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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

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Given By 
\I. S. SUPT. OF DOCUMENTS 



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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OE THE PEARL HAEBOR ATTACK . 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES ^' g -^ 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS ^ *,,,''l 

SECOND SESSION ^ '^'^^ ^ 

PURSUANT TO // V^ 

S. Con. Res. 27 ^^JO 

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress) 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 






PART 10 

FEBRUARY 15, 16, 18, 19, AND 20, 1949 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 





HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEAEL HAKBOR ATTACK . ^^ 
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES ^^ 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGEESS ' > ^ 

SECOND SESSION « //*** 

PURSUANT TO /y*fO 

S. Con. Res. 27 ^"^-^^ 

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress) 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 10 

FEBRUARY 15, 16, IS, 19, AND 20, 1946 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
79716 WASHINGTON : 1940 



U. S, SUPEWWTENDENT Of OOCUMENli / fc fO 

SEP 201946 



JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL 
HARBOR ATTACK 

ALBBN W. BARKLEY, Seiuator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 
WALTER P. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California 

gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from 

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin 
North Carolina 



COUNSEL 



(Through January 14, 1946) 
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel 
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel 
Jule M. Hanxaford, Assistant Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 194G) 
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel 
Samuel H. Kaufman. Associate General Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel 
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 



HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 


Pages 


Transcript 




Hearings 


No. 




pages 






1 


1- 399 


1- 1058 


Nov 


. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 


2 


401- 9S2 


1059- 2586 


Nov 


. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945. 


3 


983-1583 


2587- 4194 


Dec. 


5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945. 


4 


1585-2063 


4195- 5460 


Dec. 


14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 


5 


2065-2492 


5461- 6646 


Dec. 


31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946. 


6 


2493-2920 


6647- 7888 


Jan. 


15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946. 


7 


2921-3378 


7889- 9107 


Jan. 


22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946., 


8 


3379-3927 


9108-10517 


Jan. 


30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 


9 


3929-4599 


10518-12277 


Feb. 


7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 


10 


4601-5151 


12278-13708 


Feb. 


15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 


11 


5153-5560 


13709-14705 


Apr. 


9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 

No. Exhibits Mos. 

12 1 through 6. 

13 7 and 8. 

14 9 through 43. 

15 44 through 87. 

16 88 through 110. 

17 111 through 128. 

18 129 through 156. 

19 157 through 172. 

20 173 through 179. 

21 180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations. 

22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings. 

26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings. 

35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



IV 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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VI 



CONGRESSIONAL INVE.STIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Con?;ressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1915, 

to May 31. 

1940 


Page* 
5080-5089 

3826-3838 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 1 4 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Paget 

163-181 

""418-423" 
""451-464" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23. 1914, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Paget 

"8'7"-B" 
205 

"B223-224" 
B65-66 
B229-231 
49-51 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

rciarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


^ ; i i i i 1 i i i i i ; i i i i i i i i i i i 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

14*5 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Paget 
495-510 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Array Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. '20, 1944) 


Paget 

4125-4151 

1695-1732 

2745-2785 
4186-4196 

3190-3201" 
1928-1965 

3642-3643 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

141 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Paget 

179-184 
'"105-114" 

96-105 

74-85 

"368^378" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. IS, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Paget 
478-483, 
301-310 

1171-1178" 

1178-1180" 
1659-1663, 
170-198 

'"812-843," 
1538-1571 
504-509 

2-32" 
365-368 

1747-1753" 


1 


Craige, Nelvin L., Lt. Col 

Creighton, John M., Capt. (USN)_.___ 

Crosley, Paul C, Comdr 

Curlev, J. J. (Ch/CM) 

Curts, M. E., Capt., USN 

Daubin, F. A., Capt., USN 

Davidson, Howard C, Maj. Gen 

Davis, Arthur C, Rear Adm 

Dawson, Harry L 

Deane, John R., Maj. Gen 

DeLan.y, Walter S., Rear Adm 

Dickens, June D., Sgt 

Dillingham, Walter F 

Dillon, James P 

Dillon, .John H., Maj 

Dingeman, Ray E., Col 

Donegan, William Col 

Doud, Harold,' Col 

Dimlop, Robert H., Col 

Dunnhig, Mary J 

Dusenhury, CarHsle Clyde, Col 

Dyer, Thomas H., Capt., USN 

Earle, Frederick M., W/0 

Earle, John Bayliss, Capt., USN 



INDEX or WITNESSES 



VII 



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VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


1 ^§^2 i^?3§ 
5 ! ! itl ; I ; : : 1 : ; ; : ! ! !ci=-§'-? ; :j.^^^ 

(S : 1 !S 1 1 ! ! ! ! ! ; 1 : : ! :SS§Js \ !S-^'^"cr 

^ : ! ;^ ; ! ; 1 : 1 1 1 : : : ; r ^ : i^^ttt 
! 1 i ; ! 1 ! ; : 1 : 1 1 ; ! ! ^^ \ \ ^6^ 
! 1 ; 1 ! : ! : ! ! ! 1 1 ! 1 ; i i ^-^^ 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

428-432 
414-417 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1914, 

to Sept. 12, 

1915) 


iiiiiiiCO"-iC0iiiii-Hi iiii 

IIIIIII— iioooiiiiioi IIII 

S iiCOii-i^iiiii'-<i IIII 

g. 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 p 1 1 IIII 

3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 CO 1 O 1 1 1 1 1 C 1 IIII 
CI, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1— 1 lO 1 1 1 1 lO 1 IIII 

lllllllC^I—l lllllr-l| IIII 


Joint 

Committee 

Eihibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


Vol. 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

;Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 

1070-1076 
461-469 

"763-772" 
816-851 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Bo'ird, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


1 III IIII III III 

lO^-i-^iiOCOiiii-^t^iii .OOii 
lC5l~~ ll^ 1 1 -f ■* 1 1 1 1— 1— 1 III If^ 1 1 

s locn ico 1 icoa> 1 1 1 icoo i i i it^ i i 

S,iCOrOi| iilCOiiiiC^l-Hiii i| II 

.O 1 1 1 1 1-H 1 1 t^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 

(ii 1 O t>- 1 ■* 1 1 O -^ 1 1 1 1 -^ 1 1 1 1-^ 1 1 
iCOiO iCO 1 iCOCO 1 1 1 lO-H 111 it^ 1 1 
lOOli IIO31IIIC0O5III 1 II 
iCOCOl iiCMiiiiCO— IIII .1 II 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
417-430 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18. 1941. 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 

1571-1574' 

1664-1676 
""469-473' 


1 


Hamilton, Maxwell M., State Dept 

Hannum, Warren T., Brig. Gen 

Harrington, Cyril J 

Hart, Thomas Charles, Senator 

Hayes, Philip, Maj. Gen 

Heard, William A., Capt., USN 

Henderson, H. H., Lt., USA 

Herron, Charles D., Maj. Gen 

Hill, WiUiam H., Senator 

Hohnes, J. Wilfred., Capt., USN 

Holtwick, J. S., Jr., Comdr 

Hoppough, Clay, Lt. Col 

Hornbeck, Stanley K 

Home, Walter Wilton 

Howard, Jack W., Col 

Hubbell, Monroe H., Lt. Comdr 

Huckins, Thomas A., Capt., USN 

Hull, Cordell 

Humphrey, Richard W. RM 3/c 

Hunt, John A., Col 

Ingersoll, Royal E., Adm. 

Inglis, R. B., Rear Adm 



IXDEX OF WITNESSES 



ts. 



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.£ .S .£ .S .S .-^ ^ c S 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 
Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Oiiii'iCiOOiiiiii r-r^-O 1 1 

CDi OCDiiiiiiiiiiiSriOil 

lo Tf 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 i5J|f5»o 1 1 

1^ ! 1 1 1 : ick;; : 1 1 i i 1 1 ; : 1 \^^J, : : 

c lo <M CO 2 S i> 1 1 

tiio oo 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 iS^-i 1 1 

lo 1 1 1 1 1 I'*! 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I'E.z,'^ ' ' 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

541-553 
182-292 

'"140^142" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


iiiCOiiilMiiiii CD(M (Ml 

iiiOiii^ iiiOO(N Oi 

«lll.-^illr-H r-,(M T-ll 

g. 1 1 1 ' ' 'J ''''''' ' 

_a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1> 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 05 1 

ft, 1 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 1 -1 1 

III 1 , 1^ 1 1 (M 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investiffation, 

Sept. 14 to 

IC, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


2 i i i i ; i i 1 i 1 i i i 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


llliiiiQOiiiiiCOiiliOiiC II 

^ -^iiii-^iOO II 

g iiOiiiiicDiiiit^iOO II 

a|iiliil4iilliiCOilli4ii(M II 

ft.iiilliiO (MiiiiCOiiO II 

iiiiliiOiiiiiiOiiiit-iQO II 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

266.5-,2695" 
3028-3067 

1161-1185" 

2787-2802" 
1014-1034 
1678-1694 
3226-3250 

2362-2374" 

2-54' 

T. S. 2-52, 

192-226 

3126-3152 

1816-1913 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
Juue 15, 1944) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 iiO 1 t^ 1 1 1 1 1 11 

1 1 1 1 1 1 i(M iCD 1 1 1 Ill II 

« (MiCOiliiiiiiiii 11 

1 ; ! 1 ; ; ; 14^ iJ: ; 1 1 ! ! 1 1 1 1 ! 1 ; i 

ft,iliiiii,-iiCDiiiiiiiiiil II 
1 i(N iCO I II 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


iicoir-HifMioiiiioiiii-tiiiiio km'ioj 
1 iio It- ieoo5 1 1 100 1 1 1 lO 1 1 lO iioooic 

M 1 1 ,-H 1 ^ 1 1 O 1 1 1 (N 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 oo iCOt^CO 

^ 1 ,^ l_ l4^ , , ,^ 1 1 , , 1 1 , 1^ , 1 o^ 

a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 r 1 (±1 1 1 1 1 1 O -H 
ft, 1 ICO iCD 1 GO 1 1 i(N 1 1 1 1 O 1 1 iCO i(N 
1 1 ■>!*< 1 lO 1 CD 1 1 It- 1 1 1 I lO 1 1 1 C5 1 CO 
llrHI^I OiiKN t^ 1 


a 


Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN 

Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen 

Landreth, J. L., Ens 

Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/0 

Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col 

Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC 

Lawton, William S., Col 

Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN 

Leahy, William D., Adm 

Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm 

Lewis, Fulton, Jr 

Litell, S. H 

Locey, P'rank H 

Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA 

Lorence, Walter E., Col 

Lumsden, George, Maj 

Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN 

Lynch, Paul J 

Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr 

Mac Arthur, Douglas, Gen 

Marshall, George C, Gen 

Marston, Morrill W., Col 

Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen 



IXUEX or WITNESSES 



XI 






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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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XIV 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee. 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1940 


\^ 1111 ;^"o 1 :^ : :?:f^'^^gS : lo^ i i : 
, iS i i i : ihs i IS ; :lkSis ; i?! : i i 


Joint 

C()mmittee 

E.xhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11. 1945) 


Pages 

4-9 
'335-375 

411-413 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

14S 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

69^ 
195-197 

203-204 
185' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarko 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


11 1 1 !(M 1 1 1 1 Ic^ 1 1 111 III 
^11 111 1 j 1 I j j 1 j j 1 111 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


lo lIllllM -hIIII ^-^-0 111 111 
.t^ 1 1 1 1 it^ 00 1 1 1 i^^'-i 111 III 

l\l 1 1 1 : 1? 2 1 1 1 iS^I' 1 i ! Ill 

^\'k ! ! 1 1 1?5 tl 1 1 I 1^0^ 11! Ill 

1 c^ ko t^ 1 1 1 1 si i^ 

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 '^ 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 
3644-3650 
276-541, 
4411-4445 

320.5-3286" 

1539^1575' 
4037-4094 
C 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
32^65' 

323-334 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


lOSt^iO N 1 lOOO 1 

1 to Tt< 10 IIIII 1 •<*< 1 1 CTi III III 
g iT-HCO-* it^ 1 1^00 III 111 

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„o ll> 1 (N 1 L 1 1 i 1 1 

ft< icor^io 00 1 i«oio III III 

i.-i-«l<illll iCOiiOOO 1 

ICO IIIII ll^llrlOO III III 




Short, Arthur T 

Short, Walter C, Maj. Gen 

Shortt, Creed, Pvt 

Sisson, George A 

Smedberg, William R., II, Capt. USN.. 

Smith, Ralph C, Maj. Gen 

Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen 

Smith, William W., Rear Adm 

Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN 

Smoot, Perry M., Col 

Sonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr 

Spalding, Isaac, Brig. Gen 

Staff, W. F, CH/CM 

Stark, Harold R., Adm 

Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR 

Stilphen, Benjamin L 

Stimson, Henry L 

Stone, John F 

Street, George 

Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XV 



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XVI CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 
Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


. : ; ; : ; ;7 : 1 1 ! i 1 1 i ; ; ; i^"? : 

§, CO 1 1 1 1 1 co"^ ' 

„o 1 1 1 1 1 |(M 1 1 1 1 1 i=2o t 

^ i i i i i i- i 1 i i 1 i : i \\\''M^\ 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149* 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

"'389^410' 

376-386 
541-553 
597-602 

442-450 


Joint 

Coimnittoe 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


1 ' 1 1 loi O 1 

CO o 1 11.11 1 

1, 1 1 1 i i ! 1 7 ' 'i 'i 1 1 1 ' 11111 1 

e 1^ 1 1 1 1 1 >0 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 

tt, GO Oi iiiii 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to' 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


£ 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
1083-1090 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

2722-2744 
3120-3124 

1989-2007' 
2450-2478 

134.5-1381' 

910-931 
3663-3665 

3077-3683' 

3750-3773 
3357-3586^ 

2580a-2598 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
"279-288' 

379^382 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 
1311-1329 
496-499 
1830-1842 

1334-1340' 

"247-259' 

1.52,5-1538' 
1683-1705 


Witness 


Wells, B. H., Maj. Gen - 

West, Melbourne H., Lt. Col 

Whaling, William J., Lt. Col 

White, William R., Brig. Gen 

Wichiser, Ilea B 

Wilke, Weslie T 

Wilkin.son, T. S., Rear Adm 

Willoughby, C. A., Maj. Gen 

Wilson, Durward S., Maj. Gen 

Wilson, Erie M., Col 

\Mnier, Benjamin R., Col 

\^ithers, Thomas, Rear Adm 

Wong, Ahoon H 

Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR 

Woodward, Farnsley C, Lt. (jg), USN. 

Woolley, Ralph E 

Wright, Wesley A., Comdr 

Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col 

York, Yee Kain 

Zacharias, Ellis M., Capt., USN 

Zucca, Emil Lawrence 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4601 



\i2m-\ - PEARL HAEBOE ATTACK 



FBIDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington, D. G. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman), presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. 
Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee. 

{^12279^ The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in 
order. 

Does counsel have anything at this time before the examination of 
the witnesses ? 

Mr. Richardson. Nothing, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I have some questions that I want to 
ask from Colonel Bratton. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, last night the Senator from Michigan, 
in questioning the witness on the stand, read from paragraphs of his 
testimony on page 1 of the Clarke Report, under the heading of 
"Lieutenant O'Dell," about a certain dispatch from Australia. 

On page 2 there is testimony to the effect that that telegram or 
dispatch had been sent to Hawaii, and that there was no mention of 
Pearl Harbor whatsoever in the telegram, that they expected an 
attack on the Philippines and the Indies. 

I think, in view of part of the statement of the witness having gone 
into the record, that the rest of the statement of the witness should be 
incorporated at this point. 

Senator Ferguson. I have no objection. 

The Vice Chairman. Without objection, so ordered. 

(The testimony referred to follows :) 

[12280] Colonel CABrrEB W. Clarke, Colonel E. W. Gibson, and Lt. O'Dell — 

6 OOTOBEE 1944, 9 A. M, 

CWC. All right, now tell me your story. We got the story that you wrote to 
Kemper and said you knew who did Pearl Harbor, or something to that effect; 
60 you can start telling us what you know. 

O'D. Well, sir, here's the part of the information that I thought might not 
have come out through other sources. There was a cable that was sent on the 
fifth of December to the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian and Philippine 
Departments concerning the movement of a Japanese Task Force in the South 
China Sea. The information had come to the Military Attache through the 

1 Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of 
testimony. 

79716— 46— pt. 10 2 



4602 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Australian Government, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett, who called 
Colonel Merle Smith and myself to his office. 

CWC. You were then Merle Smith's assistant? 

OD. That's right. There were the two of us, and he is now dead. That's 
the reason I stuck my nose in this. We were called over on Thursday after- 
noon about 5 o'clock. Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett, myself, and 
Colonel Merle Smith and Commander Saom, who is the Naval Liaison Officer 
from the Dutch East Indies. The information was primarily in regard to the 
Netherlands, to the Indies, and, as I say, principally concerned itself with the 
movement of a Jap Task Force [12281] in the South China Sea. How- 
ever, within an hour after we had gotten there some additional information 
came in, the exact nature of which I wasn't told at the time, but when we went 
out. Colonel Merle Smith had me prepare a cable which he revised to send out 
and the principal part of that other, than the movement of this convoy, was 
that the Dutch had ordered the execution of the Rainbow Plan, A-2. I re- 
member, it's been almost three years now, and I can distinctly remember that 
particular part of the cable where it said A-2, repeat A-2, which was a part 
of the joint Abducan plan only to be taken in the event of war. It provided 
for specific occurrences they would counteract by certain other action. In other 
words, A-1 would have been some other direction expected attack, A-2 was from 
a particular direction, and they ordered the execution of this A-2. That was 
signiticant because the plan called for joint operations for the Australians, and 
the Dutch and to the best of my knowledge our Navy if nothing else. That 
was to go into effect only in case of war and here the Dutch had ordered it. 
That was the definite information that it had gone into effect. There was a 
bit of flurried excitement with that, and Sir Charles Burnett asked us not to 
send that cable and Colonel Merle Smith, although impatient to send it, said 
that he [12282] would wait twelve hours at Sir Charles Burnett's specific 
request. In other words, they didn't say they wouldn't let that cable go out, 
but I dare say they probably would have stopped it had we tried to launch it. 

CWC. Let me ask you — now that was on December 5? 

O'D. Sir, that was Thursday, the 4th, and we held it. 

CWC. In other words that's the 3rd our time. 

O'D. That's right, sir. 

CWC. And you didn't send it actually until the 5th? 

O'D. Well, the reason for the delay was that there was a War Cabinet 
Meeting at wliich Sir Charles Burnett was to report this information to the 
Australian War Cabinet which was meeting in Melbourne that evening, and 
he went from his office to the War Cabinet meeting. We, on our part, held 
the cable twelve hours, and I coded it and had it ready for dispatch and held 
on to it. In the cable (it was extremely urgent) this convoy, they had it doped 
out, could get to somewhere, either the Philippines or the Indies mthin, I be- 
lieve it was, 60 hours, and that is the way that we had figured it. So we 
sent the cable one copy to General MacArthur in his code that we had then and 
another copy in a different code to Hawaii with a repeat to the Commanding 
General, Hawaiian Department, the request to repeat it to Washington. In 
other words, we sent none direct to [12283] MILID as we would have 
done if time hadn't been such a factor. But, we were extremely laborious in 
writing 

CWC. In other words, you fellows instead of having a drop copy for Hawaii, 
you have it to Hawaii and told them 

O'D. And told them to repeat it here, sir, and then send another copy to the 
Philippines. There was no hint of Pearl Harbor in this whatsoever. It wholly 
concerned itself with the Philippines and the Indies, and it looked like the Indies 
at that precise moment would be the first to get it! Now, we sent that cable, 
that would be the morning of the 5th their time, and I see in the papers where 
Dixon denied that his country had any information of an attack on Pearl 
Harbor, and it was reported to the press in that way, which is so. But they 
did have a warning of action in the Philippines or in the South Pacific Area. 
I would say it is inescapable that they did. I don't know— we never had any 
acknowledgment of the cable from either Hawaii or the Philippines, and we 
never heard anything from MILID to let us know whether or not it had reached 
them. Of course, the subsequent events were such that it might have been 
overlooked. The file copy was destroyed — ah, this looks like it. That's it, sir, 
Netherlands Far East Command on Execution of Plan A-2. Naval moves 
in Mindanao — (Interrupted) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4603 

[12283] CWC. General Osmun, this is Lieutenant O'Dell. 
RAO. O'Dell. 
O'D. How do you do, sir. 
RAO. Mighty glad to know you. 
O'U. Pleased to meet you, sir. 

CWC. He's giving us some information here in connection with this Pearl 
Harbor business. 
RAO. I've heard about it. 
CWC. You've heard about Pearl Harbor? 

RAO. Ha ! Ha ! I'll tell you sometime about a year from now at Christmas 
we'll all get together and celebrate that. I'm glad to have met you. 
O'D. Thank you, sir. 

O'D. What made us particularly angry about this was that the next morning 
the newspaper came out in the early edition with a certain part of this informa- 
tion about the Indies. And, after we had held the cable up at their request. 
Colonel Merle-Smith naturally raised a great deal of trouble over why we 
had had to hold our cable and the press had gotten an inkling of it ; they hadn't 
gotten the words, sir, but they had an inkling. That is tlie message in particular, 
sir. That is the one 
CWC. Notice the footnote down there. 

O'D. (Reading from message:) "And relayed to War Department message 
center." 

[12284] (Interrupted by telephone. CWC talked for some time with 
General Strong.) 

O'D. We expected action to take place on Sunday, our time, and we all went 
down to the office on Sunday and waited with bated breath, and nothing hap- 
pened Sunday. That led us to believe that, well, this was another of those 
scares. As you can probably guess, sir, we had had several previous warnings 
of impending action in time to reflect that in the reports and cables that we had 
sent. One other positive action was that Kopang — 2 days before this hap- 
pened — received 50 (the Japanese Consul received) cases which he wished to 
have in under Diplomatic privilege and it was refused by the Dutch and opened 
by the Dutch before he could get them back on this Japanese ship. I think that 
was the trouble, there wasn't a Japanese ship that he could put it on. And, 
when they opened it, they found a complete, well not radar because radar 
wasn't in the state that we now know it, but it was a sending and receiving radio 
set, and we had had information about that. Also, of course, all the Japanese 
shipping had been pulled back into Japanese waters for at least sixty .days 
before. And, then on the afternoon that this was sent, we sent that in the 
morning, the Japanese consul in Melbourne, who was under surveillance, was 
[12285] seen to burn all of his codes in the back yard. Nobody, of course, 
was able to make a move to stop him, but they saw that. 

CWC. You're sure this was sent out from Singapore, or where was it sent from? 
O'D. From Melbourne, sir. 
CWC. Melbourne on the fifth. 
O'D. The fifth, in the morning, sir. 

EWG. According to this copy. Colonel, this was received by Signals Hawaii, 
don't know when, but it was relayed to the War Department, arriving here at 
the night of Pearl Harbor day, December 7, with a memo on it that this was 
addressed to CG, Hawaii and relayed here with request for decipherment and 
repeat back to them. 

CWC. Well, we got that in there with old man Smith's note. 
EWG. Yes, we have that. The only thing is, it is curious why Signals Hawaii 
held that so long. They couldn't decipher it ; maybe they thought they could. I 
don't know. 

O'D. It was sent positively in a code which Hawaii had. 
CWC. What did you use? 

O'D. The information that was on the code and cipher. We used the secret 
book with the cipher table. 

VWC. Did you use the black book or the red book? Do you remember? 
O'D. If I saw it. of course, I could identify it. As I [1228G] remember 
it, it was gray. I don't remember. There was a thick confidential and a thin 
secret and then there were the cipher tables that were changed every thirty 
days, and we were very careful to pick one. That's why we had to code it twice, 
once in a code that we knew Hawaii had and once in one the Philippines had 
because the Philippines had different codes entirely from Hawaii, and we had 
to — well, you can imagine, that is a rather laborious job, a message like that. 
CWC. The message we got in said it was held for 17 hours. 



4604 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

O'D. That was 17 hours, sir, from one afternoon until the next morning. I see 
they have a question mark under what government. It was the Australian Gov- 
ernment. We put that in the message. 

EWG. Did you ever in Australia hear of any information indicating that there 
was a task force sailing toward Pearl Harbor? 

O'D. Not toward Pearl Harbor, sir. We never had any information or any- 
thing in that direction. We knew of a task force in the South China Sea, and 
whether it was headed for the Philippines or whether it was headed for any 
part of the Indies, the reconnaissance information that was available to us did 
not specify. 

CWC. Did you know about the build up of a task force in the Marshalls? 
[1228T\ O'D. Yes, sir. 
CWC. You did know about that. 

O'D. Yes, sir, through the Australian Government again. Mostly the RAAF. 
They were the ones rather than the Army or the Navy, it was the RAAF that was 

feeding us what information of value 

owe. How far in advance of Pearl Harbor did you know that, do you recall? 
O'D. I should say it was in that same week. Probably early in that week. 
That was toward the latter part of the week. I should say in the early part of 
that week, sir. We had been following the Japanese disposition of troops and 
had sent a report, a regular M/A report on the disposition of all Japanese di- 
visions about a month before all this came up, which was used merely to confirm 
what other reports were here. It was just how the Australians had the disposi- 
tion of the Japanese Army and which we sent in confirming the other information 
here. Shipping, as I say, we knew that all the Japanese shipping had been moved 
back into its own territorial waters. Most of our information led us to the 
definite and inescapable conclusion that war was going to break here, nothing 
about Pearl Harbor, sir. 

CWC. Well, of course, that is a typical Jap stunt. Now, who [12288] 
is this Sir Charles Burnett again? 

O'D. He was Chief of Staff of the RAAF. He has been sent back to England 
now. He is an RAF oflBcer who was on loan, and it was through him and Air 
Commodore Hewett, he was an intelligence officer, that we had disposal of what- 
ever information they had, and they did, of course, cooperate a great deal with 
us. But the message that you have there, sir, which is the same one exactly as 
we sent it out, and a pretty good decipherment as well. Col. Merle Smith was 
exceedingly careful, and he was the opposite of an alarmist. He would not put 
anything in a cable that he didn't have absolutely down under his thumb per- 
fectly. 

CWC. Yes ; I knew Merle Smith. I knew him very well. 

[12289] O'D. And you can see from that cable, sir, that he put nothing that 
would tend to alarm that wasn't definite fact that he could attribute to some- 
thing precise. 

EWG. Do you know whether or not Hawaii knew what this plan A-2 was? 
O'D. We believed that they did. That point came up because of the naval, 
because of Pearl Harbor being the naval headquarters and the Plan A-2 being 
for United States participation mostly in a naval manner. We certainly as- 
sumed that if anybody knew A-2, Pearl Harbor did know it. Now, whether the 
Army would show that to the Navy and that sort of thing, we naturally left up 
to them. But this naval plan, you see there was a naval attache in Melbourne, 
Captain Coursey, and we informed him of that and curiously enough Captain 
Coursey did not send any message like that. I do not believe he did. I'm not 
qualified to say for certain, but he was not in the same state that we were about 
it. What I am trying to say is that what we sent back might not have seemed 
such a positive indication, but that everything where we were definitely led to 
the assumption that war was going to break out. This was about the third or 
fourth time it had happened, but this time it really seemed in a state where 
in 60 hours that task force was going to be somewhere and with all this code 
[12290] burning and various other indications from all sorts that I knew 
about and no doubt they knew more than I did, it looked like this time it was 
going to be the end, and, as I say. we expected it on our Sunday and that 
Sunday came and went and nothing happened, and we had a let down, and then 
of course it was Monday, our time, that it happened. He put nothing in that 

cable that wouldn't be 

EWG. Well, this cable says the Netherlands command at 8 a. m. on 7 December 
reported planes to have reached Kopang. Could you have sent it before? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4605 

O'D. That was added, sir, on the morning as was the fact that it was delayed. 
In other words we had to rewrite it because the situation was changing momen- 
tarily. 

EWG. Then you don't think that it was 

O'D. No, sir ; that went out on Friday. 

EWG. Do you think that might have been a mistake in deciphering? 

O'D. Yes, sir. You see the meat of the thing : the suggestion that the RAAF 
likewise take reciprocal action. In other words "we're going to live up to our 
obligation — ". 

EWG. This date bothered me. That's all. 

O'D. Well, it bothers me a bit, sir. That is the only copy that I know of in 
existence. The file copy was destroyed by the present military attache with all 
old papers, about two [12291] years ago. 

CWC. Do you think that the Australians notified their people here? Do you 
have any way of knowing that, or any opinion? 

O'D. I know that our own Minister was not informed of the situation. You 
see, of course, the capitol, sir is in Canberra, and we were stationed in Mel- 
bourne because that was the scene of activity. The War Cabinet met the pre- 
vious night. That's when Sir Charles Burnett had told them this information. 
Whether the War Cabinet, who would be the body then who would have in- 
structed them to let Washington know — . Sir Owen Dixon wasn't hei-e then. 
He was a shipping man in Australia, and Mr. Casey was here. 

CWC. Casey was the guy that was here then. 

O'D. That's right, sir. Mr. Casey. 

CWC. I know there was a roar about it when they pulled him out of here. 

O'D. Yes, sir ; that's right, sir, jealousy I think. Whether or not they sent a 
cable to — I rather doubt that they did, sir, because, as I say, the Australian 
Government wasn't too happy about our sending this out even after the delay. 
I mean they realized that it was inescapable, and we had to keep our Govern- 
ment informed, but 

CWC. Well, there is one thing I'd like to get straight in my [12292] 
own mind. Now, when Burnett gave Merle Smith this information, he gave it 
to you with the understanding that you not transmit it. 

O'D. No, sir ; when he told it to us we were getting ready to send it out. 
It was only after we had the cable — you see, we were there over an hour, 
over 2 hours, that afternoon, and the information was dribbling in in spurts, 
and we had that and it was only when we were getting ready to go, which 
was around 7 o'clock, that the War Cabinet meeting was called. I shouldn't 
say before 6 : 30, at the time we came out there, it wasn't scheduled. They 
called this emei'gency meeting and at that time when we had prepared the cable 
and were getting ready to go code it. Sir Charles Burnett requested very 
specifically that it not be sent, that we hold it up until he had infoi-med the 
War Cabinet. I rather think that that is why he didn't want the information 
to leave Melbourne. In other words, he hadn't told his own Government yet. 

CWC. In other words, he wanted to spring it on his people first. 

O'D. Before there was any chance of our sending anything out, sir. 

CWC. That's logical. 

O'D. I might say, sir, that because there were only two of [12293] us 
and because everything was happening day and night then, that was one of 
the last messages that we sent out in our own code. From then on we used the 
Australian cipher section back and forth. 

CWC. Why? 

O'D. Well, sir, we weren't too sure of our codes to the Philippines. We knew 
they had the cipher device, but we weren't sure of the security afforded by the 
cipher device. 

CWC. You mean the cylindrical? 

O'D. That's right. After the outbreak of war, you see, sir. 

CWC. But it was secure befoi-e the outbreak of war? 

O'D. Once the show broke and we were going back and forth between General 
MacArthur's headquarters and Australia, we were given the vise of the Australian 
code and it was mostly of a liaison nature, anyway, as to whether General 
MacArthur could send a plane here on reconnaissance or a plane there or what 
could be expected in one way or another. There were so many messages coming 
and going. General MacArthur would send us messages. Sir Charles Burnett 
would ask us for certain informatipn from the Philippines. You see Washington 
was pretty far removed from us at that time. We didn't know what delays 



4606 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

would be encountered in the cables going through Hawaii to Washington, which 
was the only means of sending any message here, and there were matters which 
would [12294] come up which we would want answered in 5 or 6 hours, 
which we knew we'd never get to Washington and back in that time, and it 
concerned what General MacArthur would be able to tell us and what Washington 
would only have to ask someone else foi*. So, we had quite a bit of correspondence 
back and forth by cable and wireless from the Philippines to Australia as soon 
as the war broke out. We simply didn't have the means, I mean it would take 
at least 3 hours to do a job like that message there. By that time the information 
was not even wanted. So, we had this coming and going. We moved our office 
right into the RAAF headquarters. 

CWC. They had the machines then, too, didn't they? 

O'D. No, sir, they did not. They had — I can assure you that Col. Merle Smith 
went into it to the last detail, no violations of any security. 

CWC. Oh, no ; I wasn't think about that. Mine was just a question of the time 
factor. There is one question I want to ask you. This has nothing to do with 
Pearl Harbor. Were you aware of that convoy which was at sea when Pearl 
Harbor hit? 

O'D. Yes, sir. 

CWC. Were you aware of the correspondence when they sent it all over the 
whole damned South Pacific? 

O'D. Then, sir, we started getting messages from General [12295] Mar- 
shall in a code that was, at first one message came and we didn't have the code. 
They repeated the message in a different code, and we had that code, and curiously 
went through that and got that, it was a double transposition which, of course, 
didn't use the book. We got that, and, of course, that was a long one there 
again. We were having our troubles. We got that deciphered, and it was from 
General Marshall, and we called that the Pe7isacola, sir, that was under escort 
by one cruiser, which was the Pensacola. We would do about 10 of those in 1 
message, sir. One little error in the first, and you go back and do the whole 
thing over again, and you can't tell until after you've finished that you've made 
an error, when you start to get your word groups. But we had heard, we got 
several cables about the arrival of the Pensacola convoy, including what was on 
it. As I remember, there were A-24's and P-40's. There were, I think, 26 P^O's 
and 18 A-24's. Immediately Sir Charles Burnett wanted to know what was the 
A-24. Well, sir, frankly the means at our disposal there, the Air Force manuals 
on what the A-24's were, we didn't get far, and that was a little annoying. 

CWC. That was that Mitchell dive bomber? 

O'D. That's right, sir; single engine, and, of course, the [12296] A-20 
was a twin engine, and the question in Sir Charles Burnett's mind was, is it a 
single engine or is it a twin engine. They wanted those planes, and they had to 
make arrangements for staging areas for them and discharge and so forth, and it 
was rather difficult to do without that information. Still, by the time we wired 
to Washington to ask them (we didn't of course, because, with everything hai>- 
pening all over) they were going to land. They were due on the 23d of Decem- 
ber, sir. They arrived in Brisbane, and we went up to Brisbane to meet the 
convoy, 

CWC. Some of my old gang in the Second Air Force were on that. That 
interceptor outfit that came out with them. 

O'D. Yes, sir; they were destined, of course, for the Philippines and South 
Hawaii. General Brereton had sent a mission down. General RLacArthur had 
sent General Brereton with a mission of about eight men, eight officers, from the 
Philippines in the latter part of November, and General Brereton had arrived at 
Darwin and Col. Merle Smith went up to Darwin and flew over to Rabaul with 
them, and I met them in Brisbane and they went on this mission. They were 
primarily concerned with the fueling facilities for B-17's being flown out from 
Hawaii via Rabaul, Darwin, and then up through the Indies to the Philippines. 
They were trying [12297] to arrange for petrol from the Shell Oil Co. and 
airports, airports principally. That was where we got about a 60-day start, not 
quite that, about a 45-day start on building airports around Darwin which were 
later used when they evacuated the B-17's, these strips through the jungle. Gen- 
eral Brereton, of course, had come down in plain clothes. He wouldn't have been 
allowed in the country in uniform at that time. He had flown down here, and 
we took them all around looking for airports where we could land them. Then, 
of course, this Pensacola convoy came in. 

CWC. Yes; I remember all those things. Well,' I doiTt think there is anything 
else unless you have something you want to add to what you have said. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4607 



O'D. No, sir ; I just wanted you to have 

CWC. All risht. Well, I'm awfully glad you came in, and I appreciate your 
taking the trouble. It's nice to have seen you. 
O'D. Thank you very much, sir. 

[12298'] The Vice Chairman. The committee finished with 
Colonel Bratton last evening. 

Mr. Keefe, Senator Ferguson said he thought you might want to 
ask him some questions. I went over and asked Mr. Gearhart, and 
he said he did not know of any questions you wanted to ask him, and 
we excused Colonel Bratton. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I think it should appear that I 
stated to you before that time 

The Vice Chairman. If you allow me to finish my statement, I am 
covering that, Senator. If you look at last night's record you will 
see where I said Senator Brewster had suggested to me that Mr. Keefe 
might want to ask some questions. 

Senator Brewster. I said he did want to ask some questions. There 
is no "might" about it. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, I went over to ask Mr. Gearhart. 

Senator Ferguson, Mr. Gearhart and I, all three of us made state- 
ments that appear in last night's record. There isn't any difficulty 
about the matter. I excused Colonel Bratton with the understancl- 
ing that he would come back this morning if Mr. Keefe did want to 
ask some questions. 

Will you please step aside, Colonel Sadtler, and let Colonel Bratton 
come forward, if he is here? 

{12299'\ TESTIMONY OF COL. RTJFrS S. BRATTON, UNITED 
STATES ARMY— (Resumed)^ 

The Vice Chairman. All right, Colonel, Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin 
will inquire. 

Mr. Keefe, I regret, Mr. Chairman, that it was impossible for me 
to be here last evening, but I think my attendance in previous hearings 
justifies my being away for a couple of hours last night. 

Colonel Bratton, when you testified before the Army board you 
were under oath, were you not, to tell the truth ? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You understood that oath ? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you undertook to tell the truth to that board ? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You knew at that time, did you, that the testimony 
which you were giving before that board might affect the lives and 
welfare of many men ? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you knew that that board might use your testimony 
that you gave as the basis of assessing responsibility for the tragedy 
at Pearl Harbor ? 

[12300] Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And with that full knowledge you went before that 
board and testified in answer to specific questions that were pro- 
pounded to you, did you not ? 

» Col. Bratton's testimony begins in Hearings, Part 9, p. 4508. 



4608 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel BRATroN. Yes, sir. 

[l^SOl] Mr. Keefe. I understand your explanation to be, and if 
I am in error, you correct me, that you endeavored to give the im- 
pression to this board that when you testified before the Army board, 
you had not had an opportunity to refresh your recollection by exam- 
ination of documents and consultation with other people, and that 
you were flown over here from Europe, that you were tired and dirty 
and dusty and that you went before the Army board somewhat cold 
without sufficient preparation ; is that correct ? 

Colonel Bratton. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, granted that all of those things were true, in the 
face of the realization that what you testified to was supposed to be 
the truth, I want to call your attention to the examination appearing 
on page 237 and subsequent pages of the Army board transcript, and 
to questions that were asked you by Colonel Toulmin. 

You understand that as a witness, Colonel Bratton, if you do not 
recall a fact, that you are interrogated about, it is always the priv- 
ilege of the witness to say, "I do not remember"? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Or "I have no recollection on the subject" ? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. But when a direct question is asked, and [l^SO^] 
you testify without equivocation and without qualification, under oath, 
the people who hear that testimony should have a right to rely upon 
the fact that you have told the truth. Isn't that true ? 

Colonel Bratton. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, then [reading] : 

Colonel Toulmin. 

Colonel Bratton. May I ask, sir, what page you are reading from ? 

Mr. Keefe. I am starting at the bottom of page 236. I will ask 

you if these questions were put to you and did you make these answers : 

Colonel ToTJLMiN. I am aware of that, but you don't answer my question. Why 
weren't the first thirteen parts, which were considered important enough by 
the Navy to be delivered to the President and to everyone of the important Ad- 
mirals in the Navy Department delivered by the War Department officers to 
the Chief of Staff, and his attention called to it, so he could have taken some action 
upon it? That's what puzzles me. 

Colonel Bratton. You are referring, now, to the Japanese reply? 

Colonel Toulmin. To the 13 parts. 

Colonel Bratton. Yes — not to the short message? 

[12303] Colonel Toulmin. Not to the short message. 1 am talking about 
the evening of December 6, and they were in English by 9 or 10 o'clock. The 
President of the United States and the leading Admirals of the Navy Department 
all had that message before midnight, most of them by ten or eleven o'clock. 
You had it in the early evening also. 

What I am trying to find out is why it was that the Chief of Staff was not 
called and advised, as were others, that this important document had been re- 
ceived. In view of the tenor of its contents, it hardly needed the 14th paragraph 
to be conclusive as to its intent and contents ; and why did not the Chief of Staff 
get that message? 

Colonel Beatton. I am trying to remember, sir, what I did with the copies 
that went to General Miles and General Marshall and General Gerow. I can't 
verify it or prove it at this time, but my recollection is that those three officers 
got their copies the evening of the 6th. 

Colonel Toulmin. By "the three officers" you mean whom? 

Colonel Beatton. General Marshall, General Miles, and General Gerow. Now 
it was my practice to deliver them their copies before I went to the State Depart- 
ment. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4609 

Colonel ToxTLMiN. That was your practice? 

Colonel Bbatton. Yes, sir. 

[123041 Colonel Toulmin. Did you deliver this copy, for instance, to General 
Marshall personally on the evening of the 6th? 

Colonel Bratton. No ; I very seldom delivered it to him in person. I gave it 
to his secretary, in a locked bag. 

Colonel Toulmin. And you gave it to General Miles in that way, on the evening 
of the 6th ? 

Colonel Bratton. I generally took them into his oflSce and handed them to him, 
and if he wasn't there, I left it with the executive secretary. Major, now Colonel, 
Smith. 

Colonel Toulmin. We are now talking about the evening before, Saturday 
evening, December 6. 

Colonel Bratton. Yes. 

Colonel Toulmin. Is it your recollection that you handed this important, long, 
13-part message to General Miles on that evening? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Colonel Toulmin. Is it your recollection you handed that long 13-part message 
on that evening to the secretary of the Chief of Staff? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Colonel Toulmin. And it is your recollection that you handed it on that evening 
of December 6 to General Gerow, [12305] or some representative of Gen- 
eral Gerow? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes. 

Colonel Toulmin. Did you hand it to General Gerow directly, or to his 
secretary. 

I am reading on page 238. 

Colonel Bratton. To his executive secretary. 

Colonel Toulmin. Who was he? 

Colonel Bbatton. The executive? 

Colonel Toulmin. Yes. 

Colonel Bratton. Colonel Galley. 

Colonel Toulmin. And what is the name of the secretary of the Chief of StafE? 

Colonel Bratton. Colonel Smith, Bedell Smith, now lieutenant general. 

Colonel Toulmin. And after this, you then went over and delivered it to the 
Secretary of State in the locked pouch for and on his behalf, is that right ? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes ; to the watch officer in the State Department. 

Colonel Toulmin. To the watch officer, about 10 or 10:30. on that Saturday 
evening, December 6? 

Colonel Bratton. That is correct. 

Colonel Toulmin. Now, having made these deliveries, Colonel, to these four 
recipients, the Chief of Staff, the [12306] Chief of G-2, the Chief of the 
War Plans Division, and the Secretary of State, did you get any reaction to that 
message until the following day? 

Colonel Brattox. What do you nsean by "reaction," Colonel? 

Colonel TouLMiN. Did they answer it? Did they act upon it, did they men- 
tion it, did they discuss it, did they call you, did they look at it, to your knowl- 
edge? Or, put it in the negative — did they do nothing about it, so far as you 
know? 

Colonel Beatton. I had some discussions of the message, as I remember now, 
with General Miles, indicating to him that the final part was yet to come. It 
did not come in until the following morning. The reaction from General Marshall 
was a reading and a discussion of the entire communication. 

General Frank. That night? 

Colonel Bratton. No. 

General Frank. Or the following morning? 

Colonel Bratton. The following morning. 

Colonel Toulmin. Let us confine ourselves to the night of December 6, now. 

Colonel Bratton. Sir? 

Colonel Toulmin. Let us confine ourselves to the night [1230T\ of De- 
cember 6, for the moment, at least. 

Now, did you talk to General Miles? 

Colonel Bratton. I did not talk to General Marshall the night of the 6th. 

Colonel Toulmin. Did you talk to General Miles on the night of the 6th? 

Colonel Bratton. My recollection is that I did, sir. 

Colonel Toulmin. You talked to him on the phone, or in his oflace? 

Colonel Bratton. No ; I believe I talked to him in his office. 



4610 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. Did you talk to him in his office ? 

Colonel Bratton. My memory on that is not clear even today, sir, 
but I do know that I talked to him over the telephone because I have 
conferred with General Miles on that subject; we have both refreshed 
our memories on the point, and I now know that I did talk to him on 
the telephone that night at about 11 : 30. I don't believe I talked to 
him in his office on the night of the 6th. I did talk to him in his office 
on the afternoon of the 6th in connection with another message, the 
so-called pilot message. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, I am intrigued somewhat by the fact that Captain 
Kramer testified that he had no recollection that General Miles was at 
the home of Admiral Wilkinson [12308] until he was told 
later. His first testimony was that only Admiral Wilkinson and Ad- 
miral Turner were there. Then he was refreshed by someone later 
to the effect that General Miles was there. 

Now, you testified before the Army board that General Miles was 
at his office, and you tallied with him. 

Colonel Bratton. Well, this was Saturday afternoon. 

Mr. Keefe. Was it true ? 

Colonel Bratton. Saturday afternoon, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. I am talking about Saturday evening when you de- 
livered this message. 

Colonel Bratton. I think I have already answered that question. 
My recollection is now that I did not talk to him in his office on Sat- 
urday night, but I did talk to him over the telephone. 

Mr. Keefe. When do you expect the members of the committee are 
going to know when the truth is being told in this proceeding ? 

Colonel Bratton. I was telling the truth on all occasions in which 1 
testified before any board in connection with this Pearl Harbor affair 
to the best .of my ability, and I am still doing so. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, is truth dependent upon a man's ability to say a 
thing? 

[1^309] Colonel Bratton. No ; it is dependent upon his ability 
to recollect details of events. 

Mr. Keefe. Let me read these questions to you, and ask you if you 
made these answers. Page 241 : 

Colonel TouLMiN. And how about General Smith? Did you get any I'eaction 
from him, or any reaction, rather? 

Colonel Bratton. No. General Smith did not have access to these pouches. 
You mean General Bedell Smith? 

Colonel TouLMiN. Yes. 

Colonel Beatton. He didn't have a key to the bag. 

General Russell. What was his relation? 

Colonel Bratton. General Marshall's secretary. 

General Russell. Well, he is the man to whom you gave General Marshall's 
copy, was he not? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes ; but it was in a locked pouch, to which General Marshall 
had the key. 

You didn't qualify your answer and say : 

I don't recollect whether I gave it to him or not, but my present recollection 
is that I did. • 

Colonel Bratton. I beg your pardon, I did. 
Mr. Keefe. In this answer? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4611 

Colonel Bratton. On page 307 in the same document you are look- 
ing at, the third line : 

Colonel Bratton. That is correct, sir ; to the best of [12310] my knowl- 
edge and belief. My recollection is that I found Colonel Smith in his office. It 
may have been one of the other secretaries, but my recollection is that it was 
Colonel Smith 

Mr. Keete. Well, your recollection is that it was Colonel Smith 
and your recollection is that it might have been somebody else, but 
your recollection is positive that you delivered that message to the 
office of the Chief of Staff that night ; that is what you testified before 
this Army board wasn't it ? 

Colonel Bratton. In one sense, yes, sir ; but I qualified 

Mr. I^EFE. You gave no reservations. 

The Vice Chairman. Just a minute. Let the witness finish. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, this witness is entitled to respect. 

The Vice Chairman. Let him answer. Complete your answer, 
Colonel. 

Colonel Bratton. I qualified that statement, and a number of other 
statements throughout the testimony of mine before the Army board 
by saying that that was the best of my belief, I thought so ; it was the 
way I recollected it at the time, or that I was not sure, or some other 
such [12311] qualification, some other such qualifying phrase. 

Mr. Keefe. Wliat changed your belief ? 

Colonel Bratton. Sir? 

Mr. Keefe. What changed your belief ? 

Colonel Bratton. A number of facts that were presented to me sub- 
sequent to this. 

Mr. Keefe. Wlien were they presented to you ? 

Colonel Bratton. Tliat I had not recollected at the time. 

Mr. Keefe. "When 

Senator Lucas. Let him answer. 

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead, Colonel. 

Colonel Bratton. As I stated to the committee last night, there were 
a number of facts that were brought to my attention subsequent to this 
date which materially modified mj^^ recollection of the details of events 
on the night of the 6th, and the morning of the 7th of December, 1941. 

In the first place, when I testified before the Army board I did not 
at that time remember that Colonel Dusenbury was working with rne 
in the office that night. When I worked over this stuff, this magic, 
alone, there was one standard operating procedure that was followed 
with respect to its processing and delivery. Wlien I had help in the 
person of [12S12] Colonel Dusenbury, of one of my other 
assistants, we used another method, particularly with respect to the 
delivery of the pouches. 

When I had two assistants, there was still another standard operat- 
ing procedure. 

Now, that is one fact that was brought to my attention. 

AVIien Colonel Clausen interviewed me in Europe he invited my 
attention to a number of affidavits signed by General Gerow, General 
Bedell Smith, General Ralph Smith, General Gailey, and a number of 
other officers, to the effect that they did not receive these pouches from 
G-2 on the night of the 6th. 



4612 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

As I stated to the committee last night, I know all of these officers ; 
they are men of honor, and integrity, and if they say that they didn't 
receive the pouches from me, or Colonel Dusenbury, or one of my 
assistants, then my recollection must have been at fault and I so admit. 

Mr. Keefe, Now, I w^ant to read these questions to you and ask you 
whether they were submitted to you, and did you make these answers. 

Colonel Bratton. Sir? 

Mr. KJEEFE. I want to ask you if these questions were put to you and 
did you make these answers. 

General Russell 

[12S1S] Colonel Bratton. What page, may I ask, sir ? 
Mr. Keefe. Page 242. 

General Russejll. Well he is the man to whom you gave General Marshall's 
copy, was he not? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes ; but it was in a locked pouch, to which General Marshall 
had the key. 

General Russiax. Did you know what Bedell Smith did with it? 

Colonel Bratton. No, sir. 

Colonel TouLMiN. Did you tell him that it was an important document in the 
locked pouch? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Colonel TouLMiN. And that the Chief of Staff should know about it. 

Colonel Beatton. Should see it right away. 

Colonel TocxMiN. What was General Smith's response — that he would get in 
touch with the Chief of Staff, or would not? 

Colonel Bratton. It must have been because if it had been otherwise, it would 
have registered on my memory. 

Colonel TouLMAN. And about what time in the evening was it when General 
Smith was told there was an important document in that locked pouch for 
General Marshall, and that his attention should be called to it? 

[12314] Colonel Bratton. I don't remember that, sir. 

Colonel TouLMiN. And that was on the evening of December 6? 

Colonel Beatton. Yes. 

Colonel TOULMIN. 1941? 

Colonel Beatton. Yes, sir. 

Were those questions asked you, and did you make those answers? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

[1B31S] Mr. Keefe. All right. Now, then, the next time that 
you had any discussion about this matter was when you were inter- 
viewed by Colonel Clausen, is that right ? 

Colonel Bratton. No, sir. 

Mr, Keefe. When was the next time ? 

Colonel Bratton. If you will turn over, sir, to page 279 

Mr. Keefe. No ; I mean the next time after that Army Board report. 
Do you want to refer to some other evidence in the Army Board ? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. If you will turn over to page 279 you 
will see further reference to this incident in the middle of the page. 
[Reading :] 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. When I last appeared before the Board I was 
somewhat puzzled by what I considered at that time an over-emphasis placed 
by the Board on two messages. One was the implementation of the winds- 
weather code. The other was this fourteen part ultimatum. I was considerably 
puzzled at the time by the insistence of the Board that these were vitally im- 
portant documents, and I had the feeling that there was something missing, 
that they had no longer the significance after the 3rd of December, in my mind, 
that the Board attributed to them. I find, I think I know now [12316] 
why I had this feeling. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4613 

A search of the files in G-2 as of the clay before yesterday and yesterday 
brought to light a carbon copy of a chronologically arranged series of extracts 
from intercepted Japanese communications which I prepared sometime after 
Pearl Harbor for the Chief of Staff. In glancing through this document I find 
that there was a message which I had forgotten when I api)eared before you last ; 
dispatch from Tokyo on the 2nd of December, to the Japanese Ambassador in 
Washington. It was interpreted, or rather it was translated on the 3rd and pre- 
sumably placed in my hands on that date. 

General Fkank. During what month? 

General Russell. December 3, 1941, Colonel? 

Colonel Beatton. December 1941, sir. And it is listed here on my paper as 
S. I. S. 25640, and the extract that I have on this paper reads as follows : — 

Then the message is quoted. 

After the receipt of this translation any further intercepts that were brought 
to me would simply contribute toward the climax that I saw coming. That was it. 

Then we branched off into a long discussion of this winds code 
business and I never did get back to an explanation of the 13 parts of 
the 14-part ultimatum. It [I'^SIT] slipped my mind and that 
of the board apparently. 

Mr. Keefe. Are you telling us this to imply that if you had gotten 
back to the 13th part you would have changed the testimony that you 
had given before the board ? 

Colonel Bratton. Exactly that. 

Mr. Keete. Is that what you want to tell us? 

Colonel Bratton. Exactly that, and as I testified before the com- 
mittee yesterday, if I had had an opportunity to review or edit this 
testimony before leaving Washington in the fall of 1944 I would have 
corrected many of the conflicting and contradictor^^ statements that 
now appear therein. I did not have that opportunity. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, is it your understanding that witnesses testifying 
in important matters before boards or commissions or courts have the 
right to examine their testimony that they have given under oath and 
correct it from time to time and day to day ? 

Colonel Bratton. Certainly. I was told that I had that privilege 
by the president of the board. 

Mr. Keefe. When was that ? 

Colonel Brattox. I don't remember the exact date. It was on 
the occasion of one of my appearances before the Army board. I 
asked that specific question, if I would be given an opportunity to re- 
view my testimony and make such correc- [12318] tions as 
were necessary. 

Mr. Keefe. Then you knew at the time you had concluded your 
testimony before the Army board that your testimony was in error 
as to the delivery of the first 13 parts of this Japanese reply, is that 
right ? 

Colonel Bratton. No ; I did not know that and I did not say that, 
sir. 

Mr. Kj:efe. Well, I understood you to say that had you had the 
opportunity to correct your testimony you would have corrected it in 
that particular. Did I misunderstand you? 

Colonel Bratton. I think I would have corrected many of the con- 
tradictions and conflicting statements that appear in this record, sir. 

Mr. ICeefe. Well, the most conflicting statement that appears in 
this record in conflict with 3'our affidavit given to Colonel Clausen is 
with respect to the delivery of this 13-part message. 



4614 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, I want to ask you the direct question: Do you 
mean to tell this committee that you were not given the right to 
correct your testimony before the Army board and that had you had 
that opportunity and not gone off on a tangent discussing the winds 
code and gotten lost in a mirage of discussion relating to the winds 
code that you would have ' [13319] corrected your testiniony in 
respect to the delivery or failure of delivery or lack of delivery of 
the 13-part message ? That is what I would like to get clear. 

Colonel Brattox. I did not say that I did not have the opportunity 
to review this testimony. As I testified before the committee yester- 
day, I was accorded that right. I also testified before the committee 
that my commanding general in Europe had instructed me to return 
as soon as I could be released from temporary duty in Washington. 
The testimony was not available for my review on the two occasions 
that I returned to the Grunert board for the purpose of checking over 
typographical and other errors therein and as time was passing by 
I left Washington without reviewing this testimony. I was anxious 
to get back to my command post. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, you did not answer my question at all. 
Colonel. You are just rambling. I want to ask this question of 
you now : 

You have stated to this board this morning and specifically referred 
to the testimony which you read at some length into the record, that 
you got into a discussion before the board relating to the winds mes- 
sage and that you did not get a chance to talk about the 13-part 
message. Did I misunderstand you? 

Colonel Bratton. You misunderstood me, sir. I did not 
[12320] say that I did not get a chance. I said that my initial 
reference to the scond message, which was the Japanese reply, slipped 
my memory later on in the course of the questioning. I did not 
get back to it because we had gotten way off the track and I forgot 
about it. Apparently no member of the board remembered that that 
was one of the messages that I wanted to discuss. 

Mr. Keefe. AVell, how many times did you appear before the Army 
board ? 

Colonel Bratton. Three times. 

Mr. Keefe. You had three opportunities to tell your story or make 
any corrections you wanted to, didn't you ? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, and I think if you will examine this testi- 
mony you will see that I made a number of corrections and changes 
each time I appeared. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes, I have read it and studied it very carefully and 
I am very familiar with it, I assure you. 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, you went back to Europe? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you were there confronted by or met Major 
Clausen ? 

Colonel Bratton. About a year later. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. And you finally got to Paris where you 
112321] discussed this matter with him ? 

Colonel Bratton. I gave my affidavit in Paris ; yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4615 

Mr. Keefe. Oh, didn't you discuss anything with him before you 
gave that affidavit? 

Colonel Bratton. Well, sir, just to clear up any misapprehension 
that may be in your mind, sir, I would like to explain why I gave 
my affidavit in Paris. 

Mr. Keefe. No, I would like to have you answer my question, please, 
if you will. Before you made this affidavit or signed it did you discuss 
the facts with Major Clausen? 

Colonel Bratton. On numerous occasions, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now go ahead. Colonel. If you want to make 
an explanation, you are entitled to make it. 

Colonel Bratton. When I first encountered Colonel Clausen I was 
on the autobahn encircling Berlin on my way to the British sector 
headquarters. A British car overtook me and pulled over to the right 
of the road and flagged me down. 

Colonel Clausen stepped out and he presented me with his creden- 
tials, identified himself, said what his mission was, said that he was 
looking for me and that he had authority to interrogate me. I took 
him and his baggage into my car and after I had completed my busi- 
ness up in the British sector took him to my billet, which was the 
billet of the Chief of Staff and the officers on the General Staff of the 
United States [12322'] District Headquarters. We put him 
up there ; he became a part of our mess. 

It developed that the papers that he had had been left in Paris 
locked up in a safe at G-2 of the same base sector. He sent a radio- 
gram to G-2 in Paris requesting that these papers be flown up by 
officer courier to Berlin so that they could be utilized in his questioning 
of myself. G-2 of the same base sector refused to do this on the ground 
that they were top secret material and for security reasons could not 
be flown over enemy territory for fear the plane would crash and the 
documents would fall into the wrong hands. It then became necessary 
for Colonel Clausen and myself to go to where the papers were so that 
1 could see what it was he wanted to question me about, look at the 
affidavits that he had and make such correction of my previous testi- 
mony as might be necessary or make such comment as seemed called 
for upon the affidavits which were in Paris. That is why the affidavit 
was given in Paris. 

The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your evidence on this? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KJEEFE. Is that all you want to say? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe. 

[12323] Mr. Keefe. All right. When you got to Paris, then, 
you had all these affidavits before you ? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Were you in a hotel room ? 

Colonel Bratton. I was in one of the officers' billets of the same 
base sector. That headquarters had taken over a number of hotels 
in Paris for that purpose. They were run as billets for officers. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. 

Colonel Bratton. This happened to be the Hotel Prince of Wales. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, I will refer to it as a hotel. You can refer to it 
as a billet. 

Colonel Bratton. Yes. 



4616 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. It was a hotel, wasn't it ? 

Colonel Bratton. It was a hotel. 

Mr. Keefe. And you and Clausen sat down in a room in that hotel, 
did you not? 

Colonel Bratton. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And discussed the testimony that you had given before 
the Army Board ? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, do you remember that discussion? 

Colonel Bratton. Not in any detail ; no, sir. 

[WS24] Mr. Keefe. Do you remember what Colonel Clausen 
said to you ? 

Colonel Bratton. He showed me the statements and affidavits made 
by various officers that he had reached and run down all over the 
world, bearing upon the delivery of the 13 parts of this 14-part mes- 
sage, among other things. 

He had some notes in his possession, transcribed notes from my 
testimony before the Grunert Board. He said : 

Now, after you have read these attidavits and considered the matter and tried 
to refresh your memory on the thing, do you wish to make any comment on this 
point that you covered in your testimony before the Grunert Board? 

Mr. Keefe. And then he gave you these affidavits, the affidavits of 
Clyde Dusenbury, Moses Pettigrew, Ralph Smith. Charles Gailey, 
Tom Betts, Walter B. Smith, Leonard T. Gerow, Robert Schukraft, 
John F. Stone, and George Renchard, is that right? 

Colonel Bratton. I read them all, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You read those affidavits? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And when you got through reading the affidavits, what 
happened then? 

Colonel Bratton. Well, I made some statement to Colonel 
[12326'] Clausen to the effect that in the light of the evidence 
liefore me now it seems advisable for me to modify some of the state- 
ments that I gave before the Grunert Board. 

Mr. Keefe. Anything else? 

Colonel Bratton (reading) : 

All right. Suppose we draft up what it is you would like to say now? 

Mr. Keefe, That is Colonel Clausen speaking? 
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Keefe (reading) : 

All right, suppose we draft up what you want to say now. 

Colonel Bratton. Then he got a pencil and paper and, as I remem- 
ber it, I dictated what I thought I should say in modification of my 
original statement and I made corrections as we went along and he 
made suggestions as to arrangement of the material. Finally we got 
it all in shape in pencil. Then he put a piece of paper into the type- 
writer and typed it. I read the thing over and as I recall now I made 
a number of suggestions and corrections in the typewritten copy. I 
don't remember now whether it was retyped or not. 

After I was satisfied that the document before me represented my 
best recollection at that time, I signed it. 

Mr. Keefe. Were you sworn ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4617 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you signed it ? 

\ 12326'] Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe, And that is the affidavit that is before us? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, but I want to make it perfectly clear that no 
pressure was put on me. 

Mr. Keefe. Oh, yes. 

Colonel Bratton. I was not coerced in any way whatsoever. 

Mr. Keefe. Oh, yes. 

Colonel Bratton. The statement or affidavit that I gave was given 
freely, of my own accord. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes, I understand that, you said that. It appears quite 
clear. 

Well, now, in your affidavit which has been offered in evidence you 
say this: 

The intercept, Tokyo to "Washington, consisting of fourteen parts, SIS No. 25843, 
started coming in from tlie Navy the evening of 6 December 1941, when I was on 
duty with Colonel Dusenbury in the office. 

Is that correct, that it was coming in in the evening? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes. By "evening" I mean somewhere from 5 
o'clock on. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, I find that in some portions of the country they 
refer to "evening" as any time after 12 o'clock noon. Now, just what 
did you have in mind when you said it started coming in in the 
evening? 

[12327] Mr. Richardson. He just told you, Congressman. Five 
o'clock. 

Mr. Keefe. Did I understand you to say some time after 5 o'clock ? 

Colonel Bratton. Or thereabouts, sir. I don't remember the exact 
hour Avhen any one of the parts first reached my desk. 

Mr. Keefe (reading) : 

We assembled and studied the thirteen parts, which I believe had come in by 
ten o'clock P. M. 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, when you made that statement in your affidavit 
had you read the affidavit of Dusenbury? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. I had read all the affidavits that Colo- 
nel Clausen had with him. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, Dusenbury's affidavit in that respect says : 

I recall the intercept, Tokyo to Washington, consisting of fourteen parts, SIS 
No. 25843, which started coming in the night of 6 December 1941 when I was on 
duty. Colonel Bratton was also on duty then and saw the message coming in 
and he remained until about half of it had been received. Thereupon he left 
and went home at about 9 P. M. I stayed so he could go home and sleep. I waited 
for the remainder. The fourteenth part, being [12328] the final part of 
the message, was received about 12 that night. 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Did that statement of Dusenbury's refresh your recol- 
lection any when you were talking with Colonel Clausen ? 

Colonel Bratton. Not at all. Colonel Dusenbury is at present on 
duty in Washington in G-2, War Department General Staff. He is 
available as a witness before this committee. If you call him I think 
he will contradict every statement that he made in that affidavit be- 

79716 — 46— pt. 10 3 



4618 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

cause his recollection now as to what happened on the evening of 
Saturday the 6th is even worse than mine. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, but, Colonel 

Colonel Bratton". There are obvious errors in that affidavit. It has 
been proved 

Mr. Keefe. Did you recognize them as errors when you read his 
affidavit over there in the hotel in Paris? 

Colonel Bratton. Sir? 

Mr. Keefe. Read him the question, please. 

(Question read.) 

Colonel Bratton. Yes; I recognized at that time that several of 
the statements he made in there could not be correct. 

[12329'] Mr. Keefe. So his affidavit did not refresh you any as 
to the events, did it? 

Colonel Bratton. Only to the extent of reminding me that he 
was with me in the office that evening. Up until that moment I had 
forgotten that Colonel Dusenbury and I were working together that 
evening. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, in your affidavit you say further : 

After receipt of the thirteenth part I called the officer on duty at the SIS, 
who I believe was either Colonel Schnkraft or Colonel Doud, and asked if there 
waa any likelihood of the fourteenth part coming in that night. I was told 
there was not, as there had been a delay in transmission. Colonel Dusenbury 
and I then assembled the thirteen parts in preparation for delivery to the 
authorized recipients. 

That was your normal practice, wasn't it? 

Colonel Bratton. When the two of us worked together that was 
our operating procedure; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And when a message of this kind came in it was operat- 
ing procedure to deliver it to those who were entitled to receive that 
message ? 

Colonel Bratton. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. ICeefe. And so your affidavit is as given to Colonel Clausen 
that you did assemble this information for the pur- [12330] 
pose of making delivery to the authorized recipients. 

Colonel Bratton. That is the statement that I made in my affidavit, 
yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, you say in your affidavit : 

I directed Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the set for the Chief of Staff to his 
home in Fort Myer that night as Colonel Dusenbury went to his home in Arlington. 
This was about ten o'clock P. M. 

Colonel Bratton. That was our 



Mr. Eleefe. Did you deliver it to Colonel Dusenbury? 

Colonel Bratton. That was our normal practice and procedure, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, did you deliver this pouch to Colonel Dusenbury 
and instruct him to deliver it to General Marshall's home at Fort 
Myer ? 

Colonel Bratton. That was my recollection when I made that 
statement. I know now that I did not and I just 

Mr. Keefe. So again we go from one step to the other. So the affi- 
davit that you gave to Colonel Clausen was in error then? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. When did you find that out ? 

Colonel Bratton. Upon my return to Washington this time, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4619 

[12331] Mr. Keefe. Who told you? 

Colonel Bratton. No one told me. I deduced that from conversa- 
tions that I had had with General Miles, Colonel Dusenbury, Colonel 
Pettigrew, General Gerow and from an examination of documents in 
the files of the War Department which up to that time I had not had 
access to. 

JNIr. Keefe. Well, now, that is a very general statement, Colonel. 
I am referring now to a situation that involved yourself and Colonel 
Dusenbury. 

You state that you two assembled this material and that you gave 
that material to Colonel Dusenbury with instructions that he deliver 
it to the Chief of Stall' at his home at Fort Meyer that night as Colonel 
Dusenbury went to his home in Arlington. Now, either you did or you 
did not, give that information to him and those directions. What is 
the fact now? Did you or did you not give those directions? 

Colonel Bratton". I did not, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Then your affidavit in that respect was false, was it not ? 

Mr. Richardson. Just a minute. 

Colonel Bratton. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Just a minute. Just for the sake of the committee 
I think that we should have some understanding with reference to the 
use — Mr. Keefe did it before with a witness — [12332] as to 
whether he is charging the witness with committing perjury or 
whether he is charging that the witness made an incorrect statement. 

Now, I don't care how it is but I really think it would be for the 
advantage of our proceedings if when a charge of falsity based upon 
perjury is made the witness is given to understand that is the point of 
it, as distinguished from calling the witness' attention to an incorrect 
statement in the testimony. 

Now, we had that word the other day with Kramer I think, which 
had to be corrected later and I simply bring it up now, not as criticism 
of the Congressman at all, but simply if that is his purpose in asking 
the question that the witness be given that definite information. 

Mr. IvEEFE. Well, the distinguished counsel, I think, is very familiar 
with the fact that there is a great distinction between perjury and false 
swearing. 

ISIr. Richardson. There is no 

Mr. ICeefe. There couldn't by any possible stretch of the imagina- 
tion be any charge of perjury when there is false swearing in the 
making of an affidavit. 

Mr. Richardson. I do not know, sir, that there is any difference 
between 

Mr. Keefe. Well, there is a difference under any rule of [12333] 
law. 

Mr. Richardson. Just a minute. I don't understand there is any 
difference in this proceeding between a charge of false swearing and a 
charge of perjury. 

Mr. Keefe. I understand there is in the law of the land and I will 
demonstrate it to you conclusively. I will go further and say that this 
man when he made the statement before Colonel Clausen and took 
an oath in aniiffidavit that he could not be guilty of perjury. Perjury 
must be willful and knowing. 

Mr. Richardson. So must false swearing. 

Mr. Keefe. Oh, no. 



4620 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Both perjury and false swearing are indictable of- 
fenses, and it does not make much difference what the technical differ- 
ence in definition may be. 

Mr. K^EFE. One is a felony and the other is a misdemeanor. 

Mr. Richardson. It depends upon the particular State. 

The Chairman. It depends on the State. Proceed, Mr. Keefe. 

Mr. ICeefe. Well, we may get the law 

Mr. Richardson. Either one is a misdemeanor in any State. 

Mr. Keefe. We may get the law defined in a short time [1£SS4} 
from what I read in the paper this morning. 

The Chairman. I don't know what that has to do with this hearing, 
whether it has any relation to this testimony or this investigation. 

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman 

Mr. Keefe. Let us not split hairs about it, Colonel. 

Colonel Bratton. My answer to your question was "No, sir." 

Mr. Keefe. Well, is it your testimony today that when you read these 
affidavits that Colonel Clausen had submitted to you that your memory 
was refreshed and that is what prompted you to change the testimony 
you had given before the Army Board? 

Colonel Bratton. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, I am limiting it to Colonel Dusenbury's affidavit. 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You say that there isn't anything that is true in that 
affidavit ? 

Colonel Bratton. No, sir; I did not say that. 

Mr. Keefe. What did you say ? 

Colonel Bratton. I said that there are several statements therein 
that are obviously incorrect and can be so proved. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, you make a distinction between truth [123S5] 
and incorrect statements, is that right? 

Colonel Bratton. Very definitely. 

Mr. Keefe. I see ; all right. We are getting into very fine distinc- 
tions now. 

Senator Lucas. The Congressman makes the fine distinctions. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, I want to turn to the affidavit of Bedell Smith. 
Did that influence you to any extent in changing your testimony? 

Colonel Bratton. Wliy, yes, sir. If Colonel Smith stated that he 
was not on duty in the office of the Chief of Staff Saturday night I 
accept that statement as being the truth and I could not have delivered 
this pouch to him that night. I know Colonel Smith. Obviously, my 
memory had been at fault when I made the original statement. 

Mr. KJEEFE. Now, you referred to the fact that — I have some diffi- 
culty in finding Bedell Smith's affidavit, but in view of the fact that 
you referred also to the affidavit of Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith as one 
of the affidavits that refreshed your recollection I want to refer to that 
affidavit. What was there in his affidavit that refreshed your recol- 
lection ? 

Colonel Bratton. I could not possibly have given a pouch to Gen. 
Ralph Smith on the night of Saturday, December the [12336'] 
6th because at that time Gen. Ralph Smith was on a train headed 
for Fort Benning, Ga. I was to have been a member of that same 
group. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you testify that you had delivered it to Gen. Ralph 
Smith? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4621 

Colonel Bratton. I did in the proceedings before the Grunert 
Board; yes, sir, 

Mr, Keefe. So when Gen. Ralph Smith said he was not there, he 
was on a train going to Fort Benning, Ga. 

Colonel Bratton, I know that he was. 

Mr. KJEEFE. Well, he says that in his affidavit. 

Colonel Bratton. I would have been with him. 

Mr. Keefe. He says that in his affidavit. 

Colonel Bratton". Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe, When did you find that out? 

Colonel Bratton. Find what out? 

Mr. Keefe. That he was on a train going to Fort Benning that 
night? You indicated that you were supposed to be on that same 
train. 

Colonel Bratton. Well, I remembered it when I read his affidavit. 
I said, "Wliy, of course this is correct, I remember now." 

Mr. Keefe. And that is the refreshing that you got from his affi- 
davit? 

[1^SS7] Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Those facts did not come to you when you were testi- 
fying before the Army board ? 

Colonel Bratton. I did not remember them at that time, no, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. What was there in the affidavit of Charles Gailey that 
refreshed your recollection ? 

Colonel Bratton. I don't remember now what General Gailey said. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, he says this : 

Specifically with respect to the evening of 6 December 1941 I do not recall 
having received any pouch or intercepts from Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusen- 
bury or from any other person. 

He is testifying from his recollection he did not recall it. You did 
recall it before the Army board. 

Colonel Bratton. Well, I may be able to clear this up a little bit 
by saying that what I told this Army board was my best recollection 
at the time. I was repeating to them a procedure that I had followed 
over and over and over again. I was remembering the delivery of 
some other message. I had done it that way countless number of 
times. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, Bedell Smith's affidavit with respect to this inci- 
dent, Colonel Bratton, reads as follows : 

[12338] To the best of my recollection I left the office at about the usual 
time the evening of 6 December 1941, that is about seven P. M., turning over 
to the night duty officer. I am quite certain I was not at the office after 
ten P. M. 

I repeat that : 

I am quite certain that I was not at' the office after ten P. M. If the inter- 
cepted radio messages referred to by Colonel Bratton was delivered either to me 
or the night duty officer it would have been delivered in the locked envelope 
which I have previously described and unless the officer who received it were 
so informed by Colonel Bratton he would have had no definite knowledge of 
its contents, as neither I nor any other officer in the secretariat was classified 
as "Ultra." If he had been informed of the contents or of the urgent nature 
it would have been delivered to the Chief of Staff in accordance with our usual 
procedure, either by the officer on duty or someone other than myself. 

Now, just how did that refresh your recollection ? 



4622 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Bratton. I accept that as his best recollection when he made 
that statement. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, he says that to the best of his recollection he was 
not there after seven and then he says that he [l^SSO] is cer- 
tain that he was not there after 10 p. m. He may have been there 
up to 10, however, up to 10 p. m. 

Colonel Bratton. All right, he may have been there then, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you may have delivered it to him there then up 
to 10 p. m., isn't that true ? 

Colonel Bratton. I don't think now that I did. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, at least according to his affidavit he has no clear 
recollection when he left the office and that the only thing he is certain 
about in his affidavit is that he was not there after 10 p. m. 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. So it is possible he may have been there when you, as 
you testified, delivered it to him about 10 p. m. 

Colonel Bratton. That is what I testified to before the Grunert 
Board ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you want to say that that affidavit refreshed your 
recollection so that you now are of the opinion that you did not make 
any such delivery to him ? 

Colonel Bratton. That was one of the contributing factors; yes, 
sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now I refer to the affidavit of General Gerow and 
this is what he says : 

Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is [12340] stated to 
have been testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the following 
general effect : 

(3) On the night of 6 December 1941, Colonel Bratton or another delivered 
to General Gerow 13 parts of the 14 part Japanese intercept number 25843. My 
recollection concerning the facts of these subjects is as follows: 

And then he referred to 3 : 

I did not receive or see any parts «f the message mentioned until the morning 
of 7 December 1941, when a conference was held with the Chief of Staff. If I had 
received parts of the message on the night of 6 December 1941, I would have 
immediately warned the overseas commanders and informed the Chief of Staff. 
Access to the Chief of Staff for such purposes was always open to me. 

Now, he says : 

I did not receive or see any parts of the message. I did not receive or see the 
13 parts of the message or the fourteenth part until the morning of December 7 — 

and if he had seen it on the evening of the 6th he would have inunedi- 
ately warned the overseas commanders. 

Now, is it because General Gerow makes that statement that your 
recollection was refreshed so that you can now state with certainty that 
neither Colonel Dusenbury or you delivered the first 13 parts to him 
on the evening of the 6th of December 1941 ? 

[W34.I] Colonel Bratton. Mr. Keefe, the preponderance of evi- 
dence indicates that my memory was at fault when I made these state- 
ments before the Grunert Board. To say that any one statement made 
by any one man got me to change my mind is not correct. If General 
Gerow said that he did not receive the 13 parts or the fourteenth part 
until the morning of the 7th of December 1941, then I probably did 
not deliver that message to him or to his executive officer on Saturday 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4623 

night. I know General Gerow, I have known him for a long time. He 
would make no such statement as that unless it represented his best 
belief at the time. 

Mr. Kjiete. Well, then, when Colonel Clausen showed you these 
affidavits you became convinced that the preponderance of evidence 
was that you were in error ? 

Colonel Brattox. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And then you tried to set down meticulously to Colonel 
Clausen what the facts were, that is correct, isn't it, as you then re- 
membered them? 

Colonel Braxton. I tried to modify my statement to make it what 
was my best recollection when I signed that affidavit. 

Mr. Keefe. And that is when you made the statement that you 
directed Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the pouch to General Marshall 
at Fort Meyer on his way home to Arlington? 

[1234^] Colonel Bratton. That is so, sir. We had done that on 
numerous previous occasions and I was simply remembering some- 
thing that had happened before. 

Mr. Keefe. You did deliver them to the State Department, you re- 
member that? 

Colonel Bratton. Definitely. 

Mr. Keefe. That night? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, what was there in the affidavits that were shown 
you by Clausen that got you to make this statement in your affidavit 
that you had directed Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the 13-part mes- 
sage to General Marshall? 

Colonel Bratton. Well, the fact that it was recalled to my memory 
that Colonel Dusenbury was with me that evening. When the two of 
us worked together and it was necessary to make delivery at an unusual 
hour, because I lived in one direction from my office and he lived in 
another direction, we divided the work. On several previous occasions 
I had made deliveries to the State Department late at night and he 
had made delivery to General Marshall in his quarters at Fort Meyer. 
I was remembering one of those previous occasions when I made that 
statement. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, you were attempting to just reconstruct in your 
mind something that may have happened, is that right, [1£343] 
when you made that statement? 

Colonel Bratton. That is correct, and as I have stated to this com- 
mittee anything beyond what I said to the Grunert Board must neces- 
sarily be an attempt on my part to reconstruct the details of events 
based upon my knowledge of what was my operating procedure at the 
time under various sets of circumstances. 

Mr. Keefe. And then after you got back to Washington and got to 
digging into the matter you found that the statement which you made 
to Colonel Clausen was not in accord with the facts? 

Colonel Bratton. That is true, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Are you certain that the statements you ai^e making to 
this committee are in accord with the facts now or might they be 
refreshed at some later time and be changed ? 



4624 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Bratton. They are true to the best of my knowledge and 
belief at this time. 

Mr. Keefe. That is all. 

The Chairman. Any further questions? 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I have a question. Do I under- 
stand that the Chair recognizes me ? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yesterday or last evening you indicated that 
the winds message as a message did not come into your de- [12344-] 
partment. You heard the testimony under which the Navy had set 
it up on cards so that it would be telephoned rather than delivered m 
the usual manner? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you have a similar system of cards or 
any memorandums or papers? 

Colonel Bratton. Not exactly, but 

Senator Ferguson. What did you have? 

Colonel Bratton. At General Miles' request I wrote out for the 
office on paper either the Japanese phrase or the English translation 
or both, indicating below the meaning, so that if I had to call him up 
at any unusual hour in his quarters I could repeat one of these phrases 
to him in a guarded way and he would know what I was talking about. 
I also carried one of those slips of paper around in my pocket ; I believe 
Colonel Dusenbury did, too. I don't know whether I gave one to 

Colonel Sadtler or not. , o . j. o^ ^ ^( 

Senator Ferguson. Did you give one to the Secretary ot State i 

Colonel Bratton. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The Chief of Staff? 

Colonel Bratton. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Gerow? . r.^^/n 

Colonel Bratton. No, sir. I knew that if the imple- [mSjdj 
mentation of the winds code ever came in and came to the attention 
of Colonel Dusenbury, myself, or General Miles, we would know what 
to do about it with respect to those other officers. 

Senator Ferguson. But you did not set up a system then the same 
as the Navy? 

Colonel Bratton. No, sir. ., ^r- 

Senator Ferguson. But you handed it on to two or three officers, you 
had a system whereby you gave them memoranda that they could refer 
to if you telephoned them? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. . ,, ^, • 

Senator Lucas. I would like to ask one question, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator Lucas. , , ^ ^ ^ , , . 

Senator Lucas. There was a good deal of flurry yesterday about 
this fellow Lieutenant O'Dell. Who was he, Colonel ? . , ^ ^ 

Colonel Bratton. As I understand it, sir, he was an assistant to 
Col Merle Smith, who was our military observer out m Australia. 

Senator Luc is. Well, what authority did Merle Smith have with 
respect to ^ending cables to Australia or communicating with any 
foreign government with respect to tense situations between this coun- 
try and Japan or any other nation ? ^ ,1 , i! VKP^/Al 

Colonel Bratton. His position was analogous to that ot ll^JJ/^j 
a military attache, sir, and before we sent him down there he was 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4625 

accredited to the Australian Government as a military observer and 
he was furnished with certain codes and ciphers for use in com- 
municatinsr with G-2 or the War Department in Washington. 

Mr. MuKPHY. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Lucas. I will yield. 

]Mr. MuRPiiT. In the record this morning I placed the rest of the 
O'Dell testimony to the effect that the dispatch from Australia was 
sent to the Philippines and Hawaii, that they anticipated an attack 
on the Indies, somewhere down in there, and never anticipated any 
on Pearl Harbor. That is in the record offered this morning. 

Senator Lucas. What I was trying to get clear in my own mind is 
with respect to this testimony that O'Dell gave before someone in 
connection with one of these investigations. _ 

Colonel Bratton. Before the Clarke inquiry, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. Wliat I want to find out is this. Now, O'Dell 
testified as follows : 

However, within an hour and a half after we had gotten there some additional 
things came in, the exact nature of which I was not told at the time, but when 
we went out Colonel Merle Smith said that he had prepared a cable which he 
had to send out and the principal part of [12341] it was that the move- 
ment of this convoy was there and that the Dutch had ordered the execution of 
Rainbow Plan A-2 — 

and so forth. 

What I want to find out is, what authority, if any, did Colonel 
Smith have as a colonel to send out a cable of this importance? 
Wasn't that up to somebody else ? Wouldn't that have to go through 
somebody higher than Colonel Smith to send a cable of this kind? 

Colonel Bratton. He was the highest ranking American officer in 
Australia, sir, and was a representative of G-2. 

Senator Lucas. Well, do I understand that Smith at the time was 
serving in Australia, Colonel Smith was serving in Australia? 

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And was O'Dell serving with him out there? 

Colonel Bratton. That is my belief ; yes, sir ; as his assistant. 

Senator Lucas. I understand. That is what I wanted to get 
straightened out in my mind. Now, just wait, Colonel, one thing 
more. 

UmS] Senator Lucas. That is all. 

Mr. Richardson. Colonel, I want to get myself oriented in connec- 
tion with Congressman Keefe's examination. 

If either the 13 part message or the 14th part message was to be 
delivered to General Marshall on the evening of the 6th of December 
ic would have to be delivered by either you or Dusenbury ? 

Colonel Bratton. Through us, yes, sir ; out of my office. 

Mr. Richardson. And either you or Dusenbury would know how the 
delivery of that message to Marshall was to be made ? 

Colonel Bratton. We ought to : yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. You did not make any delivery to Marshall that 
evening of either the 13 parts or the 14th part message? 

Colonel Bratton. Not in person ; no, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And you now have been convinced, by your con- 
tact with Dusenbury, that he did not ? 

Colonel Bratton. That is correct, sir. 



4626 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK: 

Mr. Richardson. Then am I to understand that it is your present 
recollection and belief that no copy of either the 13 parts or the 14th 
part message went to General Marshall on the evening of Decem- 
ber 6th? 

Colonel Bratton. That is my present belief ; yes, sir. 

[12S4D] Mr. Richardson. And that the first time General Mar- 
shall saw either the 13 parts message or the 14th part message was 
when he got to his office sometime between 11 and 12 o'clock on Sunday 
morning, December 7? 

Colonel Bratton. I do not think General Marshall saw either the 
13 or the 14th part of the 14-part message until sometime in the morn- 
ing of the 7th of December. 

Mr. Richardson. And that occasion was when he came, after his 
horseback ride, to his office, and found the message there then? 

Colonel Bratton. Presumably so ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. As far as you know ? 

Colonel Bratton. As far as I know. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, one question on that point, if I may. 

The Chairman. Mr. Keefe. 

]Mr. Keefe. You did not deliver the message to General Marshall 
on the morning of the 7th, the 13 parts or the 14th part, did you? 

Colonel Bratton. I did not, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Do j^ou know whether Colonel Dusenbury did? 

Colonel Bratton. He has no definite recollection of it, either. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, could it have been delivered to General [123501 
Marshall bv anybody else other than you and Dusenbury? 

Colonel Bratton. It could have, but I do not see how at this time. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, how did General Marshall get that message then? 
How did it get on his desk when he came there? 

Colonel Bratton. I think it must have been given by Colonel 
Dusenbury to Colonel Deane, who was the secretary on duty there on 
the morning of December 7; and I think Colonel Deane must have 
taken it in and placed it on General Marshall's desk so it would be 
there when he arrived. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you know this to be a fact ? 

Colonel Bratton. I do not know it; no, sir. Colonel Deane has 
no recollection of it and Colonel Dusenbury has none, and I know 
I did not put it there. 

Mr. Keefe. He could not have gotten it from General Gerow be- 
cause there had not been any delivery to General Gerow, as you say. 

Colonel Bratton. By that time in the morning the pouch had been 
delivered to the War Plans Division ; yes. 

Mr. Keefe. And had been delivered to General Miles also ? 

Colonel BiLVTTON. And General Miles had seen it and read it in 
his office. 

Mr. Keefe. But you are unable to throw any light, other than 
what you have said now, on the point as to where [12351] this 
magic, which was so highly secret, came from that was found on 
General Marshall's desk when he came into his office that morning? 

Colonel Bratton. I am unable at this time to throw any addi- 
tional light on that subject, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That is all. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr, Chairman. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4627 

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you give us the hour that the War Plans 
received the 13 parts ? 

Colonel Bratton. I do not know when the War Plans Division 
got their 13 parts or the 14th part. As I testified before, the moment 
I received the 1 p. m. deliver}- message at about 9 o'clock Sunday 
morning I left all other deliveries in the hands of my assistant, 
Colonel Dusenbury, and took off with this 1 p. m. message and tried 
to follow it through from that time on. 

Senator Ferguson. What time did you give the 1 p. m. message 
to the War Plans ? 

Colonel Bratton. I did not give it to them. General Gerow saw 
it when he came in with us to General Marshall's office. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you talked to him on the telephone so 
that you told him the contents of it ? 

[12352] Colonel Bratton. As I testified, sir, I do not remember 
whether I talked to him on the telephone or whether General Miles 
did. One of us did. 

Senator Ferguson. At what hour ? 

Colonel Bratton. Oh, sometime about 9 : 30, after I had made my 
initial call trying to trace General Marshall. 

Senator Ferguson. So the War Plans had notice of the 1 p. m. 
message at 9 : 30 either through you or Miles ? 

Colonel Bratton. No, sir ; I did not say that. 

Senator Ferguson. When did that happen ? 

Colonel Bratton. I said I don't think General Gerow knew any- 
thing about the 1 p. m. delivery message until he came into the office 
where General Miles and I were with General Marshall at 11 : 25. 

Senator Ferguson. 11 : 25. Now have you any knowledge as to 
when Gerow or the War Plans got the 13 parts ? 

Colonel Bratton. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I am not talking about the fourteenth part. 

Colonel Bratton. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You say "no"? 

Colonel Bratton. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you anj^ knowledge as to when they got 
the fourteenth part? 

[12363] Colonel Bratton. Only what I heard him say in testi- 
mony before this committee. 

Senator Ferguson. Of your own knowledge, you haven't any ? 

Colonel Bratton. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Wlien counsel asked you the question as to 
when General Marshall first saw the thirteenth or the fourteenth part, 
you have no personal knowledge except that you saw them on his 
desk that morning when he was reading them ? 

Colonel Bratton. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you haven't any other knowledge that he 
may have seen them before somewhere else ? 

Colonel Bratton. I have not, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right, that is all. 

The Chairman. Thank you. Colonel, for your cooperation in try- 
ing to elicit the facts in this case. You are now excused. 

Is there any further statement that you wish to make, or anj" further 
information that has not been elicited by the questions ? 



4628 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Bratton. No, sir. I have no other testimony to give. 

The Chairman. All right. Thank you very much. 

The committee will go into executive session and our [12354] 
guests will depart as rapidly as possible. 

(The witness was excused.) 

The Vice Chairman. The hearing will be resumed at 1 : 30. 

Colonel Sadtler will please be here at 1 : 30. 

(Wliereupon, at 11 : 35 a. m., the committee recessed to meet in 
executive session, and to reconvene at 1 : 30 p. m. of the same day.) 

[12S55] AFTERNOON SESSION 1 : 30 P. M. 

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order. 
Does counsel have anything at this time ? 
Mr. Richardson. No. 

The Vice Chairman. Counsel will proceed with the examination 
of Colonel Sadtler. 

TESTMONY OF COL. OTIS K. SADTLER, UNITED STATES ARMY 

(Resumed)^ 

Mr. Kaufman. Colonel, what is your full name? 

Colonel Sadtler. Sadtler, Otis K., colonel. Signal Corps. 

Mr. Kaufman. How long have you been in the Army, Colonel? 

Colonel Sadtler. Thirty-seven years the 1st day of March. 

Mr. Keefe. You will have to speak a little louder, Colonel, so we 
can hear you. 

Colonel Sadtler. Thirty-seven years the 1st day of March. 

Mr. Kauf^ian. What was jour assignment during the months of 
November and December 1941? 

Colonel Sadtler. I was on duty in the office of the Chief Signal 
Officer, in charge of the military branch of [12SS6] the Signal 
Corps, which duties comprised the supervisory operation of the com- 
munication services, the signal intelligence service, the Army pictorial 
work, military training, and the signal schools. 

Mr. Kaufman. That included the division that received messages 
for signal intelligence ? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. Are you familiar with the set-up of the so-called 
winds codes ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. That are referred to in Exhibit 1, Japanese Circulars 
2353 and 2354? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. When were they first called to your attention ? 

Colonel Sadtler. About November 28, 1941. 

Mr. Kaufman. And what did you do after that set-up was called 
to your attention ? 

. Colonel Sadtler. I sent my liaison officer. Colonel Guest, to the 
Federal Communications Commission, and asked them to make a spe- 
cial watch on that broadcast frequency, and that they make arrange- 
ments so that Colonel Bratton, our liaison officer with G-2, could be 
reached by telephone. at any hour of the day or night. 

^At the time of Colonel Sadtler's previous appearance before the committee, the oath 
was administered to him, but he gave no actual testimony. See Hearings, Part 9, p. 4599. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4629 

[1^357] Mr. Kaufman. Did you get any communication from 
the Federal Communications Commission of an implement to either 
one of those two circulars ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Not to my knowledge ; no, sir. 
Mr, Kaufman. Did you ever receive a call from anybody in the 
Navy ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. Will you tell us when it was that you received a call 
from the Navy ? 

Colonel Sadtler. About 9 or shortly thereafter on Friday, December 
5, Admiral Noyes telephoned me to the effect that the message was in. 
Mr. Kaufman. How do you fix the date of December 5. 
Colonel Sadtler. On December 4 I attended, as an alternate to the 
Chief Signal Officer who was then absent in Panama, the weekly meet- 
ing of the Defense Communication Board, which met every Thursday 
at 10 a. m., and that was December 4. 

Mr. Kaufman. And you know it was after that meeting that you 
received that call from Admiral Noyes ? 
Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. Will you tell the committee as fully as you can the 
conversation that you had with Admiral Noyes ? 

[12S58] Colonel Sadtler. Admiral Noyes telephoned to say that 
the word was in. I asked hipti which one, and he told me that it was the 
word that implied a break in relations between Japan and Great 
Britain. 

I then went to General Miles' office 

Mr. Kaufman. Before you went to General Miles' office, was that 
the entire conversation you had with Admiral Noyes? 
Colonel Sadtler. Practically, yes, sir. 
Mr. Kaufman. Then what did you do ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I went to General Miles' office and informed him 
that the word was in. He then sent for Colonel Bratton, and when 
Bratton came in, I told him that the word had been received from 
Admiral Noyes to the effect that diplomatic relations between Japan 
and Great Britain were in danger. 

He pulled out a little slip of paper from his pocket and asked me 
which one of those words it was. I told him I did not know any 
Japanese, but it was the one that indicated Japan and Great Britain. 
We discussed that to the extent of some few words, as to whether 
or not it was a false alarm, and he asked me to verify the receipt of 
that message. 

I went back to my office, which was several doors down [123S&] 
the hall, where the secret telephone between Admiral Noyes' office and 
the Chief Signal Officer was located. 

I then called Admiral Noyes again and asked him to verify the 
Japanese word. He replied that he did not know any Japanese, but 
it was the one that meant Japan and Great Britain. 

I asked him if he could verify that for me at that moment, and he 
said "no," that he had an engagement to go immediately either to the 
Secretary of the Navy or the Chief of Naval Operations' office for a 
conference, and he would do it at a later time. 

I then returned immediately to General Miles' office and told him 
that Admiral Noyes could not verify the word at that moment ; that 
he would do it later, but it was the one definitely meaning Japan and 
Great Britain. 



4630 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Kaufman. Did you try to get in touch with Admiral Noyes 
after that? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Mr. ILvuFMAN. Did you have any further connection with this winds 
code execute after that ? 

Colonel Sadtler, Well, in view of the "Haruna" message which had 
just come in, the winds message at that time made a great impression 
on me. In fact, I think it is the most important message I ever 
received. So I went back to my [12360] office and decided to 
go to see General Gerow, who was the head of War Plans, and tell 
him that the word was in. 

I saw General Gerow and told him that the winds implement was 
in, and we discussed it something to the effect of notifying various 
people, and he told me, as I recall it, that the various departments 
had been adequately warned. 

i then went over and talked to Colonel Bedell Smith, who was the 
Secretary of the General Staff, and told him that the winds implement 
was in. He asked me what I had done, and I told him I had seen 
General Miles and General Gerow, and he did not wish to discuss it 
further. That ended the conversation. 

Mr. Kaufman. You talked a moment ago about the winds imple- 
ment, or what you thought was the winds implement, coming on top 
of the "Haruna" messages. 

Will you tell us what they were ? 

Colonel Sadtler. About December 2nd — you will find it on page 
215 of this exhibit. 

The Vice Chairman. That is Exhibit 1, Colonel, of this hearing? 

Colonel Sadtler. Of Exhibit 1, message No. 867. 

Mr. Keefe. 8-6-7? 

The Vice Chairman. Yes. 

Colonel Sadtler. Page 215, message No. 867 : 

Among the [12361] telegraphic codes with which your ofl5ce is equipped, 
burn all but those now used with the machine — 

and so forth. They were to be burned and destroyed, and when that 
was done, they were to reply by the one word "Haruna," to Tokyo. 

That message indicates at the bottom it was translated on the 3rd, 
corrected on the 4th, and is Army 25640. 

Mr. Kaufman. How many messages, to your knowledge, were in- 
tercepted from various parts of the world to Tokyo, using the word 
"Haruna"? 

Colonel Sadtler. I recall seeing several from New Orleans, San 
Francisco, Seattle, and I have since seen the record produced showing 
that there were 16 of these words "Haruna" received up until the 
6th of December. 

Mr. Kaufman. Colonel, do you know what facilities were avail- 
able in Hawaii to the Army for the breaking down of Jap codes, or 
ciphers ? 

Colonel Sadtler. The Army had no means of breaking down any 
of the more difficult codes. 

[12362] Mr. Kaufman. Did they have the means to break down 
any of the codes in Hawaii ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I do not think so, except some very simple ones 
they may have had, but I do not recall any real crypt analyses that 
were in Hawaii at that time. 



PROCEEDINGS ,0F JOINT COMMITTEE 4631 

Mr. Kaufman. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. I do not believe I have any questions at the 
moment. 

Senator George. 

Senator George. Did you ever see the message, Colonel, that Ad- 
miral Noyes reported to you ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Senator George. You never examined it ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Senator George. Was it ever in your immediate office, so far as you 
know ? 

Colonel Sadtler. As far as I can ascertain, it did not come over. 

Senator George. It did not come ov^r ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Senator George. No further questions. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Clark is not here at the moment ? 

Senator Lucas. He is not here at the moment. 

Mr. Ivautman. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one additional 
[12363] question ? 

The Vice Chairman. Yes, Mr. Kaufman. 

Mr. Kaufman. The fact that a copy of this so-called winds execute 
failed to come over to the Army was an unusual thing, was it not ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Most unusual, yes, sir, because it was a routine 
matter that any message would come over in the normal interchange 
of business between the two services. 

Mr. Kaufman. You mean any message that came to ONI would 
go to the Signal Intelligence Service, and correspondingly, any 
message that SIS received would go to ONI ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. That is all. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will inquire, 
Colonel. 

Mr. Murphy. Colonel, who was your counterpart in the Navy? 

Colonel Sadtler. Admiral Noyes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. I notice on page 248 of the Army Pearl Harbor 
hearing the question by General Kussell : 

Did you give attention to the substance of tliose messages at any time, or 
were you primarily or solely interested in a proper deciphering, interpretation, 
and delivery? 

[12364] Colonel Sadtler. In general my position was one of operations 
only. In other words, we were concerned primarily with the collection of data 
that came to our attention through various intercept means, and we were not 
concerned with the evaluation or the analysis of the content of those messages. 

Does that describe your duties? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now on page 249 you testified that you expected a 
declaration of war, at the bottom of page 249. Do you have a copy 
of your testimony. Colonel? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. I do not know that there is an extra copy available. 

Mr. Kaufman. There is not. 

Mr. Murphy. I will read it slowly, Colonel. You say on the bot- 
tom of the page : 

General Mauborgne, the retired Chief Signal Officer at that time. 



4632 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I will go back a little bit : 

General Russsell. What was the history as it relates to the number of mes- 
saees reaching you, or those associated with you, for processing, late in No- 
vember and early in December, 1941, relating to the Japanese-American 
\12'i65^ negotiations? Did they become more numerous or fewer? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir ; the messages regarding the relations between Japan 
and the United States did increase materially. , ^ , , ^ ^. 

General Feank. On what date? Leading up to what date, about.' 

Colonel Sadtxeb. I don't know. It seems to me that when I first came to 
the office I was warned that the messages beginning to come, on the relations 
between Japan and the United States, were getting more tense, the condition. 

General Frank. Who warned you of that? . ^r. ^- 

Colonel Sadti^. General Mauborgne, the retired Chief Signal Officer at that 
time The information began to assume rather serious proportions regarding 
the tense and strained relations between the two countries, and the number 
of messages about warnings of conditions that might obtain in case of hostili- 
ties really reached a climax around the middle of November, to such an extent 
that we were of the opinion that there might be a declaration of war between 
Japan and the United States on Sunday, November 30. This, as you all know, 
proved to be a "dud", and on Monday, December 1, if I recall the date correctly, 
messages that morning began coming in from Tokyo telling the Consuls to 
destrov their codes and to reply to Tokyo with one code [12S66] word 
when thev had so complied with their directive. If I recall correctly, that word 
was "haruna". It is the same name as that battleship that Colin Kelly was 
alleged to have sunk. 

You made that answer and that is a true statement, as I understand 
it, of the situation at that time ? 
Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Was there anything in particular which made you 
feel there might be war on November 30? Was it the dead line 

message ? 

Colonel Sadtler. It was the message of November 22 which stated 
after the 29th things were going to automatically happen. 

Mr. Murphy. Then you also stated : 

About December 3, Tokyo notified the Embassy pertaining to the destruction 
of their codes, at once. 

General Frank. The Embassy in Washington? 

Colonel Sadtler. The Japanese Embassy in Washington, regarding the de- 
struction of their codes. Now, those messages were important as showing the 
trend of conditions. 

You made that statement at that time ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now you testified at page 253: 

Some time about— I don't know whether it was the [12S67] 5th or 6th 
of December, or at that period, Tokyo notified the Japanese Embassy at Wash- 
ington to destroy their remaining codes, which was done on Saturday afternoon, 
and duly reported in the Sunday Star on December 7. 

Was it in the Sunday Star ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir, it was in the Monday Star. 
Mr. Murphy. The Monday Star ? 
Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Murphy. You said Sunday Star. 
Colonel Sadtler. I am sorry to say I looked it up. 
Mr. Murphy, It was Monday ? 
Colonel Sadtler. It was Monday ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. In the Monday Star there was word about the Japs 
destroying their codes ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4633 

Colonel Sadtler. There was a picture in the paper of their burning 
their codes on the Embassy grounds up on Massachusetts Avenue. 

Mr. Murphy. That was on Monday, December 8, 1941, the Washing- 
ton Star? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. A good paper, by the way. 

Now, then, as to the night of the 6th and the morning of the 7th, 
you have no f amiliaritv with those messages, because you did not work 
on the night of the 6th or the [12S68] morning of the 7th? 
Isn't that right ? The 6th of December ? 

Colonel Sadtler. The 6th we worked. The 7th I did not go to 
work, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. I refer you to your testimony on page 255. This was 
by General Russell : 

It has corae to the attention of the Board that sometime on the evening of 
December 6, probably around 9 : 00 or 10 : 00 o'clock, there were received by some 
Government agency the first 13 of 14 parts of the reply of the Japanese Govern- 
ment to Mr. Hull's note of November 26, 1941. Did that clear through your 
agency? 

Colonel Sadtler. I don't know, sir. 

General Russexl. It is also in the record that sometime in the morning, Decem- 
ber 7, the last, the 14th part of this reply, reached War Department agencies, and 
the time for delivery of the entire reply was received in a message, as well as some 
further instructions about the destraction of codes or code machines. Do you 
have any recollection of those December 7 messages which I have described? 

Colonel Sadtlee. No, sir ; I did not go to work on the morning of December 7. 

General Geuneet. How about the night of the 6th? Were you there? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir; I was not. I heard about [12369] these 
things after that, on about the 8th or 9th, General. I did not know anything 
about them at the time. 

Was that a true reflection of your testimony ? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct. I left the office usually on Satur- 
day afternoon, I imagine aroiuid 6 o'clock. That is when I generally 
left. I did not stay there until 9 or 10 o'clock. 

Mr. Murphy. That is all. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster would be next. He is not 
present at the moment. 

Mr. Gearhart would be next, but he is not present at the moment. 

Senator Ferguson, of Michigan, will inquire, Colonel. 

Mr. Murphy. Senator, may I just ask one question? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. At page 252 you describe those present in the office 
when you discussed the message with Noyes as General Miles, Colonel 
Bratton, Colonel Sadtler, and General Roderick, who is now dead. 

Colonel Sadtler. I have been told that it was General Roderick, Mr. 
Murphy. I did not know the man at the time ; I did not know who he 
was. 

Mr. Murphy. But in the record you said you thought it was "Gen- 
eral Roderick, who is now dead". 

[12-370^ Colonel Sadtler. I think my memory was refreshed at 
the time that I made that statement. 

Mr. Murphy. On page 252 you said that ; did you not ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I do not recall it, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Let me read the exact words : 

[123'71'\ I went immediately to General Miles' oflBce and told him that the 
word was in. He said, "Wait a minute. I will call Colonel Bi-atton," and in 
79716 — 46 — pt. 10 4 



4634 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

a very short wbile Colonel Bratton came into the oflBce, and we sat down at 
General Miles' desk. There were General Miles, Colonel Bratton; some oflBcer, 
I don't know who it was. I think he has since been identified as General Rod- 
erick, who is now dead ; and myself. 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. No other questions. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. Colonel Sadtler, what hours did you work on 
the 6th ? From what time ? 

Colonel Sadtler. From about 8 a. m. to about 6 p. m. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you left your work? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you went back to work Sunday morning? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir; I did not go back to work Sunday 
morning. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not work Sunday ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So you had nothing to do with the receipt of 
the 13 parts ? 

[12372] Colonel Sadtler. No, sir ; I had nothing to do with it. 

Senator Ferguson. Nothing to do with that. 

Did you know whether or not there had been a special line run to 
Colonel Bratton's home so that he might get the winds message if it 
came in ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I did not know of a special line. I knew that 
the FCC had been given his telephone numbers so he could be reached 
at any time, day or night, by telephone, if that message came in. 

Senator Ferguson. But you did not know of any special line? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was there any special set-up about the winds 
code as far as you were concerned ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Except the arrangement that we made with the 
FCC to monitor that frequency, and the special arrangements that 
were made by both the Army and Navy to attempt to catch that 
message. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, when you talked to Admiral Noyes, did 
he call you or did you call him ? 

Colonel Sadtler. He called me the first time. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he say why he was calling you ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes; he said "The message is in." 
[1^373] Senator Ferguson. At that first conversation, did he 
say whether it was with the British or the Dutch, or Russia ? 

Colonel Sadtler. He said it was between Japan and Great Britain. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Did you ask him whether it was 
between America and Japan at all ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Just Japan and Great Britain ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, what did that mean to you? That there 
was going to be war between Great Britain and Japan? How was 
America concerned with that message? 

Colonel Sadtler. Senator, these intercepts are a very difficult thing 
to obtain. You either get it or you don't get it. It is very easy to 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4635 

get part of a message, and I assumed that, having gotten the British 
part, that they had somehow missed the American part, and thought 
no more about it. 

I knew that those "Haruna" messages were being sent back to Tokyo, 
indicating destruction of codes at various consulates in the United 
States and Great Britain, Singapore, Hongkong, and therefore that 
the indication was that there was going to be a break between Japan 
and Great Britain and there must necessarily be one between Japan 
and the [12374.] United States. 

Senator Ferguson. So you felt the British part meant a break also 
with the United States, and that is why you became so concerned ? 

Colonel Sadtler. In view of everything that had gone before ; yes, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you were concerned, as I understand it, 
because you went to General Gerow ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And told him about it ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And told him about it. You went to JVIiles — 
or Bratton, which was it? 

Colonel Sadtler. Both. 

Senator Ferguson. Both. To Miles and Bratton. How did you 
get in to see Col. Bedell Smith, the secretary to General Marshall ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Just walked in his door. 

Senator Ferguson. Why did you want to see him on this code 
message ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Colonel Smith was secretary of the General Staff 
and he had direct access to General Marshall. 

Senator Ferguson. And you felt that this was a message that should 
reach General Marshall ? 

[12375] Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And did you tell Bedell Smith that. Colonel 
Smith? 

Colonel Sadtler. Everybody in the War Department knew about 
that winds message as far as I know. Everybody was talking 
about it. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you 

The Vice Chairman. Let him finish. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you finished ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Pardon me. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you explain to them that in your opinion, 
that because the way the messages were received, getting the British 
part and what other things you knew, that that by necessity meant 
war with America ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you say to Colonel Bedell Smith, 
"The part is in about the British"? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. I said, "The winds message is in," as I 
recall the wording. 

Senator Ferguson. You didn't explain to him what part of the winds 
message was in ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I don't recall doing that, no sir. 



4636 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. So you told him the winds message [1£376] 
was in. And did you ask him to get it to General Marshall, that word, 
that it was in ? 

Colonel Sadtler. As I remember it, he asked me what I had done 
and I told him I had talked to General Miles and General Gerow. 

Senator Ferguson. And told them ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What did he say ? 

Colonel Sadtler. He said he didn't care to discuss it further. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat did that really mean, that he didn't care 
to discuss it further? 

Colonel Sadtler. That I was through. 

Senator Ferguson. That you had completed your job? 

Colonel Sadtler. Had done as much as I could possibly do. 

Senator Ferguson. You had done all you could do ? 

Colonel Sadtler, Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he say as to whether or not he would convey 
this to General Marshall ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, I assume, you thought your mission had 
been performed, when you told them that the winds message was in? 

[J3377] Colonel Sadtler. I think I had gone a little too far in 
talking to either General Gerow or Col. Bedell Smith. 

Senator Ferguson. But at least you had gone as far as you could go ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And then, I take it from what you say in your 
previous testimony, that having done that, you never tried to ascer- 
tain in detail whether this was a fake message or not ? 

Colonel Sadtler, No, sir ; I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. You considered it was genuine message ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I did, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And that continued until after the attack? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir ; that is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. So far as you were concerned, the winds message 
was in and it meant war ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, war within what length of time ? 

Colonel Sadtler. "When the winds message was first brought to my 
attention by Colonel Bratton, he emphasized the destruction of codes, 
that it could mean one thing, and that was war. Here we had prac- 
tically all codes in the United [12378'] States destroyed except 
the one left in the Embassy in Washington, Japanese Embassy in 
Washington. That meant that we were going to have war in a verv 
short time. 

Senator Ferguson. And at one time I think you used the expression 
"within 48 hours" ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir ; that is not my expression. 

Senator Ferguson, Well, now : 

Just before that meeting, Mr. Gaston asked me what I thought about war 
being declai'ed, and I said that I thought they would have war within 48 hours. 
He turned to Captain Redman who represented Admiral No.ves at that meeting 
and asked him what he thought and he said he agreed with Colonel Sadtler. 

You are testifying. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4637 

Colonel Sadtler. That is true, yes, sir ; but I have since verified it 
with Captain Redman, and Mr. Gaston, member of the committee, and 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, said it to Captain Redman, and 
Captain Redfman replied, "I think we will have 48 hours," and I have 
just been reversed. 

Senator Fergusox. You agreed with Captain Redman? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Senator Fergusox. What date was that? 

Colonel Sadtler. That was December 4. 

[12379] Senator Fergusox. December 4. Then you did feel 
that there would be war within 48 hours of December 4 ? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct; yes, sir. 

Senator Fergusox. Then you were not surprised when the war came 
at 1 o'clock : 1 o'clock Washington time ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Not a bit ; no, sir. I was only surprised that the 
attack was in Hawaii. 

Senator Fergusox. I see. 

You were not surprised that there was an attack ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No. sir. 

Senator Fergusox". How, why were you surprised that there was an 
attack in Hawaii ? 

Colonel Sadtler. During the entire 

Senator Fergusox. That is where the fleet was, wasn't it? 

Colonel Sadtler. Where the fleet was was no concern of mine. I 
didn't know where it was. 

Senator Fergusox^. All right. 

Colonel Sadtler. All the discussion that I heard in the War and 
Navy Departments, I never heard the word Pearl Harbor or Hawaii 
discussed in connection with an attack by Japan on the United States 
in the event of war. 

There was a great deal of conversation about the Philippines, Indo- 
china, and Panama Canal. 

[12380] Senator Fergusox. Well, now. did you know as late as 
the 5th, General Miles had sent a message to Panama after the war 
warning message, after the message of the 27th telling them that when 
the break of diplomatic relations became imminent they would notify 
them ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I did not know of that message, sir. 

Senator Fergusox. Well, it is to this eflPect: 

U. S. -Japanese relations strained. Will inform you if and when severance of 
diplomatic relations imminent. 

Signed "Miles." 

Do you know how such a message could be sent on the 5th after you 
had told him that the wind message was in, and you had discussion 
about the destruction of codes? 

Colonel Sadtler. No. sir; I don't recall that message to Panama at 
all, nor should it have been my business to have even seen it, except 
as officer in charge of Army communications. 

Mr. MuRPHT. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Fergusox. Yes. 

Mr. MuRPHT. The 48-hour incident occurred 24 hours before he saw 
the winds message, so-called winds message. That was at the meeting 



4638 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

on Thursday. I mean the conversation was at the security meeting 
24 hours before the call from Noyes, as I understand it. 

[12381] Colonel Sadtler. That is correct, Mr. Murphy; yes, sir. 

Senator Fergusox. You told us about Colonel Bratton discussing 
it with you, that the discussion of these codes, the wind code message, 
and so forth, meant war? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear that there were any files 
destroyed or lost? 

Colonel Sadtler. I heard some gossip to that effect ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, I want to ask you, down in the Army, 
how you determined between gossip and non-gossip, the real thing. 
You say you heard it by gossip. 

Colonel Sadtler. In 1923, I think 

Senator Ferguson. No, no. 

Colonel Sadtler. I mean 1943, I think it was at Fort Bragg, N. C, 
in a casual conversation with Gen. Isaac Spalding, he told me that 
nothing could be found about Pearl Harbor because the records had 
been destroyed. 

Senator Ferguson. What was Spalding? 

Colonel Sadtler. Gen. Isaac Spalding. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he tell you anything more ? 

Colonel Sadtler. And he told me that Colonel Bissell, Jack Bissell, 
J. T. Bissell, had told him that he had destroyed certain evidence, cer- 
tain documents. 

[12382] Senator Ferguson. Did he tell you what documents 
were supposed to have been destroyed ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I don't recall that he did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, why did you tell me that was gossip? 
He was attempting to tell you a fact, was he not ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Well, it was a casual conversation between two 
men who have known each other for a great many years. 

Senator Ferguson. And you hadn't any reason to discount that 
this gentleman was speaking to you and telling you what he consid- 
ered to be a fact that he had heard ? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And was it gossip ? 

Colonel Sadtler. It turned out to be ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliy do you tell me it turned out to be gossip ; 
what investigation was made, to your knowledge? 

Colonel Sadtler. By General Carter Clarke. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you come back here and tell anyone about 
what you had been told? 

Colonel Sadtler. I may have ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you know how the inestigation of 
Carter Clarke got started? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. I was just told to appear before it. I 
appeared before it twice, to be exact. 

[12383] Senator Ferguson. Do you know why the Army Board 
didn't investigate that gossip ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you tell the Army Board that ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I don't think so. I don't know, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4639 

Mr. MuEPHT. It wasn't mentioned in that hearing. 

Senator Ferguson. You don't think you told the Army Board ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir; I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the only knowledge that you have 
concerning the missing of any files or papers in the "War Depart- 
ment ? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keete. Will the gentleman yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. I am interested in knowing whether or not this thing 
that you refer to as gossip is that which my boys always referred to 
in the service as being "scuttlebutt"? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is another name for it. 

Mr. Keefe. Isn't that the same thing? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Saying "according to scuttlebutt", so and so, that is 
what you refer in the service as meaning gossip ? 

[1238Ji\ Colonel Sadtler. Well, it is referred to by a lot of 
names, Mr. Keefe. 

Mr. KiEFE. That is quite a familiar word, isn't it? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. not "scuttlebutt," in the Army; it is a 
Navy term. 

Mr. Keefe. That is a Navy term. 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. One of my boys was a marine and he was always re- 
ferring to "scuttlebutt." 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I want you to explain part of your testi- 
mony about this message of the 7th. It isn't clear to me. 

The circumstances attending that message are abont as follows — 

You are testifying — 

I sent the inquiry, with the approval of the General Staff, inquiring as to the 
operation of radar on December 7. Upon receipt of that message Colonel Colton, 
Acting Chief Signal OfRcer, personally toolv a copy of it into General Marshall's 
office. I gave a copy to General Gerow. Colonel Colton, upon his return from 
General Marshall's office, said that he wanted all copies of that message collected 
and held intact as, inasmuch as radar and the damage done at Pearl Harbor were 
secret at that time, the information was \_1238o'\ not to be disclosed. Gen- 
eral Gerow kept his message and I think that Colonel Handv had it and he 
held it. 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. "What were you talking about? 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator give the page of the record and 
where from? 

Senator Ferguson. That is volume 2 of the Clarke Report. 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What were you talking about? That isn't clear 
to me. 

Colonel Sadtler. We were trying to find out whether our radar 
sets were working in Hawaii at the time of the attack. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you make an investigation on that 
question as to whether or not the radar was working just prior to the 
attack? 



4640 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Sadtler. I talked to Colonel Powell in Hawaii on the night 
of December 7 and asked him the question as to the operation of his 
radar, and he did not answer as it was secret, and he said he would 
let us know later, and the next day Mr. Bundy gave me permission 
to send that message — I think it was Bundy because he accused me 
of being in charge of it — to find out whether the radar was working 
in Hawaii on the morning of December 7. We sent a telegram 
[12386^ to make an inquiry. The reply to the effect that it was 
working came in and was delivered to me and I gave it to Colonel 
Colton, who took it in to General Marshall personally. 

When he came out he said : 

I want all copies collected and held intact so that this information cannot 
get out. 

That was merely a precautionary move to preserve secrecy as to the 
effect of what happened in Pearl Harbor and also the secrecy of radar 
at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, that radar was working that 
morning was to be held a secret? That was to be held a secret? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. Any information regarding radar was 
to be held a secret. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what you had in mind by that testi- 
mony ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It was to be held a secret, that radar had been 
working? 

Mr, Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I don't think we should draw in- 
ferences. 

Senator Ferguson. You tell us what you meant again. 

Colonel Sadtler. We were trying to find out whether radar was 
working on December 7 and when the information came in we wanted 
to keep it as secret as possible, any [12387] information re- 
garding radar. 

Senator Ferguson. Not necessarily that it had been working but 
the fact that radar was there was to be kept a secret? 

Colonel Sadtler. All right. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you know what was done with those 
messages, did you file them, or keep them? 

Colonel Sadtler. No. sir. Those messages are on file today. 

Senator Ferguson. They are on file? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever keep a diary or a log sheet in your 
office? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. I have kept some notes. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have those notes ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know where they are? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any in a safe? Did you at one 
time state that you may have had them in a safe? In your Clausen 
affidavit I notice that you say — have you got the Clausen affidavit? 
I will get it. 

Have you identified as much as you can who Spalding was and who 
Bissell was? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4641 

[l^SSS] Colonel Sadtler. Bissell was on duty in G-2. Spalding 
was on duty in G-1. 

Senator Ferguson. One was in G-1, intelligence, and the other 
in G-2? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment. 

Mr. Murphy. For a correction. I think you will find Spalding 
wasn't in Washington but he was under a tree down in North Carolina. 

Colonel Sadtler. May I explain that at the time of December 7 
Colonel Spalding was in Washington in G-1. Bissell was in G-2. 
In 1943 the conversation was, I think, at Jackson or Fort Bragg, N. C. 
Colonel Bissell was overseas at the time. 

Senator Ferguson. At the time of Pearl Harbor they were both in 
Washington ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. One in Intelligence and the other in G-1 ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, what is Bissell's first name? 

Colonel Sadtler. He has three initials. J. T. Jack Bissell, we call 
him. 

[12389] Senator Ferguson. Jack Bissell? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes. sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, who is presently the head of G-2? Isn't 
there a Bissell there now ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. General Vandenburg is head of G-2. 
Bissell was. That is an entirely different Bissell. 

Senator Ferguson. An entirely different Bissell. 

Now, you said here in this affidavit : 

"I have not collected any such material in a safe deposit box although 
I thought I had done so." 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. How would a man think that he had done so if 
he hadn't ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I don't know, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Why did you say this? 

Colonel Sadtler. Because I thought I had. 

Senator Ferguson. You thought you had. 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you accoamt for that kind of thinking, that 
you had collected it and put it in a safe deposit box ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you put any papers in a safe deposit 
box, collected in any way, about Pearl Harbor, [12390'] memo- 
randums or notes ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir ; because there are none in there now, and 
I looked to find them, so I couldn't have put them there. 

Senator Ferguson. I see. WHiat you mean is you thought you had 
put them in the safe deposit box but when you went there to look for 
them you didn't find them and then you considered that you were mis- 
taken ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 



4642 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson, Have you tried to think since where you would 
have put them ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I had a little tin box I used to keep in my desk and 
I think I kept them there. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, they were there on the 7th, then ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Evidently not ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, when do you consider that they were re- 
moved ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I don't know, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you make any memorandums in relation to 
the winds message? 

Colonel Sadtler. I made some notes on the whole subject ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You made some notes on the whole subject. 
Now, when did you make those notes? 

[123911 Colonel Sadtler. After talking with General Drum in 
New York. 

Senator Ferguson. And what year was that ? 

Colonel Sadtler. 1942. 

Senator Ferguson. In 1942 after the happening of this event you 
made a memorandum putting down on paper these various things that 
happened so that you would be able to remember them ? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What conversation had you with Drum? 

Colonel Sadtler. I told him the story. 

Senator Ferguson. You told him the story ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What was that, an investigation ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And who was General Drum ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Commanding General of the Eastern Defense 
Command of the First Army. 

Senator Ferguson, Do you know how that conversation came about 
that you related the story to him ? 

Colonel Sadtler, He just asked me one day what happened. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? Get General Drum's assign- 
ment at this time. Wliere is he now ? 

Colonel Sadtler. He is retired now. 

[12392] Mr. Murphy. Is he retired or is he in a military posi- 
tion ? Isn't he Military Aide to Governor Dewey ? 

Colonel Sadtler. That I don't know, Mr. Murphy. At that time he 
was Commanding General of the Eastern Defense Command. 

Mr. Richardson. Better be careful. That is a serious charge. You 
better be careful about it, Mr. Witness. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, may I have the last answer read? 

(The last question and answer were read by the reporter.) 

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct, is that all you want to say on 
that? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir, that is about all. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, when you told him, did you at that time 
make this memorandum ? 

Colonel Sadtler. It was the time that I was being relieved from 
duty at Governors Island to go to the Second Army at Memphis, 
Tenn,, and that was around about the latter part of 1943, about 
November. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4643 

Senator Ferguson. Then how did this get into your tin box here 
in Washington? 

Colonel Sadtler. I had this little box with me, to carry with me. I 
am not sure that it was ever in the tin box, Senator. 

[123931^ Senator Ferguson. Well, now, was what you put on the 
memorandum the same as you are testifying to here, do you know? 

Colonel Sadtler. Essentially ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have any other memorandum ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That was the only one and you haven't any idea 
now where that could be or what happened to it ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever make any investigation of one of 
the cable companies in relation to any messages? 

Colonel Sadtler. I don't think I understand the question, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever make any investigation in relation 
to any files of a cable company ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I don't recall any ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever go to any of the various intercept- 
ing monitoring stations or did you know of anyone going to inspect 
their tiles as to whether or not any wind message did come in? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir ; I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. You know nothing about that ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Senator P'erguson. Were you familiar with the so-called \_1239Jf\ 
pilot message ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Only in a general way. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, what was the general way ? 

Colonel Sadtler. That there was a long message coming in on Sat- 
urday. 

Senator Ferguson. And when did that first come to your attention, 
that the long message was coming in and there would be a time of 
delivery ? 

Colonel Sadtler. There was never any notice came to me of any 
hour of delivery. 

Senator Ferguson. No, not the specific hour, but that there would 
be a time of delivery. Did you ever see the pilot message ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear about it? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What did you hear about the pilot message? 

Colonel Sadtler. That there was a long message coming in. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that about all? 

Colonel Sadtler. Except that we would keep people on at night to 
see that the thing was received. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, sometime prior to the long message 
coming in you had information that it was coming [1239S] in 
and you kept your staff on at night to intercept it? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir; I hadn't kept anybody on to intercept it. 
It was to be covered at night until the message was intercepted. And 
I think we can thank one civilian, Mr. Rowlett. who stayed down and 
did that work of his own accord with Colonel Schukraft. I think they 
are better witnesses than I am on that question. 



4644 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. You didn't make any plans in the Department 
to have someone stay on ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I knew there would be someone on. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you concerned at one time about getting 
messages out to the theaters ? 

Colonel Sadtler. On what subject, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. On the question of alerting them. 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir; except as the Army Communications 
Service would handle those messages. 

Senator Ferguson. Not that you were personally talking with any 
other officers about the various services to be notified ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You had no such conversations? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

The Chairman. Mr. Keefe. 

[12396] Mr. Keefe. May I have the book of affidavits again, 
the Clausen report. Colonel Sadtler, you gave an affidavit to Colonel 
Clausen, did you not? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Here at Washington on the 13th day of August 1945 ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, if I understand your testimony here today, it is 
that Admiral Noyes called you on the morning of the 5th of Decem- 
ber 1941 and in substance told you that the message was in, referring 
to the wind execute message ? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you explained to us how you definitely recalled 
the date because of the meeting which you had had the day before? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. If I understand your testimony here, it is that you 
immediately informed General Miles? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And he sent for Colonel Bratton ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And Colonel Bratton pulled out a slip of paper from 
his pocket and asked what words were used on [12397] this 
message ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you did not know and you were instructed by 
General Miles to go back to Admiral Noyes and find out the exact 
words, and Admiral Noyes said he was going to attend a meeting 
and you didn't get the exact words? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct; yes, sir. 

Mr. KJEEEE. You then discussed the matter with General Gerow ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

]\Ir. KJEEFE. And advised General Gerow of the receipt of this 
winds message? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And discussed it some with him? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you then went to the secretary of the general 
staff, General Bedell Smith ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4645 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And advised him that this winds execute message was 
in? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And advised him that you had talked to General Gerow 
and General Miles and that upon his learning that you discussed the 
matter with them he said he didn't [12398] care to discuss it 
further with you ? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct, yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you left? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That is the story that you tell us here today ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, in this affidavit which you gave to Colonel 
Clausen you say this : 

I made the recommendations to General Gerow and General Smith on 5 
December 1941, as stated on pages 253 and 254 of the transcript mentioned, 
without getting additional information from Admiral Noyes, on my own initi- 
ative and without informing any representatives of G-2. 

That is correct, isn't it ? 
Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Keefe. (reading) : 

I was alarmed by the series of Japanese diplomatic and consular intercepts 
which I had been reading over a considerable period of time — 

And you have referred to these intercepts with reference to the 
destruction of codes ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Keefe (reading) : 

— and the mounting tension, and the information which [12399] Admiral 
Noyes had just given me. Accordingly, after I had conferred with General Miles 
and Colonel Bratton, as I have testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I 
went to my office, which was also in the Munitions Building and personally typed 
a proposed warning which I intended to recommend be sent to the overseas com- 
manders, and which warning read substantially as follows and quoted herewith 
from memory : 

"C. G. — P. I., Hawaii — Panama. Reliable information indicates war with 
Japan in the very near future Stop Take every precaution to prevent a repeti- 
tion of Port Arthur Stop Notify the Navy. Marshall." 

Now, is that statement correct ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you want us to understand that to be your testi- 
mony here before this committee ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That you did prepare such a warning message ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I did. yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you did it because of the mounting tension and 
flow of information which you had together with the winds execute 
message which you believed was the true winds execute message at 
that time ? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct, yes, sir. 

[12400] Mr. Keefe. You were very apprehensive that war was 
going to strike immediately? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 



4646 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. And I understood your apprehension that war would 
come to the United States was based in part at least upon the fact 
that the Japanese code word that was being sent out from the consular 
offices here in the United States indicated the destruction of all codes 
and ciphers and secret papers except the one code here in the Embassy 
at Washington; is that correct^ 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct. 

Mr, Keefe. Your affidavit further says : 

I have since checked with my office staff at the time and they have no recollec- 
tion of the drafting of this proposed warning message. I did not show it to any- 
one. I do not know where the message is now, and I made no copy at the time. 
After I had typed this message, I conferred with General Gerow and General 
Smith as I have testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. I did not show 
them the warning message I had typed. 

What became of your message ? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is what I don't know, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Your mind doesn't reach back that far? 

Colonel Sadtler. I know that I had it, and I thought _ [12401] 
I had put it away to keep, and when I went to look for it, it was gone. 

Mr. Keefe. You knew you had put it away ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I put it away for safekeeping. 

Mr. Keefe. Why wasn't the message sent ? 

Colonel Sadtler. General Gerow informed me that he thought they 
had been adequately warned, and General Smith refused to discuss it 
any further. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you suggest to General Gerow that a message of 
that character should go ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No. I talked to him to the effect that the winds 
message was in and didn't he think there should be some warning sent 
out. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you discuss this particular message that you had 
drafted ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Then I understand your testimony to be that you asked 
him whether he did not think that an additional warning should be 
sent. 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And he advised you that in his opinion they had suffi- 
cient warning ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And when you told that to General Smith — [12402] 
I guess it was Colonel Smith at that time? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir; Colonel Smith. 

Mr. Keefe. He refused to discuss the matter further with you? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now. you thought you put this message, this proposed 
message, away some place for safekeeping ? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct ; yes sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, did you put it away with these memoranda that 
you have told us about? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir; because the memorandum was not made 
until later, and that was made at the time? 

Mr. Keefe. Where did you last see this propose message ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4647 

Colonel Sadtler. I don't know where it was, sir. I have no idea 
where it is. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, the last time you saw it you had it in your hand? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That was sometime on the morning of the 5th of De- 
cember, 1941? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is right. 

jNIr. Keefe. Did you have it in your hand when you talked to Bedell 
Smith? 

Colonel Sadttler. I think I did. 

[12403^ Mr. Keefe. Did you have it in your hand when you 
talked to General Gerow ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I think so ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You perhaps went back to your office and from that 
point on you do not recall what became of that proposed message? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. It never became an official message because it never was 
sent? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir, 

Mr. Keefe. With the approval of the proper authorities? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, in this affidavit that you gave to Colonel Clausen, 
you say this : 

I have read the comments of Genei'al Gerow and General Smith in affidavits 
given Colonel Clausen, dated respectively 20 .Tune 1^4.") and 15 June 1945, refer- 
ring to my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to my conference 
with them for the purpose stated on 5 December 1941. 

Now, I want you to listen to this next : 

I believe the comments by General Gerow and General Smitli, contained in the 
affidavits mentioned are correct statements of fact, wherein they set forth as 
follows concerning this subject : 

[12.'fOJf] "General Gerow. I have no such recollection and I believe that 
Colonel Sadtler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was 
purely a Signal Corps officer, and that lie was not concerned with the dissemina- 
tion or interpretation of magic. I would naturally expect that enemy information 
of such grave moment would be bi'ought to my attention and to the attention of 
the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps 
officer. To the best of my recollection I did not receive prior to 7 December, 
1941, notification from any source of an implementing message to the Japanese 
winds code. If I had received such a message or notice thereof I believe I would 
not recall the facts, in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel Sadtler 
told me of an unverified report, or tliat he had received some tentative informa- 
tion which was subject to confirmation. In any event there should be written 
evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the facts, which 
evidence would be more reliable than any person's memory at this time, especially 
since so many major events have intervened." 

If I understand your affidavit, you state : 

I believe the comments by General Smith contained in his affidavit are correct 
statements of fact. 

[1^405] In his affidavit he says he has no recollection that you 
ever talked to him at all, and believes you are entirely mistaken. 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. How can you make a statement that you did talk to 
him, before this committee, and make an affidavit before Colonel 
Clausen that you believed that Colonel Smith or rather General Gerow, 



4648 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

is correct, when he says he doesn't believe that you talked to him at 
all, and that you must be mistaken? You seem to be taking two 
different positions in the same affidavit. 

Colonel Sadtler. I realized when I got through talking to Miles 
that I had made no impression to the effect that the winds message 
was in in view of the "Haruna" messages going back to Tokyo and the 
reason I went to Gerow was to arouse somebody that I thought should 
be aware of what was happening. 

I made no impression on Gerow at the time I was there and for 
that reason I went to Colonel Smith, and he shut it off to the effect 
"I don't care to discuss it further." 

I don't believe I made any impression on any one of those three 
men. 

[124-06] Mr. Keefe. Well, I can well believe that and I think 
that is the absolute truth that you are telling us now, Colonel Sadtler, 
but the difficulty that confronts me is the affidavit which you gave to 
Colonel Clausen. 

Colonel Sadtler. Isn't that essentially what I said just now ? 

Mr. Keefe. Well, General Gerow says, "I have no such recollection 
and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mistaken", and you say in your 
affidavit that you believed the comments of General Gerow contained 
in his affidavit are correct statements of fact. 

Colonel Sadtler. Insofar as he goes I think they are essentially 
absolute statements of fact. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. 

Colonel Sadtler. I am absolutely positive that General Gerow said 
that to me. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. Now, we get down to this, Colonel Sadtler. 
that your interpretation of this affidavit and the one that you would 
like to have this committee understand is that when you said you 
believed that General Smith and General Gerow in their affidavits 
stated correct statements of fact that you are of the impression that 
they could not recall or recollect that you talked to them at all and 
that, perhaps, that was a correct statement of fact, is that it ? 

[12407] Colonel Sadtler. Practically that ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. But you mean to tell this committee positively and with- 
out any question at all of faulty recollection is that you did talk to both 
of them as you have indicated here ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Absolutely, I talked to both of them. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you remember the circumstances under which this 
affidavit was given to Colonel Clausen ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Will you state them? 

Colonel Sadtler. It was in a room in the Pentagon Building. He 
sent for me and asked me to come up and talk to him, as I recall it. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, tell me just what took place. 

Colonel Sadtler. He showed me the affidavits of Gerow and Smith 
and asked me to comment on them, which I have done. An}i:hing 
further that I cared to add to the testimony or anything that I wanted 
to say that could help clear up anything. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, I note that you added to this affidavit this lan- 
guage, in your own handwriting, I assume it is. 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4649 

Mr. Ej:efe (reading) : 

Other than the persons mentioned, namely. General Miles, Colonel Bratton, 
General Gerow, Colonel Smith and whoever may have been in General Miles' oflSce 
at [I24OS] the time, to the best of my recollection up to December 7, 1&41 
I did not give any other person the information I received from Admiral Noyes. 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct ; j^es, sir. 
Mr. Keefe. And that is your testimony today, Colonel? 
Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, in this statement you say — a statement given to 
Clausen : 

I deny the testimony of Mr. Friedman given to General Clarke to the effect that 
I could not get the execute message from Admiral Noyes and reiterate that other 
than making the telephone call, as testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
I made no further efforts to obtain the execute message mentioned by Admiral 
Noyes. 

Now, did you have a discussion with Colonel Clausen as to the testi- 
mony of everybody that had testified that seemed to contradict your 
statement ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I do not recall all the conversation with Colonel 
Clausen, but if that is what it says that is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, as a matter of fact, then, in reading your affidavit 
meticulously it impresses me that it is not exactly correct because you 
have testified to us that you [12409'] did go back to Admiral 
Noyes after you had talked with General Miles and Colonel Bratton, 
at the direction of General Miles, I assume, to get verification of the 
message. 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That is in addition to the telephone call? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is the telephone call. 

Mr. Keefe. Wliat is that ? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is the telephone call. 

Mr. Keefe. Oh, you did not go ; you just called up ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Oh, I see. Well, then, that clears it up, Colonel. You 
did not actually go to Noyes' office then? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You simply called him on the phone and asked for 
verification ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And did not get it ? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is right. 

Mr. Keefe. And you did not want to give the impression that 
Noyes had refused to give you that message ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. He said he was going to a meeting and was busy and 
you did not press the matter thereafter? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct ; yes, sir. 

[12P0] Mr. Keefe. Well, personally I want to thank you. We 
have at least got one witness that has some clear recollection without 
refreshing. That seemed to be the case in each case. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Any further questions ? 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a few 
questions in connection with the questions asked you by Senator 
Ferguson. 

79716— 46— pt. 10 5 



4650 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Now, this conference that you spoke of in response to Senator Fer- 
guson's question with Redmond, Gaston, and whoever else it was, that 
was on December 4, 1941 ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. That was the time that the question of 48 
hours was discussed ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. That was the day before the so-called winds 
execute message was supposed to have reached Admiral Noyes? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir ; that is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. So that this conference in which the 48-hour 
question was mentioned had nothing to do with the winds execute 
message at all? 

Colonel Sadtler. Nothing at all ; no, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And whatever discussion occurred [i^^ii] 
there in which the 48-hour question was mentioned was solely with 
relation to the information j'ou had about the burning of Japanese 
codes ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir ; and the other information that had gone 
before, Mr. Cooper. 

The Vice Chairman. But it had nothing to do with any winds 
message ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir ; not a thing. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, your reason for thinking 
that war with Britain would also probably mean war with the United 
States was because the Japanese were destroying their codes in both 
the United States and in Britain? 

Colonel Sadtler. And in British possessions ; yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Yes. And that had nothing to do with any 
winds message at all ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Not a thing ; no, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, this message written by you on Decem- 
ber 5 which is mentioned in your affidavit to Colonel Clausen, I believe 
you state was never shown to General Gerow or General Miles or 
Colonel Bedell Smith or Colonel Bratton. 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct ; yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. You did not show it to anybody else? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

[124^2] The Vice Chaieman. You simply wrote it out and kept 
it yourself? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct; yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And did not show it to any of these other 
officers. 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, you never did see the so-called winds 
execute message and all you know about it is what Admiral Noyes told 
you? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct; yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. You never did at any time see it ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And as far as you know of your own knowl- 
edge there never was any winds execute message received ? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct; yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4651 

The Vice Chairman. All right, thank you. 

Mr. MuRrHY. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. Colonel, as I understand it then, because you had a 
phone call from Admiral Noyes about which there was some doubt 
and concerning which you could not get confirmation you, who had 
charge of the collection of data and not the evaluation or analysis of 
data, took it upon yourself to go to the Chief of War Plans and the 
Secretary of the Chief of [l£413] Staff in order to have a 
message sent out to Hawaii and the other possessions, is that right? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is essentially correct; yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you know at that time of the war warning message 
of November 27? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir; I knew about that. 

Mr. Mijrphy. Did you read — you had read the Navy's message ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. I knew the one that General Short had 
sent into the War Department. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, did you know about the Navy's message, "This 
is a war warning" on the 27th? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir; I knew nothing of that message. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you know about the message of the 24th of No- 
vember that hostilities might commence at any moment? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you know about the message of the 27th of No- 
vember to General Short from General Marshall ? 

Colonel Sadtler. To which General Short replied that he was on a 
sabotage alert? 

Mr. Murphy. I am not talking about his reply. I am talking about 
the message of Marshall to Short, did you know about that? 

\ 124/^1 Colonel Sadtler. No, sir ; I don't identify it ; no, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. So that you, not knowing that there had been a warn- 
ing message on the 24th of November and the Army message of the 
27th of November and the Navy message of the 27th of November, 
were feeling disturbed that no warning message had gone out, is that 
right ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I thought that additional warning should go out, 
sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, did you know what had gone out ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. So that you took it upon yourself, not knowing what 
the Chief of Staff and the other officers in charge of such functions 
had done and not knowing what the Navy officers in charge of such 
functions had done, decided that you would write the kind of a message 
that should go out, is that it ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I intended that to be some sort of a model that if 
they wanted to send a message they could use that to start out with. 

Mr. Murphy. And you expected General Gerow, after you came 
into his office as head of Signal Corps, to discuss with you the kind 
of a message that should go out, is that it? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Well,youexpected that he would take your [12416] 
suggestion that a message should go out? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 



4652 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. And then when you didn't get any satisfaction from 
General Gerow you then went to the Chief of Staff's oiRce, is that 
right? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct, yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, did you tell the Chief of Staff at that time that 
you had already conferred with General Miles and you had already 
conferred with General Gerow? Did you ever tell that to Colonel 
Smith? 

Colonel Sadtler. I think you mean Colonel Smith, the Secretary 
of the General Staff. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. You told him that you had discussed the matter with 
General Miles, Chief of Army Intelligence, G-2, and that you had 
already discussed the matter with General Gerow and that you did 
not get any satisfaction from them, and didn't he then tell you, "Well, 
don't bother me about it," or something to that effect? 

Colonel Sadtler. Essentially, yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. Now, then, we come to your conversation with 
General Drum. I would like to get some more details on that. Tliis 
material that you got was of a highly confi- [124-16] dential 
nature, wasn't it? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And what did you tell General Drum about it ? Did 
he have any right to know about this magic ? 

Colonel Sadtler. He had been my commanding general. 

Mr. Murphy. I don't care what he was. You knew that he did not 
have any right to know about magic, didn't you ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir, I knew that. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. And did he as your commanding general pre- 
sume as your general to ask you to reveal such information to him ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. It was the time of my relief from duty 
under General Drum to go to duty with the Second Army. 

Mr. Murphy. All right. 

Colonel Sadtler. And he said — he asked me, "Weren't you on duty 
in the Chief's office at the time this trouble occurred ? " 

Mr. Murphy. What else? 

Colonel Sadtler. And asked me to tell him the circumstances. 

Mr. Murphy. And did you discuss magic with him and the messages ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I told him about the winds message. 

[1^17] Mr. Murphy. What else? 

Colonel Sadtler. I don't know, sir, I have forgotten exactly, but I 
essentially told him what was done at that time about that, what had 
happened. 

Mr. Murphy. Did he tell you why he wanted to know ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And then after you talked with him you went out 
and made a memorandum? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. I left for Tennessee almost immediately. 

Mr. Murphy. But you have already told us that after you talked 
to General Drum you made some notes. That is what you said in this 
record. 

Mr. Richardson. A few months later he said. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4653 

Colonel Sadtler. I don't know whether it was the same day or a 
week later or a month later. 

Mr. MuRPPiY. After you talked to General Drum you made some 
notes. Why did you make the notes? Did General Drum suggest 
it or not? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. He suggested that you make some notes ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Did he say why ? 

Colonel Sadtler. He said, "You had better remember this." 

[12^8] Mr. Murphy. What is that? 

Colonel Sadtler. He said, "You had better remember this." 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. What else ? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is all. 

Mr. Murphy. And was it he who suggested you make notes? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you tell General Drum about magic ? 

Colonel Sadlter. No, sir ; I don't think so. 

Mr. Murphy. You mean you just confined it to that one incident? 

Colonel Sadtler. I don't recall telling him anything else ; no, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, you have already testified before the Army Pearl 
Harbor Board and you have testified before this Board that you felt 
on the 4th of December 1941, 24 hours before any talk of a conversa- 
tion with Admiral Noyes, that you felt war was coming in 48 hours. 

What was there about the winds intercept that you singled out, 
since you felt it was coming the day before, that you would talk about 
only that one instance to General Drum? How do you explain that? 

Colonel Sadi-ler. I can't explain it, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, have you any idea? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

[124^9] Mr. Murphy. The gentleman from Wisconsin said your 
memory was clear. Now I would like to have your memory on it. 
Why would you discuss that one little incident when you said you felt 
the "Haruna" message meant war, when you knew the consuls were 
being told to destroy their codes, when you knew the ambassador was 
being told to destroy his codes, when you felt that war was coming, 
why would you single out this one incident to talk to General Drum 
about ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I cannot answer that question, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Wlio brought up the subject ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Wlien I went in to say good-by to General Drum 
he asked me the circumstances surrounding the events at Pearl Harbor 
at the time. 

Mr. Murphy. You said you only told him about one little incident 
after he asked you about the conditions surrounding Pearl Harbor. 
Is that so, now ? He asked you what were the conditions surrounding 
Pearl Harbor and out of all this important mass of detail you just 
singled out one little item. Is that so ? 

Colonel Sadtler. The winds message. Mr. Murphy, as I said before, 
was the most important message that I think I ever handled in my 
life. 

Mr. Murphy. Wliy ? Will you tell the committee ? 



4654 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Sadtler. The whole thing. We knew on the 29th, 
[124-20] we knew of the disappearance of the Japanese fleet, we 
knew of Mr. Hull's ultimatum, we knew on December 1st these code 
machines were being destroyed, we knew the "Haruna" messages, and 
then this final winds message came in to cap the whole climax. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, what did the winds message mean to you ? You 
said before in your testimony that it meant a break in diplomatic 
relations. 

Colonel Sadtler. It meant destruction of codes, papers, and so 
forth. 

Mr. Murphy. "Weren't they already destroyed ? 

Colonel Sadtler. That was the final word to me that everything 
had happened, because that winds message was also predicated upon 
the fact, upon the interruption of international communications that 
they would certainly have. 

Mr. Murphy. But, sir, didn't you already testify that there were 
sixteen "Haruna" messages ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir, I did not. I said after that date there 
have been found sixteen. I saw two or three at that time. 

Mr. Murphy. But at any rate you did say — let me get it exactly. 
Let me get your exact words. 

The Chahjman. Go ahead and answer it if you can. 

Mr. Murphy. Page 250. 

[124^1] The Chairman. It seemed to be in the form of a ques- 
tion that required an answer. 

Mr. Murphy. You did expect a declaration of war on the 30th of 
November, didn't you ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Well, we expected something to happen. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, didn't you say before the Army board that we 
were of the opinion there might be a declaration of war between Japan 
and the United States on Sunday, November the 30th ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy (reading) : 

This, as you all know, proved to be a "dud" and on Monday, December 1, if I 
recall the date correctly, messages that morning began coming in from Tokyo 
telling the consuls to destroy their codes and to reply to Tokyo with one code 
word when they had so complied with their directive. If I recall correctly, that 
word was "Haruna."' It is the same name as that battleship that Colin Kelly 
was alleged to have sunk. 

About December 3, Tokyo notified the embassy pertaining to the destruction 
of their codes at once. 

Now, if you had all those messages that the consuls were to destroy 
their codes and if you had on the 5th the message about the Embassy 
burning their codes, what did the winds [124>'^2] intercept do? 

Colonel Sadtler. It capped the climax. 

Mr. Murphy. In what way? 

Colonel Sadtler. That everything is here. Now we have the whole 
thing. 

Mr. Murphy. What was here that you did not have before? 

Colonel Sadtler. Nothing, not a thing. Now, there was nothing but 
the winds message, which was a message that we had been straining 
every nerve to get; we had everybody listening for that message. 

Mr. Murphy. You did intercept certain messages after the 5th, 
did you not? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4655 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. Were the codes destroyed when you were in- 
tercepting those messages? 

Colonel Sadtler. Practically all the codes were destroyed execpt 
the one in the Japanese Embassy. 

Mr. Murphy. Weren't you kept busy all day on the 5th and on the 
night of the 5th and all day on the 6th and on the evening of the 6th 
and on Sunday intercepting messages? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy, New messages? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, they were not destroyed then on the [124^3] 
5th, were they? 

Colonel Sadtler. What was not destroyed on the 5th ? 

Mr. Murphy. You said that it capped the climax. The message to 
destroy the codes came on the 5th. You still received intercepted mes- 
sages the afternoon of the 5th and the night of the 5th and the 6th and 
the 7th? 

Colonel Sadtler, That is true, yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, if that capped the climax they did not destroy 
the codes, did they ? Do you understand me ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir; I understand you perfectly, but they 
had destroyed practically all of their codes by that time except the one 
in the Japanese Embassy. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, you knew that there were messages to dif- 
ferent parts of the world that we intercepted, too, did you not ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Not at that time, I did not, no, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Will you give me Exhibit 1 ? Will you show that 
to the witness? 

Mr. Richardson. If he doesn't know, why show him anything? 

Mr. Murphy. Do you know about the message of December 7th com- 
ing in ? 

Colonel Sadtler, No, sir, 

Mr. Murphy. About relations with England « 

il^m] Colonel Sadtler, No, sir. 

Mr, Murphy, You don't know about that? 

Colonel Sadtler, No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy, You don't know that we did intercept a message on 
the 7th of December about relations between Japan and England 
not being in accordance with expectations ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir, I do not ; that is correct. 

Mr. Murphy, Now, then, in view of all of that you still say that 
you only told General Drum about that one little message ? 

Colonel Sadtler, No, sir, I will not, I think that is about all we 

fr^^^^T ' ^^^o^^g^^^ 38 to what happened in Washington at that time 

Mr, Murphy. Now, what happened to your notes ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I don't know, sir. 

Mr, Murphy, Well, you certainly don't want to create any inference 
that anybody m Washmgton is responsible for your notes beino- de- 
stroyed, do you ? ' ^ 

Colonel, Sadtlkr. I do not, sir, 

Mr, Murphy, How many times did you talk to Captain Safford 
before vou were a witness? 



4656 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Sadtler. I have never talked to Captain Safford but once 
or twice in my life and that was before December 7, 1941. 

[134£S] Mr. Murphy. Did you talk to anybody about this ex- 
cept General Drum ? 

Colonel Sadtler. You mean discuss what has happened? 

Mr. Murphy. About the winds intercept, yes ; or your notes ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I remember telling General Carter Clarke the 
story. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, about Carter Clarke: That has come into the 
record three times and the Clarke exhibit is not in the record as yet. 

As I understand it, you were talking to General Spalding, and 
General Spalding gave you some gossip about certain papers being 
destroyed, did he not? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you learn that General Spalding learned it from 
Bissell? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And did you learn that Bissell learned it from 
Friedman ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you learn where Bissell got it ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Are you familiar with the Clarke report that in- 
vestigated that whole incident and dismissed it ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I am familiar with the part of my tes- [124^6] 
timony and I listened to General Spalding when he gave his testi- 
mony. 

Mr. Murphy. In other words, you had heard from General Spald- 
ing certain things; and then the gossip you got from General Spald- 
ing, who did you give it to ? 

Colonel Sadtler. It is going to get down to Mr. Friedman ; isn't it ? 

Mr. Murphy. It is going to get to wherever you put it. 

Colonel Sadtler. I did, in conversation with Mr. Friedman, tell him 
that; yes, sir. 

Mr, Murphy. It was you, then, who told Friedman? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And then Friedman told other people ? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is right ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. So tliat you are the one responsible for Friedman 
having this so-called information ; is that right? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. May I see the Clarke report, please? I refer to 
your testimony. You testified before General Clarke on the 14th of 
July 1945; is that right? 

Colonel Sadtler. I think that is about right ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. You were questioned by Colonel Gibson [reading] : 

Colonel Sadtler, you realize that you are under oath [12/i27] and you 
are fully aware of what your rights are? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes. 

Colonel Gibson. I want to ask you first if you ever saw a so-called winds 
execute message? 

Colonel Sadtler. I did not. 

Colonel Gibson. To your knowledge, was such a message ever in the War 
Department? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4657 

Colonel Sadtler. It was not. 

Colonel Gibson. And all that you know about that message and all contact 
that you had with it is in your former testimony? 

Colonel Sadtleb. That is right. I might further add that the information 
came from Admiral Noyes. 

Colonel Gibson. Mr. William F. Friedman has testified before Admiral Hewitt 
of the Department of the Navy recently as follows : "Then if I remember cor- 
rectly, I asked Colonel Sadtler whether he had a copy, had ever gotten or seen 
a copy of this message, and liis answer was, if I remember correctly, that he 
hadn't himself seen a copy but that he had been told by somebody that the 
copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by General Marshall." 

You were the one, then, that told 

Colonel Sadtler. I did not. Those words were Mr. Fried- 
[1^28] man's words. 
Mr. Murphy. Well, he said yon did. 
Colonel Sadtler. Mr. Friedman tells it in his words. 
Mr. Murphy (reading) : 

Did you tell Mr. Friedman that you had been told by somebody that the 
copies of the winds execute message had been ordered or directed to be de- 
stroyed by General Marshall? 

Colonel Sadtler. I will make an absolute flat denial of that statement made 
by Mr. Friedman because, as far as I know, that message was never in the War 
Department and I never made any statement that General Marshall ordered 
it destroyed or that anyone told me that General Marshall ordered it destroyed. 

Colonel Gibson. When did you return to duty in Washington this last time? 

Colonel Sadtler. About March 28, 1944. 

Colonel Gibson. After your return during the following summer and fall on 
occasion did you visit with Mr. Friedman? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes. 

Colonel Gibson. And did you visit about Pearl Harbor, amongst other things? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes. We had discussed what had [12Jf29] happened at 
that time. 

So that yon did talk to more than Drinn, didn't you? You did say 
Friedman, did you not, before? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, I talked to a lot of people who I assumed 
would get this message. 

Mr. Murphy (reading) : 

Colonel Gibson. Did some of those discussions take place in Mr. Friedman's 
office? 

Colonel Sadtlee. Well, I assume they did because I have been in his office sev- 
eral times. I had talked to him on occasions about what had happened, not only 
in his office but at his house. 

Colonel Gibson. At some time did somebody tell you that messages pertaining to 
the Pearl Hai'bor affair were being destroyed ? 

Colonel Sadtlee. Yes. Sometime during 1943 General Isaac Spalding at Ft. 
Bragg, North Carolina, told me something to the effect that J. T. B. Bissell had 
told him that everything pertaining to Pearl Harbor was being destroyed or had 
been destroyed. 

That is what General Spalding told you, was it? 
Colonel Sadtler. That is correct, yes, sir. 
Mr. Murphy (reading) : 

Colonel Gibson. Is it possible that you told that [12J,30] to Mr. Fried- 
man in one of your conversations? 

Colonel Sadtlee. It is possible. 

Colonel Gibson. You have been an old friend of Mr. Friedman for many years? 

Colonel Sadtler. I have known him for over 25 years. 

Colonel Gibson. This Colonel, now Brigadier J. T. B. Bissell, that you speak of, 
do you know him personally? 

Colonel Sadtlee. I do not. 



4658 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Gibson. To your knowledge have you ever met him? 
Colonel Sadtleb. Yes. I have met him casually but I doubt if I would recognize 
him today if I saw him. 

I will try to cut this down. 

Now, you typed this so-called message that you spoke to the gentle- 
man from Wisconsin about, you typed it yourself, didn't you ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. You did not have your stenographer type it? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, on December 1st you tried to dissuade General 
Olmstead from going to Panama because you thought that there would 
be war there then, did you not? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. That is December 1st? 

[124S1] Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. You said : 

On December 1, when General Olmstead was making preparations to go to Pan- 
ama, I attempted to dissuade him from his trip because I felt positive that war 
would be declared before he returned and I thought that it was his duty to be 

in Washington. 

You did say that before General Clarke ? 

Colonel Sadtler. That is correct; yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, Colonel Sadtler, you were asked this question : 

Colonel Sadtler, Mr. Friedman has also testified that you told him that you 
had heard that in addition to the Winds execute message being ordered de- 
stroyed by General Marshall, there was a second message that was ordered de- 
stroyed by Genei'al Marshall. This second message was a message which was 
the result of a message sent by the War Department a day or two after Pearl 
Harbor to the Signal Officer, Colonel Powell, asking him whether the radar in- 
stallation in the Islands was in operative order at the time of the attack, and 
the answer came back in the aflSrmative. Did you tell Mr. Friedman that you 
had heard that the message of inquiry relative to the working of the radar in- 
stallation in the Islands or the answer [12'fS2] thereto had been de- 
stroyed? 

Your answer was, "I did not." 

So that you were not responsible for that part of the gossip? 

Colonel Sadtler. Absolutely not ; no, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And the fact is that radar message is down in the files 
of the War Department now, is it not ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. That was collected for secrecy at first, 
as I have explained before. 

Mr. Murphy. Right. That is all, Colonel. 

Mr. Kaufman. Mr. Chairman, counsel for General Short requests 
that I ask a question of the witness. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Kaufman. Counsel for General Short would like to have me 
inquire* from the witness as to whether he had seen the reply of Gen- 
eral Short to the November 27th message? 

Colonel Sadtler. That would be the sabotage ? 

Mr. Kaufman. Yes. 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. Where did you see it for the first time? 

Colonel Sadtler. In the War Department. 

Mr. Kaufman. Around the date that it was received ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4659 

Colonel Sadtler. I imagine so ; yes, sir. I have forgotten exactly 
when, but I do recall seeing it before Pearl Harbor. 

[12433] Mr. Kaufman. That is all. 

Mr. IvEEFE. One question on that, Mr. Chairman. I was going 
to ask that same question because I thought that you had attempted 
to say something with respect to the message from General Short 
to General Marshall of the War Department with respect to his being 
alerted only against sabotage. It impressed me that you were cut-off 
by Mr. Murphy and did not get to say it. 

Now, as a matter of fact do I understand that at the time you be- 
came so apprehensive and felt that a message should go out to Short,' 
was that because you had seen this message which set forth that he 
was only alerted against sabotage ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir; I had no reason to single General Short 
at Hawaii out to get a warning. I thought that they all should be 
warned because I personally thought that if the Japs attacked it 
would be the Panama Canal. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, then the fact that he had sent in a wire and you 
knew about it, that he was only alerted against sabotage did not make 
any particular impression on you ? 

Colonel Sadtler. No, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. All riglit. 

Colonel Sadtler. Except that I knew he had not 

Mr. Keefe. I just want to get that clear. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I want to get that clear. 

[J2434] General Short sent more than one sabotage message. 
Did you see both of them ? 

Colonel Sadtler. I don't recall but one. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, if he stated 

Mr. Richardson. Well, if he only saw one why go into the second ? 

Mr. Murphy. I want to know which one he saw. 
Colonel Sadtler. The one I saw was about — I imagine — it was about 
a hundred words. 

Mr. Murphy. A hundred words ? 

Colonel Sadtler. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. That is all. 

Colonel Sadtler. It was not a long message. 

Mr. Murphy. That is all. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Colonel, for your coopera- 
tion. The committee appreciates your attendance here. 
(The witness was excused.) 

The Chairman. Who is the next witness ? 

Mr. Richardson. Commander Schulz. 

The Chairman. Commander Schulz, come around, please. 

[12435] TESTIMONY OF COMMANDER LESTER ROBERT 
SCHULZ, UNITED STATES NAVY 

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.) 
Mr. Richardson. Will you state your full name, please? 
Commander Schulz. Lester Robert Schulz. 

Mr. Richardson. How long have you been in the Navy, Com- 
mander ? 



4660 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Commander Schulz. Since June 1930, beginning as a midshipman. 
Mr, KicHARDSON. Were you in Washington during November and 
December 1941 ? 

Commander Sciiulz. Yes, sir: I was. 

Mr. Richardson. What was your assignment for duty in Washing- 
ton during the first week of December ? 

Commander Schulz. I was under instruction in the Office of Naval 
Communications for communication intelligence. That was my per- 
manent assignment. However, I was on temporary duty under verbal 
orders at the White House as a communications assistant to the Naval 
Aide, then Captain Beardall. Also, I had gone to Warm Springs in 
the same capacity the previous week end. Thus, my return to Wash- 
ington, I believe, was Tuesday of that week. 

Mr. Richardson. You were under Admiral Beardall ? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir ; that is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. Wlio others of the Navy were occupying the same 
duty, a similar duty there under Beardall ? 

[124^6] Commander Schulz. On the 6th of December, I be- 
lieve the morning of the 6th there was an Ensign Carson who was sent 
up to assist me. Actually he performed no duties that day and was 
simply being instructed and informed as to what his duties would be. 

Mr. Richardson. Wliat is your present assignment now? 

Commander Schulz. I am under orders at present to be executive 
officer of the Indiana^ a battleship. 

Mr. Richardson. Were you on duty at the White House in Admiral 
Beardall's office there on the night of December 6, 1941 ? 

Commander Schulz. I was on duty in the White House. Admiral 
Beardall had no fixed office in the White House at that time. He 
conducted his business for the most part in the Navy Department in 
the Navj^ Building and I was given a small office in a corner of the 
mail room, a closed office, but it was not a place used by Admiral 
Beardall. 

Mr. Richardson. That was at the White House? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir: it was. 

Mr. Richardson. Do vou recall Captain Kramer coming to the 
White House on the evening of December 6 to deliver any papers ? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir ; I do. 

Mr. Richardson. About what time did he come ? 

[124^7] Commander Schulz. Between 9 and 10; I should say 
about 9 : 30. 

Mr. Richardson. In the evening ? 

Commander Schulz. In the evening; yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Wlio was there besides you? 

Commander Schulz. No one else of the Navy. 

Mr. Richardson. To whom, if anyone, did Captain Kramer hand 
iiis papers? 

Commander Schulz. He handed them to me. They were in a 
locked pouch. 

Mr. Richardson. Was that the customary way in which dispatches 
that were being delivered there were delivered ? 

Commander Schulz. Material of that category was so delivered. 

Mr. Richardson. Wliat did you do with the locked pouch when it 
was handed to you ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4661 

Commander Schulz. I took it from the mail room, which is in the 
office building, over to the White House proper and obtained permis- 
sion to go up on the second floor and took it to the President's study. 

Mr. RiCHARDSOx. Did you go alone? 

Commander Schulz. I was accompanied by someone from the 
usher's office and announced to the President, However, then I was 
alone. 

Mr. KiCHARDSON. But Captain Kramer did not go with you? 

[12JiS8] Commander Scpiilz. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. KiCHARDSON. How long from the time the papers were placed 
in your hands by Captain Kramer was it before you went to the Presi- 
dent's study? 

Commander Schulz. About 5 minutes, I would say. 

Mr. RicHARDSox. Whom did you find in the study when you arrived 
there ? 

Commander Schulz. The President was there seated at his desk, 
and Mr. Hopkins was there. 

Mr. RiCHARDSox. That is Mr. Harry Hopkins? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir; that is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. You knew him ? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir. I had met him the previous day. 

Mr. Richardson. And you knew the President? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir, 

Mr. Richardson. Was the pouch still locked ? 

Commander Sciiui.z. I had a key to the pouch. I do not recall 
just when I unlocked it. In all likelihood it was after I was in the 
study, however. 

Mr. Richardson. What did j^ou do after you entered the study? 

Commander Schulz. I was announced and I informed the Presi- 
dent that I had the material which Captain Kramer had [W4S9] 
brought and I took it out of the pouch. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you make any further statement at the time 
with reference to the material, as to your having been told that it was 
important or not? 

Commander Schulz. That I do not recall, sir, but I believe that the 
President was expecting it. As I recall, he was, 

Mr, Richardson, Why? What makes you believe that? Was 
there anything said, I mean, that would indicate that? 

Commander Schulz, When Admiral Beardall instructed me to 
stay and meet Captain Kramer and receive the material, he told me 
of its important nature, 

Mr, Richardson. Now, wait just a moment there. 

Commander Schulz, And niy recollection was also that it was of 
such importance that the President expected to receive it. 

Mr. Richardson. Before Captain Kramer came did you have a talk 
with Admiral Beardall witli reference to the possibility of papers 
being delivered m the immediate future ? ^ i r 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir; I did. That is whv I stayed 

Mr. Richardson. What did Admiral Beardall say'to you ^ 

Commander Schulz. He told me that during the evening'Captain 
Kramer would hvmg up some magic material and that I was to take 
it and give it immediately to the President and ll^UO] he 
gave me the key to the pouch so that I could take it out and deliver it 



4662 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Richardson. That is the substance of your conversation with 
Admiral Beardall ? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir ; that is right. 

Mr. Richardson, Well, now, when you presented the material to 
the President, was it in the pouch ? 

Commander Schulz. To the best of my recollection I took it out 
of the pouch and handed it to him. The papers were clipped together. 
There were perhaps 15 typewritten pages and they were fastened 
together in a sheaf and I took them out of the pouch and handed them 
to the President personally. 

Mr. Richardson. You know now what we mean when we talk about 
the first 13 parts of the 14-part message ; you know what I am talk- 
ing about ? 

Commander Schulz, Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Are you able to state now whether among the 
papers which were delivered to the President there were this 13 parts 
of what was eventually the 14-part message? 

Commander Schulz. No, sir; I cannot. I did not read the mes- 
sage. I have only learned of its substance through information that 
has been divulged during this inquiry, from {12U1^ news- 
papers and so on. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, what happened when you deliv- 
ered these papers to the President ? You remained there ? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir ; I remained in the room. 

Mr. Richardson, What happened? 

Commander Schulz. The President read the papers, which took 
perhaps 10 minutes. Then he handed fliem to Mr. Hopkins. 

Mr. Richardson. How far away from the President was Mr. Hop- 
kins sitting? 

Commander Schulz. He was standing up, pacing back and forth 
slowly, not more than 10 feet away. 

Mr. Richardson. Did the President read out loud when he was 
reading the papers ? 

Commander Schulz. I do not recall that he did. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now go ahead and give us in detail 
just what occurred there, if you please, Commander. 

Commander Schulz, Mr, Hopkins then read the papers and handed 
them back to the President, The President then turned toward Mr. 
Hopkins and said in substance — I am not sure of the exact words, but 
in substance — "This means war." Mr. Hopkins agreed, and they dis- 
cussed then, for perhaps 5 minutes, the situation of the Japanese 
forces, that is, their deployment and 

Mr, Richardson, Can you recall what either of them said? 

[i^4^] Commander Schulz, In substance I can. There are 
only a few words that I can definitely say I am sure of, but the sub- 
stance of it was that — I believe Mr. Hopkins mentioned it first — that 
since war was imminent, that the Japanese intended to strike when 
they were ready, at a moment when all was most opportune for 
them 

The Chairman. When all was what? 

Commander Schulz. When all was most opportune for them. That 
is, when their forces were most properly deployed for their advantage. 
Indocliina in particular was mentioned, because the Japanese forces 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4663 

had already landed there and there were implications of where they 
should move next. 

The President mentioned a message that he had sent to the Japanese 
Emperor concerning the presence of Japanese troops in Indocliina, 
in etfect requesting their withdrawal. 

Mr. Hopkins then expressed a view that since war was undoubtedly 
going to come at the convenience of the Japanese, it was too bad that we 
could not strike the first blow and prevent any sort of surprise. The 
President nodded and then said, in effect, "No, we can't do that. We 
are a democracy and a peaceful people." Then he raised his voice, and 
this much I remember definitely. He said, "But we have a good 
record." 

The impression that I got was that we would have to stand 
[1244^] on that record, we could not make the first overt move. 
We would have to wait until it came. 

During this discussion there was no mention of Pearl Harbor. The 
only geographic name I recall was Indochina. The time at which war 
might begin was not discussed, but from the manner of the discussion 
there was no indication that tomorrow was necessarily the day. I 
carried that impression away because it contributed to my personal 
surprise when the news did come. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there anything said. Commander, with ref- 
erence to the subject of notice or notification as a result of the papers 
that were being read ? 

Commander Schulz. There was no mention made of sending any 
further warning or alert. However, having concluded this discussion 
about the war going to begin at the Japanese convenience, then the 
President said that he believed he would talk to Admiral Stark. He 
started to get Admiral Stark on the telephone. It was then deter- 
mined — I do not recall exactly, but I believe the White House operator 
told the President that Admiral Stark could be reached at the National 
Theater. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, was it from what was said there that you 
draw the conclusion that that was what the W^hite House operator 
reported ? 

[12444] Commander Schulz. Yes, sir. I did not hear what 
the operator said, but the National Theater was mentioned in my 
presence, and the President went on to state, in substance, that he 
would reach the admiral later, that he did not want to cause public 
alarm by having the admiral paged or otherwise when in the theater, 
where, I believe, the fact that he had a box reserved was mentioned and 
that if he had left suddenly he would surely have been seen because of 
the position which he held and undue alarm might be caused, and the 
President did not wish that to happen because he could get him 
within perhaps another half an hour in any case. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there anything said about telephoning any- 
body else except Stark ? 

Commander Schulz. No, sir ; there was not. 

Mr. Richardson. How did he refer to Admiral Stark ? 

Commander Schulz. When he first mentioned calling him, he 
referred to him as "Betty." 

Mr. Richardson. Was there any further discussion there before you 
left? 



4664 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Commander Schulz. No, sir. To the best of my knowledge that 
is all that was discussed. The President returned the papers to me, 
and I left the study. 

Mr. Richardson. That is all you know about it? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir ; that is all. 

[124-4^] Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions. 

The Chairman. What time would you say you went to the Presi- 
dent's study that night ? 

Commander Schulz. It was approximately 9 : 30. 

The Chairman. How long were you there altogether. 

Commander Schulz. I would say about one-half hour, sir. 

The Chairman. One-half hour ? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. So you left there about ten ? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Then where did you go ? 

Commander Schulz. Then I went back to the office which I men- 
tioned before. 

The Chairman. Back to what you call the situation room ? 

Commander Schulz. No, sir. The situation room was a later 
development, after the war began. 

The Chairman. Oh, I see. You went back to the place from which 
you departed to deliver the message ? 

Commander Schulz, Yes, sir ; that is correct. 

The Chairman. Congressman Cooper ? 

The Vice Chairman. No questions, thank you. 

The Chairman. Senator George? 

Senator George. No questions. 

The Chairman. Mr. Clark? 

[12446] Mr. Clark. No questions. 

The Chairman. Mr. Lucas ? Mr. Murphy ? 

Mr. Murphy. Commander, you just flew in from California, did 
you? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir; that is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. You got off the plane within the last hour or so? 

Commander Schulz. No, sir. I arrived at the National Airport 
at about 9 o'clock this morning. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you ever commit any of this material to writing 
at any time ? 

Commander Schulz. No, sir ; I have not. 

Mr. Murphy. You have no notes whatsoever ? 

Commander Schulz. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, I would like to have you just relax yourself 
just a little bit ; you are tense. No other questions. 

The Chairman. Mr. Brewster? 

Senator Brewster. I will pass at this time. 

The Chairman. Mr. Gearhart? 

Mr. Gearhart. Were there any other high ranking Army or Navy 
officers that called at the White House that night, that you know of? 

Commander Schulz. Not to my knowledge, sir. However, I was 
not in that part of the Wliite House, except during this [12447] 
half hour, where I would have seen them. 

Mr. Gearhart. Your office was in the annex near the executive end 
of the building? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4665 

Commander Schulz. I believe that is what it is called, sir. It is 
the annex over toward the State Department. 

Mi*. Gearhart. That is right. And where is that office to which you 
have referred ? In the basement ? 

Commander Schulz. It is on the basement level ; yes, sir. I haven't 
been in it now for over 4 years but I believe it is on the street level, 
however, on the side on which you come in on. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Your particular room was off of the mail 
receiving room? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir; that is correct. 

Mr. Gearhart, How long did you remain on duty that night? 

Commander Schulz. Until about 10 : 30. 

Mr. Gearhart. And when did you return to duty the next day? 

Commander Schulz. The next day, after the news of the attack, I 
called Admiral Beardall after I had heard the news, and then came 
back to the White House. 

Mr. GearHx^rt. Arriving at the White House at what time? 

Commander Schulz. About 4 o'clock, I would say, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is all. 

[i^448] The Chairman. Mr. Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. I just want to take the situation after you left 
the President's study. You then returned, as I understand it, to the 
mail room? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir ; that is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. And the mail room had these long tables in it ? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir; that is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, was Captain Kramer sitting at those tables 
when you went back, at one of the tables ? 

Commander Schulz. It is my collection that he was. 

Senator Ferguson. And then did you return to Captain Kramer 
this pouch? Is that your recollection. 

Commander Schulz. That is my recollection. The happenings dur- 
ing that particular period are somewhat hazy but I know that I did 
not have the papers the next day. Further, I hadn't too suitable a place 
to put them during the night because of their high secrecy classifica- 
tion. 

Senator Ferguson. You had worked in the Naval ONI so that you 
knew how secret these papers were and how valuable they were? 

Commander Schulz. I was in the Communications Division rather 
than ONI. ^ 

Senator Ferguson. All right, Communications. 
[1244^] Commander Schulz. However, I knew of their nature 
and their general source because of their importance. 

Senator Ferguson. And, therefore, "you wouldn't have cared to keep 
them at home or where you stayed, and you did not leave them any- 
where in the White House? 

Commander Schulz. I would not have kept them under any cir- 
cumstances, no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So that is your reason for saying that you aave 
them to Commander Kramer, or he was Captain at that time," was he? 
Commander Schulz. I am not sure of his rank but it is the same 
Captain Kramer. 

Senator Ferguson. What was your grade at that time? 

79716 — i6— pt. 10 6 



4666 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Commander Schulz. I was a Lieutenant at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. And you would say that you were in all about 
1 hour or I/2 hour, I think you said, in the President's study ? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir; that is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you have any other conversation that 
night later with Commander Beardall? 

Commander Schulz. I recall having talked on the telephone to then 
Captain Beardall after I had shown the papers to the President. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you give us that conversation? 

[124-50] Commander Schulz. I do not remember the exact 
words. However, the purpose of the call was to inform him that I had 
received the papers, the President had seen them and I had carried out 
my instructions ; then I would be free to go home. 

Senator Ferguson. And you did get home about what hour that 
night? 

Commander Schulz. I left the White House at about 10 : 30. 

Senator Ferguson. Did Admiral Beardall ask you for the details 
of the conversation of what the President may have said ? 

Commander Schulz. I don't recall that he did ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you do not recall telling Admiral Beardall 
at any time this conversation that you have related here ? 

Commander Schulz. I never told any one during the course of the 
war of any conversation being held that night in the President's 
presence. 

Senator Ferguson. And to whom have you repeated this conversa- 
tion? 

Commander Schulz. I have repeated it since to you and to Lieu- 
tenant Commander Baecher and the gentleman who was with you at 
the time ; I did not know his name. 

Mr. MuRPHT. By "you" you mean who ? 

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson? 

[124^1] Commander Schulz. I mean 

Mr. Murphy. You mean you told Senator Ferguson about this 
before today ? 

Senator Ferguson. This is Mr. Morgan. 

Commander Schulz. No, sir; not before today. Immediately pre- 
ceding my coming to the chair, within 10 minutes before I came to 
the chair here. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Morgan was present and Commander 
Baecher was present? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir ; that is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, had you talked it over with anyone else 
prior to that? 

Commander Schulz. No, sir • I have not. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, can you tell us whether or not that was 
the first week of your assignment there, so that you had not been 
with the President prior to his Warm Springs trip and this particular 
week in the Wliite House ? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir ; that is correct. My first association 
with the White House in any capacity was on the Friday of the week 
before, when I made the trip to Warm Springs. I did not go to the 
White House at that time. The first time I was ever in the Wliite 
House was on the 5th of December. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4667 

Senator Ferguson. Now, on the 5tli of December did any messages 
come in, to your knowledge ? 

[124S2] Commander Schulz. There was one message. I had 
that in my custod}^ As I recall, it was given to me by Captain 
Beardall and had already been shown to the President. At least it 
was given to me only for custody, and it concerned the reported burn- 
ing of Japanese consular codes. It came to me on a normal Navy 
Department secret message form. Its original source, I recall, was 
from Australia, but I do not know and do not recall who actually 
originated the message. 

Senator Ferguson. Did it say anything about the Japanese de- 
stroying a code machine in Batavia or sending it back to Tokyo, do 
you recall? 

Commander Schulz. No, sir ; no machine Avas mentioned. 

Senator Ferguson. No machine was mentioned in that particular 
message ? 

Comamnder Schulz. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, outside of that message, have you any in- 
formation as to any messages delivered to the President ? 

Commander Schulz. No, sir ; there were no others. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, is this the only conversation or the only 
words that you heard from the President, that you have given us, in 
relation to the Pacific or the Japanese question? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir ; that is correct, the only words. 

Senator Ferguson. Nothing at Warm Springs, any messages 
[124^S] there or any conversations about the Far East? 

Commander Schulz. No, sir; I had no such material or informa- 
tion there. 

Senator Ferguson. And you heard no conversations by the Presi* 
dent there ? 

Commander Schulz. No. sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, there is one thing I am not entirel}' clear 
on and that is when the President said that he did not want Admiral 
Stark or "Betty," as he referred to him first, called from the National 
Theater because it would, in your language, arouse people, or what 
was the word ? 

Commander Schulz. It might have caused public alarm. 

Senator Ferguson. Public alarm ? 

Commander Schulz. Or at least speculation. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, and there was one thing said about that lie 
didn't want that to happen for another hour? 

Commander Schulz. He made no statement as to when it would be 
all right that public knowledge might be all right. His statement, his 
words were, in effect, that he would reach the admiral later. The 
matter of it being another hour is my own observation based on the 
fact that the theater eventually was going to close that evening. 

Senator Ferguson. So the President did not use the words "an- 
other hour" ? 

[12454,] Commander Schulz. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you took that to mean that he would get him 
after the show ? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you have any knowledge as to whether 
the President did reach Admiral Stark that night or not ? 



4668 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Commander Schulz. No, sir, I do not know. 

Senator Ferguson. And as I understand it then, you did not work 
or ffo to the White House on the morning of the 7th. 

Commander Schulz. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And will you tell us who was the President's 
naval aide on Sunday morning, if you have any knowledge of it? 

Commander Schulz. Captain Beardall was the naval aide at that 
time, on that morning. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. To your knowledge, this other gentleman, 
the other lieutenant — and I did not catch his name. 

Commander Schulz. The officer who was my assistant was Ensign 
Carson. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that C-fi-r-s-o-n? 

Commander Schulz. C-a-r-s-o-n- Carson was not there that morn- 
ing either. He had only reported for work the pre- [12^55~\ 
ceding day and was not yet fully instructed. 

Senator Ferguson. And to your knowledge then he was really not 
authorized to handle this locked pouch, is that correct? 

Commander Schulz. He had never been left there alone for such 
an assignment before. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, there is only about one other thing, and 
that is when did Admiral Beardall first tell you to remain there that 
night to receive this special message for the President ? 

Commander Schulz. It was aabout 4 o'clock. The time is not 
exact 

Senator Ferguson. Near the time. 

Commander Schulz. It was late in the afternoon, before the ad- 
miral left, himself. 

Senator Ferguson. What time did Admiral Beardall leave? 

Commander Schulz. I do not recall exactly, but about 5 :30, 1 should 
say. 

Senator Ferguson. And you were the only one that remained on 
duty or did Carson stay with you ? 

Commander Schulz. No. sir, Carson left, also, and I remained. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, when did you first learn that 
you were going to be a witness here? 

Commander Schulz. I learned definitely only on the 12th 
[J24-56] of this month ; that is about 3 days ago. I had previous 
indication about the 1st of Derember, when I was informed by Lieu- 
tenant Commander Baecher that because of my having been on duty 
at the White House at that time that I might be called. I did not re- 
ceive definite word. 

Senator Fekguson. Were you then here in Washington ? 

Commander Schulz. No, sir. I was in Bremerton, Washington, 
the Puget Sound Navy Yard at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Was Baecher there or did he telephone you ? 

Commander Schulz. He telephoned to me. 

Senator Ferguson. And did he ask you to hold yourself in readi- 
ness for a call? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir; in effect. 

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me? 

Commander Schulz. In effect, to expect to come. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And did you tell him at that time what 
you knew? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4669 

Commander Schulz. Not in as great detail as I have today, but 
I mentioned the fact that I had received the material from Captain 
Kramer and that I had personally delivered it to the President and 
stayed there while he read it. 

Senator Fergusox. Yes. And have you been called by any other 
board or anyone else to get your story, to get your [J24'57] ver- 
sion of what happened ^ 

Commander Schulz. No, sir; I have not. 

Senator Ferguson. This is the first time that you have testified? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir; that is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did anyone else call you and tell you that 
you might be a witness ? 

Commander Schulz. No, sir ; no one has. 

Senator Ferguson. You were on the Indiana when you got word 
to come into San Francisco to get off? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir; I was. The ship was at sea and 
we received orders from the Bureau of Personnel that I proceed here 
for this purpose. 

Senator Ferguson. And your ship pulled into San Francisco ? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir; the ship came into San Francisco 
yesterday morning. 

Senator Ferguson. You took a plane and landed here at 9 o'clock 
this morning? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir; that is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

The Vice Chairman. When are you going back? 

Commander Schulz. Sunday or Monday, I would think, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I have two questions. 

You say you talked to Mr. Morgan and Senator Fergu- 
[12458] son. Where was that ? 

Commander Schulz. That was in the hall, just beyond the large 
door over there. 

Mr. Murphy. With only those two persons present before you came 
into the presence of the committee ? 

Commander Schulz. And Lieutenant Commander Baecher. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, one other question. Did you know any- 
thing about the President dispatching a message to the Emperor on 
the night of December 6th, the Emperor of Japan ? 

Commander Schulz. I knew that a message had been sent since 
during the discussion with Mr. Hopkins the President mentioned that 
he had sent a message to the Emperor and he made a point of the fact 
that he had sent it to the Emperor as Chief of State and not to Tojo 
as Premier. He had sent the message to the Emperor and such men- 
tion of it as was made in my presence concerned only Indochina. 

Mr. Murphy. But that had been sent, apparently, before the con- 
versation that you heard down there ? 

Commander Schulz. Whether it had actually been sent I do not 
know, but I know the President had drafted it. 

Mr. Murphy. That is all. 

Mr. Keefe. Just one question. 

Commander, you made a statement that you believed that the 
President was expecting this message. Did I so under- [124^9] 
stand you ? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir, that is what I said. 



4670 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. All right. 

Commander Schulz. And such was my impression. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, I would like to pursue that just a little bit further. 

Commander Schulz, My reason for telling that was that Admiral 
Beardall, knowing its importance and knowing that it was coming 
out, told the President to expect it during the evening. 

Mr. Keefe. How did Admiral Beardall know that it was coming? 

Commander Schulz. It had been — it is my understanding that it 
had been received in the Navy Department and was being worked on. 
It, of course, takes time, some time to obtain the English text in such 
a message. 

Mr. Keefe. Were you aware of the fact that there was a so-called 
pilot message ? 

Commander Schulz. No, sir ; I was not. 

Mr. Keefe. I would like to see if we can get that cleared up. You 
have no knowledge yourself as to the fact that there was a pilot mes- 
sage which came in some time around about noon on the 6th, which 
indicated that a long message was going to be sent to the Japanese 
Ambassador? 

[l^^SO] There is evidence before the committee that that pilot 
message was delivered to certain people around about 3 o'clock. Do 
you know whether it was delivered to the White House by the Navy 
that afternoon ? 

Commander Schulz. I have no knowledge of that, sir. I did not 
receive it or see it personally. 

Mr. Keefe. At least Admiral Beardall before he left indicated to 
you that they were expecting a message in reply from the Japs ? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir ; a message at least. He did not indi- 
cate the substance, but a message which was a decode. 

Mr. Keefe. An important message ? 

Commander Schulz. And an important message. 

Mr. Keefe. And did he indicate to you that he had advised the 
President that there might be such a message ? 

Commander Schulz. I don't recall that he did; no, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. Now, when the President got through read- 
ing it, as I understood your testimony, he showed it to Hopkins and 
said, "This means war," and Hopkins concurred. 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir. The words may not be exact but that 
is the substance. 

Mr. Keefe. Then the discussion went on between Mr. Hopkins and 
the President as to possibly where the Japs might strike and you re- 
member discussions of Indochina ? 

[1£4^1] Commander Schulz. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. But there was no mention of Pearl Harbor or Hawaii ? 

Commander Schulz. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Or any other places that you recall ? 

Commander aS'chulz. No other places that I recall; none that I 
recall. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you recall with any degree of certainty. Commander, 
just what tile conversation was with respect to the transmission of this 
message direct to the Emperor of Japan and how that came into the 
conversation ? 

Commander Schulz. It came into the conversation when the dis- 
position of forces in Indochina was mentioned, and the way it came 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4671 

in was that in this message to the Emperor it is my understanding 
that the j)resence of Japanese forces in Indochina was mentioned and 
that the — I have never read the message, if I may say, Congressman, 
I would like to have you understand that — but, however, I recall men- 
tion being made, the President quoting from this message that he 
drafted to the effect that he had told Hirohito that he could not see 
how it could be held that there was any danger to peace in the Far 
East as far as the United States was concerned if there were no Japa- 
nese forces in Indochina. 

[124(^2] In other words, we were not going to attack Indochina, 
nor was anyone else. Therefore, the presence of Japanese forces in 
Indochina was for an aggressive purpose or for ulterior purposes on 
the part of the Japanese. We ourselves held no threat for Indochina. 

That also is in substance, but I do remember that point being 
brought out. 

[124'6'3] Mr. Keefe. Did you get the impression from that con- 
versation that the message to the Emperor had been sent, or was 
going to be sent ? 

Commander Schulz. I cannot recall that definitely, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now w^hen the President said he wanted to get in touch 
with "Betty'', did he seem to know wdiere "Betty" Stark was that 
night? 

Commander Schulz. No, sir; not initially, at least, because I re- 
call that he started to place a telephone call for Admiral Stark. 

Mr. KJEEFE. Then did word come back that Admiral Stark was at 
the National Theater? Is that what I understood you to say? 

Commander Schulz. Word came back that that was where he 
might be reached. Personally, I have no knowledge that he was 
there, but the President was informed that that was where the admiral 
had either left word or else someone who could get in touch w^ith him 
expected to find him there. 

Mr. Keefe. And then the President indicated that he would not 
bother calling him to the phone, that he would get him later after the 
theater was over ? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir ; that is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. That is the impression you got ? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir. 

[12464] Mr. Keefe. That is because he felt Admiral Stark's 
leaving his box in the theater might cause some speculation and 
arouse some public discussion, or alarm. 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir ; that was my impression. 

Mr. Keefe. Now when you got to the President's study the only 
people who were there were the President and Harry Hopkins? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir ; that is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. That is all. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I just ask a question? 

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. You are a graduate of Annapolis ? 

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir ; that is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. What year ? 

Commander Schulz. 1934, sir. 

The Chairman. Thank you again. Commander. 



4672 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Commander Schulz. You are welcome. 
The Chairman. You are excused. 

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call Admiral 
Rochefort. 

The Chairman. Admiral Rochefort, come forward, please. 
The Vice Chairman. It is Captain Rochefort. 

[7^4^.5] TESTIMONY OF CAPT. JOSEPH JOHN 

EOCHEEORT, UNITED STATES NAVY 

(Having been first duly sworn by the chairman.) 

The Chairman. What is your rank ? 

Captain Rochefort. I was about to thank you. Senator, for pro- 
moting me. I am actually a captain. 

The Chairman. Oh, yes. You are not averse to a real promotion if 
it comes your way, I suppose. 

Captain Rochefort. I would appreciate it, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Captain, will ,you state your name? 

Captain Rochefort. Joseph John Rochefort. 

Mr. Richardson. How old are you, Captain? 

Captain Rochefort. Forty-six years, sir. 

Mr, Richardson. How long have you been in the Navy ? 

Captain Rochefort. Since 1918, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. When were you first assigned to Hawaii? 

Captain Rochefort. You mean my first trip there, sir? 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. 

Captain Rochefort. The first trip was in 1920 — 1921. 

[I24B6] Mr. Richardson. How long were you there then? 

Captain Rochefort. Approximately 2 months. 

Mr. Richardson. When did you next go to Hawaii? 

Captain Rochefort. In 1924:. 

Mr. Richardson. And how long did you stay that time ? 

Captain Rochefort. Approximately the same length of time, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Then when did you return there on regular assign- 
ment ? 

Captain Rochefort. In April 1939, when the Hawaiian Detach- 
ment was formed. 

Mr. Richardson. And in what capacity? 

Captain Rochefort. At that time on the staff' of Commander, 
Scouting Force, who was also Commander, Hawaiian Detachment. 

Mr. Richardson. Wliat changes occurred in your assignments 
thereafter ? 

Captain Rochefort. In May of 1941 I received dispatch orders to 
report to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, for duty. 

Mr. Richardson. That would be Admiral Bloch? 

Captain Rochefort. That would be Admiral Bloch, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Right. 

Captain Rochefort. In personal correspondence [124^7^ I 
was informed tliat my duty there would consist of Officer in Charge 
of the Communications Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Richardson. When did you assume those duties ? 

Captain Rochefort. In June 1941. 

Mr. Richardson. How long did you remain in that capacity? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4673 

Captain Rochefort. Until October 1942. 

Mr. Richardson. AVho was there in your unit when you took 
charge ? 

Captain Rochefort. Approximately 10 officers and 20 men at Pearl 
Harbor, and an additional 10 officers and approximately 50 to 60 men 
in the outlying stations. 

Mr. Richardson. What was the name of your unit as it was known 
at Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Rochefort. After I arrived there we changed the name 
slightly and called it the Combat Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval 
District. 

Mr. Richardson. What were your duties during November and 
December 1941? 

Captain Rochefort. Very briefly, sir, to find out about all of the 
Japanese naval cryptographic systems. 

Mr. Richardson. What experience had a^ou had in connection with 
cryptographic work? 

Captain Rochefort. During the period 1925 to 1927 I [1^468] 
was in charge of all cryptographic work for the Navy Department in 
Washington. I had had, subsequently, 3 years in Japan as a lan- 
guage officer, and on various staff's during various war problems had 
carried out cryptographic research. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you speak Japanese ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Proceed, and give us a little detail as to the scope 
of your duties with your assignment in Hawaii. 

Captain Rochefort. The primary duty consisted of intercepting 
all Japanese naval traffic, and of attacking all the Japanese naval 
systems contained in that traffic with the exception of- one system, 
which was being worked on in Washington, and in Cavite. 

Along with that we had organized a radio intelligence unit whose 
duties were to obtain all information available from the Japanese 
naval traffic by means other than cryptanalysis. 

We also had in the unit a mid-Pacific direction-finding unit with 
stations in Dutch Harbor, Samoa, Pearl Harbor, and Midway. 

Mr. Richardson. What Japanese codes and ciphers were in use 
by Japan during November and December that it was [124^9] 
your duty to intercept ? 

Captain Rochefort. Of the regular systems; that is, the systems 
used for any considerable period of time, approximately 8 to 10, in 
addition to which there would be several what we called minor sys- 
tems, or systems used for specific purposes, such as a fleet problem. 

Mr. Richardson. And what field was covered by those codes and 
ciphers that you were intercepting? 

Captain Rochefort. All Japanese naval traffic of all descriptions, 
including personnel matters, engineering matters, operational intelli- 
gence, direction finding; in short, all types of naval communication, 
including ship movements. 

Mr. Richardson. Ship locations ? 

Captain Rochefort. Ship locations would be incidental. That is, 
they would be contained in the traffic. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, were there any Japanese naval codes that 
you could intercept, but could not translate at Hawaii ? 



4674 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. How many ? 

Captain Rochefort. In terms of volume of traffic, perhaps 90 per- 
cent. 

Mr. Richardson, Let me see if I get it accurately. [12470] 
Out of all the interceptions that you had with reference to Japanese 
naval operations, you were only able to decode and therefore under- 
stand at Hawaii approximately 10 percent of that traffic ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. You were not able there to handle by decipering 
what is known as the purple code ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. That was a diplomatic system. 

Mr. Richardson. Give me the designations of the other codes there 
that you could not handle. 

Captain Rochefort. Diplomatic or naval, sir ? 

Mr. Richardson. Well, both. 

Captain Rochefort. I will put it this way : We were not handling 
any of the diplomatic systems. We were directed to attempt to process 
all naval systems with the exception of one, which I previously men- 
tioned. 

Mr. Richardson. Was the fact as to what section you were expected 
to handle and decode the result of a working arrangement between you 
and Washington ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Was it true that messages might be intercepted 
by you that you were unable to decode ? 

Captain Rochefort. Naval ; yes, sir. 

[1247 J] Mr. Richardson. And when you intercepted a dispatch 
or information that you were unable to decode, what was your duty 
then with respect to that information ? 

Captain Rochefort. If it were other than Navy, we would send it 
to Washington. But I might point out, sir, that the circuits that we 
were covering were all naval circuits in which no diplomatic traffic 
would be passed. 

Mr. Richardson. By way of illustration. Captain, let me show you 
two dispatches here that appear to have been intercepted by the Army 
at Hawaii — not by the Navy but by the Army, and ask you what codes 
they came in on ? What is the page, please, so it may be identified for 
the record ? 

Captain Rochefort. On page 21 of Exhibit 2, 1 see two dispatches, 
the first one No. 123, which was translated on 30 December 1941, and 
it is in the J-19 system. 

[124.72] Mr. Richardson. Now if the Army had presented that 
dispatch to you, could you have decoded it in Hawaii ? 

Captain Rochefort. Not without special equipment.^ 

Mr. Richardson. Well, did you have the equipment in Hawaii that 
would permit you to decode that message? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. On December 2, 1941 ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Now let me show you the message number 128 on 
page 26 of Exhibit 2, dated 5 December. Will you tell me what code 
that came in on ? That is also an Army message. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4675 

Captain Rochefort. That came in the PA-K2 system. 

Mr. Richardson. If you had been requested by the Army to decode 
that dispatch would you have been able to do it at Hawaii ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. In about how long a time from the time it was 
presented to you ? 

Captain Rochefort. Probably 6 hours to 6 days. Three days may 
be a good average, 

Mr. Richardson. Who was in charge of G-2 in Hawaii for the 
Army ? 

Captain Rochefort. Colonel Fielder, sir. 

[124T3] Mr. Richardson, And who was under Fielder as his 
Chief Assistant? 

Captain Rochefort, Colonel Bicknell was at that time, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. You knew both of those gentlemen ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Were your relations with them cordial ? 

Captain Rochefort. My relations, I should say particularly with 
Colonel Fielder, were most cordial, 

Mr, Richardson. How frequently would you see them? 

Captain Rochefort, Perhaps twice a week, sir. 

INIr. Richardson. Was there any discussion between you as to the 
intelligence that you were handling and the intelligence they were 
handling ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir ; but it would be in very general terms, 
because our jobs were different. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there ever any request by the Army for as- 
sistance from you and your outfit ? 

Captain Rochefort. In my particular work, sir? 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. 

Captain Rochefort. To the best of my recollection not until after 
the 7th. After the 7th there was. 

Mr. Richardson. To whom was the information that you picked 
up in Hawaii transmitted by you ? 

Captain Rochefort. To the Commander-in-Chief verbally, 
[12474] and by means of written sunmiaries to the Navy Depart- 
ment and commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, by dispatch or by air 
mail. 

Mr. Richardson. Then you would turn over what you had to Lay- 
ton, and Layton had the duty of transmitting it to the commander in 
chief? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. In addition to that we would send 
over with the summary a qualified officer to discuss the matter in de- 
tail with Layton, if he so wished. 

Mr. Richardson. Are you familiar. Captain, with a dispatch that 
appears in the record here, sent through the Army, requesting G-2 in 
Hawaii to contact you for information with reference to weather 
broadcasts ? 

Captain Rochefort. I have heard of such a message, sir, but I did 
not hear of it up until a short time ago. 

Mr. Richardson. There never at any time was presented any com- 
munication to you to contact you ? 

Captain Rochefort. Not for that express purpose. 



4676 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Richardson. Based upon such a dispatch, as far as you knew? 

Captain Rochefort. Not for that express purpose, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you know how the messages went out from 
Hawaii, from the Japanese consuls to Tokyo? 

Captain Rochefort. I have no first-hand information on [12475] 
that, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. I did not understand. 

Captain Rochefort. I have no first-hand information on that? 

Mr. R chardson. With reference to the dispatches from Honokdu 
to Tokyo during the first w^eek in December, such as is iUustrated by 
the number 247 here, indicating the message went out under PA-K2, 
woukl such a message as that go by cable or would it go by some other 
form of transmission? 

Captain Rochefcrt. It would go either by cable or by radio. 

Mr. Richardson. Were there any arrangements that you had which 
would have enabled you to know what was being sent out by cable? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. If we had been asked to do it, or 
directed to do it, we could have possibly obtained the information. 

[12476] Mr. Richardson. What is the basis for that statement. 
Captain ? 

Captain Rochefort. The basis for the statement is, sir, I have had 
considerable experience in attempting to obtain so-called commercial 
traffic over a period of years, and there are one or two Federal statutes 
in the matter which made the thing rather delicate to try. 

Furthermore, I knew that the authorities in Washington were ob- 
taining the information in sufficient detail, and if they required any 
assistance, they would ask me to get some information from Honolulu. 

In other words, not receiving aii}^ requests, or direction from the 
Navy Department, I assumed they were getting all the information 
they needed from the diplomatic traffic. 

Mr. Richardson. Then, such a dispatch as this shown on page 29 of 
Exhibit 2, might have gone to Tokyo either by cable or by radio 
broadcast ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And if you had made the effort, would it have 
been possible for you to have intercepted and decoded that message? 

Captain Rochefort. If it had gone by radio, we could, of course, 
have intercepted it. If it had gone by cable, special arrangements 
would have to have been made in order to obtain copies of the cable 
traffic. 

[124.77] Mr. Richardson. Wliy were not such arrangements 
made with reference to knowledge of cable transmissions? 

Captain Rochefort. Speaking of Honolulu, sir? 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. 

Captain Rocheford. Because attempts had been made in previous 
3'ears to obtain the same information, without success, and I had 
been led to believe, without making any specific inquiries, that the 
Navy Department, or the War Department, or both were receiving 
that information from sources known only to them. 

Senator Lucas. What was your last statement based on ? You said 
you were led to believe. 

Captain Rochefort. In personal conversation, sir, with officers 
from Washington on their way to or from the Far East. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4677 

iSenator Brewster. Will you name any of them ? 

Captain Eochefort. No, sir. Of course, I was in communication 
with Captain SafFord. He was in charge of the entire organization. 
The others I cannot recall their names at this time. They were 
officers going and coming from the Asiatic Fleet. 

Mr. Richardson. During the week prior to December 7, were you 
actively translating for the information of the commander in chief in 
Hawaii all of the messages coming [124'^8] in to Honolulu and 
going out of Honolulu, which it was possible for you to decode ? 

Captain Eochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Could you, by any arrangement with the cable 
company, have increased the number of messages that you could have 
translated and reported to the commander in chief? 

Captain Eochefort. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, Mr. Counsel, 
that had been done on either the M or the 4th of Deceniber, on which 
certain messages were made available to me by the District Intelligence 
Officer. They were being handled in Washington, but I undertook 
to attempt to handle them myself in Honolulu, as well as send back 
copies to Washington immediately, and thus we did read some before 
the 7th, but the important ones after the 7th. 

Mr. EiCHARDSON. And those that you read were transmitted by you? 

Captain Eochefort. To the commander in chief. 

Mr. Richardson. To the commander in chief, in due course? 

Captain Eochefort. Yes. Actually, I think what happened, sir, 
was I told Layton that we had some messages, but they were absolutely 
of no value then. They involved such things as wages, visas, and 
that sort of thing. 

Mr. Richardson. Then, it is very definite, is it not, [i^^7^] 
that there never was any time prior to Pearl Harbor when your station 
in Hawaii could handle any of the purple or other high Japanese code 
transmissions ? 

Captain Eochefort. No, sir ; we could not handle them. 

Mr. Richardson. And that, of course, would include the code J-19 
that you spoke of a moment ago ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. But it would not include the PA-K2? 

Captain Rochefort. We could handle the PA-K2 and lower classi- 
fications. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, did you make up, while you were there, a 
communications intelligence summary covering specific periods? 

Captain Eochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. EiCHARDSON. For transmission from your department to the 
commander in chief? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. What was that? 

Captain Rochefort. The communications intelligence summary 
was a daily report to the commander in chief. Pacific, of all informa- 
tion obtained, estimates made, and deductions drawn from the pre- 
vious day's traffic. 

Mr. Richardson. How often ? Daily ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir, daily. 

[134^0] Mr. Richardson. And covering the period of a week 
or 10 days prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster, you furnished, as part 



4678 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of your duty to the commander in chief, a daily intelligence sum- 
mary, to acquaint him with everything that had passed through your 
unit during the preceeding 24 hours ? 

Captain KocHEFORT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. I show you our Exhibit 115, and ask you whether 
those are samples of that intelligence summary. 

(The document was handed to Captain Rochefort.) 

Captain Rochefort. Yes; they are. 

Mr. RicHARj^soN. Then the fact is, Captain, that your activities 
there, as is indicated by these intelligence summaries, were quite 
definitely confined to Japanese ship movements, and other matters 
connected with naval operations which came in codes which you were 
able to handle and translate? 

Captain Rochefort. About 10 percent of which we were able to 
handle and translate, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, all that did come to you that you were 
able to handle and translate came from ship movements? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And other similar activities of the Japanese naval 
forces ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

[J24^J] Mr. Richardson. And did not include the diplomatic 

intercepts, which, it was your understanding, as I understood your 
testimony, were being handled by Washington, and at Cavite? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there any arrangement, so far as you know, 
between your station in Hawaii and Cavite with respect to the inter- 
change of communications? 

Captain Rochefort. There had been an arrangement, which had 
existed for some years, in which one of the three stations, that is, 
Cavite, Pearl Harbor, or Washington, if they had information of 
value to one or more of the other stations, it was immediately passed 
to that station by radio, or by airmail. 

Mr. Richardson. When was that stopped? 

Captain Rochefort. I do not think it was ever stopped ; not to my 
knowledge, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there any cessation of it ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. There might have been a possible 
lowering in the number of messages which were sent to us for in- 
formation, but that would be because they felt they were more tech- 
nical in nature and did not interest us. 

Mr. Richardson. Captain, if there had been suitable empowering 
directions from Washington, could there have [124S^^ been 
closer and better cooperation between your unit and G-2 in Hawaii ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. When I say "yes, sir" that may 
sound as if there were not full cooperation. We did cooperate to the 
fullest extent possible, bearing in mind the different jobs we had. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you know anything of your own knowledge 
about the G-2 set-up there ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir; from conversations with Colonel 
Fielder. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4679 

Mr. Richardson. Do you know what they were able to intercept 
and decode? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir; we did not discuss that matter. 

Mr. RiCHARDSox. You were unable, in many instances, to discuss 
with G-2 the character of the intelligence that you were receiving, 
were you ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir; by reason of the fact that, insofar as 
I knew, Colonel Fielder, as G-2, was not authorized to receive "ultra." 

Mr. RicHARDSox. Then there was a large field of intelligence that 
would pass through your unit that you could not communicate to G-2, 
or any officer in G-2 ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. I could not communicate 
[J £483] it to G-2 as ultra, but I could communicate the sense of 
it, which I did. 

Mr. RicHARDsox. Would you be able to say that that duty was 
carried out to the extent that you feel G-2 got all of the information 
from you that would have been useful to them ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RiCKARDSOx. I have no further questions. 

The Chairmax. What is your assignment now ? 

Captain Rochefort. On duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence, 
sir. 

The Chahimax. Here in Washington ? 

Captain Rochefort. Here in Washington. 

The Chairmax. How long have you had that assignment? 

Captain Rochefort. Since approximately the middle of December 
1945, sir. 

The Chairmax. And prior to that, where have you been ? 

Captain Rochefort. I have been ordered to sea duty, sir, at my own 
request, in October. 

The Chairmax. How long after the attack on Pearl Harbor before 
you were assigned to some other place? 

Captain Rochefort. In October 1942, sir. 

The Chairmax. Nearly a year ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

[1£4^4] The Chairmax. You were not in Washington at any 
time immediately prior to the attack and immediately after? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir ; I was not. 

The Chairmax. Mr. Cooper. 

The Vice Chairmax. No questions. 

The Chairmax. Senator George? 

Senator George. I have no questions. 

The Chairmax. Mr. Clark. 

Mr. Clark isn't here. 

Senator Lucas. 

Senator Lucas. I would like to pass for the moment. 

The Chairmax. Mr. Murphy ? 

Mr. Murphy. Is it commander or captain ? 

Captain Rochefort. Captain, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Captain Rochefort, as I understand it, each day at 
Pearl Harbor you prepared an intelligence summary, which in turn 
was turned over by you to Layton. That would be Captain Layton ? 

Captain Rochefort. Captain Layton now, sir. 



4680 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. Then Captain Layton himself would make his own 
estimate of the situation, and present it to Admiral Kimmel, or would 
he present your intelligence summary? 

Captain Rociiefort. He would present our intelligence summary, 
sir, in addition to which he would prepare for [134^6] Aclmiral 
Kimmel, at infrequent intervals perhaps an over-all general estimate. 

Mr. Murphy. But, at any rate, each of your summaries would, in 
the ordinary course of events, be presented to Admiral Kimmel daily ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, on November 1, the Japanese changed their 
code signals, did they not ? 

Captain Rochefort. Call sign, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Call sign. 

Then sometime towards the end of November you predicted that the 
Japs were about to change their call sign signals again? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. In Navy parlance, that would be pretty extraordinary, 
wouldn't it, a change within less than 30 days of call sign signals? 

Captain Rochefort. It would have been the first time it had hap- 
pened, to my knowledge, yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And you conveyed that information to Layton, and 
he in turn to Kimmel, did he not ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Then, about the first of December there was an actual 
change of the call signs again, was there not? 

[124^6] Ca]:)tain Rochefort. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. That too was quite unusual, wasn't it, the fact that 
they actually changed it? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Ordinarily it would be 6 months to a year before 
they would make such a change; isn't that right? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. The periods in which they were being 
kept in effect were comparatively smaller. 

Mr. Murphy. It is also a fact, is it not, sir, that in your daily 
intelligence summaries, you stated definitely and positively that the 
Japanese appeared to be preparing for a major offense in the Pacific? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. About wlien was it that you stated that in your 
summary? 

Captain Rochefort. We prepared a special dispatch along that line 
on the 26th of November, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And on that day you felt the Japanese were prepared 
for a move on a large scale ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. You also predicted in your daily summaries the fact 
that the Japanese were moving in the direction of Hawaii with their 
submarines, did vou not? 

[124^7] Captain Rochefort. We did not say they were moving 
in the direction of Hawaii. 

Mr. Murphy. You said they were moving eastward ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. And moving eastward was in the direction of Hawaii, 
so far as our possessions were concerned, Midway, and the United 
States? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4681 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MuRPHT. They were moving, at any rate, from the Asiatic coast 
and from the Japanese coast in the direction generally due east, weren'^ 
they? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And due east would be Midway, Johnston, Hawaii, 
and the west coast of the United States, wouldn't it ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And you showed that in your summaries, that that 
progressive move was occurring, did you not ? 

Captain Rochefort. Perhaps not in those words, sir, but that was 
the sense of it. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, to a naval man, it would mean you predicted 
the gradual move east of submarine activitv of the Japanese, would it 
not? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. As I recall, sir, we [124.88] 
said they were going to the Marshalls. 

Mr. Murphy. They were going to the Marshalls ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, 

Mr. Murphy. As far as the Marshalls were concerned, there was 
some controversy over how many carriers were in the ^Marshalls, 
wasn't there? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. You felt there were onl}^ two carriers there did you 
not? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. You were right, weren't you? 

Captain Rochefort. We said one cardiv, or carrier division — at the 
most, two carriers. 

Mr. Murphy. At the most two carriers? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. You were right and the others were wrong ? 

Captain Rochefort. I would hesitate to say. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you were right. There were only two 
down there. 

Captain Rochefort. There would be a maximum of two down there. 

Mr. Murphy. And that was your report on your daily intelligence 
summary ? 

Captain Rochefort. That was a special summary. 

[1£489] Mr. Murphy. That was a special summary. 

On the 26 ("h of November you said there were only two carriers at 
the Marshalls, and you later learned there were only two carriers at 
the Marshalls? 

Captain Rochefort. There were two carriers actually at Palau, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. There were two carriers at Palau? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Then, in addition to that, you had located en masse 
practically the entire Japanese Fleet which attacked Pearl Harbor, 
had you not ? I mean in your daily intelligence summary. 

Captain Rochefort. We located them in a negative sense, sir. We 
had lost them. We did not know where they were. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you made reference in one of your sum- 
maries, did you not, to the actual group or block, almost without 
exception, of the actual ships that had come to Pearl Harbor? 

79716— 46— pt. 10 7 



4682 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Rochefort. I do not recall that, sir. We may have. I do 
not recall that. 

Mr. MuRPHT. Now, then, the fact is you did, on your daily intelli- 
gence summary, show that the carriers were not accounted for, did 
you not? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

[IBPO] Mr. Murphy. You got to the point where you could not 
account for them, you just left them out of your report, to indicate 
that nothing; was known about them ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

As I recall, we said, "Nothing is known about carriers." 

Mr. Murphy. And the reason for doing that, as a Navy man, as a 
communications expert, was you did not want to venture an opinion 
on an unlmown quantity; isn't that correct? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes. The idea there was, by means short of 
cryptanalysis, in other words, radio intelligence, we could obtain a 
considerable amount of information. That is, without actually read- 
ing the messages. 

From that information, we found we did not know anything about 
the carriers. 

Mr. Murphy. The fact you did not know anything about them, and 
the fact that you did not put in your intelligence summary anything 
as to their being in home waters meant to indicate, did it not, to those 
who rend it. that there was a danger signal? 

Captain Rochefort. I would not say that, sir, because that condi- 
tion had obtained before. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, the fact is, you said you knew nothing about 
them. 

Captain Rochefort. Yes. 

[12491] Mr. Murphy. And, therefore, when there is an uncer- 
tainty you usually look for the worst, don't you? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. Of course, they could have gone out 
on a fleet problem, or they could have gone into radio silence, or a 
variety of other things. That happened before, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Is it the usual plan, when you have a war warning 
and you cannot account for carriers, that you prepare for the worst? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes. sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, the fact is that you did say on your summaries 
that they could not be accounted for, and then you gave that to Cap- 
tain Layton, and Captain Layton went to Admiral Kimmel, and 
presented it to him and Admiral Kimmel said to Captain Layton, 
"You mean to say they might even be coming around Diamond Head?" 
Do you remember that ? 

Captain Rochefort. I had heard that later, sir. 

[I2492] Mr. Murphy. Captain, did you, as the communications 
expert at Pearl Harbor, know anything about the war warning of 
November 27 ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir ; I did see it on or about November 27. 

IVIr. Murphy. So that you had Imowledge of that and you took 
that into consideration when you were preparing your intelligence 
summaries about the location of the carriers ; isn't that right ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Were you alarmed approaching December 2d about 
tliose carriers? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4683 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. You expected trouble was coming, did you ? 

Captain Rochefort. We all knew it Avas coming, sir. It was a 
question of where. 

Mr. Murphy. Now then, what facilities did you have for inter- 
changing what you had with your counterpart of the Army '{ 

Captain Rochefort. Personal conversation, sir, with Colonel 
Fielder in Shafter and Colonel Fielder in Pearl Harbor; meeting 
Colonel Fielder in Captain Layton's office and perhaps seeing him 
down town with Captain Mayfield. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, it has come to the committee's attention 
\^12Ii9S'\ that the FBI sent a message to Washington to the effect 
that the Japanese were destroying most of their important papers as a 
result of an intercept of a conversation of a cook in the Japanese 
consulate with Japan ; did you know about that ? 

Captain Rochefort. I did not know about the conversation at the 
time, sir. I had been informed by the district intelligence officer of 
the fact that the Japanese consulate was destroying certain papers 
and codes. 

Mr. Murphy. The only difference is that the information that Ad- 
miral Kimmel and General Short appeared to have gotten was that 
the Japanese were reported destroying papers but the FBI reported 
to Washington that they were destroying most of their important 
papers. Did you know that? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. The information was given to me 
that they were destroying their codes. 

Mr. Murphy. Codes? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, there was a message from Honolulu to 
Washington on the 6th day of December that the Japanese were de- 
stroying their codes. Did you know about that ? 

Captain Rochefort. I originated that message, sir, from Honolulu 
to Washington. 

[i^^9^] Mr. Murphy. General Short said that he never heard 
about that. Do you know whether he did or not ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir; I do not. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, do you know whether your counterpart 
in the Army knew the Japanese were destroying their codes on Decem- 
ber 6 at Hawaii ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir; because I received that information 
from the district intelligence officer. I was fairly sure without asking 
that he had received it either from the FBI or the Army and in either 
event the Army would have known about it either from the FBI or 
themselves. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate. General Short said he never heard it. 
Would you be surprised at that? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir; it could very well be that it was a 
matter which was known perhaps to somebody in General Short's 
staff and was not considered important. I don't know. 

Mr. Murphy. As a communications expert. Captain, when you 
heard of the destruction of the codes at the very place where you were 
located, what did it mean to you? 

Captain Rochefort. Well, I am trying to keep hindsight out of it. 



4684 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. Yes; I don't want present-day quarterbacks. What 
did it mean to you on the 6th with the carriers not [124^5] lo- 
cated, with the war warning message before, with the feeling that war 
was coming, and then the sign that right where you are they a^re 
destroying their codes, the expected enemy? 

Captain Rochefort. I think that my reaction at that time would 
have been that Admiral Hart is going to have himself quite a job very 
shortly. 

Mr. Murphy. You felt that at least some of the forces of the United 
States were going to be in for action ? 

Captain Rochefort. That Admiral Hart was going to have him- 
self quite a bit of work to do. 

Mr. Murphy. I have just one other question. 

Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield ? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. Captain, in order to straighten out my own mind 
I would like to ask you one or two questions. 

You originated that message that was sent to Washington ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Wherein you advised the Navy that the Japanese 
consul was destroying codes? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Now, was that information disseminated after you 
sent the code or where did the information come from in the first 
instance ? 

[12496] Captain Rochefort. The reason for sending the mes- 
sage was twofold. First, we received a message either from Washing- 
ton or from Admiral Hart, Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet, to the 
effect that the Japanese were destroying communications equipment 
in various places throughout the world, and my message to Washing- 
ton was in amplification of that message in part. 

Senator Lucas. What I am trying to find out. Captain, is what 
means you had or what liaison did you have with the Army so thai 
everyone of importance in the Army, and in the Navy, would know 
about the burning of the codes in the consulate at Hawaii ? 

Captain Rochefort. I don't think I follow you there, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Well, you knew the codes were being burned ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. You sent a message to Washington? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Who else knew ? 

Captain Rochefort, Layton. 

Senator Lucas. That codes were being burned ? 

Captain Rochefort. Layton, I was informed. 

Senator Lucas. What was your arrangement between the Army and 
Navy to get that information to the Army ? 

[124^7'] Captain Rochefort. As I said, sir, the information 
came to me from the District Intelligence Officer. 

Senator Lucas. Who was he? 

Captain Rochefort. It was Captain Mayfield, sir. He was a naval 
officer. Captain Mayfield. He gave me tlie information. In other 
words, the District Intelligence Officer then was familiar with the 
situation. He informed me and I undertook to inform Washington 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4685 

and the Commander in Chief of the Fleet and, as I said before, I was 
fairly sure that Captain Mayfield had obtained the information in 
the first instance either from the FBI or from the Army. In any 
event, I would not consider it my job to have informed either the FBI 
or the Army. 

Senator Lucas. I understand. I am trying to ascertain as to whose 
responsibility it was to disseminate that information between the 
Army and the Navy, assuming that the Navy got it first ? 

Captain Rochefgrt. The District Intelligence Officer, sir. 

Senator Lucas. That was Captain Mayfield? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. And it was his duty to inform the Commander in 
Chief of the Pacific Fleet as well as the Army ? 

[l£4dS] Captain Rochefort. No, sir. Captain Mayfield actually 
informed me and I undertook to see that the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Pacific Fleet was informed. 

Senator Lucas. So it was your duty then to see that the Commander- 
in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was informed? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Wliose duty was it in the Navy — I assume they got 
the message first — whose duty was it in the Navy in Hawaii to advise 
General Short and his staff of this important message? 

Captain Rochefort. I would say the District Intelligence Officer, sir. 

Senator Lucas. That would be Captain Mayfield? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. They must have had an arrangement for the ex- 
change of information, intelligence. 

Captain Rochefort. From what I observed they worked in close 
contact. 

Senator Lucas. Wouldn't you know about that? 

Captain Rochefort. I would not know first-hand. 

Senator Lucas. We would have to rely upon Captain Mayfield for 
that information as to whether or not he exchanged information with 
the Army on such vital information as the burning of codes at that 
particular time? 

[I2499] Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. I would liave no first- 
hand information of that. 

Senator Lucas. Thank you. 

Mr. Murphy. Captain, is there any doubt in your mind that Admiral 
Kimmel knew of this message that you sent to Washington on the 6th ? 
I believe you said that was sent by the Commandant of the Fourteenth 
Naval District to Washington. 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. That would be the office clearing the 
message that I had prepared. 

Mr. Murphy. What I mean is, do you know whether or not that 
message, that information about the destruction of codes on the 6th 
in Hawaii, got to Admiral Kimmel? 

Captain Rochefort. I naturally couldn't say positively, sir, but I 
am quite sure it would have ; quite sure. 

Mr. Murphy. How would it get there, who would be the one, 
Lay ton ? 

Captain Rochefort. From Layton ; yes, sir. 



4686 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, one other question. In Exhibit 2 there are 
a number of messages concerning ship locations in Hawaii. Do you 
recall whether or not you were translating any of the PA-K2 dis- 
patches ? 

Captain Rochefort. Not until the 3d or 4th of December, sir. 

[12600] Mr. Murphy. And some of these, though, that you did 
decode had something to do with the number of ships that were ac- 
tually in Pearl Harbor, did they not? 

Captain Rochefort. As I recall, one or two of them did, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. I wonder if you would be able to tell which ones — 
you did refer to them in your previous testimony, not before this com- 
mittee but before another committee. It may be that you didn't. Some- 
body at Hawaii did, Captain. 

Captain Rochefort. The only message that I would recall, sir, of 
any importance in the group that we worked on at Pearl subsequent 
to the night of 3 December was the rather long message pertaining to 
lights in homes and that sort of thing. 

Mr. Murphy. Had you succeeded in getting enough out of that to 
know pretty much what they were doing ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir ; unfortunately, that was not translated 
until the evening of the 10th. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you didn't know what was in it on the 
7th? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Had you translated any messages before the 7th which 
indicated an interest on the part of Tolryo in what was going on at 
Hawaii? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

[12501] Mr. Murphy. None at all? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you know that Tokyo was making inquiry of 
Honolulu for any purpose up to the 7th ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir ; I recall of no messages that indicated 
that, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, my final question : You said you expected 
there would be a lot of trouble in store for Admiral Hart. How soon 
after you heard that about the codes being destroyed at Hawaii ? 

Captain Rochefort. Not more than 3 or 4 days, sir, at the outside. 

Mr. Murphy. Thank you. sir. That is all. 

The Chairman. Senator Brewster is next. 

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave now. 

Captain, are you going to be in the city for awhile? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. I don't know that I shall want to further inter- 
rogate you, but if you will be here tomorrow I will appreciate it. 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Mr. Gearhart. 

Mr. Gearhart. Captain, how many kinds of codes are there? 

[12S02] The Chairman. Just a moment. Senator Brewster is 
next. 

Senator Brewster. I will pass. 

The Chairman. Go ahead. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4687 

Mr. Geakhart. I have heard of the Army, the Navy, and the diplo- 
matic. Are there any other classifications of codes and ciphers ? 

Captain Kochefort. Yes, sir. Most any government agency would 
have its own system or systems as well as the various commercial 
systems. * 

Mr. Gearthart. Of course, when you are monitoring for, picking up 
these codes, you don't know what they are while you are getting them, 
it is only after you get them and study them that you can classify them ; 
is that correct? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. Over a period of years we had de- 
veloped a pretty fair knowledge of the Japanese naval communication 
system which involved, among other things, a rather detailed knowl- 
edge of the radio circuits that were plied, such as between Tokyo and 
ships at sea, that sort of thing. In Pearl Harbor we merely covered or 
monitored, if you will, the circuits that we felt the most information 
was available on. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, do we have respected channels when using 
radio ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. Even if there weren't, sir, 
[WoOS] we would still find it, because we maintain special watches 
for searching the whole spectrum. 
Mr. Gearhart. You broke some of the Naval codes. 
Captain Rochefort. Sir? 

Mr. Gearhart. You were able to crack some of the naval codes. 
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Gearhart. Some of the diplomatic codes. 
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Were you able to crack any of the Army, Japanese 
Army codes? 

Captain Rochefort. We didn't try anything with the Army systems 
at all, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. The Army systems would come over the air once 
in awhile? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir, they would, but we were not covering 
any of those circuits. Our primary concern was with the Navy. When 
I say that I do not wish to be misunderstood. We were only able to 
cover a part of the naval communications system through a lack of 
personnel. 

Mr. Gearhart. Because you were way out in the middle of the 
Pacific, I suppose there weren't many Army messages coming, were 
there? 

Captain Rochefort. We could have probably picked up [1B504-] 
quite a few had we had the personnel to do it with. 

Mr. Gearhart. Once in awhile the Navy could be caught? 
Captain Rochefort. We could have, sir; but I conceived my first 
job was to put my own house in order, which was the Japanese Navy. 
Then when we were able to do that, we could look around and offer 
whatever help we could. 

Mr. Gearhart. I believe that is all. 
The Chahiman. Senator Brewster. 
Senator Brewster. I pass. 
The Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 



4688 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Captain, there was a message sent from 
OPNAV, Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, for Commander in Chief 
Asiatic Fleet, No. 061743. 

Mr. Masten, will you show him that message. 

Captain RociiEroRT. Yes, sir. ♦ 

Senator Ferguson. Now, that reads : 

In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying 
Pacific Islands, you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and con- 
fidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency. Means 
of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence 
should of course be maintained until the last moment. 

That is the way that reads. 

[12S0S] Captain RocHEFORT. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know when that was received by 
CINCPAC, which is Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir, I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you note whether or not it is marked 
"Urgent" or "Priority"? 

Captain Rochefort. I can't see from this copy, sir, what the classi- 
fication was. This copy that I have is not marked at all as far as the 
classification. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether in the Navy if it wasn t 
marked "Priority"' or "Urgent" that it would not go "Priority" or 
"Urgent" ? 

What hour was it sent out of Washington ? 

Captain Rochefort. 1743, which would be 12 : 43 Washington time. 
In other words, 43 minutes after noon. 

Senator Ferguson. On the 6th? 

Captain Rochefort. 6 December, Saturday. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you receive that prior to the attack? 

Captain Rochefort. I did not see this message prior to the attack, 

sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know when it did come to your attention ? 

Captain Rochefort. I recall having seen it. sir, and [12506] 
it must have been some time after the 7th. 

Senator Ferguson. AVhere were you at the time of the attack on 
Sunday morning at Hawaii ? 

Captain Rochefort. At Pearl Harbor, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you on duty? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. I got out there about 20 minutes after 
the attack started. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you surprised at an attack? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir ; at Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you anticipated an attack Sunday morning? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Anywhere? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Where? 

Mr. Murphy. May we get the answer as to whether he was sur- 
prised at an attack. 

(The answer was read by the reporter, as follows :) 

Yes, sir, at Pearl Harbor. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4689 

' Senator Ferguson. Did you anticipate an attack Sunday morning? 

Captain Rochefort. I anticipated an attack might occur any morn- 
ing or any afternoon certainly definitely along the China coast, pos- 
sibly in the Philippines. 

[I£r507] Senator Ferguson. Was that because of your Intelli- 
gence^ What would you draw that conclusion from i I mean, when 
I say your '"Intelligence," I mean the information that you had. 

Captain Rochefort. Probably it was due on my part at least to a 
feeling that the Japanese had more or less committed themselves in 
southeast Asia, possibly the Philippines, which would not leave very 
much for an attack on Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Ferguson. I didn't understand. 

Captain Rochefort. ^AHiich would not leave them very much in 
the wa}" of ships and planes for an attack on any other spot. 

Senator Ferguson. Wasn't the only deterrent to the Japanese move- 
ment to the south in Pearl Harbor in the form of ships ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And airplanes? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Where was the deterrent? 

Captain Rochefort. Considering the fact that we had a 5-5-3 ratio 
in the two fleets, Pearl Harbor, some 5,000 miles aloof from Tokyo, 
and one of the reasons for the 5-5-3 ratio was to give the Japanese 
a parity in their own waters, it follows that if they were going to 
the south that the existence or nonexistence of a fleet 5,000 miles 
[1250S] to the eastward was certainly not a major deterrent. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it a deterrent? 

Captain Rochefort. In my opinion not. 

Senator Ferguson. Was there any deterrent at all to them moving? 

Captain Rochefort. There would be a deterrent if the entire Japa- 
nese Fleet moved to the south thereby risked a hit and run attack 
on a certain part of their territory, yes. to that extent. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, didn't you know that the entire fleet was 
not moving south ; didn't you know from the British how many ships 
were moving into the Kra Peninsula ? 

Captain Rochefort. We could count, both from our own sources 
and other sources, a group of ships going to the south, which com- 
prised, I would say, probably a majority of the Japanese forces 
available. 

Senator Ferguson. The majority. Would you say over half? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, where did you think the other half was 
going to strike ? 

Captain Rochefort. Some, of course, would be in overhaul. Some 
we just plain lost. 

Senator Ferguson. What about those you lost ? Didn't you think 
there may be danger that they would strike ? 

[I£o09] Captain Rochefort. They could; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then why weren't you prepared at Pearl 
Harbor ? 

Captain Rochefort. You will pardon me, sir, but I had a rather 
relatively junior position in Pearl Harbor in connection witli prep- 
arations. 



4690 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. You were the head of the Intelligence section ? 

Captain Rochefoet. I. was the head of the Combat Intelligence 
Section, radio intelligence section. 

Senator Ferguson. You were the head of the Radio Combat Intel- 
ligence Section ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't it be your duty to appraise as to where 
Japan was going to attack, when Japan was going to attack and where 
she was going to attack, and with what force ? 

Captain Rochefort. Based on radio intelligence only, sir, we would. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand then that we had our 
Intelligence so divided that you only operated on radio intelligence ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then what did you mean by your last 
[m510] answer? 

Captain Rochefort. We gave all the information that we had avail- 
able or that we had deduced or estimated that had been obtained by 
means of radio intelligence to the Fleet Intelligence Officer. 

Senator Ferguson. That was 

Captain Rochefort. Captain Layton. 

Senator Ferguson. And then you didn't pay any attention after 
you had given it to him and had drawn the appraisal of it? 

Captain Rochefort. We gave him our best estimate, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you estimate to him that there was 
going to be rxi attack somewhere on Sunday? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir; not on Sunday. We did not specify 
any date, as I recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, when did you give him the last estimate ? 

Captain Rochefort. Saturday, sir, December 6. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you tell him it would happen? 

Captain Rochefort. We did not tell them, to the best of my knowl- 
edge, on Saturday, 6 December, when it would happen. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you tell them it was going to happen? 

[12511] Captain Rochefort. We indicated very strongly there 
was an offensive movement. 

Senator Ferguson. An aoffensive movement where ? 

Captain Rochefort. I think perhaps the best statement on that, 
sir, would be the November 26 message. 

Senator Ferguson. What did you say to him on the 26th? I am 
trying to find out now — ^you are the Radio Intelligence man there — 
why they didn't know about this attack coming, I am trying to find 
out why the Intelligence System didn't work out there. 

Captain Rochefort. As to that I have no answer, Mr. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. You have no answer as to why it didn't work ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. I cannot explain to you why we did 
not specify a certain date or a day in the week. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, if you had known under your radio sys- 
tem that there was a message being delivered in Washington Sunday 
morning and it was to be delivered to the Secretary of State at 1 
o'clock and that it was even more than an ultimatum, would that have 
given j^ou the hour ? 

Captain Rochefort. I believe it would have, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you get such a message ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4691 

[l^Sl^] Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. No ; not now. 

Mr. Murphy. I am wondering the basis for the Senator's statement 
about it being more than an ultimatium. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what I am talking about, the 14:th- 
part message ^ 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. I did not see that message until 
1944-1945. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, when you had this, as you call it, the radio 
intelligence, did j^ou get other intelligence so that you could appraise 
the entire situation? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

[12S13] Senator Ferguson. Well then, did you give to Captain 
Layton an entire appraisal, as far as the Navy was concerned of the 
situation as to whether or not to expect war and where to expect it ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you give it to him? 

Captain Rochefort. Daily. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you ever call it to his attention that 
there was going to be war as far as the United States was concerned ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, I would not say in writing that we made 
the flat statement that there was or was not going to be war. We gave 
them indications as we saw it. 

Senator Ferguson. Were those indications that we were going to 
have war with Japan, America was ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You never gave him such an appraisal ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir, not in writing. We may have dis- 
cussed the matter and undoubtedly did at great length. 

Senator Ferguson. If you had the foundation for such appraisal, 
why didn't you put it in writing? 

The Chairman. It is 5 o'clock. Obviouslj^ we can't finish with the 
witness. We will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. 

Mr. Murphy. May we have available in the morning that 26 
summary ? 

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., February 15, 1946, the committee recessed 
until 10 a. m., Saturday, February 16, 1946.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4693 



im6U-\ PEAEL HARBOR ATTACK 



SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

or THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

'Washington^ D. C. 
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman), presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present : Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel ; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, Associate General Counsel ; John E. Hasten, Edward P. 
Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the Joint Committee. 
{^12516^ The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 
Senator Ferguson will proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. JOSEPH JOHN ROCHEFORT, UNITED STATES 

NAVY (Resumed) 

Senator Ferguson. You have the message now ? 

Captain Rochefort. Sir? 

Senator Ferguson. I asked you about the message of November 24. 
Do you have it? 

Captain Rochefort. November 26. 

Senator Ferguson. November 26. 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. Do you wish me to read it, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Captain Rochefort. At the direction of the Commander in Chief, 
the unit under my command during the month of November had been 
making various summaries and as a result of Admiral Kimmel's order, 
as transmitted by Captain Layton, we prepared a summary on the 
26th of November which gave our general views as regards the situa- 
tion which had been developing. I shall read the message.^ It went 
to OPNAV for information of Commander in Chief Asiatic and 
C0M16 and Commander in Chief Pacific : 

For the past month Commander Second Fleet has been [12516'\ organ- 
izing a task force which comprises following units: Second Fleet, Third Fleet 
including First and Second Base Forces and First Defense Division, Combined 
Air Force, Desron Three, Airron Seven, Subron Five and possibly units of Batdiv 
Three from First Fleet. 

In messages concerning these units South China Fleet and French Indo China 
force have appeared as well as the naval station at Sama, Bako and Takao. 

1 The message referred to is printed in full in Hearings, Part 6, pp. 2814-2815. 



4694 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Third base force at Palao and RNO Palao have also been engaged in extensive 
communications with Second Fleet commander. 

Combined air force has assembled in Takao with indications that some 
components have moved on to Hainan. 

Third Fleet units believed to be moving in direction of Takao and Bako. 

Second base force appears transporting equipment of air forces to Taiwan. 

Takao radio today accepted traffic for unidentified Second Fleet unit and 
submarine division or squadron. 

Crudiv seven and Desron three appear as an advance unit and may be en route 
South China. 

There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air groups in 
the Marshalls which comprise Airron twenty-four at least one carrier division 
unit plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet. 

[12517^ Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to 
operate in Southeastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palao 
and Marshalls. 

That, I think, Mr. Senator, gives our views as of the end of 
November. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, boiling that down, where did that mean 
an attack, if one ? 

Captain Rochefort. That meant — we did not refer to it in terms ol 
attack or war. We referred to it constantly as a strong offensive move- 
ment with major operations of the Japanese primarily toward South- 
eastern Asia, while certain parts may operate from Palao and the 
Marshalls. 

. Senator Ferguson. Well, where would they go from Palao? Wliat 
should we be on guard for ? Did you see that Australian message that 
was held up the 17 hours ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir ; I do not recall having seen it. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you seen it recently ? 

Captain Rochefort. I have seen it in the papers, sir, is all, or some 
reference to it in the papers. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, if the Dutch knew there was going to be 
an attack on the Dutch possessions from Palao at the time or prior 
to that message, how do you account for your Intelligence Branch not 
knowing? Didn't you have \_12S18] close liaison with the 
Dutch? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And with the English? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know what the arrangement was under 
the ABCD Bloc? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How could you plan if you didn't know the 
arrangement ? If there was an attack on British possessions, what did 
that mean to you as far as America was concerned? 

Captain Rochefort. You mean whether or not we would be in- 
volved, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Captain Rochefort. I would not hazard an opinion on that, sir; 
that decision would be made in Washington. 

The Vice Chairman. I didn't understand, Captain. 

Captain Rochefort. I said I would not hazard an opinion on that ; 
the decision would be made in Washington. 

The Vice Chairman. If you will permit the suggestion, I am afraid 
you keep- a little too close to the microphone. It has a tendency of 
blurring your words. Keep 4 or 5 inches from it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4695 

Senator Ferguson. You knew there was some arrangement 
[12519^ but the actual arrangement was not known by you and 
all action, as far as that would be concerned, would come from Wash- 
ington ? 

Captain Rochefort. Would come from Washington to the Com- 
mander in Chief, sir. 

[l^SSO] Senator Ferguson, Yes. But if there was going to be 
an attack on the Dutch, for instance, as shown by the Melbourne mes- 
sage that was held up by the Australians, where they were going to put 
Eainbow-2 into effect, which meant the joint plan, as I take it from 
reading that with the evidence, now did that mean anything to you ? 

Captain Rochefort. That merely — if I had seen the message from 
the Australians prior to the 7th that would merely have confirmed an 
opinion that we already had, namely, a movement to NEI, Indochina, 
and neighboring areas. 

Senator Ferguson. But the fact that they were going to attack 
there on Sunday 

Captain Rochefort. I did not see the message, sir, prior to the Tth. 

Senator Ferguson. No ; but if you had known that they were going 
to attack these possessions on Sunday, would that have meant any- 
thing to you under what you knew about the A-B-C-D ? 

Captain Rochefort. Not necessarily, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you were more or less of a collector of 
this material, is that true, and handed it up to Layton ? 

Captain Rochefort. Of the radio intelligence material? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

[12521] Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you were confined, really to the radio in- 
telligence ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not feel that your responsibility was 
to determine when war was coming or where it was coming, except 
as you would get it from radio intelligence ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir ; that is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. And as to the policy, you did not have charge 
of that ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And did not understand it and did not know 
it? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. That was at a higher level. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, when you got radio intelligence — 
for instance, you intercepted some of these messages that are in Ex- 
hibit 2, which you were shown yesterday, that you saw here. Did you 
send them to Washington ? Do you know what I mean by Exhibit 2? 
The ship movements. 

Captain Rochefort. Oh, yes, sir; they would have been sent to 
Washington. 

Senator Ferguson. How were they sent to Washington ? 

Captain Rochefort. If they were important enough they would 
have been sent by radio. Otherwise, if they were very [12522] 
old. they would have gone by air mail. 

Senator Ferguson, Well, look at page 22. First look at page 12. 
Do you see the message on page 12 ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 



4696 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. September 24, 1941. 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. That is a diplomatic message, Mr. 
Senator. I think we are perhaps being confused by diplomatic 
and naval. 

Senator Ferguson. Oh, no. 

Captain Rochefort. That is a diplomatic message, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, the one on page 12 is considered a diplo- 
matic message? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. That did not go in an}^ naval system. 

Senator Ferguson. Look on page 22. 

Captain Rochefort. That is also a diplomatic message, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, do I understand then that all 
these exhibits in Exhibit 2 were the J-19 '( 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir; in the various diplomatic systems, 
sir, J-19 and so on. 

Senator Ferguson. They were all in the diplomatic systems? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

[12523] Senator Ferguson. And therefore you were not de- 
coding them in 

Captain Rochefort. Honolulu. 

Senator Ferguson (continuing). Honolulu or Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you know how to do PA-KS? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But some of these messages are in that code? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, would you tell me whether 12, 22, 25, 26, 
27, and 29, in what codes are those ? 

Captain Rochefort. The one on page 12, sir, is in the J-19 system. 

Senator Ferguson. So then you did not translate it? 

Captain Rochet'ort. No, sir; we did not have facilities for trans- 
lating that one. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever seen that one before, up to the 
7th, up to and including the 7th ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, what is 22 ? 

Captain Rochefort. The one on page 22 is PA-K2, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But you did not attempt to translate 
[1£S24] that and send it on to Washington. Do you know 
whether you intercepted it ? 

Captain Rocpiefort. No, sir ; we did not. We did not intercept it ; 
we did not read it. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now go to the one on page 25. 
These are all in exhibit 2. 

Captain Rochefort. The one on page 25, sir, is also PA-K2. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you intercept it ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir; we did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Therefore, you did not have any knowledge of 
it prior to the 7th. 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir; we did not. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, on page 26 there are two of 
them, the first one and the second one. 

Captain Rochefort. The first one, No.- 252, was also in PA-K2. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4697 

Senator Ferguson. Did you intercept that ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The second one on that page? 

Captain Rochefort. That is also PA-K:2. 

Senator P'erguson. Did you intercept that one ? 

Captain Rochefort. We did not intercept it or read it. 

Senator Ferguson. Tlie one on page 27 and then the one [12525] 
on 29. 

Captain Rochefort. The one on page 27, No. 253, likewise was not 
intercepted or read. 

Senator Ferguson. What code is it in ? 

Captain Rochefort. PA-K2, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And on 29 ? 

Captain Rochefort. The one on page 29 is also PA-K2. The same 
condition applies ; we did not intercept it or read it. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you in effect did not know that those 
existed ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you were before Admiral Hewitt, 
were you not? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Hewitt said this : 

The book of Battle Reports states, "The United States shortly before 7 Decem- 
ber 1941 had two task forces at sea and the Japanese espionage had so informed 
Tokyo." What do you know about that? 

You answered: 

To the best of my knowledge Tokyo was not informed on the presence at sea 
of the two task forces. 

"V^Hiat did you mean by that ? 

Captain Rochefort. What I was referring to there was, sir, 
[12526] that at the time I did not know whether or not they had 
been and I had seen no traffic subsequent to that that indicated that 
they had ; in other words, reading this sort of material here. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, weren't you concerned with the 
exhibits in number 2 where Japan is trying to ascertain, as they did 
originally on the 24th of September, laying out a plan of the harbor, 
not only of the ships that were going out but where they were 
anchored, so that if they came in for an air attack they would know 
exactly what ship was at what dock or what buoy i 

Captain Rochefort. If I may have your indulgence for just a 
moment, sir. perhaps I can clear up that point. 

My unit in Pearl Harbor was chargecl by the authorities in Wash- 
ington with specific duties, which were to intercept and to exploit all 
Japanese naval communications systems and transmit all the informa- 
tion we could obtain from those interceptions to the fleet and to the 
Navy Department and other interested parties. We were specifically 
tolcl to keep away or not to exploit the so-called five-number system, 
which was a naval system. That was being done elsewhere. 

We were not to do any work on the diplomatic sj'stems. That was 
being handled in Washington and perhaps in Cavite. In other words, 
the reason that we did not have these diplo- [12527] matic 
messages, the reason we did not intercept them, the reason we did not 

79716 — 46 — pt. 10 8 



4698 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

work on them or read them was because it was not our assignment but 
was being handled by Washington. 

On the other hand, Washington was not doing anything on our 
general naval systems. That was our responsibility. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Captain Eochefort. In other words, there was a division of work, 
a division of labor. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, your job then was to use the radio finders 
and locate fleets ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And that was your specific assignment, on 
radio ? 

Captain Eochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And that was your assignment ? 

Captain Eochefort. Japanese naval messages. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Captain Eochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And not these so-called diplomatic, or from the 
consuls in Hawaii. 

Captain Eochefort. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson: That was not your assignment. 

Captain Eochefort. No, sir, it was not. 

Senator Ferguson. That does clear up some of this testi- [126^81 
mony. 

Captain Eochefort. Yes, sir. There apparently has been some 
confusion on that, Mr. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I correctly understand then that you 
did not personally inform Fielder, Bicknell, or any other Army officers 
of the fact that the Japs were destroying most of their codes in the 
United States in early December 1941 ? 

Captain Eochefort. I would hesitate to make a categorical state- 
ment to that effect, sir. I may have. If I did, it was probably in the 
course of conversation. I do not recall informing them at this time. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, when you were considering that point did 
you have in mind that it meant war with America ? 

Captain Eochefort. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you do not have any recollection of it now ? 

Captain Eochefort. No, sir. I may have, but I do not recall it. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you know what conference you had 
with Bicknell or with — yes, with Bicknell — or Fielder between the 
27th of November and the 7th of December ? 

Captain Eochefort. As to dates or hours or places, no, sir. I saw 
them fairly frequently, perhaps twice a week, something in that na- 
ture, and maybe oftener. 

[1^529] Senator Ferguson. Would you generally sit down with 
your various memorandums and messages and compare them? Is 
that what you call liaison, or is it just to meet each other and be 
friendly ? 

Captain Eochefort. No, sir. You see, as of that time, Senator, 
Colonel Fielder was not what we would say in on the "ultra" picture. 
In other words, he was not a recipient of that type of information. 
However, if it affected him or it affected his organization, I would give 
it to him in a somewhat sanitized form. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4699 

Senator Ferguson. What did you mean by the last answer'^ In 
what form? 

Captain Eochefort. I would give him the sense of the information 
without disclosing its source. 

Senator Ferguson. Now you are going back. You tell me now, this 
morning, that you were connected only with the Navy, the naval codes 
and location of the fleets, and so forth, and I think at one time there 
was a dispute between your branch and the one in the Sixteenth ; was 
there not ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir ; there was no dispute, because Admiral 
Hart said what he was going to do and that was sufficient. 

Senator Ferguson. No, no ; as to where the fleets were. 

Captain Rochefort, Yes, sir There was no dispute there. 

[12630] Senator Ferguson. It w^as decided here in Washington 
that in the future they would look for and rely more on Admiral Hart's 
information than they would upon yours. 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What did that mean to you ? Did that remove 
from you that branch ? 

Captain Rochefort. Oh, no, sir ; not at all. 

Senator Ferguson. And you considered then that the Army was not 
directly connected with the information on what you were covering, 
the fleet movements of the Japanese, and that is the reason that you 
cannot recall giving anything to Bicknell or to Fielder ? 

Captain Rochefort. I would not put it that way, sir. I would say 
that if anything developed insofar as the Japanese were concerned that 
indicated a vital interest or a general interest or which affected the 
Army, I would have given it to either General Fielder or Colonel Bick- 
nell, whoever was conoirned, in a sanitized form. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the Army was alerted to 
sabotage from the 27th on? 

Captain Rochefori. Yes, sir. 

Senator Fergusoiv . You knew that ? 

Captain Rochef( rt. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know where you got your infor- 
[12SS1] mation? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. Probably in conversations with Army 
officers. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did j^ou ever tell Colonel Bicknell 
about any magic messages or about the winds message ? 

Captain Rochefort. I do not recall that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And if you did, did you place a condition on it 
that he keep it secret even from Fielder and from General Short? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir ; I would never have done anything like 
that. On the contrary, it is much more reasonable to assume that I 
would have given the information to General Fielder rather than to 
Colonel Bicknell by reason of the fact that General Fielder was Colonel 
Bicknell's superior. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you do not then recall either Fielder or 
Bicknell conferring with you about the winds message ? 

Captuin Rocpiefort. No, sir ; I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you know what I mean, the original set-up 
on the winds message. 



4700 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Not even on those ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you ever confer with them [126321 
that you were looking for a weather report ? 

Captain Kochefort. Trying to exclude what those officers have tes- 
tified, I still cannot recall having discussed the matter with them. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you monitoring for a wind execute mes- 



sage 



Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And how did you come to do that? You had 
not intercepted the original two set-up codes ? 

Captain Rochefort. We had received from Admiral Hart's organi- 
zation the basic message. We received further orders from Wash- 
ington to listen in on the known broadcast frequencies, which we 
proceeded to do and which we continued to do until after the attack 
on the 7th. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know what I mean by the two set- 
up messages for the wind code ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. The directions you mean. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That east wind meant 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir; I am perfectly familiar with that. 

Senator Ferguson. You are familiar with that? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

[12SS3] Senator Ferguson. Where did you get that informa- 
tion — by intercepting and decoding? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. That information came to us ini- 
tially from Admiral Hart and it was followed shortly by a directive 
from Washington. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Captain Rochefort. Telling us what to do. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. So you had a directive to look 
out for and monitor for an execution of the wind code? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And up until the time of the attack were you 
continuing that monitoring for the wind code? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir; with four of my very best language 
officers on a 24-hour watch. That is, a constant watch on the fre- 
quencies that were given to us by Washington as well as at frequencies 
which we knew existed and w^hich we had uncovered. 

Senator Ferguson. You were following Washington's instructions 
and even doing more in trying to intercept a wind code message? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you at any time get such an intercept? 

[1253^1.'] Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What is that? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir; we did not. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not get it ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, after the attack did you talk to Colo- 
nel Bicknell about either the set-up messages or the execute message, 
or either of them ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4701 

Captain Rochefort. To the best of my knowledge, no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do j^ou know whether you talked to Fielder 
after the attack about either the set-up messages for the winds code 
or the execute messaged 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir, I do not believe I did. 

Senator Ferguson. Do yoai know of anything that you can add here 
to give us information that would help us in this problem that we have 
before us ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir, I do not. If the duties of my organi- 
zation are understood now, that is 

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you want to say anything on your du- 
ties, so that we do understand your duties ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir, aside from the fact that we were not 
working on diplomatic systems, that was not one of our assignments, 
and we were directed to work on naval systems only, which we were 
doing. The reason I mention that is there has been some confusion, ap- 
parently, about diplomatic systems. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all I have. 

[12S35] The Chairman. Mr. Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. No questions. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. Captain Rochefort, you were considered, and still are 
considered, one of the most capable and competent communications men 
in the Navy. I do not want to ask you to put yourself in the position 
of criticizing your superiors, but in regard to this winds message set- 
up, here you are with the four best men that you had on a 24-hour 
watch, and here is the Army and the FCC working on it, and here is 
the Navy and everybody a]3parently frantic about the winds message, 
and all that we get is apj^arently that the Japanese international com- 
munications must be broken up, and then when it comes, all we get is 
that diplomatic relations are not according to expectations. 

I am wondering why the Navy and tlie Arm}^ got so excited about a 
message of that kind, when the fact is we were still continuing to get 
all of these interceptions right along, even up to the 7th of December, 
when international communications were not broken up, and when we 
already knew the diplomatic relations were not according to expecta- 
tions; when we even knew that war was coming. Can you under- 
stand why all this excitement, and why this 24-hour wat^h [12536] 
to get a message that would only confi]-m what these fellows on the 24- 
hour watch were going to supplement by getting other valuable in- 
formation ? 

Mr. Richardson. Mr, Chairman, I submit the witness, from his 
position, cannot possibly answer any part of that question. 

The Chairman. That would seem to be an expression of an opin- 
ion, and the drawing of a conclusion by the witness and argumentative. 

Mr. Murphy. He is referred to in this record, Mr. Chairman, as 
the outstanding expert of the Navy. 

The Chairman. He could not tell why he was ordered from Wash- 
ington to put a 24-hour watch on the monitoring system. It was his 
duty to carry it out. I doubt very much whether this witness could 
give the reasons for that. If he can, the committee would be glad 
to have it. 



4702 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. Let me ask you some specific questions, in view of the 
objection of counsel. 

Do you know of any information that the winds intercept would 
have given and that you did not have? 

Captain Rochefort. It would have given perhaps a little advance 
information as to whether it was the Japanese intention to terminate 
or to break off the negotiations then in progress. 

Mr. Murphy. The fact is, is it not, that we had the 112537^ 
dead-line massage of the 29th, and we had the messages saying "Just 
carry out this pretense for a little while," and we had a message saying 
"You will be sent the code word as to what to do," and we had a message 
from someone in Tokyo saying the instructions will come very soon. 

That is one link in the chain that would add up to what we already 
had; is that it? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. It would, perhaps, have given a 
little additional or earlier information of Japanese intentions with 
regard to negotiations only. 

Mr. Murphy. One of the witnesses yesterday was permitted, in the 
record, to say it was the most important message ever received. 

Would you so consider it? . 

Captain Rochefort. You are referring to the winds message, sir? 

Mr. Murphy. What he thought was a winds intercept. 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir; that would not, in my opinion, be 
an extremely important message. 

Mr. Murphy. The next thing I would like to have is for you to put 
in the record your communication summary of the 26th of November. 

Captain Rochefort. The 26th of November, sir? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. That was the one where you pointed, 
112538'] is it not, that the Japs were ready for action ? You read 
that this morning, did you not ? 

Captain Rochefort. I read the dispatch, sir, which was based on 
perhaps a month's summaries. 

Mr. Murphy. Will you refer to the dispatch, if you can, that shows 
the submarines at Saipan moving eastward ? 

At any rate. Captain, as I understand it, all of your daily com- 
munications summaries are in evidence. I understand between No- 
vember 26 and December 7 in your communications summaries, you 
did point out that the Japanese submarines were then at Saipan and 
moving gradually in an easterl}^ direction. 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir; toward Jaluit. 

Mr. Murphy, And Jaluit is in the same general location, consider- 
ing a movement from the Asiatic Coast, as Pearl Harbor, is that right? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

We said that, I might say, on the 30th of November, sir. That 
might answer your question. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

Captain Rochefort. On the 30th of November. The known prog- 
ress of the submarine force from the Empire to Chici Jima and to 
Saipan makes his destination obviously the Marshalls, 

Mr. Murphy. One other question. You said that General 
{^12539'] Fielder was not entitled to magic in this ultra form, so 
when you say if there was something that you felt was vital, that 
affected the Army, you gave it to him in a sanitized form. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4703 

Now, who would be over you in authority to give an order so that 
you would give the information you had to your counterpart in the 
Army ? Who had the authority to give you the order to do that ? 

Captain Rochefort. Captain Layton, as a personal representative 
of Admiral Kimmel. 

Mr. MuRPHT. Admiral Kimmel had the authority to order you, did 
he not, to give this ultra material to General Fielder ? 

Captain Rochefort, Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And, of course, if you got the order you would 
promptly obey it? 

Captain Rochefort. I would carry out any order I received. 

The Vice Chairmax. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Mr. Cooper. 

The Vice Chairman. Captain, allow me to inquire a little for in- 
formation. 

I am not quite clear on one or two points mentioned by you. 

[1£'540] General, then Colonel, I believe, Fielder, was the head 
of G-2 in Hawaii for the Army, wasn't he ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And Colonel Bicknell was G-2 for the Army 
Air Forces in Hawaii, wasn't he? 

Captain Rochefort. That was not my understanding sir. I con- 
sidered Colonel Bicknell as a subordinate of Colonel Fielder. 

The Vice Chairman. He was an assistant to Colonel Fielder ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir; that was my understanding. 

The Vice Chairman. And that applied to the G-2 of the Army in 
Hawaii? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

[12541] The Vice Chairman. Is it your understanding that the 
head of G-2 and the assistant G-2 in Hawaii were not entitled to 
receive this secret information ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir; he was not on the list of personnel 
that I had, which indicated those that were entitled to receive ultra. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, who made that list ? 

Captain Rochefort. That list was maintained in our office and was 
made up initially by the officer in charge and was passed on to suc- 
ceeding officers in charge. 

The Vice Chairman. Who was the responsible official for deter- 
mining that question? 

Captain Rochefort. The officer in charge, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. As to who would receive this secret infor- 
mation. 

Captain Rochefort. The officer in charge, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Who was the officer in charge ? 

Captain Rochefort. I was from June 1941 on, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Then while you held this position it was solely 
within your province to determine who in the Army should or should 
not receive this secret information? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir; unless I received contrary orders 
from either Washington or from Admiral Kimmel. 

The Vice Chairman. How is that ? 

[1254^] Captain Rochefort. Unless I had received orders to the 
contrary from either Washington or Admiral Kimmel. 



4704 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. Who fixed that responsibility or that discre- 
tion in you ? 

Captain Rochefort. I do not think I understand that, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. You said it was within your province to de- 
termine who in the Army shoukl receive this secret information. 

Captain Rochefort. iTes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, who fixed your province as to what you 
should do in that respect ? 

Captain Rochefort. Nobody, sir. I would determine that by ascer- 
taining whether or not Colonel Fielder had been receiving ultra from 
his own people, from the Army, and whether or not he was qualified — I 
say qualified — to receive ultra either from Washington or from Ad- 
miral Kimmel's staflP. 

The Vice Chairman. Then you determined the question? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. As to what and how the secret information 
should be transmitted from the Navy to the Army? 

Captain Rochefort. A slight correction, sir. I would determine 
whether or not certain people in the Army received ultra from the 
Navy. Not secret information, but ultra. 

[mp] The Vice Chairman. Ultra? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Then you could receive certain ultra informa- 
tion and did ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Then you determined how much or what part 
of that was transmitted to the Armj- ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now if the Army had requested or desired this 
information, could they have secured it from you ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes. sir. 

The Vice Chairman. But they would have had to come to you and 
ask for it ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And there was not that free interchange of 
information of that type and character between you and the Army 
unless they requested it of j^ou ? 

Captain Rochefort. I think I have given the wrong impression 
there, sir. If we received any information at the ultra level, that is, 
information obtained from ultra sources, which the Army should have 
had, or it would have been desirable for the Army to have had, I would 
have certainly given it to the Army, but not in the form of ultra. I 
would have paraphrased it, or changed it around, [12oJiJf\ or, 
as we say, sanitized it and then given it to them in such a way as not 
to disclose the source. But I would have seen that they had the infor- 
mation. 

The Vice Chairman. But in the final analysis you determined what 
they should get? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And if you decided that something Avas not 
necessary in your opinion to give to the Army, why, they did not get it? 

Captain Rochefort. That applies to myself; yes, sir. Of course 
they could obtain it from Admiral Kammel, or possibly from Wash- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4705 

ington, or any other source. But insofar as I was concerned, that 
was it ; yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now were you monitoring for the Morse code, 
or Morse code information in Honoluhi ? 
Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 
The Vice Chairman. Not at any time ? 

Captain Rochefort. You are referring to the winds message now, 
sir? 

The Vice Chairman. Well, I will refer to that, but right now I am 
talking about the general situation. 

Captain Rochefort. All Japanese naval communications — I say all, 
but perhaps 98 percent of them were in Morse code or Imperial Japa- 
nese Kani, which is a variation of Morse — [1254S] about 98 
percent of it. 

The Vice Chairman. About 98 percent of it was in Morse ? 
Captain Rochefort. Yes ; of naval communications. 
The Vice Chairman. Naval communications? 
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. I am trying to find out about the Morse code. 
You certainly know what that is ? 
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Were you monitoring for that ? 
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Tlie Vice Chairman. Were you monitoring for the winds message 
in the Morse code ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 
The Vice Chairman. Never did at any time ? 
Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. So then if any winds message had come in the 
Morse code you would not have received it? 
Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. If you were monitoring the Morse code mes- 
sages why did not you also monitor for the winds message in the Morse 
code ? 

Captain Rochefort. The broadcasts that were furnished us 
[12oJf6'\ by Washington, the broadcast schedules giving the various 
frequencies, were all on voice frequencies; none of them were Morse. 
The term "broadcast" to me, in referring to weather message and news 
broadcasts, Und all that, means simply voice. As I said before, all of 
the frequencies that had been assigned us by Washington, giving in 
their opinion a complete list of all known Japanese broadcast fre- 
quencies, were all voice broadcasts. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, Captain, you stated to Senator Ferguson 
that you tried to receive information in all of the systems that were 
designated to you by Washington, and some in addition to that. 
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. You just stated a few moments 
ago that you were monitoring for Morse code messages. 
Captain Rochefort. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. Then if you were monitoring for Morse code 
messages generally, why did not you monitor for the winds message 
in Morse code ? 



4706 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Rochefort. The monitoring of Morse code messages was 
for Japanese naval communications system messages which went by 
well-known circuits, what we would call circuits ; that is, established 
channels of communication. Within the Japanese Navy, perhaps 98 
percent of that traffic would [12S4-7] have been in the Japanese 
version of the Morse code. The listening in for the winds message, 
for the winds execute message, was a separate and totally distinct 
assignment for the normal assignment which had been given us. 

In other words, it was a little additional duty. All the frequencies 
that were known in Washington on which that winds execute message 
could have been sent, and which were furnished us, were all voice 
frequencies. We listened for those. We also searched for other voice 
frequencies. We uncovered several of them. We continued monitor- 
ing all of the known voice broadcasts from the Japanese Empire. 

Does that clear up the thing, sir ? 

The Vice Chairman. No ; I am sorry. I just want to ask the simple 
question if you were monitoring for Morse code messages why you did 
not monitor for the winds execute message in Morse code ? 

Captain Rochefort. Because the very setting up of the winds exe- 
cute, the term itself implies, in my mind, voice. I have never seen it 
used otherwise. 

The Vice Chairmax. Then with the Japanese message setting up 
the so-called winds code, it was clear to you that there would not be 
any message in that code, about the winds execute message, in Morse 
code? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

[12S4S] The Vice Chairman. That is clear? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. You then knew there was no need for moni- 
toring for the winds execute message in a Morse code ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, as I recall Captain Safford's testimony 
here, I think he stated that the winds execute message, which he says 
he saw, came in the Morse code. 

Captain Rochefort. That is entirely possible, sir, but in order to 
have that condition exist you must remember that the list of fre- 
quencies given us by Washington were all voice. If the message 
was sent in Morse code, that is, the exact message was sent in Morse 
code, that would have meant then that every Japanese Embassy in 
every Japanese location throughout the world for whom the message 
was intended by the Japanese Government would have had to main- 
tain Morse code operators, people capable of receiving Morse code. 
I do not think so. 

The Vice Chairman. You do not think so ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Then you do not attach much importance to 
the winds execute message? 

Captain Rochefort. Personally, I would not, sir. I would say 
that it merely would have given a little additional \_12S4^^ in- 
formation, perhaps earlier information. 

The Vice Chairman. Is it your best judgment, Captain, that there 
was never any genuine winds code execute message received? 

Captain Rochefort. I would prefer to answer that, sir, by saying 
that, insofar as my unit was concerned, no winds execute was ever 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4707 

heard. I would rather not pass on what may or may not have been 
heard in other parts of the world. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

The Chairman. The Morse code is a technical, mechanical, instru- 
mental method of transmitting information ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. It is normally referred to as dot and 
dash. 

The Chairman. It is in no case voice? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Weather broadcasts, such as that indicated in the 
winds message, that predicted that under certain circumstances the 
weather report would be broadcast, that is always in voice, isn't it? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. So that you had two entirely different systems ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes. 

The Chairman. One of them mechanical and the other [12560] 
vocal ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And you were listening over the vocal system? 

Captain Rochefort. That is correct, sir. 

The Chairman. For the winds execute message? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. It never came through? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir ; we did not hear it. 

The Chairman. According to the two messages predicting that 
under certain circumstances the broadcast of weather would contain 
certain words, that in itself indicated it woqld be a vocal transmis- 
sion? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That is all. 

Senator Brewster. What is the difference, Captain, between a cipher 
and a code ? 

Captain Rochefort. Between a cipher and a code, sir ? 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Captain Rochefort. In the original understanding, sir, a code has 
a group of letters and numbers — sometimes the letters are pronounce- 
able and sometimes not — which designate a letter or number, a phrase, 
perhaps, a whole sentence or a complete thought. That would be 
termed a code. 

[12'551] Senator Brewster. And you would need a code book 
of some character in order to interpret it? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir ; you would require the book. That is, 
the original people would. 

Senator Brewster. Whoever would get it decoded would have to 
have a book indicating the significance of these letters and symbols ? 

Captain Rochefort, Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. What about a cipher ? 

Captain Rochefort. A pure cipher would interchange or change 
each letter of the original text so that rather than having a group of 
letters meaning a whole thought or sentence or phrase, each letter 
would be changed, or each numeral. 

Senator Brewster. You mean the letter "A" might mean "X", for 
instance ? 



4708 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir; and then the following letter "B" 
might mean "L." Where you interchange your letter by another 
letter, or a numeral by another numeral, that would be a pure cipher. 

Senator Brewster. That was the advantage of this so-called cipher 
machine that you referred to ? 

Captain Rochefort. The Japanese system, you mean? 

Senator Brewster. Yes. That would mean on this machine 
[1^662] you punch certain letters and certain other letters come 
out? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. If you know what that combination is, vou are 
able to read it ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. Is that peculiar to the Japanese, or do other 
countries use somewhat similar systems, as far as you know? 

Captain Rochefort. Ciphers go back to before "the days of Julius 
Caesar. 

Senator Ferguson. They are not exactly novel ? 

Captain Rochefort. There is^iothin<r that is novel in them, sir. 

[12S53] Senator Brewster. It is just a question of the possible 
ways in which they follow the techniques, and so on ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Anything further ? 

Senator Ferguson. There is one question. 

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. When you said you were getting radio informa- 
tion, did that include RCA ? That was cable, was it, or was that con- 
sidered radio ? 

Captain Rochefort. You mean the messages we got about the 3d 
of December ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Captain Rochefort. I do not know where the District Intelligence 
Officer got his information, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What did you do with those messages that you 
received ? 

Captain Rochefort. On the night of the 3d or the morning of the 
4th, sir? ^ 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

^Captain Rochefort. We read what we could as quickly as we could. 
We put our best people on it. Those that we read prior to the 7th 
were of absolutely no value whatever. 

We continued working on them, and on the night of the 10th, we 
managed to read the remainder. 

[J2SS4] Senator Ferguson. Give it to me up until the time the 
bombs fell. 

Captain Rochefort. Nothing of any value, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you put your best men on those messages 
as soon as you got them from the so-called cable office; is that right? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. Wherever they came from I dcTnot 
know. 

Senator Ferguson. I mean they were on other than your regular 
channel. 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. Those were diplomatic messages, 
Senator. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4709 

Senator Ferguson. Now, on this winds code, you were attempting 
to evaluate that execution message when you did not have all of the 
other diplomatic messages. 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. I think it could have been reasonable 
to assume the meaning of the thing. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know we had sent a message on the 26th 
to Japan ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir, not prior to the 7th. I did not know 
that. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not kyiow that prior to the 7th ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

[l£SSo] Senator Fergusox. Did you know there was a deadline 
.set on the 25th to close the negotiations? 

Captain Rochefort. Other than what I read in the newspapers, I 
did not know, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not know it prior to the 7th? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir ; I did not know it prior to the 7th. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that was extended to the 29th ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir; my information came from news- 
papers. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, if you had that kind of knowledge, would 
the winds code execute have been more significant if you had those 
diplomatic messages ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir : I do not think so. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not think so ? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

Mr. Richardson. Just a question. Captain. ^ 

The Chairman. The counsel has a question. 

Mr. Richardson. If there was to be a winds execute message sent in 
Morse, it would have had to be initially started in Morse in Tokyo? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

[1:2-5S6] Mr. Richardson. And wherever that message would 
go, it would go in Morse ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Then if it was to be in a weather news communi- 
cation, it would mean that London and the United States and other 
places that Morse could go to would be advised in Morse what the 
news and weather was in Japan ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. If you had had any idea that a winds execute 
might come in Morse, you could have directed your attention to Morse 
intercepts for the purpose of getting such an intercept, could you not ? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir, we could have. 

Mr. Richardson. But it was your understanding, from the informa- 
tion you received from Washington, and the nature of the recitals in 
the original winds code message, that any intercept was to come by 
radio broadcast? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. That is all you monitored for? 

Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, it is true, is it not, that early in 
1941 arrangements were made for the transmission from Washington 



4710 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to Cavite the information with respect to purple messages received at 
Washington from Tokyo ? 

[12557] Captain Rochefort. I imagine there were a series of 
messages technical in nature. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, when Washington would transmit the infor- 
mation which they got from the purple intercepts to Cavite, would that 
be transmitted in the Japanese code to Cavite or would it be trans- 
mitted in our code, or would it be transmitted in English between 
Washington and Cavite? 

Captain Rochefort. That would have been transmitted in one of the 
U. S. Naval cryptographic systems. 

Mr. Richardson. Then, would you be able in Hawaii to intercept 
and read the communications from the United States to Cavite, the 
information that Washington had received in purple ? 

Captain Rochefort. Oh, yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Then, whenever information was given by Wash- 
ington to Cavite, based upon information which came to Washington 
nnder the purple.code, did you pick it up in Hawaii? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. You could have? 

Captain Rochefort. We could have, with considerable difficulty, I 
would say. In other words, it would have involved picking one mes- 
sage out of perhaps 50,000, which would have required going to the 
Fleet communications officer. 

[12558] Mr. Richardson. Then you paid no attention, in your 
station at Hawaii, to communications between Washington and Cavite 
of that nature? 

Captain Rochefort. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Th^t is all. 

The Chairman. The committee thanks you, Captain, for your ap- 
pearance here. You are excused. 

Captain Rochefort. Thank you, sir. 

(The witness was excused.) 

The Chairman. Call the next witness. 

Mr. Richardson. I would like to call Admiral Noyes, Mr. Chairman. 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. LEIGH NOYES, UNITED STATES NAVY ^ 

(Having been first duly sworn by the chairman.) 

Mr. Masten. Admiral Noyes, will you please state your full name, 
your rank, and present assignment for the committee. 

Admiral Noyes. Leigh Noyes. Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy. Presi- 
dent of the Board of Inspection and Survey. 

Mr. Masten. And what were your rank and duties on the 7th of 
December, 1941 ? 

Admiral Notes. I was Rear Admiral, Director of Naval Communi- 
cations in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. 

Mr. Masten. When did you become Director of Naval [12559] 
Communications, Admiral ? 

Admiral Notes. About the 1st of August 1939. 

Mr. Masten. And how long did you then continue as such? 

Admiral Notes. Until the 2J:th, I think, of February 1942. 

1 See suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by Admiral Noyes, Hearings, 
Part II, pp. 5306 et seq. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4711 

Mr. Masten. Now, would you state briefly to the committee, your 
experience in the Navy? 

Admiral Notes. I was appointed to the Naval Academy from Ver- 
mont ; graduated in February 1906 ; went to the Asiatic station for 3 
years ; came back in the cruise around the world ; was in the Missoui'i, 
Mississippi; aide to Rear Admiral Ward; the Wyoming; in 1914 I 
went to the Office of the then Aide for Operations in the Navy De- 
partment, and became the first communications officer of the Navy 
Department. 

I went to sea in 1916 as Fleet Communications Officer, Commander- 
in-Chief, United States Fleet. I commanded the Biddle^ a destroyer; 
came ashore to the Office of Director of Naval Communications, At- 
lantic Coast Communications Superintendent ; went to the Naval War 
College; battleship Colorado; the Naval Mission to Brazil; Director 
of Training for Navigation on shore; commanded the light cruiser 
Richmond for 2 years ; went to Pensacola to qualify as a naval aviator ; 
commanded the Lexington; Chief of Staff to commander [12560] 
aircraft battle force. 

In 1939, Director of Naval Communications, which I left in Feb- 
ruary 1942 to go to sea in the Pacific Fleet. 

Commander Task Force 18, 61 ; came ashore in November of 1942 
to the Board of Inspection and Survey, West Coast, and in March 
1945 to Washington as President of the Board of Inspection and 
Survey, which position I now hold. 

Mr. Masten. Admiral, how many appearances have you made 
before boards investigating the Pearl Harbor matter? 

Admiral Notes. One. Before the Naval Court of Inquiry. 

Mr. Masten. That was in July 1944, about ? 

Admiral Notes. December. 

Mr. Masten. December 1944? 

Admiral Notes. Yes ; in San Francisco. 

INIr. Masten. In San Francisco? 

Admiral Notes. Yes. 

Mr. INIasten. Where had you been immediately prior to your ap- 
pearance before that board? 

Admiral Notes. I was then a senior member of the Board of Inspec- 
tion and Survey. West Coast — Pacific Coast. 

Mr. Masten. Now, the office of Naval Communications 

Admiral Notes. May I add something, sir ? 

Mr. Masten. Excuse me. 

Admiral Notes. I was approached by the Hewitt Board [12S61] 
or, rather, I was given an opportunity to appear before them if I 
wished to make any changes in any testimony I had given to the 
Naval Court of Inquiry, but at that time I had nothing to say. 

Mr. Masten. It is my recollection that all, or part of your testi- 
mony in the Navy proceeding was incorporated in the record of the 
Hewitt proceeding. 

Admiral Notes. I would have made three minor changes if I had 
known then what I do now. 

Mr. Masten. What would those have been, Admiral, do you recall? 

Admiral Notes. In regard to the cards for the winds code; in re- 
gard to the telephone message from one of the watch officers about 
a false winds message; and about my knowledge about the first 13 
parts. 



4712 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Hasten. We will come to that a little bit later. At the time 
we mention it, will you state what changes you would have made in 
any part of M'hat you have previously testified ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Masten. Now, in November and December 1941, the Office of 
Naval Communications was one of the principal divisions of the 
Office of Naval Operations, was it not ? 

[13562] Admiral Noyes. It was one of the coordinate divisions. 
xA.ll divisions are supposed to be coordinate. 

Mr. Masten. On a par with the War Plans Division and the Divi- 
sion of Intelligence? 

Admiral Noyes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Masten. And you were Admiral Stark's principal adviser on 
matters relating to naval communications, were you not? 

Admiral Noyes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Masten. Did your work as head of that office bring you into 
contact more closely 'with certain of the division heads than others; 
that is. Admiral Wilkinson or Admiral Turner? 

Admiral Noyes. You are speaking of the pre-Pearl Harbor period ? 

Mr. Masten. Yes. 

Admiral Noyes. Yes; more closel;^ with Admiral Wilkinson and 
Admiral Turner than the other divisions. 

Mr. Masten. At that time, the principal function of your office was 
the maintenance of the Navy's communication system, was it not? 

Admiral Noyes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Masten. In a sense, you were the Navy's Western Union at that 
time? 

[m56S] Admiral Noyes. Western Union and A. T. & T. 

Mr. Masten. In addition to those duties, your office includedthe 
unit that was under Captain Safford, known as the Communications 
Security Unit, or some such name? 

Admiral Noyes. Yes, sir. 

INIr. Masten. And a part of that unit was the translation section 
headed by Captain Kramer? 

Admiral Noyes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Masten. At whose initiative was Captain Kramer appointed to 
that work? 

Admiral Noyes. I found him there when I reported. 

Mr. Masten. At the time you became Director of Naval Communi- 
cations ? 

Admiral Noyes. That is my recollection. 

Mr. Masten. Now, who was'your Assistant Director of Naval Com- 
munications during the period just prior to Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Noyes. Then Capt. J. R. Redman. 

[12654.'] Mr. Masten. Did he come into the office after you came 
in, or was he there before ? 

Admiral Noyes. After . 

Mr. Masten. What was what might be called the chain of command 
as regards the Communications Intelligence Unit? Did you issue or- 
ders directly to Captain Safford in matters pertaining to his unit, 
or did you issue orders to Captain Redman and then he passed them 
on to Captain Safford ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4713 

Admiral Notes. I was the Chief of the Division and Captain Red- 
man was my assistant, second in command, the Executive Officer, 
Chief of Staff, whatever you might call it. I dealt directly with 
the heads of sections, who acted in my place. I could give instruc- 
tions to him, or in handling a certain amount of detail, he could 
cany it out without referring to me. 

Mr. IMastex. "\"\nien you were absent, Captain Eedman would be 
in charge of the Office of Naval Communications? 

Admiral Notes. Yes. 

Mr. Masten. To what extent were you familiar with the day-to- 
day operations of Captain Safford's unit ? 

Admiral Notes. I tried to be familiar with all that was going on, 
that was my responsibility. I did not exactly follow you on the ques- 
tion, as to how much detail I could keep track of. 

[12560] Mr. ]\Iasten. Would it be only matters that he would 
bring to you that you would be informed regarding, or on occasion 
would you find it necessary to raise questions with him as to the 
daily operation of his unit? 

Admiral Notes. It was desired to have a considerable amount of 
decentralization. There was a great deal of detail to Captain Saf- 
ford's section. In addition to the part in which you are interested, 
magic, we had a tremendous job in our own codes and ciphers, for 
which he was responsible. 

Mr. Masten. Captain Safford was also responsible for that work? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, or his office. 

Mr. Masten. Turning to the interception and decryption of the 
Japanese messages, we know from the testimony before the committee 
that the Navy was maintaining a system of monitoring stations for 
the interception of those messages. You were familiar, were you 
not, with that system? 

Admiral Notes. I was, except 

Mr. Masten. Except what? 

Admiral Notes. Except the intercept stations were part of the 
Navy system. They had not been established for this specific purpose. 

Mr, Mastex. And did they take their orders directlj^ from Wash- 
ington through Captain Safford ? 

[12566] Admiral Notes. We had what is called in the Navy 
operational control of all the systems, somewhat similar to the tele- 
phone tie-up. You have to have a net. There must be some over-all 
control of the entire system. Each station — as Commander Roche- 
fort mentioned, he reported directly to the Commander-in-Chief, 
Commander Fourteenth Naval District, but he got over-all directions 
from Washington, 

Mr. Masten. Now in addition to the intercepting system of moni- 
toring stations, did the Navy Department also maintain facilities 
in Washington and at Corregidor and Pearl Harbor for decrypting 
Japanese messages? Captain Rochefort has been testifying as to 
how it was done at Pearl Harbor. 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Masten. You were familiar with the assignments and facili- 
ties available at Pearl Harbor and at Corregidor, were you not? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 
79716 — 46— pt. 10 9 



4714 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Masten. What was your understanding, prior to December 7, 
as to what could be decrypted in Pearl Harbor, of the diplomatic 
traffic ? 

Admiral Notes. What Captain Rochefort said. 

Mr. Masten. That is to say, you understood that there were no 
facilities at Pearl Harbor for decryption of Japanese messages in 
the purple code? 

Admiral Notes. Yes. 

\^12667'\ Mr. Masten. And in the code known as J-19, that was 
your understanding prior to December 7? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct. 

Mr. Masten. Admiral Kimmel has contended before the committee 
that the Japanese diplomatic intercepts which were decrypted in Wash- 
ington — some of them — should have been sent to Pearl Harbor, and 
Admiral Turner has stated before the committee that it was his un- 
derstanding there were facilities at Pearl Harbor which permitted 
the people at Pearl Harbor to read th^ Japanese diplomatic messages. 
Did Admiral Turner or Admiral Stark ever discuss that matter with 
you? 

The Chairman. We will suspend just a moment. 

(Short interruption.) 

Mr. Masten. Admiral, you were about to say whether or not Ad- 
miral Turner or Admiral Ingersoll or Admiral Stark had ever had 
any conversations with you as to the facilities available for the de- 
cryption of diplomatic messages in Pearl Harbor. 

Admiral Notes. I know the question. I think it has already 
been stated by Admiral Turner that he discovered he was mistaken. 
I think if you look at his testimony, on page 419 of the Navy narra- 
tive, you will see that he is speaking of what we call radio intelli- 
gence, which is the activity that Captain Rochefort has been dis- 
cussing. It [12568'] does not involve knowing the contents 
of the messages. It involves direction finding, to find the location 
of ships, the analysis of the transmissions they monitored, and call 
signs on messages in code, which, although you cannot read, you can 
form a good estimate of what the ships are doing from the call signs 
and the direction alone. That is called a traffic analysis. The ulti- 
mate was the question of the carriers, when the traffic became zero. 

Mr. Masten. Now did you ever make any statements to Admiral 
Turner that Admiral Kimmel was able to read the translated or de- 
crypted messages in purple code at Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Notes. Not to the best of my knowledge and belief, be- 
cause I had been the one who had proposed, when we had one machine 
available — I had to get approval from Admiral Stark to send it to 
Cavite, and I knew perfectly well that they could decipher the diplo- 
matic traffic and send it to Honolulu. 

Mr. Masten. Do you now recall that at any time prior to December 7 
Admiral Turner made any statements to you which would have in- 
dicated at the time that he understood that Admiral Kimmel had the 
means of decrypting purple traffic? 

Admiral Notes. I do not. 

Mr. Masten. You account for his apparent misunderstand- 
[IZSGO] ing as confusion in his mind between the decrypting and 
handling of tlie traffic that you spoke of and the diplomatic, the Jap- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4715 

anese diplomatic code? In other words, do you think that he had 
those two types of information confused in his mind ? 

Admiral Notes. That is merely my opinion. 

Mr. Hasten. That is merely your opinion ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes. I think it is the only way in which I could 
see that a misunderstanding could have occurred, puis the fact that 
his original testimony referred to traffic analyses, which had nothing 
to do with the reading of the text, of enemy messages. 

Mr. Masten. Now turning to the exchange of purple information 
between Manila and Washington and Pearl Harbor, to what extent was 
the station in Manila expected to forward in to Washington the in- 
formation which it derived from the interception and decryption of 
Japanese purple messages at Manila ? Will you state in a general way 
the arrangement between Manila and Washington for any such ex- 
change of information ^ 

112S70] Admiral Notes. Originally there were no facilities at 
Cavite for decrypting diplomatic traffic, it all had to be forwarded to 
Washington. I might say that starting in 1939, when I first came, what 
little we were doing was not of immediate importance and mail was 
used almost entirely for forwarding the intercepts. 

As Pearl Harbor approached, as December approached and the 
crisis, that was speeded up more and more. 

Mr. Masten. May I interrupt you there. Admiral. Are you speak- 
ing of forwarding the messages still in the Japanese code or after 
decryption in English? 

Admiral Notes. Originally they could only be forwarded in the 
Japanese code. 

Mr. ]\Iasten. Yes. 

Admiral Notes. I think it was early — may I look at this dispatch 
that you have there. 

I should say that about March 1941 one machine became available 
and it was decided to send it to Cavite. 

Mr. ]\Iasten. And after that anything that came into Washington 
from Cavite was decrypted and in English? 

Admiral Notes. If they could handle it. All this enemy intercep- 
tion is not an open and shut proposition. Many messages we never 
could translate. We were very fortunate to get what we did. 

[12o?'l] Mr. Masten. Was it the practice for Manila to send on 
to Washington, in the encoded Japanese, what they could not handle 
in Manila in order that Washington could have an opportunity to 
decode it ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes. 

Mr. Masten. And did they also send to Washington in English 
the messages which they did decode in Manila ? 

Admiral Notes. The object of putting the machine at Cavite, which 
was the best listenins post we had, was to cut out the transmission 
between Cavite and Washington, let them decrypt the messages there, 
throw out the unimportant ones and forward in Navy cipher the 
important ones, or b}' ML the important ones, to Washington, depend- 
ing on the importance. 

Mr. Masti:n. Now, to what extent was the reverse true, to what 
extent did Washington send to Cavite decrypted messages that had 
been decrypted here in Washington ? 



4716 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK: 

Admiral Notes. 1 think testimony has been given as to the division 
of responsibility between Navy Intelligence and Conimunications 
in regard to the enemy intercepted messages. The function of Naval 
Communications was to obtain understandable messages from the 
original material. That was turned over to Naval Intelligence for 
distribution. It was their function to evaluate or distribute it to the 
[12572'] proper people, everything in its final form. We only 
exchanged messages to assist the other station. For example, if Cavite 
had found that they had gotten started on a message and found a 
reference which they didn't have, to another message, and they were 
stuck on continuing their translation, breaking down this message, 
they would ask Washington for this reference which they had found 
and that would be sent out to assist them. 

Mr. Masten. That would be sent out translated in English, would 
it not? 

Admiral Notes. Probably. 

Mr. Masten. When it was sent would it be sent for the information 
of Admiral Kimmel as well as for action to Admiral Hart, or how- 
ever you would describe it at that time? 

Admiral Notes. It would be sent for the use of the people who were 
decrypting some message which they had. It wouldn't be sent for 
information to anybody. 

Mr. Masten. Now, I will ask you to look at Exhibit 37, pages 6 
through 10. Exhibit 37 contains various basic dispatches from the 
Navy Department in Washington to Admiral Kimmel and Admiral 
Hart, and these dispatches on pages 6 through 10 contain specifically, 
do they not, material derived from intercepted Japanese diplomatic 
[12573'] messages in the purple code? 

The first one is dated 7 July, the one on page 6 ; the next is also on 
7 July; the next is 15 July; the next is 17 July; and the last one, 
on page 10, is dated 19 July, and they all appear to have been sent 
from the Navy Department in Washington for action of Admiral Hart 
and for information of Admiral Kimmel, and they all specifically 
refer to particular intercepts, do they not? 

Admiral Notes. They do, although they are not exact translations, 
but apparently just briefs of what appeared. 

Mr. Masten. Yes. 

Admiral Notes. I would say those are not actual messages that you 
were referring to. 

Mr. Masten. These are not messages that were sent to aid Admiral 
Hart in translating? 

Admiral Notes. This is straight intelligence. 

Mr. Masten. According to the photostats from which this Exhibit 
was prepared, the message on page 6 was released by Captain Kramer 
by direction of Captain Safford : the message on page 7 was released 
by Captain Kramer also by direction of Captain Safford ; the message 
on page 8 was released by you ; the message on page 9 was released by 
Captain Kramer by your direction, as also in the case of the message 
on page 10. 

[12574-] Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Masten. Now, for the information of the committee will you 
explain what is meant by the use of the phrase "released by" on these 
Navy forms? Does that mean that you decided to send the message 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4717 

or does that mean that it \\'as final clearance for sending it, that final 
clearance was given by the people that I have just referred to ? 

Admiral Noyes. Each office of the Navy Department had officers 
authorized to release messages and we only insisted that a message be 
authenticated by the authorized officer. We had one very strict rule. 
The basis of all our handling of these enemy intercepted messages 
was the extreme importance of allowing no inkling to reach the Jap- 
anese that we could read their messages. That would have ruined 
everything. 

We had a strict rule and endeavored to carry it out that nothing 
should ever appear in any kind of ordinary Navy traffic which referred 
to the fact that we could read any Japanese messages. We had ai 
special cipher, a special security cipher, which any reference to magic 
was supposed to be in, in which it was supposed to be decrypted, and 
I or some of my subordinates were the only ones that released mes- 
sages in that system. I would have released in that system, if any- 
one wished to, I would have been directed by the Chief of Naval Oper- 
ations or requested by [12S7S] the Director of Naval Intelli- 
gence, or by War Plans, to transmit the messages in this form, and 
any one of those forms, I would have immediately sent them in cipher, 
provided they wished to refer, as they did, to the fact of their origin. 

If they could express it as intelligence without referring in any way 
where the information was to be obtained, for example, the expres- 
sion of "reliable source," that doesn't give away the secret, that could 
have been sent in ordinary naval dispatch. 

Mr. Masten. This special cipher that you had — when one of these 
messages was sent which either paraphrased or quoted directly from a 
Japanese purple message, was there any danger in your opinion that 
that special Navy code would be broken by someone else? 

In other words, did j^ou have any feeling of danger in revealing the 
secret of magic when you forwarded messages from Washington to 
Admiral Hart in that special cipher? 

Admiral Notes. We didn't like it particularly. We would have 
preferred never to cross up any reference to Japanese messages in our 
own codes, because, particularly in any long message, it is the greatest 
opening to a crypt analyst to break a cipher or code, the fact that he 
knows something has been sent; but actually by keeping [125761 
the traffic down as we did in this particular cipher, it could not be. 
The cipher was not used even by my own communication watch officer. 
We had a special watch who were the only ones that could read the 
cipher. Wlien messages came in in this cipher, the regular communi- 
cations watch officers had to send it down to the special watch to be 
translated. They never saw it. 

Mr. Mastex. If you look at pages 11 and 15 of the same Exhibit 37, 
those are two messages also in July, the first one on the 19th of July, 
the second on the 20th, from COM-16, which was the naval district in 
the Philippines, was it not? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mastex. To Washington. And those also refer specifically to 
intercepts, Japanese intercepts in the purple code, do they not? 

Admiral Notes, Yes, sir. 

Mr. Masten. So that these are representative of messages that were 
exchanged during July between Washington and Manila containing 
information derived from the purple code ? 



4718 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. I had nothing to do with the preparation 
of this document. I am accepting them as they stand. 

[12S77] Mr. Masten. We understand. 

Admiral Notes. I can't remember now whether those are all the 
messages. There are no originals there. There is nothing I have to 
go by. 

Mr. Masten. Were there any messages comparable to these on pages 
6 through 10 which were sent after July and prior to December 1, 
1941, and which referred specifically to, or quoted from, Japanese 
diplomatic intercepts? There are none in this Exhibit 37 but I am 
asking whether you recall any others ? 

Admiral Notes. Let me see. 

Mr. Masten. It won't be necessary to look through. You will have 
to accept my assurance that there are none that refer specifically to 
purple messages in this particular Exhibit. 

But do you now recall any, so if we don't have them here we can 
get them ? 

Admiral Notes. No, I do not. I couldn't recall any. 

Mr. Masten. If you look at pages 40 and 41 of Exhibit 37, the first 
one on page 40 is the message from Washington for action of CINCAF, 
CINCPAC, C0M14 and C0M16. This starts off "Highly reliable in- 
formation has been " 

Admiral Notes. Which one is that ? 

Mr. Masten. One page 40, Exhibit 37. 

[12678] Admiral Notes. Yes. 

Mr. Masten. Starting off : 

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent in- 
structions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at 
Hongkong, Singapore, Batavla, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most 
of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential 
and secret documents. 

That also was based upon information from purple sources, was 
it not ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes. 

[12579] Mr. Masten. Similarly in the case of the message on 
the next page, page 41, that specifically refers to the number designa- 
tion of the circular from Tokyo, does it not ? 

Admiral Notes. It does. 

Mr. Masten. So that we have a situation where, during July mes- 
sages were sent in this special code to which you have referred between 
Washington and Manila for the information of Admiral Kimmel in 
Hawaii, which specifically referred to magic and quoted from magic, 
and no other messages after July were sent until December; is that 
not correct ? Which referred to magic ? 

Admiral Notes. You are asking me to accept something that I had 
nothing to do with. 

Mr. Masten. I am asking whether you recall any during the period 
from July to December 1. 

Admiral Notes. I have no recollection now of individual messages. 

Mr. Masten. But it is also true that during that same period, as 
shown by, for example, the warning message of November 27, mes- 
sages went out which contained information from magic and did not 
specifically refer to the magic soiirce ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4719 

Admiral Noyes. That is true. I would have very much preferred 
that that be done. We always preferred that [12580] the mes- 
sage be sent out, like the message you referred to, giving the infor- 
mation, but not stating its source, rather than in these direct 
quotations. 

Mr. Masten. Now, were there any rules established in your division 
or was there any rule set up in the Navy Department, which expressly 
prevented or instructed against the sending of messages after July 
referring to magic and the source from which the information came ? 

Admiral Notes. I know of no specific rule. I would say that — I 
think there has been testimony before this committee that we had 
several worries about the fact — the Japanese finding out the fact 
that we were reading their code, or at least one, and we had others 
where we were afraid that they were finding out that we were reading 
their codes, which, of course, caused us to be more careful in what we 
were doing. 

Mr. Masten. You say there were no specific rules. Was there any 
policy established in the Navy Department against that? 

Admiral Noyes. The basic policy was that, as I mentioned before, 
direct reference to the fact of our being able to read Japanese messages 
should never be referred to in ordinary Navy traffic. 

Mr. Masten. Was that a rule or a policy that you [12S81] 
established in your division, or was that established elsewhere in the 
Navy Department. 

Admiral Noyes. It is one I inherited when I came to the place. 

Mr. Masten. So that if messages that were being sent out for the 
information of those two posts, Manila and Hawaii, included infor- 
mation based upon purple intercepts, you w^ould have sent it if you 
had been instructed by Admiral Wilkinson or Admiral Turner or 
Admiral Stark, or Admiral IngersoU; is that correct? 

Admiral Noyes. If a message came to me, or if it came to the com- 
munications watch officer, released by proper authority, it might very 
well have gone. All of the messages in the Navy Department didn't 
pass through me. I couldn't visa all messages before they went out. 
It was generally understood that the people involved in this sort of 
thing knew what the rules were. 

Mr. Masten. Well, did all messages that went by radio from Wash- 
ington to Hawaii or the Philip])ines go through your office or did the 
Navy Department use other radio means? 

Admiral Noyes. Every message that went out from the Navy De- 
partment, every official dispatch, passed through the [1£582] 
Navy Department's communications office, which was one of my activi- 
ties, but it was a 24-hour-a-day function ; they were handling at that 
time — I got the data the other day. I think it was 4,100 messages a 
day. 

Mr. Masten. By naval communications means? 

Admiral Noyes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Masten. From Washington? 

Admiral Noyes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Masten. Now, you say there were other means by which this 
information could be sent. Are you referring to mail dispatches, or 
courier disaatches. or what else did you have in mind ? 



4720 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Notes. Yes; we had a special arrangement with Pan 
American by which the pilot carried in a locked box, to which he did 
not have the key, messages for Honolulu. 

Mr. Hasten. How frequently did messages go by that system? 

Admiral Notes. I couldn't say. 

Mr. MAS'rEN. Weekly ? 

Admiral Notes. That was not necessarily for the purpose of send- 
ing these messages. It was a general means of communication. 
We would not have used ordinary air mail for any of this sort of 
thing on account of the danger. 

Mr. Masten. Was this courier system regarded as safer [1£583] 
than the special radio codes to which you referred a few minutes ago, 
in connection with these other messages that went from Washington ? 

Admiral Notes. No, sir. 

Mr. Masten. Did you consider there was less likelihood of the 
knowledge leaking out that we were breaking the Japanese code? 

Admiral Notes. Of course, we would have put anything we sent 
by the courier into a Navy cipher before we sent it so that we wouldn't 
have been much worse off if we had lost them than if it had been 
intercepted on the air. 

Mr. Masten. And if anything went by this naval courier, which 
involved magic, you would have presumably used this special cipher 
which you referred to a few minutes ago ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. One of the greatest dangers of the com- 
munications business is the security side of it; we were responsible 
for both things. We had to protect our own codes and ciphers, and 
we were endeavoring to break the enemy codes and ciphers, and we 
had certain rules that we went by. We knew what we could do, and 
we avoided giving them the same opening. A large amount of 
traffic is one of the worst things that can be done, one of the worst 
offenses that can be committed against the security of any means of 
communication. 

\_1258Ii\ Mr. Masten. At page 11157 of our transcript appears 
this message, which I will ask you to look at. It is dated December 1, 
and it is an additional message conveying purple information from 
AVashington to the Philippines for the information of Admiral 
Kimmel. 

Down at the bottom of the message there is a certification that that 
is a true copy of an encrypted message in the files of the Navy Depart- 
ment. I would like to ask you this : 

Was it customary when a message was sent from Washington to 
Manila which contained purple information, or information derived 
from Japanese purple messages, was it customary to leave in the 
files of the Navy Department the outgoing message only in the Navy 
code, or were copies of the message left in other files of your 
division ? 

In other words, I am interested in finding this : Would we be able 
to find other messages which went from Washington to the Philip- 
pines by making a further search through the encrypted messages in 
the files of the Navy Department, or was it also the practice to leave 
the translated versions in some of the files of your division? 

Admiral Notes. I couldn't say what the details of the filing were ; 
I couldn't say at this date what the details of the filing system were 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4721 

then. I notice this is not the [12'5S5] original of the message, 
but has been translated by someone from the coded copy, so I don't 
know who originated it. 

Mr. Masten. You know of no practice whereby when a message 
containing purple was sent from Washington, the only file copy of 
that was kept in the Navy code as a matter of precaution ? 

Admiral Xoyes. Anything that referred to the purple code should 
not have appeared in the ordinary Navy filing system. It should have 
gone in a special channel which was kept entirely separate from this 
sort of stuff. 

Mr. Masten. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. What do you mean by "this sort of stuff" ? 

Admiral Notes. It is an ordinary naval dispatch which went in, it 
is a secret dispatch that went in a Navy cipher. 

Mr. Masten. Now, I have here. Admiral, a message, No. 281500 
dated March 25, 1941, from Opnav to Com 16 for the information of 
Cincaf, and Chief of Staff, United States Army, which reads as 
follows : 

Following plan of coordination between Asiatic communication intelligence 
units of Army and Navy proposed X Army intercept unit furnish Navy decrypt- 
ing unit copies of all intercepts in orange diplomatic systems forwarding same 
[12586] by land wire or other rapid and secure means X Com 16 furnish 
Commanding General Philippine Department translations of above messages — 

There are some words stricken out here. Do you know what they 
are? 

These two words ? 

Admiral Notes. The original draft said "of interest to the Army," 
and it is corrected to say, "the translations of above messages be 
delivered." 

Mr. Mastex. Will you continue and read the balance of the message ? 

Admiral Notes (reading) : 

Details to be worked out locally X Foregoing is additional to forwarding of 
intercepts to Washington by both services X Deliver Commanding General exact 
translation this message. 

Mr. Masten. Now, would you also read into the record, Admiral, 
this second message of the same date ? 

Admiral Note:. It is addressed from the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions and the Army Cliief of Staff to the Commanding General of the 
Philippine Department and Commandant Sixteenth Naval District. 

Chief of Naval Operations and Army Chief of Staff authorize Commanding 
General Philippine Department and [1258T[ Commandant 16 Naval Dis- 
trict to confer on subject matter of Opnav 281500. 

Mr. Masten. Will you explain the purpose of the arrangement that 
is set up there, which applies only, as I understand it, to the Philip- 
pines and to the Com. 16 situation? 

Admiral Notes. Originally, the Army and Navy had worked inde- 
pendently in regard to magic. The Army had their intercept stations 
and the Navy had theirs, and we each had a unit which was only for 
the purpose of training cryptographers, cryptanalysts. 

Early in 1941, General Mauborgne, Chief Signal OiHcer of the Armv, 
who was my opposite number in the War Department, and I, had "a 
conference in regard to avoiding duplication and pooling our interests 
in this matter. 



4722 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

At about this time we had been able to send a machine to Cavite and 
this arrangement was set up in order to cut down the amount of trans- 
mission to Washington and speed up the entire operation. 

Mr. Masten. So this was, in effect, an arrangement to keep the 
Army and the Navy in the Philippines informed as to what each was 
doing in regard to the interception and decryption of Japanese diplo- 
matic messages ; is that correct ? 

Admiral Noyes. As far as the diplomatic traffic was [1£S88] 
concerned, the object was to improve the system of getting the diplo- 
matic information to Washington, rather than for the local value. 
They were given the benefit of it by giving them the authority to 
exchange locally. They were able to cut out the transmission iDack 
and forth, or at least back from Washington, of matters that were 
of interest to them. 

[125<S9] Mr. Masten". Now, did this proposal and this method 
originate in your division, or was this a suggestion which originated 
elsewhere in the Navy Department and which you simply passed on 
as the man who was charged with communicating messages to the 
Philippines ? 

Admiral Notes. Well, on our level there were four of us involved : 
The G-2 in the Army, the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, Director 
of Naval Intelligence, and I. We four agreed on this plan as an im- 
provement over the independent work we had been doing. 

Mr. Mastex. Now, was any similar plan to this set-up with respect 
to Hawaii that you recall? 

Admiral Notes. This plan could not have worked for Hawaii, be- 
cause thei'e was no machine available for Hawaii and, as I learned from 
listening to Comander Rochef ort's testimony, they could not read an- 
other code, which was necessary. 

Mr. Master. But if there were advantages in making the informa- 
tion availal)le in the Philippines with regard to the purple traffic, 
might there not have been similar advantages in Hawaii in arranging 
for exchange of information in connection with the messages that 
were being intercepted and handled and decrypted by the Armj^ and 
the Navy in Hawaii ? 

Admiral Notrs. In the first place, we did not have another machine. 

[12S90] Mr. Masten. I realize that. 

Admiral Notes, And in the second place, as Commander Rochefort 
explained in his testimony, our plan was to have Hawaii concentrate 
on the naval codes, which was a large part of the business and what we 
were most behind on. 

Mr. Masten. I was thinking of this : There is testimony before the 
committee that the Army station, which I believe was No. 5, inter- 
cepted certain messages which Captain Rochefort could have handled 
had they been made available to him by the Army. Now, do you 
recall whether or not any attempt was made, or any instructions sent 
from Washington, which would have jiermitted that interchange of 
information or intercepts, or which specifically directed it? 

Admiral Notes. No; I cannot recall. I should think that — in lis- 
tening to Commander Rochef ort's testimony I was surprised that there 
would have been anything intercepted in Hawaii that the Navy could 
translate that was not immediately passed to the Navy. I do not 
understand why that should not have been done. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4723 

The Vice Chairman. You mean immediately passed to the Army ? 

Admiral Notes. No. These are messages intercepted by the Army, 
as I understand it, which were forwarded to Washington, although 
there was one message that I don't think [12591] Commander 
Rochefort said they could have translated. They might have. 

Mr. ]\Iasten. That was in this code J-19 about which he testified 
this morning. 

Admiral Notes. I would like to add to one thing Commander 
Eochefort said, which I am sure he would approve. You did not allow 
him to finish when he was describing the ciphers. He described a pure 
cipher to you, and then something came up and he did not go on. 

I am sure he intended to add that we also speak of a cipher where 
there is a code book there. A key is applied to the code words or 
groups of figures in that book, and the key must be found out before 
you can get down to looking things up in a book. I am sure he would 
have said that if he had not been interrupted, and one of the big 
troubles was to recover the keys day by day, and that would require a 
certain amount of traffic before that could be done. It is very seldom 
that an individual message in anything can be translated. It requires, 
generally, a large number. 

Mr. Masten. Now, turning to the handling of magic in the Navy 
Department. We have been discussing the exchange of information, 
and the method, back and forth between Washington and the Philip- 
pines and Hawaii. Turning now to the question of how the magic 
was handled in the Navy Department, the tes- [12592'] timony 
shows that in the customary procedure a decrypted purple message 
would be taken to Captain Kramer's unit for translation and prepara- 
tion of smooth copies for dissemination among those in the Navy 
Department who were entitled to receive them. 

When was it customary for you to see the magic messages? That 
is, did Captain Kramer bring them to jou before his dissemination or 
did you just learn of them afterward, or what was the practice in that 
regard ? 

Admiral Notes. Maybe this is repetition but to make it quite clear. 
Captain Kramer was primarily a subordinate of the Director of Naval 
IntelHgence and his primary duty was to act for the Director of Naval 
Intelligence in the distribution of the messages when they had been 
finished, when they were in readable form. He had an additional 
duty, somewhat, in getting them into readable form, the idea being 
to have one officer who carried right through horizontally through our 
two divisions. 

Originally — that is, when I say originally — when I first came tc 
the division in 1939 as Director of Naval Communications, there was 
onl}'' one copy made of any distributed messages. They were about 
3 weeks old before we got any of them and the Director of Naval Intelli- 
gence took the book and carried it himself to the few persons that 
saw them. 

[12593] Mr. Masten. Well, now, would he show that book to 
you before starting out on his distribution, or at what point did you 
come into the picture, if I may interrupt you ? 

Admiral Notes. I was going to put that in. 

Mr. Masten. All right, sir. 



4724 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Notes. That was the original plan and, therefore, the 
book was brought to me to O. K. before it went to him. I saw the book 
before he got in. 

Mr. Masten. And that practice continued after the one-book method 
was abandoned and the several folders were prepared ? 

Admiral Notes. No ; it did not. One of our first efforts after Sep- 
tember 1939 was to concentrate on speeding up the recover}^ of these 
intercepted messages, and between 1939 and December 1941 we got 
them down to where we were getting some messages in hours or a day 
or 2 days, and the volume had greatly increased. That is one of the 
points that I wish to change in my testimony. I said that after Pearl 
Harbor we changed to separate books. I am convinced from the testi- 
mony of Kramer, who delivered the books, and others that the change 
had already been made. 

Mr. Masten. That is the testimony which you gave before the Navy 
court. 

Admiral Notes. The change had been made and I think it 
[1^594-] was made between October and November, when I was on 
temporary duty and absent, and that is the reason I did not remember 
the change. 

Mr. Mastex. Well, now, when Captain Kramer brought these mes- 
sages to you and they were ready for distribution or dissemination, 
did you make any deletions from messages that he brought to you or 
did you pass on and give him to distribute all of the messages that 
he had translated? In other words, did you exercise any censorship 
over the messages that were distributed ? 

Admiral Notes. I exercised no censorship. I scanned the messages 
for the purpose of seeing that they appeared to be in good — appeared 
to be authentic — in the first place. Second, for any indication that 
the Japanese had broken any of our codes. Several times I found 
indications that they referred to information, secret naval informa- 
tion. United States naval information. I always ran those cases clown 
and every time it developed that they got the information somewhere 
else rather than by breaking one of our codes. 

I also criticized my subordinates ; required an explanation in regard 
to delays in messages. There was usually no criticism involved but I 
asked for an explanation as to why we had not gotten things sooner. 
Generally, it was because we could not read it. 

[1259S] Mr. Masten. So that your participation in the dis- 
semination of the magic was simply the participation of one who was 
charged with the responsibility for getting it out to those others ? In 
other words, you made no attempt to evaluate the messages or censor 
them in any way. Everything went out that your people decrypted 
and translated ; is that correct ? 

Admiral Notes. There is only one other point that bears on it. There 
was an understanding between the Director of Naval Intelligence and 
myself that if at any time the other was involved when an important, 
when something important came up, that the other would act for him 
because we were closer than anyone else to it. We bot]i understood 
each other's duties, and if, for example, some important message had 
come up and the Director of Naval Intelligence was involved, instead 
of going to his subordinate Kramer would have come direct to me and 
I would have taken it up immediately to the Chief of Naval Opera- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4725 

tions. However, that had no bearing on this particular period because 
at that time it had been decentralized among the several bureaus, and 
the Chief of Naval Communications went direct to him, and at the same 
time the Director of Naval Intelligence went to him direct. 

Mr. Masten. Now, you mentioned a few minutes ago the question 
of delays in translations. What specific steps do you recall that were 
taken prior to December 7 which were directed [lJo96] toward 
speeding up the decryptions and translations, or increasing your staff 
to that end ? 

Admiral Notes. The first thing we did was to — we conferred on this 
matter in September 1939. As I say, it was taking us about 3 weeks 
to get anything out — and made an analysis, an office analysis. Our 
bottleneck really was the translators, so we made every effort to ac- 
quire more translators, but they were very difficult to find because, in 
addition to being reasonable Japanese students, it was necessary to 
have them of unquestioned loyalty to the United States, and we could 
not afford to take a chance on anyone whose record was not entirely 
clear. 

We found that with the competition of the Army and the State* 
Department and some other Government departments the supply of 
Japanese translators in the United States was very small. 

Mr. Mastex. By December 7, do you recall how many translators 
you had in your Division ? 

Admiral Notes. I heard Captain Kramer say the other day six. I do 
not know of my own knowledge that that is correct. 

Mr. Masten. Did that represent an increase during the immediately 
preceding period ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes. 

Mr. Mastex. In how many you had had on January 1, 1941? 
' [l^Si97] Admiral Notes. Well, I don't think we had found 
more than a couple. I should say we probably added two in the 
whole period. 

Mr. Mastex. Now I would like to turn to this question of the winds 
message. Admiral Noyes. I would like to have you look at page 154 
of Exhibit 1, pages 154 and 155, which contain the messages estab- 
lishing the winds codes. You were familiar with those, were you 
not, at the time they were intercepted and translated 'i 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mastex. Now. following the receipt of those two messages, what 
steps were taken in your division to make sure that an implementing 
message, if it was sent, would be picked up ? 

Admiral Notes. At my direction Captain Safford made certain as- 
signments of frequencies to be covered by our intercepting stations — 
the same was done by the Army and through the iVrmy by FCC — in 
order to intercept any message which might include this winds code. 

Mr. Mastex. Do you recall whether there were any written orders 
issued in that respect? 

Admiral Notes. I do not, 

Mr. Mastex". Probably it was done orally? 

Admiral Notes. I think so. Everything about the enemj^ inter- 
cepts was kept out of writing as much as possible. [12598] That 
is one reason it is difficult to find records. 



4726 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Masten. Do you recall the question of these cards that Captain 
Kramer was instructed to prepare, on which were to be written the 
English translation of the code words and what they would mean 'i 

Admiral Noyes. I do now. 

Mr. Masten. You mentioned it a few minutes ago, earlier in your 
testimony. 

Admiral Noyes. I testified previously I did not recall them, the 
reason I should think being that, as I understood the question, I was 
asked if we had cards in the office and I could not see any reason why 
we should have done that. 

Captain Safford explained to me this summer that we had these 
cards so that we could telephone to people at home and just mention 
"weather." Of course, we never used the telephone for anything 
which had to do with intercepted messages and by having the cards 
with the English expression "East wind, rain," we could call up Ad- 
miral Stark and say that a message had come in — we had a weather 
report of "rain with an east wind" and he would have understood what 
it meant. 

Mr. Masten. So that this card system was a special code in the 
Navy Department to enable you to discuss this matter over the tele- 
phone, was that the original purpose of it? 

Admiral Noyes. It was a code to enable the watch officer [l£o99] 
in the Navy Department or me to talk over the telephone — to transmit 
that information at night or at odd hours to leading people at home. 

Mr. Masten. If the information for which the Department was 
looking had come in during the daytime or at a time when you were 
at your office, there would have been no occasion to use these cards; 
it would simply have come direct to you ? 

Admiral Noyes. That is correct. 

Mr. Masten. Did you issue any instructions that any winds exe- 
cute message, if received, should be brought directly to you ? 

Admiral Noyes. Reasonably direct. There was no reason that it 
should not pass through Captain Safford. It did not need to pass 
through anybody else, because the watch officers understood it and it 
was just a case of an expression appearing and it did not require any 
translation. I knew the words, I knew the Japanese words. The 
English meaning did not make any difference to us. 

Mr. Masten. You say it was just a case of an expression appearing. 
Wasn't it also necessary to see the entire context of the message in 
which the words appeared? 

Admiral Noyes. That is true. It had to appear in a certain way. 
It had to appear, this one to which you refer 

Mr, Masten. Page 154. 

\_12600'] Admiral Noyes. It had to be repeated twice in the mid- 
dle of a short-wave broadcast. 

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather broadcast 
and each sentence will be rei)eated twice. When this is heard please destroy all 
code papers — 

and so forth. 
At the beginning it said: 

The following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese lan- 
guage short wave news broadcast — 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4727 

which is the same thing that you will hear over WINX hourly in this 
city. 

Mr. Masten. In the case of the code established by the message on 
page 154, which is circular 2353, did you expect that that would come 
in in voice or in Morse ? 

Admiral Notes. In voice. In voice because that is what the message 
said: 

The daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast. 

As I say, a good example of that is given in WINX on an hourly 
broadcast by voice which people would listen to. The other message — 
do you know what page the other one is on ? 

Mr. Mastex. The next following, on page 155. 

Admiral Notes. Oh, yes. In that, they only use the first words, the 
words that mean "East, North and West," which [12601] were 
at the end of the general intelligence broadcast, and I believe those 
could have come in the Morse broadcast, which is the dot-dash. You 
can hear it on the same receiver, but we knew in general what the 
schedule was. 

Mr. Masten. Now, while it is perfectly true that under circular 2353 
it was to be in a short-wave news broadcast, was there not a possibility 
that that short-wave news broadcast might be sent out from Tokyo 
in the Morse code ? 

Admiral Notes. I don't see how. You can only have a broadcast 
when people know when it is coming, just the same as, to use the anal- 
ogy here, you would have to listen all day long if you did not know 
when the news was being sent. Now, if you say that you are going to 
put something in a news broadcast on a certain schedule and then you 
send it at some other time, then you certainly cannot depend on any- 
body hearing it who is familiar with the schedule. 

Mr. Masten. So that as far as your opinion at the time is concerned, 
you wish the committee to understand that you expected any imple- 
menting message under 2353 to be a voice broadcast? 

Admiral Notes. I did and, furthermore, I expected it to be a voice 
broadcast in accordance with this. 

Mr. Mastex. With the other conditions. 

Admiral Notes. "Daily Japanese language short wave news 
[12602] broadcast." If they changed their short wave news 
broadcast to a Morse transmission, that would have changed the 
code along with it, but at the time it was being sent by voice. The 
guiding point was what they said, that it would appear m the middle 
of the daily Japanese language short-wave news broadcast, and the 
Japanese are most meticulous in carrying out their own instruc- 
tions, 

Mr. Mastex. Now, under this arrangement that you set up, would 
it have been necessary for a winds execute message, if received, to 
have passed through Captain Kramer's hands? 

Admiral Notes. No. 

Mr. Mastex. It would have been brought directly to you, or to 
Captain Safford and then to you? 

Admiral No^t:s. I should think so. There is no reason that Cap- 
tain Kramer should not have been consulted, but if a correct mes- 
sage had ever come in nobody would have needed to be consulted. If 



4728 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

there had not been a question about it, I could have told just by being 
shown it. 

Mr. Masten. Now, under the system which was set up who was 
to be the final judge of whether or not a message was a genuine winds 
execute message under either of these two circulars that we have 
mentioned ? 

Admiral Notes. Well, I was the Director of Naval Communica- 
tions. I was supposed to be the deciding factor over my [12603] 
subordinates if there was any question. 

Mr. Masten. And in deciding whether or not an alleged winds 
execute message was genuine would you have taken into account 
these various points you have mentioned that appear in circular 2353, 
is that correct? 

Admiral Noyes, Yes, sir. That is what I did do. 

Mr. Masten. Now, did anybody 

Admiral Noyes. If you do not mind, if you will refer to that FFC, 
it is on page 

Mr. Masten. It is item 3d right at the top, in the right-hand corner. 

Admiral Noyes. That is what I expected to come as an excuted 
winds message, assuming that it is repeated at the end. 

Mr. Masten. You are referring now to item 3-D of Exhibit No. 142? 

Admiral Noyes. Item No. 3-d, document No. 4. 

Mr. Masten. Document No. 4, yes. 

Admiral Noyes. Sent as in the right-hand column, which is in 
Japanese, expressed in "Kana". 

Mr. Masten. With the phrase repeated twice? 

Admiral Noyes. The English translation is, "This is in the middle 
of the news." He went out of his way to state that it was in the 
middle of the news, to comply with those [1200Jf] instructions 
and that here it should be in the middle of the news, so that some- 
body would not say that it was too far and miss it — 

but today, at this point specially I will give the weather forecast : West Wind, 
clear — West Wind, Clear. 

The other station did the same thing in almost the same words, just 
changed the point of the wording, of the word "specially." Now, I 
would say that, assuming that that was repeated again at the end, 
that that was an authentic broadcast in this cipher, in this code. 

Mr. Masten. This document that you are looking at is the one which 
is described as a true copy of two weather messages intercepted by 
Federal Communication Commission monitors from Tokyo stations 
between 0002 and 0035 GMT December 8, 1941, and telephoned to 
Lt. Col. C. C. Dusenbury, U. S. Army Service Corps, at the request 
of Colonel Bratton's office at approximately 8 p. m. eastern standard 
time, December 7, 1941. 

I am reading from the certification of Mr. Slowie, item 3 of this 
Exhibit. 

Now, before we discuss anything further, I would like to ask you 
this. At any time prior to December 7, 1941, did anyone bring to you, 
or call your attention to, a message which they said was or appeared 
to be a genuine winds execute message and which, [126051 after 
consideration by you, was so regarded ? In other words, did you see, 
prior to December 7, 1941, a genuine winds execute message under 
either of these two circulars, 2353 and 2354 ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4729 

Admiral Notes. You asked me about two things. You asked did I 
receive a false one and did I receive a correct one. 

Mr. Masten. Let us confine it just to the latter part. Did you receive 
a genuine one? 

Admiral Notes. I did see messages that were brought to me because 
they were supposed to be, but I never saw one which checked out as 
being an authentic message. 

The Chairman. It is now 12 : 30. We will recess until 1 : 30. 
Admiral, be back at that time. 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

(Whereupon, at 12 : 30 p. m., a recess was taken until 1 : 30 p. m. of 
the same day.) 

[12606'] AFrERNOON SESSION — 1 : 30 P. M. 

The Chairman. The committee will be in order, please. 
Counsel may proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. LEIGH NOYES, UNITED STATES NAVY 

(Resumed) 

Mr. Masten. Admiral, just before the recess I asked you whether 
prior to December 7 any genuine winds execute message was brought 
to you, or to your attention, by anyone in the Navy Department. 

Admiral Notes. There was not. 

Mr. Masten. Your answer to that question is, there was not? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Masten. If there had been, would that have been a matter of 
importance so that you would now remember it ? 

Admiral Notes. Up to December 3 it would have been a matter of 
importance. On December 3 we received an intercepted message, 
which is in the exhibit 

Mr. Masten. Exhibit 1. 

Admiral Notes. Yes, which informed us that the Japanese were 
destroymg their codes. Sent out on December 2, No. 867. 

Mr. Masten. Will you identify the page. Admiral? 

Admiral Notes. Page 215. I think that is the one. 

Mr. Masten. That is message No. 867 ? 

[12607] Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Masten. And what effect did that have on how you regarded 
the question of intercepting a winds execute message ? 

Admiral Notes. We sent that message out to all people concerned, 
and thereafter there was no particular importance to an execute of 
the winds message except in a cumulative way. 

Mr. Masten. So that you regard the sending from Tokyo of the 
instructions to burn the codes of the Japanese representatives as for 
all practical purposes nullifying the importance of the search for a 
winds execute message ; is that what the committee is to understand ? 

Admiral Notes. No, I don't think that that way, I am quite sure, 
from what I heard testified to, for instance, in Honolulu, I don't 
think the orders were immediately countermanded, I don't think 
they would have been, because- this coverage was, at any time some- 
thing else might have come up, and we had a system which covered 
pretty well Japanese transmissions. 

79716 — 46— pt. 10 10 



4730 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Hasten. But the receipt of this message instructing the Jap- 
anese representatives to burn their codes did lessen the importance 
in your mind, at any rate, of the interception of a winds execute 
message ? 

Admiral Notes. Of this particular east wind rain message, 
[12608] yes. 

Mr. Keefe. What message are you referring to, east wind rain? 
Are you referring to that code set-up when you make that statement ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You are not referring to the message that is alleged to 
have been delivered by Captain Safford? 

Admiral Notes. That is what is alleged to have been delivered to me. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, I want to know whether that answer relates to 
the message which Safford delivered. We haven't gotten to the point 
where it is shown one was delivered. 

Mr. Masten. We haven't come to that. 

Mr. MuRPHT. Well, now, counsel is doing a good job. 

Mr. Keefe. I am not critical of counsel. 

The Chairman. He will do a better one if he is not interrupted. 

Mr. Masten. Admiral, the question was whether or not after Decem- 
ber 3 and the receipt of this message from Tokyo instructing the Japa- 
nese representatives to burn their codes, you regarded the interception 
of a winds execute message of as great importance as you had before you 
received the message regarding the code burning, and I take it your 
answer to that is, that it was not of as great importance [12609] 
after December 3 ? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct. 

Mr. Masten. Now, before the recess we referred to document 4, item 
3 (d) of Exhibit 142, and you stated that you regarded that as a genuine 
winds execute message under circular 2353 ; is that correct ? 

Admiral Notes. Assuming it was repeated again at the end of the 
message. 

Mr. Masten. Yes. This document does not show whether or not it 
was repeated at the end of the message. 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Masten. But did you check at the time, or was this communi- 
cated to you at the time so that you could check as to whether or rot it 
had been repeated at the end of the message, do you remember ? 

Admiral Notes. I do not remember the receipt of this specific mes- 
sage in detail. It occurred after the attack on Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Masten. Now, then, prior to December T, do you recall any 
instances when- messages that were first thought to be winds execute 
messages were brought to you and were determined by you not to be 
genuine winds execute messages ? 

Admiral Notes. I recall the fact that there were several but I do 
not recall the details. 

[12610] Mr. Masten, How many occasions were there on which 
alleged winds execute messages were brought to you and it was left 
for you to determine whether or not they Avere genuine winds execute 
messages ? 

Admiral Notes. I could not say. Few. 

]\Ir. Masten. As many as half a dozen or a dozen ? 

Admiral Notes. Not a dozen. Less than a half-dozen. Two or 
three, perhaps. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4731 

Mr. Masten. Now, Captain Safford has testified before this com- 
mittee tliat a winds execute message was received on the morning of 
December 4. I am going to read you his testimony from his prepared 
statement in that regard. At page 9641 of our transcript Captain 
Safford testified as follows : 

The winds message broadcast was about 200 words long, with the code words 
prescribed in Tokyo circular 2353 appearing in the middle of the message, whereas 
we had expected to find the code words of Tokyo circular 2354 in a Morse broad- 
cast. All three '"code words" were used, but the expression meaning "North Wind 
Cloudy" was in tlie negative form. 

When I first saw the winds message, it had already been translated by Lieuten- 
ant Commander Kramer, in charge of the Translation Section of the Navy De- 
partment Communications [12611] Intelligence Unit. Kramer had under- 
scored all three "code phrases" on the original incoming teletype sheet. Below 
the printed message was written in pencil or colored crayon in Kramer's hand- 
writing, the following three translations : 

War with England (including NEI, etc.) 

War with the U. S. 

Peace with Russia. 
I am not sure of the order ; but it was the same as in the broadcast and I think 
England appeared first. I think Kramer used "U. S." rather than "United 
States". It is possible that the words "no war", instead of "peace", were used 
to describe Japan's intentions with regard to Russia. 

Then dropping down to the bottom of page 9642 he continued : 

I immediately sent the original of the winds message up to the Director of 
Naval Communications (Rear Admiral Noyes) by one of the officers serving 
under me and told him to deliver this paper to Admiral Noyes in person, to track 
him down and not take "no" for an answer, and if he could not find him in a 
reasonable time to let me know. I did not explain the nature or significance of 
the winds message to this officer. In a few minutes I received a report to the 
effect that the message had been delivered. 

[12613] Now, going back to the description which I have just 
read you, given by Captain Safford before this committee, do you have 
any recollection of ever seeing such a message as he describes? 

Admiral Notes. I don't believe that his description is good enough 
for me to answer that question. I will say, however, that the message 
which he describes is not an authentic execute of a winds message. 

Mr. Masten. Why do you say it is not an authentic winds execute 
m.essage ? 

Admiral Notes. In the first place, for the reason, in my opinion, 
that it Avas not transmitted as the Japanese said it would be, which he 
passes over. 

Mr. IMastex. What do you mean by that ? 

Admiral Notes. It was sent in Morse code and not by voice. Not 
on the schedule and not in the broadcast whicli they had said they 
would send it. Furthermore, his description of the meaning of the 
phrases, of course, is not correct. I think that has been discussed. 
About whether it meant war or not. But actually this one had nothing 
to do with ''including the Netherlands East Indies," the circular that 
was set up — the one he says did — east wind rain. 

Mr. Masten. 2353? 

Admiral Notes. Had no reference to Netherlands East Indies. 

[12613] Mr. Masten. Now, what other reasons? 

Admiral Notes. That would have been the Morse one. which merely 
said north, east, and south. There is no such thing in Japanese, any 
more than there is in English, as negative nouns. We don't say, the 
Japanese don't say, "no north wind," they say what the wind is. It 



4732 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

wasn't provided in the code for any negative expression. The only 
thing in connection with that I have a recollection of, which is not very 
distinct, is that this question did come up of someone trying to make 
out of a translation that it meant "Peace with Russia," which is in 
common with what he said here. 

Mr. Masten. Was that in connection with a message that you recall 
having been brought to you on December 4? 

Admiral Notes. T don't recall the date. 

]Mr. Hasten. But you do remember some incident prior to December 
7 having to do with whether "Peace with Russia" was a proper expres- 
sion under the winds code? 

Admiral Notes. If I may take up another matter, it was, in another 
place, in a previous investigation, it was said that one of the watch 
officers telephoned to me at my home a possible winds execute message 
and I replied that that was a peculiar direction from which to have 
the wind blowing. I didn't remember that at the first investigation. 

\^1261If\ Captain Safford recalled to my recollection that that 
is what I had agreed I would say, that if I didn't agi-ee over the tele- 
phone that the message was authentic. So if that is the message, that 
part fits together. 

I believe that a message was presented to me which in some way men- 
tioned Russia, which I was unwilling to accept. 

Mr. Masten. Let's come back to the reasons why the particular 
message described by Captain Safford would not, in your opinion, 
have met the requirements of the winds code? 

In the first place, you say you have no specific collection of this 
incident ? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct. 

Mr. Masten. Then you say that if a message such as this had been 
brought to you, you would not have regarded it as an authentic winds 
execute for the reasons, first, that it was a Morse broadcast whereas 
you expected it to be a voice broadcast? 

Admiral Notes. Because it had been stated in the set-up that it 
would be. when these expressions were used it would be in a voice 
broadcast. In Circular 2354 there was not another set-up that could 
have been used in the Morse broadcast. 

Mr. Mastex. Your second reason was that the message \ 12615'] 
as written, the interpretation as said to have been written by Captain 
Kramer at the bottom, "including N. E. I. etc." does not appear in 
Circular 2353; is that correct? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct, and also the fact 

Mr. Masten. Or in 2354, for that matter? 

Admiral Notes. This did not aarree with 2353. which Captain Saf- 
ford said it was intended to be. Captain Kramer also I believe stated 
that he would never have written "war" because he didn't consider, 
and so testified before the committee, that that was the correct Japanese 
translation of the set-up. 

Mr. Masten. And your fourth reason is that the expression used in 
regard to Russia was in the negative form ; is that correct ? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct. 

Mr. Masten. Wliich was not provided for under the circular estab- 
lishiner the code? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4733 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir ; and there is nothing positive to show that 
it did appear in the middle of a broadcast so that it was repeated twice. 

Mr. Masten. But the phrase "including N. E. I." might have been 
derived, might it not, from the dispatch you had received from Admiral 
Hart, [12616] which also appears in Exhibit 142, and in which 
he says he translates the intercept received from Singapore, the phrase 
"Nishi," as meaning England, including the occupation of Thai or 
invasion of Malaya or N. E. I, 

Admiral Notes. That is right; that is 2354. 

I will tell you, I think they did a poor job of a second-hand trans- 
lation out there. I think they got it rather mixed up. 

Mr. Masten. Do you recall whether by the morning of December 
4, this message from Admiral Hart had been received? That is on 
pagel (c) of Exhibit 142. 

Admiral Notes. Please repeat that. 

Mr. Masten. I just wanted to get your recollection as to whether 
or not this message had been received in the Navy Department before 
the morning of December 4. 

Admiral Notes. It had. It should have been. It was transmitted 
on the 28th of November. 

Mr. Masten. Now, Colonel Sadtler testified yesterday before the 
committee that on the morning of December 5 you telephoned him 
and said to him, "The message is in,'' or words to that effect, regard- 
ing a winds execute message. 

Do you have any present recollection of having said that ? 

Admiral Notes. No, I have not. We had a private tele- [12617] 
phone, secret telephone, from my desk to the desk of the Chief Signal 
Officer in the Army and we talked together a number of times a day. 
As to any particular conversation, I do not identify a conversation 
such as he testified to, although I wouldn't say it didn't occur. 

Mr. Keefe. What was the last part ? 

Admiral Notes. I would not say that it didn't occur, because I 
talked to him several times a day. 

Mr. Masten. At any rate you were in communication with him on 
matters such as this from time to time during the period prior to Pearl 
Harbor? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct. I cannot see why I should have 
said "The" message, because, to my mind this was not "the" message. 
We had large numbers of messages to discuss. If anything the note 
which we were waiting for was more important on the date he says, 
the 5th, than this. Incidentally, his day is not the same as the date 
given by Captain Safford or Captain Kramer, which makes it diffi- 
cult for me to identif}' a date in answering. 

Mr. Masten. Well, now, would it have been your practice in de- 
ciding whether an alleged winds execute message was authentic or 
not, to have discussed the matter with Admiral Ingersoll, or Admiral 
Wilkinson, or Admiral Turner before making up your mind on the 
subject? 

[12618] Admiral Notes. Yes, particularly if I, if it met some 
requirement, and if it was approaching the borderline, I certainly 
would have discussed it with them. 

Mr. Masten. Admiral Turner testified before this committee that 
on December 5 in the afternoon you telephoned him and told him 



4734 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that a winds execute message translated "North wmd clear," or per- 
haps "North wind cloudy" had been received in the Navy Depart- 
ment. Do you have any recollection of that incident ? 

Admiral Notes. He says the afternoon of the 5th ? 

Mr. Masten. He said the afternoon of the 5th. 

Admiral Notes. Of course, Captain Safford says the morning of 
the 4th. I would say there was only one message that had a Russian 
slant. They are probably both talking about the same false message. 

Mr. Masten. But you have no specific recollection of that particular 
incident ? 

Admiral Notes. I have not, except that I have an indistinct recol- 
lection of a message — of going over this thing once before, that there 
is no such thing in Japanese as a negative noun. 

Mr. Masten. Then would it be fair to summarize your testimony on 
this question of a winds execute message as follows, that prior to De- 
cember 7 in your best recollection [12619] no authentic winds 
execute message was received in the Navy Department ? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct. 

Mr. M1\STEN. That prior to December 7, a number, perhaps as many 
as a half dozen, alleged winds execute messages were brought to you and 
you decided, perhaps after consultation with Admiral Ingersoll or 
Admiral Turner or Admiral AVilkinson, that the messages were not 
authentic winds messages? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct, except I would say that some of the 
ones brought to me were brought with a subordinate saying himself 
that he was sure it couldn't be correct. 

In other words, already questioned by one of the watch officers, or 
Captain Safford. 

[12620] Mr, Masten. Were the watch officers supposed to bring 
them directly to you, or to take them to Captain Safford, if an alleged 
message came in? 

Admiral Notes. They took them to him if he was there. 

Mr. Masten. If he was there. 

Admiral Notes. I imagine. 

Mr. Masten. Do you recall having had anything to do after De- 
cember the 7th with the preparation of a folder of intercepted Jap- 
anese messages to be submitted to the Roberts Commission ? 

Admiral Notes. I received orders from the Secretary of the Navy, 
probably via the Chief of Naval Operations, to prepare such a folder 
for the Roberts Commission and I passed that order on to my subor- 
dinates and checked the folder after it was presented to me. 

Mr. Masten. Did that folder include an execute message under 
either of the codes establishing the winds code? 

Admiral Notes. It did not. It was supposed to contain no magic 
or any reference to it. 

Mr. Keefe. What was that answer ? 

Admiral Notes. The folder for the Roberts Commission was not 
supposed to contain magic. 

Mr. E^eefe. And did not? 

Admiral Notes. It did not to the best of my recollection. [12621] 
If it did, it got by me. 

Mr. Masten. Now, there is one other point at which this winds mes- 
sage comes up and that is in connection with the warning dispatch 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4735 

which Captain McCollum prepared during the week prior to Pearl 
Harbor and which was never sent. 

Captain Safford has testified before this committee in connection 
with that message (and he also testified before the Navy Court) that 
the message ended with a reference to the receipt in the Navy De- 
partment of a winds execute message. Do you recall having been 
shown this message proposed by Captain McCollum on or about De- 
cember the 5th ? 

Admiral Notes. I recall having been shown a message prepared 
by Captain McCollum. I am not sure of the date. Incidentally, 
Captain McCollum's own testimony was that it did not contain any 
reference to the winds message; that is my own recollection. 

Mr. Masten. Do you recall whether or not the proposed message 
contained a reference to a winds execute? 

Admiral Notes. I will say it did not. 

Mr. Masten. It is j^our present recollection that there was no ref- 
erence in this message prepared by Captain McCollum to any winds 
execute message; is that correct? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct. 

Mr. Masten. Now, referring again to these dispatches [7^,6'^^] 
in Exhibit 37, on pages 42 to 44, which were the messages regarding 
the destruction of codes by the United States representatives in our 
outlying islands, will you state again — I think you touched on it 
briefly earlier — will you state again why those messages were pre- 
pared at that particular time? 

Admiral Notes. To the best of my recollection, based on an inter- 
cepted Japanese message, we had on the 3d of December notified 
our outlying representatives of the fact that the Japanese had de- 
stroyed their codes and papers in general. 

Mr. Mastex Now, those are the dispatches on pages 40 and 41, are 
they not ? 

Admiral Notes. The dispatches on pages 40 and 41. On the morn- 
ing of the 4th of December I asked Admirals Turner and Wilkinson 
to come to my office and proposed to them that we had better destroy 
our own codes and ciphers in our most outlying positions. They 
agreed and I gave instructions to Captain Safford over the inter- 
office phone to prepare these messages which you have in the Exhibit. 

Mr. Masten. And the reason, the immediate cause of sending those 
out was the receipt and decryption in Washington of the Japanese 
messages instructing their representatives to destroy their codes; is 
that correct? 

[JSS^S] Admiral Notes. It was a natural sequence to the fact 
that they had destroyed theirs at the places named, Tokyo, Bangkok, 
Peiping, Shanghai. Of course, when we did it we limited ourselves 
to any — we cut ourselves off from any further information. That is 
the reason it was desirable from our point of view and from the opera- 
tional people's point of view that it had to be agreed to. 

Mr. Masten. And the sending of those messages was not caused, 
are we to understand, by the receipt in Washington of a winds execute 
message prior to that time ? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct. 

Mr. Masten. You say that is correct? 



4736 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Notes. These messages vrere not caused by the receipt of 
any winds code execute. 

Mr. Masten. Now, Admiral, turning to the events of December the 
6th and 7th, will you state briefly where you were, and what you did, 
on the late afternoon and evening of December the 6th. if you can 
now recall ? 

Admiral Notes. On the 6th, Saturday the 6th, around noontime we 
had another conference, to the best of my recollection, to discuss au- 
thorizing the commander in chief, Pacific, to destroy more codes, 
which was a rather serious matter because that still further out down 
our communications, incoming communications. The message was 
prepared and sent up to be [1^624] considered by the Chief of 
Naval Operations and eventually released by him, or by Admiral 
Ingersoll, it was. 

Mr. Masten. Could I interrupt you and ask you if that is the mes- 
sage on page 44 of Exhibit 37 ? 

Admiral Notes. No; that is about Guam. It is the message on 
page 45. 

Mr. Masten. The message on page 45 is the one that was discussed 
at this conference to which you referred ? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct 

Mr. Masten. And that was in the late afternoon of December, the 
6th? 

Admiral Notes. You see, we had Com 16, who was the shore repre- 
sentative of the commander in chief, Asiatic, he had been covered by 
the dispatch on page 42 and this covered the rest of the islands. 

Mr. Masten. Now, about what time did this conference take place? 

Admiral Notes. I would not remember except for the reference 
number on the dispatch, which is my best guide. 

Mr. Masten. And what time does that indicate? 

Admiral Notes. That is around noontime. 

Mr. Masten. Around noontime. 

Admiral Notes. The middle of the day. 

Mr. Masten. Now. during the afternoon of December the 6th, 
[12625] did you know that the 13-part message, so-called — you 
are familiar with what I mean when I refer to that? 

Admiral Notes. Yes. 

Mr. Masten. Did you know that that had been received and was 
being decrypted in the Navy Department? 

Admiral Notes. I now believe that I did. I was either informed 
or saw the rough originals of the parts and knew they were coming 
in, and I particularly instructed Kramer to be sure that the Secretary 
of State got his copies promptly, although it was the Army responsi- 
bility for the deliver}^, because I felt it very important that he should 
be able to study the note before the Japanese representatives presented 
it to him. 

Mr. Masten. And when did you first see the 13 parts as translated? 

Admiral Notes. As I say, I think I saw the rough. When these 
messages come in originally they are quite full of holes and they 
were — I think you will notice in that message, I believe, reference 
to 46 words that we never did get. I saw enough to get the sense of 
it before I left. 

Mr. Masten. Can you be more specific as to what time it was? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4737 

Admiral Notes. No. 

Mr. Masten. It would have been along in the late afternoon, before 
6 o'clock? 

ll^6£6] Admiral Notes. I left between 7 and 8, nearer 8, from 
my office. It could have been any time. It wasn't after 8 o'clock. 

Mr. Masten. And did you return home at that time ? 

Admiral Notes. I did. 

Mr. Masten. And you were at home all during the evening of 
December the 6th ? 

Admiral Notes. I was. As I mentioned before, I might have come 
back then to the office but nobody seems to have seen me, so I guess I did 
not. 

Mr, Masten. Do you have any recollection of having seen on the 
evening of December the 6th the so-called pilot message ? That is the 
message on page 238 of Exhibit 1. 

Admiral Notes. No, I am rather definite that I did not. 

Mr. Masten. You did not see that in the late afternoon or evening of 
the 6th? 

Admiral Notes. I don't think the Navy received it on the 6th. 

Mr. Masten. Now% what time did you come to your office on Sunday 
morning ? 

Admiral Notes. Around 9. 

Mr. Masten. Around 9 o'clock ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Masten. And what time on Sunday morning, or when, did 
[1^627] you first learn of the receipt of the fourteenth part of the 
14-part message ? 

Admiral Notes. Actually I was reading my copy of the note when I 
got the intercept of the warning of the attack on Pearl Harbor — I 
mean of the notice of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Just when the book 
was brought to me I could not say. 

Mr. Masten. Do you recall specifically what time it was on Sunday 
when you say you first heard of the attack on Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Notes. Oh. the broadcast — we intercepted the broadcast 
from Pearl Harbor. I do not remember the exact number of minutes 
after 1, but as soon as it was intercepted by my people — I was sitting at 
my desk reading the booklet when on my interoffice phone they gave me 
the message, "Air raid on Pearl Harbor ; this is not drill." 

Mr. Masten. Now, by "booklet" you mean the volume of translated 
intercepts which contained the full 14 parts of the 14-part message; 
is that what you mean ? 

Admiral Notes. I think the fourteenth part was in it. 

Mr. Masten. Was the 1 p. m. message in the booklet at that time? 
Do you recall seeing it? 

Admiral Notes. I am sure it was not. 

Mr. Masten. Prior to that time had you seen any of the other 
admirals in OPNAV during the morning of December the 7th? 

[1£628] Admiral Notes. I had been busy from nine until one. 
We were quite involved with a Japanese convoy, which over our regu- 
lar systems of communication hacl been reported by Admiral Hart. 

Mr. Masten. Did you have any discussion with any of the other 
admirals that morning regarding the 14 part and 1 p. m. message? 
Are we to understand that you had not seen it up until just prior to 



4738 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the time when the radio message was intercepted saying, "Air raid 
on Pearl Harbor ; this is not drill" ? 

Admiral Noyes. That is my best recollection. 

Mr. Masten. You had not read it prior to that time and had not 
discussed it with anyone or heard anyone else talking about it or its 
receipt ? 

Admiral Notes. I might explain by saying that Kramer in being 
caught between the White House and State Department and Sec- 
retary of the Navy did not get around to cover my copies of those 
messages, which was quite proper because I knew my job was to see 
that the things got delivered to the ultimate addressees and I would 
not expect him to hold up in getting the copies through. I gathered 
from his testimony that when he returned from one trip he found 
another and had to go right back. I think that is the reason I did 
not have my booklet sooner. 

IM629] Mr. Masten. Now, you said that on the afternoon of 
December the 6th you had seen the 13-part message in the rough. 

Admiral Noyes. I said I think so. I had either seen them or had 
been told about them by Kramer. 

Mr. Masten. Did you receive any — or, rather, did you leave any 
instructions with Captain Sallord about it, or with Captain Kramer 
about it, when you left the Navy Department on the evening of De- 
cember 6th — regarding that message or any other intercepts'? 

Admiral Noyes. The only specific instructions that I remember 
were to be sure that the Secretary of State got the completed copy 
as soon as possible. At the time it was coming, and we did not know 
how long it was going to take for the note to be completed. 

Mr. Masten. Did anyone get in touch with you during the late 
evening or night of December 6th regarding those messages? 

Admiral Noyes. Not to the best of my recollection. 

Mr. Masten. Is there anything else in connection with the events 
of those two days that you now recall that would be helpful to the 
committee? For example, as to whether or not during the morning 
of December the 7th you heard any discussion of Pearl Harbor. 

[126o0] Admiral Noyes. Well, I can be very definite that I heard 
no discussion of Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Masten. You heard no discussion of Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Noyes. I heard no discussion of Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Masten. Until the time of the attack? 

Admiral Noyes. That is correct. There is only one thing. A Brit- 
ish officer came to my office shortly after 9 o'clock in connection wdth 
this actual sighting that we had made of this Japanese convoy head- 
ing either for Thailand, Malay Peninsula or the Philippines. It was 
around abreast the Philippines at that time. He had some informa- 
tion and I gave him ours, which we were doing, and he wanted an 
appointment with the Secretary of State. I called up the Secretary 
of State's office and they told me that the Japanese, I believe, had con- 
flicted; that the Japanese representatives had asked for an appoint- 
ment at 1 o'clock. That is the best of my recollection. 

]Mr. Masten. Other than that incident you have no other informa- 
tion which you think would be helpful regarding the events on the 
morning of December the 7th? 

Admiral Noyes. No. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4739 

Mr. Hasten. Now, Admiral what steps were taken in the Navy De- 
partment, in your division of the Navy Department, immediately after 
December the Tth to make certain that there , [12631] were no 
leaks of information from the Navy Department? I suppose there 
were such steps taken. 

Admiral Notes. Well, I read in the paper Captain Safford's testi- 
mony that I directed all personal memoranda to be destroyed, war 
having been declared. I have no recollection of that particular meet- 
ing. 

We had a conference every Tuesday morning of division heads, but 
I certainly would be perfectly willing to stand by that order. I would 
not have allowed officers to keep personal memoranda on secret mat- 
ters and it is now, it is at the present time a standing instruction in 
the Navy. 

Mr. Master. Did you attend a particular meeting, or call together 
a particular meeting of your subordinates to issue such instructions, 
during the week after the Pearl Harbor attack ? 

Admiral Notes. I have no such recollection, but as I say, I may 
very well have done that. That would have been a logical thing to do. 

]VIr. Masten. Captain Safford also testified that at that meeting to 
which he referred there was reference to stopping the attack on, or the 
rumors about. Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Do you have any 
recollection of that ? 

Admiral Notes. I have not, but the same thing applies. According 
to what he said, I said that the Roberts commission [12632] was 
going to investigate the attack on Pearl Harbor and that I did not 
want any gossiping from any of my people. If they had anything 
to say they were to say it when they were witnesses on the stand, which 
is also standard Navy procedure, that witnesses are not to discuss 
matters aside from court. 

Mr. Masten. Did any instructions of that character which you is- 
sued at that time call for the destruction of any official papers of any 
kind? 

Admiral Notes. Absolutely not. 

Mr. Masten. I think we have no further questions. 

The Chairmax. Junior counsel has covered the ground so thor- 
oughly that the chairman has no questions to ask. 

Mr." Cooper? 

The Vice Chairman. No questions now. 

The Chairman. Senator George? 

Senator George. I do not believe I have any at the present time. I 
mav want to ask some later on. 

The Chairman. Mr. Clark? Mr. Lucas? Mr. Murphy? 

Mr. MuRPHT. Admiral Noyes, there has been testimony before this 
committee that you made a call to the Army and you gave them to 
believe that there had been some kind of a winds intercept and that 
the Army, in their desire to find out what the truth was, called you on 
the phone and you said you were too busy, you had to go to a meeting. 
Is that true or not true ? 

[12633] Admiral Notes. I have no such recollection, Mr. 
Murphy. I don't believe that I would have ever handled it in that 
way, 

Mr. MijRPHT. Well, now, this committee for the last 2 weeks have 
been working night and day on this matter, I think largely on what 



4740 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

your subordinate, Captain Safford said, that he took it to you and he 
said when he brought it to you that ended his responsibility and I 
think this committee is entitled to a definite, positive statement from 
you- to pick up from what your subordinate stated with reference to it. 
Captain SaflPord said : 

There was a winds message. It meant war — and we knew it meant war. 

What do you have to say about that ? 

Admiral Notes. I say that that is not a correct statement. 

Mr. Murphy. Also Captain Safford said: 

I saw the Winds message typed in page form on yellow teletype paper, with the 
translation written below. I immediately forwarded this message to my com- 
manding officer (Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, USN), thus fully discharging my 
I'esponsibility in the matter. 

Is that so ? 

Admiral Notes. I cannot say that Captain Safford did not send to 
me a message. I will say that he sent me no message which was a 
correct execute of the winds message or, rather, [12634] that I 
did not receive it. 

I will again read you what Captain Safford said : 

I immediately forwarded this message to my Commanding Officer (Rear 
Admiral Leigh Noyes, USN), thus fully discharging my responsibility in the 
matter. 

He said that he forwarded this message to your personally. Do you 
know whether he did or did not ? Is that question clear ? 

Admiral Notes. I cannot say that Captain Safford did not on the 
4th of December forward some form of message on yellow teletype 
paper to me. If it was such message as he describes, it was not a correct 
execute of the winds message. 

Mr. MuRPHT. Now, he says on page 2 : 

CINCAF 281430 together with Tokyo Circular 2353 and other collateral intercept 
information apparently made an impression upon the Director of Naval Intelli- 
gence, for he immediately sent word to me, through the Director of Naval Com- 
munications, that he wished the Communication Intelligence Organization to 
make every attempt to intercept any message sent in accordance with the Winds 
codes. 

Was it usual for Admiral Wilkinson to send messages to Captain 
Safl'ord through you or would he confer with you directly? 

Admiral Notes. He would confer with me directly and in 
[126So] my own opinion this is not correct. 

Mr. MuRPHT. Now, then, he says : 

It would be a feather in our cap if the Navy got it and our sister service didn't. 

Were your services trying to get feathers in their caps in competition 
with the other service that you know of? 

Admiral Notes. They were not, and I disapproved very much of his 
making any such statement. We were making every effort to cooper- 
ate with the Army. As I told you, we had the closest cooperation 
between General Maughborne and myself and he was later succeeded 
by General Olmstead and Colonel Sadtler was Acting at the time. 

Mr. MuRPHT. Now, I would like to ask at this point, Mr. Chairman, 
that counsel prepare for the record Tokyo-to-Washington serial 843, 
dated November 27, 1941. prescribing the schedule of Tokyo news 
broadcasts, as well as OPNAV 282301 and the three otheij messages 
which Captain Safford referred to at the bottom of page 3 of his 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4741 

statement, so that all five of them can be in the record. Are they in 
the record ? 

Mr. Hasten. They are not all in the record, Mr. Murphy. Com- 
mander Baecher has furnished us with a number of the messages 
referred to in Captain Safford's statement and they are still looking 
for some others and we had intended to put them all in at the same 
time. 

[126S6] Mr. Murphy. We will get them all in at the same time. 

Mr. Masten. I think this 28143, that is one of the documents we 
have here. If you wish me to do so, I will read it into the record 
now. 

Mr. Murphy. No ; I will wait. I want them all to go in at the same 
time in the record so that we can refer to them at one place.^ 

Captain SafFord said that his superiors were heckling him. You did 
not indulge in any heckling of Captain Safford, did you? 

Admiral Noyes. I never did. 

Mr. Murphy. That is on page 8 of his statement. 

Now, he says on page 10 : 

"We used to "sample" these broadcasts periodically until the F. C. C.'s Foreign 
Broadcast Intelligence Service came into existence and relieved the U. S. Navy 
of this duty. 

And he is speaking there of general information broadcasts, as well 
as Domei News to its diplomatic and consular officials in foreign lands. 

Is it true. Admiral, that FCC did take over that function from the 
Navy? 

Admiral Noyes. The Navy never had that function, Mr. Murphy. 
Mr. Berle, who was Assistant Secretary of State — [12637] one 
of his representatives came to see me at one time and asked if we would 
not expand our copying of Japanese broadcasts. I told him that we 
did not want to go into that business; we had all we could haindle 
with official traffic and I suggested that we much preferred that the 
FCC should do it. Eventually the FCC got some funds or found some 
funds and took that on. It was more a taking on than a taking over. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, Captain Safford then in connection with 
that on page 10 said : 

There is no basis for assuming that the Winds message had to be sent on a voice 
broadcast — 

and then he leaves the inference, to me, at least, on page 10 that the 
Navy then started, after December 1, to listen in on these broadcasts 
which FCC was covering generally. Do you know whether or not 
that is true ? 

Admiral Noyes. I do not agree with him about its not being neces- 
sary to send the broadcast by voice. It had to be sent in accordance 
with the instructions that they had sent out, on certain broadcasts, 
which was at a definite time, and in voice. We only covered such 
broadcasts as were specifically covered by those two circulars. 

Mr, Murphy. Well, it is true, is it not, that FCC was covering the 
general information broadcasts and the Domei News broadcasts to 
diplomatic and consular officials? 

[12638'] Admiral Noyes. I think so, sir. 

Mr, Murphy, And do you of your own knowledge know whether 
or not Cheltenham then decided to go into that field as a result of this 
dispatch on page 155 in Exhibit 1 ? 

1 See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5500 et seq. 



4742 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Notes. Whether Cheltenham started to cover this Circular 
2354 on page 155? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Notes. The one we were talking about is page 154. 

Mr. MuRPHT. That is right, but Safford talks about page 155 instead 
of 154. 

Admiral Notes. No, sir ; I think he has got them mixed up. 

Mr. MuRPHT. He says: 

We expected that the Winds message would be sent in Morse code — and it was. 

Admiral Notes. Well, I think 

Mr. MuRPHT. Were you expecting it to come in Morse code ? 

Admiral Notes. No, sir. I think Commander Rochefort testified 
to the same effect on that. 

Mr. MuRPHT. Well, Commander Rochefort was listening only for 
voice and he certainly would not get code if he was listening for voice. 

Admiral Notes. I think that the 24-hour-a-day [12639] 
coverage that he mentioned was — it is, and I may be repeating — 
just like WINX in their news broadcasts. They do not send it out 
24 hours a day, all day, but during the 24 hours of the day they had 
certain schedules on which they broadcast that news and people listen 
for it. 

Mr. MuRPHT. Now, Captain Safford said on page 11 : 

The original documents giving details of the interception of the Winds mes- 
sage are not available. 

What is your answer to that? 

Admiral Notes. He was in charge of the files at the time. I will 
say further I left Washington in February 1942, and I have no 
knowledge of what has occurred since then. 

Mr. MuRPHT. Well, he also stated that after he went to your office, 
that there was a smooth copy placed in the dispatch case and that 
that was delivered to each of the recipients in the Army and the Navy. 
Of course, he had only an impression on that. 

Did you ever approve any winds intercept as being authentic so 
that it would get over to Captain Kramer and then be placed as a 
communication for each of the recipients of magic in the Navy and 
the Army ? 

Admiral Notes. I did not, Mr. Murphy. 

I would like to say about the files, I was talking to the command- 
ing officer of the radio station at Cheltenham. [12640] This 
broadcast business, when you intercept it is not addressed to us. It 
is things like weather reports and press and things like that that 
build up to a terrible amount of paper in a short time and it is cus- 
tomary in any naval radio station to keep files of any message ad- 
dressed to a station for which they are responsible or which comes 
for information, in other words, all Navy business, but intercept 
stuff is never kept more than 3 or 4 months. 

Now, this question not having been raised, as I understand it, un- 
til almost a year later whatever station might have intercepted would 
have by that time destroyed intercepts that far back. The command- 
ing officer at Cheltenham told me it was customary to keep it for 3 
or 4 months. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4743 

Mr. Murphy. Well, you did receive then after that monthly re- 
ports from Cheltenham, Winter Harbor, and Bainbridge Island, 
did yoii not ? 

Admiral Xoyes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And those reports for 1941 are still down in the 
Navy Department, aren't they? 

Admiral Xoyes. I left there. I have no information on that matter. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate, I am going to ask the Na\^ liaison 
to make a statement in the record as to whether they are or not. I 
understand they are and have been since [126Jfl^ 1941, but I 
would like to haVe it definitely by the Navy Department. 

Now. then, he says at page 12— is he in a position to indicate it now? 

The Chairman. Not at the moment. 

Mr. Murphy. My question is whether or not the reports fi'om Chel- 
tenham, Bainbridge Island, and Whiter Harbor are available at the 
Navy Department presently for the month of December 1941. 

Commander Baecher. They are, sir. 

Mr. MimPHY. And they have been since 1941, have they, the monthly 
reports? 

Commander Baecher. Yes ; that is the way I understand it, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

Now, then, at page 12, Admiral Noyes, Captain Safford said : 

The Winds broadcast message was about two hundred words long, with the 
code words prescribed in Tokyo circular 2353 — 

SO that would be voice broadcast — 

appearing in the middle of the message, whereas we had expected to find the 
code words of Tokyo circular 2354 in a Morse broadcast. 

Now, then, if you will just go back to 154 and 155 a [1264^] 
while, in 154 it was to appear in the middle of the daily Japanese 
language short wave broadcast and at the end and the sentence was 
to be repeated twice. In the one on page 155 it was to be repeated five 
times and both at the beginning and at the end. On 154 it was to 
be in voice. On 155 it was to be in code. So that Captain Safford 
describes one that is part of 154 and one that is part of 155. Do the 
Japanese do things like that ? 

Admiral Noyes. They did not, sir. I think the Japanese are much 
more meticulous than any people I know of in carrying out exactly 
instructions that thev send out. That is supposed to be one of their 
faults. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, as I understand it you have no recollection 
whatever of a call from Captain Sadtler to inquire as to what word 
was used, do you ? Do you have any such recollection ? 

Admiral Noyes. As I understand it from listening to Colonel 
Sadtler's testimony, he talks about the 5th of December and Captain 
Safford's is the 4th of December. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, now, do vou have anv recollection of having, 
either on the 1st. 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th or 7th of December, had a call 
from Colonel Sadtler asking 3^011 what word was used in the alleged 
winds intercept ? 

Admiral Noyes. I have no such recollection, sir. [12643] I 
could not say that he did not ask me such a question because we 
handled many messages together and the only thing that I am sur- 



4744 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

prised at is that he would make a point of someone, that, I would 
say, that he would say that I would speak of the message when we 
handled so many things together. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, when did you first have a talk with Cap- 
tain Safford as to whether or not there were any missing papers or 
did you ever have a talk with him ? He has been talking to a lot of 
people for a long time. Did he talk to you about it ? 

Admiral Notes. The only time I have talked to Captain Safford — ^I 
had been away from Washington from February 1942 until March 1945 
and it was some time after I got back. I had not heard any more 
about Pearl Harbor since I had appeared before the Naval Court of 
Inquiry. 

[1£644] Mr. Murphy. Now at this point I would like it if 
counsel would produce the page in the record referring to the Roche- 
fort message that Colonel Bratton said he forwarded to Hawaii, and 
I would like to offer that in the record at this point for the reasotn 
that the record shows it was mailed instead of dispatched, and I 
would like to ask the witness about it. 

Do you have that ? It is in the B, C, or D of the Army board. 

Mr. Masten. We do not have it in our record. 

Mr. Mukpht. While you are getting that, I will move on. 

Admiral Noyes. I did not finish, Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. Excuse me. Go ahead, if you will. I am sorry. 

Admiral Noyes. I do not know whether you want to go ahead 
with my talk with Captain Safford. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

Admiral Noyes. I did not see Captain Safford from the time I 
left Washington or hear from him until I got back in March 1945. 

Mr. Murphy. So you did not talk to him in the meantime? 

Admiral Noyes. I did not. 

Mr. Murphy. Did he try to communicate with you ? 

Admiral Noyes. Did he try to communicate with me? 

[1264S] Mr. Murphy. " Yes. 

Admiral Noyes. No, sir ; he did not, to the best of my knowledge. 

Mr. Murphy. When vou came to Washington — you say it was what 
month of 1945 ? 

Admiral Noyes. March, 1945. 

Mr. Murphy. Now then. Captain Safford did talk to you on your 
return to Washington ? 

Admiral Noyes. He came to see me on my initiative. 

Mr. Murphy. Will you tell us what that conversation was? First 
tell us when it was, and then what it was. 

Admiral Noyes. I gathered from the questions that were asked 
me in the Naval Court of Inquiry that somebody had had a different 
recollection on certain matters from mine. So I called up Safford 
and asked him to have lunch with me. He said he was very busy 
and could not, but he would come down to the office. I told him I 
wanted to see him about things in connection with our past, with 
the Office of Naval Communications. 

So when he -came down I told him I gathered from the questions 
that were asked me that there was some difference of opinion, and 
asked him why he and Kramer and I could not get together and get 
hold of the files, now that we were here in Washington, and remove 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4745 

any of these discrepancies [12646] and decide them one wav 
or another. 

Well, he said there were not many discrepancies, and he said he was 
sure there was a winds message and that everybody else agreed with 
me. I said, "Can't you find some evidence that you are right, that you 
can show me what this is based on ?" He said no, that he had not been 
able to find anything. So he said he was going to write a statement 
and when he got it together he would show it to me and we would talk 
it over. 

Well, I did not hear from him. In about, I think it was in August, 
there was something in the newspaper about Pear Harbor. So I called 
him up. There were some things that I had not ever heard of. I called 
him up and I asked him what he was doing about his statement in con- 
ference with me. He said that he was still working on it. Within a 
few days it was proposed that this congressional inquiry occur. So he 
called me up and said he thought it would be better if we did not have 
any conference, that we might be criticised for talking together, and I 
agreed with him, and so we dropped it. 

Mr. Murphy. Do you know of any trouble that Captain Safford had, 
or any differences between him and anyone clown there at the Navy? 

Admiral Notes. I do not. 

[12647] Mr. Murphy. Was there any difference between him 
and Captain Redman, or anyone else there that you know of? 

Admiral Noyes. I left Washington in February 1942. 

Mr. Murphy. That is right. 

Mr. Chairman, I have just one other thing that I want to cover, 
that I will pass for the time being. When I find that one thing I want 
to show a reference in the Army board to the Rochefort message. 

The Chairman. All right. We will pass you temporarily. 

Senator Brewster is absent. 

Mr. Gearhart. 

Mr. Gearhart. Admiral, did I understand you correctly to say that 
you testified first in the Navy Court of Inquiry investigation? 

Admiral Noyes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. You have not testified in any other investigations 
other than that one, and this one ? 

Admiral Noyes. That is correct. Mr. Gearhart. 

Mr. Gearhart. And the Navy Court of Inquiry investigation was 
carried on during the summer months of 1944 ? 

Admiral Noyes. Well, they did not get out to San Francisco until 
December 1944, as I remember it. 

Mr. Gearhart. It started in the summer and continued [12648] 
through the balance of the year? 

Admiral Noyes. I believe they went out to Pearl Harbor and on the 
way back, they stopped at San Francisco, and I was called as a witness 
there. 

Mr. Gearhart. That, you say, was in December? 

Admiral Noyes. I thought it was December. I may be wrong about 
the month. 

Mr. Gearhart. The Secretary of the Navy's statement is the next 
to the last notation that appears in the succession of events, and that 
was the 28th of August 1944. 

79716 — i6— pt. 10 11 



4746 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Notes. I must be wrong about the date, then. It ought 
to show the date that I appeared in the transcript. I did not appear 
in Washington. I appeared in San Francisco. 

Mr. Gearhart. The thing that makes me inquire about that is the 
fact that the Secretary of the Navy himself prepared a statement in 
reference to the court of inquiry's decision, which is the fourth 
endorsement, and that is dated the 28th day of August, unless I am 
mistaken. 

No, I see another one here now. That was the third endorsement, 
which preceded the one I have reference to. The date of the fourth 
one is December 1944. So it extended from the summer to the end 
of the year. 

Admiral Notes. That is my recollection. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes ; I think you are right. The dates [12649] 
are so confusing, but they are here, nevertheless. 

Now, what did you have to do, if anything, with or in the inves- 
tigations that preceded the Navy Court of Inquiry? 

Were you consulted in reference to your knowledge about these 
matters or did you have anything to do with it at all ? 

Admiral Notes. When the Roberts Commission was held, I was 
directed to prepare the dispatches to and from the Navy Depart- 
ment bearing on the incident, for the use of the committee, or the 
commission, whatever it was called. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did that involve the making out of any memoran- 
dum, or any evaluations, or any statement as to your own participa- 
tion in or with relation to the events? 

Admiral Notes. It involved nothing but a file of dispatches, with 
a list and index. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, did you prepare a memorandum between De- 
cember 7, 1941. and December of 1944. as an aid to your memory? 

Admiral Notes. I did not, sir. I did not particularly, because I was 
at sea, in the Pacific, and I think in general the naval officers at that 
time did not know about magic. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, when you testified in December 1944, you 
testified from your memory at that moment, unaided [12650] 
by any memorandum that you may have made between December 7, 
1941, and the time you testified? 

Admiral Notes. I was not only testifying from memory, but I did 
not know until I got into the room what I was going to be asked, or 
what the questions would be, or the subject. 

Mr. Gearhart. Between Pearl Harbor and the giving of your tes- 
timony, many earth-shaking events had occurred, events of tremen- 
dous importance, hadn't there? That is correct, isn't it? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Matters of tremendous importance, which, in your 
mind, as in other persons' minds, overshadowed the earlier events; 
isn't that true? 

Admiral Notes. That is true, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, you have heard the testimony of Captain 
Kramer with reference to the so-called winds execute. He said that 
a watch officer came by and handed you a teletype paper on which 
there was an evaluation — or a translation, rather — of a message, what 
he constructed to be a winds execute message. He was so impressed 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4747 

with it that he went to Captain Safford and said, "This is it." You 
have heard that testimony, haven't yon? 

Admiral Noyes. I thought that was Captain Safford's [12651] 
testimony. 

Mr. Gearhart. No ; Captain Kramer's testimony, and also Captain 
Safford's testimony. They— you heard the testimony of Admiral 
Ingersoll to the effect that they brought him the message and he 
read it, and tossed it aside, because he considered it unimportant; 
that there were many other events, many other messages which pre- 
ceded it, which convinced him that war was very imminent. 

You heard his testimony to that effect, didn't you ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes ; I heard Admiral Ingersoll's testimony. 

Mr. Gearhart. There we have three naval officers who say it was 
a winds execute; all three of them said they saw it, and Admiral 
Ingersoll said it was unimportant. 

Admiral Notes. I did not gather that from Captain Kramer's tes- 
timony, Mr. Gearhart. 

Mr. Gearhart. What? 

Admiral Notes. I did not gather that from Captain Kramer's 
testimony. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, I think you will find that that is a correct 
statement. 

Admiral Notes. I certainly did not gather that he agreed with 
Captain Safford at all. 

Mr. Gearhart. He agreed definitely that he took it from 
[12652] the hands of the watch officer, hastily read it, and took 
it to Captain Safford and said ''This is it." No question about that. 
He does not pretend to remember clearly what was in that message, 
but he has stated in his testimony over and over and over again, 
"Wlien I handed it to Captain Safford, I said 'This is it'." He also 
testified definitely that he, Captain Kramer, considered it the winds 
execute message. So Captain Kramer absolutely corroborates Cap- 
tain Safford, as far as he goes, and that was as far as he did go. 

Then Admiral Ingersoll stejjs into the picture and tells us : 

Yes ; they brought it to me. I read it, but I did not consider it important. 
There were so many other things of greater importance that indicated to me 
that war was imminent and I tossed it aside. 

But the substance of that testimony is that there was a winds 
execute. Now, I say those things preliminarily to asking you this 
question: In all fairness, isn't it possible that you read it too, but 
considered it so unimportant, for the same reason that Admiral In- 
gersoll considered it unimportant, and you not being interrogated 
on the subject from December 7, 1941, until December 1944, that it 
might have gone from your mind ? Isn't that possible ? 

Admiral Notes. No, sir; not in mj^ opinion. 

[12653] Mr. Gearhart. You knew about the message of Novem- 
ber 29, after which things were automatically going to happen ? You 
knew about that, didn't you ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now that was a very, very important intercept, 
that was teeling us of the hostile attitude of Japan, wasn't it, "tilings 
were going automatically to begin to happen"? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 



4748 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gearhart. That was a very direct warning, wasn't it ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. It was of overshadowing importance, wasn't it ? 

Admiral Noyes. Progressive importance, I would say, sir. 

Mr. Geabhart. And you knew all about the Japanese message 
directing their Ambassadors, their consuls, and all the other Japanese 
agents of different degrees, the Japanese nationals, directing them to 
destroy their codes, didn't you ? The fact that consuls were included 
indicated more than anything else the suspension of diplomatic nego- 
tiations, didn't it ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Those messages collectively were of \^1266Ji^ 
tremendous importance, were they not? 

Admiral Notes. As I say, each one carried matters a step further. 

Mr. Gearhart. All right. Then if you should get another message 
which would merely tell you that relations between the United States 
and Japan were becoming dangerous, you would regard that message 
as of overshadowing importance, would you not, after you had already 
received these other messages ? 

Admiral Notes. I would not consider it as of overshadowing im- 
portance, but it would be of sufficient importance so it would be taken 
up, under my standard system, and handled as a message. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. 

Admiral Notes. There would have been at least 50 copies around 
Washington before we got through — not 50, but 30 I should say. 
If somebody had brought to me in November, 1943, a paper with my 
initials on it I would have had to admit that my recollection was wrong. 
If anybody could have brought me other documentary evidence I would 
have to admit my recollection had failed me. I am only testifying 
to the best of my recollection, except in this case I have studied other 
people's testimony and I can find no testimony that will hang together 
against my own recollection. \^12655'\ There is nothing that 
in any way tends to make me feel that my recollection as to the fact 
that there was no execute message is not correct. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, supposing you had gotten the execute message 
conveying that thought to you, that relations with Japan were growing 
dangerous — that is a literal interpretation of the words, isn't it ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. What it was primarily is an instruction 
to destroy the codes. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is right. 

Admiral Notes. We would have written it up as an instruction to 
destroy the codes. 

Mr. Gearhart. The message on the destruction of codes was an 
important message? 

Admiral Notes. Yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. That was the tell-tale to us of what Japan was up to ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now if you got this other message, the winds exe- 
cute message, after you hacl read all these other msssages about the de- 
struction of codes, would you be called upon to do anything about it? 

Admiral Notes. There was nothing to do about it, except it would 
be written up, distributed and handled as [12656] an enemy 
intercept, just like all these messages that are in the book. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4749 

Mr. Gearhart. Did you send every message that came over your 
desk to all these distributees, whether it was important or unimportant? 

Admiral Notes. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. You decided whether or not it was important enough 
to be distributed, did you not? That was one of your jobs? 

Admiral Notes. But it was gaged not on whether action was to 
be taken, but the subject matter of the message. There were lots of 
messages about typewriters, personnel, promoting clerks, and that 
sort of thing, which we just threw out, which we did not finish trans- 
lating. But anything of that character would have been carried 
through as a matter of record. 

Air. Gearhart. But in view of this importance of the message would 
you not have distributed it? You had already distributed the very, 
very ultra important ones, and here you had the most important one, 
in the light of events, and yet you might have tossed that aside as 
unimportant, just like Ingersoll said he did when he read it ? 

Admiral Notes. Admiral Ingersoll was not in my position, sir. I 
was responsible for all this business, whereas [126S7] Admiral 
Ingersoll had it as only one of his activities. To him it was very far 
down the list, and to me it was down the list, too, but it still had to be 
taken care of. 

If it had been an authentic execute, we had all these people copying 
and intercepting messages, the War Department, the FCC, we would 
have had to distribute it as a message. 

I cannot imagine, from Colonel Sadtler's testimony, how the War 
Department, if they thought it was authentic at all, could have thought 
of dropping it, why they would not have followed it through, unless 
it was a false message. 

Mr. Gearhart. That was just the point I had in mind. Here you 
have several people saying they are very positive as to the existence 
of the winds execute, and you seem to be equally positive what they 
testified to is not the fact. So I was trying to harmonize the testimony 
they have given with the testimony that you have given on the ground 
that you simply don't remember, because you regarded it, as Admiral 
Ingersoll did, as being only in part important. 

Admiral Notes. May I ask you a question, sir ? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. 

Admiral Notes. Did you hear my testimony in answer to the couu 
sel this morning? 

Mr. Gearhart. I have listened, but if you wish to repeat what you 
have said, that I may have overlooked, I [126S8] , would be glad 
to hear it again. 

Admiral Notes. I testified that there were several false messages 
that came in. It is very difficult for me to answer when these different 
witnesses all differ in their description of the circumstances. The 
dates are different, the conditions are different. 

I am perfectly willing to admit that Captain Safford may have sent 
me such a message and on the face of it, from a documentary point of 
view, I would never have accepted that message as an execute of the 
winds message, and I gave the reasons to the counsel for my believing 
as I do. 

Mr. Gearhart. How can so many testify to the same thing and it 
not have a semblance of truth? These other things that these other 



4750 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

officers have said must be true, because you don't remember whether 
it was true or not true. 

Then when you come up to the winds execute message you posi- 
tively say there was none, in the face of these other men testifying 
there was a winds execute. How can you be so positive about that and 
at the same time you are willing to accept what Cap)tain Safford says, 
or Colonel Sadtler? 

Admiral Notes. Colonel Sadtler ? 

Mr. Gearhart. You said many things he said may have been true 
because he said so. You have no memory on it. 

Admiral Notes. I am perfectly willing to admit that [126S9- 
1^669] every one of the witnesses that have testified to a so-called 
winds execute has some message in mind of which I had knowledge, 
but I do not think that any one of their stories, their recollection, 
their description will stand up as a description of a true winds execute, 
nor do they fit together. 

Captain Kramer's and Captain Safford's descriptions were entirely 
different. It is very difficult for me to answer if you ask me if I got 
a message on the 4th or the 5th. Captain Safford goes into great 
detail about his reasons for thinking it was the 4th, although his orig- 
inal testimony was it was the 5th. 

I do not want to question the fact that their recollection is the 
best they have, but that does not convince me that there is anything 
wrong with my recollection. That is all I can say about that, sir. 

Mr. Geakiiart. That is all. 

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, as I understand it now, in your De- 
partment you were the head and it was your duty, in effect, to deter- 
mine what messages were to be distributed to certain persons, which 
included the President, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Naval 
Operations, the War Plans Division, the Intelligence Department — 
and what other departments of the Navy? 

Admiral Notes. I think that is all. 

[1S670] Senator Ferguson. That is all? 

Admiral Notes. Yes. But I had nothing to do with them. 

Senator Ferguson. No, but you determined what messages were to 
be distributed. 

Admiral Notes. No, Senator Ferguson, I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Now let us get down then to this : If a message 
came to your desk, or your department, about hiring a clerk in the 
Embassy and one came in relation to a reply to the message of the 26th, 
who determined* what message would be delivered to the President ? 
What department? 

Admiral Notes. The Director of Naval Intelligence, 

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, who determined how that message 
would get to the Naval Intelligence ? 

Admiral Notes. In the mechanics of deciphering. Captain Kramer, 
who was primarily the subordinate to the Director of Naval Intelli- 
gence, had the additional duty with me, so that one officer could carry 
through the whole process from the interception, from the receipt in 
Washington of an enemy message in cipher until it was actually deliv- 
ered, as far as he was concerned. On account of the load we had, and 
the peak loads we had, we could not possibly decipher every message 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4751 

of the ones we received. Therefore, having started the message, as 
soon as it turned out to be of no apparent value, it was laid aside and 
the next one was [12671] gone ahead with. We had to do that. 

We found at first that the Army and ourselves, working independ- 
ently, were wasting a lot of time by translating the same messages. 
We might work 3 days on a message and find we had the same thing. 
At a conference we decided the best solution was to take the Tokyo date 
of origin, and it was agreed that the Navy would take all messages 
originated in Tokyo on the odd day and the Army would take all 
messages originated in Tokyo on an even day. 

In order to determine when it originated in Tokyo it was necessary 

to start to break the message. So each service took the message coming 

from its own intercept stations and the message was given a number, 

. and as soon as they had reached the date of origin they kept it or sent 

it over at it might be. 

Now from there on the other service went on until they discovered 
it seemed to be something that was not of diplomatic, or military, or 
political value and they laid it aside. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he have before him the cipher to break the 
date? 

Admiral Noyes. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So that you had to know what key in the cipher 
or the machine was necessary by breaking the \_12672] date? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And then you sent the key over to the other 
department, or would you let them work it out for themselves ? 

Admiral Notes. Well, we had a constant interchange. If there was 
any recovery of keys, we had a direct telephone from our code room to 
theirs, a secret phone. 

Senator Ferguson. Then as soon as the date was ascertained you 
had the cipher and you knew what key it was in ? 

Admiral Notes. We did not necessarily. We might get that far • 
and still not be able to go all the way through, but we had a start then. 

Senator Ferguson. Now we come back to the question, and you say 
it was Kramer's duty to ascertain and determine what messages were 
distributed to the list that I gave you just in my former question. 

Admiral Notes. The question of what messages were finished was 
primarily determined below, by Kramer, who supervised 

Senator Ferguson (interposing). I am trying to get an answer to 
this particular question, because 1 think it is very important. 

xVdmiral Noyes. Yes, sir, I understand, Senator Ferguson, 
[12673] and I am trying to explain it to you, sir. Some messages 
were never finished. Other messages that were finished, I doubt if 
they were all sent to the White House. I did not censor them myself. 
The Director of Naval Intelligence was the one who did that function, 
in regard to the finished messages. He probably did not want to bother 
the President with a lot of messages, or the Secretary of State. 

In other words, there were certain messages that lie probably had 
culled out of certain books, but, as far as I know, there was nothing 
culled out of the finished stuff from the Navy books. 

Senator FER(ius()N. Who, in your department, or in anyone's de- 
partment, determined what messages would be decoded ? You say some 



4752 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

were decoded just part way and you determined they were not of any 
value. Now who had that determination ? 

Admiral Notes. Well, I should say Kramer was the one who was 
directly responsible for that. If he had a question he could bring it 
to me. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, if he was in doubt he could bring it to you. 
Then it was your responsibility to determine what was decoded, is 
that right? 

Admiral Notes. I was responsible for it, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson-. All right. Now, then, who determined what 
messages were sent in to the Intelligence when they were [12674-^ 
intelligence ? 

Admiral Notes. They were all sent to Intelligence. 

Senator Ferguson. They were all sent to Intelligence ? 

Admiral Notes. Everything that was decoded was sent to Intelli- 
gence, whether it was important or not. 

Senator Ferguson. Whether it was hiring a clerk or doing some- 
thing else? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It was sent to Intelligence? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. Incidentally, some of those things that 
we did not bother with ourselves, all personnel matters, were sent to 
FBI, as a matter of fact. That was done by Naval Intelligence. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you did not have to determine what mes- 
sages went in to Intelligence because all that was translated, that 
Kramer determined should be determined, unless he needed your help, 
went immediately in to Intelligence? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now with that in mind, how can you reconcile 
this fact, that you were to get tlie winds code message ? 

Admiral Notes. Because that was a special thing. It required no 
translation. They had set up those Japanese expressions which ac- 
tually were p]ain Japanese. Wliat they [12676] said in Japa- 
nese was "Eaf,t Wind Rain," in the Japanese language, with no cipher, 
no code. They were not the ordinary run of diplomatic messages. 

[12676] Senator Ferguson. You just told me that after it was 
completely translated, it, by necessity, went to the Intelligence Branch, 
and this was in Japanese and, therefore, needed translation. 

Admiral Notes. It did not need translation. Senator Ferguson. 
They had given certain expressions a fixed meaning. Anyone of us 
could have told what the message was. 

Those words did not mean destroy codes and ciphers ; they just had 
an arbitrary meaning. 

Senator Ferguson. They mean what was in the message you had 
previously received ? 

Admiral Notes. They appeared to be a weather report, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you draw up cards on that particular 
code message ? 

Admiral Notes. Cards were drawn up to give the meaning of this 
in English, so that by telephone, in case we ever got an authentic 
execute of the winds code. Admiral Stark and the people concerned 
could be called over the telephone, and without any give-away we 
would say, "We received a weather report 'east wind rain' " and he 
would know what it meant. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4753 

Senator Ferguson. Wlio ordered the cards drawn up ? 

Admiral Notes. Well, I ordered it. It was my responsi- [1^677] 
bility. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you send one to the Wliite House? 

Admiral Notes. No, sir. I think the naval aide had one. 

Senator Ferguson. The naval aide had one ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes. We did not deal directly with the President. 
I think the naval aide dealt with the President. 

Senator Ferguson. Then one went to the AYliite House, to Admiral 
Beardall? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. I am not certain that he was one of them, 
but I think so. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever set up a similar system of cards? 

Admiral Notes. Never, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. This was an outstandingly important message? 

Admiral Notes. At the time it was received, we thought it was 
the first — at the 28th of November — we thought it was very important 
and might give us our first tip as to what was to occur. 

Senator Ferguson. But a little later you say it had become a little 
doubtful. 

Admiral Notes. Become what, sir? 

[l^OTS] Senator Ferguson. A little doubtful as to its value, be- 
cause you got similar messages about destruction of codes. 

Admiral Notes. Having gotten the message from the Japanese in 
their own cipher, with detailed instructions about destroying the 
codes, it went very far down in importance. 

Senator Ferguson. But you still kept the cards ? 

Admiral Notes. I do not remember whether the cards were de- 
stroyed at that time or not. The cards only said "East wind rain; 
U. S." We made them with the idea if anybody lost them, nothing 
would be given away. 

Senator Ferguson. That was in English ? 

Admiral Notes. In English. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

If Colonel Sadtler is correct, that you called him and told him that 
was it — do you remember that testimony ? 

Admiral Notes. I do not, sir. I remember the testimony, but I 
do not remember the incident. 

Senator Ferguson. He called you back and you told him you could 
not get the translation for him because you were going to a meeting. 
How could you reconcile your testimony with that, that you did 
not see any winds code message, any winds code execute message? 

[12679] Admiral Notes. Senator Ferguson, that is not the way 
I interpreted his testimony. 

As I interpreted it, what he said was he called back to ask for the 
exact words that were in the intercept. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

And you were too busy to give it to him. 

Admiral Notes. That I do not admit, but that is what he said. 

[12680] Senator Ferguson. You have no memory of it? 

Admiral Notes. I have no memory of it. 

Senator Ferguson. If there wasn't any winds code execute message 
how do you account for Admiral Ingersoll testifying here in this 
room that he saw one and never knew that there was any question 



4754 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

about it being a genuine or a phoney until sometime just recently 
when he landed back in this country ? 

Admiral Notes. I do not account for it, sir. I think he is very 
busy and had many things to do at the time. I think he stated in 
his testimony that it very likelj^ did turn out to be a false message. 

Senator Ferguson. Now I want to ask you this : Could it have been 
that you called Sadtler when you received this message from the watch 
officer that Kramer and Safford talked about going to your office 
with your message ? Could that be a true statement ? 

Admiral Notes. Could I have called Sadtler? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Notes. When I first got this message? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now will you tell me-— — 

The Chairman (interposing). I did not understand his [12681] 
answer. 

Admii-al Notes. I said I could have called Sadtler when someone 
came to my office with a message. I had a private phone to his office. 

Senator Ferguson. So at that particular time you believed that this 
was a genuine message on this winds execute code, isn't that true? 

Admiral Notes. I would think it was a possible message. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Admiral Notes. That is the impression he got, as I take it. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now I will ask you whether or not 
you ever made an examination to determine that the message that the 
watch officer delivered to you, that Kramer and Safford were talking 
about, and that you telephoned to Sadtler about, whether you ever 
determined that that was a phoney and not a genuine message? 

Admiral Notes. I will give you a reconstruction that could be 
possible, if you would like to have me do it. 

Senator Ferguson. I would like to know whether you ever made a 
determination that this message that you telephoned about, that the 
watch officer gave you, whether you ever made a determination that 
that particular message was a phoney and was not the genuine mes- 
sage in compliance with the code. 

[12682] Admiral Notes. The message has been testified to, 
that it was received on two different days. 

Senator Ferguson. That is not my question. My question is 
whether or not you ever made a determination at that time. I am 
not asking you what you determine now as you try to reconstruct, but 
I want to know whether or not you ever made a determination that 
that message that was sent to you was a phoney. 

Admiral Notes. If the message that Captain Safford describes in 
his statement was presented to me, and I think very likely it was, I 
would have determined it to be a phoney message. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to ask you that: Did you determine 
that that message was a phoney? 

Admiral Notes. I have no direct recollection from his description, 
but from his own description I would not have accepted it. That is 
the best I can say, Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. You would not have accepted it. How could 
you then have called Sadtler about that message ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4755 

Admiral Notes. Sadtler says it was a different day; it is not the 
same day. 

Senator Feeguson. I am not talking about the reconstruction now, 
I mean as to what you heard testified here. Could you have kept it 
over a day and then called him? That [12683] even makes 
his testimony stronger, that it was a genuine message. 

Admiral Notes. I would not thuik of doing such a thing. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat I am trying to do is to get the facts as to 
whether or not you ever made a determination that the message 
brought to you by the watch officer was not a genuine message. 

Admiral Notes. I am certain, sir, that I did not seem to make 
myself clear. I am perfectly willing to admit that several messages, 
which in the end turned out to be false, were brought to me by various 
watch officers. I also think one watch officer telephoned me at my 
home about one of the messages, which was afterwards delivered to 
me. I think every one was determined by me to be not correct, and, 
so far as I knew, everyone was in concurrence, no one raising a ques- 
tion, no one questioning my decision, to the best of my knowledge and 
belief at the time. 

The first time any question was raised was much later on. 

Senator Ferguson. After the 7th? 

Admiral Notes. No; after I had left Washington. Nobody ever 
questioned me while I was here. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you this question : Did you ever no- 
tify Kramer that the message that he saw and said "Here it is," or 
whatever his expression was at the time, [12684-] and showed 
it to Safford and they sent a watch officer to you, did you ever notify 
Kramer that that message was a phoney or a bad message ? 

Admiral Notes. I was not supposed to be present, Senator Fergu- 
son, when Kramer said "Here it is.'" That identifies nothing to me. 

Senator Ferguson. You admit here that Safford could have sent you 
a message. Did you ever send word back to Kramer, or to Safford, 
that the message was not a genuine message ? 

Admiral Notes. I undoubtedly did, if this message as described 
by Safford, which I am not at all sure is correct — it is not what he 
told me this summer at all, and I am not sure that it is at all correct — 
but if it is correct, I would have determined it to be not a proper 
winds execute, and I would have informed him. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you inform him ? 

Admiral Notes. I have no recollection of the message being re- 
ceived as described nor of having determined it as being wrong, and 
therefore not informing him. 

Senator Fergusox. My question is a short one. Did you so inform 
him, that it was not a genuine message ? 

Admiral Notes. I cannot admit that this message, as now described 
by Captain Safford, was ever delivered to me, sir. [12685] It 
does not comply with the description that he gave me as long ago as 
4 months ago. 

Senator Fergusox'. That is not what I am talking about. He has 
testified that he had delivered to you a message that he believed was 
a genuine one. My question to you now is : Did you ever notify him 
that that message was not a genuine message ? 

Mr. Murpht. Now, Mr. Chairman 



4756 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

. Admiral Notes. I do not agree with his testimony, Mr. Ferguson. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever notify Safford personally then 
that any message on the winds was not a genuine one ? 

Admiral Noyes. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. On what occasion ? 

Admiral Notes. I could not tell you. 

Mr. MuRPHT. Will the Senator yield for a correction ? 

Senator Ferguson. Not at this time. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever notify Sadtler— keeping in mind 
his testimony — that you had two conversations with him, that it was 
not a genuine message ? 

Admiral Notes. I have no recollection of that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any other people in [12686] 
the Department there that you notified that there had come in some 
messaged that were not genuine as far as the winds execute code was 
concerned? 

Admiral Notes. I have no specific recollection of the details re- 
garding any of the false messages at this time. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you have done what you did not do if 
3^ou had received a winds code execute on either the 4th or the 5th ? 

Admiral Notes. I would have approved the message as a winds code 
execute, and it would have been written up and distributed to the 
regular recipients. It is very difficult for me to say now everything 
I would have done. I think I would have put a note on it saying : 

This confirms the previous information from the Naval Attaches and Com- 
mander in Chief. 

Senator Ferguson. I understood that only the messages that 
Kramer was in doubt about went to you. Why were you wanting 
this particular message? What were you going to do with it? 

Admiral Notes. This was the only instance that occurred, this was 
the only message of that sort which came up during my experience, 
that is this and the others that go with it. There is a series of them, 
I mean the ones that are shown in this book. 

[12687] Senator Ferguson. When did you come to the conclu- 
sion that war between Japan and the United States was imminent ? 

Admiral Notes. Imminent ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Notes. I first held a conference in my Division in Sep- 
tember 1939, shortly after I took the Division over. I told them at 
that time that I thought that the chances of our being involved in 
the war which had started in Europe were considerable, and that we 
in 20 years had gotten very much on a peacetime basis and I wanted 
everything done to get us on a war basis, and I had a report for 
everything that was necessary to put us on a war basis in Naval Com- 
munications. That brought in the question of this time lapse, the 
intercepted enemy messages, but I imagine you would not be inter- 
ested in all of the details. 

However, in May 1941, on my recommendations, the Communica- 
tions were mobilized, which meant that we had gone on a war status, 
as far as Communications were concerned. From then on we were 
on a war basis. I was cognizant, through my position, of these var- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4757 

ious messages as we went along. I considered that things practically 
continuously got worse. 

At the time that when I came into the Department, which I think 

was June 

[12688] The Chairman. 1940? 

Admiral Notes. Of 1040 — there was one time when I thought we 
might likely go to war with Japan. In June 1941 was another time. 
Each time we got by, but it became worse. 

I think that the last chance that I thought of a peaceful settlement 
was when we turned down the Japanese proposition and submitted 
our last note, to which the 13 parts was the reply. 

Senator Fergusox. In other words, when we turned down the modus 
vivendi and sent the message of the 26th, you then considered that we 
would have war? 

Admiral Notes. That is nothing but my personal opinion, sir. 
Senator Ferguson". How is that? 
Admiral Notes. This is my personal opinion, Senator. 
Senator Ferguson. That is what I mean. 

Admiral Notes. In my own opinion, Japan would not accept those 
terms, and therefore she would go ahead with her invasion of Siam, 
Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and the question was what the result 
would be of that ; were we or were we not going to stand for it. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now did vou know about the message 
that the President gave on the I7th of August [12689] 1941 ? 
Admiral Notes. I do not identify it that way, sir. 
Senator Ferguson. Did you know what we were going to do in 
case of an attack, or a further move into the Southwest Pacific? 

Admiral Notes. I knew that we had tried to impress the Japanese 
with the idea that we would take definite action if they proceeded with 
their invasion. 

Senator Ferguson. If they proceeded with an invasion of the Brit- 
ish or the Dutch, or both om them, we had undertaken, as you say 

now 

Admiral Notes (interposing). No, sir; I beg your pardon. I did 
not say we had undertaken. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read his answer ? 
(The record was read by the reporter.) 

Senator Ferguson. Now we tried to impress the Japanese with what 
we would do if they proceeded? What would we do if they pro- 
ceeded ? 

Admiral Notes. One thing we did was cut off the oil and scrap-iron 
shipments. 

Senator Ferguson. What else did we do to impress them if they 
moved down there that we would take action? You understand your 
answer, don't you? 
Admiral Notes. Yes. 

[12690] Senator Ferguson. What else did we do to impress them 
that we would take action? 

Admiral Notes. Other than arguments and notes, we had done 
nothing. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat did we say in notes to impress them ? 
The Chairman. Senator, will not those notes speak for them- 
selves ? They are in the record, they are a part of the testimony. 



4758 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. I haven't any idea as to whether all of the notes 
are in evidence yet. 

Admiral Notes. I must say I am not familiar oflHiand with the 
contents of those notes individually, Senator P^erguson. 

Senator Ferguson. But you just told me that we tried to impress 
them that if they made further moves we would take action. That is 
the substance of what you said. 

Admiral Notes. That is what I gathered from what I had been 
reading in the papers, and what I also knew of officially. I had no 
direct knowledge of what was going on through the State Department. 

Senator Ferguson. How could you evaluate the evidence if you had 
not any knowledge of our policy? 

Admiral Notes. I said I had no direct knowledge of what 
[IBGdl] was going on through the State Department, sir. I think 
you will find most of it appeared in the press. I had some access to 
other information through this book. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, that book is Exhibit 1. Those are the mes- 
sages that we had been given. 

Admiral Notes. I had a general familiarity with the messages that 
are in this book. That is where I got my picture partly. 

Mr. MuRPHT. Mr. Chairman, for the record, I would like to object. 
They are not the messages that we were given that were sent out. 
They are the Jap version of certain dispatches. 

Senator Ferguson. The record is clear as to what Exhibit 1 is. 

Were we intercepting messages to Rome? 

Admiral Notes. To whom in Rome? 

Senator Ferguson. The Japanese. To anyone in Rome. 

Admiral Notes. From time to time we got messages that were from 
the Japanese Ambassadors abroad. 

Senator Ferguson. That was not quite the question. The question 
is, were we intercepting Japanese messages to Rome? 

Admiral Notes. From time to time; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. From Tokyo to Rome? 

[12692] Admiral Notes. Yes, sir, or Rome to Tokyo. I do not 
remember seeing any from Tokyo to Rome. It is more difficult for 
us to intercept from Tokyo to Rome. Rome to Tokyo was a different 
proposition. 

Senator Ferguson. I do not think I have been able to find any mes- 
sages in Exhibit 1 that we intercepted from Rome to Tokyo or Tokyo 
to Rome. 

Admiral Notes. I think there is one in there that I saw. 

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would point them out. 

Mr. MuRPHT. The one of December 3d. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, there is one on page 228, the 3d of Decem- 
ber. Are you familiar with that message? 

Admiral Notes. What page, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. On page 228. 

Admiral Notes. I would like to say I had never seen this book unti] 
2 weeks ago when it was given me by the counsel of the committee. 

I have read the message now, sir. I do not recall it specifically. It 
was not tra*nslated until the 6th of December, according to the note. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know Avhen it was delivered to the people 
who were supposed to receive these messages? 

Admiral Notes. I have no idea, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4759 

[12693] Senator Ferguson. Now one paragraph there on page 

229: 

Regarding paragraph 2 again, slioulrt Japan declare war on tlie United States 
and Great Britain I asked wonld it be due almost immediately and Mussolini 
replied of course she is obligated to do so under the terms of the tripartite pact. 
Since Germany would also be obliged to follow suit, we would like to confer with 
Germany on this point. 

That would indicate that the message that they are talking about 
was that they were trying to get a commitment from Italy as to 
whether or not, if the war started, the}' would join in it. Would you not 
say that is a fair construction of that paragraph ? 

Admiral Notes. I shoidd think so ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did that indicate to you that they were going 
into a war with America? 

Admiral Notes. I do not imagine I saw this message before the 
attack on Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not know as you saw it ? 

Admiral Notes. No, sir, I have no definite recollection of it, and 
I would not be surprised at that sort of conversation. I think it was 
a natural thing for the xA.mbassador to discuss matters like that. In 
my own opinion, some of the Japanese were afraid that we were going 
to war with them if they went ahead with their invasion. It was not 
[12694] that they wanted to go to war with us, it was that they 
wanted to occupy southwest Asia. If we let them do it they would not 
go to war with us. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you think the reason for the attack, as 
you give in this last answer, would be that they expected that we 
would interfere with their occupation of other countries? 

Admiral Notes. That would be my personal opinion, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is your personal opinion. And you were 
of that opinion back in December of 1941 ^ 

Admiral Notes. As I stated, that if we had been willing to accept 
their point and allow them to occupy Siam, French Indochina, the 
Dutch East Indies, they would probably not have gone to war with 
us, if they could avoid it. 

[1269S] Senator Ferguson. Were you surprised on December 7 
that there had been an attack by the Japanese on an American pos- 
session ? 

Admiral Notes. I was surprised that the attack got in. I was 
surprised that an air raid was made on Pearl Harbor at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, wait. You said first that you were sur- 
prised that the attack got in. You mean that it was successful? 

Admiral Notes. I will put it in the reverse. I was surprised that 
an air attack was made on Pearl Harbor at that time, and if it was 
made, I was surprised it got in. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you expect an attack on the 7th? 

Admiral Notes. I did not expect an attack on the 7th, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Anywhere? 

Admiral Notes. Beg pardon? 

Senator Ferguson. Any where ? 

Admiral Notes. When, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. I mean anywhere on the 7th, any country by 
the Japanese. 



4760 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Notes. I do not understand. At what time did I expect 
an attack on the 7th ? I didn't expect an attack on [12696] the 
7th. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not expect the Japanese to attack any 
country on the 7th ? 

Admiral No^t:s. I did not expect it; no, sir. 

I knew that 30 warships, a large convoy was heading south, and 
they were going to attack somewhere within a short time. The convoy 
would not probably have landed on the 7th. They could go to the 
Philippines, but they were pretty far away to get in on the 7th. 

Senator Ferguson. They were over in the north of Siam ? 

Admiral Notes. That is right. 

I had considerable to do with traffic on that point. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I will ask you about that traffic. Were 
you not in contact with Admiral Hart, about that move ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You knew the movement was to the Kra Penin- 
sula, did you not? 

Admiral Notes. I did not, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did not America know from the message that 
our Ambassador Winant sent here at 10 : 40 on the morning of the 
6th, which was Saturday, that the movement was on the Kra Pen- 
insula, and that we could expect an attack within 14 hours? 

[12697] Admiral Notes. I never saw that message, sir. That 
was not a Navy message. It was a State Department message. 

Senator Ferguson. "Wliere did you understand the movement was 
going ? 

Admiral Notes. Probably somewhere in that vicinity. Whether 
they were going first into Indochina, or Thailand, or direct to the 
Kra Peninsula, I could not say, but there was always a possibility 
that they could turn toward the Philippines. It was in that order 
of possibilities. 

Senator Ferguson. They would have had to reverse their course 
and sail almost 1,000 miles, would they not, to the Philippines from 
where they were? 

Admiral Notes. I do not think so, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How far ? 

Admiral Notes. I do not remember exactly the position, but Cam- 
ranh Bay is a little less distant to Manila Bay than it is to the Kra 
Peninsula. 

Senator Ferguson. Had not the ships gone further than that on 
Saturday ? 

Admiral Notes. I do not think so. 

Senator Ferguson. Had not the ships gone further than Camranh 
Bay on Saturday? 

Admiral Notes. I do not think so, sir. I have no definite recol- 
lection of the exact position, but as I remember, [12698] it 
was somewhere near Camranh Bay. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you would not have been surprised at an 
attack on the Philippines on Sunday ? 

Admiral Notes. I am getting a little out of my depth. Senator 
Ferguson. I was not concerned with the war plans or with this from 
a strategic point of view. That was not my business at the time. 
I was merely handling the traffic. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4761 

I got involved in an expression of my personal views. I had no 
responsibility in this respect in the Navy Department. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what I mean when 1 say the 
pilot message? 

Admiral Notes. The what message, sir? 

Senator Feeguson. The pilot message. 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. . o x. • • -c^ i,-u-^ i 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what that is? It is m ^.xhibit 1. 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you look at it and ]ust tell me when you 
first knew that there was such a message, if you knew at all, prior 
to the attack? ,1 i, t 

Admiral Notes. Mv recollection is not clear as to exactly when i 
saw that message. I "think it was in the afternoon. 1 do not think 
I saw the message prior to the at- [12699] tack. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say your best judgment then was 
that you saw it after the attack ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. n . ^i 

Senator Ferguson. I want to -ask you when you hrst saw the mes- 
sage that tells them not to use typists or any other person, which is 

on X)^Q'& 24:0 

Admiral Notes. I should imagine during the afternoon of the 7th, 

sir. 

Senator Ferguson. After the attack? „ ^ .• it 

Admiral Notes. I have no direct recollection ot the time when i 
first saw that particular message. . , , • , 

Senator Ferguson. Now, what were you working on m relation to 
Admiral Hart's position in the Southwest Pacific? , . , «, 

Admiral Notes. We had received a considerable amount of traihc, 
which I do not remember exactly now, the overnight trafiic from both 
the Atlantic and Pacific. I do not remember any of the traflic speciti- 
cally, except a report from Admiral Hart in regard to the convoy. 
That is the thing that sticks in my mind m regard to that warning. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know when that report came in from 
Admiral Hart about convoys ? . -, ^ 

Admiral Notes. No, sir; I do not recollect at the moment. 

[12700] Senator Ferguson. Well, was it the 6th ? 

Admiral Notes. I thought you were speaking of the morning ot 

the 7th. . T^ 1 -u 

Senator Ferguson. That is when you saw it. Do you know when 

it came in? . -, . ., • i i. 41 i.u e+v. 

Admiral Notes. A message came m during the night ot the bth, 

that is during our night of the 6th. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you whether it was this message from 
Admiral Hart. 

To OPNAV 

Learn from Singapore we have assured British armed support under three or 
four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you. 

Admiral Notes. No, sir; that is not the message to which I was 
referring. . , 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know that there was such a message? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir ; I think I knew at the time. I have heard 
it discussed here. 

79716 — 46 — pt. 10 12 



4762 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know of it before the attack ? 

Admiral Noyes. I should say I did. I think that I knew of it before 
the attack. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, what interpretation did you give that? 

[12701] Admiral Xoyes. That 'it was some misinformation in 
regard to the ABC agreement. 

Senator Ferguson. You say it was some misinformation? 

Admiral Notes. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Why do you say that ? 

Admiral Notes. Because the ABC agreement was purely a military 
conversation, starting with an assumption that the United States would 
be associated with certain other countries in a war with Japan, and 
from there on the plans would be put into effect if that assumption 
should come through. 

Senator Ferguson. What does this mean : 

Learn from Singapore we have assured British armed support under three or 
four eventualities. 

Admiral Notes. I think it was somebody misinterpreting the ABC 
agreement. That is my personal' opinion. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you understand in case of war we were to 
give them armed support? 

Admiral Notes. What war, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. With Japan. 

Admiral Notes. I do not understand. 

Senator Ferguson. What did you interpret this to mean? 

Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or 
four eventualities. 

[12702] Admiral Notes. I was familiar with the ABC agree- 
ment because I had certain duties under it, and I knew whoever said 
that misinterpreted what the whole agreement was. 

I suppose it is a case of some young liaison officer getting off the 
track. 

[12703] Senator Ferguson. If this was Admiral Phillips of the 
Royal British Navy, you wouldn't expect that he would be very far 
off the track, would you? 

Admiral Notes. I don't believe it was Admiral Phillips of the Brit- 
ish Navy. I think it was some young man in our Navy talking to 
some man in the British Navy. 

Senator Ferguson. Where did you ever get that idea ? Where did 
5'ou ever hear that? 

Admiral Notes. You asked me what I thought of the message. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Notes. I suppose I should have said I don't know anything 
about it. 

Senator Ferguson. You said you do know, now. 

Admiral Notes. I said I supposed that that was discussed. You 
asked me what I thought at the time. The truth was I thought some- 
body misinterpreted the agreement. 

Senator Ferguson, Did you know that Admiral Phillips told Ad- 
miral Hart this at Manila on December 6, and that is why Admiral 
Hart cabled to Washington to find out why he didn't have the infor- 
mation that the British had, and there was about to be an attack 
upon the British? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4763 

Admiral Notes. I did not know that information, sir, and I knew 
I had read and was involved in the duties in the [12704] ABCD 
agreement, and it is purely a military agreement, starting out with 
an assumption. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that Phillips was in command of 
the British in Singapore ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. I don't, I don't know; I wouldn't be 
positive about that now. I thought he was a captain on one of the 
British ships, but my recollection may be wrong. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you really think at the time that 
Admiral Hart would wire Washington if some young officer told him 
this, that the British were assured armed support under three or four 
eventualities ? 

Admiral Notes. You are asking me what I think now, and what I 
thought then, sir. I do not remember having any particular thoughts 
on it. The best answer I can give is that that is what seems to me 
would have been my reaction then, seeing that message. 

Senator Ferguson. Isn't it true that you were working on this? 
I didn't bring it up. You brought it up, about working, you were 
busily engaged on this Hart proposition in the South Pacific. 

Admiral Notes. You askecl me what I was doing. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Now, I show you this message. 

[1£70S] Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you whether or not you saw that 
message that morning and were working on that proposition? 

Admiral Notes. May I ask the date of the message? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. It came in Saturday night. 

(A paper was handed to Admiral Noyes.) 

Admiral Notes. I did not have this message in mind at all. I 
had thought that this message came in before the 7th. 

Mr, Ferguson. Yes, it did. It came in Saturday night. 

Admiral Notes. I hadn't thought it was a message that was in it. 

Senator Ferguson. What were you working on? What message 
were you replying to? Didn't Admiral Hart then send a much 
longer message and a wire also, cable, fi'om the British, about this 
proposition, that very day? Is that what you were working on? 

Admiral Notes. The recollection I have is the strategic and tacti- 
cal implications of a convoy. I do not remember any other messages 
specifically. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you explain just what it was [1^706] 
you were working on and what you had worked out, whether you 
had sent a message? 

Admiral Notes. We had been following the — trying to follow the 
course of this convoy, because we — you are again asking me some- 
thing I had nothing to do with except from seeing messages. 

Senator Ferguson. You stated, as I understood you, that you were 
working on this proposition of Admiral Hart in the South Pacific. 
Now, this was one of the propositions that he had and he sent a 
long message which was replied to before the attack, but not ac- 
tually sent until after the attack, and that is in the record — on this 
very point. Did you know about that ? 

Admiral Notes. I don't recollect such a message, sir. 



4764 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, what were you working on about 
the convoy ? Wliat were you doing that morning ? 

Admiral Notes. This message had come in in regard to the scout- 
ing, reports on the convoy entirely aside from this other enemy inter- 
cept. This was a straight naval message from Admiral Hart. 

A British officer came to see me with some information that he had 
on the same, in regard to what information the British received about 
the movements of the big convoy. I gave him the information we 
had. He went up to see the ll£70f] Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions and the Secretary of the Navy, I believe, and later on he asked 
me if I would arrange for him, ask for an appointment for him 
with the Secretary of State, 

I called up the Secretary of State's office, and asked for an ap- 
pointment. That is the one message that sticks in my mind on Sun- 
day morning other than the note business. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand that you did this all 
Sunday morning? 

Admiral Notes. I can't — no, sir. I had all the Atlantic traffic 

Senator Ferguson. Do. Did you call the Secretary of State ? Did 
you see the British officer on Sunday morning? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

[J2708] Senator Ferguson. Then do I understand that the 
British had an officer talking with you about this convoy going to the 
Kra Peninsula, or going somewhere, and you and he were working 
it out as to where it was going ? 

Admiral Notes. We weren't working out where it was going. He 
came to me with his information. 

Senator Ferguson. What for, what information did he have? 

Admiral Notes. I don't remember the specific information now. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you recall what you gave him ? 

Admiral Notes. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What information did you have on that convoy ? 

Admiral Notes. I think I have seen it in some of these dispatches, 
but I don't remember the text of it now. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat I am trying to point out is why he would 
come to the communications officer, the head of the Communications, 
this British officer, and not come to our Intelligence Branch, if he 
wanted to get this information. You were not an evaluator of this 
information, were you ? 

Admiral Notes. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Who was this British officer that came to you 
Sunday morning and what time did he come ? 

Admiral Notes. I could not give you the exact hour, sir. 

[12709] Senator Ferguson. About what time ? 

Admiral Notes. I would say about 9 : 30 or 10. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he say that they expected an attack thai, 
morning ? 

Admiral Notes. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he say that they did not expect an attack 
that day ? 

Admiral Notes. I have no recollection in regard to that. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, wouldn't that be a thing that a man would 
be likely to remember ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4765 

Admiral Notes. I am sure I would remember if they had expected 
an attack. I might not remember if they didn't. There would be many 
days when you would not expect an attack but only one day when 
you did expect one. 

Senator Ferguson. Can't you help the conunittee here on what 
this conversation between you and the British officer was about this 
transport on Sunday morning ? 

Admiral Notes. I have — ^you asked me what I was doing, sir. I 
had a 24-hour day job. The only thing I remember specifically about 
that morning was this British officer coming in. In addition I had 
enough business to do going over my traffic with the Atlantic where 
we were in a very serious situation to take me the morning without 
doing anything [12710] else. I have no recollection of the 
British officer except the part that I have explained to you, sir. I 
had no conversation about Singapore. I had no conversation about 
political matters. It was purely in regard to the strategic and tactical 
implications of this convoy movement. Why he came to me, probably 
was because it was Sunday morning and there probably weren't so 
many people down there. 

Senator Ferguson. Was your office alerted this morning to war? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir, it was, 24 hours a day, since May 1941. 

Senator Ferguson. What was said, why did you send him to the 
Secretary of State and not to the Intelligence Department of the 
Navy? 

Admiral Notes. That I said to the Secretary of State? 

Senator Ferguson. Didn't I understand that you called the Sec- 
retary of State for an appointment ? 

Admiral Notes. I called his office. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Notes. Some subordinate. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you make an appointment with the Secre- 
tary of State? 

Admiral Notes. I did, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the point that he wanted [l^?!!] 
you to get him in touch with the Secretary of State to discuss? 

Admiral Notes. He didn't tell me, sir. He merely said everybody 
was busy and would I ring up the State Department and ask if they 
could see him. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he say who he wanted to see in the State 
Department ? 

Admiral Notes. I am not sure whom he wanted to see. I thought 
it was the Secretary of State. It might have been the Under 
Secretary. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the rank of this officer? 

Admiral Notes. I think he was a rear admiral. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that at 10 o'clock that morning 
there was a meeting between the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
War, and Secretary of Navy ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know why that had been called? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir 

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us why ? 

Admiral Notes. It was called on the Japanese note. 



4766 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Had you received word that the Secretary of 
State had told the Secretary of the Navy that it was up to the Ar-my 
and Navy as early as the 2Tth of November? 

[i^'/i^"] Admiral Noyes. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You never knew that? 

Admiral Notes. I know it now. 

Senator Ferguson. Before the 7th you didn't know it? 

Admiral Notes. I think not. I don't remember having it brought 
to my attention. 

[1^71S~\ Senator Ferguson. Where did you get the information 
about the meeting betweh the three secretaries ? 

Admiral Notes. I don't remember. I imagine Kramer told me. 
Kramer, or one of his people. 

Senator Ferguson. Pardon? 

Admiral Notes. Kramer, or one of his assistants. 

Senator Ferc^uson. Did you know of any meeting in Admiral Stark's 
office that morning ? 

Admiral Notes. Admiral Stark's office was more or less full of 
meetings in those days, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I didn't understand. 

Admiral Notes. There were meetings going on all the time in Ad- 
miral Stark's office. I remember nothing specific about it that morning. 

Senator Ferguson. You don't recall anything about that morning? 

Admiral Notes. I did not see Admiral Stark that morning. I 
saw Admiral Ingersoll, but not Admiral Stark. 

Senator Ferguson. Where was Admiral Ingersoll when you saw 
him? 

Admiral Notes. I think in his office. 

Senator Ferguson. On what occasion was it that you saw him 
Sunday morning? 

Admiral Notes. I don't remember, sir. 

[12714] Senator Ferguson. You don't recall that at all. 

Admiral Notes. No. I saw hmi very often. He was Assistant 
Chief of Naval Operations and I dealt a great deal with him? 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any discussion about the 14 parts 
message or the pilot message or any of these other messages ? 

Admiral Notes. No, sir; I remember nothing. I believe, as I re- 
member it, that I felt they were having this meeting and they had 
the note and would decide w^hat they were going to do about it. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you would say that was a normal morn- 
ing in your office and in Admiral IngersoU's office ? 

Adniiral Notes. Normal for the last week: There had been gradually 
increasing tension. 

Senator Ferguson. Normal for the last week. Will you explain 
that a little more? Things were getting rather tense were they not? 

Admiral Notes. Yes. I think from the 28th of November on, some 
important dispatch had been sent out almost every day in regard 
to the situation. There was hardly a day that there wasn't some 
approach to the crisis. 

Senator Ferguson. And it was gradually getting worse. 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

[127 IS] Senator Ferguson. Now, did you ever see the message, 
the answer to General Marshall's note sent by General Short? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4767 

Admiral Notes. No, sir. 

Senator Fergusox. You did not. 

Admiral Notes. I say I didn't. I didn't see it before Pearl Harbor. 
I have seen it since. 

Senator Fergusox. You didn't know then ^Yhat was going on between 
General Marshall and General Short, or Admiral Kimmel and Admiral 
Stark? 

Admiral Notes. Oh, yes ; I handled the war-warning message that 
was sent by the Navy. " I didn't see the Army's incoming message. 
The message from General Short to the War Department. We ex- 
changed this intercepted enemy traffic with the War Department. 
Our ordinary business was not exchanged through me. We didn't send 
a copy to the War Department of every message we sent to the field. 

The important messages were in general discussed between Admiral 
Stark and General Marshall. And at one time I was sent over to see 
General Marshall about a message and clear it with him. Whenever 
it involved the Army, we endeavored to clear with the Army. 

But it didn't happen that General Short's message to the War Depart- 
ment ever came to my attention until after Pearl [12716] 
Harbor. 

Senator Fergusox. Now Captain Safford has testified that he 
drafted a message to CINCPAC for information of Wake : 

In view of the imminence of war destroy all registered publications on Wake 
except this system and current editions of aircraft code and direction finding code. 

This message was not sent. 
Admiral Noyes asked : 

What do you mean by using such language as that? 

Captain Safford. Admiral, the war is just a matter of days if not hours. 

Admiral Noyes. You may think there is going to be war, but I think they are 
blufl5ng. 

Captain Safford. Well, Admiral, if all these publications on Wake are captured, 
we will never be able to explain. 

Now, do you remember such a conversation? 

Admiral Notes. What date was this, may I ask? Was this message 
under discussion? 

Senator Fergusox. I may refresh you memory further on it : 

Admiral Noyes rewrote 061743. 

That is the number of the message which was sent deferred on 
December 6, and received after the attack. It was [12717] that 
message about the destruction of codes on Wake. 

Admiral Notes. I recollect no such conversation as you have read 
me. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Fergusox. Pardon? 

Admiral Notes. I recollect no such conversation with Captain Saf- 
ford. As a matter of fact, I took the initiative in the sending of these 
previous — the only argument that I recollect having with Captain 
Safford in regard to the destruction of codes, which we both agreed 
as being responsible for the security of our own codes, we were both 
in agreement that we would like to get all of the dangerous ones out 
of the way, but we recognize the fact that it had a very direct influence 
on the operations people, intelligence and war plans, and I think he 



4768 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

recognized, as well as I did that we had to get their concurrence, and 
that is the reason we had to consider quite a bit before it was sent. 

The one argument we had about it was that he wanted to specify 
to the commander in chief what codes, exactly what codes should be 
kept, and I, since you bring it up, sir, it comes back to me, that 
argument that I had with him that he shouldn't tell Admiral Kimmel 
which codes to keep with the outlying islands; let him decide that for 
himself. 

That is the only difference of opinion that I remember, except I 
think he stuck in some rather brusque language to [12718] the 
commander in chief, which was contrary to the policy of the Chief 
of Naval Operations, and I scratched it out. 

Senator Ferguson. What kind of language ? 

Admiral Notes. Brusque. 

Senator Ferguson. There could have been such a conversation then : 
"What do you mean by using such language as that?" 

Admiral Noyes. Well, that might have been — I will modify what I 
said to that extent, if that is what he refers to. You didn't say what 
the language was. 

Senator Ferguson. No. 

Admiral Notes. I think he made the direct order to Admiral Kim- 
mel that he should destroy certain codes in the outlying islands, 
something to that effect. Nobody was willing to go along with that 
because they felt Admiral Kimmel should have more discretion in 
the matter. 

Senator Ferguson. Didn't you believe that you and Captain Safford 
would know more about what codes to destroy than Admiral Kim- 
mel would because you were the men who knew your codes, knew 
how you would have to communicate? Wouldn't you say you had 
more experience along that line and should have told him what to 
destroy ? 

Admiral Notes. We can't run the Navy that way, sir. We have 
to let the man in the field use his judgment in [12719] regard 
to things within his province. That is what the discussion was be- 
tween Captain Safford and me. He wanted to specify. 

Senator Ferguson. Tell the Admiral what to do ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you thought that that was not the way 
the Navy did business? 

Admiral Notes. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that right ? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Now, did you at that time think Japan was bluffing as far as the 
United States was concerned ? 

Admiral Notes. On what date ? 

Senator Ferguson. On the 6th. 

Admiral Notes. No ; I don't think so, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Prior to that did you think they were bluffing? 

Admiral Notes. Sometimes I would see a message, these intercepted 
messages, which would have a little bit of a favorable tendency in 
that direction, but on the whole not. 

I never had any feeling that way that lasted over one message. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4769 

Senator Ferguson. Then you came to the conclusion ^ {127201 
that this was really business and that Japan was not bluffing in these 
messages ? 

Admiral Notes, I have made a list of messages that you could 
read that would lead you to believe that they weren't going to war. 

Senator Fekguson. They were not going to war ? 

Admiral Noyes. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. They would indicate that they were bluffing. 
Will you give us those ? 

Admiral Notes. 1180, page 181; 842, page 186; 1204, page 192; 
844, page 199; 857, page 199; 1393, page 200; 985, page 204; 865, 
page 208; 1226, page 212; 1243, page 227; 1256, page 227. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you the occasion for making up that 
list. 

Admiral Notes. Sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. What was the occasion of making up that list? 

The Chairman. Did you finish your answer to the former question ? 
Did you complete your answer to the former question after you read 
that list? The Chair thought you started to say something else. 

Admiral Notes. No, sir. I think Senator Ferguson asked me if I 
ever thought there wasn't going to be war. As [_127211 I say, 
I didn't get this book until 2 weeks ago. I just did it as a matter 
of interest, to pick out certain messages from these messages. In 
most of these messages Nomura and Kurusu and even the Prime 
Minister, the Japanese Prime Minister, give the impression that they 
are sincere. And the other thing that I said, that the Japanese 
would be glad to — in other words, if we would leave them alone, 
they would occupy southeast Asia and not necessarily attack us. 

But, of course, I didn't think that would ever be. 

Senator Ferguson. Going back, I had been asking you whether or 
not you thought that they were bluffing, and you said at times you 
did, and at times you did not. 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, you made up this list to 
demonstrate that they didn't mean to go to war. 

Admiral Notes. No, sir. That is not my thesis, sir. I said among 
those messages, you will find times when the Prime Minister seemed 
to be optimistic, says we are trying one more thing. There are several 
messages in there where the Japanese seem to be endeavoring to patch 
things up. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, look on page 204, the message to Berlin. 
The last part of that message : 

Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may sud- 
denly break out between the Anglo-Saxon [12722] nations and Japan 
through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this 
war may come quicker than anyone dreams. 

Admiral Notes. If you go back, I think you will find that the pre- 
ceding one to that shows that the Japanese told Hitler that they were 
afraid if they went ahead with Thailand that we would intervene. 

Also at this time Hitler was trying to get Japan to go to war with 
Eussia. My general conclusion was — I merely meant to say, Senator 
Ferguson, that in going over all of them there are times when you 
see some evidence of Japan trying to do something to smooth things 
over, but the net result was certainly all to the bad. 



4770 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Well, look at the one on page 195. They are 
referring there to the message of the 26th : 

Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this 
American proposal which I will send you in 2 or 3 days, the negotiations will be 
de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. That is one of the worst ones. 

Senator Ferguson. That didn't leave much doubt, did it ? 

Admiral Notes. Well, look at the one, if you will, sir, on page 197, 
that follows that. 

1127SS] Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, what are we after 
with this examination? 

The Chairman. The Chair doesn't know. 

Mr. Richardson. I don't think the witness knows anything about 
these dispatches, and I don't think his opinion amounts to anything, 
therefore. 

The Chairman. The Chair can't pass on that question, but the Chair 
has been unable to see just where this meticulous inquiry about these 
particular messages leads. 

It may be that the Senator from Michigan can explain it. 

Senator Ferguson. I am not going to comment upon the evidence, 
but the witness gave me a list of messages and I was inquiring about 
some other messages that seem to contradict the ones he had. 

Mr. Richardson. I know, but my suggestion is that the list of mes- 
sages is just as far out of relevance in this proceeding. I want to get 
through with it and get through with this witness. 

The Chairman. The Chair would like to cooperate, and I am sure 
the member at the far end of the table to the left would also be glad 
if we could do that. 

Mr. Richardson. I have no witness to follow this witness this after- 
noon, so perhaps I shouldn't have interrupted. 

[12724] Senator Ferguson. The witness has been on the stand 
all day, and I have only had him for a short time. 

The Chairman. It has perhaps only been a short time, but it prob- 
ably just seems long. 

Mr. Richardson. No; I don't even make that criticism; I just 
wondered whether we couldn't get along. 

Senator Ferguson. Of course, I am not accustomed to ask the other 
members of the committee what questions I should ask ; neither do I 
ask counsel. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I think if the committee is able 
to endure it, counsel ought to be able to do so, and I think that the 
propriety of counsel raising these issues is somewhat open to question. 

Members of the committee have repeatedly raised that question but 
I hadn't supposed that we secured counsel in order for him to tell us 
how to cross-examine witnesses. 

I regret that the issue has been raised in just this way. 

The Chairman. The Chair would like to say that counsel were 
secured, not only present counsel, but all counsel, to assist and guide 
the committee in the interrogation of witnesses and the elucidation 
of facts, and the Chair sees no impropriety in counsel suggesting that 
the witness' testimony might be terminated. The whole thing started 
by counsel [1272S'\ asking the Chair a question that he couldn't 
answer. From there on, it went. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4771 

Mr, Rtchardsox, I just Avant to say that I agree with Senator 
Brewster. I have been waiting for some kick in the shins when I made 
one of these objections, but this is the first time I have received it. 

I won't do it any more. 

The Chairman. Tlie Chair hopes that counsel will feel free to kicK 
any shins that need to be kicked. Maybe we ought to have done more 
of that. 

Will 3^ou proceed so that we can finish with the Admiral today if 
possible ? 

Senator Ferguson. I might say that I haven't questioned the Chair- 
man's questions to the witnesses. 

The Chairman. You haven't had much chance, because the Chair 
has asked very few questions of any witness. 

Go ahead. 

Senator Ferguson. I could say many things right now but for the 
purpose of getting through with the witness I will not say them. 

I ju^t want to find out why you prepared this list of messages that 
you just read. 

Admiral Notes. Senator, I have been waiting to testify, present in 
this committee room, since last Monday. For 2 [12726] weeks 
before last Monday I have been standing by, away from the committee 
room. 

I made it purely for my own information: while studying it over 
I made notes, as I read through this Exhibit 1, which was given to me 
by counsel for the committee. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you make any list that would indicate that 
they were going to war? 

Admiral Notes. That is a combination of both, sir. It is a list of 
both. It has to do with the probability of war. Negative or positive. 

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, then, the list is on both sides ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. and I am very sorry that I brought this 
up. I tried to tell you this is my personal opinion and I recognize 
the fact that I didn't have any business to express my personal opinion 
on this matter. 

The Chairman. You were asked if you stated to Captain Safford 
that you thought the Japanese were bluifing and in answer to that 
question, I think you went into this. 

Admiral Notes. That is where I got into it, yes. 

The Chairman. You were led into it. You didn't just go into it. 

Senator Ferguson. Is the Chair through? 
The Chairman. For the moment. 

[12727] Senator Ferguson. Of course, other people have tried 
to take me off the track, but I will ask more questions anyway. 

Admiral, it is your understanding that the Navy sent direct com- 
munications, that is, the direct intercepts to Admiral Kimmel prior 
to July 1941, or up until sometime in July 1941 ? 

Admiral Notes. I tried to explain that in my answer this morning 
by saying we had a strict rule not to send exact translations or direct 
reference to enemy intercepted messages mixed up with any other Navy 
business. There was no objection to sending from time to time an 
exact translation of any message under my cognizance for the purpose 
of helping people who had had it as a reference in other messages. 
In other words, for the mechanics of decrypting. 



4772 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACE! 

Senator Ferguson. If you look back on the question, we will get 
through quicker. If you will try to keep to the question. 

Admiral Notes. I know of no reason why there were less after 
July than before July unless it was on account of the international 
situation. 

Senator Ferguson. On May 26, 1941, did you know that Admiral 
Kimmel had written a letter to Admiral Stark asking [127^8] 
him specifically for this kind of information ? 

Admiral Notes. I did not, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know there was a circular sent out 
through the various departments along that line ? 

Admiral Notes. A circular, Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, to the various departments. 

Admiral Notes. In regard to magic ? 

Senator Ferguson. No, about sending information direct to Kimmel. 

Admiral Notes. I had nothing to do with that, sir. That was the 
Director of Naval Intelligence, who sent out information. 

The messages I sent were at the request of someone else. • 

Senator Ferguson. You say there may have been a change from July 
until November because of the international situation. Will you 
explain what you mean by that answer ? 

Admiral Notes. I understood your question, Senator Ferguson, to 
be on the assumption that the number of messages sent out decreased 
after July. 

Senator Ferguson. There isn't any doubt about that. That is what 
I was asking about, and that is a fact, as I take it from this record. 

Admiral Notes. I liad nothing to do with the preparation 
[12729] of the record, and I supposed the record was supposed to 
bear on subsequent events. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever get an order from Admiral Stark 
on that? 

Admiral Notes. I did not, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Ingersoll ? 

Admiral Notes. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Anyone, to your knowledge? 

Admiral Notes. All of the orders in regard to the handling of magic 
came from the Chief of Naval Operations. I could make no change in 
the orders or the general policy without his approval. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, as far as you were concerned, there was no 
change in policy, as far as you personally were concerned, you knew of 
no change in the policy of sending messages to Admiral Kimmel ? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral Turner has indicated on this 
record — I want you to be specific on this — that he obtained some infor- 
mation from. you that Admiral Kimmel was getting all of the magic, 
and Admiral Stark to the same effect. 

What have you got to say about that ? 

Did you believe that Admiral Kimmel was getting all [12730] 
of the magic? 

Admiral Notes. I knew that he was not, sir. It would not have been 
a possibility to do it. There was no way to get the messages to him. 

Senator Ferguson. And there was no way for him to decode it? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4773 

Senator Ferguson. You knew specifically that Admiral Kimmel or 
his source there did not have any machinery or equipment to decipher 
or decode magic, that is purple ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. Magic includes all. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I changed it to purple. 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What is your answer? 

Admiral Notes. Purple. 

Senator Ferguson. You knew that ? 

Admiral Notes. I knew that, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know of anyone ever asking you that 
.|uestion as to whether or not they were able to get purple or not? 

Admiral Notes. No, sir, except when it was discussed when the 
machine was sent to Cavite, when the purple machine was sent to 
Cavite the decision had to be made between Cavite and Honolulu. It 
was sent by the approval of [12731] Naval Operations because 
it was the best listening post for us. It wasn't sent for the benefit of 
Admiral Hart. That was a secondary consideration. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us when it was sent to Cavite? 

Admiral Notes. No, sir, I cannot. 

Senator Ferguson. What year? 

Admiral Notes. 1941, 1 think. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what part of 1941 ? 

Admiral Notes. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. With whom did you discuss the question? 

Admiral Notes. Admiral Stark and Admiral Ingersoll. Admiral 
Ingersoll certainly, and I think with Admiral Stark. 

Senator Ferguson. At that time did the British have theirs, their 
machine ? 

Admiral Notes. I think so, sir. 

[12732'] Senator Ferguson. We had already sent one to the 
British, is that correct ? 

Admiral Notes. The Navy did not do that, so I am not sure of that. 

Senator Ferguon. Do you know who did furnish the British with 
the deciphering machine ? 

Admiral Notes. I am not familiar with the — I cannot give you a 
specific answer to the question. I imagine it was the Army, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. At least you don't know who did it i 

Admiral Notes. I don't recollect. I didn't have anything to do 
with it. I did not do it personally. 

Senator Ferguson. But you did have a discussion with Admiral 
Stark that you only had the one machine and it could be sent to 
Cavite and not sent to Hawaii? 

Admiral Notes. I recommended that it be sent to Cavite because 
that was the best place to intercept Japanese traffic and receive in- 
formation during that time and that was — I will say that that was 
about the time of the message that the counsel put in the recoi'd this 
morning, when we sent a joint message to the Philippines, the com- 
manding general in the Philippines and the commandant. Sixteenth 
Naval District, to make a full exchange at their end of the line. 

Admiral No^t:s. I think that was ]March 1941. 

Senator Ferguson. You say this is in March 1941 ? 



4774 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Notes. I think the message was sent in March 1941 and it 
would have had to be — the machine would have had to be there before 
the message was sent. 

Senator FERorsoN. Now, do yon know whether you discussed that 
matter with Admiral Turner? 

Admiral Notes. 1 do not, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And would your answers be the same on Ad- 
miral Turner about a conversation of purple being translated at 
Hawaii, as it was with Admiral Stark, that you do not recall any such 
statement to Admiral Turner or Admiral Stark on that question, that 
Kimmel was getting the purple? 

Admiral Notes, In regard to Admiral Turner, his testimony indi- 
cates that he was referring to traffic analyses and I think that he got 
confused between the business that Commander Rochefort was de- 
scribing this morning in his testimony, the analysis of traffic, radio 
direction finder bearings, and that kind of strictly naval work, as 
contrasted with diplomatic dispatches, which was what was the pri- 
marj use of the jjurple code. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you at the time breaking the Japanese 
navy code ? 

[1273Jf] Admiral Notes. We were working on them. Actually 
we — it is a relative matter with all codes. There is no code ever read — 
there is no one code ever read 100 percent. We speak of it in percent- 
age. Some codes can be read 10 percent, some 90 percent, and I never 
heard of any one that could be read for any length of time 100 percent. 

Senator Fergison. How much of the Navy code were you in 1941 
able to read ? 

Admiral Notes. I would have to refer you to Commander Roche- 
fort's testimony. 

Senator Ferguson. You don't know? 

Admiral Notes. Not of my own knowledge. I heard him this morn- 
ing but I do not recollect his exact statement. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether we were able to read all 
of it, whether there was a top and a lower code ? 

Admiral Notes, Whether we could read all Japanese naval codes? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Notes. The naval codes had given us much more trouble 
than the other codes in general, that is the reason that we liad — since 
it was directly naval traffic, before I took over the job — we had that 
set-up, with the people in HaAvaii concentrated on the naval systems 
and they were the hardest \1273o'] and they had not got as far 
as we had with the diplomatic through more or less luck. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, there is one message that is mentioned 
in Safford's testimony; that is No. 843, on November 27, 1941, prescrib- 
mg a schedule of Tokyo news broadcasts. That is just a short time 
after — it is not in a book. That is just a short time after the setting 
up of the wind code, I will send it to you so that you can see it. It is 
from Tokyo to Washington, 27th of November 1941, purple 843 is the 
number [handing document to witness]. 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever see that before? 

Admiral Notes. I could not say, sir. I probably did, I am 
familiar with what it means. It was used in connection with the — 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4775 

Captain Safford though it had a connection with the winds execute. 
It is a list of Japanese stations and their frequencies. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. When did Captain Safford discuss that 
with you, or was that what you took from his testimony ? 

Admiral Noyes. Oh, we discussed, as soon as the 

Senator Ferguson. Oh, when it came in ? 

Admiral Noyes. When the winds set-up came in. This came in 
actually prior to the — well, it came in the — they were translated the 
same day, apparently. This was the day before [127S6] this 
schedule message came in a day before the set-up for the winds code 
was sent out from Tokyo or, rather, it was sent out a day before, as I 
remember it. 

Seiiator Ferguson. No. 

Admiral Notes. No, I am wrong on that. 

Senator Ferguson. On the 19th. 

Admiral Noyes. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It was sent out on the 19th. 

Admiral Noyes. It was not translated until the 28th. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. 

Admiral Noyes. We got them both translated on the same day. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall a discussion with Safford that the 
message that he has now referred to in his testimony, that is not in the 
book. Number 843, which I have shown you, had something to do with 
setting up a program for this winds code ? 

Admiral Noyes. Well, for the reason, I should say, that does not 
check, because the winds code had been sent out on the 19th and this 
schedule was not set up until the 27th, so it could not 

Senator Ferguson. I just want to know whether you had a discussion 
with him? 

Admiral Noyes. I do not recollect, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, didn't you tell us that you did [1^737] 
have a discussion with him at some time ? 

Admiral Noyes. I did have a discussion 

Senator Ferguson. When? 

Admiral Noyes (continuing). — In regard to the implementing 
winds code. 

Senator Ferguson. When? 

Admiral Noyes. At about the time that it came in. 

Senator Ferguson. And was it on that schedule that I have shown 
you, 843 ? 

Admiral Noyes. I have no specific recollection of any discussion of 
this particular schedule. I am perfectly willing to accept his state- 
ment that he thought that this schedule was received — that this sched- 
ule was likely to be one on which the winds execute might be received 
He may have said that; I don't know. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

The Chairman. Mr. Keefe ? 

Mr. Keefe. In view of the fact, Admiral, that there was a little 
discrepancy as to the time you testified before the Navy Court I have 
checked that record and find that it was in September 1944 and not 
December. 

Admiral Noyes. Thank you, sir. My recollection was at fault. 

Mr. Keefe. The Navy Court had concluded its hearings on 
[1£73S] the 19th of October 1944. 



4776 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Noyes. Yes. 

Mr. KJEEFE. The Hewitt examination followed and took place in 
December. 

Now, I am very much mystified by certain portions of your testimony 
and some time or other in the course of trying to work out some sort 
of a report to come to some determination on this testimony we will 
have to judge the witnesses that testified and we have got to believe 
some. 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir, I realize that. 

Mr, Keefe. And that is going to be a pretty dilRcult task in view 
of the testimony that has been given here, as I see it. 

Admiral Noises. I have been here this past week, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, I would like to refer you to the testimonyo which 
you gave before the Navy Court of Inquiry and I want to ask you 
whether or not this question was asked you, or these questions were 
asked you, and did you make these answers? This is question 82: 

Q. What special circumstances or procedures were set up in your oflBce for the 
handling of the execution signal of the winds code system if and when the execu- 
tion signal was received? 

A. We had a special twenty-four hour watch for all [12739] Com- 
munication Intelligence matters. 

Q. Were there any special cards prepared giving the Japanese words that were 
expected and these cards, sets of them, delivered to persons in the Navy Depart- 
ment who would be particularly interested upon the receipt of the execution 
of that signal? 

A. I could not say. 

Now, I want to stop right there. 

Admiral Notes. Did you say question 82, sir? 

Mr. Keefe. Well, that is the way it appears in our record, questions 
82 and 83. I read you the questions and read you the answers. 

Now the question is, were those questions asked you and did you 
make those answers before the Naval Board of Inquiry? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, Mr. Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. Now you come before us in this matter and you say 
that after hearing the testimony of Captain Kramer you think that 
you did direct the preparation of some cards. Now, did you or didn't 
you? 

Admiral Notes. T stated that I had a discussion with Captain Saf- 
ford after my return to Washington this summer which 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, the question is — pardon me. I don't want 
to interrupt you but I would like to have this as [12740] short 
and as succinct and as clear as possible without a lot of roaming 
around the bush. Did you or did you not direct the preparation of 
these cards ? 

Admiral Notes. I authorized the preparation of them, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, is there a distinction to be made between authori- 
zation and direction? 

Admiral Notes. I think that the suggestion probably came from 
Captain Safford or Captain Kramer and I approved of its being 
done. They were in my division. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, can't you answer that specific question? Did 
you yourself direct the preparation of those cards ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. Can you answer that yes or no ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4777 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. E^EEFE. Well, than the answer is "Yes, sir." We have got that 
much settled then. Now,- the next question is were those cards pre- 
pared ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And who prepared them? 

Admiral Notes. I do not recollect, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Were they delivered to you? 

Admiral Notes. I do not recollect, sir. They were delivered to me 
or to the ones who were to use them but I do not know that I made 
the delivery or Kramer. I should think that [12741] Kramer 
would have been probably the one to deliver it. 

Mr. Keefe. I don't care for argumentation that is not an answer. 
I am asking you simple questions and they can have simple and direct 
answers. That has been the trouble with this whole hearing, every 
answer is an argument; instead of being an answer to the question 
we go off arouncl the bush and saying all around about what this one 
said and that one said and everything else instead of getting a direct 
answer to the question. 

Now, I am going to have difficulty, in passing on the character of the 
witnesses that testified here, to determine who is telling the truth. 
They cannot all be telling the truth, as Iliave listened to this testimony 
and I want to see if we cannot pin some of these things down. We have 
now reached the point where you have testified here that you did direct 
the preparation of these cards. 

Admiral Notes. And that the cards were distributed. 

Mr. KJEEFE. Distributed to whom? 

Admiral Notes. I should say. to the best of my recollection 

Mr. Richardson. He is asking for your personal knowledge now. 

Mr. Keefe. I am asking you to testify not about what somebody 
else told you or somebody told him or what you heard [127 Ji^] 
here in this room. I am asking you to test your recollection and your 
knowledge of the things that you are testifying about, trying to apply 
what are ordinary rules of evidence and the construction of evidence. 

To whom were those cards distributed ? 

Admiral Notes. If you ask me to whom I personally delivered the 
cards, I do not recollect. 

Mr. Keefe. To whom were they delivered by your direction ? 

Admiral Notes. I believe that they were delivered to the Secretary 
of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Wilkinson, the 
Naval Aide, probably Admiral Turner. 

Mr. Keefe. The Naval Aide to whom ? 

Admiral Notes. The Naval Aide to the President. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now, it is perfectly sensible, is it not. Admiral 
Noyes, that that procedure would have been indulged in due to the 
importance that had been previously attached to this winds code 
that had been set up ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And the evidence is before this committee that as to 
no other message other than this proposed winds execute was any 
such arrangement made. That is true, isn't it? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct, sir. 

79716 — 46— pt. 10 13 



4778 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[1274^] Mr. Keefe. Yes. It is also true, is it not, that due to 
the fact of secrecy of magic these cards would not have been delivered 
to any persons other than those entitled to receive ultra-magic, isn't 
that true ? 

Admiral Notes. That is true, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And the very purpose of delivering these cards was 
so that when and if this winds code execute message came in it would 
be possible to immediately contact the recipients of those cards and 
advise them of the receipt of that message, isn't that true ? 

Admiral Notes. At night, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, at night, yes. They could have those cards at 
home with them, isn't that true ? 

Admiral Notes. That was the idea of the cards. 

Mr. Keefe. So you had a plan set up by which a telephone message 
could be sent to the Chief of Naval Operations or to the President 
or- to this one or that one of the six that you have named and they 
could be given language that would indicate to them what the winds 
execute message was and by turning to the card they could interpret 
it and understand it, isn't that true ? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, you devised that plan yourself, didn't you? 

[12744] Admiral Notes. I am not sure whether I devised it or 
whether it was suggested to me. It may have been a joint affair. It 
came — Kramer and Safford and myself 

Mr. Keefe. I am trying to give you the credit. 

Admiral Notes. Sir ? 

Mr. Keefe. I am trying to give you the credit in this case. 

Admiral Notes. Well, Safford, I see, took credit for it already. 

Mr. Keefe. Safford does not take credit for that. The testimony 
of both Captain Kramer and Captain Safford is that this whole card 
system was your production. 

Admiral Notes. Well, it was undoubtedly my direction. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. 

Admiral Notes. I thought you asked me if I initiated the idea, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, we have got this far, that the cards were made 
out, they were distributed and in the hands of those entitled to re- 
ceive ultra-magic. You are sure about that, aren't you? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Before this committee now, that much you are sure of? 

Admiral Notes. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. There can be no mistake about that? 

IW74^] Admiral Notes. No. sir. 

Mr. Keefe. So that subsequent refreshment won't change your opin- 
ion later, is that right ? 

Admiral Notes. My opinion has only been changed once, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, I am not so certain about that if I go through 
your testimony, as I will before we get through. 

The Chairman. You mean today? 

Admiral Notes. I mean this particular incident. 

Mr. Keefe. What is that? 

Admiral Notes. I did not mean that there was only one discrep- 
ancy. I mean that I changed my opinion on this after talking to 
Captain Safford upon my return to Washington. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4779 

Mr. Keefe. Well, what I want to be sure — is what you are testifying 
to now a fact ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Keefe. I am asking for facts. 

Admiral Notes. To the best of my recollection it is a fact. 

Mr. Keefe. Not rumors, suspicions, and not conjectures, and not 
composite ideas resulting from conversations where you worked out 
something to say, but I am asking for simple facts. You realize that, 
do 3^ou not? 

Admiral Notes. I understand that, Mr. Keefe. 

[1274'S] Mr. Keefe. And the reason I am asking it is because this 
question was asked you. Question 84 : 

As a possible refreshing of your memory, there has been testimony given 
before this court that prior to the receipt of the execution signal you had pre- 
pared a series of six cards and each had been delivered to officials in the Navy 
Department who would be particularly anxious to know of this execute signal at 
the earliest moment it was received. Do you now recall if any such system was 
established? 

No, I could not say. 

That is what you told the Court of Inquiry ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. But since that time, after talking with other individuals 
you now are prepared to come here under oath and tell this committee 
as a fact what j^ou have stated to us this afternoon in respect to those 
cards, is that right? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. One other individual, not individuals. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now, was this question asked you before the 
Naval Court of Inquiry at that time : 

Q. Then at no time did you learn from anyone the execution of the winds 
message in any form and at no time did you tell anyone of the execution in any 
form of [i27-}7] the winds message, is that the way you want to leave 
your testimony on this subject? 

A. That is right ; yes. 

Now, you want that changed before this committee, do you not? 

Admiral Notes. I do not, sir. I have stated before this commit- 
tee that there was no authentic execute on the winds message. 
Mr. I^efe. Well, now. Admiral, I don't want to split hairs. 
Admiral Notes. I am not trying to split hairs, INIr. Keefe. 
Mr. Keefe. I think you are. 
Admiral Notes. I am sorry. 
Mr. Keefe. Now, listen to this question that was asked you : 

Then at no time did you learn from anyone of the execution of the winds 
message in any form. 

Admiral Notes. I did not take that question to be an execute, a false 
execute at the time. That is the reason I answered as I did. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. Question 136. Was this question asked 
you and did you make this answer : 

Q. Referring to this winds message and the execute of the winds message, 
have you any recollection whether Lieu- [121^8] tenant Commander 
Kramer came in with an execute of the winds message and said, ''Here It is"? 

A. As I remember it we received some outside information which afterwards 
turned out not to be correct. 



4780 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

What information was taken to mean that an execute of this winds 
message had been received which turned out not to be correct? Did 
you make that answer ? 

Admiral Notes. That it turned out not to be correct ? 

Mr. Keefe, No, I am not asking you that. I am asking you the 
simple question 

Admiral Notes. Well, I haven't been able to find it. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, I assumed that you made it because I am reading 
it from the record. 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now. Admiral Noyes, Captain Kramer has tes- 
tified that the watch officer on duty, as he says, on the 5th of De- 
cember came to his door and handed him a message that had just 
been taken off the teletype. Captain Kramer looked at it and told 
this committee that he believed at that time that it was an authentic 
winds execute message; that he walked down with the watch officer 
to Captain Safford's office and said to Captain Safford, "Here it is." 

Kramer says that Safford then carried the ball from there on and 
indicated that he had gone to your office. Captain [127Ji9'\ 
Safford said that he sent one of his subordinates to your office with 
that message. 

Now, my question is. Did a message, true or false, good or bad, of 
the character described by Captain Safford and Captain Kramer 
reach your office either on the 4th or 5th of December ? 

Admiral Notes. I could not give you a specific answer to that ques- 
tion, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Wliy not? 

Admiral Notes. Because to say tliat a false message written on 
yellow teletype paper — I cannot say that a message written on yel- 
low teletype paper was not delivered to me in my office on the 4th or 
the 5th. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, was it ever delivered to you? 

Admiral Notes. No, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Then we are to understand that your memory fails 
on that subject, is that right? You have no recollection of receiving 
this message, regardless of whether you considered it to be a true 
winds execute or a false winds execute, you cannot tell this com- 
mittee whether you received such a message? 

Admiral Notes. With the exception that I have a partial recollec- 
tion of receiving a message with a Russian slant, which caused a 
dispute and that would fit in with a winds [12750] message, 
except for some parts of Captain Safford's testimony. I testified to 
that this morning, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, the difficulty that I have with this testimony of 
yours is that Colonel Sadtler, who has apparently told the same story 
all through all these hearings, comes before this committee and says that 
he received a telephone message from you on the 5th, in which you 
told him that the winds execute message was in. 

Now, he testified meticulously that he talked to Colonel Bratton; 
that Colonel Bratton took a piece of paper out of his pocket with 
some words on it, looked at them and said to Colonel Sadtler, "What 
were the words on this?" And Sadtler did not get them. They then 
talked to General Miles and General Miles told him to call you on 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4781 

the telephone and ascertain the exact words on the message and Colonel 
Sadtler says he did call you on the telephone and that you told him 
that you were busy, that you were just going to a meeting and did 
not have time to talk to him. 

Now, your testimony is, if I understand it, that your mind is a blank 
as to all of that; you have no recollection of anything of that kind 
taking place. Is that right ? 

Admiral Noyes. I testified that I had talked to Colonel Sadtler 
numerous times during that week. I have no recollection of a con- 
versation such as he describes. I believe from [12751] listen- 
ing to his testimony yesterday that he said it was a message, regard- 
ing only severance of relations with the British that he referred to. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, my dear sir, Colonel Sadtler never saw the mes- 
sage. The only thing that Colonel Sadtler knows about it is what 
you told him and he told us that you told him that over the telephone. 

Admiral Notes. He said in his testimony yesterday I told him there 
was a message in that looked like severance of relations with the 
British. 

Mr. Keefe. Exactly; that is what Colonel Sadtler said that you 
told him over the phone. 

Admiral Notes. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. And when he reported that to Colonel Bratton, Colonel 
Bratton wanted him to tell him what was the Japanese word upon it 
and Sadtler could not tell Bratton that and General Miles directed 
him to call you back and get the exact words that were in the mes- 
sage and you said you were busy and going to attend a meeting. 

Now, you wouldn't think Colonel Sadtler could possibly be mistaken 
and make up a story that was not absolutely true in that respect, do 
you ? 

Admiral Notes. I should be very sorry to think that any of these 
witnesses were intentionally mistaken, sir. 

[12752] Mr. Keefe. Well, do you think that took place exactly 
as Colonel Sadtler stated? 

Admiral Notes. I do not, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Then do you deny that it did take place ? 

Admiral Notes. I do not, sir. I deny that it took place exactly 
as he said. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, then you tell us what did take place? 

Admiral Notes. I do not know, sir. I would not have said that 
the message is in just the way I have been quoted. I might very well 
have called him and told him that we had a questionable message that 
we were considering and that is the most that I would have done, or 
that could have resulted in the train of circumstances that occurred. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, that is an argument. That is not a statement 
of facts. Admiral. 

Admiral Notes. I do not recollect that I made any such remarks 
over the telephone as Colonel Sadtler states that I made. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, you do not want to testify under oath that you 
did not, do you ? 

Admiral Notes. I do not, sir. I stated that I hadn't a recollection. 

Mr. Keefe. Then the nature of your story is you do not remember 
what was said ? 



4782 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[1Q7SS] Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Or you don't remember that there was even a telephone 
conversation ? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, then, why then build up something and argue 
and say that if I had a telephone conversation I may have said so and 
so when your recollection is a perfect blank and you don't know 
whether you telephoned him at all or not, and you certainly don't 
remember what you did say if you did telephone. Now, that is a 
fair assumption, isn't it? 

Admiral Notes. You are right, Mr. Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. Then let us get down to some facts. Now, 
did you talk to anyone else about this winds code execute that you 
do remember about? 

Admiral Notes. I have no recollection of specific conversations with 
anyone else in regard to false executes on the wind message. 

Mr. Keefe. I did not ask you for your recollection as to specific 
conversations. I asked you the simple question did you talk to any- 
one else? We will go to the question as to what the conversation was 
in a minute. 

Admiral Notes. I do not recollect, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you talk to the Chief of Naval Operations, Ad- 
miral Stark? 

[127541 Admiral Notes. In regard to the execute you mean ? 

Mr. Keefe. In regard to this message that had been brought to your 
office. 

Admiral Notes. I have no recollection of discussing it with him 
personally. You mean in regard to the set-up, I assume, and not 
the execution ? 

Mr. Keefe. I am talking about the execute message. 

Admiral No'iTES. The execution I did not ever discuss with the Chief 
of Naval Operations. 

Mr. Kjeefe. Well. I want to ask you if these questions were put to 
you and did you make these answers before the naval court of inquiry? 
Question No. 141. 

In my previous examination I asked you 

The Chairman. May I ask whether there is a chance to finish with 
the admiral today ? 

Mr. Keefe. Yes ; in just a few minutes I can get through. 
The Chairman. Let us go ahead then. 
Mr. Keefe (reading) : 

In my previous examination I asked you, at no time did you learn from anyone 
of the execution on tlie winds message in any form and at no time did you tell 
anyone of the execution in any form? I ask you if that is the way you wish to 
leave your testimony on that subject? I now invite your attention to the fact 
that you have just testi- [12755] tied that you did receive some informa- 
tion. From where did this information come? 

A. I beg your pardon. I said to the best of my recollecton there was a false 
alarm about it. 

Q. But that was information about the winds message, was it not? The mere 
fact that it turned out to be false afterwards did not take it away from that sub- 
ject, did it? 

A. I would be very glad to give you a better answer if I could. 

Q. Then you did hear from some source about the execution of the winds 
message, is that right? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4783 

A. I can only say that to the best of my remembrance no execution of the so- 
called winds message was finally received. 

Q. Did you ever discuss this winds message — and they are referring to the 
winds execute message, the one you have just been talking about— did you ever 
discuss this winds message or the receipt of it with the Chief of Naval Operations? 

A. When the message came in, as I remember it, we considered it more impor- 
tant than a later study of it indicated. The message only said that relations were 
strained. 

[12756] Q. I asked you whether you discussed it? 

A. With the Chief of Naval Operations personally? 

Q. Yes. 

A. No. 

Q. Did you give him any information? 

A. He got a copy of it. 

Were those questions asked you and did you make those answers? 
You can answer that "yes" or "no" if you remember. 

Admiral Notes. I don't think the record is correct, but I have no 
objection to accepting those. It does not sound — it sounds as if some- 
thing is misplaced in the record to me. I never had a chance to go over 
my testimony, but I see nothing that is contrary to what might have 
been said, with the exception of- 



Mr. Keefe. Well, I haven't time- 



Senator Brewster. What exception? 

The Chairman. Let the witness finish. 

Mr. Keefe. I thought he had finished. 

The Chairman. He started to say, "With the exception of" some- 
thing. 

Admiral Notes. I noticed in reading this over that it looks as if 
the question did not belong with the — the answer did not belong with 
the question, but I don't know that it makes any particular differ- 
ence so far as the facts go. 

[1£757] Mr. Keefe. I will read it to you again. 

Admiral Notes. I am perfectly willing to accept the facts as stated, 
having in mind what you just read. 

Mr. Keefe. Question 145 : 

I asked you whether you discussed it? 

A. With the Chief of Naval Operations personally? 

Q. Yes. 

A. No. 

Q. Did you give him any information? 

A. He got a copy of it. 

That is perfectly clear and logical, isn't it, and follows in sequence, 
doesn't it? 

Admiral Notes. All right, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, you made those answers, didn't you? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, was that answer true that the Chief of Naval 
Operations did get a copy of this message? 

Admiral Notes. He got a copy of the message setting up the 
winds code ; that is what I said. I don't think it is correctly written 
up from the notes. He did not get a copy of the execute. They said 
they wanted to know if he had any information on the set-up or the 
execute, as I followed you in your reading, and he did get a copy 

Mr. Keefe. Evidently you did not follow me in the reading 
[127582 because I will read it to you again and demonstrate to 



4784 CONGKESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

you that your interpretation could not possibly be a fact. This is 
what I said : 

Did you ever discuss this winds message or the receipt of it with the Chief 
of Naval Operations? 

Without going back, the previous questions were referring to the 
winds execute message, and then the question is : 

Did you ever discuss this winds message or the receipt of it with the Chief 
of Naval Operations? 

A. When the message came in, as I remember at that time we considered 
it more important than a later study of it indicated. 

Now, get this : 

The message only said that relations were strained. 

There wasn't anything in the original code that talked about the 
relations being strained, was there? That was what was alleged to 
have been in the winds execute message. 

Admiral Notes. Oh, I beg your pardon, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. 

Admiral Notes. The winds execute message contained nothing 
but a weather report, an apparent weather report. The description 
as to what it meant finally you will find on page 154. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes ; I am very familiar with it. I have got [T2759] 
it right in front of me. 

Admiral Noyes. That is the only place where any words in regard 
to severing diplomatic relations occurs. When the execute came it was 
merely to have the words in Japanese, "East wind, rain ; north wind, 
cloudy ; or west wind, clear." That was all the Japanese would mean. 

Mr. Keefe. Then I understand your present statement to be that 
you did not discuss this winds code execute message with the Chief 
of Naval Operations ? 

Admiral Noyes. I did not discuss an execute message with the Chief 
of Naval Operations ; that is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you discuss it with anyone else, the message which 
was delivered to you either by Captain Safford or one of his as- 
sistants ? 

Admiral Noyes. I think I very probably did. 

Mr. Keefe. With whom did you discuss it ? 

Admiral Noyes. Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Turner, Admiral 
Ingersoll would have been the most probable ones, outside of my own 
division. 

Mr. Keefe. I am not dealing in probabilities. I cannot arrive at 
a decision in this matter based upon probability. Did you talk to 
Admiral Wilkinson or didn't you ? 

Admiral Noyes. I have no recollection of a conversation in regard 
to any specific false- execute message with any [1£760] indi- 
viduals. 

Mr. Keefe. Where are the cards now that were made out by Cap- 
tain Kramer ? 

Admiral Noyes. I have no idea, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you have one of them in your office? 

Admiral Noyes. I had one in my possession ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Where is it now ? 

Admiral Noyes. I do not know, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Have you made any search among any of those other 
people who had those cards to determine what has become of them ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4785 

Admiral Note. I have not, sir. 

Mr. Kjiefe. Now, you had one of these cards in your possession ? 

Admiral Noyes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you recall what was stated on the card ? 

Admiral Notes. "East wind, rain— U. S.; north wind, cloudy- 
USSR ; west wind, clear — British." 

Expressions to that effect. I wouldn't be sure of the exact way of 
expressing it but to that sense. 

Mr. Keefe. Were the Japanese words on there ? 

Admiral Notes. No, sir. The Japanese words would have been of 
no value because nobody could — the code was intended purely for tele- 
phoning to people at their home and [12761] the idea was that 
over the telephone there would merely be said that a weather report 
had been received "East wind, rain" which to the recipient of this 
card would remind him which country was involved. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, I want to get this one thing straight, Admiral. 
You had this pick-up station or intercept station over here at Chel- 
tenham ? 

Admiral Notes. Cheltenham was the receiving station for the Navy 
Department. It was not a pick-up station. It was the main traffic 
station of the Navy. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, the testimony here up to date is quite undisputed, 
it seems to me, that a message was taken off the teletype. We haven't 
heard yet from the lieutenant who took it off. Lieutenant Murray. 
Some of them were identified by Lieutenant Murray. Now, if a mes- 
sage came over the teletype, that message would have to be written 
down at the station that received it; isn't that true? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. It had to be typed at the station. 

Mr. Keefe. It had to be typed at the station that received it; isn't 
that right ? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And typing it at the station sends it over the teletype 
here to the Navy Department where it is teletyped on the teletype 
machine? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That is the way it is received ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

[12762] Mr, Keefe. Now the only way you could identify the 
winds execute mesage was by finding the words that were set up in the 
original code set-up, isn't that true? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe, So when the testimony is, as testified by Captain Safford 
before the Naval Court of Inquiry, that the watch officer saw the identi- 
fication words on this teletype and tore off this page, the Japanese 
word must have been there to identify it, isn't that true? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr, KJEEFE, Without that nobody would have even thought of it 
being a winds execute, isn't that true? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And the Japanese word that was there would indicate 
with whom relations were strained or broken off ? 

Admiral Notes, It may, after the other requirements of the code 
were met. 



4786 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. Of course, I understand that. Now you found a message 
taken off the teletype which Kramer — with all the other inconsistencies 
in his testimony, but I think he was clear finally before this committee 
that he then believed that that was an original, authentic winds code 
execute message, and Safford believed it to be such, two of the high 
men handling that sort of traffic in this division, and [1276S] 
that message found its way into your office and from there on the matter 
becomes blank. Now with all this refreshing of your mind you are 
still unable to tell us what became of the message that was actually 
delivered to you from Captain Safford? I do not care whether it was 
on the 4th or the 5th. That is immaterial. Dates do not make any 
difference. 

Admii'al Notes. It is quite material to me, sir. When you ask 
me to identify a specific piece of paper and to line it up with the 
testimony of three different people, it puts me in a very difficult 
position. 

Mr. Keefe. Admiral Noyes, I am not asking you to do any such 
thing. Here is a message that the testimony is clear and convincing 
on that both the Army and Navy had gone to great lengths to re- 
ceive it, and the evidence is clear on that score, and you have gone 
to the extent of setting up an absolutely clear system that would 
apply only to this one message when it came in, so that this mes- 
sage could be identified out of all the other messages, it was the 
only one that was to be handled and brought directly to your office 
and the only one for which these cards were made out. 

Now that takes it completely out of the ordinary traffic, doesn't it ? 

Admiral Notes. It was out of the ordinary traffic; there is no 
question of that, sir. 

\_1276If] Mr. Keefe. Still you do not remember this message, 
or anything about it? 

Admiral Notes. You ask me to bring together a 200-word mes- 
sage, which is a message that long [indicating], at least, on the 4th, 
which Safford testified to, a small sti'ip of paper on the 5th, which 
Kramer testified to, and a different message on the 5th, about an 
entirely different set-up, where the British and Russia were both 
brought in, and they are not the same thing. 

I am not able to identify the disposition of any one of those three 
supposed messages. 

Mr. Keefe. Well. I would think, Admiral, there might be some 
justification for this last statement of yours were it not for the tes- 
timony of Colonel Sadtler that you actually telephoned him. He 
did not telephone you; you telephoned him and told him the mes- 
sage was in, clearly demonstrating the extreme interest that was 
applied to this one particular message, and you do not deny that you 
telephoned that to Colonel Sadtler. That is all. 

The CiiAiRMAx. Admiral, I want to ask you a question or two. 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

The Chairmax. I understood in regard to this telephone message 
that your testimony here before us is to the effect \12765'\ you 
may have telephoned him but you do not recall. 

Admiral Notes. That is correct. 

The Chairman. If you did telephone him. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4787 

Admiral Notes. That is correct. I telephoned many times a day. 
We had a secret telephone between my office and the office of the 
Chief Signal Officer of the Army for the purpose of discussing these 
matters. 

The Chairman. You were all down there in offices that were closely 
associated, weren't you? 

Admiral Noyes. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. In and out all during the day ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You were not, any of you, quarantined against 
the other so you were afraid to go back and forth, and you did go 
back and forth and held many conversations about things that were 
then of interest to your Department and to the Navy and the Govern- 
ment with respect to this Japanese situation, is that true? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct. Senator. 

The Chairman. Now about these cards that we have been talking 
about here. As I understand it, whether you initiated that or whether 
Kramer or Safford initiated it, it was a matter of convenience, so you 
could distribute those cards — which were identical, as I understand it. 

[12766] Admiral Notes. Yes, sir; they were identical. 

The Chairman (continuing). To four or five people. 

Admiral Notes. Yes. 

The Chairman. So if they happened to be at home at night and 
what 3'ou were looking for, that is the execute message came in, you 
could call these people and say, "The weather report is here." Nobody 
could understand that except the two people at each end of the tele- 
phone, is that correct? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct. 

The Chairman. The general public would not understand it? 

Admiral Notes. No, sir. 

The Chairman. They would not know what you were talking 
about. They would not know you were talking about a Japanese se- 
cret code message, would they ? 

Admiral Notes. That was the purpose of the cards. 

The Chairman. You would call up and say, "The weather report 
is in", and the other man would say, "Well, what is it?" You would 
say, "It is East Wind Rain", and he knew what that meant. You 
did not have to go into details, or to give a blueprint. That card 
was for that purpose, is that true ? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct, sir. 

The Chairman. So it does not make a lot of difference [127'67] 
who initiated it, or who actually wrote that out, if there was such a 
card system and it was distributed to these four or five top-notchers 
who were entitled to this secret information. 

Admiral Notes. I might say the original question which I was 
asked before the Navy court of inquiry indicated they were cards 
for use in the office, and having been away for a year in the Pacific, 
away from Washington, I did not recall them in that sense. 

The Chairman. The first impression I got in reference to these 
cards was that they were cards that were distributed among the high 
officers in the offices and kept there. I evidently was mistaken. They 
were supposed to take them home with them ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 



4788 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. They could keep them in the office if anybody called 
them there, and they would understand the meaning ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes. 

The Chairman. This teletype business, you had both white and 
yellow teletype paper, didn't you, or pink and yellow? 

Admiral Notes. I could not say, sir. 

The Chairman. Did you have more than one color? 

[12768] Admiral Notes. I do not know, sir. I thought the 
general run of teletype rolls was yellow. 

The Chairman. A lot of it is white. I have seen white teletype 
paper, although I do not know what the Navy uses. 

Admiral Notes, I think we would use white, if we did not have 
yellow. In other words, I do not know of any color code distinction 
in a teletype message. 

The Chairman. If you were using both yellow and pink, or white 
and pink, or any other color, would you be able now to identify which 
color any particular message was in that was handed to you ( 

Admiral Notes. The only way I could identify a message now, 
unless it recalls something to my memory, would be my initials on the 
message. 

The Chairman. Now about the execute message which has been re- 
ferred to here. When you referred to the message shown to you on 
either the 4th or 5th you were talking about the message that you 
call the false execute message ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Now in the code set-up, the weather set-up, the 
Japanese from Tokyo sent a message to their Ambassador here that 
in the event of a breaking off of relations or interfering with com- 
munications, if they heard a weather report containing these words 
this is wh^t [12769] it meant: ''East Wind Rain: Trouble 
with the United States," or a break in relations? 

Admiral Notes. Yes. 

The Chairman. "North Wind Cloudy : With Russian ; West Wind 
Clear : With England." 

Admiral Notes. It would indicate on account of the probable sever- 
ance of relations with the country indicated, upon receipt of the mes- 
sage codes and papers were to be destroyed. 

The Chairman. In other words, if other means of communication 
became impossible and they heard a weather broadcast of that sort 
and heard these words they would know what they meant ? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct, sir. I believe the reason the Jap- 
anese sent the British message on the Tth was that some one of their 
stations had not checked in with the word "Haruna," indicating that 
the papers had been destroyed, and they may have found out, or have 
suspected that they never had gotten the message, and they sent that 
out to try to get that set destroyed. 

The Chairman. Now prior to the Tth the conditions under which 
this weather report were to be broadcast had not taken place, that is, 
there had been no break in diplomatic relations nor communications, 
had there ? 

[12770] Admiral Notes. That is correct, sir. 

The Chairman. Now the message that was received here on the Tth, 
is that a message that you regarded and interpreted as a true execute 
message, according to the weather set-up ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4789 

Admiral Notes. The one in the FCC ? 

The Chairman. Yes, the one that you referred to earlier as haying 
o-otten here on the 7th. I think it is on the last page of the exhibit. 
" Admiral Notiss. Page 3 (d) of Exhibit 142? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Notes. It saj^s in English, and this is in the middle of the 
news: 

but today especially at this point I will give the weather broadcast West Wind 
Clear, West Wind Clear- 
twice. 

The Chairman. That meant there was no trouble with Russia ? 

Admiral Notes. That meant diplomatic relations severed with 
England. 

The Chairman. Of course neither of those signals or symbols were 
to be interpreted as meaning war, necessarily. 

Admiral Notes. That is right, sir. 

The Chairman. It meant there might be severance of diplomatic 
relations between the respective countries. Well, [12771] 
now, if that was to be regarded as an execute message based upon the 
weather signals that had been previously given to the Japanese diplo- 
matic representatives, would there have been any need or any occasion 
for sending an execute message either on the 4th or 5th, and if they 
sent one on the 4th or 5th would thev necessarily have repeated it on 
the 7th? 

Admiral Notes. I should think it is very unlikely, sir. 

The Chairman. So if the message that was received here was really 
an execute message and was so intended to be regarded by the Jap- 
anese to their representatives, would there have been any need to send 
another one on the 7th ? 

Admiral Notes. No, sir, except I think this one on the 7th was just 
intended to clean up some things in some British point. 

The Chairman. That related to the British? 

Admiral Notes. They had not got an answer back from some 
British station and they were afraid they were going to lose their 
codes at that place, or for some reason the British had held them up. 

The Chairman. Now with reference to Admiral Phillips, he was 
an acquaintance of yours? 

Admiral Notes. No, sir, I did not know him personally. I knew 
who he was. • 

The Chaiirman. Do you know whether he came there [12772] 
specifically to see you that Sunday morning, or just came to see 
somebody ? 

Admiral Notes. Admiral Phillips was at an Asiatic station, I think 
sir. 

The Chairman. I am talking about the man who came in to see 
you on Sunday morning, the 7th. 

Admiral Notes. I think that was Admiral Little, sir. 

The Chairman. He was referred to here as Phillips. 

Admiral Notes. I beg your pardon, sir. He was talking about 
Manila. 

The Chairman. I am talking about the man who came into your 
office on Sunday morning and wanted you t omake an appointment 
with Secretary Hull. 



4790 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Who was that ? 

Admiral Ncn^ES. I think it was Admiral Little. I do not know 
whether Admiral Phillips was in Washington at that time or not. 

The Chairman. Was there anything unusual about that? 

Admiral Noyes. No, sir. 

The Chairman. You say he gaA'e you some information that he 
had from British sources and tlien you gave him some ide'a about this 
fleet going down through the South China Sea. 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

[1£77S~\ The Chairman. Then you called up to see if you could 
make an appointment with Secretary Hull, and you talked to one of 
his subordinates. 

Admiral Notes. Normally a foreigner is supposed to go through 
the Office of Naval Intelligence, and he wanted to cut a corner and 
asked me if I would be willing to call the Secretary of State's office. 
I knew one of the Secretary of State's people and I just called him 
up. 

The Chairman. Was this man an acquaintance of yours? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. He was? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

The Chair:\ian. So he knew you and you knew him ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. It being Sunday and most of the officers probably 
not being there, he chose you as a sort of agent through whom he 
could seek an appointment with the Secretary of State? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You performed tl^at function and he left? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That is all. 

The Vice Chairinian. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Mr. Cooper. 

[12774] The Vice Chairman. Admiral, you stated that you had 
a conversation with Captain Safford, I believe, about 4 months ago. 

Admiral Notes. During the summer. I could not give you the exact 
month, sir. 

[1277S] The Vice Chairman. During this last summer? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. What was the description that Captain Safford 
gave you about the winds message at that time? 

Admiral Notes. To the best of my recollection. Captain Safford 
said — he said that he still thought there had been an execute of the 
winds message. I said, well, I don't think so. Why can't you show 
me something, if it is true; some record that we can get together on. 
I said, when did it come in. He said that it came in at Winter Harbor, 
I think, and they have destroyed their records. I didn't want to put 
any pressure on Captain Safford to change his opinion. 

I just told him that I had no recollection of it, and that he would 
have to show me something to indicate that there was an authentic 
execute. 

The Vice Chairman. I understood you to state that the description 
that Captain Safford gave here in his prepared statement of a winds 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4791 

execute message was different from the description that he gave you 
last summer; is that correct? 

Admiral Notes. It is correct in that he didn't give me any descrip- 
tion like that. 

[12776'] He said, in the first place, that it came in at Winter 
Harbor, he thought, and he didn't tell me anything about this business 
about the Russian slant, the negative Russian business. That wasn't 
mentioned. 

The Vice Chairman. When he talked to you that summer, he said 
the message came in at Winter Harbor, Maine? 

Admiral Notes. Yes. I don't think he was positive. 

The Vice Chairman. When he testified here, I think he said it came 
in over the Cheltenham station, didn't he? 

Admiral Notes. That is right. 

The Vice Chairman. That is, two different places ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now then, whatever description he gave you 
last summer about a winds execute message, your impressioi; of that 
is that it was different from the description he gave here. Is that 
correct ? 

Admiral Notes. Specifically to the extent of the station and in the 
fact he did not mention any — he mentioned very little — of what was 
contained in his present statement. 

The Vice Chairman. And he told you that he was going to prepare 
a statement, and would show it to you ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And he never did do that ? 

[^12777] Admiral Notes. That is correct, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Admiral Notes. But he stated that he didn't tliink it was proper 
after this inquiry was ordered by Congress; that was his reason, and 
I agreed with him on that. 

The Vice Chairman. Admiral, I would like to ask you this question : 
You were present during the appearance of Admiral Ingersoll here ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Before tliis committee ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chair^vian. You heard his testimony about the so-called 
winds execute message ? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. In which he said, in substance, that he thought 
it had been magnified beyond all reasonable proportion of importance? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Do you agree in that statement ? 

Admiral Notes. I do, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. It is your opinion then that if such a message 
had been received as Captain Safford contends, it would have been 
of very little importance in the light of [12778] other infor- 
mation you had ? 

Admiral Notes. I should have recommended no action whatever 
in regard to such a message. 

The Vice Chairman. Even if a correct winds execute message, just 
as Captain Safford contends, had been received on either the 4th or 



4792 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the 5th of December and brought to you, you would not have recom- 
mended that any action be taken on it? 

Admiral Noyes. I would not have recommended that any action be 
taken, Mr. Cooper. 

The Vice Chaikman. Because you didn't consider it of any impor- 
tance then.^ 

Admiral Notes. We had already informed our people in the field 
everything that the message would have told. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. That is all. 

The Chairman. I overlooked one question. 

In regard to these cards, in your former testimony, I believe, before 
the naval inquiry, you either said that you did not know about the 
cards, or didn't remember them? 

Admiral Notes. 1 said I didn't remember. 

The Chairman. After you came back here, you testified, I believe, 
on the Pacific coast, after having been in the Pacific since 1942, you 
testified from memory and after you [1^779] got back to Wash- 
ington, you talked it over with Captain Safford, and you concluded 
that he was correct, and that you were mistaken in the first instance, 
and that there was a system of cards, is that true ? 

Admiral Notes. That is correct. 

The Chairman. That is all. 

Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, on the 6-7 of December, were you in 
civilian clothes? 

Admiral Notes. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was Admiral Hart in civilian clothes ? 

Admiral Notes. Admiral Hart? 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Stark. 

Admiral Notes. Admiral Stark? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Notes. I said right away, "yes." I may be wrong. I didn't 
think we put on uniforms until after the attack at Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Ferguson. You were all in civilian clothes? 

Admiral Notes. All the same way. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Stark, Admiral Ingersoll. Now, Ad- 
miral Little, was he in civilian clothes or in British uniform? 

[12780] Admiral Notes. Well, I think if we were, he was. I 
tliink the attache people in foreign stations wear the same rig we do. 

The Chairman. Inasmuch as Britain was at war, he might well ■ 
have been in uniform, and our naval officers in civilian clothes? 

Admiral Notes. That is true. Yes, you are probably correct, 
Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

The Chairman. If there are no further questions, thank you very 
much for your presence here. You are excused. 

(The witness was excused.) 

The Chairman. The committee will recess until 10 o'clock Monday 
morning. 

(^^Tiereupon, at 5 :35 p. m., February 16, 1946, the committee ad- 
journed, to reconvene at 10 a. m., on Monday morning, February 18, 
1946.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT -COMMITTEE 4793 



\_i278i-] PEAEL HAEBOE ATTACK 



MONDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF the Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington, D. C. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben 
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. 
Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee. 

\^12782'] The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in 
order. '' 

Does counsel desire to call his next witness ? Who does counsel de- 
sire to call as his next witness ? 

Mr. Richardson. The first thing I wish to call the committee's 
attention to, Mr. Chairman, is a letter I have just received from Mr. 
Farrington, the Representative from Hawaii, in which he states: 

I have received from Fred Ohrt, manager and chief engineer of the Board of 
Water Supply of Honolulu the accompanying map and memorandum showing the 
bombs which dropped in the city of Honolulu on December 7, 1941. 

I am calling this to your attention to ascertain whether or not you care to 
incorporate this information in the record of the Pearl Harbor proceedings 
I will, of course, be happy to have you do so if it is your wish, but in the event you 
feel it is not pertinent to this inquiry I trust you will return it to me for my 
records. 

He accompanies it with a statement with reference to the bomb 
damage done in Oahu at the time of the attack, together with a map 
of the area, showing on that map the points of bomb damage and con- 
tent. I present it in respect to the Delegate for the committee to 
determine whether it thinks that matter would be of any importance 
in our record. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, I at the moment, not having [12783] 
heard of it before, I rather doubt whether that would have any partic- 
ular place here. I would assume from what you say that it might 
be a question of damages sustained there that they might want some 
future consideration on, but that would not have anything to do with 
this inquiry. 

Senator Brewster. I think perhaps, Mr. Chairman, that it would 
have a bearing, of course, on the nature of the attack which we have, 
of course, gone into in some detail as to the attack on the ships and 

79716 — 46 — pt. 10 14 



4794 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the fields. I have never realized, as that indicated, that so many 
bombs hit on the city. I don't think anyone we have had before us 
has indicated it and I think it would be very valuable for historical 
purposes to have it in the record if it is not too extended. 

Mr. Richardson. The statement which is attached to it, Mr. Chair- 
man, is not controversial in any way. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, I did not assume there was any con- 
troversy about it, Mr. Richardson. It was just a question whether 
the committee feels that that type of material ought to be included 
in this inquiry, in this record. 

Senator Brewster. The bearing that it has is on the hazards which 
the Navy and other installations present. I had not realized that 
the bombs were scattered around that way. 

The Vice Chairman. Of course, I know Mr. Farrington very pleas- 
antly and any requests that he might present would certainly be 
worthy of the utmost consideration. I did not [J2784] get 
the impression from what he said that he w^as insistent on it one way 
or the other. 

Mr. Richardson. No, no. I am presenting it only because Mr. 
Farrington asked me to present it to the committee. 

The Vice Chairman. Did he specially emphasize that he thought 
it ought to be in the record here ? 

Mr. Richardson. No. He said: 

I am calling this to your attention to ascertain whether or not you care to In- 
corporate this information in the recoi-d of the Pearl Harbor proceedings. 

Senator Ferguson. I think, Mr. Chairman, that it ought to be 
made part of the record. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

Senator Brewster. I think it would be a good idea. 

The Vice Chairman. All right, without objection then it will be 
included in the record. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, may it be given an exhibit number? 

The Vice Chairman. All right, it will be given the proper exhibit 
number and received as an exhibit. 

(The document above referred to was marked "Exhibit No, 152.") 

The Vice Chairman. Anything further from counsel? 

Mr. Richardson. Now I would like to ask you to call Admiral, Mr., 
Senator Hart, whichever is correct. 

[1278o] The Vice Chairma^j. Admiral, Senator, Mr. Hart, 
please come forward. 

TESTIMONY OF SENATOR THOMAS CHARLES HART, FORMERLY 
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ASIATIC FLEET, UNITED STATES NAVY 

(Having been first duly sworn by the Vice Chairman.) 

The Vice Chairman. Counsel may proceed. 

Mr. Richardson. Admiral, will you state your full name for the 
reporter ? 

Senator Hart. Thomas Charles Hart. 

Mr. Richardson. You are now one of the Senators from the State 
of Connecticut? 

Senator Hart. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4795 

Mr. Richardson. How long did you serve in the Navy? 

Senator Hart. Nearly 52 years. 

Mr. Richardson. And what was your rank and assignment at the 
time you were retired? 

Senator Hart. I was a full admiral on the active list, was switched 
over to the retired list on the 1st of July 1942, but continued on active 
duty until the day before I came to the Senate. 

Mr. Richardson. During what period were you the commander in 
chief of the Asiatic Fleet? 

Senator Hart. From the latter part of July 1939 until the date of 
my transfer to the retired list; that was 3 years afterward. 

Mr. Richardson. You are the same Admiral Hart who conducted 
an examination of witnesses under the direction of the Secretary of 
the Navy pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, commenc- 
ing in February 1944 ? 

Senator Hart. Yes, I am that man but I do not know that the word 
"examination'' is quite correct. I was really recording testimony for 
the purposes of preservation. 

Mr. Richardson. And in your work in that connection witnesses 
did appear before you ^ 

Senator Hart. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. Were sworn and their sworn testimony taken 
down and recorded? 

Senator Hart. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. And among those witnesses, Admiral, was Cap- 
tain Safford? 

Senator Hart. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson, Now, Admiral, in Captain Safford's testimony 
which appears at page 10428, under examination by Senator Brewster, 
the following record was made which I will read to you : 

Senator Brewster. Captain, I want to speak about this Hart incident, which 
has come to my attention, and in that connection will read the testimony which 
you gave before the Army Board at pages 172, 173, and 174 : 

"Captain Safford. There is a possibility that [127S7] the original dis- 
tribution copy of that message is in existence in the Navy Department in the 
hands or in the safe of some high official, probably the Vice Chief of Na'val 
Operations if it is in existence, possibly the Secretary of the Navy. Admiral 
Hart made a statement to me which implied that he had sighted it and that I 
was not justified in the statement that all copies of the 'winds' message had been 
destroyed. 

"Major Clausen. In connection with the answer that you just gave to General 
Russell you stated that Admiral Hart informed you he had cited a distribution 
list. Do you recall that? 

"Captain Safford. No, sir. That he had sighted the actual "winds" message. 

"Major Clausen. That he had cited the mes.sage in a written report that he 
rendered? 

"Captain SAFFORiD. No, sir. He said to me, 'I have just come from the front 
office, and I have seen your "winds" message. Now, don't make statements that 
you can't verify.' This is of the time I came in to verify my testimony, so I 
withdrew from my testimony any statement to the effect relative then to other 
copies having been destroyed, because I didn't know where I stood then." 

U2788] That is the end of the quotation of the testimony. 

Now, do you recall the statement of Admiral Hart to you? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. That is substantially correct, as you testified? 

Captain Safford. It is substantially correct. 

Senator Brewster. And that was at the time you were going to verify your 
testimony before Admiral Hart when he cautioned you to be careful about any 



4796 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

statement that the winds message had been destroyed because you understood 
him to say he had seen a copy just before that? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir, immediately before that. 

Senator Brewster. That is all. 

Now, Admiral, do you recall having a conversation with Captain 
^Safford that has any relation to the incident detailed in that testimony ? 

Senator Hart. Yes. 

[1£789] Mr. EiCHARDSON. Will you tell the committee all you 
Know about the incident ? 

Senator Hart. In every case witnesses were allowed to verify testi- 
mony as a check on the correctness of the recording. Due to the lapse 
of time between the events that they were testifying to, and the dates 
that they were testifying, I was in the habit of allowing considerable 
latitude in that verification, and instructed them that I would before 
they began. 

it is a very severe tax on memory at best, and my object was to get 
the most accurate testimony I could obtain. 

Therefore all witness were told that after thinking over what they 
had given, if they noted errors of commission or omission that were 
of moment, and talked to me about it when they returned their testi- 
mony, I would make my decision as to what alterations could be made. 

Captain Safford came in as a part of the process. I found that he 
had made very extensive alterations, not so much in the way of changes 
in what he did state, but in additions to it. 

Now, as I recall, I pointed out quite a number of places where he 
was not stating simply what he knew, but what he had been told, and 
in certain places where he was, as of that date, making deductions and 
drawing conclusions. 

[127.90] May I have the testimony ? 

Mr. EicHARDSON. You mean your own record, or the testimony I 
just read ? 

Senator Hart. No ; my record. 

(The document was handed to Senator Hart.) 

Senator Hart. Captain Safford had very extensively expanded his 
answer to my question No. 18 that contained certain deductions and 
certain analyses on his part, which my conversation with him brought 
out were not made at the time, but were made subsequently. 

I think in the end I permitted him to leave his amended answer 
about as he had brought it in in this case, although I did think that 
he was taking considerably more latitude than the situation justified. 

Now, as I recall, in response to my invitation, or instruction, which 
was usual under Navy customs, to add additional facts which he 
might remember subsequent to his testimony and which would seem 
to be particularly pertinent, Captain Safford wrote a long reply, and 
I told him that so much of that reply was not a matter of stating 
facts, but was deductions on his part, and somewhat hearsay, that I 
did not think it was a correct answer and that it would be necesasry 
for him to revise it in the other direction. 

Now, it was in connection with that that Captain Safford's 
[W79l] testimony before the Army Court which you have just 
read, must have been given. 

To the best of my recollection he stated as a fact that one or all of 
the dispatches referring to the winds message had been removed from 
the files. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4797 

I pointed out that that was a very serious thing to say and that 
he ought not to say it unless he knew it to be a fact. 

[1,379£] I think I told him that in my entire naval career I 
had never known of any one instance where files had been falsified, 
and that he needed to be very sure before he made such a statement 
as that. 

I think I prefaced what I said about having seen something myself 
with the statement to him that when I first began this job of taking 
testimony, while I was planning the work, I spent some time in look- 
ing through the Navy's files to see how the pertinent material was 
stored — and incidentally, decided that I would simplify my own task 
by not doing other than referring to pertinent documents. 

So I told Captain Safford that I thought that I myself had sighted 
something in the files about the winds message, and the conversation 
on that point stopped right there. 

Now to complete the story, that same thing turned up during the 
Navy's Court of Inquiry on the subject and what had always seemed 
to me to be a matter of very little importance, as I still regard the 
entire winds code affair, was a point of issue in some respects, so I 
returned to that office to reconstruct what it was that I had seen, and 
found that I had not seen the file at alK because that particular file 
was not at that time even stored in the Na\^ Department Building. 
What I had seen was a compilation, rather a history, gotten out by 
some entirely nontechnical officer, [1279o^ to somewhat indi- 
cate to a layman's point of view wdiat the work of that unit had been. 
I ran over that rather hastily, and there was some reference to the 
winds code in it, and that was what I had seen.^ 

Now I did not, and I could not have made the definite statement to 
Captain Safford that I had seen in the official files any of those mes- 
sages, because I had not examined the files at the time, 

Mr. EiCHARDSON". Does that complete your statement. Admiral? 

Senator Hart. Well, that is all I have now. 

Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions of the Admiral. I 
called him on this one point of Senator Brewster's testimony. 

Senator Brewster. Just a minute. 

Mr. Richardson. I mean Senator Brewster's investigation. 

Senator Brewster. You mean inquiry. 

The Vice Chairman. Inquiry. I do not believe I have any ques- 
tions at this time of the Admiral. 

Senator George. 

Senator George. No, I have no questions. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Clark is next. He not being here. Sena- 
tor Lucas. 

Senator Lucas. Admiral Hart, or Senator Hart, as I [W794-] 
understood you to say in your statement to the committee, in the be- 
ginning this was more or less of a procedure for the purpose of preser- 
vation of testimony. Am I correct in that, or was it an actual investi- 
gation, or do you make a distinction between the two ? 

Senator Hart. As you state. Senator, it was a matter of recording 
testimony. My precept read : 

Certain members of the Naval forces who have knowledge pertinent to the 
foregoing matters are now or soon may be on dangerous assignments at great 
distances from the United States, and it is now deemed necessary, in order to 
prevent evidence being lost by death or unavoidable absence of those certain 

1 See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5477, for a letter from the Navy Department in this con- 
nection. 



4798 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

members of the Naval forces, that their testimony pertinent to the aforesaid 
Japanese attack be recorded and preserved. 

[12795] That was the gist of my instruction. 

Senator Lucas. Is that all of the original directive that you had? 

Senator Hart, No. 

Senator Lucas. I think perhaps at this point it probably all should 
go into the record. 

Senator Hart. That is not all. The rest of it contains various pre- 
liminary "whereas's" and instructions about what would be available 
to me. 

Senator Lucas. All right. I will withdraw that last request. 

Now, Senator Hart, with whom did you have a conversation before 
you started to gather this testimony in connection with the disaster at 
Pearl Harbor? 

Senator Hart. Will you repeat the first part of that question ? 

Senator Lucas. With whom did you confer before you started the 
gathering of this testimony in relation to the attack on Pearl Harbor? 

Senator Hart. No one, except the Navy Judge Advocate General. 
That had all to do with ways and means. No instructions about how I 
should do it from him. 

Senator Lucas. Now, an I understood your direct statement to the 
committee, after you interrogated a witness [12796] you would 
permit that witness to review his testimony before it was actually re- 
corded, in order to give him an opportunity to correct any statements 
that he might have made, or also you might give him the opportunity 
to add to anything that he had said previous to that time. 

Senator Hart. Yes, within the limitations which I stated in my 
answer to the counsel. 

Senator Lucas. I understand, and this examination of witnesses 
took place at what time ? Wliat year ? 

Senator Hart. The date of the precept was February 12, 1944, and 
the date of my submitting it to the Secretary as completed was ap- 
proximately June 30. The date of the last testinionv taken was June 
15,1944. 

Senator Lucas. And all the witnesses whom you examined at that 
time were members of the Navy, or members of the armed forces of 
this country ? 

Senator Hart. They were all Navy. 

Senator Lucas. They were all engaged at that time in the prosecu- 
tion of the war? 

Senator Hart. There may be an exception or two, but in general 
that is correct. 

Senator Lucas. You stated to the committee that it was a rather 
severe memory test of these men whom you examined in 1944, as to 
what actually happened at Pearl Harbor [12797] in early De- 
cember 1941. 

Senator Hart. I considered it so at the time, and I still do. 

Senator Lucas. What was true of the witnesses whom you examined 
would be true of all the witnesses who were examined in 1944, whether 
it was this inquiry or any other inquiry, I take it. 

As far as their memory is concerned, as far as the memory test is 
concerned, it would be difficult for any witness — if you found that to 
be true in the course of your inquiry, it would also be true in the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4799 

naval court of inquiry and it would be very difficult for any witness to 
remember exactly what transpired in those hectic days around De- 
cember 1941, isn't that true ? 

Senator Hart. I do not wish to agree or disagree with you, Sena- 
tor. You know that as well as I do. 

[12798'] Senator Lucas. Now, you stated to the committee that 
Captain SafFord made extensive alterations in his testimony. 

Will you explain to the committee just a little more in detail what 
3'ou mean by that ? 

Senator Hart. I don't think I am able to go into great detail. My 
statement was that his changes were largely additions rather than 
corrections. 

Senator Lucas. Well, in the first statement that he made to you, do 
you recall whether he went extensively into the winds message? 

Senator Hart. I don't recall, but I have an impression that there 
was nothing about it in his original testimony. I certainly didn't ask 
him anything about it. 

Senator Lucas. It is your recollection now, that in the original 
testimony suj^mitted to you, he said nothing to you about the winds 
message at all ? 

Senator Hart. That is my recollection, but I am most uncertain on 
the point. He might have. 

Senator Lucas. I think it is rather important to ascertain whether 
Captain Safford did say anything to you in his original testimony 
about this winds message. 

Counsel has suggested that this is the only compilation of testimony 
and that maybe you do not have any memorandum of what he first 
originally submitted to you. 

[12799] Mr. Richardson. Senator Hart, would you be able to 
tell from your official record there what was or what was not in the 
original reporter's statement of the testimony prior to his amend- 
ment or addition to it? 

Admiral Hart. No. That original. I am quite sure, was destroyed. 

Senator Lucas. As I understand you. Senator, it is your best recol- 
lection now that in the first memorandum submitted to you by Captain 
SafFord, there was nothing in it about the winds message? 

Senator Hart. By "memorandum" do you mean his first testi- 
mony? 

Senator Lucas. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Hart. That is what I said. 

Senator Lucas. Later on, when he made additional statements, 
when Captain Safford gave you additional testimony, then is when 
the winds message was cliscussed between you and Captain SafFord ? 

Senator Hart. That isn't what I said. Senator. 

I didn't say that he was giving additional testimony. I said that 
in the process of the verification of his testimony, he was allowed 
to correct errors of omission and commission. 

Senator Lucas. I stand corrected on that, sir. 

[12800] Now, as I understand it, you took some exceptions to 
Captain SafFord's lengthy statement, because it included a lot of 
hearsay testimony, and he drew his own conclusions and deductions 
about a number of things. 



4800 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Hart. I think I said "a certain amount." I didn't say 
"a lot." 

Senator Lucas. I said a number of things, or a certain amount. 
Whatever you said. Anyhow, he did have certain deductions and con- 
clusions to which you took some exception ? 

Senator Hart. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Now, in the conversation that you had with him 
about the winds message, as I recall, you stated that you told him that 
you thought you had probably seen some sort of a winds message when 
you made an examination of the files ? 

Senator Hart. Well, I suggest that you have the recorder read what 
I said. 

Senator Lucas. I don't want to misquote you. I am just trying to 
get exact information on that question. 

Senator Hart. I tried to give you a correct statement of the situ- 
ation. 

Senator Lucas. I think you did. 

Senator Hart. I would rather rest on that rather than have you 
interpret what I did say. 

[12801] Senator Lucas. I am not trying to interpret what you 
said, Senator. I am trying to get additional light on this winds mes- 
sage because of its tremendous importance. 

The newspapers of the country have told the people that you saw 
a message and that because of the conversation that you had with 
Captain Safford as brought out here in the examination by Senator 
Brewster the other day. 

Senator Hart. You say it is of tremendous importance. I think I 
said in my testimony that I considered it of very little importance. 

Senator Lucas. I agree. Senator, but certain people have made 
much ado about this so-called execute message. 

In the opinion of the Senator from Illinois, and I think you agree, 
there isn't very much to it, but certain people on this committee, and 
certain newspapers of the country have made much to-do about this 
winds message. 

Senaor Hart. All right, Senator, I will try to go along with it. 

Senator Lucas. That is the reason the Senator from Illinois is in- 
terrogating you further on it. 

In the final analysis, when you went back to the Navy Department, 
and you examined the files again to refresh your memory to see 
whether or not there was a so-called execute winds message, you found 
none ? 

[12802'] Senator Hart. I didn't look at the files. I simply re- 
turned, as I stated in my testimony, in order to see what it was that 
I had seen which caused me to carry on that conversation with Cap- 
tain Safford. 

I did not say that I had gone back and examined the files. 

Senator Lucas. You went back to examine the original file where 
you thought, at least you had discovered a so-called winds message 
of some kind? 

Senator Hart. Well, it wasn't a file, I didn't say it was a file. 

Senator Lucas. Whatever it was. You went back to see whether or 
not your memory was correct ? 

Senator Hart. Eight, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4801 

[12803] Senator Lucas. And when you got there you found that 
it was not what you thought it was ? 

Senator Hakt. I found that I had not seen the oflBcial file. 

Senator Lucas. Well, I am talking about a winds message. As I 
understand it, at least Captain Satford indicated in his testimony 
you had said. Senator, or he thought you said, at least, that you saw 
a winds message of some kind ; later on you went back to look at the 
place where you thought you had seen the so-called winds message, 
or whatever it was, and you discovered that it was, as I recall your 
testimony, a history that had been compiled by a nontechnical officer 
of some kind ? 

Senator Hart. That is what I said. 

Senator Lucas, And it didn't have any relation at all to the winds 
execute message or the original so-called pilot winds message? 

Senator Hakt. That is what I said. 

Senator Lucas. Did it have? 

Senator Hart. Did it have what? 

Senator Lucas. Did what you saw when you returned, what was 
in this nontechnical officer's file, did it have any relation to the so- 
called winds message and the winds execute message ? 

[12804-] Senator Hart. I didn't differentiate between the two 
parts at all. I simply saw that there was something about the winds 
code subject and I think that at the time, I am fairly sure that at 
the time, I didn't go any further than simply to note that there was 
something about it in there. 

Senator Lucas. You say there was something about it in there? 

Senator Hart. That is what I said. 

Senator Lucas. What was there about it ? 

Senator Hart. I don't remember. I don't remember any more than 
I have already told you. 

Senator Lucas. All right. I think that is all. 

The Vice Chairmax. Mr. Murphy would be next. Senator Brew- 
ster would be next. Mr. Gearhart, of California. 

Mr. Gearhart. No questions. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson, of Michigan, will inquire. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Hart, as I understand it, the purpose 
of your inquiry was to perpetuate the testimony. Had you been 
given the names of witnesses that you were to interview? 

Senator Hart. The purpose was to record and not to inquire. I 
was not given any names or any instructions whatever as to whom 
to include or exclude. It was all left [12805] to my discretion. 

Senator Ferguson. And I suppose the subject of the inquiry had 
been fully discussed with the Secretaiy of the Navy; is that correct? 

Senator Hart. No. I discussed it with no one, as I stated before, 
except the Judge Advocate General. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that Admiral Gatch? , 

Senator Hart. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What I am trying to get at is this: Did it 
include Washington as well as what took place in Hawaii? What 
took place in both places? 

Senator Hart. That was a subject, of course, of my own judgment 
and interpretation. And I carried out the instructions. I think, 
I am sure, that my first idea was to get on paper the evidence of those 



4802 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

people whom we might lose, and after a few days of taking testimony 
of men in Washington I went out into the field, out into the Pacific, 
to get that testimony, and the general sequence was that I first exam- 
ined those who were outside of Washington when the war began rather 
than those who were here. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you make any inquiry in the Secretary of 
State's office to obtain facts ? 

Senator Hart. Certainly not. I was not authorized to. 

Senator Ferguson. And I assume the same answer applies 
[1£S06] to the Executive Office, the White House ? 

Senator Hart. Yes; and also to the War Department. 

Senator Ferguson. The War Department. Did you interview Ad- 
miral Stark? 
- Senator Hart. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Ingersoll? 

Senator Hart. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. At the time that you were in command of the 
Asiatic Fleet, commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, on about the 
6th you sent a message to Washington. It is Exhibit 40. It says : 

Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three 
or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you. 

This is from CINCAF to OPNAV, which would be from you to 
Admiral Stark. 

Do you recall the sending of that message or having it sent? 

Senator Hart. Mr. Chairman, Senator Ferguson now throws back 
2 years further, over 4 years, and during this intervening time I have 
had no time for any thoughts on the events of those days at all. I 
wish to be helpful to the committee but in order to give what I myself 
would consider the best testimony I need some time to throw everything 
out [12807] of my mind and think over those days. My mem- 
ory is cold. By putting my thoughts back to those days, as would be 
assisted by what documents there are, I could warm my memory up. 
But if the committee wishes to go into my own participation in those 
days I would like a certain amount of time to prepare. 

Now, possibly I can answer this question of Senator Ferguson's 
forthwith. 

Senator FergX'Son. I will have quite a number along the same line. 
If you do want to use the documents to refresh your memory I would 
ask the committee to give you some time and to have you return as a 
later witness. 

The Chairman. We might see how many of them he can answer 
now and determine that later. The committee would want the admiral 
to be given every opportunity to refresh his recollection. 

Senator Ferguson. It would take considerable time. I think we 
would get along faster if the admiral had some time to refresh his 
memory on it, not only this but a longer message tliat was sent and 
the reply that was sent back. 

Senator Hart. I can give a fair answer to this specific question, 
Mr. Chairman, but if it does go much further I think I would like to 
have some time, and I would [13808] also like to have with 
me one or two members of my staff during those days, whom I think 
are available and who could help me in remembering, and I might be 
more specific with their aid. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4803 

Now, as regards this one, the copy seems rather incomplete, but I 
gather from the reference number that it was on the 7th of December. 
On that supposition I can answer. 

At about that time, the early days of December, I did receive a dis- 
patch from Capt. John Creighton, who was stationed in Singapore 
subject directly to the direct orders of the Navy Department, but over 
whom I had a certain amount of authority, and the substance of the 
message was as follows: That he, Creighton, had learned from Air 
Marshal Brooke Popham that the latter had been advised from London 
that in certain eventualities, which I cannot recall, they, the British, 
had been assured of our armed support. I think this dispatch of mine 
was entirely founded upon that one from Captain Creighton. At 
about that same time I was in conference with the new British com- 
mander in chief. Admiral Tom Phillips, who had just arrived on the 
station, but I do not recall that he said anything to me whatever on 
that subject, but he may have. 

Senator Ferguson. The 7th would be your 6th, which was the 7th 
in the Philippines ? 

[W809] Senator Hart. No. The 7th would be our 8th. 

Senator Ferguson. Eighth. 

Senator Hart. Yes. But, of course, this is 

Senator Ferguson. This was sent on your 7th, which was our 6th? 

Senator Hart. Your 6th. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Senator Hart. But this is Greenwich time and the date on the 
face of this, I don't think it is too reliable. In stating the date and 
hour I would rather see the original. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, it was prior to the attack at Hawaii? 

Senator Hart. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, can you recall what the eventualities were, 
that we were to give armed support? 

Senator Hart. I said I did not recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have officers here that are familiar with 
that conversation so that you could refresh your memory on that? 

Senator Hart. I didn't say it was a conversation. I said it was a 
dispatch from Captain Creighton at Singapore. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you know where we might locate that 
dispatch ? Would it come later to the office here in the Navy ? 

[12810] Senator Hart. You mean the dispatch from Captain 
Creighton ? 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. 

Senator Hart. No. My files were lost and the only source that 
you would have would be Captain Creighton himself. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you surprised at an attack on Hawaii 
on Sunday ? 

Senator Hart. You have two parts to your question. Senator. I 
was in no way surprised at the date. I was surprised at the attack, 
a part of the attack fell on Hawaii. 

Senator Ferguson. You had been alerted in the Philippines, had you 
not? 

Senator Hart. Well, I had alerted myself for a good many months 
and weeks. 



4804 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[12811] Senator FERGUSoisr. You had access to magic in the 
Philippines ? 

Senator Hart. I had a unit there which spent a certain amount of 
its time on the Japanese diplomatic code, if that is what you meail by 
"magic." 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I have in mind. And you were 
familiar, I assume, with the 13 parts of the message — did you receive 
that? 

Senator Hart. No; I don't recall receiving it. I may have, but I 
don't recall it. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the 'Japanese were sending 
reconnaissance planes over the Philippines prior to the attack at 
Pearl Harbor? 

Senator Hart. I don't recall having heard that that was the case. 

Senator Ferguson. Was your fleet attacked at the same time as 
the airports, Clark Field, in the Philippines ? 

Senator Hart. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Was the attack before or after the airfields 
had been attacked? 

Senator Hart. The first attack in the Philippines occurred at 
daybreak on Monday morning. That would be about 2 hours after 
the exact hour of the beginning of the attack on Pearl Harbor. That 
attack was made on a small [12812] air reconnaissance unit 
which was stationed in the Gulf of Davao in the southeast portion 
of the Philippines. The attack was by air, but there was an attempted 
attack on the part of four Japanese destroyers which was evaded. 

Senator Ferguson. Where was your fleet located at the time of 
the attack at Pearl Harbor? 

Senator Hart. Well, it was located in its deployment positions. 

Senator Ferguson. What was that position? 

Senator Hart. There wasn't any one position. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have instructions or any information 
as to what the United States would do, as far as your fleet was con- 
cerned, or any other fleet in case of an attack upon the British and/or 
the Dutch, and not upon American possessions? 

Senator Hart. Throwing back to this dispatch which you brought 
in. Senator, I said, "Have received no corresponding instructions 
from you." 

Senator Ferguson. You sent a longer dispatch, did you not, signed 
by you and by Phillips — page 5125 of our record? 

I will ask for the original, if it can be produced, to refresh the 
Senator's anemory. Page 5125 of our record, up to page 5127. 

I would like to have you see the record. 

[12S13] (The record was handed to Senator Hart.) 

Senator Hart. Mr. Chairman, I haven't seen or thought of this 
message since the day it was sent, and I have a very scant recollection 
of what is in it. I can read it, and perhaps go on, but possibly not. 

The Chairman. You might read it now, and see what you think 
of it. If you don't feel you are qualified to answer specifically with- 
out further research, the committee will be glad to give you that time. 

Senator Hart. Mr. Chairman, this pertains to a subject in which 
my chief of staff. Rear Admiral Parnell, was always the negotiator 
on my part, except on this one particular occasion. He was present 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4805 

through this entire interview with Admiral Phillips, and I think that 
his testimony on this, and all the rest of that series of the so-called 
A. D. B. agreements, if the committee wishes to go into it, would be 
much better than mine. 

The Chairman. What is the date of that message? 

Senator Ferguson. It is prior to the attack. It is on the Tth. Our 
reply was drawn up prior to the attack, but not sent out until after. 

Senator Hart. This dispatch which Senator Ferguson has brought 
up was drafted on Saturday afternoon, the attack on the Philippines 
beginning on Monday morning, Philippine [^1281J^] time Mon- 
day morning, and it was the culmination of about a day and a half 
of conference, the British and our Navy with General MacArthur's 
representation part of the time. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, I noticed, in the second paragraph you 
say this : 

In the early stages of a war with Japan occurring at the present time, the 
initiative must inevitably rest with the Japanese. 

Now, the bombs did not start to drop until Monday morning, and 
this language was used Saturday. Was that because you knew of 
the fleet going to the Kra Peninsula, and you knew it meant war? 

Senator Hart. No ; we did not know that when that was drawn up 
that the Japanese expedition had left Camranh Bay. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn of that, that it had 
left Camranh Bay for the Kra Peninsula? 

Senator Hart. About 5 or 6 hours after this dispatch was sent. 

[13815] Senator Ferguson. How is it that you used this lan- 
guage then, "War with Japan occurring at the present time"? 

Senator Hart. I don't know; that may be paraphrased. It doesn't 
look like very good language, but that whole paragraph simply says 
what everybody knew, that we were not going to start the war and if 
it was started that the Japanese would start it. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have such instructions about overt acts 
from Washington ? 

Senator Hart. I don't know whether the word "overt" ever ap- 
peared in any of my instructions, but I certainly didn't need any 
instructions to keep me from starting a war. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you see the war-warning message person- 
ally? 

Senator Hart. Oh, yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And you were alerted to war prior to that time, 
that was the 27th, I think you said, for months you were alerted ? 

Senator Hart. Well, Senator, there is always a degree of alert. 
Yes. We were close to the enemy. The Japanese forces were in For- 
mosa, Hainan, over in Indochina, a few hundred miles away. So 
naturally we were alerted in various degrees for some time before 
tliat. But the actual, there was no actual time when we said, "Well, 
today we don't have [13816] to worry," and "Now we do." 
It was a shading all the way along there and I don't think that I 
could give you a date as to when we were alerted. I suppose it might 
be made out that when the war began I was not fully alerted because 
I had a fuel ship or two in Manila Bay. 



4806 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Then, would this be a fair statement, that you, 
because of the tenseness of the situation, you were in effect waiting 
for the attack which you anticipated from Japan? 

Senator Hart. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. And when you learned that the fleet left Cam- 
ranh Bay about 6 hours after you sent this message you knew then 
there was going to be an attack or you anticipated an attack upon 
the Kra Peninsula ? 

Senator Hart. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Where did you anticipate that attack ? 

Senator Hart. That force might have gone up into Thailand. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. So you didn't know exactly where that 
one was going ? 

Senator Hart. No, 

Senator Ferguson. Was Admiral Phillips in Manila when that was 
drawn up ? I notice his name is purported to be signed to it. 

[I28J7] Senator Hart. That was drawn up in conference be- 
tween Admiral Phillips and me. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for the fact that a British 
admiral — your conference was in Manila, was it not? 

Senator Hart. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And how do you account for the fact, can you 
explain the fact, that the British admiral also sent this message to 
us here in Washington ? 

Senator Hart. That was a joint message that went to the Navy 
Department and to the Admiralty in London. 

Senator Ferguson. I notice there is used in the fourth paragraph 
this language : 

We are agreed that it is of great importance to prevent any Japanese move- 
ment through the Malay Barrier. 

What did you have in mind there; will you explain that on the 
record ? 

Senator Hart. I take it that you wish me to define the Malay 
Barrier? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Why it was important to America to 
prevent any Japanese movement through there. I would like to have 
the record show what you had in mind on that. 

Senator Hart. The Malay Barrier is a name that was given to a 
land from Singapore through the southernmost islands [W818] 
of the N. E. I. to the northwest coast of Australia, say Darwin. It 
has passages through, the most of which are rather narrow, and from 
the naval strategic standpoint it is a defense land, and the best de- 
fense land that there was. 

Senator Ferguson. Did it include the Malay Peninsula ? 

Senator Hart. No. I said it came from Singapore, which is the 
island south of the Malay Peninsula, 

Senator Ferguson. So it didn't include a part where the fleet could 
have gone, the fleet that left Camranh Bay ? 

Senator Hart. The fleet couldn't go across the Malay Peninsula. 

Senator Ferguson. That is sure. That is certain. But it didn't 
include that territory, did it? I am trying to analyze this message, 
because the fleet was not moving in this direction toward the Malay 
Barrier as you defined it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4807 

Now, did you have another movement in mind ? 

Senator Hart. I don't agree that it wasn't moving toward the 
Malay Barrier. Any movement that it made to the southward was 
toward the Malay Barrier. Any movement that it made to the south- 
ward was toward that barrier. 

Senator Ferguson. Did our airplanes make reconnaissance so that 
you knew from the time the fleet left about 6 hours after you had 
sent this message — so we kept track of where that fleet was going? 

Senator Hart. No ; my planes didn't see them leave Camranh 
112819] Bay and did not follow them at all. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you get information from the British as 
to the movement of that fleet ? 

Senator Hart. That was where the information came from, which 
was the first we knew that they left Camranh Bay, was the dispatch 
originated by a British plane. It was the northeast monsoon season. 
That whole area is filled with rain squalls. And on the occasion of the 
last reconnaissance made by my own planes, everything seemed to 
have been shut in so they saw nothing and I do not know to this day 
whether the Japanese expedition was still there on that occasion or 
whether it had departed. 

Senator Ferguson. The information that you received from the 
British, did you send that on to Washington? 

Senator Hart. The best evidence for that would lie in the files. I 
feel that I must have, but I don't recall having written the dispatch. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall a message dated the 2d of Decem- 
ber 1941, page 39 of Exhibit 37 : 

President directs tliat ttie following be done as soon as possible and within 
two days if possible after receipt of this dispatch. Charter three small vessels 
to form a "defensive information patrol". 

Then you were to equip three small vessels to make them [^12820] 
men-of-war. I wish you would look at that message. 

Senator Hart. Yes ; I recall the dispatch. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it carried out? 

Senator Hart. No. Time did not serve. One ship was — the Isabel 
was dispatched in consequence of this instruction and was nearing 
her station when the Japanese attack occurred. The second one to 
be( made ready was on the point of sailing and the third was not 
yet ready. 

Senator Ferguson. So the Isabel had been equipped, or was 
equipped at the time, and you sent her on the mission, the other one 
was just about ready to sail, and the third not ? 

Senator Hart. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us where the Isabel was to be 
stationed ? 

Senator Hart. She was the one that was to be off Camranh Bay. 

Senator Ferguson. She had not taken her station or had not ob- 
tained information that she could send about this fleet movement, is 
that correct, until after the attack? 

Senator Hart. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you give us the purpose, if you know, that 
was to be served by these three small men-of-war ? That was more for 
patrol of what was going on in the Gulf of Siam, was it not, than what 
would be going on in the [12821] Philippines? 



4808 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Hart. I know nothing, Senator, that is not contained in 
the dispatch. I wouldn't say that your analysis was quite correct. 

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would correct me. 

Senator Hart. The Gulf of Siam is quite a distance around the 
corner; it is south and west, and the coast of the Philippines is 600 
miles east. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you give instructions to the Isabel as 
to what they were to do, what they were to patrol ? 

Senator Hart. Yes ; based on this dispatch. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us what that was ? 

Senator Hart. I don't remember the wording of the dispatch and I 
can't give you anything better than that, that whatever instructions 
she had were in conformity with this dispatch. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, going back to a question that I had asked 
you previously on Exhibit 40, I am trying to get information on the 
question of if you had received any instructions as to what would or 
should be done in case of an attack upon the British and not upon any 
of our possessions. This message says : 

Learn from Singapore we have assured British armed [12822} support 
under three or four eventualities. 

Now, you have told us that you didn't remember those eventualities, 
but your message, signed by you and Admiral Phillips, as I read it, 
indicates that we were to do certain things, and I find nowhere in it 
that they were based upon the fact that first an attack had to be made 
upon the American possessions. 

I am trying to find out if you had any information either from the 
British or from America as to what we were supposed to do if there 
was an attack upon the British and not upon the American possessions. 

Senator Hart. You mean did I have? You said "We." Did you 
mean "me"? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Senator Hart. No. Again the same answer that I gave the Depart- 
ment. "I have received no instructions." 

\^12823'\ Senator Ferguson. So you were at that time seeking 
information as to what we intended to do because you had the informa- 
tion from the British ; is that correct ? 

Senator Hart. No, no; I don't think so. Will you repeat the 
question ? 

(The question was read by the reporter.) 

Senator Ferguson. When I use the word "we" I mean the country 
here, the Government here in Washington. The British had told you, 
as I understand it, that there were eventualities that we were to give 
them armed support. 

Senator Hart'. Well, you don't understand it correctly. I had not 
been told that by the British. 

Senator Ferguson. You learned from Singapore. Was that an 
American that gave you that information ? 

Senator Hart. I have told you two or three times. Senator, it came 
from Capt. J. Creighton, United States Navy 

Senator Ferguson. Did he tell you where he- 



Senator Hart. Who said that Brooke-Popham had told him. 
Senator Ferguson. So the information from Brooke-Popham was 
the British, was it not ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4809 

Senator Hart. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Or the Dutch ? 

Senator Hart. British. 

Senator Ferguson. British. So the information did come 
[12824.] from the British, isn't that correct, even though it was 
hearsay ? 

Senator Hart. The information to whom? 

Senator Ferguson. To the captain that gave you the message. 

Senator Hart. Yes, yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did this armed support include an at- 
tack upon the British or the Dutch, that one of the eventualities was 
an attack upon the British or the Dutch ? 

Senator Hart. I have told you that I do not remember what those 
eventualities were. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think that by some study with other of- 
ficers you can get those eventualities? 

Senator Hart. I think the best man to remember it would be what I 
said before, Captain Creighton himself. He did not have as many 
things on his mind as the rest of us had and he perhaps would re- 
member it quite accurately. 

Senator Ferguson. Dicl Creighton place in his message to you what 
the eventualities were or did he use the same kind of an expression, the 
conclusion being three or four eventualities, or did he describe them 
so that when we call him we can find out what the eventualities were? 

Senator Hart. I don't remember well enough to say. 

Senator Ferguson. You don't remember that ? 

[12825'] Senator Hart. No. I think Captain Creighton would 
be your best source of information. 

"Senator Ferguson. He would be the best source of information on 
that. 

Now, on December -Ith — it shows from the Army Top Secret, 
from Captain Safford, that on the 4th of December, from OPNAV to 
commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, under serial No. 042018 : 

Communications room should now be stripped of all secret and confidential 
books and papers which in the hands of an enemy would be a disadvantage to 
the United States, retaining for essential purposes the minimum number of cryp- 
tographic channels at your discretion. Report those retained. 

General Frank asked the question : 

Did this go to the Asiatic? 

Captain Satfoed. Those went. 

General Frank. Did information copies of that go to the Pacific Fleet? 

Captain Safford. No, that also did not go to the Pacific Fleet. 

I read that, indicating that it went to you, as far as Safford was con- 
cerned, and I would like to show you that and ask you if you remem- 
ber that message ? 

[12826] Senator Hart. No ; I don't remember that dispatch, and 
from its nature I think it is most inilikely that I would have been 
shown it. It was a matter of rather a small detail to come to me 
about. 

Senator Ferguson. Who would the officer be that would receive that 
kind of a message to the Communications? 

Senator Hart. My intelligence officer would have had the most 
direct cognizance of it. He is Capt. Redfield Mason. Also the 

79716— 46— pt. 10 15 



4810 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

officer who was in charge of that unit on Corregidor, and his name is 
Leitwiler; L-e-i-t-w-i-1-e-r, I think it is. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, that kind of a message, Admiral, would 
indicate that at Washington they thought war was near as far as your 
fleet was concerned, would it not ? 

Senator Hart. No ; I think that is a message which deals with activi- 
ties on a rather minor scale, on lower levels in the Navy Department 
and in my own command, and that no particular inference was to be 
■drawn from it. It was rather a follow-up of the higher level instruc- 
tions that had already been sent out, a matter of carrying out of cer- 
tain detail. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any discussion with the High 
Commissioner in the Philippines in relation to the coming attack or 
coming war ? 

Senator Hart. Oh, yes; we used to talk about it all [12837'] 
through the last 3 or 4 mouths preceding the war. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he indicate that he had received a message 
from the President and that he was to take a matter up with you in 
relation to the attack or the war? 

Senator Hart. There was a dispatch which was transmitted over 
Navy radio from the President to the High Commissioner, and it was 
approximately current with the war warning. Is that the one you 
mean. Senator ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Your name was not mentioned in it. 
General MacArthur — as I recall the message — was mentioned in it, 
but I wondered whether or not he had taken it up with you also. 

Senator Hart. Oh, I no doubt saw it before the High Commissioner 
did himself, because it came over my radio, my system. I think I sent 
it over to him with my own aide. * 

Senator Ferguson. Did that mean in your opinion that war was 
imminent ? 

Senator Hart. Nothing additional to what we already had. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to show you another exhibit and ask you 
about it — or it is in the transcript — a penciled memo which had noth- 
ing to do with that. 

Senator Hart. Yes, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. You are familiar with that message? 

Senator Hart. Well, I hadn't thought of it for four and [12828] 
a half years. I had forgotten all about it. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, does it refresh your memory ? 

Senator Hart. Somewhat. 

Senator Ferguson. You were asked to do some scouting with air- 
planes ; and you, as I recall the instructions, were to avoid the appear- 
ance of attacking. Will you explain how that could be done and 
what you did in relation to that order? 

Senator Hart. Well, we began doing it rather before we got the 
order. Senator, and Admiral Hart stuck his neck out considerably in 
doing it, too. We felt that we had to — that the time had arrived when 
we had to take a certain number of chances, which in air scouting 
would be a minimum, because we were concerned in order to find out 
what was going on along the Indochina coast and as far as Hainan, to 
say nothing about Formosa. 

I started it myself personally and personally instructed the pilots 
who were going in on the coast that they were not to get into combat; 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4811 

and even if they returned having seen nothing, that would be a whole 
lot better than if they brought on a collision in the air. Being avi- 
ators, I know how they would interpret most anything that I told them 
and that I was taking changes. However, it would not have been an 
overt act. The air is free, and we had just as much right to be using 
it along the Indochina coast as the Japanese had. Still, [li^8^9] 
they were to be as careful about it as possible. 

It happened that conditions were such that the very first morning 
they went out they did see the Japanese expedition in Camranh Bay, 
and I think we had been flying for about 2 days before I had any 
instruction from the Navy Department, and in the meantime one of 
our planes and a Jap plane or two had been looking each other over at 
short range in the air, so I was decidedly relieved when I got 

Senator Ferguson. The message from Washington? 

Senator Hart (continuing). The message from Washington. 

Senator Ferguson. Did Washington notify you that the Japs were 
complaining that one of your planes had gone over Formosa ? 

Senator Hart. I don't recall any incident of that sort. It most 
likely would have been an Army B-17. 

Senator Ferguson. Rather than one of your own ? 

Senator Hart. Rather than Navy, because the Army B-lT's had 
finally volunteered to take one rather narrow sector which covered 
Formosa. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, we have some evidence here of a 
message — or not a message — indicating that in the morning previous, 
3 mornings or 4 mornings previous to the attack, there had been a 
scouting plane or a Japanese [ISSW] plane flying over the 
Philippines or Clark Field, Did you have that information ? 

Senator Hart. I don't recall it now, and I don't think I was told 
that. 

Senator Ferguson. There isn't any doubt that you were fully alerted 
to war, and that was true even prior to the warning message f 

Senator Hart. I tried to express a little while ago. Senator, that it 
would not be possible, even in the future I don't think, and it is not 
possible now, to say that at this time we became fully alerted and 
before that we were not. Our degree of alertness had been growing 
for several weeks before the war warning dispatch was received. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, there wasn't any doubt as far as the 
Philippines were concerned that you anticipated for a considerable 
time that there would be war between the United States and Japan and 
it was only a question as to when it would start? 

Senator Hart. Well, if I had been getting up a bet on the subject, 
Senator, I would have given tremendous odds, but I would have felt 
that I would have liked to have a chance on earning a dollar or two 
in risking my one thousand. We were never absolutely certain, of 
course. 

Senator Ferguson. But did vou think it was a thousand [l^SSl] 
to two ? 

Senator Hart. I never got up a bet. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not. Well, it was very certain, was 
it not, in your mind ? 

Senator Hart. Well, again, Senator, in the effort to warm up a cold 
memory and go back 4 years. I think the simplest way to state my 
estimate of the situation as of those days would be this : 



4812 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Japanese, of course, sought to attain their ends without getting 
into any more extended war, and no doubt we were the hist nation 
that they wished to take on in case they did extend. They had to go 
to the NEI to get oih That was a "must" in their situation. The 
question then resolved to this : Did they dare go into the NEI in force, 
running into British opposition perhaps as well as Dutch, certainly 
Dutch, and leave the Philippines on their flank while they stuck their 
necks out fifteen hundred miles farther south ? My own estimate was 
that they would not leave us on their flank, and make the venture. 
Consequently, that they would attack. 

Senator Ferguson. That answers my question. Now, did you know 
Admiral Helf rich ? 

Senator Hart. I became acquainted with him after the war began. 

Senator Fp:rgusox. Did you communicate with him at any 
[1£833] time after the war began or have someone communicate 
with him in relation to your fleet getting in ? 

Senator Hart. There, Mr, Chairman, I suggest that you bring in 
Admiral Purnell, who, as I stated before, was the conferee in all of 
that and who can give you much better testimony. I had no com- 
munications with Admiral Helfrich, no direct communication, and 
the only business that went on between the two commands were either 
of a minor nature or, if on a higher plane, were a subject of conference 
with Admiral Purnell. 

Senator Fergusox. Well, Senator, we have had considerable testi- 
mony on the meaning of "deploy" as far as the fleet was concerned. I 
wish that you would give us your opinion of what it meant by deploy- 
ing your fleet, which you have indicated that you did this morning. 
You have stated that you had your fleet deployed at the time. 

Senator Hart. Senator, are you bringing in the language of the war 
warning dispatch ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Senator Hart. Then I think you should say a "defensive deploy- 
ment." 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Senator Hart. Is that what you mean ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; if you will tell us about that. [1£83S] 
I wanted first the word "deployed^" but the words used were "defensive 
deployment." 

Senator Hart. I think the easiest way is to indicate what the Asiatic 
Fleet did in carrying out that directive. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I would like to know, what you 
understood it to mean and what you did in compliance with it. 

Senator Hart. The Asiatic Fleet had to await attack. It could not 
attack. So, manifestly, the measure was to so dispose ourselves that 
when the attack came it would inflict as little damage as was pos- 
sible; and under the circumstances that obtained out there, the only 
way to do that was following the principle of dispersal and conceal- 
ment. That is what we did. 

The submarines, in which lay the main power of the Asiatic Fleet— 
their concealment is inherent in the type. The surface ships were dis- 
persed and disposed in a southerly direction, where they were farthest 
away from what would have to be the points from which the Japanese 
would jump off, and that was about all there was to it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4813 

Well, I could go on and say that following that we sent all the cruis- 
ers, including the Boise^ which arrived on the 4th of December and 
which I did not permit to return, and three-fourths of the destroyers 
well south, and a part ll2S3.!i^ of them even in down to the 
Borneo oil ports. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, did that defensive deployment — was it 
done in any way to protect the base — your base ? 

Senator Hart. You mean Manila Bay ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; or the base where your fleet had been sta- 
tioned? 

Senator Hart. Certainly not, as regards the surface ships. 

Senator Ferguson. And you would not so construe the words "de- 
fensive deployment" — that they were to be used for the purpose of de- 
fending the base ? 

Senator Hart. I do not think — I think your qu^estion is theoretical 
rather than practical, if you can permit me that observation, Senator. 
From the theoretical standpoint, I think you are quite correct — that 
bases are for the purpose of fleets, and it is always a wrong conception 
to tie a fleet to a base in order to protect it; but, at the same time, since 
no one ever knows enough, if there is anyhing hat the Navy can do 
while not violating theoretical conceptions to assist the other force, 
particularly the Army, in defending bases, why, that is the thing to 
do; and insofar as the Philippines were concerned, that was what we 
did. We so disposed the submarines as to be in good defensive posi- 
tions, and the main power of defense that lay in the Asiatic [1283-5] 
Fleet was confined to the submarines. 

Senator Ferguson, Those submarines were a defense from surface 
ships, were they not, of the enemy ? 

Senator H^l^rt. You mean warships? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; as far as protection of the bases is con- 
cerned. 

Senator Hart. That, or invading expeditions with transports and 
supply ships. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you at any time anticipate that the 
Japanese Fleet or shijDs that were in Camranh Bay were intended for 
an attack upon the Philippines ? 

Senator Hart. Repeat that question. 

(The question was read by the reporter.) 

Senator Hart. I am not sure what you mean by "anticipate," Sen- 
ator. I think I can only answer you to the effect that I saw the possi- 
bility that they would. 

Senator Ferguson. It had never reached the stage, though, of prob- 
ability? 

Senator Hart. I don't think that I can warm up to the point of 
differentiating between probability and possibili'ty back in those days. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, your Asiatic Fleet, as you have ex- 
plained, was certainly not intended as an offensive fleet, and had you 
had trouble getting ships for your fleet or [12836] equipment 
for your fleet that you did have ? 

Senator Hart. You mean had I been having trouble in getting rein- 
forcements ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 



4814 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Hart. Or ships and equipment for the fleet I had? De- 
tails and equipment for the fleet I had ? 

Senator Ferguson. Both reinforcements and details of equipment. 

Senator Hart. Oh, yes, yes; plenty of trouble. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you very anxious to obtain more vessels, 
more ships. I will say ? 

Senator Hart. Yes; I think I had the common failing of all com- 
manders in chief. You always want more. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, was that just because you felt, and sin- 
cerely felt, that you needed them for the purpose of defending even 
those that you did have, helping with the defense ? 

Senator Hart. Well, as you express it. Senator, it would not be my 
conception of the way to do, get some ships to defend some others, but 
perhaps I can answer you this way ; I think I know what you mean. 

I don't think that at any time during the months leading up to the 
war I felt like persistently urging upon the Navy Department' that I 
be reinforced with surface ships. The reason was that unless that 
reinforcement was great I would not be in a markedly stronger posi- 
tion. Shall I go on? 

\128r37] Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hart. The only urging of that sort that I did was to give 
me more modern shi])S, because the cruisers and destroyers that I had 
were the weakest and the slow^est that we had in the Navy. 

A small, fast force of very high quality could have been used under 
those conditions, whereas my cruisers and destroyers, which were both 
weaker and slower than the Japanese, did not give us much to work 
with. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you tell us just how many hojirs after the 
attack at Pearl Harbor the first attack on our Navy wa^pnade, as far 
as vour fleet was concerned. i— 

I^enator H'rt. T liave already testified to that in the instance of 
Davao Bay, Davao Gulf. 

Senator Ferguson. It was then 2 hours — I will let you tell that. 

Senator Hart. I said it was at daybreak that morning. It was 
about, in point of time, an hour or two after the attack 'began ,on 
Pearl HarlDor. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know, in time, how long that attack was, 
either before or after in relation to the attack upon the airfield in the 
Philippines? I am trying to get this time down. We have had some 
difficulty with this time. 

Senator Hart. Well, the attack at Balalak on my [l^SSS] 
unit in the Gulf of Davao was a little before 6 a. m. 

The first Japanese air attack on Luzon was on Bagio, as I recall, 
about 10 : 30, and the heavy, very damaging, attack upon the Army's 
airfields, as I recall, was at about 12 : 30. 

Now, those hours are as I pull them out of memory, and there is 
much better evidence. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I assume — and do I assume correctly — 
that as soon as the attack came upon your part of the fleet, which was 
the first attack, that there was notice given both to the Navy head- 
quarters at Manila and also notice given to the Army, so that every- 
one was warned there had been an attack upon the Philippines? 

Senator Hart. That would be a natural assumption. Senator, but I 
fear that was not right, because the only unit that took that attack, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4815 

that could transmit the news of it, was the destroyer, and she was so 
exceedingly busy the next 2 hours in evading the four Japanese de- 
stroyers that, as I recall, she did not get the message in, and we did 
not hear about that until, oh, I would guess 9 o'clock. 

After that, no doubt, it was immediately sent to the Army. 

Senator Ferguson. And you were in Manila at that time? 

Senator Hart. Yes, sir, 

[12839] Senator Ferguson. That is all I have. 

The Chairman. Mr. Keefe. 

Admiral, do you want to go and answer that roll call ? We do not 
pay very much attention to roll calls here in the committee. 

Senator Hart. I would like to do anything to get me out of this 
seat, but I will continue. 

The Chairman. Mr. Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. I shall be very brief. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Keefe. Admiral, the entire Hart report is in evidence before 
this committee. 

Senator Hart. What report? 

Mr. Keefe. The evidence taken by you. 

Senator Hart. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Under the direction or precej^t of February 12, 1944. 

Senator Hart. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, in accordance with the directions which were 
given to you by the Secretary of the Navy, Knox, you did, in fact, 
examine the witnesses, did you not? 

Senator Hart. Well, as it appears on the record, subject to the 
modifications in the testimony concerning which I have already tes- 
tified, all questions and answers [1£S40] appear in the testi- 
mony. 

Mr. Keefe. Exactly. But I gained the impression from your tes- 
timony today that this was an effort on the part of the Navy to pre- 
serve the testimony, and that it was in the nature of taking state- 
ments rather than the examinaion of witnesses. 

Senator Hart. Well, the witnesses were under oath. 

Mr. Keefe. They were, in fact, questioned, were they not ? 

Senator Hart. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. Questions were submitted to them to answer? 

Senator Hart. Questions were asked them. 

Mr. Keefe. Questions were asked them, we will put it that way, 

I note also in this directive, it specifically set forth : 

In view of the fact that Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, 
was on 7 December 1941, serving on active duty as the Commander in Chief, 
U. S. Pacitic Fleet, with the rank of Admiral, U. S. Navy, and therefore has an 
interest in the matter into which this examination is being made, you will notify 
him of the times and places of the meetings to be had and that he has the right 
to be present, to have counsel, to introduce, examine, and cross [12841] 
examine witnesses, to introduce matter pertinent to the examination and td 
testify or declare in his own behalf at his own request. 

That right was extended to Admiral Kimmel, was it not, during the 
course of your examination ^ 

Senator Hart. Of course, I carried out the directive of the precept. 

Mr. Keefe. Was Admiral Kimmel represented at any of these hear- 
ines? 



4816 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Hart. None of them. 

Mr. Keefe. He did not appear at any of these hearings ? 

Senator Hart. No. 

Mr. Keefe. Was he notified of the hearings ? 

Senator Hart. You will find attached to the record, which you say 
is before the committee, certain letters on the subject which I think 
fully explain it, although he did not appear, we continued to send him 
notices of the meetings for, oh, I would guess, the first seven or eight 
sessions, and after that I believe my assistant told me that he had 
heard indirectly from Admiral Kimmel that we need not inform him 
any longer. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, I note according to this record, that you did exam- 
ine Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of the Office of Naval Intelli- 
gence, Admiral Turner, Director of [12842] War Plans. That 
is right ; is it not ? 

Senator Hart. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. Admiral Schuirmann, Director of Central Division of 
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations ? 

Senator Hart. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. And Admiral Ingersoll, as Assistant Chief of Naval 
Operations ? 

Senator Hart. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. And Captain McEea, aide to the Chief of Naval Oper- 
ations ? 

Senator Hart. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Captain Wellborn, assistant aide to the Chief of Naval 
Operations ? 

Senator Hart. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. But you did not examine Admiral Stark. That is the 
thing that impressed me, and I wondered if there was any reason 
for it. 

Senator Hart. Well, for one reason he was very busy in London 
carrying on the war. I decided not to make a trip to London. 

After I had examined Admiral Ingersoll, I felt perhaps I should 
have gone to London and examined Admiral Stark, but I decided 
not to. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, as a member of this committee, it [IBS^S] 
rather impressed me when all of the high ranking officers in connec- 
tion with the Office of Chief of Naval Operations had their testimony 
preserved through your interrogation, that the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions, who was the responsible head of that department, was not exam- 
ined, and the only reason for it was because, as you state, he was then 
in London, and busy, as commander in chief of the European Fleet, 
and you did not see fit to go there to preserve his testimony for that 
reason. 

Senator Hart. Yes, Mr. Keefe. I think you may well be quite right 
in criticizing me for not having done it. I felt that I had met the 
requirements of my precept, with the exception of the two witnesses 
whom I mentioned in the end. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, of course, Senator, I am not asking you questions 
with any desire to be critical. 

Senator Hart. That is all right. 

Mr. Keefe. I want this record to be clear. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4817 

Senator Hart. That is all right. 

Mr. Keefe. It impressed me that the most important testimony that 
should be preserved, that there was any reason for preserving, should 
be the testimony of the Chief of Naval Operations, and his testimony 
was not preserved as the result of the precept which was issued to you 
by the [12844] Secretary of the Navy, and I would like to have 
that explained, as to why it was not. 

Now, the Court of Inquiry set up by the Navy Department followed 
your examination ; did it not? 

Senator Hart. Yes. 

Mr. Keefe. So as to get the chronological record, so that we will 
have it in this record at this point, my record indicates that your inves- 
tigation began on February 12, 1944, and ended on June 14, 1944. 

Are those dates correct ? 

Senator Hart. Whatever is shown in the report which I submitted. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, I would like to have the dates established in our 
record here now, if it is not too difficult to ascertain it. 

Mr. RiCHARDSox. He has already testified to it specifically. 

Senator Hart. I think I have given that a couple of times. The 
first testimony was under date of February 22 and the last date is 
June 15. It states the examination is then finished. 

Mr. Keefe. My record indicates that the first hearing of the Naval 
Court of Inquiry was on July 31, 1944, which is about a month after 
you had concluded your investigation, [12845] and that the 
first witness called, a month after you had concluded your investiga- 
tion, the first witness called by the Naval Court of Inquiry was 
Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations. 

Did you know that ? 

Senator Hart. Yes, sir. 

I might also add that I was not authorized to call Admiral Stark 
to testify, but, of course, the Court of Inquiry was. That was a much 
higher level instrument than I was. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, when Admiral Stark first appeared before the 
Naval Court of Inquiry, did j'ou appear before that court as his 
counsel ? 

Senator Hart. No. 

Mr. Keefe. Or one of his counsel ? 

Senator Hart. No. Admiral Stark was called back, and was made 
an interested party, and at the same time it was entirely apparent that 
he could not be present throughout the proceedings and would have 
to return to London to carry on the war. 

He called me by long distance phone in Chicago, and set forth the 
dilemma, that he, of course, would like to stand on his rights and 
insist on being present throughout the proceedings of the court of 
inquiry, but the exigencies [12846] of the war and his duties 
in connection therewith were such that he could not conscientiously do 
that, and he thought if I would consent that some arrangement might 
be made under which I could act as his counsel, and do my best toward 
representing him. 

I tried to get him to do much better than that, to get a lawyer, but he 
could not get one whom he Avished to turn it over to. 

Mr. K^efe. Did you attend the naval court of inquiry proceedings? 

Senator Hart. Yes. 



4818 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. KJEEFE. You appeared before the naval court of inquiry as his 
counsel ? 

Senator Hart. Yes. 

Mr, Keefe. Did you have an assistant counsel in the person of 
Admiral Ingersoll? 

Senator Hart. I think Admiral Ingersoll was in there as counsel 
before the court before I got back to town, just filling in, and was there 
for one or two sessions of the court, when he returned to his duties as 
commander of all the forces in the Atlantic. 

Mr. Keefe. Then at least after you got back to Washington you 
assumed the responsibility of representing Admiral Stark as his counsel 
before the naval court of inquiry ? 

[M847] Senator Hart. That is putting it rather extremely, but 
I will go along with that ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, if there is anything extreme about it — all I want 
is the facts. Senator, that is all. 

Senator Hart. I do not know what you are leading up to, so possibly 
I will come back to that. 

Mr. Keefe. I am not leading up to anything. 

Senator Hart. I set forth the situation under which I was before 
the court. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. I am very frank to state to you the reason for my 
asking these questions is because my attention was challenged by the 
fact that you, in your investigation, had failed to examine Admiral 
Stark. A month after you had completed your examination, the naval 
court of inquiry is set up, Admiral Stark is brought here from London 
and is the first witness, and that in the proceedings before the naval 
court of inquiry you then appeared as counsel for Admiral Stark. 

Senator Hart. And what is the inference ? 

Mr. Keefe. I just wondered whether there is any question that ought 
to be explained in reference to that situation. 

Senator Hart. I think you have an inference there, do you not? 
You may as well state it. 

[12848] Mr. Keefe. I am not the witness on the stand. 

I am asking you if there isn't any or if there is. I would be glad 
to have you state it. 

Senator Hart. No; I have stated my position, and expressed my 
reluctance to assume the position of representing Admiral Stark. 

Mr. Keefe. Very well. 

Senator Hart. There happened to be a war on at the time, other- 
wise I certainly would not have done it. 

Mr. Keefe. Very well. 

Thank you, sir. 

The Chairman. Is that all ? 

Mr. Keefe. Thaf is all. 

[12849] The Chairman. Admiral, I would like to ask you one 
or two questions. I was absent when you began your testimony. 

I would like to ask you with reference to this dispatch you received 
from Captain Creighton from Singapore, in which he told you that 
he had been informed by this British naval officer— whether he named 
him or not is not material — that he had received information from 
London that in certain eventualities, maybe three or four, assistance 
would be given. Do you know whether that had any relationship to 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4819 

the conference that took place, I thii\k in Singapore, previous to that 
between American, British, and Dutch military and naval officers 
in which a plan was worked out and agreed to there to do certain 
things under certain eventualities, but which was never approved by 
the President? 

You are familiar with that, aren't you ? 

Senator Hart. Dimly so, Senator. I think not. I think the last 
conference at Singapore had terminated some weeks before. I do not 
think there was any connection. 

The Chairman. Well, the evidence here is that these representa- 
tives of these different (jovernments did meet there and they worked 
out there a tentative plan based upon certain assumptions, that that 
plan was never agreed to, never was approved by the President and 
never went into effect. I wondered if it could have any relationship 
to [l^SSO] this information that Captain Creighton had re- 
ceived from the British officer who said he had gotten it from London. 

You do not think it had any relationship? 

Senator Hart. I would not think so. Senator, because all that plan- 
ning was staff planning, with the idea, "Well if we do become allies 
in a war this is what we will do," but with no commitments whatever. 

The Chairman. You do not know from wdiat sources the British 
officer in Singapore received that information, or how reliable it was, 
I presume, or what it was based on ? 

Senator Hart. No. 

The Chairman. When you received it you sent a dispatch here in 
which you said you had gotten this information, but that you had 
received no — what did you call it? — no corresponding instructions 
from the Navy Department or from Washington, and you never did 
after that receive any in reply to that message. 

Senator Hart. I do not think I ever had any reply. No ; I am sure 
I never had any reply to that message. 

The Chairman. So you had no instructions or no information from 
Washington with reference to any naval assistance? 

Senator Hart. No. 

The Chairman. That anybody had promised ? 

[12851] Senator Hart. I had nothing at the time, as I stated 
in my dispatch, and I got no reply. 

The Chairman. Now, Admiral, you got the dispatch from the Navy 
that was sent out on the 24th of November in which they said that 
the Japanese attack from any direction, or in any direction, might 
be expected. 

Senator Hart. Yes. 

The Chairman. You got the one on the 27th also which started out 
by saying this was a war warning? 

Senator Hart. Yes. 

The Chairman. You got that ? 

Senator Hart. Yes. 

The Chairman. You also got a dispatch from the Navy that the 
Japanese were burning their codes, which was sent out, I believe, 
December 3 or 4. You got that ? 

Senator Hart. Yes. 

The Chairman. I will ask you this question, and if you do not feel 
you can properly answer it, why, I will leave that up to you. 



4820 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

You described awhile ago your method of deployment. It is a 
sort of scatterment of your ships, if I can use such a word, so they 
would not be subject to a concentrated attack; in the first place, 
to conceal them, or to get them as far away from the jumping-off 
place of an attack as possible. [128-52] In the case of subma- 
rines it is easier to conceal them because concealment is inherent in 
their construction largely. 

Now, assuming that the same information you got went to Pearl 
Harbor with respect to the attack from any direction, with respect 
to tlie war warning, with respect to the burning of the codes, and with 
instructions to execute an appropriate defensive deployment of the 
ships preparatory for such possible attack, do you think that the con- 
centration of a fleet, any fleet, such as the one that was concentrated 
in Pearl Harlwr, would be interpreted or regarded as an appropriate 
defensive deployment of those ships ? 

Senator Hart. Senator, you, I think, should have included in your 
question also what was expected of the Pacific Fleet in case a war 
broke out, iji a way of offensive movements and readiness to carry 
them out. 

The Chairman. Probably so. 

Senator Hart. Now, even so, I doubt, despite all the information 
that I have read and heard concerning the Pearl Harbor incident, 
that I can properly put myself in the position of the commander in 
chief who was there and give a useful opinion on what was the best 
thing to do. 

The Chairman. I will not press you on that. I will ask you this : 
Whether, from the information that you have about what was done 
there with the ships that were in Pearl [12853] Harbor, and 
from the testimony that has been adduced in all of these hearings as 
to where they were located, was it the sort of deployment that you 
executed in the control of your fleet ? 

Senator Hart. No ; it was not. 

The Chairman. Now I will ask you this: You spoke awhile ago 
about no naval commander ever having all that he wanted. At that 
time we were engaged in a two-ocean war and we did not at that time 
have a two-ocean fleet or Navy, did we? 

Senator Hart. No. 

The Chairman. So that those who were in control on the war strat- 
egy had to decide the relative importance of shifting ships from one 
ocean to another, and not having enough ships for the two oceans 
simultaneously to match the Japanese Navy and German submarine 
menace and Italian, and others, that were being carried on in the 
Atlantic. You, I suppose, recognized that the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
of the countries at war had to determine how much of the Navy in the 
Pacific might be needed in the Atlantic, or how much of the Navy in 
the Atlantic could be shifted into the Pacific without weakening either 
one out of proportion to its importance; that is true, isn't it? 

Senator Hart. I do not know whether you are correct [12854-] 
in mentioning the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I am not sure that it was set 
up at the time. 

The Chairman. Let us limit it to our own Naval Department. 

Senator Hart. They naturally were the ones who were carrying the 
responsibility. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4821 

The Chairman. Yes. Wliat I understood you to say awhile ago 
was that while no naval commander ever had all he wanted, you do 
not mean by that to convey the impression to the committee that those 
who were charged with the primary responsibility of deciding where 
the Navy should be, or what proportion should be at any one place, 
were acting without due judgment in deciding that matter as they did^ 

Senator Hart. That is correct. The question of the correctness of 
the judgment is another matter. 

The Chair3Ian. Yes. Of course, that is always a question that 
enters into every human act and all human conduct, is the question of 
judgment, and when we get into that realm we get into a difficult field. 
I do not think I want to ask any other questions. 

Senator Lucas. I would like to ask one question. 

Senator Hart. I might say. Senator, while I never particularly 
pressed the Department for additional forces, I think I did make 
known, in an unofficial way, my total [12S55] disagreement in 
not keeping almost all of our force in the Pacific waters during those 
times, but at the same time I know I did not have very good knowledge 
of what the requirements and responsibilities were in the Atlantic. 

The Chair3ian. Yes. 

Senator Lucas. 

Senator Lucas. Senator Hart, do you recall from whom you first 
learned about the attack on Clark Field at 12 : 30 on the afternoon of 
December 7, or whenever it was ? 

Senator Hart. Someone of my staff officers came in and told me. 

Senator Lucas. Did you ever have a talk with General MacArthur 
about the destruction of those planes on Clark Field thereafter ? 

Senator Hart. Only on that afternoon, when he told me what had 
happened. 

Senator Lucas. Will you give to the committee the substance of that 
conversation, please? 

Senator Hart. The substance was that the Japanese had made a 
highly efficient attack, displayed excellent ability in the air, and told 
me about what he had lost and about what he had left. The respective 
figures I no longer remember. 

Senator Lucas. Did he give you at that time any [W856] in- 
formation as to why the planes were on the ground ? 

Senator Hart. No. 

Senator Lucas. Do you recall how many he said he lost at that 
time? 

Senator Hart. No. I said I did not remember. 

Senator Lucas. There are no records that I can find here in the War 
Department as to the number of planes that were lost at Clark Field, 
and that is one of the reasons I am asking you about it. 

Senator Hart. I would not know. 

Senator Lucas. That is all. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. You have indicated to one of the chairman's 
questions 

Mr. Richardson. I have some questions that I would like to ask him, 
so you might adjourn to the afternoon. 

The Chairman. It is now 12 : 30. We might as well go over. 



4822 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral, you will be back at 1 : 30, please. 

Senator Hart. Mr. Chairman, I repeat what I told you a little 
while ago, that I have been doing my best to be helpful here to the com- 
mittee, but if there is going to be much more questioning I suggest 
that I be given some [1^28571 time to get better prepared. 

The Chairman. I imagine there will not be but a few more questions, 
Senator. I hate to bring you back, but we do have to recess. The 
time has arrived. 

(Whereupon, at 12 : 30 p. m., the committee recessed until 1 : 30 p. m. 
of the same day.) 

[12858^ AFTERNOON SESSION 1 : 30 P. M. 

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order. Sen- 
ator, will you please come forward and take the stand? Senator 
Ferguson will inquire. 

TESTIMONY OF SENATOR THOMAS CHARLES HART (Resumed) 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Hart, I show you the memorandum 
which you wrote at the time that you learned that there had been an 
attack upon America and ask you to read it into the record. I think 
that should be read into the record. 

Mr. Richardson. You might give the circumstances at the time 
when you wrote it. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; if you will just relate under what circum- 
stances you wrote it. 

Senator Hart. This is a photostat copy of a scrap of paper in 
my hand which was written at 4 a. m. sitting on my bed in Manila 
just after we had received the dispatch which was sent out from 
Pearl Harbor to the effect that there was an air raid on Pearl Harbor 
and that it was no drill. 

I made sure from the staff officer who brought it over to me from 
my command post about 200 yards away that it was authentic and did 
emanate from someone who was on the official key in Pearl Harbor 
and then wrote this dispatch to send to all my forces : 

Priority dispatch : Japan started hostilities. [12859] Govern yourselves 
accox'dingly. 

That was all they had to go on until they got official word from 
Washington that the war was on. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I show you another exhibit, which is the 
one, as I understand it, you received from Washington. Is that 
correct ? 

Senator Hart. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And will you read that into the record and, 
if you can, tell us when as commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet 
you received that one. 

Senator Hart. This also is photostat copy of the working copy of 
the dispatch. I might say that these two scraps of paper were picked 
up by one of my men when we were abandoning that command post 
and were carried by him throughout his 31/2 years of captivity and 
finally got to me. I returned them to him to keep for his own purposes. 
The dispatch says : 

Execute WPL-46 against Japan. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4823 

That was the war plan which was in effect. It was issued by the . 
Secretary of the Navy and went to the entire Navy. The hour at 
which it was sent seems to be 1930 Greenwich time on December 7. 
It was received in my communication office 15 minutes afterward. 

Senator Ferguson. That is 5 hours earher in Washing- [12860] 

ton? 

Senator Hart. In Washington time this would mean 2 : 30 p. m., on 
the 7th of December when it was sent. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And 15 minutes later it was received? 

Senator Hart. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to ask you a few questions about the fact 
that you have now stated that your fleet was not deployed as the one 
at Pearl Harbor. I notice in this dispatch of the 27th it is this way : 

Execute a preparatory defensive deployment preparatory to cari-ying out the 
tasks assigned in WPL-46. 

Now, your task and the commander in chief at Pearl Harbor's task 
under WPL— 46 were different, were they not? 

Senator Hart. In detail; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. He had certain tasks to carry out against the 
Marshalls, did he not, under WPL-46 ? I have a copy if you want 
to look at it. I have turned up the page on one of your tasks if you 
will just look at that. 

Senator Hart. That is correct, Senator. His first task, either given 
to him in the Navy Department's war plan or following that written 
into his own contributory plan was a raid on the Japanese mandate 
islands. 

Senator Ferguson. Could that account for the fact that [12861] 
one man, if he had one plan to carry out, would deploy his ships in 
one way, whereas if he had another plan to carry out he might deploy 
them in another way? 

Senator Hart. Well, the war plan was not in effect until the dis- 
patch was sent which I have just read into the record. Up to that 
time it was simply a plan, but it did require something to put it into 
effect. 

Now, the dispatch that you mentioned of November 27 said, "pre- 
paratory to carrying out the plan." 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Senator Hart. In the meantime, as I read that dispatch, from any- 
body's standpoint, deployment should be defensive. 

Senator Ferguson. Defensive alone or preparatory to carrying out 
this task? 

Senator Hart. It is pretty difficult to figure just where you are 
going to draw the line and that is the difficulty that any commander 
in chief is always under such circumstances. 

Senator Ferguson. In reading the language that is sent to him. 

Senator Hart. In knowing how to act. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, in knowing how to act and understand- 
ing it. 

Senator Hart. There is no fault with the language at [12862] 
all but on the conditions that face you. 

Senator Ferguson. I understand then from this language you are 
not attempting to say how Admiral Kimmel should have deployed his 
fleet preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46. 



4824 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Hart. No. I told Senator Barkley in the preceding ses- 
sion that as to what it might mean that it was difficult to give an 
opinion on that point. 

Senator Ferguson. And the fact that you carried this out in a 
way different than Admiral Kimmel carried his task out is not to be 
considered a criticism of his method of doing it under this message? 

Senator Hart. Not at all. There was a vast difference of geogra- 
phy between the two commands. Japan was over 3,000 miles away 
from Pearl Harbor and very much less than that from where the 
Asiatic Fleet was. 

Senator Ferguson. There is one thing, and this is only for the 
purpose of trying to locate the instrument that you were speaking of, 
will you describe a little more on the record the so-called historical 
paper or historical instrument that you looked at in relation to the 
winds message, that we may be able to locate that if possible ? 

Senator Hart. I think that Admiral Redman probably knows 
what that is better than I and will know what it means [12863] 
if he reads my testimony. It obviousl}^ was produced primarily with 
a view to at some later date being able to show the rest of the Navy 
what that unit had been engaged in, what it had been trained for, 
and what it had accomplished. 

Senator Ferguson. I assume, then, it had been made out after the 
attack, that paper? 

Senator Hart. Oh, yes. I do not recall, but I rather think it was 
probably produced about January or February 1942. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, would you just tell us what office it was 
in when you saw it, which may help us locate it? 

Senator Hart. Office of Naval Communications, and it was given 
me by Admiral Redman.^ 

Senator Ferguson. And, Admiral, you made no report and was not 
supposed to make a report on 3'our work that you did in getting this 
testnnony in the, as we call it in this hearing, the Hart report or 
the Hart hearing? 

Senator Hart. No; no findings of fact or opinion were required of 
me, and it would have been going way out of my field to have volun- 
teered any. It was simply what the precept says it is. It was record- 
ing testimony that was being forgotten, and worse yet, was being lost 
on account of men dying. 

I might further say that I did not turn it in as by any means a 
complete job. A complete job, of course, would have required me to 
put Admiral Kimmel on the stand as well as [12864] Admiral 
Stark, who was mentioned this morning by Mr. Keefe, and various 
other subordinates who were important. 

At the end of the report I advised the Secretary only as regards 
two witnesses, the names were McCollum and Kramer, whom I had 
not examined but pointed out that I thought they did have very pert- 
inent testimony and I probably might well have gone back to the 
Pacific, chased them to Australia and then to the Solomons, in order 
to get the testimony, but I decided to close it down at that point. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, you started this in 1944. Did the 
Secretary of tlie Navy state to you why he was doing this that many 
years after the happening of the event, as to wha|; his purpose in 
getting his testimony was ? 

^ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5477 et se(|. for a letter from the Navy Department. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4825 

Senator Hart. No; I don't think Secretary Knox ever said any- 
thing whatever to me about that. All of my dealings were with 
Admiral Gatch ; quite a little of it is persuading me that I ought to 
be willing to take on the task, and while that was going on I think 
Admiral Gatch said that Admiral Kimmel himself had pointed out 
that situation, that testimony was being forgotten and lost and that 
something ought to be done. 

Senator Feegusox. So as I understand it, then, the Navy did not 
close the matter just because the President had appointed a commission 
and that conmiission had made a report; [1^865] that Admiral 
Gatch desired that the Navy itself perpetuate this testimony? 

Senator Hart. You refer to the Roberts Commission, Senator ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Senator Hart. I doubt if there was any relationship there. If there 
was, I did not know of it and it is my impression that I was put on this 
job because there was a feeling on the part of — a considerable feeling 
that better records ought to be made and that Admiral Kimmel was 
one of the leaders in setting that forth. 

Senator Fergusox. That is all I have. 

The Vice CnAiRiNrAN. Any further questions? 

Mr. RicrtARDSON. Yes; I have a question. 

The Vice Chairmax. Counsel will inquire. 

Mr. Richardson. Admiral, might I ask you to turn your attention 
to the dispatcli of November 24? Would you care to offer any state- 
ment. Admiral, as to what meaning the words, "aggressive movement 
in any direction,'- meant to you? In other words, is the language as 
broacl as it seems or did the words "aggressive movement in anj^ di- 
rection" confine itself to any particular theater in your mind? 

Senator Hart. Well, there are six addressees to this dispatch. 

[12S66] Mr. Richardsox. That is right. 

Senator Hart. The two commanders in chief afloat and the com- 
manders of four different naval districts, including the one in the 
Canal Zone, and in specific answer to your question I would read it 
now as I read it then : They may strike in any direction and partic- 
ularly watch out in the Philippines and at Guam. 

Mr. Richardson. But there can be no place where you have indi- 
cated the dispatch went that would not have to bear the burden of 
interpreting that language as it applied to them ? 

Senator Hart. Oh, I think that is always the case when a dispatch 
is written to multiple addressees scattered over as large a portion of 
the world as this one was scattered. 

[13S67] Mr. Richardson. Now, if you will turn to the dispatch 
of the 27th, would you care to indicate. Admiral, what meaning you 
gave to the phrase, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning" ? 

Did that differentiate this dispatch from other dispatches, or was 
there anything in your mind that was significant in the use of those 
terms ? 

Senator Hart. Well, absolutely. Insofar as I was concerned, the 
dispatch might have ended right there, "This dispatch is to be con- 
sidered a war warning." 

Mr. Richardsox. Did you regard the subsequent matters in that 
dispatch in any extent qualifying or minimizing the language in the 
first nine words ? 

79716 — 46— pt. 10 16 



4826 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Hart. Well, it certainly did not from where I sat, 

Mr. Richardson. Now, at the end of the dispatch, what significance 
woiilcl the phrase "Spenavo inform British" have ? "What would that 
mean to you ? 

Senator Hart. I am not sure that I knew at the time who Spenavo 
was. I think he was a liaison man, a naval officer in London. It 
meant nothing to me. 

Mr, EiCHARDSON. The inference you got was that the nature of this 
dispatch and the purport would come to the knowledge of the British 
in that way ? 

[12S68] Senator Hart. Yes, but not through me. 

Mr. Richardson. That is right. I realize' that. 

"Spenavo" would identify someone in London who would advise 
the British? 

Senator Hart. Yes. It is addressed to him for information. 

Mr. Richardson. That is right. 

Now, Admiral, did you observe, following the attack at Pearl 
Harbor, that there was any change in the amount of ships, and mili- 
tary supplies that were brought into the Pacific area ? 

Senator Hart. Did you say after the attack ? 

Mr. Richardson. I will repeat that. • 

You testified this morning that you asked for and desired additional 
ships and additional military supplies. You spoke of the fact that 
commanders are always doing that. 

I am asking you whether there was any change in the getting of 
supplies and equipment and ships into the Pacific after Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Hart. Certainly not in my area, because it could not be 
done, and I do not know anything about the rest of the area. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, one question further. 

You spoke about the Japanese having to take into con- [^12869'\ 
sideration the presence of your fleet on their flank, if they proceeded 
to go down to the Malay barrier. 

Would you, as a skilled naval commander have regarded the Pacific 
Fleet which was based on Pearl Harbor as also presenting any flank 
threat to a Japanese aggressive move ? 

Senator Hart. Eventually, when they were able to get there. 

Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions. 

Senator Hart. From Pearl Harbor, the radius over which they 
could deliver their power did not reach to the Philippines. 

Mr. Richardson. I will ask you one other thing further. 

Would the duty, imposed by a desire for readiness to move under a 
proper order, under War Plan 46, have required a commander to make 
the preparation and conditioning of his fleet his first objective, to get 
it ready to execute such an order when it should come at the sacrifice 
of defensive deployment in the meantime ? 

Senator Hart. Well, it is a matter of being between the devil and 
the deep blue sea. It is an occasion where you have to use 3^our judg- 
ment and make the right guess, and it does take a certain amount of 
guessing. A commander could easily make the mistake of taking him- 
self so far afield that the offensive which the Government has a right 
to expect of its forces, would be too slow in being brought to \^12870'\ 
play. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4827 

On the other hand, if he does not guard himself against an attack 
sufficiently, he is making another mistake. 

Mr. KicHARDSON. Do you recognize, as a skilled naval expert, any 
difference in the priority status between a future aggressive movement 
of the fleet and the protection or the safety of the fleet before that 
movement ? 

Is one prior to the other in importance ? 

Senator Hart. Any general statement either way, would be no good. 
Some men err, some commanders err on the side of caution and others 
err on the other side. 

Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster will inquire. 

Senator Brewster. I apologize for not having been here this morn- 
ing, and what I have in mind may have been covered, so I shall not try 
to 'duplicate. 

As I think I have said to you privately, I did hear from Admiral 
Helfrich of a message which, as I understood it, you sent to him prior 
to Pearl Harbor dealing with the possibility of moving some parts 
of your fleet down there. 

I am not clear as to what the state of the record is regarding that. 

Senator Hart. Xo, I was not asked that. 

[12871] I communicated with Admiral Helfrich only infor- 
mally. 

Under peacetime regulations naval ships cannot be sent into foreign 
ports without a process of getting permission and authority via the 
State Department. 

Well, of course, I was not going to do that, so I sent the ships down 
to these oil ports ostensibly to get fuel — and, incidentally, they did 
get some — and had word conveyed over to Admiral Helfrich infor- 
mally what I was doing, and I apprehended that those ships would 
have a great deal of difficulty in getting any fuel and might be there 
some days, and please not to raise any row about it. 

[12S72] Senator Brewster. That was some time prior to 
December 7? 

Senator Hart. About 10 days. 

Senator Brewster. That indicated some concern you felt at that 
time regarding the security of your ships ? 

Senator Hart. Well, that was the primary reason for sending them 
down there. 

Senator Brewster. Those ships did remain down there ? 

Senator Hart. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. It was thought it would not have been helpful 
to bring them back to the Philippines to join you ? 

Senator Hart. You mean after the war broke ? 

Senator Breavster. Yes. 

Senator Hart. Well, tlieir first task was guarding the escape of 
about 200,000 tons of allied merchant craft which fled into Manila 
Harbor and which we got out and to safety. As I stated this morn- 
ing. Senator, those destroyers and cruisers were both weaker and 
slower than the Jap opposite numbers, and that, coupled with the 
superiority in the air which the Japanese obtained within 2 or 3 days, 



4828 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

metint that they did not have much chance to accomplish anything if 
they had returned, so I never did bring them back. 

Senator Brewster. That is alL 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, the last answer has [12873'] 
brought up a question that was not fully covered, as I recall. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Hart, you made the statement this 
morning, as I recall it, in relation to the transfer of the ships from 
the Pacific to the Atlantic, in relation to your private opinion, or at 
least your opinion possibly not through direct navy channels that you 
had an opinion on the matter. 

Would you explain vrhat you did, or what your opinion was ? 

Senator Hart. I answered to this effect in reply to a question by 
Senator Barkley, that I, sitting out where I was, rather naturally 
perhaps, could not see any good reason for having much of our naval 
power in the Atlantic because of our situation in the Pacific, but that 
I acknowledged freely that I was not faced with the over-all re- 
sponsibility and did not know the situation which confronted our 
highest levels of command as well as they knew it themselves. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, were you of the opinion that the Pacific 
Fleet was sufficient, as it was constituted on the 7th of December, to 
carry out the war plan against Japan ? 

Senator Hart. Yes; I thought that they had power [1£874] 
enough to make a raid into the Japanese Mandated Islands. 

Senator Ferguson. They were not sufficient to go further than the 
Mandated Islands, as constituted? 

Senator Hart. No. The logistic considerations would have pre- 
vented their reaching much further than the eastern edge of the 
Mandated Islands. 

Senator Ferguson. That, of course, would not have been true if 
we had had our entire fleet in the Pacific? 

Senator Hart. Well, the entire fleet, including all of the logistic 
power that we had, would have been another thing. But just the 
combat ships 

Senator Ferguson. No; I mean all of the trains, and all. 

Senator Hart. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. That we would have been able to secure. 

Senator Hart. I do not know how far we would be able to^go. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator, the raid you spoke of into the man- 
dated islands, is that what was provided under the war plans? 

Senator Hart. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. We thank you for your appearance 
[1287S] and the information you have given the committee, and 
your apparent desire to be helpful to us in every way. You are now 
excused. 

Senator Hart. Thank you, sir. 

(Senator Hart was excused.) 

The Vice Chairman. Will counsel please call the next witness? 

Senator Ferguson. May I ask counsel if they can locate the report 
and histoiy that has been talked about so the committee might see it? 

Mr. Masten. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4829 

Mr. RicHAKDSoisr, We will call Captain Layton. 

The Vice Chairman. Is Captain Layton the next witness, Counsel? 

Mr. RicHARDSOx. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. Will Captain Layton please come forward. 

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. EDWIN THOMAS LAYTON, UNITED STATES 

NAVY 

(Having been first duly sworn by the Vice Chairman.) 

Mr. EicHARDSox. Will you please state your full name to the 
committee ? 

Captain Laytox. Edwin Thomas Layton. 

The Vice Chairman. You are a captain in the United States 
[12876] Navy? 

Captain Laytox. Captain, United States Navy; yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardsox. How lone have you been in the Navj^? 

Captain Laytox. I entered the Naval Academy in 1920. I grad- 
uated therefrom in 1924. I have served continuously ever since. 

Mr. RicHARDSOx'. What is your present assignment? 

Captain Laytox. Fleet intelligence officer and combat intelligence 
officer. United States Pacific Fleet. 

Mr. Richardsox*. What was your assignment at the time of the 
attack on Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Laytox*. Fleet intelligence officer. United States Pacific 
Fleet. 

Mr. Richardsox. Will you give to the committee in some detail 
as to what your duties were at the time of the attack on Pearl Har- 
bor, what duties you were performing in Hawaii ^ 

Captain Laytox, I will read from the staff instructions to the staff 
of the commander in chief. United States Pacific Fleet, issued July 14, 
1941, and in effect the day of the attack. The instructions I will read 
are those laid out for the duty of the fleet intelligence officer and his 
assistants [reading] : 

Paragraph 214. Intelligence Officer. 

[12877} A. Directs assembly of enemy information and evaluate the same; 
disseminating to the various members of staff, indicating where action is re- 
quired. 

B. Provides operation officer and war plans officer information essential for 
current estimates; monograph material. 

C Maintain section 2 sub-paragraph A, B, C, D, E, F and G of the estimate of 
situation, enemy forces ; maintains location plot of Fleets of possibly enemy or 
Allies. 

D. Directs counter-espionage and counter-information. 

E. Maintains intelligence records. (See the Naval Intelligence Manual.) 
P. Prepares Fleet intelligence bulletins. 

G. Evaluates intelligence information received of procedures or processes of 
other navies, and prepares detinite recommendation as to any action to be taken 
within our own Fleet. 

H. In charge of censorship. 

I. Internal security of ships. 

J. Sui)ervises reconaissance photographic activities. 

215. Assistant Intelligence Officer, 

who was my subordinate and for whom I am responsible. 
In addition to a.ssisting 25 — 



4830 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that was my number — 

In all duties of the Intelligence Section, performs the 112878] following 
additional assignments : 

A. Maintains Merchant Marine plot and analyses. 

B. Prepares silhouettes of own and enemy ships and planes for dissemination 
to the Fleet. 

C. Assembly, evaluation and dissemination of enemy information. 

D. Maintenance of current estimates of situation enemy forces and location 
of plots of fleets of possible enemies or Allies. 

Mr. RicPiARDSON. Who was your assistant? 

Captain Layton. Commander Robert E. Hudson, U. S. Navy. 

Mr. Richardson. From whom or through whom did you get your 
basic intelligence on which you made your reports? 

Captain Layton. In accordance with the set-up, the Chief of Naval 
Operations subdivision of Naval Intelligence was charged with the 
furnishing of information of all kinds from all sources to the fleet in- 
telligence officer via official oliannels. 

I also received what we then called combat intelligence, which is now 
called communications intelligence, and derived via the Fourteenth 
Naval District Combat Intelligence Unit. Tliis was the unit com- 
manded by the then commander, now Capt. J. J. Rochefort. 

[12879] In addition, from time to time and infrequently, we 
would receive telegraphic information from other communication in- 
telligence organizations, for instance, Cavite and OPNAV. 

Mr. Richardson. When you secured this intelligence did you put 
it in shape for delivery ? 

Captain Layton. In some cases the actual material was in shape. 
For instance, reports from OPNAV, various observations. In most 
cases the communication intelligence as delivered or as received by me 
was not always in shape desirable for presentation to the commander 
in chief, and therefore I would work on that, make an evaluation of 
it and sumbit it to the commander in chief. 

When I speak of it not being in shape, I refer to some of the station 
logs received from the intercept station at Guam, and the station at 
Cavite, which was recorded and indexed in accordance with their pro- 
cedure, but was not in suitable shape for intelligence material re- 
quiring a considerable digesting, collating, and the putting together 
of basic elements of intelligence information for the commander in 
chief. 

[12880] Mr. Richardson. Did most of your basic material come 
through Captain Rochefort? 

Captain Layton. Most of the basic material received concerning 
the Japanese ship locations came from Captain Rochefort, although 
I must say the unit at Cavite was of great assistance, both as a check 
and because they were nearer and could provide probably more ac- 
curate information on certain details. 

Mr. Richardson. How would information from Cavite come to 
you? 

Captain Layton. Both by mail and by dispatch. In the latter 
part of October and November most of their information came by 
dispatch. 

Mr. Richardson. To whom did you directly convey your intelli- 
gence ? 

Captain Layton. Directly to Admiral Kimmel, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4831 

Mr. KiCHARDSON. In person. 

Captain Layton. In person. 

Mr. Richardson. And in what form? 

Captain Latton. At 8 : 15 each morning I would appear at the 
admiral's office with my intelligence material. It invariably con- 
sisted of the communications intelligence summary for that day, plus 
notations of dispatches received in the recent 24 hours that I thought 
pertinent materials, that [WSSl] might bear upon the subject. 

This would then be discussed, sometimes briefly, and other times 
at length, depending upon the state of the material or the nature of 
the information contained therein. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, were those intelligence reports made di- 
rectly to Admiral Kimmel during the week prior to the attack on 
December 7? 

Captain Layton. They were made daily to Admiral Kimmel dur- 
ing the week prior to the attack on December 7, and for several months 
theretofore. 

Mr. Richardson. And in each of those intelligence reports that 
you made, did you endeavor to collate all of the intelligence that was 
available to you for that day ? 

Captain Latton. The written communications intelligence report 
contained all information noted from observation of enemy naval 
circuits. Additionally, through conversational explanation, addi- 
tional enemy reports received during the past 24 hours were discussed, 
and an attempt made to make them fit, or to key them into materials 
contained in the radio intelligence report. 

Mr. Richardson. Were you the agency through whom dispatches 
to the commander in chief. Pacific Fleet, would pass? 

Captain Layton. No, sir. The dispatches to the commander 
[1^882] in chief. Pacific Fleet, were of generally two categories ; 
regular Navy dispatches, that is, secret, confidential, plain language, 
which would come through the communications office, and there were 
the magic dispatches, or dispatches carried in the special channel 
which has been referred to before, a special radio cryptographic sys- 
tem coming over the same radio channels. 

When this went to the communications office, they could not iden- 
tify the cipher except to know it was a special cipher and held by the 
fleet security officer, the then Lieutenant Coleman, now deceased, 
who would bring out the special machinery wheels and would then 
decrypt this dispatch, would deliver it to me in person, after having 
shown it to Admiral Kimmel, or the chief of staff, then Captain 
Smith, the war plans officer, then Captain McMorris, and the fleet 
communications officer. Commander Curts. 

Mr. Richardson. Would they get that information before it came 
to you or afterward ? 

Captain Latton. There were occasions when I saw it first because 
I would be in the office when it was being deciphered, and would read 
it, but the admiral and chief of staff had priority on the receipt of 
this material, naturally. 

Mr. Richardson. Then in the transmission of intelligence to the 
chief of staff, part of it would be in your communication [1£88S] 



4832 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

intelligence summary, and part of it would be oral, and part of it would 
consist of dispatches? 

Csptain Laytojst. That is c^orrect, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. That had been sent in, where it was your duty 
to convey that to the commander in chief? 

Captain Layton. Plus other normal dispatches, such as sightings, 
or reports from naval attaches, or naval observers from State Depart- 
ment sources, and others that came in ordinary dispatch form, and 
was delivered to the admiral as well as the chief of staff and other 
officers. 

Mr Richardson. After this information had gone to the commander 
in chief, would it reach other membeis of his staff? 

Captain Layton. Yes, it would. May I explain why and how this 
was done ? 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. 

Captain Layton. The radio intelligence organization at that time 
was a secret. Regulations had been issued as to how it would be 
handled, who would have access to it, and by whose authority. 

When I first assumed this job on December 7, 1940, 1 year before 
the big day, I made a liaison contact with the Combat Intelligence 
Unit, Fourteenth Naval District. 

Mr. Richardson. That is Admiral Bloch ? 

[12884] Captain Layton. Directly under Admiral Bloch, for 
administration. 

Mr. Richardson. That is right. 

Captain Layton. I showed them my credentials, and they showed 
me these regulations, and had me read one page, and this page is more 
or less in substance as follows : 

This is very secret. No one shall know about it except the following named 
officers and oflSces : 

The Commandant of Operations, in which office is placed the Commander in 
Chief, his Chief of Staff, his Intelligence Officer, and such other officers as desig- 
nated by him or by the Chief of Naval Operations. 

This page was signed b}^ the then Chief of Naval Operations. 

I was then administerecl an oath to maintain secrecy and carry out 
these regulations. 

Now, in order that other members of the staff who were not by the 
admiral's direction on this list who would receive this secret intelli- 
gence, or supersecret intelligence might be aware of these facts, I would 
make up a special intelligence folder in wliich I would not say where 
it came from but would give it a rating of A-1 in case it was communi- 
cation intelligence, and would lay out the facts as I saw them, as con- 
tained in these dispatches. This was shown to the [J£88S\ 
members of the staff, and their initials appear in blocks at the bottom 
of the page. 

I would like to say parenthetically, by Admiral Kimmers direction, 
the war plans officer was added to this list and I received a written 
directive to that effect. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, I think you told us that it was your custom 
to include in your communication intelligence summary which you 
made daily the information which had come to you with reference to 
fleet and enemy vessel locations. 

Captain Layton. That is correct, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4833 

Mr. Richardson. Now, I call your attention to your intelligence 
summary as of November 30, 1941. 

Captain Latton. I have the original before me. 

Mr. Richardson. That appears in our record. Captain as Exhibit 
115. 

Now, will you explain to the committee what the significance would 
be of your report of November 30, as you explained it to Admiral Kim- 
mel? 

Captain Layton. It was my practice to take the communications in- 
telligence summary to Admiral Kimmel at 8:15. He would accept it 
from my hand and sit and read it. Thereafter he would ask me ques- 
tions regarding specific points and then a brief discussion would take 
place regarding its contents. 

Thereafter, he would initial it, and in this case it has initials also 
of the War Plans Officer, then Captain McMorris. I cannot now re- 
call specific words or discussions regarding this specific summary. 

[1£8S6] I would like to say, however, that since the middle of 
November the tenor of these discussions had been about the apparent 
change in the Japanese naval tactical organization as reflected by 
radio intercepts of their own circuits. 

It was apparent that the normal volumes of traffic were increasing, 
that the commanders of certain fleets had decreasing importance. 
One, for example, the c. in c, Combined Fleet, the big boss, and the 
c. in c. of the Second Fleet, who correspond roughly to our com- 
mander. Scouting Forces, who commanded normally cruisers and de- 
stroyers, had taken a position high and above what he had been in 
the previous 6 to 8 or 10 months. 

Also a fairly newly organized force, the Third Fleet that they sent 
out, and that w^e assumed to be an amphibious force, also was far more 
important in the traffic than he would have been under normal circum- 
stances. 

From receiving these from day to day there was no doubt in our 
minds that a task force was being formed. 

This same phenomenon had been noted, only not so strongly, first 
in February 1941, when the Japanese decided to mediate the French 
Indochina-Thailand dispute over a border, and with £( show of force 
went down and mediated. 

The task force organization at that time was fairly well reflected in 
the traffic. The task force organization [1£8S7]' at that time 
was well proven in traffic. When the mediation was over the security 
measures were reduced and they returned to Tokyo. 

This same sort of phenomenon had been noted in about July, 1941, 
when the Japanese, by ultimatum to Vichy and French Indochina 
authorities, decided to "move in and take over certain Japanese naval 
bases and air bases in French Indochina. 

Then we also received information from magic, from Washington, 
by the special channel, and were able to fill the picture very nicely. 

To return to November 1941, I have spoken of t]\& prominence of 
two fleet commanders. We had also the commander of the combined 
air forces, a shore-based air organization, whicli also contained air 
tenders with seaplanes aboard, and so forth. 

Mr. Richardson. Speaking now of the Japanese forces? 



4834 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Layton. Yes. The Japanese combined air force. They 
were also quite prominent. 

Another point of interest at this time that had been noted and 
talked about was the fact that fleet units belonging to certain fleets 
apparently no longer had the same mother. For instance, some first 
fleet destroyers definitely were working for the second fleet. 

[1^S88] Mr. Richardson. Captain, let me caution you right 
there, in relating this information as you saw it about the middle of 
November and from then on, I should like to have you confine yourself 
to information which was communicated to Admiral Kimmel and to 
his staff generally. 

Captain Layton. This information was communicated to Admiral 
Kimmel. 

Mr. EiCHARDSON. Go ahead. 

Captain Laytox. And was written up in the summary, which I will 
produce later, if you wish. 

Mr. Richardson. Go ahead. You said something about the ships 
not having the same mother. 

Captain Layton. Various units no longer had their normal mothers. 
In other words, each fleet commander, that we call mother, had certain 
chickens, and some of these chickens no longer belonged to the mother, 
but belonged to other mothers of other fleets. This was an unusual 
procedure, because normally all naval traific followed an administra- 
tive routing, and to have new commanders traced directly as subordi- 
nates of another commander was an unusual procedure and indicated 
he had a tactical interest as opposed to an administrative interest. 

Mr. RicpiARDSON. I see. 

Captain Layton. The associations of these commanders [1^889] 
were entirely with southern addresses, Formosa, Hainan, and French 
Indochina. Their direction of movement clearly indicated they were 
bypassing Formosa, and they were going in that general direction. 

It was noted also that certain Cardivs, carrier divisions, were ap- 
parently interested or concerned with this movement. 

To be specific, the one we called Carrier Division 3, the one we called 
Carrier Division 4, apparently were concerned somewhat with this 
movement. 

Mr. Richardson. How many carriers in a division ? 

Captain Layton. Two, sir. As a result of this radio phiBnomenon, 
Admiral Kimmel became more interested day by day, and on the 24th 
told me to contact Rochefort and to see if he was receiving from other 
units any such phenomena. Rochefort's answer was to the effect that 
no one had reported this on the circuits. Admiral Kimmel then di- 
rected me to order a dispatch, to send a dispatch in a special system 
to the unit at Cavite and OpNav, making his observations and draw- 
ing the conclusions that had been drawn in the summaries which 
Admiral Kimmel had been reading. 

The dispatch that Commander Rochefort originated and was sent 
to C0M14 was the one read here in the testimony the other day. This 
was replied to by the fleet commander of the Sixteenth Naval Opera- 
tion at Cavite, in which he agreed [1^890] in part and elab- 
orated in part and disagreed to a minor degree. 

I have always believed, and I do to this day, that it was the result 
of these two dispatches to some degree that the war warning came 
on the 27th. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4835 

Mr. Richardson. Why ? 

Captain Layton. Speaking now from December 6, 1941, we had 
this information and no more, we saw this movement growing; we 
had reports from shore observers in China, assistant naval attaches, 
merchant skippers, consular authorities, that they had seen these 
ships loading and going out, that they had been sighted going south, 
the merchant marine ships stating that they were going south in a 
convoy, and the entire movement was noted as going south. 

That was the radio picture. The visual picture, of course, was not 
as complete as to detail, or as to destination. 

[IBSPj] When the 27th of November war warning message came, 
as more than one ofiicer on the staff has explained, that fits the picture, 
as we see it, and that was what I thought myself. 

Mr. Richardson. Coming up to the 30th of November, let me ask 
you, in the designation of that Intelligence summary under the styling 
of the Third Fleet you make the recital : 

No information obtained as to the location of the Commander in Chief Third 
Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is under way. 

Will you explain that statement? 

Captain Layton. I did not write this summary and I cannot explain 
that statement other than to say that the operators and the super- 
visors who sat on these circuits week in, month in, and year in, had 
the impression, from the type of traffic they were seeing, that he was 
under way. 

I can explain it a little further by this, by going back there in 
these summaries you will see where the commander in chief, Third 
Fleet, is a very busy originator of traffic. He is talking to the com- 
mander of the Second Fleet, he is talking to the commander of the 
Air Force, he is talking to the resident naval officer of Hainan, he is 
talking to the resident naval officer in Taihoku, to the present naval 
officer in Indochina, to the officer in charge at Palao in [1^892] 
the Caroline Islands, he is entirely associated with them and with 
other high commands, C in C, Second Fleet, indicating he is getting 
ready to go in those directions. He then shows no longer in the 
traffic. He is still being addressed in the traffic. He is the addressee 
of other messages. But no messages originate from him that day. 
The operator gets the impression he is under way. I think that is 
what is meant in here. 

Like all things, radio intelligence, however, has its limitations. I 
won't go into the technical details but when you identify one whom 
you don't know you do it by association, by his activities in the radio 
circuits, and by his known friends. 

In this one, however, is an example of the misleading character of 
the radio intelligence information. In the general paragraph it 
states : 

The only tactical circuit heard today was one with Akagi and several Mams. 

A tactical circuit is one in which one unit calls another unit on 
strong enough power for us to hear at Pearl Harbor or Cavite. Nor- 
mally, units do not communicate that way. Administrative traffic 
and command traffic is usually handled up a chain of command to its 
nearest shore station who broadcasts it, and it is then rebroadcast so 
that [12893] all addresses receive it on an umbrella. 



4836 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The fact that Akagi was that day exercising with several marus 
was brought to my attention and the admiral noted it also. He asked 
me what I thought, as I recall it, and I said the Alcagi was probably 
talking to some tanker marus, marus being merchant ships and prob- 
ably going to get oil. 

As a matter of fact we now know the Akagi was at sea under radio 
silence and was not talking to the marus because this same Akagi 
identified here was identified by Cavite on this day as moving south- 
ward from the Empire. 

This, of course, is not to find fault with the time of information. 
It just has its limitations. It certainly is an inexact science and while 
the averages are good j^ou cannot follow it on to the last detail and 
depend upon it without looking it over. 

Mr. KiciiARDSON. Now, referring to this language in the fourth 
paragraph : 

Also the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence 
of at least one carrier in the Mandates although this has not been confirmed. 

What is there in the presence of destroyers which gives an indica- 
tion of the presence of carriers? 

Captain Layton. There again is the technique of reading 
[12894-] the enemy's radio signals without reading his messages 
and taking who does things as a rule and how he does it as a rule and 
using that as a thumb rule to find out what he is doing now. 

The Japanese naval organ.ization was so set up that originally the 
carriers or carrier divisions had been assigned to both First and Sec- 
ond Fleets. Sometime in the middle of 1941 this organization was 
apparently dissolved. It took us some time to find it out for sure. 
The carriers were lumped under one organization. But one of the 
Japanese tendencies had been to keep plane guard destroyers with 
the same carrier division and when they moved over from the First 
and Second Fleet into the Carrier Fleet they took their plane guard 
destroyers with them. 

The presence of a plane guard destroyer in the Mandates would be 
the first and probably the only tip-off under normal circumstances if 
they were under radio silence that a carrier might be there, too. It 
wouldn't prove that the carrier was there, but under normal circum- 
stances it would be logical to assume it. This, unfortunately, was not 
the case. This plane guard destroyer division, it later turned out, 
had been detached from the carriers and had gone to the Mandates 
to reinforce the Mandate Fleet. The deduction was right at the time 
but incorrect in fact. 

[13895] Mr. Ricfiardson. Turning to the Intelligence summary 
of December 1 I note the statement : 

The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicate an additional 
progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale. 

Will you explain that statement? 

Captain Laytox. Japanese radio call signs normally lasted about 
6 months. It was anticipated on November 1 from the type of traffic 
before that that the call signs would change about November 1, They 
did so do. To find the radio call signs changing in only 1 month, and 
when I speak of radio call signs I am speaking of fleet and command 
call signs, not shore stations, this change was significant and was 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4837 

considered an additional progressive step in preparing for active op- 
erations because, first, we saw tactical task forces being formed. We 
heard of them being formed from eye witnesses who had sighted them 
on the China coast. 

Call signs changing then on December 1 along with the formation 
of task forces was a logical thought and that they were preparing for 
operation was also a logical sequence. 

Mr. EiCHARDSON. Xow, turning to the second page of the Communis 
cation Intelligence Summary of December 2, 1 note there in reference 
to carriers the statement : 

[12896] Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. 

Now, when did this carrier silence, approximately, begin? 

Captain Laytox. There had been very little information on the 
carrier divisions and commander carriers who was their technical 
commander with the exception of Carrier Division 3 and sometimes 
Carrier Division 4 since early in November. There was no definite 
information throughout November as to their exact location or ac- 
tivity although from time to time a carrier call or carrier activity 
would be associated with shore stations, air bases. 

On November 14 a statement was made : 

The carriers remain in liome waters with most of them in i)ort. 

The subject of carrier information thereafter was generally frag- 
mentary but it was noted that BatDivThree, the carrier divisions, and 
two destroyer squadrons have been associated in traffic and addressed 
letters to the Chief of Naval General Staff, which generally indicated 
impending operations, 

Mr. Richardson. Now, for how many daj's prior to December 7 
had there been general carrier silence ? 

Captain Laytox. I would have to check the record to be exact. Car- 
rier silence was not commented on as such at any [12897^ 
time. The lack of information on the carriers was commented on 
after November 27. The November 27 summary indicated the car- 
riers were still located in home waters. 

It is to be remarked here, and I believe it to be of extreme impor- 
tance in judging all these facts, that in this build-up that I mentioned, 
since the middle of November the association of forces, the tying to- 
gether of your task forces, the commander of carriers, or carrier divi- 
sion commander, with the exception of Carrier Division 3, were not 
addressed, were not associated, and apparently were entirely aloof 
from the whole proceedings. 

Mr. RiCHARDSOx. Now, I called your attention a moment ago to your 
Intelligence summary of December 1 and to the language therein 
quoted : 

The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicate an additional 
progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale. 

Now, it is a fact, is it not, that that opinion was directly presented 
to Admiral Kimmel ? 

Captain Laytox. That is correct. 

Mr. RicHARDSox. And that is the opinion which in your testimony 
before the Hewitt investigation you referred to as being, that sentence, 
being underlined in red pencil by Admiral Kiiuniel at the time!' 



/ 

4838 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

\12898~\ Captain Layton. I have the original copy here and it 
is not underlined in red pencil. It was underlined in lead pencil. 
L-e-a-d. 

Mr. RiCHARDSOisr. Then the reference "in red pencil", was a mistake? 

Captain Latton. That was a typographical error on the part of the 
recorder, I believe. 

Mr. Richardson. And the underlining, however, was done by Ad- 
miral Kimmel? 

Captain Layton. At that time ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, is the 

Captain Layton. Mr. Counsel- 



Mr. Richardson. Is the absence of information over a considerable 
period of time of the carriers any evidence of whether those carriers 
are at sea or in port ? 

Captain Layton. Not necessarily, sir. There have been many times 
during the course of 1941 and previously when not only carriers but 
battleships, cruisers and other types were not located by Radio 
Intelligence traffic. This is because when carriers or other types of 
vessels go into home waters, home ports, home exercise areas, they 
use low power radio direct with shore stations. This is then handled 
normally on telegraphic land lines to prevent our direction finder 
stajtions and intercept stations from hearing \12899'\ their 
traffic. During such periods as that we have always carried those units 
as "home waters." 

Also when one of these vessels go into a navy yard for overhaul he 
suspends communications and it is handled by the nearest naval sta- 
tion for him. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, in reporting the fact that these carriers 
were lost, did you have in your mind at that time any apprehension 
as to what that might mean with respect to what the carriers were 
doing, speaking of your own apprehensions now ? 

Captain Layton. My apprehensions as of that time were briefly 
these : We have all of these units, all these commands, very well lined 
up for an operational, an offensive operation. We haven't seen the 
carriers except Cardiv 3 and sometimes Cardiv 4. Since it was my 
duty to keep track of the Japanese naval forces, I felt apprehensive 
as to where they were and therefore conferred with my opposite 
number daily regarding any evidence that might be able to be pieced 
out. 

\12900'\ Mr. Richardson. Now, you called Admiral Kimmel's 
attention to the fact that you didn't know where Carrier Divisions 1 
or 2 were ? 

Captain Layton. That was at the time following the December 1, 
1941, Communication Intelligence Summary which I have been re- 
ferring to. 

Admiral Kimmel told me to make out for him a location sheet on 
the Japanese Navy. I proceeded to do so from my current files, de- 
rived principally from Radio Intelligence. 

I did it at December 1, 1941, that is, it was so typed, but I am 
positive in my mind that it was actually delivered to Admiral Kimmel 
on December 2, 1941. 

This location sheet showed the location, to the best of our knowl- 
edge, of the major portion of the Japanese Fleet and which, with the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4839 

exception of the Pearl Harbor Task Force was very active. In this 
location sheet I did not list Carrier Division 1 or Carrier Division 2 
because neither one of those commands had appeared in traffic for fully 
15 and possibly 25 days. That is, identifiable traffic as an addressee, or 
as an originator. 

Mr. Richardson. Then, Admiral Kimmel at that time called your 
attention to the fact that you didn't know Avhere those carriers were? 

Captain Latton. He did, sir. 

[12901] Mr. Richardson. And that was the occasion of his re- 
mark to you, to which you testified. Admiral Kimmel speaking : 

Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't 
know it? My reply was I hoped they would be sighted before now. 

Captain Layton. Words said to that effect. I believe that Admiral 
Kimmel said, "What, you do not know where the carriers are?" And 
my reply was as you read it, or words to that effect. 

I must say that his saying "You mean they could be rounding Dia- 
mond Head," was to emphasize the fact that I didn't know where they 
were. I don't believe the admiral meant to say they were off Diamond 
Head, and I didn't know it, and I answered saying I hoped they would 
be sighted. 

Mr. Richardson. Is there any significance attached to lack of infor- 
mation concerning the whereabouts of the carriers that could be con- 
strued by you from your experience as indicating a possibility that 
they were at sea on a mission ? 

Captain Layton. I believe that everyone who has worked with 
enemy radio intelligence has always been aware that any force given 
sealed orders can get under way, go to sea, and as long as they don't use 
their radio, as long as they are not sighted, can move almost anywhere 
in the world, provided they are not sighted before they arrive where 
they [12W2] are going. 

Mr. Richardson. Then radio silence would, in itself, be one of the 
evidences from which it might be possible to deduce that certain war- 
ships were under sealed orders proceeding at sea and not using their 
radio? 

Captain Latton. That would be a very difficult deduction to make, 
but one could make such a deduction, and I might say, in hindsight 
now, not foresight, that there was no evidence in this of considera- 
tions of radio silence. 

I would like to point out that had these carriers or carrier-division 
commanders or the carrier commander in chief been addressed in any 
messages of the thousands and thousands that came out from the naval 
General Staff, regardless of the silence of carriers, then the thought 
of radio silence would have been paramount, but the fact that they 
were never addressed, not even once, led to the belief that they were 
in the same situation as the carrier divisions were in July 1941, when 
the Japanese had a task force go down with their ultimatum into 
French Indochina. 

At that time the carriers remained in home waters, and not known 
as to where they were in a covering position, doubtlessly, in case we 
took counteraction, but where they continued training, returning to 
the Empire after the conclusion of the French Indochina matter. 

[1S903] Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral Kimmel in his testi- 
mony asserted that there had been quite a number of occasions prior 



4840 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to this period during early 1941 and 1940 when there was a similar 
absence of call signs from groups of ships and carriers, quite the same 
in intimation and extent of this absence of signs to which you have 
just testified. 

Captain Layton. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Is there any difference in your mind between the 
earlier lack of information and the present lack of information you are 
referring to here ? 

Captain Laytox. No, sir. I believe it to be identical. 

In the previous cases they were not addressed, nor did they address 
messages. In this case they followed the same pattern. I submitted 
a memorandum to the Roberts commission to that effect prepared by the 
Intelligence Unit under Commander Rochefort to give a general an- 
alysis of periods in which various types of ships were unlocated. 
Some types of ships were never located by radio intelligence because 
they didn't appear. 

Mr. Richardson. If it were felt that war was imminent and a war 
warning had been received, the fact that the carrier divisions 1 and 2 
were lost, would have some significance in the evaluation of that warn- 
ing, would it not, from an intelligence standpoint? 

[12904] Captain Laytox. The valuation of the enemy informa- 
tion was my job. I evaluated it to the best of my ability. 

The formulation of the estimate of the enemy situation and its pos- 
sible courses of action was not a function of Intelligence, and was 
laid down in the staff instructions as under Operations and War 
Plans. 

I furnished those sections with my material. I furnished it to Ad- 
miral Kimmel. I did not at any time suggest that the Japanese car- 
riers Avere under radio silence approaching Oahu. I wish I had. I 
did not so consider at that time. 

My own personal opinion, and that is what we work on, when mak- 
ing estimates to oureelves, was that the carriers were remaining in home 
waters preparing for operations so that they would be in a covering 
position in case we moved against Japan after she attacked, if she 
did, in southeast Asia. 

Mr. Riciiardsox. This information that you were giving, the method 
that you were following in assembling this information, continued 
every day up to the attack, did it ? 

Captain Laytox. It continued every day up until I left Pearl 
Harbor on November 29, 1945. 

Mr. Richardsox. And in conveying that information, you did your 
very best to acquaint Admiral Kimmel with all of the information 
at vour disposal ? 

[1290S] Captain Laytox. Admiral Kimmel had all of the infor- 
tion at my disposal. 

Mr. Richardsox. And you are not now conscious of having omitted 
any method of conveying information to him that you did not use? 

Captain Laytox. I feel confident of that. I also feel confident that 
Admiral Kimmel feels confident of that. 

Mr. Richardsox. I have no further questions. 

The Vice Chairmax. I don't believe I have any questions now. 

Senator George. 

Senator George. Just one or two questions, Mr. Chairman. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4841 

Captain, you say that you transmitted everything that you received 
to Admiral Kimmel ? 

Captain Layton. That is, in general, true. Certain things came in 
to the staff that I received that he received also in the course of routine 
routing of mail, dispatches, et cetera, which I did not have the respon- 
sibility for delivering. 

Senator George. So far as you know, did the information which you 
gave Admiral Kimmel pass on to General Short ? 

Captain Layton. I was rarely present when Admiral Kimmel and 
General Short conferred. However, from time to time in late 1941, 
whenever naval task-force commanders came in to [126061 
port, there was a conference in Admiral Kimmel's cabin wherein I 
outlined the recent strategic and tactical disposition of the Japanese 
Navy, their rearmament in the Marshall Islands, in the Carolines, and 
in general went over the entire picture as against Japan. On at least 
one and possibly more of these occasions. General Short was present 
and was so briefed by me. 

However, when General Short and Admiral Kimmel had confer- 
ences between themselves, I was not a party to the conference. 

Senator George. Do you recall any conference in which General 
Short participated late in November or in the first 6 days of Decem- 
ber 1941? 

Captain Layton. I have no definite recollection of what days they 
were, but I saw General Short in the admiral's outer office, I saw Gen- 
eral Short's aide in the admiral's outer office waiting for General 
Short, who was inside with the admiral, and I believe it was the 
middle of November 1941, or around the 20th, perhaps, when I last 
saw General Short in at a general task-foi-ce briefing where I went over 
the Japanese situation as to the mandated islands, and the general 
disposition and tactical deployment of the Japanese Fleet. 

Senator George. You say that was about the middle of November? 

[1'2907"\ Captain Layton. About that time, sir. 

Senator George. Now, did you continue to tell Admiral Kimmel, or 
submit your reports to Admiral Kimmel, indicating the loss of the 
carriers, or the lack of contact with the carriers, through the means 
available to you ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. May I read those to you ? 

Senator George. Yes, sir. 

Captain Layton. December 1, 1941 

Senator George. Is that the original paper? 

Captain Layton. This is the original paper made out at that time, 
and bears Admiral Kimmel's initials. 

Carriers, no change. 

December 2, 1941 : 

Carriers, almost a complete blank of information on the carriers, today. Lack 
of identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information. 

I would like to say that the call-sign change had taken place the 
day before and with some twelve or fifteen thousand call signs being 
changed the lack of identification would naturally show little infor- 
mation on carriers. 

However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the 
change to the first of December, and not one carrier call has been recovered, 
it is evidence that carrier traffic is at a low ebb. 

79716— 46— pt. 10 17 



4842 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[1£908] About 200 calls is about 6 percent of the total. 
Senator George. That was the 2d of December? 
Captain Layton. Yes, sir. That was the 2d of December. 
December 3 : 

No information on submarines or carriers. 

The 4th of December : 

Cari'iers were not mentioned. 

Fifth of December : 

Carriers were not mentioned. 

I beg your pardon. Correction. 

No traffic from the commander carriers or submarine force has been seen. 

Sixth of December, the summary was not delivered until after the 
attack. 

Senator George. Do you have anything on the 6th of December 
relating to carriers ? It wasn't delivered ? 

Captain Layton. No, sir. It was not delivered until after the 
attack, and contained no information on the carriers. 

Senator George. Captain, did the message of December 3 relating 
to the destruction reach you ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. That came through you ? 

[12909'\ Captain Layton. No, sir. That came through a spe- 
cial security officer who signed it, delivered to the admiral. Chief of 
Staff, head of war plans, Chief of Operations, and to myself, and 
the communications officer. 

Senator George. Admiral Kimmel had that message, did he ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. Did he also have as information the message of 
December 4, 5, or 6 — 4 or 5 — I believe, relating to the code destruc- 
tion? 

Captain Layton. Senator, I am not clear on which message you 
refer to. The message I was referring to was a message stating 
that purple machines were being destroyed at certain places. Ad- 
miral Kimmel sent for me and asked me what a purple machine was. 

Senator George. That was the December 3 message ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Senator George. That was the information that was sent direct 
to him, was it ? 

Captain Layton. That was information sent — information to him ; 
yes, sir. 

Senator George. Sent as information to him ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir; and he sent for me, wanted to know 
what the purple machine was, and I told him I did not [12910] 
know but would find out. 

I went to the fleet security officer, late Lieutenant Coleman, and 
asked him, and he said it was an electric diplomatic coding machine 
of the Japs, and I so reported it to Admiral Kimmel. 

[13911] Senator George. Now, subsequent to that there were 
two other messages that referred to codes. I don't know whether you 
have them there or not. Did they go to Admiral Kimmel also as in- 
formation ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4843 

Captain Layton. One on December 3 saying : 

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent in- 
structions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at 
Hongkong Singapore Batavia Manila Washington and London to destroy most 
of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential 
and secret documents. 

That is the one you refer to ? 

Senator George. Yes, sir. 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir ; that was received. 

Senator George. That was received also? 

Captain Laytox. Yes, sir. That was believed to be another version 
of the one I previously mentioned, Circular 2444, from Tokyo, speak- 
ing of purple machines. 

Senator George. I believe I have no further questions, Mr. Chair- 
man. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Gearhart, of California, will inquire. 

Mr. Gearhart. Captain, the answers to these questions of mine 
may be obvious. They are put for the purpose of the [12912'] 
record. 

Is there any absolutely sure method of preventing a surprise attack? 

Captain Lx\yton. Mr. Gearhart, I am glad you asked me that ques- 
tion. I was a little curious myself at the end of the war to see what 
the results had been during the war. If I may have your indulgence 
for a minute, I will try and find my paper. 

To avoid having any personal interest I asked CincPac Analytical 
Section. They analyzed all reports from all sources and put them 
together in what they thought was the best narrative of what hap- 
pened. I told them that I wanted to have a study made of all our 
carrier task force raids throughout the course of the war, and that I 
would like to know what degree of surprise they were able to have 
against the Japs who were supposed to be looking for them. 

I told them to go on the cautious side, if anything. And this is what 
was handed to me by the chief of that section : 

There were 72 major raids by carrier-based planes in the Pacific 
during World War II in which it might have been expected that the 
element of surprise would be present. Of these, 21, or 297lo percent 
achieved complete surprise; 32 or'44yio percent achieved partial sur- 
prise; 15 or 20%o percent achieved no element of surprise; and 4 or 
\_12913] 5.5 percent achieved an unknown element of surprise. 

In this tabulation raids on the same area within a week's time or on 
areas under amphibious attack or under bombardment were not in- 
cluded. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is very interesting. I don't think I got the 
third one. Will you repeat it ? 

Captain Layton. There were 21, which is 29-/io percent; 32, which 
is 44140 percent; 15, which is 20%o percent; and 4 or 5%o percent. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, that was surprise to the Japs ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. When they were at war with us, when they were on 
the lookout for us, using all of their methods to prevent surprise? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then anything that is done to prevent surprise is 
merely to reduce the probability of surprise ; is that not correct ? 



4844 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Latton. In general I think that is true, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, if you were to say anything else you would 
say there would be a method of preventing surprise absolutely. 

Captain Layton. There is, sir. 

Mr. Ge^^rhart. There is ? 

[1£914] Captain Latton. Yes, sir. If you have all the infor- 
mation from the enemy's intercepts and you are reading enough of 
his systems you can prevent a surprise, and we did it at Midway. 

Mr. Gearhart. In other words, what you are saying is that if you 
achieve perfection then you approach the absolute. 

Captain Layton, Yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. But that isn't to be expected in human affairs on 
very, very many occasions, is it? 

Captain Layton. Perfection is a very rare thing, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, one of the best methods that could have been 
pursued to have prevented the surprise at Pearl Harbor would have 
been to have placed in operation adequate and efficient long-distance 
patrol ; is that correct ? 

Captain Layton. That is one of the ways, sir. I think the dapanese 
in the early part of the war had an efficient method. The raid that 
Halsey conducted to take General Doolittle and his brave fliers into 
Tokyo in April 1942 was prevented not by aerial reconnaissance but 
by picket boats or fishing boats, thousands of them, spread out there 
800 miles to the east of Japan, wherein no task force could penetrate 
without being seen. 

They sank the picket boats but they got their radio message off. 

[1291S] Mr. Gearhart. Then if they had sufficient equipment 
to have carried on an adequate long-distance aerial reconnnaissance 
for 360° around Hawaii the opportunity of a surprise would have 
been greatly reduced ? 

Captain Layton. Greatly reduced subject to weather conditions 
which would allow the search to be effective. Weather conditions 
prevented a plane from seeing forces, at that time, before the installa- 
tion of radar. 

Mr. Gearhart, Have you anj'^ idea how many airplanes of the long- 
distance reconnaissance type would have been required to keep up a 
long-distance reconnaissance around that island that was adequate? 

Captain Layton. That is a little out of my field. I would rather 
let the operations people and the aviation people answer those tech- 
nical questions. 

Mr. Gearhart. I think the figures you have given here are very 
helpful. Thank you. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson, of Michigan, will inquire. 
Captain. 

Senator Ferguson. Captain Layton, apparently from j'our answer 
about this purple machine you were not familiar with the fact that 
Washington was intercepting the diplomatic messages that the Japa- 
nese were using the machine to decipher ? 

Captain Layton. I was not personally familiar Avith the [12dT6] 
machine. I knew that Washington had been, in July 1941, intercept- 
ing and decrypting Japanese high diplomatic traffic because they told 
us what the Japanese were going to demand of Vichy and what they 
were going to do if Vichy didn't give in, and they also laid out the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4845 

bases they were going to take and which they did take. So 1 was 
aware that our unit in Washington was working and having success as 
of July with the Japanese, as you call it now, high-level diplomatic 
system. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you know the name ''purple'' ? 

Captain Layton. The name '"purple" was new to me. I had never 
Ilea I'd it. 

Senator Ferguson. So when the word "purple" came in on the mes- 
sage you were not familiar with what they were talking about ? 

Captain Layton. I didn't know what "pui-jjle machine" meant. I 
thought it probably was one of our code names to cover some device 
or means of decrypting messages, perhaps. 

Senator P'erguson. Well, now,, you mentioned tliese messages came 
to you in July and j^ou knew we were intercepting them here in Wash- 
ington. 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you get any specific notice that they were 
not going to give you any more of that kind [12917] of in- 
formation '? 

Captain Layton. I had noticed, sir. I had written to my opposite 
number in Washington, Captain McCollum, and had urged him t(j 
send us diplomatic traffic of the very nature of which you speak. He 
replied in a personal letter and said it was determined'that we should 
not liaA^e this sent to us because in fact Washington was the place best 
qualified both by personnel in number and in experience to evaluate 
it and to disseminate this information to the fleet and assured me that 
we would get what we needed at the time we needed it. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you have that personal letter? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have it with you ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you produce it? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. Shall I read it, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Captain Layton (reading) : 

April 22, 1941. 

Dear Eddie : Sorry to be so late in replying to your letter of 11 March but I 
have just gotten out of the hospital after having them trim me down a trifle. 
I have taken up the [1291S] matter of getting you the Fortnightly Sum- 
mary by air mail and hope that this matter will be adjusted in the very near 
future but I cannot be certain as another division handles the mailing and dis- 
tribution of this report. 

I would like to add parenthetically that we got it. 

I thoroughly appreciate that you would probably be much helped in your daily 
estimates if you had at your disposal the DIP. 

That is what I asked for, "DIP", standing for diplomatic traffic. 

This, however, brings up matters of security, et cetera, which would be very 
difficult to solve. While I appreciate your position fully in the matter, still I 
cannot agree that this material should be forwarded to you in the way you suggest. 
It seems reasonable to suppose that the Department should be the origin for 
evaluated political situations as its availability of information is greater than 
that of any command afloat, however large, its staff is larger and it should be 
in a position to evaluate the political consequences. Therefore it would seem 
that the forces afloat must rely on the Department for evaluated views of political 
situations. 



4846 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I should think that the forces afloat should, in general, confine themselves to 
the estimates of the strategic [12919] and tactical situations with which 
they will be confronted when the time of action arrives. The material you men- 
tioned can necessarily have but passing and transient interest as action in the 
political sphere is determined by the Government as a whole and not by the forces 
afloat. 

It does not seem to me to be very practical to build up an organization afloat 
which will merely duplicate the efforts of the Intelligence Division in the Depart- 
ment. I appreciate that all this leaves you in rather a spot as naturally people 
are interested in current developments. I believe, however, that a sharp line 
should be drawn and a distinction continuously emphasized between information 
that is of interest and information that is desirable to have on which to base 
action. 

In other words, while you and the Fleet may be highly interested in ixtlitics, 
there is nothing that you can do about it. Therefore, information of political 
significance, except as it affects immediate action by the Fleet, is merely a matter 
of interest to you and not a matter of utility. 

Senator Ferguson. Signed ? 

Captain Latton. I have another paragraph. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Captain Latton (reading) : 

I think your remarks concerning the slate are very [12920] apt and 
pertinent. 

The word "slate" means the slate for language officers in case of war. 

I would, however, ask you to look at this other aspect of the situation. If the 
officers concerned are to continue to be of use to the Navy in their specialty they 
must be given a reasonable opportunity for promotion. Certain of the promotion 
laws are matters of law and are not within the province of the Bureau of Navi- 
gation or of any Selection Board to modify. 

I don't believe reading this letter any further will have any influence 
on the Pearl Harbor investigation, Senator. It is a long talk about 
why the officers have to go to sea and cannot remain at their posts. 

Senator Ferguson. I think that is of interest to the committee. 

Captain Layton [reading] : 

A case in point — I am advised by the Bureau of Navigation that Birtley 

Commander Birtley was then the officer in charge of the Kadio In- 
telligence Unit and who was relieved as officer in charge by Commander 
Rochefort later on. I was trying to get him kept on in view of his 
experience. [Reading further:] 

A case in point — I am advised by the Bureau of [12921] Navigation that 
Birtley is barely over the line in sea duty in rank for the promotion to the grade 
of Commander, and they were not quite sure of their computation. In other 
words, it is desirable from the Bui'eau's viewpoint and from the point of view 
of law for Birtley to get to sea for about a year so that there will be no question 
as to his qualifications for promotion. 

Fullinwider, of course, has no sea duty in rank and as he must have two years 
sea duty in rank before his next grade he cannot afford to stay ashore much more 
than about another year and we are leaving him there for just that. 

I had asked for Fullinwider. He had been there for 2 years. Birt- 
ley had been there for 2 years. I wanted Commander Rochefort to 
come there as the most experienced and talented officer in the line. 
I felt that the Pacific Fleet needed the best talent on the spot. 

Senator Ferguson. You conveyed that to McCollnm? 

Captain Latton. In a personal letter. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. He is telling you why you can't have 
these valuable men ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4847 

Captain Latton. That is true, sir. 

This whole subject is tied up with matters of the progress of the work as a 
whole. I appreciate that the local view frequently looms very big but in assign- 
ing personnel [12922] to stations and providing for shifts in personnel I 
must consider future requirements as well as present needs. 

In this connection, we ran on a present need basis for several years with the 
result that our talent all of a sudden disappeared from certain important billets 
and I have had a great deal of difficulty in getting all of our stations on a func- 
tioning basis again. All of them are just now functioning with some degree of 
satisfaction and continuity and in order to provide for this desirable continuity, 
I might even say essential continuity, a definite plan for shifting personnel is 
essential. 

I appreciate that the two boys in Honolulu are doing exceptionally good 
work and for that reason I would like to see them stay there, but for their 
own good and more important for the good of the specialized service as a whole, 
some shift is going to have to be made and Honolulu is the place that a general 
study of the situation indicates to be the logical place to make the change. 

I hope to have the new silhouettes in the mail within the next two weeks. I 
am ashamed that they have not been sent out before now but I have been forced 
to accept a reduction in priority of this work as the powers that be have con- 
sidered other work more urgent. The instruction models I will have to check 
up on for you although I had [12923] understood that they were already 
being sent out. 

I hope that you will keep in touch with me from time to time as I value your 
comments very highly. 

With best regards, 

Mac. 

' Over the signature of A. H. McCollum. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, have you any other letters or memoranda ? 

Captain Layton. No other pertaining to Pearl Harbor, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, that would indicate, that letter, that you 
were told at that time that you would not be getting diplomatic 
matter except that which the Department here wanted you to know 
for action? 

Captain Layton. That affected action on the part of the fleet; 
yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And did you believe up until the time of the 
attack that you were getting all diplomatic intercepted messages that 
would in any way relate to the action of the fleet ? 

Captain Layton. I thought that the Department had sent us every- 
thing they had and when I learned a couple of years later that we had 
been short-changed I was outraged and astonished. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, we have in evidence three intercepts of so- 
called diplomatic messages, the one of the [12924] intrigue in 
Thailand and the two in relation to the codes. Do you know of any 
others ? One is on the 1st of December and the other two are on the 3d 
of December. Do you know of any other for action? Those show 
on their face that they were the so-called" magic or purple, or at least 
intercepts. You didn't know them by the name of magic. Are 
those the onl}^ three messages that showed on their face that they 
were intercepted Japanese messages? 

Captain Layton. Those are the only ones I recall at present. I am 
sure there weren't many others, if there was even one. 

Senator Ferguson. I didn't understand. 

Captain Layton. Those are the only ones I recall at present, al- 
though the setting up on the winds code may be included in that same 
category. 



4848 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now how can we find out how many other 
messages there are that on their face indicate that they were inter- 
cepts of Japanese diplomatic messages? 

Captain Layton. I have my file here. If the Senator will give me 
a little time I will go through it. 

Senator Ferguson. I will be glad to give you time. I think that is 
important. 

Captain Layton. I have one dated December 1, 1941. 

Senator Ferguson, That is your file? 

[12935] Captain Layton. That is the commander in chief, 
Pacific Fleet, intelligence file, sir. I have kept it since December 1940, 
when I first reported for duty. 

Senator Ferguson. What is that message? 

Captain Layton. It is a duplication of the one you just handed me. 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That I gave you? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Captain Layton. It started out "Ambassador in Bangkok." 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Captain Layton. I have one here dated November 28, 1941, from 
Cincaf to Opnav, Cincpac, Coml4, and Coml6, which I am sure you 
have in the record. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the winds? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir; that is the five times winds and the two 
times winds. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson has to go to the floor, and 
in the meantime Mr. Richardson has a question or two. 

Mr. Richardson. Captain, are you the author of this map of Pearl 
Harbor that has been set up on this side of the room? 

Captain Layton. I am not the artist; no, sir. The [12926'] 
map of Pearl Harbor made from existing records in the office of the 
commander in chief. Pacific Fleet, was constructed by the direction 
of the commander in chief. Pacific Feet, to show this committee if 
they wished where the ships were at the time of the attack; also where 
a couple of them moved during the time of the attack, and to show 
what has been referred to as Japanese submarine track around Ford 
Island. 

Mr. Richardson. Suppose you take the pointer, Captain, and give 
us a demonstration on that map of the information it is intended to 
convey. 

Captain Layton. This map, with its color for sounding, does not 
lend itself to being seen, but I will show with this pointer the course 
laid clown on a captured ma]) from the Japanese midget submarine 
the course he intended to follow. His course has been projected on 
the map which is a United States naval confidence chart of Pearl 
Harbor corrected and brought up to date as of December 7, 1941. It 
is to be remarked when you see me put this submarine on the ground 
that I am following his track as he laid it down in his chart, which was 
not a correct chart. 

He comes up the channel here to this point ; then he starts almost 
due north. 

Mr. Richardson. Does- this arrow indicate due north? 

[12927] Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4849 

Here he arrives in the vicinity of Hickam Field; this is Hickam 
Field here ; this area here is a naval section base at Bishop Point ; this 
point is Bishop Point. 

Mr. Richardson. Will you indicate where the entrance net is? 

Captain Laytox. The entrance net was here, sir. 

And the course of this midget submarine as he projected it in his 
chart places him almost aground on the corner of Bishop Point ; he 
then was jgoing to proceed on this course to this position and then 
around Ford Island to this position and then to cut across; and notice 
that he cuts across these ships that were anchored there at the time, 
aicross these ships to this position and down here and down here; and 
he goes then under a position which the Nevada has moved to after 
she was underway during the attack and ground herself; and then he 
proceeds on out. 

Actually I can prove, and any naval officer will believe me. that he 
was never inside of Pearl Harbor. That was his intended course. 

Mr. RiciiAKDSON. Then it is your opinion that the chart which has 
sometimes been interjDreted as indicating that he actually entered the 
harbor and made a circuit of the harbor was not correct, and it was 
simply a projection of the course ? 

{12928'\ Captain Layton. It was a projected course and not an 
accomplished course. And, furthermore, the prisoner in interroga- 
tion never said that he went inside of Pearl Harbor. 

As a matter of fact, he still had his torpedoes aboard when 
picked up. 

Mr. Richardson. Where was he picked up ? 

Captain Layton. At Bellows Field, over at Kaneohe Bay. 

Mr. Richardson. Show where the different vessels were. What is 
this channel to the left? 

Captain Layton. This is West Loch. It is not used, as a rule, by 
naval vessels, except ammunition vessels, to unload at the ammunition 
depot over here. 

At the time of the attack the vessel shown here is U. S. S. California. 

At the time of the attack the vessel shown here is the oiler Neosho. 
She got under wa}^ and moved about the harbor. She was full of 
high-test gasoline and was not touched. 

Alongside this mooring is the Maryland and Oklahoma. I beg 
pardon. OMalionna. 

Alongside of this mooring is the Tennessee and West Virginia. 

Alongside of this mooring was the Arizana and t»he repair 
[129^9] ship Vista. The Vista got under way and moved over 
here. 

The Nevada had been in this position, got under way at the time 
of the attack and moved down here. 

These were destroyers. 

This was a hospital ship. Solace. 

This was a destroyer. 

This was the cruiser Phoenix. 

Later two destroyers. 

Tender and destroyers. 

Four destroyers. 

There were four destroyers. 

Here was a crusier, Detroit. 



4850 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Light cruiser Raleigh. 

The old training ship Utah. 

And there was the Tangier. 

Seaplane tender Curtiss was here. 

Medusa^ a repair ship, was here. 

Mine sweeping destroyers were here. 

The ships that moved, the principal ships that moved were the 
vessels from alongside the Arizona, which grounded itself. 

The Nevada moved down here. 

The cruiser Detroit., these four destroyers, part of these destroyers, 
the Phoenix, these two destroyers, one [12930'] destroyer. The 
Solace moved over here. And the Nevada, which I mentioned before. 

I think that covers the high lights. 

Mr. Richardson. Where are the oil supplies ? 

Captain Layton. These are the oil supply tanks of Pearl Harbor, 
and here. There. 

Mr. Richardson. "Where are the beaches where the patrol planes 
were maintained? , 

Captain Layton. The patrol planes, sir? 

Mr. Richardson. Patrol planes. 

Captain Layton. The patrol planes were operating from this sec- 
tion of Ford Island here. 

Mr. Richardson. Where is the airport where the carrier planes 
were? 

Captain Latton. They were in this field here. 

Mr. Richardson. That is Ford Island ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. * 

Mr. Richardson. Nothing further. 

Mr. Keefe. Captain, I understand your testimony to be that you 
communicated the available intelligence to Admiral Kimmel and his 
staff each morning? 

Captain Layton. To Admiral Kimmel each morning; to other 
members of his staff on every two or three- mornings, sometimes every 
other day, depending on their availability and the amount of material 
available for them to see. The [12931] Communication In- 
telligence summaries that I have referred to were mostlv always shown 
to the Chief of Staff and frequently to the Chief of Plans, War Plans, 
and the operations officer. These officers all saw the evaluated in- 
telligence summaries that I also wrote up for the entire staff. 

[12932] Mr. Keefe. In your answers to questions before the 
Hart investigation you stated in substance facts which I assume is 
what you mean to tell us today : 

Q. How often did you communicate the intelligence available, concerning the 
Japanese naval forces, to Admiral Kimmel? 

A. Daily, at about eight-fifteen in the morninir. If subsequent thereto an 
important dispatch was received, generally from Cavite, or if important develop- 
ments took place and reported from local communications intelligence unit, I 
would take it to Admiral Kimmel at the first opportunity he was free. 

Q. Did those daily visits to Commander-in-Chief usually bring forth dis- 
cussions concerning the intelligence? 

A. Yes, sir. A discussion concerning the intelligence submitted and as to 
the Japanese dispositions, intentions, and future operations of the forces con- 
cerned, and a general discussion of the situation in general. 

That is correct ? 

Captain Layton. That is correct, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4851 

Mr. Keefe (reading) : 

Q. Was it usual for any other members of the [12933] Staff or any 
of the Commanders of the Fleet's task forces to be present during those dis- 
cussions? 

A. The Chief of Staff was most always present. On important occasions, the 
senior War Plans OflScer and the senior Operations OflBcer was called in and a 
discussion then held. Often during these discussions I was no longer required 
and was permitted to retire. When Task Force Commanders, who were then 
operating out two weeks and in one week, approximately, would return to port, 
the Admiral would send for me and have me review for the benefit of the Task 
Force Commanders, then in port the situation and developments that had taken 
place during their absence and a general discussion of Japanese potentialities, 
capabilities, strength would ensue. 

Captain Latton. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Tliat is generally the manner that you operated? 

Captain Layton. That is a better general picture than I have told 
orally here because I had a chance to put question marks, punctuation, 
and periods in that testimony. 

Mr. Keefe. And during these discussions you were in the habit of 
expressing your own opinion and estimate as to the situation that 
confronted the commander in chief? 

Captain Latton, Admiral Kimmel encouraged officers to 
[12934] express themselves and I took advantage of that opportu- 
nity to express my own opinions on several occasions. 

Mr. KJEEFE. Now, when messages came in which were considered 
important, there was a general staff discussion as to the meaning and 
intent of that particular message, was there not? 

Captain Layton. There were staff discussions almost every day. 
My participation in the staff discussions was generally of an intelli- 
gence nature, such as briefing the staff on the situation as developed 
and giving them the picture so they would not have to read a lot of 
material. Then I would be allowed to retire while they discussed 
specific phases, particularly regarding the war plans. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now, did you have a liaison with the Army 
through the person of Col. Edwin Raley ? 

Captain Layton. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. He was appointed by the G-2 of the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment ? 

Captain Layton. I understood that at the time, Mr. Keefe. He 
came to me in the middle of 1941 and said he wanted to establish a 
liaison with the fleet. 

Mr. Keefe. Ye&. 

Captain Layton. I told him that I was delighted and thereafter I 
saw Colonel Raley from time to time. Shortly [129S5] there- 
after the B-17's were to be flown to Australia and the Philippines 
and I furnished him all the information I had available of weather 
or bases, including some secret information from the Dutch that we 
had received regarding the air bases in Dutch territory that could 
be used. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, in any event there was complete, direct, friendly 
and intimate and almost daily liaison with the Army through the 
officers that had been appointed by the G-2 in the presence of Colonel 
Raley? 

Captain Layton. Colonel Raley and I saw one another on an 
average of maybe twice a week in late October and I am sure at least 



4852 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

three times a week or more often in late November of 1941. Our liaison 
was so good — I mean by good, I could get together with his liaison 
officer. His assistant reported to me, to my desk the morning of the 
attack and remained there for some 18 hours so that liaison would 
be intimate and correct. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, I want to get this one fact clear, that so far as the 
relations in matters of intelligence between the Army and Navy at 
Pearl Harbor you had an intimate and a direct and a constant rela- 
tionship. 

Captain Layton, I did, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And j^ou transferred, as I understand it, to the Army 
through their liaison oiftcer Colonel Raley the im- [129S6] por- 
tant information that you thought the Army should have ? 

Captain Layton. I had to dress it down from some of its very 
secret action. I could not tell him the sources and because I was under 
oath I went a little further than my oath allowed. 

Mr. Keefe. I see. 

Captain Layton. But Admiral Kimmel knew I was doing it. I had 
his permission to make and give Colonel Raley a little more than you 
could under the oath that I was under obligation to. I would not tell 
him how it came about we knew these things, but I would inform him of 
the general details. He knew of this December 1 message — he did not 
know it was a message — regarding the plot by the Japanese to force 
the British to invade Thailand so that the Thais could call the British 
the aggressor and then call on the Japanese to come and help them 
out. He knew that. 

Mr. Keefe. You did not have this message which has been intro- 
duced in evidence here, or discuss that one, the so-called plotting mes- 
sage, by which the Japs sought to plot Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Layton. Unfortunately, Mr. Keefe, it was not transmitted 
to the commander in chief. United States Pacific Fleet. 

Mr. Keefe. And some other things were not communicated 
[12937] to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet. 

Captain Layton. I think Exhibit 1 

Mr. Keefe. Which were considered important. 

Captain Layton. I think Exhibit 1 covers most of those, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, j^ou made a statement a few moments ago in re- 
sponse to Senator Ferguson's question, that about 2 years after Pearl 
Harbor, when you learned that you had been short-changed, you were 
very much upset and disturbed. 

Captain Layton. I was outraged, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You said you were outraged? 

Captain Layton. I still am, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, will you explain that just a little more, Captain ? 

Captain Layton. Perhaps my outrage, being 2 years after Pearl 
Harbor, is hindsight, but throughout this war I have been the fleet 
intelligence officer and the combat intelligence officer and directly 
charged with informing our forces at sea with all pertinent informa- 
tion of the Japanese dispositions or intentions or anything else that 
had to do with our forces and for their own safety, had I been negli- 
gent for 1 minute and not informed our forces of things which should 
be known, I w ould have been court-martialed and possibly shot and 
deserved it. That, of course, was during the war. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4853 

[129oS] Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now, I have before me an affidavit 
of Col. Edward W. Raley, who at the time of making this affidavit 
was at Langiey Field, Va., and who was allegedly sworn by Henry C. 
Clausen, and in this affidavit Colonel Ealey says this : 

On 7 December 1941 and for about one year preceding I was G-2, Hawaiian 
Air Foi'ce. Sliortly after i'.ssnming these duties, I establislied for purposes of 
the Hawaiian Air Force, some form of contact with the Navy, through then 
Connuander Laytou, U. S. N. 

I close the quote there and I want to inquire: From this affidavit 
it would appear that Colonel Raley is drawing a distinction between 
G-2 of the Army and G-2 of the Hawaiian Air Force, 

Captain Latton. There is a distinction, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you understand that that was his capacity when 
he contacted you ? 

Captain Layton. I knew that he was the G-2 of the Hawaiian Air 
Force. When he came to establish his liaison I imderstood that he 
was coming as Army liaison, without distinguishing in my mind G-2, 
Hawaiian Department, or G-2, Hawaiian Air Force. He did, how- 
ever, say, and I agreed with him, to the effect that this liaison was 
an ideal one insofar as the Navy and the Air Force were offensive 
weapons while the Hawaiian Depart- [120o9] ment was a 
defense garrison, and, therefore, our liaison should be good and 
intimate, and Ave thereafter carried on that liaison. 

Mr. KJEEFE. I am quoting again from his affidavit : 

I told Commander Layton that my contact was for the Hawaiian Air Force. 
During this period of about one year I had not more than six conversations 
with Commander Layton concerning tlie subiect of my contact. These conversa- 
tions were spread out during this period. As nearly as I can recall the last 
conversation I had with Commander Layton before 7 December 1941 was about 
October 1941, 

The information given me by Commander Layton was my only Navy source. 
He stated that if there was any Navy movement by .Japan coming to his 
knowledge, and which might imperil the Hawaiian Islands, he would inform 
me. The only specific information he gave me in this regard were studies he 
made of a possible Japanese Malay hostility and of Japanese fleet installations 
in the Mandates. I believe this was at least two months before 7 December 
1941. 

Any information I received from CJcmmander Layton I promptly gave to my 
Commanding General, General Martin. 

On 1 October 1941 I conferred with Commander Lay- [129JfO] ton and 
Colonel Bicknell, who was the Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, concei'ning 
a conclusion I had reached that hostilities with Japan was possible within a 
short time or any moment. They apparently shared my view. I reported this 
to General Martin. Attached are portions of a letter, written by me to my 
daughter on 2 October 1941, concerning this conference. 

Now I want to get this straightened out because the colonel's affi- 
davit is liere in the record for what it is worth: I have had no chance, 
or no one on the committee has had any chance to examine Col. 
Edward Raley, but I would like to get the exact liaison that existed 
between you and the Army out there at Hawaii and if I am to read his 
affidavit correctly, he states that he was merely representing the 
Hawaiian Air Force and that he reported to the commanding gen- 
eral of the Hawaiian Air Force, General Martin. 

Now, to a layman this is difficult to understand. It perhaps ex- 
plains some of the reasons why Pearl Harbor occurred. 

Now, I understand your story to be that there was complete 
friendly relations and almost daily liaison with the Army officer. 



4854 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

He says he did not have over six conversations in a year and the last 
one was in October' 1941, before Pearl Harbor. Now, that raises a 
question of fact. If I ^m to consider Colonel Raley's affidavit at all, 
I have got to [12941] appraise it in connection with the testi- 
mony that you have given to the committee. Do you understand the 
purpose of my questions ? 

Captain Lattox. Mr. Keefe, my testimony that I gave you here 
is the facts and I am sure in my heart that if Col. Edward Raley — 
I think I called him Edwin before — were to testify here he would 
say exactly what I have said or words to that effect. Now, I would 
like to point out one thing. His affidavit was made 

Mr. Keefe. I will give you the date. It was made the 11th of 
March 1945. 

Captain Laytox. Perhaps his memory has slipped him on that but 
he referred to a Japanese attack on Malay, didn't he? 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Captain Layton. And maj^ I point out that Ambassador Subo- 
kimo's dispatch received by CINCPAC on December 1 was the thing 
that I testified to as having told him and which he in turn refers to 
as having been told him here. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Captain Layton. That would indicate that I saw him some time 
after November 30, wouldn't it? 

Mr. Keefe. It would indicate that you saw him after October at 
least, Captain. 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

[1294^] Mr. Keefe. Well, I want to say to you and I am glad 
to say so for the purposes of the record 

Captain Layton. I would like to continue if I may, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Oh, yes. Pardon me. 

Captain Layton. I am sure that Colonel Raley in making this 
affidavit had a bad memory or his recollection was not too good. He 
has always been a personal friend of mine and I know that if he were 
to stand here I could recollect things to him. 

For example, as I recall the Army-Navy game was played on Satur- 
day, the 29th of November 1941. He invited myself and my assist- 
ant. Commander Hudson, to join him at the Officers' Club at Hickam 
Field the evening before that game. We had a little conversation 
and I took him outside the club, out onto the veranda away from ears, 
to tell him what was the latest developments at that time in my office 
and again impressed him with what I considered the seriousness of 
the situation. I am sure that Colonel Raley will remember that and 
I believe that his attitude at that time was one of not considering the 
importance of this matter as you have brought it up, or of the recol- 
lection of the matters that I have brought up. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, I do not want to be prejudging anyone, but the 
testimony that you have given here so far as I am [12943] con- 
cerned has a ring of complete sincerity and truth in it and it has im- 
pressed me just exactly that way. But, of course, this committee has 
got to try to understand this testimony and reconcile the differences 
that exist as best we can. That is what I am trying to do. 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KJEEFE. It is going to be a difficult job as we go along and see 
these differences that crop out in this testimony. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4855 

Well, now, in your testimony before Admiral Hart you stated: 

I want to say this : I had all the information of intelligence sources, and I 
had spent all of my time trying to evaluate these jig-saw puzzle pieces to make 
the true picture of events to come, and I think I was as surprised as anyone 
when the Japanese attacked the following morning. 

Captain Layton. That is correct, sir. However, I was not given 
a lot of pieces of this jig-saw puzzle. All the pieces I had made a 
pretty good picture and when you work as I have in Intelligence I can 
say it is nothing more than piecing up pieces that do not belong to a 
jigsaw and pieces that do belong to jigsaw until you form a framework. 
Then you try to complete the framework of a puzzle until you get 
[1£944] enough to show you what your complete picture is. 
Unfortunately, there were other sets of jigsaw puzzles that went with 
this one that were not given us, so all 1 could do was use what I had 
and I was surprised. 

Mr. Keefe. In other words. Captain, am I correct in saying this, 
that to me your testimony means that you had a pretty good mosaic 
or a jigsaw worked out and put together from what information was 
available to you and that information indicated that there was going 
to be war but that it would take place in its initial phases, at least, 
way off to the southwest, is that right ? 

Captain Layton. That is correct, sir, backed additionally by the 
past experience of the previous Japanese task force movement to 
French Indochina, which took place and which was backed up by 
diplomatic intercept dispatches to us to inform us as to the nature 
of these ultimatums as to what the Japanese were going to do, which 
they did. 

Here again we have the same build-up, we have a possibility, we 
get everything that Washington gives us with that and so our jigsaw 
puzzle as we make it looked pretty good at that time. As a matter of 
fact, it looked good in Washington. 

Mr. Keei^e. Well, now, you had in that jigsaw puzzle this war warn- 
ing message of the 27th • 

Captain Layton. That is correct, sir. 

[1£&4^] Mr. Keefe (continuing). Did you not? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Let me ask you this : Not having ever been an intelli- 
gence officer and not too intelligent in any respect connected with this 
whole business, I would like to have you tell me this because you are 
one witness that we have had here who talks plainly and frankly and 
you know what you are talking about, you know your business : 

Is it possible in interpreting the actions of men in the armed services 
charged with responsibility to judge their conduct by any one par- 
ticular message such as this war warning message of the 27th of No- 
vember, or must you judge that message in connection with all the 
other intelligence and all the other information that is available to 
the commander in the field ? 

Captain Layton. It has been my experience, limited as it may be, 
that certain commanders write certain messages in certain ways. 
I believe that certain commanders under them know what their com- 
mander means by the' way he writes his message. I do not think — 
other than that, I do not believe I can comment. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, I might say to you that a very high-ranking of- 
ficer in the intelligence field and who has not yet been a witness here 



4856 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

but whose affidavit appears in this [1^04^] so-called Clausen 
file, I have had a chance to talk with at some length and the con- 
clusion that I have gotten from that man was that you cannot pick 
out of intelligence any one single message and say that is the message 
which determines the responsibility of a commander in the field. 

Take a man situated exactly as Kimmel was or as Short was : Kim- 
mel gets this so-called war warning message and the implications have 
been that that ought to be sufficient to warn anybody to go out and do 
certain things, execute a suitable defensive deployment of his ships 
when he also has an order before him, war plan 46, which required 
him to attack, spearhead an attack into the Marshalls. 

Now, the point is, can I, as one attempting to evaluate this picture 
look at that one war warning message of the twenty-seventh and dis- 
regard all the other information and all of the other wires and all 
the other orders that might affect his decision as to what to do? That 
is what I am struggling with in my mind, trying to get it straightened 
out. 

Captain Layton. Any conunancler who took only one message and 
based his course of action on one message would most likely be re- 
lieved of his command because his guess most likely would be wrong. 

I have a file here and here of probably 50 messages from Chinese 
sources and diplomatic sources, I mean consuls [1294'^] and as- 
sistant naval attaches, Chiang Kai-shek's representative, and so forth, 
saying that the Japanese are positively going to invade Russia next 
week. I did not take any of this to be factual until something else 
backs it up. You have to have all these things and intelligence must 
be backed up by something else. That is what makes the jig-saw 
puzzle. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. Having all these messages and finally here 
is a message comes through which I believe in your statement before 
the Hart committee, before Admiral Hart, you said was the first 
message of its kind you had ever seen? 

Captain Laytox. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. A war warning message ? 

Captain Layton. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. It would be striking, it would be called to the attention 
of anybody, wouldn't it ? 

Captain Layton. It would, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, that m.essage must have been discussed out there, 
and I believe the evidence here shows that it was discussed in the staff 
meetings of Admiral Kimmel. 

Captain Layton. There was a staff meeting that afternoon and eve- 
ning, yes. I was drafting a paraphrase for delivery to General Short. 
As a matter of fact, I had a draft — I had to draft three paraphrases 
before I found one that carried the picture right without destroying it. 

[1'204S] When I took it to Admiral Kimmel's cabin there were 
discussions going on at the time. There were about half a dozen of 
our higher echelon staff in there. At that time the chief of staff of 
the Fourteenth Naval District brought General Short's message from 
the War Department over there and gave it to Admiral Kimmel. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, then, you found difficulty, as far as the staff v.'as 
concerned, in determining what to do, all discussing the message that 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4857 

came from Marshall to Short and here is a message from their Chief 
of Naval Operations to Kimmel. 

Now, we are sitting here on this committee judging by hindsight 
what men should have done. They were faced out there with the situa- 
tion as it was on the 7th of December and I am trying to put myself in 
that position. 

Now, there were a lot of distinguished men on that staff, were there 
not? 

Captain Latton. I thought so, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Very able men? 

Captain Layton. I am sure of that, sir. ^ 

Mr. Keefe. Did you participate in any of those discussions with 
respect to this war warning message ? 

Captain Layton. No, I did not, sir. I was busy making this para- 
phrase and thereafter I was told to get it to General Short. I was 
not in on the discussions of the war warning [1204^] message. 

Mr. Kj:efe, Well, in any event. Captain Layton, so far as you were 
concerned, with available to you all of the information that had come 
out there to Admiral Kimmel — you knew of all of it, didn't you ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You were the one that supplied him with the informa- 
tion? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. You were utterly and completely surprised at this at- 
tack the moment that it came ? 

Captain Layton. I was, sir, very. 

Mr. Keefe. But I understand your testimony to be that had you had 
the information that Washington had, which they did not send out 
there, then a situation might well have arisen in your mind ? 

Captain Layton. That is hindsight, sir, but I feel confident that had 
we had all that material, particularly those main intercepts from the 
consul and from Foreign Minister Togo to the consul telling him to 
make reports even when there wasn't anything to report, I think there 
would have been an entirely different situation there, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, you people out there knew that the Japs were 
destroying their codes and orders went out from [12950'] Wash- 
ington here to go to our outlying possessions for them to destroy their 
codes ; you knew that, didn't you ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That simply confirmed the fact that war was going to 
start ; isn't that true ? 

Captain Layton. It did to me, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. But so far as the information which you had of the 
places where the war was going to start it led you all to believe that 
it was going to start out in the Far East ; is that right ? 

Captain Layton. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And that is why everybody was surprised when it 
started with an attack on Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Layton. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, when you made the statement that you did a little 
while ago, if I understand you correctly, you felt outraged and still 
feel outraged because of the fact that you were not supplied with the 
information which you now feel had you had it at that time would 

79716 — 46— pt. 10 18 



4858 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

have given you people out there an entirely different picture of the 
situation ? 

Captain Layton. I feel very confident of that, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, the funny part of it is, Captain, from all the 
witnesses that have been here before this committee in the higher 
echelons in Washington, everyone of them [129ol] were sur- 
prised, from the Commander in Chief on down apparently, that 
there was any attack on Pearl Harbor. Nobody expected an attack 
on Pearl Harbor apparently, those in Washington here who had all 
this information. You have read the testimony, I assume, or heard it ? 

CaptainJL(AYTON. I have heard a good part of it, yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. You got that impression, did you not ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. There are only two witnesses who differ in that respect 
and I think I am right in that, I have been trying to follow this thing 
carefully. One is Admiral Turner and the other is Captain Zacharias ; 
they were the only two witnesses, and Zacharias' testimony was in 
the form of a sort of prophecy. Admiral Turner seemed to be the 
only one that had any idea that there might be any possibility of an 
attack on Pearl Harbor. 

Now, was there anybody out there that you knew out at Pearl Harbor 
that had any idea that there was a likelihood of an attack at that 
point ? 

Captain Laytox. I feel very positive that there was no one there 
that was not as surprised as I was. I feel confident also that had 
anyone predicted this attack coming that something would have been 
done. 

[lS9o2] Mr. Keefe. Well, Captain, you say that in view of 
the fact that this book that has been referred to here several times 
by some Jap, that some Jap wrote predicting the possibility of an 
attack on Pearl Harbor — you were all familiar with that, were 
you not ? 

Captain Layton. I translated it, sir. 

]\Ir. Keefe. You translated it ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That had all been presented to Kimmel and his staff 
and evaluated, was it not? 

Captain Layton. That was a book dealing with the movements or 
possible actions of the Japanese Fleet after the outbreak of war. It 
did not predict a surprise attack before war and it was one of many of 
their courses of action. 

Mr. Keefe. I see. 

Captain Layton. I do not mean to say for a minute that the Japa- 
nese did not have the Pearl Harbor raid as a potentiality, but it was 
not by itself, in my own mental estimate, made as a capability, capa- 
bility being differentiated in the military sense as something that they 
can and will do under the proper circumstances. The Japanese proved 
that it was a capability. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, in your testimony before Admiral Hart you made 
this comment, Captain : 

[1295S] I have one matter which I think should be properly included in the 
record. Admiral Kimmel, as I mentioned before, always consulted with his 
Task Force Commanders, District Commandant, on the war warning for instance, 
and had with them, many times in my hearing, a complete, free, and frank dis- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4859 

cussiou of the situation, and asked and received their opinions regarding it. 
I frequently took messages of secret, ultra-secret, and confidential nature to these 
Commanders on their Flagships on specific occasions as there was on Saturday 
morning, 6 December, when the report I have mentioned from CiuC Asiatic Fleet, 
giving the sightings of the Japanese naval and auxiliaries units in the Gulf of 
Siam and Camranh bay by CinCAF forces. I took that to Admiral Pye on his 
Flagship, the California, and there again a complete and free discussion took 
place as to what all this meant, not only this message but others they had seen 
and discussed. That was the only place that I recall as having said positively 
that the movement into the Gulf of Siam was, I considered, very significant and 
that the only problem remaining was whether or not they would leave us op 
their flank as a menace or take us out on the way down. 

That meant the Philippines and Guam, did it not ? 
{1295Ii,'\ Captain Latton. That is right, sir. 
Mr. Keefe (reading) : 

Admiral Pye and his Chief of Staff told me their opinion was that the Japanese 
would not attack us. When I returned the message to the files, Admiral Kimmel 
asked me what they said. I repeated their conversations in abbreviated form. 
On other occasions, other Admirals expressed apprehension as to the status of 
the Asiatic Fleet and our forces in the Asiatic waters, and were very anxious 
regarding the situation, indicating that they were not convinced that Japan 
could by-pass our Philippine flank. 

Now, is that a fair statement of the situation, Captain ? 
Captain Layton. That is a very fair statement of the situation as 
I saw it then and as I see it now. 
Mr. Keefe. You further said : 

It was my personal opinion that the thought of attack on Pearl Harbor at that 
time was very far from most people's minds. 

Captain Latton. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And you made that statement before Admiral Hart in 
the face of the fact that you were the fleet intelligence officer? 

Captain Layton. That is right, sir. 

[129551 Mr. Kj:efe. And had all of the available information 
that came to Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Layton. That is correct, sir, 

Mr. Keefe. And were the individual who discussed it with the 
commander in chief, Admiral Kimmel, and with the commanders of 
his task forces ? 

Captain Layton. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Who were Admiral Halsey and Admiral Newton, I 
believe. 

Captain Layton. Admiral Brown and Admiral Halsey and Admiral 
Pye were the three task force commanders. 

Mr. Keefe. Oh, yes. 

Captain Layton. Admiral Newton was a subordinate of Admiral 
Brown, I believe. 

Mr. Keeit:. I think perhaps that is right. My recollection is that 
Admiral Newton was in command of this task force in which the 
carrier 

Captain Layton. That is correct. On the movement just before 
December 7 Admiral Newton was put in command of that task unit 
or group because part of the force went to Johnston Island for land- 
ing-force exercises, so the reference to that as a task force as I have 
there would be a misnomer. 



4860 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. Now, you further made this statement. I would like 
to have this in the record and have you confirm it [12956] to 
this committee and in this record. This question was asked you : 

Q. Do you recall your own reaction to the phrase concerning war warning in 
the Department's dispatch of 27 November? 

A. As it was the first dispatch that I had ever seen saying "This is a war 
warning". I took particular note of it. I thought it over considerably. Mean- 
while, its subconscious impression was that it certainly fitted the picture up 
to date, and that we would be at war shortly if Japan would decide to leave her 
Philippine flank open and proceed southward, hoping, meanwhile, to mollify us 
through a compromise deaf with Kurusu-Nomura negotiations. It made me feel 
that the picture we had was a good picture, and perhaps complete, and that the 
times were very critical and perhaps the Department hoped for a last minute 
compromise in view of their statement that nothing should be done to aggravate 
an already serious situation. I saw the Army that evening take their condition 
of readiness, trucks moving, troops moving, and I thought I saw weapons moving 
in the street and I presumed that they were going into full condition of readiness, 
including the emplacement of anti-aircraft and other mobile weapons around 
Pearl Harbor and other im- [1295T] portant points on Oahu. 

Is that a fair statement ? 

Captain Layton. That is a correct statement except one typographi- 
cal error or else you may have misread it there where it was leaving 
the Philippines on the flank. I think it would be more properly not 
leaving the Philippines on the flank. In other words, as it was stated 
there, as I understood it, if it was leaving them on their flank they 
wouldn't bother us and go in there but I was apprehensive that if there 
was they would not leave us on our flank and proceed southward from 
the Philippines in their southward movement, and that they would 
attack the Philippines along with the Malay barrier. 

Mr. Keefe. You think that the word "not" should be in there? 

Captain Layton. I think so. It would make better sense. 

Mr. Keefe. I had better read it again as it does make sense to me : 

Meanwhile, its subconscious impression was that it certainly fitted the picture 
up to date, and that we would be at war shortly if Japan would decide to leave 
her Philippine flank open and proceed southward, hoping meanwhile to mollify 
us throught a compromise deal via Kurusu-Nomura negotiations. 

You think it should read, "If Japan would decide not [12958] 
to leave her Philippine flank open and proceed southward" ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. "Hoping meanwhile to mollify us through a com- 
promise deal via Kurusu-Nomura negotiations." 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir ; that would read better. 

Mr. KJEEFE. That is the way that that ought to be corrected ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That is quite important. 

Captain, where are you stationed now? 

Captain Layton. lam still attached to the stafi^ of the commander 
in chief. Pacific Fleet. Upon the conclusion of this testimony and 
return to the west coast I hope to be detached for new duty. 

Mr. Keefe. Detached what? 

Captain Layton. For a reassignment, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. I see. 

Captain Layton. I have been on one job too long, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, that is another thing, Captain, that bothers 
me. I don't know whether other members of the committee have 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4861 

been bothered or not but I want to ask you because I value your opinion. 

There seems to be an attitude that a man who is attached to Intel- 
ligence, which is to me a highly specialized field of [12959] 
activity, does not have very much to look forward to in the line of 
promotion ; that in order to meet the attitudes of the examining boards 
he must leave the field of intelligence and go to sea and get sea duty 
and all that sort of thing and thus we have the situation where you are 
writing to McCollum here at Washington asking him to leave out at 
Honolulu two men who are experts in their field and whom you wanted 
there for the purpose of building up and maintaining the highest 
state of efficiency in intelligence and the answer comes back that, "Well, 
sorry, but they have got other plans. They have got to go to sea 
in order to meet the tests of sea duty," and all that sort of thing. 

Captain Layton. That is true, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, is that a situation that persists in the Navy ? 

The Vice Chairman. That is the law. 

Mr. Keefe. What? 

The Vice Chairman. That is the law. 

Captain Latton. The law is that you must go to sea and you must 
perform your duties in an outstanding and highly able manner be- 
cause, you see, there is selection to promotion. 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Captain Layton. If you do not have a record that shows what you 
have been doing and have commanded ships at sea and [12960'\ 
have been a sailor you cannot be promoted to higher grade. That 
is the law. McCollum was only trying to protect his officers because 
if he had left Birtley, for example, over at Pearl Harbor he wouldn't 
show the sea service on his record. Wlien he came up for selection 
he would be passed over and he would not get his promotion. 

Mr. Keefe. All right. Captain, I will betray my ignorance some but 
I want to know about it. You say it is the law, that is a congressional 
act. Do you understand it to be a law of Congi*ess ? 

Captain Layton. Maybe" I overstepped ^ 

Mr. Keefe. Or a rule or regulation of the Navy? 

Captain Layton. I think that is, you might say, a law by doctrine. 
I can say only that I am not prepared to give testimony of that sort. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, this committee is bound to make some recommen- 
dations to the Congress and if that is the law I would like to know 
about it. If it is a law passed by the Congress governing the Army 
and Navy, that is one thing, but if it is a rule and regulation and prac- 
tice and tradition of the service, that is another thing. 

The Vice Chairman. Will you yield there? 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

[12961'] The Vice Chairman. My recollection is Admiral Stark 
testified here that it is a law passed by Congress. 

. Captain Layton. He is in a much better position to know than I, sir. 
I have been doing nothing but intelligence work for a long time and I 
haven't paid any attention to the regulations other than that pertain 
to intelligence and I must confess my ignorance on that subject. 

Mr. Keefe. On the other side of the picture we are confronted with 
a situation where you take a man off a ship who is an outstanding line 
officer and drag him into Washington to head up the Naval Intelligence 
Service 1 month before Pearl Harbor. 



4862 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Layton. It is true^that- 



Mr. Keefe. a man that never had any previous experience in the 
field of intelligence. That is the other side of the picture. 

Captain Layton. I believe it is true, sir, that intelligence as a line 
of endeavor with the Navy has not.been in the past thoroughly apprec- 
iated. I believe as a result of this war, however, there is a very high 
appreciation among many of the high-ranking officers and certainly 
those who were at sea in commanding task forces would value that in- 
telligence during this war, both in the Atlantic and the Pacific. 

[1B962~\ Mr. Keefe. Well, the reason for my asking those ques- 
tions is in line with some that have been asked heretofore, that it is 
quite difficult for me to understand, when we spent the money that has 
been spent by the United States Government in training people as Jap- 
anese language experts — you have been trained as a Japanese lan- 
guage expert ; is that correct ? 

Captain Layton. I trained as Japanese-language expert and was 
also assistant naval attache. 

Mr. Keefe. So you would be competent in the field of intelligence, 
isn't that true, in the Pacific area ? 

Captain Layton. I believe that is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, the evidence here is that they had such limited 
numbers of people in the Navy to do this sort of work, and yet it is 
the most outstanding type of work and most necessary work, perhaps, 
that has to be done, and I came to the impression that the men would 
sort of shy away from it because when their name comes up for selec- 
tion they know when they are in intelligence they get passed up. 

I don't know whether this committee will do anything about it or 
not, but it may desire to make some recommendation to the Congress, 
or to the Navy with reference to that. 

That is why I asked these questions, because I have been impressed 
with the fact that there is a lot of work that could [W9<6S] have 
been better coordinated in this field of intelligence prior to Pearl 
Harbor. 

That is all. 

The Vice Chairman. Captain, let me ask you a question or two, if I 
may, please, sir. 

You were the fleet intelligence officer at Pearl Harbor on the 1st of 
December 1941 ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. And had been or a year or more ? 

Captain Layton. I reported on December 7, 1940, 1 year to a day 
before the atttack. 

The Vice Chairman. And as I understood you to say, you were not 
present at the staff meetings that were held about the war-warning 
message. 

Captain Layton. I was not an active member. I walked into the 
admiral's cabin during the process of these meetings to show him the 
paraphrase of the war- warning message that I had drawn up to de- 
liver to General Short and to receive his approval of this paraphrase. 

I was in there while the chief of staff of the Fourteenth Naval Dis- 
trict brought in General Short's warning message that he received 
from the War Department, and I remained there while there was a dis- 
cussion among other staff members of this. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4863 

[139641 I was not directly asked to and I did not venture an 
opinion. 

The Vice Chairman. You did not give any opinion? 

Captain Layton. At that time, I did not feel it was proper, sir. 

I do not think I could have added anything to the opinions already 
being given, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Then you did not attend and participate? 

Captain Layton. No, sir, I did not attend and participate. I was 
an intruder. 

The Vice Chairman. You did not participate in the staff meeting 
with respect to the war-warning message ? 

Captain Layton. That is right, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, what messages were in Washington that 
you did not have at Pearl Harbor that would have caused you to an- 
ticipate the attack on Pearl Harbor ? 

Captain Layton. I did not want to give the impression that by 
afterthought and hindsight I could look at a book of these messages 
and pick out some and show them to you, and state what they would 
have meant to me. Offliand, I think the bomb plot would have been 
important. I am sure the messages that were passed in the latter 
part of November from Kita, the consul in Honolulu, to Tokyo, plus 
the [1^965] request from Togo to Kita for information on our 
fleet moving in and out, plus a message I have seen about, I believe, 
balloon barrages were not being used, I think were all important. 

I have not gone over Exhibit 1, sir. I have not read it in detail. 
I merely have heard these things here in this room and have been 
impressed. I did read some of the messages that are now in Exhibit 
1, 2 years after Pearl Harbor, when I first learned that they had them. 

The Vice Chairman. Are you familiar with the list of messages 
listed in Admiral Kimmel's statement to this committee? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir ; I read that statement, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. You read his statement? 

Captain Layton. I have read his statement ; yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Before he presented it here? 

Captain Layton. No, sir; I read the statement about, oh, about a 
month ago, I think, sir, and again 3 or 4 days ago. 

The Vice Chairman. I see. 

Now, of those messages listed by him as being important, that he 
should have had in Hawaii, do you agree with him in his conclusion in 
that respect ? 

Captain Layton. I agree with the statements that he made there re- 
garding these messages, yes. sir. I think it [12966] would 
have assisted considerably. I think probably, as I recall it, the one 
from Berlin outlining the conversations that had been held with 
Ribbentrop and Hitler, and the one from Rome in which the Japanese 
Ambassador outlined his conversation with Mussolini, they clearly 
indicated that the Axis were talking to one another regarding a war 
with the Anglo-Saxons, which was then very imminent. 

The Vice Chairman. Would any of those messages listed by Ad- 
miral Kimmel indicate an attack on Pearl Harbor ? 

Captain Layton. I do not believe any of them would have indi- 
cated definitely an attack on Pearl Harbor, unless you take them all 



4864 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

together, and discover that Pearl Harbor is the only geographical loca- 
tion in all the magic intercepts wherein there was increasing interest 
along toward the latter part of November, keeping in mind the in- 
formation we had from intercepts of their traffic, which indicated also 
a naval interest. 

It is another one of these things. I cannot say now that I would 
have been able to say, "Admiral they are going to take Pearl Harbor." 
I did not mean to give that impression. 

I mean to say it was a sort of jigsaw puzzle, that, when fitted to- 
gether, fell into a common pattern. 

The Vice Chaieman. It is a fact, Captain, that none of [1^967] 
the messages mentioned by Admiral Kimmel in his statement, except 
the so-called bomb-plot message refers to Pearl Harbor. Is that 
true? 

Captain Layton. I would have to review the statement very care- 
fully to make a definite answer. 

The Vice Chairman. You do not recall now ? 

Captain Layton. I do not recall now, but I thought there were 
a couple that referred to the movement of ships in and out, or the 
anchorage of ships, that referred to area C, and area A, Malama 
Harbor. 

The Vice Chairman. It is my recollection of all the list of mes- 
sages mentioned by Admiral Kimmel in his statement, none of them 
referred to Pearl Harbor, except the so-called bomb-plot message. 

Mr. Gearhart. Will the gentleman yield ? 

The Vice Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. There were five or six messages that had to do 
with the ships' movements to which the witness just referred. There 
was one message dividing Pearl Harbor into five areas. 

The Vice Chairman. That is the so-called bomb-plot message. 

Mr. Gearhart. And other messages calling for reports on ship 
movements, and calling upon Honolulu for reports [12968] 
even when there were no ship-movement messages. 

Captain Layton. Those are the ones I referred to, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. The so-called bomb-plot message is the one 
dividing Pearl Harbor into five areas. You are familiar with that? 

Captain Layton. I recall having seen that here ; yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. My recollection is that is the only one that 
directly refers to Pearl Harbor, and I believe you substantially agree 
with me in that respect. 

Captain Layton, Except those that refer to the movements in and 
out of Pearl Harbor ; yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Now, Captain you say you kept the Army 
officials in Pearl Harbor completely advised as to all the intelligence 
you had? 

Captain Layton. I do not believe I said that, Senator. I said that 
I kept Colonel Raley of the Hawaiian Air Force, who established 
Army liaison with me rather fully informed as to the general situation 
and as to some of the details of the Japanese task force, its movements, 
and its implications. I did not for a minute intend to say that I had 
contacts with General Fielder, then Colonel Fielder. I stated in my 
affidavit to Colonel Clausen that inasmuch as [12969] Colonel 
Raley was an Army liaison, I saw no reason to establish a liaison with 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4865 

Fielder, and if Fielder for 1 minute was not satisfied with what he 
was getting from Washington — and I did not know that he was getting 
anything, or nothing — then, he could certainly establish liaison with 
me. 

The Vice Chairman. Wlio was your opposite number in the Army 
in Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Layton. May I take a minute to explain what the intelli- 
gence functions were? I think I can rather straighten out a little 
doubt in the minds of the committee. 

When I joined there, we were afloat. It had been the habitual prac- 
tice and doctrine in the Xavy that when the fleet desires liaison with 
shore-based authorities, whether they be public or private services, 
or the Army or the FBI, we made this liaison through the naval dis- 
trict intelligence officer in the place where we were. 

My liaison through the Army official was, therefore, through Captain 
Mayfield, the district intelligence officer at Honolulu who was attached 
to Admiral Bloch's organization. 

There were meetings between the Army and FBI and himself 
every week or more. I attended one of them shortly after I reported, 
just to let them know I was there, and to say [12970] that 
I was willing to cooperate in all matters. But for anyone to imply 
that I had to search out and find an opposite number, or that the 
G-2 of the Hawaiian Department should be dependent upon me for 
sources of information, is rather unusual, for the simple reason the 
Army and Navy in Washington have close agreement, and have 
worked in close liaison for years in intelligence, that the Navy passed 
it down and disclosed it to the Army and the Army disclosed it to the 
Navy, and in case there was an occasion in which we wanted to con- 
sult one another in the field, we consulted then with each other in 
the field. 

Now, it is doctrine in the Army that if you do not know, and the 
same applies to the Navy, that if you do not know what you have, 
or that you want more than you already have, then you go and ask 
somebody else for it. 

Had Colonel Fielder come to m^ and said, "I want some informa- 
tion," I could give him the same amount in a paraphrased form with- 
out revealing the source, had I had Admiral Kimmel's permission. 
He did not do so. 

Tlie Vice Chairman. So you did not give it to him? 

Ciptain Latton. Well, he not being there I could not very well 
giv( c to him, sir. 

1 ! Vice Chairman. All right. 

^ .s Colonel Fielder your opposite number in the Army? 

I ',971] Captain Layton. I would not say he was my opposite 
nu 3er in the Army, because the fleet might move from Pearl Harbor, 
sa\ CO San Francisco, for example, and then my opposite over there 
would be another person. 

The Vice Chairman. All right ; I just want to try to get to the point 
and not take up too much time. 

You were the intelligence officer of the Pacific Fleet? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Who was the intelligence officer of tlie Ha- 
waiian Department of the Army? 



4866 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Layton. Colonel Field, then Colonel Fielder. 

The Vice Chairman. Was he your opposite number ? 

Captain Layton. He was the opposite number of the commandant 
Fourteenth Naval District intelligence organization. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you have an opposite number in the 
Army ? 

Captain Layton. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. You did not ? 

Captain Layton. I did not. 

The Vice Chairman. There was not anybody in the Army that you 
were supposed to cooperate with, so far as intelligence is concerned? 

Captain Layton. I would not want to use the word "cooperate,'^ 
sir. I would cooperate with him any minute. It [12972] is 
a question of delineation of the line of command and authority. 

Suppose the Army had set up on Oahu an amphibious force to go 
to sea and land on some island in accordance with the war plan, then 
the G-2 of that organization would be my opposite number, and not 
the G-2 of a local defense garrison. 

The Vice Chairman. So you did not have any opposite number in 
the Army ? 

Captain Layton. I did not have any opposite number in the Army 
in the strict sense of the word, no, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Then j^ou were in the same position as Cap- 
tain Rochefort when he testified here, that he did not give the infor- 
mation lie had to the Army officials, but he sometimes gave it to them 
in paraphrased form, or changed, sanitized form, I believe he said. 

Is that the practice you used ? 

Captain Layton. I gave it to Colonel Raley in the so-called sani- 
tized form. He never knew the source of iniormation, and he was 
requested not to ask and promised never to ask. 

The Vice Chairman. You gave it sanitized form, as did Captain 
Rochef ort ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

[12973] The Vice Chairman. Now, Captain, you of course saw 
the message of November 24 from, the Chief of Naval Operations to 
the commander in chief. Pacific Fleet. 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir; and Admiral Kimmel ordered me to 
take that to General Short in person, which I did. 

The Vice Chairman. You, of course, were entirely familiar with 
that message ? 

Captain Layton. I was, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Did not that give you sufficient knowledge 
about strained relations between the United States and Japan? 

Captain Layton. It did, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Then you also saw the war warning message 
of November 27 ? 

Captain Layton. I did, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. You have testified that that was different in 
form from any message that you had ever seen. 

Captain Layton. The words "This is a war warning" were a shock 
to me, to see it written down. I never saw anything like it before, 
and I was impressed by it. 

The Vice Chairman. You were impressed by it? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4867 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. You considered it to be just what it said, a 
Avar warning? 

[12974-] Captain Latton. It was just exactly that, sir. 

The Vice CnAiRMAisr. Now, you did not consider that an unusual 
expression, "This is a war warning" ? 

Captain Layton. I thought that was very unusual. I never saw 
anything like it before. 

The Vice Ciiaikmax. It impressed you as such ? 

Captain Laytox. Veiy much so, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. There was not anything following in that 
message that nullified that impression in your mind, was there ? 

Captain Latton. I would not say there was anything in that mes- 
sage that nullified that impression. It certainly gave me the idea 
that the Department in Washington had the same concept of the 
situation that we had, insofar as they said Japan was going to make 
an amphibious invasion in the future on the same places that we 
thought, the Philippines. 

The Vice Chairman. Guam ? 

Captain Latton. No, sir; Guam was not mentioned in the war 
warning message, sir. The Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, possibh' 
N. E. I. or possibly Borneo, I believe it was remarked at the time 
that Guam was left out of the second one, while it was mentioned in 
the first one. One person facetiously remarked, "I guess they thought 
Guam was going to fall, anyway, so it would not be worth while to 
put it in." 

[l^dYS] The Vice Chairman. The Philippines were in the mes- 
sage of the 24th ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Did you hear Admiral Hart's testimony here 
today ? 

Captain Layton. I did, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. He thought that meant all the addressees 
should be watching and on guard, and that the Philippines and Guam 
should take special note. 

Captain Layton. I heard the distinguished Admiral's testimony; 
yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. I see. 

Did you agree with the interpretation that he placed on it? 

Captain Latton. Well, I was not able to agree wholly; judging 
today from hindsight, I would say "Yes." 

At that time I was concerned, as I said, with the picture before 
me, with what they said, and it was so definitely related to the Far 
East and it was so easy to put in there, if they had any suspicion of 
Hawaii, "Hawaii," that the thought of Hawaii did not then occur 
to me. 

The Vice Chairman. I see. 

Well, you don't know of anybody in Washington or in Hawaii that 
actually expected the attack on Pearl Harbor [12976'] that 
Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, did you? 

Captain Layton. No, sir; and if I did, I would certainly shake his 
hand, because he would be a good guesser. 

The Vice Chairman. You do not know anybody either in Wash- 
ington or Hawaii that expected that attack? 



4868 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Latton. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Will the gentleman yield? 

The Vice Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. Even the man who wrote it never expected war to 
come in Hawaii, so he could not convey to you a different impression 
than he had himself. Would you expect him to ? 

Captain Latton. It is standard naval procedure that when you tell 
a man something, you tell him what you are thinking and try to pro- 
ject that thought into his mind. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then the correct interpretation of such a message 
is interpreting what he had intended to convey ? 

Captain Layton. Reading the words he put there and trying, with- 
out any great mental gymnastics, to put your mind in the same frame 
his mind was in when he wrote it; had he wanted to put Hawaii in 
he would have put Hawaii in, I am sure, if he was thinking of it. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is correct. And since that time we have had 
the man on the stand who wrote the message, and ^ [12977'] he 
said that he was surprised that war came to Hawaii, and therefore he 
could not attempt to convey to you the impression that he was not 
taken greatly by surprise. 

Does not that sound logical ? 

Captain Latton. That sounds logical to me, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas of Illinois will inquire. Cap- 
tain. 

Senator Lucas. Captain, one or two questions with respect to the 
so-called bomb-plot message. You said hindsight leads you to be- 
lieve that the Japs were talking about Pearl Harbor when they sent 
that message from the standpoint of an attack. 

Can you read into that message any other thing that they were talk- 
ing about, leaving hindsight out? 

Captain Layton. Leaving hindsight out, you can always look into 
a message and find something that is different from your first im- 
pression. 

It is typical of the Japanese that thej desire to keep meticulous 
records on everybody, whether he is a friend or an enemy. 

Senator Lucas. In other words, leaving hindsight out of the pic- 
ture, an individual who was working in the intelligence department, 
either in Washington or Hawaii, in view of the many messages that 
they had had of a similar nature, [12978'] that you just dis- 
cussed, could very well have easily reached the conclusion that you 
just have stated ? 

Captain Layton. Anyone reading that message at the time they 
did, which I believe was sometime around September, was it not, sir ? 

Senator Lucas. I think September 24. 

Captain Latton (continuing). Around September, at that time, 
could have- made the very logical mistake of seeing it only as a 
Japanese flair for listing information, and particularly on the United 
States Pacific Fleet, since we were based there, since April 1940, 
they wanted to Imow how many ships were there, when they went in 
and when they went out. 

I think the word "bomb-plot" message has been applied here. 

[12979'] Senator Lucas, That is correct, it has. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4869 

Captain Layton. I do not intend to insinuate for one minute that 
had I had it I would have known what their intention was. I only 
say had we had that, and some other information, there would at 
least have grown in our minds a suspicion that something was stirring, 
that was growing right under our feet. 

Senator Lucas. You are correct in saying the term "bomb-plot" has 
been applied in this hearing. I think General Mitchell is the one who 
first used the term. 

The situation you have described was especially true, and it became 
more true as time went on. In other words, from September 23 to 
December 7 is some two months and a half. Every day that passed 
after that bomb-plot message the so-called bomb-plot message, with- 
out any action on the part of the Japanese might indicate more defi- 
nitely that they were asking for ship movements and other things 
that they were used to asking for without thinking about an attack. 
I mean the longer they put it off the more the chances for Intelligence, 
as you have suggested. Am I correct in that ? 

Captain Layton. I believe what you said to be correct; yes, sir. 
I do not think I am capable of commenting on it. 

Senator Lucas. Now, Captain, with respect to magic, you 
[12980] could translate out there, as I understand it, PA-K2. 

Captain Layton. That is out of my field, sir. I had nothing to do 
with Commander Eochefort's unit, in its mechanics. 

Senator Lucas. I understand. Captain Rochefort testified before 
the committee that they could translate that code. 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir ; I heard his testimony, sir. 

Senator Lucas. They could translate messages that were sent in 
the code known as PA-K2. Now, in Exhibit 2, on page 22, is a message 
from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated December 3, 1941, which, as I under- 
stand, went out in that code, and which I understand Commander 
Rochefort could have decoded and translated if he had made an 
arrangement with the cable office, but did not do that. Can you tell 
the committee why no arrangement was made with the cable office 
there in Hawaii so that they would have been able to intercept this 
message ? 

Captain Layton. I believe Captain Rochefort testified, and from 
my point of view, as far as I know the side lights of it, it is correct, 
that his directive from the Chief of Naval Operations, under which 
he directly worked, was the interception of Japanese naval radio 
traffic ; that he was told to work on certain Japanese naval codes and 
ciphers; [l^dSl] that he was directed to pass other material 
to Washington. Now, if Washington were not receiving these inter- 
cepts, then it would be up to Washington to tell Rochefort to make 
these arrangements, or it would be up to Washington to make them 
themselves. 

As I understand it, these were cabled. Now you can sit in here and 
you can intercept a Japanese radio transmission and not violate the 
laws of the United States. 

Maybe I am wrong, but that is the way I understand it, but you sit 
down and tap that cable and you get a $10,000 fine and 10 years in jail. 

Senator Lucas. Is it not a fact that the Navy were tapping the com- 
munication lines or the telephone lines of the Japs for 22 straight 
months there? 



4870 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Layton. I did not know the district Intelligence officer was 
tapping the lines. I did not know until I read it here in the commit- 
tee. I did not want to know, incidentally. 

Senator Lucas. How is that? 

Captain Layton. I did not want to know. Had I known it it would 
have been my responsibility to have reported it to Admiral Kimmel, 
and then he would have had the responsibility of directing tliat either 
this be approved by the authorities in Washington or be discontinued. 
It was against [12982] the law, and that is a Federal statute. 

Senator Lucas. I understand. It is a very strange thing to me that 
the district Intelligence officer could tap the Japanese telephone lines 
for 22 straight months and then on December 2, because of some infor- 
mation he received about the FBI doing the same thing, right at that 
particular time, the Navy, at the height of the crisis, stopped the work 
of tapping these confidential communications. 

Captain Layton. I cannot' account for Captain Mayfield's action, 
but had it been I, I might have pulled the tap for fear the FBI would 
pull it out for me, and give me a $10,000 fine, or 10 years in jail. 

They were not caught until the 2d or 3d of December, and then they 
pulled the tap. 

Senator Lucas. It is very strange to me that the FBI could violate 
the law. 

Captain Layton. They may have had clearance from some high 
authority. I do not know, sir. I cannot comment on that matter. 

Senator Lucas. Captain, do you know Captain Bicknell? 

Captain Layton. Colonel Bicknell, you mean ? 

Senator Lucas. Colonel Biclaiell. 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir ; I met him in Pearl Harbor. I think I 
met him down in Captain Mayfield's office at one [12983] of 
their weekly meetings. 

Senator Lucas. Are you familiar with the Mori message, so-called? 

Captain Layton. My only connection with the Mori message — and 
I only learned of it here about a year ago — is on the evening of De- 
cember 6, Captain Mayfield called me in and asked me if I was going 
to the office the next day. 

I told him I expected to. He asked me if I would stop down in his 
office on the way down. I lived to the east of Honolulu. I asked him 
if there was anything I could do, and he said : 

No, there is nothing you can do here because I haven't got the material, and I 
won't have it until tomorrow morning, but I would like to have you stop in here 
because I liave something that I want your opinion on. 

That is the last I ever heard of the so-called Mori message. 

Senator Lucas. What night was that ? 

Captain Layton. The night of December 6, 1941. As you know, the 
next morning the attack came. Then I next heard about it, as I re- 
call, at the naval court of inquiry, when they asked me about it. I did 
not know what it was until they quizzed me about it, and then I thought 
that must be the circumstance. 

Senator Lucas. What happened that you did not see him [12984] 
on the night of the 6th ? 

Captain Layton. He told me he did not liave the material and would 
not have it until the next morning, and did not therefore desire that 
I come down there until the next moi-nins. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4871 

Senator Lucas. Why would he call you if he did not have the mate- 
rial? 

Captain Layton. He merely wanted to ascertain that I would be 
coming down the next day. He was informed apparently of the ex- 
istence of this. 

Senator Lucas. Bicknell, in affidavit before Colonel Clausen, said 
he called General Fielder on the telephone and he said he had a very 
important message, and he had to deliver it to him. 

Captain Laytox. That illustrates my point awhile ago regardmg 
the opposite numbers in liaison. 

Mine was through Captain Mayfield. He called me in the evenmg 
about 6 o'clock and said, as I said before, he wanted to know if I was 
going to the office the following day, and I said I was, and he asked 
would I stop by, and I said I would. 

I asked could I come down now, was there anything I could do. 
He said "no," that he did not have the material at that time, and 
would not have it until the next morning, but would I please stop by 
tomorrow morning because he had [12985] something he 
wanted my opinion on. 

Senator Lucas. And you learned after that that this was the Mori 
message ? 

Captain Latton. I did not learn until the next year that it was 
actually the Mori message. 

Mr. Richardson. What message was it that he was talking about? 

Captain Latton. He did not say. He just said he had something 
that he wanted to talk to me about. 

Mr. EiCHARDSON. When you found out later, what was the message? 

Captain Layton. I believe the judge advocate before the naval 
court of inquiry asked me, when I was called, if I kne^y something 
abput the Mori message, and I said, "No, I never heard of it." 

Mr. Richardson. What message? 

Captain Layton. M-o-r-i, the Mori message. 

The Vice Chairman. What message was Mayfield calling you 
about ? 

Captain Layton. That was the same thing. It was only when I 
talked to the judge advocate and denied knowing anything about it, 
and he said, "Mayfield called you the night before?" 

I said, "Yes," and he said, "Well, that was the Mori [1£986'\ 
message that you heard on the radiotelephone," or something to that 
effect. 

Senator Lucas. Captain, one of the things that has puzzled me 
throughout the hearing is the fact that the Navy did not know that 
General Short was alerted only to sabotage. 

Will you throw, or can you throw, any light on it. 

Captain Layton. I did not know that either, sir. 

I saw these troops move, I saw the trucks moving, I thought I saw 
weapons, and my first instinct was that they were in an alert the same 
as we were. 

I did not ask my friend, Colonel Raley, either, what kind of an alert 
they were in. 

1 knew an alert had gone out, and I presumed it was the highest 
state of alert. 

Senator Lucas. Why did you make that assumption?. 



4872 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

. Captain Layton. The words, "This is a war warning" were pretty 
well impressed on my mind. When I got home that evening I was 
still thinking about it, and it impressed me very much. 

Senator Lucas. In other words, when you saw the troops mov- 
ing 

Captain Latton. That was on my way home, sir. 

Senator Lucas (continuing). You did not realize it was a sabotage 
alert. You thought they were alerted because [12987] of the 
war warning message that came in on the 27th ? 

Captain Layton. That is correct, sir. I delivered the messages 
that evening, and I was a little late with the message to General Short. 
When I went home I saw the trucks and troops, and I saw the weapons 
moving, and I came to the conclusion, a natural one, too, that they 
were on the alert. 

Senator Lucas. Can you give this committee any basic reason as 
to why the Navy and the Army should not have closer liaison upon 
such an important problem as that? 

Captain Latton. I do not believe I am qualified to state as to why. 

Senator Lucas. Probably you are not. For instance, Admiral 
Smith, who was the chief of staff on Admiral Kimmel's force, testified 
that he did not know that Short's army was on the alert for sabotage. 
He thought, as you have testified, that they were on a full alert, be- 
cause he saw them on that same day moving troops here and there. 

Now, there is something that seems to be radically wrong. 

After all these war warning messages came in, one after another, it 
seems to me radically wrong that the Navy would not know what 
the Army was doing, in view of the fact it was the Army's duty to 
defend the fleet in Pearl Harbor. [12988] I am not censuring 
you at all, sir, but nobody in the Navy has testified here, not even 
Kimmel himself, that he absolutely knew that the Army was not on a 
full alert. 

Captain Layton. I can only offer this. Senator, and this is another 
Army and Navy custom of long standing. 

If you pry into what another man is doing, he naturally resents it. 
He thinks he is capable of doing his own job. 

Senator Lucas. I can appreciate that. 

Captain Layton. I think that is the only reason that someone did 
not go to the Army and ask what kind of alert they were on, and it 
is just the reason that the Army did not come to the Navy and ask 
what kind of alert we had on the ships in Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Lucas. I can appreciate that. This fleet was the most 
precious possession that we had in the Pacific, and under tliat joint 
agreement it was the duty of the Army to defend that fleet when it 
was in Pearl Harbor from a landing attack or an air raid. To me, 
it is inexcusable, unbelievable, that Short and Kimmel would not have 
a definite understanding with respect to what the other one was doing. 

I have never been able to understand why Kimmel and all his chiefs 
of staff and other subordinates would not have known that Short was 
on a sabotage alert, alert No. 1, [12989] in view of the crisis 
pending. 

That is all, Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. It is now 5 o'clock, so we will suspend until 
8 o'clock this evening. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4873 

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 8 
p. m. of the same day.) 

11^990] EVENING SESSION — 8 P. M. 

The Vice Chaikman. The committee will please be in order. 

Does counsel have something at this point ? 

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I have two certifications both from 
the War Department. 

The first one is a memorandum furnishing to me at my request the 
number of patrol planes delievered by the United States between 
February 1 and December 7, 1941, under lend-lease. Also a memo- 
randum under date of February 14 furnishing to me at my request the 
lend-lease figures on antiaircraft guns delivered under lend-lease from 
February 1 to December 7. 

I would like to have these memoranda extended on the record in 
the usual and regular way. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered. 

Senator George. Delivered to whom, Mr. Richardson? 

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, about this 

The Vice Chairman. Just a moment. 

Senator George. Delievered to whom ? 

Mr. Richardson. Well, the exhibit names and identifies the various 
countries who got the planes and who got the guns. 

Senator George. Oh, it is a general statement then ? 

Mr. Richard. It is a general statement indicating that, for in- 
stance 

Senator Ferguson. What was the total ? 

[M991] Mr. Richardson. Between February 1 and December 
1 in round figures there were 1,900 planes that went abroad, of which 
about 1,750 went to the British. Then of guns, interestingly enough, 
there were about 1,900 antiaircraft guns under lend-lease, of which 
some 1,500 went to the British. 

Mr. Murphy. That is from the 1st of the year 1941 to what date ? 

Mr. R1CH.VRDS0N. From the 1st of February to the 1st of December 
1941. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be so received as requested by counsel. 

(The documents referred to follow :) 

War DBTABTMin^T 

WASHINGTON 

4 D757 

The Pentagon, 12 February 1946. 
Memorandum for Mr. Richardson : 

Reference is made to your memorandum of 31 January 1946 asking for the 
number of patrol planes and antiaircraft guns delivered by the United States 
between 1 February and 7 December 1941 to countries subsequently allied with 
the United States. 

Inclosed herewith is a table, based on information sup- [12992] plied by 
the Army Air Forces OflBce of Statistical Control, showing the number of bombers 
usable as patrol planes which were delivered at the factory to foreign countries 
(a) between 1 February and 30 November 1941 and (b) in December 1941. Infor- 
mation concerning such deliveries for the period 1 to 7 December 1941 is not 
79716 — 4&— pt. 10 19 



4874 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

presently available in tlie War Department and search of field records will be 
necessary if that information is desired. 

A search of War Department records relating to deliveries of antiaircraft guns 
to foreign countries is still in process ; when that search is completed, any perti- 
nent information obtained will be promptly forwarded. 

(Signed) Haemon Duncombe, 

Lt. Colonel, G8C. 

U. S. Factory Deliveries of Bom'bers to Foreign Countries, 1 Fehruart/ to 30 
November and 1-Sl December lOJfl 





Description 


Recipient 


Number 


11S99S] Type 


1 Feb-30 
Nov 41 


1-31 Dec. 41 


B 17 


AAF Heavy Bomber 4-eng_._ 
AAF Heavy Bomber 4-eng_.. 
AAF Medium Bomber 2-eng. 


British Empire 


20 

93 

3 




B 24 


British Empire 


3 


B-25 


Latin America 


3 


B-25 


British Empire 


14 


B 25 




U. S. S. R 


5 

129 

36 

455 

29 

79 

800 




PBY 


Navy Patrol Bomber 2-eng.... 


British Empire 


25 


PBY 


Netherlands 




A 20 


AAF Light Bomber 2-eng 


British Empire 




A 20 


Netherlands 




A 20 




U. S. S. R -. 


2 


A 28/29 


AAF Light Bomber 2-eng 


British Empire 


49 


A 28/29 


China 


17 


A-30 


AAF Light Bomber 2-eng 

—AAF Light Bomber 2-eng... 

AAF Light Bomber 1-eng 

AAF Light Bomber 1-eng 

Navy Light Bomber 1-eng 

Navy Light Bomber 1-eng 

Navy Light Bomber 1-eng.... 

Total 


British Empire. 


78 
90 
10 
1 
2 
50 
24 


58 


167 


British Empire 




A 27 


Latin America 




V-12 


China.. . 




8A 






SB2U 


British Empire 




N3PB 














1,904 


171 











[1299^] Wab Depaetment, 

Washington, 14 February 19Jf6. 
Memorandum for Mr. Richardson : 

Your memorandum of 31 January 1946 asked for the number of patrol planes 
and anti-aircraft guns delivered by the United States between 1 February and 
7 December 1941 to countries subsequently allied with the United States. On 
12 February this office forwarded information from the War Department files 
showing factory deliveries to foreign countries between 1 February and 31 Decem- 
ber 1941 of bombers usable as patrol planes. 

In further response to your request, there is transmitted herewith a memo- 
randum signed by the Director of the International Division, Army Service Forces, 
on transfers of antiaircraft weapons prior to 7 December 1941. This office has 
been advised by the International Division that the transfers listed in the mem- 
orandum were made after 11 March 1941, the effective date of the Lend-Lease 
act, and were all a part of lend-lease except for the transfer to the Netherlands 
East Indies, which was pursuant to a commercial contract. 

(Signed) Harmon Duncombe, 

Lt. Colonel, GSC. 



[12995] 



BESTBICTED 



Hbiadquaeters Army Servic*: Forces. 

Washington, 25, D. C, Feb. 11 19J,6. 
SPLIX 400.318 

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, W. D. G. S. 
Attention : Major John C. Catlin 

Subject: Anti-aircraft Weapons Transferred to Lend-Lease Countries Prior to 
December 1941. 
1. Reference is made to telephone request of Major John C. Catlin of your office 
for information regarding anti-aircraft weapons transferred to Lead-Lease coua- 
tries prior to 7 December 1941. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4875 

2. The records of this office indicate that the following anti-aircraft weapons 
were transferred to the countries noted. 

United Kingdom: 

Quantity 

Machine Gun, 50 Cal. w/c A. A 1520 

Gun, 3", AA, Mobile 18 

Russia : 

Gun, 90 mm, AA, Mobile 4 

China : 

Machine Gun, 50 Cal. w/c A. A 28o 

[12996] Netherlands East Indies : 

Gun, 3", A. A. Mobile SO 

(Procured by Netherlands East Indies on their own contract.) 
For the Commanding General : 

D. G. Shingler, 
Brigadier General, G. S. C, 
Director, International Division. 

Mr. MuEPHY. Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. Mtirphy. If we are going into part of lend-lease questions in 
this record and in view of references made by counsel, I ask that a copy 
of the Lend-Lease Act be inserted in the record and the date of its 
passage and a statement as to the organization which was set up by 
this Government for the purpose of determining what distribution 
should be made under lend-lease and what officials were responsible for 
such distribution. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered. 

(The text of the Lend-Lease Act follows :) ^ 

il2996-A] [Public Law II— 77th Congress] 

[Chapter II — 1st Session] 

[H. R. 1776] 
AN ACT Further to promote the defense of the United States, and for other purposes 

Be it enacted ty the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States 
of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as "An Act to 
Promote the Defense of the United States". 

Sbo. 2. As used in this Act — 

(a) The term "defense article"' means — 

(1) Any weapon, munition, aircraft, vessel, or boat; 

(2) Any machinery, facility, tool, material, or supply necessary for the 
manufacture, production, processing, repair, servicing, or operation of any 
article described in this subsection ; 

(3) Any component material or part of or equipment for any article 
described in this subsection ; 

(4) Any agricultural, industrial or other commodity or article for defense. 
Such term "defense article" includes any article described in this subsection : 
Manufactured or procured pursuant to section 3, or to which the United States 
or any foreign government has or hereafter acquires title, possession, or control. 

(b) The term "defense information" means any plan, specification, design, 
prototype, or information pertaining to any defense article. ■• 

Sex:. 3. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President 
may, from time to time, when he deems it in the interest of national defense, 
authorize the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any 
other department or agency of the Government — 

(1) To manufacture in arsenals, factories, and shipyards under their 
jurisdiction, or otherwise procure, to the extent to which funds are made 
available therefor, or contracts are authorized from time to time by the 
Congress, or both, any defense article for the government of any country 
whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States. 

(2) To sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose 

1 See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5305 et seq. for a letter on the operations of lend-lease. 



4876 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of, to any such government any defense article, but no defense article not 
manufactured or procured under paragraph (1) shall in any way be dis- 
posed of under this paragraph, except after consultation with the Chief 
of Staff of the Army or the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy, or both. 
The value of defense articles disposed of in any way under authority of 
this paragraph, and procured from funds heretofore appropriated, shall 
not exceed $1,300,000,000. The value of such defense articles [12996] 
shall be determined by the head of the department or agency concerned 
or such other department, agency or officer as shall be designated in the 
manner provided in the rules and regulations issued hereunder. Defense 
articles procured from funds hereafter appropriated to any department or 
agency of the Government, other than from funds authorized to be appro- 
priated under this Act, shall not be disposed of in any way under authority 
of this paragraph except to the extent hereafter authorized by the Con- 
gress in the Acts appropriating such funds or otherwise. 

(3) To test, inspect, prove, repair, outfit, recondition, or otherwise to 
place in good working order, to the extent to which funds are made avail- 
able therefor, or contracts are authorized from time to time by the Congress, 
or both, any defense article for any such government, or to procure any or 
all such services by private contract. 

(4) To communicate to any such government any defense information, 
pertaining to any defense article furnished to such government under para- 
graph (2) of this subsection. 

(5) To release for export any defense article disposed of in any way 
under this subsection to any such government. 

(b) The terms and conditions upon which any such foreign government re- 
ceives any aid authorized under subsection (a) shall be those which the President 
deems satisfactory, and the benefit to the United States may be payment or 
repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which 
the President deems satisfactory. 

(c) After June 30, 1943, or after the passage of concurrent resolution by the 
two Houses before June 30, 1943, which declares that the powers conferred by 
or pursuant to subsection (a) are no longer necessary to promote the defense of 
the United States, neither the President nor the head of any department or 
agency shall exercise any of the powers conferred by or pursuant to subsection 
(a) ; except that until July 1, 1946, any of such powers may be exercised to 
the extent necessary to carry out a contract or agreement with such a foreign 
government made before July 1, 1943, or before the passage of such concurrent 
resolution, whichever is the earlier. 

(d) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or to permit the 
authorization of convoying vessels by naval vessels of the United States. 

(e) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or to permit the au- 
thorization of the entry of any American vessel into a combat area in violation 
of section 3 of the Neutrality Act of 1939. 

Sec. 4. All contracts or agreements made for the disposition of any defense 
article or defense information pursuant to section 2 shall contain a clause by 
which the foreign government undertakes that it will not, without the consent 
of the President, transfer title to or possession of such defense article or defense 
information by gift, sale, or otherwise, or permit its use by anyone not an ofBcer, 
employee, or agent of such foreign government. 

Sec. 5. (a) The Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any 
other department or agency of the Government involved shall, when any such 
defense article or defense information is exported, immediately inform the 
department or agency designated [12996-G] by the President to admin- 
ister section 6 of the Act of July 2, 1940 (54 Stat. 714) , of the quantities, character, 
value, terms of disposition, and destination of the article and information so 
exiforted. 

(b) The President from time to time, but not less frequently than once every 
ninety days, shall transmit to the Congress a report of operations under this 
Act except such information as he deems incompatible with the public interest 
to disclose. Reports provided for under this subsection shall be transmitted to 
the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House of Representatives, as the 
case may be,* if the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, 
is not in session. 

Sec. 6. (a) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated from time to time, 
out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such amounts as 
may be necessary to carry out the provisions and accomplish the purposes of this 
Act. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4877 

(b) All money and all property which is converted into money received under 
section 3 from any government shall, with the approval of the Director of the 
Budget, revert to the respective appropriation or appropriations out of which 
funds were expended with respect to the defense article or defense information 
for which such consideration Is received, and shall be available for expenditure 
for the purpose for which such expended funds were appropriated by law, during 
the fiscal year in which such funds are received and the ensuing fiscal year ; 
but in no event shall any funds so received be available for expenditure after 
June 30, 1946. 

Sec. 7, The Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the head of the 
department or agency shall in all contracts or agreements for the disposition 
of any defense article or defense information fully protect the rights of all citizens 
of the United States who have patent rights in and to any such article or informa- 
tion which is hereby authorized to be disposed of and the payments collected for 
royalties on such patents shall be paid to the owners and holders of such patents. 

Sec. 8. The Secretaries of War and of the Navy are hereby authorized to pur- 
chase or otherwise acquire arms, ammunition, and implements of war produced 
within the jurisdiction of any country to which section 3 is applicable, whenever 
the President deems such purchase or acquisition to be necessary in the interests 
of the defense of the United States. 

Sec. 9. The President may, from time to time, promulgate such rules and regu- 
lations as may be necessary and proper to carry out any of the provisions of this 
Act ; and he may exercise any power or authority conferred on him by this Act 
through such department, agency, or ofiicer as he shall direct. 

Sec. 10. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to change existing law relating 
to the use of the land and naval forces of the United States, except insofar as 
such use relates to the manufacture, procurement, and repair of defense articles, 
the communication of information and other noncombatant purposes enumerated 
in this Act. 

Sec. 11. If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to 
any circumstance shall be held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act 
and the applicability of such provision to other circumstances shall not be 
affected thereby. 

Approved, March 11, 1941. 

[12997] The Vice Chairman. Mr. Gearliart, do you have some- 
thing? 

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, the question that I wanted to ask 
was precisely the one that was propounded by the Senator from 
Michigan. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Does counsel have anything else ? 

Mr. Richardson. No. 

The Vice Chairman. Captain, do you have any statement you de- 
sire to make before your examination is resumed ? 

Captain Latton. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Then Senator Ferguson of Michigan will 
inquire. 

Senator Ferguson. Do we have on this record, Mr. Richardson, the 
amount of planes that went to Hawaii and the Philippines during 
this same period and the amount of antiaircraft guns? Could you 
get that? 

Mr. Richardson. We will inquire and see if we have it and if we 
have not, I will endeavor to get the figures for you. 

Senator Ferguson. They should be in also. 

Mr. Murphy. I am sorry, Senator, I did not hear what you said. 

Senator Ferguson. I wondered whether the record showed the 
amount of planes that had been furnished to Hawaii and the Philip- 
pines, respectively, and the number of antiaircraft guns during the 
same period. 

[12998] Mr. Murphy. And are the dates also given in the break- 
down, Mr. Coimsel ? 



4878 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. So that we may get those later. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. 

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. EDWIN T. lAYTON, UNITED STATES 
NAVY (Resumed) 

Senator Ferguson. Captain Layton, you indicated that you had 
written to Captain McCollum a letter here in Washington. Was that 
sent through the mail or special pouch ? 

Captain Latton. As I recall it, I wrote the letter in pen myself 
with no copies and had it sealed, gave it to the flag secretary of the 
commander in chief, who in turn gave it to an officer courier passing 
through and going hj air to the United States and to Washington, 
for hand-to-hand delivery to Captain McCollum. 

Senator Ferguson. And did you get your answer back which you 
have read into the record in the same way ? 

Captain Latton. It came back via the locked box on the Clipper, 
which has previously been described here as a secure means of de- 
livery of highly important and highly secret material. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, when you lost the two important men in 
July — is that when you lost them ? 

[12999'] Captain Latton. We only lost one, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. T^Tiat happened to the other one ? 

Captain Latton. He was the one who was allowed to remain all 
during the year. 

Senator Ferguson. And when did he leave the Intelligence Service? 

Captain Latton. He did not leave the Intelligence Service. He 
was transferred after about 2 more years, possibly 3, to Washington 
where he continued his highly specialized duties and did not leave 
his duties entirely until after VJ-day. 

Senator Ferguson. How long have you been a captain ? 

Captain Latton. About 2 years, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You were not a captain, then, at the time that 
you were 

Captain Latton. I was a lieutenant commander on the outbreak 
of war on the senior part of the numbers. 

Senator Ferguson. Going back to the question that I asked before, 
you were looking up in your book the amount of purple, or as we 
call it, of magic here and did you find anything in tnere? 

Captain Latton. None other than the winds set-up message that I 
mentioned previously in testimony before this committee. 

[13000] Senator Ferguson. Yes. Did the Philippines send you 
any of their magic that they translated ? 

Captain Latton. The one I referred to specifically was from Com. 
16, which was in the Philippines, setting up the five winds and the two 
winds hidden word codes. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that purple, do you know, or J-19? 

Captain Latton. I will check to see what it says. It didn't say 
which system, sir. It merely said : 
Following Tokyo to net. Intercept translation received from Singapore X. 

Senator Ferguson. I imagine it came to you in English, did it not ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4879 

Captain Layton. Oh, yes, sir. It came to us in or by this special in- 
telligence high security channel for transmitting this so-called magic 
purple messages. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, after getting Captain McCoUum's letter 
did you believe up until after the attack that you had received all 
diplomatic messages in some form or another that they figured that 
you should have in Hawaii for action ? 

Captain Layton. I thought so until some 2 years later when I found 
to the contrary. I also so stated on examination before the Roberts 
Commission that I did not believe that Washington was holding out 
on us. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you know that there was a dead line 
set on the 25th of November ? 

[13001] Captain Layton. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And shifted then to the 29th ? 

Captain Layton. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know there was a message delivered on 
the 26th of November to Japan and a reply to it on the 6th and morn- 
ing of the 7th of December ? 

Captain Layton. I knew nothing concerning our notes to Japan 
nor Japan's answers. I may have seen in the paper that we had de- 
livered a note but I do not recall distinctly recalling that it was in tlie 
papers or not. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, do 3'Ou know whether or not after the 
26th any Hawaii papers carried evidence that we were still negotiating 
back and forth from Japan to Washington ? 

Captain Layton. Senator, I do not recall what the papers said at 
that time, although I might refresh my memory. I have made it a 
policy, however, not to use newspaper stories in evaluating intelligence 
unless they back up other known material or other material that was 
of some real value because a newspaper story can be slanted if they 
wish. For instance, what was coming out from Tokj^o in those daj^s 
under Domei I would not pay any attention to at all. 

Senator Ferguson. It appears that that wind code was J-19. 

Captain Layton. Well, it did not say it in the message. [1S002] 
It merely said, "Following Tokyo net intercept." 

Senator Ferguson. Is that all that you got from the Philippines? 

Captain Layton. That is all that I recall at the present time; yes, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would go to Exhibit 2. Some of your 
answers indicated that you were talking about some other messages 
in Exhibit 2 and I want to go over them with you, if we might. 

Page 12 was the one that you have talked about. That is the 24th of 
September 1941 where they lay it out in areas. Do you have that 
exhibit before you ? 

Captain Layton. I have it before me ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you say that standing alone that would 
not be as clear, as I understood it, as with other evidence. Now, take 
the one from Tokyo, from Toyoda. Do you know who he was ? 

Captain Layton. Toyoda ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Captain Layton. Offhand, no, sir. 



4880 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Was he F'oreign Minister? 

Captain Latton. No, sir; Togo was the Foreign Minister at that 
time, T-o-g-o. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

\^13003'\ Captain Layton. Toyoda would have been a depart- 
ment chief within the ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, on the next one, on the 29th of September 
1941, from Honolulu to Washington, giving certain information in 
relation to Honolulu. Do you see that message? 

Captain Layton. What page is that. Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. That is on page 13. They say 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir, I have it. 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island. FV. 

Alongside in Ford Island. FG. 

Navy dock in the Navy Yard (The Ten Ten Pier)— KT. 

And then some other items, indicating that they were giving mes- 
sages in relation to the ships in dock ; was that not true ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

{^ISWJj.'] Senator Ferguson. Now, the next one from Tokyo 
(Tojo) to Honolulu, the 15th of November, says: 

As relations between Japan and United States are most critical, make your 
ships in harbor report irregular but at the rate of twice a week, although you 
are already no doubt aware please take extra care to maintain secrecy. 

Would that have been a significant message, that they wanted the 
ships in harbor report twice a week at Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Layton. I think so, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then we go to the next page, on November 18. 
If these were regular messages, why would they take the extra care? 

They say : "Please take extra care to maintain secrecy." 

Captain Layton. Senator, the Japanese love secrecy even among 
themselves. 

Senator Ferguson. And so that, in itself, would not have meant 
anything? 

Captain Layton. That, plus the the fact that we had caught one of 
their agents snooping around and had him arrested. He being a 
Japanese naval officer, and at the insistence of the Secretary of State, 
he was released and deported. 

The fact that he had been caught before would tend to make these 
people more suspicious and therefore they would \^13005'] want to 
take more secrecy. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you catch the Jap naval officer ? 

Captain Layton. The FBI caught him, sir, but he sent an agent 
of his out to Honolulu to obtain highly secret and confidential in- 
formation on the United States Pacific Fleet, to come back to the 
west coast and report to him. Fortunately this agent that he ap- 
proached had once been in the Navy and maintained loyalty, and hav- 
ing taken his story to the FBI and having been more or less told to 
await details, when he called on him again here he was told there was 
nothing much to do. 

He then approached our Naval Intelligence agency in Los Angeles, 
and told his story. 

Senator Ferguson. When was that? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4881 

Captain Latton. That was in mid-1941, as I recall, sir. It may 
have been late spring. 

Senator FERGUsoisr. What finally happened to this Jap naval officer ? 

Captain Layton. Well, after we secured evidence, we waited for him 
and saw to it that he got it through our own agents. We saw to it 
that he got to the west coast, and saw to it the FBI could pick him 
up, and after that followed him to Washington where he had been in 
audience with the Japanese [13006] naval attache here in 
Washington. 

After this was over, we got permission of the Secretary of State 
to arrest him, and then in the interest of amity or other reasons, the 
prosecution was dropped, and he was deported as an undesirable alien. 
That was Lieutenant Tachibana. 

Senator Ferguson-. Now, go to page 14. 

Here is Honolulu again sending a message to Tokyo, and they are 
using the set-up that was provided for on page 12. 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And they also give harbor locations. 

Look under 3. There is care taken there to show how they come in 
and how long it takes them from the entrance of the harbor through 
area B to the buoys in area C — 

to which they were moored, they changed course five times each time roughly 30 
degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered 
area A after passing the water reservoir on the eastern side. 
Relayed to (bank). 

Captain Layton. I read it, sir. 

[130071 Senator Ferguson. Is that a significant message ? 

Captain Layton. Senator, I would like to divorce hindsight from 
foresight on these. But were I reading these on December 1, 2, 3, 4, 
and 5, 1 am sure they would have struck a responsive chord in my mind. 

Senator Ferguson. Now we have three on the next page, and they 
are all from Tokyo to Honolulu, seeking evidence. 

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein : Area "N", 
Pearl Harbor. 

What bay is that ? That is not Manila Bay ? 

Captain Layton. I think that is Manila Bay. That is near Hono- 
lulu Harbor. 

Senator Ferguson (continuing) : 

and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.) 

That would be translated on the 5th, which would be on Friday the 
first week of December. The next one is from Tokyo (Togo) to Hono- 
lulu again. 

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet (blank) bases in the neighborhood 
of the Hawaiian military reservation. 

Now there has been some testimony here that where the blank line is 
there was something about air base, fleet air bases, which would make it 
even more significant, would [13008] it not ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then the next one from Tokyo to Honolulu, 
November 29, 1941 : 

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future 
will you also report even when there are no movements. 



4882 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

We got that on a Friday. 

Captain Layton. I think this caps them all by adding considerable 
significance to their individual messages taken collectively. A report 
when there are no movements is sometimes more significant than to 
have reports when there are movements. 

Senator Ferguson. Now there is some evidence in the entire record 
that the one on page 22 was translated in the rough by 2 o'clock, 1 or 2 
o'clock, Saturday, here in the Navy. Would that one be significant ? 

Captain Lattox. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now were any of these messages decoded and 
sent to you, or the substance of them sent to you ? 

Captain Layton. None of them were decoded and sent to me or the 
commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, I should say, prior to December 
7,1941. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have specific evidence, or [13000] 
any evidence that there was going to be an attack in the vicinity of the 
Kra Peninsula on Sunday? 

Captain Layton. I would like to answer that in two parts, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right, I wish you would. 

Captain Layton. There was a considerable amount of evidence 
from reports from various agents, I mean proper agents, consular offi- 
cials, military observers, and so forth, who predicted an attack on the 
Kra Peninsula. 

The Sunday angle of it can be taken only from an observation of 
the movement, of those Japanese movements that were actually sighted 
in the South China Sea, and the time and distance factors lend them- 
selves toward Sunda}^ being a rather critical day. 

Senator Ferguson. Did the radio traffic give it to you ? 

Captain Layton. Not specifically as to the Kra Peninsula, but the 
radio traffic certainly showed the movement was to the south, south 
of French Indochina, south of Formosa, south of Hainan, and plus 
the one purple message we received on the Japanese intrigue in Thai- 
land, which certainly pointed toward either the Thailand border or 
Malaya. 

It was also shown that the Thai airfield at Singora [13010] 
on the very southern tip of Thailand and only a few miles from the 
border, being a good beach area, presented an ideal point for amphib- 
ious landings. This point was shown to Admiral Kimmel in the 
morning conference I had with him on the morning of December 
6, 1941. 

Senator Ferguson. Now you were asked as to whether or not the 
Navy in Hawaii knew that the Army, whose duty it was to protect the 
base, or the fleet while in the base, knew that the Army was only 
alerted to sabotage. Did you know that the Navy here in Washington 
did not know what the Army was alerted to in the Hawaiian Is- 
lands, even though General Short had sent back a message on the 28th 
of November that he was alerted to sabotage, and there was no other 
mention of any other alert ? 

Captain Layton. I did not know that. 

Senator Ferguson. The Navy did not know what ships were in the 
harbor, or what alert the Army was on ; did you know that ? 

Captain Layton. I did not know that the naval officials here in 
Washington were unaware that the Army forces in Hawaii were on 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4883 

a sabotage alert. I was not aware that the naval officials in Wash- 
ington did not know what ships of the Pacific Fleet were in Pearl 
Harbor, either. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, was it the custom of Pearl Harbor 
1^13011^ to report their ships in the harbor? 

Captain Layton. No, sir. 

Senator FERGUSoisr. The location of ships ? 

Captain Laytox. It was not customary, as I recall it, for them to 
report the ships in the harbor, but reports of all movements of all 
groups or units was reported to Washington. The sailing, for in- 
stance, of Admiral Halsey "s Task Force, of Admiral Brown's Task 
Force, of Admiral Newton's Task Unit, I felt confident were a matter 
of disi^atch to Washington, and I think the records will bear me out. 

Senator Ferguson. Now take the two messages on pages 40 and 41 
of exhibit 37. As I understand it, these messages were sent about 5 
minutes apart. Those on the od of December, 31850 and 31855, which 
would be 5 minutes apart. 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you gave some evidence this morning, as 
I recall, that you thought one related to the other, or they were the 
same message. 

Captain Layton. When they were received and read it was ni}' 
interpretation that these two messages originated by two different 
people in Washington were based on the same information, insofar as 
they carried basically the same data. 

[13012^ Senator Ferguson. Well, now, the first one names 
Washington. It says : 

urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular 
posts at Hongliong, Singapore,. Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to 
destroy most of tlieir codes and ci pliers at once. 

That would indicate that they were to keep certain ciphers and 
certain codes, would it not ? 
Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

and to burn all other important and confidential secret documents. 

Now, the next one on the next page was sent 5 minutes later. It is : 

Ordered London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy machine. Bata- 
via machine already sent to Tolcyo. December 2nd Washington also directed 
destroy all but one copy of other systems and all secret documents. British 
Admirality London today reports Embassy London has complied. 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did those two messages mean war with the 
United States, as far as your evaluation was concerned I 

Captain Layton. They added to my concern at the time I first read 
the message saying this was a war warning, but it did not necessarily 
mean war. 

[13013] Let us examine this line of thought which I had at the 
time, and have previously testified to here. It was a matter of con- 
jecture as to whether the Japanese would leave the Philippines on their 
flank and proceed further south. 

If they Avere to try to go down into the south China Sea and to 
further their aggressive acts without treading on Uncle Sam's toes, 



4884 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and if they thought they could get away with it, then it would not 
mean war, necessarily ; but in case we were to take counteraction such 
as seizing their embassies, or their consulates, we would seize at that 
time their code machines, cryptographic material, and their secret 
documents. 

So for the self-preservation, which everyone is born with, they de- 
cided to destroy certain or almost all of thees documents which meant 
considerable to them. 

It can be read another way, by saying that they had made a de- 
termination that the war warning was emphasized by these but this 
neither proves nor disproves. They merely add more background 
and emphasis. 

This matter of destroying codes and the purple machine, which I 
have mentioned previously was very briefly discussed with Admiral 
Kimmel, and, as I recall it, stress was laid on the fact that the word 
was "most," meaning most of their codes [ISOI4] and ciphers. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Did you know that the Navy here in Washington had notified the 
military attache in Tokyo to destroy his code machine and codes about 
the 5th? 

Captain Layton. I believe it was around the 5th that I was aware 
that the Navy had directed the naval attache in Tokyo, and also other 
naval establishments in China, such as at Tientsin to destroy their 
crypotographic material. 

Senator Ferguson. How did you get that message ? 

Captain Layton. I believe we were an information addressee in 
the messages sent them, and I know we received their plain language 
message, one of them which said "Boomerang," which was the code 
message saying all papers, codes, and ciphers, and so forth, to have 
destroyed. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know what the policy of this Govern- 
ment was in case there was an attack only by Japan on the British ? 

Captain Layton. No, sir ; I was not on that level of high policy. 

Senator Ferguson. You mean that you did not know because you 
were not on that level ? How could you evaluate the evidence, or the 
intelligence, if you did not know what the policy was? 

[1S015] Captain Layton. That same question I asked myself 
in December 1941, prior to the attack. I believe I heard it said no 
less than four or five times, five or six times, "I wish I knew what we 
were going to do," or words to that effect, by Admiral Kimmel. 

Senator Ferguson. In case of an attack just on the British? 

Captain Layton. In case of eventualities in southeast Asia in which 
the United States was not immediately and directly involved. 

Senator Ferguson. So you did discuss that question with Admiral 
Kimmel, and it bothered you in evaluating the evidence ? 

Captain Layton. I would not say that Admiral Kimmel had dis- 
cussed it with me. He had made these remarks in my hearing when 
the situation was brought to his attention regarding the movements 
of these ships, their position, their potentialities for attack, and the 
Japanese propensity for always trying to get something for nothing, 
if possible, as they had done in French Indochina, and if they were 
trying to do this again, for instance, in Thailand, hoping we would 
take no action, and knowing if they got in there and we would not 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4885 

take any action, that would be another base for another move in the 
future. 

[1S016] At that time Admiral Kimmel said, "I wish I knew 
what we are going to do," or "This is the same thing that was true 
in relation to the Dutch East Indies." I do not recall if the Dutch 
East Indies was mentioned specifically by name. Actually it was 
a general discussion that dealt with the area of the South China Sea 
and Thailand, I believe was the only specific country mentioned. 

Senator Ferguson. You made a statement that you believed, or 
you may have had a conversation with Colonel Raley concerning the 
geographic limit belond which the British and Netherlands would 
not permit the Japanese to penetrate. 

What was that? 

Captain Layton. That is one of these rumors you hear, Senator. 
I had heard a rumor to the effect there was some geographic limit 
drawn, that only the high authorities knew it; that if the Japanese 
went beyond that limit, action would be taken by either the British 
or the Dutch or ourselves, perhaps. 

There was no specific paper, or conversation by anyone in authority. 
It was one of those corridor gossip things that you pick up, but I 
passed it on to Colonel Raley for what it was worth. 

[1S017] Senator Ferguson. Did you know there were certain 
documents in Washington, for instance, Exhibit 17 which we have 
here, indicating that there was a line ? 

Captain Layton. I was not aware of the exact location of a geo- 
graphic line, nor that there was a line, in fact. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. That document was also in Hawaii. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I will ask, did you ever see this docu- 
ment? 

Captain Layton. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. We will get it. 

Captain Layton^ I didn't see every document that came in. Many 
documents that had to do with war plans alone were handled^ by 
the War Plans Division, which is a very understandable thing; j^ou 
don't show everybody on the staff high plans and policies of future 
operations. 

Senator Ferguson. While they are looking for this document, do 
you know of anything else. Captain, that you can give us here that 
could help us in the solution of the problem that we have? 

Captain Layton. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. As to how this could happen and we not be 
alerted in Hawaii? 

{13018'] Captain Layton. Well, I formed a pretty good idea of 
how they did it. If you are interested in hearing how I think they did 
it and were able to come in undetected throughout I will be glad to 
give it to you in a couple of minutes. 

Senator Ferguson. There is no doubt but they came in and they 
were not detected. 

Captain Layton. There is no doubt about that in my mind. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you look at that instrument ? 

Mr. Geaehaet. Will the Senator yield ? 



4886 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. I would like to heai: that if he can tell it in a min- 
ute or so. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Captain Layton. I mentioned this radio intelligence as being an 
inexact science. I also said that if you go under sealed orders, don't 
use your radio, and take the precaution that you will receive no radios 
yourself addressed to you, then you can move freely on the high seas, 
so long as you are not detected by planes, submarines, picket boats or 
casual merchant vessels. I have formed a definite conclusion that the 
Japanese realized that a blow on Pearl Harbor was necessary toward 
their major plan of operation and that they had carefully studied 
their own radio traffic and had [1S019] made an analysis of it 
and that therefore they made their plans, gave it to the carrier task 
force commander, and thereafter never addressed him and, of course, 
he went under radio silence, and therefore he had no implications, no 
associations, no mention in traffic, he was just as if, what they wanted 
me to believe he was, in home ports. That can always be done. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you look at that instrument. The 
bottom of the page. 

Captain Layton. I see it. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever see that before? 

Captain Layton. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is Exhibit 17. 

Mr. Masten. Exhibit 106. 

Senator Ferguson. Exhibit 106. It was originally in Exhibit 17. 

Mr. Murphy. The page, for the record. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat is the page on that ? 

Captain Layton. This says page 4 here, but this is a very thick 
volume. 

Senator Ferguson. It is the November 5. Admiral Stark and Gen- 
eral Marshall for the President. 

Captain Layton. I never saw it. I had heard corridor gossip that 
there was a delineation line. 

[ISOW] Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. In other words, you, as the chief of intelligence for 
the fleet at Hawaii, were obliged to be passing corridor gossip about 
the question that the Senator asked you but Admiral Kimmel did not 
show you that recommendation of the Army and the Navy given to the 
President? 

Captain Layton. Admiral Kunmel did not see fit to so inform me. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, it would have been of help to you, as an 
intelligence officer, if you had that, since you found it necessary to in- 
dulge in corridor gossip to meet the situation ; isn't that correct ? 

Captain Layton. I tried to pass on to my liaison in the Hawaiian 
Air Force everything that I had that I thought would help him, and 
if I was passing gossip I told him that it was gossip and he could 
evaluate it accordingly, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you had to indulge in gossip because 
the admiral hadn't shown you this particular paper which discussed 
the idea of the Army and the Navy as to the Japanese at the time ; 
isn't that right? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4887 

Captain Layton. That is true, sir. 

Mr, Murphy. Now, you said that you could give us in a few 
minutes how the blow was brought about. You said that [13021] 
they could make plans and give those plans to a carrier task force, 
have the carriers j)roceed without traffic, and that that can always be 
done. You knew that before December 7, 1941, did you not? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Murphy. And you also knew that the Japanese had 10 carriers, 
did you not? 

Captain Layton. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. You knew that you had only accounted for two, did 
you not ? 

Captain Layton. Not in my sheet of December 2. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, how many had you accounted for? You had 
accounted for two going south and you thought there were two at 
the Marshalls; is that not right? 

Captain Layton. There were a few more than that. I would like 
to read them. 

Mr. Murphy. All right. Take it slowly so that I can follow your 
testimony before the Koberts Commission. 

Captain Layton. Aye, sir. 

On page 3 of my Location Sheet typed on December 1, corrected 
and submitted on December 2, I put: Cardiv-4, two carriers and four 
destroyers ; Cardiv-3, two carriers and three destroyers ; in the Bako- 
Takao area, 

Mr. Murphy, You also felt, did you not, that they were [13022] 
part of the second fleet under the commander in chief of the second 
fleet? 

Captain Layton, Yes, sir, 

Mr. Murphy. All right, go ahead. 

Captain Layton. In the Marshall area I showed the Koryu plus 
plane guards, being one carrier and four destroyers in the Marshall 
area. 

Mr. Murphy. How many carriers? 

Captain Layton. One. 

Mr. Murphy. One in the Marshalls? 

Captain Layton, Yes, sir. I showed the Kasuga Maru^ a converted 
carrier, as being also in the Bako-Takoa area. 

Mr. Murphy. How many did you have going south ? 

Captain Layton. I had a total of five going south. 

Mr. Murphy. Five? 

Captain Layton. Five ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And one in the Marshalls? 

Captain Layton. One of those five was a converted carrier, 

Mr. Murphy, Let me review your testimony before the Roberts 
Commission. Before I do that. Captain, you said that the Secretary 
of State sent this man back to Japan for amity or other reasons. What 
would be the other reasons ? 

Captain Layton, Well, I wouldn^t be in a position to know. 

[13023] Mr. Murphy. I thought there might have been some- 
thing sinister in your "other reasons." 

Captain Layton. No. I meant rather than have this Naval Jap- 
anese officer up for a trial of espionage in our country and the ensuing 



4888 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

row in the Japanese papers, I believed it was deemed, and I am not 
speaking first-liand, I am guessing now, better to let him go as an 
undesirable alien. 

Mr. MuKPHY. Now, then, were you familiar with Japanese broad- 
casts intercepted at Pearl Harbor on December 8, were they called to 
your attention ? 

Captain Layton. You mean the Japanese broadcasts in plain lan- 
guage, sir ? . 

Mr. Murphy. The broadcasts in which they told about the attack 
on Pearl Harbor. 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And you were familiar with the weather broadcasts 
put in the middle of that message ? 

Captain Layton. I don't recall that there was a weather broadcast 
in the middle of that message ; there may have been. 

{130^41 Mr. Murphy (reading) : 

In the message here a weather forecast was made as far as I can recollect. 

This is the Naval report. 

A weather forecast was made, as far as I recollect. No such weather forecast 
had ever been made before. 

His exact words were : 

Allow me to especially make a weather forecast at this time. West wind 
clear. Since these broadcasts are also heard by the Japanese Navy it may be 
some sort of a code. 

Captain Layton. We heard that late the night of the 7th. It was 
reported to us that that west wind clear hidden code winds execute 
did come through late the night of the 7th, but we were not interested 
in it then. 

Mr. Murphy. West wind clear would refer to 

Captain Layton. England. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, you had some discussion with Admiral 
Kimmel, did you not, between the 1st of December and the 7th of 
December, about the carriers you could not account for ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. That was on the 2nd of December. 

Mr. Murphy. And you also had discussion with him of the fact that 
you were unable to account for battleships ? 

\^13026'\ Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

I believe that was in the middle of November, or possibly a little 
later. 

Mr. Murphy. You are sure it wasn't about the same time in 
December? 

Captain Layton. No, sir. Battleships were not brought up as a 
matter of conversation in the carrier conversation. 

Mr. Murphy. I refer you to your testimony on page 1090 before 
the Roberts board : 

The Chairman. Commander, you were at conferences with the Commander 
in Chief, I presume, between November 27 and December 7, respecting the instant 
situation? 

Commander Layton. Yes. I was in conferences daily. 

In that conenction, I would like to ask if there was at any time 
a conference between Admiral Kimmel and General Short and your- 
self and some intelligence oiRcer of the Army between those dates? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4889 

Captain Latton. I previously testified that General Short had a 
conference with Achniral Kimmel and other naval force com- 
manders 

Mr, Murphy. Do you understand my question ? 

Captain Latton, Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Was there at any time 

Captain Layton. An Army Intelligence officer present. 

[Io0£6] Mr. Murphy. At any meeting you ever had with Gen- 
eral Short? 

Captain Layton. No, sir, never. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, you also testified that you had liaison with the 
Air Corps, the Army Air Corps intelligence officer? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Did j^ou have liaison with the Navy Air Corps intel- 
ligence officer ? 

Captain Layton. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Why would you have liaison with the Army Air 
Corps intelligence officer and not the Navy? What is the difference 
between the two ? 

Captain Layton. None, as I see it, except that Colonel Raley of the 
Hawaiian Air Force came to me in mid-1941 and said, or I understood 
him to say that he had been directed to establish liaison, which I was 
glad to do. 

Mr. Murphy. Isn't it rather singular that the Army Air Corps, 
who knew what was going on, or at least part of what was going on, 
and Captain Davis and Admiral Bellinger, neither knew anything 
about these messages? 

Captain Layton. Admiral Davis was on the staff, sir. He was a 
subsection officer under Operations. 

Mr. Murphy. He was in charge of Air ? 

Captain Layton. Under the officer who had all of the [13027] 
intelligence that I had, and all of my evaluated intelligence reports 
and who was aware of all of the situation. 

Mr. Murphy. Then, if Captain Davis didn't know about it that 
would be his superior's responsibility ? 

Captain Latton. That would be his superior. His superior had 
directed me to show the book to his assistant in Operations. 

[13028] Mr. Murphy. Did you show it to Captain Davis? 

Captain Layton. No, sir. He saw several of the books without 
initialing because he had not been ordered or told to read the books. 

Mr. Murphy. He has testified under oath that he didn't know about 
these war warning messages and I wondered if you knew whether 
he had or not. 

Captain Layton. I couldn't state positively here under oath that I 
know positively that he did. It would be my assumption that he 
was present when the war warning message was being discussed in 
the admiral's cabin. 

Mr. Murphy. Do you know whether he was or not ? 

Captain Layton. 1 do not know positively. 

Mr. Murphy. What do you know about Admiral Bellmger. He 
was also an air officer. He has testified that he knew nothing about 
them. 

Captain Layton. I do not know, sir. 

79716 — 46 — pt, 10 20 



4890 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, you also testified this afternoon that you 
felt that the Army was on an all-out alert. Was that your testimony ? 

Captain Layton. That was my conception at the time. 

Mr. Murphy. You presumed the Army was on the highest state of 
alert? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

[13029] Mr. Murphy. Why would you presume that when the 
fleet wasn't on the highest state of alert, they were only in the third 
condition. 

Captain Layton. I didn't know there was a difference in the Army 
states of alert at that time. I thought they only had one. 

Mr. Murphy. Weren't the Navy ships themselves on the lowest state 
of alert, with only one- fourth of the antiaircraft guns manned? 

Captain Layton. They went into the one customarily in while in 
port. 

Mr. Murphy. They didn't take any special precautions after the war 
warning than they had for months previous; isn't that true? 

Captain Layton. I believe that is correct, although I don't know 
that first hand. 

Mr. Murphy. The Navy was in the normal ordinary routine alert 
and yet you thought that the Army was in the highest state of alert ; 
the first hand. 

Captain Layton. I thought the Army had only one state of alert. 
When I say "highest" I mean that they were on the alert. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, you said you did not expect war in 
Hawaii. 

[13030] Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Is that so ? 

Captain Layton. That is true. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you expect an attack on the fleet ? 

Captain Layton. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral Kimmel has testified before us that he did 
expect a submarine attack. Why would you differ with him? 

Captain Layton. My words were loose. I meant air attack, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Then you are restricting it to an air attack. If you 
were to have a submarine attack that would be war in Hawaii, would 
it not ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. We had had submarine contacts off 
Hawaii many, many times, but you couldn't prove that they were 
submarines. We suspected that there were Japanese submarines lurk- 
ing about trying to scout for information. We also had a report from 
the naval attache in Tokyo that the crew of one submarine had re- 
turned and were bragging about having been in Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Murphy. You knew that there was a considerable submarine 
movement moving east ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. You know they were sighted at Saipan ? 

[13031] Captain Layton. They weren't sighted. 

Mr. Murphy. I mean the sound — they were detected. 

Captain Layton, Definitely, passing down to the Marshalls. 

Mr. Murphy. Captain Rocliefort did tell you in his daily intelli- 
gence summary that there was a submarine movement eastward? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir ; eastward toward the Marshalls. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4891 

Mr. Murphy. Well, the Marshalls are much closer to Hawaii than 
home waters, are they not ? 

Captain Latton. It would be a logical place to go for refueling and 
standing by for further exercises or operations. 

Mr. Murphy. How do you account for the fact that if the submarines 
were going to the Marshalls and you felt there were aircraft carriers 
at the Marshalls that the Army didn't know anything about it ? Gen- 
eral Short says that he never heard of it. 

Captain Layton. I can only say that Washington had all the in- 
formation that we had. Washington had close liaison with the Army. 
The Army in Washington knew who they were sending their infor- 
mation to. The Washington authorities had full right to send out their 
information. And it is my conception and belief, and it is sound, that 
if they didn't want to send it out to the authorities in [1303B'\ 
Hawaii, that was a responsibility of the War Department. 

Mr. Murphy. Sir, did you have any responsibility ? What were you 
doing out there ? 

Captain Layton. My responsibility was as laid down by the staff in- 
structions which I read this afternoon. They clearly outline the full 
scope. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, as the fleet intelligence officer you were to advise 
the fleet generally as to conditions wherever the fleet was ; isn't that 
right? 

Captain Layton. I was to see about the fleet. 

Mr. Murphy. And while the fleet was in the harbor the fleet was your 
responsibility, wasn't it? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. That is, my responsibility as far as in- 
telligence went. 

Mr. Murphy. That is right. It was up to you to know everything 
there was in the way of intelligence to protect that fleet wherever it 
was ? 

Captain Layton. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, the fact is, you did expect hostile Japanese 
action in the first week of December, did you not? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. You had that information from various sources. Naval 
Intelligence, reports of naval attaches, naval observers, [13033] 
the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and the intelligence unit 
at Manila, did you not? 

Captain Layton. And Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. And the Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval 
District? 

Captain Layton. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, about the middle of November you knew 
that the normal organization of the Japanese Fleet was disrupted ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. You also knew that the commander in chief of the 
Second Fleet was placed in a position far more important than his 
normal adminisirative job? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. You also knew and had been informed that that fleet 
was apparently getting together for an offensive action ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 



4892 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. MuRPHT. You also had a report as to what ships were seen 
going south, didn't you ? 

Captain Latton. Some reports ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. You had detailed reports to some extent of warships, 
did you not ? 

Captain Latton. Yes, sir. 

[1S0S4^ Mr. Murphy. And there were a number of carriers not 
accounted for in that report, were there not ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, no carriers were 
reported by citation at any time. 

Mr, Murphy. You also knew that it appeared as if instead of pro- 
tective operations by the fleet there was to be an operation by task 
forces or a task force, and the commander in chief of the Secord 
Fleet was to be put in supreme command ? 

Captain Layton. We expected it, and he was. 

Mr. Murphy. You also knew by radio intelligence that you had no 
contact as to the commander in chief of the Second Fleet in con- 
nection with the southward movement? 

Captain Layton. I don't believe that is correct. Would you repeat 
that? 

Mr. Murphy. I say, did you also know that there was no radio 
intelligence placing the commander in chief of the Second Fleet in 
the southward movement ? 

Captain Layton. Oh, yes, there was. 

Mr. Murphy. There was? 

Captain Layton. Considerable. 

Mr. Murphy. To make you believe he was in charge ? 

Captain Layton. He was commander in chief of the Second Fleet 
and was taking supreme command of the task forces moving 
[130SS] south? 

Mr. Murphy. Was he in charge of the one coming to Hawaii ? 

Captain Layton. No, sir. The commander in chief of that force 
was called the commander in chief of the First Air Fleet, 

Mr. Murphy. You felt from radio intelligence that the movement 
would be south and that it would be amphibious in nature? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Murphy, And you felt that it would be to the Malay Barrier 
or against Singapore or to the Netherlands Indies or the Philippines, 
did you not? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. In other words, you agreed entirely with what Wash- 
ington had said to you in the dispatch they sent to you ? 

Captain Layton, Exactly, I considered their dispatches as dot- 
ting the i's and crossing the t's. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, you also knew that there had been no positive 
indications of the location of the Japanese carriers with the exception 
of Carrier Division 3, did you not? 

Captain Layton. Well, I had positive location of Carrier Division 
3. There was no positive location of Carrier [1S036] Division 
4 or these other units. I put one in the Marshalls and one in the 
south Formosa area. However, the extra carrier division had been 
in the past previously associated, even in a light way, with the com- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4893 

mander, Second Fleet, and commander, Third Fleet, and on the basis 
of that I placed that carrier division there. 

Mr. Murphy. I ask you whether or not before the Roberts Com- 
mission you gave this testimony : 

Commander Layton. There had been no positive indications of the location 
of the Japanese carriers with the exception of Carrier Division 3, which was 
associated with the southern movement for some time. 

The Chairman. What was Carrier Division 3? Two carriers? 

Commander Layton. Two carriers, sir ; the Ryuio and the EosJio. 

The Chairman. Now, did your command have knowledge of the number of 
Japanese carriers in their Navy? 

Commander Layton. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. How many were there? 

Commander Layton. Ten, sir. 

The Chahiman. So you have accounted for two? 

Commander Layton. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Of the other eight I understand you to [13036A] say 
there were no definite indications as to their location. 

Commander Layton. No positive indications of their location. 

Captain Layton. That is correct. No positive. I have tried to 
indicate, sir, that when you make a location sheet you have to use 
some of the very small evidence rather than the preponderance of the 
evidence to locate your forces because if you wait for all positive evi- 
dence you would only put down two or three ships. 

Mr. MuEPHY. On the information you received from Commander 
Rochefort, the daily intelligence summaries, there was carried as to 
the carriers "no information." 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, the first time you heard from the commander 
in chief of the carrier fleet was on December 8 ? 

Captain Layton. December 7, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. December 7. 

Captain Layton. He opened up after the attack. 

Mr. Murphy. You hadn't heard from him for some days and that 
morning you told Admiral Kimmel that you had heard from him 
for the first time in some time ; isn't that right ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, there was also a change in radio calls, was there 
not, in November? 

[13037] Captain Layton. November 1 ; yes. sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And there was also a change the first of December ? 

Captain Layton. December 1 ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. That was extraordinary, wasn't it ? 

Captain Layton. Rather extraordinary. I would like to point out 
that the Japanese at that time were showing all the symptoms of 
taking increased radio security. I won't go into the technicalities 
but they were using multiple addresses and blanket coverage and what 
we call addressed to nobody from nobody, which everybody copied, 
and when they do that nobody is being talked to that you can identify, 
and therefore the forces are pretty hard to identify in traffic. 

Mr. Murphy. You did have a report from the commander in chief 
of the Asiatic Fleet and a report from the American observer in 
Singapore and the commander in chief of the British Far East Naval 
Forces that gave you some idea as to the initial distribution of the 
task force in the south, did you not ? 



4894 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Layton. A part of it ; yes. 

Mr. Murphy. That left the carriers unaccounted for except two? 

Captain Layton. Not precisely ; no. That left a good [13038] 
part of that force unaccounted for by sighting, but they were def- 
initely headed south. It left my distribution of carriers good in my 
mind. However, on that location sheet I did not list Cardivs 1 or 2 
because they had not shown in traffic, had not been addressed, were 
in no way in the traffic headings, and had all the usual appearances 
of being in home ports or possibly standing by for a covering force 
in connection with the southern movement, remaining in home waters, 
I thought. 

Mr. Murphy. You say that the answer you made as to the inquiry 
as to the battleships not being accounted for was prior to Novem- 
ber 27? 

Captain Layton. It is my recollection. I have not read the Roberts 
report. I never saw a copy of it. It might have been after. 

Mr. Murphy. Before the Roberts Board, on page 1090, you were 
questioned about the conferences between November 27 and December 
7, and it was then that you said in answer to this question : 

The Chairman. Commander, you were at conferences with the Commander 
in Chief, I presume, between November 27 and December 7, respecting the instant 
situation? 

Commander Layton. Yes. I was in conference daily. 

The Chaieman. Had you the slightest suspicion of a [13039] possible 
air attack upon Pearl Harbor? 

Commander Layton. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Why not, when you had the warning and from what you 
knew about the situation that Japan would strike and probably strike hard and 
even before war was declared? 

Commander Layton. Yes. That had all been considered. 

The Chairman. That had all been considered? 

Commander Layton. Yes, that had all been considered and discussed. The 
Admiral, in fact, said one day, "Where are the battleships". I said "I don't 
know. Their location had not been known for more than a week." He said, 
"Do you think they could be off here or out at sea without our knowing it?" 
I said, "Yes, if they have maintained radio silence." He said "Do you think 
they are?" and I said, "No." He said, "Where do you think they are?" and I said, 
"I estimate they are in port, having completed two weeks operations and they 
are having overhaul for new operations." 

General McNarney. Was there some discussion held with reference to the 
carriers? 

Commander Layton. Yes, only not so specific. The Admiral knew of the car- 
riers down there, I am sure. 

You told us here tonight that they could maintain radio silence. 
Did you take that into consideration ? 

[13040] Captain Layton. That is always taken into considera- 
tion to a degree ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you also take into consideration, since you ex- 
pected a submarine attack, in the plans you had in effect at Hawaii, 
that if there was a submarine attack it would in all probability be ac- 
companied by an air attack? 

Captain Layton. I don't believe I recall having grouped those two 
together in my mind. I know that was one of the feasibilities and 
capabilities of the enemy as laid down. I knew that was in our stand- 
ard operating procedure letter. I won't say definitely I had those 
two coupled in my mind during that time. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4895 

As I recall it, and my memory may be bad, that conference regard- 
ing the battleships was previously, because on this location sheet dated 
December 1, 1941, I showed battle division 1 and battle division 2 in 
the Kure-Sasebo area. Now, they were fairly well indicated as being 
there and they hadn't been showing the radio silence but had shown 
it previously. They had no traffic on them and the admiral asked where 
they were. This was not the only location sheet that I submitted. I 
also carried BatDiv 3 in this location sheet as in the southern task force 
and of course only two were there. The other two came to Hawaii. 
But all the battleship divisions were accounted for, so I think that 
[1304J] perhaps is the conversation prior to the period mentioned 
there as it being a general question referring to conferences regarding 
the surprise attack. The conference regarding surprise attack was 
some time before Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Murphy. Do you mean you indicated any such date before the 
Roberts board ? 

Captain Layton. I don't think I did. 

Mr. Murphy. Before the Eoberts board did you make this answer : 

that Carrier Division 3 was enroute or in the Cliina Sea, and one of the carrier 
divisions was reported to be in or near the Mandates, and others were getting 
their bases all set, but their location was not known. 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now. is it true that the strength of our two task 
forces that we had at Hawaii was superior in strength to the task force 
that attacked Hawaii? 

Captain Layton. Superior, sir? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

Captain Layton. I believe the task force that attacked Hawaii 
infinitely superior than a combination of our task forces, let alone any 
individual one. 

Mr. Murphy. Were you asked this question — of course, we may have 
more information since that time : 

[13042] Admiral Ree\'Es— 

This is page 1093. You were discussing then before the Roberts 
board the strength of the Japanese Fleet : 

Admiral Reeves. And that is the striking force. 

Commander Layton. Yes. As I obtained that from the radio call sheet out 
of the plane. 

Admiral Reeves. Then in strength, that is hardly equal to the strength of our 
task force, three of which we had out, except in carriers. That is, a carrier in 
each one, three heavy cruisers 

Commander Layton. Yes. 

Admiral Reevbs. And 12 destroyers? 

Commander Layton. Yes. 

Admiral Ree:ves. And that was 12. They did have more carriers in this one 
group? 

Commander Layton. Yes. 

Now, was that to indicate our strength was greater than theirs? 

Captain Layton. I don't follow the line of that questioning. I have 
never had a chance to proofread it. I know they struck a lot from 
the record. It is my firm belief that the Japanese carrier task force, 
with 6 carriers fully trained, armed, ready to go, with 2 battle- 
ships, 2 battle cruisers, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 [130^] light cruiser 



4896 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and 12 destroyers, was a powerful offensive force. They had weak- 
nesses. If they were caught at night or in poor visibility, then 
they had a weakness because somebody could make slashing attack 
upon them without them being able to use their air. 

[ISOJfJf] Mr. Murphy. I won't press it because it is a matter of 
certainty in the record as to what each force consisted of. We have 
that in the record without indulging in speculation or recollection. 

Were you aware of the message that was sent from Hawaii on the 
night of December 6 as to the destruction of the codes at Hawaii ? 

Captain Laytox. I was informed by then Commander Rochefort 
that he had very good pipe-line information to the effect that die 
Japanese consulate was destroying codes and official papers by burning. 

Mr. Mtjrphy. Wliy didn't Admiral Kimmel know about that ? 

Captain Layton. I don't know that he didn't know about it, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. My recollection is that he said he didn't. That was 
Com-14. Com-14 advised Washington on December 6 : 

Belieye local consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not 
including your eighteen double five of third. 

Did you know about that ? 

Captain Layton. I did not see that message, although Commander 
Rochefort informed me of the purport. 

Mr. Murphy. You feel you certainly notified your commander in 
chief? 

\^130JfS'] Captain Layton. I wouldn't be too positive. I may have 
been notified when Admiral Kimmel was not in or at some time when 
I didn't get the message to him immediately, but I have no definite 
recollection. 

Mr. Murphy. If you heard they were destroying their system, you 
would report it? 

Captain Layton. Then I would report it. 

Mr. Murphy. If they were destroj'ing all but one system, you would 
feel that was important enough to get it to the commander in chief 
as quickly as possible ? 

Captain Layton. I would think so, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. What is the significance to you of the destruction of 
codes ? That is pretty important information, isn't it ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Would you consider that a matter of vital importance ? 

Captain Layton. If we had not had previous information that the 
Japanese were destroying codes, I would say it Would be very vital. 
The previous information was well known and this would merely 
be added evidence. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, you also testified that you delivered the 
message of the 24th direct to General Short. 

Captain Layton. In person. 

\^130Jt.6'\ Mr. Murphy. Now, Admiral Kimmel criticized you 
about one message, didn't he ? 

Caj^tain Layton. That was the 27th, sir. 

I believe he withdrew that criticism when he discovered that Gen- 
eral Short had in fact received it. 

Mr. Murphy. I know just what I read in the record, and I believe 
there was some qualification of it. I don't want to say that is true 
either. I mean his characterization. Far from it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4897 

Now, you also said that you heard it said by Admiral Kimmel 
as to what we would do if there was an attack on the British. 

You knew at Hawaii that we were a democracy, and that Congress 
had the right to declare war? 

Captain Latton. Yes, sir. I believe his statement was "I wish 
we knew what we were going to do." 

Mr. Murphy. You meant "What would we do when"? 

Captain Layton. What would we do and when. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, as to knowledge of ships being in Pearl Harbor, 
did you know as the intelligence officer what reports were being made 
to Washington as to the ships? You did testify that they would 
not, in your judgment, be the task forces? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

\_130Ii7^ Mr. Murphy. Is it not a fact that your reports to Wash- 
ington were only as to the ships in the Harbor or that they were in the 
Hawaiian area? 

Captain Layton. Very likely so. That was the province of Oper- 
ations. 

Mr. Murphy. We had testimony before us and we have a map 
here showing some ship to the north of the island of Oahu on Decem- 
ber 6. Did you know anything about that ship ? 

Captain Layton. My guess would be that it was a merchant ship 
that was torpedoed there on the morning of December 7. 

Mr. MuKPHY. But it wasn't there on the 7th. At least the map 
doesn't show it. 

Captain Layton. It wasn't on my plot and I couldn't say. 

Mr. Murphy. The map shows it on the 6th and not on the 7th. 
In fact, it seems to trace it going into Pearl Harbor on the week end. 

Captain Layton. It was customary for the ships to go in for the 
week end to give the crews needed rest and relaxation, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. This is my last question. 

So far as liaison with the Army was concerned, you never received 
a single order from the commander in chief as to to any liaison what- 
ever with any particular Army intelli- 'il30Jf8'\ gence? 

Captain Layton. That is correct, sir. Nor did I have any requests 
from Army sources for liaison. 

Mr. Murphy. That is all. 

Senator Lucas. I would like to ask a few questions. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas. 

Senator Lucas. Captain, shortly after the Pearl Harbor disaster, 
we had unity of command in Hawaii ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Is that still in existence ? 

Captain Layton. I don't believe I am competent to answer that 
question because I am not real sure. I left Pearl Harbor on the 29th 
of November to come before this committee, sir, and I am a little 
bit rusty on what is going on out there. 

[13049] Senator Lucas. When you left on the 29th of Novem- 
ber was unity of command still in operation at that time? 

Captain Layton. To a limited degree, sir. The commander in 
chief of the Pacific Fleet still conunanded the Pacific Ocean areas and 
the Army forces in that area came directly under General Mac- 
Arthur. Under the unity of command principle that was in effect 



4898 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

prior to VJ-day or about that time the Army forces in the Pacific 
Ocean areas were under the direct military command of Admiral 
Nimitz through General Richardson, commanding general of the 
Central Pacific Forces. 

Senator Lucas. Captain, from what you know about the Pearl 
Harbor disaster and the events leading up to this disaster, did you 
feel that there was proper liaison between the Army and the Navy 
at that time ? 

Captain Layton. I believe the liaison at that time could be improved 
on in the light of war experience. 

Senator Lucas. Well, in light of what happened at Pearl Harbor 
and the war following you believe the liaison could be improved 
upon ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir ; but it must be done on a chain of com- 
mand principle and not on parallel ladders, so to speak. 

Senator Lucas. I am not sure that I follow you on that last state- 
ment. 

[13050] Captain Layton. For example, sir, under the principle 
of unity command in effect in the Pacific Ocean areas during the war, 
intelligence that funneled to the Pacific Ocean areas was a responsi- 
bility of the commander in chief of that area to get it to all forces in 
his area for their use. Before the setting up of that principle of that 
unity of command no single person was responsible for the intelligence 
for everybody else, so you had two parallel intelligence systems and 
as it turns out — and I did not know until afterward — the Army in 
Hawaii was receiving very little intelligence from Washington. The 
Navy was developing combat intelligence regarding the Japanese 
fieet but we received no Japanese troop movements or dispositions 
from the Army, and I don't believe the Army in Hawaii received them 
either. 

If those funnels had been only funneled to one man whose respon- 
sibility it was, who in turn gives it to all the forces no matter what kind 
of a uniform they wear and is responsible for that, then you have a 
principle of single purpose, single responsibility, and a proper func- 
tioning organization. You cannot have two presidents of a corpora- 
tion. 

Senator Lucas. I think that you have expressed it better than I 
would know how and it more or less coincides with what I believe 
should be done as a result of the testimony that has been adduced be- 
fore this hearing. 

[13051^ In other words, do you agree with me that, either in 
peace or in war, if you are going to have a successful intelligence de- 
partment either in Washington, Hawaii, the Philippines, or in any 
other outpost, you are going to have someone upon whom rests the 
sole responsibility for the proper evaluation and the dissemination of 
that information to every branch of the service, whether it is the Navy, 
the Army, or the Marine Corps ? 

Captain Layton. I quite agree with vou whole-heartedly. Senator, 
and I believe the present new set-up that I have read about in the 
papers, wherein the State Department, Army, and Navy will form 
one central intelligence agency or whatever it is, will function to the 
benefit of this country in the future. 

Senator Lucas. You fellows in the Navy had some of the finest men 
that the Naval Academy ever turned out in the Pacific area during 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4899 

ihat time, according to the testimony that has been given to this com- 
mittee and Admiral Kimmel was in charge of the Pacific Fleet at that 
time as well as the Atlantic Fleet. 
Captain Layton. No, sir. 
Senator Lucas. On December the 7th? 
Captain Layton. No, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Wasn't he commander in chief of the entire fleet? 
[13052'] Captain Layton. No, sir. He was commander in chief 
of the Pacific Fleet. 

Senator Lucas. Of the Pacific Fleet ? 

Captain Layton. And also the doctrines that he evolved, the tech- 
niques or matters of policy or standard operating procedure that he 
thought were good enough and having consulted with the commander 
in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and the commander in chief of the Atlan- 
tic Fleet, were in fact issued by the commander in chief under the di- 
rective which he had to this United States Fleet. 

Senator Lucas. Well, at one time he was commander in chief of the 
United States Fleet? 

Captain Layton. That was just a title, that was a hat he could wear, 
but it was not a tactical or administrative office. 

Senator Lucas. Well, the fact that this was a title or hat that he 
could wear, did that add anything to his importance out there as the 
commander of the Pacific Fleet ? 

Captain Layton. No, sir, I don't think you can find anything 

higher than the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet in the Pacific. 

Senator Lucas. Well, now, it is a fact that General Short was out 

there and his was just a small part of the United States Army although 

he held a very responsible position. 

Captain Layton. That is correct, sir. 

[ISOSS] Senator Lucas. I have obtained this sort of an idea and 
if I am wrong I want you to disabuse it from my mind. You fellows 
in the Navy are a pretty powerful group, and you had charge of the 
Pacific Fleet out there, and Short was more or less in charge of just 
an outpost, and, as far as the Army was concerned, was pretty small. 
I have gained sort of an impression that you fellows did not pay much 
attention to Short and his crowd ; and I am wondering if I am wrong. 
Captain Layton. If I answer that, you put me in an embarrassing 
position if I either agree with you and am not telling the truth. 

Senator Lucas. I won't press it if it is going to embarrass you, and 
I probably should have asked Admiral Kimmel that question when he 
was here. 

Captain Layton. I say I think it is an embarrassing question, be- 
cause I, for one, never thought of the Army as any small potato. In 
fact, I worked with the Army at our Army post all during this war, 
and the;7 are a fine bunch of people, and if you really want to see how 
the services get together go out where they don't wear a collar and tie 
when they put them in the South Pacific. You can't tell the Army 
from the Navy. 

Senator Lucas. I am sure you always worked faithfully under any 
conditions, and that was the attitude in the Navy and Army, and I 
know that you worked faithfully since Pearl [13051^] Harbor ; 
there isn't any question about that; but the only thing I am talking 
about is previous to Pearl Harbor, when there was a sort of a non- 
chalant, lackadaisical attitude with the American people, and it seemed 



4900 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to me that went right on into the Army and the Navy about that 
particular time. I may be wrong about that. 

Captain Layton. I recall our attitude toward the impending crisis 
was anything but lackadaisical, Senator. As a matter of fact, there 
were some gray hairs sprouted out at that time. 

Senator Lucas. Some what? 

Captain Layton. Gray hairs. 

Senator Lucas. There may have been some after Pearl Harbor, 
but do you think there were many before Pearl Harbor ? 

Captain Layton. I can only speak for myself, sir. 

Senator Lucas. How far did you think that the carrier and the two 
destroyers and what number aircraft they might have had was from 
Pearl Harbor when you made an estimate to the commander in chief 
of the Pacific Fleet? 

Captain Layton. I think that was really December 2. 

Senator Lucas. December 2. 

Captain Layton. I considered them in the Marshalls themselves, 
and I was delighted when the Army proposed a distance long-range, 
overwater reconnaissance of the Marshalls [130SS] and the 
central Carolines to spot this task force down there. 

Senator Lucas. Yes ; well, how far did you think that these carriers 
were from Pearl Harbor at the time you made the estimate? 

Captain Layton. I thought they were in the Marshalls themselves, 
and most likely at anchor in one of the atolls — Jaluit, possibly Wotje, 
and possibly Maleolap. 

Senator Lucas. How far in miles would that be, the nearest one, 
I mean, that the carrier might be based in ? 

Captain Layton. I would like to give you the exact distance if I 
can, sir. 

Senator Lucas. All right, sir, I would like to have it. 

Captain Layton. From Jaluit to Pearl Harbor is 2,096 nautical 
miles. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. Is that the nearest port they might be located 
in? 

Captain Layton. I believe that Wotje is a little closer. It is 1,970 
miles. I believe that is about the nearest that has a good harbor and 
base facility. 

Senator Lucas. Well, now, should that fact alone. Captain, have 
given the commander of the Pacific Fleet some concern and some 
warning, if there was an aircraft carrier that close on December 
the 3d? 

Captain Layton. The attack that came did not come from 
[1S0S6] the Marshalls. 

Senator Lucas. I understand that. 

Captain Layton. There had been aircraft carriers in the Marshall 
Islands before. The situation, of course, was not as tense. 

Senator Lucas. That is right. 

Captain Layton. Now, one of the basic axioms of intelligence is to 
always think if 3'OU were the enemy what would you do and being in 
intelligence you say, "Now, this fellow has got a carrier out here. 
I am a Jap. What did I put him down there for?" My answer to 
that one was he was there to ferry down some planes for other di- 
visions. I mean they were expanding and enlarging the movement 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4901 

in preparation for what you would, tliink then would be our most 
logical point of attack, an attack on the Marshalls. 

Senator Lucas. In other words, it never occurred at that time, and 
I can understand it from the evidence, that this carrier might be there 
for the purpose of making a final attack upon Oahu ? 

Captain Latton. I did not think so, sir. The Senator will recall 
that there was a difference of opinion between the combat intelligence 
unit at Pearl Harbor and the one at Cavite as to the presence or ab- 
sence of carriers in the Marshalls. 

[1S0S7} Senator Lucas. That is right, I know there was a dif- 
ference of opinion. 

Captain Layton. And I had to evaluate this. One said none and 
the other one said two divisions, so I straddled the fence by putting 
one down there. 

Now, there had been two and good evidence of two. They might 
be down there as a covering force and a scouting force to detect with 
their carrier planes the advance of our raiding force, which they could 
anticipate well by looking at the geography just along there where 
they stretched and thereby allow their land-based planes to make an 
attack in force without having to do scouting. 

Senator Lucas. Did you ever learn thereafter whether your evalua- 
tion of that carrier was correct ? 

Captain Layton. No, sir; I don't believe there has been anything 
found, any evidence found anywhere that one carrier was in the 
Marshalls. There was evidence of two carriers in the Palau area 
and they attacked the Philippines on the morning of December 8 
Philippine time, December 7 our time. 

Senator Lucas. The fact is that the evidence before this commit- 
tee shows that the Japs expected to lose one-third of their task force. 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. You are familiar with that? 

[ISOSS] Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Senator Lucas. Do you know upon what basis they might have 
figured that in view of the complete surprise ? 

Captain Layton. That figuring was done before they had the com- 
plete surprise. Senator. 

Senator Lucas. Yes. 

Captain Layton. They sat down and worked this out on a game 
board. They moved their forces and they had members of their gen- 
eral staff act as Americans, while the members of their task force who 
worked tliis out acted as their own selves, Japanese, and in working 
this out they did not, so I am told, anticipate getting off scot free 
and the umpires which you always have in a game of this nature 
assessed them one-third carrier damage. Based on that they antici- 
pated one-third carrier loss. 

Senator Lucas. Well, in other words, regardless of how they finally 
reached the conclusion, they did not expect to be as successful in this 
surprise raid as they were. 

Captain Layton. I believe their success surpassed their fondest 
dreams. 

Senator Lucas. In other words, they expected the Army and the 
Navy in Hawaii to be on the alert and give them some battle instead 
of finding them the way they were ? 



4902 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Layton. That is true. They also gave the Army and 
[ISOSO] Navy in Hawaii credit for far more planes than we had, 
in their war-college game board they worked out in advance. 

Senator Lucas. That is probably true. I am glad that we did not 
have more planes there the way it turned out. Of course, it may be 
that if we had had more planes they might not have struck, too ; that is 
another angle. If we had had enough there to have had long-range 
reconnaissance around the perimeter, they probably may not have 
taken a chance. 

Now, one other question. I think that is bordering along the line 
of a question I previously asked. I quote from Colonel Clausen's 
testimony. Senator Ferguson said this [reading] : 

Did you find that that same thing took place in Washington? 

Colonel Clausen. In Washington, sir, I think there was far more cordial and 
freer exchange, but the same thing applies. Senator. 

For the sake of the counti-y it should be known that there was evidently some 
jealousy between the services, and this thing existed prior to Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Ferguson. And it existed in Washington, Hawaii and the Philip- 
pines? 

Colonel Clausen. That is what I understand. In other words, what a ludicrous 
situation is presented if you have [1S060] a fleet intelligence oflBcer, Cap- 
tain Layton, saying he gave information to Colonel Raley but would not tell 
Colonel Raley where it came from. How would Colonel Raley know to evalu- 
ate it? 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I was going to get at for many days in this 
hearing here in Washington. 

Colonel Clausen. If I can make one simple contribution to this case, and if 
anything comes out of this hearing, it would be that you pursue the idea of having 
one agency and let that thing be coordinated on a business basis, so you do not 
have monopolistic agencies trying to hide the information for themselves. 

And that is practically what you agreed to a little while ago in the 
question I propounded to you. 

Captain Layton. That is basically what I said without the ad- 
jectives. 

Senator Lucas." Yes, sir. I think that is all. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question? 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. Was there a separate Coast Guard set-up at Hawaii ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir; I believe the Coast Guard set-up was 
separate but I am not positive. 

Mr. Murphy. Do you know whether they had a separate in- 
{13061'] telligence service? 

Captain Layton. Their radio intelligence personnel worked with 
and side by side with the Navy. 

Mr. Murphy. But they had a separate intelligence man ; did they 2 

Captain Layton. If they did, I never saw him ; I never heard of him. 
I do not believe that they did, sir. The Coast Guard was concerned 
with the coastal waters alone there. 

Mr. Murphy. Well, they were firing on the morning of the 7th; 
weren't they ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. I was not saying anything to detract 
from the Coast Guard's fine record. 

Mr. Murphy. No. 

Captain Layton. I meant that their service was entirely limited and 
as such they came under the commander of the Fourteenth Naval 
District, and as a fleet intelligence officer I would not have cognizance 
over matters pertaining to the Coast Guard. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4903 

Mr. Mtjrpht. I have been asked the question as to whether or not 
the Coast Guard were fully alerted on the morning of December 7 and 
ready to meet the attacks coming in there. Do you know anything 
about that? 

Captain Layton. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. That is all. 

Mr, Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, 

[1306^] The Vice Chairman. Mr. Gearhart. 

Mr. Gearhart. Captain, if I understood your testimony, you attrib- 
uted great importance in the achieving of the success the Japanese 
carrier obtained to their ability to maintain radio silence over their 
ship movement. 

Captain Layton. More than that, Mr. Gearhart. Radio silence 
alone would be a give-otf if they had been in the traffic, but they were 
not in the traffic at all throughout the month. When the build-up 
came, they were not addressed. They had all the rest of these com- 
manders addressed, but they were not. It was not unusual, but the 
fact they were not addressed and the fact that they were apparently 
unconcerned with this entire matter and operating no radio, whether 
as originators or as addressees, led us to the belief, erroneous as it was, 
that they were unconcerned and were remaining in home waters, prob- 
ably preparing for future operations. 

Mr. Gearhart. Wouldn't you have described that as a complete 
radio silence? They were just simply not involved in radio at all. 

Captain Layton. It is more than radio silence, sir. Radio silence 
involves a ship or unit or series of units not using their radio but being 
addressed. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, if you are being addressed and there is no 
directional radio broadcasting, how can that help you ? 

[13063^ Captain Layton. I mean if they are addressed in the 
traffic, their future activity may be forecast. 

Mr. Gearhart. I would like to have you define something that I 
have been hearing over and over again. Wliat do you mean by 
"traffic"? 

Captain Layton. Well, sir, traffic is a broad term for all the radio 
messages that pass on the many, many circuits that a Navy has. I 
imagine the Japanese had somewhere around 200 different circuits as 
of December 7 or before, and they have a peculiarity, maybe I should 
explain, that is different from that in ordinary usage. 

For instance, if a ship is at Kure in southwest Japan, and it is going 
to Ominata in the Hanshus, under normal circumstances he would 
send a movement report in which he would address the chief of the 
main reporting division in Tokyo, the commandant in Kure, w^here 
he was leaving, and to the naval station in Ominata, telling him he was 
coming. That would then be placed on the Kure broadcast. It would 
then go to the Tokyo broadcast, it would be picked up and broadcast 
on the Ominata broadcast, and by putting these together and watching 
their sequence you could forecast that this ship was going to go from 
Kure to Ominata. That is the way we forecast the task force that 
was going to the south. i 

Mr. Gearhart. I understand that all right, but I cannot \^1306^'] 
understand what you mean when you say it is not the equivalent of 
radio silence when a ship is simply not mentioned on the radio at all, 



4904 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

no messages go from the ship and no messages are addressed to the 
ship. Now, isn't that absolute radio silence ? 

Captain Layton. It is more than radio silence, sir. If the ship it- 
self merely remained silent and does not use its radio, that is generally 
called radio silence. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, it is a complete condition of no sending. 

Captain Layton. It is a blank condition obtaining. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is what it is, yes. 

Captain Layton. Yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, you attributed great importance to the Jap- 
anese attack — in their attack on Pearl Harbor — to the fact that they 
were able to achieve their super two-way silence. 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, what I would like to know is, is your attach- 
ment of importance to that condition which was produced, is that 
a hindsight matter or was that a principle that you had in mind before 
Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Layton, I think I stated, sir, that it was a hindsight ob- 
servation that I would like to give in 2 minutes. The fact that ships 
could go under radio silence was well known but never in the history 
of the Japanese naval communication that I had observed over a 
period of years had such a phenomena ever occurred. 

[130661 Mr. Gearhart. Well, an order for radio silence of 
some degree — I do not want to argue over terms, but an order for radio 
silence of some degree was imposed on American ships issued from the 
Pacific Fleet Command, was it not? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, an examination of logs of ships has disclosed, 
at least one of them, the Boise, that enemy ships were sighted in 
American waters adjacent to Guam on the last couple of days of 
November of 1941. 

Captain Layton. I believe that is true. 

Mr. Gearhart. You have learned that? 

Captain Layton. I have read of that ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. The fact that the Boise sighted enemy ships in 
American waters, adjacent to Guam, was never reported to you? 

Captain Layton. That is true, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. That is because of the order of radio silence; is 
that it? _ 

Captain Layton. That, I believe, was the result of the interpretation 
of the captain on radio silence. 

Radio silence as ordered is general in terms. You will maintain radio silence 
and will only break it in case of emergency. 

This being a peacetime mission that the Boise [13066] was 
on, he maintained a radio silence. Whether he had an alternate in his 
directive or not, I do not know. 

As a matter of fact had the Boise reported sighting the ship near 
Guam, it would have added nothing to our store of knowledge, as we 
had already suspected some of the ships in the southern Pacific 
force were going down to Palau. 

Mr. Gearhart. It would have been important to know because it 
would have been a confirmation or proof of a fact which you merely 
suspected ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4905 

Captain Layton. That is true, sir. 

Mr. Gearhaet. Also, an examination of the log of the U. S. S. 
Wright in Hawaiian waters discloses that they sighted enemy ships 
on the 6th day of December 1941. Was that reported to you or to 
the fleet ? 

Captain Laytox. No, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Would that have been important information for 
you to have received ? 

Captain Lattox. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Under the orders for radio silence, do you think the 
commander of that ship or the captain of that ship was under an 
obligation not to report it, or did he exercise bad judgment? 

Captain Lattox. By no means, sir. I would say that was 
\^13067'] a case of bad judgment. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, can you tell me of any other instances where 
the order of radio silence prevented Admiral Kimmel's command from 
obtaining information they should have had until after the 7th day 
of December 1941 ? 

Captain Lattox. I do not recall any at first-hand ; no, sir. I do not 
recall any rumors either. 

Mr. Gearhart. How is that? 

Captain Lattox. I do not recall any ; no sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, does anything occur to you along that line 
that you should report to us ? 

Captain Lattox. No, sir. I am being honest when I say I do not 
recall any such instance being brought to my attention at any time. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did you have anything to do with the issuing of that 
order for radio silence shortly before Pearl Harbor? 

Captain Lattox. No, sir. That would be the communications 
officer. 

Mr. Gearhart. Was it not inspired or suggested by reason of your 
belief that the control of radio use was so important? 

Captain Lattox. No, sir ; none whatsoever. 

Mr. Gearhart. I think that is all. 

[13068'] Mr. Muepht. Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chair:max. Are you through? 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. 

Mr. MuRPHT. Wlien Mr. Shivers was before the Roberts Board he 
spoke of a message of December 6, you spoke of one of December 5, and 
one of December 4. another of December 4, and one of December 3. 

I do not know of any place in the record as to whether or not they 
were known in Hawaii before December 7. 

De we, counsel? 

Mr. Mastex. They were messages from whom ? 

Mr. Mtjrpht. They were messages from Kita. I will ask it this way : 

Captain, on December 6, 1941, from Togo, Foreign Minister, to the 
consul at Honolulu : 

Please inform us immediately of any rumors of movements of warships after 
the 4th. 

Signed, "Togo." 

Did .you know about that before the 7th ? 

Captain Lattox. No, sir. I believe Mr. Shivers got that after: th^ 
7th, sir. 

79716 — 46— pt. 10 21 



4906 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. MuKPHY. That series of messages ? 

Captain Latton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. He did not make it clear to the Roberts [ISOSO] 
Board. 

Captain Layton. Those are the ones Captain Rochefort referred to, 
that they worked on some after the 3d and were not able to break down 
until I believe it was the 10th, he said, at which time I know they were 
given to the district intelligence officer to use, and Mr. Shivers was 
shown those. 

The Vice Chairman. Is that all ? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I just want to inquire if the 
Japanese ships were up in the "vacant sea," and without receiving 
radio messages, would the throwing of the beam to those ships, as I 
understand you can do, and being intercepted by your station, would 
that indicate that they were reaching ships in the "vacant sea" ? 

Captain Layton. The which sea ? 

Senator Ferguson. It has been referred to as the "vacant sea," 
from Japan over north 2 or 3 hundred miles, north of Oahu. 

Captain Layton. Well, if they were using a beamed antenna, shoot- 
ing its beams only in a directional way, and they were not heard 
in Hawaii, and they were not heard in Cavite, there was still a chance 
that the radio direction finder unit as Dutch Harbor in the Aleutians 
would have heard [13070] them, and being a part of Captain 
Rochefort's mid-Pacific direction-finder net, they would so have re- 
ported it, and that would have been given considerable weight. 

Senator Ferguson. Then if the Japanese information indicates 
that on the 6th they sent out the message "Climb Mount Niitaka," 
if that was broadcast to the fleet to the Jap Fleet, that should have 
been picked up by the Dutch Harbor unit? 

Captain Layton. I read that Japanese report with considerable 
interest. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you an opinion on it? 

Captain Layton. I am of the opinion that "Climb Mount Niitaka" 
or any other such code phrase, was never transmitted. 

Senator Ferguson. You believe they went in there under radio 
silence both ways ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. In and out ? 

Captain Layton. No, sir; they broke radio silence right after the 
attack. 

Senator Ferguson. I mean until the attack took place? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

The fact is that the minute the attack was commenced, the direction- 
finder bearings were placed immediately on, [13071] I think, 
the Akagi and Kaga and they were immediately identified. 

Senator Ferguson. You mean by our radio station ? 

Captain Layton. At Hawaii. 

Senator Ferguson. Then why did not we send some planes up 
there ? 

Captain Layton. Unfortunately, Senator, the direction-finder bear- 
ing is bilateral; it runs two ways. They did have one direction 
finder which could take a unilateral bearing, or a one-direction 
bearing. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4907 

The communications in that station were completely out all the 
forenoon, until late afternoon. They sent their information in by 
sidecar, or bicycle, or some such slow transportation. 

Our direction finder at Haeia on the north part of Oahu was 
sending, and was giving what had come to that set what was called 
bilateral bearings. 

As an example, the first information I received was 10 : 40 local 
time, Oahu, bearing bilateral 357°, or 178° true from Haeia. 

Senator Ferguson. Then do I understand you went south to find 
these ships instead of going north ? 

Captain Layton. It was not a case of misleading at all, sir. The 
radio direction finder gives you two bearings; [1307^] this 
way and that way [indicating]. It is the nature of the instrument 
and it cannot be helped. 

Additionally, at that same time, they had reports, vague as they 
were, of carriers to the south, and that gave cause for thinking that 
the carriers were to the south, plus the report previously by Com 
16 intelligence unit that there had been carrier divisions in the Mar- 
shalls, and that also influenced their thought that they might have 
come from the Marshalls. 

Therefore, the preponderance of evidence indicated a southerly 
direction, while actually that was not true. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, the radar man found these planes coming 
in from the north. 

Captain Layton. So I have heard, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did not anyone think of calling up the radar 
man to find out whether some radar did find them coming in ? 

Captain Layton. I do not know at first-hand, but I was informed 
that several efforts had been made to obtain that information from 
Fort Shafter that morning, without results. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Are you familiar with Captain Rochefort's testi- 
mony before the Roberts commission, about him charting [ISOTSJi 
the planes to the north ? ' 

Captain Layton. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Haven't you known that Captain Rochefort did have 
some charts that pointed to the north, and he got it by cross-bearings ? 

Captain Layton. Those bearings I believe you referred to are the 
ones of the following day, when we had the direction finder fixed to 
the northeast of Midway and northwest of Oahu, but at that time 
they were seven-hundred-and-sixty-odd miles from Oahu and we had 
no planes available to carry bombs out that far and have a chance of 
getting back. 

Mr. Murphy. Are you clear on the fact that Captain Rochefort 
was speaking of the next day ? 

Captain Layton. I do not know whether Captain Rochefort was 
speaking of the next day. I know that the only fix we had — and I 
would be the person who got the fixes — was the following day. 

Mr. Murphy. Are you through, Senator ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to ask one question : 

The Japanese have supplied information to the effect that they 
sent out the message "Climb Mount Niitaka" and the Navy, 3 months 



4908 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ago or 4 months ago presented us with evidence to that effect. Have 
you ever expressed [13074] your doubt to anyone in the Navy 
before this occasion as to the authenticity of that testimony? 

Captain Layton. No, sir; only to my assistants in Pearl Harbor 
when I first read that report from the strategic bombing survey. 

Mr. Murphy. If you have been able to break the Japanese naval 
code — I don't want to press the thing 

Mr. Richardson. Which one ? There are two. 

Mr. Murphy. I am talking about the fact we have been given evi- 
dence here, and I don't want to indulge in any arguments on it. I 
would like to have you, sir, since you made a flat assertion, state on 
this record why you disbelieve the testimony that is in the record. 

Captain Layton. Had they transmitted that message, whether in 
code or plain language — and it is my understanding that in that code, 
or hidden- word message "Climb Mount Niitaka," they used plain 
language 

Mr. Murphy (interposing). Have you read the testimony in this 
record ? 

Captain Layton. Not nearly all of it, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. What is that? 

Captain Layton. Not nearly all of it, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. I am talking about this specific incident. Have you 
read the testimony on that in this record ? 

[13075] Captain Layton. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Have you read the reports from Japan ? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. You have read the report as to how they did it? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, what do you differ about in that report? 

Captain Layton. Had they broadcast that, I think we would have 
heard it, if it were broadcast "Climb Mount Niitaka". 

Mr. Murphy. Yes. 

Captain Layton. Had they encoded it and addressed it to Com- 
mander, Carrier Division, who was the commander concerned, we 
would have the address that day, but we did not have it. 

Mr. Murphy. You feel then if there was one message some time 
during the night that you would be most certain to catch it? 

Captain Layton. There was an intense watch kept from about the 
25th to the 26th of November to try to find carrier frequencies. You 
see, every once in a while the Japanese would change frequencies, and 
then you would have to search to find them. It is a very difficult 
problem, but [13076] it can be solved. 

Mr. Murphy. In other words, everybody was looking for carrier 
frequencies right up to December 7? 

Captain Layton. Yes, sir ; and they came up on regular frequencies 
that morning. 

Mr. Murphy. The only way you could find them, if you could not 
find them by radio, was by reconnaissance, was that right ? 

Captain Layton, By reconnaissance, or by some merchant ship, or 
by picket boats, or submarines. 

Mr. Murphy. Even though you were working intently to find them 
by radio and could not find them, there was no substitute other than 
by way of ships or planes to do it, was there ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4909 

Captain Layton. None that I am aware of. 

Mr. Murphy. You base your statement on this message not being 
broadcast, or on your f aihire to hear it at Hawaii ? 
Captain Latton, Yes. 
Mr. MuEPHY. That is alL 
Senator Ferguson. Just one question. 

Did you ever have any war games of an air attack upon Hawaii that 
came from any other direction than out of the north from the "vacant 
sea"? 

[13077] Captain Latton. I do not recall any, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

Senator Lucas. Just one more. 

Captain, do you care to express an opinion on whether or not our 
national defense and our security has been benefited or hurt as the 
result of this investigation ? 

Captain Layton. Do you want the truth, sir? 

Senator Lucas. Yes, sir. 

Captain Layton. I believe that the investigation has hurt our na- 
tional security to an incalculable degree by so much publicity being 
given to the decryption activities. 

While it may serve a very fine purpose for the future, that is my 
personal belief. I have the conviction that any potential enemy we 
ever have now or in the future will be watching his code bqoks and 
cipher machines, and call signs, and our information, that we have 
obtained with some success against Japan in the past, will not be in 
that fine shape that it was, mediocre as it was, on December 7. 

After all, if you recall, there was a book once written by a man named 
Yardley, called "The Black Chamber," and he exposed the reading of 
the Japanese diplomatic notes to the Washington conference at the 
time of the 5-5-3 ratio in 1922. 

Senator, you would hardly believe it, but the Japanese [13078] 
naval ciphers in those days were pretty simple.* Their call signs were 
even more simple. They were abbreviations of the full name, like 
"Kag" for Kagani. After they read that book they treated us lan- 
guage students with suspicion and rightly so, and they changed their 
codes and ciphers very fast, and the information we were able to have 
in the past, which was a prop to national security was knocked out 
from under us. 

I believe the investigation here will have the same effect in the future, 
and I say it with no disrespect to any member present. 

Senator Lucas. Of course, it is unbelievable that a hearing of this 
kind could be held during the war. 

Captain Layton. The war would still be going on if you had, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. We thank you. Captain, for your appearance 
and the information you have given the committee, and your apparent 
desire to be helpful to us in this inquiry. 

You may be excused, sir. 

(The witness was excused.) 

The Vice Chairman. Counsel will call the next witness. 

Mr. Richardson. Colonel Schukraft. 

The Vice Chairman. Is Colonel gchukraf t here ? 

Please be sworn. Colonel, 



4910 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[JW79] TESTIMONY OP COL. ROBERT E. SCHUKRAFT, "UNITED 

STATES ARMY 

(Having first been duly sworn by tlie Vice Chairman.) 

The Vice Chairman. Please give your name, rank, and present as- 
signment of duty to the reporter. 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Robert E. Schukraft, colonel, Signal Corps. 
At present assigned to the Strategic Services Unit, Office of the Under 
Secretary of War. 

The Vice Chairman. Colonel, it is now 10 o'clock, so we suspend to 
10 o'clock in the morning. 

Please be here at 10 o'clock in the morning, sir. 

(Whereupon, at 10 p. m., February 18, 1946, the committee ad- 
journed until 10 a. m. of the following day, Tuesday, February 19, 
1946.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4911 



[i3080-\ PEAKL HARBOE ATTACK 



TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint C^ommittee on the Investigation 

OF the Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington^ D. G. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in 
the caucus room (room 318) , Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. 
Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson; and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, associate general counsel; Jolin E. Masten, Edward P. 
Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee. 

\^13081\ The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Is counsel ready to proceed? 

Mr. Richardson. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I have a communication from the Hawaiian Broad- 
casting System of Honolulu asserting that there has appeared some- 
where in the record — I haven't myself seen it — and also in the public 
press reference to the fact that this broadcasting system continued 
its broadcast of Japanese programs and news in Hawaii up to the time 
of the attack. Reference has been made to that, they assert, by way 
of criticism at their failure to cooperate with proper defense measures 
in Hawaii. 

You will remember that representing the FBI in Honolulu during 
this debatable period was Mr. Robert L. Shivers. Mr. Shivers is 
not now in the employ of the FBI, but is holding a position, I think, 
inspector of customs, or customs collector, or something of that sort, 
in the Hawaiian district. 

Mr. Shivers is now no longer with the FBI, but he has given to 
Mr. J. Howard Worrall, the president of the Hawaiian Broadcasting 
System, a detailed letter in which he certifies that the continuance 
of these Japanese broadcasts by this broadcasting system was directly 
responsive to his request, in cooperation with the Office of Military 
Intelligence. Both he, representing the FBI at the time, [13082] 
and the Office of Military Intelligence, he asserts, believed strongly 
it would be necessary to use those facilities to propagandize the 
Japanese and to disseminate Japanese information, and, therefore, 
they insisted that these broadcasts continue despite the desire of the 
broadcasting company to discontinue. 

Now the request of the broadcasting system is that this letter of Mr. 
Shivers, that is not sworn to, be included in the record of this proceed- 



4912 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ing to serve as a statement tending to show that they are not subject to 
criticism because they did, in response to these requests, continue their 
Japanese broadcasts. 

The Chairman. Is there any objection to the inclusion of this state- 
ment ? If not, it will be spread on the record at this point. 

(The letter referred to follows :) 

Honolulu, T. H., January 16, 1946. 
Mr. J. Howard Worball, 

President, Hawaiian Broadcasting System, 

Honolulu, T. H. 

Deab Mb. Wokeall : In view of the recent disclosures at the Pearl Harbor in- 
quiry, which is being conducted by a Joint Committee of [13083] the 
Senate and House, concerning, Japanese language broadcasts in Hawaii prior 
to December 7, 1941, 1 feel that in all fairness to your company and for the record, 
I should review some of the negotiations and conferences between you and me 
which caused the Hawaiian Broadcasting System to continue its Japanese lan- 
guage broadcasts right up to the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor. 

You made repeated visits to my office to discuss the advisability of discontinu- 
ing the Japanese language broadcasts beginning as early as June, 1&41. At times, 
you were accompanied by some of the directors of your company. I informed 
you that from an intelligence standpoint, it was highly desirable that the Japanese 
language broadcasts be continued as it afforded a medium through which the 
Japanese population could be propagandized and that the intelligence agencies, 
particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Military Intelligence, 
did not want these broadcasts discontinued because it was felt that to do so before 
the actual outbreak of war would result in our losing the Japanese audience to 
the Tokyo radio station and that once having lost the audience, it would be very 
diflScult to regain it for the purpose of giving orders and instructions to the 
Japanese population after the outbreak of war. 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the OflSce of Military Intelligence 
believed very strongly it would be [13084] necessary to use the facilities 
of the local broadcasting stations to propagandize the Japanese and to dissemi- 
nate information to them after the outbreak of war. 

As it became increasingly apparent that war between the United States and 
Japan was inevitable, you became more insistent in your request to discontinue 
the Japanese language broadcasts and you were urged by me not to do so. You 
finally agreed to compromise and continue the Japanese language broadcasts if I 
would recommend to you some individual familiar with the Japanese language 
whom you could employ to read and edit the broadcasts before they went out 
over your station. I accepted this compromise and did recommend to you an 
American citizen of Japanese ancestry whom you employed for that purpose at 
your station in Hilo, Hawaii. I also recommended Mr. Akiyoshi Hayashido, 
whom you employed for the same purpose at KGMB in Honolulu. Mr. Hayashida 
and the employee at Hilo had been carefully investigated by the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation and their loyalty to the United States was beyond question. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation had utilized the services of both of these 
men and after the war broke out, Mr. Hayashida was employed by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation as a translator. He later worked in the same capacity 
for the OflSce of Military Intelligence and thereafter was employed by the Ofllce 
of War Information as a translator [13085] and interpreter. 

About the first of November, 1941, you came to my office and informed me 
you had definitely decided to discontinue the Japanese language broadcasts and 
that you would do so immediately. I urged you to defer this action until I 
had had an opportunity to consult with the officers of Military Intelligence, which 
you agreed to do. I conferred with the responsible officers in the Military In- 
telligence and advised them of your proposal to discontinue the Japanese lan- 
guage broadcasts immediately. They agreed with me that this action should 
not be taken and requested me to urge you again to continue the Japanese 
language broadcasts for the reasons I have previously outlined. I again commu- 
nicated my desire and that of the officers of Military Intelligence to you and 
with considerable reluctance, you agreed to continue the broadcasts. 

I have also observed statements which have been made before the Investigat- 
ing Committee which were inferentially critical of the management of your station 
for having destroyed the records of the Japanese language broadcasts some time 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4913 

after the Pearl Harbor attack. I want you to know that all of the Japanese 
language broadcasts over the Hawaiian Broadcasting System for several months 
prior to December 7, 1941, were carefully reviewed and investigated by the Fed- 
eral Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval [1S086] Intelligence, and 
the Office of Military Intelligence and nothing was found by either agency which 
in any way remotely indicated that your broadcasting station had been used 
for the dissemination of information to the enemy. Furthermore, it was dis- 
covered that nothing of a subversive nature had gone out from your stations in 
the Japanese language. Sometime in the latter part of 1942 or the early part 
of 1943, I was asked by officers of Military Intelligence if there were any fur- 
ther need to retain the records of the Japanese language broadcasts over your 
stations. I informed these officers that these broadcasts had been carefully 
reviewed and investigated by all three of the intelligence agencies and that 
so far as the Federal Bureau of Investigation was concerned, it interposed no 
objection to their destruction. 

I have gone into this matter very fully — ^probably more so than is necessary. 
But, since practically all of our discussions and negotiations were verbal, I feel 
that while the facts surrounding this issue are still fresh in my mind, I should 
record them for our mutual benefit. 
Very truly yours, 

/S/ Robert L. Shivers. 

ROBEBT L. ShIVEKS. 

[13087] Mr. Eichardson. Now I would like to bring up again at 
this time another matter, since open hearings are supposed to pause 
tomorrow, and that is the suggestion that I made concerning the 
memorandum which the Hawaiian Planters Association desire to 
have filed, tending to show their cooperation with the military forces 
in Hawaii during the period of the emergency. 

As I stated before, that so-called memorandum is verified by the 
secretary of the association. 

The suggestion was made, and I think with considerable point, that 
there was no opportunity to cross-examine the parties and therefore 
it might not be a proper part of the record. I have a feeling person- 
ally, after reading it, that the factual matter therein contained re- 
cites actual acts accomplished, and so forth, and it might be of some 
assistance to the committee as some source of material. 

The committee held no hearings in Hawaii, and therefore there 
would be considerable difficulty in bringing the various people before 
the committee for the purpose of establishing these facts, and that is 
the reason why it appears in connection with this memorandum, 

I suggested at the time that I would hold it in abeyance and bring it 
again to the attention of the committee, which I do now, and what- 
ever action the committee desires to take [130881 with refer- 
ence to it will be fine. 

The Chairman. Well, I suppose, for whatever weight may be given 
to it, it may be made part of the record. 

Mr. Richardson. You can give it whatever weight you want to. 

The Chairman. Without objection, it will be made a part of the 
record at this point. 

Mr. Keefe. Do I understand it will not be spread on the record, 
that it will just be an exhibit? 

Mr. Richardson. Yes, sir; just an exhibit. 

That is all we have. 

The Chairman. All right. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 153.") 

The Chairman. I believe you were just about to proceed to examine 
this witness. 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. 





4914 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

TESTIMONY OF COL. EOBERT E. SCHUKRAFT, UNITED STATES 

ARMY (Resumed) 

Mr. Richardson. Will you state your full name, Colonel? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Robert E. Schukraft. 

Mr. Richardson. How long have you been in the Army ? 

Colonel Schukraft. I have been an officer since 1932. 

Mr. Richardson. At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and 
some time prior thereto, what was your assignment? 

Colonel Schukraft. I was assigned to the office of the [1S089] 
Chief Signal Officer in Washington, in charge of radio intercept for 
the Chief Signal Officer. 

Mr. Richardson. Who was your superior officer ? 

Colonel Schukraft. My immediate superior was Colonel Minckler. 

Mr. Richardson. As a part of your duties prior to Pearl Harbor, 
was your attention ever called to what has been familiarly referred 
to as the winds code? 

Colonel Schukraft. Yes, sir ; it was. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you see the original implementing intercepted 
dispatches which established that code? 

Colonel Schukraft. Yes, sir; I did. I saw both of them. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you have anything to do with a program of 
monitoring ? 

Colonel Schukraft. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Will you state to the committee just what you did 
in that regard ? 

Colonel Schukraft. About November 28 Colonel Minckler and I 
went to Colonel Sadtler's office and went over the two messages set- 
ting up the winds code, and Colonel Sadtler desired that some action 
be taken 

Mr. Richardson. Colonel who ? 

Colonel Schukraft. Colonel Sadtler. 

[13090] Mr. Richardson. Statler? 

Colonel Schukraft. S-a-d-t-1-e-r, Sadtler. 

The Vice Chairman. Just a minute. Who was it you went with ? 

Colonel Schukraft. With Colonel Minckler, sir; M-i-n-c-k-1-e-r, my 
boss. 

Mr. Richardson. Proceed. 

Colonel Schukraft. Colonel Sadtler desired that some action be 
taken to monitor for the winds execute message. We knew at that 
time that the Navy was doing some monitoring for this and decided 
to coordinate our activity with the Navy. During the discussions it 
was decided that station 2 in San Francisco would probably have about 
the best chance of hearing this. 

We had a double problem : One of them of getting the intercept into 
Washington, and the other problem of not telling the monitoring 
stations too much, not passing too much information to the monitor- 
ing stations. So that left the stations in the position that they had 
to monitor almost all of the broadcasts and forward the broadcasts 
intact to Washington, where they would be examined. 

So to carry out this directive I had a teletype conference with the 
NCO in chaa-ge at the west coast, and told him to monitor certain 



PROCEEDINGS OP JOINT COMMITTEE 4915 

specific broadcasts, the general intelligence [ISOdl] broad- 
casts, which they did. 

At the same time it was decided to ask the FCC to monitor for the 
voice broadcasts. We were to monitor the code broadcasts and the 
FCC to monitor the voice broadcasts. This was because we had no 
Japanese linguists at the intercept stations. 

Later in discussing the matter with Colonel Minckler, since con- 
siderable importance appeared to be attached to this, we decided we 
would also have station 7, which at that time was located in Fort 
Hunt, Va., monitor for the code broadcasts. I made a trip to Fort 
Hunt and discussed the matter with the officer in charge. I told liim 
specifically what we were looking for, and they monitored from that 
point on, and I checked with them periodically. 

That is all, Mr. Richardson. 

Mr. Richardson. Then it was contemplated that there might be 
responses to intercepts under this monitoring system, both of voice 
broadcasts and of code, Morse code intercepts? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir ; both or either. 

Mr. Richardson. That is right. What information, with reference 
to what key words or sentences you were looking for, did you give to 
these monitoring stations ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. We gave no information to station 2. We 
merely told them to monitor certain specified Japanese [13092] 
broadcast stations. To station 7 I did give the officer in charge the 
information that we were looking for a broadcast which would follow 
the pattern that the Japs had set up, that is, that certain code word 
or code words would be repeated. 

[13093] Mr. Richardson. Did you give them the code words ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAiT'. I did not, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Just simply told them that there would be a repeti- 
tion of words in the message that you were looking for. 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. That would have required them to have translated 
every message that came in that had any such repetition i 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. It would require station 2 — that is correct, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, with reference to the voice broadcast, was 
there any information given to the monitoring stations as to the precise 
words you were interested in ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. The English translation of the words was 
given to the FCC. It was not given to the Army monitoring stations 
at all. ' 

Mr. Richardson. Did you ever see any asserted winds execute mes- 
sage, either in a voice broadcast or teletype description, as the result 
of these monitorings ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. I have seen two such, sir. 

I have seen the FCC one recently. 

Mr. Richardson. That is the one that is asserted to have been in- 
tercepted about the 7th or 8th of December ? 

[13094-] Colonel Schukraft. The 8th of December, I believe, 
sir. 

Mr. Richardson. That is right. 

Now, what was the other one ? 



4916 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL K ARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. The other one was a piece of teletype paper 
which contained what appeared to be a winds execute message. 

Mr. EicHARDsox. Who called your attention to that piece of paper? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Colonel Minckler brought this piece of paper 
into my office. 

Mr. RiCHARDSOX. About when ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. It was 2 or 3 days, as I recall, prior to Pearl 
Harbor. 

Mr. Richardson. What time of day ? Do you recall ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. I do not recall exactly, except my impression 
is it was sometime in the morning, prior to noon. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there a conversation between you and Colonel 
Minckler concerning it? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. What was it ? 

Colonel Schukraft. Colonel Minckler asked me what I thought of 
this piece of paper. 

Mr. Richardson. Did he say where he got it? 

[1S09S] Colonel Schukraft. I do not recall whether he said 
exactly or not. The impression I had at the time was that he had re- 
ceived it from Colonel Sadtler. 

Mr, Richardson. What further conversation occurred between you ? 

Colonel Schukraft. This message that he brought in was obviously 
not a true winds execute message. There were about three things 
wrong with it. 

Mr. Richardson. Before you read it, was there any reference in 
the conversation to Kramer ? 

Colonel Schukraft. Yes, sir ; there was. 

Mr. Richardson. What was it ? 

Colonel Schukraft. He had indicated 

Mr. Richardson (interposing). Who had indicated? 

Colonel Schukraft. Colonel Minckler — that the Navy had thought 
this was a true winds execute message, and that Captain Kramer had 
seen it and had thought that this was a true winds execute message. 

Mr. Richardson. Very well. Was that the substance of the identi- 
fying information that was discussed between you and Minckler? 

Colonel Schukraft. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Then, was this piece of paper handed to you? 

[13096] Colonel Schukraft. I never actually had it in my hand, 
sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Describe the piece of paper and the message on 
it, as nearly as you can. 

Colonel Schukraft. The pieces of paper was a piece of yellow tele- 
type paper, 3 or 4 inches wide. Colonel Minckler, at the time I saw it, 
had this piece of paper folded in his hand. 

Mr. Richardson. How many words, or lines were there on that 
sheet of paper ? 

Colonel Schukraft. There were not more than one or two lines on 
that piece of paper. 

Mr. Richardson. Was the language on the paper Japanese? 

Colonel Schukraft. I do not know, sir, 

Mr. Richardson. Did you examine the paper ? 

Colonel Schukraft. I did. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4917 

Mr. Richardson. Did you conclude that it was or was not a true 
winds execute ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. I concluded very positively that it was not a 
true winds execute message. 

Mr. Richardson. Why? 

Colonel Schukraft. It did not follow the pattern specified by the 
Japanese in setting up the winds execute message. 

As I remember, there were about three things wrong [1S097] 
with it. 

First of all, it was transmitted by a Morse station, and the message 
was in the voice form, which was impossible. 

Mr. Richardson. What do you mean by that? 

Colonel Schukraft. Well, when you set up a code of this type, 
it must carry some means of identifying this as a. message, otherwise, 
you have no means of knowing whether the identification that was set 
up by the Japanese was actually carried. Whereas, if sent by voice 
there would appear in a specified place in the message in the broadcast 
and would be repeated in a certain specified manner, the words that 
they had set up in their code. Those were the keys to the fact that 
this was a message and not a weather report. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

Now diagnose this message you saw, and state what you think were 
its indications. 

Colonel Schukraft. Well, my memory on it actually is rather hazy, 
but the one thing was that it was in a voice form. 

Mr. Richardson. What do you mean "in a voice form" ? 

Colonel Schukraft. Of the type of "East wind rain," of that type. 
Those were not the words on the message, as I remember. 

[13098] So it was in the voice form transmitted by Morse station. 
It did not appear, the indications at the time were that it did not ap- 
pear at the beginning of the message, but appeared in the middle of the 
broadcast, which, again is not correct for the Morse broadcast. 

There was no indication that it was repeated at the end of the 
message. 

Mr. Richardson. And your point is then that under the original 
code messages, there was a difference in the position of the key words 
where the message was to be sent in a voice news broadcast, and where 
the message was to be sent by Morse code ? 

Colonel Schukraft. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. With respect to the position of the words? 

Colonel Schukraft. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. What was the difference ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFr. In the voice code it was to be sent in the middle 
of the news broadcast, repeated twice, and also at the end of the broad- 
cast and again repeated twice and those are the keys which indicated 
that this was a code message and not a weather report. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, what was the requirement with respect to 
an intercept that would come in, in code? 

11S099'] Colonel Schukraft. That it would be repeated five 
times at the beginning and end of the broadcast. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, your voice broadcast code message would be 
No. 2353 which had the words Higashi No Kaze Ame and the other 
Japanese phrases appearing in the middle of the broadcast ? 



4918 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel ScHUKRATT. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Whereas the second message establishing a winds 
code was No. 2354 which had simply the single words Higashi and Kita 
and Nishi with the recital, "The above will be repeated five times and 
included at the beginning and end"? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. What you are endeavoring to tell us, as I under- 
stand it, is that in order to qualify as a true winds execute, the execut- 
ing message must comply with those requirements ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Richardson. For you as an officer interpreting that message to 
give it authenticity ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That is correct. It must comply absolutely 
with the rules laid down by the Japanese, otherwise they, their own 
people, would have no means of knowing that this was an execute 
message. 

{^13100'] Mr. Richardson. Was there any discussion to that 
effect between you and Colonel Minckler at the time you saw this 
message ? 

Colonel Schukraft. Only that I pointed out to him what the dis- 
crepancies were. 

Mr. Richardson. And did you conclude from that that it was or was 
not a true winds execute ? 

Colonel Schukraft. That is very positively was not. 

Mr, Richardson. You don't know where Minckler got the message? 

Colonel Schukraft. I do not, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, what was the color of the paper? 

Colonel Schukraft. It was yellow. 

Mr. Richardson. And was the message the original typed message 
or the carbon copy ? 

Colonel Schukraft. My memory is very clear on that point, that 
it was a carbon copy and was not an original. 

Mr. Richardson. What became of the message after you saw it? 

Colonel Schukraft. Colonel Minckler left with the message, and 
that is the last I ever saw it. 

Mr. Richardson, Did you ever see any other alleged winds message 
except the FCC one that you mentioned earlier in your testimony? 

[^13101^ Colonel Schukraft. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there ever at any time any information given 
to you by anyone with whom you came in contact that a true winds 
execute message had been received, except the FCC one? 

Colonel Schukraft. No sir ; there has not. 

Mr. Richardson. You never saw another ? 

Colonel Schukraft. No, sir, 

Mr. Richardson. And no one ever told you of another? 

Colonel Schukraft. No, sir. 

Mr, Richardson. And it would have been part of your duty, would 
it, to have seen and inspected and evaluated a message of that type? 

Colonel Schukraft, Not necessarily, sir. Since I was in charge 
of the intercepts, it very probably would have been called to my atten- 
tion, or I would have heard about it in one way or another, but I 
would not necessarily have seen it, I did not see nor hear of the FCC 
message, for example, the message of December 8, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4919 

Mr. Richardson, The FCC message did. not come in through either 
the Army or Navy channels ? 

Colonel SoHUKRAFT, That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Were you supposed to have contact with inter- 
cepts that came in through Army sources ? 

[13102] Colonel Schukratt. I had contact with all intercepts 
that came in, sir, regardless of where they came from. 

Mr. Richardson. Army or Navy ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Army or Navy, that came into our office. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Colonel, there has been some explanation 
with reference to this but I want to ask you a question about it. 

There appears in connection with our exhibit which shows these 
intercepted messages, and their translation and deciphering a great 
deal of variation in point of time, point of elapsed time between the 
receipt of the original message and its ultimate decoding, translation. 

What is the reason why one message will come in at 9 o'clock in the 
morning and be translated by 10 o'clock and another message will 
come in at 9 o'clock in the morning and not be translated for 2 or 3 
days? 

Colonel Schukratt. Actually there are very many reasons for 
that, sir. 

First of all, in many cases, the key to a message had to be obtained 
before the message could be deciphered. This may take anywhere 
from 15 minutes to a week or even to a month, or we may never re- 
cover it. 

It depends on many factors. 

[13103] Then, after the message is deciphered, it would go to 
the translators, and in many cases the message would be scanned for 
information and the more important messages or the messages that 
appeared to the translator to be more important would be pulled out 
and translated first, and the messages which appeared of lesser impor- 
tance would be translated during more or less free periods of the 
translators, when they did not have more important material to 
work on. 

Mr. Richardson. Then the fact that there is a difference in the time 
in which various messages have been translated cannot be laid to any 
negligence or slothfulness or delay or oversight in handling the 
messages ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAPT. No, sir ; I don't think so. 

There is one thing on all of these messages coming in. There is no 
way of knowing what a message is about, or the importance of a mes- 
sage until it is actually deciphered and scanned by a translator. Ex- 
ternally there is nothing in the message except that you know that 
certain systems tend to be of more importance than others. 

Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions. 

The Chairman. I have just one question. 

You saw the message that came in, you say, on the 8th of December? 
[ISlOj^] Colonel Schukraft. I saw that recently, sir. I did not 
see it at the time. 

The Chairman. All right. Then my question would be of no value. 
That is all. 

Mr. Cooper. 

The Vice Chairman. No questions. 



4920 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman". Senator George. 

Senator George. In whose hands did you say you saw this message ? 

Colonel ScHUCKRAFT. Colonel Minckler brought it in, sir. 

Senator George. Did you say that you did not know where he got 
the message, from whom he got the message ? 

Colonel ScHUKRATT. I do not recall that he specified who he had 
obtained it from, sir. 

Senator George. In your first examination on that point, did you 
say you had the impression that he got it from Colonel Sadtler ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. I had the impression at the time that he had 
obtained it from Colonel Sadtler. 

Senator George. That was just an impression ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. It was only an impression, sir. 

Senator George. Do you remember the date of the message? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. The only recollection I have of that is that it 
was 2 or 3 days prior to Pearl Harbor. [13106] That would be 
about December 4 or 5, I cannot place it any closer than that, sir. 

Senator George. You are satisfied that the paper you saw was not 
the winds execute message ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. I am positive that it was not, sir. 

Senator George. No further questions. 

The Chairman. Let me ask this question, if you will : After you saw 
the message that was intercepted on the eighth, did you interpret it 
as being a true execute message ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Yes, sir. I don't think there is any doubt that 
that was a true execute message, sir. 

The Chairman. If you had seen it on the day it had come in, you 
would have interpreted it as being a true execute message. 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir. There would have been 
no doubt whatever. 

The Chahoian. That is all. 

Mr. Clark. 

jVlr. Clark. You say this was not a genuine winds execute message 
and you give some very clear reasons for that statement. 

The question in my mind is as to why this matter of whether this 
was or was not a winds execute should be debated at such length as to 
get all around to the departments, and [1S106] have a dis- 
agreement here before this committee on it. 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That was the thing that puzzled me at the 
time, sir. 

Mr. Clark. It was a highly important question, was it not ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. At that time, I don't think it was so important, 
sir. 

Mr. Clark. Why were you monitoring for it ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. We had started monitoring for it about No- 
vember 26. 

Mr. Clark. Why did you do that, if it wasn't important 2 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. I think the importance of that message de- 
creased as time went on. 

You see, at the time that this came in, we knew that the Japanese 
were destroying codes. 

Mr. Clark. What I am trying to get at is why there was all this 
debate, if I might so term it, or discussion, of whether this was or 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4921 

was not a true execute message, in the Navy Department, in the Army, 
and through all these hearings. 

I am puzzled to know how that should occur if it was so plain 
that that was not a winds execute message. 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Sir, this is a guess on my part: I honestly 
have not remembered this incident until [1-3107] recently. 

Mr. Clark. What was that ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. I had not remembered this particular incident 
until recently. I think the reason that is hazy in everyone's mind is 
that they had thought it was a true winds execut€, and then had 
found out that it was not which more or less wiped the thing from 
their memory. 

Mr. Clark. But if the message so clearly indicated that it was not 
a winds execute message, as you have stated here and for the reasons 
you have stated here, how could anybody be uncertain about it'^ 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Sir, I believe that is the same message that 
Captain Kramer had seen, I am positive that it is, although I do not 
know. 

Mr. Clark. Well, I think so too, for that matter. 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Captain Kramer, if you will remember, testi- 
fied that he did not check that the message appeared in the proper form 
or in the proper place in the broadcast. He checked only the 
translation. 

Now, the thing that puzzled me at the time was how he could pos- 
sibly have passed this as being a true winds message when it was obvi- 
ously not, and I think his explanation of that explains what happened 
and why he did at the time think it was a true winds execute message. 

[13108] Mr. Clark. According to your testimony it showed on 
the face of it that it was not ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. It was very obvious that it was not. 

Mr. Clark. Still there is all this debate through all these years, 
which surprises me a little, coming from the Army and the Navy 
Departments, about a matter of that kind. It looks like it is something 
that could have been settled. 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. I think it was settled and came up again much 
later after people had forgotten about it. I think that is what 
happened. 

Mr. Clark. It has certainly cut a big figure since that time. 

That is all. 

The Chairman. Senator Lucas is not here. Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. Has Captain Safford talked to you? 

Colonel Schukkaft. I have not talked to Captain Safford in several 
years. 

Mr, MuKPHT. Has he ever talked to you about this particular piece 
of paper ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Not to my memory. 

Mr. Murphy. No other questions. 

The Chairman. Senator Brewster is not here, Mr Gearhart. 

Mr. Gearhart. No questions. 

Mr, Richardson. I have one further question now, IMr. [1S109] 
Chairman. 

The Chair]vian. Mr. Richardson. 

Mr. Richardson. Have you ever talked with Colonel Minckler 
about this message? 

79716 — 46 — pt. 10 22 



4922 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Yes, sir ; I have. Colonel Minckler has a veiy 
hazy recollection of having handled what was believed to have been 
a winds execute message. In other words, another false alarm. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you discuss with Colonel Minckler whether 
he got this paper that you saw? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. I did, sir ; and he does not remember. 

Mr. Richardson. That is all. 

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. You are unable to tell us what words were usea 
in the message you saw? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. I do not remember what the words were, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, were there more than one group of words^? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. As I remember, there was one group of wordi 
and the message heading, and that about all that was on the paper 

Senator Ferguson. How large a sheet of paper was it ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. It was standard teletype width; about 
[13110] 3 or 4 inches in length. 

Senator Ferguson. Three or four inches in length. 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't that indicate that that was not the 
entire broadcast? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir; it was not the entire 
broadcast. 

Senator Ferguson. Then how could you tell that this wasn't used at 
the end of the broadcast ? You say it was not used at the end and was 
not a genuine message. 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. There would have had to have been some ex- 
plaining on the message. I do not remember why I knew this had to 
appear at the end. There must have been some cormnent on it placed 
on it by the operator. I do not remember actually. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you see any handwriting on the message, 
interpretations or translation ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. I actually do not remember such, sir. It is my 
impression that there was some writing on it, but I honestly do not 
remember. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did Minckler tell you in substance 
that this was not repeated at the end of the original message received ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. No, sir. There was something on [ISlll] 
the paper, as I remember, which indicated that it had not been 
repeated. 

Senator Ferguson. Why are you so sure about the fact that it wasn't 
at the end and that is the reason you discarded this message ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. It was not repeated, sir. You see, this par- 
ticular broadcast called for it being repeated five times, and it was 
not repeated five times. There was nothing to indicate it had been 
repeated five times. 

Senator Ferguson. Didn't you tell the stations when they were 
monitoring not to send anything in that wasn't repeated ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. We told station 7 that, but did not tell sta- 
tion 2, We told station 2 to monitor those particular stations and 
transmit all, to send in all transmissions from these particular sta- 
tions. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, where did it originate, the one that 
you saw, where did that message originate ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4923 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. At the time I had thought it was from the 
FCC. It could not possibly have been from the FCC, however, and 
it was not an Army intercept. If it had been an Army intercept I 
would have been the first to have received it. 

Senator Ferguson. But if you didn't have the entire [ISll^] 
message, I am at a loss to understand how you could tell, if it indicated 
it was torn off, how you could tell that this was not repeated at the 
end and repeated the proper number of times. Wasn't this true, that 
you had difficulty at times getting the entire message ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That is very true, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. By reason of static? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Therefore, you would have to have some direct 
information as to whether or not the static did interfere, whether they 
did get the entire message ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That is correct. The operators would nor- 
mally indicate that on the intercepted copy. They would make some 
such' mark as "Transmission faded before the end," or some remark 
of that nature. 

Senator Ferguson. But this was not an Army intercept, this was 
somebody else's ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. The Navy also did that. All of the intercept 
operators. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us if there was such a message on 
this or not such a message ? I mean writing indicating that it did or 
did not fade? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. I do not remember that there was, but still 
there must have been a comment by an operator or [ISllS] it 
would not have been obviously a false message. 

Senator, if the message had contained only the heading and the 
message itself, "West Wind Clear", or whatever it may have been in 
Japanese, then there would be no way of knowing, except in this case 
there would be only one thing wrong with it, it would show the sta- 
tion call signs and frequency and one line of text, and then an opera- 
tor's intercept time. That must occur on every copy. So if it con- 
tained the call sign of a code station and three words in the voice form, 
then it would not comply with the Japanese instructions to start with. 
However, that alone would not be conclusive. 

The message must have had some comment that this appeared in 
the middle of it, weather broadcast, or some such words. I do not 
remember what did occur on the paper, however. 

[ISII4] Senator Ferguson. But you had forgotten all about this 
because in your present testimony you did not even mention it ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And by sitting here in the room and hearing 
testimony from the Navy your memory was refreshed ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir. Captain Kramer, when 
he was explaining what happened to this message that he thought it 
was original, explained what had puzzled me at the time and that 
brought the whole incident back to me. 

Senator Ferguson. But you had testified in a previous hearing that 
you had heard of an intercepted telephone conversation in which 
J;!urusu used the expression— or Tokyo used it to him — "East wind, 



4924 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

rain", and that he had expressed the opinion that he was sorry to hear 
that, isn't that correct? 

Colonel SciiuKRAFT. That is correct, sir. When Colonel Clausen 
visited me in Italy he had a number of these intercepts with him. He 
did not have the complete file. He showed me, as I recall, one tele- 
phone conversation between Kurusu and Tokyo and I remembered very 
distinctly that there was a telephone conversation in which they had 
discussed a number of other things which Colonel Clausen did not have 
with him and my memory at that time, without having a complete 
file, {131151 was that a direction, wind direction had been in 
one of the conversations. My memory was faulty on that point. I 
had not thought of those conversations since December 1941, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But, Colonel, you swore to that in the affidavit, 
that you had remembered of a conversation between Tokyo and the 
embassy here in which the wind code was Used, "East wind, rain" and 
that even the Ambassador, Kurusu, had expressed the opinion that he 
was sorry to hear that. Now, how could you be mistaken on a thing 
like that, which was so vital and so important at the time ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. I do not think it was so vital or so important 
at the time, sir. Also, remember that this happened — this was nearly 
4 years after the event. 

Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that. 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. And I had not thought of the event since. 
There had been no reason to recall the event. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do you now testify that you did 
never hear of a conversation between Tokyo and the embassy here in 
which "East wind, rain" was used and the expression by the Ambassa- 
dor or someone at this end of the line that he was sorry to hear that ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Senator, I must have been mistaken on the mat- 
ter, and a bad memory on my part because there is no {13116\ 
such conversation in the files. There are conversations, one conversa- 
tion in which they are discussing a special movement. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, the fact that that is not in the file 
is what causes you to change your testimony ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. No, sir, it is not. Sir, in going through the 
file and seeing the complete things it has brought back many things that 
I had not thought of since then which fit into a pattern. 

Senator Ferguson. And that is the reason for the change of the 
testimony ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, this message that you were picking 
up on the teletype, was it brought for you, brought to you, that you 
might evaluate it and determine specifically whether it was a genuin<i 
winds code execute message or not? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. I do not think so. I think actually that Colo- 
nel Minkler had intended to discuss it with another officer who was 
out at the time and that he showed it to me since I happened to be 
present. 

Sir, incidentally, in respect to this message, we did call in one addi- 
tional officer who verified that it was a false winds message. 

Senator Ferguson. This was not your duty, then, to determine 
whether or not this was a false winds message ? 

[131171 Colonel Schukraft. If we had received a winds mes- 
sage, it would have been passed on to other officers to evaluate in addi- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4925 

tion to myself. Sir, if we had received a winds message from station 
7, for example, it would probably have come to me and I would have 
evaluated it and passed it on with whatever evaluation I placed on it. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then even though this was a false 
winds message your duties would have caused you to pass it on to some- 
one else to have their determination as to whether it was true or false ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, how do you account for the one that you 
determined was false, as you now tell us, not being passed on by you to 
someone else to determine its truth or falsity ? 

Colonel Schukraft. Colonel Minkler was my chief at the time, sir, 
and we did call in an additional officer, who would have been one of 
the officers who would evaluate it. 

Mr. Richardson. Who was that officer? 

Senator Ferguson. Now, who was that officer. 

Colonel Schukraft. It was Colonel Rowlett. 

Senator Ferguson. I did not get the name. 

Colonel Schukraft. Colonel Rowlett. 

Senator Ferguson. Then would you say that he would be [13118] 
able to tell us about this consultation that you had over this winds 
code? 

Colonel Schukraft. I have asked liim, sir, and again he has no 
memory on the thing. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, why did this so-called wind execute 
message become of very little value around the 4th or 5th? 

Colonel Schukraft. Largely because we knew at that time, this 
winds message, sir, indicated a tenseness in relationship and in addi- 
tion to that carried instructions to destroy codes and confidential 
papers. We knew at that time that the Japanese were destroying 
codes and confidential papers because we had other messages directing 
that that be done. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, had you ever seen the Batavia message 
where they interpreted the original c»des as meaning war ? 

Colonel Schukraft. I had not at the time, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You had not? 

Colonel Schukraft. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So as I understand it, then, in your department 
at least, that when you received the other indication, the other notice 
following or indicating the destruction of codes and the tenseness of 
the situation, that you disregarded the winds message idea? 

[1S119] Colonel Schukraft. Not disregarded, sir, but the winds 
message would have had very little importance at that time. Novem- 
ber 27 or 28, it probably would have been quite important, but after 
we had the code destruction instructions, but then it became of less and 
less importance. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, how do you account for the fact that 
you did not keep in your files all of these so-called wind execute mes- 
sages whether they were true or false for some higher authority if they 
ever did want to look over them to determine your judgment? 

Colonel Schukraft. Sir, I don't think there was any reason foi 
keeping them. We used to get in reams of jDaper and there was no 
point in filing a piece of paper which is determined to be worthless 
and that is what this piece of paper was. 



4926 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Now, on this Batavia code it appears that on 
the 5th of December Batavia sent to Miles— he was your chief, was 
he not ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That is right, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. This you see decides the code meant war. You 
never saw that ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. So far as I know that message had— no, sir, 
I had not seen it until this hearing. 

Senator Ferguson. And you cannot give us any idea what 
[13I£0] the words were, whether they were in Japanese or in Eng- 
lish or whether a translation was written on the margin or at the 
bottom ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Sir, I have an idea what the words would be. 
My memory of that, any memory I would have at this moment of 
them would be a reconstruction of what I think was on it. I do not 
actually remember. 

Senator Ferguson. I do not want a guess. 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

The Chairman. Mr. Keefe? 

Mr. Keefe. No questions. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Colonel, for your appear- 
ance. 

Senator I'erguson. Just one moment, Mr. Chairman. 

Were you working the 6th and the Tth ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Yes, sir, I was. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have any knowledge of the pilot mes- 
sage ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When did the pilot message come in and when 
was it translated as far as the War Department was concerned ? You 
know what I mean by the pilot message ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Yes, sir, i do. Sir, Saturday morn- [13121] 
ing I was home sick and I was called to come to the office by Colonel 
Minkler some time Saturday afternoon. The basis for that call, to the 
best of my knowledge, was the pilot message. 

Senator Ferguson. And then you saw it when you came in in the 
afternoon? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. I did see it after I came in, yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And it was completed and translated? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And what time would you say that was ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. As I remember, I got to the office about 3 o'clock 
in the afternoon. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And do you know of any reason why it 
was not distributed, if it was not distributed, that afternoon? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. I am quite sure that it was, sir, because a mes- 
sage of that type would not have been held up. 

Senator Ferguson. That was a very important message, was it not? 
It indicated a certain time of delivery of a 14-part message which was 
to be a reply to the message of the 26th of Secretary Hull to the Jap- 
anese Government ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITIEE 4927 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir, and that was the basis of 
opening up the Army SIS Saturday afternoon after it had been closed. 

[13122'] Senator Ferguson. Well, then, do you know when that 
pilot message would be delivered to the Navy ? You say it was a very 
important message. 

Colonel ScHTJKRAFT. I do not know on that specific message, sir. 
Normally those messages were sent over at the same time or prior to 
their delivery by us to G-2. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, you would not want to deliver 
the messages in their regular course, which was the Secretary of State, 
Secretary of War, the War Plans and G-2 and the various other de- 
liveries ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. We were responsible only for delivery to G-2, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. The distribution was made by G-2. 

Senator Ferguson. And when you delievered to G-2 you would de- 
liver to the Navy ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. At the same time. 

Senator Ferguson. At the same time ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That is right, sir, or prior. 

Senator Ferguson. Pardon? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Or we would deliver to the Navy prior to de- 
livery to G-2. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. That is, you would not deliver to G-2 so 
that they could make their deliveries before the Navy [13123] 
officially knew that you had one ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. No, sir ; that would create an embarrassing sit- 
uation. If the Secretary of State, for example, had a message and the 
President had not had it, it would not be too good. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. In other words, you were responsible for 
the Secretary of State and they were responsible for the President, so 
you felt that the delivery should be made simultaneously? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Insofar as possible, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Without unnecessarily delaying an important 
message. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. And this being an important mes- 
sage you feel that it was delivered to the Navy at the time? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. I am quite positive that it was, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Although I do not actually know. 

Senator Ferguson. I mean you do not remember the transaction of 
passing over the message ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir, because that is one thing 
that we used to watch carefully, is that messages were delivered to the 
Navy. 

[i312Ji\ Senator Ferguson. And you being called in at this 
particular time because you had been ill and off that morning, you saw 
to it that these important messages went out, is that correct? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir. We got rather mixed up 
on our days again Saturday night and Sunday and anyone that hap- 



4928 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

pened to be there more or less took charge of anything that was going 
on at the time. 

Senator Ferguson. But that was later at night ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That was later at night ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, isn't it true that you then 
knew there was a 14-part message coming in — in fact, it .was coming in 
that afternoon, was it not? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You are familiar with that, are you not ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You did bring the staff back so that they could 
work and get that message out ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. To the best of my knowledge that was the rea- 
son that they were called back, because we were anticipating the 14- 
part message and we wanted to be sure that we got it to the people 
concerned as quickly as possible. 

Senator Ferguson. In fact, that is what the pilot mes- [1S125] 
sage was and that is why you were going to go back, to get the four- 
teenth part? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That is right. The pilot message was alert- 
ing the Japanese, so we were alerting ourselves. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. When did you get the 13 parts 
completed ? 

Colonel ScHUKKAFT. I do not recember the exact time, sir. It is 
in the record, I believe. It was some time Saturday evening. I do 
not remember the exact time, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, would it be 9 o'clock? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. My memory actually is it is about 9 o'clock. 

Senator Ferguson. About 9 o'clock. 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, then, did you get the 13 parts — why did 
you want to send out 13 parts and not send out 10 or 12? Was there 
any reason why you did not use 13 or decided to send 13 parts out? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Well, actually, sir, all the deciphering of that 
message was done by the Navy since they had started it. The normal 
practice was if you had several parts of a message you tried to get 
the message as complete as possible and find the set if it did not 
unnecessarily delay things. As I remember, the 13 parts in them- 
selves were [131£6] not too important and they were hoping 
they would get the part which would say more or less what would 
happen. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, then, why did you deliver the 13 
parts ? The evidence indicates it was delivered to the President around 
9 o'clock. 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Because the fourteenth part was missing and 
we did not have it and could not find it. 

Senator Ferguson. And did you think that you had missed that 
entirely? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. We thought that we had missed it completely 
at the time, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And is that the reason for delivering the 
13 parts? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4929 

Senator FERGUSoisr. Now, would your department call anyone to tell 
them that you were going to deliver a message later? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. I do not know, sir. We delivered it to G-2 
and then further discussion would be by them. 

Senator Fergusox. By them ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. And their set-up on that I do not know. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you work all night that night ? 

Colonel SciiUKRAET. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what time the fourteenth part 



came m 



[131^7] Colonel Schukraft. I do not know. So far as I know 
the only copy of that fourteenth part that was received was a copy 
from, I believe it was station S and the Navy received that copy 
and it was on a Navy cryptographic date so that they would have gone 
ahead and deciphered it. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you see the fourteenth part? 

Colonel Schukraft. I saw it some time Sunday morning, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How early ? 

Colonel Schukraft. I do not actually remember the time. It was 
■d, considerable time before noon, I recall, because we had sufficient 
time to get the message to the Secretary of State prior to 1 o'clock. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you say you worked at the Depart- 
ment all night ? 

Colonel Schukraft. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Tlie whole night? 

Colonel Schukraft. That is right, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you do not remember seeing it early in the 
morning, the fourteenth part? 

Colonel Schukraft. I do not know, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you see the so-called 1 o'clock mes- 
sage? 

Colonel Schukraft. I saw that shortly after it came in, \_13128'\ 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, at what hour ? 

Colonel Schukraft. Let's see, I might be able to find that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Colonel Schukraft. Sir, my memory on that is rather hazy. The 
times are not actually shown as to when it came in. My memory 
actually is that I saw it shortly after I saw the fourteenth part, or 
about the same time. I think that was around 9 or 10 o'clock Sunday 
morning, but that is .very, very dim. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, piow, as I understand the hours that they 
were received it was around 3 or 4 o'clock in the morning. 

Colonel Schukraft, That was the time they were intercepted by 
the intercept station, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And you had the key to these messages, 
did you not, the fourteenth part, because it came in in the same key 
as the other parts ? 

Colonel Schukraft. No, sir; it came in in a different key. 

Senator Ferguson. It did ? 

Colonel Schukraft. It came in under the date of the 7th, sir. You 
see, part of this fourteenth part message was keyed on the 6th and 
part was keyed on the 7th. 



4930 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[13139] Senator Ferguson. Do you know if there was difficulty 
in finding the key for the fourteentli part? 

Colonel ^CHUKRAFT. I am positive we did not have, sir. 

^Senator Ferguson. Positive? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferouson. Now, how do you account for the fact that it 
took until 9 o'clock? You were working there all night; it came 
through your department. This message came in around 3 o'clock 
in the morning. AVhy would it be until 9 before it would be translated ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Sir, we did not — that was a Navy date. We did 
not have it. However, I think I can explain it, because we were look- 
ing very, very hard for the fourteenth part and we had thought that 
we had missed it. If you will notice, that fourteenth part was filed 
about 12 to 14 hours after the thirteenth part. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, it came in about 12 hours later. 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. It was filed about 12 hours later, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It was filed about 12 hours later? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That is right and there was no indication on 
the message that it was the fourteenth part until they started on it. 
What we were doing was looking and check- [13130] ing and 
rechecking every message that came in from Tokyo that was filed 
about the time of the other messages, of the other parts. 

Senator Fekguson. Well, at the top of the translation, in forwarding 
instructions to the radio station handling this part, appears the plain 
English phrase, "Very important". 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Fircuson. So you had a flag right on here. 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Not that it was the fourteenth part, and the 
fourteenth part was the most important thing we were looking for at 
the moment, sir. 

Senator Firguson. You had a flag over here? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. It does not necessarily mean anything. 

Senator Ferguson. It does not? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. No, sir. The priorities are a litle bit incon- 
sistant at times. In this particular case it did, but you could not use 
that as a rule to go by. 

Senator Ferguson. And that "S. T. T." at the end, what does that 
mean ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Station S forwarded by teletype, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That was the Army? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. No, sir; it was not. That was a Navy station. 

[1313J] Senator Ferguson. As a matter of fact, the Army did 
not get this message at all on teletype. They received it as translated. 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir. So far as I know the 
station S copy of that message is the only copy that we ever received. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you get the 1 o'clock message? 
That is 3-our translation, isn't it? That is on page 248, "the time of 
delivery one o'clock on the 7th, your time"? 

Colonel Schukraft. That is correct, sir, that was translated because 
the Navy had no translators that morning. It was decoded by the 
Navy and they sent the plain text over, the plain text version to the 
Army and one of our translators translated the message. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4931 

Senator Fekguson. Would that come into your department to be 
translated ? 

Colonel ScHUKEAFT. Not the department that I had direct respon- 
sibility for, sir. It would have come into the section of which I was 
a member. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what time it was translated ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. I do not know, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, look across on page 249, the top 
[131S2] message. [Reading :] 

After deciphering part 14 of my 902, and also 907, 90S and 909, please destroy 
at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like 
manner also secret documents. 

When did you first see that message? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. I also saw that one some time Sunday morn- 
ing, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Could you give us the hour ? 

Colonel SciiUKRAFT. I cannot actually, sir. My memory actually 
for the 7th of December is rather hazy as far as events of the night 
and specific times. I had been there all night and I was getting pretty 
sleepy at the time. 

Senator Ferguson, I don't suppose you received any more important 
message than the one that I just referred to, the 910, after they got 
these messages to destroy at once all the remaining cipher machines 
and all their codes ; that ended it, didn't it ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. That is right." As I remember it, that mes- 
sage was given special handling, sir. That was given to G-2 as 
quickly as possible. 

Senator Ferguson. If it came in at 5 o'clock in the morning when 
should it have reached G-2 if it had had special handling? 

[18133'] Colonel Schukraft. It would not have been by 5 
o'clock in the morning. It was intercepted by station S at 6 o'clock 
in the morning. 

Senator Ferguson. How long should it take to be teletj'ped to 
your office ? 

Colonel Schukraft. It would have been teletyped to the Navy office, 
sir, and it would take probably a minimum of 20 minutes up to even 
2 hours to be teletyped in. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you see General Marshall at all Saturday 
or Sunday? 

Colonel Schukraft. No, sir ; I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you see General Gerow, General Miles? 

Colonel Schukraft. No, sir. Our contacts, Senator, would be with 
G-2. 

Senator Ferguson. 910 was filed by the Japanese at 6 : 44 p. m., 
Washington time, 4:44 a. m. 7th of December. Intercepted in Jap- 
anese code in naval station at Bainbridge Island. Washington. 5:09. 
Teletyped in Japanese code to the Navy — blank; decoded by the 
Navy — blank; sent by the Navy to the Army — b'ank: translated and 
typed by Army SIS on basis of Navy code (A) 6th of December 1941 ; 
no hours given. 

Colonel Schukraft. That is right, sir. We checked very carefully 
at our end to try to find times on these and there [13134] just 
are no times in existence unfortunately. 



4932 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, will you tell ns what you worked at ? 
The 13 parts were out and delivered by 9 : 30. What did you work 
on the rest of the night if you didn not" work on these messages when 
they came in the next morning? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. We were doing a number of things, sir. One 
of the things was trying to get the fourteenth part. That was our 
object, our major object in there at the time. We had stations send in 
notice of everything that they had in the hopes that one of them 
might have the fourteenth part. No one ever dreamed that the four- 
teenth part would have been following 14 hours later and I was look- 
ing for, as I recall it, a message that was filed about the time of the 
other 13 parts and when we did not get such a message, then we merely 
assumed or thought we had missed it. 

Senator Ferguson. But. Colonel, you had two other very impor- 
tant messages, 907 and 910, the 1 o'clock and the destruction of code 
messages. 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Those were Navy dates, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Those were Navy dates. Those messages were 
messages the Navy processed. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, the fact that it was Naw day after 
midnight, is that what you have in mind ? 

[J3135] Colonel Schukraft. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And, therefore, you were not personally, your 
department was not personally responsible ? 

Colonel ScHUKRAFT. Our responsibility would be to get the cipher 
text to the Navy, sir, if it came in from an Army station. If it came 
]n from a Navy station, then the Navy would keep the message and 
process it. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand it, then, you had these 
divided so that even though this was a very vital and important time 
and you were waiting for the fourteenth part and other messages in 
relation to it, you had split the time up so it was definite and you sat 
there and waited ? 

Colonel Schukraft. No, sir; we did not. We went over and 
checked and rechecked all messages coming in in the hopes that one 
of them might be the fourteenth part, but we would not have looked 
tor a message that came in there 14 hours later with any idea that it 
might be the fourteenth part of the message. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, if you were only over there and checking 
and you were there working the whole night, at 5 : 07 in the mornino- 
this No. 910 was in. ^ 

Colonel Schukraft. It came into the Navy, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But did you go to the Navy to check it? 

Colonel Schukraft. We were working very closely with 
\ 13136^ them that night; yes, sir. We did not check on this par- 
ticular message because we did not know of the existence of that mes- 
sage until after it was decoded and translated. 

Senator Ferguson. You cannot give us any time then on these two 
messages, the 1 o'clock and the destruction of codes? 

Colonol Schukraft. I do not remember, no, sir; except that I do 
know it was sometime Sunday morning. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4933 

The Chairman. That is all. Thank you very much, Colonel. 

(The witness was excused.) 

The Chairman. Who is the next witness ? 

Mr. Kaufman. Colonel Phillips. 

The CnAiRMAjf . Colonel Phillips, will you be sworn ? 

TESTIMONY OF COL. WALTER C. PHILLIPS, 
UNITED STATES AEMY 

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.) 

Mr. Kaufman. What is your full name? 

Colonel Phillips. Walter C. Phillips. 

Mr. Kaufman. And will you for the record state your Army ex- 
perience? 

Colonel Phillips. I have had almost 29 years' service. I came in 
on the examination, headed the examination in 1917, a graduate from 
the University of West Virginia, as a [13137] provisional 
second lieutenant. At the end of 2 years, which covered the AVorld 
War period, I had served in command capacities most of the entire 
time. 

Mr. Kaufman. What do you mean by "command capacities"? 

Colonel Phillips. I acted as a platoon commander; I commanded 
first a platoon and a company, for a time a battalion. I attained the 
rank of captain and for a short period was sent to the general staff 
of the Ninth Division as assistant G-2. 

In 1919 I came to Washington attached to the general staff in 
G-2, or the Intelligence Department. I remained here until 1922 
when I went to China in the capacity of G-2 for Maj. Gen. W. D. 
Connor. I remained in China until 1926 as G-2. 

In 1926 I returned to Fort Benning, in which I completed the com- 
pany officer's course. In 1927 I went to the Eighth Infantry in 
Georgia, later up at Charleston, S. C. In 1929 I returned to Fort 
Benning, took the advanced course and was retained as an instructor 
until 1934. 

From 1934 to 1936 I was with the Sixth Infantry and in 1936, in 
the fall, I went to Fort Leavenworth, graduated in 1937. 
• I joined the First Division in 1937 and remained with the First 
Division, being the G-3 or operations and training officer of the divi- 
sion until January 1941 : actually till Febru- [13138] ary 1941. 

In December 1940, after a very successful series of maneuvers in 
the First Division, where I was operations officer, General Short re- 
quested that I come to Hawaii as chief of staff. I was going with 
the First Division, as I thought at that time ; I was very well satisfied 
with my job and I requested some time to think this over. 

In the meantime, having known General Marshall for many years — 
he was then Chief of Staff — I requested an appointment with him 
to talk over this jump to foreign service. I came to Washington and 
had my appointment with General Marshall, whom I had known 
since 1921. 

He told me, speaking very freely, that General Short had spoken 
to hiin when he had conferred with him about having me come to 
Hawaii. General Mashall stated he thoroughly approved and di- 
rected that I attempt to bring the Hawaiian garrison as to training 



4934 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARfeOR ATTACK 

up to the present training of the First Division, which he Considered 
the best in the Army at tliat time. 

I returned to my station in New York City and told my command- 
ing general, Gun. Carl Truesdale, of this conference or the results 
of the conference. He had approved the conference prior to my going 
to Washington. 

In February I sailed for Hawaii and joined the staff of [13130] 
the Hawaiian Department on March 1. 

Mr. Kaufman. And when you joined the Hawaiian Department 
did you become its chief of staff at that time? 

Colonel Phillips. 1 did not. 

Mr. Kaufulvn. What was your first assignment when you arrived 
at the Hawaiian Department? 

Colonel Phillips. My first assignment as a rather roving staff 
assignment was to go through the various staff sections and to thor- 
oughly acquaint myself with their various and sundry problems. I 
had desired this opportunity and General Short approved. I moved 
through and worked in the various sections for a period of about 8 
months. 

JSIi-. Kauf^nian. And when did you become chief of staff? 

Colonel Phillips. On November the 5th, 1941. 

Mr. Kaufman. So that you had been in the Hawaiian Department 
since about the 1st of March? 

Colonel Phillips. Since the 1st of March. 

Mr. Kaufman. And became the chief of staff of the Hawaiian De- 
partment on the 5th of November? 

Colonel Phillips. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. Of 1941? 

Colonel Phillips. 1941. 

Mr. Kaufman. After the time of your appointment as chief of 
staff were you familiar with the coastal frontier defense [IS 14^] 
plan ? 

Colonel Phillips. I was. 

Mr. Kaufman. Were you familiar with the message sent by the 
Navy to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, on November 24, 1941 ? 

Colonel Phillips. I believe I recall it. 

Mr. Kaufman. Who called your attention to that message? 

Colonel Phillips. I would like to refresh my memory on that. I 
am not sure ; I cannot recall it. 

Mr. Kaufman. Have you got the message before you ? 

Colonel Phillips. I do not. 

Mr. Kaufman. Well, we will come back to that. 

Do you recall the receipt of the message from General Marshall 
under date of November 27, 1941, which is on page 8 of Exhibit 
No. 32? 

Colonel Phillips. I do. 

Mr. Keefe. What is the answer? I did not get it. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. Coming back to the message of November 24 from 
the Chief of Naval Operations to the commander in chief, Pacific 
Fleet, which is Exhibit 37, on pages 32 and 33, I ask you to tell us 
whether those two messages were called to your attention at that time. 

Colonel Phillips. This one and the next one ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4935 

[I314I] Mr. Kaufman. Yes, sir. 

Colonel Phillips. I have seen the first mesage, I recall that, but I 
do not recall the second. 

Mr. KAurMAN. You recall the message from the Chief of Naval 
Operations to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, under date of 
November 24, 1941, which is on page 32 of Exhibit No. 37 ; is that 
correct ? 

Colonel Phillips. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. And that was called to your attention on or about 
the date that the message bears, that is, namely, November 24, 1941 ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes ; that is to the best of my recollection. 

Mr. Kaufman. Up to that time you were familiar with the tenseness 
of the situation in the Pacific? 

Colonel Phillips. I was generally ; yes, sir. 

Mr. KLvuFMAN. And did you become familiar with the correspond- 
ence between General Short and General Marshall which is in evidence 
here. Exhibit No. 53? 

Colonel Phillips. I was acquainted with that 

Mr. Kaufman. An'd that was part of the studies that you made 
during the time you had this roving staff commission before you be- 
came cliief of staff? 

Colonel Phh.lips. That is correct. 

[1314^] Mr. Kaufman. So that we have it that prior to the 
24th of November you were familiar with the correspondence between 
General Marshall and General Short; that is correct? 

Colonel Phillips. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. And we have it that you were familiar with the 
growing tenseness of the situation in the Pacific? 

Colonel Phillips. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. And we have it that you were familiar with the 
coastal frontier defense plan ? 

Colonel Phillips. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. And the Martin-Bellinger report of 1941? 

Colonel Phillips. I had read that. 

Mr. Kaufman. And we have it also that you saw the message from 
the Chief of Naval Operations to the commander in chief, Pacific 
Fleet, on or before November 24? 

Colonel Phillips. I am not positive about that date, on or before, 
but to the best of my recollection that is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. And in that message you saw that the Chief of 
Naval Operations advised the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet 
that the outcome of negotiations with Japan were very doubtful 
and that a surprise attack might be expected in any direction at any 
time ? 

Colonel Phillips. Particularly to Guam and the Philippines, I 
believe — including Guam and the Philippines. 

[13143] Mr. Kaufman. It says that a surprise movement in any 
direction, including attacks on the Philippines or Guam. Do you 
recall that? 

Colonel Phillips. That is right. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now, a surprise move in any direction did not ex- 
clude Hawaii in your mind ? 



4936 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Phillips. It did not include it at that time due to the in- 
clusion of the Philippines and Guam. 

Mr. Kauf3Ian. Did it exclude Hawaii in your mind ? 

Colonel Phillips. I did not know that it did entirely. Such a 
thing was always a possibility. 

Mr. Kaufman. Then is it one of the things that you discussed 
with General Short? 

Colonel Phillips. I did, repeatedly. 

Mr. Kaufman. Then on November 27 you received the message 
from General Marshall? 

Colonel Phillips. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. That is on page 8 of Exhibit No. 32. 

Colonel Phillips. That is correct? 

Mr. Kaufman. And on the receipt of that message you conferred 
with General Short ? 

Colonel Phillips. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. And according to his testimony the conference did 
not include any other officers except you and General [13144] 
Short. Is that correct? 

Colonel Phillips. I think that is correct. I was under the im- 
pression at one time that G-2, Colonel Fielder, now General Fielder, 
was present, but he may not have been present. 

Mr. Kaufman. General Short testified that you and he were the 
only persons that considered that message at the time of its receipt. 

Colonel Phillips. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. And that within a half an hour after the receipt of 
that message General Short made his answer. 

Colonel Phillips. That is generally correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. And what conference did you and General Short 
have during the half-an-hour period between the receipt of this mes- 
sage of November 27 and the time he sent his telegram, his dispatch 
to the War Department stating the receipt of that message of Novem- 
ber 27 and advising them that he has alerted against sabotage and 
made liaison with the Navy; what conference did you and General 
Short have? 

Colonel Phillips. I have made some notes here in regard to the 
estimate of the situation that we made at that time. 

The Army has always had a five-paragraph method for making a 
formal estimate of the situation. While we did not actually write 
this estimate out at the time, if it had been written it would have 
followed generally this form. 

\i3i45'] Mr. Kaufman. Now, are you answering my question, 
Colonel? 

Colonel Phillips. I am. 

Mr. Kaufman. I see. 

Colonel Phillips. I am. This is part of the conference. 

Mr. Kaufman. I see. 

Colonel Phillips. This was the entire conference, which consisted 
of the estimate of the situation, which was necessary to arrive at a 
decision on General Marshall's message. 

The first paragraph in the estimate of the situation is the mission. 

The Hawaiian Department had several missions. Our primary 
wartime job would be to defend the fleet and naval base at Pearl Har- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4937 

bor and to defend the airfields on Oaliii. In peacetime our job was 
chiefly training and preparation for our wartime mission. 

When I went to Hawaii, General Marshall told me specifically that 
he wanted the training brought up to the high standard set by the 
First Division. In late 1941 we had the very pressing duty of train- 
ing air crews to ferry planes to Gen. Douglas MacArthur. "\Ye were 
part of MacArthur's support in this way. 

No word from Washington in any way purported to relieve us of 
our training mission. We had only six B-17 Flying [13146'\ 
Fortresses in condition to use, which we needed for this Air Corps 
training. 

Second paragraph. This is the estimate of the situation. 

Second, the situation and the opposing lines of action. In this 
paragraph an Army commander and his staff consider the capabilities 
of the enemy and all the reasonable lines of action open to our side. 
Our facts were briefly these : 

The Navy had task forces out and was conducting that kind of dis- 
tant reconnaissance to the fullest extent they believed necessary and to 
the greatest degree possible consistent with their mission to prepare 
for raids on the Japanese mandated islands under WPL-46. The 
Navy was not worried, and we had only six planes which they could 
have borrowed to make their distant reconnaissance more effective. 
Six planes could cover an arc of only 8°. Six planes could only cover 
a small arc so far as degrees were concerned. 

The Navy did not feel that such coverage would so substantially 
add to their security as to justify depriving us of the planes so vitally 
needed for training and for all possible support to General MacArthur 
in the Philippines. 

Our enemy intelligence came from Washington and the Navy. We 
felt they had more than they gave us, but we assumed, and reasonably, 
that they could not be so foolish as [13147] to withhold vital 
intelligence from us. 

Senator Lucas. You mean the Navy in Hawaii? 

Colonel Phillips. No, sir. 

Senator Lucas. You said "Washington and the Navy." 

Colonel Phillips. I meant Washington, sir. They told us only that 
an attack might be expected in the Philippines, Kra, Guam, Borneo, 
or somewhere in the East. 

They told us to expect hostile action. We believed they meant sabo- 
tage. After we were alerted to prevent sabotage and so reported to 
them, we received three more sabotage messages. This made us abso- 
lutely sure they meant sabotage and not some other unmentioned form 
of hostile action. 

[1-3148] Since General MacArthur might expect to be attacked, 
according to the intelligence sent from Washington, it became even 
more important that we continue our training of ferry crews because 
our mission included this type of support to him. 

We weighed those considerations. We had three alerts to choose 
from. 

Under the third paragraph we analyze the opposing lines of action 
open to the enemy. On this planning had been very careful. We 
knew we could prevent sabotage, and we did. We knew we could not 
stop an air attack. We did not have the necessary planes. The only 

79716 — 46— pt. 10 23 



4938 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

way to do it is to locate the carriers more than 300 miles at sea and 
sink them by plane or naval bombardment before they can launch their 
planes and begin the attack. 

The Army could not locate the enemy at such distance. Radar was 
considered effective only to 100 miles, and at that time provided no 
means of friend or foe identification. 

The Navy had the job of long-distance scouting and patroling, and 
they were doing their job with task forces. They were doing it to 
the greatest extent consistent with their potential offensive mission 
to raid the Marshall Islands. 

The Navy believed there was no danger of an air raid. "We were 
there to support the Navy— to defencl their base and [1314^] 
the fleet within it. 

Paragraph 4 of the estimate is : 

We compared our lines of action. Alert 2 or 8, if adopted, might 
help to disorganize an air raid, but an air raid was only a bare pos- 
sibility. On the basis of intelligence from Washington, on the basis 
of what the Navy thought, and in reliance on the effectiveness of the 
most complete reconnaissance the Navy could furnish, we felt that 
preparation to defend against a bare possibility should be weighed 
against the urgent need to continue training. We could adopt alert 
1 and fulfill all our missions, our defense mission to prevent sabotage 
which we and the War Department expected, and our training mis- 
sion. Or we could adopt alert 2, or 3, and stop training, abandon our 
urgent training mission, to better prepare ourselves for the bare pos- 
sibility of an attack which the War Department did not expect. 

I knew from the dispatches which Admiral Kimmel and General 
Short received that the War and Navy Departments did not want the 
Rainbow plan implemented until Japan committed the first overt act. 

I knew also that General Short had been ordered not to alarm the 
public, not to disclose intent, and not to inform any more than the 
minimum essential officers. 

You can't put people out to shoot at enemy planes, unless [ISldOl 
you tell them to shoot. These were the lines of action as we com- 
pared them. We did not have the "magic" which Washington had, 
and we did not have the hindsight which is now open to everyone. 

Paragraph 5 in our estimate is the decision. We made the decision 
to order an alert to prevent sabotage. We ordered it. We reported to 
the War Department, and as General Marshall testified, we were rea- 
sonable in our assumption that if Gerow or Marshall disagreed with 
what we had done, they would tell us what they wanted us to do. 

In conclusion, I want to add that I fully approved of General 
Short's decision to order alert No. 1. I feel also that I share any re- 
sponsibility that he bears for that decision. That decision turned 
out to be wrong, but it was'as right as we could make it at the time 
on the information we had. 

That is what we discussed during that 30-minute period. 

Mr. Kaufman. You could not have discussed all of it, because a 
large part of what you have just read did not happen until long after 
the 27th of November. 

Colonel Phillips. That is correct. 

Mr. Kaufman. Isn't that so? 

Colonel Phillips. That is correct. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4939 

[131511 Mr. Kaufman. So what you have really given to us 
is your reasons, or your justification for having agreed with General 
Short in alert No. 1 against sabotage. Isn't that the fact ? 

Colonel Phillips. I have given you in that statement exactly what 
we covered. Generally speaking, we covered every subject, with the 
exception of the additions that I heard here. 

Mr. Katjfman. Who prepared this memorandum for you? 

Colonel Phillips. I did. 

Mr. Kj^utman. Was that memorandum seen by anybody besides 
yourself? 

Colonel Phillips. I am not positive about that. Of coarse I did 
not type it. I have no means of typing it. 

Mr. Kaltfman. Did General Short's counsel see that memorandum? 

Colonel Phillips. I showed him a copy of it ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. When did you show it to him ? 

Colonel Phillips. I cannot say. Perhaps 10 days or 2 weeks ago, 
when I thought I was going to testify at that time. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now, did you inform the Navy that you were alerted 
against sabotage only ? 

[1-3 15£] Colonel Phillips. We informed the Navy that we were 
alerted for sabotage. We had a naval liaison officer in the G-3 office 
that was thoroughly conversant with everything that was occurring 
in our headquarters. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now, I will ask you, Colonel, whether you advised 
your corresponding number in the Navy, the chief of staff, that you 
were alerted only to sabotage? 

Colonel Phillips. I did not, because that was not within my line of 
duty. That was not part of my job. 

Mr. Kaufman. Well, now, you were the chief of staff of General 
Short in command of the Hawaiian Department ? 

Colonel Phillips. Exactly. 

Mr. Kaufman. And Admiral Smith was the chief of staff to the 
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, is that correct? 

Colonel Phhxips. That is correct. 

Mr. Kauttman, And the primary function of the Army was to 
protect the fleet at its base ? 

Colonel Phillips. Right. 

Mr, Kaufman. And do you want us to understand that you did not 
tell Admiral Smith, then Captain Smith, the chief of staff, that you 
had alerted only against sabotage ? 

Colonel Phillips. Not personally. We had liaison officers in our 
staff, whose primary duty things of that kind [1315S] were. 

Mr. Kaufman. Now, you heard Admiral Smith testify, did you not? 

Colonel Phillips. I do not believe I did. 

Mr. Kaufman. Well, did you hear Admiral Kimmel testify ? 

Colonel Phillips. I did. 

Mr. Kaufman. And you know both of them testified that neither 
of them knew that you had any alert other than a general alert? 
You knew that, did you not ? 

Colonel Phillips. I heard Admiral Kimmel testify to that effect; 
yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. And you know that Admiral Smith testified to the 
same effect ? 



4940 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Phillips. I do not know about that. 

Mr. Kaufman. The record shows that he so testified. 

Senator Lucas. Who is the liaison man ? 
Mr. Kaufman. Who is the liaison man? 

Colonel Phillips. Lieutenant Burr. 

Mr. Kaufman. Lieutenant Burr ? 

Colonel Phillips. He was at that time ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Kaufman. What did you mean in the dispatch that you sent 
to the War Department in reply to their message of November 27, 
that liaison with the Navy had been made ? 

Colonel Phillips. My impression of the meaning of that 
[i«^i54] sentence was that General Short — that was his message, 
not mine — General Short intended to convey to the War Department 
that he was working very closely with the Navy, and merely telling the 
War Department, or assuring them that we were cooperating fully in 
that respect. 

Mr. Kaufman. Was the Army justified in believing that liaison 
with the Navy meant the invocation of the coastal frontier defense 
plan? 

Colonel Phillips. I do not think so at all. 

Mr. Kaufman. You do not think that they were justified in so be- 
lieving ? 

Colonel Phillips. I do not think so. 

Mr. Kaufman. So that the only impression you wanted to create 
on the War Department was that you had very close relations with 
the Navy ? 

Colonel Phillips. That is correct. 

[13155] Mr. Kaufman. And those close relations did not even 
contemplate your telling, or General Short telling to their correspond- 
ing numbers in the Navy the fact that you had alerted only to sabotage? 

Colonel Phillips. That was not part of my duties, as I have just 
stated.