in the 
translations? Were they purple? 

Captain Kramer. They were not, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That would account for them not being trans- 
lated? 

Captain Kramer. The 7,023, 7,024, and 7,025 that you just read 
were all in the system known as JIG 19, which required delay in the 
recovery of keys. 

Senator Ferguson. And that is what accounted for the delay ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir ; many keys, in fact, we never recovered. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Let me have Exhibit 2 again. 

Those messages I show you, do you have the ones from 12 on ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What were they in ? • 

Captain Kramer. It is not apparent from Exhibit 2, [11187] 
what system they were in, sir. That could be determined by further 
study of this JD file, however. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, would you not say that the delay in those 
was due to the fact that you did not have the keys ? 

Captain Kramer. I cannot tell without knowing the system, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But you can specifically state that on 7,023, 
7,024, 7,025, and so forth, that is true? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; because I have on my copy of exhibit 
142 a brief notation of the system. I do not know from Exhibit 2 
which JD file number these Army translactions were, except the last one 



4188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Does anyone from the Army here have the data 
that they were to get me on 900 and 901, the time of the transhition 
and the other things from the worli sheet? 

Colonel DuNCOMBE. Mr." Richardson gave you a memorandum on 
that. 

Senator Ferguson. This only covers 900. I will read this into the 
record : 

11 February 1946. 

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson : 

Examination of the Signal Intelligence files discloses that Tokyo to Wash- 
ington message #900, dated 6 December, 1941, [111S8] was intercepted by 
Army station No. 7 (Fort Hunt, Virginia) at 1212 GMT — 

This is Greenwich mean time, is it ? 
Captain Ejiamer. Greenwich mean time. 
Senator Ferguson (continuing) : 

on 6 December (7:12 a. m. Washington time). The message was delivered to 
SIS by courier and was decoded by SIS at 11 : 07 — 

And they have then got "m" and at the bottom they have got a star 
and they say: "Time stamp indistinct — not clear whether 'a. m.' or 
' p. m.' " [Continuing :] 

6 December. 

So it would be either 11 : 07 in the morning, or 11 : 07 in the evening. 

The following summary of the message was written on the decode sheet, "Domei 
chief praises Kato for good reportage". The message was not further dis- 
seminated. 

Now, that came in immediately. Well, it came in with, as I am 
informed, with 901, at least it has a number before 901, so it would be 
very significant as to whether or not that was translated in the morn- 
ing or in the evening, and if it was translated at the same time that 
901 was translated — 901 bears the date of translation on December 6. 

Now, I come back to the point: How does it come about that this 
very, very im]iortant pilot message, which [11189] is trans- 
lated on the fith, was not delivered on the 6th, or early on the morning 
of the 7th, with the first delivery ? 

Captain Kramer. I cannot account. Senator, for the handling of 
the message by the Army. From the study I made for you a few days 
ago, my best knowledge and present conviction is that my section in 
the Navy Department did not receive it until approximately 10 : 25 
or 10 : 30 Sunday morning, sir. 

Senajtor Ferguson. And when I get the file we are going to go 
over it so you can tell me what is in the file to refresh your memory. 
So that you have changed your testimony, as I understand it, that you 
delivered it on the niglit of the C)th, your first testimony ? 

Captain Kramer. I don't believe I have changed that testimony 
materially, sir, inasmuch as any testimony on this point previously, 
including in this hearing, in any such testimony I have indicated my 
doubt of when that thing was delivered. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have any doubt now ? 

Captain Kramer. Not after a study of this file ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. That is why I want the file here. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4189 

[11190] I am reading from page 17 of the Clarke report, Brat- 
ton's testimony : 

When we received the Japanese message concerning the code to be used in 
weather broadcasts, I discussed the matter with my opposite number in the 
Navy, Commander McCoUum, and his assistant, Lieutenant Commander Kramer. 
They informed me that the matter was with their man in Hawaii, that he had 
all the information that we had and the same intercepts. They stated that he 
could explain in detail to the Commanding General, or his G-2 the significance 
of the code, and suggested that our Gr-2 in Hawaii get in touch with Commander 
Rochefort immediately as a means of saving time. In other words, we could 
get the desired information to the Commanding General in Hawaii or his Gt-2, 
much faster and in much greater detail and with far. greater security than by 
means of a long involved explanatory message that we would have been forced 
to send through the Army communications system. 

Do yon remember that conversation with Bratton ? 

Captain Kramer. I have no recollection of that conversation, nor 
do I have any recollection of such a message being sent. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you see General Marshall on the 6th or 
the 7th ? 

[11191] Captain Kramer. I did not, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Not to deliver to him anything, but just see 
him? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You know you did not see him ? 

Captain Kramer. I know that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I will come to one message, and I will try 
to be short on it. 

If you just try to keep to answers as short as you can, we will get 
through sooner. 

Captain Kramer. I will try. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know that the Army had set up a 
similar system to yours, not using cards, but using sheets of paper? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir; this is my first knowledge of that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not know that that was set up the same 
way in the Army ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir, not in the least. 

Senator Ferguson. But you did know that the system being used 
in the Nav}^ was by means of these cards, and telephone conversations ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever on any other occasion [11192] 
set up a system whereby you were to deliver messages by means of a 
card system like this, and telephone conversations? 

Captain Kramer. That was the first and only instance of which I 
am aware, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, was Admiral Noyes able to translate Jap- 
anese ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you first hear that the winds message 
that you saw on the 5th — you place it as the 5th ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The winds execute message, when did you first 
hear that that was phoney ? 

Captain Kramer. I never heard that, sir. I reached that conclu- 
sion myself, commencing sometime in early December of last year, 



4190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

after I commenced a study of these documents, including those inter- 
rogations conducted in Japan last fall. 

Senator Ferguson. Now wait. Do I understand that you have 
drawn this conclusion that it was a phoney from the Japanese mes- 
sages, that they never sent it out ? 

Captain Kramer. I have, sir. I thought I had clearly indicated 
that in previous testimony. 

[iii^J] Senator Ferguson. In the same message that the Jap- 
anese claim they never saw the winds execute message, they deny ever 
having set up the means of sending it out, and do you now claim 

Captain Kramer (interposing). I am unfamiliar with that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you show me what you draw that conclu- 
sion from? 

Captain Kramer. I believe it is in interrogation No. 11, or it may 
be No. 10, conducted by part of General MacArthur's staff. 

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would get me that file, because they 
deny having sent either 2353 or 2354. 

Mr. Richardson. What difference does it make? He said he read 
it and based his conclusion on it. You have a right to bring that in, of 
course, but it does not do any good to call his attention to that question, 
except to have it go into the record. 

I agree they say they never did send it. 

Senator Ferguson. You now say you did not see the Japanese deny 
sending out the original two code messages, that they would set it up 
in that manner ? 

Captain Kramer. That did not impress me at the time, if it is in- 
cluded in that interrogation, sir, because I [iiiP^] know that 
they did. 

Senator Ferguson. And therefore when the Japanese say they did 
not send out the execute message, you came to the conclusion that it 
was phoney ? The one that you saw ? 

Captain Kramer. It was not solely on that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, what else was it based on ? 

Captain Kramer. On many other aspects of this so-called winds 
system, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What aspects, solely on this question that this 
was a phoney that you saw on the teletype ? 

Captain Kramer. I have clearly indicated, I think. Senator, that I 
was thoroughly convinced at the time I saw that teletype that it was an 
authentic winds message. 

Senator Ferguson. I do not think there is any doubt but what that 
is your testimony. 

Captain Kjiamer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You thought it was authentic? 

Captain Kjiamer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And up until you saw the Japanese messages 
from Japan to MacArthur, you felt all the time that it was authentic, 
and then you came to the conclusion that it was a phoney ? 

Captain Kramer. That was very likely it, sir. I do not know still 
whether it was or not. 

\^11195'\ Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Now, we have diluted it so it very likely was, and you do not know 
whether it was or was not. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4191 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now have you any other evidence that weakened 
it, and brought you down to the conchision that it may have been a 
phoney ? I would like to see it, if you have any other evidence. 

Captain Kramer. No other specific evidence that I can recall now, sir. 

Senator Fergusox. All right. 

Captain Kramer. It was just a general conclusion I came to. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not there were any 
other winds execute messages, other than the one you saw, that ever 
came in on the teletype ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; there were a number, which proved to 
be false alarms in each case. 

Senator Ferguson. And on those occasions, you demonstrated they 
were false alarms ? 

Captain KIramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But no undertaking was ever made to determine 
that the one you saw was not a legitimate execute message? 

[11196] Captain Kramer. My understanding was that such a 
study was undertaken. 

I should like to be more specific on that Senator, in case it does not 
appear clear to you. 

Senator Ferguson. I do not want hearsay at this particular time. 

Captain Kramer. No, sir ; I am talking from first-hand knowledge 
now, sir. 

There were as many as three or four hundred weather reports re- 
ceived during that 10-day period. 

[11197] Senator Ferguson. I am only talking about the tele- 
typed weather reports. 

Captain Kramer. That is what I am talking about, sir. 

Seantor Ferguson. Let us keep to that. 

Captain Kramer. Over and above that there were the FCC voice 
broadcasts. 

Senator Ferguson. I am not talking about that, only about the 
teletype. 

Captain Kramer. I will leave that out. Those which I examined, 
which consisted of two or three during night hours and probably a 
half-dozen during daylight hours, on each occasion I saw the full sheet 
of teletype, including the whole of the Japanese news broadcasts, and 
examined the weather report contained therein as to the character- 
istics called for by the Japanese weather code system. The piece of 
teletype I saw on December 5 was a short piece of teletype. All these 
other weather reports I have referred to, several hundred in number, 
were examined by the GY watch officer and determination made as to 
authenticity. 

In this particular case I was shown a piece of teletype paper torn 
off of the long strip, and my presumption was that the GY watch 
officer had made the determination I have just outlined. I remember 
his showing it to me and accompanying him, and my only check was 
as to the wording. 

[11198] Senator Ferguson. You have gone over that before. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 



4192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Now what I want to know is whether or not 
in the Department, prior to the attack, there had been any survey, 
which you have personal knowledge of , tliat the winds execute message 
that yoa saw was a false one? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir, not that I am aware of, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all I want to get at. 

You have handed me this sheet. As soon as I can get the original 
file 7001 and the others I Avant you to point out on the files themselves 
what there is that caused you to want to make certain statements in 
relation to a change in your testimony. 

Now can I ask Commander Baecher whether we will have this? 

Commander Baecher. That will be here at 1 : 30. 

Captain Kramer. I have a photostat of that sheet, if you would like 
to see it, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is this an original ? 

Captain Kramer. I prepared that. 

Senator Ferguson. I want the whole file, I want to go through it 
with 3^ou. I have no other questions at the present time, except this 
last final one 

Mr. Murphy. INIr. Chairman, may I make a correction? 

[11199] The Chairman. Just a minute. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any other statements now, or 
any other information that you feel in any way will help or aid this 
committee in ascertaining the facts in relation to the Pearl Harbor 
catastrophe ? 

Captain Kramer. I have not, Senator. Those papers which have 
been introduced in the last few days are the only thing, in my best 
knowledge and belief, that might, by any construction, be considered 
as bearing on this issue. 

Senator Ferguson. And there are no other papers or memoranda 
written by you, up until the time you took the witness stand, that are 
outstanding at the present time ? 

Captain Kramer. That is precisely correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So we are not quibbling on that word "memo- 
randum," or anything else? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir; there are not. 

Senator Ferguson. And as soon as I can get that file I will close. 

Mr. Murphy. May I make one correction in the record ? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. On page 10927 there is reference on two occasions to 
a letter. The letter I was referring to was the letter written by Ad- 
miral Kimmel. The record shows Admiral Wilkinson. I ask that 
''Wilkinson" be changed to [11200] "Kimmel" on page 10927. 

The Chairman. Very well. It is now 12 : 30, and we will recess 
to 1 : 30. 

(Whereupon, at 12 : 30 p. m., the committee recessed until 1 : 30 p. m. 
of the same day.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4193 

[ll£Ol] AFTERNOON SESSION 1 : 30 P. M. 

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order. 

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KRAMEE, UNITED STATES 
NAVY (Resumed) 

Senator Ferguson. Captain Kramer, I spoke to you this morning 
about the message of the 24th of September 1911 and we left it hang 
in the balance because you said it had been pointed out in some way 
where the gist of it was determined and then I left it because I did 
not know what you were referring to, I had not seen what you were 
referring to. 

Now, at the noon hour I have received three pages and one is a copy 
of page 12 in Exhibit 2, if I might come near there and refer to this 
exhibit and we will straight this matter out. 

Now, page 12 is the so-called bomb plot of Pearl Harbor. 
The Vice Chairman. Is that page 12 of Exhibit 2? 
Senator Ferguson. Of Exhibit 2. 

Now, I show you what is a photostatic copy of that message wnth the 
exception of "Original copy" in longhand writing at the top. Is that 
correct ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And the w^ord "Secret" w^as in black and then 

there is "Top Secret-Ultra" in red. Is that cor- [11^2] rect? 

Captain Kramer. Sir, at the time that message was disseminated 

the only thing that appeared was the "Secret" at the top and I believe 

at the bottom. The "Top Secret-Ultra" was not on it. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know when the words "Top Secret- 
Ultra" was put on top ? 

Captain Kramer. That has presumably been done at some time sub- 
sequent to Pearl Harbor, sir, by a new custodian of the files. 

Senator Ferguson. "Top Secret-Ukra." What is the "Ultra"? Is 
that the purple code ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir; that was a code developed in 1942, I be- 
lieve, applying to this cryptanalytical work. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, at the bottonys a stamp and it has "1012-1, 
2-OP-G, MIG, BE, B" what is that? 
Captain Kramer. Pound sign, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Pound sign. "AF, XY, MONO." Is that cor- 
rect? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What is that stamp on the bottom of that mes- 
sage? 

Captain Kramer. That was a stamp we commenced using in the fall 
of 1941 to indicate interesting and important [11203] mes- 
sages. It was stamped on by the yeoman at the same time when he 
was applying the JD file number to it, but was not always done ; there 
were some daj'S we skipped it for lack of time. When it was on there 
and again if I had time to do so, I would circle those symbols to in- 
sure that items of interest to the people or organs represented by those 
symbols were apprised. 



4194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferquson, All right. Now on the original page 12 of Ex- 
hibit 2 that stamp does not appear ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. This photostatic copy is a photostatic copy of 
what now appears in the Na^^ Department as far as page 12 of Ex- 
hibit 2 is concerned ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. That was only used by Navy. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, did you circle anything on any of 
those numbers indicating that they should be of special interest to 
them? 

Captain Kramer. There is nothing circled on this piece of paper; 
no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, the next page that was in this exhibit is 
"Top Secret-Ultra" both in black print and red stamp. Is that cor- 
rect ? 

Captain Krajier. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. "GZ routing system." That would in- 
[11204-] dicate the people that got this message that was attached 
to it, this Exhibit 12? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir; not at all, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What is this ? 

Captain Kramer. That is simply an explanation, I believe, very 
recently drawn up of what those symbols mean. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then *'l" means special interest to 
"DNI", is that right? 

Captain Kramer. That is an incorrect interpretation of that ex- 
planation. 

Senator Ferguson. No, I am wrong. "1" is the Secretary of the 
Navy ? 

Captain Kraivier. Secretary of the Navy ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is correct, is it? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And "10" was CNO?^ 

Captain Isjramer. Admiral Stark ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And "12" was War Plans? 

Captain Kramer. Admiral Turner ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. "2X" ^as what ? 

Captain Kramer. I have forgotten what that symbol was used for. 

Senator Ferguson. But it say, "Not used." 

Captain Kramer. Well, apparently we actually used it, sir. 

[11205] Senator Ferguson. "P" for the 

Captain Kramer. President. 

Senator Ferguson. For the White House? 

Captain Kramer. For the White House. 

Senator Ferguson. "S" for State; "G" for Captain Saflford; "Mis." 
for miscellaneous, is that right? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. "B"— "BE-not used." "B-0P-16-BZ," I 
think. What is that? 

Captain Krajmer. That is Wilkinson-Intelligence. That would be 
in the Navy, 

Senator Ferguson. Pound sign? 

Captain Kramer. Pound sign — London. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4195 

Senator Ferguson. British, London? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. "AF CINCAF, Asiatic Fleet. X-20-G1" 

Captain KJRiVMER. GX. 

Senator Ferguson. "GX." "Y" is "20-GY"? 

Captain I^amer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. "MONO" is for files? 

Captain Kramer. That means a monograph file, separate from the 
numerical file. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I notice you had on the stamp an "AF" 
which was CINCAF, Asiatic Fleet, is'that right? 

[11206] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; that is true. 

Senator Ferguson. That was Admiral Hart? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Why didn't you have Admiral Kimmel's symbol 
on that? 

Captain Kramer. Senator, everything that went to CINCAF, 
Asiatic Fleet, also went either as an action addressee or information 
addressee to Admiral Kimmel. 

Senator Ferguson. Who made up this designation of this so-called 
code at the bottom ? We might call it a code. 

Captain Kramer. I believe the present custodian of the JD file, 
Commander Boone, quite recently. 

Senator Ferguson. But you Imew all the time what these letters 
stood for? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you ever personally use "AF" to send 
messages to CINCAF ? 

Captain Kramer. Not that I recall, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But you did not have any designation for 
CINCPAC, which was Kimmel? 

Captain Kramer. He was included in that "AF". 

Senator Ferguson. Now I show you the third page and it is October 
the 10th 1941. Will you interpret it? 

Captain Kramer. One asterisk means interesting messages. 
[11207] A double asterisk means especially important or urgent 
messages. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, number 

Captain Kramer. No. 236-41 meant the two hundred thirty-sixth 
gist of that kind made up during 1941. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, what did you list this on page 
12 of Exhibit 2 under? 

Captain Kramer. Under JD file, No. 5696. 

Senator Ferguson. And what is on this paper in relation to that 
message ? 

Captain Kramer. "Tokyo to Honolulu, 24 September." That be- 
ing the originator's date, originator's message No. 83 meaning, aster- 
isks, as an interesting message. 

Senator Ferguson. Just' one of them? Just one? 
Captain Kramer. One ; yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson. Meaning "interesting message"? 
Captain Kramer. That is right, sir. 



4196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. And what was there on that? Read what is 
on there ? 

Captain Kramer. The gist of this message is : 

Tokyo directs special reports ou ships in Pearl Harbor which is divided into 
five areas for the purpose of shovs^ing exact locations. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, this particular paper that I have 
[11208] in my hand and have shown you with this written on it: 

Tolvyo directs special reports on ships with Pearl Harbor 

Captain Kramer. "In Pearl Harbor" I presume it should have been. 
Senator Ferguson. It says "with." 

Captain Kramer. Yes; "with Pearl Harbor," but it should have 
been "in Pearl Harbor," I presume. 
Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

Which is divided into five areas for tlie purpose of sliowing exact locations. 

That particular sheet of paper was delivered to the recipients who 
received Exhibit 2, page 12? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So that wlien they had Exliibit 2, page 12, show- 
ing this bomb plat as we have referred to it here, they had a signal 
or a flag showing them that it was an important, as you say, inter- 
esting message ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you tell me from your records who 
received that sheet with the flag on it telling them what it was in your 
deliveries ? 

Captain Kramer. I cannot recall who specifically received that but 
I must presume that all the usual recipients [11209] did re- 
ceive that, namely, the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Stark's office, 
Admiral Wilkinson, the head of the Far East Section and the Director 
of Naval Communications, Admiral Noyes, who has initialed this 
sheet, and the Director of War Plans. 

Senator Ferguson. The President? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir; we did not send those gists to the Presi- 
dent. We sent the original folder with the gist to the naval aide to 
the President, who I do not believe used those gists in showing things 
to the President. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, wait. Did you deliver the gists to 
the aide for the President? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; it would have gone to him, too. 

Senator Ferguson. And he would have it in the folder ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So that when he would take the folder to the 
President he would have not only the message but your flag, being 
the gist? 

Captain Kramer. I do not know just what he did or did not show 
the President. 

Senator Ferguson. But that was at least in there ? 

Captain Kramer. It was delivered to him ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, can you tell us why we [11210] 
have been almost 3 months on this hearing and I suppose that we 
have spent many hours on this one message and we have never known 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4197 

before that there was such a thing as a gist sheet which went to the 
various people who received these messages as a flag, calling the 
importance of the message to the recipient of the message? 

Captain Kjia:mer. I have no knowledge whatsoever, Senator, about 
what was furnished or has been or will be furnished this committee, 
except what I have furnished. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you called this to my attention this 
morning on some question that I put to 3'ou. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That would not indicate in any way, except that 
the person who received this had a flag, that this was an interesting 
message, is that right? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. If I might just look at that : Now, on that flag 
sheet — let us call it a flag sheet — this flag sheet that carried this 
message Xo. 5696-A, Tokyo-Honolulu, September 24, 1941, I assume 
that is. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. No. 83, which is the identical sheet there? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

[11211] Senator Ferguson. Together with other papers, is that 
right? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That flag sheet would indicate that the messages 
indicated on that flag sheet were all delivered at the same time ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And the flag sheet had only a sheet with a flag 
showing "interesting messages"? 

Captain Kramer. On that page; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, on that page ; and there were 12 messages, 
is that right ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Fergusofn. Delivered at that same time? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct ? 

Captain I^aimer. There are more than that, of course, but 12 are 
shown there. 

^ Senator Ferguson. Well, now, where is the other? Do you know. 
Commander. 

Commander Baecher. Senator, this other sheet I can get. I 
assumed if there are any others they would be in the Navy Depart- 
ment. We were only asked for the sheet showing the distribution of 
this one particular message. 

[11212] Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know whether or not 
the 14 parts and the other messages delivered Saturday night had a 
flag sheet ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir, because my section abandoned the prep- 
aration of those gists, I believe, in early November or it may have been 
nearer the middle of November. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, why did you abandon the flag-sheet 
idea when you delivered to the various parties 12 or 15 messages ? WliJ 
didn't you flag them on the most important ? 



4198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. Senator, the preparation of these gists required 
several hours work on the part of one officer and one yeoman in my 
office. The practice was abandoned in November because of the fact 
that the diplomatic crises were increasing in acuteness and it was felt 
by me that delays required by the preparation of these gists could not 
be accepted and therefore the original traffic without gists were deliv- 
ered several times a day without waiting for the preparation of gists. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, do I understand that after some time 
in November everything became important or interesting? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir ; that is the 

Senator Ferguson. That is, the gist of it ? 

[II'SIS] Captain Kramer. That is the understanding ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct? 

Captain Kramer. So much of importance that we wanted to get it 
out fast ; 3^es, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But on this particular message, the September 
24 message, this gist that went with it, this gist sheet went with it so 
that anyone receiving that file on that day would have called to his 
attention at least two items, his being the first one that was interesting ? 

Captain Kramer, Yes. sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now I want to turn you to these files. 

Mr. Richardson. Are you going to put those files in ? 

Senator Ferguson. No, that would take too much time. 

I want you to point out in those files the things that refreshed your 
memory that you did not see the pilot message until you had returned 
from the delivery of the fourteenth-part message to the Secretary of 
Navy and the Secretary of State in the Secretary of State's office. That 
was the second delivery on that day. 

It will be well to put on the record that these are the files that I 
started on this morning and asked about. Don't look at your yellow 
sheets. Don't look at your own memorandum. I want to see on these 
original records the things [1J214-] that refreshed your mem- 
ory that you did not make the delivery of the pilot message as you 
first stated on Saturday evening? 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that if the witness has work 
sheets which he prepared at the time when he examined the files that 
it is perfectly proper for him to refer to his work sheets in order to 
draw his attention to whatever sheets he wants to find in the file. 

Senator Ferguson. I have no objection to him using the sheets to 
asist him to find the other sheet, but I want to see the original sheet 
and what he saw. I am talking now about the pilot message. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is 901. 

Captain Kramer. I have transferred to this work sheet, Senator, 
considerable data from these files. It was not till I made a study 
of this compilation, the work sheet, that I reached that conclusion 
that the pilot message was not delivered until the time I have 
indicated. 

Senator Ferguson. No. Now, we will have to come back. I want 
you to point on the pilot message or the other messages in these original 
Navy files the information that refreshed your memory that the de- 
livery was made Sunday instead of Saturday. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4199 

Captain Kramer. Starting with file No. 7137, which is [11216] 
dated September 5 — December 5, rather. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, wait. We had better describe it. It 
is from Berlin to Tokyo, 5th of December 1941 ? 

Captain Kramer. Originator's serial No. 1421. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, is that in Exhibit No. 1? Will you get 
Exhibit No. 1 so that we can identify it for the committee ? 

Captain Kraivier. According to my notes, sir, it is not in Exhibit 1. 
I compared this file with Exhibit 1 when I made the study. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then will you read it; what is not 
in Exhibit 1, will you read that in? 

Captain Kramer (reading) : 

Chief of Office Routing : Re your No. 986. * * * 

Asterisks to a footnote. The footnote says : 

JD-1:6944. I relayed the general outline of the Japanese-U. S. negotiations 
to the Germans. The United States will no doubt attempt to bring about a split 
between Japan and Germany by publishing details at some time in the future. 
It is quite possible that they will try to utilize them in an extensive propaganda 
program. I believe that it would be to our interest to advise the Germans 
and Italians in a very direct manner the [IIEIG] contents of the Konoye 
mesage which received much publicity at the time and all other matters that we 
can. It may be more convenient for you to do this through the German and 
Italian ambassadors in Tokyo. 

[11217] Senator Ferguson. What was this message, do you 
know, the Konoye message? 

Captain Kramer. I believe, without referring to it, the message at 
the end of November disclosing to Berlin the tenor of the United 
States-Japanese negotiations. We can refer to that letter. 

Senator Ferguson. The next page is what? That helped to re- 
fresh your memory that the pilot message was delivered Sunday in- 
stead of Saturday? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is there anything on that? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. That is the latest date of a block of 
about 11 messages, arranged chronologically in this file, preceding that 
message I just read. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now the next page is what? 

Captain Kramer. The next page is file No. 7138. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that in Exhibit 1 ? 

Captain Kramer. That is not in Exhibit 1. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, will you read that ? 

Captain Kjiamer. That is from Berlin to Tokyo, dated December 3, 
1941, originator serial No. 1408, Secret. 

At the time of my interview with Foreign INIinister Ribbentrop in my 1407 the 
Minister told me the following: "Britain and America have been making merry 
on the German [11218] defeat at Rostov. However, this is all a fabri- 
cation. The facts in the case are that the inhabitants of Rostov were so violent 
in their antipathy and resistance and Soviet Army were so persistent in its attack 
on the German Army where it had brc^cen through that General Kleist. who had 
kept the place in order, not to inflict unnecessary losses on his meclianized forces, 
retired voluntarily to prepared positions in the West. I am in receipt of a 
report to the effect that operations in Libya are proceeding very satisfactorily 
and only recently Rommel's Army has completely annihilated one division of 
New Zealand troops which came to the aid of Tobruk garrison. Also I have 
the report that the encirclement of Moscow is progressing favorably." 



4200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. What is this message 1407 ? 
Captain Kramer. It is JD-1 : File No. 7132. 
Senator Fer(;uson. Is it in Exhibit 1? 
Captain Kramer, No. sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, will you find that message there? 
What is its date? 

Captain Kramer. December 3, 1941, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right, will you read that one into the record ? 

Captain Kramer (reading) : 

From Berlin To Tokyo 
[11219] 3 December 1941. 
Orig. Serial 1407. 
Re my 1405. 

In compliance with his request I called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop at 
2 : GO o'clock in the afternoon of the 3rd. He said that Dictator Hitler was at 
a distant place at the present. He further said that he did not like to use 
the long distance telephone and because of snow planes could not be utilized. 
There i.s nothing for him (Ribbentrop) to do but go to the military headquarters 
himself and await the Dictator's arrival there. (He is expected to return to 
the headquarters tomorrow or the 4th, but if he could not be reached on tliis 
occasion he would be on tlie 5th) to establish contact with him. Although it 
is regrettable, he said the delay cannot be avoided. 

RiRBENTROP. "As I liavc toUl you before, we cannot make an official reply until 
the Fuehrer has given his approval. The Japanese Government is undoubtedly 
very anxious to liave our reply as soon as possible. I myself am in agreement 
with it and have no objections, but will advise your home Government of that 
fact. Moreover I am of the opinion that the Fuehrer will be in agreement too, 
but we cannot say so definitely until the Fuehrer's return." 

I told him that the situation is more critical than [11220] is imagined 
and therefore we are very anxious to have a formal reply as soon as is possible. 
From my previous experience with Ribbentrop I feel fairly confident when I 
say that you will not be mistaken if you assume there will be no objections. 
Arrangements have been made for a direct telephone connection between Ribben- 
trop at the general headquarters and here. However he said that whenever 
possible he would come back here and contact me. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now what was the message they 
were talking about? 

Captain Kramer. It is not available, or at least was not at that 
time. 

Senator Ferguson. So j'ou did not know, "Ee my 1405," you did not 
know what 1405 was? 

Captain Kramer. Not from the reference indicated on this message. 
It might have apjoeared later. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you try to find out if it did apj^ear later, 
before the 7th ? 

Captain Kramer. That would have to be done by the present cus- 
todian of those index files, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you try to find out if 1405. referred to here, 
was ever received before the attack. Commander Baecher? ^ 

Commander Baecher. All right. 

Senator Ferguson. Now what was there on any of those [11221] 
messages that indicated to you or ti^at brought you to the conclusion 
that you had not delivered the pilot message on Saturday night? 

Captain Kramer. This 7132 I just read is one of the block of 11 
messages I previously referred to. 

Senator Ferguson. What I am trying to get at is how do you know 
there were 11, that block was struck off at that one point? 

1 See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5492. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4201 

Captain Kramer. The group of 11 I referred to was the extension 
back to only what appeared on my work sheet. It extends further 
back three more messages, so there are presumably 14 in the whole 
block. 

Senator Ferguson. Now what is your next message in the file? 

Captain Kramer. File No. 7139. 

Senator Fergusox. Is that in Exhibit 1 ? 

Captain Kramer. On page 235 of Exhibit 1 ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the long message and ends on page 236? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now will you go to the next mes- 
sage, the one in 7139? That is the one you just referred to? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And said it was on page 235? 

CaptainKRAMER. Yes, sir. File 7140. 

Senator Fer(;usox. Is that in Exhibit 1 ? 

Captain Kramer. That is on page 234 of Exhibit 1. 

Ssnator Ferguson. And it is the one at the bottom of the page? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Feeguscn. What is this writing on that sheet? 

Captain Kramer. That is my penciled notation using a double 
asterisk next to the name "Terasaki," with the footnote identifying 
Terasaki and his activities. 

Senator Ferguson. So when this message at the bottom of page 
234 was delivered did it have your memo on it ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, in the Navy. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read what was delivered to the Navy? 

Captain Kramer (reading) : 

* * * Tera.saki, Second Secretary, is head of Jaijanese espionage in West- 
ern Hemisphere. He and his assistants are being sent to South America. 

Senator Ferguson. So you called to the attention of the various 
people that were to receive this message that the head of Japanese 
espionage in the Western Hemisphere was being transferred from 
Washington to some country in South America ? 

[11223] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That was used as a flag, was it not ? 

Captain Kramer. Not quite that. sir. It was an additional footnote 
added after this message was typed. 

Senator Ferguson. Whose initial is on that message? 

Captain Kramer. The initial "J," sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now do you know why that message as delivered 
was not put in exhibit 1 to be distributed to the committee, calling 
the attention of the committee to who this man was ? 

Captain Kramer. Apparently, Senator, the message appearing on 
page 234 of exhibit 1 was taken from the copy in the Army files and 
not the copy in this file. 

Senator Ferguson. Now "this file" is the Navy file? 

Captain Kramer. Yes. sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then do I understand that the exhibits in No. 1 
were made from the Army file and may not be true copies of what was 
delivered to the Navy officials, or to the President ? 

Captain Kramer. I sometimes added penciled footnotes of that kind, 
sir. The}^ were rather rare, however. 

79716 — 46— pt. 9 19 



4202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Feeguson. But this is can example of one, and is one? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

[11224.] Senator Ferguson. Now you must have thought at the 
time that the head of the secret service being transferred to South 
America was a very significant point. 

Captain Kramer. I did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And that is the reason for calling it to the 
attention of the various people that were to receive copies, is that 
correct? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. Primarily domestic intelli- 
gence would take action in the premises. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now when was that message delivered to 
OpNav, Admiral Stark, that is No. 7140, being the one in regard to 
the head of the secret service ? 

Captain Kramer. That was included in the block delivered Satur- 
day evening, which could not be delivered to Admiral Stark. He 
would have seen it the following morning. 

Senator Ferguson. At least it was delivered to the Secretary of the 
Navy and the White House, and to the various parties over at Admiral 
Wilkinson's that night? 

Captain Kra^ier. Yes, sir. I believe, at least I have brought it out 
in previous testimony, it was also specifically delivered to the domestic 
Intelligence Branch of the Navy, who saw occasional items of that 
nature bearing on domestic intelligence, Japanese agents, their move- 
ments and activities. 

[11225] Senator Ferguson. How do you come to that conclu- 
sion ? Is there something on this particular sheet that would indicate 
that? 

Captain Kjramer. No, sir, that is my distinct recollection, however, 
that I did that. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now we will go to 7141. That is the 
next sheet in the Navy file, is it not ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And is that in Exhibit 1 ? 

Captain Kramer. According to my notes on this work sheet, it is 
not, sir. 

Senator Frguson. Will you read that ? 

Captain Kramer (reading) : 

From Washington 

To Tokyo 

5 December 1941 

Serial 1262. 

From Kurusu to Secretary Tasiro. 

Re your 896. I feel confident that you are fully aware of the importance of 
the intelligence set-up in view of the present condition of the Japanese-U. S. 
negotiations. I would like very much to have Terasaki, who would be extremely 
difficult to suddenly replace because of certain circumstances, remain here until 
we are definitely enlighten&d as to the end of the negotiations. I beg of you as 
a personal [11226] favor to nie to make an effort along these lines. I 
shall have him assume his post as soon as his work here is disposed of. 

Senator Ferguson. What is the reference to ? To what message ? 
Captain Kramer. To the one preceding this, 7140, sir. 
Senator Ferguson. That is 1245. In the book it is 1245? 
Captain Kramer. No, sir, 896. 
Senator Ferguson. 896 at the bottom ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4203 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. They have got both numbers, is that correct? 

Captain Kraivier. That is correct, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now when was that message delivered to the 
parties that you have named ? 

Captain Kramer. The same remaks that I made regarding 7140 
apply in respect to 7141. 

Senator Ferguson. So that was delivered Saturday evening? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The next is 7142, is it not ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that one in Exhibit 1 ? 

Captain Kramer. On page 237, yes, sir. 

[11227] Senator Ferguson. The message at the bottom of the 
page? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you just read it ? It is short. 

Captain Kramer (reading) : 

From Tokyo 

To Washington 

December 6, 1941. 

(Urgent) 

#897 

Re your #1268. 

The footnote indicates that is not available. 

To Counselor Iguchi from Kameyama. 

What I meant in paragraph 2 of my #867 — which footnote indicates is SIS 
#25640 regarding the destruction of codes and one code machine in the 
Washington office — was that of the two sets of "B" code machines with which 
your office is equipped, you are to burn one set and for the time being to 
continue the use of the otlier. 

Senator Ferguson. Now this footnote was delivered to the various 
recipients of these messages on Saturday evening the 6th, is that 
correct ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, as part of this message. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And where will we find 25640? Do you 
know where that one is? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir, I could not find it readily [ll^^S] 
without the JD file number. 

Senator Ferguson. And the JD file number is not on it? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

[11229] Senator Ferguson. But the gist is here regarding the 
destruction of codes and one code machine in the Washington office? 

Captain Kramer. That I would guess offhand — and it is probably 
more than a guess — is the Tokyo directive of December 3 regarding 
the destruction of cryptographic aids in Washington. 

Senator Ferguson. It clearly indicated there was to be one code 
machine left in Washington ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. , All others were to be destroyed ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So we knew that on Saturday evening? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 



4204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK. 

Incidentally that is the first time we knew they had more than one 
machine here. 

Senator Ferguson. And that was delivered Saturday evening with 
the 13 parts ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, take the next page. 

Captain Kramer. The next page is the first part of the 14-part 
note. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Now 7142 is Army 25835? 

[11230] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct^ 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senatoi" Ferguson. How does the Army number get on the Navy 
file here :* 

Captain Kramer. That was an Army translation, and was so num- 
bered before being delivered to my section. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, when we come to the 13 parts, they are in 
exhibit 1, but they have no Army file numbers on them, do they? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. We had no Army file numbers on any 
Navy translations. 

Senator Ferguson. That would indicate that all of the 13 parts of 
the 14-part message were translated in the Navy Department? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir, except for the rough trans- 
lations, some of which were done by the Army and sent to the Navy 
for typing up. 

Senator Ferguson. But if they were done in the rough no number 
w^as put on them? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir, only our number was used. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, let us come to the fourteenth part. It 
was made in the Navy also ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

[11231] Senator Ferguson. So all of the parts were made in the 
Navy? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All of the 14 parts have got "'JD-l #7143''? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Indicating that that is the Navy number? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ierguson. Well, we will go to the next page after the four- 
teenth part in the Navy file, and we get a number 7144. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is a Navy translation? 

Captain Kramer. That is an Army translation, 7144 being the Navy 
file number of it. 

Senator Ferguson. How does it come that the stamp, as we get back 
on these otlier Army files — here is the stamp 25835, is it not ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson (continuing). And no stamp is on the one that 
we were referring to, 7144? 

[1J232] Captain Kramer. I cannot account for that, except 
tliat W must liave been a clerical error on that particular copy. 



PKUCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4205 

Senator Ferguson. The leaving off of the Army number? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, when was this message in 7144 delivered? 

Captain Kramer. According to my study it was the first of the 

block that was delivered sometime between my departure for the State 

Department 9:30 Sunday morning and my return at about 10:20 

Sunday morning. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the message that is in exhibit 1, known 
as not to use a stenographer or typist? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The next number. 

Now, you claim that that is the dividing line, because there they 
'were in the book and they were in numbers, and that gives you the 
idea you delivered the 13 parts and not the pilot message, because the 
pilot message is not in the group, is that correct? 

Capta*in Kramer. That is correct, sir. It is also my distinct recol- 
lection, in that connection that there were no file numbers beyond 
the 13 parts of the 14-part note delivered that Saturday night. 

[1J£33] Senator Ferguson. Now who would put these file 
numbers on these pages in the Nav}^ file? 

Captain Kramer. My chief 3''eoman, normalW. 

Ssnator Ferguson. What is his name? 

Captain Kramer. Bryant. . He applied these numbers just before 
we made up the folders for delivery. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I notice that some of them are in stamped 
ink and some of them have been copied over. How do you account 
for that? 

Captain Kramer. That copying over is apparently a development 
of the last several years, subsequent to Pearl Harbor by the present 
custodians of these files. 

S3nator Ferguson. Not by Bryant, but by the present custodian? 

Captain I^amer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why he would do that ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not know, unless he was simply doodling, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How is that? 

The Chairman. Simply what ? 

Captain Kramer. Doodling. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, you find him doodling on these official 
Navy files, is that correct? 

Captain Kramer. Presumably he was making a study that began 
to bore him. 

[11234] Senator Ferguson. "Well, it makes it rather difficult to 
read wliat was under this doodling, does it not? 

Captain Kramer. It is perhaps possible to get another file number, 
if it exists, with our stamp not written over, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, that particular one did not have the stamp 
of the Army although it was translated by the Armj^? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, go to the next file, 7145, which has not 
been doodled. 

It has a stamp 25850, does it not ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that in our book. Exhibit 1, here ? 

Captain Kramer. That is page 248 of Exhibit 1. 



4206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. That is the 1 o'clock message ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, what is the next page? 7146? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And that has a number 25853, the Army 
number ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that in Exhibit 1 ? 

Captain Kjiamek. On page 248, sir. 

[]1235^ Senator Ferguson. That is 908? 

Captain Kramer. That is the second one on page 248. 

Senator Ferguson. Now we will come to the next one, 7147, and 
that has been written over, and it is difficult to read what was under* 
it, is that correct? 

Captain. Kramer. Yes. 

S3nator Ferguson. That is Army #25854? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that in the book? 

Captain Kramer. Page 249, sir. 

[1J236] Senator Ferguson. That is the top message, or the de- 
struction of the last remaining machine message? 

Captain Ivramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What is this last number on here, the SIS 
number ? 

Captain Kramer. 25858, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what that is? It is in pencil. 

Captain Kramer. Presumably it was omitted from this copy at the 
time it was typed up by Army, but since it appears in Exhibit 1 presum- 
ably it was determined shortly after delivery of this message that it 
applied to their file number and it was phoned over to us. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether that is in the book? 

Captain Kramer. It is on page 249. 

Senator Ferguson. It is the one preceding in the book but not the one 
preceding in your official Navy files? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now in the Navy files it is back how 
many? 

Captain Ivramer. It is ahead four numbers, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Ahead four numbers? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, in the Na^^ files. 

[11237] Senator Ferguson. Well, let us go to the next. 

Captain Kramer. The next one is the so-called hidden word mes- 
sage, sir, translated by Navy. 

Senator Ferguson. That is at the top of page 258, is it not — or 253 ? 

Captain Kramer. 251, 1 believe, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. 251. And what is the Army number on that 
one? 

Captain Kramer. It was a Navy translation, and we normally, in 
fact almost never had an Army file number on a Navy translation. 

Senator Ferguson. Then there was no Army file number on that. 
Now the next one is a photostatic duplicate of it ? 

Captain Kramer. That is apparently an Army copy. I do not know 
who made that photostat. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4207 

Senator Ferguson. You know nothing about that photostat that is 
in there ? 

Captain Keamer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. In fact there are two photostats. 

Captain IOiamer, There are two photostats. 

Senator Ferguson. Now w^hat is the next one? 

Captain Kramer. That is the so-called pilot message, Navy File 
7149, Tokyo serial 901. 

Senator Ferguson. Now on the bottom of this message [11238] 
there is scratched out in pencil "not available." That is in re 902? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is scratched out. Now your file number 
on that is 7149 ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The Army file is 25838? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now that is the pilot message ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now just look at the Army one next to it. By 
the way, when this file is made up is it made up from the bottom up 
or from the top down ? Which is the earlier paper, 7150 or 7149 ? 

Captain Kramer. 7149, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. 7149 ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now the next sheet of paper, the 
Army number is 25857. 25838 was the pilot message ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And the next number beyond it is 25857 ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

[11239] Senator Ferguson. Going the other way, the number 
was the so-called hidden word message, one of them, and then we come 
to the Army file No. 25854, is that right ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now how do you account for the fact that you 
have an Army No. 25838 between the two sheets 25854 and 25857 ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not account for that, sir. I know in a gen- 
eral way that the Army system of numbering was quite different than 
ours at that time, in fact similar to what we had used a year or two 
before. In other words, I believe it was their practice to assign a file 
number at about the time a translation was to be worked on and com- 
pleted. It would, therefore, be quite possible that a much later file 
number would be completed, because being a short message and deliv- 
ered prior to an earlier file number which might require considerable 
work in clearing up garbles, and so forth, in translation. 

Senator Ferguson. But if the testimony later should show that this 
pilot message was seen by an Army officer, translated by 2 o'clock on 
Saturday, you would not want any of these hypothetical things you 
have stated to indicate that it had' not been sent to the Navy in the 
regular channels and as translated on the 6th, would you ? 

[II24O] Captain Kramer. Not necessarily; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now let us try and find the next 
number as nearly as we can to 25838 Army instead of 25854. 



4208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kramer. I have an indication on my study of an Army file 
number 25835, which is Navy file No. 7142, appearing on page 237 of 
exhibit 1. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now let us come back to 7142, and 
that appears before any of the 14 parts of the 14-part message, does 
it not ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; it does, because that block was arranged 
chronologically by my section. The block 7138 through 7143 runs 
chronologically with the dates of originator, December 3, December 5, 
December 5, December 5, December 6, and December 6. 

Senator Ferguson. Now there isn't any doubt that this pilot mes- 
sage is shown to have been translated December 6, 1941, which is Sat- 
urday, is that true ? 

Captain Kramer. That is true. 

Senator Ferguson. The only reason why you say that the pilot mes- 
sage was delivered Sunday morning is due to the fact that in the Navy 
book it appears after the 14-part message and after the 1 o'clock mes- 
sage, and therefore you came to the conclusion that it must have been 
delivered [11241] Sunday instead of Saturday!' 

Captain Kramer. That is the sole reason. Senator, based on the 
practice in my office of disseminating these things as soon as we got 
them. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now I want vou to look at this pilot mes- 
sage—and that is 7149 Navy and 25838 Army? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now this is the original file of the OP-20-GL. 
"What does that mean ? 

Captain Kramer. That is the designation of the section having 
present custody of this file, sir. In the days about Pearl Harbor it 
was in the custody of section 20-GZ. 

Senator Ferguson. Now in that same book, or set of papers, we have 
on the outside of it ''JD-1 : 7001-7500"? 

Captain Kramer, Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That would indicate that you started your books 
on the 100 numbers? 

Captain Kramer. When I had custody of these files they were 
started with an even number, sir. We have started this file with 7000. 
There has been apparently some regrouping of these in later custo- 
dian's hands. 

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand then that all of the JD book 
6501 to 7000 — by the way, so that this record may be clear, what you 
call a file is the intercepted decoded [11242'] messages? 

Captain Kramer. The translations ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The translation is really the file? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. For each of these translations there is 
another file with the work sheets. 

Senator Ferguson. Is there a work sheet for these exhibits which 
you have here, that you have been given ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir ; there is a work sheet file for each trans- 
lation prepared by Navy. Just what the Army files are in that respect 
I do not know. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, would that file come over wdien this pilot 
message came over from the Army ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4209" 

Captain ICeamer. No, sir; not at all. 

Senator Ferguson. That would not come over and should be in the 
Army file ? 

Captain Kra3ier. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So someone apparently has remade these files 
and put on the top 7001, and it should be on the bottom of this other 
file? 

Captain Kramer. That is my recollection of the way those files 
were maintained when I had charge of the section. It is probable that 
Chief Ship's Clerk Bryant can give more specific information on that 
point, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now what is this sheet \_112I^3^ 
of paper in this file? Is this the so-called JD-1:7001? 

Captain Kramer. 7001 ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, 7001. And there is nothing on it. except 
almost in the center, typewritten, "No initials. JD-1 : 7001 appear 
cancelled." 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. On the bottom of it in pencil and not in ink, or 
not in stamp, are the figures '"7001"? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now if an original sheet was made up at the 
time for that number it should have a stamped 7001, should it not? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And that stamp was in red ink? 

Captain KRA:\rER. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now how do you account for this 7001 having 
only a pencil memoranclmn on it ? 

Captain Kramer. That blank file number is a sheet inserted by the 
yeoman who had custody of the files, who added at the bottom of the 
sheet in pencil ol)viou'sly 

Senator Ferguson, (interposing). Now wait. Of your own knowl- 
edge do you know this? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir; only from the fact that I recognize his 
handwriting as being very similar and I believe identical with that of 
my chief yeoman at that time. Bryant. 

[ii^-^i Senator Ferguson. Where is Bryant now ? 

Captain Kramer. I believe he is in this room, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, Now, when did you first learn that there had 
been a blank sheet of paper with the exception of what we have read in 
that file ? 

Captain Kramer. I first learned. Senator, a week ago Saturday that 
there was not only this blank 

Senator Ferguson. Just stick to this now. 

The Chairman. Let him answer. 

Captain Kramer. Not only this blank file, but a half dozen or more 
ether blank files in the 1941 translation file, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, I will put the question again. 

When did you first learn that there was a vacant place in these 
numbers, and that 7001 had this sheet in it ? 

Captain Kramer. From first-hand knowledge is what I was testi- 
fying to. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, first-hand knowledge. 



4210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kjiaivier. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Just recently? 

Captain Kramer. Just recently, yes, sir. I have heard about this 
blank file, of course, for a year or more past. 

[11B4^] Senator Ferguson. Who had custody of these books 
that could have put this sheet in ? 

Ca^^tain Kramer. My chief yeoman, Bryant, primarily, who in- 
serted them in that file, although my officer assistant, Lieutenant 
Harrison, might and did at times earlier in the year, do so, or an 
assistant yeoman in training by the name of Densf ord might well have 
done it as part of his assistance to my chief yeoman. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you tell us if there are any other blank 
sheets, we will call it blank because there are not translations in this 
book, that are not initialed, or dated? 

Captain Kramer. Not that I am aware of, no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All others, if they are blank they are dated, and 
initialed ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And the only one not dated and not initialed, 
is this TOOL 

Captain Kramer. On that point I have testified that earlier in the 
year Lieutenant Harrison whom I have referred to, used these files in 
preparing his gists, that if he in the process of preparing the daily 
gists discovered a duplication, an extra part of a multipart message 
that had previously been assigned a file number, he would have 
[11246] removed that extra part, canceled the file number and 
combined it with the earlier file number of that multipart message, and 
apparently, in fact obviously, from what appears in these files, in 
doing so, he wrote the blank file notation out in handwriting and in- 
serted it in the file he was not a typist, in my recollection, except of 
the "hunt and peck" variety. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, answering my question, I want to know 
whether there is any other page in this book where there is simply 
a typewritten notation and with the number in pencil rather than in 
long-hand and initialed and dated ? 

Captain Kramer. Not that I am aware of, sir ; no sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you Imow of any reason why the committee 
should not have seen this so-called blank page with this memorandum 
on it that I have read prior to bringing it here in the last few days ? 

Captain Kramer. I am not familiar. Senator, with current policy. 

Senator Ferguson. I am asking if you know of anything. 

Captain Kramer. I do not ; no sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

The Chairivian. Is it any part of your duty to know. 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

[1124'^'] Mr. Richardson. I have a question or two, Mr. Chair- 
man. 

The Chairman. Counsel wishes to pursue the inquiry. 

Mr. Richardson, Captain, I wish you would turn your mind again 
to the Japanese words which were contained in the original winds 
code broadcast. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Richardson. We have been talking here a great deal about the 
phrase "Higashi no kaze ame." 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4211 

Captain Kjiamer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Has there ever been the slightest question any- 
where by anybody as to what the English translation of those words 
was? 

Captain Kramer. Not that I am aware of, no, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And that translation was "East wind rain" ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, "East wind rain" either in the Japanese 
language or the English language, by itself, was of no significance, 
was it? 

Captain Kramer. Not without knowing the code referred to, no, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. There had to be some additional Japanese lan- 
guage in the instrument which set up the code that placed an under- 
standing that was to follow the use [11248] of the words 
"East wind rain" ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, when you turn to the Japanese language 
contained in that dispatch, which is shown in Exhibit 142 under date 
of November 6, 1941 — do you find it? 

Referring now to the dispatch sent to the commander in chief ? 

Captain Kjjamer. Referring to the table of contents, sir, I can 
probably find it more readily. 

Mr. Richardson. There is no paging on this thing. 

Captain Kramer. I have it. 

[11249] Mr. Richardson. Now, that document, as I understand 
it, purports to be a document sent to the MacArthur staff in Tokyo 
about November 6, 1941, and as I am advised it sets forth under the 
title 

The Chairman. You don't mean 1941 ? 

Mr. Richardson. 1941 is what it says at the top. 

The Chairman. To the MacArthur staff in Manila ? 

Mr. Richardson. No. It recites here, November 6, 1941, from the 
War Department to the MacArthur staff. That may be an error. 

Mr. Murphy. I believe you find that it should be 1945. 

Mr. Richardson. It is of no importance because it refers to Cir- 
cular 2353. Does it not. Captain ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And Circular 2353 was the instrument that fixed 
the original winds code ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. The winds code which Captain Safford says re- 
lated to the winds execute which he testified concerning ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, following the phrase "Circular 2353" are 
some 16 lines of Japanese ? 

Captain Kramer, Yes, sir. 

[II249] Mr. Richardson. And under the figure 1, about the 
middle of the Japanese phraseology in that dispatch, occurs, together 
with other words, the words "Higashi no kaze ame" ? 

Captain ICramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richai?dson. The words which you have identified as meaning 
"east wind rain"? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 



4212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. EiCHARDsoN. Now, in order to find out tlie meaning that the 
Japanese agents would get from reading from an execute under that 
code dispatch you would have to go back into the language which pre- 
ceded the phrase "Higashi no kaze ame," would you not? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And when you do go back you find, do you not, 
in the fifth line of the Japanese words, the word "wagahoo" ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And then there follows some nine Japanese 
words ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Ending with the word "wa"? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And it is true, is it not. Captain, that the meaning 
of that phrase starting with "wagahoo" and \^112o0] ending in 
''wa,'' constitutes in this dispatch which fixed the code, as to what, 
so far as the United States was concerned, the phrase "east wind rain," 
•'Higashi no kaze ame," was intended to mean to Japanese agents who 
read the code execute ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, what is the definition of the words commenc- 
ing with "wagahoo" and ending with "wa"? 

Captain Kramer. "Wagahoo" is the Japanese word literally trans- 
lated meaning "our side", or in better English, "we". 

"No" is a preposition identical in character with our prepositions, 
a possessive. 

"Gaikoo" means "foreign". 

"Kankei' means "relations". 

In other words, the first four words means "Our foreign relations". 

"Kiken ni hinsuru" means "are approaching danger", "kiken" mean- 
ing "danger", "hin", meaning "approaching", or "in close proximity 
to . something of that nature. 

"Baai" means simply "when". 

Mr. Richardson. Then the definition would be "When our foreign 
relations are approaching danger"? 

Captain Kr.\mer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Is there any word there or any permissible 
[11257] translation which would give effect to such a word as 
"war"? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir, except an evaluation which would be 
stretched to mean that. 

Mr. Richardson. In other words, unless the phrase "our foreign 
relations are approaching danger" can be construed to mean "war" 
there is no "war" permissible under the Japanese translation of this 
dispatch ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And has there ever been any translation by any 
of the experts in Washington of that dispatch that differs materially 
from the translation which you have just given? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir; there has not. 

Mr. Richardson. And when you refer to the translation which ap- 
pears in the translation which we received from the Asiatic Fleet 
which is shown in Exhibit 142 as 1 (c) the phrase — have you it before 
3^ou? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4213 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. The phrase contained in the dispatch which came 
to us from tlie Asiatic Fleet having reference to tliis same code estab- 
lishment, the phrase is "If diplomatic relations are on the verge of 
being severed", do you, as a Japanese scholar, believe that that phrase 
"If diplomatic relations are on the verge of being severed", is a per- 
missible translation of the Japanese words which you just read and 
[11^52] which you interpreted as meaning "When our foreign 
relations are approaching danger"? 

Captain Kramer. That is a close proximity to it ; yes, sir. It might 
])e translated that way. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. So, Captain, it would be of no signifi- 
cance at all, would it, in determining whether a dispatch was constraed 
to mean "war", it would be of no significance at all that the language 
of "Higashi no kaze ame" was used ? 
Captain Ivramer. Not "war"; no. sir. 

Mr. Richardson. You would have to use those Japanese words I 
have just quoted simply as a flag to indicate that here was an east- 
wind rain message? 

Captain Kr^vmer. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Richardson. And then to determine what east-wind rain meant 
you would be completely confined to the meaning which had been 
interpreted of the Japanese language that you have just spelled out 
for us word by word in the original dispatch creating the code? 
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. So I ask you, again, anyone looking at a dispatch 
and seeing the words "Higashi no kaze ame" on it would not have 
progressed in his understanding of what the dispatch might convey 
by way of meaning unless he went [11253] back to the original 
Japanese words in the original code message and obtained a translation 
of what these words between "wagahoo" and "ni", mean in that original 
di&T)atch ? 

Captain Kjjamer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Now. one thing further. There has been some 
suggestion here that this blank page which the Senator from Michigan 
examined you concerning, 7001, that that blank page, it has been 
suggested here, might act as a telltale to the abstraction from the file 
of what is asserted may have been a wind execute message and, to be 
more specific, and, as I understand the inference in the testimony, 
simply for the purpose of bringing you to the point of my next ques- 
tion, the suggestion is that this message which you and Captain Safford 
have testified came in either on the morning of the 4th of December 
or the 5th of December, that went to Admiral Noyes, may have been 
the message which when it was abstracted from the file was succeeded 
in that file by that master page 7001, which, as the Senator pointed 
out, has no stamp on it and no longhand writing. 

Now, did any dispatch ever go into your files of which these files 
are a part where the dispatch had not originally come through your 
office for transmission to the proper recipients ? 
Captain Kramer. None, sir. 

[11254] Mr, Richardson. And if by reason of a special arrange^ 
ment entered into by Admiral Noyes, as testified to by Captain SafFord^ 
a message was to come from the teletype and be transmitted direct 



4214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to Admiral Noyes for dissemination by Admiral Noyes under such 
system as he might authorized, could there be in your files at any time 
properly a copy of that message ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir, unless by some chance it was sent back 
to my office for additional dissemination. 

Mr. Richardson. That would mean, sir, would it not, that it would 
have to have come back to you from Admiral Noyes, or someone under 
his authority, the message which Captain Safford says was to go direct 
to Admiral Noyes and be disseminated by Admiral Noyes without 
reference to you ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Would the return of such a message to you under 
those circumstances have been in the routine, or would it have been 
highly irregular? 

Captain Kramer. It would have been unusual in that that type of 
message was the only instance in which in the set-up directed by 
Admiral Noyes it ever occurred. 

Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions. 

The Chairman. Captain 

[11255] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman 

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I would like before we proceed 
further, to read a memorandum 

The Chairman. Unless there are some further questions of the 
captain 

Senator Ferguson. I have a question, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Richardson. This has to do with my examination. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Richardson. I would like to read a memorandum furnished 
me by Commander Baecher in response to a request made for in- 
formation regarding the handling of the ALUSNA Batavia dispatch 
031030 of December 1941, as to which, just for the information of 
the committee, I will suggest there has been some reference here, as 
to the possibility that someone may have read this dispatch from 
Batavia before the so-called winds execute message came in, and 
put on the winds message as a result the definition which the Batavia 
dispatch contained. 

The information is this : 

(a) As previously stated, the time of receipt of the above dispatch was 
040621 GCT 4 December 1941 which was 1 : 21 a. m. 4 December 1941, local 
time. 

(b) The time of decoding of this dispatch was 050645 GCT, which was 1: 45 
a. m. 5 December 1941 (local time). [11256] The 24-hour lapse between 
receipt and decoding is accounted for by the routing designation which was 
"deferred", the lowest priority in handling. 

2. No further information is available regarding the exact time of delivery 
to a naval officer inasmuch as no written record was kept of delivery times. 

That is all. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman 

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. In answer to some of Mr. Richardson's ques- 
tions, and I think sometime ago you stated that the Japanese in 
their language were accustomed to understatements. That is, they 
described things weaker than we would. 

Captain Kramer. Often that is the case, yes. 



PROCEEDIXGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4215 

Senator Ferguson. Could that account for the difference here be- 
tween "war" and the other expressions ? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir, not in this case, I do not think. How^ 
ever, as I pointed out in the previous testimony in the case of the 
Dutch East Indies, later on in the message 

Senator Ferguson. I think you have described that before. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, I have. 

Senator Ferguson. Just one more group of questions on [11^57] 
where these numbers are. 

I wish you would look at No. 142. Have you got that page? I 
can bring it to you. 

Go to 7119. Your number, JD number. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator F'erguson. Do you have that on the page ? 

Captain Krajier. I do, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, that is translated — the date is not signifi- 
cant, when the message came in. You can't tell anything about its 
order that way? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Because you have got December 2, December 3, 
and then December 2 down under 7122, 7123, and 7124. So let's go 
to the date of translation 12-6-41. Navy, wasn't it? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The next one, 7120, translated 12-6-41, Army; 
7121, 12-6-41 Army. Now, following, 7122 12-5-41, Navy. So that 
is a Navy. 

The next one is 7123, 12-6-41, Na^'y. There you have a Navy 
translation on the 5th between two Navy translations on the 6th. 
Isn't that correct ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you have 7124, translated [ll^SS] 
12-7-41, Army. So you have a Navy of the 5th between an Army of 
the 7th and the Navy of the 6th ; is that correct ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So, it wasn't anything unsual to have a num- 
ber out of its sequence, was it? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; it was. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you will find all through this, the same 
thing as I checked on this one. 

Captain Kramer. If you will notice, Senator, from the dividing 
line just below which is 7110 and the Eoman numeral V 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Captain Kramer. The chronological dates run in order from No- 
vember 18 down to file number 7123, December 3. There should be 
another dividing line at that point indicating what was dissem- 
inated in that batch. All the dates of translation in that batch are 
December 5 or 6. The 5 would indicate that those were translated 
late afternoon or evening of the 5th, and they were not disseminated 
until some of the first translations the morning of the 6th. 
Senator Ferguson. Go over to 7090. 
Captain I^jlamer. Yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson. There you have 7. 

[11269] Captain Kjumer. Yes, sir. 



4216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. There you have a Navy, 12-5-41. Another 
Navy 12-5-11. The next one 7092, Navy, 12-41. 7095, Navy, 12- 
5^1. 

So you have a 4 in between two 5's. 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, The same explanation there ? 

Captain Kramer. All that block on that page is of similar char- 
acter. They are 4 or 5 dates. That block carries through the divid- 
ing line after file No. 7109. 

Senator Ferguson. But, there is no dividing line on here that I 
can see. 

Captain Kramer. On the next page there is, sir, below 7109. 

Senator Ferguson. Oh, yes. That is all. 

Mr. MuRPHT. Mr. Chairman 

The Chairman. Mr. INIurphy. 

Mr. Murphy, On page 252 of the intercepts, there is a message 
about which no witness has testified. We have had no word on it. 
That is exhibit 1. 

There w^as a statement in the press at one time quoting Senator 
Ferguson, I believe, to the effect that that referred to the European 
war, 

I do not think that we should come to a close of the [11^60] 
liearings without something on that message. 

Captain, before you leave, do you know anything ab(jut that Buda- 
pest message ? 

Captain Kramer. My study, Mr. Murphy, the other day for Senator 
Ferguson, did not extend to file No. 7184. It could be readily done in 
tlie next few minutes, I think, since the file is here. 

Senator Ferguson. I don't think tlie witness understands your ques- 
tion. 

Mr. Murphy. The particular message I am referring to is from 
Budapest to Tokyo, December 7, 1941, No. 104. 

Captain Kramer. That is the one. 

Mr, Murphy. On the page 252 : 

On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country 
a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break 
out on the 7tli. 

Relayed to Berlin. 

And then : 

Army 25866. 
JD 7184. 

As I said, there has been a reference in the papers quoting Senator 
Ferguson as saying that that apparently referred to the European war. 
Am I correct ? 

[11^61'] Senator Ferguson, I don't know what the papers may 
have quoted. 

All I do know, and will state on the record now, is tliat as I read 
that message it is the war between Great Britain and Hungary and 
has nothing to do whatever with Pearl Harbor or the Japanese-Amer- 
ican war, or Japanese-British war. 

Mr. Murphy. It would seem to me, Mr. Chairman, before we close, 
we ought to have a definite statement on that, so we can dismiss it 
from our thinking. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4217 

Senator Ferguson. 1 think it is clear from the page itself what they 
were talking about. There was a declaration of war delivered by the 
British to the Hungarian Government through the Japanese. 

Mr. Gearhart. What is the fact ? Was war declared on Hungary 
on the 7th? 

Senator Ferguson. That is true — war was declared between Great 
Britain and Hungary on the 7th. I do think we ought to have testi- 
mony on it. 

The Chairman. Are there any other questions ? 

Captain Kramer. Mr. Murphy, a hasty study in the last minute on 
that point w^ould indicate that Navy File Nos. 7152 run chronologi- 
cally from November 15, 1911, through December 7, 1941, w^iich is the 
date of translation 111263] of the message you were talking 
about, 

Immediatelj?^ following that block is one or more translations dated 
December 8, 1911. That would indicate to me from further study, my 
first reaction would be that it was translated by Army on the 7th and 
disseminated at least so far as Navy is concerned, probably the after- 
noon of the 7th. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, there has been a rec^uest made that the 
record be cleared on that. Apparently it referred to the European 
war, and I think the record should be filled in in regard to that gap 
so that we can dismiss that from our thinking. 

The Chairman. Mr. Gearhart. 

Mr. Gearhart. Captain, you testified that you had no intention of 
calling your memorandum to the attention of this committee until you 
were asked a question about it. Do I remember your testimony cor- 
rectly in that regard ? 

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Why had you reached that conclusion? Because 
you thought the paper was unimportant? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; since I was here to testify myself re- 
garding the fact. 

Mr. Gearhart. But you have referred to other notes, from which 
you refreshed your memory, have you not ? 

[11263] Captain Kramer. The only notes or papers of any kind 
that I have referred to are papers since I arrived in Washington around 
the 6th of December of last year, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Of last year, you say ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Haven't you looked at any papers since you have 
been here on this particular mission ? 

Captain Krainier. I have not. 

Mr. Gearhart, Since you have been here to appear as a witness? 

Captain Kramer. None, except as I have previously testified, those 
show^i to me last summer as exhibits before the Hewitt Board of 
Investigation. 

Mr. Gearhart. From the examination that you have had on the 
subject of this memorandum, it would appear that the members of this 
committee considered that memorandum a very important document 
in this proceeding. Isn't that the impression you have gotten after 
listening to all the questions ? 

79716 — 46— pt. 9 20 



4218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Kr^vmer. The impression I have gained, Mr. Gearhart, is 
that apparently at least some members of the committee attach a great 
deal of importance to the impressions I had of circmnstances sur- 
rounding Pearl Harbor at the time I prepared that memorandum. 

[11264^] Mr. Gearhart. Circumstances that are at variance to 
a certain degree between the testimony you have given before and the 
testimony j^ou have given now ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. I noticed in the testimony of Captain Safford, that 
he referred to some messages, intercepts, and so forth, that had not 
theretofore been introduced in evidence in this proceeding; do you 
recall that ? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. . 

Mr. Gearhart. Have you during the course of 5'our testimony re- 
ferred to any messages of any kind that are not already in evidence 
or were not in evidence before you mentioned them ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not believe I have, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Do you know of any messages, intercepts of any 
kind, that have not been introduced in evidence in this proceeding? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir, I do not, with the possible exception that 
from my own memory there are certain things in back traflSic of a 
year or more before that simply parallel and throw some light on 
interpretation to be put on messages of a nature similar to those im- 
mediately preceding Pearl Harbor. 

I refer, for example, to such things as messages [112661 
concerning ship movements. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, there are some messages on ship movements 
that have been put in evidence. Do you believe there are others on 
ship movements that have been withheld from the record? 

Captain Kramer. I do not believe that those in evidence extend 
back before the beginning of 1941, although I may be mistaken in 
that respect. 

The 1st of January 1941, 1 mean. 

Mr. Gearhart. The ones we have been referring to are rather 
recent. December 6, 1941. Referring to the exhibits that appear on 
page 14 of Exhibit 2. Do you mean that there are others that are 
closer, during the last week, that are not included in Exhibit 2 ? 

Captain Ivramer. Not that I am aware, no. I have not studied the 
files to determine that point. 

Mr. Gearhart. Do you have any in mind that up to now have been 
withheld from the record of this hearing ? 

Captain Ivramer. None that I know of; no, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. You are familiar with the President's order of 
November 7, directed to all chief executives of all executive depart- 
ments, agencies, commissions, and bureaus, including the General 
Chiefs of Staff? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

[112661 Mr. Gearhart. You are familiar with the fact that it is 
made the duty of every officer of the Army and Navy and whether 
presently in the service or out of the service to volunteer any infor- 
mation that may be of importance to this connnittee? 

Captain Kramer. Fully aware of that ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then, if 3'^ou knew of the injunction the President 
had imposed upon you to reveal to us whatever evidence may be 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4219 

brought to your attention, why didn't you call that letter or memo- 
randum that you prepared when in the South Pacific with Admiral 
Halsey to the attention of the committee? 

Captain Kramer. I considered that hj no stretch of the imagination 
as being considered as better testimony than I could give first-hand 
now, or better than I had given before previous hearings, sir. 

Mr. Geakhart. Don't you think it was your duty under that order 
of the President to state that the testimony you were giving at that 
time was not the testimony you would have given had you been called 
at the time you prepared the memorandum? 

Captain Kramer. I am not at all certain I would have given that 
version in the detail I did if I had been called to testify at that time. 
That memorandum was pre- [11267] pared under some degree 
of pressure without any particular attempt to rehash or refresh my 
memoiT on it, purely and simply to give Admiral Halsey a broad 
picture of the situation in Washington at that time, and was not in- 
tended to be as meticulously accurate as I could make it at that time. 
Mr. Gearhart. Certainly you had no idea of leading Admiral 
Halsey to conclusions that did not conform to the facts, did you? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. There was no question on that what- 
soever raised during our conversations since he simply read that memo- 
randum and we discussed no details concerning it. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, certainly you wanted to be accurate when you 
were rehiying information to jonr commander, did j^ou not? 
Captain Kramer. Certainly. 

Mr. Gearjiart. Then, did you not at that time prepare it with the 
utmost possible care in order that your commander would not be 
cieceived? 

Captain Kramer. I did, sir, keeping in mind the pressure under 

which T was working to do so, and my previous remarks on this point. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then you made every effort at that time to make that 

memorandum represent your then recollection [ll'SOS] of what 

had transpired during the days preceding Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. And you also prepared that paper with the fact in 
mind that it might sometime aid you in the case of you eventually 
appearing as a witness subsequently? 

Captain Kramer. Would you repeat that? 

Mr. Gearhart. As an aid to your memory in anj^ subsequent 
proceeding ? 

Captain Kramer. At no time, whatsoever, Mr. Gearhart, did I have 
the concej^tion in mind in preparing that memorandum. In fact, my 
expectation was when I prepared it that I would destroy it within a 
few days and prepare the deposition or affidavit which I had promised 
Admiral Halsey to do. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, there is one other question I want to ask you, 
and that is about all I have. 

Do you remember of having intercepted any messages whatsoever 
from the" civilian government of the Philippines to Washington? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir; I don't believe I ever have seen a mes- 
sage from the High Commissioner or the Philippine government to 
Washington, sir. w0^ 

Mr. Gearhart. You say you have never seen one ? 



4220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[11269] Captain Kramer. I may have been shown one at some 
time, as an exhibit, or otherwise. I recall none now. I was not cus- 
tomarily shown such messages, however. 

Mr. Gearhart. When you are monitoring for Japanese exchanges, 
you naturally pick up those other exchanges, don't you? 

Captain Kramer. No; our monitoring system kept entirely clear 
of United States Government or dependency circuits. 

Mr. Gearhart. You know nothing then, of a short-wave telephone 
call between any of the high officials of the Philippine government 
and of the State Department in the earlv davs of December, December 
6, 1941 ? 

Captain Kramer. Nothing, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did jou ever hear it discussed among those with 
whom you were associated ? 

Captain Kramer. I may have. I don't recall having heard it pre- 
viously to your mentioning it. 

Mr. Gearhart. Who would intercept messages of that kind if any 
occurred ? 

Captain Kramer. I do not know. 

Mr. Gearhart. Wasn't the Government monitoring everything that 
went through the air. the Army, the FCC? 

Captain Kramei;. I don't know what the rest of the Government was 
monitoring, sir. I only have in a general [11270] "^'fiy? though 

I think a fairly comprehensive way, knowledge of what our Navy 
monitoring system was covering, and to a less degree what the Army 
monitoring system on foreign intercepts, was covering. 

Mr. Gearhart. AVas your station in Virginia equipped to pick up 
all short-wave broadcasts? 

Captain Kramer. I do not know, sir. 

[11271] Mr. Gearhart. Woukl it require different kind of 
equipment to pick up the dot-dash than oral discussion? 

Captain Kramer. I believe the same radio sets can be used for both, 
sir, depending on the range. It would require different appurtenances, 
however. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did you have as one of 3^our responsibilities the 
transmittal of messages to our own commands? 

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. You had nothing to do with the transmittal of 
messages sa}^ to the Naval Stations on the Pacific Coast? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Or to the Coast Guard, for instance, that might be 
in charge of harbor defenses in different places on the Pacific Coast. 

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir. 

]Mr. Gearhart. AVho would have to do with that? 

Captain Kramer. Presumably some division of the Office of Chief 
of Naval Operations, possibly War Plans, though I am not certain on 
that point, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is all. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, may I propound one additional 
question ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

[11272] Senator Lucas. Captain Kramer, there has been much 
speculation and much conjecture as to the conversation you had with 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4221 

the foreign service officer of Secretary Knox on Sunday morning, De- 
cember 7, when you were delivering important magic messages to the 
Secretary, 

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. N(jw. as I understand from your previous testimony 
you were surprised when you learned of the attack on Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Kramer. At about a quarter to '1 in the afternoon, yes, sir, 
ver}' much so. 

Senator Lucas. In other words, there was nothing in the statement 
that 3^ou made to the foreign service officer of Secretarv Knox which 
could give him any impression that you knew or believed that the 
Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor at 7 or 7 : 30 in the 
morning I 

Captain Kramer. Xone whatsoever, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Whatever you said at that time to this service officer 
merely directed or called attention to the difference in time at the 
various places in the Pacific in line with what the 1 o'clock message 
called for? 

Captain Kramer. Yes. sir; that is it. 

Senator Lucas. That is all. 

The Chairman. Captain, when you first appeared here [11273] 
you gave in detail your record in the Navy, I don't recall whether 
anyone asked you about the decoration which you wear upon your 
breast. 

Would you mind telling us what that indicates { 

Captain Kramer. It is not a decoration, sir. It is simply a badge, of 
pure gold, I understand, presented to me by the Xavy Department in 
1930 as a result of getting three legs, as required, on this badge, which is 
known as the Distinguished Marksman's Medal for rifle shooting. 

The Chairman. Had nothing to do with Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Kramer. No, sir, none whatever. 

The Chairman. The committee thanks you for your forthright testi- 
mony and before you are excused the Chair would like to ask you if 
there is au}^ other statement or information you have to submit to the 
committee bearing upon the Pearl Harbor situation which has not been 
elicited by the "few'* questions that liave been asked you during 3'our 
examination. 

Captain Kramer. I tliink all knowledge I have of circumstances and 
details surrounding Pearl Harbor have been exhaustively elicited, sir. 

The Chairman. The committee thanks 3'ou, Captain, very much for 
your cooperation. 

Captain Kramer. Thank you, sir. 

The Chairman. You are excused. 

(The witness was excused.) 

[11274] Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I should like to pre- 
sent for examination Admiral Ingersoll. 

The Chairman. Admiral Ingersoll, come around. 

TESTIMONY OF ADMIEAL R. E. INGERSOLL, UNITED STATES NAVY 

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.) 
Mr. Richardson. Admiral, will you state your name to the reporter, 
please? 

Admiral Ingersoll. R. E. Ingersoll, Admiral, U. S. Navy. 



4222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. Will you spell your last name, please, 
Admiral ? 

Admiral Ingersoix. I-n-g-e-r-s-o-1-1. 

Mr. EiCHAKDSON. How old are you, Admiral ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I shall be 63 the 24th of June of this year. 

Mr. KiCHARDSON. How long have you been in the Navy of the United 
States ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I entered the Navy in March of 1901. 

Mr. Richardson. What is your present rank ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Admiral, United States Navy. 

Mr. Richardson. Will you in a very brief way detail what your 
progression has been in the Navy in point of assignments generally 
during the time you have been with the Navy ^ 

[1127o] Admiral Ingersoll. I graduated from the Naval Acad- 
emy in 1905. My sea service following graduation was 6 years in bat- 
tleships, until 1911. 

My next cruise was on the China Station, Asiatic Station, 1913 to 
1916, most of which I was on the staff of the coimuander in chief. 

From 1919 to 1921 I was the executive officer of the battleships 
Connecticut and Arizona. 

My next cruise was in the command of a surveying ship. 

From 1928 to 1930, I was at that time a captain and was chief of 
staff of the battle fleet, assistant chief of staff of the battle fleet, and 
also chief of staff of the United States Fleet. 

In 1933 to 1935 I commanded the heavy cruisers Auffusfa and San 
Francisco. 

From 1938 to 1940 I commanded a division of heavy cruisers in the 
Pacific Fleet. 

And from the first of January 1942 until the middle of November 
1944 I was the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, during this 
war. 

At that date I was detached in order to command the Western Sea 
Frontier, which is my present duty, which includes command of the 
Nineteenth Fleet. 

Mr. Richardson. What was your assignment during November and 
December 1941 ? 

[11276] Admiral Ingersoll. I was at that time Assistant Chief 
of Naval Operations. 

Mr. Richardson. Your immediate superior was Admiral Stark? 

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. What were your duties generally speaking in that 
assignment, Admiral ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations had 
no duties assigned by law or by Navy regulations. By Executive order 
he was a member of the joint board which was the forerunner of the 
joint chiefs of staff. By office regulations prescribed by the Chief of 
Naval Operations he had in general supervision of all officers of the 
Office of Chief of Naval Operations. I had no original cognizance of 
any manner. As a matter of fact I had no office other than myself. 
And all heads of sections took up their questions with me usually 
before presenting them to the Chief of Naval Operations. 

Once the Chief of Naval Operations had established a policy, I 
endeavored then to relieve him of all of the load that I could of the 
details in carrying out that policy, in signing papers and releasing 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4223 

dispatches, I kept him informed of correspondence when I thought 
there was something of which he should be informed. 

[11277] Mr. Richardson. Now, you testified in connection with 
this Pearl Harbor matter first in what is called the Hart Investigation, 
did you not? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I did. 

Mr. Richardson. And then after that you also testified before the 
Naval Court of Inquiry? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Are those the only two of the preceding investi- 
gations where you have been presented as a witness ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct. I talked to Admiral Hewitt 
when he passed through San Francisco. I am quite certain that he 
did not consider me as a witness but I did talk to him. I think he found 
I had no information which was of value to him for the particular 
thing he was looking for. 

Mr. Richardson. You were not sworn except in the two investiga- 
tions that I have referred to? 

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral, I wish to say as far as counsel is 
concerned that I have made an examination of your testimony in both 
of these hearings. I have no further questions to ask you with refer- 
ence to the general scope of your testimony in those hearings, which I 
think was rather full and comprehensive, but there has been developed 
in this [11278] case this matter, by previous witnesses, ques- 
tions concerning the existence of what has been called an execute or 
the winds code. 

Wlien I speak of the winds code you know, do you not, what I am 
talking about ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I do. 

Mr. Richardson. Referring to page 429 of the testimony that you 
gave in the Hart investigation I should like to read you several ques- 
tions and answers for the purpose of directing your attention to the 
particular subject there discussed. The question is this : 

68. Q. During November or December, '41, you were cognizant of a special 
code which the Japanese had arranged imder which they were to inform their 
nationals, concerning against what nations they would make aggressive move- 
ments, by means of a partial weather report? 

A. Yes ; I do recall such messages. 

69. Q. Do you recall having seen, on or about 4 December, the broadcast 
directive, thus given, indicating that the Japanese were about to attack both 
Britain and the United States? 

A. Yes. 

70. Q. Do you know why that particular information was not sent to the 
commander in chief, Pacific? 

[11279'] A. I do not know except it was probably supposed that the inter- 
cept stations in the Hawaiian Islands had also received this broadcast. How- 
ever, it may have been because of a message sent in regard to the destruction of 
Japanese codes which had been sent to London and Washington which indi- 
cated that war with the United States and with Great Britain was imminent. 

Keeping that testimony in mind I also wish to read to you testi- 
mony which you gave before the Naval Court. I read from page 
825 ; question 33 : 

Q. I show you document 15 of Exhibit 63. This document has been popularly 
termed by some witnesses as the "winds code." State whether on or before 



4224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

7 December 1941, you had seen or been informed of the contents of this 
document. 
A. Yes ; I had been. I remember a message of this character. 

34. Q. Will you relate the circumstances under which it came within your 
cognizance? 

A. This document bears the inscription, "Translated on November 28". Ac- 
cording to the system, I probably saw that on the following day, on the 29th. 
I also recall that at the time this message was received, or possibly the 
execution which is referred to in the message, that there [11280] was 
some difference of opinion among the translators as fo just what was meant. 
Whether or not what I saw is exactly in the form as it appears there or not 
I am not certain. However, I did know definitely that they were setting up 
a code to be used in a weather broadcast. 

35. Q. Can you state whether or not this information was discussed by you 
and tlie Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark? 

A. I don't remember whether it was discussed with Admiral Stark or not. 

36. Q. Did you take any action yourself as a result of the information that 
was contained in this document 15? 

A. As far as I recall, we took no action on this dispatch at that time, because, 
as I have stated before, I believe there was some doubt in the minds of trans- 
lators as to just what the translation should be. 

37. Q. Can you remember in substance what this doubt was? 

A. No ; I do not recall, except that there was some doubt as to whether they 
had an exact translation— a difference of opinion among the translators as to 
what the Japanese words meant. 

38. Q. Can you recall whether this difference of opinion related to the subject 
of a declaration of war or [.11281] whether it related to severance of 
negotiations, or what the dis<"ussion was about — can you remember that? 

A. No ; I don't remember that point now. 

39. Q. On or prior to 7 December 1941, did you receive any information as 
to whether or not code words had been received in the Navy Department 
which would put in effect the action contemplated by the so-called "winds'' 
message? 

A. Yes. 

40. Q. Will you state the circumstances? 

A. I recall that sometime I did see the messages which were supposed to 
put this "winds" message, translated on the 28th, into effect. I do not recall 
whether I saw them prior to December 7 or afterwards. If I saw them prior to 
December 7, I am quite sure that would have been considered confirmation of 
the information which had previously been received and which had been sent 
to the Fleet on December 3 or December 4 regarding the destruction of codes 
at London, Washington, Manila, and elsewhere, which indicated definitely that 
war was imminent. 

41. Q. Can you recall whether or not on or before 7 December 1941, any 
action was taken in the office of Chief of Naval Operations as a result of the 
information contained in this execution of the "winds" code which you 
[11282] state you saw? 

A. As I stated before, I do not recall when I saw the answer, whether it was 
on or prior to December 7, or whether it was after December 7. If it was after 
December 7, there was no purpose in sending it out. If it was before Decem- 
ber 7, I think it was not sent out because we considered that the dispatch 
sent to all Fleets regarding the destruction of codes was ample warning that war 
was imminent, or that diplomatic negotiations were going to be broken off, and 
that this dispatch was only confirmatory. 

42. Q. Did you have any knowledge of the location of the dispatch or of the 
information which conveyed to you the execution of the "winds" code? 

A. I have no knowledge regarding the location or disposition of any of these 
dispatches, as I have seen none of them since December 1941. 

Now, Admiral, having called that testimony to your attention, 
what is your present recollection with reference to your having seen 
any dispatch which purported to be an execute of this winds code 
which it is agreed had been sent out by the Japanese and intercepted 
by our interceptors? 

Admiral Ingersoll. During these two investigations the circum- 
stances under which I saw these things were not asked me. I recall 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4225 

that I was informed by officers who [11383] came to my office 
and not by the means of the sheaf of messages which was distributed 
daily that a message supposed to be in the winds code had been 
received. I assumed that it was correct, that they had the proper 
thing. I thought that when I testified before Admiral Hart and I 
thought so when I testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry. 

However, inasmuch as it had come in after the dispatches sent to 
the fleets regarding the destruction of codes it was of no importance. 
Simply confirmed what we had already sent out. 

Mr. RicHAEDSON. Do you recall whether your information with 
reference to this so-called execute came to you by reason of some 
writing in a dispatch or memorandum or by the telephone or orally ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. No. I remember distinctly that officers came 
into m}^ office with it. They had a piece of paper with them which 
purported to be a message sent in the wind code. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, there has been one discussion here, Ad- 
miral, that there were executed in connection with Captain McCol- 
lum's office a group of cards which cards were, as I recall, 3 or 4 
inches square, and that they contained thereon the English -swords, so 
far as the United [11284^ States was concerned, "East Wind 
Rain, United States", that there were no Japanese words on those 
cards at all, just the English words as relating the United States, the 
English words as relating to England, the English words as relating 
to Russia. 

Now, do you recall having received one of those cards? 

Admiral Ingersoll. No ; I did not have a set of cards. 

Mr. Richardson. Then the paper that you saw in your office was 
not one of those cards? 

Admiral Ingeksoll, I am not certain just what the paper was now 
that the officers brought in to me. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you examine that paper? 

Admiral Ingersoll. It is possible that I might have, but I do not 
recall it specifically. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you speak Japanese ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Had you familiarized yourself with what an 
execute of the so-called winds code would be? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes; I knew that from the original dispatch 
which had come in in the latter part of November. 

Mr. Richardson. And that paper that was brought in to you, that 
you saw, you accepted as an execute under the wind code? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I understood it to be a message [11£85] 
which had been received in the wind code. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you know what became of it ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not know except that I know they took 
it out of my office when they left. 

Mr. Richardson. Then the officers when they went away took it 
with them? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you ever hear that made a subject of any 
conversation or reference thereafter as far as you can recollect? 

Admiral Ingersoll. No ; and I paid no further attention to it be- 
cause of the fact that it simply confirmed, if it was a genuine message, 



4226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

it simply confirmed what we had already sent out regarding the de- 
struction of codes, which was absolutely positive. 

Mr. RicH.\RDSON. What would be the significance that you, as a 
high ranking naval officer, immediately below Admiral Stark, who 
was the head of naval operations, what was your then interpretation 
of the meaning of the information that an enemy, supposed, was burn- 
ing, destroying their codes and diplomatic papers ? 

[11286] Admiral Ingersoll. I considered that the information 
which we received regarding the destruction of the codes and which 
was sent out to the fleets as one of the two most important messages 
that were sent out by the Chief of Naval Operations during the entire 
period before Pearl Harbor, the other one being the dispatch stating 
that, "This is a war warning" in effect and that all hope of negotia- 
tions had broken off. 

Now, the wording in that winds message did not say that we are 
going to be in a state of war or that hostilities now exist. It referred 
to a rupture of diplomatic negotiations or that the situation between 
the countries was becoming critical. 

The importance of the messages regarding the destruction of the 
codes is this : If you rupture diplomatic negotiations you do not neces- 
sarily have to burn your codes. The diplomats go home and they can 
pack up their codes with their dolls and take them home. Also, when 
you rupture diplomatic negotiations you do not rupture consular 
relations. The consuls stay on. 

Now, in this particular set of dispatches they not only told their 
diplomats in Washington and London to burn their cocles but they 
told their consuls in Manila, in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Batavia 
to burn their codes and that did not [112S7] mean a rupture 
of diplomatic negotiations, it meant war, and that information was 
sent out to the fleets as soon as we got it and it made no difference 
whether we ever got an execute from the winds after that or not, and 
that is why I think officers in high positions are vague about it. It 
did not make any difference. 

Mr. Richardson. You, then, as the second ranking officer in the 
Office of Naval Operations at the time you saw this execute, so-called, 
did not regard it as of primary importance as a basis for information 
to be sent to the field ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. If it had been a truthful message in the winds 
code the most it could have done was to have confirmed what we had 
already sent out and it was not as positive that war was coming as 
we had sent out. 

Mr. Richardson. Have you any recollection in your mind that this 
so-called execute, or any so-called execute had thereafter been de- 
termined to be what we may refer to as a false alarm? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I have since heard it but I did not know it 
at the time and I did not know it when I testified before the investiga- 
tion of Admiral Hart and the Court of Inquiry. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you communicate the fact of the disclosure 
of this so-called execute to your chief, Admiral Stark? 

[11288] Admiral Ingersoll. I cannot recall definitely that I 
did or did not. I may have done so. 

Mr. Richardson. Any message which came to your attention that 
you deemed of sufficient importance, it would have been your duty to 
have seen to it that your chief learned of that message ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4227 

Admiral Ingersoll. It would have been, 

Mr. Richardson. Do you think it at all probable, Admiral, that 
the fact that you do not remember having acquainted Admiral Stark 
with the information you had as to this winds execute was because of 
the little importance you attached to that document ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I think I should state it another way, that 
because of the little importance which I attach to it is the reason I 
have forgotten whether I did or did not. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you know wliat officers brought it in to you? 

Admiral Ingersoll. No ; I cannot remember definitely. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there more than one? 

Admiral Ingersoll. There were several officers for whom it would 
have been a logical thing to do. There were half a dozen officers who 
might have brought it in. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, let me ask you how definite your informa- 
tion is. Admiral, on when it was brought in, whether [11289] 
before or after December 7 ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I am not absolutely positive of that except that 
I am absolutely certain that it was after we had sent out the messages 
regarding the destruction of the codes. 

Mr, Richardson. Well, in view of the startling commotion caused 
by the attack on the morning of the 7th it would be fair, would it not, 
to assume that your best recollection is that it came to you before 
the 7th? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I think that is correct but I can not fix it 
definitely. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there more than one such so-called execute 
that was shown to you or discussed with you ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I can only recall one occasion on which officers 
brought in a message to me of that character. 

Mr. Richardson. Would there have been any duty after acquaint- 
ing you with that information, a duty to also bring it to the attention 
of Admiral Stark ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. They might have done so, but having brought 
it to my attention they would have trusted me to give it to him. 

Mr. Richardson. And it would have been your dutv to do so ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. If I had thought it was of siiffi- [11290] 
cient importance. 

Mr, Richardson. Is there any other recollection that you have which 
throws any light on this so-called winds execute that you are able to 
state to the committee at this time ? 

Admk-al Ingersoll, No ; none that I can think of. 
■ Mr, Richardson. Mr. Chairman, in view of my preliminary state- 
ment that after an examination I feel that all the other questions I 
might otherwise want to ask the admiral are covered by his earlier 
testimony which has been twice presented and is in the record which 
will be of record in this committee also, I have no furtlier questions 
to ask Admiral Ingersoll at this time. 

The Chairman. The Chair has no questions. Congressman 
Cooper ? 

The Vice Chairman. No questions. 

The Chairman, Senator George ? 

Senator George, No questions. 



4228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Mr. Clark? 

Mr. Clark. No questions. 

The Chairman. Senator Lucas ? 

Senator Lucas. No questions. 

The Chairman. Mr. Murphy? 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, there is a message on page 251 of Exhibit 1. 
Will you hand that to the admiral, please? [11291] Did you 
ever see that ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Which number, sir? 

Mr. Murphy. On the top of page 251, Admiral. Do you recall ever 
liaving seen that message? 

Admiral Ingersoll. You mean the one stating: 

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir. I am wondering if there would be any 
possibility that 3'ou might have confused that with some other mes- 
sage, Admiral : that came into the Navy Department on the 7th of 
December and was apparently submitteil to the receivers of magic. 

Admiral Ingersoll. If that came in on the 7th of December I would 
have normally seen it on the morning of the 8th. I do not recall this 
particular dispatch now. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, I am wondering. You said you saw one winds 
intercept and that is something that might appear to be a winds inter- 
cept and I am wondering if you saw that or if you saw something other 
than that { 

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not recall it sufficiently well to remember 
what it referred to, what countries it referred to or the status. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, you do not have any recollection now, 
[11292] then, do you, of what the winds intercept which you feel 
you saw or had called to your attention, you do not know what country 
that referred to either, do you ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Except that the winds code required definite 
answers in accordance with the code and as I recall now the general 
tenor was in accordance with the winds code. 

Mv. Murphy. You mean all tliree countries? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes. 

yir. Murphy. Or one or two? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I think it was all three countries, as I recall it. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, you say that it was received after the mes- 
sages had gone out to destroy the codes ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Oh, 3^es. 

Mr. Murphy. You sent those messages out on what date? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I believe the date was the third or fourth, I 
have forgotten which. It is in the record. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, do you have any recollection in addition 
to this particular officer handing you — or in calling it to your atten- 
tion, what did he do after? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I have every recollection that they took it away 
with them when they left my office and that I never saw it again. 

Mr. JMuRPHY. Were you one of the persons who ever saw the 
[11293] magic on the regular distribution ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes; I saw them. They were brought to my 
office. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4229 

Mr. Murphy. Now, do you have any recollection of ever seeing any- 
thing like this in magic form in the dispatch case that contained the 
magic ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not recall having seen it and from ^Yhat I 
know of the system it would not have been in the magic because it would 
have been a copy of a broadcast in plain Japanese. 

Mr. MtjRptty. In other words, what— — • 

Admiral Ingersoll. It would not have gone through the magic 
set-up system. 

Mr. Murphy. In fact, if it had not gone through the magic system 
it would not get into Captain Kramer's hands for distribution as 
magic, would it ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. No. 

Mr. Murphy. And if it had not gone through Captain Kramer 
for distribution as magic it would not be in the magic files, would it? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I don't know enough about the magic files to 
know. It would undoubtedly have gone through his section for 
translation. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, there has been testimony here [11294] 
that the Chief of Naval Operations and apparently his group in 
Washington participated in a frame-up of Admiral Kimmel. Do you 
know of anything, of any kind of evidence of anything like that? 

Admiral Ingersoll. f have not the slightest bit of evidence of any- 
thing of that kind, that anything of that kind occurred or was con- 
templated or was talked about. 

IVir. Murphy. Well, there is a Navy Captain that has testified here 
to a frame-up. You don't know anything about any frame-up in the 
Navy, do you ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I certainly do not and Kimmel was my can- 
didate for that job when he was appointed. I mean by that when 
my opinion was asked I suggested Kimmel. 

Mr. Murphy. There has also been testimony here to the effect that 
someone in the Navy Department, and on one occasion the witness 
said he had a suspicion of Admiral Stark, although he changed it once 
or twice, but at any rate at one time he had a suspicion of Admiral 
Stark that if there was a winds execute message that they had ordered 
it to be destroyed because they had failed to notify Kimmel, that they 
were hiding their failure in ordering the destruction of that paper. 
Do you believe there is any foundation for that charge whatsoever? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I have never heard anything like that, 
[1129S] sir, and I do not believe it. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, there is a Navj- captain, Safford, who put it 
in this record. You don't know anything about destroying any papers, 
do you ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I don't know anything about it. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, there also has been testimony in the record 
to the effect that you had a recollection that on the night of December 
6 you did receive a copy of the thirteen parts of the fourteen part mes- 
sage. What is your recollection on that ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. My recollection is very distinct on that. 

Mr. Murphy. That you did receive it? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. And who delivered it to you ? 



4230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Ingersoll. I cannot recall who delivered it to me. I re- 
call very definitely that some time on the evening of December the 
6th or early in the morning of December the 7th that an officer came 
to my house and rang the door bell and woke me up and I went down 
and read the first thirteen — read what they told me were the first 
thirteen parts of a long message. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, Captain Kramer 

Admiral Ingersoll. And I don't know whether it was before 
111296] or after midnight. 

Mr. MxJKPHY. Yes. Captain Kramer testified that about a week or 
so before the night of December 6th he .had awakened you and had 
taken to your house another message but he said he was rather positive 
in his recollection that he had not taken it to you and attributed your 
saying that you received it to faulty memory. 

Admiral Ingersoll. Well, I asked Captain Kramer about that today 
and he says he did not personally bring it to my house. All during 
the period before Pearl Harbor I used to be awakened up at least two 
or three times during the week by officers bringing messages, not 
only of this character but of every character of operational character 
to my house and so I could not recall every officer who brought them 
there. 

I seem to recall, and I may be mistaken, it was some other occasion, 
that the officers that brought this thing to my house that night asked 
for my identification card, which Captain Kramer would not have 
done, so that would identify it, if Captain Kramer said he did not 
bring it out to me, that some other w^atch officer brought it, I also 
recall that they told me that the message had been taken or would be 
taken to the President and to the Secretary of the Navy. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, you were familiar with the two documents set- 
ting up the winds code originally, were you not? 

^11297] Admiral Ingersoll. The one document setting it up. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, there is one on page 154, if you will refer to it. 
Admiral. There is one on page 154 which says : 

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and 
the cutting off of international cominuiiications, the following warning will be 
added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast. 

Then on page 155 : 

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the follow- 
ing at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcast. 

You were familiar, were you, wdth both of those dispatches? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I remember very distinctly the one which ap- 
pears on page 154. That is the one which w^e have been talking about 
as the "winds." My recollection regarding this other one, which I 
believe is now called the hidden word, is rather hazy. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate. Admiral, when the officer did come 
into your office and referred to a winds intercept, what did it mean 
to you? 

Admiral Ingersoll. It meant to, me that they had received a mes- 
sage which was sent in compliance with this one on page 154. 

\^11298'] Mr. Murphy. Meaning what ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Well, relations between the United States and 
Great Britain and — that is, Japanese relations with the United States, 
Great Britain, and Russia were as stated in the code message there. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4231 

Mr. Murphy. Did you have any understanding that that meant 
war or merely. a breaking off in relations, the message as such? 

Admiral Ingersoll. As stated there on the face it says "rupture of 
diplomatic negotiations," and that is why it seemed to me that the 
messages regarding the codes were so much more in place. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, now, in view of your testimony do you see any 
reason in the world why anyone in the Navy, large, great or small, 
would want to destroy any paper which would show any receipt of 
the winds message ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. No ; I cannot see any. 

Mr. Murphy. No other questions. 

The Chairman. Senator Brewster is away. Mr. Gearhart. 

Mr. Gearhart. Admiral, you regarded the code destruction mes- 
sages, both our directions to our agents in the Far East and the Japan- 
ese directions to their agents in our country, you regarded those mes- 
sages as the most important ones, is that not correct ? 

[1J2W] Admiral Ingersoll. I stated that I thought that the 
messages which we sent to the commanders in chief that the Japanese 
were destroying their codes and the message regarding the war warn- 
ing on the 27th of November as the two most important messages that 
were sent out. The messages which we sent out to the Pacific, to Guam 
and Peiping, I believe, to destroy their codes and the authority which 
we gave to Admiral Kimmel to destroy codes on outlying islands and 
possessions were, of coarse, in direct consequence of the messages which 
the Japanese had sent out, because they indicated that the Japanese 
expected to be at war in a very short time. 

Mr. Gearhart. In addition to that we sent the message to the naval 
attache in the American embassy at Tokyo directing the destruction of 
codes there? 

Admiral Ingersoll. It was the same general idea, of course. 

Mr. Gearhart. So in your estimation the winds activate or execute 
was unimportant because the code destruction orders had gone out as 
far as America was concerned and had been received as far as Japan 
was concerned? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I considered one of the two most important 
messages sent out and it made no difference in my opinion whether 
there had ever been a winds message or whether a winds execute was 
ever received. 

[IISOO] Mr. Gearhart. Now, your impresion now is that the 
order to our f oieign agents in the Far East had been sent out before we 
received the winds execute? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I am sure of that. That is, before we received 
the message which I thought was a winds execute or was told was a 
message sent in the winds code. 

Mr. Gearhart. And you say that our orders had been sent abroad 
on the third or fourth? 

Admiral Ingersoll. The message which we sent to the commanders 
in chief informing them that the Japanese had ordered the destruction 
of their codes in Washington, London, Manila and other places I be- 
lieve was sent on the third or fourth. I think the messages to our own 
people to destroy their codes were a day or two later, although I do 
not recall the exact dates now. 



4232 CONGRESSIONAL, INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gearhart. But whether or not the. winds execute was received 
before or after we had sent out our notices would render it unimportant 
after the code destruction messages had gone out, is that not correct? 

Admiral Ingersoll. That is the point I am trying to make all along, 
sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, the point that I am suggesting to you as a 
companion and not a corollary is this, that the winds execute messages 
became unimportant, and to use a legal phrase 

[lloOl] Admiral Ingersoll. I did not understand you. 

Mr. Gearhart. That the winds execute would become unimportant 
even if received before, after our destruction of code messages had gone 
to the field, because it would be, as the lawj^ers say, it would become 
functus officio? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Well, when we received the original message 
which set up the winds code that became important then because that 
would be the first indication that we would get of when the Japanese 
thought they would rupture negotiations or be at war if a broader 
interpretation were placed on it and steps were taken to monitor that, 
message and. also, Admiral Noyes took steps to insure that he would 
receive information as soon as it was received in the code, but once 
we had learned that thej^ were destroying their codes then the winds 
message lost its importance. 

. Mr. Gearhart. I agree with you on that, but I am aserting the fur- 
ther idea that it is equally important whether received before or after 
the order went out for the destruction of our codes in the Far East 
because if it came in before and the fact of its receipt initiated the order 
sending out the code destruction orders, when the code destruction 
orders went out it had served its purpose and it was no longer im- 
portant. Does that sound reasonable? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I am afraid I don't get your point, [11S02] 
sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is what I was thinking. Admiral. 

The point is this : Whether it came in before the orders were sent out 
for the destruction of codes in our far outlying Eastern agencies or 
whether it came in after we had sent out the order for the destruction 
of our codes it was after the fact equally unimportant, is that not 
correct ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Oh, in regard to the destruction of our own 
codes ; yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. Of course. 

Admiral Ingersoll. It made no difference at all and the destruction 
of our codes was not based on that supposition. It was based on the 
fact that the enemy had issued orders to destroy his codes. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes ; but it would become an element in the fact that 
war was about to commence? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Any true winds execute would confirm the other. 

Mr. Gearhart. And it would not be any more important if it were 
received before our orders went out for the destruction of our codes 
or whether it was received afterwards. 

Admiral Ingersoll. No. 

Mr. Gearhart. It would be exactly in the same classification after 
the order went out. 

[11303] Admiral Ingersoll. For the destruction of our codes. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4233 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, that is what the lawyers call functus officio if 
it came in first. 

Now, the reason why 3'ou knew that the destruction of the codes 
meant war and not merely breaking off of negotiations was the fact 
that if they were merely breaking off diplomatic negotiations with us 
the}^ would not have to destroy their codes ? 
Admiral Ingersoll. Not necessarily. 

Mr. Gearhart. Thej' could pack them up, as you said with their 
second suit of clothes and take them home if they were merely breaking 
off diplomatic relations. 

.^miral Ixgersoll. Correct. 

Mr. Gearhart. So that it was a dead tip-off, a foregone conclusion 
in the estimations of the higher ranking military officers that the order 
for the destruction of their codes within our areas meant nothing but 
war? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes ; and the fact that the consulates were in- 
cluded cinched it in my opinion that it was war and not a rupture of 
diplomatic negotiations or diplomatic relations. 

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, the high ranking naval 
\_1130If.] and military officers all felt that war was coming sooner 
than it did come. Wasn't there much talk about that preceding the 
seventh ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. So far as the Chief of Naval Operations was 
concerned war could have come at any moment after the 24th or the 
27th of November and it would have been no surprise. 

Mr. Gearhart. You knew about the deadline date of the 29th of 
November ? 
Admiral Ingersoll. I recall that dispatch. 

Mr. Gearhart. That was a date after which things were going to 
automatically happen and so when that date passed you began to 
watch for things and look for things to happen, did you not? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Well, in all these things, sir, when you con- 
sider a particular dispatch you cannot consider that dispatch alone 
and nothing else. You have to consider all the other things that you 
can. 

Well, at this time, that is, at the latter part of November, we Jmew 
that they were assembling vast forces of ships and men and landing 
craft in southeast Asia, in China, and Formosa; we knew they were 
on the move and it would only be a question of a very short time when 
they would land somewhere. There wasn't any question about it. It 
was only the exact [11305] spot and when. Admiral Hart 
was watching them with his planes. We knew they were going down 
the coast of China and down Indochina. We did not know until the 
last moment whether they were headed for the Kra Peninsula or for 
Thailand, but they were on the move definitely, and it was only a 
question of the hour as to when it would come. 

Mr. Gearhart. You knew that Secretary Hull had delivered the 
American note to the Japanese here in Washington on the 26th day 
of November ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. On the 27th of November the dispatch was 
sent out stating that all — in effect, I am quoting now from memory — 
that all efforts for peaceful solution had failed, 

79716—46- pt. 9— — 21 



4234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. And when you sent it out on the 27th, was it 
because you felt that the Hull message had been interpreted by the 
Japanese as an ultimatum? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I am sure that Admiral Stark felt that they 
could not accept it and also, as I say, things were moving in the East, 
the concentration of troops, did show that war was coming very, very 
soon. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, as it now appears, as it now turns out, we find 
that the Japanese fleet sailed from Tankan in the Kurile Islands on 
the night of the 27th and morning of the 28th, a day ahead of their 
deadline date, but we did not [11306] know that until later, 
but the 29th went by, and that was their deadline date, and we taiew 
what that deadline date was, and we had been told by the Japanese 
that things were going to happen automatically. Then when nothing 
happened on the 29th, nothing happened on the 30th, nothing hap- 
f)ened on the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th of December, did that long 
delay after their fixed deadline cause any discussions among the higher 
ranking naval officers with whom you were in daily conversation in 
a search for an answer to the question ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Of course, we had no definite information that 
a task force had sailed from the Kurile Islands for the Hawaiian 
Islands but the time of the break, that is, the time of hostilities was 
indicated would come very soon in the movements of the Japanese 
in the Far East. It could not go on many days longer or many hours 
longer. They were approaching a place where they were going to 
land. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is, we knew about the moves of the Japanese 
fleet in the China Sea ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. We had received reports on that. We knew the 
deadline date of the 29th, and because of those circumstances and 
others, perhaps, it was the belief that the Japanese would do some- 
thing over the week end of December 1, that was the general 
supposition ? 

[11307] Admiral Ingersoll. I cannot say that it was the belief 
that something would happen over the week end of the — did you say 
the 31st? 

Mr. Gearhart. The week end of — no, the 30th was in November. 
Over the week end of the 1st of December, after the 30th of November ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. No ; I think not. The forces had not yet 
reached a point in the Far East where actual hostilities were implied 
over that week end. 

Mr. Gearhart. But you expected action to follow the 29th very 
closely, did you not ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. We did not know when it would occur. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, they told you in their own message, didn't 
they. Admiral ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. We did not know how soon after that they 
would actually start to move. For example, forces were in Formosa 
and forces were in the Pescadores. They could have gotten to Manila 
in 24 hours or in 40 hours. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is the point. After the 29th they could have 
gotten there in 24 hours if they wanted to make that attack as soon 
as they could in Luzon ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4235 

Adniiial Ingersoll. Yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. In your conferences with the other high ranking 
officers did you not discuss the point that they could [11308] 
have attacked within 24 hours after the 29th and they did not? Did 
3'ou not speculate on why they had not attacked, give the subject some 
consideration? 

Admiral Ingersoll. There was a conference in Mr, Knox' office 
every morning in which the Director of Naval Intelligence presented 
the whole situation, not only in the Far East but in Europe, the Atlan- 
tic situation, everything and everywhere, and the possibilities were 
discussed. They were sometimes discussed by the Director of War 
Plans, Admiral Turner, who would point out the implications, and so 
forth. The situation was reviewed every morning. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did you attend those meetings? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes. 

JNIr. Gearhart. Well, theu, I am asking you the question and you are 
in a position to answer it. Were there in those meetings after the 29th 
discussions of why after that had occurred, after we had read the Jap 
intercept that after the 29th things were going to happen automat- 
ically ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I cannot recall now, sir, that that particular 
point was discussed as to why they did not carry out what they said 
they were going to do in that message. 

Mr. Gearhart. All right. 

Admiral Ingersoll. As a matter of fact 

Mr. Gearhart. Pardon me. 

[11309] Admiral Ingersoll. As a matter of fact the messages 
received in these codes were usually not discussed at the Secretary's 
conferences and mentioned as such because there were more officers 
present there than who knew of the existence of these messages. 

Mr. Gearhart. All right. The discussions go on. You had had 
daily meetings on the 1st, on the 2d and the 8tl and we find we get 
further and further away from the deadline date of the 21)th. Did 
anybody in those meetings raise the question that possibly the Japa- 
nese were sailing to a distant point of attack? 

Admiral Ingersoll. No; none that I recall. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, you are a naval expert, one of the greatest liv- 
ing of naval experts. Didn't it occur to you when the time began to 
lengthen out into close to a week after the date the Japanese said things 
were going to automatically begin to happen, didn't it occur to you as 
a strategist that the Jajjanese fleet was sailing to a distant point of 
attack ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. The question of an attack on Pearl Harbor, 
of course, was always considered as a possibility. 

Mr. Gearhart. Eemote or close? 

Admiral Ingersoll. It was considered, of course, as a possibility 
because there was no other reason for putting [11310^ anti- 
aircraft guns there or stationing fighting planes on the island or hav- 
ing radar installation or anything of that kind except to keep Japanese 
planes away. That was the only reason for putting them there, so 
that is why I call it a possibility. ' 

Mr. Gearhart, Why is that your position I 

Admiral Ingersoll. Now, as to a probability as to whether or not 
they would attack is something else. 



4236 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Geariiart. Was that frequently discussed in your conferences, 
in your morning conferences ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not recall in the few days immediately 
preceding Pearl Harbor that they expected the Japanese to attack 
Pearl Harbor in the manner in which they did. 

Mr. Gearhart. Were you surprised? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I was surprised that Pearl Harbor was at- 
tacked but I was more surprised that the attack was not detected, that 
was my first reaction, and if I express it in the words which I used at 
the time, it was, "How in the hell did they get in there without some- 
body finding it out?" 

Mr. Gearhart. Then I will ask you if that was in your mind and 
that was always considered a possibility in your considerations why 
was Hawaii never mentioned in any of the so-called war warning mes- 
sages as a place of possible attack ? Why were other places in the Far 
East always stressed as the places of [11311] expected attack? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Because the places in the Far East were the 
only places of which we had definite information towards which the 
Japanese were moving. 

5lr. Gearhart. Didn't the fact that the Japanese were constantly 
pressing their Honolulu confederates for reports on the movement of 
ships in Pearl Harbor direct your attention to the rather acute possi- 
bility of an attack at Hawaii ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Xow you are referring, I presume, to the dis- 
patch regarding the location of ships in Pearl Harbor? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes ; the series of dispatches that reached your desk. 

Admiral Ingersoll. Well, as far as I am concerned personally I 
have no recollection of seeing that dispatch, so it did not occur to me 
personally. 

Mr. Gearpiart. Might I say. Admiral, it is not one dispatch? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Sir? 

Mr. Gearhart. Might I say it is not one dispatch? It is seven of 
them. 

Admiral Ingersoll. I meant that series of dispatches I did not see. 

Mr. Gearhart. Didn't they bring you all of them in that [11312] 
leather case and didn't you open the leather case with the key that was 
supplied you 

Admiral Ingersoll. No. 

Mr. Gearhart (continuing). And read all of those messages? 

Admiral Ingersoll. No. 

Mr. Gearhart. You don't know anything about this inordinate in- 
terest on the part of the Japanese in respect to the movement of ships 
in Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. There are two kinds of movements which would 
afford interest; one which was a movement of departure of ships in 
and out of Pearl Harbor would excite no interest whatever because 
we do that all the time and continue to do it in time of peace ; that is, 
to keep track of the strategic location of ships. So dispatches asking 
for departures and arrivals would excite no interest. I think if I had 
seen the dispatch which referred specifically to the location of ships 
in Pearl Harbor, I would have been interested very much. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did you see the intercept which divided Pearl Har- 
bor into five areas and the dispatch which called upon the Japanese 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4237 

agents at Honolulu to report each shifting and visit of ships from one 
area to another, as well as the ships coming in and out of the harbor 
entrance ? 

Admiral Ixgersoll. I think I first learned of that dis- [11313] 
patch when Admiral Hart asked me about it on his investigation. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, if you had seen those dispatches and they had 
been called to your attention, what would you have done? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Well, in the first place I would have wanted 
to know why they were interested in the actual location of a ship within 
a harbor as distinguished from whether or not the ship just happened 
to be in port. My suspicion would be aroused if I had seen that dis- 
patch I am certain. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, there was nobody to ask anything. All you 
had to do was read these messages and you would have to draw your 
own conclusions, so if you had seen those seven or eight dispatches, 
impatient demands from Tokyo that reports be given even if ships 
did not move 

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not recall seeing that dispatch. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, what would you have done as a naval strate- 
gist, what would you have thought as a naval expert if you had seen 
that message ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. If I had seen the dispatches which indicated 
interest in a specific location within Pearl Harbor as distinguished 
from being within the Hawaiian area, that would have indicated to 
me that they had an unusual interest in that place. 

Mr. Gearhart. That would have been out of the ordinary, 
[11314] wouldn't it? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes, it would have been. 

Mr. Gearhart. What would you have done if those messages had 
been called to your attention 1 

Admiral Ingersoll. I think Admiral Kimmel should have been 
informed. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, the fact is he was not. 

Now, getting back again to this 29th deadline, the passing of the 
29th, the passing of the 30th, the passing of the 1st, the 2d and the 3d 
and the 4th and the 5th and the 6th and nothing happened, did that 
not suggest to your mind, and this is back to the same question I asked 
before, did it ever suggest to your mind as a naval expert that the 
Japanese Fleet was sailing and steaming to a distant target? 

Admiral Ingersoll. It did not to me ; no. 

Mr. Gearhart. Wliy would it not ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Well, in the first place I did not think that the 
Japanese would risk an air attack on Pearl Harbor. While it was a 
possibility and while the defenses for Pearl Harbor had been set up 
for that purp.ose, the Japanese had very extensive operations under 
way at the time. Reports indicated, of course, that they were going 
into the Dutch East Indies, right into the Malay Peninsula, in the 
Philippines. Guam, of course, we knew would fall like a ripe plum 
any time they wanted to take it, which meant that the area of their 
operations was extended over a considerable stretch of territory. 

[11315] Furthermore, if all of the installations at Hawaii had 
been working, had the planes been on the alert, the attack there, in my 
opinion, might have been detected, and there might have been very 
serious damage to the Japanese, 



4238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

It would have deterred them from making an attack of that kind. 

Furthermore, if our fleet had not been in Pearl Harbor and it was 
at sea, in a place where it might have intercepted them, they might 
have incurred a very serious naval loss at that time. 

Mr. Gearhart. tVell, my clear Admiral, if you had read the in- 
tercept I referred to, you would have known that the Japanese knew 
that our fleet was in Pearl Harbor and the battleships tied up one 
next to the other in pairs. 

Admiral Ingersoll. As far as that goes, the Japanese had been 
reporting our movements of ships all over the world for a good many 
years. All you had to do was to stand back of the road at Pearl 
Harbor, and you could see everything that was in Pearl Harbor, 
where every ship was anchored. 

I had no doubt when I was there in 1940 that they were reporting 
everything at that time. 

Mr. Gearhart. You said a while ago, the high ranking [11316] 
naval officers and military officers were of the opinion that the Jap- 
anese would not risk an attack against Pearl Harbor in the light of 
the great obligations that they were assuming in the event of an 
attack on the Southwest Pacific ; is that not correct ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I think that was the opinion of most of the 
people in the Office of Naval Operations, that the Japanese would not 
make an attack on Pearl Harbor, although, of course, it was a pos- 
sibility. 

Mr. Gearhaet. Did it occur to you, and the high ranking naval and 
military officers, that they would not make an attack on the South- 
west Pacific if the xAmerican Fleet was left on their flank? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I did not understand that question. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then I will state it again. 

Did it occur to you that the Japanese would not dare to make the 
attack we expected them to make in the Southwestern Pacific if the 
American Fleet was left on their flank? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I still did not understand the question, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did it ever occur to you, or was it ever discussed 
among the officers you have told us about, the high ranking military 
and naval officers of the United [11317] States, that the Jaj)- 
anese would not dare to launch a major offensive in the Southwestern 
Pacific if the American Fleet was left in fighting shape on their flank 
at Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. They could have made the attack at that time, 
in December, on the Philippines and Malay Peninsula, even on the 
northern part of the Dutch East Indies, when our fleet was in Pearl 
Harbor, and they could have gotten away with it in time. 

Mr. Gearhart. Why? 

Admiral Ingersoll. The question is why the}^ came- to attack us. 
They hoped to cripple us so it never would be a factor in the rest of 
the war. 

Mr. Gearhaet. Don't you think, as a naval expert, that they came 
to Pearl Harbor for the purpose of attacking our fleet and immobi- 
lizing it for a time, so it would make it possible for them to complete 
their conquest of the Southwestern Pacific ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I think what you stated was their line of 
reasoning. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4239 

Mr. Gearhart. Did that enter into your conferences with the other 
high-ranking naval and military officers, that the Japanese might be 
thinking about immobilizing our fleet so that they could accomplish 
their objectives in [11318] the Southwestern Pacific? 

Admiral Ingersoll. As I stated before, the result of our estimate 
was that the Japanese would not do that, that they were fully occupied 
with what they were doing at that time, and that the risks were too 
great. 

Mr. Gearhart. In other words, it was the studied and carefully 
arrived-at opinion of the high ranking naval and military officers in 
AVashington that the Japanese would not launch an attack on our fleet 
in Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I could not answer it and say it was the opinion 
of all. I think it was the opinion of those with whom I talked. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did Admiral Stark express that opinion? 

Admiral Ingersoll. How is that, sir? 

Mr. Gearhart. Was that the opinion of Admiral Stark? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I think it was. 

Mr. Gearhart. And other people that you were in daily association 
and frequent conversation with? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I think so. 

Mr. Gearhart. If you felt there was any possibility of doing that 
kind of thing, making that sort of attack, you would, of course, have 
sent special messages to Admiral Kimmel and General Short? 

[11819] Admiral Ingersoll. I think there is no question at all, 
if we had any information, an}^ definite information that the Japanese 
ships were moving toward Pearl Harbor or if the Chief of Naval 
Operations felt that there was a distinct probability, as distinguished 
from a possibility that there was a distinct probability that Hawaii 
was in danger, I know he would have told them. 

Mr. Gearhart. But you have told lis that the destruction of codes, 
code machines, secret papers by the United States in the Japanese 
sphere, and by the Japanese in the American and British sphere, 
you told us that that meant war. 

Why did not you sent a notice to that effect and relay that in- 
formation on to Admiral Kimmel? 

Admiral Ingersoll. We did. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yoa did? 

Admiral Ingersoll. That is, we sent word that they had ordered 
the destruction of their codes. We had previously told them on the 
27th, that war would come at any time. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes ; but you did not say anything in the message 
of the 27th about the destruction of the codes, did you ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. We did not know it then. 

Mr. Gearhart. What other messages did you send [113£0] 
about the destruction of the codes before December 7, when it got 
there too late? 

Admiral Ingersoll. We sent them the instruction, or the informa- 
tion that the Japanese had ordered their codes destroyed, I believe, 
on the 3d or 4th of December ; I have forgotten the exact date. It was 
on the 3d of December. 

Mr. Gearhart. Is that the only message that was sent on that sub- 
ject, the one of the 3d of December? 



4240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Ingersoll. That was the only message sent on the 3d of 
December informing him that the Japanese were ordering the destruc- 
tion of their codes. Here is the one on December 3 which reads as 
follows : It was sent to the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, the com- 
mander in chief. Pacific Fleet, the commanding officer of the Four- 
teenth Naval District, which was Hawaii, and the commanding officer 
of the Sixteenth Naval District, which was Panama. 

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instruc- 
tions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most 
of their codes and ciphers at once, and to burn all other important confidential 
and secret documents. 

There is another one on December 3 that says : 

[11321] Circular 2444 from Tokyo one December ordered London, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy machine. Batavia machine already 
sent to Tokyo. December second Washington also directed destroy all but one 
code of other systems and all secret documents. British Admiralty London today 
reports embassy London has complied. 

Here is our dispatch to Tokyo, that is, to the naval attache at Tokyo, 
Bangkok, Peiping, Shanghai, to destroy their codes. That was sent 
on the 3d. 

Mr. Gearhart. On the 3d? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes. 

And Peiping and the Marine detachment at Tientsin were ordered 
to destroy on the 4th. Guam was directed on the 4th, and Admiral 
Kimmel was instructed on the 6th: 

In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying 
Pacific islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confi- 
dential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency. Means 
of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence 
should of course be maintained until the last moment. 

Mr, Gearhart. That should be interpreted, and should have been 
interpreted by Admiral Kimmel, as the most conclusive evidence that 
war was coming, and coming quickly? 

[11322] Admiral Ingersoll. It was the intention to convey that 
when they were sent. 

Mr. Gearhart, Yes, You felt war was coming and coming quickly ; 
and even though you thought that an attack on Hawaii was a possi- 
bility, every message in which places were mentioned directed the at- 
tention of the Hawaiian commanders to the fact that war was expected 
in the Philippines, in Indochina, the Kra Peninsula, and possibly 
Borneo and Guam ; is that not correct ? 

Admiral Ingersoll, The information that we had of Japanese forces 
on the move at that time, was in that direction, 

Mr, Gearhart. And even though all these days passed after the 
deadline date of the 29th of November, you and the high-ranking offi- 
cers with whom you were in daily conference, thought that possibly 
the Japanese were scheming on a distant point as a place of attack? 

Admiral Ingersoll, As I stated before we had no definite informa- 
tion that the Japanese were on the move toward Hawaii, and I do 
not think it was the opinion of the officers in the Office of Chief of 
Naval Operations that they were moving in that direction. 

Mr, Gearhart, You did not know where the fleet was; did you? 
Was not this Japanese Fleet lost for a week or [11323] two ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4241 

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not know. The information regarding the 
location of Japanese ships was the primary responsibility of the com- 
mander of the Pacific Fleet. He was the man who was in charge of 
the methods of determining the location of the Japanese Fleet through 
radio intelligence, as it was called. 

There Avere very long periods of time, and at various times, when 
we never knew where the Japanese Fleet was. They might go to 
their mandated islands; and they might just as well have been on the 
moon, as far as we knew where they were. 

Mr. Gearhart. There were times when you did know where the 
Japanese Fleet was? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. You got in touch with the Japanese whenever you 
could ; is that not correct ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. It is like people that talk too much. Whenever 
they use the radio too much they get in trouble, because then they find 
where they are ; and when you maintain radio silence, you don't know 
where they are. It was only by means of the radio direction finders 
and the analysis of the traffic that they could in most cases keep track 
of where they were. 

[11324] There were long periods of time when we did not know 
where they were, or when we did not know where particular ships were. 

Mr. Gearhart. And, as a matter of fact, there were days following 
the 29th day of November, the dead-line date, when it was known to 
you, and the men with whom you were in daily conference, that the 
Japanese were in a position unknown to American Intelligence; is 
that correct? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I believe, although I did not keep track of the 
position of all Japanese ships, that there were some ships at that time 
that they did not know where they were, but there were a great many 
Japanese ships that we did know where they were. 

We had sighted them off the coast of Indochina, lots of them. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did you have to do with the preparation of the war 
planWPL-46? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes. As a member of the joint board, that war 
plan was finally approved by the joint board, before it was sent to the 
Secretaries and the President for approval. 

Mr. Gearhart. WPL-46 was a revised plan, was it not? 

Admiral Ingersoll. It was a result of several revisions. 

[11325] Mr. Gearhart. We had plan after plan, and it is the 
forty-sixth war plan? Does that mean that it is the forty-sixth plan 
that had been worked out for the defense of the Pacific? 

Admiral Ingersoll. No. 

Mr. Gearhart. Were there that many plans, or more? 

Admiral Ingersoll. No. As I recall, there were numerous plans 
that had been prepared for different situations, and different enemies 
over a period of many years, and that simply meant war plans volume 
No. 46. 

In the old Orange war plan, which had been in existence 5 or 6 years, 
there were four volumes, and each one of them had a separate WPL 
number. 

Mr. Gearhart. WPL-46, though had been recently, just a short time 
before Pearl Harbor on December 7, revised ? 



4242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Ingersoll. I believe WPLf-46 was approved in April. 

Mr. Gearhart. In April of 1941. Now, that represented the joint 
opinion of a committee, in reference to the problem which might come 
on? 

Admiral Ingersoll. It is a little more than that, because WPL-46 
was based on another plan, x\BC-l, which was the American-British- 
Canadian joint plan, which had been approved on the highest political 
levels. Once that plan was approved, then the basic Army and Navy 
joint plan was [11326] drawn up, and from that the Navy war 
plan, WPL-46 was evolved. 

Mr. Gearhart. Was the high level political plan, the ABC plan, 
was that the ABC-1 plan ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. ABC-1 was the plan agreed upon by the con- 
versations with tlie British and Canadians, prior to No. 46. 

Mr. Gearhart. And was it the adoption of that plan that made 
necpssarv the making of the general defense plan which became known 
as WPL-46? 

Admiral Ingersoll. The existing plan, the number of which I have 
forgotten at the moment, was to be brought into agreement with 
ABC-1, which liad been approved on high political levels. 

Mr. Gearhart. Generally speaking WPL-46 was an offensive plan, 
was it not? It contemplated offensive action on the part of the 
Pacific Fleet? 

Admiral Ingersoll. On the contrary; no. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did it not involve the sending of the fleet down into 
the Marshalls before the Jap attack, and we became involved in this 
war ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I haven't the plan here, but my recollection of 
the plan was that the offensive movement to the Marshalls did not 
take place until D plus 180, [11327] which was 6 months, and 
the reason for that was we did not have the auxiliaries or the trans- 
ports sufficient for the fleet to make an offensive movement. 

Mr. Gearhart. But the ultimate purpose of WPL-46 was to capture 
the Marshall Islands? 

Admiral Ingersoli.. No. The principal task in WPL-46' which was 
in agreement with ABC-1. was to defeat Germany and Italy in the 
Atlantic, and then defeat Japan. That was the basic decision. 

Mr. Gearhart. WPL-46 did not relate to the Atlantic warfare, did 
it? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Was it such a wide plan ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. It was a plan for the United States Naval 
forces wherever situated". The Pacific Fleet tasks were only one 
chapter of it. 

Mr. Gearhart. What did it provide for the defense of Hawaii? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Sir? 

Mr. Gearhart. What did it provide for the defense of Hawaii? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Is the plan here so I can see ? 

Mr. Gearhart. I was not going into details. Do you remember, 
generally, the underlying scheme ? 

[11338] Admiral Ingersoll. One of the tasks of the Pacific 
Fleet was to defend the west coast and our possessions in the Western 
Pacific. That included Hawaii as a part of it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4243 

Of course, the primary responsibility for the defense of the Hawaiian 
Islands was an Army responsibility and not a Navy responsibility. 
Under the joint action of the Army and Navy the Army was supposed 
to defend Hawaii so that the fleet could leave it without any naval 
ships there. But the fleet was supposed to cover it in its general 
operations, to prevent the Japanese from sending an Army there to 
capture it. 

Mr, Geaehakt. Was not that the underlying theory of WPLr-46 that 
we would defend Hawaii and defend the United States by an offensive 
action against the Japanese ? 

Admiral Ixgersoll, The basic task, the major task of the Pacific 
Fleet in WPL-46, for the first 6 months was largely defensive. 

My testimony in the Court of Inquiry has that outlined in particu- 
lar, where I have enumerated each task, and whether or not it was 
defensive or offensive. The reason for that was because the instruc- 
tions which were sent to Admiral Hart and to Admiral Kimmel in 
the war warning dispatch of November 27, directed them to take 
a defensive deployment [USSd] preparatory to carrying out 
the tasks assigned in WPIi-46. 

Mr. Gearhart. You have heard the old phrase, the best defense is 
often an attack, have you not ? 

Achniral Ingersoll. I have heard that. 

Mr. Gearhabt. Is that not the theory on which WPL-46 was 
based ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Sir? 

Mr. Gearhart. Is not that the theory on which WPL-46 was 
based ? 

xldmiral Ingersoll. No, sir ; it was not. 

Mr, Gearhart, That is all. 

The Chahiman, Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment. 

The Chairman, May I ask, while j'ou are getting ready, there is 
one question that occurred to me with regard to not only the Pacific 
Fleet, but with regard to all fleets. 

Is it or is it not true that the man who has risen to the rank in 
the Navy that he would be in charge of a fleet of the proportions of 
the Pacific Fleet, or the Asiatic, or the Atlantic Fleet, is expected to 
know enough about the situation and keep himself enough informed 
about the situation to exercise judgment based upon information he 
gathers on the ground, and it is not necessary for Washington to feed 
him out of a spoon every little detail [11SS30] of information 
that he ought to obtain in the field, on the ground where he is 
expected to have judgment and use it? 

Is that a fair statement of the expectation of all officers ? 

Admiral Ingersoll, Yes, sir; that is a very good statement, sir. 

Of course, there is sometimes information which exists in the 
Capital which the commander in chief has no means of obtaining. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Ingersoll. Or perhaps an expression of policy. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Ingersoll. Then it is the function of the Navy Depart- 
ment to keep him informed along those lines. 



4244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

For example, in connection with thtit I said here before, i^dmiral 
Kimmel would have had no means of knowing that the Japanese 
had sent out instructions to burn their codes, except I have heard 
that they did see the Japanese consul burn stuff in his back yard in 
Honolulu, but I mean he would have no means of knowing that the 
Japanese in Washington or London, were to burn their codes. 

The Chairman. Would there be information that he would obtain 
in the field, or in the ocean where he was in command [11331] 
that Washington would not have ? 

You mentioned a while ago that he had to keep up with where 
the Japanese Fleet was. 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes; because the coordination of all of the 
radio direction finder stations in the Pacific was under the com- 
mander in chief. Pacific Fleet, and it was his assigned task to make 
the analysis of radio traffic in order to keep track as best he could 
with where the Japanese ships were. He was assigned that task 
because of his phj^sical location and proximity, and nearness to them. 

He could do it better than anybody else. 

The Chairman. In other words, as I gather your answer, there is 
information that could be obtained at each end of the line, that the 
other one could not obtain, and in case Washington obtained in- 
formation that was important and that the commander in the field 
could not get, or does not have, it is the duty of the Washington 
offices in the Navy, and the same in tJie Army, to ajDprise the com- 
mander in the field of that information, and also it is the duty of the 
commander in the field to obtain informatioa and act upon it accord- 
ing to his judgment, along the lines, within his discretion that they 
could not obtain here in Washington ; isn't that true? 

[11332] Admiral Ingersoll, That is true. 

I mentioned before that we were obtaining information regarding 
the movement of the Japanese along the coast of Asia. 

That information was obtained by the planes which Admiral Hart 
sent out from Manila. 

It was also obtained by reports from Chinese agents and I think 
they were transmitted to him, and he, in turn, transmitted that 
information to us. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

[11333] Admiral Ingersoll. A commander in chief is consid- 
ered by the Navy as almost a viceroy out in his own field. They 
tell him in broad terms what he is supposed to do and they do not 
bother him with asking him how he is going to do it, or keep bother- 
ing him with whether he has done it. 

The Chairman. Would not any naval officer worthy of a command 
of that sort feel that he ought to have discretion and he ought to be 
depended upon and may be depended upon to act within the field of 
his own information, and to gather all the information on the ground 
that it is at all possible from any source, and would there be many 
sources of such information in Hawaii, or in Manila, or anywhere 
in the Far East or in the Atlantic on the part of a commanding officer 
of the Navy? 

Admiral Ingersoll. When you put a commander in chief out there 
you want to leave him, as far as possible, free to do his job, and you 
trust that he is going to do it, and you help him in such ways as 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4245 

you can, where there are things of which he has no knowledge him- 
self. 

The Chairman. That is all. 

The Senator from Michigan may inquire. Pardon the interrup- 
tion. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all right. 

Admiral, is there any question in your mind that the [11334] 
chief source of intelligence of the United States Navy in the fall of 
1941 was in AYashington ? Is there any question about that ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. That the chief what ; sir i 

Senator Ferguson. The chief source of Naval Intelligence was be- 
ing assembled and evaluated in AYashington in 1941. 

Admiral Ingersoll. I should say the chief source of evaluation was 
in Washington, but not necessaril}^ the sources from which all of the 
information was obtained. 

Senator Ferguson. I appreciate not all of it was in Washington, 
as far as obtaining information is concerned, but the evaluation of 
intelligence was centered in AYashington ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Generally speaking, I think that is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And in what particular office was it i 
AA^ho had authorit}", and whose duty was it to evaluate intelligence? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Generally speaking, the evaluatioii of intelli- 
gence was done in the Office of Naval Intelligence. Of course in near- 
ly every case the credibility of the information, or the reliability of 
the information, was determined there. But in some cases you had to 
refer, say, to technical bureaus as to whether or not reports on this 
or that mechanical device, or plane, and so forth, was worth 
[11 335] anything. 

In regard to the evaluation of the combined political and military 
information, particularly as it might pertain to its effect on opera- 
tions, or the strategic distribution of our own forces, that sort of 
evaluation was done in the AA'ar Plans Division. AA"e did not call it 
evaluation there. It was the estimate of the situation which the AYar 
Plans Division made in drawing up the war plans. 

Senator Fergltson. In other words, you have two sources of in- 
formation, or you have two kinds of information, the military, or 
naval in your case, and political information ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. And the political part of the information was 
never given to the Naval Intelligence, so that they had nothing to do 
with the evaluation of political information or intelligence, as far as 
it related to or controlled Naval Intelligence ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I am not sure that that is correct, that the po- 
litical information was never given to Intelligence. I think that is not 
correct. I think Naval Intelligence had practically the same informa- 
tion that everybody in Operations had, except possibly the direct con- 
tact which Admiral Stark had with ^Mr. Hull, and of course that was 
as good political information as you could have. 

[11336] Senator Ferguson. And Admiral Stark also had direct 
contact with the President? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Oh, yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Now how did that information that Admiral 
Stark got from those two men on the political side of our Intelligence 



4246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

get down into Naval Intelligence that was headed by Admiral Wil- 
kinson? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Well, as I said before, we used to have these 
conferences' in the morning. Admiral Stark discussed matters at 
those times. He had a liaison officer, Admiral Schuirmann, or Cap- 
tain Schuirmann at that time, who saw the State Department officials 
I think every day, and sometimes more than once a day, and Admiral 
Schuirmann would not only, when he came back from the State De- 
partment, report to Admiral Stark, but he would tell the other officers 
in Operations, War Plans, Intelligence, I am almost certain, and my- 
self, what he had learned at the State Department that day. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know what the political policy, foreign 
policy, was in 1941, in December, in the early part, prior to Pearl Har- 
bor, as far as it related to Japan ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I am not sure that I know what you mean by 
the political policy. I was kept informed by Admiral [113.37] 
Stark as to the more or less general process of our relations with Japan. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then I will ask you this question : 
Did you know what our policy was prior to Pearl Harbor — and that 
was on the 7th — that if there was an attack on the Malay Peninsula, 
what the position Avould be of the United States of America, as far as 
the Navy or the Army were concerned ^ 

Admiral Ingersoll. As far as the Navy and Army were concerned, 
what we would do was contained in our war plans and had nothing 
of course, whatever to do with wliether or not there would be war 
between the United States and Japan if Japan went into the Malay 
Peninsula. 

I do not think there was anybody in the Navy Department who 
knew what would happen if Japan went into the Malay Peninsula, or 
into Siam, or Thailand. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, as far as the United States Navy 
was concerned — and I am talking about OPNAV, which was your 
department — you had no idea as to what the position of the Navy 
would be in case there was an attack by the Japanese upon the British 
and/or the Dutch and no attack upon any American possessions? 

Admiral Ingersoll. The position of the Navy would have been the 
position taken by the United States Government, [llSoS] and 
what the President would have recommended to the Congress about 
declaring war. The Navy's position would have been exactly the po- 
sition of the United States. 

Now the only thing we had to go by was the destruction of codes, 
which indicated that the Japanese expected to be at war with us soon, 
and they were moving in the direction of the Malay Peninsula. So 
the only inference you could draw is that very soon we were all going 
to be at war and there were going to be hostilities. But the Navy did 
not know what the President was going to recommend to the Congress. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that there had been war in the 
Atlantic without any recommendation to the Congress ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I certainly did. 

Senator Ferguson. How does that account then for your answer 
about war in the Pacific? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Then it was not a legal war, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4247 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you, as one of the chief officers in 
OPNAV, expect the same kind of a ^Yar in the Pacific as they had 
in the Atlantic if there was an attack on the British possessions and 
not upon America ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. No, because the Germans were still here in 
Washington and they had not declared war on us for all that we had 
been doing to them in the Atlantic. 

[11339] Senator Ferguson. Then do I understand it was be- 
cause of the burning of the codes that you got definite information 
that there was going to be war with America ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. There is no question about it. 

Senator Ferguson. Now when did you come to the conclusion that 
there was going to be war with America ? Will you give us the date 
as nearly as you can ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. You mean when Japan was going to be at war 
with the United States ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Ingersoll. I think everybody in the Navy was convinced 
that we were going to have war with Japan for the last 20 years. 

Senator Ferguson. Can we get a little closer than that ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. As the situation got worse during 1941 there 
was not any question about it, that sooner or later we were going to be 
at war. The resignation of the Cabinet in Japan in October looked 
as though it was going to be a very, very serious situation, that there 
was no hope of a peaceful settlement. Again on the 27th of Novem- 
ber, when Mr. Hull, I believe, informed the Secretary of the Navy 
that there was no hope of a peaceful solution with Japan, there was 
no question in the mind of Admiral Stark, I know, that war was 
coming very soon. The destruction of their [11S40] codes 
brought it still closer. 

The Chairman. The committee will recess until 10 o'clock tomor- 
row morning. 

Admiral, you will be back then. 

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., February 11, 1916, the committee recessed 
until 10 a. m. of the following day, Tuesday, February 12, 1946.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4249 



[imn PEAKL HARBOR ATTACK 



tuesday, february 12, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack. 

Washington, D. C. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the Caucus Eoom (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman), presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas. Brewster, 
and Ferguson and Kepresentatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe. 

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Hasten, Edward P. 
Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee. 

lll3Jik\ The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Admiral Ingersoll is still on the stand. Senator Ferguson was 
examining him when we recessed. 

TESTIMONY OF ADMIKAL R. E. INGEESOLL, UNITED STATES 
NAVY (Resumed) 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Ingersoll, we knew of a great war 
being conducted in Europe, and we knew how Hitler had gone into 
Poland and into Denmark, and so forth, that all of the actions of war 
had changed, and we were unorthodox, did we not? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes, sir ; I have almost humorously called the 
war in the Atlantic as illegal. It was more in the nature of irregular. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you want to change your language from 
yesterday, that the war that we were conducting from August in the 
Atlantic was irregular rather than illegal ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes ; I think that is a better description of it. 

Senator Ferguson. You use the word "irregular" after I used the 
expression unorthodox method of Hitler in his attacks without dec- 
laration of war. 

Admiral Ingersoll. In the Atlantic we were doing some things 
which only a belligerent does. There had been no [11S43] dec- 
laration of war. We had done a great many things that under 
international law, as it w^as understood before the last war, were 
unneutral, and Germany just did not see fit to declare war on us on 
many occasions when she could have assumed our acts as unfriendly. 

It was apparently to her advantage to have us as a nonbelligerent 
rather than as a full belligerent. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, Now, you say that Germany, under in- 
ternational law, as I understand it, had just cause for de43laring war 
from the overt acts that we had been committing? 

79716 — 46— pt. 9 22 



4250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know as to any reason- why we were 
doing these acts without a declaration of war? Was it in any way 
that Germany was to declare war first? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I cannot answer that question, sir. This is a 
question of high policy, of political policy. The Navy Department 
was ordered to do certain things, which it did. 

Senator Ferguson. As an officer of our Navy, in fact, next to the 
Chief, you knew that these overt acts were going on ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Correct. 

Senator Ferguson. And they were all irregular and [11344-] 
not in accordance with the old idea of declaration of war? 

Admiral Ingersoll. And of international law, as it was understood. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Now, what I am getting at, in asking you these questions is why 
did not we anticipate the same thing in the Pacific with Japan? 

Admiral Ingersoll. There are two reasons for that. One was 
that we ourselves were not ready, or as ready as we wished to be to go 
to war in the Pacific. 

As a matter of fact, I think it was in November that the Chief of 
Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy 
wrote to the Secretary of State, and I believe sent a letter to the Presi- 
dent, urging that nothing be done which would precipitate hostilities 
in the Pacific in order that we would have more time to strengthen 
our defenses in the Philippines, and to get more strength in the Pacific. 

Senator Ferguson. Does not that then add strength to the supposi- 
tion when we were not ready in the Pacific, and knew from all of these 
messages what was going on, that Japan would take advantage of our 
unreadiness and attack without a declaration of war? 

Admiral Ingersoll, On the 27th of November, I think it [1134^'\ 
was, on rather the 24th of November — I am speaking from memory 
now — Admiral Stark's message to the Fleet stated that an attack 
could be expected in any direction. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Then on the 27th another message, the so-called warning message, 
was sent out ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But Japan had notified us on the 25th, the dead- 
line message had she not ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I believe that was the date. I am not sure that 
that was addressed to the United States. 

Senator Ferguson. No, no. 

Admiral Ingersoll. We picked it up. 

Senator Ferguson. It was an intercepted message to her ambas- 
sador. 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Then they altered it to the 29th, which was our 
30th, was it not? 

Admiral Ingersoll. No, we would be one day earlier than she 
would be. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Their 29th 

Admiral Ingersoll. Is our 28th. 

The Chairman. That is right. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4251 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. 

[1134S] They set the 29th as the date, that is correct, is it not? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I believe so. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did anything happen between November 
29 and December 7 that would indicate to your department that war 
was not coming? 

Admiral Ingersoll. On the contrary. Senator, the information 
which we received on the Japanese, or from the Japanese messages, 
was that they had instructed their embassies and consulates to burn 
their codes, and that was positive evidence that they expected to be 
at war with the three nations indicated in those dispatches very soon. 

Furthermore, the Japanese forces were on the move, and we had 
sighted them moving in the Far East. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. That is just what I want to get at. 

Here we find them moving in the Far East. We know that on the 
29th, they have stated that that is the last day, and after that they 
said "Things are automatically going to happen." 

Did not that indicate to you that there were other movements on 
foot and not only those that we could see down in the South Pacific, 
going to Siam? As a Naval strategist, did not your department see 
that there was [11347] a movement and anticipate that the 
movement could have been towards Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. There was nothing in the Japanese movement 
which we saw which indicated any movement anywhere except in that 
direction to where we saw them moving. 

However, we knew there were troops massed in Formosa, in the 
Pescadores, and on the coast of China, whose most logical destination 
was the Philippines. 

And there might also have been other forces whose location we did 
not know, who might be going in any direction, or that might have 
been going towards Alaska. 

Senator Ferguson. So it is the ones that were going "in any direc- 
tion" that we did not have the information on, that we should have 
anticipated their action rather than those that we did know their 
movements into Siam and into the Kra Peninsula? 

Admiral Ingersoll. That was the reason that Admiral Stark put 
into the war warning message the words — and I should digress for 
a moment. 

The war warning message was sent to all three commanders in chief. 
It was sent to the Atlantic, to the Pacific, and to the Asiatic. 

It was sent for action to Admiral Hart and to Admiral Kimmel, and 
it was sent to Admiral King in the Atlantic [11348] for in- 
formation, because the action required by that dispatch was to take 
a defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks in 
WPL-46, which was the war plan. 

It was not sent to Admiral King for action because he was deployed 
all over the Atlantic at the time and could not do any more. 

Senator Ferguson. I am going to come back to that defensive de- 
ployment a little later. 

Were you familiar, Admiral, with the fact that on the 2nd of De- 
cember 

Will you show the Admiral Exhibit 37, page 39 ? 



4252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Were you familiar with that message that the President directed, 
as to the charter of three small vessels ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes ; I am familiar with that message. 

[11S49~\ Senator Ferguson. You released that message, did you 
not? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I am not sure whether I released it or not, but 
I had a large part in preparing the message. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the purpose of that message ? It was 
three small vessels to form a defensive information patrol. They were 
to go over into the Camranh Bay, Cape St. Jaques, and one off the 
point of Camau. 

Now I have those marked on here, and they are many miles away 
from the Philippines, in fact they are way over so they can watch the 
movement into the Malay Peninsula, are they not ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us why you wanted to have these 
three small men-of-war out in the Gulf of Siam watching for a move- 
ment on the British possessions ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. The reason that we wanted them there is be- 
cause it says in the beginning of the dispatch the "President directs 
that the following be done as soon as possible." That was our reason 
for doing it. Admiral Stark was told by the President to do it. 

Senator Ferguson. Was there any reason given by the President 
to do it? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Not that he told me. I do not know what he 
told Admiral Stark, except to do this. I do not [11350] know 
whether he told Admiral Stark his reason or not. 

Senator Ferguson. You had no reason but you prepared the dis- 
patch ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Admiral Hart was already conducting recon- 
naissance off that coast by planes from Manila. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know the reason for the statement : 

Filipino crews may be employed with minimum number Naval ratings to accom- 
plish purpose which is to observe and report by radio Japanese movements in West 
China Sea and Gulf of Siam. 

Why did they want to use Filipino crews ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. The only reason I can ascribe to that is that 
possibly Admiral Hart did not have sufficient enlisted men to do it, 
and it simply authorized him to use Filipinos to do it. and he could 
simply take a ship which was already manned by Filipinos, put naval 
officers on it, put a gun on it, hoist an American flag on it and it would 
then be a man-of-war. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what you were trying to do at that time ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. That is what we were told to do, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You took it rather as an order? 

Admiral Ingersoll. That is the reason it starts off the "President 
directs that the following be done." 

[11S51] Senator Ferguson. This was not something being done 
by the Navy as the Navy, it was the Commander in Chief doing it ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I am sure Admiral Stark would not have done 
this unless he had been told. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you see any useful purpose that could be 
accomplished by these three small men-of-war as lookouts there? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4253 

Admiral Ingersoll. We did not initiate this movement, sir, and we 
were getting, I think, so far as Admiral Stark was concerned, sufficient 
information from Admiral Hart by the searches which his planes were 
making. 

Senator Ferguson. Now that brings up a certain matter on planes. 
Admiral, could you tell me as to whether or not these were really men- 
of-war, so if they had been fired on it would have been an overt act 
against the United States ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. May I read this again more carefully? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. It was to have a cannon and machine gun. 

Admiral Ingersoll. It says in the beginning : 

Minimum requirements to establish identity as U. S. men-of-war are command 
by a Naval officer and to mount a small gun and one machine gun would suflSce. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Would that have been an overt act if one 
of these small boats had been fired on '. 

[IIS'5^] Admiral Ingersoll. It would have been. 

Senator Ferguson. It would have been ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. It would have been an overt act on the part of 
Japan. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I am talking about. And, there- 
fore, we would have been in war ? 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Is that your idea, Admiral ? I mean as far as 
the overt act was concerned. 

Admiral Ingersoll. It would have been an incident on which we 
could have declared war had we wished to. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Ingersoll. Of course, our men-of-war had been fired upon 
before, like the Panay incident, and we did not go to war. I do not 
know whether this would have resulted in war or not, but it might have 
resulted in war. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ? 

The Chairman. Will the Senator yield to Mr. Murphy ? 

Senator Ferguson. Not at the moment. 

Mr. Murphy. It is already developed anyway. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, I want you to look at page 2 of Ex- 
hibit 78. This is on the 30th of November. Would you just read that ? 

Admiral Ingersoll (reading) : 

Indications that Japan about to [11353] attack i>oints on Kra Isthmus 
by overseas expedition x In order to ascertain destination this expedition and 
for security our position in the Philippines desire you cover by air the line Manila 
Camranh Bay on three days commencing upon receipt this dispatch x Instruct 
planes to observe only x They must not approach so as to appear to be attack- 
ing but must defend themselves if attacked x Understand British Air Forces 
will search ARC 180 miles from Tedta Bharu and will move troops to lin|e 
across KRA isthmus near Singora x If expedition is approaching Thailand 
inform MacArthur x British mission here informed. 

Senator Ferguson. The idea there was that we were going to put 
planes out over this same area to watch for movements into the Kra 
Peninsula, is that correct? 

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. And if they were armed it was not to appear that 
they were doing the attacking, but they were to defend themselves ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct. 



4254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. That is correct? 
Admiral Ingersoll. If attacked. 

Senator Ferguson. If attacked. I assume the same thing was true 
with these three small boats. 

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct. 

MISSJ^] Senator Ferguson. With the machine guns and cannon. 

Admiral Ingersoll. They would have undoubtedly defended them- 

selves. 

Senator Ferguson. That would have been the intention, is that 

correct? . 

Admiral Ingersoll. That is a right of self-preservation which you 

have. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you look at the previous message. 
Admiral Ingersoll. May I enlarge on this one a moment before I 

go on? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Ingersoll. You have a perfect right to fly planes over 
the ocean. You have also a right to send ships and men-of-war over 
the ocean. A plane may also approach a formation if it is a large 
formation and ascertain what is going on without being sighted. 
So that the chances of an overt incident occurring m the case of a 
plane search are very much less than that of a small ship trying to 

trail a force. 

Senator Ferguson. So you would have anticipated that there would 
be more danger of an attack on the three small men-of-war than on 
these airplanes? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Much more. 

[11355] Senator Ferguson. Much more. 

Admiral Ingersoll. We had a perfect right to observe what they 
were doing. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, look at the previous message. 

Admiral Ingersoll. Do you wish me to read it? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Ingersoll. This is from the Commandant of the 14th Dis- 
trict of Operations : 

Following received by British Consul from usually reliable source. Japanese 
will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on one December without ultimatum or 
declaration in order to get between Bangkok and Singapore. Attackers will pro- 
ceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. Main landing to be made at Songkhla. 

Senator Ferguson. That is in line with the same, is it not? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes, sir, except that it now turns out it wasn t 
a good prediction. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, attached to the November 29th memoran- 
dum of conversations of the Department of State I find this lan- 
guage—it is headed "Most Secret". It comes from— I can't tell. Cor- 
dell Hull's initials are on the paper that it is attached to. But this is 
the significant part : 

[11S56] R. A. F. are reconnoitering on arc of 180 miles from Tedta Bharu for 
three days commencing November 29th and our Commander in Chief, Far East, has 
requested Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet at Manila to undertake air recon- 
naissance on line Manila-Camranh Bay on the same days. 

Now, that would indicate that that is from the British. 
Admiral Ingersoll. It is from the British, I think. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4255 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And it is asking our Asiatic Fleet send 
out a reconnaissance on the line of Manila-Camranh Bay on the same 
days. 

Now, that is the day that the deadline was placed, the 29th. So we 
really expected an attack on the 29th, did we not? 

Admiral Ingersoll. We expected an attack when the Japanese 
forces which were proceeding around the south end of Indochina 
would land. Whether they landed on the Kra Peninsula or on Thai- 
land we did not know at that time, but depending on the speed they 
were making and the distance they were away at that time we could 
predict very closely what day they might expect to land there. 

Senator Ferguson. Didn't every message we received after the 29th 
indicate to you that the attack was coming, that there was going to be 
war ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. After the 27th we were expecting it \^11357'\ 
any time, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You were expecting it any time and as it moved 
on, let's say three or four days, didn't you anticipate that there was a 
movement on Pearl Harbor, because it was taking the number of days 
that it was taking, that every time a day elapsed it would indicate 
more that the movement had been for a longer distance, and therefore 
anticipate that it was Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Ingersoll. The answer to that is no, it was not anticipated. 
Otherwise they would have told them about it. 

Senator Ferguson. Who would have told them ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Admiral Stark would have told Admiral Kim- 
mel had he had the slightest idea, I think, that it was probable and 
that an attack on Pearl Harbor was impending. 

Senator Ferguson. So I take it you did not anticipate, as the days 
elapsed, an attack of that character ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I testified in the Court of Inquiry that we did 
expect that there would be Japanese submarines off Hawaii, that there 
would be Japanese submarines off our Pacific Coast, that they would 
be on a line of communications between Pearl Harbor and our Pacific 
Coast, that there might be an attack on our outlying possessions, as 
there were at \^11358^ Midway and Guam, and there were sub- 
marines off Hawaii, there were submarines off of the Pacific Coast, 
and they were sinking ships, I believe, on the 7th of December between 
Pearl Harbor and the Pacific Coast. We did not anticipate — I say we 
did not anticipate — I am sure Admiral Stark did not anticipate an 
attack of the character which the Japanese made at Pearl Harbor, 
although it was always a possibility; but he did not anticipate it as 
a probability. 

Senator Ferguson. How did you appraise it? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I did not expect an attack of that character 
on Pearl Harbor as I testified yesterday. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I wish you would look at these two ex- 
hibits. They are from the British Admiralty to the United States 
on Saturday morning of the 6th. 

Admiral Ingersoll. Do you wish me to read them, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. They are in the record. If you will just refer 
to them so you will know what is in them, because I want to ask you 
some questions about them. 



4256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that those reports were in the 
State Department on Saturday indicatino; that there was to be an 
attack with 14 hours on the Kra Peninsula ? 

Admiral Ingersoll, I don't know whether I saw this particular 
dispatch and I can't find my initials on it. [11359] However, 
at that time the Japanese forces were in that area and the attack might 
have come, I suppose, with 14 hours or any time, depending on what 
hour they selected for their landing. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you have indicated that Admiral Stark 
and General Marshall gave to the President a memorandum — I think 
one is dated on the 5th of November and one the 27th — at least both 
of them used the statement "to give no ultimatum to Japan", is that 
correct? You are familiar with that? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I would like to see the document if I could to 
refresh my memory. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Admiral Ingersoll. The date of November 28 seems to stick in 
my craw at the moment. 

Senator Ferguson. 16 and 17 are the exhibit numbers. 

While they are getting those exhibits I will ask you some other 
questions. 

This war that we w^ere talking about yesterday and this morning 
in the Atlantic was,'of course, a Government decision? It wasn't the 
Navy alone, it was the Government, our Government, that had made 
the decision? 

Admiral Ingersoll, Everything that the Navy did in the Atlantic, 
Bxcept the details of carrying out the various [11S60] move- 
ments, and so forth, was on direction, I presume, from tlie Presi- 
dent. Of course, there was a certain part which was a protection of 
lend-lease stuff which we were sending to Europe. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, priority of goods to the Atlantic was 
being used because of what was being done in the Atlantic ; isn't that 
correct ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I don't understand what you mean by "prior- 
ity of goods", sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you have any priority to the Atlan- 
tic? I am talking about airplanes, ships. Didn't we send some 
ships from the Pacific, from Pearl Harbor, out to the Atlantic? 

Admiral Ingersoll. We did. The basic strategy of the war plan 
in effect, WPL-46, and which w-as also derived from ABC-1, was to 
defeat Germany and Italy first and to maintain a strategic defensive 
in the Pacific until we could defeat Germany and Italy and then 
concentrate on licking the Japs. And that was the strategy followed 
in the war. 

Senator Ferguson. We are not talking about the right or wrong 
of the decision. We are just trying to get the facts. 

Admiral Ingersoll. So far as the Navy Department was concerned, 
that decision was made for it. 

[11361] Senator Ferguson. Yes, and it followed out the deci- 
sion? 
. Admiral Ingersoll. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4257 

Senator Ferguson. Now, wasn't this true, that because of what 
was going on in the Atlantic we had a shortage of equipment in the 
Pacific? 

Admiral Ingeksoll. We had a shortage of equipment everywhere. 
There were certain tasks assigned to the Atlantic Fleet in that war 
plan. There were others assigned to the Pacific. There were tasks 
assigned to the Asiatic Fleet. The Chief of Naval Operations hav- 
ing those tasks in view endeavored to allocate the forces available 
to him in the proper proportion which he considered as nearly ade- 
quate as he could, the forces which were sufficient to carry out the 
tasks which he had assigned. 

For that reason the forces in the Pacific were by no means as strong 
as they should have been for an offensive war, and I think the whole 
Navy would not have been, at that time, strong enough to carry on 
an offensive war in the Pacific. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, if we had had the entire Navy 
of the United States in the Pacific 

Admiral Ingeksoll. At that moment. 

Senator Ferquson. At that moment, when the war started, it would 
not have been sufficient to carry on an offensive war ? 

[11S62] Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And, of course, this was all known when the 
fleet was moved to Hawaii, was it not? 

Admiral Ingersoll. It was. 

Senator Ferguson. And the insufficiency of the equipment at 
Hawaii was known prior to the time and at the time the fleet was 
sent to Hawaii? 

Admiral Ingersoll. It was. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, as a result of that, didn't that place 
an extra burden on the Navy, creating a hazard by placing the fleet 
in Pearl Harbor, to be on the alert at all times to save that fleet? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I don't consider that a hazard, sir. One of 
the tasks of the Pacific Fleet — I should like to have the war plan 
here so that I can answer some of these questions a little more ac- 
curately — was to defend 

Senator Ferguson. All right, we will see that you get the war plan. 

Admiral Ingersoll. Was to defend. One of the tasks of the Paci- 
fic Fleet was to protect the territory of the associated powers in the 
Pacific and prevent the expansion of enemy military power into the 
Western Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by sup- 
porting land and air forces in denying to the enemy the use of land 
positions [11363] in that hemisphere, the Western Hemi- 
sphere. 

You can't defend the Western Hemisphere, that is our west coast, 
from a position on the coast. You can only defend it from an ad- 
vanced position, which was the Hawaiian Islands. That was the best 
central location from which the fleet could cover the Pacific coast, 
Alaska, and the Panama Canal. 

If is had been on the coast, and the Japanese had made an attack 
on Hawaii such as they did, they couldn't possibly have caught them 
even if they had attacked some place on the Pacific coast. If the 
fleet had been actually in the place of attack and not damaged, it 



4258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

couldn't have caught them, because our fleet as a whole was slower 
than the Japanese Fleet. 

[11364] Senator Ferguson. Now, by virtue of the lack of equip- 
ment when the fleet was at anchor in Pearl Harbor, it was in a posi- 
tion of peril, was it not? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not consider that it was, no. 

Senator Ferguson. You don't consider that it was ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Did it have plenty to defend itself with while 
laying in the harbor? 

Admiral Ingersoll. If all of the measures for the defense of 
Hawaii were operating, that is, if the radar were operating, if the 
planes in Hawaii had been alerted, if the Army had been deployed, 
and if antiaircraft in position, if a distant reconnaissance had been 
conducted in the most dangerous sector by aircraft, or if surface 
pickets had been sent out so that warning of an attack might have 
been received in time for the ships to go to general quarters, in my 
opinion the fleet was safer in Pearl Harbor than it would have been 
at sea, but I do not wish my answer to be construed that I think it 
should have been in Pearl Harbor because there were other circum- 
stances which might have caused it to be out of Pearl Harbor. 

But purely from the question of safety, I believe it was safer in 
Pearl Harbor than anywhere else. 

[11365] Senator Ferguson. Did you know at that very time that 
General Short had previously, on the 28th day of November sent a 
message to the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, which was distrib- 
uted to the Secretary of "War, War Plans, and General Marshall, that 
he had interpreted the message of the 27th as an alert to sabotage 
and he was alerted to sabotage and had liaison with the Navy? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Would that have made any difference in your 
last answer, if you had known that the Army which was the one to 
defend the fleet in Pearl Harbor was only alerted to sabotage and 
had so notified the authorities in Washington? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Well, in order to know whether the Army 
had taken proper dispositions, I would have had to have known what 
their plan against sabotage was, but if it had meant that their planes 
were all lined up, wing-to-wing, that their antiaircraft guns were 
not in positions which they were expected to be, and that their radar 
was not operating, then I would have said certainly that that was 
not a proper condition to defend the fleet and it was their respon- 
sibility to defend the islands. 

Senator Ferguson. It turns out that that is just what happened, 
the planes were wing-to-wing in a sabotage [11366] alert, so 
they could not be destroyed by sabotage, the guns were not manned 
and the ammunition was not there. 

Now, will you look at exhibits 16 and 17 in relation to the "no 
ultimatum." 

Admiral Ingersoll. After a hurried glance, remember it. 

Senator Ferguson. You remember it now ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. But I should— may I digress for a moment to 
show you how your memory can trick you ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4259 

Admiral Ingersoll. Because I presented at a joint board meeting 
on apparently the day before this memorandum was sent, I presented 
at that meeting the arguments why we should not precipitate a war, 
and when I came back here to Washington 4 years later, I had for- 
gotten completely that I had ever presented such a memorandum at 
the joint board meeting. The only satisfaction I had was that it 
didn't sound silly after 4 years. And this was based on that. 

Senator Ferguson. Sometimes that is the test, isn't it, as to how it 
does sound 4 years later ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes. 

[11367] Senator Ferguson. Can you let me see Exhibit 16 ? I 
want to call your attention to something in it. 

There was the minutes of a meeting. Yes, here it is ; on the bottom 
of page 2 of this Exhibit 16 I am reading : 

Action of the United States in the Far East in Support of China — At the 
request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action 
taken at the State Department meeting on Saturday morning, November 1, at 
which a discussion was held on the Far Eastern situation. 

Were you familiar with that ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I probably was but I have forgotten it. 
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that Admiral Schuirmann had — 
here, it says this : 

He pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the 
meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to 
Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case 
of further Japanese aggression. 

Did you ever know that? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I cannot recall it now unless it was phrased 
at the time in some other way in the note which was not at that time 
called an ultimatum. I have no recollec- [11S68] tion of any- 
thing being called an ultimatum at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you know in Peace and War that 
this statement is in Peace and War ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I have never read Peace and War, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I will read it to you. [Beading :] 

During the August 1941 conference between President Roosevelt and Prime 
Minister Churchill of Great Britain the situation in the Far East was discussed 
and it was agreed that the United States and Great Britain should take parallel 
action in warning Japan against new moves of aggression. 

Did you ever know that that appeared in Peace and War published 
by our State Department on page 129 ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I have never read Peace and War, sir. I do 
not know anything that is in there. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, if you had known that that was 
our policy and that the President on the 17th, as indicated by Schuir- 
mann— I am just giving the date that Schuirmann indicates — on the 
17th of August, on page 556 of Foreign Relations, that the President 
gave to the Ambassador of Japan a note containing these words, a 
memorandum containing these words [reading] : 

Such being the case, this Government now finds it [11369] necessary 
to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any 
further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by 
force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United 
States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may 



4260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the 
United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and 
security of the United States. 

Admiral Ingersoll. I probably did, now that you have read it, 
but I never considered that an ultimatum, nor I do not think I ever 
heard it called an ultimatum. I remember what you have read. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, but I was only reading what Schuirmann 
had said on the 3d of November 1941 at a meeting. 

Admiral Ingersoll. I remember that now. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, having in mind what I have read here 
that the President told to the Japanese Ambassador and also what I 
have read out of Peace and War, the parallel action statement ; then 
having in mind this note of Winant's coming in to us at 10:20 on 
Saturday morning, having in mind that we were sending out three 
small men-of-war over to the Gulf of Siam, having in mind the fact 
that we had sent planes out, how do you account for the fact that we 
did not antici- [11370] pate that Japan, when she was going 
to attack Great Britain or in the Kra Peninsula would not at the 
same time consider that parallel action was being taken and that, there- 
fore, she would attack our fleet which was on her flank and the only 
deterrent in the Pacific for her movement south? How does it come 
the Navy did not anticipate that? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I have said before that we anticipated that the 
Philippines, Guam, and our outlying possessions might be attacked 
by Japan, as they were. We also anticipated that there would be 
submarines in the Eastern Pacific. We did not anticipate that — at 
least Admiral Stark and mj'self did not — that Japan would make an 
attack on Pearl Harbor of the character that she did. 

I do not agree with your statement that the Pacific Fleet at Pearl 
Harbor was the onlv deterrent that prevented Japan from going into 
the Far East. 

Senator Ferguson. "Wliat was the other deterrent? 

Admiral Ingersoll. The Pacific Fleet had no train, it had no 
transports, it did not have sufficient oilers to leave the Hawaiian 
Islands on an offensive campaign and Japan knew it just as well as 
we did and she knew that she could make an attack in the area in which 
she did, that is, Southeast Asia and the Philippines, with impunity. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, as I understand it, that [11371] 
we were almost utterly unprepared for war in the Pacific, on your last 
statement. 

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not agree with that, that we were utterly 
unprepared for war. We were unprepared to make an offensive 
campaign, to undertake an offensive campaign in the Pacific and the 
task that was assigned to Admiral Kimmel in the war plan stated as 
follows, so far as offensive action was concerned. 

Senator Ferguson. To make raids on the Mandates, were they not? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes, but a raid is not a — is only a minor 
offensive. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, she was to make raids on the Mandates. 
They had to have a train to make raids, didn't they, of any distance? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Well, he had a sufficient train for minor raids 
but he did not have a sufficient train, nor transports, nor troops to 
proceed across the Pacific and establish bases and establish the fleet 
in the Pacific. 



PROCEEDIICGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4261 

Somewhere in this plan — I cannot put my finger on it — is a provision 
that he was directed to plan for the occupation of the Marshalls and 
Carolines and I think that 180 days 

Senator Ferguson, That was Truk, was it not, that she [11372] 
was to take Truk in 180 days, or not later, D-day plus 180 days ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I think it was confined only to the Marshalls, 
sir. I am not certain if Truk was mentioned. However, he would 
have required a long time for such an advance in force across the 
Pacific because he did not have the force to do it and we knew it and 
the Japs knew it, too. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you know that Admiral Hart had sent 
a message to OPNAV, which was vour department, on the 6th to this 
effect? 

Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three 
or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you. 

Admiral Ingersoll. I probably saw the dispatch but I cannot recall 
it now. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you know that we had assured Britain 
armed support under three or four eventualities ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Only as it was provided in the war plan and in 
ABC-1, that should the United States be involved in war then we 
would do certain things, we had certain areas allocated for our spheres, 
but there was nothing in the war plan which obligated the United 
States, so far as I know, to go to the assistance of Great Britain if 
Great Britain was attacked. That was a decision which the Navy 
Department could [11373] not make. 

Senator Ferguson. I miderstand the Navy Department could not 
make it; it had to be made by someone else other than the Navy 
Department. 

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. But what I am trying to find out is whether or 
not the Navy Department had any information along this line so 
that she could have acted ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I have no information that the Navy Depart- 
ment had any directions to go to the aid of the British, we will say, 
if the British were attacked. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, that would indicate, then, that 
all this information about the movement into the Kra Peninsula was 
of no value in alerting you here in Washington in OPNAV because 
you knew of no commitments that we had to go to the aid of the British. 

Admiral Ingersoll. I cannot agree with that statement, sir, be- 
cause all our own possessions, such as the Philippines, were endangered 
by the concentration of Japanese troops, which still remained in the 
Pescadores and the coast of China and in Formosa. They were a 
direct threat there and only 24 hours away from the Philippines; 
also Guam, which is a little farther away. 

Senator Ferguson. But you did not anticipate an air [11374] 
attack on Hawaii ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I did not think that an air attack would be 
made on Hawaii ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And when you testified to what was meant by 
"preparatory deployment" in the dispatch of October the 16th you 



4262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

said this, and I will read part of your testimony and ask you whether 
you agree with it today : 

I think the preparatory deployment that would not constitute provocative action 
and disclose strategic intentions against Japan referred more to the withdrawal 
of certain units of the Asiatic Fleet from the China Sea area toward the south- 
eastern Philippines rather than to any particular deployment of the Pacific Fleet, 
with the possible exceptions of sending out submarines for observation. 

Is that correct? 

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct so far as carrying out the tasks 
prescribed in the war plan. The withdrawal from the Manila area 
was a part of Admiral Hart's plan. Also, "take measures, whatever 
measures were necessary for the security of the Fleet at Hawaii" might 
be construed also as a part of a defensive deployment and, as a matter 
of fact, Admiral Kimmel in his own war plan had just such measures 
prescribed by him at the time we were not at war with Japan, 
[1137S] in what he called the first phase. 

Senator Ferguson. Now let us come back to Washington on the day 
of the 6th. Do j^ou remember the 6th of December in relation to your 
work, anything happening up until the time that you went home that 
was unusual as far as messages were concerned or information? 

Admiral Ixgersoll. Well, all of those days were busy days. 

Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that. 

Admiral Ingersoll. Ajid I cannot pick out now out of the air a 
particular thing. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, when did you first learn that there was a 
message coming in, being intercepted from Japan, that was indicating 
an answer to the message of Secretary of State Hull of the 26th of 
November ? You know the message I am talking about. 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes. I never learned that it was coming in. 
The first I heard about it was when I was awakened some time on the 
very late evening of the sixth or the morning of the seventh and, as 
I said before, I do not know whether it was before or after midnight 
when I was shown the first thirteen parts of the message that had been 
translated. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Admiral Ingersoll. I never learned that that message was coming 
in and that it was being translated. 

[11-376] Senator Ferguson. All right. And I assume that you 
read it that night when they showed it to you ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I did. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, were there any other messages with it ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not recall any now. 

Senator Ferguson. Was there a pilot message with it ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I never heard of a pilot message until I heard 
them taUving about it yesterday. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you know what we are talking about 
when we are talking about this pilot message ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. No, sir ; I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to show it to you. It is called "pilot" 
because it merely indicates that there was a message to come and it 
was to be delivered when they were told to deliver it. 

If you will look on the bottom of page 238, it is the message there 
from Tokyo to Washington, December the 6th. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4263 

The Vice Chairman. Of Exhibit 1, Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, Exhibit 1. And it is translated on the 6th 
of December. 

Admiral Ingersoi.l. I do not know whether I saw that or not; I 
do not recall it. Being dated the 6th the usual thin<r would have been 
I would have seen it on the morning of \_11377\ the seventh, 
when dispatches of this character were distributed. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, there was a distribution, though, Saturday- 
night. 

Admiral Ingersoll. There was a distribution, so far as I was con- 
cerned, on Saturday night, of what they told me were the first 13 parts 
of a 14-part message and they also told me that those 13 parts had 
been or would be taken to Mr. Knox and to the President. 

Senator Ferguson. And that being true I assume that you assumed 
that it would be taken care of and proper action would be taken on 
the 13 parts. 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes ; and when I read the 13 parts there was 
nothing on which the Navy Department as such could that night take 
action. The gist of the 13 parts was a restatement of the Japanese 
position which we had known, of course, all along. 

Senator Ferguson. As a matter of fact, the Secretary of State had 
turned it over to the Navy and said that he was through as far as any 
negotiations were concerned on the 27th, did he not. 

Admiral Ingersoll. That was correct. That is, I have read that he 
said so. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you knew that at the time ? 

\^11378^ Admiral Ingersoll. I did not know what the Secretary 
said at the time but I knew when Admiral Stark sent out the message 
of the 27th that so far as the State Department and the Navy Depart- 
ment were concerned negotiations were finished, but everything after 
that was just for the record. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; just for the record. Now, Admiral, you 
knew where you had been Saturday evening. You could be reached 
at your home. 

Admiral Ingersoll. So far as I knew I was at my home from the 
time I left the Navy Department and I do not know now what time 
I left the Navy Department. I was there many nights until 8 and 9 
o'clock in the evening and I do not remember now what time I left 
the Navy Department but I was at my home. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you contact Admiral Stark that evening? 

Admiral Ingersoll. No ; I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know where he was ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not think I did but I am certain that after 
having seen what this 13-part message had in it that if the officers 
who brought it there had mentioned Admiral Stark I would have told 
them not to take it to him that night because all it had in it was a 
restatement of the Japanese position from way back and tliere was 
nothing on [11379] which the Navy Department as such could 
have taken action. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you know it was of sufficient impor- 
tance that Secretary Knox of the Navy got in touch with the Secretary 
of State that night and the Secretary of War and called a conference 
for 10 o'clock Sunday morning ? 



4264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Ingersoll. I did not know at the time but I presume that 
the reason for the conference was because they were expecting the 
fourteenth part, which would probably have the meat in it. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you say that it only indicated what you 
knew before, the 13 parts ; that is, that everything was through, that 
this was for the record. You read that from the 13 parts? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Then why wait on the fourteenth part ? What 
difference does it make as to what the fourteenth part said? This was 
all for the record and you knew what it was saying. 

Admiral Ingersoll. I don't know what the fourteenth part 1 

did not know at the time what the fourteenth part was going to con- 
tain, of course. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then you went back to your home 
and went to bed. You got up the next morning and what time did 
you get down to the office ? 

[IISSO] Admiral Ingersoll. I was down there some time be- 
tween 8 and 9 o'clock Sunday morning. 

Senator Ferguson. And was there a meeting at 8 or 9, between 8 and 
9 o'clock? 

Admiral Ingersoll. There was no scheduled meeting. Admiral 
Stark came in somewhere around that time and the officers began bring- 
ing in dispatches. I believe the fourteenth part was delivered to Ad- 
miral Stark that morning. 

Senator Ferguson. About what time? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not know ; sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you at a meeting with Admiral Stark in his 
office? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I was in and out of the office, of course, all the 
time. Our offices were 

Senator Ferguson. Adjoining? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Not adjoining, but there was an entrance way 
and the Secretary's room between them and I was in and out all the 
time. I have forgotten exactly what we talked about when he came in 
or whether we even talked, whether I even talked to him the moment 
he came in. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, there was nothing happened at any meeting 
where you were present with Admiral Stark on Sunday morning after 
the fourteenth part arrived that indicated war? 

[11381] Admiral Ingersoll. I do not recall that Admiral Stark 
after — in fact, I am certain that Admiral Stark after he received the 
fourteenth part of the message did not call me at that time. I do not 
think — or I think that I did not learn of the contents of the fourteenth 
part and of the instructions to the ambassadors to deliver the whole 
rnessage at 1 o'clock until after Admiral Stark told me of his conversa- 
tion with General Marshall. 

Senator Ferguson. So that was some time after 11 : 30 ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. It must have been. 

Senator Ferguson. After 11 : 30. 

Admiral Ingersoll. But I had on my — when I got down there in 
the morning I would have a stack of dispatches as big as that and things 
to go over in connection with other matters of the fleet. 

Senator Ferguson. It had nothing to do with this fourteenth part ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4265 

Admiral Ingersoll. Nothing to do with me. Other matters of the 
department, which were down in my sphere and not up in the high 
levels. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know whether or not Admiral Stark 
talked to the President that morning? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not know. 

Senator Ferguson. After he talked with General Marshall 
[11382] you had a conversation with him? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes. He told me that he had talked to General 
Marshall. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And did you see General Marshall on the 
7th? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat was the conversation that you had with 
Admiral Stark after he had talked with General Marshall ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. As I recall. Admiral Stark said that he had, 
after seeing the dispatch regarding the delivery of the Japanese mes- 
sage at 1 o'clock, that he had called up General Marshall about it and 
at first he thought that he would not send anything to Admiral 
Kimmel because we had already sent him a lot of stuff and then he 
almost immediately changed his mind and called General Marshall 
and said he thought they should send it to Admiral Kimmel and to 
General Short. 

Senator Ferguson. And that is the conversation you had with him 
that morning? 

Admiral Ingersoll. That is as I remember it in general terms; 
yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; in substance. 

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not know whether he used those exact 
words. 

[11S83] Senator Ferguson. Yes. That is it in substance. 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. We do not expect the exact language. 

Admiral Ingersoll. That is the substance ; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And you that morning were working on some- 
thing else and, therefore, there was nothing unusual except this one 
conversation with Admiral Stark. 

Admiral Ingersoll. It is difficult to remember all of the details of a 
day because the officers, the heads of departments would come in to talk 
over other matters, there were dispatches to release, to send out, there 
were telephone calls to answer. I cannot recall the details of every- 
thing that happened that morning. 

Senator Ferguson. But at least nothing happened that indicated 
to you about this 1 o'clock message of delivery being dawn at Pearl 
Harbor ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. No. I think that that just did not hit me, that is 
all. 

Senator Ferguson. That just did not hit you. 

Admiral Ingersoll. As a matter of fact, I do not know when Ad- 
miral Stark told me about the delivery at 1 o'clock or delivery — yes, 
1 o'clock. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think it was after the attack that he told 
you about that ? 

79716 — 46— pt. 9 23 



4266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[11S84-] Admiral Ingersoll. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Some time before? 

Admiral Ingersoll, It must have been ; I know it was before. Yes ; 
it was before. 

Senator Ferguson. But when he discussed it with you nothing hit 
you, as you say, that 1 o'clock meant dawn at Pearl Harbor and that 
there might be an attack there, because war was unorthodox, as we 
have found out in Europe, as we had found out in the Atlantic, and 
you were looking for unorthodox things, were you not, at that time? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I have said all along. Senator, that I personally 
did not expect an attack of that kind at Pearl Harbor, so it is natural 
that it did not occur to me. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you know that Admiral Kimmel was 
not receiving the magic as far as the purple was concerned and the 
diplomatic messages? 

Amiral Ingersoll. I am not sure whether I knew that or not, sir. 
That was a part of the mechanics of that complicated system, and I 
do not know whether I knew that Admiral Kimmel was not receiving 
it or not. I knew, of course, that he was a source of information re- 
garding movements of ships obtained by radio direction finders and 
analysis of traflfic. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Ingersoll. And I am not certain whether I knew 
[11S85] whether he was not getting those dispatches or not. It 
is very difficult after 4 years to know what you now know as to 
whether you knew it before that time or Whether you learned it after. 

Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that. Well, now, that fact that 
you knew that he was getting radio messages as far as finding ships 
were concerned — there had been a dispute between Com 16, which was 
at the Philippines, and Com 14, which was at Hawaii, and on the 
24th — I will ask you to look at the message, whether or not that did 
not indicate that they were going to take Com 16's word instead of 
Com 14's word because the}^ were nearer to Tokyo ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I am not familiar with the details on which 
that dispatch was based. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, is this true then. Admiral, that when 
Admiral Stark was there at the office — 

Admiral Ingersoll. Sunday morning? 

Senator Ferguson. No, when he was able to be reached, that you 
did not get these intercepted messages and that you did not have full, 
detailed knowledge of what was going on in the Pacific? 

Admiral Ingersoll. What messages are you talking about, Senator ? 

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about these diplomatic [11386] 
messages in Exhibit 1 there, the ship movement messages that we 
showed you yesterday, that someone showed you in Exhibit 2. 

Admiral Ingersoll. I saw a great many of those when they were 
brought around and I am pretty sure that there are some that I did 
not see. 

Just, for example, what I was talking about yesterday : I am certain 
that I did not see at that time any of the dispatches from Japan direct- 
ing their consuls and diplomats to destroy their codes. There are 
half a dozen or more, maybe fifteen or twenty. They brought in to 
me for release the message to our fleets, informing them that the codes 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4267 

were to be destroyed. I remember that very, very distinctly because 
that is important. I am absokitely positive that I never saw the 
fifteen or dozen messages on which that dispatch was based. 

So that when I now say that I do not recall seeing this message, 
I am not sure that I did see this or that message. I saw a great 
many, some of which I remember, and I have seen other messages 
which I now recall that I had no recollection of seeing. 

I remember one, for example, which reported the movements of 
a British battleship up at Puget Sound. I had forgotten it completely 
until I saw it in this exhibit and then I remembered having seen it. 
I would have sworn on a stack of Bibles as high as the Washington 
monument last July that I [11387] never had seen it. 

Senator Ferguson. Now. Admiral, as I understand it, then, all 
these messages were not delivered to you and who selected the messages 
to be delivered to you, or was it on occasions when Admiral Stark 
was absent that you were shown the messages? 

Admiral Ingeesoll. The Director of Naval Intelligence was the 
one under whom the distribution of these messages was made and 
the officers would bring these dispatches around and they would 
sometimes leave the folder on your desk or they would leave it with 
Admiral Stark's aide and sometimes they would be clipped to show 
you an important message. There were some times where I might 
be absent from my office for a good part of the day for conferences 
Or other reasons and I might have missed a day's messages. 

Senator Ferguson. Then what I am getting at, how could anyone 
evaluate these messages if they were missing some of them ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. As I told you before 

Senator Ferguson. That was not your job. 

Admiral Ingersoll (continuing). When I first started my testimony 
and when I was describing my duties there, I did not have original 
cognizance of war plans, nor of Intelligence nor of communications. 
I was a funnel through which [11388] stuff was relayed to try 
to take the load off of Admiral Stark of all the details and that I 
endeavored to do and that was a busy job. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you were working then on the details. 
Could you tell us this : Who would know why planes were not being 
sent to Pearl Harbor for defense as was being requested by Admiral 
Kimmel and if they were being sent elsewhere? Who would have 
charge of that? Would you know about that if you were handlmg 
the details ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes, I would know about that but the actual 
distribution of planes between the Atlantic and the Pacific was almost 
exactly about in accordance with the distribution of forces assigned 
to the Atlantic and Pacific in WPLr46. Also, the distribution of ships 
was almost in accordance with that. 

Senator Ferguson. What about the distribution of planes on lend- 
lease, and so forth ? Who had charge of that ? 

^ Admiral Ingersoll. I cannot tell you anything about lend-lease, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So you do not know what proportion was com- 
ing to America for its defense and what was going to lend-lease in 
the war effort ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I cannot tell you anything about that. 



4268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PJEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. You haven't knowledge of that and [11S89'] 
even though you had charge of the details you cannot give us that ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. No, sir, 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. Not at this moment. 

Who represented the Navy on this lend-lease ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Admiral Reeves, I believe, was the Navy De- 
partment's representative on that. 

Senator Ferguson. But that did not come to you ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Now I want to ask you just a few questions on 
the winds execute message. They showed you the execute message 
prior to the 7th, as I understand it ; someone came into your office and 
showed you the message. 

Admiral Ingersoll. They showed me what was supposed to be one 
at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. 

Admiral Ingersoll. And I believed it. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And you believed it. Now, you never 
knew until after attack that that was not a genuine winds message? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not know that I ever knew until some time 
after the Court of Inquiry last year that that was not a genuine 
message. I believed it was. 

[11S90] Senator Ferguson. Yes, you believed it was and, there- 
fore, your conduct was based in relation to that message upon it being 
a genuine winds message, execute message ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. No, because it came in after the destruction of 
the codes and it did not mean anything, particularly after that. It was 
not important. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what you say, but it was not because 
you thought it was phoney ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. No. 

Senator Ferguson. It was merely because it was considered informa- 
tion, is that correct ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. The use that I made of it was only that it was 
a confirmation of the other. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, is J. M. Reeves — was he the 
Admiral in charge of lend-lease ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct, sir. He was retired. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the same man that was on the Roberts 
Commission, is he not? 

Admiral Ingersoll. He is. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. So the Admiral who was in charge of 
lend-lease, the distribution of these planes to lend-lease or to our de- 
fense, was the same as the one on the Commission, there is no doubt 
about that? 

[11391] Admiral Ingersoll. I do not know to what extent 
Admiral Reeves made decisions as to who was given what. I simply 
know that he was the officer in the Navy Department who handled 
lend-lease matters until they got down to the bureaus for the actual 
release of material. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, all right. Now I want to talk to you 
about the code messages that you did not see but which came to you 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4269 

to be sent out to Kimmel and Short. You remember the destruction 
of codes? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, does the destruction of codes neces- 
sarily mean war, that a country that destroys its codes is going to 
commit an overt act of war or declare war ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. It meant that to us, particularly the destruc- 
tion of codes in the consulates. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, if that is true, then did it 
mean the same thing when we sent a message to Tokyo to destroy our 
codes and our code machines, that we intended to declare war and com- 
mit overt acts ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. It would have meant to Tokyo had they been 
able to read the dispatch that we expected to be at war with Japan 
soon but not necessarily that we were going to declare war on Japan. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, isn't that exactly what it could [11392] 
have meant here when they were destroying their codes, that no overt 
act would be necessarily committed but they did not want this country 
to be in a position to raid their embassy and take their codes whether 
or not there was war or not ? Isn't that true ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I don't know why they sent out the dispatch, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But would you say that all Navy men would 
come to the conclusion that the moment that codes were going to be 
destroyed that that meant war between the countries ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. That was what we construed it and I think 
everybody construed it, that it would mean that. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, you know of no one in the 
high command in the Navy that construed the destruction of the 
codes in any other way than you construed them ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. I think everybody in the Navy Department 
construed the destruction of the codes as the fact that Japan expected 
to be at war very shortly with the three countries that were involved 
in that series of messages. 

Senator Ferguson. Then we come to this conclusion, that at least 
on the 4th — I think that is the date they sent the messages out, was 
it not? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Third or fourth. 

[11393] Senator Ferguson. Third or fourth, that everyone in 
the Navy, as far as the high command was concerned, were alerted 
that war was going to occur between America and Japan? 

Admiral Ingersoll. Those instructions were sent to certain com- 
manders, to the commanders of the fleet, to the naval attaches in 
Peiping and to the Marine detachments and others and the purpose of 
sending it to them was to inform them that we expected to be at 
war — or that' Japan expected to be at war with those countries in a 
very short time. 

Senator Ferguson. And our country was one of them ? 

Admiral Ingersoll. And our country was one of them. 
Senator Ferguson. Well, then, why didn't you tell them when you 
sent out those messages that the Navy Department, the high command, 
had interpreted these destruction of code messages as meaning iin- 
mediate war ? Why did you leave it open for two constructions ? 



4270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Ingersoll, It was expected that they would understand 
it and if they did not understand it nobody asked any questions about 
it. We never had one inquiry from any commander afloat as to what 
the dispatches from the Chief of Naval Operations meant or what their 
import was, nor asking for any elaboration and in the absence of those 
we had to construe that his instructions were understood. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you look on page 45 of [ii,JP-^] 
Exhibit 37 ? That is the message sent on the 6th and I understand was 
not delivered until Monday. That is the one reading : 

In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying 
Pacific islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confi- 
dential documents now or imder later conditions of greater emergency. Means 
of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence 
should of course be maintain